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BUREAUCRATIC POLITICS AND THE FALKLANDS CAMPAIGN

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The nature of the American government makes it very difficult to have one clear-cut and comprehensive fount of policy.

SIR NICHOLAS HENDERSON, British Ambassador to Washington during the Falklands Crisis

INTRODUCTION

The 1982 Falkland Islands (Islas Malvinas) war between Great Britain and Argentina provides a rich case study for the military theorist. A limited war in all but the violence with which it was pursued, the Falklands conflict marked the first combat use of a number of modern weapons systems. The main elements of classical military theory all came into play -- public passion, national will, chance, miscalculation, surprise, deception, fog, and friction.

In defeating the Argentine occupation forces, British troops overcame significant disadvantages related to the remoteness of the conflict, the severity of the South Atlantic climate, and the effects of a British military drawdown worldwide. Tactically, four factors are widely recognized as crucial to British victory: training, leadership, courage, and the aid provided by Britain's closest ally, the United States. Whether Britain could have triumphed without the assistance of the United States is an intriguing question and beyond the scope of this paper, which instead focuses on how that assistance came to be.

The development of United States policy towards the conflict provides an abundant source of materials for the student of bureaucratic politics. The struggle over what constituted the proper policy response was played out at the highest levels of the Reagan administration. The process was confined almost entirely to the executive branch, dominated at the time by a conservative view of America's place in the world. One therefore might have expected the rational actor model to predominate, i.e., for the entire administration to have rallied around an agreed course of action in support of broadly accepted policy goals. Allison's bureaucratic politics model\(^1\) would and does tell us otherwise. President Reagan's leadership style, the interplay of diverse personalities, conflicting interpretations of the national interest, and divergent bureaucratic imperatives all combined to create a situation characterized by diffuse power, multiple action channels, and missed and mixed signals.

In describing the bureaucratic politics of U.S. policy toward the Falklands conflict, this study will examine the policy dilemma posed by the crisis, the motivations of the key players involved in the process, and the policy that finally emerged.

THE POLICY DILEMMA

Argentina’s decision to occupy the Falkland Islands in April 1982 confronted the Reagan Administration with a policy dilemma on several levels. In the most immediate sense, it placed the United States in the uncomfortable position of watching two friends and allies moving rapidly toward war. The press was quick to recognize the fundamental problem: “The United States, caught between its Atlantic/European and American hemispheric roles, is in the most frustrating position of all. This is because, despite overwhelming power, Washington cannot use it without putting at risk one or the other of those roles.”

The arguments went beyond the short term implications of the Falklands crisis for the United States; they represented a fundamental difference of view as to where U.S. security interests ultimately lay. United Nations Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick, explaining her conduct during the Falklands crisis in the context of the Reagan Administration’s overall Latin American policy, noted:

I did believe then, and I do now, that it adds up to a growing security problem for the United States, of such a nature that it could, if continued, inevitably reorient US policy away from Europe or the Pacific to the defence of the United States in our own hemisphere. One of my good political friends was the late Senator ‘Scoop’ Jackson of Washington. Scoop Jackson said, at about that time, that our European friends should understand that if there were ever a choice between defending the United States on our Mexican border, and defending Europe, it was no choice. Every country must first defend itself.

On the other side of the coin — as Kirkpatrick herself suggests — was the prevailing view that Europe, as the centerpiece of American postwar containment strategy, mattered more than any

other region. Simply put, one commentator had it almost right when describing the split in Administration thinking over the Falklands issue, “Problems can be summed up as the Atlantic versus the American school of thought, or the Jefferson (sic) versus the Truman doctrine.”4

Exacerbating the dilemma for Washington was the perceived importance of each of the potential belligerents to its respective region. With its extraordinary nuclear and intelligence cooperation with the United States, Britain was unquestionably first among equals of the NATO allies. Argentina, for its part, was a pillar of the Reagan administration’s Latin American policy:

The administration, impressed by the Junta’s strident anti-communism, sought to enlist their cooperation against leftist regimes and guerilla movements in Central America. Argentina was encouraged to speak out against the Mexican-French initiative for a negotiated settlement in El Salvador. Cooperation between the two countries was later broadened to encompass a wide range of activities including the despatch of Argentine ‘advisors’ to the Salvadorian and Guatamalan armies and to Somocieta Camps in Honduras. Argentina also withdrew its ambassadors from Havana and Managua....”5

In addition to the geopolitical quandary, the conflict forced a number of other issues on U.S. decision-makers. Legal/ethical questions raised by Argentina’s use of force to regulate its territorial dispute stood out as the thorniest of these issues. Particularly troublesome in this regard were the implications for regional stability, given the parallels that could be drawn with situations elsewhere in Latin America.6 There was also the matter of the United States’ historical role in the sovereignty dispute:

The United States was neutral on the issue of Falklands sovereignty--partly out of guilt at having instigated Britain’s seizure of the islands in 1833. This position was reiterated in a secret state department paper prepared during the Peronist period. Both the assistant secretary for Inter-American affairs, Mr Tom Enders, and the

6 One journalist noted, “But the most obvious possible situations are those likely to follow if Venezuela and Guatemala (both Spanish-speaking) resorted to force in pursuit of their respective claims to parts of Guyana and Belize (both English-speaking) [Godsell 1]."
ambassador to the UN, Mrs Jeane Kirkpatrick, relied heavily on this neutrality in seeking to minimise support for the British during the conflict.7

Finally, the Argentine action upset fundamental assumptions underlying U.S. policy toward the sovereignty issue: "The traditional United States neutrality on territorial disputes had tacitly favored the status quo and thus Great Britain. Neutrality now favored the Argentine status quo in occupation of the islands."8

Overlaying the entire policy debate was a fast-approaching deadline9 -- the arrival of the British task force in the South Atlantic.

These were the defining issues for United States policy makers as they confronted the Falklands crisis. We shall now examine the principal players and their organizational and individual motives.

THE PLAYERS

The key participants in the formulation of United States policy toward the Falklands conflict can be divided into two categories, primary and secondary, reflecting the importance of each in shaping policy. Those in the first category are:

-- President Reagan
-- Secretary of State Haig
-- U.N. Ambassador Kirkpatrick
-- Defense Secretary Weinberger.

The second category is composed of:

-- Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Enders
-- Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Eagleburger
-- NSC Adviser Clark
-- Deputy Director of Central Intelligence Inman
-- The White House Staff

9 Deadlines constitute a key organizing concept in Allison's bureaucratic politics paradigm (Allison 168).
The role of each is described below.

**President Reagan**: Ronald Reagan's role, while largely passive, was nonetheless decisive in terms of U.S. policy toward the Falklands crisis. This was due more to the detached, devolved style of decision-making and the emphasis upon cabinet government the President had established at the outset of his Administration[^10] than to any action or decision he took at the time of the conflict. It is thus within the organizational context of the Reagan presidency that one can best understand the forces that shaped the policy response to the Falklands crisis.

One important parochial consideration -- the President's high regard for British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher[^11] -- must also be considered in any analysis of Reagan's handling of the Falklands crisis. Reagan the politician surely recognized that Thatcher's political survival was dependent on a positive outcome for Britain. Of all the elements affecting the balance of U.S. policy, this may have been the most decisive, particularly after Thatcher initiated a series of telephone conversations between the two leaders.

Reagan's own recollection of his role in the Falklands affair[^12] diverges in two important respects from other accounts. He describes eventual U.S. support for Britain as more of a foregone conclusion than others involved in the process: "... the junta misjudged not only Margaret Thatcher's will but the strength of our ties to England and our opposition to armed aggression wherever it occurred ...."[^13] Similarly, Reagan's memoirs suggest greater hands-on management by the President than one would gather from other readings.

**Secretary of State Haig**: Alexander Haig was the most actively engaged of all the key players involved in the U.S. policy process. This was a function of both his organizational perspective ("Where you stand depends on where you sit"[^14]) and his strong personality. Both of these factors

[^12]: Reagan 357-360.
[^13]: Reagan 358.
[^14]: According to Allison's Model III theory, this proposition applies to priorities as well as to perceptions (Allison 176).
were reflected in Haig’s efforts to bolster the role of the Secretary of State at the outset of the administration, and both shaped his actions during the Falklands crisis.

The sole professional soldier among the principal formulators of Falklands policy, Haig was also the most anxious to obtain a peaceful, brokered solution. Under attack from within and outside the Administration, Haig viewed his mediation of the crisis as a do-or-die proposition for his own bureaucratic survival:

It was clear to me that if I undertook this mission and did not find a way to stop the hostilities, I might have to resign. By now it was clear enough that there were men and women around the President who would urge my departure. “If the situation cannot be saved, and this is very possible,” I told my wife, “then whatever I do will be seen as a failure, even if it is a success in larger terms than the conflict itself. I’m going to take this on because I have to, but it may turn out to be my Waterloo.”

Substantively, Haig’s determination to find a diplomatic solution was rooted in the belief -- stated in his memoirs and supported by press interviews from the time of the crisis -- that the United States was in an untenable position, with as much to lose as the potential combatants should war break out. This approach reflected part the organizational bias of the State Department, where the geographic bureaus have roughly equal voices in the policy process and where accommodation among the bureaus (in this case between the European and Latin American bureaus) is at a premium.

Admittedly pro-British -- an attitude undoubtedly strengthened by his years as Commander of NATO forces -- Haig was of the opinion that a negotiated settlement would be in the interest of Britain as well as the United States, even though he believed from the start that the British would prevail in any war. Another important element in Haig’s thinking was his determination not to repeat what he saw as the mistakes of the Suez crisis and leave Britain, in effect, holding the bag.

17 “But each development in the crisis strengthened the conviction that the most vital interests of the United States were at stake (Haig 271).”
18 “While my sympathy was with the British, I believed that the most practical expression of that sympathy would be impartial United States mediation in the dispute (Haig 266).”
19 “Knowing the technological capabilities and the state of training of the two sides, there was never the slightest doubt in my mind that if it came down to a fight--as I feared it must--Britain would win (Haig 268).”
United Nations Ambassador Kirkpatrick: The leading proponent within the Reagan Administration of an activist Latin American policy, Jeane Kirkpatrick viewed the Falklands crisis first and foremost as a pitfall for American interests in South America. Several years after the conflict, Kirkpatrick wrote, "I dreaded the impact of war on U.S.-Latin American relations." Her reasoning was straightforward: "Latin Americans tend to reproach the U.S. for indifference to the hemisphere, for caring only about Europe. Any situation which forced the U.S. to choose Britain over a Latin American nation would exacerbate these feelings."20

Ambassador Kirkpatrick's objections to the traditionally pro-British orientation of U.S. foreign policy went beyond complaints of elitism and clubbiness; she believed, as was cited in the previous section (p. 3), that America's security interests in the Hemisphere were being dangerously ignored. Moreover, Kirkpatrick had a major stake in the policy reorientation initiated by the new Administration: "We had worked hard in the Reagan administration and at the United Nations to establish better relations with Latin nations at the UN, and we had made some progress."22

The issue of Argentine aggression was of secondary importance to the U.N. Ambassador. She preferred to view the basic issue as one of British colonialism versus self-determination for the Falklands inhabitants and came down on the side of the former: "And, I may as well say it, although I deplored the use of force by Argentina, I believed one could make a reasonable case that the Falklands pose a colonial issue."23

If Kirkpatrick possessed a trump card in the bureaucratic struggle -- ready access to the Oval Office -- she was at a serious disadvantage in nearly every other respect. She was responsible for a full slate of issues besides the Falklands. Her base of operations was in New York, not Washington. Her small office in the State Department's Bureau of International Organization Affairs (IO), like that of previous U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, was sparsely staffed and responsible for liaison and scheduling rather than substantive support. Moreover, IO came under the authority of the Secretary of State -- in this case a bureaucratic adversary.

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21 Kirkpatrick 18.
22 Kirkpatrick 18.
23 Kirkpatrick 17.
Defense Secretary Weinberger: If Jeane Kirkpatrick represented one point of view among top policy makers, Caspar Weinberger was at the other end of the spectrum:

In many National Security Council meetings and in forums elsewhere in April, I vigorously expressed my view that the rest of Latin America had no interest in helping an invasion perpetrated by the Argentine military dictators; that there would be no support by other South American countries for Argentina; that there would be no adverse reactions by any of those countries if we helped Britain.24

Even before the crisis began, the Defense Secretary was predisposed toward Britain. Described in *The Economist* as “an ardent anglophile, admirer of both Pitts and Churchill,”25 Weinberger in his memoirs describes Britain as “America’s closest friend,”26 “our principal ally,”27 and “our oldest friend.”28

Weinberger reflected the U.S. Navy’s pessimistic outlook of Britain’s military prospects:

The task of raising and equipping task forces that would have to travel those eight thousand miles, land, and drive out invaders who were already in possession of the Islands—which were only four hundred miles from the Argentine mainland—seemed, to most, not just a very formidable task, but an impossible one.29

Given this desperate situation, the proper course of action, in Weinberger’s view, was obvious, “Some of us (and I was one) felt that if the British were going to mount a counterattack and try to retake the Islands, we should, without any question, help them to the utmost of our ability.”30

From the perspective of bureaucratic politics, Weinberger had three significant advantages. First, he had the closest personal relationship with the President of all the first-category policymakers. Second, he commanded a bureaucracy that had an extensive, ongoing supply relationship with the forces he wanted to assist. Third, he had the full support of the Joint Chiefs,

26 Weinberger 206.
27 Weinberger 205.
28 Weinberger 207.
29 Weinberger 204.
30 Weinberger 205.
who were gravely concerned with the performance in battle of a key NATO ally.

Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Enders: Thomas Enders was the chief standard-bearer for the Argentine cause in the day-to-day bureaucratic struggle. Nonetheless, Enders earned the begrudging respect of the British Ambassador to Washington, Sir Nicholas Henderson: "Enders always kept American requirements in Latin America in the forefront of his mind, as it was his business to do."\(^{31}\)

Although doggedly persistent from all accounts, Enders clearly did not pursue the Latin American agenda with the same zeal as his substantive ally, Jeane Kirkpatrick. Viewed from the perspective of bureaucratic politics, two factors help explain this difference. First, Enders had spent most of his career in European affairs. Second, and more important, his bureaucratic loyalties lay with the Secretary of State, who had a wider agenda to follow.

Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Eagleburger: Lawrence Eagleburger, the third ranking official in the State Department at the time of the Falklands crisis, had devoted virtually his entire Foreign Service career to European matters. Prior to his nomination as Under Secretary for Political Affairs -- traditionally the highest position at the State Department reserved for careerists -- Eagleburger served as Assistant Secretary for European Affairs. Eagleburger, like Caspar Weinberger, took an unabashedly pro-British line. In the words of one observer, "Eagleburger was for immediate commitment of help to Britain on all levels."\(^{32}\)

NSC Advisor Clark: Haig’s deputy at the State Department at the outset of the Reagan Administration, Judge William Clark was an extremely discrete behind-the-scenes player. Fiercely loyal to the President, his long-time friend, the NSC Advisor saw his role as more of a facilitator than a maker of policy. Sympathetic to the views of Ambassador Kirkpatrick\(^{33}\) but prodmed by NSC staff to support Britain, Clark tried to stay neutral throughout the crisis. As events unfolded, Clark repeatedly reminded British Ambassador Nicholas Henderson of the damage the


\(^{33}\) Kaufmann 11.
conflict was causing to U.S. interests in Latin America. \textsuperscript{34}

**Deputy Director of Central Intelligence Inman**: Inman, by his own account, was the point man for the Falklands crisis within the intelligence community, rather than CIA Director William Casey. \textsuperscript{35} Inman is described as leaning toward support for the British out of concern for continued access to British overseas facilities by U.S. intelligence operatives. \textsuperscript{36} The low profile adopted by the CIA in the Falklands debate\textsuperscript{37} may have reflected divisions or mixed feelings at the top of the agency, given Casey’s strong interest in covert operations in Central American and the growing Argentine involvement in those activities.

**The White House Staff**: Although not heavily involved in the policy debate, the senior White House staff (primarily Edwin Meese, James Baker, and Michael Deaver) no doubt kept a watchful eye on the political consequences of the Administration’s evolving Falklands policy in light of the American public’s pro-British sentiments. Additionally, there was a widely-shared feeling of contempt among White House staff toward Secretary of State Haig, who was seen as trying to usurp the President’s authority to manage foreign affairs. The feeling was mutual; Haig, in his memoirs, attacks Meese for derailing NSDD\textsubscript{I}, the framework for foreign policy decision-making in the new Administration. \textsuperscript{38}

**The Congress**: Reflecting U.S. public opinion and reacting to Argentina’s abysmal human rights record, both houses adopted “sense of the Congress” resolutions (S Res 382 and H Res 441) by overwhelming majorities urging the Administration to abandon its policy of official neutrality. \textsuperscript{39} Despite the broad consensus that existed in the Congress regarding the Falklands issue, it gave the Executive Branch a free hand to set the policy agenda. The resolutions cited above -- the Congress’ main contribution to policy -- came late in the policy debate, when U.S. support for Britain was a

\textsuperscript{34} Henderson 37, 41.
\textsuperscript{35} Qtd. in Kaufmann: 14.
\textsuperscript{36} Kaufmann 11.
\textsuperscript{37} As opposed to operations, where the CIA provided Britain with much useful intelligence support.
\textsuperscript{38} Haig 76.
\textsuperscript{39} Richard Whittle, “In Falklands Crisis: U.S. Supports Great Britain; Senate Demands Argentina Withdraw from Falklands,” Congressional Quarterly 1 May 1992: 1014.
foregone conclusion.

THE POLICY

Given the conflicting motivations of the cabinet-level officials most deeply involved in the Falklands crisis and the loose central control exercised by the President, it is hardly surprising that several disparate policies emerged. These were pursued in conflict with one another until well into the crisis. Bargaining among the competing policy advocates -- the expected focus of government action in the bureaucratic politics model -- was at a minimum with the main players free to pursue their own agendas within their respective fields of action.

In the case of Alexander Haig, this entailed shuttle diplomacy between London and Buenos Aires “to bring about a settlement that avoided bloodshed and humiliation for either side.”40 In the case of Jeane Kirkpatrick, the logical policy prescription was strict neutrality, “I thought that a policy of neutrality in that war made sense from the point of view of U.S. interests and would have done Britain no harm--views that offended Alexander Haig and some of the press.”41 Kirkpatrick’s efforts were carried out primarily in private meetings with the President but contained a public dimension as well:

On the evening of invasion day, Jeane Kirkpatrick ... went to a dinner in her honour given by the Argentine Ambassador to the US.... The British Ambassador ... remarked that it was as if he had dined with the Iranians the night of the Teheran hostage seizure. Kirkpatrick, never one to waste good oil on troubled waters, responded that America had always been neutral on the issue of Falklands sovereignty and ‘if the Argentines own the islands then moving troops into them is not armed aggression’.42

In the case of Caspar Weinberger, the policy solution was quick and large-scale materiel, logistics, and intelligence support to the advancing British task force:

I therefore passed the word to the Department that all existing requests from the United Kingdom for military equipment were to be honored at once; and that if the

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40 Henderson 42.
41 Kirkpatrick 15.
British made any new requests for other equipment or other types of support, short of our actual participation in their military action, those requests should also be granted, and honored immediately. I knew how vital speed would be for the extraordinarily difficult operation they were about to undertake.43

The divergent, if not schizophrenic, nature of U.S. policy was not lost on political commentators:

Difficulties between a US ambassador to the United Nations and the State Department in Washington are nothing new. Several persons in the UN post (Warren Austin, Adlai Stevenson, Andrew Young) have seemed to think that they had a policymaking role which can depart from State Department plans and purposes. Mrs. Jeane J. Kirkpatrick is in this category.44

This American assistance ... depended heavily on the direct personal commitment of Mr Weinberger himself. Though much of American public opinion was on his side, his intervention ran strongly counter to policies being pursued elsewhere in Washington during and since the war -- manifested most clearly in Mrs Kirkpatrick's activities at the United Nations. It was in effect Mr Weinberger’s own foreign policy....”45

President Reagan, for his part, stayed above the fray. He did this not so much by ignoring the divergent policies of his subordinates -- although this entered into the equation with Ambassador Kirkpatrick -- than by supporting them in their individual endeavors. He encouraged and aided Haig's mediation efforts, for example, by telephoning Argentine and British leaders at key points in the negotiations and by not waiving from a line of strict neutrality in his many encounters with the press while the negotiations were taking place.46 In the case of Reagan’s Secretary of Defense, “Mr Weinberger privately cleared his approval of this help with President

43 Weinberger 205.
Reagan, though not, it is believed with the full National Security Council."47

In the absence of a clearing house for policy, the relative effectiveness of the different strategies being pursued by Haig, Weinberger, and Kirkpatrick became the main criterion in the bureaucratic struggle. Haig, handicapped in his efforts by a hostile White House staff,48 was not able to bridge the considerable gap between Britain’s insistence that Argentina withdraw before sovereignty negotiations could begin and Argentina’s refusal to withdraw until its rights in the islands had been acknowledged. Kirkpatrick, increasingly isolated in New York, was going against the grain of public and Congressional sentiment and was part of an Administration that was fundamentally sympathetic to Britain. Weinberger, whose efforts were secret and thus unopposed -- besides being warmly welcomed by their recipients -- emerged as the winner. On April 30, 1982, the United States imposed sanctions on Argentina, announced military assistance to Britain, and withdrew its mediation efforts.

48 Edwards and Wayne illustrate the nature of Haig's problems. "One high-level Reagan aide disclosed how he and other White House officials tried to undercut Secretary of State Alexander Haig. 'In a classic case of Washington infighting, we threw virtually every booby trap in his way that we could, planted every story, egged the press on to get down on him' (204)." A small but telling example was that during the Falklands negotiations, Haig had constant problems obtaining suitable aircraft for his shuttle diplomacy from the White House travel office, which caused him to postpone flights and travel at all hours of the day and night.
Works Cited


