[Descents] are operations of rare occurrence, and may be classed as among the most difficult in war when effected in presence of a well-prepared enemy .... It is difficult to lay down rules for operations of this character.

-- Jomini, The Art of War

Joint warfare is essential to victory.

-- Joint Warfare of the U.S. Armed Forces, Joint Pub 1

The American Civil War has almost certainly been the subject of more books than any other event in U.S. history. An avalanche of print shows no sign of stopping; indeed, it has increased in recent years. These books run the gamut from supermarket novels of the John Jakes ilk to microscopic examinations of a single action or day like Harry Pfanz's Gettysburg: The Second Day.

At the same time, the United States military has embraced the doctrines of joint and combined operations with a fervor never before seen. Prodded by the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986, the regret of Vietnam, and the embarrassment of affairs like Grenada, joint operations now permeate official U.S. strategy, and are taught to officers at all levels of professional military education. Interestingly, however, the flood of Civil War monographs and the official frenzy over jointness seem to have remained almost totally separate phenomena. There is, to my knowledge, only one book which purports to treat Civil War joint operations as an integrated whole. This is Rowena Reed's Combined Operations in the Civil War, which, while provocative, draws some very dubious conclusions and is over 15 years old.

1. REPORT DATE  
MAR 1993

2. REPORT TYPE

3. DATES COVERED  
00-03-1993 to 00-03-1993

4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE  
Joint Operations in the American Civil War

5a. CONTRACT NUMBER

5b. GRANT NUMBER

5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER

5d. PROJECT NUMBER

5e. TASK NUMBER

5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER

6. AUTHOR(S)

7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)  
National War College, 300 5th Avenue, Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, DC, 20319-6000

8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER

9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)

10. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S ACRONYM(S)

11. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S REPORT NUMBER(S)

12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT  
Approved for public release; distribution unlimited

13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

14. ABSTRACT  
see report

15. SUBJECT TERMS

16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:  
   a. REPORT  
      unclassified
   b. ABSTRACT  
      unclassified
   c. THIS PAGE  
      unclassified

17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT

18. NUMBER OF PAGES  
   29

19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON

Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98)  
Prescribed by ANSI Std Z39-18
I propose to examine two major joint operations in the Civil War—the Henry-Donelson campaign and the Fort Fisher operations—to determine whether any conclusions may be drawn from them as to such operations in their infancy. Did, as Reed claims, the Union have a coherent joint strategy in 1861-1862 which was thrown away with McClellan's demotion from general-in-chief? Were joint operations simply ad hoc affairs which depended upon the personal chemistry between Army and Navy commanders? What part did politics and the Clausewitzian "fog of war" play in such operations? Did they have any lasting effect upon interservice cooperation?

Before examining the above operations, it is essential to examine the state of thought on joint warfare at the time war broke out, as well as previous American experience with it. By 1861, Clausewitz had been dead for 30 years, but his great work had yet to be translated into English and was essentially unknown to Americans. The principal tactics manuals used at West Point, Mahan's Out-Post 4 and Hardee's Tactics, 5 did not even mention joint operations. Jomini's The Art of War, which was the principal strategy text there, contains a short article on "descents" (Jomini's term for amphibious operations). 6 Jomini stated that such operations were "rare" and "among the most difficult in war." He expressed regret that Napoleon's great plan for an amphibious invasion of England was never carried out, in order to determine whether a very large-scale assault could have been done. Jomini recognized the problems of weather, supply, and logistics in such operations, but, in the end, stated that "It is difficult to lay down rules for operations of this character," and then set out a few maxims of deception and concentration of force, which did not differ greatly from those applicable to land warfare. 7 He included as an appendix an anecdotal survey of amphibious operations from antiquity to 1862. 8

4 Dennis Hart Mahan, An Elementary Treatise on Advanced-Guard, Out-Post, and Detachment Service of Troops . . . (New Orleans: Bloomfield & Steel, 1861).
7 Id., 248, 250-251. He did warn the defender "not to divide his forces too much by attempting to cover
Naval thought on joint operations was even sketchier in 1861. Traditional naval thought then (and long after) held that an aspiring officer could learn everything he needed by going to sea at an early age. The Naval Academy had not been established until 1845, and then largely as a political response to the "mutiny" on the U.S.S. Somers in 1842. The curriculum was basically nautical, although academic subjects were taught. Because no naval counterpart of Jomini had yet emerged, officers of the Navy paid little attention to theories of naval warfare, let alone amphibious or other joint operations.

Actual American experience with joint operations prior to 1861 was limited. The American Revolution saw several amphibious expeditions, including the combined French-American fiasco at Newport in 1778 and the successful Yorktown operation in 1781. However, the fact that the U.S. Navy was not established until 1794 (and then virtually abolished again under Jefferson) illustrates that no lasting lessons as to the efficacy of joint operations were learned. The most recent experience in 1861 was Winfield Scott's unopposed landing at Veracruz in 1847, a superbly-executed operation using the first specially-designed landing craft in American history. Some 8600 men were put ashore in a few hours without losing a man, a fitting prelude to one of the most brilliant campaigns in our military history.

In 1861, Scott was still, at 75, general-in-chief of the Army, a post he had held since 1842 (he had been a general officer since 1814). Although physically unfit for field service, Scott recognized the likelihood of a long and difficult war. In May, 1861, he wrote to his eventual successor, George B. McClellan, laying out his every point," advice which would have been useful for the Confederacy. Id., 251.

---

8 Id., 361-390.
famed "Anaconda Plan" for the strangulation of the South by blockade, and its invasion by joint operations
down the Mississippi to New Orleans:

We rely greatly on the sure operation of a complete blockade of the Atlantic and Gulf ports soon
to commence. In connection with such blockade, we propose a powerful movement down the
Mississippi to the ocean, with a cordon of posts at proper points . . . the object being to clear out and
keep open this great line of communication in connection with the strict blockade of the seaboard, so
as to envelop the insurgent States and bring them to terms with less bloodshed than by any other plan . . . .
This army, in which it is not improbable you may be invited to take an important part, should be
composed of our best regulars for the advance, and of three years' volunteers, all well officered . . .
I propose to organize an army of regulars and volunteers on the Ohio River, of say, 80,000 men, to
be divided into two unequal columns, the smaller to proceed by water on the first autumnal swell in
the rivers, headed and flanked by gunboats . . . and the other column to proceed as nearly abreast as
practicable by land--of course without the benefit of rail transportation--and receiving at certain
points on the river its heavier articles of consumption from the freight boats of the first column.

Scott was also realistic enough to recognize the political dangers inherent in a protracted campaign when
public anger was aroused:

A word now as to the greatest obstacle in the way of the plan--the great danger now pressing
upon us--the impatience of our patriotic and loyal Union friends. They will urge instant and
vigorous action, regardless, I fear, of consequences--that is, unwilling to wait for the slow instruction
of (say) twelve or fifteen camps, for the rise of the rivers, and the return of frosts to kill the virus of
malignant fevers below Memphis. I fear this, but impress right views, on every occasion, upon the
brave men who are hastening to the support of their Government . . . . I commend these views to your
consideration and I shall be happy to hear the result.13

Scott's caution was well-founded; political pressure provoked the advance on the Confederate positions at
Manassas which resulted in the rout at First Bull Run. Thereafter, the appointment of McClellan to
command the Army of the Potomac, clashes between the two, and Scott's debility prompted his retirement
and replacement by McClellan on November 1, 1861.

McClellan's tenure as general-in-chief lasted only four months; yet it has been claimed that, during this
time, he formulated a "revolutionary" strategy of joint operations which would begin with coastal strikes at
Charleston, New Bern, Mobile, and New Orleans, and then, driving inward along railroads and the
Mississippi, cut Confederate internal communications, and sever the parts of the Confederacy from each

other. In this interpretation, the Peninsular Campaign is seen as a joint operations triumph which was only kept from success by Lincoln's obtuseness in keeping McDowell's corps in Washington, by fumbling on the part of the Navy, and by the demotion of McClellan, which "prevented him from coordinating the movements of other Federal armies ... or obtaining reinforcements from less active theaters of war." The final conclusion is that a great opportunity was missed:

The Navy, whose aid McClellan had actively solicited and used, when available, to maximum advantage, was allowed to pursue an independent strategy while the Army commanders, lacking McClellan's foresight and flexibility of method, agreed with the Lincoln administration that wars were only won by slugging it out on the battlefield. The failure of the Peninsular Campaign signalled both the demise of Federal grand strategy and the demise of combined operations planning.

This revisionist interpretation is deeply flawed. First, it posits that McClellan could, with the nebulous powers of the general-in-chief, achieve results with other armies which he was unable to do with his own when in active field command. Second, the notion that McDowell's corps was essential to victory on the Peninsula is nonsense; McClellan at all times vastly outnumbered his opponents and McDowell would not have made the difference. Third, McClellan possessed no command authority whatsoever over naval forces; to assume that he could, as general-in-chief in Washington, force Army-Navy cooperation in distant theaters flies in the face of experience throughout the war. Finally, the interpretation simply passes over the very real flaws in McClellan himself--flaws that were to prove fatal. His unwillingness to move quickly and to fight, his consistent overestimation of his opponents, his paranoid secretiveness about his intentions, and his contempt for his political masters and their needs in this most political of wars destroyed him in the end.

There is absolutely no reason to believe that his retention as general-in-chief and his being given everything he wanted on the Peninsula would have made any difference. Spinning out grandiose plans was an activity to McClellan's liking; execution was another matter altogether. The fact is that neither the command

14 Reed, chapter 2.
15 Id., 188.
16 Id., 189.
arrangements nor the doctrine for joint operations existed at this time. Successful joint operations, like much else, would have to be improvised by those on the scene.

The first large-scale joint operation in the Western theater of war was the Fort Henry-Fort Donelson operation, which brought Ulysses S. Grant to public attention. Central Tennessee was an area of great strategic importance to the Confederacy. Not only was it a fertile farming area, but it had large iron deposits and numerous forges and furnaces. Given the insurgents' lack of industrial capacity, this was a resource almost beyond price. However, the problems of defending this area, immense to begin with, were devilishly complicated by Kentucky's attempt to stay neutral in the war. Since neither side wanted the opprobrium of violating this neutral status, defensive works to protect central Tennessee had to be built outside Kentucky. 17

Given the poor state of the roads and the lack of north-south railroads, the obvious invasion route into central Tennessee was by the "twin rivers", the Tennessee on the West and the Cumberland on the east. To deal with this threat, Confederate fortifications were constructed on both rivers during 1861, although work went slowly. Fort Henry, on the Tennessee, was poorly located on low land facing Kentucky on the other side of the river. On September 15, 1861, Colonel Bushrod Johnson, the engineer officer who selected the site, described it as "a good enclosed work, with bastion fronts, mounting 6 32-pounders and 2 12-pounders, requiring about 1,000 men to man it." 18 Fort Donelson, 12 miles to the east on the Cumberland, was a stronger position. It sat on a bluff 75 to 100 feet above the river, and was surrounded by gullies which would hamper assault by land. 19 However, progress on Fort Donelson was quite slow, aggravated by lack

17 The obvious place for fortifications on the Tennessee and Cumberland Rivers was at the Birmingham "narrows" between Paducah and Eddyville, where the rivers are only three miles apart. However, this site is well within Kentucky and therefore was politically off-limits in 1861. Benjamin Franklin Cooling, Forts Henry and Donelson: Key to the Confederate Heartland (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1987), 46.

18 U.S. Army Service Schools, Fort Henry and Fort Donelson Campaigns Source Book (Fort Leavenworth: The General Service Schools Press, 1923), 158.

19 Cooling, 46.
of men and the reluctance of local slaveowners to rent their slaves to the government during harvest. By November 4, Donelson only had 4 32-pounders and 2 naval guns. ²⁰

Kentucky's shaky neutrality had ended in September, 1861, when Confederate General Leonidas Polk occupied Columbus and turned it into a fortified bastion. Grant promptly occupied Paducah, at the confluence of the Tennessee and Ohio. In November 1861, Union Army command in the area was shaken up, when Major General Henry W. Halleck assumed departmental command in St. Louis. Grant was subordinate to Halleck. However, Union forces in Kentucky were not all under Halleck's authority. Rather, he shared responsibility for the state with Major General Don Carlos Buell, at Louisville, who commanded the Army of the Ohio. Buell's department included Kentucky east of the Cumberland and all of Tennessee. ²¹

The idea of an advance down the twin rivers was not a new one; on November 20, Colonel Charles Whittlesley, Chief Engineer of the Department, had written Halleck, suggesting "a great movement by land and water" down the rivers. ²² President Lincoln was very eager for a campaign in Tennessee, to succour the Unionists in the eastern part of the state. However, the actual mounting of such an expedition was dependent upon naval forces which did not as yet exist. The first naval commander in the West, Commander John Rodgers, was sent to the Mississippi primarily to interdict clandestine commerce, although he was also to begin work on the Anaconda Plan's great advance down the Mississippi. This advance, it was thought, required the construction of a fleet of ironclads, which eventually emerged as twin-engine, single-wheel craft with sloping sides, carrying 10 guns including 3 of the new 8-inch Dahlgren rifles. The building of these was a joint Army-Navy affair, and squabbles over the contract resulted in the recall of Rodgers, who was replaced by Captain Andrew Hull Foote. ²³

²⁰ Id., 56; Source Book, 182.
²² Source Book, 14.
Foote, a strongly religious New Englander who was a strict temperance man, was instructed by Secretary of the Navy Gideon Welles to cooperate with the Army without subordinating himself to it. Foote threw himself into the construction of the ironclads, and by November seven of them had been launched. However, the Army Quartermaster Corps, which was responsible for paying the contractors, was immensely slow in doing so. Foote also had enormous trouble getting crews for the ships. Civilian rivermen naturally preferred the higher pay and lesser danger of contract work, while naval personnel were few. Assistant Secretary of the Navy Gustavus V. Fox discovered 500 sailors on garrison duty in Washington, and shipped them west. Nevertheless, as late as January 9, Foote had to commission the Cincinnati and the Carondelet with only 1/3 of a crew each, and as late as the beginning of the Fort Henry expedition, Halleck was authorizing Grant to detail soldiers for gunboat duty. Nevertheless, by the end of January, Foote had a workable gunboat fleet.

In early January, Grant was directed by Halleck to make a reconnaissance up the Tennessee to keep Polk from sending reinforcements to Bowling Green, toward which Buell was planning an advance in response to Lincoln's desires. This excursion turned into a miniature version of General Ambrose Burnside's "Mud March" a year later. Grant said, "We were out more than a week splashing through the mud, snow, and rain, the men suffering very much." The reconnaissance had its intended effect, in that Polk sent no reinforcements, and General George Thomas was victorious at Mill Springs, thereby erasing the threat of a Confederate move against Buell's flank. Grant, however, was restless and impatient; he saw opportunity in a joint operation up the twin rivers, but had to persuade Halleck to approve such an expedition. He accordingly traveled to St. Louis for an interview with Halleck, which went very badly. Halleck barely knew Grant, but was familiar (as were most officers in the old Army) with the stories of

Grant's drinking, and had no doubt heard more recent ones as well. 26 Grant recounted the scene in his Memoirs:

... I renewed my request to go to St. Louis on what I deemed important military business. The leave was granted, but not graciously ... . I was received with so little cordiality that I perhaps stated the object of my visit with less clearness than I might have done, and I had not uttered many sentences before I was cut short as if my plan was preposterous. I returned to Cairo very much crestfallen.27

Crestfallen Grant may have been, but his spirits revived upon his return to Cairo, Illinois, where he consulted with Foote, who agreed on the advisability of a joint operation down the rivers. Therefore, on January 28, both officers cabled Halleck, asking permission to occupy Fort Henry. Foote stated that four ironclads would suffice. Foote's intervention changed Halleck's mind; he replied that he was only waiting for a report on the condition of the roads and then would give the order.28 While Foote's intervention (and the knowledge that he would "keep a fatherly eye" on Grant) certainly had some effect, equally effective was a report which Halleck received from McClellan on January 29, that Beauregard was on his way to Kentucky from northern Virginia with 15 regiments. 29 This turned out to be untrue (except for Beauregard himself, sent by Davis to get him out of the East), but certainly had an effect on Halleck's sudden volte-face.

Halleck's order provoked a violent spasm of preparatory activity. Grant and Foote worked closely together in arranging transportation and the landing of troops. The expedition sailed on February 4, and landed troops early on February 5 some miles north of Fort Henry. Fort Heiman, a companion installation on the Kentucky side of the river, had already been abandoned. The land advance was very slow because of severe rains and the poor condition of the roads. On February 6, Foote took his gunboats down to the fort and began a bombardment.

27 Grant, 190.
28 Source Book, 139-144; U.S. Department of the Navy, Naval History Division, Civil War Naval Chronology 1861-1865 (Washington: Department of the Navy, 1971), II-14.
Fort Henry was situated on very low land along the river, which in the winter of 1862 crested some 30 feet above normal. This flood was a disaster for the Confederates, for it made the mines anchored to the river bottom useless and put part of Fort Henry under water. Brigadier General Lloyd Tilghman, commanding there, had 3000 men and 17 guns; however, only two of the riverside guns, a Columbiad and a 24-pounder rifle, were effective against armor. Tilghman, thinking Fort Henry indefensible, had sent most of his men to Donelson. The artillery battle between Foote's gunboats and the fort was a heavy one. U.S.S. Essex was hit in a boiler by the Columbiad, causing "carnage" below decks and scalding the captain and others. U.S.S. Cincinnati, Foote's flagship, was hit over 30 times. However, shortly thereafter, the fort's 24-pounder burst, killing most of her crew; then the Columbiad was accidentally spiked by a broken priming wire. The gunboats were firing at point-blank range, and Tilghman raised a white flag. The river was so high that the boat sent to accept the surrender floated in through the fort's sally port. Grant's forces arrived 30 minutes later, delayed on the roads, and Foote turned the fort over to the Army. Foote had taken 47 casualties, 38 of them on the Essex. Tilghman surrendered approximately 60 men; the rest managed to escape, but left the artillery and stores behind. Grant promptly determined to move against Fort Donelson, but could not do so immediately, both because of the condition of the roads and because of the necessity for Foote to return to Cairo, repair damage, and drop down the Cumberland to Donelson. Foote left the Carondelet at Fort Henry to support Grant, and took the rest of the fleet with him. Grant, hampered by the weather, did not move toward Fort Donelson until the 12th of February. Foote, in Cairo, was feverishly trying to repair damage and assemble crews for the ascent up the Cumberland. When Halleck learned that he was planning on sending only one gunboat (in addition to Carondelet), he told Foote that at least two must be sent. By shifting crews around, Foote managed to get three ironclads--St. Louis.

31 Source Book, 327; Cooling, 106.
Louisville, and Pittsburgh, under way and reached Donelson on the 14th. The Carondelet had already arrived on the 12th, and thrown a few shells into the fort.  

Foote, who felt unprepared for another attack against fixed fortifications, nonetheless attacked Donelson on the 14th. This bombardment was as unsuccessful as the one on Henry had been successful. Fort Donelson was located on high bluffs and could subject the gunboats to an intense plunging fire. Donelson had eight 32-pounder smoothbores, a 10-inch Columbiad, two 32-pounder carronades, and a 64-pounder rifled gun in its waterside batteries. One after another, the gunboats were disabled and floated back downstream. St. Louis, Foote's flagship, was hit 59 times and Foote was himself wounded. The Confederates in the fort were jubilant; Grant was correspondingly depressed. He had invested the fort on the 14th, but many of his men lacked tents and had left their overcoats at Fort Henry, fooled by unseasonably warm weather. The weather had now turned bitterly cold, and Grant was faced with the possibility of conducting a siege under unfavorable conditions. On the 15th, he met with the wounded Foote, who stated that he would have to return to Cairo to repair damage, but would return within 10 days and lay siege to the fort with his gunboats, and would leave the least damaged behind.  

Grant now faced the unappetizing prospect of a prolonged siege under bad conditions, with dubious support from Halleck; however, as he later wrote, "the enemy relieved me from this necessity."  

While Foote's attack had been a tactical failure, it had had important operational results. The Confederate commanders in the fort, mesmerized by the naval threat, had allowed Grant to invest the post, missing the opportunity for strategic withdrawal and the saving of the substantial forces (about 17,000 were eventually surrendered) therein. The Confederate situation was not helped by a command divided among three generals, two of whom--Gideon Pillow and John B. Floyd--were inept poltroons, and two of

---

32 Anderson, 94-96; McFeely, 98-99.  
33 Anderson, 96-97; Chronology, II-22; Grant, 204; Cooling, 136.  
34 Grant, 204.
whom--Pillow and Simon B. Buckner--despised each other. On the 15th, while Grant was away conferring with Foote, Pillow's Confederates managed to break Grant's lines on the east side, opening the way for escape. However, the opportunity was then thrown away when Pillow ordered a retreat back into the fort.  

Grant, returning from his conference, managed to plug the hole by nightfall. Further squabbles among the Confederate command, and another unsuccessful breakout attempt, ended with the escapes of Pillow and Floyd and Buckner's unconditional surrender to Grant on February 16.

The Henry and Donelson campaign illustrates several points about the conduct of joint operations at this stage of the war. First, of course, in the absence of unified command or meaningful doctrine for joint warfare, the conception and execution of joint operations were totally dependent upon the ad hoc actions of the responsible commanders, and therefore upon their personal chemistry and communications. Grant and Foote were very different individuals--the one a teetotaler who preached sermons at church services, the other a cigar-smoking quasi-alcoholic who had left the Army under a cloud--yet they worked well together. Whatever their differences, they shared a common inclination to attack the enemy, both hating inactivity. They maintained excellent communications with each other, and worked together without undue worry as to who would get the credit--a quality rare in Civil War commanders. The reverse of this is of course equally true; a lack of personal chemistry and communication between commanders could (and would) doom some joint operations. Given the rudimentary command and departmental arrangements which existed in 1862, however, this was the situation, and commanders had to deal with it.

The second point to be made is that the command arrangements which did exist on the Army side hampered, rather than encouraged, successful joint operations. Although Grant describes Foote as "subject to the command of General Halleck," he was not in any formal sense. His instructions from the Navy

---

55 Accounts as to why Pillow made this seemingly inexplicable decision vary. Some say it was a withdrawal to regroup and remove stores from the fort, others that his tactical victory convinced him that the fort could be defended. Cooling, 180-182.

56 Grant, 190.
Department were to cooperate, and he did that admirably, but he was not Halleck's subordinate. Halleck therefore had true operational control of only half the joint operation. Moreover, Halleck's dislike and distrust of Grant almost destroyed the operation before it started; only Foote's intervention on Grant's side (and the Beauregard rumor) finally got it moving. In addition, departmental arrangements then were highly unsatisfactory. Halleck had no operational control over Buell, who was supposed to be moving in support of Grant, but who adamantly refused to budge. Another two years would pass before the North developed satisfactory high command arrangements, and even then they were more dependent upon the personalities in place than on well-thought-out doctrine.

Finally, although the Henry-Donelson campaign produced important strategic results, it was not followed up as it could have been. Halleck seemed more interested in curbing his ambitious subordinate than in exploiting the victory. Indeed, in early March, Grant was relieved of command and almost arrested in a ludicrous mixup over his not sending requested reports. After his restoration to command, he was somewhat discredited by being caught unawares the first day of Shiloh, although his rally turned that bloody affair into victory. Halleck, who had told McClellan on February 15 that "I have no definite plan beyond the taking of Fort Donelson and Clarksville. Subsequent movements must depend upon those of the enemy," took field command and wasted much of the spring in a glacial and ultimately useless move on Corinth, Mississippi. Grant's services were essentially lost to the Union until the fall of 1862, and much that lay open to conquest after Henry and Donelson (including East Tennessee, so vital to Lincoln) had to be won by bloody attrition later.

Between the spring of 1862 and the end of 1864, several joint operations, both riverine and littoral, were carried out by the Union with varying degrees of success. New Orleans was taken in April 1862 by the Union Navy, which ran past Forts Jackson and St. Philip, defending the city from the south, and occupied

---

37 McFeely, 105-110; Grant, 219-221.
38 Source Book, 691.
the city. The Army took over New Orleans after forcing the forts' surrender in a Donelson-type operation supported by mortar boats. A union attempt to take Vicksburg in 1862 through joint operations failed; when the city fell, it would be through classical siege warfare. In April, 1863, a Union fleet under Admiral Samuel F. DuPont attempted to pound Charleston into submission, in an operation presaging the attempt to force the Dardanelles by naval gunfire alone in 1915. The failure of DuPont's fleet convinced the Navy that joint operations would be necessary to reduce the city, as DuPont had predicted. Even so, Charleston held out until 1865. Finally, in August, 1864, Admiral David G. Farragut won his spectacular victory in Mobile Bay, defeating a Confederate fleet and sealing off the port. Farragut's campaign again illustrated the need for joint operations; the Army had committed inadequate numbers of troops to the operation, and the city thus remained unoccupied until virtually the end of the war.39

The operations at Fort Fisher, North Carolina, in December 1864 and January 1865 differ from the Henry-Donelson campaign in several important particulars. First, of course, late 1864, by which time almost any disinterested observer would have pronounced the Confederates defeated, was not early 1862, when the issue was in doubt. Second, there were great differences in scale, Fort Fisher (except for the numbers engaged on the Confederate side) being a vastly larger operation. Third, the amicable relations which marked the Federal high command in the Henry-Donelson campaign were markedly absent in the first phase of Fort Fisher. Finally, of course, Fort Fisher was a salt-water, not a riverine operation, and in its execution was far closer to the great amphibious landings of the Pacific War of 1941-1945 than it was to Henry and Donelson.

Fort Fisher, "the largest, most formidable fortification in the Confederate States of America", 40 was located on a peninsula between the Cape Fear River and the Atlantic Ocean 18 miles south of Wilmington.

North Carolina. After the Battle of Mobile Bay in mid-1864, Wilmington, always a popular destination for blockade runners, had become the only port remaining open for such commerce—the Confederacy’s sole lifeline to the outer world. Some 100 blockade runners plied in and out of Wilmington during the war, attracted by the stupendous profits to be made in the trade. Even in 1864, with over 30 Federal ships patrolling it, Wilmington had taken in $3.2 million in imported goods. Blockading the port was very difficult because two separate inlets into the river, separated by 25 miles of shoals, had to be watched—an arc 50 miles long, which was too large to be thoroughly patrolled.

Colonel William Lamb, the fort’s commander since mid-1862, had been working steadily on the fortifications for 2 1/2 years. By late 1864, the L-shaped earthen work consisted of a half-mile landface across the peninsula, made up of 15 30-foot traverses containing bombproofs and connected by a tunnel, mounting 20 Columbiads, three mortars, and several field pieces. For a half-mile north, the area had been cleared of trees to present a clear field of fire. It was also protected by a nine-foot palisade. At the angle of the L was a 43-foot-high work called the Northeast Bastion. The fort’s seaface ran south along the ocean for another mile of traverses, bombproofs, and tunnels. Twenty large artillery pieces, including a 150-pounder Armstrong rifle, were emplaced here. The seaface culminated in a 60-foot emplacement called the Mound Battery, which mounted two heavy coast guns. The landface was also defended by a minefield—a great innovation. Twenty-four buried shells and mines were connected electrically, to repulse a land assault.

Mounting 44 large guns, Fort Fisher by late 1864 was a very impressive work. Its principal weakness was manpower; its permanent garrison was only about 600, not enough to defend so huge a work.

---

A ton of coffee could be purchased in Nassau for $249 and resold in Wilmington for $5500; the blockade runner could then buy cotton for 3 cents a pound and resell it in Great Britain for $1 a pound. A bottle of gin purchased for $4 in Bermuda could be resold in Wilmington for $150.

---

41 Id., 11-12.
42 Id., 18-21.
The impetus for a joint Army-Navy expedition against Fort Fisher came from Navy Secretary Gideon Welles, who had been arguing for it since 1862. When Wilmington became the preeminent blockade-running port in mid-1864, Welles finally persuaded President Lincoln and Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton to support the idea. However, Grant, by now a lieutenant general and general-in-chief of the Union armies, was cool to the idea, partly because he did not want to commit a large number of troops, and partly because he disapproved of General Quincy A. Gillmore, the War Department's choice to lead the Army contingent, who had performed badly before Richmond earlier in the year. Eventually, Grant approved committing about 7,000 troops to the operation but he vetoed Gillmore; his choice was Godfrey A. Weitzel, a talented young West Pointer who was chief engineer of the Army of the James, then sitting "bottled up" at Bermuda Hundred below Richmond. Grant liked Weitzel and particularly approved of the fact that Weitzel agreed that the fort could be taken without a huge mass of infantry. Secretary Welles had his own command problems. The naval command was offered to Admiral David G. Farragut, but the hero of Mobile Bay, in poor health and believing the expedition a dubious venture, declined. The command was then offered to Rear Admiral David Dixon Porter, the brash, self-promoting son of a hero of the War of 1812. Porter, seeing a chance for glory and advancement, threw himself into the planning of this largest naval expedition of the war. 44

The Army command arrangements were then completely upset by the decision of the commander of the Army of the James, Major General Benjamin F. Butler, in whose department Fort Fisher lay, to take personal command of the Army portion of the expedition. Butler was the stormy petrel of Federal command, who sowed controversy wherever he went. A brilliant and eccentric Massachusetts lawyer and politician, he had, as a delegate to the Democratic convention in 1860, submitted a minority report on the platform supported only by himself, and voted 57 times for the nomination of Jefferson Davis.

44 Id., 34-37; Reed, 331-333.
Commissioned a major general of volunteers in 1861, he conceived the idea of treating escaped slaves as "contraband of war" forfeit to the United States. As military governor of New Orleans in 1862, he issued the notorious "Woman's Order", which stated that any woman who insulted a Federal soldier was to be "treated as a woman of the town, plying her vocation." This affront to Southern femininity earned him a price on his head from Jefferson Davis, the nickname "Beast," and his face on chamber pots all over the South. His other nickname, "Spoons", came from the rumor that he had enriched himself at New Orleans by stealing Southern silver and by rakeoffs and bribes from contractors. Although scandal resulted in his relief at New Orleans in 1862, his position as one of the nation's leading War Democrats insured his continuation in command, despite his rascality and his almost total failure in field command. 45

The problem with Butler's assuming field command, which annoyed Grant but which the latter did nothing to prevent, was that Butler and Porter despised each other. In 1862, while military governor, Butler had publicly criticized Porter's part in the New Orleans action; this led to a feud which ended only with their deaths. The immediate effect of Butler's assumption of command, however, was delay. Some of this was the normal confusion attendant upon such a switch; most of it, however, was due to the famous affair of the powder-boat. 46

Butler had a great interest in innovative military technology and was an unsuccessful inventor himself. Prompted by newspaper reports of destruction caused by the accidental explosion of two gunpowder barges in England, he conceived the notion of packing a hulk with explosives, running it in near Fort Fisher, and exploding it. At a meeting with Grant and Porter in November, he predicted that such a huge explosion would flatten the fort's wall and kill most inside, so that infantry could walk in and take it. Grant was unenthusiastic but let the scheme proceed; Porter, despite his dislike for Butler, was taken in and agreed to

provide the ship, the explosives, and the transportation. The ship selected was the U.S.S. *Louisiana*, a flat-bottomed, shallow-draft vessel then doing blockade duty. She was disarmed, cut down, camouflaged to look like a blockade runner, loaded with 200 tons of gunpowder, and fitted with an elaborate ignition system. 47

The expedition left Hampton Roads on December 13 and 14. Butler's transports carried two divisions, a total of 6500 men. Porter had 57 ships, including ironclads, frigates, and gunboats. The expedition arrived off Wilmington on December 19, but a gale began to blow and the transports returned to Beaufort, North Carolina, to wait it out. The storm, which lasted three days, enabled Colonel Lamb to bolster his defenses; by December 23 he had some 1400 troops in the fort, although 1/3 of them were "Junior Reserves"--boys 16 to 18. 48

Butler, at Beaufort, sent Porter word that he would return on the 24th, with the bombardment and the landing on Christmas Day, the 25th. Porter, whose ships had ridden out the gale without serious damage, now decided to set off the powder-boat early on the 24th--in the Army's absence--and begin the bombardment the same day. When he heard this, Butler exploded. The old animosity between the two fused with the Navy's seeming desire to get all the glory to provoke Butler into a rage. He promptly steamed south, ordering his transports to follow as soon as they had finished taking on coal.

The *Louisiana*, under the command of Commander Alexander C. Rhind, was towed near Fort Fisher on the evening of the 23rd. The engines were then started and the ship brought closer. However, the night was a clear one and a blockade runner, the *Little Hattie*, then inconveniently appeared. Not wanting to alert the fort's sentries, Rhind anchored the boat at a point he thought about 300 yards away, but which was actually

---

47 Grant, 663; Gragg, 40-42; Reed, 337-338. For the scientific calculations supporting the idea see U.S. Navy Department, *Official Records of the Union and Confederate Navies in the War of the Rebellion*, Series I, Volume II (Washington: Department of the Navy, 1900), 207-214 (hereinafter cited as O.R.N.).
about twice that. 49 The fuses were lit and the crew got away. The Louisiana went up in a huge explosion shortly before 2:00 A.M. on the 24th. Nevins called it "one of the most ludicrous fiascoes of the war."

Rhind, watching his work go up in smoke, remarked "There's a fizzle", and went below. The explosion, while impressive, had done absolutely nothing to the fort except waken its garrison and badly frighten some of the teenaged recruits. There would be no easy entry into Fort Fisher. 50

On December 24, Porter began an immensely heavy naval bombardment, throwing over 100 shells per minute into the fort. The fort replied, but with fairly limited fire, both because the bombardment made the gun emplacements exceedingly uncomfortable, and to save ammunition. Nevertheless, several of Porter's ships were damaged by the fort's fire. More serious were five separate accidental explosions of Parrott rifles in the fleet, causing 37 casualties. Eventually, Porter had to order the 100-pounder Parrots out of the battle.

Butler finally arrived late in the day, exceedingly disgruntled at Porter's actions. Porter was equally peeved at the fact that the transports were arriving too late to attempt a landing that day, and suspended the bombardment. Some 10,000 shells had been thrown into Fort Fisher with, it turned out, very little effect. 51 The landing took place on Christmas Day, north of the fort. Approximately 2000 troops went ashore, under Weitzel's command, while Porter resumed the naval bombardment. Although the landing was unopposed, it soon became apparent that the fort was still full of resistance. Canister exploded in the advancing ranks, and the minefield took its toll as well. Furthermore, the wind was coming up, which meant that reembarkation might become impossible. Finally, Confederate prisoners boasted that 6,000 men under General Robert Hoke were on their way from Wilmington. Although Butler's orders from Grant explicitly directed him to entrench and besiege the fort if necessary, he thought it impossible to carry the place by storm and simply did not want to undertake a siege. He therefore ordered the withdrawal of the troops, although officers on

51 Foote, 719.
the scene felt that a determined attack would have worked. The withdrawal had to be broken off when the surf became too high to bring in the boats. Butler sailed off for Hampton Roads, leaving 700 men on the beach. 52

Porter was livid. Even before the attack relations between the two men had become so bad that they only communicated through intermediaries. Now Butler had abandoned the joint effort, leaving his men and Porter in the lurch. Porter, to his credit, kept up a continuous fire and managed to get the 700 men off the beach when the wind changed the next day. He then gradually withdrew to Beaufort.

The Confederates were naturally jubilant at the repulse of the huge expedition. Colonel Lamb telegraphed, "This morning, the foiled and frightened enemy left our shore." General Braxton Bragg, the department commander, wrote President Davis with the news, commending Lamb and his superior, Brigadier General W.H.C. Whiting, for "gallantry, efficiency, and fortitude displayed under very trying circumstances." 53

Reaction in the North was stinging. Grant wired Lincoln that "The Wilmington expedition has proven a gross and culpable failure . . . . Who is to blame will, I hope, be known." Porter, writing General William T. Sherman, whom he hoped would replace Butler, included a sharp barb at the Army: "When you have captured [Savannah] I invite you to add to your brow the laurels thrown away by General Butler after they were laid at his feet by the navy, and which neither he nor those with him had the courage to gather up." To Secretary Welles, Porter wrote: "I feel ashamed that men calling themselves soldiers should have left this place so ingloriously . . . . [In] a war like this, so many incompetent men in the Army are placed in charge of important trusts . . . . If this temporary failure succeeds in sending General Butler into private life, it is not

52 O.R.N., I, II, 149-150, 250-251; Gragg, 88-97; Foote, 720.
to be regretted . . . " Later, when Butler attempted to blame the failure on the Navy, Porter pronounced Butler's report "a tissue of misstatements from beginning to end . . ." 54

The fiasco ended Butler's military career. Lincoln had been reelected and no longer needed to tread as lightly with the War Democrats; after a quick calculation of Butler's support, which was still strong among black troops and abolitionists, he authorized Grant to relieve him. In early January, he was replaced as commander of the Army of the James by Major General E.O.C. Ord. 55

Although Porter had wanted Sherman to replace Butler, Grant's choice, Major General Alfred H. Terry, was an excellent one. Terry, a Yale Law School graduate and court clerk who played the flute for recreation, was as unlike the flamboyant Butler as could be imagined. Although not a professional soldier, Terry had risen to corps command by his own merit. He was quiet, dependable, and easygoing--qualities that would help in dealing with the mercurial, self-promoting Porter. 56 Grant's instructions to Terry left no doubt that he did not want a repetition of the former command friction:

It is exceedingly desirable that the most complete understanding should exist between yourself and the naval commander. I suggest, therefore, that you consult with Admiral Porter freely, and get from him the part to be performed by each branch of the public service, so that there may be unity of action. It would be well to have the whole programme laid in writing. I have served with Admiral Porter, and know that you can rely on his judgment and his nerve to undertake what he proposes. I would, therefore, defer to him as much as is consistent with your own responsibilities.

Grant wrote to Porter in the same vein: "I send Major-General A.H. Terry with the same troops General Butler had, with one picked brigade added, to renew the attempt on Fort Fisher .... [He] will consult with you fully, and will be governed by your suggestions as far as his responsibility for the safety of his command will admit of." 57

Porter was somewhat dubious of Terry, both because he had been a subordinate of Butler's and because the additional soldiers he brought were U.S. Colored Troops, of whom Porter disapproved. However, once

54 O.R., I, 44, 832; O.R.N., I, 11, 264, 268; Grant, 668.
55 Foote, 739-740; Gragg, 103-104.
56 Gragg, 105-106.
the two men met, at Beaufort on January 8, things went well. After a three-day gale, the expedition set out on January 12, the largest ever to sail under the American flag to that time. Porter had 59 warships mounting 627 guns, while Terry had nearly 9,000 men in the 21 transport vessels. 58

The fleet arrived at Wilmington late that night. Porter had been dissatisfied with the accuracy of his naval gunnery in the first bombardment; far too many shells had sailed over the fort and landed in the river, or simply buried themselves in the sand. His instructions to his fleet directed commanders to fire "deliberately . . . to dismount the guns and knock away the traverses . . . never . . . fire at the flag or pole, but . . . pick out the guns." The Parrots, whose explosions had caused such problems the first time, were to be fired, if at all, only with reduced charges. 59

The fort's garrison was only some 700 men; Hoke's division, which had arrived just as Butler withdrew, had itself been withdrawn to Wilmington by Bragg, who did not think that the Union would attack again before spring. Colonel Lamb, upon sighting the fleet, sent an urgent appeal to Bragg, who ordered Hoke back, telling him to prevent a landing and, if it had already occurred, to establish a defensive line to protect Wilmington.

Porter began the bombardment before the dawn on the 13th, hoping to provoke the fort's guns into disclosing their location by muzzle flashes. This worked, and after sunrise the rest of the fleet joined in, sending into the fort a fire as heavy as, and substantially more accurate than, the December bombardment.

The landing began between 8:00 and 9:00 A.M. To guard against a repetition of the December fiasco, where the men had been marooned for a day, they carried three days' rations. Terry's biggest fear was an attack during the landing by Hoke's troops; therefore the Federals were ordered to establish a defensive line facing north. The landing was unopposed, however, and by mid-afternoon 8,000 men were ashore. Porter

kept up the bombardment until dark, and left his ironclads at work all night to discourage repairs to the fort. Several ships were damaged, but none severely. 60

By this time, Hoke's division had advanced from Wilmington and set up a defensive line. Despite appeals from the fort, Bragg, who thought the Federal force too strong to resist, at first refused to order Hoke to attack the forces on the peninsula. Colonel Lamb was reinforced by some North Carolina troops and sailors, bringing his force to about 1550. Later, on the 14th, Bragg ordered Hoke to attack and went out to the scene. Upon seeing the well-entrenched Federal troops (whose numbers he overestimated), Bragg thought the assault futile, especially given the power of the fleet. He countermanded his order and Hoke remained quiescent. 61

Porter resumed the bombardment on the 14th. It had a substantial effect; General Whiting, who thought Bragg a fool and had come to share the fort's fate, said: "It was beyond description, no language can describe that terrific bombardment." The fort took some 300 casualties from the bombardment, and only one gun on the landface was still operational. 62

Porter and Terry met that night aboard Porter's flagship and planned the land assault. The fleet would continue its bombardment until 3:00 P.M. on the 15th. At that time, two columns would assault the fort, one Army and one Navy. The Army assault, made up of 4000 troops, would hit the landface near its western end, while the Navy one, 2000 sailors and marines, would attack the Northeast Bastion. The remaining 4000 Army troops would protect against an attack in their rear by Hoke.

The naval assault was a dubious proposition, consisting as it did of sending men innocent of infantry tactics, and armed only with cutlasses and pistols, against strong works. Perhaps Porter, despite his excellent cooperation with Terry, was loath to give the Army all the glory of storming the fort. In any event, the

---

60 Foote, 741-742; Gragg, 114.
61 Gragg, 126-127.
62 Chronology, V-11.
assault failed; the sailors were badly cut up by musketry and canister, taking about 300 casualties. Pinned down by fire, they desperately attempted to dig holes in the sand and finally broke and ran.

However, the naval assault had done the Army attackers a great service; convinced that this was the main assault, the defenders' manpower and attention were diverted from the landface. Even as the exultant Confederates saw, in Lamb's words, "a disorderly rout of American sailors and marines," Federal battle flags appeared on the western end of the landface. A counterattack was mounted, but then the fleet opened up on the Confederates massed in the fort, creating havoc. Fierce hand-to-hand fighting ensued at the landface, where the ships could not fire without hitting their own men. The fight moved from one traverse to another, not ending until about 10:00 P.M.63

The fort surrendered some 2000 men and 169 guns. Terry had 955 casualties and Porter 386. Approximately 250 more Federal casualties resulted from the accidental explosion of the fort's main magazine on the day after its surrender. The surrender of Fort Fisher prompted a national celebration. Grant ordered the firing of 100-gun salutes at his City Point headquarters, and Congress tendered its thanks to both Terry and Porter. The strategic value of closing the South's last blockade-running port was apparent to both President Lincoln and the Northern public, while Southern response was gloomy in the extreme.64

The essential part which joint operations had played in the Fort Fisher campaign was readily apparent to participants from both services. Porter wrote to Secretary Welles: "[General Terry] is my beau ideal of a soldier and a general. Our co-operation has been most cordial; the result is victory, which will always be ours when the Army and Navy go hand in hand."65 Secretary of War Stanton wrote to Terry and Porter: "The combined operations of the squadron and land forces of your commands deserve and will receive the

63 Gragg, 157-190.
64 Grant, 670; Foote, 746; Gragg, 232-242.
thanks of the nation, and will be held in admiration throughout the world as a proof of the naval and military prowess of the United States."

Two campaigns—one early, one late; one riverine, one salt-water—have been reviewed in detail. What conclusions can be drawn from them about joint operations in the Civil War?

The first, quite straightforwardly, is that joint warfare existed and could work effectively. Joint operations were not, as some seem to think, something which sprang full-blown, like Athena from Zeus' brow, in World War II or 1986. They existed in the Civil War; commanders like Grant, Porter, or Foote were "thinking jointly" in that they were considering campaigns in terms of what resources the Army and the Navy could bring to the objective, and how the two could work together to accomplish it. The Henry-Donelson campaign and Fort Fisher both presented difficult problems of terrain, weather, logistics, tactics, and strategy. Joint operations solved these problems, or at least dealt with them to the extent necessary for success. Joint operations may not have been "essential to victory," as Joint Pub 1 asserts, but they certainly aided in very important respects in the attainment of victory.

Second, by the end of the Civil War, joint operations had achieved a high degree of sophistication. The contrast between the rather small-scale Henry-Donelson operation, pushed by Grant in the face of opposition from the Army command, uncoordinated with other movements, and not followed up, and the Fort Fisher operation, with its huge scale, full support from both War and Navy Departments, and detailed planning, is instructive. Fort Fisher illustrates as well the industrial and organizational maturity which the war vastly accelerated in the North and which, to Allan Nevins, was its most important contribution to the nation. Much of this sophistication would be lost with the end of the war (as the logistical nightmares and command squabbling of the Spanish-American War were to show), but for the United States to have attained this level


of sophistication in operations in the 1860s, with a volunteer army, was a remarkable feat. No other nation in the world—including the vaunted Prussians and French—could have carried out the Fort Fisher campaign; indeed, operations of this scale and maturity were not to be seen again until World War II.

Finally, notwithstanding the very real advances set out above, the command structure for joint operations remained deficient throughout the war. Ultimately, the success or failure of these operations depended upon the personalities of the Army and Navy commanders. In the absence of a commander-in-chief, it was only by cooperation and good relations between them that victory could be attained. The hatred existing between Butler and Porter was enough to doom the first expedition to Fort Fisher, notwithstanding the military, economic, and political power that lay behind it. It is only in our own age that we have succeeded, we think, in exorcizing interservice rivalries by giving real powers to joint combatant commanders. Will this in fact work? The experience in the Persian Gulf was positive, but he who thinks that formal command arrangements can reduce men to smoothly-functioning machines understands neither history nor the fog and friction of war. All command arrangements can do is provide the best possible framework for what must be done, and those in the Civil War were deficient in that respect; ad hoc relationships, not formal organization, were the essence of success in joint operations.

The American Civil War was a war of tradition—dazzling Napoleonic maneuvers, bayonet charges, cavalry skirmishes—and of innovation—minesfields, submarines, and rifled artillery. Lincoln, in his Second Annual Message to Congress in 1862, told Americans: "The dogmas of the quiet past are inadequate to the stormy present. The occasion is piled high with difficulty, and we must rise with the occasion. As our case is new, so we must think anew, and act anew. We must disenthral ourselves, and then we shall save our country."68 Those who carried out joint operations in the war had indeed disenthralled themselves from

---

military dogma; the occasion, "piled high with difficulty" as it was, brought forth innovation, organization, and ultimately victory on a grand scale.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


