JAPANESE REMILITARIZATION:
CONTAINING THE SAMURAI

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Long Essay
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**Report Documentation Page**

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For the past four decades, the bilateral US-Japan relationship has been the bedrock of security and stability in the Asia-Pacific region (APR). Moreover, this relationship, along with other bilateral agreements throughout the APR, has stood as one of the premier pillars for United States national security policy in the postwar period. Though many would argue that Europe was the primary battleground of the Cold War, Asia certainly ranks, in some ways, as an equal partner. Regarding US containment policies, Korea and Vietnam are stark testimony of that national security strategy. Our bilateral treaty commitments throughout the APR have provided a security framework to counterbalance the threat of Soviet global expansionism. Without a doubt, Japan has been the cornerstone of those security commitments and has remained the primary focus of US national security strategy in the APR, today. For the most part, the US-Japan relationship has been one of the true success stories of the bipolar world order.

Yet, now, almost revolutionary in nature, the bipolar world order seems to have suddenly disappeared. A democratic transformation in Eastern Europe and the subsequent demise of the Warsaw Pact has occurred. Where there had been little to no hope, there are now signs of rapprochement between North and South Korea. Also, though Tiananmen Square continues to weigh heavily in the minds of many, China is again showing positive trends and, with the passing
of her aged hardline leadership, the situation may improve even more. And, finally, these events, coupled with the incredible dissolution of the Soviet Union have radically changed the international security environment.

Because of this change, some quarters, both at home and abroad, suggest that it is time for the US to start disengaging from the APR and allow Japan to "go it alone." After all, the Cold War is over and Japan won it. Such statements are tame compared to the more vicious rhetoric associated with the US-Japan trade imbalance issue. No doubt, the relationship between the US and Japan appears to be deteriorating, but this is not the first time. We have been over rough ground before. Rather than overreact and disengage from, perhaps, our most valuable security alliance, we should continue to revitalize and update our relationship with the Japanese.

Now, possibly more than ever before, we must maintain a credible US-Japan security framework. One might argue that a reduced US influence in the APR could make Japanese remilitarization inevitable. An economic powerhouse is one thing, but a militarily resurgent Japan is probably an unacceptable proposition for not only the US, but also for most nations in the region. Well what about this proposition? Certainly, a rearmed Japan is an emotional issue and many interesting questions arise. First of all, is Japan rearming? Some experts agree that Japan has been rearming for years. More importantly, how much is too much. Is current US national security policy providing the Japanese just cause to remilitarize beyond the danger zone? Do the Nunn-Warner reductions and burden sharing pressures create a situation for a
remilitarized Japan? If such a situation exists or could exist, how do Japan’s neighbors feel about this possibility? Do we care? Is the US-Japan security arrangement a vital US interest? I have already suggested that it is. And, finally, how should US policy makers shape future national security policy and strategy to avoid a remilitarized Japan?

Before discussing the status of Japanese remilitarization, it is necessary to very briefly analyze our policy over the past four decades. With the end of World War II, Japan was a ravaged and war torn country. She was a thoroughly beaten power — a far cry from her current economic status. For General of the army, Douglas MacArthur, the political objective was clear. "The objective, he said repeatedly, was to restore Japan to the world community as a free and democratic society with a viable economy."¹ As a sidelight, the fact that Japan is an economic powerhouse today is probably owed to one factor — the genius of General MacArthur.

That aside, from the beginning of occupation, it was obvious that General MacArthur had been given enough authority to accomplish the objective. The Joint Chiefs of Staff provided him with the following guidance: "Our relations with Japan do not rest on a contractual basis, but on unconditional surrender. Since your authority is supreme, you will not entertain any questions on the part of the Japanese as to its scope."² To say the least, this statement reflected some fairly clear guidance.

A major task of MacArthur’s staff was to draft a constitution. For our purposes, Article 9 of the 1946 Constitution "made a definite statement" and summarized best what US policy was concerning
Japan. Article 9 states, "The Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes." Additionally, Japan could never possess "land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential."

Now, one could clearly argue that this remarkable verbage in the constitution was the result of a relatively sound and lasting national security policy. Sounds like we meant business! We forced Japan to "...forever renounce aggressive warlike actions as a right of its nation." But, how long would this policy apply? Well, not very long. After all, US national security policy never stands still for very long.

By 1950, several events had impacted our initial policy. First of all, the US, in its normal fashion, had demobilized or "built down" to extremely minimal forces. Sound familiar? Consequently, occupation in Japan was getting hard to do. In addition, John Foster Dulles was beginning to introduce what would later be called burdensharing. Why?

The Communists had just scored a victory in China by 1949 and North Korea had invaded the South by the following summer. The bulk of US occupation forces in Japan departed for Korea in July 1950. Suddenly, burdensharing got real serious. Dulles proposed a mutual defense agreement whereby Japan would acquire a self defense capability. Dulles and Prime Minister Yoshida disagreed over the size and scope of this capability. Dulles wanted more; Yoshida wanted less. In July 1950, Yoshida created the National Police Reserve with a force of 75,000 personnel. "Mr. Dulles, however, insisted that a mutual defense agreement would be pos-
sible only if Japan rearmed to the level where it could assume primary responsibility for defending itself against a direct Soviet attack and could assist militarily in protecting regional security. He urged rapid expansion of the National Police Reserve into a 350,000 man army. "4

The key word above was rearmed. Notice our policy had gone from total disarmament to rearmament in just three years. Of course, the name of this army, National Police Reserve, reflects the strong sense of pacifism which Japan had already developed. In 1952 the force was renamed the National Safety Agency, and finally by 1954, it was called the Self Defense Forces.

In any event, by 1951 the US was firmly committed to maintaining the future security of Japan. And, Japan really had little choice but accept the commitment. "Upon signing the San Francisco Peace Treaty on September 8, 1951, a Japan stripped of the last vestiges of its past military power placed itself under American protection by obtaining shelter under the US nuclear umbrella and became assured of conventional armed defense against eventual external aggression."5 By signing the treaty, Japan continued to relinquish more and more sovereignty. In effect, the Japanese Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) was giving up the foremost responsibility of any government ---- provide for security of the nation. However, this did not go unnoticed. Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, there was constant anti-American sentiment, especially from left and far right Japanese extremist groups. Consequently, the situation got so heated that President Eisenhower had to cancel a planned visit to Japan in 1960.

In the same year, the US-Japan Security Treaty was revised
to reflect a more self-help approach. Japan was committed to defending US military installations on its territory should they be attacked. Mutual assistance dominated more and more of the dialogue between the US and Japan. "By the early 1970s, the security relationship had won broader support in Tokyo as well as in Washington, with the US agreement to return Okinawa to Japan, the American (and Japanese) openings to China, and the promise of a Soviet-American detente symbolized by the signing of the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty in May 1972." Relations were strong between the two nations, Japan was prospering, and signs of stability were prevalent in the Far East. Then, came the Carter years and the road got bumpy again. President Carter moved to withdraw troops from Korea and this created the impression with Japan and its neighbors that the US was departing Asia. Also, there was increased pressure for the Japanese to absorb more and more of the cost for security. This was not a bad idea; however, as was usual with many Carter policies, there was not a lot of good direction and guidance. Obviously, this led to many misunderstandings in the security relationship.

In any event, by the 1980s security relations had grown stronger again. With increased budgets during the Nakasone years, Japan was participating increasingly in her own self defense. Over the years, both nations had benefitted mutually from the security arrangement, especially the US.

"The American security commitment was intimately connected to the policy of global containment and the policy of global containment and the stationing of US forces on Japanese territory was seen as the principal manifestation of this policy in the Western Pacific. Their presence not only protected Japan but facilitated the projection of American military power on the Asian
mainland. US naval power in the region aimed at denying the Soviet navy access to open ocean areas and countering the Soviet attack submarine fleet. American bases in Japan served as staging bases for actions taken during the Korean and Vietnam Wars. 7

Though the road has been bumpy due, in some cases to US policy shifts and subsequent tensions with the Japanese, the security relationship has served us well. Japan has been our largest aircraft carrier, looming in Northeast Asia.

For the most part, Japan has been a loyal ally. However, we need to remember that our national security strategy and policy was not always consistent, regarding the security relationship. First, we disarmed the Japanese and helped promote pacifism. Then, several years later, we proposed (or, was it forced?) that they rearm. We have seldom accused them of doing too much. More often than not, we have accused them of doing far too little. On occasion, we have had to "drag them kicking and screaming" to do more for their own security.

So, all in all, when we ask the question: Is Japan rearming? The answer should be obvious. To some extent, US national security policy not only supported rearmament, but actually prompted a remilitarized Japan.

Once considered a "defense slacker," Japan is the only G7 nation increasing defense spending. "With the US and most other industrial nations pursuing significant military reductions, Japan has assumed the unlikely role of the world power that continues to increase its armed might." 8 Depending on how you figure defense budgets, Japan ranked seventh or eighth in 1982. Ten years later, Japan has the third largest defense budget in the world. Only the US and CIS spend more. Japan's current Five Year Defense Plan is
programmed at $171 billion, practically $35 billion more than the old plan. "Japanese defensive capabilities are growing steadily. The judgement of the Pentagon now (was) that by 1991, Japan (would have achieved) a minimum force level required to carry out fundamental defense missions. Previously, Japan fell far short of that goal."9

Now, one might ask: "Are the Japanese making a significant move toward remilitarization? It may not be that Japan is building up near as much as we are "building down." The Japanese Defense Agency (JDA) programmed for a 5.38% increase in 1992. After inflation, this represents 4% real growth. On the other hand, the US defense budget is going "south" at a rapid rate. One cannot dispute that the Japanese defense budget is going up. Moreover, the defense budget continues to reflect the 6% annual increases that it did throughout the 1980s. "Also on tap are significant additions of new fighter aircraft, more sophisticated air defenses, better naval weapons, and advanced ground arms, to name only the visible items. (Japan has) transformed its force from the laughingstock of Asia into a credible defensive outfit."10

Therefore, the budget is up, the trend continues up, and everyone else is heading down. This exasperates the situation even more. But, why aren't the Japanese coming down also? "The JDA says that the country 'cannot hastily cut the defense strength and must prepare for unpredictable crises situations in the future ....thus the (Japan) Self Defense force will continue its qualitative improvement.' So Japan continues to stress the defensive nature of its military forces and emphasizes the immutability of its links with the US."11 Quite frankly, the Japanese may not
view the world or, at least, their part of it as a "Kinder and
gentler" place to be.

Though tensions have subsided in the West, stability and
security may be very questionable in the Far East. "The end of
the cold war in Europe has not brought peace to Asia. Territorial
disputes and civil insurrections threaten to explode. China,
Russia and Kazakhstan have nuclear weapons, India and Pakistan
are capable of producing them, and North Korea is on the threshold
as it tries to conceal a fast-moving weapons program."12 Addi-
tionally, the JDA in its most current white paper, "Defense of
Japan 1990." states "whatever may be happening elsewhere in the
world, east Asia is still a tough neighborhood."

Tokyo-Moscow relations have never been real good, especially
due to Soviet occupation of the Northern Territories. Recently, a
new and more promising dialogue appeared to be forming on this
issue. Now, some experts are not so sure. Regardless of what one
might think the Russians will do, they still have a navy. It may
not be real active right now, but this does not dismiss the stra-
tegic importance of those four islands. As they have for years,
the Russians understand that these islands are essential for main-
taining control of the Sea of Okhotsk, a stronghold for their nu-
clear missile submarines. Up until recently, Soviet military
forces in the Far Eastern Military District had moved away from
large quantities of hardware to more qualitative improvements. On
the brighter side, with the demise of the Soviet Union, that up-
graded capability may not pose the threat that it once did.

As we turn toward China, there may be cause for greater con-
cern. "China's defense budget rose 12% in 1991, to $6.4 billion,
and new equipment could catapult the Chinese Air Force from the 1950s into the 1980s by the end of this year. A drive is under-way to build China a blue-water Navy that will give it more muscle in Asia in the 21st century.¹³

Realistically, should nations be "quaking in their boots" over these developments? Probably not. This is nothing new. China has been trying to modernize for years, but most experts agree that only small gains have been made. After all, until widespread reform is enacted throughout the ranks, little will change in the Chinese military. Nevertheless, one cannot dismiss the fact that the trends are up again. And, remember China is still a major nuclear power. This situation definitely deserves watching. Though China may pose a legitimate security threat for the future, a more serious threat to regional stability looms on the horizon.

Richard Solomon, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, states, "We view nuclear proliferation on the Korean peninsula as the number one threat to stability in East Asia." Admittedly, Kim Il-Sung is an extreme fanatic and practically anything could happen in North Korea. As early as the construction of a nuclear facility at Yongbyon, there has been some evidence that Pyongyang shows signs of wanting to go nuclear. In February 1992, "CIA Director Robert Gates told a congressional committee that North Korea may be trying to hide a nuclear weapons program and could have a weapon within a few months. If North Korea goes nuclear, that could prompt South Korea and even antinuclear Japan to rethink their military ---- and perhaps their nuclear ---- options."¹⁴
Nuclear proliferation may become even more probable if the US begins a substantial disengagement from the region. All of this is a fairly scary proposition. Ironically, there may be one event that is more troubling and it involves good news. A united Korea may pose an even bigger security problem for Japan.

Of course, there are other areas of potential instability throughout the region and along Japan's vital sea lines of communication (SLOC). "Almost totally dependent on imported raw materials and fossil fuels, Japan also must purchase overseas half its food stuffs. Keeping the sea lines of communication open is a matter of national existence for Japan." Though unlikely, Hong Kong and Taiwan are potential hot spots because of future relations with China. And, of course, the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea, where China, Vietnam, Malaysia, Taiwan, Indonesia, the Philippines and Brunei claim some form of control, represent a possible conflict. Insurrection and civil unrest is prevalent throughout the region. Again, though not a big threat yet, India is beginning to project naval power along Japan's vital SLOCs.

There is always a possibility that Japan could be dragged into these disputes, especially if America disengages and leaves behind a power vacuum. "Instability in the region, particularly in places like China, could reawaken and invite Japanese rearmament were the US to become strategically disengaged and thus increasingly irrelevant in the region. Japan is still the principle economic power in the region and would not idly sit by if political instability were to threaten their long term access to commercial markets in Asia." Therefore, the Far East may be very different from the West.
regarding stability and security. As the JDA suggests, it may be a tough neighborhood for quite some time. Regardless of whether the US remains engaged or retreats to America, Japan will be left to deal with potential regional conflicts. More will follow on America's disengagement and its subsequent impact on the region.

But, for the time being, due to growing defense budgets, Japan is rearming. One might argue that Japan is rearming because of its perception of potential threats. Certainly, US burden sharing pressures impact rearmament. And, of course, Japan realizes that one day she may have to stand alone. It may be a combination of all these factors. In any event, the question now arises. Just how much is Japan rearming?

Once again, it is worthwhile to review the bidding, regarding Japan's military development over the past four decades. First, we totally disarmed them and made "the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation." Several years later, US policy changed. Total disarmament was not such a good idea after all, especially with the outbreak of war in Korea. We prodded the Japanese to accept responsibility for some of their own self defense.

By and by, the self defense program grew and grew with more and more prodding. Mutual assistance and collective defense became essential to the US-Japan security arrangement. Concerning Japan's participation, the key word was defense, not offense. "Since the end of US military occupation, a military structure has been in place known as the Japanese Self-Defense Force (JSDF). The JSDF is equipped with weapons that are tactical; fighters, not bombers; destroyers, not aircraft carriers; surface-to-air
missiles, not long-range surface-to-surface intercontinental, or even intermediate-range weapons." Defense systems and missions have been Japan's major contributions to the security framework.

With the 1980s, defense budgets were increased, and consequently, Japan contributed more toward defense oriented missions. "Strongly encouraged by Washington, Japan in 1981 decided to acquire the ability to defend its own sea lanes and airspace to a distance 1,000 miles from its shores." In addition, Japan also agreed to defend Hokkaido against Soviet assault and barricade the crucial Soya, Tsugara, and Tsushima straits, thus attempting to trap the Soviet navy.

To accomplish these missions, the Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) had deployed 50 destroyers by 1991. This represents twice the number of destroyers in Seventh Fleet. MSDF has made great strides in antishubmarine warfare with a fleet of over 100 P-3 Orion patrol aircraft. Four AEGIS destroyers and additional attack submarines, bringing the total to 17, are programmed in the current Defense Plan. "Naval developments include the building of underway replenishment groups for blue water operations. The Fleet Escort Force is now nearing completion, giving Japan one of the youngest fleets in terms of hull age." With the acquisition of high tech naval systems, attack submarines, and underway replenishment capability, who is drawing the 1000 mile limit lines in the water? Easy answer ---- no one is. "Japan's MSDF is rapidly becoming a blue water navy with capability to project naval power far into the Pacific and Indian Oceans." Is this defense or offense? Sometimes, it is hard to
say. As usual, at some point, it becomes real difficult to distin-
guish the difference between defensive and offensive systems
and missions.

By the end of 1990, the Japanese Air Self-Defense Force
(JASDF) had acquired 400 modern combat aircraft. By 1995 there
will be 200 highly capable F-15 aircraft for defense of the air-
space out to 1000 miles. The remainder of the air defense force
is composed of upgraded F-4 aircraft. In addition, there are
three squadrons of F-4EJ aircraft which are tasked for the air-
to-surface mission. These will be replaced at the turn of the
century by the more capable SX-3, a copy of the US F-16. Remember
the FSX deal ---- not a pretty picture. Well, the FSX will be the
SX-3. Currently, it is two years behind schedule and 100% over
budget. The initial buy was 130 aircraft. Now, the total may be
increased to 170.21

In addition to combat aircraft, JASDF has programmed for four
AWACs in the current defense plan. However, the US wants Japan to
purchase 12-14 AWACs and 20 tanker aircraft to go with the fighter
force.

"Acquisition of a tanker aircraft force to refuel orbiting
AWACs aircraft and fighters on combat air patrol would go
a long way in providing air defense out to 1000 nautical
miles. However, an inflight refueling capability could
be considered a threat by some of Japan's neighbors. So
sensitive is Japan to the feelings of its Asian neighbors
that, in the late 1960s when the JASDF acquired F-4 fighter-
bombers, the inflight refueling probes were removed."22

Most experts agree that JASDF's sensitivity has somewhat dulled
over the years, especially since these acquisitions are sanctioned
by the US. Yet again, with air-to-surface fighters and tanker air-
craft, where do you cross the defense-offense line?
With most of the budget over the past decade going to naval and air systems, the Ground Self-Defense Forces (GSDF) appears to be receiving an overdue modernization program. New main battle tanks and Patriot air defense missiles are major acquisitions. Additionally, multiple rocket launch systems, new artillery, and state-of-the-art command and control equipment are being purchased. There was more emphasis in the 1991 budget on morale/welfare programs and facilities improvement. Budgets and high-tech equipment purchases may be on the rise, but all is not "rosy" in the Japanese defense establishment. Apparently, future budgets will contain more funding for personnel programs. "Largely protected in the budget; however, are initiatives and funds aimed at easing the Japanese military's biggest headaches: attracting and retaining high-quality personnel."\(^\text{22}\)

JSDF leadership has always had difficulty meeting recruitment levels. From time to time, part of the destroyer force is listed at half readiness due to crew shortages. The recruitment problem will probably not get better in the near future. Like most industrialized nations, the number of potential recruits from the prime age group will be significantly lower by the turn of the century due to declining population growth. "Compounding the recruiting difficulties is the fact that Japan's booming private sector economy attracts the best and brightest of Japan's youth. In addition, a social stigma still attaches to the Japanese military as a result of World War II."\(^\text{24}\)

Over the past four decades, this social stigma has caused deep-rooted pacifism throughout Japanese society. Opinion polls consistently show that over 60% of the population believe armed
forces are unnecessary. Many continue to suffer from the atomic bomb complex. They feel that Japan suffered most in World War II. Typically, the media, educators, and labor unions foster this position. From a recent poll among 1800 junior high students, most believed that it was unlikely for Japan to become involved in another war and therefore armed forces are not required. If war did break out, 38% would flee, 19% would appeal for an end, and some would commit suicide. Only 9% of those polled would stand and defend their country. 25 Only recently, did military members begin wearing uniforms consistently in public. Due to this attitude, it is little wonder that JSDF suffers manpower shortages.

In addition to personnel problems, critics point out that Japan does not get very much "bang for the buck." Relatively speaking, the budget does not buy as much capability as it could. Rather than purchase US arms exclusively, Japan desires to buy a limited number and then produce the weapon system in Japan. This may preserve jobs, but it also drives up the cost of weaponry, sometimes double the amount. Reference the SX-3 (F-16) project.

The critics are right; however, there is another side to Japan's production of military hardware. A more alarming explanation for Japanese weapons production has also been put forward. "There is a latent fear that embarking on such programs as the FSX, OHX, Type-90, OTH-R, and Aegis-equipped destroyers could lead to a large indigenous arms industry. If the political moderates who have been in power for more than 40 years should fall, such an industry could produce the weapons for a reborn militarist government." 26 And, of course, there should be no doubt among the critics that Japan is technologically capable of producing
state of the art weaponry. US-Japan competition over the past few years should be instructive.

So ---- Is Japan rearming too much? In my view, I think not. No doubt, there are trends, but there have been trends for quite some time. One cannot dismiss the budget and the acquisition of highly capable weapon systems. Likewise, one cannot dismiss the extreme pacifist elements of society. For the time being, this force is far too strong. Japan remains an inward-looking nation. "Without an assertive foreign policy, a change from a self-defense force to an armed force capable of power projection is remote; however, there are some ominous signs beneath the surface."27

Now, one must ask: Could Japan cross over that defense-offense line in the future? Could Japan rearm too much? Could US national security policy provide the Japanese just cause to remilitarize beyond the danger zone? For our purposes, danger zone is defined as power projection capability (offense) and/or nuclear capability. Well, I believe the answer is yes for all of the above. Nunn-Warner reductions and burdensharing pressures could adversely impact our national security policy. In turn, this could damage the US-Japan security arrangement.

The US has been a Pacific power since 1853 when Commodore Perry sailed into Uraga Bay in Japan. That power blossomed in the postwar period. However, with Nunn-Warner reductions, the US is beginning to withdraw certain elements of military power. These reductions have aroused many nations in the APR, especially the Japanese. "Tokyo vigorously opposes calls for Pacific arms control agreements, especially those that would threaten to reduce the US presence beyond a 12,000 troop cut announced last year."28
This troop cut reflects reductions in both Korea and Japan. By 1992, the 50,000 troops in Japan will have been reduced by 5000; the 44,000 in Korea by 7,000. An additional 3000 came off the roles in the Philippines. In all, Nunn-Warner called for a 15,000 troop reduction from the APR. This reflects a 12% reduction by 1992. For the most part, this reduction came from "tail, not teeth." Of course, that was only Phase I. Phase II begins in 1993 and Phase III comes in the year 2000. 29

Undoubtedly, the US will reduce forward presence in the APR; however, we need to move very cautiously and deliberately on this issue. As pointed out earlier, the APR remains a tough neighborhood. This, along with our proposed withdrawal, rationalizes Japan's military modernization program. It may even increase the probability of a remilitarized Japan. In turn, this arouses the suspicion of Japan's neighbors. Most in the APR would not look forward to a resurgent Japanese military. More on this point later.

We must avoid deep cuts for the short and medium term. "Given the inevitability of force reductions, Jonathan Pollack, an Asia expert at Rand Corporation has suggested that the US concentrate on keeping in the region those forces needed to project power beyond the Pacific region, to gather intelligence and to patrol sea lanes. That means naval and air forces may take priority over ground forces." 30 As we pull out and talk about pulling out more, the subject of burdensharing becomes more heated on both sides of the Pacific.

As previously mentioned, the burdensharing argument may have begun as early as John Foster Dulles' proposal for the Japanese
to create a self-defense force. Over the years, the pressure has increased to an almost feverish pitch at times. Our modern day "Joan of Arc," Congresswoman Pat Schroeder, typifies one end of the spectrum with her comment during a 1989 trip to Asia.

"Unless Japan, Korea, and other Far Eastern powers are prepared to help the US in maintaining a military presence that benefits their security as well as ours, the US will not be forward deployed here much longer. We simply cannot afford it anymore."

And, from a GAO report in 1989 comes the following: "While Japan has increased its contributions to US forces in other programmes, given its impressive economic growth, Japan could do more." 31

There are signs that the Japanese are beginning to resent certain US Congressmen for accusing them of shirking their security obligations. In times past, little was said, but now, with the trade balance, Toshiba, and FSX, this is only one more point of contention for the Japanese. And, they are beginning to counterattack quite vigorously. Shunji Taoka, a staff writer for Business Tokyo adds to the emotion. "Demands by the US Congress that Japan pay more of the costs of US forces in Japan are making Japanese appreciate how Americans in 1776 felt about King George III." 32

Obviously, a great deal of emotion has developed over the issue of burdensharing. One might ask: Could the Japanese do more? Until a few years ago, I would have said yes, but now is a different story. The 1991-95 Host Nation Support Agreement contains $17 billion for support of US forces in Japan. "I believe Japan's commitment to our alliance, the security treaty, and to a more equitable sharing of the costs of manning US forces in
Japan is strong and warrants greater recognition than it has received to date.\textsuperscript{33}

With practically $3.4$ billion per year going to US troop presence, one could argue that having forward bases in Japan has become a bargain. The Japanese Facilities Improvement Program (JFIP) is a model project. Conditions and quality of life at bases like Kadena and Misawa surpass most bases in the US. Actually, if salaries were not included, the Japanese will be paying $73\%$ of stationing costs by 1995. What remains, over and above, are costs which the US probably does not want Japan to pay anyway. "This $27\%$ consists largely of operational costs associated with running a military establishment no matter where it is located such as training, exercises, spare parts, and supplies."\textsuperscript{34} Obviously, if Japan paid these costs, operational flexibility could be jeopardized.

In any event, US troop costs in Japan probably is a bargain. "As a result, it will cost the US Navy less to keep the Midway carrier battle group at Yokosuka than at San Diego."\textsuperscript{35} For the time being, one might agree that the Japanese are contributing their fare share to the security arrangement. It may be time for some of our more vocal Congressmen and government officials to reduce the rhetoric.

Due to Nunn-Warner troop reductions and burdensharing pressures, we may be creating a situation where a remilitarized Japan is inevitable. Thusfar, troop reductions have made perfectly good sense. Generally speaking, we have pulled out support forces and staff overhead. We are transitioning to a new world order where additional reductions could be made; however, it is essential
to maintain a credible forward presence in Japan and the APR. More on specifics later.

Again, we need to cease and desist on the burden-sharing issue. The day may come when Japan takes our threat seriously and simply invites us to leave. Over the years, US troop presence served a dual purpose. We contained communism, primarily. But, we also contained Japan from itself and its neighbors. The Japanese probably understand this better than we do. If we pull out completely, the cork will, indeed, be out of the bottle. And, if that means a remilitarized Japan beyond the danger zone, Japan's neighbors may not like this possibility.

Most nations throughout the APR remember quite well the Japan of the 1930s and 1940s. And, obviously, they wish not to return to those years. "Asian neighbors harbor concern about how far Japan may go."36 It is difficult to dismiss their perceptions. They look to Japan and see an economic superpower with the potential resources to produce a very capable military force. They see the defense budget on the rise and they see Japan developing industry, capable of producing high tech weaponry.

The Japanese leadership goes to great lengths to convince their Asian neighbors that the rearmament program is nonthreatening. "Japan is moving very cautiously to avoid provoking a backlash from its neighbors."37 One could argue that Japan is trying to allay these suspicions and anxieties with foreign aid dollars. Japan is now the largest donor in the APR. Relatively speaking, Japan contributes a higher percentage of GDP to foreign aid than any other nation. Why would an inward looking nation like Japan go to these lengths to help her neighbors? Some say
the motive is economic. It may be. It could also serve a dual purpose. But, no amount of money or rhetoric may relieve the fears of Japan's neighbors, especially with the potential US disengagement from the APR looming on the horizon.

Throughout the postwar period, many Asian states have looked upon the US as an honest broker or a Grand Neutralizer. US presence in the region has maintained a tenuous balance. "The residual animosity toward Japan throughout Asia remains substantial and the termination of the US-Japan security treaty would multiply security anxiety throughout the region." 38

Simply stated, the US keeps the "cork in the bottle" and the rest of Asia likes it this way. Imagine the following scenario. The US withdraws from the security alliance. The conventional and nuclear umbrella is removed. Who guarantees security? Better yet, who guarantees oil deliveries from the Persian Gulf? Japan is forced to develop a conventional power projection capability to protect the vital SLOCs. Japan's powerhouse economy begins to produce high tech weaponry in large numbers. The race is on.

How does North and South Korea feel about this proposition? Reference Leonard S. Spector and Jacqueline R. Smith's comment in Arms Control Today. "Even if Japan continued its policy of nuclear abstinence, a nuclear armed North Korea could encourage a Japanese military buildup that would, in turn, trigger anxieties throughout Asia." The North goes nuclear. Then, the South goes. The race is really on now. Japan waivers. Pacifist groups in Japan protest. But, some senior leaders in the JDA, militant nationalists within the government, and key members in society control this protest. They insist that Japan acquire military
forces corresponding to its economic might. There are those who feel it is time for Japan to take its rightful "place in the sun," again. Sound familiar? Japan goes nuclear. China, Taiwan, and Indonesia respond accordingly. Every other nation in the APR follows suit. And, now, the arms race is really, really on. Pretty incredible?

Is this scenario that unrealistic? Maybe, maybe not. Some experts believe that a removal of American forces could upset the balance and provoke a regional arms race. One could argue that some of Japan's neighbors may view this as a distinct possibility. Do we care how Japan's neighbors feel? Why should the US act as a "pinning or fixing force" to Japanese remilitarization? In my view, if peace, stability, and economic prosperity are in question in the APR, then, we should care a great deal. We care because the region is in our vital interest and this may require us to be the fixing force.

Moreover, the US-Japan security relationship remains the centerpiece of US national security strategy in the APR. "No country in Europe can substitute for the role of economic partner that Japan and the United States provide each other. No other nation in Asia can provide either country with the same unique terms of alliance embedded in the US-Japan security treaty." Politically, this relationship constitutes the keystone of our engagement in Asia. Militarily, our armed forces remain the most visible contribution to the region. They assist primarily in the defense of Japan. But, they also contribute to the security of South Korea as well. And, above all, they contribute to the overall security and stability of the region. Economically, there
should be no question about the importance of our relationship. "The US retains enormous interest in the stability and prosperity of the region with which its trade now substantially exceeds trade with Europe. And this stability depends on a continuing US political-military presence."40

We now come to the final question. How should we shape future US national security strategy and policy regarding the US-Japan security relationship? Naturally, the major factor impacting my answer is that Japanese remilitarization is definitely not in our interest. In order to promote stability and prosperity in the region, real or perceived remilitarization must be avoided. Of course, remilitarization can be avoided if the US continues to reaffirm and strengthen our alliance with Japan.

First and foremost, the US needs to maintain a credible forward presence in the region. As stated in the 1992 National Military Strategy, "US forces demonstrate our commitment, foster regional stability, lend credibility to our alliances, and enhance our crisis response capability." Our credibility and commitment must be visible.

As mentioned earlier, the US should move very cautiously and deliberately regarding future Nunn-Warner reductions. If further reductions are required in 1993, then, we should phase in additional support and overhead force reductions through 1997. After 1997, if conditions in the APR appear promising, one might begin by downloading ground forces from the region. Our Army division in Korea could be reduced to a reenforced brigade by the year 2000. By 2002, the Marine Expeditionary Force on Okinawa could begin a phased reduction down to an expeditionary brigade. Unless some-
thing revolutionary like the unification of Korea occurs, it may be 2010 before we look at further ground force reductions in the region.

Regarding air and naval force structure reduction, we need to move very deliberately. By 1997, one tactical fighter base in Korea could be closed. Further reduction of fighters in Korea or Japan would not be relooked until 2010. Simply stated, naval presence in the APR might come down as a relative proportion of overall force reduction in the Navy. Since naval presence is critical to the region, the US should move very slowly in this area. Again, our presence in the region may prevent the Japanese from ever contemplating remilitarization.

In addition to forward presence, the US must continue to provide a nuclear umbrella to Japan and Korea. Like conventional presence, nuclear deterrence has guaranteed the flourishing of democratic institutions and economic growth in the region. Of course, we also need to press ahead aggressively to avoid nuclear proliferation. Nuclear weapons in North Korea is unacceptable for obvious reasons. And, above all, our presence may prevent the Japanese from ever going nuclear ---- a prospect which no one wants in the region. The US nuclear umbrella appears to provide stability in Asia just as it does in Europe.

Second, the US needs to back off on the burdensharing issue. Clearly, it is a bargain to have US troops stationed in Japan. For the time being, the Japanese are providing more than their fair share of stationing costs. However, we need to continue to work with Japan on self defense capabilities. "In terms of international security, Japan should be encouraged to augment its
capability for self-protection, while avoiding substantial power projection capabilities." No bombers; no aircraft carriers; no ballistic missiles. US policymakers should encourage Japan to fully implement the Five Year Defense Plan and assume follow-on growth. Special emphasis should be placed on joint training/readiness programs. Sustainability of the JSDF is a must. Finally, interoperability with US forces captures the true essence of our security partnership. By doing this, we emphasize the equality of our relationship.

Third, just as we emphasize the aspects of our military partnership, policymakers must emphasize the importance of our economic partnership. Truly, we live in a global economy. Understanding the economic interdependence of our two nations is crucial to the US-Japan security relationship. No doubt, we need to strengthen our own economy. Domestic savings, reduction of the deficit, R & D support, and education and infrastructure improvements are a must. At the same time, we need more cooperation on opening parts of Japan's economy. Jointly, we must deepen and widen the interdependence of our two economies. Further cooperation in the area of shared defense related technology would also strengthen our security arrangement. If we can have military interoperability, then, we can also have economic interoperability.

It only makes sense that if we are tied together economically this also helps avoid a remilitarized Japan. Undoubtedly, there will be competition and some disagreements. "As we enumerate our economic grievances with the Japanese, we need to keep a sense of perspective and recall that Japan is our best market outside this
continent. Trade will inevitably lead to frictions and frictions to blisters. We need to reject the quick cure of amputation."\textsuperscript{42} The Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) initiative appears to be a very promising forum. Remaining firmly engaged with Japan in this economic framework emphasizes close cooperation with other neighbors in the APR. One would think that this also enhances security and stability.

Finally, we come to the most important factor. If the US is serious about avoiding Japanese remilitarization national security policymakers should formulate a strategy which encourages Japan to play a more active role in the world. Yes, Japan should become a world power. Naturally, there will be nations that oppose this proposal, especially those in the APR. But, East Asian nations need to put World War II behind them and face the "economic music." Japan is an economic superpower and needs to become a full fledged member of the world community.

One could also argue that inward looking Japan will also oppose an active role in world politics. "Japan's inability to articulate a coherent response to the Gulf crisis as a result of domestic constraints damaged relations with the United States. But while its response was widely seen within the US as too little, too late, the size, scope, and visibility of the Japanese contribution would have been unimaginable in previous world crises."\textsuperscript{43} No doubt, for the Japanese a $13 billion contribution to the Gulf War was a good effort, but "checkbook diplomacy" is not enough. The world community expects more of a superpower.

Now, there may be some "kicking and screaming," but Japan needs to become a "real part" of the problems and solutions of the
international environment. After all, getting Japan actively involved in the process may prevent any future moves toward militarization. To get Japan actively involved, the US needs to sponsor a proposal which would make Japan a full time member of the UN Security Council. It is absolutely ludicrous that this economic powerhouse is not a member. (Of course, this goes for Germany, too.) This might solve the peacekeeping operation issue for Japan. "We should encourage Japan to send personnel to support UN peacekeeping operations to foster Japanese internationalism, and as a step toward assuming a greater share of responsibility for international security." This will take a constitutional amendment and may not be popular in Japan, but we should encourage them to do so. We must convince the Japanese that they should assume an international role commensurate with their economic weight.

In summary, Japan is rearming and has been for some time. Thusfar, there are no signs of developing a power projection capability. Though Nunn-Warner reductions and burdensharing pressures may encourage a remilitarized Japan, US policymakers are in the "driver's seat." US engagement in the APR enhances security and stability in the region and controls the fears of Japan's neighbors. The APR is a vital interest to the US and we must maintain a visible and credible commitment.

Our partnership with Japan is absolutely essential in this new multipolar world. "The keystone of our engagement in East Asia and the Pacific is our relationship with Japan. Nothing is more basic to the prosperity and security of the region, and indeed to the effectiveness of the post-Cold War system, than a
harmonious and productive US-Japan relationship." US national security policy and strategy must emphasize continued political, economic, and military engagement in the APR. As it has in the past, a committed and credible US presence will prevent Japanese remilitarization.
NOTES


2. Sackton: 64.


13. Lawrence: 36.


27. Grimes: 54.
34. Solomon: 47.
36. Dudney: 42.
40. Dedtler and Nacht: 111.
41. Abshire: 2.
42. Solomon: 54.
44. Abshire: 2.