Defence Science Board
2004 Summer Study

on

Transition To and From Hostilities

Supporting Papers

January 2005

Office of the Under Secretary of Defense
For Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics
Washington, D.C. 20301-3140
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The DSB is a federal advisory committee established to provide independent advice to the Secretary of Defense. Statements, opinions, conclusions, and recommendations in this report do not necessarily represent the official position of the Department of Defense.

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<td>Dr. Craig I. Fields and Mr. Philip A. Odeen, Task Force Co-Chairmen</td>
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MEMORANDUM FOR THE ACTING UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR ACQUISITION, TECHNOLOGY, AND LOGISTICS

SUBJECT: Report of the Defense Science Board 2004 Summer Study on Transition to and from Hostilities—Supporting Papers

I am pleased to forward the supporting material volume of the final report of the Defense Science Board 2004 Summer Study on Transition to and from Hostilities. This volume contains supporting papers on historical perspectives and organizing for post-conflict operations. These papers provide in-depth discussion of some of the issues that underlie the recommendations, offered in the main report, for enhancing U.S. effectiveness in stabilization and reconstruction operations.

I encourage you to review their report.

William Schneider, Jr.
Chairman
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MEMORANDUM TO THE CHAIRMAN, DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD

SUBJECT: Report of the Defense Science Board 2004 Summer Study on Transition to and from Hostilities—Supporting Papers

The Defense Science Board 2004 Summer Study on Transition to and from Hostilities presented a vision for enhancing U.S. effectiveness across the spectrum of activities from peacetime through stabilization and reconstruction (S&R). That vision contained two dimensions.

The first dimension is management discipline. The task force believes that the military services' approach to management, now focused on combat, must be extended to peacetime activities, to stabilization and reconstruction operations, and to intelligence—not only in DOD but across the government.

The second dimension is building and maintaining certain fundamental capabilities, now lacking, that are critical to success in stabilization and reconstruction. While management discipline is essential, it must be coupled with certain fundamental capabilities that are critical to preparing for and executing stabilization and reconstruction operations. These capabilities include stabilization and reconstruction capabilities; strategic communication; knowledge, understanding, and intelligence for the 21st century; and identification, location, and tracking for asymmetric warfare.

This supporting volume of our study provides in-depth discussion of a number of areas fundamental to the aforementioned vision. Part 1 of the report provides a historical perspective on postconflict operations that illuminates a pattern of repeated failures in conducting such operations—a pattern that underscores the importance of the recommendations found in our main report.

The topics covered in part 2 include an effective process for government-wide stabilization and reconstruction operations, how the Department of State can be better empowered to support these operations, and how the Department of Defense should enhance its capabilities for S&R operations. Two additional reports also offer further analysis of important capabilities addressed in this study: the Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Strategic Communications (September 2004) and the Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Identification Technologies of the Future (forthcoming).
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PART I. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

Why Are Postconflict Operations Important?

- **Object of postconflict operations: translate military success into political success**
  - Only way to secure strategic goals
- **Failed postconflict operations overshadow military success**
  - Crucial to overall long-term political impact of victory
- **Military victory only the first stage**
  - Operation Just Cause
  - French in Algeria 1960-1962
  - Failure of postconflict settlement of WWI
  - Union victory in American Civil War

Military victories are the stuff of history. Since Homer's account of the fall of Troy, the acts of war - assaults, tactics, heroic deeds, great battles won, and armies defeated - have captured the Western world's imagination. Even military historians, who should know better, have focused their attention on the conduct of war and left its aftermath for others to account. Yet, as Clausewitz aptly pointed out nearly two centuries ago, "War is not merely an act of policy but a true political instrument, a continuation of political intercourse,
carried on with other means."¹ Military success by itself is irrelevant. Allied victory in World War I proved hollow indeed, because it failed to remove the danger of another German effort to achieve European hegemony. Throughout history, the military, political, economic, and social efforts of the victorious powers in the period after conventional hostilities have proven essential to achieving the political goals for which wars have fought. Where postconflict operations have failed, the result has inevitably been to seize defeat from the jaws of victory.

The past's dismal record suggests that nations and their military organizations have consistently failed to execute postconflict operations with the same enthusiasm and intelligence with which they have conducted war. In fact, history suggests that failure rather than success has characterized postconflict periods. This section presents a number of case studies of postconflict operations, some of which achieved success, but most of which failed. Success in such operations has inevitably demanded clear objectives, an understanding of the defeated and his culture, the commitment of sizeable forces for extended periods of time, and above all, patience. When conducted successfully, postconflict operations have removed the tensions and causes of war. When they have failed, they have opened the door to new conflicts.

This section includes the following illustrative case studies:

- Operation JUST CAUSE in Panama (1989-1990)
- The French campaign in Algeria (1954-1962)
- Germany following the two world wars (1918-1933 and 1945-1954)
- The British experience in Iraq (1920-1932)
- The American South following the Civil War (1864-1877)
- The Roman Empire (30 B.C.-235 A.D.)

**INTRODUCTION**

**Patterns of Postconflict Operations**

<table>
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<th>Keys to Planning and Execution</th>
<th>Iraq in 2003</th>
<th>Israel in Lebanon</th>
<th>Russia in Afghanistan</th>
<th>Algeria</th>
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<td>Seamless transition between combat and stability operations</td>
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<td>Understand conditions of postconflict ops (chaos)</td>
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<td>Open, integrated planning process</td>
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<td>Senior officials involved in postconflict planning</td>
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The above chart presents the degree of success – or lack – of planning and execution in a variety of historical cases of postconflict operations. Light gray represents success; dark gray failure. White indicates gaps in the historical record. These case studies reflect a general framework for postconflict operations. The pattern suggests a less than impressive record – one that has not improved with time or historical experience. Two modern examples, however, do stand out: the occupation of Germany following the Second World War and postconflict operations in Panama following JUST CAUSE.

While fighting the Second World War, U.S. and British policy makers kept the precedent of Germany’s behavior after the First World War firmly in mind. Thus, planning for postconflict operations began as early as 1942. Within the historical context, the policy of “unconditional surrender” made good sense. This time the Western Allies would bring defeat directly to the doorstep of the German people; hence the policy of unconditional surrender.
Postwar plans aimed at ensuring that the settlement would integrate the German economy into the larger European-wide economy. We will examine the full import of the postconflict planning for victory over the Third Reich later in this section.

Operation JUST CAUSE, the American invasion of Panama in 1989, provides an all-too illustrative example of postconflict operations that failed. U.S. planning for the reestablishment of a coherent Panamanian government quite simply did not exist. The fact that JUST CAUSE occurred 14 years before Operation IRAQI FREEDOM is not an encouraging sign regarding the American military’s ability to learn, even from the recent past.
CHAPTER 2: PANAMA CASE STUDY: "JUST CAUSE" AND "BLIND LOGIC"

The Panama Case Study

- Combat operations:
  - Brilliant military plan
    - Focused on overthrowing Noriega and Panamanian Defense Force (PDF)
  - Excellent execution
    - Multidimensionality and simultaneity
    - Physical and psychological domains
  - Good operational security
    - Noriega did not believe United States would invade
    - Caught Panamanians completely by surprise
  - Troops adapted to unexpected conditions
  - Overwhelming force used cleverly

The overthrow of Manuel Noriega's regime by U.S. military forces during the course of a single night represented a brilliant operational achievement. The military plan, code-named JUST CAUSE, focused almost exclusively on the removal of Noriega's regime and with it the criminal enterprises in which the Panama Defense Forces had engaged. A multifaceted, simultaneous military operation broke Panamanian resistance at the start. Despite indications that Panamanian actions had deeply annoyed American leaders, Noriega and his henchmen refused to believe that U.S. military action was about to occur, which further contributed to their disorientation and lack of preparedness when it came. By the morning of the first day of military operations, Panama's military and government had collapsed before the onslaught of U.S. military forces.
Panama Case Study

- **Background to “Just Cause”**
  - Deteriorating situation over the course of the previous decade
    - Noriega regime deeply involved in drug trade
    - Pervasive corruption - collapse of legal system
    - Expansion of military (Panamanian Defense Force) control
  - Immediate provocations: killing of US Marine officer and physical abuse of a U.S. Navy lieutenant and his wife by the PDF

- **“This was the Panamanian political legacy. Missing was a democratic tradition, a professional civil service, a non-politicized military, and a civil culture. For two decades, Panama had a very different experience that was marked by extra-legal, corrupt, and increasingly repressive military rule.”**

  Richard Schultz, 1993


Over the course of the 1980s, Panama had steadily sunk into a morass of corruption and criminality. Its political and judicial institutions had degenerated into vehicles for the support of criminal activities: arms smuggling, money laundering, and the transshipment of drugs from Colombia to the United States and Europe. All of these activities were hallmarks of Noreiga’s regime. Moreover, as the dictator took an increasingly hostile stance against the United States, it was clear that he was drawing closer to Fidel Castro. In effect, Panama had become a state run by criminals – one which joyously and confidently thumbed its nose at the United States. At the same time, political pressure and efforts to launch a successful coup against the Noriega government had both failed.

The straw that broke the camel’s back occurred on December 15, 1989. On that day some of Noriega’s thugs, members of the Panamanian Defense Force, shot and killed U.S. Marine Lieutenant Robert Paz at a checkpoint near the Panama Canal. Furthermore, the Panamanian Defense Force arrested, assaulted, and then beat a U.S.
Navy lieutenant and his wife, witnesses to the incident. President George H. Bush regarded these incidents as unacceptable and ordered U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) to execute JUST CAUSE, the planning for which had been ongoing for over a year.
Military planning for an invasion of Panama had begun in earnest in the summer of 1988 as relations with Panama deteriorated. From the beginning, planning developed in a bifurcated fashion: combat operations were the responsibility of SOUTHCOM’s J-3 (Operations), while planning for postconflict operations was SOUTHCOM’s J-5’s (Strategic Plans and Policies) responsibility. Communication between officers working on the separate plans was weak at best. In summer 1989, planning for the operation moved into high gear. To exacerbate the lack of interest in the postconflict phase, XVIII Airborne Corps planners became involved in the planning processes, and their focus remained exclusively on the execution of military operation.
Moreover, the regional commander-in-chief (CINC), General Max Thurmond, focused all of his attention on planning and preparations for military operations. Planning for the postconflict phase languished in the closet of the J-5 plans directorate. As Thurmond later commented, “I did not spend five minutes on ‘BLIND LOGIC’ [planning for postcombat operations] during my [update] briefing as the incoming CINC in August.” The result was that KRYS TAL BALL (the initial code name for postconflict operations) and then BLIND LOGIC (the final name) received little attention from senior officers in either Panama or the United States.
The Panama Case

- The results of inadequate preparation and planning for the postconflict operation, "Blind Logic":
  - No anticipation or preparation for massive looting and collapse of civil government
    - Looting estimates of $2 billion
  - No interagency coordination before military operations
    - No country team existed: U.S. embassy down to one charge d’affaires and two clerks
  - No seamless transition to postconflict operations
    - Result: higgledy-piggledy adaptation to steadily worsening looting and violence
  - It took nearly a month to create a military government to run the country (not established until 17 January)
  - New Panamanian government inherited an empty treasury and collapsing physical and societal infrastructure
  - Finally, "the Civil-Military Operations Task Force proved unprepared to reshape the security forces, lacked a coherent organizational structure, and found itself short of personnel."


The United States, but particularly the Panamanians, paid a considerable price for this lack of focus on the postconflict phase. There were simply no preparations to meet the massive looting that broke out in the immediate aftermath of the U.S. invasion. Estimates are that upwards of $2 billion dollars in damage and stolen property resulted from a complete breakdown of law and order after the destruction of the Panamanian Defense Force and Noriega’s police. That total represented a catastrophic loss to an economy as small as Panama’s.

Even more serious was the collapse of government in general. There was no money left in the treasury; the judiciary no longer functioned; and there was no political framework on which to build an effective new government. Planners should have foreseen and prepared for all of these circumstances, but not within a dysfunctional planning process. The planners in XVIII Airborne Corps assumed they could turn the postconflict phase over to the State Department’s country team. But no such team existed. The State Department had reduced the embassy itself to a single chargé d’affaires and a couple of clerks. The J-5 planners had not bothered
to contact other federal agencies outside of the Department of Defense. In fact, one of the "triumphs" of operational security was that none of the rest of the federal government knew that JUST CAUSE was about to occur. So unprepared for the postconflict tasks was the U.S. military that it began training a new Panamanian police force in January, only to discover that U.S. law prohibits the armed forces from training such forces. It then had to turn the task over to the Justice Department's International Criminal Investigative Training Program – an organization completely unprepared for building a new Panamanian police force.

Moreover, it took nearly a month to establish a military government and restore order in Panama. Almost immediately, SOUTHCOM scrapped BLIND LOGIC and replaced it with an improvised plan, PROMOTE LIBERTY. From December 21, 1989, to January 17, 1990, Panama had no organized government. Only in mid-January did the United States finally establish a military government, at last recognizing what in fact had occurred with the overthrow of the entire Panamanian government; the United States and its military forces had to assume control of the remains of a government they had destroyed.
Panama Case Study

- Obstacles to effective postconflict operations planning
  - First: Lack of clarity as to the mission for “Blind Logic”
    - Questions not asked:
      - What would a post-Noriega government be?
      - Was democratic government possible in Panama anytime soon?
      - How long would it take to create the rule of law?
      - What would replace PDF?
      - What was state of Panamanian society?
    - General Thurman: “‘Blind Logic’ was not suitable for the reconstruction of Panama because it did not accurately assess the dimensions of the task...[I]t was a plan based on the hope that life would quickly return to normal.”
  - Second: planning process for “Blind Logic” did not even involve SOUTHCOM’s J-3
  - Third: Bifurcation in planning process
    - “Just Cause” planned by SOUTHCOM J-3 and XVIII Airborne Corps
    - “Blind Logic” preserve of SOUTHCOM’s J-5 with little access to senior commanders
    - General Thurman: “The warfighting elements are mainly interested in conflict termination as opposed to postconflict restoration, which is admittedly a problem for us in the military establishment. If I had been XVIII Airborne commander, I might very well have said ‘Blind Logic’ is going to be residual.”

The lack of serious planning behind BLIND LOGIC suggests a number of key points for planning postconflict operations. Planners must examine a full range of potential consequences of contemplated military actions. Those planning the Panama operations should have asked themselves a series of questions, such as the following: Would there even be a Panamanian government after military operations removed Noriega and his cronies, while at the same time destroying the Panamanian Defense Force and the police? What kind of government did the United States wish to see arise in Panama during the postconflict period? Was democracy a viable alternative, or should the focus be on the establishment of law and order and economic activity? What type of forces would the U.S. military need to maintain order in Panama for both the short term and long term – an army, a constabulary, a police force? What was the current state of Panamanian society? Was there, for example, even a functioning legal system? The failure to address such relatively simple questions – although admittedly none had easy solutions – inevitably created
problems that the U.S. government, not to mention its military organizations, was unprepared to address.

The second significant point is that the planning for BLIND LOGIC did not involve SOUTHCOM’s J-3. Thus, the planning effort for the postconflict period existed in a limbo disconnected from military operations. With no plan, commanders and their troops had to adapt on the fly. Admittedly skill at adaptation is one of the admirable qualifications of American soldiers and Marines, but this was no way to run a complex operation.

Moreover, because separate staffs executed the planning of BLIND LOGIC and its execution, with little or no interchange among planners, a series of dangerous assumptions crept into the planning cycles. The most dangerous was the belief by the planners of JUST CAUSE (particularly in XVIII Airborne Corps) that some other agency would assume control in the postconflict period. Thus, there would only be a matter of a relatively quick and simple hand-off. As General Thurman suggested after the operation,

The warfighting elements were mainly interested in conflict termination as opposed to postconflict restoration, which is admittedly a problem for us in the military establishment. If I had been the XVIII Airborne commander, I might have said BLIND LOGIC is going to be residual.²

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Obstacles to effective postconflict operations planning (cont'd)

- Fourth: SOUTHCOM's J-5 had little competence in understanding political, social, and institutional situation in Noriega's Panama
  - Failed to understand extent to which previous 20 years had wrecked Panama's social and political fabric.
- Fifth: Planners assigned responsibility for execution of "Blind Logic"
  - General Thurman: "It is a bad plan when J-5 ends up commanding anything."
- Sixth: No interagency coordination, much less planning, existed
  - Compartmentalization of planning within DOD
    - SOUTHCOM's J-3 and J-5 had neither interest nor experience in interagency arena
    - XVIII Airborne had even less
  - Other federal agencies were neither consulted nor prepared to cooperate in serious planning for postconflict operations
    - Lacked culture and experience
    - Lacked personnel and other resources

What is particularly surprising, given how long the United States had been involved in Panamanian affairs, is the fact that the planners of BLIND LOGIC had little understanding of the extent to which the organs of Panamanian government had deteriorated under Noriega's rule. Nor did they recognize the impact that 20 years of corruption had had on the Panamanian psyche. In other words, they lacked the most basic knowledge of what Panama had become and how Panamanians were likely to react to the removal of controls on their actions. If this were so in regards to the planners of BLIND LOGIC, it was even more so in the case of those planning of JUST CAUSE.

Astonishingly, General Thurman entrusted command of BLIND LOGIC to his J-5, the individual who had been responsible for the planning, but who possessed no command authority. Not surprisingly, General Thurman later wryly remarked that "it's a bad plan when J-5 ends up commanding anything."

Finally, one must note that the planners of BLIND LOGIC failed to bring other federal agencies into their efforts. Thus, no one else in
the U.S. government could offer support when the operation occurred and chaos followed in its trail. Without a country team in place – or even established in Washington – and with virtually no civil affairs units on call, the military discovered itself in a chaotic and dysfunctional situation in which it possessed no plans, nor skill sets, nor doctrine. Not surprisingly, it has taken Panama years to recover from the results.

Lawrence Yates has commented:

The greatest flaw in [urban operations] in Panama was the failure to coordinate the combat with the stability operations, the latter of which would take place in the country's two largest cities, Panama City and Colon. General Thurman, once he became the CINCSO, gave little thought to BLIND LOGIC, while General Steiner [commander of XVIII Airborne Corps] had been directed to work only on [JUST CAUSE]. Attempts in December 1989 to revise BLIND LOGIC and link it with the planning for Blue Spoon came too late to accomplish either goal. When PROMOTE LIBERTY began on December 20, the effort lacked synchronization and focus, in part because key assumptions underpinning the original plan – for example a Reservist call up – were no longer valid. Furthermore, the lack of coordination meant that U.S. combat troops were unprepared for much of the non-combat chaos they encountered and the numerous stability operations they were called upon to perform during the first days of JUST CAUSE.”

Panama Case Study

Summary

"Following military action, the United States must implement a postconflict policy that contributes to a positive consolidation of the situation, promoting stability and development."

Richard H. Schultz (1993), commenting on the postconflict results of "Just Cause"

"Just Cause" – an overwhelming military success
Destroyed Noriega's regime and dismantled the PDF in less than 24 hours

But virtually no postconflict planning. The results:
1) Extensive looting damage
2) Severe economic disruption that lasted nearly a decade
3) Stability and crime still a problem

Just Cause was an overwhelming military success. It toppled the kleptocratic Panamanian regime in a matter of hours.

However, the postconflict operation, BLIND LOGIC, demonstrated nearly all imaginable shortcomings, compounding the postconflict difficulties:

- A weak, compartmented planning process that failed to ask basic questions about the desired endstate
- Ignorance of the conditions prevailing in Panama
- A lack of interest by senior SOUTHCOM leaders
- A lack of coordination with combat forces
- A failure to involve civilian U.S. government agencies essential to performing basic tasks, such as police training
The result was loss of order in Panama, severe economic damage, and a stability and crime problem that persists today.

The United States did displace Manuel Noriega and his henchmen; but it did not leave Panama better than it found it.
**CHAPTER 3: ISRAEL IN LEBANON 1982-2000**

**Israel in Lebanon**

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<td>- Through 1968, Lebanon quietest of Israel’s borders</td>
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<td>- In 1969, PLO and other terrorists began basing in southern Lebanon</td>
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<td>- Israeli response: air strikes and raids</td>
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<td>- In some cases all the way to Beirut</td>
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<th><strong>Lebanon sinks into civil war</strong></th>
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<td>- Collapse of government</td>
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<td>- Terror and criminal groups run amok</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Ironically Israelis receive considerable help from the Shi’a</td>
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Israel’s foray into Lebanon represents a textbook example of how success can decisively undermine strategy. This happened on several levels. First, Israel’s historical record of success on the battlefield promoted a fixation on the operational level of war — what American military professionals today call “kinetic strategy.” Second, the appearance of prompt and complete military success served to reinforce the assumption that the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) had achieved victory in the very arena where Israel had always excelled. Third, an idée fixe of combat as the essence of strategy assumed that the authority of victory in battle equaled post-hostilities authority as well. Fourth, the lopsided and almost effortless realization of battlefield success encouraged a denigration of the enemy — the Israelis dismissed even the thought that Arab resistance might prove effective in other ways. Finally, the battlefield “fix” left the Israeli army unprepared for the possibility that dominant military force
might also be, over time, a strategic liability — ultimately even self-defeating.

The Lebanon War was an outgrowth of the always-evanescent resolutions of earlier wars. If the Six Day War had led to de facto peace with Jordan after 1967, and the Yom Kippur War to peace with Egypt after 1973, these wars had also resulted in the tortuous emergence of Palestinian resistance. Expelled from Jordan after Black September, the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) made its way to Lebanon and opened up another front against Israel. This presence only added to the worrisome chaos of Lebanese sectarian civil war — a morass into which Syria had now directly inserted itself. Increasingly alarmed by these developments, Lebanese Christians had been petitioning Israel to intervene on their behalf since the mid-1970s.

Israel’s leaders began to look for ways to end what they saw as an emerging threat to the northern frontier through the same sort of direct means that had seemed to end the issue in the south and west. But the actual border with Lebanon had been relatively quiet. In spite of intelligence that suggested that the PLO was fortifying its position and preparing for future war, there was no imminent threat. Thus it was necessary to create a case for preemption today: a “defensive war” to forestall the emergence of a greater threat tomorrow.

As originally framed, such a preemptive operation looked simple and straightforward: wipe out PLO nests and bases south of the Litani River. But in the end the Israelis pursued a much grander design: drive not only the PLO from Lebanon, but the Syrians as well, and install a compliant Christian political leader who would sign a peace treaty. The phrase of the day was: “create a new order in Lebanon.”
Israel in Lebanon (cont’d)

• In late ’70s, increasing Syrian intervention in Lebanon
  - Supported PLO and other terrorists
  - Viewed by Israelis as significant threat
• Israeli response: “Operation Peace in Galilee”
  - 6 June 1982: massive Israeli invasion of Lebanon
    o No fewer than six divisions
    o Huge military success
      » 100-1 exchange ratio with Syrian air force
      » Complete destruction of Syrian air defense system in Lebanon
      » Syrian ground forces in Lebanon largely destroyed
      » PLO chased out
      » Advance all the way to Beirut-Damascus highway
    o Large booty:
      » 1,350 trucks, 113 armored fighting vehicles, 22,000 small arms, 650 anti-tank missiles, 12,000 rockets, 43 artillery pieces, millions of rounds of ammunition

At its beginning, Israel’s invasion of Lebanon was a stunning success. Furthermore, the PLO — when it had actively joined in the ongoing Lebanese civil war — had killed thousands of Lebanese Shi’a. It so alienated the Shi’a population of southern Lebanon that at the beginning of military operations Israeli troops were actually welcomed as liberators.

Moreover, the IDF thought it had planned well, taking history’s recent lessons to heart: “In Lebanon, we tried to figure out what was similar to what went on in Vietnam,” Avraham Burg, a member of the Israeli Parliament who went to Lebanon as an officer in the paratroopers, later commented.

But in spite of conventional combat success, big problems soon emerged. The Likud leadership refused to let foreign news cameras cover the operation, so the war ended up being covered from Beirut — and thus from the Arab side. For the first time, the world watched an Arab-Israeli war from the Arab perspective.
The true negatives of this decision mounted as the IDF began its investment and assault on Beirut. In a siege lasting almost three months, it created a truly devastating piece of political theater that eventually wrecked every objective that operation “Peace for Galilee” had sought. Simply, the Israeli army was not ready for urban warfare on a grand scale, a war conducted under the scrutiny of a hostile international news media. Its army had sensible doctrine for urban warfare, but lacked a force structure designed for such combat. To reduce their own casualties, the Israelis relied on artillery to neutralize enemy strong points. Heavy civilian casualties resulted. Moreover, the Israelis were unprepared for the PLO’s use of civilian sites as tactical shields.

The spectacular failure in Beirut, however, only set up the fall. Israel’s single-minded support of the Christian Lebanese minority undercut its bid to create a compliant Lebanese regime. Moreover, the spirit of the age had changed, since the French had engaged in a similar effort before - a century earlier. According to Menachem Klein (Bar-Ilan University), “The problem of how to rule a society that is divided, a country that does not exist as a state with a central authority with legitimacy — this is a problem Israel faced in the 1980s in Lebanon.” It was a problem compounded by terrible missteps and blindsidings. First, Israeli commanders on the scene permitted the massacre of hundreds of PLO fighters by Christian Phalangists. Then, the leader of their chosen regime was assassinated. Then, the entire Israeli design unraveled.
Israel in Lebanon (cont'd)

- **The making of a morass**
  - Lebanese politics a nightmare
    - Shi'a, PLO, other terrorists, Syrians, Christian militias, Moslem militias, criminal militias, tribal militias, Druze
  - PLO prisoners mistreated
    - "Special means" authorized
  - Sabra and Shatilla massacres
  - The real disaster in southern Lebanon
    - Israeli conscripts fire into innocent crowd of Shi'a
      - Israeli response slow and inadequate
    - Results in creation of Hamas
      - Increasingly effective Shi'a guerrilla war against Israelis
- **17 years after beginning of Operation Peace in Galilee, Israelis withdraw leaving a far worse situation than '82**
  - Southern Lebanon now in hands of Hamas

Nonetheless, Israel might have salvaged a supportive Muslim minority in Southern Lebanon, essentially assuring Israel's security and perhaps keeping the PLO and Syria at bay. In 1982 Lebanon was 40 percent Shi'a. But the IDF entered "a conflicted maze of political and religious rivalries" without any sort of preparation.

In hindsight, some have blamed Shi'a radicalism for the turning against Israel, but Richard Norton (Boston University) argues that it was not a lack of mainstream Shi'a clerics, but rather Israel's failure to cultivate the Shi'a, that led to their radicalization. Israel had little feel for the divisions within Lebanese society. It allied itself with elite Christians, "fanning the Shiite sense of deprivation." Norton describes a "tipping point" event more than a year after the invasion, on October 16, 1983. That day, an Israeli military convoy provoked a riot in Nabatiya when it tried to drive, honking, through tens of thousands of Shi'a worshipers gathered to celebrate their most important holiday, Ashura. Ultimately, it was the Shi'a cultural
connection that Israel did not understand, and which in its hubris it ignored. At its heart it was this: the Shi’a, organized around religious rather than secular political leadership, were passionate in resistance, if aroused, and could demonstrate a ferocity and tenacity across the whole of society.

The embodiment of Shi’a ferocity and tenacity took the form of Hizbollah, which emerged within a year after the invasion. Unceasing Shi’a animus led to eighteen years of war against Israeli forces in southern Lebanon. Israel tried to salvage at least a shred of security for its wasted effort in Peace for Galilee by maintaining an occupied buffer zone. The cost may be thought of as modest — averaging thirty-one Israeli soldiers killed per year. But year after year, the weight of this sacrifice grew until it became intolerable. By the late 1990s a grass roots parents’ movement called the “Four Mothers” agitated for unilateral withdrawal, and in early 1999 polls showed 75 percent of Israelis opposing continued occupation of the buffer zone. Thus the final exodus.
CHAPTER 4: FRENCH IN ALGERIA

Algeria: The Background

- Revolution broke out in November 1954
  - Posed revolutionary FLN against French republic
  - Algeria divided into many tribes and cultures
    - Berbers, Arabs, Pied Noir, Jews, French administrators, and others
  - French had controlled Algeria since 1830s
    - Knew the local cultures
    - But unaware of depths of Moslem anger
  - French response influenced by the ideological nature of their war against the Viet Minh in Indo-China
    - Defeat at Dien Bien Phu had occurred previous spring
    - French theories of revolutionary war based on Indo-China experience
  - But French administrators had no desire to fight a revolutionary war
    - Over course of 1954-1956 period French lost control of situation
    - FLN eliminated the middle ground
    - French intelligence failed to penetrate revolutionary cell structure of the FLN

In the 1830s, the French intervened in Algeria with the stated intention of eliminating the various piratical regimes. In fact, they came to stay. Over the remainder of the nineteenth century they encouraged emigration not only from France, but from their European neighbors bordering the Mediterranean as well. By the turn of the century, Europeans—nicknamed pied noirs by French authorities in Algeria—accounted for almost 15 percent of the Algerian population. By that time the Europeans had expropriated much of the best farmland in Algeria, with the Algerians—drawn from many diverse groups—providing cheap labor. Nevertheless, in both world wars the native populations in North Africa provided some of the best troops in the French army. In May 1944, North African troops spearheaded the breakthrough of the German Tenth
Army’s positions south of Rome, making possible the liberation of that city on June 5, 1944.

Despite the fact that France was eventually on the winning side in World War II, the disastrous defeat of 1940 made a profound impression on many of the peoples who formed the French empire. In the late 1940s rebellion broke out in Indo-China (Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos), and the French waged an interminable struggle over the next seven years that culminated in their defeat at Dien Bien Phu in May 1954. French veterans of the Indo-China War returned from Southeast Asia determined not to repeat the mistakes of that conflict, where their generals had repeatedly failed to grasp the revolutionary nature of the war against the Viet Minh.

The French Army almost immediately found itself involved in another conflict: Algeria. In fact, that territory had been seething with violence since the French defeat of 1940; the arrival of American and British troops in November 1942 in Operation “Torch” further exacerbated the political troubles. In early May 1945, a series of spectacular atrocities by locals led to even more horrendous reprisals that killed thousands of Muslims.

In November 1954, the FLN, an Algerian, nationalistic movement, launched attacks across the length and breadth of Algeria. The response by the authorities was lethargic and unimaginative. For the most part they refused to pay attention to the lessons that the veterans of the first Vietnam War had brought home. Thus, over the course of the next two years the FLN eliminated the moderates within the Algerian communities, while at the same time launching a wave of terror attacks against the European settlers.

The FLN developed a cell structure modeled on that used by the communists in most of their revolutionary movements. French police work proved incapable of cracking the FLN’s structure, while the army’s intelligence organizations proved no more successful. Despite having over 130 years of experience in Algeria, the French discovered that they did not really understand the Muslims, nor did they understand the depths of bitterness that most Algerians felt toward French rule.
### Algeria: The Battle of Algiers

#### Battle of Algiers: a turning point
- By 1956 French security had broken down
  - FLN bombing of Pied Noir hangouts
  - Assassination of major political figures
- The French response: Jacques Massu's 10th Parachute division
  - Massu and his paratroopers given complete control over city
- FLN general strike
  - Aimed at influencing international public opinion
  - Believed French could not penetrate organization

#### Massu's response
- No attention paid to legality
- Ruthless attacks on strikers
- Massive roundup of FLN supporters and suspects
- "Special means" (i.e., torture) to break into structure of FLN
- Strike crushed in eight days
  - FLN irreparably broken open throughout Algiers

By late 1956 French security throughout Algeria, but particularly in the cities, had broken down. The European population was carrying out acts of retaliation on its own; order, in the face of communal violence, appeared on the brink of complete collapse. A major campaign of FLN bombings of pied noir hangouts caused considerable casualties among the Europeans and raised temperatures to the boiling point. Problems were particularly severe in the great city of Algiers, where the FLN was in almost complete control of the native district, the famous Casbah.

At the same time, the FLN declared a general strike immediately before a major vote in the United Nations to condemn continued French rule in Algeria. Confronting a deteriorating situation in Algeria, and particularly in the city of Algiers, as well as increasing disapproval abroad, the French acted. The French high command ordered General Jacques Massu's 10th Parachute Division to occupy Algiers. It was first to break the strike and then the FLN. Up to this point, Massu had had an extraordinary career. He had not hesitated when France had collapsed in 1940, but had been one of the first to
rally to Charles de Gaulle and the Free French. He had proven himself against both Germans and Viet Minh to be an extraordinarily brave and competent officer.

Using extralegal means that included torture, Massu attacked the FLN from the moment his troops arrived in Algiers. The contest was a bloody and ferocious one that the movie “The Battle of Algiers” – one of the greatest war films ever produced – captures. Within eight days of its beginning Massu had broken the general strike, while massive roundups of FLN suspects occurred throughout the city. “Special means” (i.e., torture) allowed Massu’s to break into and then break up the FLN’s secretive and highly compartmentalized structure.
Algeria

- Devastating campaign in the countryside followed
- Extensive use of “special means”
  - Operational successes, but also blowback: growing opposition in France
    - Revived memories of WWII Gestapo torture
  - French win the war, but lose the peace
- “Special means” led to near-breakdown of the French Army
  - Torture led to loss of discipline, atrocities, and eventually loss of civil discipline
  - Motivated military coups of 1958 and 1961

The French military copied Massu’s methods in one form or another over the course of the next five years. And to a considerable extent it achieved military success. Not only did it crush the Algerian guerrillas in the hill and mountain country of the bled, but it was also able to root out much of the FLN’s political infrastructure. By so doing it reinstated a large measure of control over the countryside. This was as complete a military victory as one could achieve over an insurgency without achieving the political aim of a French Algeria with which France had embarked on war.

The difficulty was that France is a democracy. Bit by bit the story of the widespread use of torture by French troops came out in the French press. For a nation which had experienced the atrocities of Nazi occupation barely a decade earlier, this occurrence was simply unacceptable. The result was increasing disaffection in France with the war, which in turn had its impact on how the politicians acted...
and debated. The blowback from the use of torture had a powerful impact on Frenchmen, who increasingly separated themselves from the war and their army. It had an equally powerful negative impact on how the world community viewed the war in Algeria. France found itself increasingly isolated even within the councils of NATO. Finally, the use of torture embittered the native Algerian population to the point that even without the FLN structure, anti-French riots occurred.

Thus, the French army by 1960 found itself increasingly isolated from its own nation. Given the traditions of the French Revolution, this was a bitter experience - one which increasingly led to dangerous talk about the need to clean up the political mess in Paris. The moves that the French government was undertaking in the early 1960s to get France out of Algeria only exacerbated such feelings. Charles de Gaulle, recalled to power by the Algerian troubles in 1958, had by now recognized that politically, a French Algeria made no sense, since France could not assimilate the Muslim population of Algeria without itself losing its own identity and culture. A number of senior and midlevel officers then embarked on a campaign to overthrow de Gaulle's Fifth Republic - so much had the bonds of disciplined obedience to civil authority loosened within the army. In the end they failed, but they added to the pain and suffering that the war had inflicted on Frenchmen and Algerians alike.
**Algeria: The Lessons**

- Political goals must come before military expediency
- Realistic political goals essential
  - Algérie Français not realistic
- Do not underestimate the effects of military actions on people at home
- Thorough understanding of culture, society, and history essential
- The larger political context must influence strategy
- “Special means” will destroy the cohesion of the military and are ultimately self-defeating

The French confronted an extraordinarily difficult situation in Algeria. At the beginning, they underestimated their opponent and the extent of the insurgency. Then when matters spun out of control, they fell back on the belief that any means that would result in military victory were justified. From the beginning they failed to establish realistic political goals. Algérie Français was simply not a realistic goal, given the divide between the two cultures. The Algerians were not about to become Frenchmen, nor in the end would Frenchmen have been all that eager to accept them as such.

The larger political context did not influence the French conduct of the war until de Gaulle got his hands on the levers of power. By then the widespread use of torture and various attempts to launch military coups against the legitimate government had robbed the French army of much of the respect in which the people of France had traditionally held it. And one might note that the actions undertaken by so many soldiers in torturing Algerians or executing atrocities scarred them for life. Even as late as last year, a book by a retired general on the use of torture by the French army caused a scandal in France.
CHAPTER 5: EXPERIENCES POST WWI AND WWII

Germany Post-WWI – Germany Post-WWII

- **November 1918**
  - No thought to changing Germany’s political and cultural frameworks
  - Idealist cant of 14 points
    - Not applied to Sudetenland or Austria
  - No Allied troops on German soil
- **The Paris peace settlement**
  - Germany humiliated, but not permanently suppressed
  - The confusing agenda of reparations
  - Settlement saddled German Republic with impossible political baggage
  - Settlement fell between two stools
  - Exacerbated German desire for revenge

In late July 1918, the German army’s military situation on the Western Front began to unravel. A series of Allied offensives broke on a battered German army that had suffered nearly a million casualties in its spring offensives, which had aimed at knocking the Allies out of the war before the Americans could arrive. On August 8, 1918, the British, aided by a large number of tanks, smashed their way through German lines near Amiens, a defeat which Eric Ludendorff, the virtual dictator of Germany, characterized as the “blackest day” of the war for the German army. In September,

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4. Two recent books have examined in considerable detail the crucial role of the British Army in defeating the Germans in the last six months of the war. See J.P. Harris, with Niell Barr, Armeins to the Armistice, the BEF in the Hundred Days’ Campaign, 8 August – 11 November 1918 (London, 1998); and Timothy Travers, How the War Was Won, Command and Technology in the British Army on the Western Front, 1917 – 1918 (London, 1992).
British and Commonwealth forces broke through the "Hindenburg Line," while American forces drove the Germans out of the St. Mihael salient. By October, German forces in the west were reeling. Battalions were down to company size. Platoons were down to the size of squads.

While defeat was staring the Germans in the face in the west, matters were even worse elsewhere. The army itself was coming apart at the seams; by late summer there were over 700,000 deserters. Meanwhile, Germany's allies were bailing out as fast as they could. In October 1918 the Bulgarian and Turkish governments asked for armistices. Even more disastrous from the German point of view was the collapse of Austria-Hungary, which opened up all of southern Germany to an Allied invasion - and there were no German reserves available to defend the Reich. Finally, to seal Germany's fate, the German people, on the brink of starvation and having suffered horrendous casualties over four years of war, rose in revolt.

The suddenness and completeness of the German collapse caught the Allied powers and the United States by surprise. Virtually everyone expected the war to continue into 1919. Consequently, little to no postwar planning had occurred. At best, Wilson's Fourteen Points, which displayed little knowledge of European realities, represented the only document presenting a framework for a peace. But it also suggested a peace without retribution, an approach with which not only the governments, but the people of France and Britain could not agree - especially the French, given the extent of their losses and the damage the Germans had done to their territory.

The result was a peace treaty that failed to address the fact that Germany remained the most powerful nation in Europe. The treaty was both too harsh and too lenient. On one hand it severed territories from Germany (such as the Polish corridor) which the Germans regarded as traditionally theirs. It saddled the Germans with a clause on reparations for the damage they had caused that

5. Although it is worth noting that the majority of the population living in the Polish corridor in fact regarded themselves as Poles.
only an economically powerful German nation with the potential to
dominate Europe could pay. The treaty, which the Germans had to
sign, also attributed the responsibility for the outbreak of the war in
August 1914 to the German state. Finally, despite the proclamation in
Wilson’s Fourteen Points of the right of national self-determination,
the treaty expressly forbade the Germans and the Austrians from
unification of their states, while it included German-speaking
Sudetens in the new Czech state against their wishes.

All of these factors contributed to a mind-set in Germany that not
only rejected the treaty, but soon created a series of myths that helped
set the stage for the next conflict. The inequities in the peace
settlement led many Germans to believe that the spurious promises
of the Fourteen Points had tricked their nations into surrendering in
1918; that their army had remained unbroken and undefeated in the
field in November 1918; and that Jews and communist traitors at
home had been responsible for the collapse. The fact that Allied
advances of 1918 had yet to cross the frontier into the Reich
reinforced the belief that the German army had not been defeated.
None of these beliefs were true, but truth was far from the minds of
most Germans. The disastrous inflation of 1923 and the catastrophic
depression of the 1930s were then to exacerbate further the dark
feelings of revenge.

6. A claim that the Reichstag hearings of 1924 indicated to be complete nonsense.
Much of the preparation that the British and American policy makers did for the post-World War II settlement reflected their thinking about the mistakes the victorious powers had made in the treatment of Germany after the First World War. This time the settlement would not fall between two stools. The policy of “unconditional surrender” reflected a belief that to make the Germans accept the ensuing peace, the Allies must dictate the peace on the Germans’ own territory. With the help of the fanatics leading the Third Reich, this certainly turned out to be the case. By May 1945 the strategic bombing offensive had smashed all of Germany’s cities to pieces, while across the length and breadth of the Reich, British, Soviet, and American soldiers chased the broken remnants of the Wehrmacht through the rubble.

While in the postwar era many Germans grumbled about how unfair it had been for the Allies to reply to German aggression with overwhelming power, no sane German could argue that his nation had not been crushed. The Allies immediately made clear it would be a victors’ peace. In the east, Soviet and Polish troops drove
millions of Germans out of areas that had been a part of the
Germanies since the Middle Ages. In the west the Americans and
British declared martial law, with curfews and severe constraints on
when and how German civilians could travel. The occupying
powers ruthlessly maintained order. Looters and others who stepped
outside of the bounds of acceptable behavior (as defined by the
Allies) were shot. In the area around the Dachau concentration camp,
American commanders forced the local population not only to walk
through the camp, with its mounds of dead, but to participate in the
burial of those who had not survived the mercies of the Third Reich.

Military administration assumed responsibility for virtually every
aspect of German life. In the case of the Western Powers, the Allies
had begun preparing in 1942 for a large-scale postconflict
administration to administer the political and economic life of the
German population. Staffed with German speakers and economic
and technical advisers, the preparations and ensuing occupation
government ensured there was no break between the occupation of
German territory by combat troops and assumption of control by the
occupation.

Concurrent with the rapid occupation of German territory, the
Allies began a massive hunt for war criminals. In the east the Soviets
shot out-of-hand all members of the SS, including the Waffen SS,
while in the west those who had committed crimes such as the
murder of Allied POWs were tried by summary courts martial and
executed. The major figures in the Nazi regime who survived were
saved for trial at the Nuremberg War Crimes Tribunal, and most
were hanged as a result of guilty verdicts.

Slowly but steadily order returned out of chaos. The diligence
with which the Germans were willing to rebuild their country, as
well as the high level of technological expertise and literacy that
characterized the German population as a whole, helped the process.
But two factors particularly helped in the recovery of the West

7. Although it certainly could not match the raping and looting that was occurring in the
areas that Soviet troops occupied as a result of their military operations.
German economy. The first was the integration of Germany's industrial structure into a larger European-wide market - the European coal and steel community being the first area addressed. Second was the massive inflow of American aid, under the Marshall Plan, which ensured the rapid stabilization and resurgence not only of the German economy but that of Europe as a whole. In the end, the immediate process of postconflict stabilization demanded the commitment of large number of Americans as well as billions of dollars. The success of that effort in building a stable, democratic German state was a major factor in the winning of the Cold War.
Germany Post−WWI − Germany Post WWII

• The settlement 1954−1989
  - Sovereignty returned to Federal Republic in 1954
    o Nine year occupation
    o Extensive de−Nazification
    o Time for growth of new political leadership
    o Time for economic miracle (fueled by American aid)
      » German leadership shared credit for economic improvement
  - Defeat discredited the old elite
  - Careful pre−May 1945 preparations for sustained occupation
    essential component in success
  - By 1954, Germans felt they were full partners with West

In 1954 the Allies returned sovereignty to the West Germans and their new Federal Republic. The nine years of occupation, as well as the experiences of World War II, had created a different nation from the one that had gone to war in 1939. From the point of view of justice, the procedures of de−Nazification never reached sufficiently into West German society to winnow out all the war criminals. However, there was never a threat that right wing revanchism would ever again establish itself as a significant political force in Germany.8

There were now four key elements in the Federal Republic’s success in comparison to the failure of the post−World War I Weimar Republic. First, there was no question among most Germans as to who had lost the war. Second, the Soviet−administered zone of East Germany – later called the German Democratic Republic – made it clear to most West Germans that there was no alternative to

8. This was particularly true with regards to the German military. Moreover, once the Federal Republic achieved its independence from Allied controls, it was to release large numbers of Germans who had been convicted of war crimes by Allied courts.
cooperation with the West and acceptance of the post-World War II world they had done so much to create. But two other factors were also important: first, the nine years of strict occupation allowed for the growth of a new generation of German political leaders. Equally important was the fact that American aid, reconstruction efforts by the Germans themselves, and integration into the Western European economic community created the basis for the economic miracle of the next 20 years, which solidified the Bundesrepublik's political framework.

By 1956, Germany's growing economic power and the stability of its political institutions created the possibility of the Federal Republic's full integration into NATO and the Western Alliance. That integration allowed for German rearmament and the integration of its military forces into NATO – a reality that few could have foreseen in 1954. The success of American and British postconflict operations reflected the careful and thorough planning of the occupation, the provision of sufficient military and occupation forces and resources, and the far-sighted economic and political policies that underlined a deep and coherent understanding of German society and culture and what had failed in the occupation policies of the period after World War I.
CHAPTER 6: BRITISH PRESENCE IN IRAQ AND THE MIDDLE EAST, 1914-1922

**Changing British and European Attitudes Toward the Ottoman Empire in Early 20th Century**

- European powers had long assumed that the Ottoman Empire would collapse
- During the nineteenth century, British supported Ottomans against European, particularly Russian, expansion
- British strategy in Middle East changed with onset of World War I
  - Oil entered the picture in the early twentieth century but not yet decisive (reserves not known, strategic demand mostly naval)
  - When Ottoman Empire allied with Germany, British reversed policy

Overall, British strategy and policy in the Middle East was successful during the period between 1914 and 1932, in spite of sustaining several hundred thousand Empire casualties in Gallipoli in 1915, and surrendering an entire army in Mesopotamia to the Turks in 1916. How did the British manage to succeed?

Before the war, the British had sustained the Ottoman Empire in order to keep Russia from dominating the straits and the Byzantine-Slavic states of the Balkans. But at the same time Britain had occupied Egypt, carved out a sphere of influence in southern Iran, and extended a cozy protectorate over most of the coastline emirates of the Arabian Peninsula. These protectorates were of increasing strategic significance because the minor emirs sat on a vast table of...
crude oil. The Royal Navy decided to convert its battle fleet from coal-fired propulsion to oil in 1912, and this area was to be its future source of fuel.

Turkey's turn to the Central Powers forced the British Empire to make a quick strategic volte-face. The defeats that came in the united effort to dismember the Ottoman Empire did not overturn the war effort, and the British Empire (including significant Australian, Indian, and Egyptian forces as well as British) eventually prevailed.
British Appetite for Empire/
Nation-Building Plummet

- 1919: Fatigue trimmed tolerance for imperial adventures
- Fromkin thesis: "The long-expected European imperial adventure in the Middle East had...begun too late; Europeans could no longer pursue it either with adequate resources or with a whole heart."
- By 1919, the British had reversed their views on the Middle East
  - Parliament and the press clamored for withdrawal from costly remote areas
  - By 1922, Churchill eliminated 75 percent of Britain’s expenditures in the Middle East, from 45M £ to 11M £
- Public no longer accepted arguments for increased empire
  - Only Churchill’s ingenious strategy of doing things on the cheap made the British presence viable, for a time, but sowed seeds for departure

British society was not only fatigued at war’s end: it was exhausted. The empire’s dead in the Great War totaled almost three-quarters of a million men. Britain’s economy was in the doldrums, and the borrowing from America to finance the war had left its Exchequer in a parlous state — certainly in the mind of His Majesty’s government. And then there was the growing situation in Ireland.

But now the British Empire — with the French ensconced on the old Crusader coast of Lebanon — occupied nearly the whole of the Ottoman Empire outside of its Turkic heartland. The victors, though no longer fired by Victorian colonial appetites of old, wanted to keep control. In this, however, they were defied. The Turks declared complete independence in 1920, while the Arabs immediately followed suit in Damascus. This was intolerable — especially in terms of Faisal and the Arabs.

As for the Turks, the Greeks could be — and were — easily encouraged to quash them. But the Arabs were another matter. They longed for national recognition, and while His Majesty’s government.
was in no mood to rule them — with an electorate tired of foreign commitments, and a domestic political scene obsessed by Ireland — neither did it wish to let them go. If it gave up control there, then Egypt (and the Suez Canal) could be next, and the canal was important for access to oil. Furthermore, the Imperial web around India had to be protected.

So the British marshaled its new technologies from the recent war: aircraft, armored cars, and gas bombs. A smaller, transformed military could manage the Arab world “on the cheap.” Winston Churchill — as Minister of War and Air — was this vision’s greatest proponent and a man clearly ahead of his time.
British imperial strategy had acquired in its halcyon Victorian days, for better or worse, a neuralgic focus and perpetual self-exculpation in the framework of guarding the Indian Empire. After the Great War, this focus fixed on the great Singapore naval base in the Far East and the Suez Canal in the Near East. These two geographical features represented the anchoring hubs around which to festoon garlands of lesser strong points. The British now proceeded to integrate the Middle East into the Suez hub, the region being of strategic importance in and of itself because of its oil reserves.

Thus, for example, control of Egypt and Palestine protected the canal directly. Aden and Somaliland protected the nether end of the Red Sea leading to the canal from the South, while Cyprus did the same from the north. It was a tracery-like worldview driven by an old Victorian and naval-cartographic vision of strategy. But it nonetheless determined the British definition of “interest” in Iraq, or for that matter, almost every place in the Middle East.
A faraway but intrusive difficulty, however, had emerged. The brief comet of American idealism, embodied by Woodrow Wilson at Versailles, had flared even over the skies of an Arab world the British considered primitive. In the wake of victory that they had secured ("saving" European civilization), the authority of American ideas forced otherwise sober British statesmen into ringing declarations of their own. They assured "liberation" and "self-determination" for all. These would soon, in a new entity called Iraq, get them into trouble.
Military Occupation in Iraq

“"Our armies do not come into your cities and lands as conquerors or enemies, but liberators."” - Lt. Gen. Sir Frederick Stanley Maude, 3/19/17

- Small ground force
  - Troop levels in Iraq slashed from wartime totals of 270,000 in 1918 to 14,000 in 1920
- "Air control" strategy
  - Revolutionary (and economical) military innovation
  - Gave purpose to post-WWI RAF
  - Allowed Churchill to slash military budget for Iraq from £25M to £4M
- June 1920 revolt
  - 130,000 Iraqis launch uprising
  - 1,000 Empire troops killed, 8,500 Iraqis by February 1921 when revolt ends
  - Major reinforcements required
- Iraqi army (1921) built up to augment RAF in internal security
  - Hoped to keep army small and representative, but became focus of Sunni authority
  - Grew significantly after independence in 1932

Political scientists often hold up British military occupation in Iraq as classic postcolonial management — it suppressed an authentic revolt against recent foreign occupation, not on the basis of Britain’s right to rule, but rather Britain’s obligation to fulfill the mandate of international authority. It is noteworthy as well that British intervention in Mesopotamia had replaced the former Ottoman “regime.” Thus Britain was not simply in the business of occupying—as in “stabilizing”—but also building a new state—as in “reconstruction.” In November 1918, the British declared that their goal was “the complete and final liberation of the peoples who have for so long been oppressed by the Turks, and the setting up of national governments and administrations that shall derive their authority from the free exercise of the initiative and choice of the indigenous population.”

The Kurds’ leader, Sheikh Mahmud al-Barzani, took this pledge so seriously that it is alleged that he kept a copy of it in an amulet as a talisman. Within six months the Kurds had set up a state in northern Iraq, which Imperial forces then crushed in May 1919. But other
Iraqis also took British declarations of support for Iraqi self-determination seriously. Furthermore, there was the eloquent example of Faisal fêted in Damascus — if Arab liberation had been so encouraged and hyped in Syria, then why not in Iraq?

Part of the problem was that Iraq was being run by the India Office, and occupied by Indian and British troops from the Indian army. This meant that although there were debates in Parliament and the Foreign Office about Iraqi’s political fate and future, such arguments had little practical impact on what actually happened. The civil commissioner for Iraq did not believe even in protectorate status; rather he wanted direct British rule. His assistant Gertrude Bell (the FAO equivalent) agreed: “The people of Mesopotamia, having witnessed the successful termination of the war, had taken it for granted that the country would remain under British control and were as a whole content to accept the decision of arms.”

They were not. Coming on the heels of recent declarations of Turkish and Arab nationalism in Constantinople and Damascus, the revolt in Iraq was more of a traditional tribal and religious revolt. The Shi’a of Iraq rose up when the British in their effrontery tried to tax them. There were at the time only some 14,000 Indian army regulars in Iraq, and they were soon in difficulty. The authority in Baghdad urgently requested reinforcements.

Those soon arrived, in sufficient numbers to put down the revolt quite savagely. Most Imperial losses were Indian; however, this fact did not get in the way of outcry in England. T.E. Lawrence was blistering in his denunciation: “The people of England have been led in Mesopotamia into a trap from which it will be hard to escape with dignity and honour. ... We say we are in Mesopotamia to develop it for the benefit of the world. ... How long will we permit millions of pounds, thousands of Imperial troops, and tens of thousands of Arabs to be sacrificed on behalf of colonial administration that can benefit only its administrators?”
British Governance and Iraqi Reactions

- Strong internal British debate over goals in Iraq
- British dominated Iraqi politics
  - Instituted constitutional monarchy
  - Established Sunni minority as ruling elite, keep Kurds and Shi'a from power
  - British-ran Iraqi civil service (1,000 British in Iraqi civil service by 1920)
- Iraqis revolted in 1920
- The new state of Iraq:
  - Sunni minority rule
  - Military the power broker in state; tool for Sunni control
  - Weak democratic institutions
    - Parliament quickly loses semblance of "popular representation"
    - Series of coups begin shortly after 1932 independence

Sufficient reserves from India — amounting to several divisions before the revolt was suppressed — contained the crisis, but highlighted a broader strategic problem for continued British imperial management of the Arab Middle East: money. Britain could not possibly keep nearly 100,000 Imperial troops in Iraq indefinitely; it needed another approach.

Britain applied Churchill’s vision of military transformation based on high-technology systems to Iraq. Although Royal Air Force (RAF) aircraft deployed to Iraq had a great effect, and although Churchill suggested constantly that they had played a decisive role in beating the revolt, there was much controversy as to their actual impact on operations.

Nonetheless, the myth of the RAF in the 1920 revolt created a mission that Chief of the Air Staff Hugh Trenchard ran with. The new mission fit the expectation that technology could triumph over mere primitives; furthermore, it was relatively cheap. Short of an actual, full-scale insurrection (the Iraqis had fielded 130,000 fighters), the
aircraft of the day could bring light machine guns into play against tribesmen and flatten mud villages with modest explosive ordnance. They were the perfect policing vehicle, and soon became ubiquitous across the British Middle East, active variously against Egyptian rioters, Sudanese pastoralists, and Somali nomads.

In the wake of insurrection, how did the British govern Iraq? The revolt forced a compromise, and a partial accommodation. The British agreed to give the Iraqi nationalists a measure of autonomy, and gave them a king — the very Faisal who had caused so much trouble in Damascus. Nevertheless, they insisted on setting everything up their way. Britain first created a provisional governing authority, then drafted a constitution according to British values, and finally concluded the process with a treaty between Britain and Iraq drawn up by British diplomats: a treaty wholly favorable to British interests. The reality of the mandate, though not its form, persisted for another 10 years until Iraqis finally — after much agitation — gained real independence in 1932.

Looking back it is easy to criticize the political "solution" the British advanced. To better serve Imperial interests, they had overseen the creation of a state that favored the Sunni minority over the Shi'a majority; whose parliament was shaky, with more than 50 cabinets in 33 years; and whose stability was ultimately undergirded by the Iraqi army. It was the army, of course, that finally ended both monarchy and constitution in 1958.
Lessons From British Experience

- **Set realistic and realizable goals**
  - Continuously assess strategy to ensure it remains valid

- **Ensure sufficiency of forces to achieve objectives**
  - Undermanned garrisons only embolden insurgent movements

- **Understand the culture**
  - Ignorance of Islam and local culture significantly undermined British effort
  - British expected Muslim opposition to modernity would vanish
  - Imposition of an alien and artificial state over disparate and disputatious population created modern Iraq

- **Empowering military or ethnic minority may secure short-run stability, but foster long-term structural problems**
  - Created system of control rather than governance in Iraq

The four lessons numerated on the facing page do not really speak to the British experience in Iraq — they speak to our own.

1- **Set realistic and realizable goals.** The British did that, but they had to crush a major insurrection and continually put down minor rebellions in order to do it. Overall they realized their strategic goal in Iraq. Even after real independence was finalized in 1932, the British retained key bases in Southern Iraq, and that was what they really needed. The British had no problem keeping and using military forces in Iraq indefinitely. (Imperial forces were in Iraq from 1914 until well after World War II.)

2- **Ensure sufficiency of forces to achieve objectives.** The British knew the importance of that principle too, but they simply felt they did not have the money to keep a large garrison in Iraq. Nevertheless they wished to hold on to the place, so they took risks. When faced with a large-scale rebellion, they had sufficient strategic reserves nearby (in India) and could get them in-theater within weeks. As a
corollary to (1), the British never kept large forces in Iraq for extended periods, but preferred small garrisons, financed by the Indian exchequer.

3- Understand the culture. British administrators possessed a flawed and limited understanding of the peoples and cultures of Mesopotamia, but in the end that really did not matter — at least to them in the early 1920s. After four hundred years of Turkish rule, Iraq was a society with no mature political elites. It was predominantly a tribal society, and as the British amply demonstrated, modern states and their military can deal with tribal societies. By the early 1930s, however, all this had changed, and has continued to change, as Americans have seen in Iraq over the past year and a half.

4- Empowering a minority may secure short-run stability, but will eventually foster long-term problems. The British did not care about long-term problems. They simply wanted to run the country with a minimum of effort. Within a short time, events revealed the path they would have to take to ensure Imperial security, while letting go of direct rule. To the British, long-term direct rule or even a protectorate was always a preference rather than a necessity. Their strategic aim was a state that tolerated British bases on its soil — and that is what they got. Beyond that, they held on to as much influence in Iraq for as long as was convenient. In the event, their administrators created a state that lasted as long as the British Empire had — or required — influence in the region. The British simply did not worry about, or demand, from Iraq the sorts of things that Americans are demanding today.
Post Reconstruction
The American Civil War

Chapter 7: Post Reconstruction: The American Civil War

American Civil War

- 1865: Complete Union victory
  - Destruction of Richmond; occupation of Virginia
  - Sherman's destruction of Georgia, South Carolina, and North Carolina
  - Thorough destruction of Hood's Army
  - Wilson's massive cavalry raid across Alabama and Mississippi, April 1865
- Results of victory
  - A devastated South: chimneyvilles
  - Broken and divided society
  - One out of two Southern males between 15 and 50 either KIA or maimed
- Attitude of Union officer corps
  - Welcome Southern states back into Union
  - Brothers again under the same flag

By spring 1865, Union military victory in the American Civil War was complete. Robert E. Lee and his Army of Northern Virginia had surrendered to Grant at Appomattox, and Richmond was in ruins. Johnston surrendered to Sherman in North Carolina, after Sherman had destroyed most of Georgia, South Carolina, and North Carolina. Thomas had shattered Hood's army in the west at the Battle of Franklin, while Wilson's massive cavalry raid through Alabama and Mississippi wrecked the remainder of the South's economic power east of the Mississippi River. Union troops derisively referred to Southern towns as "chimneyvilles" for the forest of chimneys that remained from burned-out houses and other buildings in hundreds, if not thousands, of Southern towns. The Shenandoah Valley, breadbasket to much of Virginia, was in ruins.
Moreover, the South’s transportation and manufacturing infrastructure had for all intents and purposes ceased to exist, and its agricultural output had fallen drastically. The war had broken and divided Southern society. Moreover, the war had killed or maimed half of white Southern males between the ages of fifteen and 50. Slaves, the bulk of many well-to-do Southerners’ assets, were now free, thus shattering the financial basis of the South’s economy.

Nonetheless, the Union officer corps, once brothers to Southern officers in the prewar U.S. Army, many of them classmates at West Point, believed that a quick reconciliation with their former compatriots was probable.
American Civil War (cont’d)

- **One of two basic issues solved:**
  - United States now a singular noun, not plural

- **Race issue had not been solved**
  - Slavery prompted the states rights issue that resulted in war
  - Abolition raised issue of what should happen to the Freedmen
    - Education?
    - Civil rights?
    - Position in society?

- **Lincoln did considerable thinking about post–Civil War period, but confided in few**
  - Sustained period of occupation experienced from 1862 in conquered areas
  - No systemic planning for postwar period
    - Triumph of hope over experience in thinking about postwar attitudes of South

The war’s outcome had confirmed the preeminence of the Union. The change ran deep; whereas before the War Between the States, the United States was considered a plural noun (“the United States are . . .”), usage following the war made the term singular (“the United States is . . .”).

Unfortunately, the one man who had given serious thought to the orderly reconstruction of the South lay dead of an assassin’s bullet in April 1865 as the war came to an end. Abraham Lincoln had communicated few of his reconstruction plans outside his immediate staff, so whatever systemic planning had occurred disappeared. Following his death, a political vacuum resulted that attracted congressional radicals, moderates, and disobedient cabinet members in a dysfunctional administration. The result was an inconsistent program of military rule, new laws, and constitutional amendments that had little lasting effect on the South, as well as a great constitutional crisis that nearly resulted in the impeachment of a sitting president.
The resulting power struggle led to chaotic actions aimed at restructuring Southern society, both economically and racially. Freedmen's Bureaus, schooling for blacks, voting supervised by Union troops, the 13th and 14th amendments to the Constitution, and the adoption of new state laws and constitutions all aimed at leaving the South repentant of slavery and establishing racial equality. The reconstruction did not, however, produce lasting economic reform that provided blacks economic viability - poorly prepared as they were to assume an equal role in the South, while whites of all classes opposed economic and social reform. By failing to achieve its goals, post-Civil War reconstruction established the base for a Southern culture that persisted in its inequalities until the 1960s.
Occupying Union troops confronted many problems. The South lay in ruins. The war had destroyed its infrastructure thoroughly. Southern whites, resentful at having lost the war, were deeply antagonistic toward occupying troops. Moreover, their culture was incapable of adapting to the industrial age, with many previously prosperous Southerners destitute. Furthermore, the educational system, never strong, had served only the elite. The bulk of the Southern populace was barely literate. Two hundred years of slave-based society had aimed at keeping the blacks passive (“in their place”).

The North dedicated neither money nor leadership to achieve its postwar abolitionist aims. When reform finally came during the Grant administration, it was too little and too late. Hatred of outsiders (“carpetbaggers”) and local reformers (“scallywags”) remained powerful influences and stymied meaningful reform.
The Reconstruction's punitive measures ceased in 1877 following the election of Rutherford B. Hayes as president, leaving Southern blacks again in servitude – this time economic – to Southern whites. State constitutions and laws perpetuated the inequality of the races – a situation that persisted for another 90 years.

The triumph of hope over experience, advocated by the abolitionists, to change attitudes of the South remained a dream. While the American Civil War's postconflict period did succeed in outwardly pacifying the South, it left a legacy of internal racial conflict perpetuated by organizations such as the Ku Klux Klan, "Jim Crow" laws, and popular prejudices that resulted in the lynching and terrorizing of the South's blacks.
CHAPTER 8: THE ROMAN EXPERIENCE

What the Roman Empire Suggests:
30 BC – 235 AD.

- Roman strategic problem similar to that of United States today
  - How do you achieve world security?
- Jerusalem and Masada not typical of how the Romans ran their world
  - But when necessary, they crushed intractable opponents
- 300 years of success due to careful weighing of interests
  - External wars carefully calculated: Britain, Dacia, Parthia, Germany
  - Interventions of two type: permanent fix, or teach the natives a lesson
  - Appear to have taken both long-term and short-term into account
  - Thorough understanding of opponents
  - Willing to manipulate the barbarians; ultimate goal was to co-opt them
  - Post conflict aimed at bringing stability, economic advantages, and good government to defeated (those not sold into slavery)

The history of the early Roman Empire, which encompasses the years 30 B.C. to 235 A.D., contains much that is worthy of note in comparison with the complex strategic environment that the United States confronts at the beginning of the twenty-first century. The Romans controlled the entire Mediterranean basin from the Straits of Gibraltar to the watershed of the Mesopotamian Valley and from the southernmost reaches of the Nile Valley to the border of modern-day Scotland. On most of their frontiers they confronted barbarians whose fondest wish was to attack and loot the territories controlled by Rome.

The Romans protected all of this vast territory with a relatively small force structure – approximately 25 to 30 legions (150,000 legionaries) and 150,000 auxiliary troops. Because theirs was a subsistence economy, the Romans could not afford to spend greater
sums on the Empire’s defense. At the same time, they confronted
dangerous enemies on their borders. In the north a variety of
German, Dacian, and Gothic tribes threatened the Rhine and Danube
frontiers with varying degrees of intensity, while in the east the
Parthian kingdom remained a constant danger to the security of the
eastern provinces.

Roman strategic policy had to balance carefully the Empire’s
economic vitality against its strategic needs. Thus, the Romans
carefully calculated the wars they had to fight in terms of whether
they should merely undertake punitive expeditions or wars of
outright conquest. The latter involved far greater expenses in both
the short term as well as the long term. The conquest of Britain in the
first century A.D. aimed at removing a substantial cultural threat to
Gaul’s stability. Similarly, in the conquest of Dacia in the early
second century, the Dacians had become such a threat to the
Danubian frontier that the Romans felt it necessary to conquer an
area that today consists of modern-day Romania.

In both cases the postconflict phase involved major long-term
expenses: roads, bridges, aqueducts, and towns all had to be
constructed, in addition to new camps for the legions and auxiliaries.
Postconflict operations may have represented the most successful
aspect of Roman military operations. The Latin heritage of France,
Belgium, the Rhineland, and Rumania centuries after Roman
conquest all point to the success of Roman occupation in bringing
those areas into the framework of Roman civilization.
What the Roman Empire Suggests (cont'd)

- Able to weigh costs and benefits of permanent versus short-term occupation
  - Fundamental aim: security of the empire
  - Abandoned German conquest early in first century
    - Military defeat at Teutoburgwald incidental
    - For next 200 years consistently crushed Germans in battle
      - But only incorporated south Germany into empire
    - North Germany would have provided more defensible frontier
      - But new territory would not have been a paying concern
  - Abandoned Parthian conquests in early second century as:
    - Too difficult to defend
    - Too alien a civilization
  - Never allowed empire to be seen as defeated

The fundamental aim of Roman policy at the strategic level was the security of the territories under imperial sway. The conquest of new territories inevitably added new burdens on the Empire's hard-pressed treasury. War did not pay for war. And the postconflict phase was inevitably expensive over a considerable period of time. In some cases, such as in Dacia, it is doubtful whether the new territory ever paid for itself.

There were territories on the Roman frontier that the Romans knew simply could not pay for themselves. Germany was a case in point. Under the early empire, Augustus and his generals had attempted to move the frontier from the Rhine and the Danube to the Elbe. That effort had culminated in the disastrous defeat in the Teutoburgwald, where the Germans massacred three Roman legions, as a result of the incompetence of the Roman general. At this point the Romans decided that the conquest of Germany was not worth the costs it would entail.
Nevertheless, they still had to deal with the German problem. For the next two centuries they solved that problem by a variety of means. First and most important was diplomacy and indirect interventions, which aimed at preventing the Germans from uniting and thus posing a direct military threat. When that failed, the Romans conducted quick strikes aimed at warning the Germans. And if that failed, the Romans were willing to carry out massive military campaigns, which invariably devastated the territory from the Elbe to the Rhine. In the period after the defeat at Teutoburgwald, three of the foremost generals of the early Republic, Drusus, Tiberius—later successor to Augustus as emperor—and Drusus’s son Germanicus, carried out a series of major campaigns to underscore to the German tribes that the battle of Teutoburgwald was not what they could expect in fighting the Romans.

Similarly, against the Parthians the Romans carried out a mixture of diplomacy, political maneuvering with the border states, and major campaigns when the Parthians appeared to pose too great a threat. In the early second century A.D., the great soldier-emperor Trajan actually conquered the Mesopotamian Valley and destroyed most of Parthia’s military power. But his successor Hadrian decided that the cost of maintaining Roman control over Mesopotamia would be too great, and withdrew the legions back to the eastern frontiers of Anatolia and Syria.
### Chapter 9: Lessons of History

**The Difficulties of Postconflict Period**

- Military defeat of the enemy forces essential but not sufficient to achieve long-term aims
- Enemy society as a whole only defeated when it psychologically accepts defeat
  - After the U.S. Civil War, South refuses to acknowledge defeat
  - After World War I, Germans refuse to acknowledge defeat
  - After defeat of FLN, civilian population in Algeria refuses to acknowledge defeat
- Postconflict success often depends on significant political changes
  - Barriers to transformation of opponent’s society immense
  - U.S. military not prepared to deal with such transitions
- Security is a key component of postconflict success

Perhaps the most basic theme in the history of the past two millennia is that military victory in war is a precondition to realizing the political goals for which war has been fought, but is rarely sufficient for the achievement of long-term aims. There is of course the example of Rome's treatment of Carthage in the Third Punic War, when the Romans simply executed or sold into slavery the entire Carthaginian population. But this has been the exception throughout history, even with regards to the Romans.

One of the crucial issues involved in a successful postconflict period has been the willingness of the enemy society to recognize that it has been defeated. Without that acceptance, the defeated have inevitably bided their time with the aim of overturning the result. In the American South after the Civil War, Southerners invented a series of myths aimed at whitewashing the extent of their defeat. The
South's aristocracy was able to strike a deal with northern politicians that allowed it to restore its position at the expense of poor whites and blacks. As a result, they changed their society and culture to a minimum degree. The result was that the economic development of the rest of the country largely skipped the South, while a racist ideology further exacerbated the region's distance from the rest of the nation. Outside of the abolition of slavery, no major political changes were able to outlast Reconstruction.

The example of Germany after the First World War is even more graphic. By November 1918, the German army confronted general collapse on the Western Front, hundreds of thousands of deserters at home, and (with the collapse of Austria-Hungary) Allied armies invading the defenseless borders of the Reich from the south over the Italian Alps and through the Balkans. Yet within a little over a year, the majority of the German population, particularly those in the upper and middle classes, had become firmly convinced that the German army had not been defeated and that their leaders had been tricked into agreeing to an armistice. That myth provided the basis for the pernicious Nazi argument that Germany had been stabbed in the back by communists and Jews - a myth that was to have a devastating impact on European history. Not until after World War II would Germany go through the political and cultural changes that would fundamentally alter its position in Europe and the world. Nor was there anyone left in Germany in 1945 who believed that the Allies had not completely defeated the Wehrmacht.

Finally, it is necessary to underline that security has been a key component in postconflict success. The success of the Allied occupation of Germany after World War II rested to a considerable degree on the toughness with which the Western Powers administered their zones. The contrast with Panama, where riots and looting were rampant for over a month, could not be more graphic. Stability has invariably provided the basis on which all else - economic, political, and cultural reconstruction - has rested. Where it has not been present, the inevitable result has been the failure of postconflict efforts to enable political and cultural changes.
The Difficulties of Postconflict Period (cont'd)

- Difficult to craft combat operations that maximize postconflict success
- Insistence on rapid decisive operations could lead to postconflict difficulties
- Time and patience essential components in all transitions
- Nuanced, careful approach essential to achieving long-term results
- Since 1965, increasingly difficult for United States to influence world public opinion positively
  - Consistent problems in selling Vietnam, Grenada, El Salvador, missile deployments in Europe, Panama, First Gulf War and Somalia
  - Also trends in the Middle East
- Clear and attainable goals essential

The recent example of Iraq suggests that concepts such as rapid decisive operations may have fundamental flaws at their heart. Too rapid a defeat of the enemy's conventional forces may have two deleterious effects. First, if conventional victory comes too quickly, the enemy population may not accept the reality of defeat. Second, it may allow many of the defeated force to melt into the population in preparation for a resumption of the struggle on another level. Moreover, the very nature of violent combat operations may well create unintended collateral damage that makes the political settlement in the postconflict period that much more difficult to realize.

Concepts such as rapid decisive operations suggest an American desire to end a conflict as quickly as possible and return U.S. troops to their regular peacetime duties. The difficulty with such an approach is that successful postconflict operations have inevitably required sustained commitments of resources and, above all, time. The postconflict period in the zones of the defeated Germany
occupied by the Western Powers lasted until 1954 – nine years after the Third Reich had gone down in defeat. Hundreds of thousands of American, British, and French troops had to execute the occupation, while economic aid, including the Marshall Plan, added up to billions of dollars. Yet, the most successful contributor to the success of the postconflict period may well have been the willingness of the German people to rebuild their country and society within the framework that the occupiers provided.
What's Old About the Emerging World?

- Thucydides and Clausewitz are still right:
  - Human nature will remain the same
    - Ambition, fear, invidia, anger, and fanaticism will dominate
  - War and violence will play their part
  - Strategic ambiguity and uncertainty will remain
  - Friction and mistaken calculations will continue
- Religious and cultural motivations crucial
- Americans don't understand ourselves and how different we are
  - Our ignorance of our own history, as well as of others, is extraordinary

There was considerable debate in the decade after U.S. and coalition forces destroyed the Iraqi forces in the Kuwaiti theater of operations in Operation DESERT STORM. Many in Washington - within as well as outside the military - claimed that the wave of new information and computer-based technologies had made the old verities of historians like Thucydides and theorists like Clausewitz irrelevant in an era when U.S. forces would see and understand everything in the battle space. Thus, war waged in the future by the United States would be swift, decisive, and virtually without casualties for American forces. Events in Iraq since March 2003 have highlighted the fact that such views were premature, to say the least.

In fact, what has happened in Iraq has served to reiterate that because nations fight wars for political purposes, military victory (no matter how decisive) does not necessarily translate into the achievement of political aims. Equally important, the events in Iraq have again underlined that in war, ambiguity and uncertainty dominate every facet of operations. U.S. forces in Iraq may have had
“information dominance” – amorphous and inchoate as that term is – but they certainly did not have knowledge dominance – nor do they have such dominance today. To put it bluntly, they never possessed an understanding of the political and religious nature of their opponent.

Even during the rapid coalition campaign that over threw Saddam Hussein's regime, commanders, staffs, and troops lived in a world of uncertainty. Friction is an inevitable part of war and its aftermath. Technology may have mitigated some of the frictions that have in the past affected the conduct of military operations, but it has added new ones in their place. As the new sciences have been underlining over the past 20 years, man lives in an unpredictable and uncertain universe, where predictability is simply not in the cards.

As in the past, the events in Iraq have also served to emphasize that religious and cultural motivations are crucial in determining human behavior. The only way to understand the motivations of an opponent is by having a real understanding of the historical and religious framework that has molded his culture. It is clear that Americans who waged the war and who have attempted to mold the aftermath have had no clear idea of the framework that has molded the personalities and attitudes of Iraqis. Finally, it might help if Americans and their leaders were to show less arrogance and more understanding of themselves and their place in history. Perhaps more than any other people, Americans display a consistent amnesia concerning their own past, as well as the history of those around them.
What's New About the Emerging World?

- Political correctness prevents us from speaking to our interests
- Pervasive media influence
  - The U.S. government has been ineffective in adapting
- Our opponents have easy access to our world
- WMD represent threat of catastrophic damage by a few
- Compression of time and speed of real-time coverage
- Tactical events have strategic impact

The world of the twenty-first century is increasingly becoming a world of stunning contrasts. It is also a world that has become interlinked by waves of technological change. The Internet is bringing the world closer together. But at the same time it is making the disparities and differences between rich and poor, between Western and Islamic civilizations, between new and old, clearer and sharper. Those who are or will be America's opponents also have much easier access to the First World - and the United States - than they did in the past. In a world where weapons of mass destruction proliferate, this factor carries with it great significance. It will inevitably force the United States and its allies to intervene in many parts of the world – better an away game than a home game in order to deal with these kinds of threats.

Moreover, the media now has a pervasive presence. It can at times drive policy. At other times it can thwart or sabotage policy. It has no responsibilities except to itself. It is global in reach, but parochial in understanding. The speed of coverage from reporters on
the scene to television screens around the world already has narrowed down the options that policy makers possess. It also means that actions by a corporal on a street in Baghdad can have wide-ranging strategic consequences. The actions of a few wayward soldiers at the Abu Gharib prison have had an enormous impact on the image of the United States throughout much of the Islamic world. The pictures of soldiers taunting and demeaning their Arab prisoners will haunt U.S. information operations for decades. Policy makers and military leaders must pay the closest attention to how their subordinates act in a world where perceptions may count for more than actions.
LESSONS OF HISTORY

What Questions Does History Suggest We Should Ask in Preparing for Postconflict Operations?

- How does this war fit into a larger strategic framework?
- What are U.S. goals?
  - How do short-term political and military goals relate to the larger context of American strategy and policy?
  - Long-term political goals?
- What is the nature of U.S. opponent?
  - How does his history and culture mold his - versus our - view of the world?
  - What are the change forces in his society?
    - What factors drive his toward stability or instability?
  - What is the prospect for economic stability?
  - What is the educational level?
  - How does he think of us?
  - What is the basis for future relationships with us?
- What does history suggest about employing military force in similar historical contexts?
- Can we assess the staying power of the United States in prolonged postconflict operations?
- What are our alternatives, if things go south?
- Have we challenged our assumptions rigorously?

One of the unexamined aspects of the concept of effects-based operations is the need to focus on the political aims for which military force is being employed. It would seem, therefore, that political and military leaders must focus not only on the short-term effects of military operations that begin a conflict, but on the long-term goals of U.S. strategic policy as well. Therefore, it would seem that planners and policy makers must make every effort to elicit and develop clear and realizable goals that span the entire spectrum from the initiation of hostilities through to the end of occupation and the postconflict phase.

Such questions should cover a broad range of topics. They should move beyond an examination of America’s political goals to those of its opponents and even to the nature of the opponent’s regime. Such questions might include the following: What are his goals? How does he view the world? The United States? What are the influences of history, culture, religion, and ideology on his world view? They should also examine historical analogies. At the same time, U.S.
goals, concepts, and understanding should receive coherent and well-thought-out challenges from red teams that examine the most fundamental assumptions underlying U.S. policy, no matter how uncomfortable those challenges make military and political leaders. Finally, if things deteriorate, serious thinking and preparations must provide alternatives to the initial course and design.
What Does History Suggests About Postconflict Operations

- Conflicts have always led to postconflict operations
  - Major conflicts require sustained postwar efforts
- Time is of the essence – there must be no gap between conflict and postconflict
- Transition and reconstruction require security and stability
  - Long-term not just an extension of short-term
  - Maintenance of order crucial
  - Economic reconstruction efforts must fit within societal context
- Successful postconflict operations still demand significant manpower and resource commitment
- Conflicts within target society may exacerbate difficulties in transition phase

One of the inevitable results of war is that there will be a postconflict period, and the greater the war or military action, the greater will be the challenges of the postconflict period. Here time is of the essence. Where postconflict efforts have worked in the past, there has been no gap between the end of conventional military actions and a seamless transition to postconflict operations. Planning for the postconflict period must begin in concert with the planning for military operations, and it must begin as military operations are ongoing. The model here is World War II, and the planning for and the execution of postconflict operations in Germany. This is particularly important, because the maintenance of order is the essential precondition to all other efforts at reconstruction: economic, judicial, political, and cultural. Only a seamless transition between military and postconflict operations will ensure the maintenance of civil order.

The case of Germany after World War II is a particularly good example of a seamless transition from war to peace – one that rested
on an absolutely firm grip on the conquered territory, one that ensured order - in some cases with ruthless determination. All of this took extensive manpower and resources for nearly a decade until the German economy and democracy were in a position to stand on their own. Finally, one should not minimize the difficulties that the defeated society may present in terms of internal tribal and religious conflicts, which must be muted if there is to be success in the postconflict period. Here the German occupation enjoyed a significant advantage, given the homogeneity of German society.
Identity drives how people think and act ... and identity is all about culture and history. In this sense, “human nature” — as we observe it — expresses and exemplifies the overarching patterns of human existence. These patterns lie at the existential level, and thus we are not truly aware of them even as we speak them.

The United States — in the form of its American ethos — represents to others a potent cultural cocktail of “modernity” aggressively packaged as both promise and threat. Yet as Americans we see ourselves very differently, as offering a universally correct and even sacred framework through which the world can be redeemed. We like to say that religion still frames reality for much of the world — but we should not forget that such a sacred and determinant belief system also frames our own reality as well.

We go even further in our assumptions and assert that people do not like change. But as a deeply conservative society, we also have problems with real change. We like to see change as a transforming
agent that we offer to others — others who must change and become more like us if they are ever to have the good things we have. Thus their change, becoming more like us, ratifies our perception that we have come the closest in all humankind to social and civic perfection.

In this sense we doubly misunderstand the revivalist forces within Islam that we insist on calling “fundamentalist.” Our abiding expectation of the Muslim world is (on our terms) simple and reasonable: embrace the world of secular Western modernity. Its refusal to do so we blame on “fundamentalists” whose rejection represents something primitive to us. At a deeper level we see their rejection as expressive of a larger failure of Islamic civilization itself, which is perceived to be in a state of unending decay, capable of producing change only as an obdurate and evil return to the past.

But this view is not correct. In reality the world of Islam is in the throes of vast and creative change — a revival that not only goes back to first principles, but also ahead to new syntheses and new frameworks of identity that mix old and new, Western with traditional ways. Conflict, and even chaos, are thus indicators of creative change — which we can understand through our historical metaphor of “creative destruction.” In this volatile cultural mix the so-called “fundamentalists” should be seen as an element forcing change rather than prefiguring some future cultural “outcome.” It is important to understand that violent “revival” (or better yet, “restoration”) is the essential, mobilizing narrative in which they have always organized and driven historical change in their world.

Radical Islamism, however, does not figure into the Muslim historical narrative in terms of an ultimately emergent cultural “mix.” Muslim historical tradition emphasizes working models where the conservative is always preferred to the radical. Thus, even today we can see alternative “New Islamist” movements that are tolerant and quietist competing with radical Islamists. Moreover, the long-term impact of American intervention in the Muslim-Arab world will only encourage more and greater borrowings and adaptation to Western modernity — on their terms.
Thus we should see fundamentalism and revivalism in the world today as vehicles for change that need to be heeded and harnessed, rather than as likely — and thus deeply threatening — working models for future society.
The Impact of War on Post Conflict Operations

- War, no matter how swift and decisive, brings chaos in its wake
- Almost inevitable that defeated society will crumble
  - Stability absolutely essential
  - All systems tend towards maximum entropy unless otherwise controlled
  - Indigenous military or police forces may not be available
- Often no clear line of delineation between end of military operations and start of postconflict period
  - Postconflict operations must begin while military operations continue

The harsh lesson of history is that war, no matter how decisive, brings in its wake destruction and chaos. In the postconflict period, the victors must inevitably grapple with the fact that the society they have defeated will lack the most basic framework of stability. Without stability progress in economic and political reconstruction cannot begin. If the victorious power is not prepared to bring stability in the wake of its military operations, it will inevitably hazard the political aims for which it has waged the conflict.

Moreover, in the future – as in the past – there cannot be any delineation between military operations and postconflict operations. Any seam between the two will inevitably result in consequences that may be in the end uncontrollable and that can place in jeopardy the political goals. In the twenty-first century, with an omnipresent media, the “three-block corporal” has come into his or her own.
Conclusions as to What History Suggests

- The past has no "answers," but raises the kinds of questions we need to ask
- If we don't understand the past, we will repeat its errors
- Speed of information will continue to disrupt deliberative processes
- We must be able to travel in the minds of our opponents
  - They are already traveling in our minds
  - Don't begin military conflict unless the postconflict plan and resource commitment is secure

History is not just the story of what has happened in the past, but is also a treasure trove of evidence “through their eyes.” As such, it is not so much what “happened” that interests us, but how people perceived things to happen, how they responded to problems and challenges, and how they judged their own performance. Thus history tells us not only about how people have spoken and acted in response to problems and challenge and change, but also how others observed their words and their actions. In essence, history is unexpectedly like fieldwork in anthropology, except the evidence is written down. This written record is an open window into other cultures and their societies as they struggle with the difficulties of their world. History shows us how other cultures defined the world around them, how they assessed what was going on, and how they made decisions to do something about what moved them.

That kind of understanding of the global context represents an essential element for the U.S. military and political establishment as
they craft their responses to unfolding events. If the United States does not understand its opponents, then it is unlikely to develop the strategic and operational concepts that will allow it to go beyond mere conventional military victory and shape the international environment. But there are no “answers” from history in the formulaic sense. Even in our “advanced” state of human intellectual and scientific evolution, we cannot yet come up with an algorithm that will truly reveal and predict human behavior.

In the absence of such algorithms, history does suggest patterns that can be enormously useful in thinking about current and future problems. History’s importance is in suggesting the kinds of questions that policy makers and military leaders should be asking. As George Santayana has suggested, “Those who do not study the past are condemned to relive it.” It is clear that ignorance of the past is a sure ticket to disastrous military and policy choices. The similarity between what happened in the immediate aftermath of JUST CAUSE and in the aftermath of the U.S. victory in IRAQI FREEDOM affirms the truth of that statement.

But can we ever truly learn from the past?

As humans we are driven to repeat ancestral errors, no matter how hard we try to learn from past “lessons” and avoid their mistakes. That comes from the immutable commonalities all human societies share. But we are also all different. Just in terms of material size and complexity, contemporary society is incomparable in almost all visible aspects to the ancient or medieval worlds — or even to our own world just a century or two past. For example, the Peloponnesian War took place in a preindustrial world of city-states, and thus may have little to tell us about the planning and conduct of modern strategy and its operations. But at the most enduring and intimate level of personal command relationships, and of existential strategic and operational choices, it is indeed revealing. In contrast, however, a more developed human model — the Roman Empire, with bureaucratic institutions and a military organization of much greater complexity — offers us a much greater range of useful comparison to problems we face today.
Increasingly, the ability of the United States to understand fully and operate within the constraints of differing cultures will have a limiting effect on the ability to exercise the instruments of political, economic, and military power. In addition, it must understand itself better in order to see the holistic effects of its actions, and the actions of those around it. If it fails in this task, the United States will find all of its instruments blunted and hollow.
PART II. POSTCONFLICT ACTIVITIES

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Enhancing stabilization and reconstruction (S&R) capabilities is vital to U.S. interests. S&R operations can occur in conjunction with, or be unconnected to, major combat operations. They can take place in the aftermath of a regime change (as in Afghanistan and Iraq today), in support of friendly governments, or in dealing with failing and failed states. Major combat can defeat an enemy; S&R operations can secure the peace.

The likelihood of U.S. involvement in S&R operations is high, based on recent history. Since the end of the cold war the United States has been engaged in six such operations—on average, one every two to three years. It is not known whether this rate will persist, but S&R operations will remain in the national interest. Terrorists have declared war on the United States. They are resourceful, committed, and adaptive. Failing and failed states are ideal as terrorist breeding and training grounds. The Taliban in Afghanistan has been described as a terrorist-sponsored state. Thus the United States will have strong motivation—security-based as well as humanitarian—to treat failing and failed states.

S&R operations are exceedingly difficult.9 Success requires strategic vision, a wide range of competencies covering multiple elements of national power, perseverance, excellence in planning and executing multifaceted campaigns, and cooperation from international partners (postwar Japan being an exception to this last requirement). S&R operations are complex and chaotic. Stabilization and a start on reconstruction can occur simultaneously and often in the same area as, combat and counter insurgency. In addition, reconstruction calls for a myriad of competencies: in humanitarian assistance, public health, infrastructure, economics, rule of law, civil administration,

9. Lessons from history are provided as another paper in this publication.
and media. It is counterproductive to consider these as distinct phases.

*Effective government-wide direction is needed to prosecute S&R operations.* The military plays vital roles in S&R operations; without security there can be no reconstruction. But, much more so than in major combat, the military campaign must be integrated within a larger campaign framework employing multiple elements of national power.

*S&R operations need to become core competencies at both the Department of Defense (DOD) and the Department of State (DOS).* A strong civilian agency is needed to lead the nonmilitary aspects of S&R and to partner with DOD to plan and execute these operations. DOS is the natural candidate. DOD and DOS will need an extraordinarily close working relationship. This relationship must transcend mere coordination. True collaboration is needed for anticipatory precrisis planning, so that each department can serve in either a supported or supporting role depending on the circumstances.

There are daunting challenges associated with all of the above. Cross-government processes and players lack the requisite discipline, authority, and accountability. The Department of State lacks the resources and culture to plan, execute, and lead complex stabilization and reconstruction campaigns. The Department of Defense has not taken S&R seriously enough, it does not open up its planning to substantive interagency participation, and its culture works against its being an effective "supporting command."

**GOVERNMENT-WIDE DIRECTION**

*To address the first challenge – how to institute and integrate the government-wide planning and execution of S&R campaigns – we recommend the following:*

10. The role of the intelligence community is covered in the main report.
Create cross-government contingency planning and integration task forces to orchestrate the planning and execution of extended campaigns (including S&R operations) requiring multiple elements of national power.

These task forces would differ from the traditional working groups in their authorities, accountability, longevity, resources, and related support. We envision that several of the task forces would be active at any time, with the lifetime of each more likely to be years than months. Each would address a region or nation with emerging serious consequences for U.S. security.

These task forces would integrate interagency activities and field support for a campaign addressing an emerging crisis (or opportunity). They would report to the National Security Council (NSC) and go to the Principals Committee to resolve issues or enforce action. The president would determine task force leadership, and federal agencies would designate senior officials to participate as representatives.

Establish a national center for contingency support to enable rapid start-up and sustainment of the task forces.

The center (a federally funded research development center offers advantages) would provide the staff, supporting facilities, and other resources necessary to support the different task forces. It would include a full-time research staff (supported by a network of consultants) encompassing the array of requisite expertise including cultural, regional, functional, technological, red teaming, communication, logistical, and administrative expertise.

Set up in-country or in-region interagency task forces to coordinate and integrate actions of the deployed (the operational and tactical level) activities.

The operationally oriented counterdrug joint interagency task forces provide a model.

The secretaries of defense and state should jointly propose a national security presidential directive (NSPD) to codify the above by creating
processes for crisis-related interagency activities and assigning responsibilities and authorities.

The NSPD would also make explicit the role of the NSC, create a deputy NSC position to oversee these activities, and establish a small permanent core NSC staff for expertise and continuity.

EMPOWERING DOS

DOS’s responsibility should be to plan for, and lead the execution of, the civilian aspects of S&R operations. This responsibility includes developing a portfolio of plans, integrating other civilian government agencies into these plans, incorporating international and nongovernmental organization (NGO) capabilities, integrating its plans and capabilities with DOD operational plans, and exercising these plans with DOD and other government agencies.

Initiatives are already underway to provide these capabilities. The creation of the Office of the Coordinator for Stabilization and Reconstruction (S/CRS) in DOS is a first step; 11 enactment and implementation of the Lugar-Biden bill would provide more significant capability. An endorsement from the Secretary of Defense or the White House would be helpful.

To accomplish these ambitious responsibilities, DOS needs much more than a small planning office and a set of planning tools. It needs resources (funds and people) and an organization with an execution culture. Those responsible for executing a plan should have the lead in developing it. Those responsible for developing and executing the plan should also have control over required resources and have the authority to select key people. The plans and planning assumptions should be continually challenged through red teaming and other means and exercised with DOD’s combatant commands and other government agencies.

11. This office was initially named the Office of Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations (OSRO).
We estimate that approximately 250 people will be needed to develop a portfolio of five plans comparable in their degree of detail to DOD's OPLANS. This number of people will be needed in order to integrate complementary efforts of other government agencies, to exercise and update the plans, and to serve as the core of an execution task force when the need arises. They would also develop S&R operational concepts to complement those being developed by DOD. The number does not include the planners for communications, lift, logistics, administration, and other support needs.

The proposed funding in the Lugar-Biden bill ($100 million) is a step toward providing resources, but more funds and more funding flexibility will be needed: to staff an approximately 250-person office for stabilization and reconstruction, to create a new account with flexible "notwithstanding" authority for S&R operations, to reprogram funds from other DOS accounts into S&R to meet new contingencies, and to use DOD funding (perhaps via the economy act).

We recommend that DOS be empowered with sufficient funds and spending flexibility, comparable either to that provided to DOS for assistance to the countries of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union or to FEMA through access to emergency funds (Stafford act).

WHAT DOD NEEDS TO DO

Most important, by far, DOD must take S&R operations as seriously as it does its other missions. Clearly DOD is taking S&R operations seriously today given the circumstances in Iraq. The challenge is to sustain the focus, apply the lessons, and institutionalize the training and the organizational, doctrinal, leader development, and other changes that will better prepare U.S. troops when they are called on again to perform S&R missions.

A CRITICAL ELEMENT OF INSTITUTIONALIZING "SERIOUSNESS" IS EMBEDDING S&R OPERATIONS IN BOTH OPERATIONAL AND FUTURE FORCE PLANNING.
The regional combatant commanders should be directed to fully integrate S&R operations into their operational plans (OPLANs). S&R operations should be afforded the same level of attention as major combat operations and not treated as a peripheral annex. These plans must be developed with active participation of interagency partners, especially DOS. We suggest that responsibility for planning and executing the S&R should be assigned to the Joint Force Land Component Commander. Creating a separate component commander for S&R operations would exacerbate the problem of integrating combat and S&R operations.

S&R operations should be given more weight in planning and programming the future force, and appropriate objectives and metrics should be established. S&R operations are not adequately accounted for in DOD's current force-planning framework, which is driven by objectives of rapid responses, swift defeats, and decisive wins. The desired time for completion of these operations is measured in days and weeks. These objectives and the associated metrics need to be complemented by a set of objectives and metrics appropriate to S&R operations, where the implementation time will likely be measured in years.

We do not recommend establishing specialized organizations, at the division or brigade level, dedicated to S&R operations. The rationale is that unless the total force is considerably enlarged and many of these organizations created (unless the nation builds a second army), a few such specialized S&R organizations will be insufficient to handle envisioned S&R operations. Moreover, U.S. general-purpose forces have demonstrated on-the-job adaptability in meeting the challenges of S&R operations. There is a need for specialized units below the brigade level.

We do recommend that S&R operations should be made a core competency of the general-purpose forces. There will be opportunity and other costs in doing so. We believe U.S. supremacy in other forms of combat provides some room for these trade-offs. There are initiatives.

12. During peacetime or when a JFLCC has not been designated, the Army Forces Commander will fulfill this responsibility.
already underway to enhance the department’s S&R capabilities. For example, the Army is creating a more modular force, based on brigades rather than divisions as building blocks, and is increasing the number of specialists crucial to S&R operations, including civil affairs experts and military police.

We recommend additional steps involving training, doctrine, organizations, readiness, technology insertion, and professional military education. We highlight two of these here.

- DOD should develop and promulgate joint doctrine for S&R operations in the form of a living “best practices handbook” continually informed by real-world experiences and lessons. The military personnel who have gained these experiences constitute a growing and invaluable asset to DOD. The thoughtful draft “Joint Operational Concept on Stability, Transition and Reconstruction Operations” provides a starting point for the doctrine development.
- The Army should extend the principle of modularity below the brigade level. It should develop subbrigade modules of critical capabilities, so that it can tailor a brigade to the situation in its area of responsibility. The Army and Marine Corps, with Joint Forces Command, should experiment with innovative concepts of task organization at the brigade level and below.

MONEY IS AMMUNITION IN S&R OPERATIONS

The panel discussed the role of money, contracting, and legal authority in S&R operations. These areas did not easily fit into any category but were considered important enablers for DOD to enhance its capabilities for S&R operations.

DOD should provide the authorities and accountability for U.S. forces to disburse money in support of S&R operations. Experiences in Iraq have

13. Enhancing regional expertise and language skills is covered in more detail in the main task force report. We did not address the critical issue of force protection in S&R operations, since it will be the focus of a new DSB study starting this fall.
demonstrated the value of empowering tactical-level commanders with funds and the flexibility to disburse them as they see fit. The tactics, techniques, and procedures of "funds as a weapon system" should be explored in experiments and embedded in training. DOD should seek congressional support in the form of legislation modeled on the Commander's Emergency Response Fund.

The contracting community needs to organize and plan for success in S&R operations. The problems today are not the result of laws or regulations but rather policy and execution. The panel's recommendations include redesignating contracting authorities to support commander/S&R authority in the field and prepositioning contracting and legal personnel.

The length of postconflict operations offers opportunities for insertion of technology into existing systems, as well as the introduction of new capabilities during operations.

We recommend that Director, Defense Research and Engineering, (DDR&E) set up a process for more rapid and coherent exploitation of service and departmental science and technology (S&T) organizations in ongoing operations.

We strongly urge that DOD be more proactive in fostering interagency collaboration and in exporting its campaign planning/execution skills to other agencies.

The first includes more interagency involvement in DOD's experiments, exercises and OPLANS. The second should include detailing a group—including senior officers—to help the Office of the Coordinator for Stabilization and Reconstruction (S/CRS) get started. DOD and DOS should also create an integrated Foreign Service Institute–National Defense University program to research and teach S&R planning skills.

CONCLUSION

We offer three interdependent major recommendations.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

- Establish an effective process to orchestrate cross-government S&R operations.
- Empower DOS to lead the nonmilitary portion of S&R.
- Enhance DOD capabilities for S&R operations as an integral part of its mission.

These are very big challenges. Thus, we have directed most of our recommendations to the Secretary of Defense: to use his authorities within DOD, and his influence outside of DOD. Addressing extra-DOD aspects of security issues, as we do here, has become more common in DSB studies, reflecting the need to consider the military as part of a larger set of national security tools.
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION

The global security environment of the 21st century offers new challenges related to U.S. national security. In the post-cold war era, failed states present not only humanitarian concerns, but also breeding grounds for terrorist networks. The number of weak or failed states around the world, coupled with the global war on terrorism, makes it almost inevitable that the United States will be called upon to engage in stabilization and reconstruction (S&R) operations in support of U.S. national interests.

During the past decade, the United States has engaged in new S&R operations, on average, once every two or three years. U.S. missions in Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq have demonstrated a wide variety of challenges, each case involving its own set of complex (internal and external) political issues and international relations. In some instances, the mission has focused on humanitarian efforts, such as in Haiti, while more recent engagements have sought to establish democracy and free markets, as in Iraq. Each mission significantly draws on resources, as each is long-lasting: “No effort at enforced democratization has taken hold in less than five years.”

In light of these factors, this panel’s task was to review post-cold war stabilization and reconstruction operations (e.g., Somalia, Haiti, Kosovo, Bosnia, Afghanistan, Iraq) and recommend mechanisms for improvement in several areas.

Based upon our review of prior operations, we have come to several conclusions.

- First, that U.S. national interest will periodically require dealing with failing or failed states. The number of failed or failing states around the world, coupled with the global war on terrorism, makes it

14. Dobbins et al, America’s Role in Nation-Building, p. xxiv
almost inevitable that the United States will be called upon to intervene again somewhere in support of U.S. national interest.

Second, that S&R operations present complex problems that demand substantial and integrated U.S. government efforts over long periods of time. Interventions in other nations are always complex, involving confusing internal and external political issues, international relations, the likelihood of combat, and the resulting need for stabilization and reconstruction. This study convinced the panel that the United States almost always underestimates the amount of time and resources necessary to achieve U.S. goals in stabilization and reconstruction. While the United States can defeat almost any enemy armed force quickly, this speed does not translate to stabilization and reconstruction of a nation. S&R requires different levels of skills and effort compared to combat operations: the pace of S&R operations is the pace of political progress and relation building.

The frequency of these missions—coupled with their length—presents significant resource challenges to the U.S. government S&R operations. This cumulative impact on S&R resources over time (compared to that of combat operations) is illustrated in the graphic below.
The ability of the United States to defeat an enemy on the battlefield has become unequaled. The rapid advance of technology now enables the United States to win major combat operations quickly, with a smaller force than ever before. Indeed, it may come as a surprise that combat may take far less time and be “easier” than S&R operations. We believe that S&R operations may be the forcesizing mechanism for many future conflicts.

Despite the ability to quickly defeat the enemy in major combat, the United States must be prepared to establish security in a low-intensity conflict environment. In Iraq, asymmetric attacks continue against coalition forces, destroying many efforts to rebuild the country. The Rand Corporation conducted detailed studies of decades of prior conflicts to identify the numbers of forces that have been required to provide stabilization in specific countries. The chart below shows the Rand results, namely that the number of forces required is, unsurprisingly, a function of the operating environment and U.S. strategic objectives. Establishing security is the sine qua non.
non, as all S&R activities (effective public safety, civil administration, infrastructure, etc.) build upon adequate security.

**Stabilization Force Requirements**

- Coherent Environment
- Co-opt Indigenous Forces
- Modest Goals

- Highly Conflicted Environment
- No Functional Forces for Social Order
- Ambitious Goals

**Conditions on the ground and U.S. objectives drive the size of the needed security force.**

Recent U.S. S&R missions have had very ambitious goals. Iraq is the only nation-building operation since 1945 in which the United States has had to actually govern the society that it is seeking to move from conflict to peace and democracy. More often a weak but legitimate indigenous government is in place (e.g., in Afghanistan) or an international administration rules the country (e.g., in Kosovo). In such circumstances, the United States has concentrated its efforts on those areas where it has a comparative advantage or a special interest, in particular on the security sector and political reforms. Even as U.S. policy should seek to share the burdens of S&R missions more broadly, U.S. planners must look to the possibility that the United States might again have to assume the major role in S&R operations.
U.S. military expeditions to Afghanistan and Iraq are unlikely to be the last such excursions in the global war on terrorism. Therefore, recent U.S. S&R efforts were examined to seek ways to improve policy formulation, force structure, doctrine and training, organization, and interagency processes. While every stabilization operation will be unique in a number of ways, there are many constants that apply to every such activity, and our recommendations have, we believe, universal applicability to all stabilization and reconstruction efforts.

We identified a number of significant factors or issues that come into play:

- Managing the security transition is crucial, and very complex.
- The military loses the initiative in the transition from major combat operations.
- Complex and diverse missions overlap in time and space—missions related to internal security, public safety, law enforcement, justice, humanitarian relief, governance, etc.
- DOD and DOS must work more closely with each other and with other agencies, non-government organizations (NGOs), different contractors, and international organizations.
- Effective interagency planning and execution are more crucial than ever.
- Planning must take place well in advance of conflict to be most effective.
- The nature of these operations requires that many S&R activities occur simultaneously rather than sequentially.

The DOD and the DOS each have leading roles in almost every S&R operation. In any possible scenario involving S&R operations, the Department of Defense and the Department of State will be major
actors, and it is clear that their combined capabilities will be required if the United States is to be successful.

The panel’s findings and recommendations are centered on these issues for three specific and interrelated areas:

- First, that national and interagency processes be expanded and improved to bring together the best capabilities of the U.S. government early enough to set and achieve U.S. strategic objectives.

- Second, that the State Department be empowered and resourced for S&R plans and work. While the DOD has the major responsibility for combat, and for establishing security, it is clear that the DOS must play its own crucial role, from the early planning for conflict avoidance through stabilization and reconstruction. DOS must be empowered and resourced to accomplish this range of tasks.

- Third, that substantially improved planning and capabilities for S&R operations are required and are well within the capability of DOD. The DOD has superb planning and execution capabilities for contingency planning and must expand them to bridge Phase III to Phase IV operations. Improved planning must be accompanied by enhanced capabilities for stabilization and reconstruction and an outreach program by the DOD to participate more fully in interagency processes.

The following chapters will examine each of these findings and expand on the associated recommendations.
CHAPTER 2. AN EFFECTIVE PROCESS FOR GOVERNMENT-WIDE S&R OPERATIONS

Recent events in the Middle East and South Asia have highlighted both the criticalness and the difficulty of effective collaboration across the full spectrum of the U.S. government in planning for S&R activities. In today's S&R operations, combat, stabilization, and some reconstruction will occur simultaneously and often in the same area. Moreover, low-intensity warfare and asymmetric attacks often continue after major combat ends—clearly complicating the security transition. Indeed, it is the lack of a stabilization capability—not a lack of combat capability—that is the limiting factor in successfully executing U.S. strategic goals. Effective S&R planning and execution are more crucial than ever.

S&R operations span a time continuum starting well in advance of actual combat and extending potentially for years into economic and political development. The chart below illustrates the multiyear dimensions of these issues. Accordingly, the assumption that the number of resources on the ground will diminish after armed combat ends is no longer valid. In fact, the numbers of forces needed "in-country" could substantially increase after major combat. Moreover, the United States may need to provide substantial resources for stabilization and reconstruction in nations in which there was essentially no combat.
Findings

Achieving political objectives, not "just" military objectives, depends on preparation years in advance and stabilization*/reconstruction years after open hostilities

*Stabilization: The period following cessation of high-intensity conflict wherein violence is the decisive factor in daily life and indigenous capabilities, e.g., law enforcement, are unable to achieve security and stability.

Effective planning— in advance of conflict— is crucial to achieving successful S&R operations and meeting U.S. strategic objectives. National and interagency processes must be expanded and improved to bring together the best capabilities of the U.S. government early in the process. Planning for S&R operations requires different skills than does planning for traditional combat, and it needs to be better integrated with preconflict contingency and war plans. While combat is uniquely a DOD role, S&R requires a very broad set of players, potentially including foreign governments or institutions (orchestrated by DOS), in addition to DOD. To implement these S&R planning objectives at the national level, the U.S. government must have clear government-wide direction, an effective coordination mechanism, close defense-civilian collaboration, and enhanced S&R capabilities.
GOVERNMENT-WIDE DIRECTION

It is apparent that the current interagency processes do not always function effectively in planning for crises. Integrated planning for stability operations rarely occurs at the national level prior to conflict. The full range of U.S. capabilities for stabilization must be included in planning for the combat phase and the expected transition towards reconstruction. It is the proper role of the National Security Council (NSC) to orchestrate U.S. response to crises. A national security presidential directive (NSPD) – driven set of processes can strengthen and improve U.S. interagency processes.

We make the following recommendation:

The Secretary of Defense and Secretary of State should jointly propose an NSPD to

- Make explicit the role of the National Security Council in managing national resources for crisis planning
- Assign specific roles and responsibilities to departments and agencies
- Create a formal set of processes for crisis-related interagency activities
- Create a deputy NSC position for pre-S&R planning
- Establish a small permanent core NSC staff for expertise and continuity

Overall direction and coordination for S&R operations should be provided by the president and NSC. A decision made by the two should trigger aggressive interagency planning and actions for peacetime, combat operations, stabilization, and reconstruction. The deputy NSC position would provide a focal point to ensure that the Principals and Deputies Committees work on crisis-planning issues continuously. As significant issues emerge, the cross-government contingency planning and integration task forces (operating simultaneously) would orchestrate the planning of extended campaigns utilizing multiple instruments of national power.
We make the following recommendation:

- Establish a national center for contingency support – one option is an FFRDC organized, managed, and focused to provide broad expertise and support for the contingency planning and integration task forces:
  - Rapid start up and sustainment of task forces
  - Standing core staff with standing presence with customers
  - Standing set of consultant agreements for rapid assembly of needed expertise

In fulfilling these roles, this center would provide six types of capabilities:

- Cultural and regional expertise
AN EFFECTIVE PROCESS FOR
GOVERNMENT-WIDE S&R OPERATIONS

- Functional knowledge, such as that of utilities, energy, transportation, and banking
- Support to include administration, logistics, and communications
- Deployable personnel contracted to enter a crisis or combat zone
- Red teaming and exercise coordination
- Technical expertise

Also, the center would provide planning support for departments and regional combatant commanders.

Because S&R operational planning relates to so many noncombat issues, the United States must develop and effectively use in-depth knowledge of the languages, environments, and cultures of potential adversaries. To underscore this point, a cursory examination of the differences between Judeo-Christian and Islamic cultures indicates that the areas in which the cultures exhibit the greatest apparent differences (for example, the political, educational, and social/cultural realms) are the areas to which the United States (and in fact most of the “West”) devotes relatively little effort in study and research. A core capability at the national center for contingency support in area and regional expertise would foster understanding of cultural, regional, ideological, and economic differences among nations. Moreover, we also believe that the Secretary of Defense and the military services should task service schools and joint military colleges and universities to develop studies in area and regional expertise. Building this intellectual framework will enhance U.S. initiatives to select achievable strategic objectives for public safety, economic development, and political stability in the countries of interest.

DEFENSE AND CIVILIAN COLLABORATION AND ENHANCED CAPABILITIES

Discussions of “phases” for combat, stabilization, and reconstruction have engendered visions of relatively crisp transitions
(or hand-offs) between each phase. However, the nature of these operations requires that many S&R activities occur simultaneously rather than sequentially. Establishing security (a DOD role) in one part of a country may occur simultaneously with establishing public safety (a State role) in another part of the same country. As illustrated in the graphic below, the amplitude lines show that both DOS and DOD are involved in these operations on a continuing basis. Complex and diverse missions overlap in time and space—such missions as the provision of internal security, public safety, law enforcement, justice, humanitarian relief, and governance. S&R demands an extraordinarily close planning and working relationship between the DOD and DOS that does not exist today.

**State and Defense Share Collaborative Responsibilities for Stabilization**

As the major players, the Department of Defense and Department of State must consider S&R planning and operations as primary missions for their departments. While the DOD has the major responsibility for combat and for establishing security, it is clear that
AN EFFECTIVE PROCESS FOR
GOVERNMENT-WIDE S&R OPERATIONS

the DOS must play its own crucial role from the early planning for conflict avoidance through execution of stabilization and reconstruction. The Department of State and the Department of Defense need to augment their existing capabilities for stabilization and reconstruction planning and operations. To underscore these points, the panel identified specific criteria for effective stabilization capabilities that apply equally to both DOS and DOD, and then made NOTIONAL assessments of each department, as illustrated in the chart below.

Criteria for an Effective Stabilization Capability

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Effective Partnership Requires Improvements on Both Sides</th>
<th>Finding</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Actively train, practice, exercise, rehearse</td>
<td>DOS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evaluate readiness and validate plans</td>
<td>DOS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Available on short notice</td>
<td>DOS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Continuity in theater</td>
<td>DOS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Large enough to support multiple concurrent cumulative stabilization operations</td>
<td>DOS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prepared for a range of cultures, languages</td>
<td>DOS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elasticity to respond and adjust to an adaptive enemy</td>
<td>DOS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Active experimentation program</td>
<td>DOS</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Recommendations**
- DOD and DOS use these criteria to develop metrics to measure progress in S&R readiness
- DOD include S&R readiness in the Joint Military Readiness Reporting System

It is absolutely clear that the DOD and the DOS have inextricably interleaved equities in planning for stabilization and reconstruction operations. The Department of Defense conducts combat operations and directs the transition to internal security operations—while the Department of State brings together resources to provide public safety, rule of law, governance, and other essential services. Planning for contingencies is a primary mission of DOD, and it therefore has a professional staff with a great deal of expertise in the planning.
disciplines. These plans, and the premises upon which they are based, are subjected to a complex set of evaluations and exercises that improve the plans and integrate them with other DOD elements. The U.S. government requires a strong DOS to lead nonmilitary aspects of S&R and partner with the DOD to plan and execute these operations. Given these intertwined roles and capabilities, the panel focuses its findings and recommendations first on the Department of State and then the Department of Defense.
CHAPTER 3. EMPOWER DEPARTMENT OF STATE

OVERVIEW

The Department of State, like the Department of Defense, has not traditionally regarded stabilization and reconstruction missions as being among its core competencies. Both agencies need to recognize that the S&R mission is inescapable, its importance irrefutable, and closer cooperation between the two of them essential.

A hierarchy of tasks needs to be performed in any nation-building operation. First comes security—demobilizing former combatants, rebuilding police, and establishing an effective justice system. Next is basic governance, public administration, and provision of public services—garbage, water, schools, and power. Third are tasks related to macroeconomics and regulation, including stabilization of currency and resumption of commerce. Fourth is political reform, which should result in a free press, civil society, political parties, and elections. Finally, there is traditional economic development, to include the development of heavy infrastructure.

By establishing a secure environment, military forces open a window of opportunity during which political and economic changes can take place, thereby allowing a society to move from conflict to peace and democracy. It is the civil elements of an S&R mission that must promote such changes. It is police, judges, civil administrators, and technical advisors who help build new institutions for security, rule of law, governance, civil society, a free press, and political parties. If these civil capacities are not deployed and employed in a timely fashion, then the window opened by the military intervention eventually closes, leaving the situation no better than it was before.

The capacity to promote political and economic reform exists in many civil agencies of the U.S. government, in international organizations, in nongovernmental organizations, and in other governments. Someone needs to mold these many strands into a coherent pattern, based upon a common vision and a coordinated
strategy. The locus for this integration should be DOS, the only U.S. agency that maintains connections to all the other essential actors.

**DOD AND DOS PARTNERSHIP**

Success in S&R operations depends upon a strong partnership between the civil and military, between DOD and DOS. All civil agencies of the U.S. government are accustomed to working abroad under DOS oversight. U.S. military forces will never operate under command of an ambassador, nor will embassies take instructions from the local military commander, but the two must operate in tandem, alternating in supported or supporting roles as the situation may require. Success requires that plans be integrated and capabilities exercised. At present, neither occurs with any regularity.

Genuine DOD-DOS partnership in S&R will require adjustments on both sides. DOD will need to share aspects of its operational planning; something the U.S. military has long been reluctant to do. DOS will need to develop a capacity for operational planning it currently does not possess.

We recommend that

- The Secretary of Defense should urge DOS to participate with regional combatant commanders in the creation and exercising of contingency plans for stabilization and reconstruction
- The Secretary of Defense should share DOD contingency plans with DOS early in the development process

**PLANNING, READINESS, AND EXECUTION**

Planning for S&R operations, to be most effective, must occur prior to actual conflict. Since DOS and DOD will be both supported and supporting “commanders,” it is important that collaboration between DOS and DOD begin early, prior to formalization of plans. It is in this early process that assumptions can be challenged and
strategic objectives can be refined to more closely match capabilities. Both the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense should work to create this integration throughout planning processes for S&R.

S&R plans should be made by those who will execute them. This objective is hard to achieve at DOS, where senior officials tend to be fully occupied seeking to avoid the contingencies for which such planning is intended. State’s new Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) will provide a locus for individuals who have the time and expertise to engage in such planning, and a link to the policy makers who will ultimately have to implement them.

In DOD, the locus for S&R plans and operations is the regional combatant commanders. The plans and planning assumptions are continually challenged through red teaming and other means and exercised with combatant commanders/joint task force commanders. It will be essential to create two-way links, which do not currently exist between DOS and these regional commands. Like DOD, DOS should develop metrics to measure progress in S&R readiness.

DOS will also need to develop a more robust capacity to execute such plans. The Department of State’s overseas operations are managed through its regional bureaus, much as DOD’s are through the regional combatant commanders. The new office DOS has created for S&R operations will perform a function analogous to the Joint Forces Command, building a pool of expertise upon which the regional bureaus can call, and creating a global doctrine for the civil aspects of such operations.

DOD’s extensive capabilities in crisis and deliberate planning could substantially help kick start S/CRS if 10 or more experts, along with an experienced senior leader, were assigned to DOS to bring to it the intellectual capital and best practices developed over years within DOD.
We recommend:

- The Secretary of Defense should export DOD's core competencies in crisis and deliberate planning by assigning a staff of ten experienced DOD planners (led by a flag-level senior) to the Office of the Coordinator for Stabilization and Reconstruction to provide models in training, education, red teaming, course of action analysis, worst case, war gaming, and the like.
- DOD should develop metrics to measure progress in S&R readiness

BUILDING CIVILIAN CAPACITY FOR S&R

SUPPORTING CURRENT INITIATIVES

DOS is creating the Office of the Coordinator for Stabilization and Reconstruction within the department. This step is important and should be supported by DOD and other departments with lessons learned, experienced people, and collaborative planning and exercising of contingency plans. Secretary Powell has agreed to provide the new S/CRS office 25 positions from the department's current resources, but made clear that further increases depend upon additional congressional funding and authorization.

The Secretary of Defense is in a position to help DOS by publicly giving support to passage of the Stabilization and Reconstruction Civilian Management Act of 2004 (the Lugar-Biden bill). The Lugar-Biden bill seeks to provide for the development—as a core mission of DOS and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)—of an expert civilian response capability to carry out S&R activities in a country or region in transition from conflict or civil strife (S.2127).

Similarly, the Secretary of Defense's public support of the new office of reconstruction and stabilization in DOS, with commitment to work collaboratively with it, would send a clear message to those in
and out of government that the Department of Defense is committed to working with DOS on these crucial issues.

We recommend:

- The Secretary of Defense should formally support the Lugar-Biden bill and the creation of the Office of the Coordinator for Stabilization and Reconstruction in State.
- The administration should seek and Congress should appropriate proposed funding in the Lugar-Biden bill ($180 million).

RESOURCES AND FUNDING

The Lugar-Biden bill is a good starting point, but it does not provide enough resources for either DOS staff or funding of participation by other government agencies in supporting DOS's contingency planning and operations. It is clear that the Department of State needs substantially more resources, people, and funds if it is to fulfill its proper role in stabilization and reconstruction operations. The administration should request and Congress should authorize and appropriate the necessary positions and funding.

Further occasions like Iraq may arise wherein the United States must assume responsibility for the full range of another nation's government functions. Accordingly, S&R planning can require expertise in all of the following areas:

- Infrastructure: roads, rail, waterways, ports, airfields, telecommunications, power
- Public health: broad public health issues, sanitation, hospital administration
- Civil administration: agriculture, banking, education, law enforcement
- Governance and political processes
- Rule of law and legal systems
Postconflict Activities

- Economic development, commerce, and trade
- Humanitarian assistance
- Media: press, radio, television

Even as U.S. policy should seek to share such burdens more broadly, U.S. planners must look to the possibility that the United States might again have to assume such responsibilities. S/CRS seeks to coordinate the civilian S&R capabilities for failing states emerging from conflict and assist them on a path to peace, free markets and democracy.

DOS will require a cadre of people with experience in S&R operations, committed to the planning and preparation of future operations as well as the conduct of ongoing ones. An addition of approximately 250 positions will be required to

- Develop and maintain approximately five detailed and executable plans for the civilian aspects of S&R operations
- Orchestrate and incorporate other civilian government agency, international, and NGO capabilities into these plans
- Integrate DOS/civilian plans and capabilities with DOD operational plans
- Exercise these plans with DOD and other government agencies
- Prepare, deploy, and lead the civil components of the S&R missions

This level of detail cannot be achieved by a handful of people. Although some of these resources might be seconded from other agencies, most of them will need to be full-time State employees.

15. The 250 additional positions do not include the planners for communications, lift, logistics, administration, and other support needs.
We recommend:

- Additional funding, people, and authorities must be provided.
  - DOS should be provided adequate funds and staffing for an approximately 250-person capability.
  - DOD and other departments should provide personnel and other forms of support to S/CRS.
  - DOS should seek and Congress should provide more authority for DOS to move funds across accounts for S&R purposes.

**PROVIDING ADEQUATE FUNDING AND RESOURCES FOR KEY PARTICIPATING AGENCIES**

The willingness of other agencies, such as Justice, Treasury, and even USAID to participate in such missions will depend on whether DOS has funding to pay their costs. No agency, and in particular no domestic agency, will bear large out-of-pocket costs for such missions from their own budgets.

Accordingly, DOS will also require access to adequate funding if it is to be able to mobilize its own capabilities, and those of other civil agencies, on short notice. This access requires either a contingency fund, on the Federal Emergency Management Act model (Stafford Act), or the freedom to reprogram funding from other streams for S&R purposes. Ideally, all funding for the civil aspects of such missions should be provided through a single flexible channel, such as Congress provided for assistance to Central and Eastern Europe and the states of the former Soviet Union.

In sum, while DOS and the Congress have pointed the way in creating S/CRS and introducing the Lugar-Biden bill, these efforts will need to be given more substantial and concrete form, to include the necessary positions, contingency funding, and authority to reprogram existing funding to S&R purposes expeditiously, to
POSTCONFLICT ACTIVITIES

include the possibility that DOD would then transfer such funding from its budget to DOS for S&R planning or operations alternatively, would reimburse DOS for services performed under the economy act.16

We recommend:

- The administration should propose legislation (perhaps similar to the Stafford Act) to provide DOS with authorities and funds to plan, staff, and contract for S&R.
- DOS should establish contingency contracts with requisite agencies and companies to permit immediate response in crisis.

CONCLUSION

The U.S. government needs a strong DOS to lead nonmilitary aspects of S&R and to partner with DOD to plan and execute these operations. The Department of State's role must be more explicit, and it must have authorities and funding commensurate with that role. Providing effective operational-level reconstruction planning will require people and money, as well as flexibility to operate during intense crisis and conflict. The level of preparation required for the civilian side of S&R should approach that of DOD's operational plans. Additionally, DOS would benefit from substantial collaboration with the Department of Defense. The implementation of these recommendations will provide DOS with the capabilities and resources to plan and execute the civilian component of complex, large-scale campaigns.

16. The economy act allows one agency to buy services from another agency.
CHAPTER 4. ENHANCE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE CAPABILITIES FOR S&R OPERATIONS

OVERVIEW

The Quadrennial Defense Review of 2001 led to a new national military strategy for the United States. The strategy dictated that the Department of Defense had four missions:

- Defend the homeland
- Deter potential enemies in four critical regions of the world
- Maintain the ability to swiftly defeat the efforts of two potential adversaries
- Remain able to fight and win one decisive military operation

Known as the 1-4-2-1 strategy, it was used to determine the size of the military departments. The strategy recognized the need to conduct stability and reconstruction operations in the wake of a decisive military operation, but it did not explicitly address the size of the S&R force that might be needed. Additionally, the strategy did not address the potential need for S&R operations attendant to "swiftly defeat" efforts.

The new strategy seemed to assume, as its predecessor had done, that S&R operations were a subset of combat operations. That is, whatever military force was required to defeat an enemy would be adequate to conduct successful S&R activities.

This panel challenged this assumption by looking at major S&R operations conducted since the end of the cold war. We found that, though there are many variables that affect the size of the force required for S&R operations, the two most important are the political goals of the conflict and the stability of the postconflict environment.
Force Size Has Not Always Matched U.S. Strategic Goals

In general, the more ambitious the political goals of the conflict, the larger the force required for their achievement. The chart above illustrates that the ambitious political goals in Bosnia and Kosovo led to a large S&R force requirement, even though the conflicts themselves were relatively small. On the other hand, relatively modest political goals in Haiti were temporarily achieved with a much smaller force.

The stability of the S&R environment also has a major impact on the size of the force required for S&R operations. The lack of any political stability in Bosnia and Kosovo contributed to the large S&R force requirement there. One can see from the chart that the United States is attempting to accomplish very ambitious goals in Iraq in a chaotic environment with a small ratio of force to inhabitants. More modest U.S. goals in Afghanistan require a smaller force, though
perhaps a larger one than the United States and its coalition partners have committed.

Our review of current and recent S&R operations leads us to conclude that S&R operations are not a subset of combat operations. They are an explicit mission of the Department of Defense, and deserve equal consideration in force sizing, planning, training, and execution. Technology has given U.S. military forces an overwhelming advantage in the conduct of combat operations. So powerful is this advantage that U.S. forces can defeat opponents with less force than may be required to provide for the stabilization and reconstruction of the defeated enemy. This fact has diverse implications for the Department of Defense. In the pages that follow, we make recommendations regarding four of the areas we believe are most important:

- Planning and organization
- Force structure
- Doctrine, training, and readiness
- Enablers

**PLANNING AND ORGANIZATION**

The mind-set of the Department of Defense needs to change; the department can no longer view S&R operations as a subset of combat operations. It is now recognized that S&R operations can be even more manpower-intensive than is combat, and S&R operations can last for years, while periods of intense combat are getting shorter.

S&R operations also possess a level of complexity not found in combat operations, since their successful execution requires the application of many elements of national power besides military force. S&R operations demand unprecedented levels of collaboration among the departments of government, notably between the Department of State and the Department of Defense.
The military services have a robust planning culture, and they nurture that culture with resources, adequate planning time, and excellent people. None of the other departments of government have the resources, training, or culture necessary for them to make the necessary contribution to planning for postconflict S&R operations.

We recommend:

The Department of Defense should treat stability and reconstruction operations as an explicit mission in force planning.

The Department of Defense should embed concepts for S&R operational planning and execution in all service schools, specifically including interagency roles, responsibilities, and processes.

The Department of Defense should proactively export its competence in operational-level planning by

- Assigning a staff of experienced planners to the new DOS Office of the Coordinator for Stabilization and Reconstruction. Led by a flag or general officer, this group can provide expertise in, training, red teaming, and war gaming.
- Increasing the numbers and frequency of liaison visits and cross-department assignments for military officers to work at the DOS and USAID.
- Designating a flag or general officer from each regional combatant command as interagency liaison for S&R planning.

The regional combatant commanders are the keys to successful planning for S&R operations, but their staffs lack some of the technical expertise unique to S&R planning, as well as access to all of the interagency representation required to develop a comprehensive S&R plan.
We recommend:

The chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff should designate a military service college or a college of the National Defense University to support each regional combatant commander with stabilization and reconstruction research and planning.

The Secretary of Defense, in collaboration with the Secretary of State, should designate a federally funded research and development center as a center of excellence for research on stabilization and reconstruction planning and execution.

We believe that the planning and execution of S&R operations will benefit from the same unity of command that is so important in combat operations. We also recognize that stabilization and reconstruction planning has unique intelligence requirements. S&R planning must be conducted concurrently with and mesh seamlessly with combat planning, and needs the active collaboration of many agencies outside of DOD.

Another unique aspect of S&R operations is their transition from DOD lead to DOS lead as operations move from initial stabilization operations to longer term reconstruction operations. This transition is just as critical as the transition from combat to stabilization. Using the familiar analogy of supported and supporting commands, military forces are the supported command during combat and stabilization operations, but become the supporting command as the DOS assumes control of reconstruction operations.

We recommend:

Each regional combatant commander should designate a joint commander for stabilization and initial reconstruction operations. Planning should include:

- Aggressive outreach to appropriate interagency partners
- Appropriate plans for exercises and red teaming
- Transition planning for combat-to-stability operations and stability-to-reconstruction operations

**FORCE STRUCTURE**

The panel identified eleven critical capabilities, listed in italics throughout the section below, necessary for successful stability and reconstruction operations, which were grouped into four major areas: security, communication, humanitarian services, and focused expertise.

Security is the bedrock of S&R operations. It is the umbrella under which all other S&R operations proceed. Security requires robust intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capability. There is no substitute for the ability to gather human and technical intelligence, observe the environment, and conduct reconnaissance. *Adequate numbers of security forces* must be in place in the immediate aftermath of combat operations to ensure adequate force protection and security for the indigenous population. *Adequate numbers of trained military police* are also required to properly execute law enforcement functions and maintain order.

Communication, both internally and externally, is critical for S&R forces. *Strategic communication and public affairs* allows S&R forces to get their story before the public, and to counter rumors and misinformation. A *robust information operations (IO) capability* is necessary to protect S&R forces as well as to control the communications environment.

Humanitarian services are most critical for S&R operations, as they tend to be one of the most visible manifestations of U.S. and coalition efforts. Adequate numbers of *well-trained civil affairs personnel* are vital to successful humanitarian operations. *Robust engineering capability, including civil engineers*, is required, especially if infrastructure has been damaged or neglected. S&R forces need to be prepared to render *humanitarian assistance* (medical treatment and provision of basic human services) as well as to *disburse funds to hire local labor*.
Focused expertise is at once critical to success and difficult to acquire. *Language capability* is vital. While the panel recognizes that no S&R force is likely to have adequate numbers of linguists, *cultural familiarity and sensitivity* can and should be a prerequisite for troops assigned to S&R missions.

These critical capabilities come from a wide variety of units at multiple levels in the DOD. Some of them, like military police, are traditionally task-organized into existing formations. In these cases, the units are comfortable being attached, and commanders of the gaining units are generally familiar with the attachment’s capabilities and support requirements.

Other critical capabilities are less well known at the brigade and battalion levels. They typically reside at the highest operational level of the Army, or outside of the Army in the various defense agencies. They do not typically train with brigades and battalions, and gaining commanders are not likely to be familiar with their capabilities or their support requirements.

We recommend:

The Army and Marine Corps, in conjunction with the Joint Forces Command (JFCOM), should develop some modules of various critical capabilities and experiment with them to determine whether there are some combinations of these capabilities that bring synergy to S&R operations.

We believe that this recommendation will also lead to a greater familiarity on the part of brigade and battalion commanders with the capabilities and support requirements of some of these providers of critical capability, enhancing planning and execution of S&R operations.

The Army is currently undergoing a dramatic restructuring from its traditional divisions to modular combat brigades. In addition, a
rebalancing between the active and reserve force is underway. This process should provide the nation with more flexible general-purpose forces, which we believe are the right forces for S&R operations. As the Army proceeds with its restructuring, it is important to recognize the critical role the reserve force will play in future S&R operations.

We recommend:

The Department of the Army should accelerate the restructuring of guard and reserve forces, with emphasis on modular capability for the S&R mission.

We specifically do not recommend the creation of specialized units at any level dedicated to S&R operations. The size, complexity, and length of S&R operations demand that they be a core competency of U.S. general-purpose forces.

DOCTRINE, TRAINING, AND READINESS

DOCTRINE

The current draft Joint Operational Concept on Stability, Transition, and Reconstruction Operations published by Joint Forces Command is a good baseline doctrinal publication. If Joint Forces Command taps into the wealth of recent experience currently available, it will be able to publish usable joint doctrine quickly. We should think of this doctrine as constantly evolving, informed by the latest experience of U.S. men and women in theater. As this doctrine is developed, joint planners need to give additional thought to the contributions of the Navy and the Air Force.

We also urge the DOS to give careful thought to the current draft joint operational concept, and use it as a model to produce complementary guidance for DOS. With DOS in the lead, other federal agencies should be encouraged to produce usable guidance for the conduct of S&R operations.
We recommend:

Joint Forces Command should use the current draft “Joint Operational Concept on Stability, Transition and Reconstruction Operations” as a guide to develop, publish, and refine joint doctrine for stability and reconstruction operations.

- Make it a living best-practice guide informed by real-world experience.
- Clearly identify the contributions of all the services to S&R.

The DOS should use the current draft operation guidance as a model to produce complementary documents for its use and the use of other federal agencies.

**TRAINING**

While creating and publishing joint doctrine for S&R operations is important, it is only the first step. DOD general-purpose forces must be adequately trained in the doctrine. It must be a part of major service and joint exercises, and should form an important part of the curriculum in both service and joint schools at every level. To be effective, this training should involve other federal agencies likely to play a role in S&R operations, notably the DOS, Department of Justice, and USAID.

We recommend:

Service secretaries and the Joint Chiefs of Staff should integrate stabilization and reconstruction operations into all joint and military service schools and premier training events.

The under Secretary of Defense for personnel and readiness should provide additional funding and classroom seats at service and joint
education institutions to accommodate more students from other federal agencies.

DOD should partner with the Foreign Service Institute to create a program at the National Defense University to teach integrated planning skills.

READINESS

The DOD has a formal process (the Joint Military Readiness Reporting System) for checking and reporting the combat readiness of various service units. This process has agreed-upon metrics and common measures of readiness that apply to personnel, training, force structure, and equipment. No such system or metrics exist to measure the readiness of military forces to execute S&R operations.

We recommend:

DOD should develop metrics to measure the readiness of military units to conduct S&R operations, and include those metrics in the Joint Military Readiness Reporting System.

ENABLERS

This section was created to describe some of the additional areas on which DOD will need to focus in order to enhance S&R capabilities as an integral part of its mission. While they do not fit neatly into any particular category, these factors emerged as key enablers to successful S&R operations.

MONEY

At the conclusion of combat operations in Iraq, commanders were provided with money confiscated from the former Iraqi government. They used this money to finance local projects and boost local economies throughout the country. When this confiscated money was spent, there was a substantial delay before appropriated funds were
made available. Even then, the bureaucracy made it difficult for commanders to spend the money without the risk of censure.

The Iraqi experience makes it very clear that “money is ammunition” in stabilization and reconstruction operations. Commanders need the ability to disburse resources at the tactical level to help achieve coalition goals.

We recognize the utility of the Commanders Emergency Response Fund, but we believe that much more can be done to make this fund an effective weapon in S&R operations.

We recommend:

The Secretary of Defense should move aggressively to gain the support of the Congress and related government agencies to design a program whereby money can be made available for commanders at the tactical level to support S&R operations.

The rules governing the use of the Commanders Emergency Response Fund should be liberalized, and training should be provided to commanders in the proper disbursement of these resources. We strongly believe that commanders in the field can be entrusted with these funds when given proper guidance and common-sense regulations.

**CONTRACTING**

Commanders in the field found that contracting procedures were too difficult, slow, and risk-averse to be effective in a fluid situation such as that in Iraq. For the most part, the panel found that the problems responsible for this circumstance were not legal problems, but policy restrictions. Had contracting professionals been a part of the planning process, many of the contracting problems could have been avoided or quickly resolved.
Operational commanders need access to contracting expertise during the planning process and at every step of combat and postcombat operations.

We recommend:

As part of the planning process for S&R operations, a team led by the staff of the combatant commander should

- Analyze prior contracting problems and anticipate solutions
- Predesignate operational contracting authority and adequately resource that authority to execute contracts
- Position contracting and legal personnel in the field for continuous support to operational commanders

**LEGAL AUTHORITY**

In some postconflict situations (notably in Iraq, relating to DOD participation in training indigenous police forces) operational commanders labor under the assumption that they do not have the necessary legal authority to act in the best interest of their mission. In fact, adequate legal authority often exists, but overly risk-averse policies a lack of expert advice lead to poor outcomes.

We recommend:

Commanders should be encouraged to utilize the full extent of their legal authority in the interest of mission accomplishment, and senior departmental leadership should provide strong encouragement and support for common-sense decisions made with the best available legal advice.
APPENDIX A: TERMS OF REFERENCE
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MEMORANDUM FOR CHAIRMAN, DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD

SUBJECT: Terms of Reference - Defense Science Board 2004 Summer Study on the Transition to and from Hostilities

You are requested to form a Defense Science Board (DSB) Task Force addressing the Transition to and from Hostilities.

Our military expeditions to Afghanistan and Iraq are unlikely to be the last such excursion in the global war on terrorism. We may need to support an ally under attack by terrorists determined to replace the legitimate government; we may need to effect change in the governance of a country that is blatantly sustaining support for terrorism; or we may need to assist an ally who is unable to govern areas of their own country — where terrorists may recruit, train and plan without interference by the legitimate government.

Our armed forces are extremely capable of projecting force and achieving conventional military victory. However, we have learned that sustainment of military success must be accompanied by concomitant location of enemy leaders, location of weapons including WMD, interruption of terrorist's finances, and interdiction of couriers providing communication so as to truly progress in the global war on terrorism. These latter challenges cannot be ensured during hostilities unless there has been effective intelligence preparation of the battlespace in the years — not weeks or months — preceding hostilities.

Furthermore, we have and will encounter significant challenges following conventional military success as we seek to ensure stability, democracy, human rights and a productive economy. Achieving these ends would be facilitated by successful shaping activities in the years before the outbreak of hostilities, as well as exploiting the capabilities not traditional to our armed forces in the period following hostilities.

To enhance the effectiveness across this spectrum of pre- and post-conflict issues, the 2004 Summer Study shall focus on the following issues:

1. Understanding and shaping the environment: the gathering of long-lead intelligence and effective preparation of the battlespace — in the absence of an immediate threat — requires diligence, foresight and preparation.
Long-lead intelligence preparation of the battlespace will involve terrestrial sensing, tagging and tracking in concert with HUMINT, SIGINT, and open sources; and the application of sophisticated means of data tracking in cyberspace. Are there gaps in our technology? How can we assess our 'intelligence readiness', as we now assess our military readiness, in selected regions where hostilities may occur?

Shaping is extremely complicated, requires significant cultural understanding and a long attention span, well in advance of hostilities.

The handoff from long-term shaping efforts to shorter term DoD interests can significantly impact the intensity of hostilities and its aftermath.

- Likewise, the post-hostility environment is likely to be affected significantly by details of the war prosecution such as collateral damage and treatment of combatants and civilians alike.

How can our capabilities in shaping, language and cultural understanding be enhanced by technology?

2. Force protection during transition: Increasingly, US military forces rely more on speed and mobility than hardening to achieve their objectives. In the transition to the post hostilities phase, forces become much more stationary, and become easier targets for residual resistance. What technologies, and tactics, techniques, and procedures can provide force protection during transformation from maneuver warfare to peace keeping operations such as a garrison force charged with establishing order?

3. Disarmament and destruction of munitions stocks: The deposed regime may leave behind many dangerous devices; e.g. conventional munitions and WMD, and other legacies. What capabilities are needed to address disposal, as well as environmental and security issues associated with these unwanted devices?

4. Intelligence exploitation in the aftermath: Rapid, decisive battlespace victory can produce a rich vein of captured documents, materiel, and human sources, but their exploitation, today, is personnel-intensive and requires good language skills coupled with substantive and cultural understanding. What approaches can more swiftly and economically process said collection?

5. Stabilizing the civilian population: There will be inevitable need to address problems of refugees and displaced persons, mortuary assistance, food
supply, housing and health care. DoD will likely be charged with these challenges: what preparation, training and technology can be applied to facilitate these elements of infrastructure?

6. **Re-establishing the rule of law:** One important step in establishing order is the need to reconstitute a constabulary force. Improvements are needed in our methods for vetting applicants, tracking them and their behavior, and avoiding friendly fire incidents between them and our own forces. Improved technologies are desirable for their selection, training, and interoperability with US forces.

Furthermore, the use of precision munitions results in much less damage to the enemy's military infrastructure and armed forces. Therefore, the post-hostility phase will likely face large numbers of motivated individuals with military training who view the US as an enemy. Are there techniques and technologies which can identify those who will or will not present an insurgency threat in the post hostilities phase? Can something be done in the pre hostility phase which will minimize or even eliminate post hostility phase insurgency and terrorism problems?

7. **Rapid rebuilding of basic infrastructure:** This requires reliable communications and interim power and potable water sources. How rapidly can these be inserted? Might there be opportunity for establishing subsequent monitoring capabilities?

After the initial effort, it is critical to put in place the infrastructure, economic enablers, and a political/legal structure to establish a successful post-war economy, a representative and democratic government, and a stable social structure. What can and should DoD do to further these goals? What other agencies, international organizations and non-governmental organizations should be involved? How should DoD work with them?

In responding to the above challenges, it must be recognized that transitioning to and from hostilities requires such a wide range of capabilities that many are not integral to the Department of Defense (DoD). It is important to manage the transitions in such a way that those capabilities are exploited fully despite organizational boundaries. Sound capability management requires DoD to identify those capabilities resident within other US government agencies, those inherent within DoD and those needing development by the DoD or others. Where the capabilities are external to DoD, provision for their transfer to DoD control if appropriate should be pre-arranged and tested in joint exercises.

This study will be co-sponsored by me as the Under Secretary of Defense (AT&L), Under Secretary of Defense (Policy), and Under Secretary of Defense
(Intelligence). Dr. Craig Fields and Mr. Phil Odeen will serve as co-Chairmen. Dr. Jerry McGinn and COL Kevin McLaughlin will serve as co-Executive Secretaries. LTC Scott Dolgoff, USA, will serve as the Defense Science Board Secretariat Representative.

The Task Force will operate in accordance with the provisions of P.L. 92-463, the "Federal Advisory Committee Act," and DoD Directive 5105.4, the "DoD Federal Advisory Committee Management Program." It is not anticipated that this Task Force will need to go into any "particular matters" within the meaning of section 208 of Title 18, U.S. Code, nor will it cause any member to be placed in the position of acting as procurement official.

[Signature]

Michael W. Wynne
Acting
### APPENDIX B: TASK FORCE PANEL MEMBERSHIP

#### POSTCONFLICT ACTIVITIES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Current</th>
<th>Former</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Larry Wright, Co-chair</td>
<td>Current: Private Consultant</td>
<td>Former: Senior Vice President and Senior Partner, Booz Allen Hamilton</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gen Mike Williams, USMC, (Ret), Co-chair</td>
<td>Current: Senior Fellow, Logistic Management Institute</td>
<td>Former: Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr. Janet Ballantyne</td>
<td>Current: Group Vice President International, Abt Associates</td>
<td>Former: Foreign Service Officer, U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), rank of career minister</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr. Joseph Braddock</td>
<td>Current: Potomac Institute</td>
<td>Former: Founder, Corporate Officer, and Director, BDM International</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMB James Dobbins</td>
<td>Current: Director, International Security and Defense Policy Center, RAND</td>
<td>Former: Special Envoy to Afghanistan, Kosovo, Bosnia, Haiti, and Somalia; Assistant Secretary of State for Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr. George Heilmeier</td>
<td>Current: Chairman Emeritus, Telcordia Technologies</td>
<td>Former: Director, DARPA; Senior Vice President and Chief Technical Officer, Texas Instruments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADM Joe Lopez, USN (Ret)</td>
<td>Current: President, Information Manufacturing Corporation (IMC)</td>
<td>Former: Commander-in-Chief U.S. Naval</td>
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</table>
### Task Force Membership

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Current</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dr. Joe Markowitz</td>
<td>Private Consultant</td>
<td>Forces Europe and Allied Forces Southern Europe (N8B)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr. Susan Marquis</td>
<td>Vice President, Resource Management, LMI</td>
<td>Assistant Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Resources, Requirements and Assessments) (N8B)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ms. Judith Miller</td>
<td>Partner, Williams &amp; Connolly LLP</td>
<td>General Counsel, Department of Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prof Harvey Sapolsky</td>
<td>Professor of Public Policy and Organization, Massachusetts Institute of Technology; Director of the MIT Security Studies Program</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Rich Wilhelm</td>
<td>Vice President, Global Resilience, Booz Allen Hamilton</td>
<td>Senior Policy Advisor to Vice President Gore</td>
</tr>
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#### Government Advisors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Office</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dr. Jerry McGinn</td>
<td>Special Assistant to the Principal Deputy, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr. Stewart Patrick</td>
<td>Department of State</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Michael Shama</td>
<td>HQ, Army Corps of Engineers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Ross Wherry</td>
<td>U.S. Agency for International Development</td>
</tr>
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#### Staff

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Organization</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ms. Tamara DiGregorio</td>
<td>Booz Allen Hamilton</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ms. Julie Evans</td>
<td>Strategic Analysis, Inc.</td>
</tr>
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#### Historical Perspective

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dr. Bill Howard, Co-chair</td>
<td>Private Consultant</td>
<td>Senior Vice President and Director of Research and Development, Motorola, Inc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr. Williamson Murray, Co-chair</td>
<td>Senior Fellow, Institute for Defense Analyses; Professor Emeritus of History, Ohio State University</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mr. Alan Ellinthorpe</td>
<td>Private Consultant</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Frank Hoffman</td>
<td>Research Fellow at the Center for Emerging Threats and Opportunities at</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Former/Current Position</td>
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</table>
| Mr. Norman Polmar             | Quantico  
*Former:* National Security Analyst and Director, Marine Strategic Studies Group  |
| Dr. Michael Vlahos            | Current: U.S. Naval Institute and Anteon Corporation                                    |
| Gen Mike Williams, USMC (Ret) | Current: Director, Security Studies Program, The Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies  
*Former:* Director, Center for the Study of Foreign Affairs, U.S. Department of State |
| Government Advisor            |                                                                                       |
| Dr. Jerry McGinn              | Current: Senior Fellow, Logistics Management Institute                                  
*Former:* Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps                                   |
| Staff                         |                                                                                       |
| Mr. Kevin Gates               | Current: Strategic Analysis, Inc.                                                      |
### Appendix C: Briefings Received by the Panels

**PostConflict Activities**

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<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Presentation Title</th>
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<tr>
<td>Mr. Lincoln Bloomfield-Assistant</td>
<td>Discussion on Post Conflict and Reconstruction</td>
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<tr>
<td>Secretary of State, Bureau of Political</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Military Affairs</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Jim Kunder - Deputy</td>
<td>USAID role in stabilization and reconstruction</td>
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<tr>
<td>Assistant Administrator for Asia</td>
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<tr>
<td>and the Near East in USAID</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mr. Rick Barton - CSIS</td>
<td>Governance issues</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dr. Harvey Sapolsky - Director of the MIT</td>
<td>Governance issues</td>
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<tr>
<td>Security Studies</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mr. Dave Oliver</td>
<td>Iraq experience</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ms. Janet Ballantyne</td>
<td>USAID role in stabilization and reconstruction</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mr. Jim Bishop</td>
<td>Discussion: How to improve U.S. and international</td>
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<td></td>
<td>performance in Post Conflict operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gen Jim McCarthy, USAF (Ret)</td>
<td>OIF Lessons Learned</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mr. Robert Perito</td>
<td>Discussion: how can we improve public security</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mr. Ken Adelman</td>
<td>Lessons for Today’s Leaders</td>
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<tr>
<td>MG Buford Blount, USA</td>
<td>Army’s view of post-hostilities reconstruction</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gen Michael Hagee, USMC</td>
<td>Discussion</td>
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<tr>
<td>MG Bill Nash, USA (Ret)</td>
<td>Discussion Post Conflict activities</td>
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<td>Mr. Ross Wherry – USAID</td>
<td>Post Conflict Planning</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mr. Anthony Cordesman</td>
<td>Discussion</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mr. Pat Patterson-DOS</td>
<td>Future of Iraq</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ms. Jane Lute – (Assistant Secretary</td>
<td>Discussion on Post Conflict Phase</td>
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<tr>
<td>General for Mission Support in the</td>
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<td>Department of Peacekeeping Operations of</td>
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<td>the UN (Military)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Prof Francis Fukuyama</td>
<td>Discussion on Post Conflict</td>
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### APPENDIX D: ACRONYMS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>C/JFLCC</td>
<td>Combined/Joint Forces Land Component Commander</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CINC</td>
<td>Commander-in-Chief</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DARPA</td>
<td>Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DDR&amp;E</td>
<td>Director, Defense Research and Engineering</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOD</td>
<td>Department of Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOS</td>
<td>Department of State</td>
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<tr>
<td>DSB</td>
<td>Defense Science Board</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FEMA</td>
<td>Federal Emergency Management Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FFRDC</td>
<td>Federally Funded Research and Development Center</td>
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<tr>
<td>IDF</td>
<td>Israeli Defense Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>JFCOM</td>
<td>Joint Forces Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>JTIAF</td>
<td>Joint Interagency Task Force</td>
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<td>Nongovernment Organization</td>
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<td>National Security Council</td>
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<td>NSPD</td>
<td>National Security Presidential Directive</td>
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<tr>
<td>OPLANS</td>
<td>Operational Plans</td>
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<tr>
<td>OSRO</td>
<td>Office of Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>PLO</td>
<td>Palestinian Liberation Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>S/CRS</td>
<td>Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization</td>
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<tr>
<td>S&amp;R</td>
<td>Stabilization and Reconstruction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOUTHCOM</td>
<td>U.S. Southern Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>U.S. Agency for International Development</td>
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