Showtime: An Analysis of the Embedded News Media Program During the Pre-Combat and the Combat Phases of Operation Iraqi Freedom

A Monograph
by
MAJ Han Bouwmeester
Royal Netherlands Army

School of Advanced Military Studies
United States Army Command and General Staff College
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

AY 04-05

Approved for Public Release; Distribution is Unlimited
**Title**: Showtime: An Analysis of the Embedded News Media Program During the Per-Combat and the Combat Phases of Operation Iraqi Freedom

**Authors**: Major Han Bouwmeester

**Performing Organization**: US Army Command and General Staff College
School of Advanced Military Studies
250 Gibbon Ave.
Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027

**Abstract**: The embedded news media program has set a new model for media coverage of future conflict, because it was a win-win-win-situation for the military, the media, and the public. The program enabled the military to provide the public with timely, accurate and fair information on the operation, without violating the OPSEC rules. The media, especially experts and producers, were hesitant to participate in the embedded program, because the program could violate the idealistic rules of good journalism. It turned out differently. The media took enormous economic advantage of the embedded program. The program facilitated journalists to keep a tight rein on all military activities during the operation. The American public was positive about the embedded program. Their collective opinion was that it was a "good thing." The international press and audience were less positive on the embedded program, but that did not affect the effectiveness of the program in the United States. Though the program was effective during Operation Iraqi Freedom, the U.S. Department of Defense needs to make improvements, such as enhancement of media training, selection criteria for the embedded program, prevention of negative impact on the home front, and an update of the prevailing joint pubs and army field manuals.

**Subject Terms**: Embedded News Media, Military-Media Relationship, OIF

**Security Classification**: U

**DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT**: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Title of Monograph: Showtime: An Analysis of the Embedded News Media Program During the Pre-Combat and Combat Phases of Operation Iraqi Freedom

Approved by:

__________________________________   Monograph Director
Mark S. Inch, COL, MP

__________________________________   Director,
Kevin C.M. Benson, COL, AR   School of Advanced
                                 Military Studies

__________________________________   Director,
Robert F. Baumann, Ph.D.   Graduate Degree
                                 Programs
Abstract


Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, and his Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, Mrs. Victoria Clarke, initiated the embedded news media program. The intent was for the public to see directly through the media what happened at the front before others could affect public opinion. In February 2003, just before the start of Operation Iraqi Freedom, the U.S. Department of Defense implemented the Public Affairs Guidance on Embedding Media.

The embedded news media program has set a new model for media coverage of future conflict, because it was a win-win-win situation for the military, the media and the public. The U.S. Department of Defense took risk with the program, but it worked. The program enabled the military to provide the public with timely, accurate and fair information on the operation, without violating OPSEC rules. It also catalyzed a better relationship between the military and the media.

Many media experts and news producers were hesitant to participate in the embedded program, because the program would violate the idealistic rules of good journalism. It turned out differently. The media took enormous economic advantage of the embedded program. The program facilitated journalists to keep a tight rein on all military activities during the operation. Journalists got access to information and that had a fatal fascination for them.

The American public was positive about the embedded program. Their collective opinion is that it was a “good thing.” In the international environment, the program was not as effective as it was in the United States. The international press was less positive on the advance of the Coalition troops than their American colleagues. However, the lower interest in the international environment did not affect the effectiveness of the program in the United States.

The embedded program proved to be effective during Operation Iraqi Freedom, but the Department of Defense needs to make improvements. The improvements introduced in this monograph concentrate on nine issues: (1) Enhancement of media training and education in the U.S. Armed Forces; (2) Development of more steps to prevent inaccuracy and dishonest on the Armed Forces in the media; (3) Further development of a practical Public Affairs Guidance on Embedding Media; (4) Creation of selection criteria for the embedded program; (5) Prevention of negative impact on home front; (6) Update of the prevailing joint publication and field manual on public affairs; (7) More analysis on the use of embedded pictures as a management information tool; (8) Continuation of the embedded program; (9) Integration of the embedded program into Information Operations.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................................... 1  
Organization and Methodology................................................................................................. 3  
Explanations and Limitations....................................................................................................... 5  
EMBEDDED NEWS MEDIA PROGRAM.......................................................................................... 9  
The History of the Military – Media Relationship ................................................................. 11  
THREE PERSPECTIVES.................................................................................................................. 19  
Military Perspective...................................................................................................................... 19  
Media Perspective........................................................................................................................ 23  
Public Perspective......................................................................................................................... 27  
Summary ..................................................................................................................................... 28  
THREE RESULTS.......................................................................................................................... 30  
Military Perspective...................................................................................................................... 30  
Media Perspective........................................................................................................................ 38  
Public Perspective......................................................................................................................... 48  
Summary ..................................................................................................................................... 49  
INTERNATIONAL VIEWS.............................................................................................................. 50  
British Reaction............................................................................................................................ 50  
Netherlands Reaction................................................................................................................... 51  
German Reaction.......................................................................................................................... 53  
Reactions in the Middle East......................................................................................................... 54  
Summary ..................................................................................................................................... 55  
FINAL REMARKS.......................................................................................................................... 57  
Conclusion................................................................................................................................... 57  
Discussion................................................................................................................................... 60  
Appendix A: PUBLIC AFFAIRS GUIDANCE ON EMBEDDING MEDIA................................. 69  
Appendix B: GUIDELINES FOR DISCUSSIONS WITH THE MEDIA......................................... 86  
BIBLIOGRAPHY.............................................................................................................................. 89
CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

We worked so hard to get the military and media cultures to be like each other that we overlooked the fact that they are “natural enemies” and that will never change.

Colonel Barry E. Willey, Former Deputy Public Affairs Officer of the U.S. Army

Today it is unthinkable to conduct a war without any real time news coverage by the media. Both the military and the media try to serve the American public, but their relationship was not always smooth. It started as an almost perfect symbiosis, but that changed over time to an adversary relationship. Many soldiers, not just Vietnam veterans, distrust the media and are very cautious when dealing with press. Their perception is that journalists are always looking for headlines, especially negative headlines, and when there is no arresting headline to report, journalists will fabricate one. The press, on the other hand, does not trust the military leaders. A perception of some journalists is that military leaders always withhold information from the press.

The basic construct of the two professions can exacerbate the mutual negative perceptions. Peter Braestrup observes in his book *Battle Lines* that both professions attract different personality types and foster different sets of values. Military people are educated to respect tradition, authority, and obedience, while journalists are more freewheeling, irreverent, skeptical of authority and challenging official wisdom. Joseph Galloway, a military expert of Knight Ridder Newspapers calls the gap “a struggle between ‘anarchists’ and ‘control freaks’.” Margaret Belknap adds in her paper *The CNN Effect: Strategic Enabler or Operational Risk* that

---


the military wants to control everything on the battlefield, while reporters want free access to all aspects of operations. Commanders worry over leaks of information compromising an operation. Keeping secrets is abhorrence to reporters.⁴

The mutual mistrust between the military and the media led to generations of military officers that were overwhelmingly negative toward the media. Media and media operations are still not a favorite topic in the military. During the Academic Year 2003 – 2004 of the U.S Army Command and General Staff Officer Course, the course spent only two hours on dealing with media. Later, during the academic year, students could select a few electives on media, but these electives were not mandatory for the whole class. ⁵ Lieutenant General (Ret) Bernard Trainor of the U.S. Marine Corps wrote in 1990 in his article “The Military and the Media: A Troubled Embrace” that the credo of the military has become “duty, honor, country and hate the media.”⁶

After a long difficult period and just before the start of Operation Iraqi Freedom, Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, and his Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, Mrs. Victoria Clarke, introduced the embedded news media program. In all, there were 662 news media people in Coalition units.⁷ The intention of the embedded program was to guarantee that the home front would see the same as soldiers at the front; no lies, no propaganda, no tricks; the camera was to register the battlefield. The embedded program promulgated by Mrs. Clarke carried risk to operational security, while placing the military and the press in a position of greater intimacy than in any previous conflict.

---

⁵ Experience of the author, who was a student at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff Officer Course during Academic Year 2003-2004.
Some believe that the embedded program was a smart move of the U.S. Department of Defense; others think that it was an impulsive decision of Rumsfeld and Clarke. There is not one vision on the embedded program. Experts view the embedded program in different ways. Many questions on the embedded program rose. One of these questions forms the main research question of this monograph: “Was the embedded news media program effective during the pre-combat phase and combat phase before and during Operation Iraqi Freedom from February through April 2003?”

**Organization and Methodology**

The monograph divides the main research question into six subordinate research areas, which lead systematically to an answer and recommendations:

1. What is embedded media? What is its history? What was the media plan for Operation Iraqi Freedom?

2. How are media operations related to Information Operations? What determines whether media operations are effective?

3. What happened during the pre-combat and combat phase of Operation Iraqi Freedom? Were there mismatches between the plan and the execution or was the media plan executed without any friction? Did the media plan achieve the planned effects?

4. What were the journalists and the U.S. home front’s perspectives on the embedded news media program?

5. What were the perspectives in the rest of the World?

6. Is embedded news media a useful tool for future operations?

Chapter 2 “Embedded News Media Program” explains the first subordinate research area. Chapter 3 “Three Perspectives” creates a framework with criteria for judging the embedded program. It centers on the second subordinate research area and the criteria to address the effectiveness of media operations. Chapter 4 “Three results” analyzes the effectiveness of the
embedded program within the framework of measures created in chapter 3. It responds to the subordinate questions in areas 3 (execution of the embedded program) and 4 (American perspectives on the embedded program). Chapter 5 “International views” examines the reactions in the rest of the world and focuses on the fifth subordinate research question. Chapter 6 “Final Remarks” provides a conclusion as final answer to the main research question. It also makes recommendations for the future and answers the sixth subordinate research question.

The study of literature is the main research method for this monograph. It means that the researcher uses secondary sources for his research. He utilizes information on a certain subject to answer a new research question. The researcher must be aware that information meant to answer another question might affect him. Dutch social scientist Swanborn clarifies in his requirements for social scientific studies that the thoughts of primary researches can influence a researcher. 8 This monograph is not an exception. The ultimate objectivity does not exist. This monograph introduces in chapter 3 a framework with criteria seen from three different perspectives (the military, the media and the public) to resist this tendency. The different perspectives seek to prevent this monograph from judging the embedded program with only a military bias.

This monograph is not simply a military hosanna story on how well the embedded program worked during Operation Iraqi Freedom. Different views might lead to different but interesting conclusions and overlooked and unintended effects. Not everybody in the Armed Forces will like that, but it might be beneficial to the military. The first reason for this is that, as said in the first paragraph, the military and the media do have an adversary relation. Sometimes this relationship generates an opposing mechanism based on: what is “good” for the military may be “bad” for the media and the public. The long-term effect is that something worse for the media and the public will become worse for the military as well. The second reason is that opposing

perspectives might encourage a dialectic approach of “thesis, antithesis, synthesis,” which will contribute to the quality of the discussion on military and media.

**Explanations and Limitations**

*Webster’s Encyclopedic Unabridged Dictionary of the English Language* explains that the word “media” is not only the plural form of “medium,” but it has also its own meaning: “the means of communication, as radio, television, newspaper, magazines, etc. that reach the very large number of people.”

Today, the media comprises three different forms. The first form is the “print media,” which includes newspapers, magazines, and books. The second form is the “broadcast media,” which encompasses radio and television. The third form is “on-line media,” the internet, which is the newest version of media. Most publishers and broadcasting services have their own website with a news page. There is also a new movement among common people to start their own news website. This last category does not involve journalists, so it is not part of this monograph. The term media in this monograph focuses on professional news media. There are many terms describing the same phenomenon. This monograph uses both terms “media” and “news media” together with others, such as the “press,” “journalists” and “reporters,” without making any distinction between the different media capacities.

The Department of Defense designed the embedded news media program for all four Services, but in practice mainly the Army and Marine Corps, and to a lesser extend the Navy, dealt with the program. That is a logical consequence. The Army and Marine Corps formed the advancing ground forces. They were not only the largest contributors to Operation Iraqi Freedom, but they were also more suitable to accommodate embedded journalists. The monograph is in line with this approach.

---

with the practical use of the embedded program. It pays mainly attention to embedded news
people in Army and Marine Corps units and a few glimpses of what happened aboard Navy ships.

The monograph briefly addresses Information Operations.\textsuperscript{10} Information Operations are
actions taken to affect adversary information and information systems while defending one’s own
information and information systems.\textsuperscript{11} Both John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt in their book \textit{In
Athena’s Camp: Preparing for Conflict in the Information Age}, and Alvin and Heidi Toffler in
their book \textit{War and Anti-War: Survival at the Dawn of the 21\textsuperscript{st} Century} consider Operation Desert
Storm in 1991 the beginning of the information warfare age.\textsuperscript{12} It still took the Department of
Defense eight years to implement the first Joint Publication 3-13 \textit{Joint Doctrine for Information
Operations}.\textsuperscript{13} Former Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Hugh Shelton emphasized the
importance of this publication. Commanders must bring it to bear during joint and multinational
operations.\textsuperscript{14} However, Colonel (Ret) Gregory Fontenot (et al) infers in the book \textit{On Point: The
United States Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom} that even after a decade, Information Operations
planning, coordination, and execution remained ad hoc during Operation Iraqi Freedom.

There is still no joint consensus on Information Operations, which hindered planning and
execution of the joint campaign. Moreover, the resulting Information Operations effort was
disjointed and not well integrated with maneuver, fires, and other combat activities.\textsuperscript{15} Another
void was the planning of media operations. Planners did not treat media operations as a

\textsuperscript{10} Since the implementation of Joint Publication 3-13 \textit{Joint Doctrine for Information Operations} in
1998, media within the U.S. Armed Forces is linked to Information Operations.
\textsuperscript{11} U.S. Department of Defense, \textit{Joint Publication 1-02: Department of Defense Dictionary of
\textsuperscript{12} John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, \textit{In Athena’s Camp: Preparing for Conflict in the Information
Age}, Santa Monica: RAND National Defense Research Institute, 1997); p. 85. And: Alvin and Heidi
Toffler, \textit{War and Anti-War: Survival at the Dawn of the 21\textsuperscript{st} Century}, (Boston: Little Brown and Company,
\textsuperscript{13} U.S. Department of Defense, \textit{Joint Publication 3-13: Joint Doctrine for Information Operations},
\textsuperscript{14} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{15} Colonel (Ret) Gregory Fontenot (et al), \textit{On Point: The United States Army in Operation Iraqi
component of Information Operation. Major Joe Cox, who worked in the Information Operations cell of 4th Infantry Division, admits that Information Operations and media were poorly synchronized during Operation Iraqi Freedom. Planners did not integrate Public Affairs into Information Operation as supposed in Joint Pub 3-13. The integration depended on the willingness of both Information Operation and Public Affairs personnel to work together.  

The only used document for media operations was the Public Affairs Guidance on Embedding Media, which will be explained in chapter 2. Major Tom Bryant, who worked in V Corps’ Public Affairs cell, explains that before the appearance of the embedded program, Public Affairs personnel at every level made their own plans.

The measures to judge the effectiveness derive from different perspectives: a military, a media, and a public point of view. These three perspectives approached the embedded news media program in a different way and with different interests that may lead to new and interesting understandings. The monograph does not use the tenets of Information Operations to judge the effectiveness of the embedded program, because of the lack of synchronization between Information Operations and the embedded program.

The monograph is limited by time. It focuses on the pre-combat and the combat phase of Operation Iraqi Freedom. The issuing of the Public Affairs Guidance on Embedding Media in the beginning of February 2003 is the start of this period. The end is marked by 01 May 2003, the day on which the President of the United States, George W. Bush, aboard the USS Lincoln, officially declared that the major combat operations were finished. The number of embeds decreased significantly soon after the fall of Baghdad in April 2003. Joe Strupp reports in his

---

16 Major Joe Cox, interviewed by author, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 21 October 2004.
17 Colonel (Ret) Gregory Fontenot (et al), On Point, p. 420.
18 Major Tom Bryant, Re: Monograph Prospectus briefing on Media in OIF, response on a personal electronic mail, 23 August 2004 (Fort Leavenworth, 23 August 2004 at 0952 hrs).
article “Newspapers Pull Reporters From Embed Slots,” that the quantity of embeds dropped to a fewer than 190 during the third week of the operation.\textsuperscript{20} At the end of April 2003 almost all embedded journalists had left their units.

CHAPTER TWO

EMBEDDED NEWS MEDIA PROGRAM

Public Opinion wins wars. I have always considered as quasi-staff officers, correspondents accredited to my headquarters.

General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower

When Bob Wright, the Chairman of NBC, was asked to write a foreword to NBC’s book *Operation Iraqi Freedom*, he described “being embedded” in plain terms: “journalists eating, sleeping, and moving in concert with their assigned combat units.” Bill Katovsky went more in detail in the book *Embedded*, which he wrote together with Timothy Carlson:

Embedded reporters ate, lived, traveled, and slept with the troops. They choked on the same sandstorm grit, and carried the same mandatory gas mask and chem. suits. They dined on the same MREs (Meals Ready to Eat), and bounced along the same rutted desert tracks. They faced the same enemy fire.

These two descriptions reflect the practical side felt by the media. The other side of the story derives from the Department of Defense. On 30 October 2002, the Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, attended unexpectedly a meeting of Washington bureau chiefs of major media companies. Secretary Rumsfeld promised them a public relations strategy of embedded media with warriors. If there were to be a war with Iraq, journalists would be with the troops. His main argument was that in Afghanistan both the Taliban and Al-Qaeda showed great skills in news management. The best way to counter it was to have accurate, professional journalists on the ground. They could see the truth of the ongoing operation.

---

24 Ibid., p. xiii.
Colonel (U.S. Marine Corps) Glenn Starnes described in his paper *Leveraging the Media: The Embedded Media Program in Operation Iraqi Freedom,* that Rumsfeld was faced with three courses of action. The first course of action was a continuation of Operation Enduring Freedom’s policy: limited media access to the battlefield and press briefings at the Pentagon and the military operational headquarters. The second course of action envisioned the return of the media pools as had been done during Operation Desert Storm. The third course of action recommended that the military leverage the media by a new Public Affairs plan now referred to as the embedded news media program. Secretary Rumsfeld, assisted by Victoria Clarke, decided to implement the embedded news media program.  

Howard Kuntz points out in his article “A Battle Plan for the ’03 Campaign,” that Victoria Clarke told reporters that they would get more access than in Operations Desert Storm and Enduring Freedom. “It is in our own interest to let people see for themselves through the news media, the lies and deceptive tactics Saddam Hussein will use.”

Former TV Reporter Michael Burton presented a more critical view on the embedded concept in Danny Schechter’s book *Embedded: Weapons of Mass Deception:*

The idea originated with the Pentagon, where military and political strategists pitched the idea to editors last year as a compromise. The Pentagon strategists, already planning for the Iraqi war, wanted proud, positive, and patriotic coverage over national airwaves. If editors agreed to all their provisions for security reviews, flagging of sensitive information, limitations on filming dead bodies, and other restrictions, then journalists would be welcome. The editors not only went along – they accepted the ground rules without fight.

Lieutenant Colonel (U.S. Army) Tammy Miracle wrote in her *Military Review* article “The Army and Embedded Media,” that before Operation Iraqi Freedom, Secretary Rumsfeld and Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff issued a directive in which they emphasized that the goal of the

Department of Defense was to get it right from the start of the operation. The main purpose was to facilitate the press with firsthand impressions. Miracle states that these policy changes profoundly affected the way Public Affair Officers operated. The U.S. Department of Defense assigned news crews, journalists, and photographers to specific combat units for a longer time: days, weeks or even months.\(^{28}\) The directive mentioned by Miracle was the Secretary of Defense’s *Public Affairs Guidance (PAG) on Embedding Media*, which was issued on 10 February 2003. It contains in point 2 the basis for the embedded news media program: “We need to tell the factual story – good or bad – before others seed the media with disinformation and distortions.”\(^{29}\) Miracle described that during the combat phase of Operation Iraqi Freedom the Coalition Forces embedded almost 700 journalists, photographers, and news crews within their units, while another 2,000 unilaterals, who did not participate in the embedded program, stayed in Kuwait.\(^{30}\)

**The History of the Military – Media Relationship**

Ted Morgan mentioned in his article “War Reporting” that the idea war news could be gained by independent coverage rather than from government dispatches or letters from junior officers took a long time in coming.\(^{31}\) Peter Young and Peter Jesser depict in their book *The Media and the Military: From the Crimea to Desert Storm* that it was not earlier than the late

---

\(^{30}\) Lieutenant Colonel Tammy Miracle, “The Army and Embedded Media,” p. 41.
eighteenth century that the newspaper began to emerge as a power.\textsuperscript{32} Morgan recognized Swiss reporter Gottfried Ebel, who published a small article on the storming of the Bastille in Paris, as the first known war journalist.\textsuperscript{33} Young and Jesser regarded Henry Crabb Robinson, who covered Napoleon’s campaigns along the River Elbe, as the first professional war correspondent.\textsuperscript{34} The first reporters attached to units were British correspondents, who tried to follow their nation’s armies in Napoleonic Wars, but the Duke of Wellington sent them away. The Duke grumbled that the reporters gave away military secrets.\textsuperscript{35}

Since war correspondent was a new profession, no one had any experience. There was no firm distinction between correspondent and soldier. New Orleans Picayune correspondent George Wilkins Kendall, who covered the Mexican War, rode into battle with McCulloch’s Rangers on the Rio Grande and captured a Mexican flag.\textsuperscript{36} The American Civil War was the first war fully covered on both sides. As Morgan renders, it was the use of the telegraph more than any other single development that changed war reporting. With the wire came the spot news. One could read what happened yesterday. Newspapers became more competitive.\textsuperscript{37}

War reporters described combat in prosaic stories to entertain the public. Filmmaker Stephen Ives portrays in his film documentary \textit{Reporting America at War} that the romantic period in American war reporting ended after World War II. Reporters, who stayed with units, such as Richard Harding Davis in the Spanish War and World War I, and later Ernie Pyle during World War II, were very patriotic. They wrote in a poetic way on small combat situations.\textsuperscript{38} The change came during the Korean War. Young and Jesser state that in the beginning the military saw the

\textsuperscript{34} Peter Young and Peter Jesser, \textit{The Military and the Media}, p. 22.  
\textsuperscript{36} Ibid.  
\textsuperscript{37} Ibid.  
role of the correspondents in the same way as they had in World War II: patriotically reporting in support of their own troops. As a result, the U.S. Department of Defense initially restricted embedded journalists only by a code preserving operational security. Nevertheless, most journalists decided to make judgments that were more objective, they reported what they saw. According to Young and Jesser, critical reporting of Allied disunity and distrust marked those early days. For the first time, the military faced war correspondents reporting without any limitation on the truth as they saw it. 39

Margaret Belknap indicated that the war in Vietnam was a determining event in military-media relations. It was the last war in which reporters had free access and no censorship, and it was the first war with television coverage. It was the first time that correspondents reported that American units lacked discipline. As Belknap states, senior commanders saw these stories as a major reason they were losing the war at home while they were winning the battles in Vietnam.40 The media became very skeptical. The crossroads came after the negative coverage of the Tet Offensive in early 1968. The images on television were in sharp contrast to the official reports of the Pentagon that the U.S. Armed Forces were factually winning the war and would be out of Vietnam soon. After Tet, the reports were more focused on the difference between what Washington said versus what reporters in Vietnam saw. Belknap concluded the U.S. military learned that they needed the support of the American people, but they failed to see the importance of the media as a channel to the people back home. 41 Colonel Barry Willey added in his article “The Military-Media Connection: For Better or For Worse,” that if Korea was the transition, Vietnam must be viewed as the turning point. Willey infers:

Reporters did not lose the Vietnam War for America, as is often alleged, but their aggressive and candid reporting did inform a callous public about the futility of the war’s

39 Peter Young and Peter Jesser, The Military and the Media, pp. 48-49.
40 Margaret Belknap, The CNN Effect, p. 3.
41 Ibid., pp. 3-5.
strategy—a strategy that ignored the need for public support and that cost 58,000 American lives.42

Young and Jesser explained that the Vietnam experience shook defense forces all around the world, especially in Western democracies. As a result, the military took measures to prevent the media from influencing a conflict in such a large degree. During the Falkland War43 in 1982, there were a few journalists attached to combat units.44 Young and Jesser observed that the British military campaign was able to exercise control through its monopoly of access to transport and communications in this expedition. That gave the British the power to conduct censorship, deception, misinformation and disinformation.45

The next conflict in which the U.S. Armed Forces fought was Operation Urgent Fury, Grenada 1983. Belknap pointed out that the overwhelming lesson from Vietnam seemed to be: “Keep the press out!” The operational commander, Admiral Metcalf, therefore banned reporters from Grenada. They were welcome after the completion of the operation. The press was enraged. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Vessey considered this failure as a “huge mistake at national level.”46 He installed a panel to study the military-media relations. The panel was doomed from the start because media organizations did not want to be members of a government-sponsored commission. Retired journalists took their place. The main recommendation of the commission in the Sidle Report47 was the establishment of press pools.48

---

43 The Falklands or the Islas Las Malvinas are a few small islands in the South Atlantic. They are located before the south-east coast of Argentina and Chile, some 8,500 miles distance from the United Kingdom. Argentina invaded the islands in April 1982 and claimed them as Argentinean territory.
44 Among these reporters were BBC-journalist Robert Fox, who wrote a book Eyewitness Falklands: A Personal Account of the Falklands, on his experiences with the 2nd Para Battalion and 3rd Commando Brigade Headquarters, and London Evening Standard journalist Max Hastings and political editor of the Economist Simon Jenkins, who, together, wrote The Battle for the Falklands.
45 Peter Young and Peter Jesser, The Military and the Media, p. 98.
46 Margaret Belknap, The CNN Effect, p. 5.
47 The commission was called the Sidle Commission after its chairman, retired Major General Winant Sidle. This commission concluded their inquiry with the so-called Sidle Report.
48 Margaret Belknap, The CNN Effect, pp. 5-6.
Operation Just Cause in Panama 1989 followed Grenada. Belknap stated that the military felt confident that they could manage media access by controlling pools of reporters. CNN\(^49\) approached Panama as a media event with live reporting.\(^50\) Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Powell, realized that the military-media relation was changing again. He considered later in his book *My American Journey*: “This was a new, tough age for military, fighting a war as it was being reported. We could not, in a country pledged to free expression, simply turn off the press. But we were going to have to find a way to live with this unprecedented situation.”\(^51\) CNN journalist Peter Arnett’s contrasted these thoughts: “The Panama story showed CNN just how alluring live coverage of a crisis could be. CNN now had the technology, the skills and money to go live anywhere in the world.”\(^52\)

The next conflict was Operation Desert Storm, which started soon after Panama. Young and Jesser illustrate that the Secretary of Defense, Richard Cheney, refused reporters to accompany first troops into the Gulf region. Under pressure of intense media criticism, Cheney approved a small pool of seventeen reporters accompanied by six media escorts.\(^53\) General Powell, who served in Vietnam, was concerned that direct battlefield reporting would bring home the horrors of war. Reporters and cameras following every step in a ground offensive would create anti-war sentiments in the United States. Powell greeted the policy of media pools with open arms.\(^54\) Young and Jesser explain that military leadership decided that the world’s public would see a very limited and antiseptic version of the war. They also concluded that during the Gulf War the military followed their familiar pattern of denying media access to the earliest phase

\(^49\) Cable News Network.
\(^50\) Margaret Belknap, *The CNN Effect*, p. 7.
of operations, followed by a policy of media containment and limitation. Colonel Willey contradicted this view by stating that “most commanders have to agree the media coverage of Desert Shield / Desert Storm was balanced and generally favorable where cooperation, patience and tolerance were evident.”

Warren Strobel explained that the common vision of Operation Restore Hope, which took place in Somalia in 1992-1993, was that it was an example of the “push” and “pull” effects of television imagery. He points out that the reason the U.S. Armed Forces were “pushed” into Somalia was mainly based on terrible images on television of starving people in Somalia. Within a year, the terrible images of U.S. soldiers being dragged through the streets of Mogadishu “pulled” the U.S. troops back out. Belknap called Somalia an example of careful planning for involvement with positive reports on media access. When the U.S. Marines got their feet on land, the operation looked more like a movie than an amphibious action. Frank Aukofer and William Lawrence supported Belknap’s conclusion in their book America’s Team, The Odd Couple: A Report on the Relationship Between the Media and the Military. “It is noteworthy that there were few, if any, complaints from the news media about their treatment by the military in Somalia.”

Colonel Willey described Operation Uphold Democracy in Haiti in 1994 as the “oft-predicted scenario” with media already on the ground waiting for the troop arrival. From the start, the primary rule was freedom of movement for media and open access to all units and operations while dealing with legitimate security measures for the units involved. Military escorts were not

---

55 Peter Young and Peter Jesser, The Military and the Media, pp. 175-176,
58 Margaret Belknap, The CNN Effect, p. 9.
needed. Willey deduced that the expanded access combined with daily briefings and use of subject-matter experts created an atmosphere of trust between the reporters and the military.\textsuperscript{60} 

Belknap stated that during Operation Joint Endeavor, led by NATO in Bosnia in 1995, the Army decided to attach about twenty-five reporters to units in Germany, which were going to deploy in Bosnia. The military hoped that this deal would produce positive stories for the Army with an increasing effect on soldier’s morale. Belknap inferred that both reporters and the military judged the concept of attached journalists as a successful notion.\textsuperscript{61} Willey remarked that Bosnia replicated Haiti in which hundreds of journalists roamed around the Balkan countryside. He saw the smooth cooperation in Bosnia as “another high-water mark in the history of military-media relations.”\textsuperscript{62} The Kosovo Air Campaign in 1999 was an alteration in the military-media relation. General Wesley Clark, NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, had difficulties sharing information with the press. Clark writes in his book \textit{Waging Modern Wars} that the media were going to play a vital role in the campaign. However, NATO was not able to generate sufficient information, clear it through various national systems, and then release it in time.\textsuperscript{63} Belknap explicated that frustrated reporters tried to get to the fields to get the “real” story. The ground campaign that followed returned to the practice of attached reporters.\textsuperscript{64} 

Colonel Melanie Reeder, a former U.S. Army Public Affairs Officer in Afghanistan, said in Miracle’s article that it was sometimes difficult to get the media out in front with the troops during Operation Enduring Freedom, which started in 2001 in Afghanistan. Eight embedded

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{61} Margaret Belknap, \textit{The CNN Effect}, pp. 10-11.
\textsuperscript{63} General (Ret) Wesley Clark, \textit{Waging Modern War: Bosnia, Kosovo and the Future of Combat} (New York: PublicAffairs, 2002), p. 188.
\textsuperscript{64} Margaret Belknap, \textit{The CNN Effect}, p. 11.
\end{flushleft}
reporters in Operation Anaconda, which was part of Operation Enduring Freedom, helped blaze the path for a large-scale, embedded media program in Operation Iraqi Freedom. Reeder inferred that when journalists were provided access, the accurate story was told, but when they got information, the result was speculation, misinformation, and inaccuracy.

This review of the military and the media shows a changing relation. For a long time the media favored the military with patriotic stories on combat situations. Korea and Vietnam became the turning point. The media saw themselves as independent “conscience of the nation.” The military did not like that and tried to control the media during operations in the 1980s. Live coverage in the 1990s led in a cautious way to attached journalists and to restoration of the military-media relationship, but this ended abruptly during the Kosovo Campaign in 1999. NATO was not able to provide the media with accurate information. The war in Afghanistan marked the start of the embedded concept with a few reporters attached to U.S. units.

65 According to Time’s Website, Operation Anaconda took place in March 2002 to “squeeze” Taliban and Al-Qaeda strongholds in the Shah-i-Kot Mountains.

66 Lieutenant Colonel Tammy Miracle, “The Army and Embedded Media,” pp. 41-42.
CHAPTER THREE

THREE PERSPECTIVES

Like it or not, the news media have more impact than most other agencies on how an operation is perceived by the outside world.

Dr. Lawrence A. Yates 67

The nucleus of this monograph is to elucidate the effectiveness of the embedded news media program during the combat phase of Operation Iraqi Freedom. Criteria to address the effectiveness of the embedded program do not only derive from the military. The military has only one perspective on the military-media relations. That would give a too narrow point of view on the embedded program. The second party involved in the relationship is the media. The media have other interests and represent another culture than the military. The third party is the audience or the American public. The connection between the media and the public is close. Braestrup wrote that the media “serves as eyewitness” for the public and “it also provides one of the checks and balances that sustains the confidence of the American people in their political system and armed forces.”68 This chapter describes the three perspectives and provides a framework with criteria to judge the embedded concept.

Military Perspective

Today, Joint Publication 3-61 Doctrine for Public Affairs (Joint Pub 3-61) gives the basis for how the military considers the military – media relation. It explains that the news media are the principal means of communicating information about the military to the public.69 The military

68 Peter Braestrup, Battle Lines, p. 13.
must make a free flow of general and military information available without censorship or propaganda. “Accurate and timely information” is essential in times of crisis. Incorrect military terminology can lead to much confusion in the public debate. It is the military’s responsibility to provide reporters with accurate and honest information. The consequence of providing false information is severe. Judson Conner described in his book *Meeting the Press: A Media Survival Guide for the Defense Manager*:

> It is usually very easy to lie to a reporter. But there is a catch to it once . . . The truth will come out eventually, and when it does, that reporter will never again believe anything you have to say, whether it is true or not. And no other reporters will either, for the word gets around news circles very rapidly whenever an official lied to the press.\(^71\)

It means that soldiers must be honest with the press. Likewise, Joint Pub 3-61 states: “information will not be classified or otherwise to protect the government from criticism or embarrassment.” \(^72\)

The Secretary of Defense’s *Public Affairs Guidance on Embedding Media* was the only instruction for dealing with media during Operation Iraqi Freedom; issued just before the operation and additional to Joint Pub 3-61. For some parts, it even replaced the Joint Pub 3-61. \(^73\)

It became therefore the most important military document on how the U.S. Department of Defense saw the cooperation between the military and the press. The most significant instruction in the guidance was “to tell the factual story – good or bad – before others seed the media with disinformation and distortion, as they most certainly will continue to do. Our people in the field need to tell our story – only commanders can ensure the media get to the story.” \(^74\) This instruction supports the importance of giving accurate, timely and honest information to the press.

\(^70\) Ibid.
\(^73\) Joint Pub 3-61 still speaks about forming media pools, while the *Public Affairs Guidance on Embedding Media* was focused on embedding of the media.
\(^74\) Secretary of Defense, *Public Affairs Guidance on Embedding Media*. 

However, there is military information that the military must not show openly. It is vital for success of the mission. Joint Pub 3-61 states that “information will be withheld only when disclosure would affect national and operations security.”\textsuperscript{75} Operations security (or OPSEC) is a protection measure that identifies critical information and subsequently analyzes friendly actions attendant to military operations and other activities.\textsuperscript{76} Military personnel may not give away vital and classified information. Annex B shows the Joint Pub 3-61’s list with classification aspects.

Although the military has to offer the media accurate information, it is still not a guarantee that journalists are able enough to convert this information into precise reports and news coverage. The military must build a better relationship with the media to help the media provide a clearer picture of military operations. William Kennedy, professional journalist since 1945 and retired Army Public Affairs Officer of the Pentagon doubted in his book \textit{The Military and the Media: Why the Press Cannot Be Trusted to Cover a War} whether American journalism is able to oversee the complexity of military operations. Kennedy disputed that in cases like the Vietnam War and Operation Desert Storm, all essential facts were available and accessible in the public domain, but the press fell short to report matters of crucial importance.\textsuperscript{77} Providing the press with accurate information is not enough. The journalist has to understand the whole case he wants to cover, with all its details and all its implications. The understanding is not only a responsibility of journalists; it is also a responsibility of the military. Therefore, it is essential for the military and the media to have a relationship of mutual respect. Willey recommended:

Learning to nurture that mutual enmity – building on similarities and mutual interests and recognizing differences – can create a trust and confidence between the two that results in fairer media coverage of the military and greater access by the media.\textsuperscript{78}

\textsuperscript{75} Ibid.
There is another military measure. Mrs. Victoria Clarke made clear in *Television Week* that one of the motivations to create the embedded program was to show people around the whole World how the U.S. forces conducted their operations in a very real and compelling way. Clarke’s statement seems to be fair and innocent, but it leads to a critical question that needs an answer. Did the networks and publics from countries other than the United States welcome the reports of embedded media? And, were the Americans and British reporters favored above reporters from other countries? These questions justify a better look on the international views, which is done in chapter five of this monograph.

It is hard to give one international perspective. Therefore, the international perspective in this monograph consists of the opinions of the people of the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Germany and some countries from the Middle East. The reason for selecting these countries is that it gives a wide range of countries with different perspectives and interests in Operation Iraqi Freedom. The United Kingdom was United States’ closest coalition partner and the second largest troop contributor to Operation Iraqi Freedom. The Netherlands was coalition partner of the United States, but they did not participate with troops during the combat phase of Operation Iraqi Freedom. Germany was against the war and it did not participate in the coalition. Countries from the Middle East have other cultural patterns, another religion and different political systems than the aforementioned Western democracies, but they share the same religion as the majority of the Iraqi establishment. That might give different viewpoints.

To put it briefly, there are four military criteria to evaluate an effective embedded program: (1) Providing *accurate, timely, and honest information* to the media is important to prevent the media from disinformation and distortion and in the longer term to avoid confusion to the American public. (2) *Violations of OPSEC:* the military will make a free flow of general and

---

military information available, while preventing divulgation of vital military information through 
the media to the world-wide public. Divulgation might imperil the security of military units and it 
might endanger success of the mission. (3) **Building a good relationship** between the military and 
the media, based on respect and confidence that results in more complete and fairer media 
coverage. (4) **International response** to U.S. and Coalition operations in Iraq.

**Media Perspective**

The best way to start the media perspective is using the approach how journalists see 
themselves in the ideal situation. Leonard Downie Jr. and Robert Kaiser explained in their book 
*The News about the News* that journalists have a special role in preserving one of America’s 
greatest assets, the culture of accountability. They saw accountability as a crucial aspect of the 
American national ideology, based on the rejection of tyranny. The founders defined tyranny as 
the unjust use of power. Accountability is an important check on that power. Good journalism is a 
principal source to make such accountability meaningful. Downie and Kaiser clarified that good 
journalism “enriches Americans by giving them both useful information for their daily lives and a 
sense of participation in the wider world.”

Bill Kovach and Tom Rosenstiel portrayed in their book *The Elements of Journalism: 
What Newspeople Should Know and the Public Should Expect*, that the purpose of journalism is 
to provide people with the information they need to be free and self-governing. They distilled a 
pattern of elements of good journalism to fulfill that task. These elements of good journalism 
form useful criteria to judge the embedded program.

---

81 Ibid., p. 8.
82 Ibid., p. 4.
83 Bill Kovach and Tom Rosenstiel. *The Elements of Journalism: What Newspeople Should Know 
1. Journalism’s first obligation is to the truth in order to serve the citizens. One of the helpful ways to achieve this mission is verification. Kovach and Rosenstiel state that getting at the truth is a process of stripping information first of any attached misinformation, disinformation, or self-promoting information. As citizens encounter a growing flow of information, they have more need for someone (a reporter) who highlights what is important and filtering out what is not. A way of getting at the truth is verification. *Webster’s Encyclopedic Unabridged Dictionary of the English Language* explains verification as “the process of research, examination, etc., required to prove or establish authenticity or validity.” In journalistic terms, verification is a process of testing and checking a story. Kovach and Rosenstiel discovered five aspects that form the foundation of the discipline of verification: (a) Never add anything that was not there or that did not happen. (b) Never deceive the audience. Misleading is on the same level as lying. (c) Be transparent as possible about the methods and motives. (d) Rely on original reporting. Originality is deeply grounded in journalism. An ancient axiom of the press is: “When in doubt, leave it out.” (e) Exercise humility. Not only should journalists be skeptical of what they see and hear, but they also should be skeptical about their ability to know what it really means.

2. Journalists must maintain an independence from those they cover and they must serve as an autonomous monitor of power. Independency does not mean being neutral or impartial. Most journalists find facts and draw conclusions. Kovach and Rosenstiel write that having an opinion is not only allowable, it is important to the natural skepticism with which any good reporter approaches a story. It is not about believing people but it is a skill based on reporting, learning, understanding, and educating. Kovach and Rosenstiel conclude: “creating barriers to this process of discovery is, in the end, being disloyal to the public.”

---

84 *Webster’s Encyclopedic Unabridged Dictionary of the English Language*, p. 1587.
85 Bill Kovach and Tom Rosenstiel. *The Elements of Journalism*, pp. 75-86.
86 Ibid., pp. 95-96 and 109.
of power refers to the watchdog principle, which means watching over the powerful few in society on behalf of the many to guard against tyranny. Kovach and Rosenstiel explain that it implies that the press should recognize where powerful institutions are working effectively, as well as where they are not.  

3. Journalism must provide a forum for public criticism and compromise. This means that reporters contribute to the forming of people’s opinion. Kovach and Rosenstiel expound: “the natural curiosity of humankind means that by reporting details of scheduled events, disclosing wrongdoing, or outlining a developing trend, journalism sets people to wonder.”

4. Journalism must keep the news comprehensive and proportional. Kovach and Rosenstiel make a comparison with cartography, although cartography is scientific and journalism is not. “A journalist that leaves out so much of the other news in the process is like the map that fails to tell the traveler of all the other roads along the way.” Proportion and comprehensiveness is the key to accuracy. A news story can only be accurate if a reporter places it in the right way in a larger context.

Kovach and Rosenstiel’s elements of good journalism are useful criteria to judge the embedded program, but they are idealistic. It is utopian to believe that the press provides the public with unbiased news. News media is competing business. Media companies and networks are commercial institutions and their first concern is making money. Media expert Dr. Carl Jensen stated in Kristina Borkesson’s book *Into the Buzzsaw: Leading Journalists Expose the Myth of a Free Press* that “corporate media executives perceive their primary, and often sole, responsibility to be the need to maximize profits for the next quarterly statement and not, as some

---

87 Ibid., pp. 114-115.
88 Ibid., p. 135.
89 Ibid., p. 164.
observers would have it, to inform the public.”

A survey conducted by the independent Pew Research Center For People and Press together with the Columbia Journalism Review in April 2000 revealed that almost the half of the nearly 300 surveyed journalists admitted that they avoid going after important stories and/or soften stories to benefit the financial interests of their news organization or advertisers.

Eric Alterman depicted in his book *What Liberal Media? The Truth About Bias and News* that the reporter, the editor, the producer, and the executive producer all understand implicitly that their jobs depend in part on keeping their corporate parents happy. Alterman did not only see the ownership as an important fact, but he is also convinced that the profit motive determines the content of the news. Factual news on politics is boring and does not sell very well. Today the public is more interested in glamorous and electrifying news leading to competition between the news networks, which have the most exciting coverage of a news item. The economic motive, selling the news and making profits, is also a media criterion to judge the embedded program.

Explaining business competition leads to other elements that are important for the media. Not only is the content of the news important, but also the speed to get the message across. Willey declares that “deadlines still drive reporters to ‘crash and burn’ to get the facts, write the story and land the ‘page one, above-the-fold byline.’” This was the situation before the embedded program came into being. The time pressure did not only count for print media, but also for the broadcast media. They had to finish the adaptation of an interview or coverage before the start of the prime time eight o’clock news show. Interesting is to see whether the embedded

---


91 Ibid.


program, especially for the broadcast media with the real time coverage of moving and fighting units, had an impact on the media’s race against the clock.

Another criterion related to competition is the selection of the journalists for the embedded program. The Public Affair Guidance on Embedding Media clarified that “the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs is the central agency for managing and vetting embeds to include allocating embed slots to media organizations.”94 It did not explain any selection criteria. That leads to many questions. For what reasons, and by what criteria did the military select journalists and media organizations to take part in the embedded program? What happened to journalists who were not fortunate enough to be selected?

The last criterion focuses on the security measures for journalists, because a severely wounded or killed journalist is obviously not very effective. This criterion contrasts the embedded journalists and the unilaterals on their personal security during and previously to the major combat operation phase during Operation Iraqi Freedom. Though being a war correspondent is still a dangerous profession, certain expectations for security do exist.

In short, the media criteria are the elements of good journalism (truth and verification, independency and autonomous monitor of power, forum for criticism and compromise, and comprehension and proportionality), economic motives, speed, selection, and security measures.

### Public Perspective

The public is an important party for judging the effectiveness of the embedded media, because they have to take in all presented information. The public’s criteria focus on the way the people perceive and appreciate the embedded program. Renowned research institutes like The Pew Research Center, The Columbia Journalist Review and the Project for Excellence in

---

Journalism distinguish three different audience aspects during war coverage, which are useful measures to judge the embedded program:

1. *Quality.* Quality is a broad and hard to define term, but the explanation of the term quality in this research is whether the public appreciates the way they get their information through the embedded reporters. The question belonging to this criterion reads: Did the public esteem the real time coverage of fighting and moving U.S. units?

2. *Objectivity.* Most people in the United States like to receive the news as objective as can be to form their own opinion. Although they realize that all media have their own audiences, they prefer to have their news without major biases. But are embedded journalists able to cover the news without any biases of the units to which they were embedded? There is also another aspect of objectivity. The Coalition Forces did not embed every journalist. Can the public expect objective news from journalists who were frustrated because the military did not select them for the embedded program?

3. *Combat fatigue.* Television and internet journalists, who were embedded to units, especially those at the very front, did not have any time to edit coverage and reports on the war in Iraq. The result was that television newscasts in the United States daily broadcasted the war in Iraq for a very long period. Did the American people appreciate these lasting reports? Did the coverage lead to an overload of emotional information? Were the reports overvalued? In other words: was there too much, enough, or too little coverage of the war?

Shortly, the public criteria to judge the embedded program are quality, objectivity, and combat fatigue.

**Summary**

This chapter leads to a framework of measures to judge the embedded program. The framework is a combination of the three different perspectives with their respective measures. Table 1, on the next page, shows the framework in a schematic way. This framework provides the
base for the next two chapters. Chapter 4 will address the American perspectives, the military, the media and the public. Chapter 5 will deal with the international reactions.

Table 1-Framework with measures to judge the embedded program

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FRAMEWORK WITH MEASURES TO JUDGE THE EMBEDDED PROGRAM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Perspective</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Media</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER FOUR

THREE RESULTS

Embedding the press would provide journalists the opportunity to see the good, the bad, and the ugly.

Mrs. Victoria Clarke, Former Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs\textsuperscript{95}

Chapter 3 introduced three groups, which have different perspectives of the embedded program. This chapter analyzes primarily from an American view. It focuses on American media that covered the U.S. Armed Forces for an American audience. International reactions to the embedded program are diverse and justify a separate chapter. They are explained in the next chapter.

Military Perspective

The military perspective consists of four different measures: Accurate, timely and honest information, violations of OPSEC, building a good relationship, while the International response will be addressed in the next chapter.

1. Accurate, timely and honest information. Broadcast media, especially television, had a unique opportunity with the embedded program to show real time coverage of front scenes. Major networks, such as Fox, CNN, and MSNBC broadcasted the entire day live coverage from the front. The public in the United States could directly see front actions. There was no delay and no editing of images. That made it easy for the military to provide timely and honest information.

The print media sometimes had, due to the operational tempo, problems with typing a story and sending it to their home base. On accuracy, Colonel Glenn Starnes, Battalion Commander within

the Marines during Operation Iraqi Freedom, explained that embeds had access to the original plans and were aware of the commander’s intent. Instead of criticizing the tactical situation as plans changed, embeds knew the whole story and reported about the brilliant modifications. The military involved in the media coverage of Operation Iraqi Freedom were very satisfied with the quality information of the operation shown in the media. It met their standards of accuracy, time and honesty. Secretary Rumsfeld also strongly approved the reports that came from the hundreds of journalists: “They could see accurate presentations and representations and written accounts of what the men and women in uniform were doing.”

The military had, during the beginning of Operation Iraqi Freedom, some difficulties in providing complete information of the war. While the embedded TV journalists already showed snapshots of the war, CENTCOM omitted to give a broader view during the first days of the war. Army Lieutenant Colonel (Ret) Robert Leonard stated in his article “Battlefield Leader: Tommy Franks Hyperwar” that CENTCOM initially mishandled the daily briefings. For the first several days there were no briefings, leading reporters to wonder why they were invited. Once the daily briefings began, the first CENTCOM briefers were evasive and defensive. This start cost the military some credibility of the press and the public. As the war continued, Brigadier General Vincent Brooks, CENTCOM’s spokesman, cultivated a more balanced and phlegmatic demeanor and the briefings became more effective.

After some start-up problems, the military was very satisfied with the embedded program. The program met its standards of providing accurate, complete, timely and honest information.

---

2. Violations of OPSEC. Air Force Lieutenant Colonel Larry Cox, chief of the press desk during Operation Iraqi Freedom, told John Laurence of the Columbia Journalism Review that fewer than half a dozen out of the more than 600 embedded news people were expelled. Part of the decision to dis-embed journalists was that he or she said something over-the-line as far as ground rules go (See Appendix B). Another part of the decision was a reflection of how intentional it was and how likely it was to happen again. Most journalists did not realize that they passed the line. In only one major case, the U.S. Armed Forces sent away a journalist. Cox added that the program worked, stating: “Journalists are professionals, and inclined to give due regard to their own safety and the safety of the unit they’re with.” 99 The case that gained the most notoriety was with Geraldo Rivera, reporting for Fox News and embedded 100 to the 101st Air Assault Division. While on camera, Rivera drew a map in the sand to show his viewers his location and what the locations of the next military objectives were going to be. 101 However, Lieutenant General (Ret) Michael DeLong of the U.S. Marine Corps, Deputy Commander of U.S Central Command (CENTCOM) during Operation Iraqi Freedom, declared in his book Inside Centcom that CENTCOM was not so worried about embeds giving away secrets. Their biggest concern was the group of “armchair generals and retired generals turned commentator,” that offered opinions and often false predictions on the operation in many news shows. 102

Most embedded journalists realized that showing classified and sensitive information, such as current locations or targets, could jeopardize the unit to which they were embedded.

---

100 It is still unclear in the different reports whether Geraldo Rivera was officially embedded in 101 Air Assault Division. Rivera and FOX say that he was officially embedded, but the U.S. Department of Defense never confirmed this.
Journalist Bob Ditmar depicted in his Article “Peter Arnett & Geraldo Rivera Singing The Media Blues” that reckless acts, such as Geraldo Rivera did with showing vital locations on television, can create real danger to troops facing real bullets.\textsuperscript{103} The public was satisfied that journalists minded out the OPSEC rules. Consequently, it did not give the journalist extra incentives to violate the OPSEC rules. ABC news conducted a news poll before Operation Iraqi Freedom with reference to OPSEC. The poll showed that almost 70\% of the U.S public said that the military should have the right to prohibit media disclosure to sensitive and secret information.\textsuperscript{104} For most Americans OPSEC was more important than a free flow of all information on the operation.

The U.S. Department of Defense was willing to take some risk with the embedded program, but there were minimal OPSEC violations during the pre-combat and combat phase of Operation Iraqi Freedom. Out of 662 newpsersons, most of them were embedded for more than three weeks, the military dispatched less than six journalists. That is less than 1\%. Thus, for the U.S. Department of Defense it was worth to take this risk.

3. \textit{Building a good relationship}. The relationship between the military and the media was personality driven. Lieutenant Colonel Miracle comments that the level of cooperation depended on the unit commander. Positive news coverage indicated that the commanders were open and available to embedded journalists even on the battlefield. She concluded that possibly a new level of trust and respect between soldiers and journalists will evolve through the embedded program. Miracle also thinks that the U.S. Department of Defense news media boot camp, which


prepared journalists for the harshness on the battlefield, helped to establish a better relationship between the media and the military. 105

Some of the embedded journalists had negative experiences. Washington Post’s Lyndsey Layton, embedded to the USS Abraham Lincoln, was forced to sign an agreement that was more restrictive than the Pentagon’s Public Affairs Guidance. The Commander of the USS Abraham Lincoln lifted the ad hoc constraints when Layton and her colleagues complained to Navy brass in Bahrain. Most reporters were enthusiastic about their treatment. T. Sean Herbert, head of CBS News analyst’s desk, said that embeds and troops became a “band of brothers,” leading to “giddy and excited reporting.” 106 Lai Ling Jew, a NBC News producer embedded with 101st Air Assault Division, even spoke at the funeral of one of the killed soldiers, because soldiers of the division asked her to do so. “It was a strange responsibility for a journalist.” 107 The embedded program in general contributed to a more respectful and trustful relationship between the military and the media, although a few Commanders did not understand their media responsibility.

Despite a better relationship, not all of the embedded journalists agreed that they were able to see the essence of the operation. U.S. News & World Reporter Mark Mazatti, embedded to 1st Marine Expeditionary Force’s mobile command, admitted that it took a lifetime to understand all the implications of a military operation. “The press corps’ poor performance in reading the Iraq battlefield indicates that you can be embedded all the way up to the four-star generals and still not understand the meaning behind the action.” 108 It means that the military and

105 Lieutenant Colonel Tammy Miracle, “The Army and Embedded Media,” p. 41.
some “honest” reporters have a different opinion about the quality of the information during Operation Iraqi Freedom. Where journalists complain about the poor quality, it is however not due to the embedded program. In most cases, journalists had full access to all the plans and intentions, but war is very complex and not easy to understand, especially not for those who did not spend their whole career studying this phenomenon. The Prussian military philosopher Carl von Clausewitz already remarked in his book On War: “Everything in war is very simple, but the simplest thing is difficult.”¹⁰⁹

The Public Affairs Guidance on Embedding Media did not only cause foreseen effects, but also three unforeseen effects. The first unforeseen effect was that the embedded program had an enormous impact on the home front of the deployed soldiers that plausibly affected the morale of soldiers in the longer term. U.S. 1st Marine Division showed only the positive side of this effect in their lessons learned. The Marines were euphoric about the way the embedded media contributed to their internal communication. Embedded media kept family members and friends back home well informed. Concerned family members were able to receive daily updates on their loved ones by the press.¹¹⁰ However, this effect also has a negative aspect. The story of Mrs. Nancy Chamberlain shows a very different view. On the third day of the war, she reacted to NBC anchorman Tom Brokaw in his news show just after she received the formal confirmation that her son, Marine Captain Jay Aubin, was killed in Iraq:

I truly admire what all the network news and news technologies are doing today to bring it into our homes. But for the mothers and wives who are out there watching, it is murder. It’s heartbreak. We can’t leave television. Every tank, every helicopter, “Is that my son?” And I just need you to be aware that technology is great. But there are moms, there are dads, there are wives who are suffering because of this.¹¹¹

¹¹¹ Marc Kusnetz (et al.), Operation Iraqi Freedom, p. x.
Instead of having only a positive effect on the home front, the embedded program can also lead to much stress among the home front and that can become counter-productive.

The second unintended effect of the embedded program is the use of embedded information as a tool for management information. Some think it is a positive aspect, but it might become a negative one. This is best described by “Bing” West and Marine Major General (Ret) Ray Smith in their book *The March Up: Taking Baghdad with the 1st Marine Division*. They wrote that Lieutenant General James Conway, the senior Marine commander, watched in his combat operations center live CNN coverage of the fighting in East Baghdad. Conway was so impressed by the wide-open friendliness and lack of opposition that he immediately approved the division’s request to let the battalions roll until they hit a defense. The CNN coverage together with other live feeds from embeds encouraged Conway to speed the advance and to modify his plan. “That’s OBE – overtaken by events,” Conway said. CNN coverage enabled Lieutenant General Conway to make a fast assessment and a change to his plan. ¹¹²

Using opportunities during operations is always highly recommended, but there is a high risk in changing the plan because of embedded reports. Embedded journalists are not official intelligence sources, such as reconnaissance units or Unmanned Aerial Vehicles. Embedded pictures only show a very narrow view of a combat situation. Moreover, the way Lieutenant General Conway used the embed reports is not in line with a mission command culture. *Field Manual 6-0: Command and Control* explains that mission command accepts the uncertainty of war. Mission command is a mechanism to direct operations through decentralized execution based on leaders at levels in the organization who are willing to use initiative. It also requires an

environment of trust and mutual understanding.\textsuperscript{113} It means that a General in his higher headquarters must trust the commander on the scene in his decision-making.

The third unintended effect of the embedded program during Operation Iraqi Freedom was that guidance on embedded media was too long and too complicated. The purpose of the Public Affairs Guidance was to provide rules and guidance, but in practice, it turned out to be too long and too detailed. Professor Michael Pasquarrett illustrated in his report made after a U.S Army War College workshop on media that both media and military agreed that the “eight page” list\textsuperscript{114} was too lengthy to be of practical use. Most commanders and embedded journalists present at the workshop and who participated in Operation Iraqi Freedom indicated that in practice a simple discussion between the Public Affairs Officer, the commander and their embedded media representatives on workable parameters was adequate enough to solve the problem.\textsuperscript{115} Colonel Starnes supports this indication. ”At the tactical level, commanders and reporters used common sense to determine what could be reported and when a reporter could transmit or ‘go live.’”\textsuperscript{116}

The military is very positive about the embedded program. It met their standards of providing accurate, timely and honest information without violating the OPSEC rules. The embedded program also contributed to a better relationship between the military and the media, which adds to more complete and positive media reports on the military during the war. However, the military must realize that the embedded program had three unintended effects: First, embedded coverage can lead to much stress to families back home. Second, using embedded reports as management information tool might be risky. Third, improvisation at the lower level


\textsuperscript{114} The size on standard 8½ by 11 inch paper, font 11, times roman, was more than 12 pages.


\textsuperscript{116} Colonel Glenn Starnes, \textit{Leveraging the Media}, p. 9.
was necessary, because the guidance for the embedded program was too long and too complicated.

**Media Perspective**

The journalistic perspective comprises five measures: the elements of good journalism (truth and verification, independency and watchdog function, forum for criticism and compromise, comprehension), economic motives, speed, selection, and security. This section starts with the elements of good journalism:

1a. *Truth to serve the citizen and verification.* Kovach and Rosenstiel saw the truth as information, which was stripped of all attached misinformation, disinformation, or self-promoting information. Most of the time, it was not necessary to strip the information. Raw information became the broadcasted information, because of the speed of the real time coverage. Television networks did not transform the information into the usual smooth fifteen-second shot with a catchy sound bite. The embedded program gave another dimension to verification, which became more implicit. The public could see directly what happened at the front. Personal observation of the fact is the ultimate verification. New show producers simply did not have any time for editing or even manipulation. The U.S. audience witnessed the war from a distance. The embedded program linked the military performances directly to the public. Kovach and Rosenstiel discovered five foundations of verification and none of them was violated. Journalists could not even add information, because of the speed of the operation and the real time pictures on television. Embeds did not deceive their audience. They showed and wrote about what they saw.¹¹⁷ Embeds were transparent on there coverage, they were original in their reporting and in

---

¹¹⁷ There is another side to this which will be explained in point 1d (“Comprehensive and proportional news”). Embedded media can unintended lead to distortion.
general they did not over exaggerate their own skills. Most of the time, they told their audience that the coalition soldiers impressed them.

The embedded program changed the way experts such as Kovach and Rosenstiel think of truth and verification. Verification became more implicit, but journalists never violated the verification foundations in Iraq. Kovach and Rosenstiel probably judge the embedded program as providing the public with unstripped information, but that view on truthful information is too small. The public could witness directly battlefield actions now.

1b. Independency and autonomous monitor of power. The loss of independency was one of the biggest complaints of news producers and media experts on the embedded program, but reporters themselves do not agree with their producers. Sam Howe Verhowek of the Los Angeles Times made clear that the embedded program created an inherent conflict: “From the military’s point of view, when you embed somebody in your unit, they become family. For the media side that’s very tricky. You want to keep objective distance from your source.”118 Some media experts like Professor Michael Pfau of the University of Oklahoma and CNN embedded reporter Bob Franken, referred to the embedded as producing a variation of the Stockholm syndrome119 in which journalists became dependent for their survival on soldiers.120 Thomas Ricks from the Washington Post understood the dilemma between affinity for protecting soldiers and objectivity

118 Jack Shafer, “Embeds and Unilaterals.”
119 Stockholm Syndrome describes the behavior of kidnap victims, who become sympathetic to their captors because of a mechanism to deal with fear and violence. The name derives from a 1973 hostage incident in Stockholm, Sweden. At the end of the six days captivity in a bank, several victims resisted rescue attempts, and refused to testify against their captors. (Yahoo Q&A Site. Available: http://ask.yahoo.com/ask/20030324 as of 2003. Accessed on 17 October 2004 at 1030 hrs.).
and independency but adds that reporters were never forced to become an embed. “Some journalists covered the war unilateral by choice.”

Atlantic Monthly correspondent Robert Kaplan, who spent much of the past two years embedded with the U.S. military in both Afghanistan and Iraq, admitted that most media experts and news producers were concerned that the embedded program is undermining independent and objective media. Though, he did not agree with that opinion, because he believed that no journalist is independent and objective. None of them is a blank sheet. “A journalist may seek different points of view, but he shapes and portrays those viewpoints from only one angle of vision: his own.” Every journalist is biased. Nevertheless, the military offered with the embedded program the press a huge opportunity to have a look inside in what most journalists see as the mysterious martial world. Journalists could now observe military aspects during an operation themselves. Major Tom Bryant, who worked in the Public Affairs cell of Fifth Corps, described the discussion on less objectivity versus participation in the embedded program:

Bottom line is yes, they did lose a level of objectivity, and yes, we did use their presence […]. What they cannot deny is they enjoyed a level of access – to classified briefings, plans, and combat operations – that was unprecedented. It’s media cocaine for them – they need the access, want it more than anything, and can’t stop themselves from actually learning to like the soldiers they’re around – and they hate themselves for it.

The watchdog function, or autonomous monitor of power, did not work perfectly. From the start of the war the press became patriotic. That made the press less critical on one of America’s most powerful institutions, the U.S Armed Forces. Tatiana Serafin of the National Interest stated in her article “That’s Entertainment! News Coverage and the War in Iraq” that technological advances in communication equipment enable networks to follow all positive coverage of the war, real time and from a very close distance, from the footage of Prisoner of War

---

121 Jack Shafer, “Embeds and Unilaterals.”
122 Ibid.
123 Major Tom Bryant, Re: Monograph Prospectus briefing on Media in OIF, response on a personal electronic mail, 23 August 2004 (Fort Leavenworth, 23 August 2004 at 0952 hrs.).
Private Jessica Lynch’s rescue to Central Command’s daily press briefings. With such coverage, news networks followed what Serafin called “the Bush Administration party line.” The Fact Index Website in their article “2003 Invasion of Iraq Media Coverage” agreed with Serafin that most major networks became patriotic; adding nationalistic symbols, such as waving American flags, to embedded pictures of rapid advancing U.S. troops. On the other hand, as the website reports, some news networks, such as Fox, did not only show positive embedded pictures. They also gave floor to more critical voices against the violence or even against the war.

The general tendency among the major networks was a positive nationalistic report of the war, which made them less critical on the actions of the Armed Forces. There was probably already some existing national sentiment among many media networks, but the embedded pictures of fast moving U.S. troops made that feeling stronger. For three weeks in April 2003, the media portrayed U.S. Soldiers, Airmen, Sailors, and Marines as America’s real heroes.

1c. Forum for public criticism and compromise. This criterion is linked with the previous criterion. The embedded coverage provided a lot of information for the public, but the information came only from one side. The embeds were only attached to Coalition Forces. There were no western embeds with Iraqi units; a situation that was likely unfeasible. It was not the role of the embed to provide the public with well-analyzed information. Embeds simply provide first hand observations. It is up to producers and editorial staffs of news programs to analyze and critique these embedded pictures, but they most of the time omitted to do so. The one-sided embedded coverage did not contribute to laying a deliberate and multilateral foundation for public opinion. As CNN reporter Christiane Amanpour said, when asked about the embedded


program: “Yes, you get good pictures, but, no, you don’t get great information. No, you don’t get necessarily great journalism.” It needs more than only pictures of moving and fighting troops to structure an opinion on the war. More balanced information with background reports from both sides would have laid a much better foundation.

1d. Comprehensive and proportional news. This last element of good journalism is connected to the previous element of laying a critical basis for the public’s opinion. The lack of comprehensive news was a big issue in the discussion on the embedded program. Many media experts concluded that the embedded coverage gave only a small and unbalanced look on reality. The reality of the war was much broader and more complex than shown in the embedded coverage and stories. CBS News President, Andrew Heyward, agreed that one of the immediate and major criticisms of TV embedding was that it provided a “soda straw” view of the war, devoid of context, perspective or a view from the Iraqi side. He retorts that “if this was looking through straws, then before we had to be looking through toothpicks.” Tom Rosenstiel, a media expert, commented that the embeds did not make the mistake, but the networks omitted to take all the straws together to give some sort of perspective. Todd Gitlin, professor in journalism and sociology at the Columbia University, remarked that he was not concerned about the coverage and stories of the embeds, but more about how the networks processed all the information:

I’m hard to remember anything out of the embeds which seemed to me particular egregious. I was much more critical of what was going on with [network] headquarters commentary, which got into the celebratory shock-and-awe thing.

126 Stephen Ives: Reporting America at War.
127 Bill Katovsky (writer), Tatiana Serafin (correspondent), Danny Schechter (former ABC and CNN producer).
128 Verne Gay, “Back from the Front.”
129 Ibid.
130 Ibid.
With this statement Gitlin not only supports Rosenstiel’s reproach on putting embedded material in perspective, but it also supports Serafin and the Fact Index Website remarks on an emotional and patriotic U.S. media instead of being a watch dog toward U.S. institutions.

Another element of proportionality is that media, especially television, enlarges situations. A small shooting incident can become a major issue on American television. The effect is that people in the United States believe that the entire operation is jeopardized. Lieutenant Colonel (Ret) Robert Leonhard elucidated in his article “Battlefield Leader: Tommy Franks Hyperwar” that this phenomenon occurred on 23 March 2003. Reports about a British aircraft shot down by a Patriot missile, five American prisoners of war, and intense fighting around the city of Nasiriyah, aggravated a widespread belief that the operation was in danger.¹³¹

Bill Katovsky clarified the different roles during real time coverage of a combat situation:

> The public was granted frontrow seats in this media multiplex, but all this instant, around-the-clock reporting led to greater confusion. A soldier’s story was to vanquish the enemy and stay alive. A reporter’s duty was to get the story. The public’s duty was to make sense of all this sound and fury.¹³²

As shown, embedded reports can lead to disproportional news coverage causing unintended effects. Skirmishes become big battles and the home front believes that the whole operation is in danger. This unintended effect is the inaccuracy both the military and the media try to prevent. The military needs accurate information placed in context, while journalists look for the truth. It shows the need for at least daily press conferences at the higher tactical level (e.g. Corps, and Army) and the operational level (e.g. CENTCOM) to place the information in a broader and more balanced perspective.

2. *Economic motive.* The economic motive is one of the most important media measures to judge the embedded program. Despite all the idealistic measures, media organizations and

---

¹³² Bill Katovsky and Thimothy Carlson, *Embedded*, p. XVIII.
networks are still commercial corporations, whether they are print, broadcast or on-line media. The first concern of every commercial firm is to make profit and media organizations and networks are no exceptions to this rule. Profit making in the media world is related to rating. After all, news shows that are watched by a huge audience or news papers that are read by a large public yield more money and attract companies for advertisement.

Jim Rutenberg wrote in his article “Cable’s War Coverage Suggest a New ‘Fox Effect’ on Television” that it was supposed to be a CNN’s war, a network that is owned by AOL Time Warner. Instead, it had been the Fox News Channel, owned by the News Corporation, which has emerged as the most watched source of cable news. Peter Johnston of the USA Today quoted media ratings of the renowned Nielsen Media Research Center in his article “For Cable News, Iraq is Clear Victory.” In the first three weeks of Operation Iraqi Freedom, Fox averaged 3.3 million viewers, a 236% increase from the weeks before the war. CNN had 2.7 million watchers, up 313%, and MSNBC had an audience of 1.4 million, up 360%. By comparison, the big three newscasts still draw millions more total viewers than news, but only NBC can boast. NBC Nightly News’ war average was 11.4 million viewers, up 3%, while ABC’s World News Tonight had 9.9 million watchers, down almost 6%, and CBS had 7.5 million spectators, down 15%. The Readership Institute concluded in their research report “U.S. Daily Newspaper Readership During the War with Iraq” that broadcast media had a much higher increase of ratings than print media, especially newspapers. This was partly due to the innovative approaches, like the

---

embedded program, that resonated with the audience. The Research Institute observed an increase of 5% among newspaper readers.135

The media took enormous advantage of the war in Iraq. The ratings of the cable networks, like Fox, CNN, and MSNBC, increased tremendously during Operation Iraqi Freedom in comparison with the weeks before the war. The long established newscasts, such as ABC, NBC and CBS, saw a slight decrease in their ratings, but they still had a larger audience comprising many million viewers. They probably lost watchers to the cable networks. The print media, especially the newspapers, had a slight increase in their ratings.

3. Speed. Speed is paramount for journalists. They are always hurrying for deadlines. Nevertheless, with the real time coverage lasting for days, deadlines were not important anymore. Speed is part of the real time coverage. What happened in Iraq could be seen on television in the United States at the same time without any editing. There is also a reverse side to the speedy culture. CNN-reporter Christiane Amanpour is concerned that her medium may be leaning too far in the direction of immediacy.

While live [coverage] is exciting, it can’t give you everything in a concise and broader context. Our network has gotten away from taped packages. They think ‘live’ brings more spontaneity; ‘keep moving’ is what they tell us.136

Print media journalists had more problems with the speed. The operational tempo did not always allow embedded print journalists write a deliberate story. James Madore remarked that the best story is worth nothing unless you got it written and out.137 Most of the time, they had to wriggle themselves to get the story out. Some print journalists, like Rick Atkinson with his book


In the Company of Soldiers and Karl Zinsmeister with his book Boots on the Ground, wrote books after the end of the war based on their embedded experiences. Reuters correspondents even combined their embedded experiences during Operation Iraqi Freedom in the book Under Fire.

Speed made a difference between print and broadcast media. Broadcast journalists were no longer concerned about deadlines. The entire day embedded broadcast journalists provided real time coverage during the war. Embedded print journalists were much more concerned to get the story out on time.

4. **Selection for the embedded program.** The selection for the embedded program turned out to be a strange process. The Public Affair Guidance on Embedding Media made a bizarre offer to local reporters. The U.S. Department of Defense allowed local reporters to embed units in their regions and cover the preparation and deployment, but as soon as the unit arrived in theater, the embedded local reporter had to make a request to the Office of the Assistance Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, which allocated slots to media organizations. There was no guarantee that the military assigned reporters to their hometown unit again.  

With this strange selection procedure, the military missed some opportunities that local media would cover their favorite, regional linked units with positive stories on their local heroes.

5. **Security.** During the combat phase of Operation Iraqi Freedom, in total sixteen journalists and news people, both embeds and unilaterals, died. 139 Out of these sixteen, five embedded journalists died; three embeds were killed during firefights, while one died in a car accident and another died due to natural causes. Firefights or mine accidents killed ten unilaterals. One unilateral fell off the roof of his hotel without clear reason. 140 It is difficult to draw any conclusion from those figures. Three embeds out of 600 is 0.5%, while ten unilaterals out of

---

139 Kusnetz (et al), Operation Iraqi Freedom, p. 233.
2100 is also 0.5%. These statistics do not explain much. Not all of the embeds saw combat, while most of the unilaterals stayed in Kuwait. It is therefore hard to say whether embeds were better secured than unilaterals and by that more effective as journalist. It is also hard to compare the casualty rate of Operation Iraqi Freedom with other wars. Bill Katovsky and Timothy Carlson mentioned that during the 100 hours ground offensive of Operation Desert Storm with its pool system four reporters had died. During the many years of the Vietnam War with reporters drifting over the battlefield, the death toll was sixty-five reporters.\footnote{Bill Katovsky and Timothy Carlson, \textit{Embedded}, p. xv.} The embedded program during Operation Iraqi Freedom did not show a significant different casualty rate among journalists.

Overall, the embedded program was a success for the media. Most important for the media was that they took enormous economic advantage of the war; especially the networks with their embedded coverage saw a tremendous increase in their ratings. The embedded program provided many opportunities. It linked the war directly to the public, an innovation in war coverage. A great virtue of embedded program was that journalists could see the actions of Armed Forces from a very close distance and with their own eyes. Most of the journalists were impressed and used a positive tone in their coverage. The embedded program emphasized the difference between broadcast and print journalists; more than any previous media war coverage policy. Especially print journalists sometimes had problems to get their stories out on time, but some of them wrote a book after the ending of the major combat operations. Figures showed that the embedded program was not significantly more dangerous or secure than other ways of war coverage. Only the selection for the embedded program showed some strange idiosyncrasies that need to be reviewed. In general terms, the media was very pleased with this offer of the Department of Defense.
Public Perspective

The public perspective comprises three measures to judge the embedded program. The measures are quality, objectivity and combat fatigue.

1. **Quality.** The term quality is, as seen in the previous chapter, translated into appreciation. How did the public appreciate the way they got their information? The Project for Excellence in Journalism, affiliated with Columbia University, conducted a content analysis of the embedded reports on television during the first days of the war. The researchers concluded that the American public found the embedded coverage largely anecdotal. It is exciting and dull, combat focused, and most information is live and unedited. The public concluded that much of it lacked context but was usually rich in detail. Researchers of the project also found out that 58% of the Americans said embedded reporters are a “good thing.” Of the 34% who said it was a “bad thing” most were worried that the embedded program was providing too much information that could help the enemy. The Pew Research Center for the People and the Press concluded that the public reaction to the embedded program had been favorable, though not overwhelming.

2. **Objectivity.** Objectivity leads to the question: Did the American public see embedded reporters as unbiased? Pew Research Center observed that 30% of the American public indicated that they had a great deal of confidence in the press accuracy and 51% said they had a fair amount of confidence, while 15% said that they did not have much confidence. Pew Research Center concludes that only a few people thought the presence of journalists with U.S forces would result in biased reports. That means that the majority of the American public does not think that the information provided by the embedded program was biased; they accepted it.

---

3. Combat fatigue. Pew Research Center summarized that there are signs that 24/7 televised images of war took an increasing toll on the audience. The research shows that 58% of the American population said it was frightening to watch the embedded media coverage and 67% felt sad when they watched the coverage.\textsuperscript{144} Pew Research Center also determined that most Americans (55%) felt that the media gave the right amount of coverage on the war. Those who said there was too much coverage (39%) far outnumbered the ones who think that the war was under covered (4%). By contrast, many people complained that in comparison to other news issues in the spring of 2003, like tax cuts and the budget deficit, the war was overemphasized.\textsuperscript{145}

The American public was positive about the embedded program. Their collective opinion is that it was a “good thing” that did not lead to biased information about the war. The embedded coverage scared most Americans, probably because it offered the American public a front seat. Most Americans felt that the embedded program did not lead to an overload of war coverage; only the amount of war coverage was not always in balance with other important news issues.

Summary

The embedded program showed a positive image. The military were enthusiastic about the embedded program, because it met their standards of providing accurate, timely and honest information without violating the OPSEC rules and it contributed to a better military – media relationship. The program was also successful for the media. It provided many opportunities for journalists and was economically advantageous. They covered directly the performance of their troops in Iraq, which was unique and of interest to the viewing public. The American public in general appreciated the embedded coverage. Their collective opinion is that the embedded program was a “good thing” and it did not lead to biased information about the war.

\textsuperscript{144} Ibid.
CHAPTER FIVE

INTERNATIONAL VIEWS

I would also try to have more foreign journalists. We can’t all sit around and complain about foreign media coverage if we’re not out there engaged.

Mrs. Victoria Clarke, Former Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs

This chapter, the international views, comprises four different international perspectives. It starts with United States’ closest coalition partner, the United Kingdom. The Netherlands, a coalition partner that did not contribute troops during the combat phase of Operation Iraqi Freedom, follows the United Kingdom. Germany, which was against the war, is next in line. The chapter concludes with reactions from the Middle East, which shows some different viewpoints.

British Reaction

The people in the United Kingdom appreciated the embedded coverage, but were not as excited as the people in the United States. British Secretary of State for Defence, Geoff Hoon, acknowledged the effect of this way of reporting in appearing to reduce opposition to the war in the first days: “The imagery they broadcast is at least partially responsible for the public’s change of mood.” Both pro-war and anti-war sides attacked the British Broadcasting Company (BBC), the national broadcaster. British soldiers fighting in Iraq were sometimes furious at the BBC for their coverage. They saw the BBC as too much pro-Iraq and they sometimes called the BBC: the Baghdad Broadcasting Company. On the other hand, anti-war demonstrators accused the BBC of being biased by the embedded program. Senior managers of the BBC apologized for the use of

---


bias terms such as “deliberate” in their coverage. Meanwhile ministers publicly criticized the BBC’s alleged bias towards Baghdad. Other channels, including the commercial ITV,148 also tried to find a balance between the ecstatic embedded pictures and opposing points of view.149 Australian journalist John Pilger cited Greg Dyke, the BBC’s director general, who attacked American television reporting of Iraq in his article “The BBC and Iraq: Myth and Reality.”

For any news organization to act as a cheerleader for government is to undermine your credibility. They should be... balancing their coverage, not banging the drum for one side or the other. Research showed that, of 840 experts interviewed on American news programmes during the invasion of Iraq, only four opposed the war. If that were true in Britain, the BBC would have failed in its duty.150

The conclusion of the British Ministry of Defence was that the embedded program enabled the primary aim of their media effort: it provided the press and the audience with accurate and timely information.151

**Netherlands Reaction**

The Coalition Forces did not allow the Dutch public broadcasting system, the NOS,152 to participate in the embedded program. NOS correspondent Wouter Kurpershoek had to stay in Kuwait, because the Coalition Forces did not select him for the embedded program. After almost two weeks, he was welcome on a British compound near Basra. Kurpershoek made clear in his article “Onbevredigend Einde van ‘Theaterstuk van de Eeuw’”( Unsatisfying Ending of the “Play of the Century”) that the public affairs office was very outspoken in their policy. “You are allowed to be here because your country is pro war, but I don’t want the shitty stories of German,

---

148 ITV stands for Independent Television.
152 Nederlandse Omroep Stichting (Netherlands Broadcasting Authority).
Belgian and French reporters broadcasted from my compound,” was the comment of their spokesmen.153

Dutch correspondent in Washington Charles Groenhuijsen154 was surprised to discover that mainly British and Americans were selected for the embedded program; even reporters of unexpected networks and magazines, such as MTV,155 Rolling Stone, People Magazine, and Men’s Health Magazine. He concludes in his book Oorlog in Irak (War in Iraq) that marketing and recruitment were the leading principles for the Pentagon.156 Marketing for the Armed Forces toward the American public was very important. However, did the policymakers oversee the international impact of this decision on the longer term? The Coalition Forces forbade NOS reporters to participate in the embedded program. The NOS was only able to receive embedded pictures from the front through American or British networks, but that is not what they wanted. The NOS looked for alternatives to solve this problem. Because of lacking an embedded reporter, the NOS tasked Dutch reporters to make contrasting docudramas in the United States and the Middle East, such as reportages on a wealthy American pacifist who decided to live in President Bush’s Texan hometown Crawford, and the grief among the Iraqi civilian population caused by the war.157 After less than a week, the NOS decided to stop the newscast that lasted the entire day and went to their normal pattern of a few small newscasts per day.

154 Charles Groenhuijsen, who is a well-known and highly respected reporter in the Netherlands, is already for more than 10 years the correspondent for the Netherlands Public Broadcasting Authority in Washington, D.C.
155 MTV means Music Television.
156 Groenhuijsen, Oorlog in Irak (War in Irak), p. 92.
157 Ibid., pp. 106 and 119.
The rates of the viewing public did not show a peak. According to Groenhuijsen, an average soccer game in the Netherlands has much larger television audience.\footnote{Ibid., p. 80.} The Netherlands public was not excessively interested in the embedded coverage of the war.

**German Reaction**

German researchers Raimund Mock and Markus Rettich, who worked for the media research institute Media Tenor in Bonn, Germany, deduced that the war was a “mega event” in Germany. The German media gave it more coverage than the catastrophic Elbe flood in Germany during the summer of 2002. Almost two thirds of the news coverage broadcast during the first week of Operation Iraqi Freedom dealt with the war in Iraq. By the end of March the coverage exceeded that on the Kosovo war in 1999 in which the German armed forces played an active role. Private network RTL\footnote{RTL stands for Radio Tele Luxemburg.} was pleased to have an embedded journalist with allied troops and a reporter in Baghdad to cover both sides of the war. The public broadcasters ZDF\footnote{ZDF stands for Zweites Deutsches Fernsehen (Second German Television).} and ARD\footnote{ARD stands for Arbeitsgemeinschaft der öffentlich-rechtlichen Rundfunkanstalten der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Labor Community of the Public Broadcasting Institute of the Federal Republic of Germany)} primarily relied on their correspondents in Baghdad. The German reporters in Baghdad put their emphasis on the suffering of the Iraqi civilians rather than on warfare. Mock and Rettich conclude that the Baghdad coverage was more proper and politically correct in Germany than the embedded coverage since two German Baghdad reporters received the prestigious Hans Joachim Friedrichs Award, annually given in Germany to courageous journalists with high quality reportages.\footnote{Danny Schechter, *Embedded: Weapons of Mass Deception*, pp. 273-276.}
Reactions in the Middle East

Al-Jazeera, in the Western World seen as the voice of the Middle East, 163 did not participate in the embedded program. They thought that might have given a one-sided biased view of the war. Faisal Bodi, a senior editor of Al-Jazeera, explained the official editorial line during Operation Iraqi Freedom:

Of all the major global networks, Al-Jazeera has been alone in proceeding from the premise that this war should be viewed as an illegal enterprise. It has broadcast the horror of the bombing campaign, the blown-out brains, the blood-spattered pavements, the screaming infants and the corpses. Its team of on-the-ground, unembedded correspondents has provided a corrective to the official line that the campaign is, barring occasional resistance, going to plan.164

The status of Al Jazeera is still a subject for discussion. Professor Mamoun Fandy of the Near-East South Asia Center for Strategic Studies of the National Defense University does not believe that Al-Jazeera is independent, while Professor Mohammed el Nawawy of the Communication and Journalism Faculty of Stonehill College, Massachusetts, defends Al-Jazeera’s independent and impartial role in the Iraqi war.165 Some people in the United States thought that Al Jazeera was provoking against the United States, but El Nawawy responded in his book Al Jazeera: The Story of the Network That is Rattling Governments and Redefining Modern Journalism, that Al-Jazeera’s formula is built on recognizing what the Arabs find important.166

---

163 Al Jazeera is a full Arab television network based in Qatar with an audience larger than 300 million people in more than twenty-two Arab countries. Al Jazeera calls itself independent, but not all experts agree with that statement.
Not many Arab TV channels showed live embedded coverage. Only the toppling of Sadam’s statue in Baghdad was an exception. Schechter points out that the Syrian television, which followed a distinct pro-Sadam line in its coverage ignored the event completely, screening instead a program on Islamic architecture. Other state-run Arab networks, including those of Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia and Sudan, chose not to broadcast the event live. Both Al-Jazeera and Abu Dhabi Television called the event history in the making. Abu Dhabi’s comment: “This is a moment in history. Baghdad people must be feeling sad at witnessing the fall of their capital.” Al-Jazeera’s comment:

This scene suggests something which does not leave any room for doubt, namely that the rule of Sadam Hussein has now collapsed in Baghdad. [. . .] This is a banner saying ‘Go home.’”

The U.S. media showed a clean war without casualties. Christopher Bollyn calls it the “sanitized view of the war presented by the U.S. media.” American media in general followed the guidance of the Secretary of Defense on media and became patriotic. The Middle Eastern media did not like the embedded program. They focused more on the casualties, especially the Iraqi casualties, and felt that the U.S. embedded media did not show the whole truth. It is, however, likely that they would have held the same opinion of pool reporters.

**Summary**

In the international environment, one can see a huge difference between U.S media and media from outside the United States. The U.S. news networks became very patriotic and showed a clean war following the guidance and rules of the Secretary of Defense. They displayed mainly embedded pictures. The networks in the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and Germany were

---

more critical and showed news that was more balanced. The Middle Eastern media did not like the embedded program. Their opinion was that the embedded program only showed one side of the war, glorifying coalition troops. Many Arabic TV channels did not use embedded pictures. They focused more on the Iraqi side and showed pictures of both Iraqi civilian and U.S. military casualties.
CHAPTER SIX

FINAL REMARKS

I think this system worked. . . . Given the tempo of the operations, almost every one of our people found themselves on the front line at one time or another. Not everyone was on the front line the whole time, but almost everybody got their share of good stories.

Mr. John Walcott, Washington Bureau Chief, Knight Ridder Newspapers

Conclusion

The main research question for this monograph reads: “Was the embedded news media program effective during the pre-combat and combat phase before and during Operation Iraqi Freedom from February through April 2003?” The answer is: “YES.” The embedded news media program was effective, because the military, the media and the American public were all happy with it and it also met the standards of the Public Affairs Guidance on Embedding Media.

Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and his Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, Mrs. Victoria Clarke initiated the embedded news media program. This initiative made the military the organizer of the embedded program with which the media was eager to cooperate. The embedded program became a new milestone in a sometimes sensitive relationship between the military and the media. Though Rumsfeld and Clark allowed journalists to embed with the U.S. troops during Operation Iraqi Freedom, there were restrictions in the guidance in how the journalists could report the war. By far most journalists complied with the restrictions.

Both relevant joint publications and the Public Affairs Guidance on Embedding Media made clear that the military would benefit from timely, accurate and fair information without violating the OPSEC. This formula worked in nearly all cases. Journalists hardly abused the rules

169 Brookings Institute, Assessing Media Coverage of the War in Iraq.
for OPSEC and accurate and honest stories were told. A good relation between embedded journalists and soldiers became important for a successful embedded program.

The *Public Affairs Guidance on Embedding Media* is still a young initiative, which needs further development. There were unforeseen effects, such as improvisation at the lower level, underestimated stress at the home front and the use of embedded pictures as management information tool. Not all of them are negative, but they need further considerations.

Media experts and news producers were hesitant to participate in the embedded program. The embedded program would violate the rules of good journalism. Embedded media provides outstanding pictures, but it does not lead to great journalism, they thought. It turned out differently. The embedded program enabled journalists to keep a tight rein on all military activities. The military gave journalists access to information and that had a fatal fascination for journalists. Above all, the media took enormous economic advantage of the embedded program. They are just businessmen who saw in the embedded program a nice opportunity to sell news.

A great virtue of the embedded program was that journalists could see the actions of Armed Forces from a close distance and with their own eyes. The embedded program linked the war directly to the American public. That was unique. The embedded program also made a clear distinction between broadcast and print media. Deadlines were not important anymore for TV journalists, while print reporters sometimes had a hard time to get the story out in time. Some of the embedded print journalists wrote books after the end of the war. Figures showed that the embedded program was not significantly more secure or more dangerous than other forms of war coverage. Only the U.S. Department of Defense needs to review the selection for the program.

The American public was positive about the embedded program. Their collective opinion is that it was a “good thing” that did not lead to biased information about the war. The embedded TV coverage scared most Americans, maybe because the public could see the front live on television. Most Americans felt that the embedded program did not lead to an overload of war coverage; only the amount of coverage was not in balance with other important news issues.
In the international environment, the embedded news media program was not as effective as it was in the United States. The international press was less positive on the advance of the Coalition troops than their American colleagues. The American media showed a clean war following the principles of the Secretary of Defense. The networks in most European countries with only a very few embeds, except for the British, showed more critical and balanced news. The Middle East did not like the American embedded coverage. Middle Eastern networks showed some embedded pictures but most of the time, they showed the Iraqi civilian side of the war. Overall, the lower interest in the international environment did not affect the effectiveness of the embedded program in the United States, but perhaps more international reporters participating in the embedded program would have increased the international attention for embedded coverage.

Media watcher Danny Schechter does not agree with this conclusion. He considers the embedded program as a well-organized propaganda machine. Schechter distinguished two different fronts: “The Iraqis were targeted by bombs and information warfare while western audiences had a well executed propaganda campaign often posing as news directed their way.”

Schechter does not see the sensitive distinction between the military and the media. He only sees the military and the media as one monolith targeting the American audience. That is far beyond the observations of the monograph.

Brookings Institution Senior Fellow, Stephen Hess, agreed with the conclusions of the monograph. He called the embedded program a win-win-win situation:

It’s clear that journalists, who want access more than anything else, were given remarkably access. It seems to me clear that the military got much favorable coverage

\begin{footnotes}
\item[170] Ibid.
\item[171] The Brookings Institution, one of Washington's oldest think tanks, is an independent, nonpartisan organization devoted to research, analysis, and public education with an emphasis on economics, foreign policy, governance, and metropolitan policy.
\end{footnotes}
than they would have had had there not been embedding. And it’s clear that the public saw a type of picture that they had never, never had an opportunity to see before.\footnote{Brookings Institute, \textit{Assessing Media Coverage of the War in Iraq}.}

\section*{Discussion}

The final point of the analysis is whether the embedded news media program is a useful tool for future operations. The simple answer is again: “YES.” Today, war without media is unthinkable. Media correspondent of PBS, Terence Smith, agreed with this conclusion. “I think it has set a new standard in the sense that I can’t imagine in a future conflict not having this. . . . This will be the new model.”\footnote{Ibid.} In fact, if the military stops, the media and the public will view this as the military hiding information.

The embedded program proved to be effective during Operation Iraqi Freedom, but the Department of Defense needs to make improvements. The perfection of the embedded program concentrates on nine issues: (1) Training and education in the U.S. Armed Forces; (2) More steps to prevent inaccuracy and unfair information; (3) Further development of a practical \textit{Public Affairs Guidance on Embedding Media}; (4) Creation of selection criteria for the embedded program; (5) The prevention of negative impact on the home front; (6) Update of the prevailing joint publication and field manual on public affairs; (7) More analysis on the use of embedded pictures as a management information tool; (8) Continuation of the embedded program; (9) Integration of the embedded program and Information Operations.

The first improvement is training and education, which forms an important precondition for the embedded program. Commanders and Soldiers must learn to understand the media to improve the relationship between the military and the media. However, the U.S. Army does not pay much attention to media training and education. The U.S. Army Command and General Staff College’s Intermediate Level Course spent during Academic Year 2003-2004 only two hours on
media. In comparison, the Netherlands Institute for Defense Courses (Command and Staff College), the British Joint Service Command and Staff College, and the German Führungsakademie (Command and Staff College) spent much more time on media during their courses. Dutch army officers at the Netherlands Institute for Defense Course during the course of 2000-2001 spent more than an entire week on media in general and the military – media relationship in the Netherlands. Moreover, during in-class exercises the students did additional media training conducted by well-known Dutch journalists.\footnote{Experience of the author, who was an army student at the Netherlands Institute for Defense Courses during the Academic Year 2000–2001.} The Royal Netherlands Army also spends time on media training for commanders and soldiers during their mission oriented training (the preparation time before a unit is sent on a mission) to make the soldiers more media-aware. The media-awareness of American soldiers is very low. Moreover, most American soldiers still think very negatively about the media.

Career courses for American officers, like the U.S. Command and General Staff Officers Course and the School of Advanced Military Studies, should give much more time to education on all aspects of media, like explaining their background, their intentions, the history of military – media relations, etc. The U.S. Army should also organize more practical media training during in-class exercises (press conferences, interviews, short statements on camera, etc.). Such training will not only make the student more familiar with media, but also confront potential American commanders and staff officers with challenges that derive directly from reality. In addition, a commander, who understands the media and does not see the media as a threat, will work on a better relationship with the media. He could take advantage of the media. The After Action Report of the Third Infantry Division (Mechanized) admits that the sporadic media training they had before deploying for Operation Iraqi Freedom primarily dealt with encountering media on the battlefield. They recommend extending media training. They also recommend that Combat
Training Centers and Battle Command Training Program should include training with embedded media in their program under the creed “train as you fight.” Media training, or more specific embedded media if the Department of Defense continues the embedded program, should become an integral part of unit training.

The second improvement is to think about more steps to prevent inaccuracy and dishonest information. The establishment of good relations between the Soldiers and their embedded reporters is still not a hundred percent guarantee for accurate and honest information. It requires a balanced policy of sticks and carrot, starting with a constructive approximation. As seen in the aforementioned improvement, the constructive approach starts with more media-awareness through training and education. The next step is that all Services offer the media yearly an education course on tactics, how to run an operation, planning process, etc., to make reporters more familiar with military procedures and operations. A mandatory boot camp for all reporters, who are going to participate in the embedded program as suggested by Miracle in her article, should follow these courses in times of a crisis and when the embedded news media program is activated. This is still not a guarantee for a fair coverage. The military also needs sticks in case the carrots do not work, because there is nothing more sensitive for the U.S. Armed Forces than losing the home front because of inaccurate or dishonest information.

The military does not possess more sticks now and that is a point for consideration. Within the American media society, there are rules for journalists set down in journalistic codes of ethics since 1923. Although the First Amendment protects the press from government interference, the press does not have complete freedom. There are laws against libel and invasion of privacy, as well as limits on what reporters may do in order to get a story. Television news

---

176 Lieutenant Colonel Tammy Miracle, “The Army and Embedded Media,” p. 45.
journalists operate under an additional restriction called the Fairness Doctrine. Under this rule, when a station presents one viewpoint on a controversial issue, the public interest requires the station to give representatives of opposing viewpoints a chance to broadcast a reply. This explanation shows that there are rules for journalists, but there are no sanctions when journalists violate these rules. By far most journalists do not abuse the rules, but what if an embedded journalist still tells inaccurate or unfair information. If sending home is not effective, there is another means: the use of blogging. Flemish journalist Paul Belien recently wrote in the respected Dutch newspaper *NRC Handelsblad* about this new growing phenomenon that can limit journalists in telling inaccurate or unfair stories. Since Rathergate, the power of the bloggers increases fast. Blogging, which is keeping a logbook on internet, gives a new dynamic to the 24 hours news cycle. It is critical on news coverage. The average blog does not have a large audience, but most of the time comments that appear on one blog are easily used by other blogs. A snowball effect comes into being and at the end, the classical media will pick it up. Belien calls blogging the new form of checks and balances for the fourth estate.

The Armed Forces confronted with an inaccurate or unfair story can send the journalist away as they did with Geraldo Rivera when he violated the OPSEC rules, or can engage producers and raise the stakes. The Armed Forces do not have sanctions when the journalist persists in his opinion. Blogging is a means to convince the American public that the story was

---


178 On 08 September 2004, Dan Rather, anchorman of CBS’s popular 60 Minutes show, showed the American public early 1970 National Guard documents on President George W. Bush’s refusal to appear for a test. A few hours later on the internet, some experts already made clear that the documents were false. The letter type and subscripts used in the document did not exist in the early 1970s. Rather persisted and called the people on the internet amateurs, but on the internet more and more people were involved in the case. Even the traditional media became involved and at the end whole America knew that the documents were false. On 20 September, CBS made their apologies to the American public.

inaccurate or unfair and forces the journalist or the network to review their story. The armed forces should penetrate more in the privately owned blogging world by enabling retired soldiers to set up and own a few “independent” and influential military blogs. Particularly retired soldiers can sidestep the First Amendment that protects the press from government interference. Instead of mediagenic generals giving their opinions in primetime news shows, the military should ask them to set up blogs and check all the different media news on the military on accuracy and fairness.

The third improvement is the further development of a practical *Public Affairs Guidance on Embedding Media*. The U.S Department of Defense implemented the *Public Affairs Guidance on Embedding Media* in February 2003, shortly before the start of the Iraqi War. In practice, it turned out that the *Public Affairs Guidance on Embedding Media* was much too long. The Department of Defense must take time to evaluate and rethink the *Public Affairs Guidance on Embedding Media* and to make it a much more workable guidance. The *Public Affairs Guidance on Embedding Media* used during Operation Iraqi Freedom set the stage for a new policy on how units at the front have to deal with media, better known as the embedded news media program. The embedded program implies that every soldier, not only public affairs officers, can have contact with the press. That means that every soldier must know how to cooperate with the media. Together with better media education and training, every soldier should receive a small plastic 3 x 5 card with all the media dos and don’ts (e.g. rules for dealing with journalists, rules on OPSEC, what to do in an interview, and some sound bites on media messages) for the specific mission in which they participate.

Another part in the further development of the *Public Affairs Guidance on Embedding Media* is to review the rule for local reporters. Local reporters can follow the entire preparations of the units based in their vicinity, but as soon as they arrive in theater, the military can transfer these reporters to other units. There is no guarantee that they can stay with their units. It is wiser to let these journalists stay with their unit. Most of the time, they already built up a good relationship back home and it is a waste to break this connection.
The fourth recommendation is the creation of selection criteria for the embedded program. During Operation Iraqi Freedom the U.S. Department of Defense was vague in their Public Affairs Guidance on Embedding Media about their allocation for embed slots. It was the responsibility of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs. Maybe they had some very good political reasons to be vague on the criteria. On the other hand, they probably did not realize that by excluding many international journalists the U.S. Department of Defense missed the opportunity to characterize the success and good intentions of the U.S. Armed Forces during Operation Iraqi Freedom in the international environment. Many international networks, especially from European countries that were critical on Operation Iraqi Freedom, were debarred from the embedded program. The long-term effect was that most networks did not have a huge interest in American or British coverage. They started to make critical news on the war in Iraq. It would have been more lucrative for the U.S. Department of Defense if they had made a list with selection criteria for the embedded program and if they had proclaimed the list as soon as the United States showed the intention to deploy their first troops. Such a list will still give the disqualified networks and journalists a disappointed feeling, but it makes clear why the military select others. With that, it prevents excluded journalists from becoming irritated and frustrated.

The fifth improvement is the prevention of negative impact on the home front. This is an important aspect, because it can indirectly affect the fighting soldier. The military focused only on the positive impact, but the reality was different. Embedded pictures stressed most family members and friends. The military may not close their eyes for this negative effect. Although most American units have family support programs, the U.S. Department of Defense as initiator of the embedded program must consider reinforcing the program with professional psychologists and relief workers for stress victims at the home front because of the embedded coverage.

The purpose of the sixth recommendation is to update the current joint publication and Army field manual on public affairs. The last version of Joint Pub 3-61: Doctrine for Public Affairs in Joint Operation dates from 14 May 1997 and is highly inspired by Operation Desert
Storm. Chapter III of the Joint Pub still talks about the Department of Defense National Media Pool system.\textsuperscript{180} Today, with the experience in Iraq, the Department of Defense should review this chapter and make clear that there are different ways of war coverage, such as the pool system and the embedded program. The latest version of the Army \textit{Field Manual 46-1: Public Affairs Operations} as of 30 May 1997 already mentions embedding. It reads: “PAOs [Public Affairs Officers] should seek out those members of the media who are willing to spend extended periods of time with soldiers during an operation, embedding them into the unit they cover.”\textsuperscript{181} This text is true, but obsolete. With the introduction of the embedded program, the armed forces must be prepared to embed many journalists. The Army should revise their field manual on public affairs based on the evaluation of the embedded news media program.

The seventh recommendation is a further analysis of the use of embedded pictures as a management information tool. Some people see this use as a positive development. Use all opportunities to run an operation is their creed. Others do not agree. They see a tendency that the use of embedded pictures as management information tool is too risky and it might lead to micromanagement. It is hard to say in general how to deal with this information. It depends on the situation, but it is good to start a discussion on this topic in career courses such as the U.S. Army Command and General Staff Officers Course and the School of Advanced Military Studies.

The eighth recommendation is the continuation of the embedded program during the ongoing Operation Iraqi Freedom. Although it is beyond the time scope of this monograph, the embedded media ended too early. Though the U.S. Department of Defense never closed the embedded program officially, they should revitalize the initiative. After President Bush announced the end of the major combat operations in Iraq, the fighting did not stop. The Coalition


Forces fought many significant battles since, some without any media, causing the media to start speculating and the adversary the opportunity to tell their propaganda stories. These were just the information aspects Mrs. Victoria Clarke tried to prevent with the embedded program. Prolongation of the embedded program with the size it had during the combat phase of Operation Iraqi Freedom could provide an advantage for the military. It could also add to a better and a more balanced vision of the ongoing operation and that is more beneficial for the media and the audience. John Walcott, the Washington Bureau Chief of Knight Ridder Newspapers, agreed that he was convinced that embedded program stopped too early. “Some of what the Pentagon worried about originally is now starting to happen, and that is Iraqis describing versions of events where we don’t have any reporters anymore present.”

The ninth and last recommendation is the integration of the embedded program and Information Operations. As explained in chapter 1, planners did not integrate media operations, and more specific the embedded program, into Information Operations. One of the reasons might be training and education. Information Operation is still an immature form of warfare. The U.S. Army Command and General Staff Officer Course does not teach their students in the basics of Information Operations. As the new Joint Publication 3-13 begins to influence the field, the burden will be on Commanders to integrate the embedded program with Information Operations.

The ninth recommendation concludes the analysis of the embedded news media program during Operation Iraqi Freedom. U.S. Department of Defense will without doubt continue the embedded program. The embedded program during Operation Iraqi Freedom set the stage, but

---

182 However, it can also lead to a more negative image of the U.S. Armed Forces referring to the Fallujah incident in which the embedded NBC reporter Kevin Sites filmed the shooting of a wounded insurgent by a U.S. Marine mid November 2004.
183 Brookings Institute, Assessing Media Coverage of the War in Iraq.
184 An experience of the author, who was a student at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff Officer Course during Academic Year 2003-2004.
185 The new draft of Joint Pub 3-13 as of July 2004 goes more into detail regarding the integration of media operations and Information Operations than the 1998 version of the Joint Pub, which was still current during Operation Iraqi Freedom.
that does not mean that the embedded program already is a perfect program. Many aspects of the program are still to debate. This monograph contributes to that discussion. The benefit of this monograph is that it analyzes the effectiveness of the embedded program from different viewpoints including an international one.
Appendix A: PUBLIC AFFAIRS GUIDANCE ON EMBEDDING MEDIA

101900Z FEB 03
FM SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//OASD-PA//
TO SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//CHAIRS//
AIG 8777
HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE//PA//
USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE//ECPA//
JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//PA//
SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC//PA//
CJCS WASHINGTON DC//PA//
NSC WASHINGTON DC
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
INFO SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//OASD-PA/DPO//

UNCLAS

SUBJECT: PUBLIC AFFAIRS GUIDANCE (PAG) ON EMBEDDING MEDIA DURING POSSIBLE FUTURE OPERATIONS/DEPLOYMENTS IN THE U.S. CENTRAL COMMANDS (CENTCOM) AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY (AOR).

REFERENCES: REF. A. SECDEF MSG, DTG 172200Z JAN 03, SUBJ: PUBLIC AFFAIRS GUIDANCE (PAG) FOR MOVEMENT OF FORCES INTO THE CENTCOM AOR FOR POSSIBLE FUTURE OPERATIONS.

1. PURPOSE. THIS MESSAGE PROVIDES GUIDANCE, POLICIES AND PROCEDURES ON EMBEDDING NEWS MEDIA DURING POSSIBLE FUTURE OPERATIONS/DEPLOYMENTS IN THE CENTCOM AOR. IT CAN BE ADAPTED FOR USE IN OTHER UNIFIED COMMAND AORS AS NECESSARY.
2. POLICY.

2.A. THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE (DOD) POLICY ON MEDIA COVERAGE OF FUTURE MILITARY OPERATIONS IS THAT MEDIA WILL HAVE LONG-TERM, MINIMALLY RESTRICTIVE ACCESS TO U.S. AIR, GROUND AND NAVAL FORCES THROUGH EMBEDDING. MEDIA COVERAGE OF ANY FUTURE OPERATION WILL, TO A LARGE EXTENT, SHAPE PUBLIC PERCEPTION OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY ENVIRONMENT NOW AND IN THE YEARS AHEAD. THIS HOLDS TRUE FOR THE U.S. PUBLIC; THE PUBLIC IN ALLIED COUNTRIES WHOSE OPINION CAN AFFECT THE DURABILITY OF OUR COALITION; AND PUBLICS IN COUNTRIES WHERE WE CONDUCT OPERATIONS, WHOSE PERCEPTIONS OF US CAN AFFECT THE COST AND DURATION OF OUR INVOLVEMENT. OUR ULTIMATE STRATEGIC SUCCESS IN BRINGING PEACE AND SECURITY TO THIS REGION WILL COME IN OUR LONG-TERM COMMITMENT TO SUPPORTING OUR DEMOCRATIC IDEALS. WE NEED TO TELL THE FACTUAL STORY - GOOD OR BAD - BEFORE OTHERS SEED THE MEDIA WITH DISINFORMATION AND DISTORTIONS, AS THEY MOST CERTAINLY WILL CONTINUE TO DO. OUR PEOPLE IN THE FIELD NEED TO TELL OUR STORY – ONLY COMMANDERS CAN ENSURE THE MEDIA GET TO THE STORY ALONGSIDE THE TROOPS. WE MUST ORGANIZE FOR AND FACILITATE ACCESS OF NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL MEDIA TO OUR FORCES, INCLUDING THOSE FORCES ENGAGED IN GROUND OPERATIONS, WITH THE GOAL OF DOING SO RIGHT FROM THE START. TO ACCOMPLISH THIS, WE WILL EMBED MEDIA WITH OUR UNITS. THESE EMBEDDED MEDIA WILL LIVE, WORK AND TRAVEL AS PART OF THE UNITS WITH WHICH THEY ARE EMBEDDED TO FACILITATE MAXIMUM, IN-DEPTH COVERAGE OF U.S. FORCES IN COMBAT AND RELATED OPERATIONS. COMMANDERS AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICERS MUST WORK TOGETHER TO BALANCE THE NEED FOR MEDIA ACCESS WITH THE NEED FOR OPERATIONAL SECURITY.

2.B. MEDIA WILL BE EMBEDDED WITH UNIT PERSONNEL AT AIR AND GROUND FORCES BASES AND AFLOAT TO ENSURE A FULL UNDERSTANDING OF ALL OPERATIONS. MEDIA WILL BE GIVEN ACCESS TO OPERATIONAL COMBAT MISSIONS, INCLUDING MISSION PREPARATION AND DEBRIEFING,
WHENEVER POSSIBLE.

2.C. A MEDIA EMBED IS DEFINED AS A MEDIA REPRESENTATIVE REMAINING WITH A UNIT ON AN EXTENDED BASIS - PERHAPS A PERIOD OF WEEKS OR EVEN MONTHS. COMMANDERS WILL PROVIDE BILLETING, RATIONS AND MEDICAL ATTENTION, IF NEEDED, TO THE EMBEDDED MEDIA COMMENSURATE WITH THAT PROVIDED TO MEMBERS OF THE UNIT, AS WELL AS ACCESS TO MILITARY TRANSPORTATION AND ASSISTANCE WITH COMMUNICATIONS FILING/TRANSMITTING MEDIA PRODUCTS, IF REQUIRED.

2.C.1. EMBEDDED MEDIA ARE NOT AUTHORIZED USE OF THEIR OWN VEHICLES WHILE TRAVELING IN AN EMBEDDED STATUS.

2.C.2. TO THE EXTENT POSSIBLE, SPACE ON MILITARY TRANSPORTATION WILL BE MADE AVAILABLE FOR MEDIA EQUIPMENT NECESSARY TO COVER A PARTICULAR OPERATION. THE MEDIA IS RESPONSIBLE FOR LOADING AND CARRYING THEIR OWN EQUIPMENT AT ALL TIMES. USE OF PRIORITY INTER-THEATER AIRLIFT FOR EMBEDDED MEDIA TO COVER STORIES, AS WELL AS TO FILE STORIES, IS HIGHLY ENCOURAGED. SEATS ABOARD VEHICLES, AIRCRAFT AND NAVAL SHIPS WILL BE MADE AVAILABLE TO ALLOW MAXIMUM COVERAGE OF U.S. TROOPS IN THE FIELD.

2.C.3. UNITS SHOULD PLAN LIFT AND LOGISTICAL SUPPORT TO ASSIST IN MOVING MEDIA PRODUCTS TO AND FROM THE BATTLEFIELD SO AS TO TELL OUR STORY IN A TIMELY MANNER. IN THE EVENT OF COMMERCIAL COMMUNICATIONS DIFFICULTIES, MEDIA ARE AUTHORIZED TO FILE STORIES VIA EXPEDITIOUS MILITARY SIGNAL/COMMUNICATIONS CAPABILITIES.

2.C.4. NO COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT FOR USE BY MEDIA IN THE CONDUCT OF THEIR DUTIES WILL BE SPECIFICALLY PROHIBITED. HOWEVER, UNIT COMMANDERS MAY IMPOSE TEMPORARY RESTRICTIONS ON ELECTRONIC TRANSMISSIONS FOR OPERATIONAL SECURITY REASONS. MEDIA WILL SEEK APPROVAL TO USE ELECTRONIC DEVICES IN A
COMBAT/HOSTILE ENVIRONMENT, UNLESS OTHERWISE DIRECTED BY THE UNIT COMMANDER OR HIS/HER DESIGNATED REPRESENTATIVE. THE USE OF COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT WILL BE DISCUSSED IN FULL WHEN THE MEDIA ARRIVE AT THEIR ASSIGNED UNIT.

3. PROCEDURES.

3.A. THE OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS (OASD(PA) IS THE CENTRAL AGENCY FOR MANAGING AND VETTING MEDIA EMBEDS TO INCLUDE ALLOCATING EMBED SLOTS TO MEDIA ORGANIZATIONS. EMBED AUTHORITY MAY BE DELEGATED TO SUBORDINATE ELEMENTS AFTER THE COMMENCEMENT OF HOSTILITIES AND AT THE DISCRETION OF OASD(PA). EMBED OPPORTUNITIES WILL BE ASSIGNED TO MEDIA ORGANIZATIONS, NOT TO INDIVIDUAL REPORTERS. THE DECISION AS TO WHICH MEDIA REPRESENTATIVE WILL FILL ASSIGNED EMBED SLOTS WILL BE MADE BY THE DESIGNATED POC FOR EACH NEWS ORGANIZATION.

3.A.1. IAW REF. A, COMMANDERS OF UNITS IN RECEIPT OF A DEPLOYMENT ORDER MAY EMBED REGIONAL/LOCAL MEDIA DURING PREPARATIONS FOR DEPLOYMENT, DEPLOYMENT AND ARRIVAL IN THEATER UPON RECEIPT OF THEATER CLEARANCE FROM CENTCOM AND APPROVAL OF THE COMPONENT COMMAND. COMMANDERS WILL INFORM THESE MEDIA, PRIOR TO THE DEPLOYING EMBED, THAT OASD(PA) IS THE APPROVAL AUTHORITY FOR ALL COMBAT EMBEDS AND THAT THEIR PARTICULAR EMBED MAY END AFTER THE UNIT'S ARRIVAL IN THEATER. THE MEDIA ORGANIZATION MAY APPLY TO OASD(PA) FOR CONTINUED EMBEDDING, BUT THERE IS NO GUARANTEE AND THE MEDIA ORGANIZATION WILL HAVE TO MAKE ARRANGEMENTS FOR AND PAY FOR THE JOURNALISTS' RETURN TRIP.

3.B. WITHOUT MAKING COMMITMENTS TO MEDIA ORGANIZATIONS, DEPLOYING UNITS WILL IDENTIFY LOCAL MEDIA FOR POTENTIAL EMBEDS AND NOMINATE THEM THROUGH PA CHANNELS TO OASD(PA) (POC: MAJ TIM BLAIR, DSN 227-1253; COMM. 703-697-1253; EMAIL TIMOTHY.BLAIR@OSD.MIL). INFORMATION REQUIRED TO BE FORWARDED
INCLUDES MEDIA ORGANIZATION, TYPE OF MEDIA AND CONTACT INFORMATION INCLUDING BUREAU CHIEF/MANAGING EDITOR/NEWS DIRECTOR'S NAME; OFFICE, HOME AND CELL PHONE NUMBERS; PAGER NUMBERS AND EMAIL ADDRESSES. SUBMISSIONS FOR EMBEDS WITH SPECIFIC UNITS SHOULD INCLUDE AN UNIT'S RECOMMENDATION AS TO WHETHER THE REQUEST SHOULD BE HONORED.

3.C. UNIT COMMANDERS SHOULD ALSO EXPRESS, THROUGH THEIR CHAIN OF COMMAND AND PA CHANNELS TO OASD(PA), THEIR DESIRE AND CAPABILITY TO SUPPORT ADDITIONAL MEDIA EMBEDS BEYOND THOSE ASSIGNED.

3.D. FREELANCE MEDIA WILL BE AUTHORIZED TO EMBED IF THEY ARE SELECTED BY A NEWS ORGANIZATION AS THEIR EMBED REPRESENTATIVE.

3.E. UNITS WILL BE AUTHORIZED DIRECT COORDINATION WITH MEDIA AFTER ASSIGNMENT AND APPROVAL BY OASD(PA).

3.E.1. UNITS ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR ENSURING THAT ALL EMBEDDED MEDIA AND THEIR NEWS ORGANIZATIONS HAVE SIGNED THE "RELEASE, INDEMNIFICATION, AND HOLD HARMLESS AGREEMENT AND AGREEMENT NOT TO SUE", FOUND AT HTTP://WWW.DEFENSELINK.MIL/NEWS/FEB2003/D20030210EMBED.PDF. UNITS MUST MAINTAIN A COPY OF THIS AGREEMENT FOR ALL MEDIA EMBEDDED WITH THEIR UNIT.

3.F. EMBEDDED MEDIA OPERATE AS PART OF THEIR ASSIGNED UNIT. AN ESCORT MAY BE ASSIGNED AT THE DISCRETION OF THE UNIT COMMANDER. THE ABSENCE OF A PA ESCORT IS NOT A REASON TO PRECLUDE MEDIA ACCESS TO OPERATIONS.

3.G. COMMANDERS WILL ENSURE THE MEDIA ARE PROVIDED WITH EVERY OPPORTUNITY TO OBSERVE ACTUAL COMBAT OPERATIONS. THE PERSONAL SAFETY OF CORRESPONDENTS IS NOT A REASON TO EXCLUDE THEM FROM
COMBAT AREAS.

3.H. IF, IN THE OPINION OF THE UNIT COMMANDER, A MEDIA REPRESENTATIVE IS UNABLE TO WITHSTAND THE RIGOROUS CONDITIONS REQUIRED TO OPERATE WITH THE FORWARD DEPLOYED FORCES, THE COMMANDER OR HIS/HER REPRESENTATIVE MAY LIMIT THE REPRESENTATIVES PARTICIPATION WITH OPERATIONAL FORCES TO ENSURE UNIT SAFETY AND INFORM OASD(PA) THROUGH PA CHANNELS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. GENDER WILL NOT BE AN EXCLUDING FACTOR UNDER ANY CIRCUMSTANCE.

3.I. IF FOR ANY REASON A MEDIA REPRESENTATIVE CANNOT PARTICIPATE IN AN OPERATION, THEY WILL BE TRANSPORTED TO THE NEXT HIGHER HEADQUARTERS FOR THE DURATION OF THE OPERATION.

3.J. COMMANDERS WILL OBTAIN THEATER CLEARANCE FROM CENTCOM/PA FOR MEDIA EMBARKING ON MILITARY CONVEYANCE FOR PURPOSES OF EMBEDDING.

3.K. UNITS HOSTING EMBEDDED MEDIA WILL ISSUE INVITATIONAL TRAVEL ORDERS, AND NUCLEAR, BIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL (NBC) GEAR. SEE PARA. 5. FOR DETAILS ON WHICH ITEMS ARE ISSUED AND WHICH ITEMS THE MEDIA ARE RESPONSIBLE TO PROVIDE FOR THEMSELVES.

3.L. MEDIA ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR OBTAINING THEIR OWN PASSPORTS AND VISAS.

3.M. MEDIA WILL AGREE TO ABIDE BY THE CENTCOM/OASD(PA) GROUND RULES STATED IN PARA. 4 OF THIS MESSAGE IN EXCHANGE FOR COMMAND/UNIT-PROVIDED SUPPORT AND ACCESS TO SERVICE MEMBERS, INFORMATION AND OTHER PREVIOUSLY-STATED PRIVILEGES. ANY VIOLATION OF THE GROUND RULES COULD RESULT IN TERMINATION OF THAT MEDIA'S EMBED OPPORTUNITY.
3.N. DISPUTES/DIFFICULTIES. ISSUES, QUESTIONS, DIFFICULTIES OR DISPUTES ASSOCIATED WITH GROUND RULES OR OTHER ASPECTS OF EMBEDDING MEDIA THAT CANNOT BE RESOLVED AT THE UNIT LEVEL, OR THROUGH THE CHAIN OF COMMAND, WILL BE FORWARDED THROUGH PA CHANNELS FOR RESOLUTION. COMMANDERS WHO WISH TO TERMINATE AN EMBED FOR CAUSE MUST NOTIFY CENTCOM/PA PRIOR TO TERMINATION. IF A DISPUTE CANNOT BE RESOLVED AT A LOWER LEVEL, OASD(PA) WILL BE THE FINAL RESOLUTION AUTHORITY. IN ALL CASES, THIS SHOULD BE DONE AS EXPEDITIOUSLY AS POSSIBLE TO PRESERVE THE NEWS VALUE OF THE SITUATION.

3.O. MEDIA WILL PAY THEIR OWN BILLETING EXPENSES IF BILLETED IN A COMMERCIAL FACILITY.

3.P. MEDIA WILL DEPLOY WITH THE NECESSARY EQUIPMENT TO COLLECT AND TRANSMIT THEIR STORIES.

3.Q. THE STANDARD FOR RELEASE OF INFORMATION SHOULD BE TO ASK "WHY NOT RELEASE" VICE "WHY RELEASE." DECISIONS SHOULD BE MADE ASAP, PREFERABLY IN MINUTES, NOT HOURS.

3.R. THERE IS NO GENERAL REVIEW PROCESS FOR MEDIA PRODUCTS. SEE PARA 6.A. FOR FURTHER DETAIL CONCERNING SECURITY AT THE SOURCE.


3.T. HAVING EMBEDDED MEDIA DOES NOT PRECLUDE CONTACT WITH OTHER MEDIA. EMBEDDED MEDIA, AS A RESULT OF TIME INVESTED WITH THE UNIT AND GROUND RULES AGREEMENT, MAY HAVE A DIFFERENT LEVEL OF ACCESS.
3.U. CENTCOM/PA WILL ACCOUNT FOR EMBEDDED MEDIA DURING THE TIME THE MEDIA IS EMBEDDED IN THEATER. CENTCOM/PA WILL REPORT CHANGES IN EMBED STATUS TO OASD(PA) AS THEY OCCUR.

3.V. IF A MEDIA REPRESENTATIVE IS KILLED OR INJURED IN THE COURSE OF MILITARY OPERATIONS, THE UNIT WILL IMMEDIATELY NOTIFY OASD(PA), THROUGH PA CHANNELS. OASD(PA) WILL CONTACT THE RESPECTIVE MEDIA ORGANIZATION(S), WHICH WILL MAKE NEXT OF KIN NOTIFICATION IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE INDIVIDUAL'S WISHES.

3.W. MEDIA MAY TERMINATE THEIR EMBED OPPORTUNITY AT ANY TIME. UNIT COMMANDERS WILL PROVIDE, AS THE TACTICAL SITUATION PERMITS AND BASED ON THE AVAILABILITY OF TRANSPORTATION, MOVEMENT BACK TO THE NEAREST LOCATION WITH COMMERCIAL TRANSPORTATION.

3.W.1. DEPARTING MEDIA WILL BE DEBRIEFED ON OPERATIONAL SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS AS APPLICABLE TO ONGOING AND FUTURE OPERATIONS WHICH THEY MAY NOW HAVE INFORMATION CONCERNING.

4. GROUND RULES. FOR THE SAFETY AND SECURITY OF U.S. FORCES AND EMBEDDED MEDIA, MEDIA WILL ADHERE TO ESTABLISHED GROUND RULES. GROUND RULES WILL BE AGREED TO IN ADVANCE AND SIGNED BY MEDIA PRIOR TO EMBEDDING. VIOLATION OF THE GROUND RULES MAY RESULT IN THE IMMEDIATE TERMINATION OF THE EMBED AND REMOVAL FROM THE AOR. THESE GROUND RULES RECOGNIZE THE RIGHT OF THE MEDIA TO COVER MILITARY OPERATIONS AND ARE IN NO WAY INTENDED TO PREVENT RELEASE OF DEROGATORY, EMBARRASSING, NEGATIVE OR UNCOMPLIMENTARY INFORMATION. ANY MODIFICATION TO THE STANDARD GROUND RULES WILL BE FORWARDED THROUGH THE PA CHANNELS TO CENTCOM/PA FOR APPROVAL. STANDARD GROUND RULES ARE:

4.A. ALL INTERVIEWS WITH SERVICE MEMBERS WILL BE ON THE RECORD. SECURITY AT THE SOURCE IS THE POLICY. INTERVIEWS WITH PILOTS AND AIRCREW MEMBERS ARE AUTHORIZED UPON COMPLETION OF MISSIONS;
HOWEVER, RELEASE OF INFORMATION MUST CONFORM TO THESE MEDIA GROUND RULES.

4.B. PRINT OR BROADCAST STORIES WILL BE DATELINED ACCORDING TO LOCAL GROUND RULES. LOCAL GROUND RULES WILL BE COORDINATED THROUGH COMMAND CHANNELS WITH CENTCOM.

4.C. MEDIA EMBEDDED WITH U.S. FORCES ARE NOT PERMITTED TO CARRY PERSONAL FIREARMS.

4.D. LIGHT DISCIPLINE RESTRICTIONS WILL BE FOLLOWED. VISIBLE LIGHT SOURCES, INCLUDING FLASH OR TELEVISION LIGHTS, FLASH CAMERAS WILL NOT BE USED WHEN OPERATING WITH FORCES AT NIGHT UNLESS SPECIFICALLY APPROVED IN ADVANCE BY THE ON-SCENE COMMANDER.

4.E. EMBARGOES MAY BE IMPOSED TO PROTECT OPERATIONAL SECURITY. EMBARGOES WILL ONLY BE USED FOR OPERATIONAL SECURITY AND WILL BE LIFTED AS SOON AS THE OPERATIONAL SECURITY ISSUE HAS PASSED.

4.F. THE FOLLOWING CATEGORIES OF INFORMATION ARE RELEASABLE.

4.F.1. APPROXIMATE FRIENDLY FORCE STRENGTH FIGURES.

4.F.2. APPROXIMATE FRIENDLY CASUALTY FIGURES BY SERVICE. EMBEDDED MEDIA MAY, WITHIN OPSEC LIMITS, CONFIRM UNIT CASUALTIES THEY HAVE WITNESSED.

4.F.3. CONFIRMED FIGURES OF ENEMY PERSONNEL DETAINED OR CAPTURED.

4.F.4. SIZE OF FRIENDLY FORCE PARTICIPATING IN AN ACTION OR OPERATION CAN BE DISCLOSED USING APPROXIMATE TERMS. SPECIFIC FORCE OR UNIT IDENTIFICATION MAY BE RELEASED WHEN IT NO LONGER
WARRANTS SECURITY PROTECTION.

4.F.5. INFORMATION AND LOCATION OF MILITARY TARGETS AND OBJECTIVES PREVIOUSLY UNDER ATTACK.

4.F.6. GENERIC DESCRIPTION OF ORIGIN OF AIR OPERATIONS, SUCH AS "LAND-BASED."

4.F.7. DATE, TIME OR LOCATION OF PREVIOUS CONVENTIONAL MILITARY MISSIONS AND ACTIONS, AS WELL AS MISSION RESULTS ARE RELEASABLE ONLY IF DESCRIBED IN GENERAL TERMS.

4.F.8. TYPES OF ORDNANCE EXPENDED IN GENERAL TERMS.

4.F.9. NUMBER OF AERIAL COMBAT OR RECONNAISSANCE MISSIONS OR SORTIES FLOWN IN CENTCOM'S AREA OF OPERATION.


4.F.11. ALLIED PARTICIPATION BY TYPE OF OPERATION (SHIPS, AIRCRAFT, GROUND UNITS, ETC.) AFTER APPROVAL OF THE ALLIED UNIT COMMANDER.

4.F.12. OPERATION CODE NAMES.

4.F.13. NAMES AND HOMETOWNS OF U.S. MILITARY UNITS.

4.F.14. SERVICE MEMBERS' NAMES AND HOME TOWNS WITH THE INDIVIDUALS' CONSENT.

4.G. THE FOLLOWING CATEGORIES OF INFORMATION ARE NOT RELEASABLE SINCE THEIR PUBLICATION OR BROADCAST COULD JEOPARDIZE OPERATIONS AND ENDANGER LIVES.
4.G.1. SPECIFIC NUMBER OF TROOPS IN UNITS BELOW CORPS/MEF LEVEL.

4.G.2. SPECIFIC NUMBER OF AIRCRAFT IN UNITS AT OR BELOW THE AIR EXPEDITIONARY WING LEVEL.

4.G.3. SPECIFIC NUMBERS REGARDING OTHER EQUIPMENT OR CRITICAL SUPPLIES (E.G. ARTILLERY, TANKS, LANDING CRAFT, RADARS, TRUCKS, WATER, ETC.).

4.G.4. SPECIFIC NUMBERS OF SHIPS IN UNITS BELOW THE CARRIER BATTLE GROUP LEVEL.

4.G.5. NAMES OF MILITARY INSTALLATIONS OR SPECIFIC GEOGRAPHIC LOCATIONS OF MILITARY UNITS IN THE CENTCOM AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY, UNLESS SPECIFICALLY RELEASED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE OR AUTHORIZED BY THE CENTCOM COMMANDER. NEWS AND IMAGERY PRODUCTS THAT IDENTIFY OR INCLUDE IDENTIFIABLE FEATURES OF THESE LOCATIONS ARE NOT AUTHORIZED FOR RELEASE.

4.G.6. INFORMATION REGARDING FUTURE OPERATIONS.

4.G.7. INFORMATION REGARDING FORCE PROTECTION MEASURES AT MILITARY INSTALLATIONS OR ENCAMPMENTS (EXCEPT THOSE WHICH ARE VISIBLE OR READILY APPARENT).

4.G.8. PHOTOGRAPHY SHOWING LEVEL OF SECURITY AT MILITARY INSTALLATIONS OR ENCAMPMENTS.

4.G.9. RULES OF ENGAGEMENT.

4.G.10. INFORMATION ON INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION ACTIVITIES COMPROMISING TACTICS, TECHNIQUES OR PROCEDURES.
4.G.11. EXTRA PRECAUTIONS IN REPORTING WILL BE REQUIRED AT THE COMMENCEMENT OF HOSTILITIES TO MAXIMIZE OPERATIONAL SURPRISE. LIVE BROADCASTS FROM AIRFIELDS, ON THE GROUND OR AFLOAT, BY EMBEDDED MEDIA ARE PROHIBITED UNTIL THE SAFE RETURN OF THE INITIAL STRIKE PACKAGE OR UNTIL AUTHORIZED BY THE UNIT COMMANDER.

4.G.12. DURING AN OPERATION, SPECIFIC INFORMATION ON FRIENDLY FORCE TROOP MOVEMENTS, TACTICAL DEPLOYMENTS, AND DISPOSITIONS THAT WOULD JEOPARDIZE OPERATIONAL SECURITY OR LIVES. INFORMATION ON ON-GOING ENGAGEMENTS WILL NOT BE RELEASED UNLESS AUTHORIZED FOR RELEASE BY ON-SCENE COMMANDER.

4.G.13. INFORMATION ON SPECIAL OPERATIONS UNITS, UNIQUE OPERATIONS METHODOLOGY OR TACTICS, FOR EXAMPLE, AIR OPERATIONS, ANGLES OF ATTACK, AND SPEEDS; NAVAL TACTICAL OR EVASIVE MANEUVERS, ETC. GENERAL TERMS SUCH AS "LOW" OR "FAST" MAY BE USED.

4.G.14. INFORMATION ON EFFECTIVENESS OF ENEMY ELECTRONIC WARFARE.

4.G.15. INFORMATION IDENTIFYING POSTPONED OR CANCELED OPERATIONS.

4.G.16. INFORMATION ON MISSING OR DOWNED AIRCRAFT OR MISSING VESSELS WHILE SEARCH AND RESCUE AND RECOVERY OPERATIONS ARE BEING PLANNED OR UNDERWAY.

4.G.17. INFORMATION ON EFFECTIVENESS OF ENEMY CAMOUFLAGE, COVER, DECEPTION, TARGETING, DIRECT AND INDIRECT FIRE, INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION, OR SECURITY MEASURES.
4.G.18. NO PHOTOGRAPHS OR OTHER VISUAL MEDIA SHOWING AN ENEMY PRISONER OF WAR OR DETAINEE'S RECOGNIZABLE FACE, NAMETAG OR OTHER IDENTIFYING FEATURE OR ITEM MAY BE TAKEN.

4.G.19. STILL OR VIDEO IMAGERY OF CUSTODY OPERATIONS OR INTERVIEWS WITH PERSONS UNDER CUSTODY.

4.H. THE FOLLOWING PROCEDURES AND POLICIES APPLY TO COVERAGE OF WOUNDED, INJURED, AND ILL PERSONNEL:


4.H.2. BATTLEFIELD CASUALTIES MAY BE COVERED BY EMBEDDED MEDIA AS LONG AS THE SERVICE MEMBER'S IDENTITY IS PROTECTED FROM DISCLOSURE FOR 72 HOURS OR UPON VERIFICATION OF NOK NOTIFICATION, WHICHEVER IS FIRST.

4.H.3. MEDIA VISITS TO MEDICAL FACILITIES WILL BE IN ACCORDANCE WITH APPLICABLE REGULATIONS, STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES, OPERATIONS ORDERS AND INSTRUCTIONS BY ATTENDING PHYSICIANS. IF APPROVED, SERVICE OR MEDICAL FACILITY personNEL MUST ESCORT MEDIA AT ALL TIMES.

4.H.4. PATIENT WELFARE, PATIENT PRIVACY, AND NEXT OF KIN/FAMILY CONSIDERATIONS ARE THE GOVERNING CONCERNS ABOUT NEWS MEDIA COVERAGE OF WOUNDED, INJURED, AND ILL PERSONNEL IN MEDICAL TREATMENT FACILITIES OR OTHER CASUALTY COLLECTION AND TREATMENT LOCATIONS.

4.H.5. MEDIA VISITS ARE AUTHORIZED TO MEDICAL CARE FACILITIES,
BUT MUST BE APPROVED BY THE MEDICAL FACILITY COMMANDER AND
ATTENDING PHYSICIAN AND MUST NOT INTERFERE WITH MEDICAL
TREATMENT. REQUESTS TO VISIT MEDICAL CARE FACILITIES OUTSIDE
THE CONTINENTAL UNITED STATES WILL BE COORDINATED BY THE UNIFIED
COMMAND PA.

4.H.6. REPORTERS MAY VISIT THOSE AREAS DESIGNATED BY THE
FACILITY COMMANDER, BUT WILL NOT BE ALLOWED IN OPERATING ROOMS
DURING OPERATING PROCEDURES.

4.H.7. PERMISSION TO INTERVIEW OR PHOTOGRAPH A PATIENT WILL BE
GRANTED ONLY WITH THE CONSENT OF THE ATTENDING PHYSICIAN OR
FACILITY COMMANDER AND WITH THE PATIENT'S INFORMED CONSENT,
WITNESSED BY THE ESCORT.

4.H.8. "INFORMED CONSENT" MEANS THE PATIENT UNDERSTANDS HIS OR
HER PICTURE AND COMMENTS ARE BEING COLLECTED FOR NEWS MEDIA
PURPOSES AND THEY MAY APPEAR NATIONWIDE IN NEWS MEDIA REPORTS.

4.H.9. THE ATTENDING PHYSICIAN OR ESCORT SHOULD ADVISE THE
SERVICE MEMBER IF NOK HAVE BEEN NOTIFIED.

5. IMMUNIZATIONS AND PERSONAL PROTECTIVE GEAR.

5.A. MEDIA ORGANIZATIONS SHOULD ENSURE THAT MEDIA ARE PROPERLY
IMMUNIZED BEFORE EMBEDDING WITH UNITS. THE CENTERS FOR DISEASE
CONTROL (CDC)-RECOMMENDED IMMUNIZATIONS FOR DEPLOYMENT TO THE
MIDDLE EAST INCLUDE HEPATITIS A; HEPATITIS B; RABIES;
TETANUSDIPHTHERIA; AND TYPHOID. THE CDC RECOMMENDS MENINGOCOCCAL
IMMUNIZATIONS FOR VISITORS TO MECCA. IF TRAVELING TO CERTAIN AREAS IN
THE CENTCOM AOR, THE CDC RECOMMENDS TAKING PRESCRIPTION
ANTIMALARIAL DRUGS. ANTHRAX AND SMALLPOX VACCINES WILL BE
PROVIDED TO THE MEDIA AT NO EXPENSE TO THE GOVERNMENT (THE MEDIA
OUTLET WILL BEAR THE EXPENSE). FOR MORE HEALTH INFORMATION FOR TRAVELERS TO THE MIDDLE EAST, GO TO THE CDC WEB SITE AT HTTP://WWW.CDC.GOV/TRAVEL/MIDEAST.HTM.

5.B. BECAUSE THE USE OF PERSONAL PROTECTIVE GEAR, SUCH AS HELMETS OR FLAK VESTS, IS BOTH A PERSONAL AND PROFESSIONAL CHOICE, MEDIA WILL BE RESPONSIBLE FOR PROCURING/USING SUCH EQUIPMENT. PERSONAL PROTECTIVE GEAR, AS WELL AS CLOTHING, WILL BE SUBDUE IN COLOR AND APPEARANCE.

5.C. EMBEDDED MEDIA ARE AUTHORIZED AND REQUIRED TO BE PROVIDED WITH, ON A TEMPORARY LOAN BASIS, NUCLEAR, BIOLOGICAL, CHEMICAL (NBC) PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT BY THE UNIT WITH WHICH THEY ARE EMBEDDED. UNIT PERSONNEL WILL PROVIDE BASIC INSTRUCTION IN THE PROPER WEAR, USE, AND MAINTENANCE OF THE EQUIPMENT. UPON TERMINATION OF THE EMBED, INITIATED BY EITHER PARTY, THE NBC EQUIPMENT SHALL BE RETURNED TO THE EMBEDDING UNIT. IF SUFFICIENT NBC PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT IS NOT AVAILABLE FOR EMBEDDED MEDIA, COMMANDERS MAY PURCHASE ADDITIONAL EQUIPMENT, WITH FUNDS NORMALLY AVAILABLE FOR THAT PURPOSE, AND LOAN IT TO EMBEDDED MEDIA IN ACCORDANCE WITH THIS PARAGRAPH.

6. SECURITY

6.A. MEDIA PRODUCTS WILL NOT BE SUBJECT TO SECURITY REVIEW OR CENSORSHIP EXCEPT AS INDICATED IN PARA. 6.A.1. SECURITY AT THE SOURCE WILL BE THE RULE. U.S. MILITARY PERSONNEL SHALL PROTECT CLASSIFIED INFORMATION FROM UNAUTHORIZED OR INADVERTENT DISCLOSURE. MEDIA PROVIDED ACCESS TO SENSITIVE INFORMATION, INFORMATION WHICH IS NOT CLASSIFIED BUT WHICH MAY BE OF OPERATIONAL VALUE TO AN ADVERSARY OR WHEN COMBINED WITH OTHER UNCLASSIFIED INFORMATION MAY REVEAL CLASSIFIED INFORMATION, WILL BE INFORMED IN ADVANCE BY THE UNIT COMMANDER OR HIS/HER DESIGNATED REPRESENTATIVE OF THE RESTRICTIONS ON THE USE OR
DISCLOSURE OF SUCH INFORMATION. WHEN IN DOUBT, MEDIA WILL CONSULT WITH THE UNIT COMMANDER OR HIS/HER DESIGNATED REPRESENTATIVE.

6.A.1. THE NATURE OF THE EMBEDDING PROCESS MAY INVOLVE OBSERVATION OF SENSITIVE INFORMATION, INCLUDING TROOP MOVEMENTS, BATTLE PREPARATIONS, MATERIEL CAPABILITIES AND VULNERABILITIES AND OTHER INFORMATION AS LISTED IN PARA. 4.G. WHEN A COMMANDER OR HIS/HER DESIGNATED REPRESENTATIVE HAS REASON TO BELIEVE THAT A MEDIA MEMBER WILL HAVE ACCESS TO THIS TYPE OF SENSITIVE INFORMATION, PRIOR TO ALLOWING SUCH ACCESS, HE/SHE WILL TAKE PRUDENT PRECAUTIONS TO ENSURE THE SECURITY OF THAT INFORMATION. THE PRIMARY SAFEGUARD WILL BE TO BRIEF MEDIA IN ADVANCE ABOUT WHAT INFORMATION IS SENSITIVE AND WHAT THE PARAMETERS ARE FOR COVERING THIS TYPE OF INFORMATION. IF MEDIA ARE INADVERTENTLY EXPOSED TO SENSITIVE INFORMATION THEY SHOULD BE BRIEFED AFTER EXPOSURE ON WHAT INFORMATION THEY SHOULD AVOID COVERING. IN INSTANCES WHERE A UNIT COMMANDER OR THE DESIGNATED REPRESENTATIVE DETERMINES THAT COVERAGE OF A STORY WILL INVOLVE EXPOSURE TO SENSITIVE INFORMATION BEYOND THE SCOPE OF WHAT MAY BE PROTECTED BY PREBRIEFING OR DEBRIEFING, BUT COVERAGE OF WHICH IS IN THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE DOD, THE COMMANDER MAY OFFER ACCESS IF THE REPORTER AGREES TO A SECURITY REVIEW OF THEIR COVERAGE. AGREEMENT TO SECURITY REVIEW IN EXCHANGE FOR THIS TYPE OF ACCESS MUST BE STRICTLY VOLUNTARY AND IF THE REPORTER DOES NOT AGREE, THEN ACCESS MAY NOT BE GRANTED. IF A SECURITY REVIEW IS AGREED TO, IT WILL NOT INVOLVE ANY EDITORIAL CHANGES; IT WILL BE CONDUCTED SOLELY TO ENSURE THAT NO SENSITIVE OR CLASSIFIED INFORMATION IS INCLUDED IN THE PRODUCT. IF SUCH INFORMATION IS FOUND, THE MEDIA WILL BE ASKED TO REMOVE THAT INFORMATION FROM THE PRODUCT AND/OR EMBARGO THE PRODUCT UNTIL SUCH INFORMATION IS NO LONGER CLASSIFIED OR SENSITIVE. REVIEWS ARE TO BE DONE AS SOON AS PRACTICAL SO AS NOT TO INTERRUPT COMBAT OPERATIONS NOR DELAY REPORTING. IF THERE ARE DISPUTES
RESULTING FROM THE SECURITY REVIEW PROCESS THEY MAY BE APPEALED THROUGH THE CHAIN OF COMMAND, OR THROUGH PA CHANNELS TO OASD/PA. THIS PARAGRAPH DOES NOT AUTHORIZE COMMANDERS TO ALLOW MEDIA ACCESS TO CLASSIFIED INFORMATION.

6.A.2. MEDIA PRODUCTS WILL NOT BE CONFISCATED OR OTHERWISE IMPOUNDED. IF IT IS BELIEVED THAT CLASSIFIED INFORMATION HAS BEEN COMPROMISED AND THE MEDIA REPRESENTATIVE REFUSES TO REMOVE THAT INFORMATION NOTIFY THE CPIC AND/OR OASD/PA AS SOON AS POSSIBLE SO THE ISSUE MAY BE ADDRESSED WITH THE MEDIA ORGANIZATION'S MANAGEMENT.

7. MISCELLANEOUS/COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS:

7.A. OASD(PA) IS THE INITIAL EMBED AUTHORITY. EMBEDDING PROCEDURES AND ASSIGNMENT AUTHORITY MAY BE TRANSFERRED TO CENTCOM PA AT A LATER DATE. THIS AUTHORITY MAY BE FURTHER DELEGATED AT CENTCOM'S DISCRETION.

7.B. THIS GUIDANCE AUTHORIZES BLANKET APPROVAL FOR NON-LOCAL AND LOCAL MEDIA TRAVEL ABOARD DOD AIRLIFT FOR ALL EMBEDDED MEDIA ON A NO-COST, SPACE AVAILABLE BASIS. NO ADDITIONAL COSTS SHALL BE INCURRED BY THE GOVERNMENT TO PROVIDE ASSISTANCE IAW DODI 5410.15, PARA 3.4.

7.C. USE OF LIPSTICK AND HELMET-MOUNTED CAMERAS ON COMBAT SORTIES IS APPROVED AND ENCOURAGED TO THE GREATEST EXTENT POSSIBLE.

8. OASD(PA) POC FOR EMBEDDING MEDIA IS MAJ TIM BLAIR, DSN 227-1253, CMCL 703-697-1253, EMAIL TIMOTHY.BLAIR@OSD.MIL.
Appendix B: GUIDELINES FOR DISCUSSIONS WITH THE MEDIA

1. Preparation results in effective discussions with the news media. Central to the process is the effort to identify what information will be released based on prevailing public affairs guidance and operations security. Commanders, briefers, and public affairs personnel should be aware of the basic facts of any operation and sensitive to the various consequences of communicating them to the public.

2. “Security at the source” serves as the basis for ensuring that no information is released which jeopardizes operations security or the safety and privacy of joint military forces. Under this concept, individuals meeting with journalists are responsible for ensuring that no classified or sensitive information is revealed. This guidance also applies to photographers, who should be directed not to take pictures of classified areas or equipment or in any way to compromise sensitive information.

3. Each operational situation will require a deliberate public affairs assessment in order to identify specific information to be released. The following categories of information are usually releasable, though individual situations may require modifications:
   a. The arrival of US units in the commander’s area of responsibility once officially announced by the Department of Defense or by other commands in accordance with release authority granted by the Office of the ASD(PA). Information could include mode of travel, sea or air, date of departure and home station or port.
   b. Approximate friendly force strength and equipment figures.
   c. Approximate friendly casualty and prisoner of war figures by Service. Approximate figures of enemy personnel detained during each action or operation.
   d. Nonsensitive, unclassified information regarding US air, ground, sea, space, and special operations, past and present.
   e. In general terms, identification and location of military targets and objectives previously attacked and the types of ordnance expended.
   f. Date, time, or location of previous conventional military missions as well as mission results.
   g. Number of combat air patrol or reconnaissance missions and/or sorties flown in the operational area. Generic description of origin of air operations, such as “land” or “carrier-based.”
h. Weather and climate conditions.
i. If appropriate, allied participation by type (ground units, ships, aircraft).
j. Conventional operations’ unclassified code names.
k. Names and hometowns of US military personnel.
l. Names of installations and assigned units.
m. Size of friendly force participating in an action or operation using general terms such as “multi-battalion,” or “naval task force.”
n. Types of forces involved (e.g., aircraft, ships, carrier battle groups, tank and infantry units).

4. Classified aspects of equipment, procedures, and operations must be protected from disclosure to the media. In more general terms, information in the following categories of information should not be revealed because of potential jeopardy to future operations, the risk to human life, possible violation of host nation and/or allied sensitivities, or the possible disclosure of intelligence methods and sources. While these guidelines serve to guide military personnel who talk with the media, they may also be used as ground rules for media coverage. The list is not necessarily complete and should be adapted to each operational situation.

a. For US (or allied) units, specific numerical information on troop strength, aircraft, weapons systems, on-hand equipment, or supplies available for support of combat units. General terms should be used to describe units, equipment and/or supplies.

b. Any information that reveals details of future plans, operations, or strikes, including postponed or canceled operations.

c. Information and imagery revealing the specific location of military forces or show the level of security at military installations or encampments. For datelines, stories will state that the report originates from general regions unless a specific country has acknowledged its participation.

d. Rules of engagement.

e. Information on intelligence activities, including sources and methods, lists of targets and battle damage assessments.

f. During an operation, specific information on friendly force troop movement or size, tactical deployments, and dispositions that would jeopardize operations security or lives. This would include unit designations and names of operations until released by the JFC.
g. Identification of mission aircraft points of origin, other than as land or carrier-based.

h. Information on the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of weapon systems and tactics (to include, but not limited to enemy camouflage, cover, deception, targeting, direct and indirect fire, intelligence collection, or security measures).

i. Specific identifying information on missing or downed aircraft or ships while search and rescue operations are planned or underway.

j. Special operations forces’ unique methods, equipment, or tactics which, if disclosed, would cause serious harm to the ability of these forces to accomplish their mission.

k. Information on operational or support vulnerabilities that could be used against US or allied units until that information no longer provides tactical advantage to the enemy and is therefore released by the joint commander. Damage and casualties may be described as “light,” “moderate,” or “heavy.”

l. Specific operating methods and tactics (e.g., offensive and defensive tactics or speed and formations). General terms such as “low” or “fast” may be used.
BIBLIOGRAPHY

Books


Articles, Journals, Periodicals and Columns


Government Documents


---

**Thesis, Studies, Reports and Other Papers**


**Electronic documents**


Accessed on 17 October 2004 at 1030 hrs

Interviews

Cox, Joe, Major U.S Army, interviewed by author, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 21 October 2004.