WINNING THE "WAR ON DRUGS"
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LTC, USA
APRIL 1990
### Report Documentation Page

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<td>National War College, 300 5th Avenue, Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, DC, 20319-6000</td>
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Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98)
Prescribed by ANSI Std Z39-18
Nation struggles to get a grip on the drug war

A Street-Side Pharmacopeia

Over the last two years some drug dealers have abandoned marijuana and heroin to push crack. But others are doing a brisk business in new imports—and some old standbys. A report from the city streets:

Cocaine and crack: A glut has forced the price of a kilogram of cocaine from $65,000 four years ago to $10,000 in some places. In some cities, a vial of crack costs only $3.

Marijuana: Though somewhat harder to find since the crack boom, pot is by far still the nation’s most popular illicit drug; 18 million Americans smoke it regularly.

Hallucinogens: A watered-down form of LSD is making a comeback, mostly in the West. Sales of inexpensive liquid PCP are up again on the East Coast.

Mexican heroin: The street price for Black Tar, which is as much as 80 percent pure, can climb to $500 per gram. A bargain brown-powder heroin sells for $120 to $150.

Asian heroin: One form comes from the Golden Crescent (Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan, India) and another from the Golden Triangle (Burma, Laos, Thailand).

Fentanyl: A potent heroin substitute known as China White, the synthetically produced “designer drug” is mostly a West Coast fad. Street price: $3,300 a gram.

Bennett’s Drug War

WAR AT SEA: DRUG INTERDICTION IN THE CARIBBEAN

Operation Blast Furnace

Army’s Drug War Role Expanding
Winning The "War" On Drugs

"What it takes to be number one. You've got to pay the price...
...There is only one place in my game and that's first place.
There is a second place ballgame. but it is a game for losers played by losers.
...It is and always has been an American zeal to be first in anything we do
and to win and to win and to win!"

Vince Lombardi

Purpose

This paper examines a paradigm for determining how to win the "war" on drugs. A synthesis of this Strategy/Process Paradigm provides a focus of what we want to accomplish, a balanced application of means commensurate with interests, threat, policy, prioritized objectives, and the domestic and international environment in which the national plan must be orchestrated.
Problem

"What was missing [in Vietnam] was the link that should have been provided by the military strategies—how to take—the means and use them to achieve the—ends."

Harry G. Summers, Jr.

As a nation we have to decide if we are going to attack and win the drug problem or not. The current situation might be likened to the situation of a new professional football franchise:

The new American Team (Counter Narcotics, CN) was not sure of its goal. Players had been motivated by the word "win", and were used to winning on their old teams, before they were picked for the big leagues. Now, however, the requirements to "win" were not present. There were inadequate resources and operating expenses due to insufficient funding. The Team owners (Congress) and the General Manager (The President) were responsible for the shortages but allocated resources to other interests. This was confusing to players and fans because both were told that CN success (Political Objective) was a national priority.

The head coach (Office of National Drug Control Policy, ONDCP) could not implement a winning strategy due to rivalry and confusion between the players and coaches (Governmental Agencies). Bureaucratic friction existed between the manager and owners as well. Consequently the team was always confused, lacked unity of effort and a strategic plan. The fans (the American people) were frustrated and the sports announcer (media) encouraged apathy. Not all the team members understood the playing field boundaries (limitations) or game rules (legal restraints) for the big leagues. Team scouts (intelligence assets) gathered information on their own and dumped opposing team data (threat) on the coach without adequate coordination among themselves. This overwhelmed the coach; he could not analyze the opponents weakness (vulnerability) and had no game plan (operations) to move the ball (the center of gravity) effectively. With the lack of a game plan, no unity of effort, game violations, and inadequate resources the team could not win.

A team must know its opponents' vulnerabilities to maintain control of the ball.
with first downs; score through offensive action to entertain the fans; and win the
game (objective) -- while always maintaining a focus on a winning season (goals and
national interests).

Situation

"I have sworn eternal hostility against every form of tyranny over the mind of men"
Thomas Jefferson

An individual caught in the drug habit soon becomes a slave of that habit, and is
no longer a free person or a responsible citizen.

The internal and international violence and instability caused by the illicit drug
trade poses a direct threat to US national security, values and institutions. Most
Americans believe that illegal drugs now represent the gravest threat to our national
well being. It is estimated that American consumers may spend as much on drugs each
year as the government spends on defense. Sixteen hundred tons of cocaine are moved
every year worldwide. The sheer magnitude and complexity of the drug threat --
foreign and domestic -- including distribution modes encompassing every means of
transport, size of profits, and the associated problems in our country from drug
related crime, injuries, and economic burdens -- is staggering. Accordingly, an
effective US response requires many elements of federal, state and local
infrastructure to solve this problem.

There is a conflict of interests and priorities in the national CN policy.
Different parts of the American bureaucracy pursue policies which are contradictory
and undermine each other. The result is to paralyze effective, coordinated policy
and ensures that no program is fully effective. Hence, the war against drugs is
difficult to sustain, defining the enemy is confusing, and focusing on common
objectives is complex.

The nation will ultimately be rid of the scourge of illegal drugs only through the
sustained application of the energy, courage and determination of the American
people. In 1986, the President signed a National Security Decision Directive (NSDD).
declaring illegal drugs a serious threat to national security. Congress has passed anti-drug abuse legislation expanding the role of governmental agencies and modifying the role of our judicial system. DOD and 50 other agencies are involved in the drug war. The question is, after years of multi-national effort, what will it take to win the "war" on drugs? Are we willing to pay the price?

The "War" on drugs is increasingly coming to mean a war against a significant portion of the American population. By the end of 1989, 25 million Americans had tried cocaine, and six million were regular users. It's obvious that reducing the demand for drugs must be at the center of our anti-drug policy. But will we provide measures like legal deterrents using punitive actions? Do we want to implement repressive measures at home which would be socially divisive and politically unacceptable? We demand these measures from our Latin allies - and tie them to foreign aid. At the same time, drug-related violence, corruption and intimidation impede Andean governments' efforts to mount US-orchestrated counter-narcotics campaigns.

Is the President's counter-narcotics goal an unrealistic ideal? I think not. The "strategy/process paradigm" identifies what kind of war we are fighting and the commitment required.

Assumptions

Due to the brevity of this paper, the following assumptions must be made:

- Legalizing illegal drugs, of noninvolvement, would result in the piecemeal degradation of vital interests and the toleration of unnecessary human suffering.

- Drug trafficking constitutes a clear and present danger to our democratic ideals.

- Measures to deal with American demand, however warranted, must go hand-in-hand with measures to deal with supply. We must eliminate both the demand and supply; because the U.S. will conquer neither if the other is left unchecked.

- The anti-drug strategy must be multifaceted, taking into account what is
supportable politically, economically and socially.

- Drug trafficking is not simply a law enforcement problem, but a complex foreign policy and economic issue requiring a long-term approach. It can be considered low-intensity conflict.

- We are currently losing the "war" on drugs.

- The definition of war will not be addressed. The term "war" is used in keeping with the President's own words.

Interest

"The centrally important question is whether it is possible to blend concern for moral principle with the imperatives of national power."

Zbigniew Brzezinski

Vital interests are derived from broad national interests. They are those interests the American people believe are worth fighting for. The supply of illicit drugs to the US from abroad is a direct threat to our national security and sovereignty. Illegal drugs damage national values/institutions, destroy American lives, and are costly to our economy. International drug trafficking, which threatens the stability and democratic institutions of our allies, produces regional and global implications adversely affecting our national security interests. The drug threat is blurred due to the magnitude of the problem.

Third world perpetrators of political violence have found common cause with the international criminal cartels that smuggle drugs worldwide. Subversives penetrate the political structure of a country to control it and use it for their own purposes. This usually occurs in a permissive political environment where the powerful drug dealers are able to use both legal and illegal methods. Also, narcotics trafficking, because of the revenue it generates, has a secondary effect of fostering instability in the world. American citizens who purchase illegal drugs often unwittingly fund criminal paramilitary activities of continent-spanning, subversive organizations. Approximately $200 billion in profits is earned annually from drug trafficking in the
US, making it the largest profit "business" in this country.

Inner-city drug use is increasing in our country. Seventy-five percent of all robberies are drug related. One half of AIDS deaths involve drug users. In 1989, 375,000 addicted babies were born to drug users in the US alone.

The "trafficante" has been connected to terrorist crimes throughout the world; the most recent were the bombings of Colombia's FBI headquarters and Avianca flight 203, the later killing 107 passengers.

The popular concern over the drug problem is confirmed by a national survey taken in September 1989 which established that more than half of the Americans surveyed named illicit drug use as the most important problem facing this country today. Threats to certain American values -- security, sovereignty, economy and health caused by illicit drugs, are a vital interest to the U.S. which brings us to the start point of the analysis.

THE STRATEGY/PROCESS PARADIGM

The Strategy/Process Paradigm begins with a trinity between the people, the government and the Counter-Narcotics Force structure.

Only when the trinity supports itself can we attempt to reach our goal. As in the diagram above the people must express the will to accomplish the goals supporting a vital national interest (the elimination of illegal drugs). If the people have that will, then political pressure will be applied by the people on our government.
Political and moral strength come from the citizen.

The government in turn uses the media to justify the effort (means and risk) to the people; and to provide direction -- political objectives (ends), resources (means), and legitimacy to the Counter Narcotics Force Structure. The media influences policy and is a vital bridge to and for the people. The Counter Narcotics Force Structure develops the how (strategy), by producing a CN Campaign plan. This plan links ends with means, producing results (accomplishment of objectives) leading to the achievement of the national goal.

People

"Americans only fight total wars effectively. A war of limited aims is too difficult for our pluralistic society."

Russell F. Weigley, Military historian

The will of the American people to support efforts against illegal drugs is evident. Time/CNN conducted a public opinion poll during inauguration week 1989, revealing that the priorities for the new administration should be: reduce the budget deficit, counter terrorism, and attack the drug problem. A more recent CBS News/NY Times poll indicated 64% of those surveyed thought that drugs constitute the most important problem facing the US today. The various actions already taken by Congress and the President against illegal drugs are a direct result of this public opinion.

The drug problem is a problem of American behavior. To change behavior, two effective instruments are education and fear. The inner-city drug abusers include many people not equipped by education for circumstances to hear, listen to, and act upon public health information. Though education is producing results in middle class neighborhoods and in the armed forces, drug use and crime is increasing in ghettos. Punitive actions have not been very effective to date because they are still very mild and difficult to enforce. People commit to efforts that directly affect their practical needs -- ability to provide for oneself and family, freedom to pursue
social needs, self esteem and safety.

Our public needs to understand the risks involved in CN activities. The American people should be convinced that sacrifices are necessary. The government must use the media to project a positive commitment to the CN policy and to increase the sense of urgency. The American public is already quite supportive of the application of military assistance to the drug war.

Narcotics trafficking is only part of a larger problem -- Low Intensity Conflict (LIC) (see enclosure 1). LIC situations do not have a quick fix. The conflicts are often protracted, requiring sustained resolve to continue to fight. Democracies have difficulty achieving the consensus necessary to fight long wars. Americans want to win quickly - the public, Congress, and the media want a quick fix. However, staying power is what is necessary. Can the government convince the public of this?

Whatever the ultimate goal, we cannot postpone dividends too long or we lose the will of the people. The CN team must "make first downs and win games". That's what Americans want - confidence in their team and cause.

Government

"Victory over drugs is our cause, and it is a just cause. And with your help, we are going to win."

President George Bush
Nationwide Television 1989

Leaders must make supportive public statements. A President's resolve demonstrated to his fellow countrymen and to our allies supporting bilateral agreements is key to any successful program. "Persuasion" is one of the key powers of our presidency. Other federal, state and local governmental officials must also respond to the ethical and moral challenges supporting vital interests of our nation. The problems with political party rivalries and the vagaries of electoral cycles disrupt the accomplishment of national objectives.

A muddled political goal and garbled national consensus is usually the norm.

However, the Administration's CN goal and policy are clear. A problem exists with
the need to prioritize our efforts for CN, and what priority the CN goal has amongst other national goals.

There has been an increase in legislative support for CN with the shift in national security concerns from Europe to the Third World due to diminished East-West tensions. This has brought more focus to activities which have always threatened US interests (insurgency, drug trafficking, terrorism, etc.). These activities occur in an environment created by conflict somewhere between routine peaceful competition and war -- known as LIC.

An NSC LIC Board was established due to the variety, probability and threat of LIC. The NSC function of the LIC Board is to develop LIC policy and strategy for counter-terrorism, insurgency and counter-insurgency, peacekeeping, peacetime contingency operations and counter-narcotics. This LIC strategy will become an integral part of our national strategy. The LIC Board will also coordinate inter-agency relationships. To date this has not been accomplished - consequently the strategies of programs within LIC do not have integrated national direction or priority.

**Goal/Policy**

"A statesman who cannot shape events will soon be engulfed in them: he will be thrown on the defensive, wrestling with tactics instead of advancing his purpose."

*Henry A. Kissinger*

The President's 5 September, 1989 address on a National Drug Control Strategy established the goal of the US: to curtail the nation's illicit use of drugs by significantly reducing both supply and demand. To support this goal, the international CN policy was established -- stop the supply of illicit drugs to this country from abroad, and reduce the world-wide traffic of drugs. The national CN policy outlines six objectives:

- Reduce the amount of cocaine shipped from Latin America to the US through an integrated program.

- Reduce the amount of heroin shipped from Asia and Mexico to the US
through an integrated program.

-Reduce the amount of marijuana entering the US from worldwide sources through an integrated program.

-Increase intolerance for illicit drugs and stimulate focused support for effective narcotics control worldwide—public awareness and demand reduction.

-Eliminate major trafficking networks and cartels.

-Secure increased international cooperation.

The President's CN policy represents a comprehensive multi-agency effort to attack the drug problem that threatens our way of life. Problems still exist; for example, the national CN objectives are not properly integrated with our foreign policy objectives for Latin America:

- Deny Communist incursions
- Maintain Democratic governments
- Promote economic growth

The National CN goal, policy and objectives are clear but they are not prioritized with other national goals.

**Analyze The Situation**

"The first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgment that the statesman and commander have to make is to establish... the kind of war on which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into something that is alien to its nature. This is the first of all strategic questions and the most comprehensive." Clausewitz

Once we have the government's CN objectives and see that they are supported by the people, the situation is analyzed using a strategic interpretation of METT-T. This is the second phase of the "strategy/process paradigm." The national goal has already been established. Analyzing the environment is accomplished first, since it is the frame for the remainder of METT-T.
Countries and regions move from an environment of peaceful competition to a LIC environment (see enclosure 1) due to some combination of insurgency, paramilitary crime, terrorism, or drug trafficking. These conflicts are the result of social, economic, or political dissatisfaction. LIC threats are the accumulation of problems, not just a threat of military confrontation. The drug problem we now face in the US and abroad is a result of 10 years of neglect. We focus on foreign countries like Colombia to solve the drug problem while neglecting our home front. Problems in parts of the US have some characteristics of a LIC environment: poverty, violence, discontent and societal change. Los Angeles offers one of the most graphic examples of social devastation wrought by gangs and the illegal drug trade. Similar problems exist in New York, Miami and Washington D.C.

The threat to the US in LIC is the exploitation of instability by groups opposed to US goals. LIC continues to be the most likely form of violence involving US interests.
examination of the international and domestic context. This examination includes:

- The nature of the society (foreign and domestic)
- The nature of the insurgencies overseas
- The nature of the governments overseas
- Interests of the belligerents (foreign and domestic)
- Internal factors affecting the belligerents
- External factors affecting the belligerents

Our ability to achieve our goal is affected not only by our adversaries but our allies as well. A need for a deep understanding of the host nation culture is indispensable. For instance, Latin American drug production allows farmers to increase incomes, enables government workers and military officers to supplement their meager salaries (through corruption), and helps pay off national debts. In Peru and Bolivia coca is an important economic force, it is in fact the most important export of those two nations. Translated into political power, both Peru and Bolivia have blocked coca crop eradication, due in part to corruption of officials and the farmer's lobby. In Peru's upper Huallaga Valley, 80% of the farmers grow coca even though that valley has never been a traditional agricultural area, nor will it revert to one if coca is eliminated. The farmers moved in only to grow coca. That is why new government agricultural initiatives are failing. In Bolivia, a half million residents derive income from the drug trade even though coca cultivation is outlawed. In Colombia, cocaine is the 3d largest means of revenue following coffee and petroleum. Some drug profit is even invested back into commerce.

Drug cartels share many common interests with economic and political elites. In Colombia, cartels are allied with conservative elites, right wing businessmen, rural landowners and a portion of the military/police. Traffickers have bought the support of the poor by lavish spending on housing projects and sports teams. The governments of Cuba, Nicaragua (and formerly Panama) cooperate with traffickers, providing safe havens, transit or political support. From South America, through Central America and into the US, the "trafficantes" are organized into elaborate conglomerates for
the purpose of growing, harvesting, processing, transporting, selling and repatriating the profits from drugs.

The US focuses on negative policies, such as imposing conditions on foreign aid and taking retaliatory actions against countries that fail to meet US-established eradication quotas or extradition. It is hard for US citizens to comprehend the scale of violence, intimidation, and corruption that goes on in the Latin drug-producing countries. In Colombia, for instance, the Medellin and Cali traffickers consider themselves a shadow government and a law unto themselves. Drug lords have immense power and use extraordinary brutality. Judges who approve a US extradition request usually sign their own death warrants. Many of the drug producing areas are in regions which are effectively controlled by guerrilla movements. Also, Latins resent the US telling them what to do. It violates their sense of national sovereignty and sense of logic -- they feel the drug problem is Yankee and the US should fight their demand problem.

We ask the Latin countries to do more -- eradicate crops with chemical spray, overcome corruption and intimidation and extradite popular criminals, and yet we do not take a tougher stand in our own country. How easy is it to destroy the Latin American drug cartels? Our mafia in New York, Miami and LA is alive and well after half a century of anti-crime effort. Latins view this as an apparent double standard making it difficult for us to obtain a truly international consensus. Drug producing countries feel that their debt problems, developmental issues, and failing agricultural markets are more important than anti-drug programs. Conversely, the US states that the drug problem is more important. No drug-producing country will be able to afford, economically or politically, to undermine the cocaine industry in the short term. Practical interests affect ideology. Latin America owes $426 billion in international debts that is partly paid off by drug money in some countries. The American people are problem solving oriented; but foreign affairs cannot be "solved"
-- only changed in small ways, and incrementally, short of war.

A 1988 poll says two-thirds of the Colombians opposed extradition of traffickers to the US. The US must be careful in pushing this issue with President Barco of Colombia. He supports the US effort, but is unable to say so publicly because of strong anti-Yankee sentiment in his country. Also, Colombian elections for President Barco are in May, 1990. Realistically, one country may support another's cause, but will never take it as seriously.

The physical environment for drug operations ranges from mountains to urban centers, from deserts to jungles. The capability of US/Allied anti-drug forces to disrupt drug production, terrorism and distribution in these remote areas is very limited. Environments also range from permissive (Mexico is an example; it is the largest single country source for heroin, the second largest for marijuana, and the leading transit point for cocaine) to non-permissive (as an example, 90% of the world's opium production takes place in areas where the US has limited access -- Iran, Afghanistan, Lebanon, Laos, and Burma).

Intelligence

"Know the enemy and know yourself."  
Sun Tzu

It is not unusual for CNN to report critical information faster than our national intelligence system. National intelligence must be envisaged as a necessary backdrop to any conceivable US response to the drug threat. The "trafficantes" benefit from an elaborate HUMINT/SIGINT system of their own that we have not been able to effectively counter. But, the link between the drug mafia, insurgents and terrorists has been identified.

Mikhail Gorbachev's policies of Perestroika and Glasnost have not changed KGB intelligence work in Latin America. Unfriendly intelligence efforts have increased since 1985 in the US, and counter-intelligence efforts are extremely difficult.

Cuba's DGI is a significant threat in the Southern region. Intelligence gained is
frequently shared with insurgent groups and/or the "trafficante".

Strategic intelligence is critical in providing our CN forces with broad patterns and trends of "trafficante" operations in predicting changes in their strategy. Tactical intelligence provides data to be exploited immediately. HUMINT is our most important, yet weakest, form of intelligence in the drug war. The DOD mission to integrate national intelligence (CIA, DIA, EPIC, etc.) should create a tiered, community-wide data base with a system for timely dissemination of information. Integration efforts should provide timely distribution of specific intelligence, a balance between target priorities and system availability, mutual understanding and cooperation between agencies.

The Enemy

"...one must keep the dominant characteristics of belligerents in mind. Out of these characteristics a certain gravity develops. The hub of all power and movement, on which everything depends. That is the point against which all our energies should be directed."

Clausewitz

The power and wealth of the international underworld enables it to literally buy governments and destabilize entire societies. It has interest in ineffectual governments, many that develop in democratic countries. These mafia-like rings are capable of very large, very complex undertakings demanding significant discipline and tight management. The complexity of processing centers, air strips, transit means, equipment and security is enormous. Drug trafficking detracts from US defense on its southern borders where we are unable to detect or apprehend the majority of the drug traffic. The "trafficante" can adapt more quickly than our government due to cumbersome, rigid bureaucratic restraints in the US.

The "trafficante" is capable of achieving significant political and economic results by employing a relatively small force conducting spectacular but small scale terrorist attacks. Terrorist groups are becoming more involved in illegal narcotics
trafficking in Latin America. This compounds the international threat of terrorism because it offers lucrative sources of revenue while providing a worldwide smuggling network for procuring sophisticated arms and explosives. There are 27 active and viable subversive groups operating in nine Latin countries. An increasing number are involved in drug trafficking.

Drug lords in Colombia depict themselves as "Robin Hoods", and even go on television (like Carlos Lehder Rivas, who has called on his countrymen to war against the American capitalists). This appeals to the esoteric needs (ideological) of the people, blaming Americans for their economic problems. The "trafficante" also use exoteric appeals (basic needs) to isolate the people from the government. The "trafficante" is preservationists (they want to preserve any ineffective government), as long as they can control portions of the government. They are moving toward a reformist role due to the government's support of US demands for extradition. Their strategy against the government and the US is conspiratorial (they infiltrate and subvert the government).

Drug traffickers, leftist insurgents and outside supporting alliances (corrupt government officials, international businesses and Soviet surrogates) have a marriage of convenience that has produced common objectives. In Colombia, for example, terrorist acts against officials have been arranged between drug traffickers and terrorist groups. Drug money funds the guerilla war against the government, insurgents provide security for narcotics production/transport, corrupt officials are bribed by the drug mafia, bankers launder money and Cuba provides external political support to some of these groups. These activities destabilize the region and provide a sanctuary for the source of our domestic scourge. Even though each group has different goals (eg. drug mafia is preservationist and the insurgents are egalitarian), common survivability interests exist.

In Colombia, the current trend is a war between the government and insurgent groups/traffickers, and a war between the traffickers/right wing groups with select
insurgent groups. Peru's situation has recently changed; government forces and traffickers were fighting insurgents, but now government forces are fighting a coalition between traffickers and insurgents. The situation constantly changes.

This international narco-insurgency infrastructure cannot be countered with separate strategies for counterterrorism, counternarcotics, or counterinsurgency. The LIC environment is convoluted.

"The center of gravity is the ultimate source of enemy strength."
Clausewitz

Our CN targeting must be part of our national strategy for LIC. In LIC, the "center of gravity" is not based on armed might, but on the opponent's ability to marshall political, economic, social, and media support. The strategic "center of gravity" for drug trafficking is the international leadership solidarity and infrastructure; it is the single common denominator. To win the "war on drugs" we must attack the "center of gravity". This infrastructure/alliance must be isolated from the people politically and psychologically, and then demoralized; the drug cartels and their allies must have their will to carry-on broken.

"Distract his alliances. Do not allow enemies to get together."
Sun Tzu
Unity of Effort/Command

"It is not so much the mode of formation as the peoples combined use of the different arms which will ensure victory"

Jomini

Unity of effort is essential to implement any CN strategy that requires all governmental agencies working together toward a common goal (the political objective). But currently we do not have the unity of effort required to win the "war on drugs" due to governmental bureaucracy, organizational deficiencies and the lack of a clear understanding of the threat environment.

Several factors undermine our ability to unify lines of command and interagency coordination. First, there is at present a fuzzy command-and-control link between the military and civilian agencies in government. There is a plethora of actors. Each agency has its own doctrine, lines of communication, goals and areas of responsibility. Second, US foreign policy is affected by Congress, the National Command Authority, interest lobbies and public opinion. Political competition and interests clash. Third, government agencies compete for resources and protect what missions and resources they have. Organizational loyalty is stronger than a sense of a national spirit of true cooperation and sacrifice of organizational sovereignty. Fourth, compartmentalization of information occurs due to lack of coordination, jealousy, classification, or the size of an organization. Fifth, we attack a perceived threat with blinders on, impervious to the environment, and focused on a quick fix.

Both Congress and the President have attempted to fix the unity of effort problem. Congress passed the Anti-Drug Abuse Act in 1988 creating the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP), which establishes policy, objectives, priorities, strategy, coordination, budget control, and resource allocation. Through the ONDCP, the President attempts to provide the unity of command for CN. Success has been minimal.
"He whose ranks are united in purpose will be victorious."

Sun Tzu

Any effective strategy and operational implementation requires some basic settlement on the nature of the conflict and a conceptual agreement on its causes and solutions. There must be concurrence regarding LIC for all government agencies. Through such cooperation we obtain unity of effort. No agency or agent is designated with overall responsibility for LIC. One agency should integrate and provide direction.

Because everything in LIC is interagency, conflict exists over responsibility and authority. Components of LIC are viewed as separate problems under the responsibility of separate agencies abiding by different rules and pursuing different goals. Agencies for CN have conflicting, overlapping and ambiguous authority.

Unity of command at the national level has been established both in law and in fact. The President as Commander in Chief is responsible for strategic coordination. The National Security Council's Board for LIC formulates, recommends, and orchestrates US policy and strategy for LIC. This responsibility conflicts with Department of State (DOS). DOS has authority and responsibility for direction, coordination, and supervision of activities overseas.

Regional geographic responsibilities conflict between government agencies. The Theater CINC's areas of operation do not match up with the DOS Regional areas of
responsibility. The regional and functional Policy Coordinating Committees (PCC) have no established procedure for coordinating activities. There is no DOS PCC for counterinsurgency regional affairs, but there is for counterterrorism (CT) and counternarcotics (CN). There is a DOS PCC for functional CT affairs, but none for counterinsurgency or CN. The problem is that there is neither a single PCC which deals with all LIC related activities nor a process to deconflict functional and regional problems.

Ambassadors have full responsibility for the activities of all elements of the US diplomatic mission. However, embassies do not have a fusion capability for country LIC activities, much less a combined regional capability. The Theater CINC has the only regional architecture to support LIC. Since CN is in the LIC arena, the CINC plays a key role though he is not the ultimate authority. The Assistant Secretary for State (AS/State) for Inter-American Affairs is responsible for inter-agency matters for that region. Coordination between AS/State and the Theater CINC is rare.

DOS is the lead agency for any US response to terrorist acts in foreign countries. But, DOD is the focal point for countries seeking military assistance to combat terrorism. In DOD, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict (ASD SO/LIC), the responsible agency for Special Operations Forces (SOF) and LIC, has no CN responsibility. The DOD CN responsibility comes under the ASD Reserve Affairs (RA). However, Para C4, Title 10 provides that ASD SO/LIC prepare the overall plans and implement guidance for various areas in the world where special operations and LIC objectives exist.

DEA is the lead federal agency in enforcing narcotics laws and regulations. The Attorney General (AG) assigned the FBI concurrent jurisdiction with DEA over drug law enforcement. The FBI and DEA have overlapping responsibilities/concurrent jurisdiction to investigate drug crime.

The DOS Bureau of International Narcotics Matters is responsible for developing US
international CN policy. This is also the stated responsibility of Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP).

The FBI conducts counter-intelligence (CI) in country, and the CIA conducts counter-intelligence out of country. But, the FBI can investigate CI issues in and out of country.

The current military role in CN is a result of actions by Congress and the National Command Authority (NCA). Military participation prior to 1981 was minimal due to the Posse Comitatus Act that prohibited US military participation except for undefined, indirect, or passive assistance. In 1981, this Act was amended to permit increased military support to CN efforts. The Defense Authorization Acts of 1982, 1988, and 1989; and the Anti Drug Abuse Acts of 1986 and 1988 provide for additional DOD participation and funding. Today DOD serves as the lead agency for the detection and monitoring of surface and maritime transit of drugs; integration of US C3I dedicated to CN; approval/funding of State governors' plans using National Guard assets; and the provision of equipment for support as allocated by OSD.

JCS formed Joint Task Forces (JTF) 4, 5 and 6. JTFs 4 and 5 are commanded by US Coast Guard (USCG) Admirals. But, the USCG is a service within Department of Transportation (DOT). JTF 6 is commanded by a US Army General. All of the JTF's come under command of military CINC's controlled by CJCS, who has no interdiction authority.

The Immigration and Naturalization Service/Border Patrol guards against illegal entry into the USA. The US Customs Service has the primary interdiction and seizure responsibility for illegal drugs. The USCG is responsible for interdiction of maritime drug smuggling. Interdiction of air transported drugs entering the US is the joint responsibility of the USCG and the Customs Service. Friction between these organizations is not uncommon.

The US Marshalls Service tracks and apprehends federal fugitives, both
domestically and internationally. DEA's long term mission is to immobilize drug organizations through the removal of their leaders. Coordination between the two is difficult.

There is also an overlap of intelligence gathering efforts. The CIA is tasked to ensure timely exploitation and dissemination of national intelligence to governmental agencies. DEA is the lead agency for intelligence supporting drug law enforcement operations. DOD is responsible for integrating national intelligence to support the CN effort.

As we can see, this brief summary of functions and responsibilities in CN efforts obviously shows the extent to which we have conflicting, overlapping, and ambiguous authority between governmental agencies involved in CN. Can there be government agency synergism? Can the US execute a coalition strategy with our allies? We have got to fix agency jurisdictional lines and bridge the constitutional/political gaps which separate the branches of government.

**Legitimacy**

"What gives the USA power, prestige, and honor is that we are perceived to abide by international law"

Dr. Albert Coll. ASF( Policy) SO/LIC

The inherent right of self-defense is recognized in Article 51 of the UN Charter. We interpret "self-defense" broadly to serve our purposes, using the "culminative threat" interpretation. Drug traffickers and terrorists are violating both domestic, host nation and international law. The Justice Department's Office of Legal Counsel has ruled that indicators of aggression against our citizens, values, or country justify pre-emptive self-defense, and that we do not need the consent of another country to apprehend a drug czar/terrorist using this protective principle. The danger, of course, is reciprocity. Also, Article 24 dictates that states shall refrain from territorial/political violations of other states. This is important since we live in a world where it matters what others think of our actions.
The scope of the drug threat may require Congress to declare war on the drug mafia and terrorist organizations. It would produce a determination to use every resource necessary to win that war. To declare war doesn't mean we must dispatch infantry divisions or drop bombs. Actions must be proportional. But it does enable the government and people to recognize a juridically altered relationship and to license such action as is deemed appropriate to win. Consequently, the political objective becomes much clearer.

"Western" thinking drives the use of force. When is force just? What limits do we observe? The answer(s)?

Unconventional Warfare (UW) is commonplace in a LIC environment. Rules Of Engagement (ROE) are complicated when mixing US and host country laws. Regulations are confusing for law enforcement agencies and the military when engaged in LIC.

The 1988 UN Convention against illegal drugs is an international document calling for criminal sanctions. It has yet to be ratified by the US Senate. Other countries that have signed the Convention are awaiting our ratification.

Resources

"Resources of the state will not last in protracted campaigns. Stress occurs between people, sovereign, and commanders."

Sun Tzu

The extraordinary number of government agencies contributing to the CN effort should be able to provide the necessary resources required to reach our national goal. DOD is the critical department due to its resources, organization and training for the LIC environment. Aviation, vessels, communications, detection/surveillance equipment, language proficiency, desert/jungle expertise and tactical LIC experience are available for our government's use. Support can be provided without a significant degradation of other defense responsibilities. With LIC being the most probable type of conflict facing the US in the future, it makes sense to support CN.

The training benefit is that real enemy are available. Law Enforcement
Agencies (LEA's) will not be successful without support from DOD. For example, DEA's agent strength is only 2900, less than the New York City Subway Police Force. DEA conducts operations in 46 foreign countries with only 240 agents.

Involvement in CN is consistent with the military's role as a strategic force, fulfilling the overall mission of safeguarding the national security of the US both at home and abroad. Active duty training missions are ongoing on our Southwest border supporting the border patrol. In Latin America, Special Forces teams are supporting DEA agents trained by Army Rangers. The Army National Guard (NG) supplements US Customs Service in cargo inspection, air/ground surveillance, eradication and transport. The NG are only legally federal soldiers if activated by DOD, thus they are not bound by Posse Comitatus restrictions.

The authorization and appropriation of money gives the Congress a certain amount of control over CN as well as LIC. This is critical, because small amounts of funding can make the difference between success and failure. The President has asked Congress for $10.6 billion for anti-drug efforts in FY 91. The military will spend $1.2 million. This is a 37% increase from FY 90.

"At times the end must be adjusted to the limited means available"  
Liddell Hart

Security assistance is a key resource in LIC; it is the bridge that links collective security between the US and its allies in times of both peace and crisis. US policy regarding Latin America has been aimed at treating separate symptoms rather than alleviating LIC causes. Comprehensive security assistance programs help attack the cause of the problems. Security assistance provides host countries with some of the resources needed to confront insurgency threats that often are endemic to narcotics-producing regions.

There are insufficient US resources to assist all lesser-developed countries engaged in LIC. Risk analysis should prioritize critical country accounts. It is imperative that the security assistance program be adequately funded and flexible to...
support our strategy.

In 1985, President Reagan stated that "dollar for dollar, our security assistance contributes as much to global security as our own defense budget". The House Committee on Foreign Affairs acknowledged in February, 1989, that security assistance must be integrated into foreign policy. To date, no action has been taken. Less than 3% of security assistance funds are earmarked for the LIC countries contributing to the US drug problem.

"A continuation of the trend toward sharply lower and more politically constrained aid programs could threaten US access and influence in many key regions over the coming years, implying a tacit retreat from US global interests and responsibilities and constraining US force projections around the world."

H. Allen Holmes

The program has undergone a series of steady cuts over the last several years. These cuts and "earmarking" practices have prevented the administration from allocating adequate resources to countries in Latin America and Africa critical to national security interests. The annual certification process is the centerpiece of US diplomatic efforts to encourage cooperation in narcotics control. But as we've seen, it is ineffective and cuts even more the meager resources provided. This generates antagonism in target countries. Finally, security assistance is, at present, a tool of the Ambassador, CINC, and Congress, resulting in future programming conflicts.

Strategy

"It should be remembered that while attacking the center of gravity may be the surest and swiftest road to victory, it will rarely be the easiest road. More often than not, the enemy recognizing his center of gravity will take steps to protect it, and indirect means will be required to force him to expose it to attack."

FM 100-5

Anti-drug strategy has gone through three stages. In the early 80's, there was a crackdown on domestic consumption. It made little impression because it was seen as a "lifestyle" issue with related concerns over civil liberties. However, since 1980, DOD has reduced drug use in the military by 82% through education and drug
testing programs. The military uses "readiness" as the requirement for drug testing. The lack of resolve on the part of the American public to do more about the demand issue in the US sets a poor example in the international context.

In the mid-80's, the supply side of drug production was emphasized. DEA conflicts with State arose overseas; we underestimated the immensity of drug production; and civil difficulties with eradication began. Most of these programs damaged local interests, consequently the host government response was half-hearted. These CN programs often conflicted with host country counterinsurgency programs. Even though the growing of coca severely damages the environment due to "slash and burn" techniques and chemical contamination in rivers, the people feared even more that government herbicide spraying programs would destroy coffee crops and gave the "trafficante" ammunition for propaganda. Eradication and the destruction of drug processing facilities requires US personnel. But the mere presence of US agents/troops creates political problems for a host nation. Major operations, like "Operation Blast Furnace" or the posting of aircraft carriers off of coastal areas, are too overt. But, a secret operation off the coast of Colombia in 1984, with USCG and Colombian forces cooperating against marijuana trafficking, was very successful.

In the late 80's, all three stages of drug trafficking were attacked: supply, transport and demand. The primary objective of interdiction was to raise the retail price and thus affect demand. It hasn't worked. In 1988, 29% more cocaine was seized than in 1987. But the amount entering the US continued to grow. The reason is the ease in replacing seized drugs, because the value is very low until it gets to the drug distributor on the street. A GAO report in 1989 states that out of 14430 suspect aircraft, Customs sought to intercept 8788 and only 23% were caught. Of those caught, fewer than 10% had drugs. Customs "busts" of 54% of the aircraft in Miami resulted from informer tips. It is estimated that interdiction stops less than 12% of the drug flow into the US by boat and aircraft.
Virtually all the chemicals used to produce cocaine are imported from the US. Controls that have been established are not effective. To date, eradication programs have not been able to keep pace with the expansion of narcotics crops. Coca cultivation expands by an estimated 10% each year. Developmental assistance is provided to foreign governments to offer alternative sources of income. But this has not been successful with farmers in peasant economies. In Peru, the government eradication program will pay a campesino $300 to destroy one hectare of coca; the trafficante middleman will pay $7000 for the leaves of one hectare of coca.

In 1971, the opium production in Turkey was eliminated. Mexico took over as a source of the US heroin supply. In 1970, the Mexican marijuana supply was virtually eliminated. Colombia supplanted Mexico as the primary source to the US. That source was curtailed and now the US produces 25% of its own. There is little chance to control production everywhere at once. It is not feasible to mount sustained eradication operations.

DEA agents are working hard on eradication of coca and destruction of cocaine production facilities. But with only 240 agents in 45 countries and with limited military assistance, it is an impossibility. No real progress has been made in a regional approach to counter-force targeting (production/distribution).

International priorities in any successful CN strategy for 1990's must be:
- disruption and dismantlement of C3I
- reducing supply
- multi-national efforts to reduce/eliminate "trafficante" (money laundering)
- making anti-drug effort a top bilateral priority

For this CN strategy to work, it must support and be supported by the national LIC strategy. This involves understanding the common threat and how to attack it, subordinating CN strategy to LIC strategy and strategic coordination.

Cooperation with foreign governments must be directed toward eliminating the conditions that nurture discontent, as well as toward initiating bilateral
agreements that will not further obstruct US interests in the area. The operational environment requires the development of regional objectives with country-specific considerations. Our strategy cannot be typically "Yanqui" imperialism, but must be shaped around Latin value systems. The economic, political, religious, social and insurgent situation in each country must be analyzed. For example, the majority of the people in the Andean countries do not care about "crack" problems in American cities. They care about basic needs and who provides for these needs. Consequently, CN activities by DEA, STATE and DOD must be closely integrated with AID economic programs, host country counterinsurgency operations and embassy policy. Operation "Blast Furnace" in Bolivia was an example of a non-integrated quick fix. It was too ostentatious. The Bolivian people perceived a "Yanqui" invasion, weak OPSEC resulted in drug mafia counter-action, critical political/economic/social actions were not properly integrated, and the operation was short-lived as production resumed immediately following US withdrawal.

AID coordinates foreign economic programs within DOS, but seldom with DOD. There is an intimate relationship between economic aid and security assistance. Both must mesh closely for our effort to work. The $2 billion American plan for Andean ridge countries in 1990 will compete with the "trafficante" influence, but only if properly integrated.

In April of this year, Secretary Baker will follow up on the Economic Summit of Industrialized Nations to make recommendations to combat money laundering. Pursuing this counter-value targeting (money) attacks the traffickers purpose (key, since it is an important aspect of the international infrastructure bonding process). Our strategy must be discriminative. What is desirable and what is feasible must be considered with the risks involved. It must include prioritization of objectives and allocation of resources. We must then establish a sequence to attain objectives. Linking these "means" with "ends" are phased in the CN Campaign Plan.
CN Campaign Plan

"A campaign is characterized by its broad scope, joint activity, and linkage to a series of operations designed to achieve strategic objectives."

FM 100-6

Campaigns are organized in LIC areas as an interdepartmental civil-military effort. CN activities must be integrated with counterinsurgency activities designed to restore governmental control based on common objectives. Access to foreign countries involved in LIC is difficult. We are trying to protect our interests in the complex environment of coalition warfare with allies who have their own interests, traditions, incentives and priorities. FM 100-20 outlines the necessary doctrine for LIC. This manual describes Internal Defense and Development (IDAD) strategy, ie. how to build on viable political, economic, social and military institutions that respond to the needs of societies. It provides principles that promote growth to protect against subversion, lawlessness and insurgency.

The LIC imperatives (political dominance, unity of effort, adaptability, legitimacy and perserverence) are vital to the CN campaign. CN operations are thus generated with unity and coherence from the campaign plan.

CN Operations

"If our operational methods and tactics are fixed routines that are not specifically attuned to the nature of enemy forces, while the latter use "relational" methods and tactics that are tailor made to exploit our weaknesses and circumvent our strengths, then our wisest strategies may be undone by operational and tactical failure..."

Edward N. Luttwak, Pentagon Advisor

The LIC environment requires operations forcing the enemy to fight on terms least favorable to him. Dislocation is the aim, using the application of violence to support intermediate objectives.

Interdiction is the most expensive and resource-demanding CN effort for DOD. To detect, monitor, and assist interdicting the infiltration/exfiltration of narcotics/precursor chemicals by air, land and sea on a regional/national level is a
monumental tasking. The military is trained and equipped better than any other agency to do this job. Though interdiction operations are mostly defensive, we must keep up a "full court press" to gain culminating results. However, defensive measures will never win -- we are just putting tourniquets on capillaries, counterforce vice countervalue.

The most adaptable and politically sensitive military resource for LIC is Special Operations Forces (SOF). These forces are "parapolitical" since political stakes and risks are very high. CN operations closely replicate those assigned to SOF in wartime. It doesn't make sense to fully duplicate this military capability within the Law Enforcement Agencies (LEA's) when they can complement each other. SOF can be used to help in the offensive to locate, disrupt, and dismantle the major transportation arteries (LOCs) and principle drug facilities, and capture/eliminate drug mafia leadership. Appropriate preemptive actions against the "center of gravity" is critical. Offense leads to winning, defense does not. It would be a mistake to confine national security strategy to the defensive mode responding only to threats. We must take the initiative away from the enemy. A small select group of SOF should be deputized to assist in the capture/elimination of the drug and terrorist leadership overseas. The key is using the military or police from the host nation for legitimacy, integrated with select DEA, CIA, and SOF, to conduct low-visibility, covert, or clandestine operations. These activities bring up questions of legality outlined in E.O. 12333, The War Powers Resolution, DCID 5/1 and the Posse Comitatus Act. But, SOF can be used for low visibility operations; and with a Presidential finding, or a change in legislation, SOF can conduct covert/clandestine operations on a selected basis. We are fighting an adversary in LIC that has focused his actions on two critically weak American seams -- those between peace and war and between domestic and international law.
"You have no idea how much it contributes to the general politeness and pleasantness of diplomacy when you have a little quiet armed force in the background."

George F. Kennan

The figure below outlines the current status of CN operations:

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Supply</th>
<th>Interdiction</th>
<th>Demand</th>
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<td>Yes</td>
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<td>No</td>
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"Status of Current CN Operations"

We have made supply, transit and demand CN objectives, but we currently are not using the required means in any of the categories. We have the will (rhetorically) to go after the supply and transit objectives, but not the demand.

**Conclusion/Recommendations**

"The degree of force that must be used against the enemy depends on the scale of political demands on either side."

Clausewitz

The following recommendations, if implemented, will support a winning CN campaign plan:

- The Senate must ratify the UN Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances. We have signed, but not ratified the Convention.

- Programs in the US to reduce demand must be strengthened with punitive severity, personnel and funds. A psychological and educational campaign using government leaders and the media must be undertaken to obtain public acceptance.

- We must take the indirect approach, the line least expected, in the psychological sphere, against the "trafficantes'" center of gravity -- the unexpected, extraordinary (Sun Tzu's "Chi") with specialized, discriminatory actions. Meanwhile, "normal" forces should continue with the direct "full-court"
press (Sun Tzu's "Cheng"). This requires ingenuity in anticipating, deterring and preempting the enemy.

-DOD must take on a larger role (see enclosure 2). For instance, SOF can take over some DEA field requirements. Both the DEA and the FBI can deputize anyone for a specific mission (eg., seeking out and arresting drug lords). The President can wave Posse Comitatus on a case-by-case basis, (eg., the Atlanta Prison situation). Additional statutory authority should be given the military for interdiction operations.

-Take aggressive action to curtail the international flow of precursor chemicals starting with procedures on exports from the US to illegal drug-producing countries.

-ASD SO/LIC should be the responsible DOD representative for CN since he is responsible for special operations and LIC.

-Congress should provide multi-year appropriations for foreign aid (specific security assistance) to specific countries and assign the CINCs more responsibility in implementation.

-The effort against laundering operations must be increased not only in the Bahamas and Europe, but also in our own country (a trillion dollars changes hands in the world each day via electrical transfer means).

-The nature of the LIC threat calls for effective civil/military mechanisms to implement national policy from the strategic to the tactical level. This must start at NSC and flow through ONDCP to all governmental agencies involved. The NSC staff is a small organization but can formulate policy quickly. NSC must resolve the LIC issues immediately integrating CN strategy.

-If ONDCP is in charge, he must be given the power he needs to conduct the national CN effort.

-The President must meet with key-Congressmen and come to an agreement on
what we really want to do and how to reach the required commitments. This may require actually declaring war, not using the word "war" in a rhetorical sense.

The drug problem that the US faces is the most serious this country has experienced in current times. The complexity of "Counter Narcotics" requires a comprehensive and well coordinated strategy that maintains unity of effort throughout planning and execution. The use of the "strategy/process paradigm" will assist in maintaining the focus essential for accomplishing the national political objective - the "ends". To reach the "ends" is to win. And after all, as Americans, our business is, as Vince Lombardi put it "to win and to win and to win!"
"Low Intensity Conflict is political-military confrontation between contending states or groups at a level below conventional war but above routine peaceful competition among states. It involves protracted struggles of competing principles and ideologies. Low Intensity Conflict ranges from subversion to the use of armed forces. It is waged by a combination of means employing political, economic, informational, and military instruments. Low Intensity Conflicts are often localized, generally in the Third World, but contain regional and global security implications."

National Security Directive No. 277

Low intensity conflict is a political-military confrontation between contending states or groups below conventional war and above the routine, peaceful competition among states. It frequently involves protracted struggles of competing principles and ideologies. Low intensity conflict ranges from subversion to the use of armed force. It is waged by a combination of means, employing political, economic, informational, and military instruments. Low intensity conflicts are often localized, generally in the Third World, but contain regional and global security implications.

FM 100-20/AFP 3-20
SPECIFIC DOD CN ACTIVITIES

I. White Operations:
   A. Detection/monitoring/interdiction/disruption
   B. Foreign country airspace control assistance
   C. Regional C3I architecture
      1. Secure "NARCNET"
      2. LIC fusion capability (CINC, Embassies, Host Countries)
   D. Intell architecture (most valuable US contribution)
   E. Targeting
   F. Provide ground, air, and sea assets
   G. Integrate NORAD support for Andean Ridge
   H. Train military and police forces for CI, CT, CN, FID
   I. SDI and other R&D technology- DARPA lead agency
   J. Establish an international CN training center
   K. Establish container tracking system
   L. OPSEC program for entire community
   M. Theater SAR
   N. Psychological operations
   O. Civil Affairs operations

II. Black Operations:
   A. Strategic reconnaissance/surveillance to identify critical LOC nodes, leaders, facilities.
   B. Capture/eliminate selected targets
   C. Pollute precursor chemicals known for drug production
   D. Provide beacons/designate targets for AC-130 and Naval vessel night strikes; and allied day bombing
   E. Disinformation
   F. Counter-terrorism
   G. Deception operations
ENCL 3 (LARGER SUPPORTING DIAGRAMS)
Low Intensity Conflict Responsibilities

CN TACTICS

DETECTION
INSPECTION
ARREST
ERADICATION
DESTRUCTION
DISRUPT

INTERDICT

PRODUCTION

CULTIVATION
HARVEST
TRANSPORT
PROCESS
REFINE
STORE

CHEMICALS
WEAPONS
FINANCES
DRUG SHIPMENTS
LIASON

BORDER ENTRY
TRANSPORT
STORAGE
DISTRIBUTE-SALES
FINANCES

DISTRIBUTION

INTERDICT

CN TARGETING OF FLOW

ENCL 4 (LARGER SUPPORTING DIAGRAMS)
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Amb David Miller, NSC

James Locher, ASD SO/LIC

Gen James Lindsay, USCINCSOC

Gen Fred Woerner, USA (RET)

LTG Tom Kelly, J3 JCS