

Law Enforcement Methods for Counterinsurgency Operations

**A Monograph
by
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Abstract

Law Enforcement Methods for Counterinsurgency Operations by MAJOR Gary D. Calese, U.S. Army 49 pages.

Recent operations have forced the United States Army to re-examine the “art” of fighting insurgencies. Although these types of operations are not new to the Army, World War II and the subsequent Cold War diminished any skill or institutional knowledge the force had in these types of low intensity wars. In the post-Vietnam Army, insurgencies were almost exclusively the job of Special Operations Forces. The fall of the Soviet Union, a decade of Peacekeeping and the Global War on Terror have brought about a renewed focus on this type of un-conventional warfare. Although the language of “full spectrum operations” has been in doctrine for over ten years, combat in Afghanistan and Iraq have driven the Army to critically examine what may become the most prevalent form of warfare for the next 20 years.

This monograph draws a correlation between insurgent organizations and organized criminal groups. Then, by extension, examines what the Army can learn from the law enforcement community. To limit the scope of this research, only criminal organizations in America were examined. Youth gangs and Mafia style organized crime are included in the study; however, international organized criminal groups are not. Only the law enforcement community in America is drawn on for potential tactics, techniques, or procedures that could benefit the Army in fighting insurgencies.

This work starts with a doctrinal examination of counterinsurgency operations. It then compares the nature of insurgent organizations to criminal organizations. It does so by correlating five common characteristics: leadership within the organization, organizational structure, culture of the organization, recruitment, and finances. The parallel between insurgents and organized criminals established, the law enforcement community is studied for ways to assist the Army in counterinsurgencies.

Today, there are sophisticated systems, structures, and tactics within law enforcement tailored to dismantle criminal organizations. Only those that can realistically help the Army fight insurgencies are examined in this monograph. Concepts that require permanent organizational change, significant new equipment, or those prohibitively expensive are discarded outright. The Law enforcement community has a long history and is extremely rich in ideas; therefore, this is not an exhaustive examination. Five concepts are identified as promising candidates for Army adoption, as well as evidence that the Army should dedicate more research to learn from law enforcement. The first idea is a cultural shift while fighting insurgencies. The second idea outlines the need and a technical solution to personal identification on the ambiguous battlefield. The third concept is a technical solution to synchronizing intelligence on the insurgent battlefield. The fourth idea is the tactic of “community policing,” and the last concept is a training recommendation for soldiers to learn “street knowledge” from the police. All of these concepts are easier to adopt than a major weapons platform. These all have a very real potential to assist fighting current and future insurgencies faced by the United States Army.

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INTRODUCTION

For as long as there have been states, there have been insurgencies. They are likely the most prevalent form of conflict in the history of political bodies.¹ It is a short distance from displeasure in how a government is managing the affairs of its people, to organizing and taking up arms to affect change. Although ubiquitous, the inspiration for insurrection is varied. Some groups want to overthrow an oppressive government, a government that is either home grown, colonial, or occupying power. The insurgents may have merely been disgruntled until they were persuaded to take up arms or aided materially by a regional or global power. Some want a total change in the form of government such as the French Revolution; some merely want to modify the actions of the sitting government such as the FMLN in El Salvador. An insurgency can be provoked by the violence of the government against a segment of the population, or it can be provoked by a segment of the population that wants to be left alone to follow a separate agenda. Some want to secede from the government to form an independent state; others only to carve an autonomous enclave.

The nature of insurgencies is varied as well. Some insurgencies involve a small segment of the population or geographic area. Some insurgencies, especially the successful ones, outstrip the government in the growth of popular support. Some are well resourced. Some are very violent. They can be driven by ideology, religion, race, drugs, scarce resources, outside powers or perceived relative deprivation.² Boiled down, however, they are all about gaining political power.³ If the established government within a state will not yield an issue to the opposition, subversion and organized violence may be the only recourse. As Clausewitz wrote, “Since war is not a senseless act of passion but is controlled by its political object, the value of this object must determine the sacrifices to be made for it in magnitude and also in duration.”⁴ If the political object is small such as an outlying region of the state

¹ Bard O’Neill, *Insurgency and Terrorism* (Dulles, VA: Brassey’s Inc., 1990), 1.

² Ted Gurr, *Why Men Rebel* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970), 25-143.

³ Department of the Army, Field Manual FMI 3-07.22 *Counterinsurgency Operations* (Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Combined Arms Center, October, 2004), 1-1.

⁴ Carl von Clausewitz, *On War* Edited and Translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (New York: Random House, 1993), 104.

desiring to grow illegal drugs, then the sacrifices on both sides in the name of the insurgency may be relatively small. If, however, the political object is the elimination of a sitting government, an agreed upon solution will probably not be reached without a significant conflict. Quite the contrary, the magnitude and possible duration of the revolution may be great. Adding even more complexity to the problem of insurgency is that a strong willed insurgent group with very little resources can wreck havoc within a state.

Although we often forget, America itself grew out of an insurrection and almost split in half over another one. Our experience in insurgencies runs the length of our history. We have been involved on both sides of insurrections on nearly every continent, yet our operational expertise has ebbed and flowed over the years. Vietnam, the longest operation of the Cold War, provided many insights, positive and negative, on counterinsurgency operations (COIN). Unfortunately, those lessons were all but lost to the Army in its post-Vietnam focus on conventional operations in central Europe. By 1975, insurgency and counterinsurgency operations were the exclusive domain of the Special Operations Forces. All operations between Vietnam and September 11th, 2001 conducted by conventional forces were either peace operations or invasions of very short duration, with the exception of Operation Desert Storm. These operations, such as Urgent Fury, Just Cause and Uphold Democracy provided little insight to the art of counterinsurgency. Even though operations in Somalia, Bosnia and Kosovo provided windows into this ambiguous world, the Army at large was little concerned with these Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW).

Critics took an even more dismal view of our ability to learn from our own history in counterinsurgency operations. Bruce Hoffman wrote in a U.S. Government sponsored Rand Study on Counterinsurgency in Iraq that a “decisive epiphany has yet to occur with respect to America’s historical ambivalence toward counterinsurgency. Indeed, an almost unbroken string of frustration (and disappointment) can be traced backward over nearly half a century from the situation in Iraq today to the early 1960s when the United States became heavily engaged in Indochina’s wars. Vietnam and Iraq thus

form two legs of a historically fraught triangle—with America’s experiences in El Salvador in the 1980s providing the connecting leg.”⁵

With our role in global security being redefined in the new millennium, partly by the events of September 11th, 2001, it is now no longer speculation that the U.S. military will spend the majority of the post Cold War era in MOOTW.⁶ During the Cold War, and even throughout the 1990s, we could deny as an institution that lower intensity operations would be our new focus of effort. Now, that is no longer the case. As the only military super-power, we are drawn to orchestrate global stability. Future military operations will come in the form of peacetime military engagements, peacekeeping operations and other small scale contingencies within the regional combatant commanders’ theater strategy.⁷ Even the new Army capstone document, FM 3-0, *Operations* of June 2001 finally admits that the Army must be able to conduct operations across the *spectrum of operations*, not making any inferences as to which end of that spectrum the Army will spend the majority of its effort. This is a clear departure from its predecessor, the 1993 FM 100-5, *Operations*. This earlier version stated that, “The Army’s primary focus is to fight and win the nation’s wars. However, Army forces and soldiers operate around the world in an environment that may not involve combat.”⁸ This is clearly a focus on major combat operations versus stability operations. Emerging doctrine is leaning the other way. These operations that were formerly considered by some as anomalies are now judged to be more the norm.⁹

The 2004 USJFCOM *Joint Operating Environment* predicts counterinsurgency operations will be the primary effort for at least the next 20 years with statements like, “failed and failing states will arise as a result of economic collapse.” And, “Although WME (Weapons of Mass Effects) will proliferate the next twenty years, the age old threat of insurgency to friendly governments will remain a challenge to the

⁵ Bruce Hoffman, *Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Iraq* (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corp, 2004), 1.

⁶ Steven Metz and Raymond Millen. “Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in the 21st Century: Reconceptualizing Threat and Response” (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2004), 1.

⁷ Department of the Army, Field Manual FM 3-0 *Operations* (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, June 2001), 9-2.

⁸ Department of the Army, Field Manual FM 100-5 *Operations* (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, June 1993), 13-0.

⁹ Department of the Army, Field Manual-Interim FMI 3-07.22 *Counterinsurgency Operations* (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, June 2001),vi.

United States.” With the current U.S. National Security Strategy of preemption, and the common understanding that nations in turmoil can breed problems that will eventually touch us here in America, we are increasingly willing to aid states fighting insurgencies, or to lead the effort ourselves.¹⁰

The Joint community and the Army are making inroads in rehabilitating the doctrine on how to conduct foreign internal defense, and it’s subcategory of counterinsurgency. A general movement in that direction was gaining momentum slowly based on the implications of 9/11, and the subsequent National Security Strategy. More importantly, the realities on the ground in Afghanistan and Iraq provided new energy to the study of insurgencies. Doctrine is being updated to define the nature, objectives, and principles in these operations. History is being reexamined as to what lessons can be gleaned from not only our own historic campaigns, but those of the British and the French during their many years of fighting guerillas, especially in Muslim countries. Military educational institutions such as the Army War College, the Naval Postgraduate School, as well as independent strategic analysis organizations are examining current operations. Tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) for operations in Iraq and Afghanistan are being posted on the Center for Army Lessons Learned web site.

This monograph examines a related area. Since the 1970s, law enforcement agencies in America have dedicated money, research, people, and structure to understanding and dismantling organized criminal organizations. Various governmental entities from the U.S. Department of Justice to police departments in the states and large cities focus on both traditional organized crime such as the Mafia as well as urban gangs. These organized crime groups have certain fundamental characteristics that share common characteristics with insurgent organizations. They recruit in order to survive. They have an identifiable culture. They need money, whether as a means to an ends, or to an ends itself, and that money has to be hidden from the law. Organized crime groups have structure, sometimes hierarchical, sometime decentralized or cellular. They have a relationship to the community at large. Simply put, they are organized, they use violence, they operate covertly, and they sometimes control territory. There are similarities between these criminal groups here in America and insurgent movements abroad.

¹⁰ National Security Strategy, September 2002, 15.

This paper examines parallels in the leadership, organization, recruitment, culture, and financing of insurgent organizations and organized crime in the U.S. By extrapolation, it is logical that the Army can learn something from the law enforcement community. Since they have been fighting organized subversive elements inside our own borders everyday, there is a good chance they have some techniques, systems, equipment, tactics, or fundamental understanding that can be adopted by the Army.

This work starts by laying a doctrinal foundation for U.S. Army involvement in counterinsurgency operations by taking a broad view to include National and Joint directives. Historic Army documents as well as current and emerging Army doctrine are examined. After the doctrinal outlay, insurgencies are examined to identify commonalities among them. The next chapter examines organized crime groups in America. Both the Mafia and youth gang organizations are discussed, with the intent of discovering common threads between them and insurgent organizations. The final chapter explores successful law enforcement methods for fighting organized crime and gangs. These techniques, special equipment, procedures or training aid the police in combating organized crime. This is followed by a discussion of their potential application in counterinsurgency operations by the Army. Those methods that are unrealistic for the Army to adopt have been omitted from discussion. The goal of this research is to identify effective methods the Army can adapt with little funding, major equipment procurement, or major organizational changes. Counterinsurgency operations are more than just an Army problem. While COIN is an interagency problem, for the sake of focus, this inquiry will limit its scope to those techniques that aid the Army, although they may have wider application.

DOCTRINAL FRAMEWORK FOR COUNTERINSURGENCY

There is no single simple policy which meets this [insurgency] challenge. Experience has taught us that no one nation has the power or the wisdom to solve all the problems of the world or manage its revolutionary tides--that extending our commitments does not always increase our security--that any initiative carries with it the risk of a temporary defeat--that nuclear weapons cannot prevent subversion--that no free people can be kept free without will and energy of their own--and that no two nations or situations are exactly alike.

-President John F. Kennedy to Congress May 25th 1961

Joint Doctrine on Counterinsurgency

Because Joint doctrine became more prominent at the end of the Cold War with the passage of Goldwater-Nichols in 1986, it has a more balanced focus on the varied types of military engagements. With countries like North Korea posing a large conventional threat on one end, and a string of stability operations in our recent history, and likely in our future, the entire Defense Department is trying its best to cover all the possibilities. Joint doctrine is very inclusive, from Nuclear Operations (JP 3-12), to Foreign Humanitarian Assistance (JP 3-07.6). Guidance from the Joint capstone document, Joint Pub 1, published in November of 2000, states that the military must

...be prepared to conduct a complex set of military operations simultaneously across and within theaters. A combat operation to contain a major conflict in one part of the world may be taking place alongside a number of supporting and independent operations to reinforce peace, provide foreign humanitarian assistance, and assist civil authorities. The military power of the United States must be prepared to fulfill both its fundamental purpose of winning the Nation's wars and provide unconditional service in support of other broad national objectives.¹¹

Inclusive in this "complex set of military operations" is unmistakably counterinsurgency operations.

Within the *operational* set of Joint pubs, operations are divided in two; war and military operations other than war. JP 3-0 lists those operations other than war as those operations that the military must be prepared to do to deter aggression, but "should this deterrence fail, force may be required to compel compliance...such operations include peace operations (PO), combating terrorism, enforcement of sanctions, enforcing exclusion zones, support to insurgency and counterinsurgency, maritime intercept operations, and noncombatant evacuation operations (NEOs)."¹² Indeed, there has been a slow but measurable acceptance of operations other than high intensity combat in the Army, and in the military at large since its drawdown in the mid 90's. With peace operations in Somalia, the former Yugoslavia, and Haiti, the 1990s was a decade of acceptance that the military instrument of American power will be wielded for a wide variety of national security interests, not just major conflicts. So went joint doctrine as well.

¹¹ Department of Defense, Joint Publication JP 1 *Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 14 November 2000), ix.

¹² Department of Defense, Joint Publication JP 3-0 *Doctrine for Joint Operations* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 10 September, 2001), I-3.

JP 3-07, *Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War* was published in 1995 with a warning from the then current Chairman of the JCS, General Shalikashvili, “While we have historically focused on warfighting, our military profession is increasingly changing its focus to a complex array of military operations — other than war.”¹³ JP 3-07 was the cornerstone for this entire family of operations. Joint manuals on counterdrug operations, antiterrorism, NEO, and peace operations were all published under this heading in the late 1990s. First published in 1996, the joint community has recently reemphasized the need to assist other nations with their stability needs with JP 3-07.1, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Internal Defense (FID)*, published again in April of 2004. This refurbished FID manual states flatly that, “When it is in the interests of US national security, the United States may employ all instruments of national power in order to assist a friendly nation in conducting internal defense and development (IDAD) programs.”¹⁴ Indeed, if there ever was, there is no longer any ambiguity in Joint doctrine that if necessary, the U.S. will support a nation’s strategy designed to protect against subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. It further assesses that “US military involvement in FID has traditionally been focused toward counterinsurgency.”¹⁵

Army Doctrine on Counterinsurgency

There is a strong argument that the Army is maintained to “fight and win our nation’s wars.” However, only four of the over 50 militarized engagements in our history can be considered “high intensity”; the U.S. Civil War, the two World Wars, and the Korean War.¹⁶ Special consideration can be granted to the Cold War, in which a high intensity conventional war on the plains of Central Europe was prepared for, but never fought, and the ground phases of both Iraqi wars. Other than these exceptions, the vast majority of Army engagements can be classified as “small wars” or smaller scale contingencies.

¹³ Department of Defense, Joint Publication JP 3-07 *Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other than War* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 16 June, 1995), i.

¹⁴ Department of Defense, JP 3-07, II-1.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, I-3.

¹⁶ Lawrence A. Yates, “Military Stability and Support Operations: Analogies, Patterns and Recurring Themes.” *Military Review* VOL LXXVII, NO. 4 (JUL – AUG 1997): 51.

Despite a history of small scale interventions, World War II reinforced the mission of the Army as a force for “big wars.” Small wars after WW II were no longer considered the business of the Army’s divisions. “Dwight D. Eisenhower, Army general turned president instituted a ‘New Look’ for American strategy that eschewed an ability to fight limited wars in favor of escalating any conflicts through the use of atomic weapons.”¹⁷ The Army was not happy about the atomic weapons end of this new look, undermining their capability to solve problems using conventional might, but they were happy about being relieved of messy little wars.¹⁸ The Army culture of high intensity conventional war was buoyed by the build up of tank and mechanized divisions across the Iron Curtain. There was, however, a small community within the Army of special operators who believed that low intensity conflicts were still an appropriate extension of strategic policy. “Offensive guerrilla operations and counterinsurgency after World War II were seen as a ‘special’ vocation that was not really appropriate for the conventional armed forces. From the late 1940s, the definition of problems related to guerrilla warfare, and the solutions fell largely to veterans of the OSS, and those in the Army who worked with guerrillas in the Philippines, China, and southern Europe. The consolidation in 1951 of the Army's unconventional warfare "assets" under the Office of Psychological Warfare provided the medium through which doctrine was formulated and plans prepared to put it into practice.”¹⁹ This minority within the Army even published the first FM on counterinsurgency operations, FM 31-20, *Operations Against Guerrilla Forces* in 1951, based on their experienced in the Pacific Theater in WW II. This niche community was expanded by President Kennedy who believed that the fight with global communism would be fought primarily on the fringes. He would use the newly renamed “Special Forces” to conduct unconventional warfare in those countries that needed a boost from the “forces of good.”

So it would remain throughout the Cold War. Even the Vietnam War, arguable the largest insurgency faced by our Army, was only fought as a counterinsurgency by the special operators, some advisors, and the Marines. Army doctrine for low intensity conflict logically was geared toward Special

¹⁷ Max Boot, *Savage Wars of Peace* (New York: Basic Books, 2002), 282.

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ Michael McClintock, *Instruments of Statecraft* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1992), 31.

Forces. The post-Vietnam era widened the divide between conventional and unconventional forces within the Army. For better or for worse, in 1976, General DePuy, the father of Training and Doctrine Command, ensured the Army would maintain its focus on conventional combat with his version of FM 100-5, *Operations*.²⁰ It would not be until 1993 that this capstone document relaxed its rigidity on the proper role of the Army. The first chapter of the 1993 FM 100-5 stated that, “The Army must be capable of *full-dimensional operations*. This means employing all means available to accomplish any given mission decisively and at the least cost—across the full range of possible operations in war and in operations other than war.”²¹ That said, Chapter 13, only eight pages of the document, was devoted to “Operations Other Than War.” The theme of the ’93 *Operations* was still very much conventional combat.

While Army doctrine has a 50 year history of discussing counterinsurgency operations, the focus has remained with the special operations community. Since 1951 there have been no less than ten field manuals on “counterinsurgency” or “counter-guerilla” or “low intensity” operations. Although the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) is the only combatant command with a legislatively-mandated FID core task, the Army is again turning to the force at large to assist in FID operations. In the Army’s current capstone manual, FM 3-0 published in 2001, the whole force is directed to be ready to conduct any of the “full spectrum” of land operations from war to operations other than war. This new umbrella manual for the Army divides the Army’s activities into offense, defense, stability and support operations, explaining that each deployment will likely be a combination of these four categories of missions. Foreign internal defense is one of the ten listed stability operations in Chapter 9.

Interestingly, today’s FM 3-0 doesn’t even mention the Special Forces when it refers to counterinsurgency as the core of foreign internal defense. Of the four types of operations according to FM 3-0, offense, defense, stability, and support, the latter two have been lumped together in an umbrella document, FM 3-07 published in 2003 named appropriately *Stability Operations and Support Operations*

²⁰ Richard M. Swain. “Filling the Void: The Operational Art and the U.S. Army,” in B.J.C. McKercher and Michael Hennessy, ed., *Operational Art: Developments in the Theories of War*. (Westport, CN: Praeger, 1996), 149.

²¹ Department of the Army, FM 100-5, 1-4.

(SOSO). This field manual was several years in the making and is appropriately a reorganization of all the Army doctrine of military operations other than war. Its release made obsolete the 1990 *Low Intensity Operations* (LIC) manual, the 1990 *Domestic Support* manual, the 1994 *Peace Operations* manual, and the 1994 manual on *Non-combatant Evacuation Operations* (NEO). Of the six chapters in the SOSO manual, one is dedicated to foreign internal defense (FID). This chapter reinforces the same fundamentals about FID as does the Joint doctrine and Army FM 3-0. The first is the identical definition of foreign internal defense as participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. There is also an important parallel sometimes called the Nixon doctrine, where the U.S. is very willing to aid a nation defend itself from internal threats, but that nation would be ultimately responsible for its internal defense and development plan (IDAD).²²

The latest in the Army chain of doctrine for counterinsurgency is an interim release of FMI 3-07.22, *Counterinsurgency Operations*, dated October 2004. This update of the 1986 FM 90-8 continues the theme that the entire Army must be prepared to conduct counterinsurgency operations, although the Special Forces are especially trained for this type of operation. Reflecting a new approach to combating insurgency, this latest manual includes emphasis in intelligence gathering, psychological operations and the use of military police support. The release of an “interim” field manual also hints at the urgency with which the manual is needed in the force, driven by current operations in Afghanistan and Iraq.

The Army doctrine for counterinsurgency follows the history of Army involvement in counterinsurgencies. The trend is clear that counterinsurgency operations are no longer conducted by shadowy organizations on the fringe of the “real” Army. Rather, it is a likely operation for the total force in support of national security goals. There is clearly a doctrinal legitimacy to exploring methods to making the Army better at conducting these operations. The interim FM on counterinsurgency operations admits that it is “broad in scope”, and therefore, does little to give a commander on the ground the

²² Department of Defense, JP 3-07.1, I-2.

necessary tactics, techniques and procedures to conduct an effective operation. This monograph attempts to identify some potential TTPs for those commanders.

NATURE OF INSURGENCIES

Insurgencies defy neat categorization. Each one has its own characteristics driven by the environment in which they operate, their objectives, the people involved in them, and the government they are combating. Certainly, a general understanding of insurgencies is only a departure point for the comprehension of any specific case. This section is intended as an overview of insurgencies and their nature in order to draw a link between the work of the law enforcement community in America and the needs of our Army fighting insurgencies abroad. The connection between COIN and police work is rarely made in Army literature. Therefore, it merits some development as a concept before borrowing methods from law enforcement will be accepted. This chapter concentrates on a discussion of some basic characteristics of insurgencies that are consistent threads. These commonalities of leadership, organization, culture, recruitment, and finances, will be defined and discussed so that links can be made to the similar characteristics in organized crime groups. For the sake of focus, this paper will restrict itself to the study of relatively “pure” insurgencies. Pure insurgencies are those contained within the recognized boundaries of one particular country. Although the disaffected sub-group within a nation may, and usually does, receive aid from an outside source, a pure insurgency is not initiated by that outside source. Insurgencies that branch out from their country of origin, or start with a global agenda are also becoming more popular, but these too will be set aside for the purpose of this monograph. These parameters will aid in understanding the fundamentals of insurgencies and assist in drawing a concrete link between counterinsurgency and crime fighting.

Definitions of Insurgency

There are many definitions of insurgency. For the British Army an insurgency is “the actions of a minority group within a state who are intent on forcing political change by means of a mixture of subversion, propaganda, and military pressure, aiming to persuade or intimidate the broad mass of people

to accept such a change”²³ This definition has the advantage of leaving the political aim of the insurgency open ended. Although the removal of the current government is implicit in the agenda of some insurgencies, it by no means is necessary to all. The category of separatist insurgent is an excellent example. The drawback to this definition is that it precludes the “top down” type of insurgency that is also a prevalent model. Although the slow to build mass movement type of insurgency of Mao Tse-Tung is more commonly understood, some insurgents move straight to armed action if they see an advantage, and can organize and equip quickly. This was the case in Cuba in the 1950’s. Fidel Castro assessed the government of Cuba weak enough that he could mass combatants to overthrow the government first, then worry about the population second. Army FM (I) 3-07.22 visualizes this type of insurgency as an “inverted pyramid,” with a small support base compared to armed combatants.

The U.S. Joint and Army definition of an insurgency is “an organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through use of subversion and armed conflict.”²⁴ This definition limits itself in the ultimate objectives of the insurgency. Again overthrow may not be an end objective, or even a means for an insurgent movement. The warlord in Afghanistan or the drug cartel in Columbia doesn’t care so much that the government exists, but that the government lets *them* exist and operate freely. Indeed, aspiration as a categorization of insurgencies is becoming less and less valid.²⁵ This American military definition is, however, flexible enough to encompass all manifestations of revolutionaries, whether they are top down, bottom up, or inspired by an outside force. Although Army doctrine does recognize political change within a state as the core impetus of an insurgency, it only alludes to this in its definition. Not to split hairs, but the use of “constituted” may imply “constitutional” to the casual observer, and constitutional implies legitimate. Legitimacy of the existing government is not merely a subjective area of concern, but usually lies at the heart of this type of conflict.

²³ John Mackinlay, *Globalization and Insurgency* (New York: Oxford University Press for the International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2002), 12.

²⁴ Department of the Army, FMI 3-07.22, 1-1.

²⁵ John Mackinlay, *Globalization and Insurgency*, 41.

The definition of insurgency that best fits the needs of this paper belongs to Bard O’Neill, “A struggle between a nonruling group and the ruling authorities in which the nonruling group consciously uses political resources (organization / propaganda / demonstrations) and violence to destroy, reformulate, or sustain the basis of legitimacy of one or more aspects of politics.”²⁶ This is a broader definition that does not burden itself with the ultimate aspirations of the movement. For the sake of this thesis, there are two points to articulate about the nature of insurgencies. The first is their level of organization. In the U.S. military definition of foreign internal defense (FID), there are three types of opposition activities to the ruling government: subversion, lawlessness and insurgency. Lawlessness implied a general lack of respect for the rule of law, but also implies a very low level of organization. The underlying premise of this work is that both insurgencies and organized crime groups are, for some reason, anti-establishment and organized. It is because of these two fundamental factors, that similarities can be drawn between them. Then, by extension, techniques to fight one may be useful in fighting the other. The second point to emphasize is that the ultimate objective of the insurgency has little relevance to this work. The ends of an insurgency and the ends of an organized crime group in America are usually unrelated, although there are some intersections. Revolutions are political creatures. Gangs and Mafias may at times influence politics, but their goal is not to change the core nature of the state. For this reason, the ultimate aspiration of an insurgency will be discussed, but only to help identify the nature of the movement.

Leadership

The conditions for revolution may be ripe, but nothing will happen without leadership. As Eric Hoffer stated in his book, *The True Believer*, a person will do nothing about the deprivations of his life, unless he feels he has the power to do something about it.²⁷ Revolutionary leaders provide that spark to get the revolution started. Revolutionary leaders have three general qualities in common. They are good managers, they truly believe in their cause, and they have a cult of personality that inspires people to

²⁶ Bard O’Neill, *Insurgency and Terrorism*, 13.

²⁷ Eric Hoffer, *The True Believer* (New York: Harper and Row, 1951), 17.

follow them. The success of a revolution is an extremely difficult task. It is trying to rearrange the existing political structure of a nation against the wishes of those in charge. This is not often possible without effective leadership.

Manager

Revolutionary movements are initially faced with an inferiority in material, personnel, and safe haven or territory. Those that achieve any level of success do so because of “the skill of insurgent leaders in identifying, integrating, and coordinating the different tasks and roles essential for success in combat operations, training, logistics, communications, transportation, and the medical, financial, informational diplomatic, and supervisory areas”²⁸ Once more, these different tasks and roles must often be isolated from each other for the sake of secrecy. In short, they must be good managers.

This was an enormously complex organizational task in the insurgencies of China in the 1930s and ‘40s and in Algeria in the 1950s. Even those revolutions that chose a different strategy than the protracted popular war, must garner sizable support for their movement. They must train those who will fight as guerillas, and those who will fight as regulars. They must establish their political doctrine, and ensure their “shadow state” officials are uniform in this doctrine. The inspirational figure head of the movement does not have to have these managerial qualities personally, but he must ensure they are present in his leadership cell. Ho Chi Minh was the ideological and political leader of the nationalist/communist movement in Vietnam, but his military commander, General Vo Nguyen Giap, was the genius of organization who managed the operations of the different types of forces fighting for reunification.

A crucial quality to the managerial skills of insurgent leaders is an ability to adapt organizations, strategies, and political messages to their environment. This is one of the greatest lessons that an insurgent can take away from the Chinese Communist revolution. Mao Tse-Tung laid down this necessity in his *Problems of Strategy in China’s Revolutionary War*, “It is well known that when you do

²⁸ Bard O’Neill, *Insurgency and Terrorism*, 91.

anything, unless you understand its actual circumstances, its nature and its relations to the other things, you will not know the laws governing it, or know how to do it, or may be able to do it well.”²⁹ Mao successfully tailored an urban based concept of Marxist communism to an agriculturally centered environment of China. Revolutionary leaders use their management skills to outline a complete campaign for the revolution. They are patient enough to know when to attack and with what form of warfare.

True Believer

Revolutionary leaders believe in their cause. Whether the cause is nationalism, religion, separation, freedom from oppression, or equal representation, more often than not, a revolutionary leader has defined himself by the cause he is fighting. From Mao’s 6,000 mile “Long March” to Nelson Mandela’s 27 years in prison, an insurgent leader is often willing to endure extreme hardship for his cause. According to Clausewitz, if you wish to overcome your enemy, you must match your effort against his power of resistance. The power of resistance is the sum of the means at his disposal and the strength of his will.³⁰ If the U.S. is involved in a counterinsurgency, it is safe to say that we will have the greater means at our disposal, but must be prepared for the insurgent leader to have the greater strength of will. After all, for the U.S. soldier, the counterinsurgency will be one campaign among many in a foreign land. For the insurgent leader, this is a fight to the death for the soul of the polity involved.

Cult of Personality

Dedication alone does not make a leader of a movement. The person who works his way to the top of an insurgency often has charisma that entices others to join the movement, and the followers to set aside personal regard for the good of the cause. This “cult of personality” can be critical to the success of the insurgency, and “in some instances the insurgent movement may deliberately exaggerate the prowess

²⁹ Combat Studies Institute, *Selected Military Writings of Mao Tse-Tung* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 199?), 77.

³⁰ Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, 86.

and attributes of its leader, in order to attract adherents.”³¹ The survival of the movement is dependant on gain supporters. Charismatic attraction is one of the positive means by which insurgents gain that support. Mao, Fidel Castro, Ho Chi Minh, Lenin are all cases among many where the strength of the personality was a major factor in the strength of the movement. As Eric Hoffer stated, the presence of an outstanding leader is “indispensable.” Without him there would be no movement.³²

Organization

There are several ways to categorize insurgencies. Often they are categorized by their ultimate goal. Bard O’Neill argues that there are seven types of insurgencies: anarchists, egalitarians, traditionalist, pluralist, secessionist, reformist, and preservationist.³³ Although understanding the goal of an insurgency goes far in an overall comprehension of its nature, it does little for the tactical commander who is trying to identify the command and control network, or template the enemy’s style of resistance. Another means of defining insurgencies is by their strategic approach. This provides the commander on the ground with a little more “feeling” for what he’s up against; whether it is conspiratorial insurgency, a protracted popular war, a military focused strategy or an urban warfare insurgency. However the strategic approach tells you little about the tactics or organizational structure of the movement.

The next means by which an insurgency can be defined is by its form of warfare. This provides the intervening forces and the host nation forces an even clearer visualization of the battlefield. Whether the insurgents’ “tactic” is terrorism, guerilla warfare, mobile warfare, or positional warfare provides a usable enemy template of the combatants within an insurgency. The three dangers to this kind of typology are that first, it tells you little about the other arms of the insurgency (political, economic, ideological), second, an advanced insurgency will migrate back and forth through these different forms of warfare as the strategic and tactical situation changes, and third, this may only apply to a popular Maoist type insurgency and does not fully account for other types of insurgencies. This form of typology also

³¹ Bard O’Neill, *Insurgency and Terrorism*, 75.

³² Eric Hoffer, *The True Believer*, 104.

³³ Bard O’Neill, *Insurgency and Terrorism*, 17.

tells you little of how the revolutionaries are “organized” which is the fourth means of categorizing an insurgent movement.

Indeed, insurgencies are often categorized, analyzed, and evaluated on their organization. In fact, organization is such a dominant feature in understanding insurgencies, it is the fundamental means by which they are categorized by John Mackinlay in his thesis “Globalization and Insurgency.” According to Mackinlay, there are four ways an insurgency can be organized. His four forms of category are: lumpen, clan, popular and global. A lumpen insurgency is characterized by its weak or informal organization, “despite the appearance of a vertical structure with brigades, battalions and staff departments for intelligence, logistics and civilian liaison. The reality does not live up to these titles. A lumpen force is horizontally structured.”³⁴ A clan insurgent organization is a manifestation of the clan culture itself. Its “chain of command” is generally a mirror of the clan hierarchy. Although “war leaders” and administrators will be appointed to military or political positions, the tribal elders hold the real power in the organization. Popular insurgencies develop structure slowly and gain power to resist government forces over time as they gain popular support from the masses of the counterstate. A global insurgency, i.e. Osama bin Laden and Al Qaeda, is a highly evolved organization with departments within departments for operations, finance, recruiting, training, and logistics. It is cellular and as its name implies, not tied to a state or a region.

Army doctrine defines the organization within an insurgency by the function of the subcomponents. FMI 3-07.22 defines the structure of an insurgent organization as having four elements: leadership, combatants, cadre, and mass base. The leadership as defined by Army doctrine is the command and control of the whole movement; they are the idea men and the planners. They translate the grievance into a campaign plan against the government. The combatants do the actual fighting. However, as the FMI points out, the movement is more than just those who fight openly. These fighters are just the most visible part of the movement. They act as the mirror image of the police force and the government’s military. The “local” forces provide local security and intelligence for the movement. The

³⁴ John Mackinlay, *Globalization and Insurgency*, 49.

“main forces” combat the military, in either guerilla, mobile, or positional warfare depending on the stage of the insurgency. The cadre is the political wing of the movement. They receive guidance from the leadership, and do the majority of the “subversion.” They seek out local grievances, and carry out activities to help satisfy those grievances. In this way, they widen the support for the insurgency and erode the legitimacy of the government. The last element of an insurgent organization according to Army doctrine is the mass base. They are the “population of the counterstate.” They do not actively fight, but they do provide intelligence, supplies and sanctuary.

The organization of an insurgency is often more complex than these four basic elements. Roger Trinquier maps the organization of the “clandestine warfare” organization in Algiers in 1956. The National Liberation Front (FLN) had 1,200 armed insurgents and 4,500 lightly or not armed supporters filling every role imaginable to advance the counterstate. They had political councils, liaison offices, information offices, finance committees, justice committees, health committees, trade union committees and bomb making networks.³⁵ Organization is a key characteristic of an insurgency. There is no way to overemphasize the need to understand the manifestation of the revolutionary organization, if you are to defeat it.

Culture

Insurgencies also have their own cultures. For the majority of movements, the insurgents are a subset of the state they are trying to change; therefore they derive their culture from that of the larger polity; however, there are obviously extremes to this theory. If the insurgents are clan structured as in Afghanistan, or Sierra Leone, or Somalia, the clan not in power shares many of the same social norms as the clan “in” power, the outcast clan more often than not merely wishes to adjust the balance of power and wealth distribution. The Palestinians in the modern occupied territories and the Indochinese of the

³⁵ Roger Trinquier, *Modern Warfare, A French View of Counterinsurgency* (Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1985), 13.

1950s and 60s had radically different cultures from those in power in their countries. These cultural differences were at the root of the rebellion.

Exclusion

A commonality to the insurgent culture is a sense of isolation or exclusion from the greater populous. Sometimes this separation is formal within the society, such as religious, ethnic, racial or caste persecution of the minority within a country. These minorities are almost driven to an insurgency by the injustice within the state. Sometimes it is less formal such as poverty, hunger, property ownership rights that isolate a certain segment of the population who then become ripe for conversion to an insurrection. It is this excluded culture that avails them to joining a movement.

Violence

Some aspects of the culture of an insurgency are less a product of the population at large, and are more a product of the insurgency itself. Insurgencies have a culture of violence. Whether his motive is personal gain, the advancement of a higher ideal, or survival, an insurgent is more willing than the average citizen to take risks and engage in violent acts. Some insurgents, such as the warlord tribes in Somalia have a history of warfare that goes back generations. In the case of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) of Sri Lanka, armed insurrection was not a popular idea until the majority government enacted laws that “proscribed their language, prospects of education, professional employment and ethnicity” in 1956.³⁶ In this case, the culture of violence led to the founding of the LTTE.

Still, the use of violence is not indiscriminant. Those in the political arm of the movement would only hurt their cause and undermine their legitimacy should they be caught in open acts of violence. Bard O’Neill lists seven ways to gain popular support for an insurgency: charismatic attraction, esoteric appeal, exoteric appeal, terrorism, provocation of government repression, demonstrations of potency, and

³⁶ John Mackinlay, *Globalization and Insurgency*, 69.

³⁷ In three of these methods of gaining popular support, violence would be counterproductive. Even for the combatant arm of the movement, selection of the right time and place for battle is critical, for resources are normally scarce. Mao Tse-Tung wrote that during the guerilla phase of the revolution “The enemy advances, we retreat; the enemy camps, we harass; the enemy tires, we attack; the enemy retreats, we pursue.” Violence is what separates an insurgency from a political movement; the insurgents from the population at large. That violence becomes not just a tool, but an inseparable part of the culture of the revolution.

Deception

Another aspect of the culture of an insurgency is deception. This is another norm that separates them from the masses. They are almost always weaker militarily than the government they are trying to undermine. This necessitates hiding their actions from the government and pro-government forces. Therefore, all of their meetings, financial transactions, movements of supplies, recruitment, printing of material, and care for the sick and wounded must go without the notice of the government forces. This is the reason some insurgencies are highly cellular, to avoid detection. Communication is sometimes by letter drop for the sake of secrecy. Training takes place in remote regions of the state, to avoid the observation of government forces. This culture of deception, secrecy, and covert operations has no real parallel in the population at large. It is strictly a trait of the movement. Although this may seem self evident to the nature of insurgencies, it is necessary to draw out this facet of their culture for future discussions about their correlation to organized criminal activity.

Recruitment

Recruitment is another unique characteristic of insurgencies. If an insurgency is to successfully overthrow the government, manning all the functions within the organization will be necessary. If the revolution is going to be protracted, replacements for those lost in battle will be needed. The People’s

³⁷ Bard O’Neill, *Insurgency and Terrorism*, 74.

Liberation Army went from 10,000 after the “Long March” to 5 million when they defeated the Kuomintang forces. In addition to recruiting for the armed branches, revolutionary movements need to recruit cadre for their diplomatic and political fronts as well as all the other activities mentioned in this section.

Recruitment specifics are largely a function of the type of insurgent organization; however, it is safe to generalize that insurgencies recruit from within a specific segment of society, whether it is religious, cultural, societal, ethnic, or geographical. Lumpen insurgents recruit from the same bottom strata of society that the insurrection welled up from. Because lumpen insurgencies are usually regional, they recruit from that same geographic base as well. Clan insurgencies recruit from within the clan. Or more appropriately, the family will send its young to serve in an armed faction.³⁸ Once the clan elders have decided to assume a war footing, recruitment is not usually a problem. Of the four types of insurgent organizations, the popular uprising recruits from the broadest cross section of the masses. This is partly because of the relative high demands for manpower that a popular uprising will have. This is also because the grievances that foment the revolution may unite people from different social strata, geographic background, or even cultural background.

Unlike the government, recruitment as all other activities must be accomplished outside of the influence of the counterinsurgency forces. If the insurgency only controls a region of the country, recruitment is probably limited to that region. If the insurgency is a clandestine activity within the cities of a country, then it must be done in secret. Insurgencies often vie for the same recruits with the government. Some are true believers in the cause and volunteer. Some recruits take a bit of convincing, either through idealistic, or pragmatic appeal. In a pinch, insurgencies will coerce people to join their ranks, although they understand that these are the least dependable type of adherent. It is important to understand, though, that recruitment among insurgencies is different than recruitment for other activities.

³⁸ John Mackinlay, *Globalization and Insurgency*, 60.

Finances

The management of finances is the final characteristic addressed for the purpose of later comparison. Money management itself is a common activity, but because of the nature of a counter government movements, funds are handled differently than they are for open societies. Revolutions don't come cheap. Among the many things there are to pay for are: arms and other war material, salaries, medical supplies, propaganda outlets, food, clothing, shelter, offices, the logistics network and so forth. The means by which insurgents draw the capital for these necessities are varied. One of the most popularly understood means of raising funds is through the sale of resources. Some of these resources can be outwardly legitimate, such as food crops or precious minerals, such as diamonds in Angola for UNITA (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola).

Many insurgencies finance their operations through the growth, manufacture or distribution of drugs, such as Opium in Afghanistan for the warlords, or cocaine sales to support the FARC in Columbia. Some insurgencies raise money through international relief organizations that canvass the globe for charitable donations. Some are more primitive in their fundraising. They will levy "taxes" among the locals in a controlled region, or will extort money for safe passage through their area. All of these means have something in common. The capital raised must be transparent to the government they are trying to overthrow. This is done through using untraceable means of exchange, whether that is bartering such as "guns for drugs", strictly cash transactions, or the use of anonymous bank accounts at home or abroad. There is an entire hidden financial network to the counterstate. The more complex the insurgency is, the more complex this financial network has to be.

The majority of works written about insurgencies spend a substantial effort trying to understand the objectives of counter state movements. The grievances and strategic goals of the insurgency go far in comprehending their nature. However, these facets of the movements are only peripheral to the thesis of this paper. In an attempt to borrow from the law enforcement community to help the US Army fight counterinsurgencies, a parallel between insurgencies and organized crime groups must be established.

There are similarities in the nature of insurgent leadership, organization, culture, recruitment, and finances to the nature organized criminal activities domestically. The other side of this coin will be discussed in the next chapter, in order to discover police methods that have military application.

NATURE OF ORGANIZED CRIME GROUPS IN AMERICA

What parallels do youth gangs and organized crime organizations have with insurgencies? This chapter outlines characteristics that are common to these disparate groups. By extension, an effective technique for fighting organized crime and gangs here in America may have potential for fighting insurgencies abroad. Insurgencies are organized, they have objectives that are outside the rules of the establishment, they hide their activities, they have clandestine functionaries within the organization, they recruit, they handle money, they have their own sub-culture, and they use violence if the conditions are right. Gangs and organized criminals here in America have many of these same traits. It can be said that policemen in the cities of America have been fighting insurgencies since the mid-1800s.³⁹

Definition of Organized Crime Groups

For the sake of clarity, this is a good time to clarify some terms. In 1976, the federal Task Force on Organized Crime observed that there were at least 18 different definitions of “organized crime” among the states.⁴⁰ The same observation has been made about the term “gang.” For the purposes of this document, occasionally, they may be lumped together. This paper uses *organized crime groups* if the context is both street gangs and Mafia style organized crime. More specific use of gang, street gang, Mafia, La Cosa Nostra or named organizations is used where appropriate. The selection of organized crime groups is two fold. The first is that from a broader perspective, they are both organized against the accepted norms of society, and have similar traits to insurgent movements. The second reason is the effort to combat both gangs and organized crime has resulted in proven techniques, tactics, methods, organizations, and technologies that are worthy of inspection. Once more they are well documented by

³⁹ Dennis J. Kenney and James O. Finckenauer, *Organized Crime in America*, (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 1995), 78.

⁴⁰ Howard Abadinsky, *Organized Crime* (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1981), 1.

the law enforcement community. With all of the research, money, and manpower used to fight our own criminal “insurgencies” here in America, the chances of finding techniques to borrow for a military application are too good not to investigate.

This chapter discusses Mafia style organized crime and street gangs for general familiarity. It follows with a parallel discussion of the selected character traits that were identified in insurgent groups in the last chapter. These same elements are examined for organized crime groups with a comparison to those in insurgent movements. This serves as a transition to the following discussion on successful techniques in law enforcement to combat organized crime with an eye for military application.

Introduction to Organized Criminal Groups

“Organized crime” gives everyone a mental image. However, few have a complete understanding of the phenomena as it occurs in America. When the term is used, John Gotti, “Lucky” Luciano or Al Capone come to mind; but what about Andrew Carnegie, John D. Rockefeller, or Jessie James? These individuals were also the heads or organizations that committed crimes. How come we think of an Italian in a three piece suit when we hear “gangster”, but we think of a Latino, or a black youth when we hear “gang.” Definitions certainly matter. For the purposes of this paper, organized crime is defined as an enterprise of several to many persons in close social interaction organized in a hierarchical manner for the purpose of securing profit and power by engaging in a combination of legal and illegal activities.⁴¹ The members of the organization may attain position through merit, social status or family relationship. The organization has several departments and positions transcend the person filling them. This definition allows us to examine all flavors of organized crime groups, regardless of racial, national or ethnic participation. The convenient aspect of organized criminal groups is that they maintain their structure. Indeed, there are plenty of crime families in America who have outlasted insurgent organizations abroad.

⁴¹ Ibid., 20.

Traditional Organized Crime

Although the roots of organized crime go back much further, in the 1920s and 30s a wave of violence and organized illegal activities surfaced in the major cities of Chicago, New York, Miami, and New Orleans.⁴² Because of the weaknesses of federal and state laws, these organizations continued to grow. During the 50s and 60s there were few industries that had not been touched by organized crime. They had deep roots in garbage collection, construction, labor unions, restaurants, realty, garment manufacturing, securities, and entertainment. These were fronts and laundering houses for their less than legal activities; gambling, book making, narcotics, loan sharking, extortion, and alcohol smuggling, to name only the highlights.⁴³ By 1970, Congress reported them as being a “highly sophisticated, diversified, and widespread activity that annually drains billions of dollars from America’s economy by unlawful conduct, the illegal use of force, fraud, and corruption.”⁴⁴

Up until this point, law enforcement was uncoordinated, decentralized and incapable of preventing the growth of crime syndicates. Two actions finally turned the momentum on organized crime activities. The first was the passage of the federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) section of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970. This federal statute outlawed all “enterprises”, legitimate or not, that profited from illegally made money. More importantly, it made it a conspiracy to be in any way associated with these “enterprises.” This allowed law enforcement to imprison any member of the organization, no matter how remote the connection to the crime. As it was the nature of organized crime networks to keep the “boss” far from the crimes, RICO enabled us to dismantle these complex organizations.

The second fundamental change that increased the effectiveness of law enforcement was the creation of “Strike Forces” or “Task Forces.” Beginning with the first Strike Force in 1967, in Buffalo, NY, these organizations are an amalgam of agencies that all bring special expertise to the mission at hand.

⁴² John Pike, “La Cosa Nostra,” www.fas.org/irp/world/para/lcn.htm, 1.

⁴³ Dennis J. Kenney and James O. Finckenauer, *Organized Crime in America*, 5.

⁴⁴ United States Code, “Organized Crime Control Act of 1970,” line 91.

They are comprised of a squad of Assistant U.S. Attorneys, as well as representatives from the FBI, Secret Service, Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco and Firearms (ATF), Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), Customs, Immigration, Department of Labor, and other federal agencies as needed. Local police, sheriffs and state police offices could also work in conjunction with the strike force.⁴⁵ These new teams were stood up with discrete missions and were immensely more effective than all these agencies working independently, or worse, at cross purposes. Strike Forces have varying life spans, depending on the mission, but they can last from a couple of months to as long as ten years. These efforts have greatly reduced the size and span of organized crime. La Cosa Nostra, a synonym for Italian crime families, membership is down significantly, with other organizations similarly reduced in size and activity.⁴⁶ Attention has migrated from the Italian-based crime families, to Asian, Russian and Latin American organized crime, the latter involved in drug importation.

Youth Gangs

Criminal gangs have been studied in many forms from the mid-1800s in New York City, to bootleg liquor gangs of the 1920s, to gangs in the major cities during the Second World War. The modern incarnation of gangs is commonly traced to the period of the “Crips” and the “Bloods” of the 1960s.⁴⁷ These and other African-American gangs formed in the poverty of L.A. city life as a means of providing mutual security and profit. Today there are approximately 731,500 gang members and 21,500 gangs active in the United States.⁴⁸ There are gang activities of some sort in all 50 states. The last 15 years had demanded new classifications because of the diversity of gangs. There are now federal, state and local understandings of “rural” and “small town” gangs as well as the more well known urban gangs. Outside of the social aspects, there are three major contributions to the phenomena of today’s gangs. The first is the low ratio of law enforcement “controllability” in modern big cities. The second is the

⁴⁵ Howard Abadinsky, *Organized Crime*, 182.

⁴⁶ James D. Torr, *Organized crime: Contemporary Issues Companion*, (San Diego: Greenhaven Press, 1999), 23.

⁴⁷ J.D. Lloyd, *Gangs, Contemporary Issues* (San Diego: Greenhaven Press, 2002), 36.

⁴⁸ Department of Justice Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, “Highlights of the 2002 National Youth Gang Survey: Fact Sheet 200401” (April 2004), 2.

explosion of firearms availability in the 1970s. The third is drugs. Drugs are so woven into the fabric of gang activity that it is impossible to talk about the nature of gangs without understanding the relationship of gangs to drugs.

There is a wider diversity of “gangs” than there is of organized crime. This is because gangs generally have lower ambitions than do syndicates; and therefore, require less organization by nature. In fact some gangs may only form temporarily for the sake of an objective, usually a single crime, and then disperse. Indeed a African-American gang in Compton is different from a Puerto Rican gang in New York City, is different from a Jamaican gang in Florida, and is different from Hell’s Angels.

Interestingly, there is a cultural difference in the understanding within the two worlds of law enforcement with respect to gangs and organized crime. Gangs, by those who study them, are most commonly modeled as a symptom of existing conditions. Reduction of gangs requires a reduction of the elements that created them; drugs, guns, broken families, social ills, economic conditions in inner cities. Organized crime is the opposite. Organized criminal groups are the source of the crime problem in an area, according to those who combat them. RICO and other laws are designed to dismantle the organization that is the root of all the criminal activity they spawn.

Gangs, for the needs of this research, will be defined as a group of individuals who are bonded together by a sense of unity, are self-determining, and consistently commit crimes for identity, preservation and profit. They have a culture unto themselves, distinguishable from other gangs and the neighborhood they stem from. They are usually connected to a piece of terrain, although the ferocity of their claim to a “turf” varies from city to city. In some ways, the definition of gangs is not as important as the work that has been done to understand their nature. The Department of Justice budget for juvenile justice programs for 2003 was over \$251 million.⁴⁹ This is only one federal agency among a dozen or more who dedicate resources to understanding and combating the gang problem in America. This figure also does not account for state and local resources. Academia, as well, dedicates considerable energy to understand the phenomena. James C. Howell, a Ph.D. from the National Youth Gang Center published a

⁴⁹ Department of Justice, “FY 2004 Budget Summary.”

110 page bibliography on gang literature. The law enforcement community and academia have a substantial body of knowledge in combating gangs and organized crime of potential use to the Army in its counterinsurgency fight.

It is safe to say that organized crime groups in America are not trying to overthrow the federal government. At best, they would fit into Bard O'Neill's "separatist" category. They want to be left alone by the "powers that be" to conduct business as they see fit. This does not mean that they don't interact with politicians and law enforcement. They are confronted by law enforcement all the time. Although they resist police efforts, open violence against law enforcement personnel is not common. Politicians are influenced in different ways. In the years before the RICO statute, politicians were often bullied or bought by organized crime to gain maneuver room for the crime family. This type of subversion is nearly identical to that conducted by insurgent groups. This being said, the strategic objective of organized crime groups is different than that of insurgencies. Insurgent groups are trying to make a major political change in their state. This audacious goal is uncommon to organized crime groups. There are, however, commonalities in the manifestation of these two disparate groups. The following section of this chapter explores the leadership, organization, culture, recruitment techniques, and financial aspects of organized crime groups. It also compares these to those traits in insurgencies as discussed in the previous chapter.

Leadership

Any organization that has a low respect for the rule of law generally has a ruthless means to selecting its leadership. Leaders in organized crime groups are not elected officials that can easily stand down after their tenure is up. Upon rising to the pinnacle, a leader is usually in it for life. Whether organized crime boss or gang head, death or imprisonment are the most frequent mechanism for a change in leadership. Sometimes, a leader can still control the organization from behind bars. This was the case of Larry Hoover who ran the 30,000-member militaristic Gangster Disciples and its drug trade from Joliet

State Prison in the 1970s.⁵⁰ Law enforcement recognizes the value of crime leadership. In 2003, California police arrested the leader of the Black Dragons street gang for conspiracy, attempted murder, and solicitation of murder. Even though this was not a particularly large gang, the bail was set for \$4 million.⁵¹ Leaders in organized crime groups often share the same major traits with leaders of revolutions. They are good organizational managers, they often truly believe in their cause, and they have a cult of personality that inspires people to follow them.

Manager

Just like the insurgent leader, a crime boss has to organize and administer many simultaneous operations including loan sharking, book making, gambling, prostitution, drug trafficking, and other complex criminal activities. He has to synchronize those activities with his more legitimate concerns of labor management, lobbying, construction, waste management, and other legal businesses. He has a hierarchy of “captains”, “lieutenants”, and “soldiers.” He has to fend off competition and keep his entire network under the radar of law enforcement. Just as an insurgent leader, he rarely controls all these activities himself, but he must effectively manage them. His selection and effective use of accountants, lawyers, and lower level managers with the rare characteristics of loyalty and competence but with the willingness to conduct criminal activities. Once more, his culture may limit the pool of potential employees to within the “family” or close associates. But for morality, the boss of a successful crime family would excel at corporate life.

This managerial quality is not limited to traditional organized crime. The heads of major gangs face a similar web of complex tasks. The “Crips” of Los Angeles is a 13,000 member organization that coordinates the business of drug distribution, auto theft, burglary, carjacking, extortion, homicide, and identification fraud among other less organized crimes.⁵² In addition, they conduct recruitment,

⁵⁰ U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration Historical File “Larry Hoover.”

⁵¹ California Department of Justice, “Organized Crime in California Annual Report to the Legislature 2003.”

⁵² David Starbuck, former Chief of Kansas City Gang Task Force, Interview by author, 9 November 2004, Kansas City, MO.

calculated violence against rival gangs, and synchronization with other Crip franchises, of which there are over 800 in the U.S. These are not the street gangs of “West Side Story.”

True Believer

As was alluded to earlier, leaders of organized crime groups are true believers in their “cause.” Although it is hard to liken them to a revolutionary leader like V.I. Lenin, they reach the pinnacle of their group at great cost and great dedication. Initiation into a gang requires either an armed robbery, a drive by shooting, or being ceremonially beaten. That is a substantial level of commitment just to achieve membership. Upward mobility requires greater expressions of commitment such as larger and more complicated crimes, and or more violence in the name of the gang. Once more, divorcing oneself from the gang is frowned upon, and can result in death. Leaders are either original members or have risen to the top through trial by violence. They have professed life long commitment and almost always fulfill that commitment. They have resisted countless challenges to their position. They are warriors with a perverse sense of mission. Organized crime “bosses” are equally committed to their cause. They work their way up the hierarchy through deeds. The price for disloyalty is normally equally final.

Cult of Personality

Life in a gang is dangerous. The organization is “under fire” from rival gangs, as well as law enforcement. It is the cult of personality of the leadership that often provides the cohesion to the organization. Leaders have a folkloric air to them. They are respected for their ruthlessness, violence and style. They propagate the ultimate “tough guy” image. “Gang leaders usually have the unique innate ability to inspire and motivate their rank and file into criminal activity, even to kill for them.”⁵³ Organized crime bosses are thought of in a very similar manner. The personalities in the underworld are household names: John Gotti, Sammy “The Bull” Gravano, Al Capone. Their fame outgrows them, a phenomenon that is leveraged in the underworld.

⁵³ Chicago Crime Commission, “Gangs, Public Enemy #1”, 1995.

Organization

Organized crime groups share characteristics of structure with insurgencies. They are not aligned perfectly by function, as the cells within each type serve different needs. However, because the tasks of both types of entities are complex, they necessarily have a structure to manage that complexity. Law enforcement studies the structure of organized crime groups for the same reason the Army attempts to understand the structure of an insurgency. You cannot defeat that which you do not understand.

The organization of gangs is not as rigid as Mafia style organized crime groups. Gangs usually have “levels of membership” as opposed to a chain of command. The nucleus of the gang is the leadership. The leadership can be one person or several persons. They determine the level of criminal activity of the gang, and make all major decisions. The next level is the “hardcore members.” These are committed to the gang lifestyle, and are the most at risk of being in the gang for life. They commit the majority of the violent crimes for the gang. The next level is the “associates.” These members have made a commitment to the gang culture, and are working their way up the organizational ladder. The “fringe” members can pass in and out of the gang culture, having not made a full commitment to the lifestyle. Lastly, there are the “posers” or “wanna-bes” These are not actual gang members, however, they view gang lifestyle as exciting and emulate gang dress and mannerisms.⁵⁴

Some gangs are highly structured. The Ñeta is a prison gang that began in Puerto Rico and has spread to the mainland U.S. Each chapter is organized by state and is autonomous. It is run by a central committee with five to nine members. The committee has a #1 supervisor, a #2 supervisor, a moderator, a secretary general, and a councilor general. The moderator general advises the supervisors, the secretary general records chapter minutes, and the councilor general documents all decisions rendered by the chapter disciplinary committee. The committees will also have a sergeant-of-order to keep discipline at chapter meetings.⁵⁵ But for the distribution of thousands of pounds of cocaine, marijuana, heroin and LSD, this would sound like a quaint town council. Most gangs have a more streamlined structure with a

⁵⁴ J.D. Lloyd, *Gangs, Contemporary Issues*, 26.

⁵⁵ David Starbuck, Interview by author.

leader, several lieutenants, a drug coordinator, soldiers, and drug couriers. Structure tends to be more rigid in the big coastal cities, and looser in the smaller or mid-western cities.

Because of their culture and the greater complexity of their enterprises, La Cosa Nostra crime groups generally have more organizational structure than do gangs. The *family* or Italian model of organized crime syndicate is headed by one man who is the “boss” whose job it is to maintain order in the organization, and maximize profits. Beneath the “boss” is a deputy, or under-boss. He collects information for the boss, and passes out the boss’s instructions to the lieutenants. Lieutenants do not talk to the boss for the sake of insulating him from the activities of the organization. Parallel to the deputy is a *consigliere* who provides legal and other advice to the boss. The lieutenants or *caporegime* are the chiefs of clusters of operating units, below them are the *soldati* or soldiers who run discrete activities of the organization. Woven within the organization are all the specialty professions necessary to run the organization, such as lawyers, accountants, and tax experts.⁵⁶

These families, especially the Italian ones, will have a relationship to other families in the region through “understanding, agreement ‘treaty’ and mutual defense to a ‘commission’ made up of the leaders of the most powerful families.”⁵⁷ The more rigid and complex structures of organized crime are both cultural, as in the Italian Cosa Nostra, or by necessity to survive. Syndicate crime groups by definition provide illegal goods and services, and are necessarily well-structured if they desire to make a profit, guard their activities from rival organizations, and stay out of the way of law enforcement.

Culture

Just as insurgencies have their own culture, so do organized crime groups. The culture varies greatly from group to group. For street gangs, they are generally a subset of the culture of the population they spring from. The Latin Kings grew out of the Hispanic neighborhoods of Chicago, The Crips and Bloods originated in Compton, the African-American section of Los Angeles, and so on.

⁵⁶ Donald R. Cressey, *Theft of the Nation, The Structure and Operations of Organized Crime in America*, (New York: Harper and Row, 1969), 109-148.

⁵⁷ *Ibid*, 110-111.

Exclusion

The sub-culture of the gang is distinct from the culture of the surrounding neighborhood. They don't have a separation of religion, or language or ethnicity as many insurgent groups do, but they have a distinct dress, a language all their own, a separate code of ethics and conduct. Many of these codes of ethics are formalized. For the Mexican Mafia, there are "hard rules" and "gray rules." Hard rules may not be broken under penalty of death and include prohibitions against informing, cowardice, homosexuality, and leaving the gang. Breaking of gray rules, however, may not incur punishment if the offender can justify his actions. Gray rules include striking another member, sex with another member's wife or girlfriend, or theft from another member.⁵⁸ A gang is a subculture within a subculture of a city. Organized crime is less a subset of an American culture than it is a blend of cultures. Theirs is a combination of the old world they came from and the new world they operate in. They have carry-overs of language and traditions from Italy, Russia, Mexico, China, but they blend that with an entrepreneurial spirit, and a disregard for the law as necessary to maximize profit, a code of loyalty to the organization, and, of course, a culture of violence.

Violence

Another similarity to insurgents is clearly a culture of violence. Ideally, an insurgency would not use violence at all. It is necessary because the state is stronger militarily and must be weakened or defeated. For the insurgent, violence is necessary to their cause. For gangs, violence is a way of life. It is how a member gains entrance into the organization, how one is promoted, and for many, it is how they will die. In 1994, gang homicide peaked in California at 880 murders. This is on top of other violent crimes such as kidnapping, robberies, trafficking of weapons and illegal narcotics, and drive-by shootings.⁵⁹ For organized crime groups, violence has a slightly different utility, although it may be imperceptible to the casual observer. Violence is not as much an ends, as it is as means to an ends. It is

⁵⁸ David Starbuck, Interview by author.

⁵⁹ California Department of Justice, Organized Crime in California Annual Report to the Legislature 2003, 18.

used for revenge, justice, intimidation, or as a service rendered. As the ultimate objective of an organized crime syndicate is profit, violence is only a tool. It is usually a tool that is used sparingly, for it draws the attention of law enforcement and potentially disrupts business.

Deception

Another cultural element that organized crime groups share with insurgencies is a culture of deception. Just like insurgencies, criminal organizations are weaker than the law enforcement they are trying to avoid. Detection almost always turns into a setback for the organization, therefore all of its activities must be hidden from the observation of law enforcement. Deception is what allowed Mafia style crime groups to flourish until the 1970s. The criminal activities of the Mafia are only at the fringes of the organization, and the police had few tools to investigate the whole organization, once a crime was discovered. Their culture of deception keeps law enforcement far from those who orchestrate the activities of the organization. Gangs also use deception to hide or mask their illegal operations. Drug production, distribution, and sales are necessarily clandestine operations. Even en route to a gang “hit”, the gang will generally blend in with the population at large, until it is time to pull the trigger. Like revolutions, this culture of deception has no parallel in the society they come from. Deception is a key attribute to crime groups to enable them to go about their illegal operations.

Recruiting

Recruiting is yet another similarity between organized crime groups and insurgencies. It is a necessary activity if the organization is going to thrive. For gangs, clandestine recruiting is necessary for survival. A gang must keep pace with its rivals in “end strength” in order to avoid encroachment. Sometimes there is an “arms race” of recruiting in order to keep the balance of power. Attrition, through incarceration, death and “retirement” must also be counterbalanced. For gangs that are closely tied to a “turf”, fresh recruits are generally garnered from that neighborhood. In some inner cities, it is virtually impossible to avoid gang involvement. If you are from that neighborhood, you are in the gang at some

level. Often, it is seen as a positive thing for the recruit as well. The gang offers guidance, a sense of family, emotional support, security in a rough neighborhood, and wealth in a low income world; all the things missing from the life of a lower class American. In the early period of a gang, the membership will tend to be ethnically pure. As its demand for manpower grows, it will start to recruit outside of its original ethnic base, especially if the gang starts a new “set” in a different city. The Tiny Rascals started out as a Cambodian gang seeking protection from Hispanic and African-American gangs in Long Beach, California. Now with memberships as high as 10,000 and sub-sets in 23 states, non-Cambodians such as Caucasians, African-Americans, and Hispanics are in the organization.⁶⁰ Organized crime families tend to be more selective in their recruiting. They will usually stay ethnically pure, especially at the lieutenant level and above. They do share two recruiting similarities with gangs. The first is they will recruit outside of their ethnic or national core as the growing organization demands more soldiers. The second is the imperative to keep the activity below the notice of law enforcement. Just like revolutionaries, organized crime groups can’t hang recruiting posters up at the town hall.

Finances

The management of finances is the final characteristic to be examined for the purpose of comparison to insurgencies. As was mentioned earlier, money management itself is a common activity, but because of the nature of a crime organization, funds are necessarily handled differently than they are for open societies and businesses. For organized crime, this is the heart of the operation, the ends for all of its activities. Because an organization is willing to take the risk of conducting enterprises in illegal goods and services, the financial gain, if properly managed, is usually high. Endeavors such as drug importation, prostitution, usury loaning, gambling, book making, and extortion are high return investments.⁶¹ All this profit must be transparent to the authorities and is done in three major ways. The first is laundering the money either through legitimate businesses or legitimate investments. The other is

⁶⁰ David Starbuck, Interview by author.

⁶¹ Howard Abadinsky, *Organized Crime*, 9.

sending the profits to overseas banks in Hong Kong, Switzerland, Bahamas, Canada, or South America. The third is bribing or blackmailing police or bank employees to ensure money is moved about without interference. Dealing in cash is still a relatively untraceable means of moving money, although riskier in modern times, as it arouses suspicion. Gangs too must engage in similar surreptitious money management. Since gangs are the primary distributor of drugs on the streets of America, they have a lot of profit to hide from authorities.⁶² They are more likely to make transactions in cash, but they can launder money as well through legitimate investments. Insurgencies and organized crime groups apply many of the same techniques to hiding their finances from the authorities.

Although organized crime groups have different objectives than insurgencies, the two types of organizations have several similar characteristics. Often, when an insurgency is weak compared to the government, the internal counterinsurgent effort is solely a police affair. There is often no need to engage the military. So if insurgencies have similarities to organized criminal activity, what can the police teach us about counterinsurgency warfare? The following chapter explores the tactics, techniques and procedures used in law enforcement that have potential for Army use in future insurgency operations.

LAW ENFORCEMENT METHODS

The history of law enforcement's response to organized criminal activity can be characterized as reactive and until recently, defensive. Up until the 1970s, law enforcement largely reacted to the crimes. Today, there are sophisticated systems tailored to dismantling the organizations and reduce the conditions that foster their growth. This is not to say that crime has been conquered, but the tools are better now than they have ever been. These tools bear examination by the Army. Fighting organized crime and gangs can be a useful model in combating an insurgency.

Interestingly, there are parallels that have been learned independently by both law enforcement and the military. One example of this is the recent emphasis on interagency coordination. Because an insurgency crosses military, political, economic and informational boundaries, the military has developed

⁶²David Starbuck, Interview by author.

a tighter interagency process to leverage expertise from other governmental agencies to operate more effectively.⁶³ Law enforcement, seeking the same synergistic effect, developed the “Task Force” or “Strike Force” to fight organized criminal activity. Like the military, these task forces are tailored around a specific threat, include agencies as their competencies are required, and are usually disbanded once the mission is over. Both the U.S. military and law enforcement have had success with this “task organizing” for their missions.

Exclusions

There are tactics, techniques and procedures in law enforcement that are unrealistic to attempt in counterinsurgency operations. An example of this would be “homesteading.” A “beat cop” is effective in part because he works in the same neighborhood for years. Although the Army may find itself in a counterinsurgency for years, it is unrealistic to recommend the same soldiers occupy the same area of operations for the duration of the insurgency. This is not to say that the accumulated knowledge of a neighborhood over many rotations should be lost. The long term development and deployment of special “police divisions” to fight counterinsurgencies is also not recommended. Permanent reorganization solely for counterinsurgency operations is unwise and unrealistic. There are also programs that are commonly understood and in use by the military in counterinsurgency operations. Since these have already been “discovered”, they will not be discussed in this work. Examples of this are amnesty programs for lesser criminals / insurgents in order to gain intelligence, and weapons buy back programs. Although these programs are at times successful in law enforcement’s fight against criminal organizations, there is institutional knowledge in the Army about these techniques that they do not need further exploration.

Laws themselves have also been omitted as a set of solutions. Not because of a lack of potential. On the contrary, what RICO and other statutes did for the law enforcement community may have parallels in counterinsurgency operations. But the study of laws and codes and their potential military application is too broad a topic to discuss effectively within the scope of this work.

⁶³ Department of Defense, JP 3-07.1 *Foreign Internal Defense*, II-1.

There are, however, tactics, techniques and procedures that have been proven effective that the Army should explore for counterinsurgency operations. Those measures that have made the initial “cut” are relatively inexpensive, require only minimal training or require only minimal changes to the organization of tactical units. These are by no means an exhaustive list of everything law enforcement has learned that can be applied to counterinsurgency. Rather, they are an introduction to a source of expertise that the Army should study in order to operate more effectively.

Cultural Lessons from Law Enforcement

The first of these can be characterized as a culture shift. Every U.S. soldier is taught from their first day in the military to “kill the enemy.” Target response is next to instinctual thanks to our training regimen. Although this is completely appropriate in major combat operations, it has two negative collateral effects during an insurgency. The first is recruitment. The death of an insurgent, rightfully or wrongfully, is a very powerful tool for the insurgent leaders to gain support. The insurgent leadership will capitalize on the emotions of the friends and family of their lost one, and gain more soldiers, suppliers, and homes to hide in. In a war for the people’s hearts and minds, the more we kill, the more they recruit, especially when the enemy has a superior means of shaping information at the local level. Killing is many times unavoidable, but we must understand this effect as we do it, to try and avoid it as much as possible. The second collateral effect is lost opportunity. Every insurgent killed is a missed opportunity to collect intelligence.⁶⁴ It is in the nature of an insurgency to avoid detection. They constantly move around. Guerilla operations are quickly planned and executed. Networks for money, arms, and supplies trafficking change as they are threatened. The collection of perishable intelligence about the insurgent’s network is paramount. The only way to gain decision superiority over the insurgents is to change our view of the intelligence potential in every insurgent. We currently do not value each insurgent as a potential font of information. We see him as a combatant to kill. Each one

⁶⁴ Joseph G.D. Babb, Instructor, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Interview by author, 3 November 2004, Fort Leavenworth, KS.

killed is a potential packet of information lost about a local commander, a safe house, a bomb making technique, or a smuggling route.

The culture of law enforcement is just the opposite. After security, gaining information from a suspect is the top priority for police. Information is in two basic categories. The first is personal identification. In America, a suspect is likely to have some form of identification with them. If suspected of a serious enough crime, the person is finger printed and photographed. In short, the identity of the individual is confirmed, and recorded for potential use by the law enforcement community. The second category is information about the crime. Within the parameters of an individual's constitutional rights, law enforcement attempts to gain as much knowledge as possible about the circumstances of the crime. If the act is connected to a crime organization, the nature and connection to the crime is key information for the authorities. In short, law enforcement understands the intelligence value of a criminal because evidence is the only weapon they have. They do not often have the leeway to kill a criminal in the same way we have the leeway to kill an insurgent.

The mindset of the U.S. soldier in an insurgency needs to be more police-like; "how many can I capture" not "how many can I kill." Dr. Leonard Wong of the Army War College's Strategic Studies Institute, wrote a thesis on how well junior leaders are adapting to the ambiguity of Operation Iraqi Freedom. If Dr. Wong's analysis of adaptive leaders in Iraq is accurate, this culture shift of capture over kill is not as hard to implement as it may first seem. It does, however, have two major implications that must be addressed. The first is the increased risk to U.S. forces with this change in mindset. A force that conducts counterinsurgency operations the same way it conducts major combat operations will have a lower casualty rate in the short term because of the force protection inherent in our method of warfare. Conversely, though, treating an insurgency like conventional combat has a low probability of success, therefore extending the duration of the deployment. Commanders must be aware of this increased risk. On balance, it is worth it to gain the information superiority necessary on the ambiguous battlefield of an insurgency. The second implication to capturing more insurgents is the logistic, infrastructure, and manpower burden of detaining and interrogating a higher number of the enemy. This burden must be

planned for prior to deploying to theater, and should be borne largely by the host nation. Again, there is a cost to a culture shift of capture, exploit and imprison versus kill, but worth the payoff.

Identity Verification

The second thing we can learn from law enforcement is identity verification. In community policing, or organized crime fighting, knowing the true identity of an individual is necessary, but not usually difficult. Identity can be obtained on the spot, as even criminals normally carry valid I.D. If not, the potential criminal can be finger printed, photographed, or even have blood drawn in certain circumstances. Police can usually get an address or a social security number from a criminal. Any of these ways here in America are easy avenues to the true identity of a suspect. From this point, due process can proceed within the criminal justice system.

The environment in a counterinsurgency is usually not so structured or lucid. Things we take for granted here such as personal identification, record keeping and functioning governmental agencies with statistics on its citizens are usually not present in the those countries we find ourselves assisting. This problem is compounded by the nature of insurgencies. They are people-based, not equipment-based. If insurgents fought wearing uniforms and operating military vehicles with their unit stenciled on the bumper, identifying each insurgent would not be an issue. They do not. The second they put their weapon on the ground, they blend into local populace. For the leaders who rarely engage in combat, and stay mostly hidden, their identity becomes even harder to ascertain. The Army needs better methods to



Figure 1–Technical Solution to Identity Verification

identify each insurgent, or those suspected of supporting the insurgency in some fashion. Our military police and human intelligence teams sometimes carry various kinds of identity kits. However, these tools are few and far between on the battlefield. The Army

needs something convenient, and distributed throughout the force. Thanks to the private sector here in America, there is a whole cottage industry of technology driven identity tools. The included picture is an example of such a device. This tool is from Identix Incorporated out of Minnetonka, Minnesota, and is called the “Integrated Biometric Information System.” It is designed to “field identify” a person by combining a scanned fingerprint, a photograph, and software to analyze the biometric data of the two. It can then wirelessly communicate with a database to either submit or receive information about the person. There are many ways to make an identity kit for use in the field; both high tech and low tech. Some means of arming the force down to the squad or platoon level to begin the task of identifying the enemy is essential. Once the person is identified, the process of intelligence gathering and analysis can begin. Without this first critical step, the Army will have a much harder time “seeing the enemy.”

Intelligence Software

The third technique that the Army can co-opt from the law enforcement community is their criminal intelligence network software. There are various systems in almost every state that are used to manage crime data. The one that most closely matches the Army’s needs in a counterinsurgency was developed by Orion Scientific Systems for the State of California Department of Justice, and is called CAL/GANG. In the words of Raymond Dussault of Government Technology magazine, CAL/GANG was designed as “a relational database that holds and categorizes everything from nicknames to tattoos on suspected or known gang members. It was designed based on the idea that gangs of every type survive and prosper by creating internal links and tiers of power. CAL/GANG allows officers to use this information to track, analyze and retrieve data collected about gangs, including individual gang members' photos and addresses, the places they hang out or live, known associates, even the cars they drive. CAL/GANG puts all this fragmented information together, allowing an investigating officer to quickly link disparate information. The system has been developed so that it can be accessed quickly from an

agency's offices or even through a laptop computer in the field.”⁶⁵ Software such as this, carried on a widely available tactical digital backbone can be an incredibly powerful tool to gain information superiority in this type of warfare. The CAL/GANG software uses the same link analysis concepts that our intelligence community uses in understanding human networks. It also uses the same data types that are accessible in counterinsurgency warfare: names, pseudonyms, tattoos, and descriptions. In such a human oriented endeavor, the Army needs a sophisticated, human oriented, intelligence management tool like that of law enforcement. As well, these software packages have a very low burden on the force. Operator training on it only takes eight hours, and it doesn't have to be permanent equipment in the unit. It can be installed in only those units deploying to theater. The key to success, again, is that this is common equipment. It could easily be located at every platoon or company in theater. Only when it is pushed down to this level can a unit collect, analyze, and act on information while on patrol. As Roger Trinquier put it; “Information is nothing in itself, particularly during a crisis, if it is not exploited. Therefore, we must create an intelligence-action service capable of exploiting its own information in the shortest possible time.”⁶⁶

Community Policing

The next law enforcement technique that is worth examining is commonly referred to as “community policing.” Although this is not new to counterinsurgency operations, it is something of a lost art to the Army. In fighting an insurgency, there is an instinct to run to every fire, to dispatch a formation to every terrorist and guerilla attack as they happen across the countryside. This disorganized response plays into the insurgent's plan. It diffuses the government's response, and allows the rebels to attack these small units piecemeal. The counter to this tactic is what John J. McCuen calls the “oil spot strategy” of slowly winning back control of the country. In this strategy, Army and local police provide safe zones for themselves and the population of a given city. This has several positive effects. The Army

⁶⁵ Raymond Dussault, “CAL/GANG Brings Dividends,” Government Technology Online Magazine, December 1998, 2.

⁶⁶ Roger Trinquier, *Modern Warfare*, 37.

now has a secure base from which to conduct operations. The police and other government forces gain legitimacy by proving they can protect the citizens of that city. Those people, in turn, feel safe enough to work with the government and against the insurgents. Once a city has been “won”, government forces secure the next city. As the first city is now “pro-government”, it will require less security forces. For, an insurgency is dependant upon the sympathies of the populace to survive. This technique requires active participation by the members of the city to root out and keep out the insurgents.

Community policing is almost identical, and has been one of the most effective means of diminishing the impact of gangs on neighborhoods. Community policing programs can be found at every level of government, but the most prominent is run by the U.S. Department of Justice. This federal program has spent “over \$10.6 billion to add community policing officers to the nation’s streets, enhance crime fighting technology, support crime prevention initiatives, and advance community policing” since 1994.⁶⁷ These programs are designed around a philosophy of community ownership of their security. Similar to an insurgency, the will of the people favors the government’s forces when they are co-opted in this fashion. It is also a far more effective means of policing, it requires fewer police, provides a wealth of intelligence, and capitalizes on citizen’s ideas for problem solving. There are 28 Regional Community Policing Institutes that have trained over 130,000 citizens, community groups, and law enforcement members on how to join forces and design local, proactive programs for reducing crime in their neighborhoods. It would be beneficial for the Army to send personnel to this training prior to deployment to a counterinsurgency mission.

Street Knowledge

The final conclusion of this research has little to do with organized criminal groups, per se. It has to do with the art of law enforcement as a necessary military technique. Through the course of researching the similarities between insurgencies and organized criminal groups, the fundamental

⁶⁷ Department of Justice, Office of Community Oriented Policing Services website, www.cops.usdoj.gov/default.asp?Item=35.

similarity between the two is understanding and exploiting human behavior. Although this is not profound, or probably even original, it is worthy of more study. Stripped of all the scientific trappings of warfare and of law enforcement, the one model the two share is understanding more deeply “why men rebel.” The constructive end of this point is that police are very good at understanding human behavior. Since they don’t have the firepower the military does, understanding people is a very real part of their proficiency, effectiveness, and their force protection. From the time they enter the police academy, they are taught the importance of “street knowledge.”⁶⁸ This is not only an intimate understanding of the geography of the area; it is an understanding of “the character, fears, concerns, problems, and attitudes of the local residents.”⁶⁹ The police learn to measure the population’s “baseline trust” of authority figures in a given neighborhood.⁷⁰ They also learn to develop their powers of observation, to understand when something is out of place by subtle clues, and to understand body language. They learn to “work the locals”, to gain relationships with people that can be later used as informants. All of these things are learned in a training setting and continuously on the job. As police officers conduct their “wartime mission” every day, they constantly refine these skills.

The U.S. Army would be a more effective counterinsurgency force if it trained on these skills. Again, this is not for the few Military Police units attached to the deployment; it is a valuable set of skills that all members of an operation should learn. At a minimum, community policing specialists and law enforcement instructors should be incorporated into mission preparation training. Soldiers should be trained on the human dynamics within an insurgency. They should learn to interact with the local populous, how to identify within an urban setting when someone is acting different than the rest of a crowd. This human dimension training can be easily incorporated into larger scenarios, or can be “lane training” by itself. While the Army is wrestling with the proper balance of what type of training to conduct, there is a strong argument for increasing the time and effort spent on these human dimension /

⁶⁸ Desmond Rowland and James Bailey, *The Law Enforcement Handbook* (New York: Methuen, 1985), 28.

⁶⁹ *ibid.*

⁷⁰ Jack Haight, Deputy Sheriff, Alameda County Sheriff’s Office, California, Telephone interview by author, 2 December 2004, Leavenworth, KS.

law enforcement skills. The burden of learning them is low, and the potential for soldiers to use these skills is increasing.

These cross over concepts that the Army can learn from law enforcement span the cultural, training, and technical realms. They are not intended to be exhaustive, merely proof that there is a profession that the Army can learn from that is largely overlooked by those in the military. Once more, these concepts are intended to be realistically adaptable solutions, with a low added burden of time, training, organization, or cost to the Army.

CONCLUSION

Insurgencies are very difficult campaigns for the U.S. Army. Because the insurgent knows he is militarily inferior, he will use terrorism and guerilla warfare to oppose pro-government forces. Once more, he will push the fight to the political and psychological battlefields in an attempt to negate the Army's strengths.⁷¹ To complicate the matter further, the insurgent today can purchase technology "off the shelf" to gain advantages that were previously only available to governments. Not only does the Army have to fight on this complex battlefield, it must do so under the watchful eye of the global media. Some TTPs that were previously available to counterinsurgent forces are no longer acceptable.

Facing the prospects of fighting these complex campaigns at much higher frequencies, the Army must assess methods to improve its capability on this battlefield. Conceptual, technical, tactical, training, and manning methods to making units more effective in the insurgent battlespace have acquired a heightened urgency with ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. The military, academia, and private industry are all dedicating substantial resources to this end. This paper argues that the civilian law enforcement community is a font of knowledge that should be explored for effective tools in counterinsurgency operations.

In order to establish the credibility and usefulness of borrowing ideas from law enforcement, this paper draws a parallel between the organized enemies of these two institutions; insurgencies and

⁷¹ Steven Metz and Raymond Millen. "Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in the 21st Century: Reconceptualizing Threat and Response" (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, November 2004), vii.

organized criminal activities. As this paper argues, there are commonalities between the two in leadership, organization, culture, recruitment, and finances. Not only are insurgencies like organized crime here in the United States, but many insurgencies are turning to organized crime to finance their operations. An example is the FARC in Columbia. They started out as a Marxist insurgency in the 1960s. Now they are so tied to the drug trade that U.S. law enforcement and the U.S. military are working together to combat them. The FARC have forced interagency operations because they occupy both the military and the criminal spheres.

However, identifying similarities between organized criminal groups and insurgents is only the first objective of this research. This is a stepping stone to the more important purpose of highlighting this source of knowledge. The law enforcement community has a wealth of knowledge about Mafia style organized crime, youth gangs, and criminal behavior in general. From this knowledge and decades of experimentation, they have grown an effective set of tools. This knowledge can help us understand our future unconventional enemy, and can provide us the tools to combat them. A handful of these tools are outlined in this work. The five methods highlighted in this paper span the technical, conceptual, cultural, and training domains. They are by no means the only ones that have potential for Army use. Although these five tools have very real promise, they only serve as examples of what law enforcement has to offer. The potential for improving the Army's effectiveness in counterinsurgency operations by learning from law enforcement is very high and deserves a more dedicated examination. There is no better place to start than within our own law enforcement community. For, there is more truth to the moniker "world's policeman" than the Army is comfortable admitting.

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