INTERVENTION, STABILIZATION, AND TRANSFORMATION OPERATIONS:
THE ARMY’S NEW MISSION

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree
MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE
General Studies

by
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**ABSTRACT**
Recent military interventions in Haiti, Somalia, Iraq, and elsewhere have confirmed the axiom that it is possible to win every battle and yet still manage to lose a war. Pundits, professors and politicians examining these operations have concluded that although the United States has “developed and implemented a method of warfare that can produce stunning military victories,” those military victories do “not necessarily accomplish the political goals for which the war was fought.”¹ Most writers on the subject agree that the U.S. Government, and the Army in particular, must improve its ability to translate battlefield success into strategic victory. However, like the six blind men of Indostan in the famous parable, all of the commentators are both right and wrong in their analyses of the environment and in the conclusions they have drawn. This thesis examines what the U.S. Army should do to improve the nation’s ability to translate military success into enduring and lasting peace.

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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)
ABSTRACT

INTERVENTION, STABILIZATION, AND TRANSFORMATION OPERATIONS: THE ARMY’S NEW MISSION, by MAJ Timothy P. Leroux, 102 pages.

Recent military interventions in Haiti, Somalia, Iraq, and elsewhere confirm the axiom that it is possible to win every battle and yet still manage to lose a war. Although the United States has developed a method of warfare that can produce stunning battlefield victories, those battlefield victories do not necessarily accomplish the strategic objectives for which the war was fought. Contemporary United States strategy requires the Army to do more than fight and win in the traditional sense; it requires a force that can intervene in failed, failing, or rogue states, stabilize those states, and facilitate their transformation into productive members of the international community. The United States Army has a fundamental, perhaps decisive role in ensuring that battlefield victories are translated into strategic success. The central research question is: What should the Army do to improve its ability to conduct intervention, stabilization, and transformation operations? To help answer this question, this thesis examines the essential nature of this new mission and deduces the Army’s proper role. It further analyzes the Army’s deficiencies in performing that role. Finally, recommendations are made to address these deficiencies.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to thank my beautiful wife and best friend, Diane for her love, support, and sacrifices--not only during my work on this project, but over the years of our marriage. I love you.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

And so these men of Indostan disputed loud and long, each in his own opinion -- Exceeding stiff and strong, though each was partly in the right -- and all were in the wrong!

John Godfrey Saxe, *The Blind Men and the Elephant*

**Background**

The recent military intervention in Iraq confirms the Vietnam-era proverb that it is possible to win every battle yet still lose a war. As one commentator states, the United States has “developed and implemented a method of warfare that can produce stunning military victories,” but those military victories do “not necessarily accomplish the political goals for which the war was fought” (Kagan 2003). Seemingly paradoxical, this conundrum is becoming recognized as a fundamental principle of military science -- tactical success, no matter how one-sided, does not necessarily result in the achievement of strategic objectives.

The question of how to achieve strategic objectives following military success is one of “. . .the most pressing and frequent problems grappled with in Western defense and geostrategic literature over the past 20-30 years” (Matthews 2004, 1). Most writers on the subject agree that the U.S. Government, and the Army in particular, must improve its ability to translate battlefield success into strategic victory. However, like the six blind men of Indostan in the famous parable, few commentators grasp the problem in its entirety. This thesis attempts to do just that by examining the nature of the challenge, the
Army’s role in contemporary U.S. strategy, and what the U.S. Army should do to improve its ability to translate battlefield success into enduring and lasting peace.

**Terms and Definitions**

The U.S. National Military Strategy specifies, “The Force must have the capabilities necessary to create and preserve an enduring peace” (Joint Chiefs of Staff 2004). This theme is not new. In April 1863, the U.S. Army issued General Order 100 which asserted, “Modern wars are not internecine wars, in which the killing of the enemy is the object. The destruction of the enemy in modern war, and, indeed, modern war itself, are means to obtain that object of the belligerent which lies beyond the war” (U.S. War Department 1863). Separated by nearly 150 years, both directives recognize that battlefield success alone can be meaningless if it fails to achieve a favorable, enduring peace. Where they differ is that today’s military strategy directly states that the military has a role in achieving that peace.

Some may question why the military has a role in achieving what are often, essentially, political objectives. The answer is that U.S. interests are global and sometimes require “boots on the ground” to protect and advance those interests. As will be shown, the U.S. military is the only instrument of U.S. national power capable of projecting a robust presence into less than secure environments. Put another way, today’s U.S. military must do more than simply fight and win battles; it also has a role in ameliorating the root causes of the conflict so that they do not reemerge (Metz and Millen 2005, 46).

The military’s role in creating an “enduring peace” requires that it perform many disparate tasks across the spectrum of conflict. In the U.S. Army, these many tasks are
collectively called Full Spectrum Operations, which are defined in Army Field Manual (FM) 3-0, Operations, as “the range of operations Army forces conduct in war and military operations other than war” (2001b, 1-4). This term and definition do little, however, to describe the Army’s mandate in the contemporary strategic environment. The Army’s role is addressed in the following section, the purpose here is to first name and define what the military as a whole is expected to do to achieve the goals of warfare.

As previously stated, the National Military Strategy mandates that the U.S. military have the capability to “create and preserve an enduring peace” (Joint Chiefs of Staff 2004), and that this requires that it perform tasks and functions other than merely fighting and winning battles. This is not a new mission for the military. These “other tasks” that fall outside of traditional major combat operations have gone by many names throughout history: Small Wars; Low-Intensity Conflict; Nation Building, Peace Operations; Operations Other than War; Stability and Support Operations; Small-Scale Contingencies; and Phase IV Operations are all “terms that have been in vogue at one time or another” (Yates 1997).

Frequent changes in terminology and ambiguous terms lead to confusion. To illustrate, the term “Peace Operations” implies that these types of operations take place in a nonviolent environment that is not always present. The terms “Operations Other than War” and its cousin “Military Operations Other than War,” are equally problematic but for a different reason. Rather than describing what these operations are, they only state what they are not. Military doctrinal manuals provide elaboration as to what these terms mean, but it is desirable to have a term that accurately indicates what is meant by that term.
The complexities of the contemporary environment are sufficiently difficult without adding confusion by using definitions that are vague, incomplete, overly broad, or excessively narrow. Regardless of their specific flaws, none of the previously mentioned terms accurately describe the mission which is essential before further analysis can proceed. Two current terms and descriptions begin to achieve this.

Joint Forces Command (JFCOM), which has responsibility for developing Joint concepts, recently gained Secretary of Defense Rumsfield’s approval for their “Stability Operations Joint Operating Concept” (2005, 1). While it does not specifically define Stability Operations, the concept notes that, despite some historical examples to the contrary, stability is generally not the strategic goal of an intervention. Rather, “at least one of the goals of an intervention . . . will be to create a ‘new normal’, one better than that which existed before the intervention . . . i.e. Reconstruction Operations” (Joint Forces Command 2005, 17). In other words, JFCOM envisions interventions, combined with stability and reconstruction operations which result in some kind of change for the better.

JFCOM’s Stability Operations Joint Operating Concept is strikingly similar to the term, “Intervention, Stabilization, and Transformation Operations” (IS&TO), which first appeared in an article by two U.S. Army War College professors in the spring of 2005 Metz and Millen 2005, 41). Metz and Millen posit that this term is the most appropriate description of what the U.S. military is striving to accomplish in Afghanistan and Iraq, and most accurately describes the kinds of missions the military is likely to conduct in the foreseeable future. This they conclude from observations of the military’s current operating environment and an analysis of national strategic documents. For example, one
of the objectives that the National Military Strategy (NMS) establishes for the Department of Defense is to “expand the community of like-minded nations” (Joint Chiefs of Staff 2004, 1). The concept of IS&TO discussed by Metz and Millen weaves together into one term the concepts of major theater war, rapid decisive operations, stability operations, and others that are used in various combinations to achieve this nation-transforming goal of the NMS.

IS&TO is a broad term in that it can apply to almost any mission anywhere along the operational continuum, but it is also specific enough to describe the three key functions required to achieve enduring, strategic objectives -- Intervention, Stabilization, and Transformation. Although very similar to the JFCOM description of Stability Operations, IS&TO is a more comprehensive, and therefore preferable, term. Of all the terms available, IS&TO best describes the kinds of operations that the NMS says the Armed Forces will be expected to conduct for the foreseeable future.

Metz and Millen define IS&TO as “sustained and integrated interagency (often multinational) activity to project power to an ungoverned area, failed state, state-in-conflict, or chronic aggressor state, to quickly restore order, and then to ameliorate the source of instability or aggression by transforming that state into a stable, progressive member of the international community” (2005, 46). Metz and Millen further state that intervention, stabilization, and transformation are three separate functions, but in most cases all three of these functions are required in order to achieve a lasting peace. This term, therefore, accurately describes operations as diverse as those recently conducted in Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq. At any point in time in any one of those operations, the U.S military performed one if not all three functions of IS&TO. In Bosnia,
for example, the objectives of military intervention included “the stabilization of the region through the imposition of a peace agreement and the creation of a new federal state” (Henning, Bogie, and Lemelin 2004, 126). This is but one example of the military performing aspects of all three functions of IS&TO.

One of the unique features of this new term is that it establishes the interdependence of the three functions. Although intervention, stabilization, and transformation may seem to be sequential actions, experience demonstrates that they often occur simultaneously. This is a critical aspect of contemporary U.S. military operations and echoes Marine General (Retired) Charles Krulak’s writings on the “three block war.” Krulak’s concept describes “…contingencies in which Marines may be confronted by the entire spectrum of tactical challenges in the span of a few hours and within the space of three contiguous city blocks” (1999).

Certain elements of the IS&TO definition are worth elaboration in order to grasp fully the enormity of what is being proposed. The first element of the definition is that these operations require a sustained effort. This is supported by the findings of the Defense Science Board’s (DSB) 2004 study on transitioning to and from hostilities. The DSB examined recent military operations and found that, whether they are primarily peacetime operations or large-scale hostilities, they “typically last five to eight years” (2004, iv). There are notable exceptions to this generalization. U.S. military involvement in providing relief to the tsunami-stricken countries of East Asia in 2005 had very limited objectives and thus lasted only a few months. Conversely, U.S. forces first entered Bosnia in 1995 and have remained for the past ten years with no end to the mission in
sight. Certain exceptions notwithstanding, it is prudent to think of IS&TO as long-term operations (a perception that some of the exceptions such as Bosnia support).

Metz and Millen’s definition of IS&TO next states that these operations involve other United States Government agencies and often involve coalition efforts. Although unstated, it is also likely that Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs) and Private Voluntary Organizations (PVOs) will participate in these operations (Morrison-Taw and Peters 1995, 379). As discussed later in this thesis, interagency, multinational, NGO and PVO participation and effectiveness vary from case to case in U.S. military operations, but the U.S. military rarely operates without some interagency, multinational, and/or NGO & PVO participation.

Clear mandates for the Army and these other organizations would be helpful. Unfortunately, they currently do not exist. The proper role of the U.S. Army is central to this thesis, however, and is discussed in detail in the following section and in Chapter 4. At this point in the discussion, it is sufficient to say that IS&TO are a mission for the entire government and that many U.S. and international organizations, including the U.S. Army, may have roles.

The next part of Metz and Millen’s definition reflects the NMS in stating that the purpose of IS&TO is to ameliorate the source of instability or aggression and transform the failed, failing, or rogue state into a stable, progressive member of the international community. The complexity and magnitude of this mission cannot be overstated. In the case of Afghanistan, for example, the United States leads a coalition that seeks to transform a society that has known only chaos and war for decades. As discussed in the following section, many criticize this nation-transforming strategy as radical and unwise.
Nonetheless, as expressed by the NMS, it is explicitly a part of contemporary U.S.
national strategy and is what the United States government has attempted not only in
Afghanistan and Iraq, but also to some degree throughout its history.\(^5\)

**The Role of the U.S. Army in IS&TO: Assumptions and Delimitations**

There are several assumptions and delimitations necessary before a detailed
examination of the Army’s role in IS&TO can proceed. First, it must be accepted that the
United States’ strategy is to selectively transform failed, failing, and chronic aggressor
states and that this strategy is unlikely to change in the foreseeable future. Although there
is no shortage of critics of current American policies and strategy,\(^6\) it is not within the
purview of this thesis to debate the wisdom or merits of this strategy. Therefore, the
appropriateness of current U.S. strategy is not discussed in this thesis.

The next assumption is that the capabilities of the U.S. Government agencies
other than the Department of Defense for conducting IS&TO are limited and will not
dramatically improve in the next twenty years and perhaps even much longer. This
assumption is discussed and validated below and in the following chapters, but it is
critical to make this point up front because it illuminates the residual requirements for the
military in IS&TO.

While agencies outside of the Department of Defense can make significant
contributions during IS&TO, political and/or security conditions often prevent or delay
many of these other agencies from even getting in theater. One observer notes that, in the
extreme, no organizations outside of DoD would go near an area where the use of
biological or chemical weapons was merely rumored (Crane and Terrill 2003, 45).
Another observes that the willingness and ability of these other organizations to deploy
rapidly to troubled environments and to sustain their efforts “time and again fall short of what is required to achieve a lasting peace” (Cordesman 2004, xv).

In light of these deficiencies in interagency capabilities, several commentators have suggested that quantum transformation of the civilian agencies is required. For example, the Center for Strategic and International Studies concluded, “Significant transformation is needed in the form of a set of interlocking innovative reforms, implemented across agencies, to create a more effective architecture for civilian rapid response” (Orr 2004, 119). Orr and others liken the magnitude of interagency reform required within the U.S. Government to the need for Department of Defense reform that spawned the Goldwater-Nichols Act in 1986 (Campbell 2004, 6). However, just as “jointness” is still, nineteen years later, a work in progress, quantum reform in terms of interagency cooperation (an inherently more ambitious undertaking given the political nature of the various agencies) can realistically be expected to take a similar if not longer length of time. Such reform should be supported and encouraged, but expectations should be tempered, and Army leaders should recognize that no other agency is, or will soon be, comparably equipped, manned, led, trained or funded to conduct the functions of stabilization or transformation (Morrison-Taw and Peters 1995, 375).

It is therefore assumed that civilian agencies are lacking fundamental capabilities for IS&TO and are unlikely to gain the required capabilities in the foreseeable future. Consequently, rather than explore the question of who ought to have responsibility for the various functions of IS&TO, this thesis focuses more on who is able and available to perform these functions -- primarily, the ground forces of the U.S. military.
It is also assumed that the strategy is unlikely to change in the foreseeable future. Given that that interagency capabilities should not be relied on and will not dramatically improve in the foreseeable future, it can be deduced that the United States military must be prepared for a significant role in the nation’s efforts to stabilize and transform troubled regions following military intervention. Because these troubled regions exist on land (rather than at sea or in the air), and because the sheer size of the institution, the Army is clearly the force of choice to lead in IS&TO.\(^8\) Thus, although IS&TO are performed by the joint force, allies, government agencies, and civilian organizations, the Army, through design or default, very often bears the burden of leading the functions of stabilization and transformation.

There are two critical delimitations for this study. First, although these issues are currently being debated in many different forums, to include the United States Congress, Joint Forces Command, and the Army Staff, no predictions regarding current initiatives are made. Initiatives such as Senate Bill 192, which proposes to improve the foreign stabilization and reconstruction capabilities of the United States and the work of the Army Focus Area for Stability and Reconstruction Operations (AFA-S&RO) are discussed, but only in terms of how they frame the problem and the recommendations that are proposed. What reforms come from these efforts in progress is not predicted or accounted for in the analysis.

Additionally, the capabilities and proper roles of allies, the United Nations, NGOs, and PVOs are not examined in detail. As stated, U.S. allies and these other organizations may well contribute in future IS&TO, and Army leaders must be prepared to support their activities. However, they cannot be forced to participate and should not
be relied upon in U.S-led IS&TO efforts. Therefore, the roles and potential contributions of allies, the United Nations, NGOs, and PVOs are not discussed in this thesis.

**Statement of the Problem**

U.S. strategy requires standing capabilities to intervene in troubled regions or states, restore order, eliminate the source of trouble, and transform the targeted area into a stable, progressive member of the international community (Metz and Millen 2005, 45). No agency within the government has capabilities to accomplish this ambitious goal that approach those resident in the United States Army (Morrison-Taw and Peters 1995, 375). Interagency synergy, which in theory would maximize effectiveness in these operations, does not currently exist and is unlikely to in the foreseeable future. The Army must therefore lead in IS&TO. However, the Army is optimally organized, trained, and equipped for intervention and combat. Far less effort is devoted to developing the Army’s ability to perform the stabilization and transformation functions that ultimately decide the outcome of IS&TO

**Research Question and Subordinate Questions**

The primary question this thesis answers is: What should the Army do to improve its ability to conduct Intervention, Stabilization, and Transformation Operations?

To answer this question, three subordinate questions must be answered:

1. What is the essential nature of the IS&TO challenge?
2. What is the Army’s role in conducting IS&TO?
3. What are the Army’s deficiencies that constrain its ability to conduct IS&TO?
Limitations

Many of the points raised in this thesis are treated in less detail than they perhaps deserve. Very little attention, for example, is given to the Army’s historical role in stabilizing and transforming troubled regions. One example of this role is the Army’s performance in the reconstruction of the South following the Civil War. “Federal troops engaged in a variety of tasks, which included maintaining order and security, while helping to set up new state governments, hold elections, ensure the rights and welfare of the newly freed slaves, and revolutionize much of the section’s economic infrastructure and social relationships” (Yates 2005). This and other historical examples of IS&TO bolster the argument that these functions are an integral part of the Army’s mission. As Yates writes, “. . . a critical analysis of the historical record will assist today’s Army in recognizing that Stability and Reconstruction Operations should be regarded as a core competency” (2005). Numerous books have been written on the Army’s historical role in stabilizing and transforming troubled regions.\(^9\) Due to the magnitude of the topic, however, detailed discussions of these operations are not included in this thesis. Similarly, possible future IS&TO scenarios are not addressed.

It should also be noted that this research and analysis is significantly influenced and perhaps biased by the author’s year spent deployed in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom and the author’s work on the Army Focus Area specifically charged with investigating this very subject. The author’s research, analysis, and conclusions differ from conclusions reached by any single author or by the Army Focus Area group, but the research is undoubtedly influenced by these personal experiences.
Another related limitation is that, during the author’s work with the Focus Area team, he was privy to numerous non-attribution interviews with current and retired General Officers and other experts. These candid interviews shed significant light on how Army leaders view IS&TO missions and are used in the analysis, but due to the context in which the statements were given, those sources cannot be identified.

With the problem introduced, a thorough review of literature is now required to understand how others view the problem, what conclusions they draw, and what recommendations they propose.

1 Warren Switzer likens these terms to pointing at a bus and calling it “not an ostrich.” While true, it is not particularly helpful (Switzer n.d.).

2 IS&TO is an unwieldy mouthful of a phrase. Nonetheless, there are several important advantages to the use of this term. Therefore, although writings that discuss past, current, and future operations using other terms are analyzed and discussed throughout this paper, the description of the problem, drawing of conclusions, and proposed recommendations are stated in terms of IS&TO.

3 At the signing of the Treaty of Versailles in 1919, French Marshall Ferdinand Foch said, “This is not a peace treaty; it is a 20-year armistice.” Failure to force the transformation of a problem country or area often results in future interventions. The United Nations’ return to Haiti in 2004, five years after the U.S. military ended its presence there, is a more recent example of this phenomenon. Robert Orr’s research indicates that only half of the attempts to stabilize a post-conflict situation and prevent a return to large-scale violence have been successful (2004, 41).

4 Nongovernmental Organizations are “transnational organizations of private citizens that maintain a consultative status with the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations. Private Voluntary Organizations are, “Private, nonprofit humanitarian assistance organizations involved in development and relief activities. PVOs are normally U.S.-based” (U.S. Army 1997, 1-110 and 1-124).

5 Dr. Lawrence Yates, a historian with the Army’s Combat Studies Institute has conducted extensive research on the subject of the Army’s historical role in nationbuilding. He writes “While the number of major conventional wars involving the United States hovers around a dozen in over two centuries, the country’s armed forces have conducted several hundred military operations that in today’s bureaucratese would be categorized as Stability and Reconstruction Operations” (Yates 2005).
William Wohlforth, a professor at Dartmouth College summarizes the many criticisms thusly: “The war on terrorism is out of control; the preemption/prevention doctrine is dangerous and counterproductive; unilateralism undermines key alliances and partnerships; dissemination of democracy is beyond our means and wisdom; the doctrine of military dominance is provoking and inflammatory…” (Matthews 2004, 7).

“Operation Iraqi Freedom . . . should have demonstrated that joint warfighting . . . is not just the mantra of the Department of Defense, but is, in fact a reality. Nevertheless, as successful as Operation Iraqi Freedom was, the department might take the concept of joint operations to still another level” (Noonan and Lewis 2003, 31).

The provisions of draft legislation (S.192) and draft DoD Directive 3000 discussed in the following chapter lend credibility to this assertion that the Army must bear the majority of the IS&TO burden.

A listing of prominent books on the subject includes: Andrew Birtle’s *U.S. Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine 1890-1941*; Max Boot’s *The Savage Wars of Peace*; and John Nagl’s *Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife*.
CHAPTER 2

REVIEW OF DOCUMENTS, STUDIES, AND DOCTRINE

Introduction

The references cited in this thesis generally agree on the fundamental essence of the problem: despite an impressive ability to determine decisively the outcome of armed conflict, the U.S. is inefficient at best in securing the strategic objectives for which armed forces were employed. Put more succinctly, the U.S. always seems to “win the battles” but often struggles to “win the peace.” 1 Most of the sources consulted during the course of this research, however, either neglect to recommend solutions or differ greatly in the recommendations they propose.

This chapter offers summaries of sixteen separate sources that bear on the subject being examined, as well as a brief review of Army keystone doctrine. Although numerous other works are also cited throughout the thesis, only these key sources are discussed in this chapter. These sources all attempt to answer, or at least allude to, the primary research question which is, “What should the Army do to improve its ability to conduct Intervention, Stabilization, and Transformation Operations?”

Five sources can be categorized as past, current, and pending strategic documents. These include the findings of the Hart-Rudman Commission; The Lugar-Biden Bill (S.2127); the charter of the State Department’s Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization; the currently proposed Lugar Bill (S.192); and Department of Defense Directive 3000, which is now in draft form. These documents are relevant to this thesis in that they illustrate how senior government and defense leaders view the problem and describe some of the initiatives that are ongoing at the highest levels of the U.S.
government. These documents generally provide descriptions of the IS&TO challenge and propose government-wide or DoD-wide solutions. They do not, however, provide explicit guidance specifying detailed plans of action.

Eleven of the sixteen sources are studies conducted by the Army, think tanks, other institutions, and private individuals. Eight groups that have produced studies are the National Defense University; the Defense Science Board; Science Applications International Corporation; the Strategic Studies Institute at the Army War College; the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command; the U.S. Army Peace Keeping and Stability Operations Institute; and the Army Focus Area for Stability and Reconstruction Operations. The Center for Strategic and International Studies produced several documents on the subject, three of which are reviewed. Robert Perito, a Senior Fellow at the United States Institute of Peace has also published a book that is reviewed. These eleven documents generally offer more detailed examinations of the problem and provide more Army-specific recommendations than the strategic documents.

Frameworks, descriptions, and analyses of the IS&TO challenge differ from author to author. This is, in large part due to varying underlying assumptions that inform the different descriptions and analyses of the overarching problem. It is in this regard that these authors come to resemble the blind men of Indostan attempting to describe an elephant. In most cases, each accurately grasps and describes only part of the overarching problem without ever fully understanding the whole of it. To illustrate, one author builds his argument on a premise that, “Crises have definite phases: Crisis, Conflict, Crisis Termination, and Crisis Resolution” (Fenzel 2001). Conceptually, it may be useful to consider IS&TO in terms of neat, distinct phases, and there are perhaps examples of U.S.
campaigns where phases were, in fact, clearly distinguishable. However, during IS&TO missions, it is often difficult to discern what phase the operation is in at any given time.\(^2\) The reality is that conflict, crisis termination, and crisis resolution activities may all take place simultaneously as evidenced by current events in Iraq. Conclusions and recommendations based on a premise of distinct phases are potentially deeply flawed. This is but one example of how a misunderstanding of the overarching IS&TO challenge can lead to fallacious analysis.

**Strategic Documents**

The Hart-Rudman Commission

The United States Commission on National Security in the 21st Century, better known as the Hart-Rudman Commission, prepared a series of studies in the late 1990s on the emerging global security environment. Though it predated the terror attacks against the United States on 9/11, in many ways it accurately predicted the post-9/11 American strategy and the challenges the nation now faces. The commission’s Phase II Report states, “To address the spreading phenomena of weak and failed states, ethnic separatism and violence, and the crises they breed . . . The United States should develop mechanisms to manage the problem of failed states” (Hart and Rudman 2000, 13). The report goes on to describe the five kinds of military capabilities needed by the United States, two of which are “rapidly employable expeditionary/intervention capabilities and humanitarian relief and constabulary capabilities.”\(^3\) In explaining the need for these capabilities, the report states, “These contingencies, often calling for expeditionary interventions or stability operations, require forces different from those designed for major theater war. We believe these contingencies will occur in the future with sufficient regularity and
simultaneity as to oblige the United States to adapt portions of its force structure to meet these needs” (2000, 15).

The significance of this report in the context of this study is twofold. First, it demonstrates that consideration of the nature of IS&TO began before 9/11. Second, it is one of the first instances where the Department of Defense is urged to create new and separate forces specifically designed for intervention, stabilization, humanitarian, and constabulary tasks. This recommendation is seen in various forms in a number of the primary sources reviewed and is examined more extensively in the fourth chapter.

The Lugar-Biden Bill (Senate Bill 2127)

Senate Bill 2127, the *Stabilization and Reconstruction Civilian Management Act of 2004* was introduced in February 2004 by a bi-partisan team of U.S. senators -- Senators Richard Lugar, Joseph Biden, and Chuck Hagel. This bill called for the Secretary of State to create an Office of International Stabilization and Reconstruction within the State Department that would primarily have responsibility for planning and coordinating civil-military planning. The report also proposed a Response Readiness Corps of 250 people to conduct stabilization and reconstruction activities when required, and a Response Readiness Reserve of unspecified size to augment the Corps. Both organizations would belong to the Department of State under the provisions of the bill. The bill proposed a budget of $180 million to fund the education and training of the Corps and its Reserve with the remainder being seed money for contingency operations (Pascual 2004). The House of Representatives also proposed a companion bill, House Resolution 3996, but both bills died in committee.
Although the legislation was not passed into law, President George W. Bush directed the State Department to create a special department specifically charged with coordinating the nation’s civilian actions in postintervention operations. On August 5, 2004, Secretary of State Colin Powell announced the creation of the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) to enhance the United States’ institutional capacity to respond to crises involving failing, failed, and postconflict states and complex emergencies (Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization 2005). Congress provided a budget of $1 million for establishment and operations of the new office and $20 million for a Conflict Response Fund to support the functions described in S.2127 (Hoffmeister 2004, 3).

The significance of this legislation is, first, that it eventually led to the creation of the S/CRS which will be discussed in the next section. More importantly, however, the proposed legislation and its ultimate fate provide insight as to how legislators view the need for interagency reform to improve the nation’s ability to conduct IS&TO. The fact that legislation proposing 250+ people and $100 million never made it out of committee in a year during which events on the ground in Iraq highlighted the need for interagency reform may indicate just how unlikely legislated reform is in the near future. The eventual presidential directive establishing S/CRS provided significantly less personnel and money than the original bill envisioned and is a fraction of what is required for them to fulfill their mandate (Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization 2005).
Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS)

Created in July 2004, S/CRS’s mission statement states, “The office will lead, coordinate, and institutionalize U.S. Government civilian capacity to prevent or prepare for postconflict situations and to help stabilize and reconstruct societies in transition from conflict or civil strife so they can reach a sustainable path toward peace, democracy and a market economy” (Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization 2005).

S/CRS has conducted extensive study on IS&TO and has made two key assumptions that guide its thinking about what is required in IS&TO. First, it assumes that the U.S. government must have the capacity to address two or three stabilization and reconstruction operations concurrently. Second, the office assumes that these operations last up to 5-10 years (Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization 2005). These assumptions are based on S/CRS’s own analysis, are supported by the findings of the Defense Science Board, and lend support to Metz and Millen’s description of IS&TO discussed in the previous chapter.

S/CRS envisions the office performing five key functions: monitor and plan; mobilize and deploy; prepare skills and resources; learn from experience; and coordinate with international partners. Of note, under the function of “prepare skills and resources,” S/CRS aims to “establish and manage an interagency capability to deploy personnel and resources in an immediate surge response and the capacity to sustain assistance until traditional support mechanisms can operate effectively” (Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization 2005).

S/CRS faces several challenges in fulfilling its proposed mandate. It is a new organization, it is understaffed, and it is underresourced (Pascual 2005). Fulfilling its
ambitious mandate, as discussed in the previous chapter, will take years, if not decades to implement, and there is every reason to question if the effort can be sustained through changing administrations and changing security environments (Henning, Bogie, and Lemelin 2004, 189).

This is not to suggest that the efforts of S/CRS should be entirely discounted. Ambassador Carlos Pascual, the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, has remarked, “There has been . . . no greater supporter of the concept of developing a strong civilian stabilization and reconstruction capability than our uniformed military” (Pascual 2005). However, because this organization is in its infancy, S/CRS has not had a role in Iraq or Afghanistan and it will likely be some time before it can fulfill its ambitious mission statement.

The Lugar Bill (S.192)

On 26 January 2005, Senator Richard Lugar introduced another piece of legislation aimed at improving the foreign stabilization and reconstruction capabilities of the United States Government. At the time of this writing, S.192 has been referred to the Senate Armed Services Committee and is pending action. This thesis does not attempt to predict the likelihood of this legislation passing into law. Nonetheless, analysis of this bill is appropriate because it illustrates what is currently proposed and under consideration.

This bill includes several findings that provide the backdrop for its conclusions and recommendations. The first finding is that the military is extremely effective in projecting forces and achieving conventional military victory, but less so in stabilization and reconstruction operations. It goes on to state, “Without success in the aftermath of
large scale hostilities, the United States will not achieve its objectives” (U.S. Congress. Senate 2005).

The proposed legislation also states, “Reconstruction activities cannot and should not wait until safety and security have been achieved. . . . Stabilization operations and reconstruction operations are intrinsically intertwined” (U.S. Congress. Senate 2005). This language agrees with Metz and Millen’s position that Intervention, Stabilization, and Transformation are simultaneous, interdependent, and need to be woven together. It also supports the assertion that stability and reconstruction functions must sometimes occur in environments that remain unstable.

S.192 proposes several directives for both the Department of Defense and the Department of State. In this draft legislation, the Department of Defense is directed to “designate the planning for stabilization and reconstruction as a mission of the Department of Defense that has the same priority as the mission to carry out combat operations.” It also directs the Army (and the Marine Corps) to “develop, below the brigade level, modules of stabilization and reconstruction capabilities to facilitate task organization and exercise and experiment with them” (U.S. Congress. Senate 2005). This latter directive alludes to, but stops short of, mandating that the Army create entirely separate forces for Stability and Reconstruction operations. It only proposes that the Army conduct experiments with such forces. The bill makes it clear that “General Purpose forces,” which comprise the current Army force, must have stabilization and reconstruction as one of their “core competencies.”

The Lugar Bill attempts to delineate which Department has responsibility for which function. Specifically, it directs the Secretary of Defense and Secretary of State to
“make stabilization and reconstruction one of the core competencies of the Department of Defense and Department of State, respectively” (U.S. Congress. Senate 2005). Thus, as discussed previously, the Lugar Bill recognizes that Stability and Reconstruction activities occur simultaneously, but envisions the Department of Defense leading the Stabilization effort while Department of State leads the Reconstruction effort. The bill also proposes legislating cooperation between the DoD and DoS, directing DoD to work collaboratively with the S/CRS and assign “no less than ten experts” to assist them in their operations (U.S. Congress. Senate 2005). The vague manner in which departmental roles and responsibilities are addressed shows the importance of determining the Army’s role in IS&TO which is the second subordinate research question of this thesis.

There are numerous other proposed directives to the Department of Defense in the Lugar Bill. Among them are directives to integrate stabilization and reconstruction into professional military education and training events and a directive to develop, publish, and refine joint doctrine for stability and reconstruction operations. These recommendations illuminate potential answers to this thesis’s third subordinate research question which is, “What are the Army’s deficiencies that constrain its ability to conduct IS&TO?”

Department of Defense Directive (Draft) 3000

Department of Defense Directive (Draft) 3000 (DoD 3000) was first released for coordination throughout DoD on October 7, 2004. It has been amended on several occasions but, at the time of this writing, remains in the staffing process. This document is significant for several reasons. First, the directive designates the Secretary of the Army as the Executive Agent within DoD for Stability Operations (U.S. Department of Defense
Should this directive be implemented, this designation will lay to rest any argument that Stabilization is not a proper role for the U.S. Army. The language in the draft DoD Directive is similar to that in S.192. Notably, however, this directive does not address Reconstruction Operations by name at all.

Also significantly, the directive provides a DoD-wide definition of Stability Operations. It states, “Stability operations are military and civilian activities conducted in peacetime and across the full spectrum of conflict to establish order in states and regions” (U.S. Department of Defense 2005). Although DoD 3000 does not refer to Reconstruction Operations by name, the directive does state that, “Reviving or building the indigenous private sector, including necessary infrastructure and broader civil society, is necessary to creating the security and political conditions that will permit the timely withdrawal of U.S. and foreign troops. Military-civilian teams designed to (accomplish this) . . . may include representatives from U.S. Departments and Agencies, foreign governments and security forces, global and regional international organizations, U.S. and foreign NGOs and private sector individuals and for-profit companies as necessary” (2005).

Note that the definition of stability operations is so broad that it can refer to almost any activity conducted by any agency of the government at any time. Notice also that the composition of “military civilian teams” for stability operations is likewise vague. This linguistic ambiguity illuminates the need for clear, descriptive terms and definitions.

To summarize, when signed, this directive will make the Secretary of the Army the Executive Agent for Stability Operations within DoD. By the definition, Stability operations...
Operations include any activities conducted to establish order in states and regions. Furthermore, the document implies that reconstruction and host nation institution building are fundamentally part of Stability Operations. These three points directly support the use of Metz and Millen’s term IS&TO and support the assertion that the Army bears the majority of the burden for conducting these operations.

Two other quotes from DoD 3000 are worth examining. First, the directive states that, “It is DoD policy that Stability Operations shall be given priority and attention comparable to combat operations” (U.S. Department of Defense 2005). Ratification and implementation of this document would require significant changes to Army doctrine, organization, training, leadership, materiel, and personnel development, and facilities (DOTLMPF). Additionally, although the document makes extensive mention of the need to coordinate Stability Operations with other agencies, it also states that, “U.S. military forces shall be prepared to support the activities necessary to accomplish these tasks when civilian authorities are unable to do so” (U.S. Department of Defense 2005). This provides yet more evidence that expecting agencies outside of DoD to lead in IS&TO may be unwise.

Studies

National Defense University

In 2003, Dr. Hans Binnendijk, the Director of the Center for Technology and National Security Policy at the National Defense University (NDU) led a study on post-conflict operations for the Defense Office of Force Transformation. The results of that study were published as a book in 2004 entitled Transforming for Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations. This study found an acute disparity between the military’s
preparedness for combat and its unpreparedness for the challenges of a postintervention environment. The authors do not attribute this deficiency to a lack of capabilities, but rather posit that the current force is unsuitably organized and trained for Stability and Reconstruction Operations (S&RO). The authors believe that the skills for S&RO are resident in the Army but are scattered throughout the force and thus cannot be brought to bear in an S&RO environment (Binnendijk and Johnson 2004, xiii).

The NDU study also notes that current U.S. Armed Forces’ tactics emphasizing rapid, decisive, offensive operations, may actually exacerbate the challenges of the postintervention environment. Specifically, the study indicates that there is a very narrow window of opportunity in an intervention during which stabilization activities must commence. The NDU study states, “The very rapid defeat of the enemy means the United States must be ready to field the resources needed to secure stability and begin the reconstruction process promptly -- ideally concurrently with the end of major combat” (Binnendijk and Johnson 2004, xiii). This is a noteworthy paradox -- rapid decisive operations may in fact handicap Stability and Reconstruction efforts because they may necessitate these efforts commence sooner than other organizations are prepared to execute.

The NDU study makes several recommendations as to how to narrow the gap between the end of major combat and the beginning of Stability and Reconstruction Operations. They recommend increased civil-military coordination and cooperation and changes to the Army’s leadership development and education programs. Most notably, however, they recommend that the U.S. Army create two division-sized units
permanently organized for Stability and Reconstruction Operations (Binnendijk and Johnson 2004, xviii).

Defense Science Board

The Defense Science Board (DSB) 2004 Summer Study on Transition to and from Hostilities agrees with the NDU study and other sources consulted that stabilization and reconstruction operations are critical to the strategic success of military interventions. The DSB study states, “Success in achieving U.S. political goals involves not only military success but also success in the stabilization and reconstruction operations that follow hostilities” (2004, iii). Notice that the authors indicate that stabilization and reconstruction operations “follow” hostilities. This sequential, linear conception is a prime example of how a questionable underlying assumption informs an entire study. As discussed in Chapter 4 of this thesis, the functions of IS&TO are demonstrably simultaneous, not sequential, and recommendations founded on a concept of linear progression are flawed.

Despite this flaw, the DSB report still contains analysis useful for the purposes of this thesis. The DSB’s primary conclusion is that, “The United States must expect to encounter significant challenges in its future stabilization and reconstruction efforts” and that such efforts “require . . . employment of capabilities not traditional to U.S. armed forces” (2004, iii). The DSB study also notes that the United States has undertaken new Stabilization and Reconstruction operations every 18 to 24 months since the end of the Cold War and that these operations typically last five to eight years (2004, iv).

Ultimately, the study states, “How the full requirement . . . can be met with current resources and capabilities is not clear” (2004, iv) but offers two primary areas for
improvement -- extending the military’s management discipline from its current focus on combat operations to include a focus on stabilization and reconstruction and that the military’s management discipline should be extended to all agencies of the U.S. Government. The second category of suggested improvements entails “building and maintaining (of) fundamental capabilities, now lacking, that are critical to success in stabilization and reconstruction” (2004, iv-v).

Several of the sources consulted in the course of this thesis recommend the creation of new capabilities within the Army. Others suggest that the Army has all the capabilities it needs to conduct IS&TO and suggest instead that what is really needed is a new cultural mindset within the Army. The DSB study, however, proposes a combination of creating new capabilities and creating a new organizational culture within the Army.

It is clear that the DSB study was relied on extensively in the drafting of S.192. The provision in the bill that directs the Army to “develop modules, below the brigade level, of S&R capabilities and to experiment with them…” is a direct lift from the DSB study (2004, vii). The DSB study and S.192 also share the conclusion that, “Stabilization and reconstruction should become a core competency of General Purpose forces.” Like S.192, the DSB study stops short of recommending DoD create a separate force specifically for stabilization and transformation functions. The study does suggest that DoD might want to consider “develop(ing) a modest stabilization capability that is of sufficient size to achieve ambitious objectives in small countries, regions, or areas, and of sufficient excellence to achieve modest objectives elsewhere,” (2004, viii) but in the end, it merely recommends that the Secretary of Defense “direct the Services to reshape and rebalance their forces to provide a stabilization and reconstruction capability” (2004,
The language is presumably quite carefully chosen to avoid recommending the creation of a separate force altogether.

Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC)

In June 2004, SAIC was awarded a contract by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Stability Operations to evaluate U.S. and coalition strategic and doctrinal approaches to stability operations and recommend ways to improve these approaches (Henning, Bogie, and Lemelin 2004, 15). This study is a particularly useful document because it includes analyses and critiques of several strategic documents and other studies on the topic and uses the best conclusions and recommendations from other authors in its analysis.

In framing the problem under consideration, the SAIC study concludes, “The primary objective of stability operations is the rapid creation of a secure environment, so that other civilian agencies can proceed with development, governance, and reconstruction” but notes, “Stability operations may sometimes include a wider variety of objectives when persistent insecurity or rapid fluctuations in violence make it impossible for civilian agencies to function” (Henning, Bogie, and Lemelin 2004, 5). The study therefore concludes, “Stability operations…must, by definition, be the domain of the military. No other agency can perform these tasks” (2004, 5).

The SAIC study does not specifically address reconstruction or transformation tasks or discuss what agencies should have responsibility for which functions. However, the study does state that when civilian agencies are unable to function due to the persistence of violence, the military must fill the gap and proceed with the reconstruction and building of institutions (2004, 11). It further states, “Asymmetric strategies, together
with weak states and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, could require the United States to conduct stability operations in a post-WMD use environment” (2004, 13). Thus, without specifically stating it, the study indicates that the military must be prepared to perform the tasks required of IS&TO without significant assistance from civilian agencies.

The study makes numerous recommendations, mostly concerning the need for a clear, overarching U.S. strategy, which fall outside the purview of this thesis. However, the recommendation that the U.S. Armed Forces standardize terminology and align doctrine (discussed in the first chapter of this thesis) is repeatedly asserted. The study also recommends Personnel reform to include a reform and broadening of the Officer Education System and lengthening of officer careers (2004, 238). It also recommends a restructuring of the PSYOP career field and development of new Joint Operational Concepts (2004, 241-243).

Center for Strategic and International Studies

The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) is a nonpartisan, Washington-based think tank led by John Hamre, a former Deputy Secretary of Defense. Over the past several years, CSIS conducted extensive study on the challenges of IS&TO and produced numerous documents on the subject. Three such documents were reviewed and analyzed in the course of this research.

The War After the War: Strategic Lessons of Iraq and Afghanistan

*The War After the War*, a book by Anthony H. Cordesman, draws three conclusions relevant to this thesis. Cordesman’s primary and overarching conclusion is,
“In more cases than not, the aftermath of conventional conflict is going to be low-intensity conflict and armed nation building that will last months or years after a conventional struggle is over” (2004, iii). Cordesman favors an interagency approach to the reconstruction function of IS&TO saying, “The U.S. must be as well prepared to win a peace as it is prepared to win a war. It must have the interagency tools in place to provide security after the termination of a conflict and to support nationbuilding by creating viable political systems, economic stability and growth, effective military and security forces, a system of public information, and a free press” (2004, xv). However, he notes that interagency organizations were unprepared for the task in Iraq. He writes, “USAID had no staff prepared, sized, and trained to deal with nation building on the scale imposed by Iraq. . . . U.S. government staff -- often with limited experience -- had to be suddenly recruited for three to twelve-month tours of duty, tours too short to ensure continuity” (2004, 23). He concludes his critique of interagency performance in Iraq by stating, “The State Department must develop organizational and operational capabilities” that it currently lacks (2004, 24).

Cordesman draws another interesting conclusion, stating that the United States must have realistic expectations regarding armed nationbuilding. Cordesman opines that unrealistic expectations lead many to bemoan the cost and complexity of such operations when the fact is that IS&TO generally take years to conclude and in almost all cases, prospects for success are rarely certain. Cordesman ultimately concludes that although development of interagency capabilities to operate in postconflict environments is a priority, “armed nationbuilding is a challenge only the U.S. military is (currently) equipped to meet” (2004, 28).
Cordesman proposes three key recommendations. First, he recommends significant changes to the U.S. Government interagency processes. He echoes the Beyond Goldwater-Nichols study discussed in the first chapter saying, “Jointness must go far beyond the military; it must apply to all national security operations” (2004, 45). Second, Cordesman recommends, “The Department of State must develop operational capabilities” (2004, 48). Cordesman makes no predictions as to the feasibility or lead time required to infuse the government with a spirit of “jointness” or for the State Department to develop “operational capabilities”, but he does acknowledge the magnitude of the undertaking. Cordesman’s third recommendation of note is “There is need to create military forces with extensive experience in civil-military action in addition to forces that can use aid as effectively as weapons -- dollars as well as bullets” (2004, 43-44).

Winning the Peace

Winning the Peace is a collection of essays edited by Robert Orr, who served as a senior fellow and codirector of CSIS’s Post-conflict Reconstruction Project. One significant aspect of this book is that it is one of the few documents reviewed that attempts to clearly identify all of the tasks that might be required in a postintervention environment. Orr identifies four main “pillars of post-conflict reconstruction” (security; governance and participation; economic and social well-being; and justice and reconciliation) and categorizes possible tasks according to which pillar they support. The identification and categorization of tasks is useful in that it provides detailed analysis that clearly conveys the magnitude and complexity of IS&TO. Orr cautions that, “Every country is different, and each country’s needs after war will be different. A ‘one-size-fits-
all’ approach is not appropriate for the broad array of cases that the United States will face in the coming decades” (2004, xvi). Nonetheless, his deconstruction of possible tasks required is extremely useful in considering the capabilities required in IS&TO and therefore, what deficiencies exist within the U.S. Government and the Army.

Another observation from Scott Feil, one of the authors, is, “Undeniably, the four pillars of postconflict reconstruction are inextricably linked, and a positive outcome in each area depends on successful integration and interaction across them” (Orr 2004, 40). This concept of interdependence across the different functions has manifested itself in Iraq as commanders have come to realize, for example, that security is directly linked to economic development in that as long as unemployment remains high, young men can be enticed to attack coalition units in exchange for cash.

One of the primary conclusions in Orr’s book is from Johanna Mendelson-Forman and Michael Pan. They write, “Despite a long and deep history of involvement in postconflict reconstruction efforts . . . the United States has failed to undertake a significant reform of its approach to and capabilities for postconflict reconstruction. . . . The U.S. military is unprepared to mount major stability operations . . . of greater concern, U.S. agencies lack the tools to take the job over from the military” (Orr 2004, 117). These authors put an even finer point on this conclusion stating “After more than a decade of active involvement by the U.S. in multinational peace operations and complex emergencies, it is apparent that the civilian capacity to respond rapidly is uneven, lacks specific legislative authorities, and is resource-starved” (Orr 2004, 119).

Orr writes extensively on the concept of “comparative advantage” and relies heavily on this concept in formulating his conclusions regarding which agency should be
responsible for which tasks during IS&TO. Different agencies, according to Orr, possess different comparative advantages for performing certain tasks. Multilateral development banks, for example, are better suited to supporting the development of host nation economic institutions than the U.S. military. Therefore, according to Orr, these banks and similarly disparate agencies should ideally have a role in postconflict reconstruction (2004, 66). Orr acknowledges that civilian capacity to actually operate in a postconflict environment is limited. He rejects the conclusion, however, that the military should therefore perform non-military tasks (2004, 15). Forman and Pan agree asserting, “Until the U.S. government develops sufficient rapid civilian reaction capacity, the military will continue to be called on to accomplish ‘civilian’ tasks…” (Orr 2004, 116). With the notion of comparative advantage as a guide, Winning the Peace proceeds to make extensive recommendations that the government and other civilian agencies should take to improve their ability to conduct IS&TO. In summation, Forman and Pan conclude, “Significant transformation is needed in the form of a set of interlocking innovative reforms, implemented across agencies, to create a more effective architecture for civilian rapid response” (Orr 2004, 119).

Play to Win

The third CSIS document reviewed is the January 2003 Final Report of the Bipartisan Commission on Postconflict Resolution entitled Play to Win. This document differs from the two previously discussed in that it was published prior to Operation Iraqi Freedom and is thus not informed by U.S. experience in that postconflict experience. The Commission was charged with making recommendations to improve U.S. capabilities to undertake postconflict reconstruction. One of its key assumptions, however, seems to
have been proven fallible by the U.S. experience in Iraq. Specifically, the report states, “All (of the Commission’s) deliberations, however, were undertaken with the explicit assumption that the challenges of postconflict reconstruction are an international problem and responsibility, and that the design of U.S. capacity should take into account the international context and a broad range of international actors” (Center for Strategic and International Studies 2003, 2). In fact, the first recommendation is that the United States stop relying on the military to do the bulk of the work in postconflict reconstruction. The U.S. experience in Iraq has shown that assistance from allies, the United Nations, and other international organizations does not always automatically materialize when requested or required.

Notwithstanding this questionable assumption, Play to Win offers a number of recommendations for developing a response to the problem of postconflict reconstruction. Because this study views the problem in an international context and because this thesis assumes that the U.S. cannot rely on international participation in IS&TO, not all of these recommendations are germane to this study. However, the section titled The Role of the United States has a framework for addressing the overall problem that is worth examination.

In discussing the role of the United States, Play to Win foreshadows the gist of Orr’s Winning the Peace by introducing the four pillars of postconflict reconstruction and the concept of comparative advantage (see previous section). “Although the military may play a crucial role” the report states, “…a host of civilian actors has a comparative advantage in addressing many of post-conflict reconstruction’s wide range of needs” (2003, 6). With these sentiments framing the issue, the Commission saw the challenge
thusly: “…first, we must identify the key response capabilities needed by the United States in the context of international operations; second, we must weave together the many existing actors and capabilities into a coherent response capacity within the U.S., and integrate them into international capacities; and third, we must identify and fill top priority gaps in our capabilities” (2003, 6). This questionable framework is another example of how an underlying assumption may lead to fallacious analysis. Experience in Iraq and elsewhere seems to demonstrate that external support for U.S.-led IS&TO sometimes fails to materialize.

Strategic Studies Institute / U.S. Army War College

In October 2002, the U.S. Army War College’s Strategic Studies Institute (SSI), in coordination with the Office of the Army Deputy Chief of Staff / G3, initiated a study to analyze how American and coalition forces could best address the requirements that would be necessary after a defeat of Saddam Hussein’s Iraq (Crane and Terrill 2003, iii). The results of that study were published in a Strategic Studies Institute booklet titled Reconstructing Iraq: Challenges and Missions for Military Forces in a Post-conflict Scenario.

The study is eerily prophetic in predicting the challenges coalition efforts have faced in post-Saddam Iraq. The value of this study to this thesis, however, is the methodology used to address the problem and the postintervention “mission matrix” the authors devised and included as an appendix to the booklet. Crane and Terrill’s mission matrix is reproduced in Appendix A of this thesis. Like Orr in Winning the Peace, the authors discern a several categories of tasks and identify the tasks required within each category. While Orr called them “pillars of reconstruction”, Crane and Terrill call them
simply “categories”. Whereas Orr discerned four pillars, Crane and Terrill identified 21 separate categories and further assign each of the 155 tasks a level of importance (Critical, Essential, or Important). They take their analysis even one step further by projecting who should have responsibility for accomplishing each task during each of four distinct phases. The initial phase, immediately after a presumed defeat of Iraqi forces, is called the Security Phase. Subsequent phases are called Stabilize Phase, Build Institutions, and Handover Phase (Crane and Terrill 2003, 63). Not all tasks are identified as being required in all phases, but most are, indicating that in their view, many of the tasks are long-term projects.

Crane and Terrill’s mission matrix is a useful model for conceptualizing the complexity of the postintervention environment. The SSI study mirrors many of CSIS’s conclusions regarding the extensive participation of various U.S. Government and international agencies. For example, Crane and Terrill identify tasks that should be performed by agencies as diverse as the U.S. Department of Energy, the Arab Police Academy, the National Endowment for Democracy, the U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, and various Nongovernmental Organizations. Since the fall of Baghdad, history has shown that assistance from these organizations, in many cases, failed to materialize. The point is, however, that the authors clearly believe in the concept of sharing the burden across government agencies. Where they differ materially from Orr in *Winning the Peace* is that Crane and Terrill recognize that, at least in the Security Phase, most of the work is done by military ground forces (2003, 63-72).

Although SSI’s mission matrix specifically addresses postintervention Iraq, it is nonetheless a useful model for conceptualizing the various tasks required in any
postintervention scenario. Its recognition that, at least in the early phases, the military must bear the majority of the postintervention stabilization and reconstruction effort helps illuminate the answer to the second subordinate research question and is, therefore, very useful for the purposes of this thesis.

U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC)

In 1986, TRADOC formed the Joint Low-Intensity Conflict (LIC) Project Group and gave them the mission to examine worldwide LIC issues, with a focus on Central American conflicts, in order to develop a common LIC data base, develop lessons learned, and identify the implications for national strategies and their impact on military operations for LIC (United States Army Training and Doctrine Command 1986, 5). Although this study was conducted nearly 20 years ago, many of its conclusions and recommendations still hold value today.

The primary value of this document to this thesis is it demonstrates that the issues under examination are not new and existed even during the Cold War era. It is remarkable that this group examined almost the exact same issues as the 2005 Army Focus Area group and, in many cases, derived similar conclusions and recommendations. For example, one of the issues the TRADOC group identified in 1986 is that there needs to be “a separate, responsive system for providing resources to commanders in peace operations” (1986, 103). In 2005, a U.S. Army General recently returned from Iraq told the Army Focus Area team during a non-attribution interview that cumbersome Federal Acquisition Regulations were his number one problem in postconflict Iraq (Warner interview with Army Major General 2005).
Sources such as the TRADOC study and the Marine Corps’ *Small Wars Manual* of 1940 illustrate that many of the issues under examination have been recognized, at least by some, for several decades without resulting in significant institutional changes; the problems addressed persist. This suggests a kind of institutional aversion to nontraditional warfighting that may hinder the Army’s ability to reorient on IS&TO. This possibility is explored in Chapters 4 and 5.

Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute

The Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI), located at the U.S. Army War College is responsible for shaping “stability operations policy and concept development at the strategic and operational levels.” It also exists to “facilitate the integration of effort among the U.S. military, the interagency, international organizations, coalition partners, and nongovernmental organizations to improve the planning and execution of future stability operations” (U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, n.d.). As such, PKSOI has done extensive study on the problem under examination. One of its current initiatives is writing a chapter on “Peace Building” for inclusion in future versions of Joint Publication 3.07.3, *Joint Tactics Techniques and Procedures for Peacekeeping Operations*. Although this chapter has not been approved or published, PKSOI’s work provides yet another useful framework for examining the problem of IS&TO.

Peace Building, as described by PKSOI “…provides the reconstruction and societal rehabilitation that offers hope to resolve conflict. . . . Peace building promotes reconciliation, strengthens and rebuilds civil infrastructures and institutions, builds confidence, and supports economic reconstruction to prevent a return to conflict” (2004,
2). Although these tasks are at times called “post-conflict reconstruction actions,” the authors acknowledge that “in some operations, a level of instability will exist concurrently with the peace building” (2004, 3). In addition to defining the problem, PKSOI also devised five fundamentals of Peace Building. Among these fundamentals are, “Focus on empowering civilian agencies to assume full authority for implementing the civil portion of the peace process” and, “Use military assets sparingly when civilian assets are more appropriate” (2004, 4). The PKSOI study is unique among the documents surveyed because it is the only study that aims to create principles and doctrine for postconflict operations.

PKSOI’s framework of the problem conveys several important points. First, it recognizes the importance of the kinds of stabilization and transformation tasks that Metz and Millen include in their definition of IS&TO. Second, it acknowledges that peace building may, at times, take place in an unstable environment. Thus, PKSOI recognizes first that the military plays a key role in the transformation function of IS&TO and also recognizes that certain activities within the stabilization and transformation functions may necessarily occur prior to the establishment of a stable and secure environment. This framework is depicted graphically in figure 1:

As depicted on the chart, Political and Economic activities are less prominent during the Conflict phase of an intervention. These activities are best conducted by civilian agencies, but if the environment is too dangerous for them to operate, the military would conduct these activities. The five sectors transform from “red” to “amber” as time passes and as stabilization and transformation activities occur. This chart graphically
depicts PKSOI’s view of the problem and is similar to other frameworks produced by other authors.

Like Robert Orr’s *Winning the Peace* and Crane and Terrill’s *Reconstructing Iraq*, PKSOI has grouped the tasks required during IS&TO into separate categories. PKSOI devised seven categories: Security; Civil Law and Order/Public Security; Humanitarian Assistance; Reconstruction; Governance, Civil Administration and Civil Society; Human Rights, Social Reconciliation; and Public Diplomacy and Information Operations (2004, 6). The PKSOI briefing provides an analysis of what roles the military should play in each of these mission sectors. Like CSIS and SSI, they recognize that certain civilian agencies have a comparative advantage to perform certain tasks, but
acknowledge that the military has a role in each sector as well. For example, within the mission sector of ‘Reconstruction’, PKSOI assigns the tasks of “Restore functioning of the power and transportation infrastructure” to unnamed civilian agencies while a possible military role is listed as “Provide advice” (2004, 14). Regardless of the manner in which the tasks are divided, the recurring use of “pillars,” “categories,” or “mission sectors” suggests that these may be useful conceptual frameworks for examining the complex problem of IS&TO.

Robert M. Perito (U.S. Institute of Peace)

Robert Perito, a Senior Fellow at the United States Institute of Peace, authored a book entitled *Where is the Lone Ranger When You Need Him?* which advocates the creation of a “U.S. Stability Force” for conducting the stabilization function of IS&TO (2004, 328). He arrives at this recommendation primarily by analyzing coalition efforts in the Balkans and drawing two key conclusions. The first is that “…the current doctrine for peace operations -- which dictates a linear transition from intervention and peace enforcement through a period of stabilization to a final phase of national institution building -- is incorrect” (2004, 322). Perito’s second key conclusion is that establishing the rule of law is the first and most important function required in a postconflict environment and that the U.S. military is not trained or equipped to perform this function. “Building rule-of-law institutions must begin as soon as the fighting stops” (2004, 322). Perito quotes Paddy Ashdown, the High Representative in Bosnia, as saying, “In hindsight, we should have put the establishment of rule of law first, for everything else depends on it: a functioning economy, a free and fair political system, the development of civil society, and public confidence in police and courts” (2004, 325). This assertion,
which Perito uses as the foundation of his argument for a separate U.S. Stability Force, highlights the linear manner in which many authors think of the functions of IS&TO. While many see establishing security as the first task required, Perito and others disagree. Perito’s analysis illuminates the potentially paradoxical nature of various IS&TO tasks. While some argue that security is required before the building of economic institutions can begin, others argue that certain economic institutions must be functioning before security can be achieved. This “chicken / egg” paradox of IS&TO is examined in Chapter 4 of this thesis.

Perito’s conclusions are significant because he sounds yet another call for the U.S. Government to create a separate force specifically for the stabilization and transformation functions of IS&TO. Additionally, his other assertions -- creating rule of law is the primary task in a postintervention environment; creating rule of law must begin as soon as the fighting stops; and that all other successes depend on rapid creation of the rule of law -- are all worthy of examination.

The Army Focus Area for Stability and Reconstruction (AFA-S&RO)

In 2005, the Chief of Staff of the Army created a focus area team, headed by Brigadier General Volney J. Warner, the Deputy Commandant of the Combined Arms Center to study Stability and Reconstruction Operations. The team conducted an extensive review of existing literature, hosted two interagency conferences, conducted independent analysis, and engaged fifty current or retired senior military and civilian leaders in candid discussions to glean their thoughts on the Army’s role, capabilities, and deficiencies in conducting Stability and Reconstruction Operations (S&RO).
The Chief of Staff of the Army gave the Focus Area team three specified tasks. First, they were to recommend whether the Army should create special units for S&RO or focus on improving the capabilities of the current force. The second task was to identify capability gaps within the current force that hinder its ability to conduct S&RO. Third, the team was tasked to identify initiatives to increase the Army’s capability and capacity to plan and conduct S&RO (United States Army Focus Area for Stability and Reconstruction Operations, 2005).

The team initially relied heavily on the task matrices found in Winning the Peace and Reconstructing Iraq (see Appendix A). Those matrices were combined and refined, resulting eventually in a new matrix depicted in figure 2 (United States Army Focus Area for Stability and Reconstruction Operations, 2005).

The slide is read left to right and top to bottom. Starting in the left-most column, the four elements of national power are listed. Reading then from left to right reveals the tasks associated with each element of national power and provides a general sequence (correlated with the phases depicted within the green arrow across the bottom of the chart) for when those tasks are performed. Tasks for which the military is not trained, equipped, or organized to conduct were subjectively depicted in red, while tasks that the military can perform with little to no modification to the current force are depicted in black.
Figure 2. AFA-S&RO Task Force Mission Matrix

In early discussions with senior leaders, this matrix proved very useful in portraying the complexity of the S&RO environment and generating discussion. A common initial reaction to this slide from senior leaders during these candid, non-attribution interviews is exemplified by one retired General Officer who said, “It looks like you’re saying the Army is going to conduct all of these tasks -- let’s be careful what we sign up for!” (Warner interview with Retired General Officer 2005). In order to portray how the Army becomes involved in nontraditional tasks, the team created a model based on Maslow’s Hierarchy (figure 3) depicting the postintervention...
environment (United States Army Focus Area for Stability and Reconstruction Operations, 2005).

Figure 3. Modified Maslow’s Hierarchy for Postintervention Operations

This slide is read from bottom to top. It shows that during and immediately following intervention, the host nation populace has certain needs and expectations that only the military is able and available to fill. As time passes, the populace’s needs mature, but the environment becomes more secure, allowing for the initiation of transition from military lead to civilian lead. Ultimately, civilian agencies have full leadership over reconstruction and the military either departs or remains in a supporting
role. As the AFA team’s analysis matured, these two slides became key discussion-drivers for the interviews of senior leaders.

**Recurring Vet Themes**

- **Embracing S&RO requires a cultural mindset change to the Army.**
- Don’t build a force for “the last S&RO”.
- **Don’t sign the Army up to do other Agencies’ missions.**
- Echelonment of responsibilities needs clarity, as does integration of combat and S&RO tasks.
- Staffs and staff processes (MDMP, IPB, etc.) need to be tailored appropriately to make timely decisions during the mission.
- DoD must work w/ interagency and coalition partners in developing S&RO strategy.
- Define a role and C2 relationship for contractors and requires a review of legal implications (what do mega-contractors bring to the table).
- MOE’s for S&RO should be based on the security objectives and generally the populace response. Measure effects rather than activities.
- Need to identify the policy decisions needed by Army forces to prosecute S&RO and reinforce in RCC planning.
- Focus as much on pre-intervention (TSCP) and during-intervention as well as post-intervention activities (S&RO).
- Validation of Modular Army’s capabilities in S&RO required (talk is cheap).
- If you don’t test it they won’t do it.
- Simultaneous operations, “like a rolling phase IV”.
- **Stop reinventing the mechanics of S&RO every five years at maximum institutional effort.**

Figure 4. Recurring AFA-S&RO Vet Themes

Although referred to as “interviews” throughout this thesis, the team termed these “Vet Briefings” because they were not interviews in a pure sense. Rather, these discussions were a free-ranging exchange of thoughts and ideas using a slide packet featuring figures 2 and 3 to drive the discourse. The AFA team identified fourteen recurring comments made by interviewees during these meetings and included them in their briefing to the Chief of Staff of the Army. These recurring themes are listed in figure 4 (United States Army Focus Area for Stability and Reconstruction Operations, 2005).
Using the models in figures 2 and 3 and the results of the senior leader interviews, the AFA-S&RO team conducted an extensive analysis of the tasks required in a postintervention environment and evaluated the tasks to determine which ones the Army cannot perform. These tasks were then analyzed to determine the capability gaps that prevent the Army from being able to perform them. The team identified eight Army capability gaps which are listed in figure 5. The far-right column illustrates that although these capabilities might be resident elsewhere in the U.S. Government (outside of the Army), the Army has no way of accessing or leveraging those capabilities when deployed and conducting operations (United States Army Focus Area for Stability and Reconstruction Operations, 2005).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gaps in Current Army Capabilities</th>
<th>Army Capability Gap</th>
<th>Army Capacity Required</th>
<th>DoD/IA Access Gap</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Provide command and control for S&amp;RO (includes coordination with OGA and NGO).</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Assess, repair and reconstruct critical infrastructure.</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Minimize immediate threat to the affected populace and enable transition to broader humanitarian operations.</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Facilitate orderly transition to indigenous security forces.</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Support transition to accountable self-governance.</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Support the development of culturally appropriate institutional systems such as judicial, corrections, police, civil administration, etc.</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Set conditions for and support economic development</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Support DoD and RCC efforts to amplify indigenous voices (legitimate political, religious, educational, and media) promoting freedom, the rule of law, and an entrepreneurial economy (28 Feb 05 Draft DoD Dir 3000).</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 5. Army Capability Gaps according to AFA-S&RO analysis

48
Determining what precisely constituted a capability gap was a matter of contention within the team. The team struggled to define the term and some team members argued that there is no such thing as a capability gap in today’s Army. Ultimately, the senior officers on the team identified the eight capability gaps based on their experience and provided the Chief of Staff of the Army with recommendations to address these gaps (United States Army Focus Area for Stability and Reconstruction Operations, 2005).

Regarding the CSA’s directive to examine the possibility of forming new types of forces, the AFA team concluded that creating special-purpose units specifically for S&RO would not improve the Army’s capabilities to conduct the required tasks (United States Army Focus Area for Stability and Reconstruction Operations, 2005). With only one exception, every senior leader interviewed concurred with this finding. Numerous reasons were given to support this conclusion, which are discussed in detail in Chapter 4.

AFA-S&RO presented their initial findings to the Chief of Staff of the Army on 1 April 2005. At the time of this writing, the group continues to analyze the problem and has not yet arrived at final conclusions. Nonetheless, the framework and underlying assumptions used by the task force are useful and are compared with other frameworks in Chapter 4.

**Army Capstone Doctrine**

The Foreword to FM 3-0, *Operations*, written by former Chief of Staff of the Army General Shinseki, states, “The Army is a doctrine-based institution” (2001a). If this is accepted as true, a review of the Army’s Capstone Doctrine⁹ should provide insight as to how the institution views its role and responsibilities in a postconflict scenario.
FM 1, *The Army*, makes it clear that postconflict operations are subordinate in importance to warfighting, stating, “Forces must be capable of shifting from engagement to deterrence to war to postwar reconstruction -- seamlessly . . . but our non-negotiable contract with the American people is to fight and win the Nation’s wars. Every other task is subordinate to that commitment” (2001a, 21).

FM 3-0 draws a different yet equally sharp distinction between warfighting and IS&TO-type tasks, saying, “Offensive and defensive operations normally dominate military operations in war and some Small Scale Contingencies. Stability and Support Operations predominate in MOOTW” (2001a, 1-15). This manual also states, “At lower echelons, units usually perform only one type of operation (at a time).” These neat delineations between warfighting and the other tasks required in IS&TO clearly run counter to General Krulak’s concept of the three-block war and run counter to what small-unit leaders are experiencing on the ground in Iraq and Afghanistan (Wong 2004, 4). FM 3-0 further states, “In stability operations, close combat dominance is the principal means Army forces use to influence adversary actions” (2001a, 4-6) Experience shows that the ability to dominate an adversary is important in stability operations, but the ability to persuasively wield the “velvet glove” is eminently more critical (Metz and Millen 2005, 49).

A full review of Army doctrine to align it with current operations has been recommended by several authors and will be mandated should DoD 3000 be signed as currently crafted. Doctrinal confusion concerning the nature of IS&TO is only a symptom, however, rather than the cause of the confusion within the Army regarding IS&TO.
Summary

All who have examined the problem of how the U.S. can better translate battlefield success into strategic victory have used variations of basic problem solving, yet have often arrived at very different conclusions. The lack of consensus among studies is primarily due to two basic factors. First, different studies use different underlying assumptions to define the environment. PKSOI, for example, envisions a clear, linear progression from combat to postcombat operations, and accordingly bases its analyses on an assumption that the postconflict environment is permissive (U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute 2004). Others, such as the SAIC authors and Robert Perito, see the need for the functions of IS&TO to occur simultaneously (Henning, Bogie, and Lemelin, 2004). The conclusions and subsequent recommendations of the different sources differ dramatically due to these and other key premises.

A second, directly related, factor that leads to diverging opinions among experts is different interpretations of roles and mandates for the various organizations that participate in IS&TO. Some see only a supporting role for the Army, while others question the capabilities and responsiveness of other organizations in a complex and often dangerous environment. Chapter 4 compares, contrasts and analyzes the competing viewpoints, attempts to discern the essential nature of IS&TO and what the Army needs to do to better perform these missions, and addresses the dissenting views of those who do not believe IS&TO is a proper role for the U.S. Army.

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1 One observer notes that one of the most pressing and frequent problems grappled with in Western defense literature over the past 20-30 years is “how to terminate wars and devise exit strategies successfully.” (Matthews 2004, 1)
To illustrate, two retired General Officers involved in operations immediately following the collapse Saddam Hussein’s regime lamented during an AFA interview that they never knew when “Phase IV” officially began.

The five kinds of military capabilities required by the nation according to the report are nuclear capabilities to deter and protect the U.S. and its allies from attack; homeland security capabilities; conventional capabilities necessary to win major wars; rapidly employable expeditionary/intervention capabilities; and humanitarian relief and constabulary capabilities.

The earliest proposal found advocating the creation of a separate force for IS&TO-like operations was published in Military Review in 1993. In an article titled “Expeditionary Police Service”, LTC Geoffrey Demarest suggested that the United States “create a permanent expeditionary force that would conduct the bulk of police and development chores that are routinely assigned to the Department of Defense” (1993).

Although this document is unclassified, it is not publicly available. The author gained access to this document through his work on the Army Focus Area for Stability and Reconstruction Operations.

Tasks that support the “security” pillar include: enforcing cease-fire and other peace agreements; disarming and demobilization of belligerents; providing for territorial security; protection of key individuals and infrastructure; reconstitution of indigenous security institutions. Under the “governance” pillar, tasks include: establishing processes to garner the views of the citizenry; writing of laws; establishing interim government; recruitment and training of new leaders, building of new governmental institutions; and conducting elections. Tasks that support the “social well-being” pillar include providing emergency food, water, shelter, and medicine; preventing refugees; developing agriculture; managing waste and water; preventing epidemics; adjudicating property disputes; reconstituting / modernizing educational institutions; generating employment; reforming markets; and facilitating investment. Under “justice and reconciliation”, tasks include: establishing transitional justice system; establishing civilian police authority, rebuilding courts and prisons; monitor human rights; adjudicate reparations; and rebuild community and religious institutions.

All information for this section was gleaned from the author’s personal work on the Army Focus Area for Stability and Reconstruction Operations Task Force, February-March, 2005.

Chief of Staff of the Army General Schoomaker directed the AFA team to examine this issue even though he was predisposed against the idea of creating special units for Stability and Reconstruction Operations (Kucera 2004, 58).

There is some disagreement as to what constitutes “capstone” doctrine and it is not specified in any of the sources consulted. The Foreword of FM 1 states, “FM 1 is one of the Army’s two capstone field manuals,” but does not state which other manual
completes the set (U.S. Army 2001a). For the purposes of this thesis, it is assumed that “Army Capstone Doctrine” refers to those doctrinal manuals that the Chief of Staff of the Army personally approves which are FM 1, *The Army* and FM 3-0, *Operations*. 
CHAPTER 3
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Introduction: Purpose and Research Questions

Recent experiences in Somalia, the Balkans, Afghanistan, and Iraq -- as well as 200 years of history -- all attest to the proposition that today’s U.S. Army is required to do more than merely fight and win wars. The purpose of this thesis is to examine the Army’s expanded role in contemporary U.S. strategy and to determine what the Army should do to improve its ability to fulfill that role.

In their article, “Intervention, Stabilization, and Transformation Operations: The Role of Landpower in the New Strategic Environment,” Metz and Millen define and describe this expanded mission (2005, 41-52). This thesis builds on their concept and examines the implications of the Army’s expanded role in contemporary U.S. strategy. As discussed in the previous chapter, experts differ in their views of the mission, the environment, appropriate roles for different organizations, and in their recommendations for improving the military’s performance in IS&TO. This thesis is, at its essence, a nonstatistical meta-study, examining the different viewpoints of various experts, and uses synthesis, analysis, and inductive reasoning to draw original conclusions.

The first of three subordinate research questions, “What is the essential nature of the IS&TO challenge?” is posed to begin to discern the context of the problem and illuminate the capabilities required during IS&TO. Once the fundamental nature of the environment and the requirements are understood, the second and third subordinate research questions, “What is the Army’s role in IS&TO?” and “What are the Army’s deficiencies that constrain its ability to conduct IS&TO?” are then addressed. With these
questions answered, it is then possible to address the primary research question which is, “What should the Army do to improve its ability to conduct Intervention, Stabilization, and Transformation Operations?”

Sources of Information

The information used to answer these questions was obtained by three primary means: first, the author’s personal experience and observations over thirteen years as a U.S. Army Officer to include nearly two years deployed in two separate interventions -- Operation Uphold Democracy (Haiti) and Operation Iraqi Freedom. Although this experience does not necessarily qualify the author as an expert, it does provide an initial filter for analyzing and evaluating conclusions drawn by others.

The second method of obtaining information was an extensive review of literature described in the preceding chapter. Primary sources of information such as congressional legislation, Army doctrine, and the U.S. Government websites were used to the maximum extent possible. When other sources, such as books and journal articles are used, effort is made to ensure that the sources are scholarly and authoritative studies as opposed to merely expressions of opinion. The vast majority of the documents used are available through the internet and public libraries. However, some special Army documents (e.g. the report from the 1986 TRADOC low-intensity conflict study), are found only in special collections such as Fort Leavenworth’s Combined Arms Research Library.

The third method of obtaining information was through the author’s work with the Army Focus Area team. During his two months working on that team, the researcher participated in the team’s analysis and had access to nearly fifty interviews with current and retired senior leaders from the Army and various government and private agencies.
The AFA study, to include the interviews, was chaired by the Deputy Commandant of the Army’s Command and General Staff College, Brigadier General Volney J. Warner. The author, as one of the junior-ranking members of the team, performed primarily administrative duties such as recording what was said during interviews.

In order to garner candid feedback, AFA interviews were conducted off-the-record and are thus, not attributable to a specific individual. Nonetheless, these senior leaders’ perspectives are invaluable to the research project and, under the restrictions in force, incorporated in this study. Although the author’s association with the team ended in March of 2005, The Army Focus Area project is still ongoing as of this writing. Once the project is complete, the team’s products will be archived at the Combined Arms Research Library at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

Method of Organization

The question under consideration is broad and widely analyzed, and in the course of this research, it became apparent that there are a nearly infinite number of sub-topics that could be explored. An important factor in organizing the research was, therefore, narrowing the focus and maintaining vigilance in disregarding data that were merely tangential to the issues at hand.¹ Settling on a primary research question and the three subordinate research questions and constructing a rudimentary outline were paramount in separating what was relevant and what was not.

Most of the sources consulted do not address the exact questions examined in this thesis. The SAIC study, for example specifically examines national strategy and joint doctrine while Play to Win examines postconflict reconstruction in an international context. This thesis, on the other hand, examines a broader issue from the SAIC study
and specifically looks at the problem from the perspective of the U.S. Army as opposed to the international context used in *Play to Win*.

Despite these and similar differences, all of the sources examine the strategic environment and other closely related subjects and are therefore pertinent to this research. As each source of information was received, the author extracted the relevant points, documented the source, and sorted them in accordance with the outline. Where studies disagree, the author evaluated the competing viewpoints and determined which was better supported by observations of the contemporary environment. As the research progressed, the outline matured and, on several occasions, expanded to the point where a refocusing was required. The research committee was indispensable in this culling and refocusing process.

Because this research topic is of such contemporary interest, the research could have continued indefinitely. Due to time constraints, however, the research for this thesis was halted in April of 2005. The topic is of such importance, however, that further study is certain to continue and the reader of this thesis should bear in mind that subsequent studies likely exist.

**Methods of Analysis: Synthesis vs. Inductive Reasoning**

The primary method of analysis used to answer the first subordinate research question was comparison and synthesis of many different viewpoints. The parable of the six blind men of Indostan included as an epigraph to Chapter 1 is fitting in that none of the commentaries in Chapter 2 covered all of the aspects of the questions under consideration. Synthesis of all of the sources -- gleaning the germane points from each
source and combining them to form a holistic viewpoint -- therefore, was the best method for determining the essential nature of the IS&TO challenge.

Several of the studies conducted by others and reviewed in Chapter 2 contain models for describing the nature of postcombat operations. Crane and Terrill, Orr, and the Army Focus Area team, for example, devised mission matrices in an effort to portray the tasks required, task sequences, and the Army’s role. The reader may wonder why one of these models was not used for this thesis. Initially, the author attempted to craft a satisfactory model for a generic IS&TO. As discussed in the following chapter, however, research and analysis of these missions indicates that two of the essential characteristics of IS&TO are that they are complex and that each is unique. The author therefore concluded that IS&TO do not lend themselves to generic models.

As the analysis progressed, the use of synthesis declined and the importance of inductive reasoning increased. In the end, few sources agreed with the author’s ultimate conclusion and answer to the primary research question (which was answered last) and therefore inductive reasoning was the primary method of answering the primary research question. Conclusions and recommendations derived from this research are therefore hypotheses requiring further study which is recommended in the first recommendation of Chapter 5.

Summary

Interest in this topic was spawned by the author’s experiences in Iraq during the first year of Operation Iraqi Freedom. Those experiences sparked a realization of the fundamental truth that defeating an enemy in battle is no guarantee of strategic victory. The author’s work on the AFA team exposed the author to a wealth of information and
expert opinion that only deepened his interest in conducting individual research on this topic. As a junior-ranking member of that team, the researcher’s personal analysis and estimation of the problem was subordinate to those of the team leaders. This research thesis represents the author’s quest to conduct and articulate his individual research, findings and recommendations and, it is hoped, provide some innovative thought on the Army’s expanded jurisdiction in the contemporary strategic environment and the implications of that expanded jurisdiction.

1 Other areas for study considered but not examined in this thesis include an analysis of what is and is not war; the role of doctrine in today’s U.S. Army; current U.S. Army transformation initiatives and their applicability in IS&TO; the root of the Army’s cultural aversion to missions outside of traditional warfare; et al.
CHAPTER 4
ANALYSIS

Introduction

This chapter poses and answers the three subordinate research questions that must be addressed before the primary research question can be answered. The first subordinate research question, “What is the essential nature of the IS&TO challenge?” expounds on Metz and Millen’s definition of IS&TO to provide a broader understanding of the fundamental nature and requirements of these operations. Using that understanding, the second subordinate research question, “What is the Army’s role in conducting IS&TO?” is then addressed. With the Army’s role understood, deficiencies in performing that role are then identified and discussed. Identified deficiencies provide the basis for answering the primary research question, “What should the Army do to improve its ability to conduct Intervention, Stabilization, and Transformation Operations?” in the following chapter.

What is the essential nature of the IS&TO challenge?

Metz and Millen’s definition of IS&TO provides insights as to some of the essential characteristics of these operations. To refresh, Metz and Millen define IS&TO as “sustained and integrated interagency (often multinational) activities to project power to an ungoverned area, failed state, state-in-conflict, or chronic aggressor state, to quickly restore order, and then to ameliorate the source of instability or aggression by transforming that state into a stable, progressive member of the international community” (2005, 46). Aside from these operations being long-term, integrated efforts into failed,
failing, or chronic aggressor states, there are additional characteristics of the IS&TO challenge that must be understood in order to answer the secondary and primary research questions. This section is not an attempt to identify all of the enduring characteristics of IS&TO, but is, rather, a discussion of five key, contentious characteristics. These five characteristics are: uniqueness, complexity, interdependence of tasks, the presence of “Spoilers”, and the importance of Information Operations.

Each IS&TO is unique

Several studies have attempted to devise a generic template applicable to any IS&TO. Such an undertaking usually leads to designating phases and devising lines of operation and task lists overlaid on a timeline. The AFA, Orr’s *Winning the Peace*, the SSI study, and PKSOI have all attempted to frame the IS&TO problem in this manner. While conceptually helpful, generic templates belie the individuality and complexity of IS&TO. Recent U.S. interventions in Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan and elsewhere demonstrate that each situation is unique. Distinguishing characteristics include the desired endstate, the environment, the culture, the threat, the extent of required reconstruction, and a nearly infinite array of other factors. Every country is different. Every situation has its own peculiarities.

To illustrate, one of the most pressing needs following the 1991 Gulf War was the need to respond to the ecological disaster of burning oil wells. Dissimilarly, the most pressing need after U.S. forces arrived in Bosnia was establishing the rule of law by breaking up organized crime networks and arresting war criminals (Wilkie 2002, 33). In the 1915 intervention in Haiti, the first task for the intervening force was to negotiate an end to that country’s civil war (Henning, Bogie, and Lemelin 2004, 70).
The unique nature of each IS&TO is supported by a number of authors in the literature on the subject. The 1940 United States Marine Corps’ *Small Wars Manual* notes, “Small Wars present an infinite number of forms” (United States Marine Corps 1940, 1). Robert Orr writes, “Every country is different. . . . A one-size-fits-all approach is not appropriate” (2004, xii). And Robert Fenzel agrees stating, “Every crisis will be different” (2001).

The uniqueness of every IS&TO has several ramifications. Because each situation is different, no single, specific doctrine, process, task list, or organization can be constructed that will optimally apply to every situation. The wide variety of possible tasks, from capping oil fires to fighting organized crime, precludes creating organizations, doctrine, and training specifically to address every possible requirement in IS&TO.

IS&TO are complex

IS&TO tend to be frustrating, open-ended, and messy conflicts (Donnally 2005). Because IS&TO are conducted in failed, failing, and chronic aggressor states where the majority of the populace live in cities, the IS&TO battlefield is typically urban and nonlinear (Morrison-Taw and Peters 1995, 376). U.S. personnel often operate in the midst of civilians, NGOs, host nation personnel, news media, diplomats, foreign military personnel, and others. The IS&TO force might deal with refugees, curfews, crowd control, municipal governments, street gangs, educators, armed citizens, disease, mass casualties, police, cultural sites, decrepit infrastructure, religious influences, and many other factors.
Adding to the complexity is that IS&TO do not progress linearly or in a predictable fashion. In IS&TO, activities may careen from stability and reconstruction to coercive measures and back to cooperative actions (Morrison-Taw and Peters 1995, 388). This phenomenon is evidenced by events in Iraq where, despite the declaration eighteen months earlier that major combat operations were over, coalition forces mounted a major offensive to root out enemy forces in Fallujah in November 2004. Rapid shifts between combat and peacebuilding can be caused by a number of different, but often interactive phenomena such as shifting guidance from political leaders in Washington, D.C., deterioration, or improvement in the operational environment (Morrison-Taw and Peters 1995, 389). One observer notes, “Such transitions are not for the faint of heart or the weak of mind or imagination” (Wilson 2004, 55).

The significance of complexity is that it places a premium on unity of effort. An operation in which different organizations are charged with the various functions of IS&TO is subject to friction that can jeopardize the entire effort. Friction between military forces and other entities in IS&TO is well documented. For example, leaders from the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA) have publicly complained that military leaders did not adequately support them in Iraq. Ambassador Timothy Carney, who was ORHA’s lead in reconstituting Iraq’s Ministry of Industry and Minerals wrote, “By our fourth day, people under Jay Garner . . . were frustrated . . . ORHA was not treated seriously enough by the military given what we were supposed to do” (Carney 2003).

Similar problems were encountered in Afghanistan. During one AFA non-attribution interview, a U.S. Army general recently returned from Afghanistan related
how the German government, who had responsibility for training police, designed a three-year training program. U.S. commanders felt that it needed to be completed much sooner and consequently created their own training programs to produce police faster (Warner interview with Army General 2005). Similar duplication of efforts and inefficiencies are likely to occur when there is no unity of effort. The need for unity of effort highlights the potential pitfalls of having different organizations responsible for the various tasks and functions required in IS&TO.

Frameworks and the interdependence of IS&TO activities

Many observers use simple frameworks for describing the IS&TO challenge. The figures included in Chapter 2 are representative of the models analysts have devised. Linear concepts such as phases, timelines, transitions, lines of operation, pillars, and task lists may be useful in conceptualization and have been used with success in devising campaign plans for specific IS&TO, but they are problematic in analyzing IS&TO in general. In addition to their previously discussed inability to account for the individuality and complexity of IS&TO, these models have additional shortcomings that make them unsuitable for analyzing the IS&TO challenge.

The use of phases and timelines that fit on a single page belies the true nature of IS&TO. Interventions “typically last five to eight years” (Defense Science Board 2004, iv) and phases and transitions are often discernable only in retrospect. Lieutenant General David McKiernan, the Land Forces Commander at the beginning of Operation Iraqi Freedom, recognized this and stated before the war began “that there would be a ‘blurred transition’ between the two phases (combat and postcombat) of the campaign” (Cable News Network 2003). McKiernan’s prediction proved accurate as two U.S. Army
Generals involved in the events that immediately followed the fall of Baghdad confirmed. They told the AFA team, “We were months into (reconstruction) and nobody had ever declared Phase IV” (Warner interview with two retired Army Generals 2005).

A simple model to explain and conceptualize the complexity of IS&TO may be desirable, but attempting to distill something so convoluted into a single PowerPoint slide is fraught with pitfalls. As one Army General said in a non-attribution interview, “People like to talk about phases and transitions, like there are clear distinctions. . . . Phases and transitions are seductive -- but the fact is that they are never clearly distinguishable in the moment. We must beware of creating simple models to complex problems” (Warner interview with Army Lieutenant General 2005).

Additionally, the tasks required during IS&TO are demonstrably interdependent. Although models often depict a clear sequence of events, there is disagreement as to which tasks must occur first. The DSB report, for example states, “Once military forces are able to reduce violence and establish a secure environment in a country or region, it creates a window of opportunity during which reconstruction can take place” (2004, ix). Meanwhile, a RAND study states, “Nationbuilding is not primarily about rebuilding a country’s economy, but about transforming its political institutions” (Dobbins et al. 2003, 161). Another observer writes, “There can be no modicum of security until the essential services and economic sectors can be stabilized” (Wilson 2004, 43). Thus, there is wide disagreement as to which tasks and functions must come first. Some believe that security begets reconstruction and transformation and, in some cases, that appears to be true, while, in other situations, it appears that reconstruction and transformation create security.
This is an important paradox and it should inform all analyses of the IS&TO challenge. Secretary General of the United Nations Kofi Annan correctly summed up this paradox when he said, “All the tasks, humanitarian, military, political, social, and economic are interconnected, and the people engaged in them need to work closely together. We cannot expect lasting success in any of them unless we pursue all of them at once as part of a single coherent strategy” (Orr 2003, 23). The NDU study concurs and goes even one step further stating, “Combat and Stability and Reconstruction operations must be conducted concurrently” (Binnendijk and Johnson 2004, xii). The reality is that no one function, line of operation, or pillar can be pursued independently from the others -- they are all interdependent.

The interdependence of required tasks highlights the need for integrated planning and execution. IS&TO campaign plans and models that portray reconstruction tasks as following the establishment of security misunderstand the nature of the environment. The Army’s experience in Iraq has shown that the insecurity stems from but also contributes to the lack of reconstruction. Thus, lines of operation and tasks need to be crafted for each unique circumstance and must be woven together in order to move towards mission success in IS&TO.

No argument is made here that lines of operation, task lists and timelines can be disposed with when designing specific campaign plans for specific IS&TO missions. As a division-level planner in the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) prior to Operation Iraqi Freedom, the author observed the utility of these planning tools first hand. The author contends only that a valid generic IS&TO template is impossible to construct. Nonetheless, models such as Crane and Terrill’s mission matrix (see Appendix A), which
was created specifically with Operation Iraqi Freedom in mind, are extremely useful tools for planning IS&TO.

“Spoilers” will attempt to undermine efforts to establish security

The JFCOM Stability Operations Joint Operating Concept states that “Nearly all societies include an element of instability,” and the military should expect various individuals and groups to attempt to thwart IS&TO efforts. JFCOM calls these destabilizing actors “Spoilers” and defines them as “internal or external groups and individuals that willfully threaten the success” of the IS&TO (U.S. Department of Defense 2004, 13). JFCOM identifies three different types: Total Spoilers, Limited Spoilers, and Greedy Spoilers. Total Spoilers are those who, “for a variety of reasons, cannot be or do not want to be assimilated into the . . . society.” Limited Spoilers oppose assimilation but can sometimes be brought into the new society once their concerns are met. Greedy Spoilers act “to satisfy selfish, usually economic, interests.” They may be criminals, but they can often be co-opted or dealt with by law-enforcement-type actions (U.S. Department of Defense 2004, 15).

The confederacy that comprises the insurgency in Iraq seems to validate JFCOM’s description of Spoilers. Jihadists constitute one aspect of the threat to coalition efforts. These elements employ suicide bombers and other irregular tactics, and are prototypical Total Spoilers. Former Ba’athists and the followers of Moktada Al-Sadr exhibit traits of Limited Spoilers in that they have strong reservations about the new Iraqi government but appear to be joining the political process as their concerns (adequate Sunni representation on the committee drafting the new constitution and adequate respect
for Islamic law, respectively) are addressed. Finally, evidence suggests that there are an abundance of Greedy Spoilers who attack coalition and Iraqi targets primarily for profit.¹

Although best expressed by the JFCOM JOPC, several other commentators highlight the threats to security and stability in IS&TO. General Frank Kitson, for example, wrote in 1971, “It is virtually impossible to imagine an orthodox war taking place without an accompanying campaign of subversion or insurgency” (1971, 27). Likewise, Robert Orr writes, “post-conflict situations, by definition, have at their core a significant security vacuum that is often the proximate cause for external intervention” (2004, 40).²

Just how prominent these Spoilers are directly impacts the availability and effectiveness of agencies outside of DoD in IS&TO. If the threat level is high, as it presently is in Iraq, civilian agencies may be incapable of making significant contributions to the IS&TO effort, thereby increasing the military’s jurisdiction. On the other hand, if the threat level is low, many of the IS&TO functions may be conducted by civilian agencies. Regardless of the threat level, the IS&TO force must include a vigilant armed force prepared to react to changes in the threat situation.

The presence of Spoilers illuminates two key requirements in IS&TO. First, there is a need for armed security forces with the ability to deal with all three kinds of Spoilers and, more importantly, to escalate offensive operations if required. Within U.S. Government organizations, this is something only the military can do on a large-scale. The IS&TO force must be able to kill or capture Total Spoilers, while performing the required information operations and constabulary functions to deal with Limited and Greedy Spoilers. As Robert Kagan writes, “Some of the people will have to be killed.
Others will have to be captured or driven into hiding. The overwhelming majority however, have to be persuaded” (2003). Metz and Millen agree writing, “. . . the most successful stabilization force is one that wears both the mailed gauntlet and the velvet glove” (2005, 49).

Other requirements arising from the presence of these Spoilers are a need for robust intelligence gathering, Psychological Operations, and Information Operations capabilities to enable the IS&TO force to identify and locate Spoilers and also to differentiate between the different types of Spoilers. These requirements help illuminate the types of capabilities required by the organizations conducting IS&TO and clearly indicate a prominent role for the U.S. Army.

Information Operations are often decisive in IS&TO

The decisive battlespace in IS&TO is often found in the psychological realm. IS&TO are ultimately successful when the host nation populace, including most Spoilers, is persuaded to assimilate into the transformed society. This “winning of hearts and minds” is accomplished by effecting economic, political, and social reforms, but most importantly through Information Operations (Morrison-Taw and Peters 1995, 405).

Several authors and AFA interviewees posit that Information Operations, which include Psychological Operations, Civil Affairs, Strategic Communications, and other functions are often decisive in IS&TO. One interviewee, a British General Officer, stated that “winning the support of the decent majority” of the host nation populace has been the main effort in every deployment he has ever been on (Warner interview with British Brigadier General 2005). Another interviewee related that in Afghanistan, he found that the only way his forces could find and target terrorists was to expand the area under his
control and that the only way to secure more area was to “go out and make friends” (Warner interview with Army General 2005). Metz and Millen also agree that Information Operations are critical stating, “The further IS&TO proceed, the more important that nonkinetic realms -- the psychological -- become” (2005, 47).

The significance of this essential characteristic is that, in many cases, capturing and killing of Spoilers should not be perceived as the decisive effort during IS&TO. Instead, the main effort must be on winning hearts and minds. The Army must be alert to the possibility that although it possess an impressive array of “hammers,” not all problems are truly “nails.” In other words, the challenges of IS&TO are often better solved through persuasion rather than force. Information Operations, therefore, cannot simply be an appendix to the campaign plan -- they are as important as kinetic, combat operations, and must be given due consideration.

Metz and Millen’s definition of IS&TO provides three characteristics of the essential nature of the IS&TO challenge. The analysis provided herein identifies an additional five characteristics. A combined list of inherent characteristics of IS&TO includes:

1. They require a sustained effort averaging 5-8 years in length.
2. They are generally conducted in failed, failing, or rogue states.
3. They require integration of interagency and multinational organizations.
4. Every IS&TO is unique.
5. They are complex and require unity of effort.
6. Functions, activities, and tasks are interdependent.
7. Spoilers will attempt to undermine IS&TO efforts.
8. Information Operations are often decisive in IS&TO. This understanding of the environment illuminates the capabilities generally required during these operations. The next step in the analysis is to determine the Army’s role in IS&TO.

What is the Army’s Role in IS&TO?

The Army’s proper role in IS&TO is the most contentious question addressed by this thesis. Opinions are polarized and firmly held. Ivo Daalder, a Senior Fellow in Foreign Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution, has said, “The only agency that should not run nationbuilding is the Department of Defense” (LaFranchi 2005) while author and retired U.S. Army Colonel Lloyd Matthews writes, “The only credible institutions for nation-building efforts are the Army and the Marine Corps” (Matthews 2004, 28). There is fundamental disagreement as to which U.S. Government agency has and should have responsibility for the stabilization and transformation functions of IS&TO. An analysis of current and pending strategic documents reveals that clear mandates do not exist and are not delineated in any of the proposed initiatives.

Department of Defense Directive 5100.1 states that one of the responsibilities of the Army is, “To provide forces for the occupation of territories abroad, including initial establishment of military government pending transfer of this responsibility to other authority” (U.S. Department of Defense 2002, 17). This directive, however, does not specify who this “other authority” will be. Additional confusion stems from the National Military Strategy which states, “. . .military postconflict operations will integrate conflict termination objectives with diplomatic, economic, financial, intelligence, law enforcement, and information efforts. Joint Forces will, when appropriate, synchronize
and coordinate their operations and activities with international partners and non-
governmental organizations” (Joint Chiefs of Staff 2004, 13, emphasis added). The
wording in these and other documents is presumably carefully chosen to avoid binding
specificity.

Pending strategic initiatives such as The Lugar Bill (S.192), the fledgling Office
of the Coordinator for Stabilization and Reconstruction, and DoD Draft Directive 3000
also fail to establish clear mandates. S.192 directs the Department of Defense to
“designate the planning for stabilization and reconstruction as a mission of the
Department of Defense,” but implies later in the bill that the Department of State will
have primary responsibility for reconstruction operations (U.S. Congress. Senate 2005).
DoD 3000 is equally fuzzy. It makes extensive mention of the need to coordinate with
other agencies, but also states that, “U.S. military forces shall be prepared to support the
activities necessary to accomplish these tasks when civilian authorities are unable to do
so” (U.S. Department of Defense 2005, 2). Clear mandates for different organizations
involved in IS&TO would be helpful in determining the Army’s role, but such clarity was
not found in any of the sources examined for this study.

Although there are potential advantages to ambiguity (e.g. it preserves a range of
options), the downside is that it fosters ambivalence and confusion within the military
and among students of U.S. strategy. Confusion reigns even among senior Army leaders.
During candid, non-attribution interviews with the Army Focus Area team, several of the
current and retired Army Generals consulted encouraged the team to be very careful
about how recommendations were worded. One typical reaction to the team’s
presentation, expressed by a retired General, was “I think you should rewrite all of your
tasks to say we will ‘support’ reconstruction and ‘support’ development of economic institutions. We need to make sure that we are not the leaders in these tasks” (Warner interview with retired U.S. Army General 2005). A counterargument to such ambiguous phrasing is expressed by another General officer who has said, “For those who say this is not a job for the military, my next question to them would be, for whom is it when there is nobody else there?” (Wilkie 2002, 38).

Without consensus among experts and without clear, unambiguous, strategic mandates, the question of the Army’s proper role in IS&TO must be deduced from two key findings that illuminate the Army’s role in IS&TO. First, the incipient capabilities of other U.S. Government agencies in IS&TO indicate that none of them are suited to lead in these operations. Second, the essential nature of the IS&TO challenge and the inherent characteristics of the United States Army indicate that it is adequately suited to bear the preponderance of the IS&TO burden. These two key findings, discussed below, make the Army the only logical choice to lead the nation’s IS&TO efforts.

There is no shortage of damning critiques of interagency organizations’ performance during recent IS&TO. One observer calls Government agencies’ efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan “half-hearted” (Leonhard 2003). Another states, “The myriad agencies involved coordinate their activities only if they feel it is their best interests to do so” (Gibbings 1998). During a non-attribution interview, one Army General Officer stated, “The interagencies simply don’t have the ethic, the capabilities, or the capacities” (Warner interview with Army Major General 2005). Another stated, “Interagency players talk a good game, but when it comes to actually fielding an operational capability, they always come up short and the Army ends up doing the heavy lifting” (Warner interview
with Army Lieutenant General 2005). Yet another Army Focus Area interviewee said, “The bulk of the interagency folks that showed up in Iraq stayed there for 90 days only to plug their resumes -- they stayed in the Green Zone, got bug-eyed, and hurried back to CONUS (the continental United States)” (Warner interview with retired Army General 2005).

These criticisms highlight some of the critical deficiencies that hinder government and civilian agencies’ ability to effectively conduct IS&TO. These agencies’ most critical shortcoming, however, is that they “cannot generally operate in less than a secure environment” (Henning, Bogie, and Lemelin 2004, 11). In a secure environment, U.S. Government and civilian agencies can make significant contributions to and may be able to lead the functions of stability and transformation. In a dangerous environment, however, they might not even make it in to theater. This alone suggests that the Department of Defense should at least be prepared to conduct IS&TO without significant assistance from other agencies.

The nature of the environment and the characteristics of the U.S. Army also indicate that the Army is uniquely suited to bear the preponderance of the IS&TO burden. While not all of the characteristics of the environment directly indicate the Army should lead in IS&TO, several of them do.

Two characteristics of the IS&TO challenge identified in the previous section are that these missions require a sustained effort over several years and are most often conducted in failed, failing or rogue states. In this context, “sustained” means not only a long stretch of time, but also a reliance on integral resources. The Army is the only organization within the U.S. Government and DoD that can truly conduct sustained
operations in an austere environment. FM 3-0 Operations states, “Army forces can conduct sustained, large-scale full spectrum operations throughout the theater of operations. . . . Robust combat support and combat service support to the joint force make sustained land action possible” (2001a, 1-6). Approximately 70 percent of the U.S. Army’s massive manpower and resources are dedicated to overhead and logistic support elements (McPeak 2001). No other organization approaches this level of sustainment capabilities.

Additionally, analysis of the IS&TO challenge indicates that there will almost always be some level of threat to U.S. efforts (i.e. “Spoilers). The Army is organized, trained, and equipped to deal with enemies of U.S. efforts. FM 3-0 Operations notes that, “Only land forces can exercise direct, continuing, discriminate, and comprehensive control over land, people, and resources” (2001a, 1-6). The U.S. Army has doctrine, organizations, and equipment specifically designed to conduct the conventional small-unit tactics required to deal with Spoilers. Thus, this essential characteristic of IS&TO also suggests a significant role for the Army.

Complexity also indicates a need for unity of effort meaning that only one person and one organization should ideally be in charge. FM 3-0 Operations states “For every objective, ensure unity of effort under one responsible commander” (2001a, 4-14). Ambiguous mandates and ad hoc co-leadership arrangements add unnecessary friction to an already complex operation. If unity of effort is important, than only one organization should lead. The Army has senior leaders educated and experienced in strategic operations. Of all the organizations available, it has the doctrine, staff processes, manpower, and organizational structure to perform this leadership role.
Finally, the complexity and uniqueness of IS&TO indicate a need for a flexible and adaptive force. The Army prides itself on its long tradition of Full Spectrum Operations. “Throughout the nation’s history, Army forces have demonstrated that the Army remains the nation’s strategic land combat force, a service with the diverse capabilities needed to conduct full spectrum operations -- anytime, anywhere” (FM 3-0, Operations 2001a, 1-7). Institutionally, the Army has extensive experience in attempting to stabilize, reconstruct, and govern foreign societies.

Viewed holistically, the capabilities required in IS&TO and the inherent capabilities of the U.S. Army emphatically suggest that the Army is uniquely suited to lead in IS&TO. One commentary’s observation that no other organization is, or will soon be, comparably equipped, manned, led, trained or funded to conduct these operations seems to be substantiated by the evidence at hand (Morrison-Taw and Peters 1995, 375).

Senior military leaders offer important counterarguments to the conclusion that the Army should lead U.S. IS&TO efforts. Chief of Staff of the Army General Schoomaker has said, “I do not believe that we should make up, in the DoD, shortcomings that exist across the rest of our system. The kinds of things that need to happen to rebuild a civil society are not purely the DoD’s job. It’s an interagency job; it’s the job of other pieces of our government. We need assistance from coalitions and others. . . Principally, our job is to create conditions in which other people can do their work” (Kucera 2004). Similarly, Central Command Commanding General John Abizaid has said, “There is no strictly military solution to the problems we face. . . . It requires that we move together on the political front, on the economic front, and the reconstruction front in a manner that is synchronized and coordinated. If we don’t do that, I do not
believe that we can be successful. So you can pay the military to stay there, but you are
only paying us to stay forever” (Orr 2004, 23).

In addition to the objections of these two senior leaders, a number of other
arguments have been made against the Army having a primary role in the functions of
stabilization and transformation. Critics have suggested that such operations overextend
the force, degrade the military’s combat edge, and that these functions run counter to the
warrior ethos. Leonard Wong’s monograph Developing Adaptive Leaders: The Crucible
Experience of Operation Iraqi Freedom states that these missions seem to have the
opposite effect improving officer capabilities by teaching them to be “adaptive and agile”
(Wong 2004, 7). Likewise, General Montgomery Meigs, a former commander of Army
forces in Europe has said, “What you’re getting out of this is a corps of leaders in the
Army. . . who are very, very, very tough in experience. That is worth its weight in gold”

The argument that the military should not lead in IS&TO is perhaps valid in
theory. However, the analysis presented herein indicates that the Army, whether by
design or default, bears the responsibility of leading the nation’s IS&TO efforts for the
foreseeable future. The participation of other government agencies, allies, and private
organizations should always be encouraged. Broad participation adds credibility to the
IS&TO force and lessens the burden on the Army. Allied and interagency participation
should not be relied on, however, and the Army must be prepared to succeed even when
little assistance from other organizations is available.
What are the Army’s deficiencies in IS&TO?

Several of the sources consulted and many of the AFA interviews identify deficiencies that preclude the Army from maximizing effectiveness and efficiency in IS&TO. Criticisms generally fall into two broad categories. Some authors and interviewees view the Army’s deficiencies primarily in terms of institutional culture and mindset. Others believe that the Army has specific deficiencies that span the areas of doctrine, organization, training, leadership and education, materiel, personnel, and facilities (DOTLMPF). Both viewpoints must be examined.

The first step in examining whether or not Army culture is inappropriate for IS&TO is to define what is meant by the term Army culture. As one Army General notes, “Culture is our set of subconscious assumptions, an organization’s collective state of mind. As such, it is frustratingly difficult to describe and articulate” (Fastabend 2004). Fortunately, this thesis does not suggest that the entire Army culture is inappropriate for IS&TO, only how the Army views its primary mission. Therefore, only an understanding of the Army’s current view of its primary mission is critical before proceeding.

FM 3-0, Operations, one of the Army’s two capstone doctrinal manuals, states, “Fighting and winning the nation’s wars is the foundation of Army service -- the Army’s non-negotiable contract with the American people” (2001a, 1-1). This statement’s prominence in the opening paragraph of the Army’s primary doctrinal manual is a very clear reflection of the Army’s current view of its primary mission -- fighting and winning wars.
The ubiquitous focus on fighting and winning has spawned a “cult of the offensive” within the U.S. Army that values and rewards firepower, maneuver, and tactical battlefield valor above all else (Wilson 2004, 4). The IS&TO challenge, however, calls for different attributes. As the examination of the environment revealed, Information Operations and the winning of hearts and minds are decisive in IS&TO. Offensive operations are an important component of IS&TO, but by themselves are unlikely to achieve strategic objectives. In fact, tactical “victories” can sometimes actually be a setback to the overall IS&TO effort. “Destroying a village in order to save it” may well actually breed more Spoilers. Furthermore, if the collateral damage is broadcast worldwide, it may be a significant Information Operations (and therefore strategic) setback. In summary, the Army’s present focus on offensive, kinetic battle is not appropriate for the realities of IS&TO and is, therefore, a key deficiency.

The position that the Army’s primary deficiency in IS&TO is an institutional culture that is averse to any tasks outside of traditional warfare is succinctly expressed by one author who writes, “Operational failures can be traced to a preoccupation with traditional fire-and-maneuver warfighting and an inability to adapt to a politically turbulent, complex environment” (Fenzel 2001). Similar sentiments are echoed by other authors and several of the AFA interviewees. During one non-attribution interview, one General Officer stated that in studying U.S. interventions in Haiti, Bosnia, and Iraq, one of the biggest deficiencies he observed was “commanders and leaders who don’t have their head in the right game – they arrive ready to shoot and find that’s not the war they’re in” (Warner interview with Army Lieutenant General 2005). A division commander recently returned from Iraq diagnoses this problem saying, “Culture change
is the biggest thing. Pure and simple, that’s the issue. The Army doesn’t have capability
gaps -- we need to quit blaming this (Army deficiencies) on capability gaps” (Warner
interview with Army Major General 2005).

The other side of the debate holds that critical DOTLMPF deficiencies do exist
and that resolving these deficiencies is the key to transforming culture and improving the
Army’s ability to conduct IS&TO. Several authors suggest that doctrine, for example, is
flawed in that there is a “separation of stability operations and warfighting within Army
document” which “leaves soldiers with a false sense of the complexity of the environment”
(Henning, Bogie, and Lemelin 2004, 14). There are also training and leader development
and education problems evidenced by the halfhearted manner in which Army schools and
Combined Training Centers incorporate MOOTW and SASO into course curricula and
training exercises.

Thomas McNaugher found that the Army’s Command and General Staff College
“devotes 50 of the 293 total hours of its two core operational courses (C300 and C500) to
conflicts below major theater war” and that only “two classes of the Army War College
on the history of warfare deal with the Army’s experience in Haiti and Bosnia”
(McNaugher 2002, 168). The author’s personal experience attending the Staff College
during the 2004-2005 school year was that the studies overwhelmingly pertained to the
study of traditional warfare. In the realm of training, McNaugher asserts that the Army
uses a “just enough (training) just in time” approach to training on tasks beyond
traditional combat (2002, 168) meaning that units only train for these tasks prior to a
known deployment. One AFA non-attribution interviewee supports these assertions
stating, “Current Army doctrine and training pay insufficient attention to everything
outside of a traditional view of warfare” (Warner interview with Army Major General 2005).

Within DOTLMPF, most recommendations encountered in the sources consulted and during AFA interviews centered on the factors of doctrine, organizational design, training, and leadership and education. The overwhelming number DOTLMPF deficiencies found in the sources consulted precludes a detailed discussion of each. However, the most prevalent deficiencies identified by the AFA team’s analysis are:

1. Doctrine that pays insufficient attention to stabilization, reconstruction and transformation functions and tasks (Doctrine factor of DOTLMPF)
2. Insufficient Information Operations capabilities in current Army organizations (Organization factor of DOTLMPF)
3. Organizational design that does not facilitate integration of interagency plug-ins (Organization factor of DOTLMPF)
4. Lack of training on tasks outside of traditional warfighting (Training factor of DOTLMPF)
5. Leadership and education programs that neglect stabilization, reconstruction and transformation (Leadership and education factor of DOTLMPF)
6. Personnel policies that fail to promote, reward, and retain IS&TO expertise (Personnel factor of DOTLMPF).

The reader may notice that the Materiel and Facilities factors of DOTLMPF are not represented in the listing above. While deficiencies in these areas may, in fact, exist (some AFA interviewees suggested, for example, that the Command Training Center facilities are inadequate for training large units for Stability Operations), the other factors
have deficiencies that were noted consistently in sources consulted and during AFA interviews. Recommendations regarding the factors of Materiel and Facilities are not, therefore, discussed in detail in this thesis.

Determining whether culture or the factors of DOTLMPF are the most pressing deficiencies in the Army’s ability to perform IS&TO requires an understanding of the relationship between Army culture and the factors of DOTLMPF. Some argue that certain factors of DOTLMPF create the Army’s cultural mindset while others believe that changing the Army’s culture will beget the required DOTLMPF changes. This latter position holds that if, for example, stabilization tasks are trained and evaluated (training and leadership and education aspects of DOTLMPF), they will become a part of the organizational culture. The former position, that culture begets DOTLMPF factors, is expressed by one AFA interviewee who said, “We have falsely believed this was not our job. Once we embrace it, we’ll rapidly develop the doctrine and tools to get it done” (Warner interview with Army Lieutenant General 2005).

Although this may seem like an irreconcilable paradox, both viewpoints have merit. Changing the Army’s culture is undoubtedly of paramount importance. Unless the Army acknowledges that its primary mission is no longer fighting and winning wars (FM 3-0 2001b, 1-2) but is now ameliorating sources of instability by transforming a state into a progressive member of the international community (Metz and Millen 2005, 46), the Army will continue to struggle in IS&TO. Changing the Army’s institutional mindset will likely take years but will eventually result in quantum changes across all aspects of DOTLMPF. Some of those DOTLMPF deficiencies should be addressed immediately, however, because they can serve as short-term wins and sustain the momentum of
changing the overall institutional culture. John Kotter, a professor of leadership at Harvard, supports this assessment positing that true transformation balances both long-term vision (e.g. culture change) with short-term results (e.g. DOTLMPF changes) (Kotter 1998). Applying Kotter’s model (1998) for transformational leadership to the Army, cultural and DOTLMPF deficiencies should therefore be pursued concurrently.

In summary, the answer to the question of “What are the Army’s deficiencies in IS&TO” is that the Army’s cultural mindset precludes it from embracing the IS&TO mission and that problem is exacerbated by inadequate doctrine, training, and leadership development and education programs. Together, an inappropriate cultural mindset and DOTLMPF deficiencies combine to hinder the Army’s success in IS&TO. Recommendations that address both categories of deficiencies are proposed in the following chapter. Before moving on to recommendations, however, it is appropriate to now consider some prevalent counterarguments to this analysis.

**Opposing Views**

There are prevalent counterarguments to the conclusion that the Army only needs to change its organizational mindset and tweak the factors of DOTLMPF. Some commentators believe that the cultural mindset required of an Army is inherently incompatible with the mindset required for stabilization, reconstruction, and transformation. Others feel that the Army can really only train for one primary task -- either traditional combat or stability operations. These critics therefore posit that “Special Purpose” forces should be created specifically to perform the different functions required in IS&TO. As discussed in Chapter 2, this position is voiced by several studies but it is perhaps best articulated by one author who wrote:
Soldiers need to know how to destroy targets. Nationbuilders need to know how to create good impressions and build formidable relationships. . . . We want first-line nationbuilders to be smart, educated, and capable of assessing situations and taking independent actions within the general guidelines set forth by the higher command. We want our nationbuilders to be open, approachable, and easy to communicate with. We want nationbuilders who understand and care about the locals.

We want nationbuilders to dialogue first and rely on force only as a last resort. We want our soldiers to have none of these qualities. The U.S. soldier should be the wrath of God, able to bring death and destruction anywhere at any time. Let the nationbuilder be the good guy and the soldier the bad guy. Attempting to have the same people in the same uniforms perform both roles confuses those around us and the soldiers themselves. (Anderson 2004, 50)

The notion that a warfighting Army is fundamentally incompatible with the nationbuilding gained significant attention during the 2004 Presidential campaign. Then-candidate Senator John Kerry campaigned partially on a promise to add two new Army divisions, one of which would be an active duty division dedicated to stabilization and reconstruction (Kerry 2004).

Army leaders are almost unanimous in their opposition to this proposal. Chief of Staff of the Army General Peter Schoomaker has said, “I’m very much against forming constabulary types of outfits because I think that’s a recipe for disaster” (Kucera 2004, 58). Of the forty current and retired general officers who spoke off-the-record with the AFA team, only one was remotely warm to the idea of creating Special Purpose forces saying, “Rebuilding a country takes very specialized skills -- I’ve always felt that specialization is appropriate when you’re looking at complex issues. We can’t have the barber double as a dentist. Some things require specialization” (Warner interview with retired Army Major General 2005). Conversely, the other thirty-nine generals interviewed expressed strong opposition to the creation of a Special Purpose force. One of the primary reasons for rejecting the notion of Special Purpose forces expressed by AFA
interviewees is that any well-disciplined unit can accomplish any mission given to it. One officer who spoke off-the-record with the author of this thesis during an AFA conference stated that if an Infantry Battalion was given the mission to sell ice-cream, “We’d have an organization rivaling Ben and Jerry’s within three days.”

Aside from the fact that many senior officers, to include the Chief of Staff of the Army, are opposed to the idea, there are several other compelling arguments against the creation of new formations specifically designed for stability, reconstruction and transformation. First, even a full division would be overwhelmed by the frequency and duration of IS&TO missions. Analysis shows a new IS&TO has begun at a rate of one every eighteen to twenty-four months since the end of the Cold War and average five to eight years in duration (Defense Science Board 2004, iv). The current IS&TO missions in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere are taxing the combined active and reserve component Army, which numbers well over a million soldiers, and would completely overwhelm any proposed Special Purpose force.

A second argument is that the functions of IS&TO are necessarily interdependent. The IS&TO force must have the ability to accomplish whatever tasks are required simultaneously with combat operations. A Special Purpose force trained, equipped, and organized to conduct only certain tasks and IS&TO functions would therefore be unlikely to achieve success.

Finally, the argument that nationbuilding is fundamentally incompatible with the cultural mindset required of an Army is not demonstrably true. Throughout its history, the U.S. Army has proven that it can “shift among offensive, defensive, stability, and support operations as circumstances and missions require” (FM 3-0, Operations 2001, 4-
The Army’s performance in Global War on Terror is only the latest manifestation of this agility.

For these reasons, creation of a Special Purpose force to perform specialized functions is impractical, unadvisable, and would not lead to greater success in IS&TO. The skills, attributes, and cultural mindset required for combat operations are not incompatible with the cultural mindset required for IS&TO. The Army’s current cultural mindset, doctrine, training, and leadership development and education programs however, are not optimal for the complex realities of IS&TO.

With the three subordinate research questions answered and the most prevalent counterarguments addressed, the primary research question can now be addressed. The following chapter provides conclusions and recommendations that answer “What steps should the Army take to improve its ability to conduct IS&TO?”

1 The Middle East Media Research Institute, a nonpartisan, nonprofit organization produces translated transcripts of captured insurgents’ interrogations. Many of these transcripts indicate that attacks are motivated primarily by money.

2 Larry Yates agrees, stating that every one of the major wars fought in U.S. history (the American Revolution, the Civil War, the War of 1812, the Mexican War, the Spanish-American War, World Wars I and II, the Korean War, Vietnam, and the two Gulf wars) has had an unconventional element (2005).

3 The Army Values of Loyalty, Duty, Respect, Selfless Service, Honor, Integrity, and Personal Courage, for example, are entirely appropriate for IS&TO and require no modification.

4 The United States Army Focus Area for Stability and Reconstruction Operations, for example, found 37 specific doctrinal deficiencies, 25 organizational deficiencies, 32 training deficiencies, 19 materiel deficiencies, 26 leadership and education programs deficiencies, 19 personnel deficiencies, and 7 facilities deficiencies (2005).
CHAPTER 5
RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION

What steps should the Army take to improve its ability to conduct IS&TO?

The answer to the primary research question of this thesis is that “The Army must change its cultural mindset and make DOTLMPF changes that will foster acceptance of IS&TO as its primary mission.” Deceptively simple to say, the magnitude of changing an institutional mindset forged over the past 230 years should not be underestimated. Changing culture requires a fundamental change in how the Army views itself and its mission and calls into question transformational initiatives currently underway. It requires a change in how the Army defines war and how it views its roles and responsibilities. In short, it is no small task. Changes to doctrine, training, and leadership and education curricula, on the other hand, are comparatively easier to effect. These DOTLMPF changes, in turn, will serve as short-term “wins” that will help sustain the long-term effort to change culture.

Dr. John Kotter posits that there are eight essential steps to transforming an organization. While it is well beyond the scope of this thesis to devise a plan for transforming the Army, Kotter’s model illuminates some of the critical first steps the Army should take to ameliorate its IS&TO deficiencies. Specifically, three of Kotter’s eight steps should be taken immediately: form a powerful guiding coalition; create a new vision; and communicate that new vision (1998).

The first step the Army should take is to, “Form a powerful guiding coalition” to lead the change effort (Kotter 1998). AFA non-attribution interviews revealed a division
between officers who grasp the concept of IS&TO, and those who cling to the notion that every problem on the battlefield can be solved with firepower. This is evidenced by two of the recurring senior leader comments listed in figure 4. While some interviewees recognize a need for the Army to embrace nonwarfighting missions, others insist that the Army should not “sign up to do other agencies’ missions” (United States Army Focus Area for Stability and Reconstruction Operations, 2005). The interviews revealed that leaders who have extensive experience in complex IS&TO environments understand the essential nature of IS&TO, while those without such experience, do not. The Chief of Staff of the Army should convene a council of leaders with extensive IS&TO experience to further study the issues raised and conclusions drawn in this thesis, modify them as they see fit, and devise a roadmap for change. This recommendation is supported by a division commander recently returned from Iraq who told the AFA team, “I’d like to get the real experts together -- guys that lived this thing -- to really identify the problem. We should have a conference that really means something” (Warner interview with Army Major General 2005). Individuals selected for this team should have “strong position power, broad experience, high credibility, and real leadership skill” (Kotter 1998).

The Army’s current cultural deficiencies and the need to embrace IS&TO as its primary mission should be addressed by creating and communicating a new mission statement for the Army. Three of Kotter’s eight steps for transforming an organization center on the need for a “vision” for change. “Producing change is about 80 percent leadership -- establishing direction, aligning, motivating, and inspiring people -- and about 20 percent management -- planning, budgeting, organizing and problem solving,” he writes (1998). If this is accepted as true, creating, communicating, and sustaining a
new vision for the Army is a critical step. The Chief of Staff of the Army should promulgate a revised vision statement that institutionalizes and explains the Army’s expanded IS&TO mission. This could be accomplished by a Chief of Staff message to the field, a chain-teach briefing, or some other mechanism, but the word must go out and be reiterated often that the Army has an expanded mission beyond merely fighting and winning wars.

Finally, the Army should address some of its most pressing DOTLMPF deficiencies, thereby creating “short-term wins” and sustaining momentum for the long-term change in cultural mindset (Kotter 1998). The doctrinal deficiency, for example, should begin to be addressed by publishing a new FM 3-0. As one of the Army’s capstone doctrinal manuals, it should be rewritten first and should address IS&TO as a “core competency”. Another short-term recommendation, achievable in the first six months of this transformation, is that major training exercises should be modified to incorporate all three functions of IS&TO. Additionally, the Army’s long-held tradition of equal command opportunity (Vandergriff 2002) should be abandoned in favor of selecting officers who have successfully led in IS&TO. A final DOTLMPF short-term recommendation is that Army officer education, from pre-commissioning through attendance at the War College needs to include more study of the Army’s 200-year history with IS&TO which would indoctrinate them with the notion that IS&TO are, or should be, a “core competency.”

Conclusion

The conundrum of winning battles yet losing wars has been examined many times prior to this effort. History shows that the inability to translate tactical, battlefield
successes into enduring strategic victories is not a new phenomenon. Unless the Army embraces the concept of IS&TO as discussed in this thesis, the cycle of recurrence is likely continue. The transformation required to optimize the Army to conduct IS&TO will take years if not decades but if the Army truly believes in accomplishing missions and taking care of soldiers, no initiative is more important.

1 Kotter’s eight steps are: Establish a sense of urgency; Form a powerful guiding coalition; Create a vision; Communicate the vision; Empower others to act on the vision; Plan for and create short-term wins; Consolidate improvements and produce still more change; Institutionalize new approaches (1998).
## APPENDIX A

### CRANE AND TERRILL’S MISSION MATRIX

#### APPENDIX A

**MISSION MATRIX FOR IRAQ**

*C = Critical Task, E = Essential Task, I = Important Task*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Task No.</th>
<th>Task</th>
<th>Security Phase</th>
<th>Stabilize Phase</th>
<th>Build Institutions</th>
<th>Handover Phase</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1A-C</td>
<td>Secure/Destroy WMD</td>
<td>CMF</td>
<td>CMF</td>
<td>DoS, UNMVIC</td>
<td>Transparent Iraq Govt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1B-C</td>
<td>Stop Intra- and Inter-faction Fighting</td>
<td>CMF</td>
<td>CMF</td>
<td>CMF, DoS</td>
<td>Iraq Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1C-E</td>
<td>Train New Iraq Army</td>
<td>CMF</td>
<td>CMF</td>
<td>CMF (broadened)</td>
<td>US Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1D-C</td>
<td>Round Up Regime</td>
<td>CMF</td>
<td>CMF, CIA, DoJ</td>
<td>CIA, DoJ</td>
<td>Iraq Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1E-C</td>
<td>Eliminate Pockets of Resistance</td>
<td>CMF</td>
<td>CMF</td>
<td>CMF</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1F-E</td>
<td>Process Delinquent POWs</td>
<td>CMF, DoJ</td>
<td>CMF, IATF</td>
<td>CMF, IATF</td>
<td>Iraq Institutions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1G-C</td>
<td>Secure Borders</td>
<td>CMF</td>
<td>CMF</td>
<td>CMF, IRA</td>
<td>Iraq Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1H-C</td>
<td>Seize and Secure Oil Facilities</td>
<td>CMF</td>
<td>CMF</td>
<td>CMF, IRA</td>
<td>Iraq Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>1I-C</td>
<td>Plan and Conduct Consequence Management</td>
<td>CMF</td>
<td>CMF</td>
<td>CMF, IRA</td>
<td>Iraq Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1J-C</td>
<td>Plan and Conduct Theater Information Operations</td>
<td>CMF</td>
<td>CMF</td>
<td>CMF, IRA</td>
<td>Iraq Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>1K-C</td>
<td>Maintain Freedom of Movement</td>
<td>CMF</td>
<td>CMF</td>
<td>CMF, IRA</td>
<td>Iraq Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1L-E</td>
<td>Regulate Movement</td>
<td>CMF</td>
<td>CMF</td>
<td>CMF, IRA</td>
<td>Iraq Army</td>
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#### Category 2 - Public Administration

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<th>Task</th>
<th>Security Phase</th>
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<th>Build Institutions</th>
<th>Handover Phase</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2A-C</td>
<td>Establish and Assist Regional and Local Governments</td>
<td>CMF</td>
<td>CMF, AID, NED, DoS, IO</td>
<td>AID, NED, DoS, UNDP, IO</td>
<td>UNDP, Iraq Inst</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2B-I</td>
<td>EUSA National Legislative System</td>
<td>CMF</td>
<td>AID, NED, DoS, IO, CMF</td>
<td>Same as above</td>
<td>UNDP, Iraq Inst</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2C-I</td>
<td>EUSA National Executive Office</td>
<td>CMF, DoS</td>
<td>AID, NED, DoS, IO, CMF</td>
<td>Same as above</td>
<td>UNDP, Iraq Inst</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2D-I</td>
<td>EUSA Ministries</td>
<td>CMF, DoS</td>
<td>AID, NED, DoS, IO, CMF</td>
<td>Same as above</td>
<td>UNDP, Iraq Inst</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2E-I</td>
<td>Preserve &amp; Improve Public Records System</td>
<td>CMF, DoJ</td>
<td>CMF, DoJ</td>
<td>IRA Institutions</td>
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#### Category 3 - Legal

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<tr>
<th>Task No.</th>
<th>Task</th>
<th>Security Phase</th>
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<th>Handover Phase</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3A-E</td>
<td>Operate Criminal Court System</td>
<td>CMF, IRAI courts</td>
<td>AID, ACUSC, CIA, DoJ</td>
<td>AID, ACUSC, CIA, DoJ</td>
<td>IRAI</td>
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<tr>
<td>3B-E</td>
<td>Operate Civil Court System</td>
<td>CMF, IRAI courts</td>
<td>AID, ACUSC, CIA, DoJ</td>
<td>AID, ACUSC, CIA, DoJ</td>
<td>IRAI</td>
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<tr>
<td>3C-E</td>
<td>Establish and Operate System to Enact &amp; Enforce Laws</td>
<td>CMF, CIA</td>
<td>AID, CIA</td>
<td>AID, CIA, CIA</td>
<td>IRAI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3D-E</td>
<td>Operate Judicial Administrative System</td>
<td>CMF, IRAI courts</td>
<td>AID, ACUSC, CIA, DoJ</td>
<td>AID, ACUSC, CIA, DoJ</td>
<td>IRAI</td>
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<tr>
<td>3E-E</td>
<td>Support &amp; Conduct War Crimes Tribunals</td>
<td>CMF, IRAI courts</td>
<td>AID, ACUSC, CIA, DoJ</td>
<td>AID, ACUSC, CIA, DoJ</td>
<td>IRAI</td>
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<tr>
<td>3F-I</td>
<td>Provide Legal Education</td>
<td>CMF, CIA</td>
<td>AID, IRA</td>
<td>AID, IRA, IRA</td>
<td>IRAI</td>
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<tr>
<td>3G-I</td>
<td>Protect Human Rights</td>
<td>CMF</td>
<td>DoS, AID, CMF, NGO</td>
<td>DoS, AID, CMF, NGO</td>
<td>IRAI</td>
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#### Category 4 - Public Finance

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<th>Task No.</th>
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<th>Security Phase</th>
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<th>Build Institutions</th>
<th>Handover Phase</th>
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<tr>
<td>4A-E</td>
<td>Stabilize Currency</td>
<td>CMF, Tres</td>
<td>Tres</td>
<td>Tres, AID, WB, IMF</td>
<td>WB, IMF, IRAI</td>
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<tr>
<td>4B-I</td>
<td>Maintain &amp; Operate Govt Finance System (Diversification)</td>
<td>CMF, Tres</td>
<td>Tres</td>
<td>Tres, AID, WB, IMF</td>
<td>WB, IMF, IRAI</td>
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<tr>
<td>4C-I</td>
<td>Establish Private Financial Institutions</td>
<td>CMF, Tres</td>
<td>Tres</td>
<td>Tres, AID, WB, IMF</td>
<td>WB, IMF, IRAI</td>
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### Category 4 - Public Finance (Cont)

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<tr>
<td>4D-I</td>
<td>Conduct Foreign Currency Exchange</td>
<td>CMF</td>
<td>AID</td>
<td>DoS</td>
<td>WB, IMF, Iraqi</td>
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<tr>
<td>4E-E</td>
<td>Pay Govt Civil &amp; Military Employees</td>
<td>CMF</td>
<td>CMF</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>4F-I</td>
<td>Collect Customs and Duties</td>
<td>CMF</td>
<td>AID</td>
<td>DoS</td>
<td>WB, IMF, Iraqi</td>
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### Category 5 - Civil Information

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<tr>
<td>5B-C</td>
<td>R&amp;M Government Radio System</td>
<td>CMF</td>
<td>AID, BBG, CMF, DoS, FCC</td>
<td>Same as previous</td>
<td>Iraq</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5C-C</td>
<td>R&amp;M Government Television System</td>
<td>CMF</td>
<td>AID, FCC, CMF</td>
<td>Same as above</td>
<td>Iraq</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5D-I</td>
<td>Establish Private TV System</td>
<td>CMF</td>
<td>AID, FCC</td>
<td>AID, FCC</td>
<td>Iraq</td>
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<tr>
<td>5E-I</td>
<td>Establish Private Radio System</td>
<td>CMF</td>
<td>AID, FCC</td>
<td>AID, FCC</td>
<td>Iraq</td>
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<tr>
<td>5F-I</td>
<td>Develop Censorship and Libel Laws</td>
<td>CMF</td>
<td>AID, DoI, CMF, DoS, AL</td>
<td>DoI, CMF, DoS, AL</td>
<td>Iraq</td>
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<tr>
<td>5G-I</td>
<td>Restore &amp; Maintain Cable Systems</td>
<td>CMF</td>
<td>AID, CMF, DoS</td>
<td>DoS, Iraq, AID, CMF</td>
<td>Iraq</td>
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### Category 6 - Historical Cultural, Recreational Services

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<tr>
<td>6A-I</td>
<td>Maintain Art &amp; Cultural Institutions</td>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>DoS/EC, AID, Iraq</td>
<td>Previous + UNESCO</td>
<td>UNESCO, Iraqi</td>
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<tr>
<td>6B-I</td>
<td>Protect Historic Antiquities</td>
<td>CMF, Iraq</td>
<td>DoS/EC, DoI, AID, Iraq</td>
<td>Previous + UNESCO</td>
<td>UNESCO, Iraqi</td>
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<tr>
<td>6D-C</td>
<td>Protect Religious Sites &amp; Access</td>
<td>CMF, Iraq</td>
<td>CMF, Iraq</td>
<td>Previous + UNESCO</td>
<td>UNESCO, Iraqi</td>
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### Category 7 - Public Safety

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<tr>
<td>7B-I</td>
<td>Train Police</td>
<td>CMF</td>
<td>DoI, DoS/IIP, AP</td>
<td>DoI, DoS/IIP, AP, UNP</td>
<td>AP, Iraq</td>
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<tr>
<td>7C-E</td>
<td>Maintain Penal Systems</td>
<td>CMF</td>
<td>AID, DoI, CMF, AL</td>
<td>AID, DoI, AL</td>
<td>UNP, Iraq</td>
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<tr>
<td>7D-I</td>
<td>Provide &amp; Support Fire Fighting Systems</td>
<td>CMF</td>
<td>AID, FEMA, CMF</td>
<td>AID, FEMA</td>
<td>Iraq</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7E-E</td>
<td>Conduct Explosive Ord Disposal &amp; Demining</td>
<td>CMF</td>
<td>CMF, AID, DoS/PM, NGO</td>
<td>DoS/PM, UNMAS, NGO</td>
<td>UNMAS, Iraq, NGO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7F-I</td>
<td>Protect Foreign Residents</td>
<td>CMF</td>
<td>CMF, DoS</td>
<td>CMF, DoS, IRAI, Forces</td>
<td>IRAI</td>
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### Category 8 - Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration

<table>
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<th>Code</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Org1</th>
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<th>Org4</th>
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<tr>
<td>8A-E</td>
<td>Demobilize &amp; Reorganize Army/Sy/Sy Forces/Minas</td>
<td>CMF, DoS</td>
<td>CMF, DoS</td>
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<td>8B-I</td>
<td>Transfer &amp; Reorient to Integrate into Civil Sector</td>
<td>CMF</td>
<td>AID, CMF</td>
<td>AID, CMF</td>
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<td>8C-I</td>
<td>Reintegrate Demobilized Persons into Civil Sector</td>
<td>CMF</td>
<td>AID, DoS</td>
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<td>8E-E</td>
<td>Eradicate Baithe Party</td>
<td>CMF</td>
<td>AID, DoS/IIP, DoS/IIP, CVA</td>
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<td>8F-C</td>
<td>Disarm and Secure Weapons</td>
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<tr>
<th>Category 9 - Electoral Process for More Participatory Government</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>9A-I Plan Local Elections</td>
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<td>9B-I Plan National Elections</td>
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<tr>
<td>9C-I Prepare Local Elections</td>
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<tr>
<td>9D-I Prepare National Elections</td>
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<tr>
<td>9E-I Assist Conduct of Local Elections</td>
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<tr>
<td>9F-I Assist Conduct of Nat Elections</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9G-I Provide Post Local Election Support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9H-I Provide Post Nat Election Support</td>
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<tr>
<td>9I-I Plan for Constitutional Convention</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9J-I Assist Conduct of Const Convention</td>
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<tr>
<td>9K-I Assist Conduct of Constitutional Referendum</td>
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<tr>
<th>Category 10 - Disaster Preparedness and Response</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10A-I Provide Emergency Warning Systems</td>
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<tr>
<td>10B-I Provide Emergency Evacuation and Treatment</td>
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<tr>
<td>10C-I Provide Post Disaster Recovery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10D-I Conduct Pre-Disaster Planning</td>
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<tr>
<th>Category 11 - Public Works</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>11A-C Repair Roads and Streets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11B-C Repair Bridges</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11C-C Repair Port Facilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11D-C Repair Airports</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11E-C Repair Railroads</td>
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<td>11F-I Repair Dams</td>
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<td>11G-I Repair Canal System</td>
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<tr>
<th>Category 12 - Public Utilities</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>12A-C Restore &amp; Maintain Power Systems</td>
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<tr>
<td>12B-C Restore &amp; Maintain Water Systems</td>
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<tr>
<td>12C-I Restore &amp; Maintain Gas Systems</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12D-C R&amp;M Sewage Systems</td>
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<td>12E-E R&amp;M Garbage Collection</td>
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<th>Category 13 - Telecommunications and Public Communications</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>13A-E Restore and Maintain Telecommunications System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13B-C R&amp;M Broadcasting Systems</td>
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<tr>
<td>13C-I R&amp;M Postal System</td>
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<tr>
<th>Category 14 - Education</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>14A-E Operate Public School System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14B-E Operate Private School System</td>
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<tr>
<td>14C-E Provide Adult Education Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14D-E Provide Job Training Programs</td>
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<td>14E-E Provide University Education</td>
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category 15 - Public Health</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>15A-E Provide Emergency Medical Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15B-E Operate Hospitals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15C-E Provide Doctors and Health Professionals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15D-E Provide and Distribute Pharmaceutical Supplies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15E-E Provide and Distribute Non-Pharmaceutical Medical Supplies</td>
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<tr>
<td>15F-E Dispose of Medical Waste</td>
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<tr>
<td>15G-E Provide Vector Control Systems</td>
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<td>15H-E Provide Garbage Disposal System</td>
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<tr>
<td>15I-E Insure Proper Sanitation</td>
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<tr>
<td>15J-E Perform Preventive Medicine</td>
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<td>15K-E Provide Mortuary Services</td>
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<th>Category 16 - Public Welfare and Humanitarian Relief</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>16A-I Provide Assistance to Poor</td>
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<tr>
<td>16B-I Provide Emergency Relief</td>
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<tr>
<td>16C-I Operate Orphanages</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16D-I Provide Care for Aged</td>
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<tr>
<td>16E-I Provide Psychological Assistance</td>
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<tr>
<td>16F-I Care for and Relocate Refugees</td>
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<tr>
<td>16G-I Care for and Relocate Displaced Persons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16H-I Administer Oil for Food Program</td>
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<tr>
<td>16I-I Manage and Distribute Relief Supplies</td>
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<th>Category 17 - Economics and Commerce</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>17A-I Revitalize Commercial Sector</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17B-I Revitalize Industrial Sector</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17C-I Repair and Maintain Oil Facilities</td>
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<tr>
<td>17D-I Manage Oil Revenues</td>
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<tr>
<td>17E-I Implement Wage and Price Controls</td>
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<td>17F-I Maintain Foreign Trade System</td>
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### Category 17 - Economics and Commerce (Cont)

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<th>Iraq</th>
<th>ILO, Iraq</th>
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<tr>
<td>17G-I</td>
<td>Set Customs and Duties</td>
<td>AID, CMF</td>
<td>DoS, Try, DoC</td>
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<td>17H-C</td>
<td>Implement Oil Fire Contingencies</td>
<td>AID, CMF</td>
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### Category 18 - Labor

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<tr>
<td>18A-I</td>
<td>Establish and Provide Employment Services and Benefits</td>
<td>AID, DoL, DosDRL</td>
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<td>18B-I</td>
<td>Establish and Maintain System to Resolve Management - Labor Disputes</td>
<td>AID, DoL, OSHA</td>
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<td>18C-I</td>
<td>Establish and Monitor Worker Safety Programs</td>
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### Category 19 - Property Control

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<tr>
<td>19A-I</td>
<td>Establish and Enforce Ownership System for Real Property</td>
<td>AID, DoC, DoJ</td>
<td>Iraq</td>
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<td>19B-I</td>
<td>Establish and Enforce Ownership System for Personal Property</td>
<td>AID, DoC, DoJ</td>
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### Category 20 - Food, Agriculture, Fisheries

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<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>CMF, IT</th>
<th>AID, USDA, IT</th>
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<tr>
<td>20A-I</td>
<td>Maintain Production System</td>
<td>CMF, IT</td>
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<td>20B-I</td>
<td>Maintain Processing System</td>
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<td>AID, USDA, IT</td>
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<td>20C-I</td>
<td>Maintain Distribution System</td>
<td>CMF, IT</td>
<td>AID, USDA, IT</td>
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<tr>
<td>20D-I</td>
<td>Maintain Retail Sales System</td>
<td>CMF, IT</td>
<td>AID, USDA, DoC</td>
<td>Iraq</td>
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<tr>
<td>20E-I</td>
<td>Establish and Execute Inspection System</td>
<td>CMF, IT</td>
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<td>Iraq</td>
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<td>20F-I</td>
<td>Maintain Irrigation System</td>
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### Category 20 - Food, Agriculture, Fisheries (Cont)

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<tr>
<th>Code</th>
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<tr>
<td>20G-E</td>
<td>Support Harvest</td>
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### Category 21 - Transportation

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<tr>
<td>21A-C</td>
<td>Operate Ports</td>
<td>CMF, IT</td>
<td>AID, CMF, DoT, IT, DoS/S</td>
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<td>21B-C</td>
<td>Operate Rail System</td>
<td>CMF, IT</td>
<td>AID, CMF, DoT, IT, DoS/S</td>
<td>Previous + UNDP</td>
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<tr>
<td>21C-C</td>
<td>Maintain InterCity Road Network</td>
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<td>AID, CMF, DoT, DoS/S</td>
<td>Previous + UNDP</td>
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<td>21D-E</td>
<td>Maintain Municipal Roads</td>
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<td>Previous + UNDP</td>
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<td>21F-C</td>
<td>Operate Pipelines</td>
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<td>AID, DoE, IT, DoS/S</td>
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**Task Breakdown:**

- 35 Critical Tasks
- 32 Essential Tasks
- 68 Important Tasks
This thesis relies extensively on the transcripts of numerous nonattribution interviews conducted by the Army Focus Area for Stability and Reconstruction Operations team. These interviews were conducted by Brigadier General Volney J. Warner in March and April of 2005. The majority of these interviews were conducted at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, but some were conducted in other locations and by Video Teleconference. Once the Army Focus Area team completes its work, its products will be archived at the Combined Arms Research Library at Fort Leavenworth.


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<td>12</td>
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<td>Critical Technology (3)</td>
<td>Section 4</td>
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<td>Chapter 2</td>
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