

Leadership Lessons at Division Command Level - 2004

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14. ABSTRACT This study focuses on the development of the Army's strategic leaders, taking advantage of recent experiences within four Army Divisions that just returned from 12-15 months of service in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). The research attempts to contribute to future operational readiness and institutional strength of the Army by providing insights and recommendations regarding leadership at Division level. A compilation of survey and interview data led to the formulation of a list of critical behaviors ("The Big 12") for Division Commanders (and other leaders) that would best assure creation of "A Command climate that supports operational excellence and also motivates competent people to continue their military service". The study found that, while the vast majority of Army officers demonstrate admirable leadership in OIF and elsewhere, Army leader development programs have not yet ensured that all field grade and general officers possess the interpersonal skills required to apply optimally their strong tactical and technical skills. Recommendations aimed at improving existing leader development systems are discussed.					
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SECTION I: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Background

This study focuses on the development of Army leaders. The basic assumption is that good leadership enhances both the short-term combat and related capabilities of the organization and the associated long-term health of the Army as an institution.

This study was authorized by the Commanding General, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command on 8 January 2004 and assigned to the Commandant, U.S. Army War College for execution. It was designed to take advantage of recent experiences within four Army Divisions just returned from 12-15 months of service in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF).

With the variety of modes of combat and combat-related functions, restructuring of task forces, decentralization of tasks, interaction with governmental and non-governmental agencies, integration of Active and Reserve Component forces, and the inherent complexities of an often incoherent battlefield, OIF may be typical of future campaigns. The OIF environment highlighted two lingering challenges for organizational leaders. First, the need to attain immediate tactical success while maintaining the long-term health of the force. Second, the need to establish the necessary centralized control to ensure integration of operating systems while encouraging and supporting the required initiative at subordinate levels.

The data collection phase included surveys and interviews with 77 officers from four Divisions, plus two Corps Commanders and a Deputy Corps Commander, from March through October 2004. This field work was supported by the Commanding Generals of U.S. Army FORCES Command, U.S. Army Europe, and the Commanding Generals of III, V, and XVIII Corps, along with the full cooperation of the Commanding Generals of the Divisions involved in the study.

Study goal and focus

The goal of the study was to contribute to future operational readiness and institutional strength of the Army by providing insights and recommendations regarding leadership at Division level. The study was designed also to be useful in other areas of officer training, education, selection, and development by identifying those behaviors that are crucial for contemporary leader effectiveness, and by suggesting methods for inculcating those behaviors.

The study focused on Division Commanders. They continue to play major tactical and operational roles. In the complex 21st Century environment such as OIF, their actions often have immediate strategic impact as well. Even on a complex, dispersed battlefield their personal leadership style has substantial impact on the quality of the command climate and the resulting capability for sustained operational effectiveness. Occupying prominent traditional positions within the Army structure, they represent collectively the primary pool for future three and four-star leaders from the Combat and Combat Support arms.

Study assumptions

The officers who participated in the study, the Commanders, Assistant Division Commanders, Chiefs of Staff, eight members of each Division Staff, and from six to ten subordinate commanders in each Division, were assumed to be familiar with Army leadership doctrine and had formed opinions regarding the behaviors of good and poor leaders whom they had personally observed. This assumption proved to be correct.

It was also assumed that these Divisions were generally healthy organizations that had performed well in OIF. That assumption, validated both inside and outside the Divisions, was also correct.

Another assumption was that Army transformation, with new organizational structures, would still require competence in tactical, technical, conceptual, and interpersonal leadership skills, understanding that the appropriate mix and type of skills would continue to evolve.

There were no data from which to conclude that these four Divisions are typical of other Army Divisions. A reasonable but unsupported assumption is that they are.

Leadership doctrine and study methods

Current Army leadership doctrine is outlined in AR 600-20, "Army Command Policy," and FM 22-100, Army Leadership. Required skills are discussed in four areas: tactical, technical, interpersonal, and conceptual. A number of Army pamphlets and studies have provided additional input in describing what particular capabilities senior or strategic leaders should have. Army values, expressed in FM 22-100 and elsewhere, set the foundation for how officers function as dedicated professionals.

The **study aimed at observable behaviors**—not inherent competencies or traits but on actions that officers take to direct and motivate others and to create command climates that support sustained operational excellence. By identifying specifically which leader behaviors are responsible for perceptions of good and poor leadership, there would be a basis for conclusions and recommendations regarding contemporary Army leader development systems.

The study relied on interview data (averaging 2-3 hours per participant) as well as on the quantitative results from the survey instruments. The statistical data and the interviews were mutually supporting, and the results unambiguous.

Study Participants

GRADE	DIV HQ	DIV STAFF	SUBORD. CMDR	CORPS HQ	TOTAL
O-9	0	0	0	2	2
O-8	4	0	0	1	5
O-7/6P	6	0	0	0	6
O-6	3	1	18	0	22
O-5	0	16	14	0	30
O-4	0	11	0	0	11
O-3	0	4	0	0	4
TOTAL	13	32	32	3	80

Selected summary data

The *Leader Behavior Preference Worksheet* (LBP)

Chart 1 shows selected data from the Leader Behavior Preference (LBP) instrument, designed specifically for this study. After reviewing Army leadership doctrine and prior leadership studies, consulting with active duty and retired officers, and holding discussions with Army War College students and faculty members, a list of 29 important, positive behaviors was developed as an instrument to collect written anonymous survey data and to stimulate discussions about leadership.

These behaviors that distilled Army leadership doctrine and reflected continuing concerns of the Army officer corps were those particularly critical in **creating a command climate that supports operational excellence and also motivates competent people to continue military service.**

Participants were required to select a particular number of items in four categories as shown. Each selection was independent and followed by a discussion. Participants saw the LBP as credible and useful. All participants in the study completed the LBP.

The summary in **Chart 1** shows behaviors at the top of the list in each of four categories. The “top” behaviors are based on the percentages of responses to each of the 29 items from the 73 officers who participated (the 4 Division Commanders and the 3 officers from Corps Headquarters are not included in this portrayal.)

The chart shows the top 12 of the 29 behaviors selected as **most important**, (Column A); the top 8 selected as **most differentiating** between “Good” and “Poor” leaders (Column B); the top 6 identified as the **outstanding strengths** of their Division Commander (Column C); and the top 5 seen as areas that their Division Commander **might work on** to enhance his effectiveness (Column D). (As one subordinate remarked about his greatly respected Division Commander, “He is really good. The best I have ever worked for. If he could learn to _____, he would be even more effective.”)

(Additional data on LBP participant responses are found in Appendix B.)

Chart 1

Top Responses on Leader Behavior Preferences (LBP) Worksheet (N = 73)

Behaviors that create a command climate that supports operational excellence and also motivates competent people to continue their military service.

Column A = Most important for setting climate (12 = 40+% of responses) [In bold]

Column B = Most differentiating between Good and Poor leaders (8 = 30+% of responses)

Column C = Outstanding strengths of the Division Commanders (6 = 30+% of responses)

Column D = Behaviors for Division Commanders to work on (5 = 19+% of responses)

Specific leader behavior (for a Division Commander)	A	B	C	D
1. Adapts quickly to new situations and requirements.	X	X	X	
2. Understands and employs current Army and Joint doctrine.				
3. Keeps cool under pressure.	X	X	X	
4. Knows how and when to involve others in decision-making.				
5. Clearly explains missions, standards, and priorities.	X	X	X	
6. Sees the big picture; provides context and perspective.	X	X	X	
7. Sets high standards without a “zero defects” mentality.	X			
8. Encourages initiative and welcomes new ideas.				
9. Backs up subordinates; confronts the boss if necessary.				
10. Is trustworthy; keeps promises or explains why he can't.				
11. Employs units in accordance with their capabilities.				
12. Can handle “bad news.”	X	X		
13. Gets out of the headquarters and visits the troops.	X	X	X	
14. Coaches and gives useful feedback to subordinates.				X
15. Sets a high ethical tone; demands honest reporting.	X			
16. Will share the risks and hardships of his soldiers.				
17. Knows how to delegate and not “micromanage.”	X	X		
18. Is consistent and predictable in his behavior.				
19. Shows respect and consideration for others of any rank.				
20. Puts mission and people ahead of his own career.				
21. Is approachable; listens to questions and suggestions.				X
22. Can make tough, sound decisions on time.	X	X	X	
23. Shares the limelight; gives due credit to others.				
24. Senses unproductive policies and makes prompt adjustments.				X
25. Builds and supports teamwork within staff and among units.	X			X
26. Holds people accountable for their actions and results.				
27. Is more interested in doing good than looking good.				
28. Is fair; doesn't play favorites with units or people.				X
29. Is positive, encouraging, and realistically optimistic.	X			
30. Write in: (There were 11 behaviors. See Section III for details.)				

The Assessment of Selected Aspects of the Command Climate Instrument (ACC)

Another technique used to collect data and to stimulate discussion was the Assessment of Command Climate (ACC) instrument shown below. Data collected from interviews supported the conventional wisdom that the quality of the command climate influences operational effectiveness, and that the Division Commander greatly influences the climate.

Shown on the ACC [**Chart 2**] are the views of the Division Commanders and the comparative views of their subordinates on various elements of the climate. These are combined results of the overall situation in four Divisions: they reflect healthy command climates, with some variation among the components of the climates. (Since these data are from members of Division Headquarters and from field grade subordinate commanders, they provide a key and meaningful portion of climate information. However, the data cannot generate reliable conclusions regarding the climates of specific subordinate units.) The strongest element of the climate was item A. "A strong, healthy focus on mission accomplishment." The relatively weakest (but still in the high range) was item C. "A reliable, timely, open flow of information." Within the best climates, officers noted particularly the clarity of the Division Commander's intent and the mutual trust that enabled subordinate commanders two or three echelons down to make local tactical adaptations to meet that intent.

One subordinate commander remarked, "I have watched three different Division Commanders over the past several years. All of them were tactically competent. But this is the only one who knew how to build a command climate."

Chart 2

Assessment of Selected aspects of the Command Climate (ACC)
--

[Average assessments by 72 subordinates (**Subord.**) compared with 4 Div Commanders (**CG**)]

1	2	3	4	5	6
Marginal		Satisfactory		Exceeds expectations	

A. A strong, healthy focus on mission accomplishment.						
Subord.					5.46	
CG				4.75		
B. Clarity of standards, goals, and priorities.						
Subord.					5.32	
CG				4.25		
C. A reliable, timely, open flow of key information.						
Subord.				4.65		
CG			3.5			
D. An appreciation for initiative and innovation.						
Subord.					5.11	
CG			3.5			
E. Consideration for the well-being of people.						
Subord.					5.51	
CG				4.75		
F. A prevailing sense of mutual trust and confidence.						
Subord.					5.26	
CG				4.25		
X. Overall assessment of the climate.						
Subord.					5.25	
CG				4.25		

The *Campbell Leadership Descriptor*© (CLD)

The third instrument used in the study, the Campbell Leadership Descriptor ©, required the 32 staff participants to describe “Self”, “Good Leader,” and “Poor leader” using 40 positive descriptions of behavior. **Chart 4** below shows the top eight items that showed the greatest differences between “Good” and “Poor.” (The complete listing is shown in Appendix B. Other depictions of Campbell results are in Section II: Findings and Observations.)

These results are consistent with those of the LBP: technical skills are at the lower end of the scale, while interpersonal—and perhaps conceptual—competencies are seen as most important. Interview sessions confirmed that this does not mean that technical and tactical skills are not important: rather it shows that technical and tactical skills are seen as commonly well-developed and that the distinction between “Good” and “Poor” leadership rests primarily in the interpersonal domain.

Chart 3

Campbell Leadership Descriptor N = 32 (Division Staff)

The eight top items in order of the greatest difference between descriptive ratings of “Good” leader and “Poor” leader.
 (“Good” leaders evidence these behaviors and “Poor” leaders do not.)

- Q. 11. **Encouraging:** Helps others to achieve more than they thought they were capable of achieving.
- Q. 18. **Trusted:** Is trusted by individuals and groups in conflict to be a fair mediator.
- Q. 22. **A good teacher:** Communicates critical information needed by groups to perform well.
- Q. 21. **A good coach:** Gives constructive feedback in a way that benefits individuals.
- Q. 31. **Credible:** Believable, ethical, trustworthy, has few hidden motives.
- Q. 24. **Listens Well:** Open and responsive when receiving ideas from others.
- Q. 3. **Persuasive:** Presents new ideas in ways that create “buy-in” from necessary constituencies.
- Q. 12. **Mentoring:** Provides challenging assignments and related coaching.

Summary list of most critical behaviors

A compilation of survey and interview data led to the formulation of a list of critical behaviors for Division Commanders (and other leaders) that would best assure creation of “A Command climate that supports operational excellence [“Operating”] and also motivates competent people to continue their military service [“Improving”]. They are taken from the LBP items and provide a convenient description of critical behaviors as seen by study participants. They are described as “The BIG 12” and are referenced in the conclusions and recommendations. (The data and interviews made 12 a logical number of conspicuously significant behaviors from the list of 29.) **[See Chart 4]**

Chart 4

The “BIG 12”

At the top of the list: (In order of question number.)

- # 3. Keeps cool under pressure.
- # 5. Clearly explains missions, standards, and priorities.
- # 6. Sees the big picture; provides context and perspective.
- # 22. Can make tough, sound decisions on time.

Also particularly significant: (In order of question number.)

- # 1. Adapts quickly to new situations and requirements.
- # 7. Sets high standards without a “zero defects” mentality.
- # 12. Can handle “bad news.”
- # 14. Coaches and gives useful feedback to subordinates.
- # 15. Sets a high ethical tone; demands honest reporting.
- # 17. Knows how to delegate and not “micromanage.”
- # 25. Builds and supports teamwork within staff and among units.
- # 29. Is positive, encouraging, and realistically optimistic.

Study Conclusions

1. The Division Commanders and other officers from the four Divisions who participated in this study were by any measure an impressive group. Their overall performance in OIF reflected the best traditions of the U.S. Army.
2. Current Army leadership doctrine as expressed in FM 22-100—outlining skills in the tactical, technical, interpersonal, and conceptual areas—is suitable for guiding the behavior of Division Commanders and other officers in 21st Century operations.

3. Tactical and technical competence as reflected in both mission success and subjective assessments of performance indicate a remarkably high level of proficiency. This is clear testimony to the effectiveness of Army efforts to train to specific high standards in those leadership skills over the last two decades.
4. The personal leadership style of the Division Commander remains a unique, significant factor in determining the quality of the command climate, even when the Division is dispersed and engaged in complex and varied operations.
5. While the vast majority of Army officers demonstrate admirable leadership in OIF and elsewhere, Army leader education, training, development, and selection processes have not yet ensured that all field grade and general officers possess the interpersonal skills required to apply optimally their strong tactical and technical skills. (This study does not have a basis for conclusions regarding conceptual competencies.)
6. There are specific leader behaviors that are particularly critical to leadership success of Division Commanders and other officers. Those behaviors also clearly distinguish between the “Good” and the “Poor” leader. These comprise the “BIG 12” list.
7. There are specific skills that even outstanding Division Commanders can improve in order to raise their performance to an even higher level. (Team-building, horizontally and vertically, and performance coaching are often two of those specific skills.)
8. There is widespread agreement that most officer leadership development takes place in command and staff assignments. However, there are no institutionalized methods for ensuring that officers, particularly senior officers such as Division and Brigade Commanders and Division Chiefs of Staff, receive meaningful performance feedback and coaching in the field.
9. Since the selection process for battalion-level command creates the pool from which Division Commanders are eventually chosen, criteria for that selection need to consider interpersonal as well as tactical and technical skills.
10. A healthy command climate is essential for sustained organizational effectiveness, and is crucial for enhancing the small unit agility and initiative required in campaigns such as OIF. However, there are few if any Army educational or training programs that teach how to examine, build, and sustain command climates.
11. The Division Commanders and other officers who participated in this study saw it as helpful in reflecting on their leadership styles and competencies. (Division and Brigade commanders indicated that assessment and feedback similar to the model used in this study would have been particularly beneficial to them early in their command tours.)

Recommendations

The implementation of these recommendations requires that Army education, training, development, and selection systems be integrated and modified so that tactical, technical, interpersonal, and conceptual skills are suitably developed in all positions that lead to Division Command.

1. Sustain current training methods (CTC, BCTP, AAR, etc.) that have produced high levels of competence in tactical and technical skills.
2. Use the results of this study, in particular the “BIG 12” behaviors, in leadership education programs in Army schools and training centers to better prepare leaders for Division and other levels of command.
3. Review current educational programs to ensure those models for decision-making, methods for formulating and articulating commander’s intent, and leadership techniques for battlefield command and control support the development of individual and organizational adaptation and agility essential in current and future campaigns.
4. Develop comprehensive, integrated systems for behavioral assessment and feedback early in an officer’s career as part of the process for preparing and selecting individuals for future command. (The 360-degree approach that compares self, superior, peer, and subordinate perceptions of behavior would be a key element.)
5. Include in the Army school system curricula an explanation of the critical role of self-awareness, and the relevance of 360-degree performance feedback as an essential tool for continuing development as a leader.
6. Develop a model for individual feedback and learning within operational units and staff assignments that supports continuous development of requisite skills and behaviors essential for professional growth.
7. Develop methods to encourage and reward coaching and developing subordinates by commanders and chiefs of staff. As one method of focusing attention, include in the next edition of the Officer Evaluation Report “Development of subordinates” as an explicit item.
8. Ensure that the Army education system, including pre-command refresher courses, includes subjects of coaching/counseling, team-building (vertical and horizontal), and climate assessment and development.
9. As an interim measure, provide officers selected for Division Command and Assistant Division Command with a brief review of the findings and recommendations of this study. Also provide refresher training in team-building (horizontal and vertical), climate building and assessment, personal time management, coaching, and performance feedback. Use this pre-command orientation until such time as these subjects have been institutionalized within the Army education system.

10. Develop assessment criteria for selection for battalion-level command that include review of interpersonal as well as tactical and technical skills.
11. Provide to the Division Commanders a reliable, uncomplicated system for periodically reviewing the command climate. (An instrument similar to the ACC would be suitable.)
12. Implement a system of structured leadership performance feedback to commanders, similar to the field methods used by this study team. Make this confidential feedback available for the personal development of new commanders at Brigade and Division level early in their command tour—perhaps 4 to 6 months after taking command.
13. Ensure that the process for selecting Division Commanders includes a review of a broad range of data that describes the leadership skills of the candidates.

END OF EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

SECTION II. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

Study Goal and Focus

Authority: This study was approved by the Commanding General, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, on 8 January, 2004, and assigned to the Commandant, U.S. Army War College, for execution. The study was supported by the Commanding Generals of U.S. Army Forces Command and U.S. Army Europe.

Study Goal: The goal of the study was to contribute to future operational readiness and institutional strength of the Army by providing insights and recommendations regarding leadership at Division level. The study was designed also to be useful in other areas of officer training, education, and development by identifying those behaviors that are crucial for contemporary leader effectiveness, and suggesting methods for inculcating those behaviors.

Focus on Division Level: Division Commanders continue to play a key role at the intersection of tactical and operational warfare, and are often responsible for activities with immediate strategic impact. The compression of the three doctrinal levels of responsibility (Direct, Organizational, and Strategic) seen in OIF is likely to be typical of future operations, and reflects the growing complexity of Division Command responsibilities. The combat power that Division Commanders have at their disposal, their relationships with higher and adjacent headquarters and agencies, and their conspicuous position within the traditional hierarchy as custodians of key segments of Army history contribute to their importance. Further, the position of Division Commander has been an important step to future promotion.

The OIF Environment: Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) in 2003/4 provided an opportunity to examine Army leadership doctrine and leader development in what may be typical of the future: dispersed and complex operations requiring initiative and agility at all levels, frequent transitions between combat and community support modes, task forces that included “plug and play” elements, Joint and combined relationships, integration of Active and Reserve Component units, and interaction with a variety of non-military agencies. The inherent complexities of Division command in OIF were heightened by an incoherent battlefield, a changing array of command structures, and the daily scrutiny of the media.

OIF required continuing attention to two basic conceptual challenges for Division level leaders. First, the requirement for balancing the short-term demands for immediate tactical success with the longer-term obligation to sustain the institution for future campaigns. Second, the requirement for balancing the need for centralized control of operations to ensure battlefield systems integration with the need to provide subordinate commanders the latitude to respond promptly to unique local situations.¹

Study Questions, and Assumptions

This study was designed to answer important questions related to the leader behaviors of Division Commanders and also relevant to other elements of officer development. Specific questions:

¹ Conceptual issues related to Defense transformation are explained again in the 17 June 2004 issue of *Transformation Times* from the Office of Force Transformation, DOD. Division Commanders and their subordinates who participated in this study appeared to be aware of the key issues raised in transformation discussions about organizational adaptability and learning.

1. What specific leader behaviors are seen as essential at the Division level in creating a command climate that supports mission accomplishment and sustained operational excellence while also motivating competent people to continue their military service?
2. What subset of leader behaviors carries the most weight in distinguishing between “Good” and “Poor” leaders? [Note: This study assumes that although we are typically interviewing “Good” leaders, these officers will have informed opinions on the critical differences between the behavior of perceived typically “Good” and “Poor” leaders.]
3. What education, training, and experience appear to have been particularly effective in preparing officers for Division-level command?
4. What, if any, modifications should be made in the Army leader development processes to best prepare future leaders for Division command?
5. How apparently useful was participation in the study as a developmental experience for the Division Commanders and other officer participants?
6. Would the methods used in this study—surveys and interviews with some prompt feedback—be useful as a developmental tool for commanders at Division and other levels?

Study Assumptions:

1. Competent senior leaders (with requisite skills in the tactical, technical, interpersonal, and conceptual, areas) enhance both the short-term combat capability of their organizations and the long-term health of the Army as an institution.
2. Army transformation to organizational structures including UEx will still require senior leaders who are competent in the tactical, technical, interpersonal, and conceptual domains.
3. Gathering data from the Division Commanders, their key staff officers, and representative subordinate commanders from four Divisions and their attached units would provide a sufficient sample from which to draw useful findings.
4. The four Divisions in the study represented well-functioning, generally healthy organizations that had successfully accomplished their missions in OIF.
5. The officers who participated in the study were knowledgeable of Army leadership doctrine and practice, and also were capable of providing informed opinions regarding leader behavior, the difference between “Good” and “Poor” leaders, the characteristics of a command climate, and the effectiveness of various methods of officer leader development.
6. While officers within the Divisions could offer a view of the Division’s effectiveness in accomplishing its missions, operational effectiveness must be assessed also by representatives of higher headquarters.

Army Leadership Doctrine and Concepts

Army Leadership Doctrine:

Army Regulation 600-20, "Army Command Policy," under the sub-heading "Characteristics of command leadership," notes that "The commander is responsible for establishing leadership climate of the unit and developing disciplined and cohesive units...Commanders are also responsible for the professional development of their soldiers. To this end, they encourage self-study, professional development, and continued growth of the subordinates' military careers." Also, further along, the AR states, "Soldiers must be committed to accomplishing the mission through unit cohesion developed as a result of a healthy leadership climate established by the command...In addition to being mentally, physically, tactically, and technically competent, soldiers must have confidence in themselves, their equipment, their peers, and their leaders."²

FM 22-100, Army Leadership, outlines current leadership doctrine. It does not elaborate on the particulars of Division Command. The FM defines leadership as "**influencing** people—by providing purpose, direction, and motivation—while **operating** to accomplish the mission and **improving** the organization."³ This current study about Division Commanders further describes essential leadership behaviors as those "that create a command climate that supports operational excellence [accomplish the mission] and also motivates competent people to continue their military service [improve the organization]."

FM-22-100 divides leader skills into "Interpersonal," "Conceptual," "Technical," and "Tactical." It rightly notes that "Leaders in combat combine interpersonal, conceptual, technical, and tactical skills to accomplish the mission."⁴ It also describes the essence of Army values as Loyalty, Duty, Respect, Selfless Service, Honor, Integrity, and Personal Courage.⁵ A convenient short list of values is "Candor, Competence, Commitment, and Courage."⁶ There is no shortage of descriptive lists. There was no confusion about basic Army values expressed by the officers who participated in this study.

FM 22-100, and publications from the Army War College starting with the 1998 "Strategic Leadership Primer," and continuing through the various papers on Defense Transformation, notes the increased uncertainty and complexity confronting senior leaders.⁷

² See AR 600-20, Army Command Policy, 13 May 2002, Para.1-5.

³ HQDA. Army Leadership: Be, Know, Do. August, 1999. This text will be updated in a forthcoming FM 22-6, Army Leadership. According to the Center for Army Leadership, no change in basic principles is envisaged.

⁴ Ibid. p. 2-25.

⁵ Ibid. p. 2-2.

⁶ See COL Dandridge M. (Mike) Malone's Small Unit Leadership: A Commonsense Approach, P. 82 for a great discussion of values.

⁷ The U.S. Army War College Department of Command, Leadership, and Management pamphlet "Strategic Leadership Primer," 1998, provided a basic overview of the special leadership requirements at strategic level. There were no new principles document, but more emphasis on "strategic vision" and a greater appreciation for senior leader roles in "shaping culture," and "managing change." A 2d Edition was produced in 2004. See also the SSI monograph, "Strategic Leader Competencies" by Leonard Wong et al., September 2003. The special demands for operating in a "volatile, uncertain, complex and ambiguous environment" have been noted repeatedly. See T. Owen Jacobs and Michael L. McGee, "Competitive Advantage: Conceptual Imperatives for Executives" in The Nature of Organizational Leadership, Jossey-Bass, 2000; and the U.S. Army Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences Research Note 96-63, "Executive Summary, 1996 Army Symposium: Leadership Challenges of the 21st Century Army," May 1966. These papers agree that

Command, Leadership, and Management: Division Commanders operate under legal as well as positional authority as they exercise “command.” In meeting their responsibilities they both “lead” and “manage” as they control and direct the organization. In general, “leadership” is the process of clarifying the organizational vision and motivating individuals and teams to achieve identified goals; and “management” is the process of designing structures, setting work priorities, and allocating resources. These processes are in fact subsumed within the “influence,” “operate,” and “improve” structure of FM 22-100. This study is not concerned with the precise boundaries of these essential functions.

Role of the Division Commander: Leaders of complex organizations (such as Army Divisions) require a wide array of skills. The work of Division Commanders may be described in three broad areas:

- They work *internally* to achieve mission clarity and focus, and to create a climate in which informed, motivated leaders throughout the organization can best support the Division’s objectives.
- They work *externally* to cooperatively form alliances and teams, to optimize use of external resources, and to support higher and adjacent echelons to best accomplish the strategic mission of the larger force.
- They work *institutionally* to contribute to the long-term enhancement of the body of professional knowledge, the retention of quality people, and the maintenance of a healthy, relevant culture.

This study considered all three areas, with the major effort devoted to the *internal* role of the Division Commanders.

Approaches to Assessing Leadership

The Problem of Measuring: A key question for this and similar studies is how to dissect the complex interrelated components of the leadership process in order to produce useful recommendations. One approach would be to assess the leader’s inherent capacities—those attributes or traits that could result in leader effectiveness. These capacities or attributes would include cognitive capability, seen as particularly critical in decision-making for senior leaders amid complexity and ambiguity;⁸ emotional well-being and “emotional intelligence” that permits self-management (self-awareness and self-

the traditional leadership skills remain relevant, with additional attention to the need for conceptual capability, consensus and team-building, climate and culture, and a capacity for adaptability. A thoughtful article in the Autumn 2004 issue of *Parameters* magazine, “Mapping the Route of Leadership Education,” cautions about resorting to lists of required characteristics at the strategic level. Such lists may foster an educational approach that disregards the need for an amalgamation of competencies that lead to the behaviors suited to complex situations.

⁸ An examination of the role and development of intellectual competencies and other attributes desired at senior level is found in “Attributes Relating to Senior Officer Effectiveness,” T. O. Jacobs, *Industrial College of the Armed Forces*, August, 2002. Exactly how to measure either current or potential intellectual capacity remains a challenge. However, measuring behaviors as seen by associates, and measuring the quality of mission accomplishment from various perspectives can provide relatively unambiguous results. A second discussion of strategic leadership complexities can be found in Wong et.al. Strategic Leadership Meta-Competencies USAWC. 2003.

control);⁹ an extensive professional knowledge base comprised of experiential, educational, and “tacit” components¹⁰; a strong set of values, derived from institutional socialization, that provides meaning and commitment for the work at hand;¹¹ and the physical energy and stamina to permit functioning under stress.¹² This approach is obviously complex and indirect, resting also on a fragile link between theoretical capability and demonstrated results, and perhaps also on limited expectations about the human capacity for continued personal growth.

A more reliable method for assessing leader effectiveness is to examine and combine two kinds of outcomes. The first is the performance of the organization. This outcome is critical, but not related exclusively to leader performance since many other factors may affect organizational performance. Also, the measurement of organizational performance is itself an inexact art. The second kind of outcome is the assessment by members of the organization of the quality and suitability of leader behaviors that motivate individuals and teams toward mission accomplishment. Neither process alone can guarantee reliable assessments about leader effectiveness. Combined, however, these two outcome measures can produce useful results.¹³

Study Design and Implementation

Critical Leader Behaviors at Division Level: The study team reviewed current leadership doctrine, prior Army and other studies describing desired and observed leader behaviors,¹⁴ gathered a wide range of input from current and former Army leaders, and produced a list of specific behaviors related to leading at the Division level, and generally applicable to other command levels. This effort resulted in a list of 29 behaviors (The *Leader Behavior Preference Worksheet or LBP*). This list was seen by the officers who were surveyed as comprehensive and relevant to their situation in OIF. The LBP permitted quantitative measures of perceptions and also prompted discussion of the relative importance and the collective impact of these behaviors by the leader. This instrument was developed mindful of the importance of cognitive ability, self-awareness, ethical fitness, and current operational doctrine.¹⁵

The Issue of the “Good” and the “Poor” Leader: The study attempted to describe precisely the behaviors that discriminated clearly between leaders who were seen by informed observers (such as their subordinates or superiors) as “Good” (effective) and those who were seen as “Poor” (ineffective).

⁹ Four domains of “emotional intelligence” are described by Goleman, Daniel et. al. in *Primal Leadership: Realizing the Power of Emotional Intelligence*, Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 2002. They are “self-awareness,” “self-management,” “social awareness,” and “relationship management.” These items in one form or another have been at the heart of Army leadership studies from 1970 to 2001.

¹⁰ For a discussion of tacit knowledge and military leader development, see Robert J. Sternberg and Joseph A. Horvath *Tacit Knowledge in Professional Practice*, 1999.

¹¹ For an overview of issues impacting on officer professionalism see *The Future of the Army Profession*, edited by Lloyd J. Matthews, McGraw-Hill Primis, 2002. (A new edition will be published in 2005 See note 49.)

¹² For another current discussion of the essentiality of “self awareness,” “situational awareness,” and “mental readiness,” see “Strategic Leader Readiness and Competencies for Asymmetric Warfare” by Thomas J. Williams in Summer 2003 *Military Review*.

¹³ Among the useful commentaries on this point is the Introduction to *Impact of Leadership* edited by Kenneth Clark, Miriam Clark, and David Campbell, Center for Creative Leadership, 1992.

¹⁴ See Appendix A, Methodology, for details. Studies reviewed included the Army War College June 1970 *Study on Military Professionalism* and July 1971 *Leadership for the 1970's*; the February 1985 Army *Professional Development of Officers Study*; the February 2000 CSIS *American Military Culture in the Twenty-First Century*; and 2001 *Army Training and Leader Development Officer Panel*.

¹⁵ See Appendix A, Methodology, for a further discussion of instruments used in this study.

The purpose was to develop an understanding of exactly what behaviors were behind these perceptions of leader quality, and the impact and significance of these behaviors. This would be a basis for specific recommendations about Army leader development in preparation for Division command. The LBP was one of two instruments used for this purpose. A second instrument, the commercially produced *Campbell Leadership Descriptor* ©, (CLD), gathered comparisons between *Self*, the *Good Leader*, and the *Poor Leader*. While it is recognized that subordinates do not have all the answers regarding the competence of their leaders, nevertheless it is their individual and collective perceptions of leader behavior and the values assumed to be underlying that behavior that impacts in particular on morale, esprit, mutual trust, cohesion, initiative, and to some degree commitment to mission success.¹⁶

The Role of Command Climate: There is a clear link between the quality of the command climate and unit effectiveness, both in military and corporate organizations.¹⁷ While a supportive, coherent, healthy command climate cannot guarantee mission accomplishment—given the possibility of intervening strategic, doctrinal, or logistical failures—a poor command climate will almost certainly preclude sustained operational effectiveness. Senior leaders significantly influence the productivity, resiliency, adaptability, and staying power of complex organizations by attending to the organizational (or command) climate. They also, thereby, impact significantly on the level of commitment of competent people to continue their military service.¹⁸ Therefore, the study reviewed perceptions of the quality of the command climate as well as the specific leader behaviors that were necessary to create a healthy, mission-focused climate. The instrument designed to assess and prompt discussion about climate, the *Assessment of Command Climate* worksheet (ACC), permitted—as did the LBP—both the Division Commander and the subordinates to provide information that could result in comparative assessments. Portions of these data were available for initial feedback to the Division Commanders. Division Commanders were offered more comprehensive feedback at a later date of their convenience.

Study Participants:

The Selected Divisions: Four of the Army's ten active Divisions were selected because of their recent tour in OIF. The study employed a combination of surveys and interviews with four Division and two Corps Commanders, a Deputy Corps Commander, Assistant Division Commanders, Division Chiefs of Staff, Division staff officers, and selected subordinate commanders within and attached to the Divisions. A total of 77 officers from the four Divisions and attached organizations provided input to the study from March through October 2004.

Officers Who Participated: The experienced officers from each Division who participated in this study had the rare advantage of lengthy service together as a command and staff team in a combat environment. Officers taking part in the study had served in OIF for an average of 11 months, and in

¹⁶ The continuing relevance of examining the specific differences between "Good" and "Poor" leaders is supported in the "Toxic Leadership" article by Colonel George E. Reed in the July-August 2004 issue of *Military Review*. This paper adds weight to the argument that while high intelligence may correlate with promotion to senior positions it does not ensure competence in interpersonal skills.

¹⁷ See "Improving Accountability for Effective Command Climate: A Strategic Imperative" by Colonel Steven M. Jones, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, September 2003 for a convenient review of concepts and issues on command climate.

¹⁸ A recent study captured the importance of a healthy command climate for essential adaptation and improvisation at small unit level in campaigns such as OIF. See "Developing Adaptive Leaders: The Crucible Experience of Operation Iraqi Freedom," by Leonard Wong, Carlisle Barracks, PA, July, 2004.

their current positions from 7 to 21 months at the time they were interviewed. The Division Commanders had held their positions from 14 to 21 months. Both staff members and subordinate commanders had adequate time to observe the Division Commander and to develop an informed sense of the command climate. Senior officers from higher headquarters provided a “top down” perspective on Division Commander performance and the quality of mission accomplishment.

The Division Commander, other members of the command team, and six to ten subordinate commanders had separate interview and data collection sessions lasting from two to three hours. Eight members of each Division staff participated in 2 ½ to 3-hour discussions. All 79 participants (76 from the Divisions and 3 from Corps Headquarters) had an opportunity to provide anecdotal information about leader behavior in OIF, and to comment on Army officer leader development programs. All completed the LBP and the ACC except for the Corps and Deputy Commanders who completed the A (“Importance” and B (“Differentiation”) portions of the LBP. The Division Commanders and the Division Staff members also completed the CLD. (Twelve retired general officers with continuing interest in leadership issues also completed one or more draft versions of the LBP during the instrument design process.)

Ongoing Related Army Studies: While this study was taking place there were a variety of initiatives ongoing in the leader development areas. The Chief of Staff had formed several task forces, some directly related to officer education and development. Some initiatives were underway regarding use of 360 degree feedback to enhance self-awareness and facilitate self-development. The institutional education system was being reconfigured to better support “A Campaign Quality Army...”¹⁹ Study recommendations have considered these ongoing actions.

Next: Findings and Observations

Following this general introduction to the study, the next section discusses study Findings and Observations. Each of 14 Findings is followed by the rationale for its inclusion and by the implications which the finding has for possible conclusions and recommendations. (The final section of the report provides the conclusions and the attending thirteen recommendations.)

END OF SECTION II

¹⁹ Les Brownlee and General Peter J. Schoomaker, “Serving A Nation at War: A Campaign Quality Army with Joint and Expeditionary Qualities,” in Summer 2004 issue of *Military Review*.

SECTION III: FINDINGS AND OBSERVATIONS

After completing interviews with officers from four Divisions, and gathering quantitative data from the three instruments used in the study, the study team reviewed and integrated the information to produce a number of “findings and observations.” For each finding there is a rationale or basis for the finding, followed by a discussion of the possible implications and relevance of that finding for Division Commander development and selection. These findings and observations also offer commentary that should be useful in other aspects of Army officer training, education, and development.

1. The officers from the four Divisions who contributed to this study were by any measure an impressive group of professionals.

Rationale: The officers who participated in this study (22 colonels, 30 lieutenant colonels, 11 majors, 4 captains, and 6 brigadier generals in addition to the 4 Division Commanders) participated in approximately 180 total contact hours of interviews and discussions with members of the study team. The expressed commitment to traditional Army values, the mission focus and concern for operational excellence, the candor and perceptivity of these officers, were remarkable. They were confident, candid, sensitive to the complexities of their Division Commanders’ responsibilities, concerned for soldier welfare, and constructive in their commentary. The warrior ethos appeared alive and well.

Implications: Officer selection, accession, and development programs, combined with individual and unit training, have produced laudable results. As in previous studies, participants expressed concern about any perceived deviation from Army values by peers, subordinates, or superiors. This strong base of mature competence and thoughtful commitment gives the Army a solid, resilient platform from which to launch any initiatives aimed at enhancing officer development. There is no reason to believe that this group of participants was dissimilar from officers assigned to similar positions in other Army Divisions.

2. Army leadership doctrine and the underlying traditional Army values, as expressed in observable behaviors, continue to be relevant in contemporary operational environments such as OIF.

Rationale: The 29 behaviors included in the Leader Behavior Preferences Worksheet (LBP)²⁰ derived from Army leadership doctrine and prior studies were seen by participants as a comprehensive list relevant to OIF.²¹ (The four areas of competency outlined in FM 22-100—Interpersonal, Conceptual, Technical, and Tactical—are incorporated within the 29 items.) There were no suggestions that basic Army leadership concepts needed to be changed to meet current operational needs. There was, however, significant discussion about the need for more universally consistent application of those concepts. (See also Findings 4 & 5.)

The participants agreed that **all of the traditional, positive behaviors listed in the LBP and consistent with current Army leadership doctrine were considered “Important” for today’s**

²⁰ The LBP was developed after considerable research and discussion. See page A-2 for a description of the instrument.

²¹ The participating officers had the option of adding an additional item to the list if needed to better describe the critical behaviors of a Division Commander. There were eleven write-in behaviors, as shown in Chart 5.

Division Commander to "...create a command climate that supports operational excellence and also motivates competent people to continue their military service."

There was general agreement across Divisions and officer grades regarding which of the 29 were most frequently identified as important. (Participants were offered the option of adding an additional item if their favorite critical behavior was not included. Only 11 were added and they are shown at the bottom of the Chart 5.) **Chart 5** shows the percentage of participants who included that item as one of the eleven they had to choose from the list of 29 as "Most important." This forced choice was done in order to identify which behaviors deserved particular attention. Participants were asked to elaborate on the reasons for their choices in follow-on discussions and interviews. The behaviors selected by more than 40 percent of the participants are in bold.

Chart 6 indicates the comparison of "Most Important" of the 29 items by officer grade level. Note there is very little difference of opinion in most items between most grade levels or between staff and commanders. The majors seemed to be somewhat more concerned with clarity in direction (Items 5 and 18) than were other grade groups, as were the staff members overall compared to the commanders. This desire for particular clarity and consistency among staff seems not unusual. Commanders in general were a bit more concerned than the staff members with the leader being able to handle "bad news." Neither of these statistical differences is particularly dramatic.

There are, however, some notable differences between the responses of general officers and others. The 10 member general officer sample placed more importance on Item 17. "Knows how to delegate and not micromanage," than did other grade groups. The generals placed less importance on Item 9. "Backs up subordinates; confronts the boss if necessary," Item 10. "Is trustworthy; keeps promises or explains why he can't," and Item 18. "Is consistent and predictable in his behavior." There may or may not be the basis for further analysis here, and while there may be some indication of incomplete self-awareness in terms of the importance of their trustworthiness or predictability, no other survey or interview data in the study provided additional meaning to these results. In fact, interview sessions indicated a high level of self-awareness among the group of general officers.

There was also little difference in LBP data among the different Divisions. Overall, the identification of critical behaviors seems relatively independent of grade level, position, or organization in OIF, indicating a larger cultural phenomenon. Percentages significantly different from other grade groups are in bold. The causes of these relatively minor differences are not clear, and there were no clear distinctions among perceptions of relative importance of these behaviors by grade or position that became apparent in the interview sessions or in other data. (See Appendix B for additional presentations of LBP data.)

Chart 5

Leader Behavior Preferences (LBP) Worksheet “Most Important” Selections
 [The percentages shown are totals from the 77 participant responses.]
 [Top 12 of the 29 items in “Importance” (40%+) are in bold.]

Behaviors that create a command climate that supports operational excellence and also motivates competent people to continue their military service.

Specific leader behavior (for a Division Commander)	A
1. Adapts quickly to new situations and requirements.	53
2. Understands and employs current Army and Joint doctrine.	18
3. Keeps cool under pressure.	74
4. Knows how and when to involve others in decision-making.	25
5. Clearly explains missions, standards, and priorities.	67
6. Sees the big picture; provides context and perspective.	67
7. Sets high standards without a “zero defects” mentality.	50
8. Encourages initiative and welcomes new ideas.	34
9. Backs up subordinates; confronts the boss if necessary.	23
10. Is trustworthy; keeps promises or explains why he can't.	22
11. Employs units in accordance with their capabilities.	15
12. Can handle “bad news.”	45
13. Gets out of the headquarters and visits the troops.	58
14. Coaches and gives useful feedback to subordinates.	33
15. Sets a high ethical tone; demands honest reporting.	51
16. Will share the risks and hardships of his soldiers.	32
17. Knows how to delegate and not “micromanage.”	45
18. Is consistent and predictable in his behavior.	38
19. Shows respect and consideration for others of any rank.	27
20. Puts mission and people ahead of his own career.	28
21. Is approachable; listens to questions and suggestions.	37
22. Can make tough, sound decisions on time.	68
23. Shares the limelight; gives due credit to others.	8
24. Senses unproductive policies and makes prompt adjustments.	16
25. Builds and supports teamwork within staff and among units.	51
26. Holds people accountable for their actions and results.	23
27. Is more interested in doing good than looking good.	15
28. Is fair; doesn't play favorites with units or people.	11
29. Is positive, encouraging, and realistically optimistic.	52
30. Write in: See below for items added by participants.	

Chart 5 (continued)

Behaviors written in as *Item 30* by participants as part of their selection as “Most important.”

- Has an inclusive, not exclusive style.
- Uses precise language and communicates effectively.
- Commands through commanders.
- Holds subordinates accountable in the orders process.
- Stays on the offensive.
- Is offensive minded.
- Properly uses the chain of command to implement orders.
- Modifies systems to adapt to the situation.
- Understands how to apply systems to fix organizational problems.
- Willing to take calculated risks to achieve vision.
- Challenges others to excel through competition, pride, or other means.
- Holds himself responsible when bad things happen in the organization.

Note: Discussions indicated that most of these were added to describe significant positive behaviors of their current Division Commander.

Another indication of the general adequacy of Army leadership doctrine was the fact that its proper application by the four Division Commanders was seen as contributing to mission success. Doctrinally correct behaviors were appreciated by subordinates, and resulted in healthy command climates.²² While observer opinions of the style and effectiveness of the four Division Commanders were not uniform, these Division Commanders provided clear examples of typically outstanding leadership at Division level.

²² Quantitative data from the ACC instrument reinforced by data from the Campbell Leader Descriptor© and interviews described generally healthy command climates. There were variations in the quality of various climate components among and within the Divisions, reflecting differences in the styles of the Division Commanders, and probably influenced also by the different missions and structure of the Divisions. (See Pages A 2-7 for a description of these instruments, and Appendix B for the data summaries.)

Chart 6

Leader Behavior Preferences (LBP) Worksheet – Column A “Importance” N = 77

[Numbers shown are percentages of total responses by officer grades.]

Behaviors that create a command climate that supports operational excellence and also motivates competent people to continue their military service.

	N =	(15)	(30)	(21)	(10)
Specific leader behavior (for a Division Commander)	O-3/4	O-5	O-6	GO	
1. Adapts quickly to new situations and requirements.	73	47	50	45	
2. Understands and employs current Army and Joint doctrine.	20	17	23	9	
3. Keeps cool under pressure.	60	80	77	55	
4. Knows how and when to involve others in decision-making.	20	20	27	45	
5. Clearly explains missions, standards, and priorities.	87	67	64	45	
6. Sees the big picture; provides context and perspective.	53	67	68	82	
7. Sets high standards without a “zero defects” mentality.	53	43	41	64	
8. Encourages initiative and welcomes new ideas.	27	27	36	64	
9. Backs up subordinates; confronts the boss if necessary.	33	7	45	9	
10. Is trustworthy; keeps promises or explains why he can't.	27	30	18	0	
11. Employs units in accordance with their capabilities.	27	17	9	9	
12. Can handle “bad news.”	33	50	55	27	
13. Gets out of the headquarters and visits the troops.	53	67	50	27	
14. Coaches and gives useful feedback to subordinates.	40	27	36	36	
15. Sets a high ethical tone; demands honest reporting.	53	53	50	27	
16. Will share the risks and hardships of his soldiers.	27	30	36	36	
17. Knows how to delegate and not “micromanage.”	40	43	45	82	
18. Is consistent and predictable in his behavior.	60	50	23	9	
19. Shows respect and consideration for others of any rank.	27	17	27	55	
20. Puts mission and people ahead of his own career.	20	20	41	36	
21. Is approachable; listens to questions and suggestions.	27	30	41	64	
22. Can make tough, sound decisions on time.	73	80	50	64	
23. Shares the limelight; gives due credit to others.	7	7	9	9	
24. Senses unproductive policies and makes prompt adjustments.	20	20	9	18	
25. Builds and supports teamwork within staff and among units.	33	53	64	55	
26. Holds people accountable for their actions and results.	20	23	23	18	
27. Is more interested in doing good than looking good.	7	17	18	18	
28. Is fair; doesn't play favorites with units or people.	0	20	9	9	
29. Is positive, encouraging, and realistically optimistic.	40	63	50	64	
30. Write in:					

3. The Army education, training, assignment, and selection systems—the training systems in particular—have produced a cadre of key officers within these Divisions whose competence in combined arms operations appears to be remarkably high.

Rationale: It is impossible to make reliable longitudinal comparisons between current and past competencies of the officer corps. However, every indication from interviews and discussions, from peer and subordinate comments, and from descriptions of OIF tactical operations supports the contention that the Army has been successful in inculcating effectively an approach to battlefield systems integration, models for analysis and decision-making, and employment of combined arms teams. Participants used a common doctrinal vocabulary and were clear about basic tactical concepts. This was a change from the findings of some earlier studies of Army leadership in the 1970's and 1980's where perceptions of tactical and technical incompetence were not uncommon.²³

It would be difficult to argue against the contention that the Combat Training Centers, the After Action Review format, the Battle Command Training Programs, and the TRADOC schools have successfully upgraded tactical competencies over the past two decades. It is noteworthy that in the listing of relative importance of essential leader behaviors (See **Chart 5**) those directly related to interpersonal or conceptual skills were seen as *relatively* more important than those in the tactical and technical areas.²⁴ (Generalized differences in levels of competence between interpersonal and tactical skills will be discussed in greater detail in Finding 4.)

There were, however, frequently expressed concerns that the leadership concepts and command procedures so effectively employed on the OIF battlefield to respect subordinate judgment and support local initiative would not transfer to garrison life. There were reservations about the capability of the institutional culture to contain bureaucratic tendencies that would in particular limit the effectiveness of unit training through “over control.”

Implications: Successful Army efforts to develop high levels of competence in tactical operations were the result of doctrine development, rigorous assessment of unit operations by trained observers using coherent standards, standardized feedback systems, and adequate funding. There is no reason to believe that other leadership skill areas could not be brought to the same uniform level of excellence if the institution were willing to make the corresponding level of commitment. There appears to be also an opportunity to bring to garrison training many of the leadership and management techniques that supported unit adaptation and initiative in OIF.

²³ There have been questions raised about possible declines in officer skills deriving from a loss of talented junior officers during the “drawdowns” of the 1990's. Officer quality issues did not arise during this study, although the study cannot be the sole basis about generalized conclusions in this area. For one discussion of this issue, see “Army Transformation and the Junior Officer Exodus” by Mark R. Lewis in the Fall 2004 issue of Armed Forces and Society.

²⁴ There is no reliable macro comparison between this and prior Army leadership studies, but studies of the 1970's and 1980's (The 1971 *Leadership for the 1970's* and the 1985 *Professional Development of Officers*, for example) may have shown greater relative concern about “Tactical” and “Technical” competence than is the current case. This is another indication of the positive impact of various Army training initiatives of the past 20 years on perceptions about, and confidence in, tactical proficiency.

Garrison life seems a more natural breeding ground for the “bureaucratic” versus the “professional” climate.²⁵

4. While recognizing the admirable leadership demonstrated by the vast majority of Army officers, Army leader development and selection processes have not been successful in ensuring that all field grade and general officers possess the interpersonal skills required to apply optimally their tactical and technical competencies.

Rationale: In every discussion and interview during the study, officers cited personal experiences as subordinates of field grade or general officers that described both remarkably good and dramatically poor leadership. The “remarkably good” constituted the majority of descriptions. The “dramatically poor” left strong imprints of personal dissatisfaction or demoralization along with clear examples of organizational dysfunction. The major immediate impact of a strikingly “Poor” leader on the organization was described as curtailment of upward flow of information. Only a few instances of abusive rejection of “bad news” or clear disdain for subordinate ideas were needed to significantly reduce the quality of staff and subordinate commander input to decision-making.²⁶

Most examples of “Poor” leadership were consistent with the descriptions of unsatisfactory leaders found in major Army studies of the past 40 years, with the possibility that there is currently greater overall satisfaction with leader tactical and technical competence.²⁷ It is possible that current officer expectations for leader behavior are unreasonably idealistic. Perhaps Army efforts to describe exemplary performance have raised the bar too high. It is also possible that a subordinate who describes flaws in the behaviors of seniors is magnifying them to make his own imperfections less striking. But several items argue against any thesis that “Poor” leadership at field grade and general officer level is typically imagined, exaggerated, or the musings of spiteful subordinates. First is the fact that many descriptions of “Poor” leadership come from successful, respected officers with a fondness for the Army and no particular axe to grind. Second is the fact that all the officers who had stories of “Poor” leaders had at least as many examples of “Good” leaders. Third is the reality that the officers discussing leader behavior were seen by the study team members as providing thoughtful and considered opinions, not personal grievances.

Implications: Efficient utilization of tactical and technical competencies, the essence of military effectiveness, rests on a foundation of interpersonal and conceptual competencies. During a time when the Army rightly emphasizes the need for a high level of leader competence to ensure that transformed and restructured forces can meet the demands of the 21st Century, preventing dysfunctional leadership seems more necessary than ever.

The ultimate solution is to have a pool of candidates from which to select Division Commanders who are totally qualified in the technical, tactical, interpersonal, and conceptual areas. Although the current

²⁵ See Don M. Snider and Gayle L. Watkins, “Introduction” in *The Future of the Army Profession*, (2002)

²⁶ Even within the healthy climates of these Divisions, flow of information was the element that was seen as needing most improvement as reflected in ACC data. (See discussion and Chart 13 on page 37.)

²⁷ These same behaviors of “Good” and “Poor” leaders have been identified time and time again, more recently in the *2001 Army Training and Leader Development Officer Panel* study, and described in the Reed (2004) article previously cited. Internet descriptions from officers in OIF as well as first hand accounts from participants in this study also paint a picture of remarkably fine leadership alongside some horrible examples. The “horrible” may be more likely exaggerated and retold, but the sheer number of such examples is evidence of some level of continuing problem.

procedures include screening for promotion and command selection at multiple levels prior to Brigade and Division command, those screening mechanisms have been unable to ensure interpersonal proficiency. A more efficient future system would have to provide a more reliable selection process for battalion command level, with further checks prior to brigade level.

Three of the four Division Commanders had been Assistant Division Commanders. Division Commanders and Assistant Division Commanders noted the unique experience gained in that role. It may be possible to use Assistant Division Commander assignments as part of a more structured preparation for future Division command.

Selection for battalion command is recognized as a crucial career juncture. That decision identifies the population from which all future command selections are made, including most key three and four star operational positions. There is some question whether or not this process may be cutting out some of the high intellectual potential needed for “strategic leaders,” as some conceptual thinkers may not be competitive for battalion command selection. Preliminary data from the Army War College and ICAF indicate that their graduates who are selected for brigade-level command do not exhibit measurable conceptual skills better than the average of the class.²⁸ Existing selection methods may treat interpersonal or conceptual skills too lightly, these skills being more difficult to assess. Consequently, efforts to determine with all possible precision exactly what behaviors are critical for effective Division command have significant implications for the validity of selection processes beginning at battalion level.

5. There are consistently recognizable behavioral differences between the perceived “Good” and the “Poor” leaders; and the significant differences are predominantly in the interpersonal area.

Rationale: Using the LBP instrument, participants were asked to indicate which 7 of the 29 listed behaviors (or one of their own to be added to the list) most differentiated between the “Good” leaders who almost always displayed the behavior, and “Poor” leaders who rarely if ever displayed the behavior. Participants needed no help in defining “Good” and “Poor.” **Chart 7** shows percentage of participant responses by grade. General Officers may underestimate the impact of handling “bad news” (# 12) and the importance of timely decision-making (#22), but this sample is relatively small.

The Campbell Leadership Descriptor© (CLD) is a commercial instrument that was designed to enhance self-awareness by asking individuals to describe themselves compared to a “Good” and a “Poor” leader they had known. The instrument includes 40 specific behaviors, and could be scored to provide a numeric comparison along nine behavior clusters or “scales.”²⁹ This instrument was completed by the eight staff officers from each Division, individuals who came into frequent personal contact with the Division Commander. (There was one colonel, sixteen Lieutenant Colonels, eleven Majors, and four Captains. Chiefs of Staff were not included in the staff discussion sessions.) The compilation of results from this instrument supports interview and LBP findings: that skills in the

²⁸ One discussion of command selection and conceptual capacity is in “Conceptual Capacity as Competitive Advantage: Developing Leaders for the New Army,” in McGee, Jacobs, Kilcullen, and Barber in Out of the Box Thinking: Transforming the Twenty-First Century Army and Other Top Performing Organizations, edited by Hunt, Dodge, and Wong, 1999. pp. 221-238.

²⁹ See Page A-2 for a further description of this instrument. (A ninth scale on multicultural awareness may be added but is not included in all charts showing Campbell results.)

interpersonal area are the key discriminators between “Good” and “Poor” leaders. **Chart 8** includes a list of the top 12 of the 40 behaviors in order of the greatest significant difference between participant descriptions of the “Good” and the “Poor” leaders.³⁰

Chart 7

**LBP Column B: Behaviors that most discriminate between “Good” and “Poor” leaders.
Percentages of response by grade. Top most discriminating behaviors in bold.**

Specific leader behavior (for a Division Commander)	O-3,4	O-5	O-6	GO
1. Adapts quickly to new situations and requirements.	33	43	23	27
2. Understands and employs current Army and Joint doctrine.	7	7	0	0
3. Keeps cool under pressure.	47	63	45	36
4. Knows how and when to involve others in decision-making.	20	10	18	27
5. Clearly explains missions, standards, and priorities.	67	47	27	36
6. Sees the big picture; provides context and perspective.	33	40	14	45
7. Sets high standards without a “zero defects” mentality.	13	17	41	45
8. Encourages initiative and welcomes new ideas.	0	17	14	18
9. Backs up subordinates; confronts the boss if necessary.	20	17	32	9
10. Is trustworthy; keeps promises or explains why he can’t.	13	13	32	36
11. Employs units in accordance with their capabilities.	7	7	5	0
12. Can handle “bad news.”	7	47	55	0
13. Gets out of the headquarters and visits the troops.	40	43	36	18
14. Coaches and gives useful feedback to subordinates.	33	10	14	36
15. Sets a high ethical tone; demands honest reporting.	33	23	27	18
16. Will share the risks and hardships of his soldiers.	33	17	41	18
17. Knows how to delegate and not “micromanage.”	27	33	41	45
18. Is consistent and predictable in his behavior.	33	20	18	0
19. Shows respect and consideration for others of any rank.	13	13	23	18
20. Puts mission and people ahead of his own career.	27	20	18	27
21. Is approachable; listens to questions and suggestions.	13	20	18	18
22. Can make tough, sound decisions on time.	60	47	36	18
23. Shares the limelight; gives due credit to others.	7	10	14	27
24. Senses unproductive policies and makes prompt adjustments.	0	3	0	9
25. Builds and supports teamwork within staff and among units.	27	17	41	27
26. Holds people accountable for their actions and results.	13	17	14	9
27. Is more interested in doing good than looking good.	13	30	32	36
28. Is fair; doesn’t play favorites with units or people.	0	20	0	0
29. Is positive, encouraging, and realistically optimistic.	7	20	23	55
30. Write in:				

³⁰ See Page A-7 for the components of the Campbell scales. See Appendix B for the complete listing of all 40 behaviors arranged in order of discriminating impact based on survey data.

Chart 8

Campbell Leadership Descriptor © (CLD)
 Most frequent descriptors of “Good” and “Poor” leaders
 N =36 (Division Staff members and Division Commanders)

	#	Items from Campbell for “ Good ” leader		#	Items from Campbell for “ Poor ” leader
1	(1)	Farsighted	1	(19)	Well connected
2	(32)	Experienced	2	(38)	Physically fit
3	(33)	A visible role model	3	(6)	Dedicated
4	(6)	Dedicated	4	(29)	Good fund raiser
5	(22)	A good teacher	5	(32)	Experienced
6	(3)	Persuasive	6	(40)	Internationally resilient
7	(9)	Focused	7	(25)	Numerically astute
8	(28)	Durable	8	(28)	Durable
9	(11)	Encouraging	9	(37)	Energetic
10	(18)	Trusted	10	(2)	Enterprising


CLD results graphically highlight the similar views of the staff officers and Division Commanders regarding the characteristics of a “Good” leader they had observed. (This same commonality of view pertained in their descriptions of a “Poor” leader they had observed at some time in their career. (Some of the officers mentioned that their current Division Commander was their model for “Good”)

Chart 9 shows those comparisons along eight scales of the Campbell instrument that the 40 questions support: Vision, Management, Empowerment, Diplomacy, Feedback, Entrepreneurialism, Personal Style, and Personal Energy.

In their comparisons between “Good” and “Poor” leaders, the greater differences were in the areas we would describe as “Interpersonal.” The specific scales that show the widest differences between “Good” and “Poor” are “Empowerment” and “Feedback” which are consistent with LBP and interview results. **Charts 10 and 11** show how the Division Staff officers and the Division Commanders define differences between “Good” And “Poor” leaders, with very little difference between the views of the two groups. In other words, the distinctions between “Good” and “Poor” leadership seem apparent within the Army officer corps.

Chart 9

**Campbell Leadership Descriptor Profile
Division Commander's Rating of a Good Leader vs
Staff Rating of Good Leaders**



The CLD also shed some light on the difference between how the Division Commanders saw themselves in terms of specific leader behaviors and how their staff officers saw them. (See **Chart 12** that compares Division Commander self-ratings with staff/subordinate ratings. These data reflected typically high marks for the Division Commanders and a generally healthy fit between their self-perceptions and those of their subordinates. This was generally consistent with the views the staff expressed during their discussion sessions.

Regarding self-awareness, note in **Chart 12** that in most of the responses to the scales the staff officers gave the Division Commanders higher marks than the Division Commanders gave themselves, both sets being on the high end of the rating scale. In some Divisions this pattern of high evaluation of the Division Commander was more pronounced than in others. This pattern was consistent with the self-subordinate depiction of a “transformational leader.”³¹

³¹ It is possible that pride in Division and affinity with a commander with whom they have shared hardship caused some inflation in staff ratings. Even if this were so in some cases, the results collectively still present a useful picture of typically admired leaders, and clear distinctions between concepts of “Good” and “Poor” leaders. Leadership studies suggest that highly effective leaders may rate their own performance slightly lower than they are rated by their subordinates. See Van Velsor, Taylor, & Leslie, “An examination of the relationships among self-perception accuracy, self-awareness, gender, and leader effectiveness” in *Human Resources Management*, 21, pp. 249-263. See also for a discussion of the impact of transformational leadership B. M. Bass *Transformational Leadership: Industrial, Military, and Educational Impact*. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. 1998.

Chart 10

Campbell Leadership Descriptor Profile
Staff Rating of Good Leaders vs. Staff Rating of Poor Leaders




Chart 11

Campbell Leadership Descriptor Profile
Commander's Ratings of Good Leaders vs. Commander's Rating of Poor Leaders





Chart 12

**Campbell Leadership Descriptor Profile
Commander's Rating vs. Staff Rating (of Cmdr)**



Leaders who know their own strengths and weaknesses (as shown on **Chart 12**) and take advantage of that knowledge are more effective as leaders than those who are less aware. In general, individuals over-rate their effectiveness in interpersonal skills more than they do their technical skills. In highly structured hierarchical organizations, there is a strong tendency for executives to rate themselves higher than their observers rate them.³²

Implications: Officers have clear ideas about the observable differences between “Good” and “Poor” leaders.³³ In the case of both the LBP and the CLD instruments, interpersonal and conceptual skills were toward the top of the list, and tactical and technical skills were generally less discriminating between “Good” and “Poor.”. These quantitative data were supported by the interviews.³⁴ In describing “Poor” leaders they had known at colonel and general officer levels, none indicated that tactical or technical incompetence was the major source of the problem. It was not that those competencies were not absolutely essential, but rather that they found them satisfactory, or they were inconspicuous amid glaring interpersonal deficiencies. It is clear that officers do not expect perfection from their leaders. They were tolerant of bosses’ human mistakes and idiosyncrasies. As SLA Marshall said in The Armed

³² See “Self versus Observer Ratings on Leadership Characteristics: A Peculiar Pattern of Corporateness in Over Ratings,” by David Campbell and Dianne Nilson, Center for Creative Leadership, April 3, 1993. (Available at USAWC)

³³ Perhaps the first Army study to define effective and ineffective leaders in specific behavioral terms was the 1971 U.S. Army War College *Leadership for the 1970's*. The report of that extensive study and its immediate replication by a CONARC team listed specific behavioral opportunities by grade of officer to improve leader behavior. Some of this study information was used in TRADOC school curriculum development, but there is no record of Army education systems having paid particular attention to specific differentiating behaviors.

³⁴ This is the classic issue of “Emotional Intelligence” referenced in footnote 9. Those authors and others are convinced that requisite interpersonal skills can be developed, albeit not a simple process.

Forces Officer. “Minor shortcomings do not impair the loyalty or growth of the follower who has found someone whose strengths he deems worth emulating.”³⁵

Descriptions of general differences between “Good” and “Poor” did not divide between a focus on mission and a focus on people. It was the style of leading toward mission or people that made the difference. Other studies comparing “Good” and “Poor” leaders have come to the same conclusion: this is not the “caring person” compared with the “results oriented person.”³⁶

The fact, mentioned above, that leaders in traditional highly structured organizations such as the Army may be likely to over-rate their interpersonal skills adds to the challenge of ensuring that those skills are brought up to the high levels of tactical skills. It is, however, necessary to focus on individual cases, because the overall data on average self-awareness among recently promoted brigadier generals shows a remarkably good profile of awareness of strengths and weaknesses. Data collected by CCL over the years shows most Army brigadier generals rating themselves quite high on many important behaviors, with their subordinates often rating them even higher—as in the case of the Division Commander averages in this study.

There were several interview discussions about whether or not the “Poor” leaders could or would change their negative behaviors if they were given credible feedback. An unresolved question is the extent to which feedback and developmental programs can modify dysfunctional behavior, or if the source of these behaviors are “hard wired” and beyond the reach of available Army efforts. The general consensus among the participants in this study was that the “toxic” leaders’ problems are “Rooted in their personalities,” and “Not amenable to change,” and that this might be more of an identification and selection challenge than a developmental challenge. Again, this may underestimate the capacity for continued adult learning and change, but such adult continuous learning must be strongly supported by the institution in order for change to persist. Any necessary “de-toxification” should in any case begin early in an officer’s career.³⁷

If the problems do stem from fundamentally narcissistic behavior—which some of the incidents of “Poor” leadership might reflect—the chances for remediation may be remote.³⁸ In these rare cases, identification and “de-selection” processes may be the only prudent alternative. If, however, an individual desires to modify behavior that is not rooted in a serious personality disorder, significant behavior improvement is possible even among successful adults—which are the most challenging cases.³⁹ Army systems should be designed to support such behavioral development. Any program

³⁵ The Armed Forces Officer, USGPO, 1960. Page 50.

³⁶ See for example, “Psychological Orientations and Leadership: Thinking Style That Differentiates Between Effective and Ineffective Leaders.” Gratzinger, Warren, and Cooke. (Undated document available at USAWC.)

³⁷ Personality interventions may have most promise at the age of mid-grade captains. See for example, Torbert’s Managing the American Dream, 1987.

³⁸ General officers as a group have a fairly consistent personality profile that shows strong skills essential to organizational leadership. Typical of senior executives they show comfort with responsibility, confidence in decision-making, etc. along with tendencies that can lead to over-controlling behaviors and discomfort with ambiguity. These data have not changed much over the past 20 years, per recent correspondence between CCL and the authors of this report. The basic reference remains David Campbell’s 1987 paper, “The Psychological Test Profiles of Brigadier Generals: Warmongers or Decisive Warriors” invited address, Div 14, APA, 30 August 1987. (Available at USAWC) Updated data from the Center for Creative Leadership show no significant recent changes.

³⁹ For another review of relevant executive temperament, see Robert E. Kaplan, Beyond Ambition: How Driven Managers Can Lead Better and Live Better. 1991. Jossey-Bass.

designed to ensure that all future Brigade and Division Commanders meet leadership standards must be comprehensive. The selection, evaluation, education, and assignment systems must be aligned and integrated.⁴⁰ These integrated systems must be applied relatively early in the officer development cycle. As one participating officer noted about his highly regarded Division Commander, “He is decisive, trusting, clear in his intent, and approachable. And he’s been this way since he was a captain!”

6. Adaptability, mental agility, the capacity to improvise, and related conceptual skills seem increasingly necessary at senior officer level, and these capacities were greatly prized when exhibited by Division Commanders in OIF.

Rationale: A variety of recent papers have noted the need for conceptual competence among strategic leaders. Studies of the characteristics of executive behavior report the positive correlation between high measurable intelligence and promotion to executive levels.⁴¹ As previously noted, an attempt to describe the capabilities of military “strategic leaders” always includes the conceptual capacity to deal with complexity. Some participants in this study pointed out how their Division Commander’s conceptual agility was responsible for all kinds of positive outcomes. This conceptual excellence was reflected in the Division Commander’s clear guidance to the staff, unambiguous commander’s intent, tactical innovation, and logistical improvisation. (“He has an amazing ability to absorb details, to pick the wheat from the chaff, and to clearly explain his intent.” “He makes a quick scan of the situation and is able to adjust on the move.”) None indicated that their Division Commander had difficulty handling the conceptual part of his responsibilities.

There was no indication that the officers who were participants in this study were lacking in conceptual ability. However, the issue of adequate conceptual ability for senior leaders is in fact complex and unclear. A number of studies, and the Reed “Toxic Leader” paper previously mentioned, confirm that intellectual brilliance absent other complementing competencies does not guarantee success as a leader. There is not consensus on this point, with some studies indicating that strong conceptual ability alone should result in greater self-awareness and ability to adjust to interpersonal requirements. A 1996 Army Symposium concluded there might be too much emphasis on developing cognitive skills and too little on interpersonal skills.⁴² A 2002 paper prepared by Army officers at Harvard noted that current leader development doctrine gave too much attention to interpersonal and technical competencies and was ignoring the conceptual realm.⁴³ An ongoing study at the Army War College concerning the development of “agile leaders” should provide further insight regarding conceptual requirements for leaders at various levels.⁴⁴

Implications: This study does not have adequate data on which to base a general conclusion regarding the conceptual competencies of Army field grade or general officers. There are apparently few data points in the Army’s archives from which to generalize about senior officer conceptual competence.

⁴⁰ Two HQDA Task Forces formed in 2003 have been working on various parts of this developmental challenge.

⁴¹ For a good discussion about cognitive complexity, see Strategic Leadership: A Multiorganizational-Level Perspective, edited by Phillips and Hunt. 1992.

⁴² See U.S. Army research Institute Research Note 96-63: Executive Summary of the “Leadership Challenges of the 21st Century Army” Symposium. May 1996.

⁴³ See “Striking A Balance In Leader Development” A Case for Conceptual Competencies,” by Col Emil Kluever, et. al. National Security Program Discussion Paper Series 92-02. Harvard University.

⁴⁴ See “Agile Leader Study” directed by TRADOC, executed by DCLM, USAWC, 2004.

Interviews by the study team revealed attributes of a generally high level of intellectual competence across all the participating officer grades. It is possible, but perhaps unlikely given the diversity of demands in strategic leader positions, that the screening mechanisms that appear to be effective in selecting competent tactical and technical leaders at Brigade and Division level also eliminate those who do not have the requisite conceptual capacity for senior levels. What, if any, extraordinary conceptual talent may be missed by this screening might be an appropriate question for further study. It is appropriate to review Army educational programs to ensure that there is the intellectual stimulation and support for reflective thinking needed for the agile and adaptive mindset suited to OIF challenges.

7. The quality of the command climate, resulting in great part from the Division Commander's leadership style, has a significant effect on the willingness of subordinate commanders to take initiative and reasonable risks, and to execute aggressively what was known to be the commander's intent.

Rationale: As previously mentioned, the command (or organizational) climate—the sense of focus, coherence, and mutual trust derived from perceptions about the environment—directly influences operational effectiveness. The state of the climate seems to have a particularly strong effect on organizational innovation and adaptability.⁴⁵ In some studies, the climate seems even more significant than the collective conceptual competence of members of the organization. This relationship between the quality of the climate and organizational adaptability is consistent with the findings of this study of OIF Division Commanders' leadership.

It is remarkable that during OIF, with a mature cadre of well trained, confident commanders and staff officers, how greatly the Division Commander's personality and leadership style permeated through the echelons of a dispersed, engaged Division and influenced the overall command climate. In 2004, just as in past campaigns in less technically sophisticated environments, the impact of a Commanding General's behavior is felt throughout the organization. This relationship between climate and adaptability is consistent with our study team findings. A recent report by Dr. Leonard Wong also noted the widespread practice of confident, innovative leadership in OIF, and questioned whether this comfort with initiative can be sustained when the unit returns to the more regularized, bureaucratic mode often seen in garrison.⁴⁶ (See Ancillary Finding 14.)

Data about command climate were gathered by using the Assessment of Selected Aspects of the Command Climate instrument (ACC). Participants first completed the instrument, indicating how they would rate the climate and how they thought the Division commander would rate the climate and then discussed the particular reasons for their ratings. (A copy of the ACC may be found on Page A - 5)

Chart 13 shows the average evaluations for how the Division staff and subordinate commanders rated the climate compared to how the Division Commanders rated the climate. The chart shows comparisons among the ACC's six measures of climate elements, and the ratings for the climate overall. As shown, these Divisions had solid command climates, some a bit more supportive than

⁴⁵ Teresa Amabile, Ph.D. has written on this issue extensively. She noted that intrinsic motivation was necessary for innovation, and that the quality of the work environment is critical to such motivation. See Readings In Innovation, Grysiewicz and Hills, eds. Center for Creative Leadership. (1992).

⁴⁶ Wong, op cit. It was interesting to hear from Division staff and other discussions of the concern that return to the more bureaucratic and structured mode at home station would impede relevant, innovative unit training.

others. (Note that these are averages of all four Divisions.) A subordinate commander in one of the Divisions remarked, “I have watched three different Division Commanders over the past several years. All of them were tactically competent. But this is the only one who knew how to build a command climate.” The Division Commander must have learned how to sense and craft climates from observation and independent study: the Army educational system does not appear to address the issue specifically. This Division Commander and others had learned how to control as needed and to build subordinate trust and commitment. He may not have thought in terms of a “loosely-coupled” organization, or of attending to the interrelated systems within the dynamics of a complex organization, but he and his team nevertheless built a climate that had clarity of mission, realistic priorities, well-functioning vertical command teams, adequately clear channels of information, and respect for the authority of subordinates. There were no significant differences overall in climate evaluations between the staff and the subordinate commanders.

Some scholars conclude that a major component of moving from an industrial age leadership model to an information age model is recognition of the need for a supportive or enabling climate within which people can maximize their contribution to organizational goals.⁴⁷ Climates described in OIF appeared often to reflect a leadership style that was both “forceful and enabling,” words that describe the required approach in the view of author Robert Kaplan.⁴⁸

In describing the best climates, officers noted the absolutely clear Division Commander’s intent combined with mutual trust between the Division Commander and his subordinates that facilitated the adaptive, innovative actions at battalion and company level. In describing the key contributions of their Division Commanders in forming a healthy, supportive, mission-focused climate, both subordinate commanders and Division staff officers mentioned frequently LBP behaviors of coolness under pressure (Item 3.), clarity of intent and the capacity to adjust and adapt and reformulate the intent as necessary (Items 1. and 5.), taking time to outline the “big picture” (Item 6.), being open to ideas even when under stress (Item 8.), and making and explaining tough decisions in time enough for subordinates to plan and react (Item 22.) While these insights are not new, these interviews again confirmed the relevance of the basics of Army leadership doctrine as well as the critical role of commanders in crafting the climate.

These best climates in OIF reflected more of the desirable “professional” than the cumbersome “bureaucratic” organizational models. The combination of individual expertise in tactical and technical areas, clear goals, and open communication between senior and subordinate is similar to the mode adopted years ago by Army Special Operations forces.⁴⁹

Within the strong climates of these Divisions the strongest element was A: “A strong, healthy focus on mission accomplishment.” This reflected a traditionally key value that put mission foremost. The weakest reported component, not surprisingly since expectations for this critical function are high, was item C: “A reliable, timely, open flow of information.” (More discussion of this shortcoming is provided at Finding 9.)

⁴⁷ See Ch 9 of Leadership That Matters, Sashkin & Sashkin. Roberts-Koehler Publishers. 2003

⁴⁸ See Robert E. Kaplan, “Leadership That Is Both Forceful and Enabling” in Leadership In Action Vol 19, No. 4, Sep/Oct 1999. Center for Creative Leadership and Jossey-Bass.

⁴⁹ See Ch 24, “Principles for building the profession: The SOF experience” by T. O. Jacobs and Michael G. Sanders in Don M. Snider and Lloyd D. Matthews (eds.), The Future of the Army Profession, Revised Second Edition. McGraw-Hill. 2005. (In press.)

Even in the strongest climate the most tenuous link within the “open flow of information” was the quality of the upward flow. Most concerns in this area centered on commander willingness to listen, and to remain open to input even when under pressure. (Recall again the high importance given to the item “Keeps cool under pressure” in the LBP data. Participants mentioned the critical impact of this behavior on the flow of upward information when the Division was in stressful situations.) Whether this common impediment in command climates is more a technical matter (understanding how to design and maintain various channels of communication, and how to manage one’s time in order to be available for incoming information), or an interpersonal matter (managing self and understanding the impact of one’s behavior on the willingness of subordinates to provide timely information) is open to question. The probability is that there are elements of both technical management and self-management in the equation.

Chart 13

[Average assessments by 72 subordinates (Subord.)
compared with 4 Division Commanders (DIV CG)]

Assessment of Selected Aspects of the Command Climate (ACC)
--

1	2
Marginal	

3	4
Satisfactory	

5	6
Exceeds expectations	

A. A strong, healthy focus on mission accomplishment.						
Subord.					5.46	
DIV CG				4.75		
B. Clarity of standards, goals, and priorities.						
Subord.					5.32	
DIV CG				4.25		
C. A reliable, timely, open flow of key information.						
Subord.				4.65		
DIV CG			3.5			
D. An appreciation for initiative and innovation.						
Subord.					5.11	
DIV CG			3.5			
E. Consideration for the well-being of people.						
Subord.					5.51	
DIV CG				4.75		
F. A prevailing sense of mutual trust and confidence.						
Subord.					5.26	
DIV CG				4.25		
X. Overall assessment of the climate.						
Subord.					5.25	
DIV CG				4.25		

Implications: Climate survey formats are available to commanders, and are used often at company level after a change of command. DA Pamphlet 600-69, “Unit Climate Profile Commander’s Handbook,” 1 October 1986, is available for that level. The questions in that survey include areas particularly relevant to garrison activities (sports programs, social courtesy, substance abuse, etc.) along with some items more directly related to tactical performance. There appears to be no instrument recently designed to measure climate at more senior levels and convenient for local administration. FM 22-100 contains a useful “Ethical Climate Assessment Survey” also targeted to company level but relevant generally. Climate surveys of various types seem to be used at brigade and higher levels when the local commander or staff director is so disposed.

Climate surveys, properly administered and analyzed with perspective, provide unique, useful insights. Their data provide a relatively non-threatening tool for looking at the outcomes of leader behavior combined with the adequacy of resources to perform the mission. They also have a high potential for constructive use at higher staff levels whose climates are critical to organizational functioning.⁵⁰ Our interview results support other research that suggests that climates are not routinely appraised. There is little doubt that the envisaged Future Army will require a prompt and reliable flow of information as a key enabler of optimum decentralized combat power. Climate assessments provide insight into the quality of that flow of information.

Participants in the study were interested in discussing the subject of command climates. None reported receiving any instruction on the use of climate survey data or in methods for assessing and building the command climate. There seems to be no Army school whose curriculum includes a comprehensive model on how to assess and build the requisite climate at battalion and higher levels.

8. Even the most highly regarded commanders—as well as their subordinates—see developmental opportunities for enhancing commander effectiveness. Moreover, there are few if any convenient opportunities for Division Commanders (and Brigade-level Commanders as well) to obtain periodic performance coaching and feedback.

Rationale: The Division Commanders in this study, while appropriately confident of their abilities, were aware they had not reached perfection. This opinion was shared by even their most admiring subordinates. (“He is really good. The best I have ever worked for. If he could learn to _____, he would be even more effective.” And as somebody else remarked, “Even Michael Jordan needed a coach!”)

During the conduct of the study, three of the Division Commanders’ schedules permitted giving them preliminary feedback. **Chart 14**, which details perceived strengths and areas for improvement, provides a consolidation of results from four Divisions,⁵¹ and as such lacks the impact of individualized feedback. Still, these averages provide useful insight.

Note that the Division Commanders indicated awareness of their shortcomings in Item 14 (Coaching subordinates) and in Item 28 (Not playing favorites.) During interviews with the Division Commanders and their subordinates, the “Not playing favorites” item was closely related to Item 25 “Builds and

⁵⁰ The CSIS study *American Military Culture in the 21st Century*, February 2000, was one of the few studies looking at staff as well as line climates. Those data appeared to be useful to the commanders and staff chiefs concerned.

⁵¹ Includes perceptions from ADC’s, Chiefs of Staff, Division staff members, and subordinate commanders.

supports teamwork” in the minds of both groups. In Discussing the subordinates’ hope for the Division Commander’s greater “Sensing of unproductive policies and making prompt adjustments,” the cause appeared to be a lack of prompt flow of upward information about dysfunctional policy in some cases, and in others a deliberate intent on the Division Commander’s part to postpone making policy corrections until subordinates had an opportunity to act.

CHART 14 STRENGTHS AND AREAS FOR IMPROVEMENT

TOP SIX ITEMS LISTED BY SUBORDINATES AS “PARTICULARLY STRONG”

(Percent of 73 participants who selected that behavior.)

- 1. Adapts quickly to new situations and requirements. (32)
- 2. Keeps cool under pressure. (36)
- 5. Clearly explains missions, standards, and priorities. (41)**
- 6. Sees the big picture; provides context and perspective. (47)**
- 13. Gets out of the headquarters and visits the troops. (38)
- 22. Can make tough, sound decisions on time. (38)

TOP FIVE ITEMS LISTED AS “MIGHT WANT TO WORK ON”

- 14. Coaches and gives useful feedback to subordinates. (32) [Yes]**
- 21. Is approachable; listens to questions and suggestions. (18) [No]
- 24. Senses unproductive policies and makes prompt adjustments. (21) [No]
- 25. Builds and supports teamwork within staff and among units. (21) [No]
- 28. Is fair; doesn’t play favorites with units or people. (21) [Yes]

[In 2 or more Division Commanders’ list of their top 3 or 4 that need work: Yes or No]

(See Appendix B for complete listing of percentages of items selected.)

The two behaviors most commonly mentioned above as strengths, explaining missions and providing context, may be primarily dependent on conceptual competence. They seemed related to the Division Commander’s understanding of the subordinate need for clarity of mission, and passion of the cognitive capacity and contextual acuity to respond promptly to that need. There is no doubt that those Division Commanders particularly adept at producing and disseminating a clear intent were appreciated by staff and subordinate commanders alike, particularly when the overall situation was saturated in ambiguity. From one subordinate about his Division commander, “He was not only clear in his commander’s intent; he could also modify it on the move and let us know without losing a beat.”

The feedback item, number 14, was clearly the most commonly reported shortcoming. Commanders admitted they had not reserved the time to coach and provide feedback. Three of the four Division commanders listed that as one of their shortcomings. When asked about their performance as coaches and feedback givers, the subordinates also noted they too had probably not done it right. It is in any case a source of at least mild concern and at worst a significant disappointment that coaching and feedback is so often touted within the culture but so rarely planned and accomplished. Properly handled, feedback is the primary key to continued development, and may be for the institution an opportunity for significant improvement in operational effectiveness in the long term. A related question in the LPB, Item 28, “Is fair; doesn’t play favorites,” was often mentioned in interviews as connected to inadequate attention to inclusion and team-building. Two Division Commanders

recognized there was a perception that some subordinates had a sense of not being in the “inner circle.”(A specific discussion of the importance of team-building is at Finding 9.)

The Division Commanders appeared to welcome the opportunity for a candid, informed, off-line discussion of their leadership style. They remarked that they had no suitable, convenient opportunity to get feedback about their behavior in their current position. They indicated this situation pertained not only in OIF but also in garrison. Their superiors were understandably focused on pressing operational matters—as they often were—and in any case were rarely sufficiently informed on the Division’s command climate or the quality of the interpersonal skills of the Division Commander and the positive or negative impact of those skills. The Division and Brigade Commanders suggested that a short climate survey and subordinate appraisal of leadership style, similar to that used in this study, would have been particularly helpful after their initial several months in command.

The idea of continuous learning about personal leadership style and behavior, and of providing coaching and feedback for accomplished senior leaders, is a relatively new organizational concept. Recent versions of FM 22-100 have expanded coverage relating to leadership at senior levels, but most focus on senior learning has been in the tactical and technical areas. Focus on the clearly essential and more easily measured tactical and technical proficiencies has de facto relegated conceptual and interpersonal development of mature officers to a secondary role. Further, the concept of the need for continuing development of senior executives remains counter-intuitive to most hierarchical cultures, military or civilian.

The Army War College has increased its attention to individual learning and self-awareness in recent years, and some senior officers have attended civilian executive development programs that included detailed personal behavioral feedback providing from subordinates and peers as well as seniors.⁵² While “mentoring” (probably the wrong term for everyday help with personal development)⁵³ and “coaching” have been urged, there is no current program for on the job mentoring and feedback, seen as essential by studies of executive growth and development.⁵⁴ There has been informal, often apparently memorable, leadership coaching provided by well qualified senior observers at some BCTP events, and more regularly by some Senior Mentors at Joint Forces Command exercises. The opportunities for feedback at these high-profile events have been only partially exploited.⁵⁵

⁵² There are now a number of initiatives underway exploring the routine use of “360” feedback in officer developmental methods, led by the Center for Army Leadership and supported by USMA faculty, elements of the G-1 staff in the Pentagon, the Army Research Institute, the Army War College and ICAF.

⁵³ For a realistic view of complexities of mentoring, see Gregg F. Martin et.al. “The Road to Mentoring: Paved With Good Intentions.” *Parameters*. Autumn 2002.

⁵⁴ Meaningful progress in leader development depends on the combined effort of school, individual, and unit as Army doctrine states. The weak element is the on-the-job follow-up. See for example, Chapter Seven, “The Leader Development Process” in *Handbook of Leadership Development: Second Edition*. Center for Creative Leadership. John Wiley. 2004.

⁵⁵ This seems to be the general opinion of current and former senior mentors at BTMS, CTC’s, and other exercises where senior leaders are observed. In conversations with the study authors, several retired senior officers recently involved in training activities saw particular strengths in adaptation (Item 1, LBP), knowing unit capabilities (Item 11 in LBP), showing consideration for others (Item 19 in LBP), and making sound decisions on time (Item 22 in LDP.) They saw progress in Joint competencies but thought that area still needed to be watched. Areas from the LBP seen as potential weaknesses were Item 4, knowing how to involve others in decision making, and Item 12, handling “bad news.” This sample is too small for generalizations, but there is basis in their comments to support more attention to coaching senior officers in their ability to keep open the upward channels of communication.

Implications: There appears to be a growing awareness of the need for continuing development of senior leaders. The current programs appear both successful in producing some excellent leaders, but inadequate in not taking advantage of existing knowledge to ensure that all facets of a senior officer's competencies are fully developed. While studies in the commercial and military worlds indicate that the typical corporate executive or general officer personality is more comfortable making decisions than listening to new ideas,⁵⁶ there are examples of such personalities adopting both individual and cultural change, particularly when the institution seriously prompts such change.⁵⁷ Again, these distinct behaviors seen in Figure 8 above describe opportunities for near term skill development in areas of climate-building, time management (to better apportion schedules to attend to field visits, coaching, etc.), and team building. Such opportunities for development relate directly to enhanced operational effectiveness.

9. "Team building," both horizontally and vertically, is crucial to the reliable flow of essential information, and is therefore one of the more critical skills of a Division Commander.

Rationale: As previously mentioned, people want to be included on the "team" of the Division Commander. That is particularly true if that commander is highly regarded by his subordinates. Division Commanders recognized their need to improve their team building skills.

At least as important as the more commonly recognized horizontal staff teams were the top command teams of Division Commander, Assistant Division Commander, and Chief of Staff. Even in Divisions where a healthy climate existed and relationships were generally positive, there was often some degree of anxiety or ambiguity regarding roles and authority of each member of the command team.

Perhaps most important were the vertical teams up and down the chain of command.⁵⁸ Some subordinate commanders were unsure of their relationship with their very busy and highly regarded Division Commander, and were at a loss as to how to ameliorate the situation. They were concerned about access to the command team and were unsure of their ability to be heard. This was true of commanders of organic as well as attached units, and prevailed in some degree even in Divisions with generally healthy climates. Part of their concerns about their roles as team members may arise from poorly conceived daily schedules that appear to give one group an unfair segment of the commander's time. Another possible source of concern was a neglect of passing important but not critical information down the chain of command that left some subordinates feeling "out of the loop." There was some degree of insensitivity on the part of commanders about the impact of their every action on their subordinates. The sources of this incomplete satisfaction with team building are both technical (managerial and information systems based) and interpersonal (areas of self-awareness). Again our officers have high expectations about what their leaders should do, and these expectations derive from Army stated values and generally rising societal expectations about executive behavior. The issue does not appear to arise from the "hurt feelings" syndrome of an adolescent, but rather from a strong need

⁵⁶ Campbell. op cit. See also on a closely related topic the article in the July 2002 issue of Army magazine by Lloyd Matthews, "The Uniformed Intellectual And His Place in American Arms."

⁵⁷ Integration of minorities and women, family support systems, alcohol and smoking constraints are all examples of significant cultural change supported and adopted by Army leaders.

⁵⁸ LTG (Retired) Frederic Brown has devoted considerable attention to the issue of vertical teams. He is convinced the dynamics of these groups plays an important part in determining sustained operational effectiveness. See his "Vertical Command Teams," Institute for Defense Analyses, IDA Document D-2728, June 2002. A more recent publication is in press. See www.AKO-BCKS for the latest draft.

for inclusion that is not inappropriate within a tight professional group. In any case, since mature officers in generally well-functioning organizations had concerns about inclusion that drew some of their energy away from more strategic matters, the issue is not trivial. It may be useful to note that while in horizontal teams stability among group members itself seems to enhance bonding, interviews in this study and prior research indicates that vertical bonding is a less natural phenomenon more sensitive to the quality of the leadership environment.⁵⁹

The internal reorganization of task forces, and the integration of units attached to Divisions was accomplished relatively smoothly. However, it appears that it could have been accomplished even more rapidly and more easily had there been specific attention to the concepts of team building on the part of the Division Commanders and their Chiefs of Staff. Concerns about non-inclusion were often related to the amount of time the Division (and Corps) Commanders spent with subordinate team members. Or in some cases the quality of that time and the ratio of listening to talking. This need for inclusion is of course not unique to OIF. In any case, since mature officers had concerns about inclusion that drew some of their energy away from more strategic issues, the issue is not trivial. There is some good academic work on team building by individuals who have practical experience as well as scholarly credentials. Clearly the first step in team building is to clarify how the team should operate.⁶⁰

Implications: Horizontal and vertical team-building warrants a place in whatever refresher training is provided to Division Commanders, Assistant Division commanders, and Chiefs of Staff. The subjects of time management and team building, and the practical methods of integrating Assistant Division Commanders, Chiefs of Staff, and the key officers in attached units into the headquarters operation deserve attention. The solution requires both technical (staff organization, time management, information flow) as well as interpersonal skill development (trust development, self-management, listening) that is not beyond the theoretical and logistical capability of the existing educational systems.

10. There is a set of most important and productive leader behaviors that best describe the effective Division Commander. (These behaviors are applicable also to other officer grades, and can be the basis for developing more effective leader training, education, selection, and development processes.) They are identified as the “BIG 12”

Rationale: Quantitative and qualitative results from this study indicate the combined power of these behaviors and their individual significance. They derive from Army leadership doctrine and values, and have been validated as relevant to contemporary operations such as OIF.

Implications: This list has particular utility because principles and concepts and traits have been recombined as observable behaviors: actions that people can see, feel, relate to, and evaluate. Adoption of these behaviors among effective commanders and staff leaders is not new, but these selected, measurable behaviors as a whole are an addition to current Army leadership references.

⁵⁹ See the report of the WRAIR Research Oversight Panel Meeting, 15 April 1986. (Available at USAWC)

⁶⁰ Based on corporate situations, the book FYI For Teams by Lombardo and Eichinger has relevant ideas about team building among successful executives. There are several reputable survey instruments available for exploring team dynamics and effectiveness. The Campbell-Hallam “Team Development Survey” developed at CCL is one.

This list could be used as the basis for education (they reflect values and principles, are applicable to a variety of environments, and stimulate discussion); as an addition to officer evaluation reporting systems (their presence on performance reports would focus attention on Army's view of their value); as the basis for one aspect of a command climate survey (questions about how the climate supports each of these would be germane); as discussion topics in officer professional development sessions (reviewing, for example, how current unit or staff policies enhance or retard development of these behaviors); what their list of 12 among the 29 would be within their current organization; how individuals believed they learned these behaviors; how they coach their subordinates in the development of these behaviors; how the list of most significant behaviors might differ between garrison and battlefield; how a list might or might not differ between staff and command positions, etc.; as an outline for coaching and feedback (a self vs. others evaluation of these behaviors); and in field After Action Reviews (determining how these behaviors led to the effectiveness of the commander during the operation.)

These Big 12 are not presented as the final answer to all leader development challenges. While they are at the center of essential Army leader behaviors, their relative importance and significance varies depending on the situation, the mission, the resources available for training and operations, the general state of training, personnel turnover rates, the experience and maturity of unit personnel, and the level of command. While most of these behaviors are important at all levels, as a group they fit best at battalion and higher levels of command and staff. All 29 behaviors are necessary within the repertoire of highly effective leaders.

Chart 15

The Big 12 (In order of LBP item numbers)

1. Adapts quickly to new situations and requirements.
3. Keeps cool under pressure.
5. Clearly explains missions, standards, and priorities.
6. Sees the big picture; provides context and perspective.
7. Sets high standards without a "zero defects" mentality.
12. Can handle "bad news."
14. Coaches and gives useful feedback to subordinates.
15. Sets a high ethical tone; demands honest reporting.
17. Knows how to delegate and not "micromanage."
22. Can make tough, sound decisions on time.
25. Builds and supports teamwork within staff and among units.
29. Is positive, encouraging, and realistically optimistic.

Most of these behaviors seem to fit into the "Interpersonal" category of Army leadership skill areas. Although any such categorization is imprecise, **Chart 16** provides a view of how these behaviors *might* be categorized within the FM 22-100 four areas. **Chart 17** provides an outline for discussing a possible array of learning sources associated with these behaviors.

Chart 16

Four FM 22-100 categories: Interpersonal (I), Conceptual (C), Technical (Te), Tactical (Ta)

The "Big 12" Behaviors	I	C	Te	Ta
1. Adapts quickly to new situations and requirements.	S	P		
3. Keeps cool under pressure.	P	S		
5. Clearly explains missions, standards, and priorities.		P		S
6. Sees the big picture; provides context and perspective.		P	S	
7. Sets high standards without a "zero defects" mentality.	S	P		
12. Can handle "bad news."	P	S		
14. Coaches and gives useful feedback to subordinates.	P		S	
15. Sets a high ethical tone; demands honest reporting.	P		S	
17. Knows how to delegate and not "micromanage."		S	P	
22. Can make tough, sound decisions on time.		P	S	
25. Builds and supports teamwork within staff and among units.	S		P	
29. Is positive, encouraging, and realistically optimistic.	P	S		

P = primary skill-related area S = secondary skill-related area

Chart 17

LBP “BIG 12” Probable Effective Learning Sources for Each Behavior

**Army schools (AS), Field tactical training (TT), Command and staff coaching (CS),
Special programs (SP), Self study (SS)**

Specific leader behavior (for a Division Commander)	AS	TT	CS	SP	SS
1. Adapts quickly to new situations and requirements.		S	P	S	
3. Keeps cool under pressure.		S	S	P	S
5. Clearly explains missions, standards, and priorities.	S	S	P		
6. Sees the big picture; provides context and perspective.			P	S	S
7. Sets high standards without a “zero defects” mentality.	S		P		S
12. Can handle “bad news.”			S	P	S
14. Coaches and gives useful feedback to subordinates.	S		P		S
17. Knows how to delegate and not “micromanage.”	S		P		S
22. Can make tough, sound decisions on time.		S	P		
25. Builds and supports teamwork within staff and among units.	S		P		S
29. Is positive, encouraging, and realistically optimistic.			P	S	S

(Obviously the learning sources often interact and are not always distinct or separable.)

AS = TRADOC schools, assuming optimum learning environment where intellectual challenge and “how to learn” are included along with tactical and technical content.

TT = Local training areas and CTCs assuming requisite standards, evaluation, and AARs, and exercises that put individuals “under pressure” and provide them developmental feedback.

CS = Command and staff experience in the field supported by skilled leaders, periodic performance feedback, and opportunities to reflect on unit and individual performance.

SP = Specialized military or civilian education; assessment center feedback; assignment with industry, etc.; and preparatory guidance on how to learn from both education and experience.

SS = Structured programs of self-study, input from selected subject matter experts, retired senior officers, senior mentors, etc., combined with instruction on measures of progress and guidance on self-awareness and self-management.

P = primary learning method S = secondary learning method

11. Although formal education was seen as a necessary component in the leader development process, participants reported that their most effective and memorable lessons came from personal experience in command and staff positions that was basically self-learning.

Rationale: One interview topic centered on what education or experience was the most significant in learning how to lead.⁶¹ The common response was the same as the conclusions in most leadership studies: while formal education provided essential concepts and the basis for awareness of institutional expectations and standards, most learning occurred on the job—in command and staff positions.⁶² The principal players were commanders and staff leaders who set the example, although some of the participants mentioned high school teachers or coaches as still the most powerful figures in their learning experience. While routine performance coaching or counseling was reported as a rare occurrence in the experience of all participants, bosses who did take time to explain standards and give feedback—as Army doctrine has long espoused—were remembered with great appreciation. For those colonels and general officers who attended a Senior Service College (SSC),⁶³ behavioral feedback as part of the curriculum was seen as helpful but of limited value since it was not reinforced on the job after graduation. Many recalled interaction with fellow students and faculty as a meaningful part of the leadership insights they gained from formal schooling.

Implications: The TRADOC schools get reasonable marks for recently increasing their emphasis on leader development concepts, and for implementing a variety of study and personnel initiatives over the past two years that have given impetus to human resource needs in the 21st Century environment. However, the fact remains that learning on the job overwhelms all other methods of development in the minds of participants in this study and in most studies of adult learning. However, the Army has not yet emphasized and rewarded the development of subordinates by commanders and staff officers. This seems even more the case in staffs than in line units. The major conclusion is well known in theory but difficult to attend to in practice: if leader development is to be both effective and efficient it must be practiced routinely on the job—as a continuation and reinforcement of institutional education. This means educating and training officers, particularly senior officers who are the role models, on principles and methods for developing their subordinates, particularly on how to reinforce in the field those useful lessons taught in the schools. This will require additional emphasis in TRADOC schools, in Pre-Command Courses, and in systems for prioritizing efforts and providing resources within organizations. It will be facilitated also by reduced personnel turbulence that provides a longer opportunity to observe and coach individuals. Interestingly, many commanders in OIF found time to conduct formal as well as informal Officer Professional Development programs. Commanders and staff directors should be held accountable for both efforts and results in subordinate leader development, as they are held accountable for other activities such as training proficiency and materiel readiness.

⁶¹ Page A- 8 shows typical interview outline used by the study team.

⁶² See Morgan W. McCall, Jr. et. al., The Lessons Of Experience: How Successful Executives Develop on the Job for a basic overview. This seminal reference also notes interpersonal behavior as the major cause of executive “derailment.”

⁶³ Of the four Division Commanders, two were Army War College graduates, one a National War College graduate, and one attended a university for his Senior Service College experience.

12. The Division Commanders, division staff officers, and subordinate commanders indicated that their participation in this study was helpful in reflecting on their own leadership styles and competencies.

Rationale: Participants, busy as they were, seemed interested in being included in the study. Most felt it was worthwhile to reflect on their own leadership skills as well as on those of their current and former commanders. It is not surprising that they found it a rare if not unique experience. (“This the longest time I have ever spent talking about real leadership issues.”)

Implications: Commanders are willing to devote some time to reviewing climate and leadership issues within their typically busy schedules. The process of taking the pulse of an organization and providing real time feedback to senior officers is a relatively inexpensive but productive process. The caveat is that those assessing the climate, interpreting the results, and providing the feedback must have the required experience and coaching expertise in order to be credible.

13. Division Commanders saw the need for both extensive prior experience in the type Divisions they were leading as well as field and staff experience outside their “normal” pattern.

Rationale: Division Commanders saw the need for both detailed familiarity with their Division, gained often by Chief of Staff or Assistant Division Commander assignments, and a wider world view gained by some “non-traditional” educational and assignment patterns. They felt strongly that not all prior tactical assignments should be in the type Division they would eventually command.

Implications: This is perhaps no change from current concepts, but assignments that stimulate innovation and broaden horizons seem especially pertinent to envisaged future operational challenges. Unconventional education or non-standard assignments can play a role in enhancing situational perceptivity and conceptual agility. This assumes that the officer has learned how to learn from his experience, and that those lessons are reinforced on the job.

As discussed in Finding 4, it seems useful to review the process by which battalion commanders are selected and to explore the whole range of methods for early identification of talent.⁶⁴ It is also noteworthy in this area that the Army does not appear to have a rigorous system of assessing and categorizing existing expertise within the officer corps.

14. (Ancillary finding not directly related to the purpose of this study.) The latitude and discretion that many officers enjoyed in accomplishing their missions in OIF was consistent with Army doctrine of “mission-type orders with decentralized execution” but was in fact relatively uncommon, particularly in the garrison environments to which these officers are now returning. Commanders and company level officers received high marks for their initiative, agility, and innovation from both subordinates and superiors. There appears to be among these commanders—and many of their battalion and brigade commanders along with members of brigade and division staffs—a fear that the unyielding structures and potential for “micromanagement” of garrison life will deny them the opportunity to apply initiative and common sense in rebuilding and retraining their units.

⁶⁴ One of the recently formed HQDA Task Forces, “TF Bench,” under the leadership of the Commandant, U.S. Army War College, has been addressing this issue.

Rationale: Company and field grade officers, and the few senior non-commissioned officers who talked informally with study team members, expressed great satisfaction about their ability to accept mission orders, consider the commander's intent, and execute with imagination and experimentation, knowing they were trusted to do their best. Junior leaders reconfigured vehicles, negotiated with tribal leaders, coordinated fire with Special Forces elements, coordinated intelligence with CIA officers, employed C-130 gunships, moved captured weapons into the hands of weaponless policemen, improvised mobile TOCs, retrained their vehicle crewmen in dismounted operations, set up firing ranges in the desert to sustain their mounted weapons proficiency, helped rebuild schools and medical clinics, and tracked down insurgent leaders among other things.

Now back in garrison, in CONUS and USAREUR, they have ideas about how best to train their soldiers and junior leaders for the skills they might need in future campaigns such as OIF while also regaining proficiency in traditional unit METL. Their most common fears appear to be that they will be locked into a training environment and model that will in fact preclude them from attaining unit proficiency and from motivating soldiers. Since this apprehension about the overwhelming bureaucratization of garrison life was not peculiar to a particular Division this must be a cultural artifact.

Implications: There may be an opportunity for the Army to take advantage of this demonstrated ability of young officers to accomplish the mission without the unnecessary boundaries. It may be time to practice routinely our doctrine of providing clear mission guidance, an unambiguous commander's intent, an unimpeded channel of vertical communication, and an assumption that junior leaders are both committed and—within their area of responsibility—competent to take charge. Such a command philosophy would seem to be one major factor in motivating some of our best junior officers to continue their military service. Division Commanders and leaders at higher level would of course be the critical operatives in any such modification of the prevailing garrison command climate.

END SECTION III

Section IV: Study Conclusions and Recommendations

Study Conclusions

1. The Division Commanders and other officers from the four Divisions who participated in this study were by any measure an impressive group. Their overall performance in OIF reflected the best traditions of the U.S. Army.
2. Current Army leadership doctrine as expressed in FM 22-100—outlining skills in the tactical, technical, interpersonal, and conceptual areas—is suitable for guiding the behavior of Division Commanders and other officers in 21st Century operations.
3. Tactical and technical competence as reflected in both mission success and subjective assessments of performance indicate a remarkably high level of proficiency. This is clear testimony to the effectiveness of Army efforts to train to specific high standards in those leadership skills over the last two decades.
4. The personal leadership style of the Division Commander remains a unique, significant factor in determining the quality of the command climate, even when the Division is dispersed and engaged in complex and varied operations.
5. While the vast majority of Army officers demonstrate admirable leadership in OIF and elsewhere, Army leader education, training, development, and selection processes have not yet ensured that all field grade and general officers possess the interpersonal skills required to apply optimally their strong tactical and technical skills. (This study does not have a basis for conclusions regarding conceptual competencies.)
6. There are specific leader behaviors that are particularly critical to leadership success of Division Commanders and other officers. Those behaviors also clearly distinguish between the “Good” and the “Poor” leader. (These comprise the “BIG 12” list.)
7. There are specific skills that even outstanding Division Commanders can improve in order to raise their performance to an even higher level. (Team-building, horizontally and vertically, and performance coaching are often two of those specific skills.)
8. There is widespread agreement that most officer leadership development takes place in command and staff assignments. However, there are no institutionalized methods for ensuring that officers, particularly senior officers such as Division and Brigade Commanders and Division Chiefs of Staff, receive meaningful performance feedback and coaching in the field.
9. Since the selection process for battalion-level command creates the pool from which Division Commanders are eventually chosen, criteria for that selection need to consider interpersonal as well as tactical and technical skills.

10. A healthy command climate is essential for sustained organizational effectiveness, and is crucial for enhancing the small unit agility and initiative required in campaigns such as OIF. However, there are few if any Army educational or training programs that teach how to examine, build, and sustain command climates.
11. The Division Commanders and other officers who participated in this study saw it as helpful in reflecting on their leadership styles and competencies. (Division and Brigade commanders indicated that assessment and feedback similar to the model used in this study would have been particularly beneficial to them early in their command tours.)

Recommendations

The implementation of these recommendations requires that Army education, training, development, and selection systems be integrated and modified so that tactical, technical, interpersonal, and conceptual skills are suitably developed in all positions that lead to Division Command.

1. Sustain current training methods (CTC, BCTP, AAR, etc.) that have produced high levels of competence in tactical and technical skills.
 - a. Tactical training exercises should also include feedback to commanders and staff officers on their leadership style: coaching, horizontal and vertical communication flow, team dynamics, reaction to stress, and clarity of intent.
 - b. Some training situations should induce stress on commanders and staff in situations that can be observed, recorded, and used for individual and team development.
2. Use the results of this study, in particular the “BIG 12” behaviors, in leadership education programs in Army schools and training centers to better prepare leaders for Division and other levels of command.
 - a. Discussion of the Big 12 could be a start point for discussion of any differences between Army leadership doctrine and typical practice, and the probable causes for any dysfunctional differences between the ideal and the observed styles.
 - b. Pre-command programs could use the Big 12 to compare perceptions of typical command styles, to diagnose the primary origins of both good and poor leadership, considering current Army activities and Army culture, and to modify the list based on the collective experience of the group.
3. Review current educational programs to ensure those models for decision-making, methods for formulating and articulating commander’s intent, and leadership techniques for battlefield command and control support the development of individual and organizational adaptation and agility essential in current and future campaigns.
 - a. Standard models for commander and staff decision-making remain essential, but need to be placed in perspective to ensure that structured methods do not override the demands of the tactical situation for prompt delivery of commander’s intent and orders.

- b. There needs to be review of command and control methods appropriate for various combinations of tactical situations: a consideration for the factors that lead to “tight” or “loose” modes of control of subordinate units based on different states of command and staff development and on particular mission requirements.
4. Develop comprehensive, integrated systems for behavioral assessment and feedback early in an officer’s career as part of the process for preparing and selecting individuals for future command. (The 360-degree approach that compares self, superior, peer, and subordinate perceptions of behavior would be a key element.)
 - a. A simple instrument should be developed for feedback from peers and subordinates in units and staffs using specific critical behaviors such as the Big 12. Preferably, each organization would develop its own list of behaviors derived from its own situation and Army leadership doctrine. The process of development would in itself be part of the learning and development processes.
 - b. Routine use of peer feedback in all pre-commissioning programs should be considered.
5. Include in the Army school system curricula an explanation of the essential role of self-awareness, and the relevance of 360-degree performance feedback as an essential tool for continuing development as a leader.
 - a. Army schools need to explain the rationale for self-awareness as essential to leader development, and the concept of self-management as critical for leader effectiveness.
 - b. Battalion-level commanders, as key exemplars of the coaching process and the first step toward Division command, need training in giving and receiving constructive feedback prior to assuming command.
6. Develop a model for feedback and learning within operational units and staff assignments that ensures continuous development of requisite skills and behaviors essential for professional growth.
 - a. Army training doctrine needs to explain how leader development is ultimately essential for optimizing and sustaining combat power as well as for maintaining a healthy institution.
 - b. Army training doctrine needs to include guidelines for how and when a commander or staff section head provides coaching and feedback for officer development, linking concepts learned in schools to activities in units and staffs.
 - c. Mission essential task lists should include development of leaders to replace those lost through combat or reassignment.
7. Develop methods to encourage and reward coaching and developing subordinates by commanders and chiefs of staff. As one method of focusing attention, include in the next edition of the Officer Evaluation Report “Development of subordinates” as an explicit item.
 - a. Emphasize the importance of the subject within the Army educational system, and suggest methods for incorporating coaching within garrison and field training routines.

- b. Ensure that senior commanders and staff leaders set the example by regularly coaching their subordinates.
 - c. Provide in the sample officer support form in DA Pamphlet 623-105 an example that shows as an accomplishment an action that assisted subordinates in their developmental and promotional opportunities.
- 8. Ensure that the Army education system, including pre-command refresher courses, includes subjects of coaching/counseling, team-building (vertical and horizontal), and climate assessment and development.
 - a. These elements need to be part of the curriculum at all levels, with Command and Staff College and Senior Service College paying particular attention to command climate and the development of command teams.
 - b. Develop guidance for the convenient inclusion of this subject matter in officer professional development programs in units.
- 9. As an interim measure, provide officers selected for Division Command and Assistant Division Command with a brief review of the findings and recommendations of this study. Also provide refresher training in team-building (horizontal and vertical), climate building and assessment, personal time management, coaching, and performance feedback. Use this pre-command orientation until such time as these subjects have been institutionalized within the Army education system.
 - a. Make this report available for general officers being assigned to Divisions prior to their attending a two or three-day pre-command program, requesting that they be prepared to discuss its findings and conclusions.
 - b. Have the officers attending pre-command programs review the Big 12 list and comment on its relevance, validity, and utility from their perspective.
 - c. Include discussion of command climate issues, including as an example the ACC results in this study, as a method of focusing attention on command climate.
- 10. Develop assessment criteria for selection for battalion-level command that include validation of interpersonal as well as tactical and technical skills.
 - a. While 360 assessment data should not at this point be used in the selection process, officers in the zone for selection might be offered the opportunity to write to the selection board a short memorandum outlining what they have learned about their style of leadership from any 360 feedback they have received.
 - b. Criteria for selection for battalion command should be openly discussed in the Army school systems at the Command and General Staff level.
- 11. Provide to the Division Commanders a reliable, uncomplicated system for periodically reviewing the command climate. (An instrument similar to the ACC would be suitable.)
 - a. Understanding that a variety of instruments are available, a short, unambiguous version such as the ACC needs to be made available with suitable instructions for its use. Its

administration should not require computer analysis or professional interpretation. The ACC, for example, can provide a basis for discussion of the climate, and the possible reasons for the results of a particular climate evaluation, without excessive expenditure of time.

- b. Highlight the availability of the “Ethical Climate Assessment Survey,” in FM 22-100, as a convenient tool for evaluating an important aspect of the climate.
 - c. At some point collect sufficient climate data (with no identification to unit) to provide Division Commanders with baseline data for general comparison.
 - d. Review DA Pam 600-69 to ensure it is current and has the right mix of garrison and operational emphasis for climate assessment at company level.
12. Implement a system of structured leadership performance feedback to commanders, similar to the field methods used by this study team. Make this confidential feedback available for the personal development of new commanders at Brigade and Division level early in their command tour—perhaps 4 to 6 months after taking command.
- a. Form one or more teams of two individuals, one of whom has command experience at the level of interest, who would be available to provide feedback to Brigade and Division Commanders after a few months in command. Two or three days on site would suffice for data collection and feedback.
 - b. At some point collect climate data, without identification of unit, to provide a baseline of data for use by Brigade and Division commanders and by the TRADOC school system.
13. Ensure that the process for selecting Division commanders includes a review of a broad range of data that describes leadership skills of the candidates.
- a. The process of selection for Division Command should include a wide ranging collection of pertinent information that considers interpersonal and conceptual skills as well as the more commonly reported perceptions of tactical and technical competence.
 - b. Peer and subordinate perceptions of candidate skills and character, gathered by methods known to all potential candidates, should be part of the data.
 - c. Officers who are candidates for Division Command should have an opportunity to provide the board with information on their qualifications and assignment preferences they deem appropriate and useful for Board deliberations.

END SECTION IV

APPENDIX A: STUDY METHODOLOGY

Study goal, focus, questions, and assumptions : See Section II, Introduction and Background.

Basic study design : This study was designed to take advantage of the recent experience of officers in four active Army Divisions who would return to home stations from Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) in the Spring and Summer of 2004. The complex OIF battlefield would tax leaders and organizations, providing a unique contemporary view of the results of Army education, training, selection, and leadership doctrine.

The study examined two elements of a Division Commander's leadership: the direct impact of his behavior on the motivation and satisfaction of individual subordinate commanders and staff officers; and the collective impact of the Division Commanders' behavior and policies on the quality of the command climate. These components of individual motivation and command climate were seen as foundations for both short term mission accomplishment and long term institutional development. It was understood that the purpose of leadership is to get the job done, and that "the job" at Division Command level has both immediate and long term consequences, and frequently both tactical and strategic ramifications. The very nature of OIF highlighted the necessity for Division Commanders to address two legitimate but often competing requirements. The first was the need to establish and operate control systems that permitted synchronization of battlefield operating systems. The second was the need to encourage and support the initiative essential for tactical and administrative success at subordinate levels.

The study focused on observable behaviors. Understanding that values, intent, commitment, capacities, competencies, and traits remain important elements of personality, style, and effectiveness none of these is readily assessed nor impacts directly on the organization. The study used a set of significant leader behaviors, as noted on the Leader Behavior Preferences Worksheet (LBP), "That create a command climate that supports operational excellence ["operating" as described in FM 22-100] and also motivates competent people to continue their military service ["building" as described in that FM]." Similar behaviors and characteristics in the *Campbell Leadership Descriptor*® instrument were reviewed to gain further insight on differences between the good and poor leader. Because the command or organizational climate plays such a critical role in determining sustained operational capability, and is significantly influenced by the Division Commander, an instrument was developed to measure and facilitate discussion of key elements of the climate. This instrument, the *Assessment of Selected Aspects of the Command Climate* (ACC) was also developed for this study.

Using these survey instruments as stimulants to discussion of particular issues, there was an exploration of how individuals learned to lead, and of the roles played by formal education, on the job experience, and coaching or mentoring. Opinions were gathered also on what elements of Army education, training, and experience—or other learning experiences—contributed to personal leader development. The combination of quantitative survey data and qualitative input from extended interviews formed the basis for the findings, conclusions, and recommendations.

Participants were provided a written description of the study, an option not to participate if they so chose with no questions asked about their reason for declining (none took this option during the study), and an assurance that neither individuals nor unit identifications would be mentioned anywhere in the study report or in oral briefings of the report. Specifically it was mentioned that there would be no identified comparisons among Divisions.

Data collection and survey sample : While members of the study team reviewed prior leadership studies and current Army leadership doctrine, field data collection was the heart of the effort. The basic model was for two to four members of the study team to spend two or three days with a Division as soon as practicable after the Division returned to its home station in the U.S. or in Germany. During that time there would be completion of survey instruments, group discussions, and interviews.

The intent was to interview and survey sufficient members of the Division to provide a reliable sense of perception about the leadership style of the Division Commander and the quality of the command climate. Further, the study explored general perceptions of “Good” and “Poor” leaders in terms of the behaviors—or lack thereof—seen as contributing to those assessments. These data would then be useful in examining Army education and training programs with a degree of specificity not previously available.

There were five groups of individuals who were selected to participate in each Division: the Division Commanders; the headquarters command group of Assistant Division Commanders and Chief of Staff; members of the Division Staff; subordinate commanders, either one or two levels below the Division Commander; and Corps Commanders and a Deputy Corps Commander. The Divisions were requested to provide these numbers of individuals, and to select representative members of the staff and the subordinate commands. Each group of participants had a different perspective from which to view the Division Commander’s competence, style, and effectiveness. Also, each had a different degree of access, as well as frequency of access, and a different hierarchical relationship, to the Division Commander as he carried out his responsibilities. All participants were in positions to have observed the Division commander under a variety of circumstances over a period of ten to sixteen months.

The Corps Commanders and Deputy Corps Commander provided the top-down view, oriented primarily toward mission accomplishment and relations with external headquarters and agencies. The Division headquarters group worked with the Division Commander on both strategic as well as internal matters, in many cases being closely involved in decision-making and task execution. The Division Staff members had frequent, routine contact with the Division Commander, and were familiar with his style, moods, tactical and technical expertise, decision-making routine, and authenticity. The subordinate commanders had the unique perspective that came from being members of the vertical command team and also the principal executors of the Division Commander’s plans and intent.

The sample size was a compromise between large enough to provide a reasonable statistical base for quantitative analysis and small enough for the study team to process and the Division to support without undue intrusion or burden. Eight members of the Division Staff and from six to ten subordinate commanders did provide a sample that generated sufficient information to craft conclusions and recommendations. While there was no assurance that this would be the case prior to commencing field data collection, in fact the relative homogeneity of responses and the lack of significant differentiation among Divisions or participant grade or position indicated that it was unlikely that a larger sample would have provided different study results. However, the sample was not designed to generate conclusions about the command climate in specific units within the Division, or about how officers in a particular subordinate unit perceived the behavior of the Division Commander.

Division Commanders were provided a description of the study several weeks prior to the mutually agreed upon dates for the data collection in their Divisions, but did not then have access to the instruments. They were asked to provide a particular number of individuals to participate in the study, with preferences for a mix of grades among the Division Staff members, and a number of subordinate commanders who would be representative of the typical Division structure in OIF. Participants were given an orientation of the study and then an option not to participate, and informed that any written and oral comments they would provide were not for attribution.

Study instruments:

The three instruments used in this study are described in the following paragraphs.

1. The Leader Behavior Preferences Worksheet (LBP). This survey tool was created for this study. It is based on data from a variety of Army and other leadership studies, and from current Army doctrine. It has 29 specific leader behaviors derived from prior work and recent discussions and pilot tests.

The instrument was developed over a period of months, using a variety of audiences to provide comments and suggestions. Earliest drafts of the instrument had a listing of more than forty candidate behaviors. These were derived from Army leadership doctrine and prior military and academic studies. They were behaviors prominent in traditional Army leadership manuals, consistent with “best practice” as explained in current Army leadership doctrine, and conspicuous by their repeated mention in reputable Army studies. Studies included those from an earlier era such as the 1970 *U. S. Army War College Study on Military Professionalism* and the U. S. Army War College 1971 *Leadership for the 1970’s*, and more recent studies such as the 1999 *Chief of Staff’s Leadership Survey: Command and General Staff Survey of 760 Mid-career Students* conducted by the Army Research Institute, the 2000 CSIS *American Military Culture in the 21st Century* report, and the 2001 *Army Training and Leader Development Panel Officer Study Report*. The list was honed to 29 behaviors—some of them being reworded in the process—after extensive consultation that included active and retired former Division Commanders known for their interest in leadership; groups of serving officers including some members of the 2004 class at the Army War College; Army War College faculty members; and both military and academic experts in the behavioral science field. Members of the study team also brought considerable experience to the task. The final list of 29 behaviors included items that collectively touched on the four areas of leadership competence used in Army FM 22-100: tactical, technical, interpersonal, and technical. This list of 29 was long enough to satisfy study team members and consultants as sufficiently inclusive, while being short enough to fit on one page. There was an option for the participants to write in a 30th behavior if they saw the list as incomplete.

In the initial orientation with each participant prior to completing the instrument it was pointed out that the major theme and overarching criterion for selecting behaviors, as shown on the LBP instrument itself, was: *“Behaviors that create a command climate that supports operational excellence and also motivates competent people to continue their military service.”*

The first task for each participant was to select from the list of behaviors (all are positive, desirable, and consistent with Army values and doctrine) those 11 that are the most critical to a commander in creating a command climate that sustains operational excellence and motivates competent people to continue their military service. (This was the “A” version of the instrument.) The number 11 was selected as small enough to force a narrowing of the behaviors, but large enough so that there was an opportunity to collect from the participants a robust range of behaviors. The second task was to select from the entire list (on a separate sheet of paper designated as the “B” form) the 7 behaviors that were seen generally as the most significant in differentiating between a “Good” and a “Poor” leader. In other words, which 7 behaviors were almost always manifested by the “Good” leaders, and rarely manifested by the “Poor” leaders. The number 7 was again a compromise to force a reasonably narrow choice. The participants were then asked to consider the behavior of their current Division Commander. The “C” part of the LBP asked them to indicate four or five behaviors from the list that were particular strengths of the Division Commander. Part “D” of the LBP form asked them to list three or four of the behaviors that their Division Commander might work on to improve his leadership. These data could be used as feedback to the individual Division Commanders (their option), as well as determining if there are common perceptions about patterns of behavior that could lead to insights regarding the overall Army leader development systems. The collective responses were expected to highlight those behaviors that were most powerful and deserved particular scrutiny in Army education and training activities.

The study team anticipated that LBP results could reveal the commonalities and differences in perspectives among the participants by function (CG, Command Group, Division Staff, and Subordinate Commanders), by grade of participant, and by organization (Division).

Typical time of completion: 10-20 minutes for all four portions. After completing parts A and B there would be a discussion of why certain items were selected as “most important” and “Most differentiating between ‘Good’ and ‘Poor’ leaders” before proceeding to complete parts C and D of the instrument. Parts A and B were on separate sheets handed out separately, part B being independent of any selections on part A. Parts C and D

(strengths and areas for improvement) were on a single sheet. There was further discussion after all four parts were completed. Instrument completion plus discussion took from 20-40 minutes.

[See Chart A 1]

Assessment of Selected Aspects of the Command Climate (ACC). This survey tool was also created for this study. It was based on a variety of prior work on organizational climates, military and other. The six main topics—mission focus, clarity of goals, flow of information, appreciation for innovation, consideration for people, and mutual trust and confidence—remain central to sustained healthy functioning of any organization. Item X, “Overall assessment of the climate” provided an opportunity for a summary assessment and for a data analysis of how each item contributed to the perception of the climate as a whole.

It was discussed with the participants before completing the instrument that the climate within an organization the size of a Division was not homogeneous. They were asked to provide their sense of what generally prevailed from that portion of the climate with which they were most familiar.

Participants indicated on a scale of 1 (Marginal) to 6 (Exceeds expectations) how they viewed each of the six broad components of the climate, plus the overall assessment. The range and norms of the responses were analyzed from the perspective of different groups of participants within a Division, and by overall groups within the study.

Additionally, Division Staff members and subordinate commanders were asked to predict how their Division Commander would rate each element of the climate. The Division Commanders were asked to indicate how they believed their subordinates would assess each element of the climate, and later to discuss the reasons for their projections. These comparative assessments were designed to stimulate reflection both about how the Division Commanders gained such perceptions and which particular evaluative criteria contributed most significantly to their evaluations of the climate elements.

Comparisons of the actual data collected on the ACC could be part of any confidential feedback to the individual Division Commanders, providing some degree of insight into the accuracy of their views of the perceptions of their subordinates.

After completing the instrument the respondents were asked to discuss the rationale for their answers, and to explain their views of the process by which Division Commanders and other senior leaders influence a command climate. The data from the completed instruments facilitated discussion of which behaviors—from those included in the LBP as well as others—impacted on each aspect of the command climate.

Typical time of completion: 15-25 minutes with Division Commanders. 10-20 minutes with other participants.

[See Chart A 2]

Chart A 1

Leader Behavior Preferences (LBP) Worksheet [Summary Version used by study team members.]

Behaviors that create a command climate that supports operational excellence and also motivates competent people to continue their military service.

Specific leader behavior (for a Division Commander	A	B	C	D
1. Adapts quickly to new situations and requirements.				
2. Understands and employs current Army and Joint doctrine.				
3. Keeps cool under pressure.				
4. Knows how and when to involve others in decision-making.				
5. Clearly explains missions, standards, and priorities.				
6. Sees the big picture; provides context and perspective.				
7. Sets high standards without a “zero defects” mentality.				
8. Encourages initiative and welcomes new ideas.				
9. Backs up subordinates; confronts the boss if necessary.				
10. Is trustworthy; keeps promises or explains why he can’t.				
11. Employs units in accordance with their capabilities.				
12. Can handle “bad news.”				
13. Gets out of the headquarters and visits the troops.				
14. Coaches and gives useful feedback to subordinates.				
15. Sets a high ethical tone; demands honest reporting.				
16. Will share the risks and hardships of his soldiers.				
17. Knows how to delegate and not “micromanage.”				
18. Is consistent and predictable in his behavior.				
19. Shows respect and consideration for others of any rank.				
20. Puts mission and people ahead of his own career.				
21. Is approachable; listens to questions and suggestions.				
22. Can make tough, sound decisions on time.				
23. Shares the limelight; gives due credit to others.				
24. Senses unproductive policies and makes prompt adjustments.				
25. Builds and supports teamwork within staff and among units.				
26. Holds people accountable for their actions and results.				
27. Is more interested in doing good than looking good.				
28. Is fair; doesn’t play favorites with units or people.				
29. Is positive, encouraging, and realistically optimistic.				
30. Write in:				

- A. Those 11 behaviors that are Most Important.
- B. Those 7 behaviors that “good” leaders display and “poor” leaders don’t
- C. Those 4 or 5 behaviors that are strongly representative of the typical behavior of the Division Commander.
- D. Those 3 or 4 behaviors that the Division Commander might want to work on.

Chart A 2

Assessment of Selected Aspects of the Command Climate* (ACC)

Please circle the number under each of the seven items that reflects your personal assessment. #

1	2	3	4	5	6
Marginal		Satisfactory		Exceeds expectations	

A. A strong, healthy focus on mission accomplishment.

	1	2	3	4	5	6
You	1	2	3	4	5	6

B. Clarity of standards, goals, and priorities.

	1	2	3	4	5	6
You	1	2	3	4	5	6

C. A reliable, timely, open flow of key information.

	1	2	3	4	5	6
You	1	2	3	4	5	6

D. An appreciation for initiative and innovation.

	1	2	3	4	5	6
You	1	2	3	4	5	6

E. Consideration for the well-being of people.

	1	2	3	4	5	6
You	1	2	3	4	5	6

F. A prevailing sense of mutual trust and confidence.

	1	2	3	4	5	6
You	1	2	3	4	5	6

X. Overall assessment of the climate.

	1	2	3	4	5	6
You	1	2	3	4	5	6

* Use as your basis for assessment that part of the Division climate with which you are most familiar.

The upper lines of non-bolded numbers may be used to record the predicted assessments of other groups or individuals.

3. The Campbell Leadership Descriptor© (CLD). This survey tool is a copyrighted assessment instrument developed by Dr. David Campbell of the Center for Creative Leadership and published by Jossey-Bass/Pfeiffer.⁶⁵ ISBN: 0-7879-5979-0. Included are forty questions and 9 scales: Vision, Management, Empowerment, Diplomacy, Feedback, Entrepreneurialism, Personal Style, Personal Energy, and Multicultural Awareness, with five components to each scale. (The Multicultural Awareness scale is a composite and was not included in some data presentations in this study.)

Each CLD packet contained an individual workbook that was left with each participant who used the instrument. It contained suggestions for future personal leadership development. While not specifically militarily oriented, the behaviors are generally relevant to senior officer leadership. It was completed by the Division Commanders, and also by the eight members of each Division Staff. Their responses provided the basis for a quantitative comparison between how the Division Commander described “Self,” “Good Leader,” and “Poor leader,” and the response patterns of the staff members to the forty listed behaviors. These data provided some opportunity to assess one aspect of the self-awareness of the Division Commander, as well as to capture the specific behaviors that led to perceptions of “Good” and “Poor” leadership.

The instructions require the participants to rate “Self,” “Good leader,” and “Poor leader” on each of the forty descriptive statements. For this study, respondents were also asked to rate their Division Commander on each of the forty questions. The response categories were 4 = Definitely Descriptive, 3 = Descriptive, 2 = Not Descriptive, and 1 = Definitely Not Descriptive. Results were presented in a graphic that compares behaviors and characteristics as perceived by users of the instrument, showing “Self,” “Good Leader,” and “Poor Leader” measures among the instrument scales. (“Self” vs. “Subordinates” comparative data were collected with the agreement of the Division Commander.)

After completing the instrument the eight staff members participated in a group discussion that included comments on what behaviors and competencies contributed to the “Good” leader, and how the Army system of education, selection, and assignment assisted in producing “Good” leaders. Also discussed were ideas regarding what prior circumstances might have produced the “Good” and the “Poor” leader, and what future Army selection or development processes might ensure a uniformly high quality of leader behavior among field grade and general officers in particular. During the interview with the Division Commander he was asked to comment on the same topics.

Typical time of completion: 25-40 minutes.

[See **Chart A 3** for a listing of items and primary scales.]

⁶⁵ Permission was received by the U.S. Army War College from the publisher to reproduce portions of the Campbell instrument for data collection and display for this study only.

Chart A 3
Campbell Leadership Descriptor© Items and Primary Scales

Vision Scale	
1. Farsighted	Sees the big picture in developing a vision for the future.
2. Enterprising	Likes to take on new projects and programs.
3. Persuasive	Presents new ideas in ways that create “buy in” from necessary constituencies.
4. Resourceful	Uses existing resources to create successful new ventures.
5. Has a global view	Thinks beyond national and cultural boundaries. *
Management Scale	
6. Dedicated	Determined to succeed; will make personal sacrifices for the vision.
7. Delegating	Effectively assigns responsibility and the necessary authority to others.
8. Dependable	Performs as promised; meets established deadlines.
9. Focused	Sets clear work priorities for self and others.
10. Systematic	Develops systems and procedures for efficiently organizing people and resources.
Empowerment Scale	
11. Encouraging	Helps others to achieve more than they thought they were capable of achieving.
12. Mentoring	Provides challenging assignments and related coaching.
13. Perceptive	Recognizes talent early and provides growth opportunities.
14. Supportive	Helps others deal with difficult personal situations.
15. Trusting	Sees the best in others; is not suspicious of differences.
Diplomacy Scale	
16. Diplomatic	Understands the political nuances of important decisions; readily involves individuals and groups who will be affected.
17. Tactful	Gains good will by not being offensive, even when disagreeing.
18. Trusted	Is trusted by individuals and groups in conflict to be a fair mediator.
19. Well-connected	Knows a wide range of people who can help get things done.
20. Culturally sensitive	Develops teamwork among individuals of different cultures, races, religions, and nations. *
Feedback Scale	
21. A good coach	Gives constructive feedback in a way that benefits individuals.
22. A good teacher	Communicates critical information needed by groups to perform well.
23. Candid and honest	Does not suppress information that might be personally embarrassing.
24. Listens well	Open and responsive when receiving ideas from others.
25. Numerically astute	Organizes data in informative ways to show trends in individual and organizational performance.
Entrepreneurialism Scale	
26. Adventurousome	Is willing to take risks on promising but unproven methods.
27. Creative	Thinks independently and comes up with many novel ideas.
28. Durable	Persists in the face of criticism or failure; hard to discourage.
29. Good fund raiser	Adept at securing funds for new projects.
30. Globally innovative	Enjoys the challenge of creating new programs and projects that go beyond cultural and national boundaries. *
Personal Style Scale	
31. Credible	Believable, ethical, trustworthy, has few hidden motives.
32. Experienced	Skilled in and knowledgeable about the organization’s core activities.
33. A visible role model	Understands the symbolic value of personal visibility in both daily and ceremonial settings.
34. Optimistic	Sees many positive possibilities; is always upbeat.
35. Looks at global picture	Provides an effective global leadership image across cultural categories and national borders. *
Personal Energy Scale	
36. Balanced	Adapts well to conflicting personal and work demands.
37. Energetic	Active, constantly on the go, radiates energy.
38. Physically fit	In good health, physically durable, seldom sick, has no troublesome addictions.
39. Publicly impressive	Presents an appealing, energizing leadership image; a good speaker.
40. Internationally resilient	Comfortable crossing time zones, eating unfamiliar foods, dealing with new customs, and generally adapting to other cultures. *

* Items that form the Multicultural Awareness scale.

The study interview protocol :

Personal, structured interviews were a main ingredient in the data collection. They are the primary source of descriptions of current practice and of suggestions for change in Army policies and procedures. Individual interviews were conducted with the Commanding Generals, Assistant Division Commanders, the Division Chief of Staff, and those subordinate unit commanders the Division Commander designated. Two Corps Commanders and a Deputy Corps Commander were interviewed as well. Division Commander and Deputy Corps Commander interviews averaged three hours. Corps Commander and subordinate commander interviews averaged 2 hours. The study instruments were completed during these private interviews. For the Division Staff, all eight members or two groups of four members were together for instrument completion and discussion with two or three staff members. These staff sessions, with completion of all three survey instruments, lasted about 3 hours.

The interviews provided a wide range of useful data. They were rich in detail about organizational mission, command climate, Army educational and training systems, preferences for leader development methods, comments on typical preparation for command, and follow-on clarification or elaboration of the issues raised while completing the survey instruments. Prominent in the discussions were observations and suggestions about preparing officers for Division Command—including how the Army can best ensure development of senior leaders who manifest the requisite behaviors. The interviews also offered an opportunity for reflection on the part of the Division Commanders and other participants regarding their leadership style and competencies.

General outline for interview: (actual interview sequence and content varied)

- a. Brief biographical data including dates of current assignment, length of time in Iraq. For Division Commanders, formal education.
- b. General perceptions about OIF: greatest challenges, satisfaction, surprises.
- c. Execution and discussion of LBP instrument. Why the selections? How leadership behaviors are best learned?
- d. Execution and discussion of ACC instrument. Which elements of the climate are most important? By what methods does a commander influence the climate? How does a commander get a sense of the climate? For the Division Commander: how will your responses differ from those of your subordinates? Why? For subordinates: how will the CG rate the climate? Why?
- e. For Division Commander and Division Staff: CLD instrument. Are there clear behavioral differences between the good and the poor leader? How should the Army assist leaders in their continuing development?
- f. Major new insights about leadership from OIF experience.
- g. What were the most influential events that molded your views and behaviors as a leader? School, experience, example, self study, role model, coaching, etc.
- h. How do you get performance feedback when you are in a leadership or a key staff position? How should you get such feedback? How are you on providing feedback to your subordinates?
- i. Do you have plan for personal self-development?
- j. How should the Army prepare its leaders for command positions at Division and Brigade level? What if any changes in the current education and training systems would you recommend?
- k. Has this interview/discussion session been of value to you in thinking about your own leadership behaviors? Would a confidential session of this nature be worthwhile for commanders in general?
- l. Anything else we should talk about in the leader development area?

Study team members took notes and later compared and discussed items, themes, and participant reactions to the study. Major themes were recorded by each study team member and were later informally correlated. Interviews were not electronically recorded. Interview results were compared with survey instrument results to confirm major issues, correlations, and consistencies or inconsistencies.

Various portions of the report were drafted and reviewed by members of the study team, and reviewed also by some of the study advisors.

Planned use of instruments and interviews with various participants :

Chart A 4

**Planned Use of Three Instruments for the Study [Four Divisions & Corps HQ]
And Possible Range of Numbers of Participants Based on Likely Availability**

Instruments P Participants B	Campbell Leadership Descriptor© (CLD) [total]	Leader Behavior Preferences (LBP) [total]	Assessment of the Command Climate (ACC) [total]	Total # of partic [4 Div]	Personal Interview (PI) Group discussion (GD)
Division Commander 1/Div	Yes (Good, Self, Poor) [4]	Yes [4]	Yes [4]	[4]	PI-yes GD-no
Division Staff Members 8/Div	Yes (Good, Self, Poor. On CG also if OK) [32]	Yes [32]	Yes [32]	[32]	PI-no GD-yes
Subordinate Commanders 6-9/Div	NO	Yes [24-36]	Yes [24-36]	[24-36]	PI-yes GD-no
Div C of S, ADC's	NO	Yes [4-12]	Yes [4-12]	[4-12]	PI-yes GD-no
Corps CG/DCG	NO	Yes [2-3]	Yes [2-3]	[2-3]	PI-yes GD-no

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APPENDIX B*

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* In addition to these quantitative data, each of the 80 individuals in the study participated in interviews and discussions lasting from one to three hours in length. This qualitative component provided additional meaning and perspective, and informed the findings, conclusions, and recommendations of the study.

APPENDIX B

Leader Behavior Preferences

Leader Behavior Preferences (LBP) Worksheet Response Percentages of All Participants N=77

Behaviors that create a command climate that supports operational excellence and also motivates competent people to continue their military service.

Specific leader behavior (for a Division Commander)	A	B	C	D
1. Adapts quickly to new situations and requirements.	53	34	32	0
2. Understands and employs current Army and Joint doctrine.	18	4	10	5
3. Keeps cool under pressure.	71	51	34	4
4. Knows how and when to involve others in decision-making.	26	17	6	16
5. Clearly explains missions, standards, and priorities.	68	44	42	9
6. Sees the big picture; provides context and perspective.	68	32	44	1
7. Sets high standards without a “zero defects” mentality.	50	26	23	4
8. Encourages initiative and welcomes new ideas.	34	13	14	10
9. Backs up subordinates; confronts the boss if necessary.	23	21	10	1
10. Is trustworthy; keeps promises or explains why he can’t.	22	21	6	0
11. Employs units in accordance with their capabilities.	14	5	10	9
12. Can handle “bad news.”	45	35	18	13
13. Gets out of the headquarters and visits the troops.	55	38	36	5
14. Coaches and gives useful feedback to subordinates.	34	19	6	32
15. Sets a high ethical tone; demands honest reporting.	48	26	13	8
16. Will share the risks and hardships of his soldiers.	32	27	8	8
17. Knows how to delegate and not “micromanage.”	48	36	21	14
18. Is consistent and predictable in his behavior.	39	19	10	14
19. Shows respect and consideration for others of any rank.	27	17	12	3
20. Puts mission and people ahead of his own career.	27	21	8	3
21. Is approachable; listens to questions and suggestions.	38	18	10	18
22. Can make tough, sound decisions on time.	68	43	36	4
23. Shares the limelight; gives due credit to others.	6	12	0	6
24. Senses unproductive policies and makes prompt adjustments.	17	3	12	19
25. Builds and supports teamwork within staff and among units.	52	27	16	19
26. Holds people accountable for their actions and results.	22	14	9	16
27. Is more interested in doing good than looking good.	16	27	4	8
28. Is fair; doesn’t play favorites with units or people.	12	8	3	22
29. Is positive, encouraging, and realistically optimistic.	55	22	25	6

- A. MOST IMPORTANT behaviors. (Participants selected 11 from the list.)
- B. MOST DISCRIMINATING: “good” leaders display and “poor” leaders don’t (Participants selected 7 from the list.)
- C. MOST REPRESENTATIVE OF THEIR DIVISION COMMANDER. (Participants selected 4 or 5 from the list.)
- D. BEHAVIORS THAT THEIR DIVISION COMMANDER MIGHT WANT TO WORK ON. (Participants selected 3 or 4 from the list.)

Leader Behavior Preferences (LBP) Worksheet

Response Percentages of All Others (Not Including CG) N=73

Behaviors that create a command climate that supports operational excellence and also motivates competent people to continue their military service.

Specific leader behavior (for a Division Commander)	A	B	C	D
1. Adapts quickly to new situations and requirements.	53	33	32	0
2. Understands and employs current Army and Joint doctrine.	19	4	11	5
3. Keeps cool under pressure.	74	52	36	3
4. Knows how and when to involve others in decision-making.	25	16	7	16
5. Clearly explains missions, standards, and priorities.	67	44	41	7
6. Sees the big picture; provides context and perspective.	67	33	47	1
7. Sets high standards without a “zero defects” mentality.	50	25	23	3
8. Encourages initiative and welcomes new ideas.	32	12	14	8
9. Backs up subordinates; confronts the boss if necessary.	23	22	11	1
10. Is trustworthy; keeps promises or explains why he can’t.	23	21	7	0
11. Employs units in accordance with their capabilities.	15	5	11	10
12. Can handle “bad news.”	45	37	18	12
13. Gets out of the headquarters and visits the troops.	58	38	38	5
14. Coaches and gives useful feedback to subordinates.	34	18	5	32
15. Sets a high ethical tone; demands honest reporting.	51	27	14	8
16. Will share the risks and hardships of his soldiers.	32	27	8	7
17. Knows how to delegate and not “micromanage.”	45	36	18	15
18. Is consistent and predictable in his behavior.	41	21	11	15
19. Shows respect and consideration for others of any rank.	26	16	11	3
20. Puts mission and people ahead of his own career.	27	21	8	3
21. Is approachable; listens to questions and suggestions.	36	18	10	18
22. Can make tough, sound decisions on time.	68	44	38	4
23. Shares the limelight; gives due credit to others.	7	12	0	5
24. Senses unproductive policies and makes prompt adjustments.	16	1	10	21
25. Builds and supports teamwork within staff and among units.	51	25	14	21
26. Holds people accountable for their actions and results.	23	15	10	16
27. Is more interested in doing good than looking good.	16	29	4	8
28. Is fair; doesn’t play favorites with units or people.	12	8	3	21
29. Is positive, encouraging, and realistically optimistic.	52	19	23	7

- A. MOST IMPORTANT behaviors. (Participants selected 11 from the list.)
- B. MOST DISCRIMINATING: “good” leaders display and “poor” leaders don’t (Participants selected 7 from the list.)
- C. MOST REPRESENTATIVE OF THEIR DIVISION COMMANDER. (Participants selected 4 or 5 from the list.)
- D. BEHAVIORS THAT THEIR DIVISION COMMANDER MIGHT WANT TO WORK ON. (Participants selected 3 or 4 from the list.)

Leader Behavior Preferences (LBP) Worksheet
Response Percentages of Subordinate Commanders N=32

Behaviors that create a command climate that supports operational excellence and also motivates competent people to continue their military service.

Specific leader behavior (for a Division Commander)	A	B	C	D
1. Adapts quickly to new situations and requirements.	50	28	28	0
2. Understands and employs current Army and Joint doctrine.	22	6	19	3
3. Keeps cool under pressure.	75	56	47	3
4. Knows how and when to involve others in decision-making.	31	19	6	19
5. Clearly explains missions, standards, and priorities.	56	28	41	9
6. Sees the big picture; provides context and perspective.	69	28	44	3
7. Sets high standards without a “zero defects” mentality.	47	31	19	3
8. Encourages initiative and welcomes new ideas.	34	13	19	16
9. Backs up subordinates; confronts the boss if necessary.	31	31	16	3
10. Is trustworthy; keeps promises or explains why he can’t.	22	22	9	0
11. Employs units in accordance with their capabilities.	19	9	6	9
12. Can handle “bad news.”	50	56	28	3
13. Gets out of the headquarters and visits the troops.	56	38	34	13
14. Coaches and gives useful feedback to subordinates.	34	13	6	34
15. Sets a high ethical tone; demands honest reporting.	50	22	3	6
16. Will share the risks and hardships of his soldiers.	34	22	6	3
17. Knows how to delegate and not “micromanage.”	47	41	31	13
18. Is consistent and predictable in his behavior.	31	19	9	13
19. Shows respect and consideration for others of any rank.	22	22	16	3
20. Puts mission and people ahead of his own career.	34	22	9	3
21. Is approachable; listens to questions and suggestions.	41	28	16	13
22. Can make tough, sound decisions on time.	59	31	38	9
23. Shares the limelight; gives due credit to others.	6	9	0	9
24. Senses unproductive policies and makes prompt adjustments.	13	0	9	28
25. Builds and supports teamwork within staff and among units.	56	28	22	16
26. Holds people accountable for their actions and results.	19	13	13	13
27. Is more interested in doing good than looking good.	22	38	9	9
28. Is fair; doesn’t play favorites with units or people.	19	9	3	22
29. Is positive, encouraging, and realistically optimistic.	50	16	28	9

- A. MOST IMPORTANT behaviors. (Participants selected 11 from the list.)
- B. MOST DISCRIMINATING: “good” leaders display and “poor” leaders don’t (Participants selected 7 from the list.)
- C. MOST REPRESENTATIVE OF THEIR DIVISION COMMANDER. (Participants selected 4 or 5 from the list.)
- D. BEHAVIORS THAT THEIR DIVISION COMMANDER MIGHT WANT TO WORK ON. (Participants selected 3 or 4 from the list.)

Leader Behavior Preferences (LBP) Worksheet
Response Percentages of Staff N=32

Behaviors that create a command climate that supports operational excellence and also motivates competent people to continue their military service.

Specific leader behavior (for a Division Commander)	A	B	C	D
1. Adapts quickly to new situations and requirements.	59	41	38	0
2. Understands and employs current Army and Joint doctrine.	16	3	6	6
3. Keeps cool under pressure.	75	53	25	3
4. Knows how and when to involve others in decision-making.	16	9	9	3
5. Clearly explains missions, standards, and priorities.	81	63	5	3
6. Sees the big picture; provides context and perspective.	59	34	53	0
7. Sets high standards without a “zero defects” mentality.	44	16	28	3
8. Encourages initiative and welcomes new ideas.	25	13	13	3
9. Backs up subordinates; confronts the boss if necessary.	19	13	0	0
10. Is trustworthy; keeps promises or explains why he can’t.	31	13	6	0
11. Employs units in accordance with their capabilities.	16	3	19	6
12. Can handle “bad news.”	41	25	13	22
13. Gets out of the headquarters and visits the troops.	63	44	41	0
14. Coaches and gives useful feedback to subordinates.	28	19	3	22
15. Sets a high ethical tone; demands honest reporting.	56	31	25	13
16. Will share the risks and hardships of his soldiers.	25	31	3	9
17. Knows how to delegate and not “micromanage.”	44	31	6	16
18. Is consistent and predictable in his behavior.	56	28	16	22
19. Shows respect and consideration for others of any rank.	25	9	6	3
20. Puts mission and people ahead of his own career.	19	22	6	3
21. Is approachable; listens to questions and suggestions.	28	9	6	19
22. Can make tough, sound decisions on time.	81	63	47	0
23. Shares the limelight; gives due credit to others.	6	9	0	3
24. Senses unproductive policies and makes prompt adjustments.	22	3	3	19
25. Builds and supports teamwork within staff and among units.	47	22	3	25
26. Holds people accountable for their actions and results.	22	19	6	22
27. Is more interested in doing good than looking good.	9	19	0	9
28. Is fair; doesn’t play favorites with units or people.	6	9	3	22
29. Is positive, encouraging, and realistically optimistic.	56	16	13	3

- A. MOST IMPORTANT behaviors. (Participants selected 11 from the list.)
- B. MOST DISCRIMINATING: “good” leaders display and “poor” leaders don’t (Participants selected 7 from the list.)
- C. MOST REPRESENTATIVE OF THEIR DIVISION COMMANDER. (Participants selected 4 or 5 from the list.)
- D. BEHAVIORS THAT THEIR DIVISION COMMANDER MIGHT WANT TO WORK ON. (Participants selected 3 or 4 from the list.)

Leader Behavior Preferences (LBP) Worksheet
Response Percentages of Commanding Generals N=4

Behaviors that create a command climate that supports operational excellence and also motivates competent people to continue their military service.

Specific leader behavior (for a Division Commander)	A	B	C	D
1. Adapts quickly to new situations and requirements.	50	50	50	0
2. Understands and employs current Army and Joint doctrine.	0	0	0	0
3. Keeps cool under pressure.	25	25	0	25
4. Knows how and when to involve others in decision-making.	50	25	0	0
5. Clearly explains missions, standards, and priorities.	75	50	50	50
6. Sees the big picture; provides context and perspective.	75	25	0	0
7. Sets high standards without a “zero defects” mentality.	75	50	25	25
8. Encourages initiative and welcomes new ideas.	75	25	25	50
9. Backs up subordinates; confronts the boss if necessary.	25	0	0	0
10. Is trustworthy; keeps promises or explains why he can’t.	0	25	0	0
11. Employs units in accordance with their capabilities.	0	0	0	0
12. Can handle “bad news.”	50	0	25	25
13. Gets out of the headquarters and visits the troops.	0	25	0	0
14. Coaches and gives useful feedback to subordinates.	25	50	25	50
15. Sets a high ethical tone; demands honest reporting.	0	0	0	0
16. Will share the risks and hardships of his soldiers.	50	25	0	25
17. Knows how to delegate and not “micromanage.”	100	50	75	0
18. Is consistent and predictable in his behavior.	0	0	0	0
19. Shows respect and consideration for others of any rank.	50	25	25	0
20. Puts mission and people ahead of his own career.	25	25	0	0
21. Is approachable; listens to questions and suggestions.	75	25	25	25
22. Can make tough, sound decisions on time.	50	25	0	0
23. Shares the limelight; gives due credit to others.	0	0	0	25
24. Senses unproductive policies and makes prompt adjustments.	25	25	50	0
25. Builds and supports teamwork within staff and among units.	75	75	50	0
26. Holds people accountable for their actions and results.	0	0	0	0
27. Is more interested in doing good than looking good.	0	0	0	0
28. Is fair; doesn’t play favorites with units or people.	0	0	0	50
29. Is positive, encouraging, and realistically optimistic.	100	75	50	0

- A. MOST IMPORTANT behaviors. (Participants selected 11 from the list.)
- B. MOST DISCRIMINATING: “good” leaders display and “poor” leaders don’t (Participants selected 7 from the list.)
- C. MOST REPRESENTATIVE OF THEIR DIVISION COMMANDER. (Participants selected 4 or 5 from the list.)
- D. BEHAVIORS THAT THEIR DIVISION COMMANDER MIGHT WANT TO WORK ON. (Participants selected 3 or 4 from the list.)

Leader Behavior Preferences (LBP) Worksheet
Response Percentages of Four Divisions

Behaviors that create a command climate that supports operational excellence and also motivates competent people to continue their military service.

Specific leader behavior (for a Division Commander)	Div A N=18	Div B N=19	Div C N=21	Div D N=19
1. Adapts quickly to new situations and requirements.	61	58	24	74
2. Understands and employs current Army and Joint doctrine.	17	21	14	21
3. Keeps cool under pressure.	83	63	71	68
4. Knows how and when to involve others in decision-making.	22	26	29	26
5. Clearly explains missions, standards, and priorities.	50	89	52	79
6. Sees the big picture; provides context and perspective.	56	74	52	89
7. Sets high standards without a “zero defects” mentality.	50	60	30	40
8. Encourages initiative and welcomes new ideas.	50	5	33	47
9. Backs up subordinates; confronts the boss if necessary.	22	32	24	16
10. Is trustworthy; keeps promises or explains why he can’t.	11	5	43	26
11. Employs units in accordance with their capabilities.	17	16	5	21
12. Can handle “bad news.”	50	42	52	37
13. Gets out of the headquarters and visits the troops.	40	60	60	50
14. Coaches and gives useful feedback to subordinates.	28	21	67	16
15. Sets a high ethical tone; demands honest reporting.	50	53	48	42
16. Will share the risks and hardships of his soldiers.	22	32	48	26
17. Knows how to delegate and not “micromanage.”	44	42	43	63
18. Is consistent and predictable in his behavior.	28	32	57	37
19. Shows respect and consideration for others of any rank.	22	26	29	32
20. Puts mission and people ahead of his own career.	22	32	38	16
21. Is approachable; listens to questions and suggestions.	50	32	43	26
22. Can make tough, sound decisions on time.	67	63	71	68
23. Shares the limelight; gives due credit to others.	6	11	10	0
24. Senses unproductive policies and makes prompt adjustments.	28	21	0	21
25. Builds and supports teamwork within staff and among units.	83	47	39	42
26. Holds people accountable for their actions and results.	17	26	19	26
27. Is more interested in doing good than looking good.	17	5	24	16
28. Is fair; doesn’t play favorites with units or people.	11	11	19	5
29. Is positive, encouraging, and realistically optimistic.	61	53	52	53

- A. MOST IMPORTANT behaviors. (Participants selected 11 from the list.)
- B. MOST DISCRIMINATING: “good” leaders display and “poor” leaders don’t (Participants selected 7 from the list.)
- C. MOST REPRESENTATIVE OF THEIR DIVISION COMMANDER. (Participants selected 4 or 5 from the list.)
- D. BEHAVIORS THAT THEIR DIVISION COMMANDER MIGHT WANT TO WORK ON. (Participants selected 3 or 4 from the list.)

The following tables represent questions where there were statically significant differences between the Commanding Generals' rating and All Others' ratings. The "Sig" column designates the probability that the difference in means could happen by chance. Therefore, the smaller the number in the "Sig." column, the larger the statistical difference between the mean rating of the CG and the mean rating of All Others will be. (A smaller significance value will usually have a larger t value associated with it as well.) The "r value" is the effect size value or the *magnitude* of the difference between the CG and All Others rating. The r values can be interpreted by the following guidelines: .10 = small effect, .30 = moderate effect, .50 and above = a large effect. On the majority of these questions below, All Others ratings were higher than the Commanding Generals' ratings. All of the differences had a very small percentage of the differences occurring by chance (Sig.), and the magnitude of the difference of the means was strong (as measured by the r value).

**Significant Differences of Most Important Leadership Behaviors
Commanding General vs. All Others**

	CG Mean	Others Mean	t value	Sig.	r value
Understands and employs current Army and Joint doctrine	.00	.19	-4.133	.000	.44
Keeps cool under pressure	.25	.74	-2.146	.035	.24
Is trustworthy; keeps promises or explains why he can't	.00	.23	-4.675	.000	.48
Employs units in accordance with their capabilities	.00	.15	-3.574	.001	.39
Gets out of the headquarters and visits the troops	.00	.58	-9.877	.000	.76
Sets a high ethical tone; demands honest reporting	.00	.51	-8.602	.000	.71
Knows how to delegate and not "micromanage"	1.00	.47	9.088	.000	.73
Is consistent and predictable in his behavior	.00	.43	-7.327	.000	.66
Holds people accountable for their actions and results	.00	.25	-4.854	.000	.50
Is more interested in doing good than looking good	.00	.15	-3.574	.001	.39
Is positive, encouraging and realistically optimistic	1.00	.53	7.923	.000	.68

**Significant Differences of Behaviors that Differentiate "Good" Leaders and "Poor" Leaders
Commanding General vs. All Others**

	CG Mean	Others Mean	t value	Sig.	r value
Backs up subordinates; confronts the boss if necessary	.00	.22	-4.496	.000	.47
Can handle "bad news"	.00	.37	-6.501	.000	.61
Sets a high ethical tone; demands honest reporting	.00	.27	-5.212	.000	.52
Is consistent and predictable in his behavior	.00	.22	-4.496	.000	.47
Builds and supports teamwork within staff and among units	.75	.25	2.244	.028	.25
Holds people accountable for their actions and results	.00	.15	-3.574	.001	.39
Is more interested in doing good than looking good	.00	.29	-5.392	.000	.54

**Significant Differences of Behaviors that the Commanding General Exemplifies
Commanding General vs. All Others**

	CG Mean	Others Mean	t value	Sig.	r value
Keeps cool under pressure	.00	.36	-6.311	.000	.60
Sees the big picture; provides context and perspective	.00	.47	-7.923	.000	.68
Gets out of the headquarters and visits the troops	.00	.40	-6.889	.000	.63
Knows how to delegate and not "micromanage"	.75	.18	2.852	.006	.31
Can make tough, sound decisions on time	.00	.40	-6.889	.000	.63

**Significant Differences of Behaviors that the CG Should Work On to Improve His Leadership
Commanding General vs. All Others**

	CG Mean	Others Mean	t value	Sig.	r value
Keeps cool under pressure	.25	.03	2.287	.025	.26
Knows how and when to involve other in decision-making	.00	.16	-3.764	.000	.41
Knows how to delegate and not "micromanage"	.00	.15	-3.574	.001	.39
Is consistent and predictable in his behavior	.00	.15	-3.574	.001	.39
Sense unproductive policies and makes prompt adjustments	.00	.22	-4.496	.000	.47
Builds and supports teamwork within staff and among units	.00	.21	-4.315	.000	.45
Holds people accountable for their actions and results	.00	.16	-3.764	.000	.41

The following tables represent questions where there were statically significant differences between the Commanding Generals' rating and Subordinate Commanders' ratings. On the majority of these questions below, Subordinate Commanders' ratings were higher than the Commanding Generals' ratings. All of the differences had a very small percentage of the differences occurring by chance (Sig.), and the magnitude of the difference of the means was strong (as measured by the r value).

**Significant Differences of Most Important Leadership Behaviors
Commanding General vs. Subordinate Commanders**

	CG Mean	SC Mean	t value	Sig.	r value
Understands and employs current Army and Joint doctrine	.00	.22	-2.946	.006	.47
Is trustworthy; keeps promises or explains why he can't	.00	.22	-2.946	.006	.47
Employs units in accordance with their capabilities	.00	.19	-2.675	.012	.43
Gets out of the headquarters and visits the troops	.00	.56	-6.313	.000	.75
Knows how to delegate and not "micromanage"	1.00	.47	5.927	.000	.73
Is consistent and predictable in his behavior	.00	.32	-3.780	.001	.57
Holds people accountable for their actions and results	.00	.19	-2.675	.012	.43
Is more interested in doing good than looking good	.00	.19	-2.675	.012	.43
Is fair; doesn't play favorites with units or people	.00	.19	-2.675	.012	.43
Is positive, encouraging and realistically optimistic	1.00	.50	1.944	.000	.41

**Significant Differences of Behaviors that Differentiate "Good" Leaders and "Poor" Leaders
Commanding General vs. Subordinate Commanders**

	CG Mean	SC Mean	t value	Sig.	r value
Backs up subordinates; confronts the boss if necessary	.00	.31	-3.754	.001	.56
Can handle "bad news"	.00	.56	-6.313	.000	.75
Sets a high ethical tone; demands honest reporting	.00	.22	-2.946	.006	.47
Is consistent and predictable in his behavior	.00	.19	-2.675	.012	.43
Is more interested in doing good than looking good	.00	.38	-4.313	.000	.61
Is positive, encouraging and realistically optimistic	.75	.16	2.929	.006	.45

**Significant Differences of Behaviors that the Commanding General Exemplifies
Commanding General vs. Subordinate Commanders**

	CG Mean	SC Mean	t value	Sig.	r value
Understands and employs current Army and Joint doctrine	.00	.19	-2.675	.012	.43
Keeps cool under pressure	.00	.47	-5.230	.000	.68
Sees the big picture; provides context and perspective	.00	.44	-4.910	.000	.66
Backs up subordinates; confronts the boss if necessary	.00	.16	-2.396	.023	.40
Gets out of the headquarters and visits the troops	.00	.34	-4.030	.000	.59
Can make tough, sound decisions on time	.00	.38	-4.313	.000	.61
Sense unproductive policies and makes prompt adjustments	.50	.09	1.385	.027	.37

**Significant Differences of Behaviors that the CG Should Work On to Improve His Leadership
Commanding General vs. Subordinate Commanders**

	CG Mean	SC Mean	t value	Sig.	r value
Knows how and when to involve other in decision-making	.00	.19	-2.675	.012	.43
Sense unproductive policies and makes prompt adjustments	.00	.28	-3.483	.002	.53
Builds and supports teamwork within staff and among units	.00	.16	-2.396	.023	.40

The following tables represent questions where there were statically significant differences between the Commanding Generals' rating and the Staff's ratings. For the majority of these questions below, Staff ratings were higher than the Commanding Generals' ratings. All of the differences had a very small percentage of the differences occurring by chance (Sig.), and the magnitude of the difference of the means was strong (as measured by the r value).

**Significant Differences of Most Important Leadership Behaviors
Commanding General vs. Staff**

	CG Mean	Staff Mean	t value	Sig.	r value
Understands and employs current Army and Joint doctrine	.00	.16	-2.396	.023	.40
Keeps cool under pressure	.25	.75	-2.116	.042	.34
Encourages initiative and welcomes new ideas	.75	.25	2.116	.042	.34
Is trustworthy; keeps promises or explains why he can't	.00	.31	-3.754	.001	.56
Employs units in accordance with their capabilities	.00	.16	-2.396	.023	.40
Gets out of the headquarters and visits the troops	.00	.63	-7.188	.000	.79
Sets a high ethical tone; demands honest reporting	.00	.56	-6.313	.000	.75
Knows how to delegate and not "micromanage"	1.00	.47	5.927	.000	.73
Is consistent and predictable in his behavior	.00	.59	-6.731	.000	.77
Holds people accountable for their actions and results	.00	.25	-3.215	.003	.50
Is positive, encouraging and realistically optimistic	1.00	.59	4.605	.000	.63

**Significant Differences of Behaviors that Differentiate “Good” Leaders and “Poor” Leaders
Commanding General vs. Staff**

	CG Mean	Staff Mean	t value	Sig.	r value
Can handle "bad news"	.00	.25	-3.215	.003	.50
Sets a high ethical tone; demands honest reporting	.00	.31	-3.754	.001	.56
Is consistent and predictable in his behavior	.00	.31	-3.754	.001	.56
Builds and supports teamwork within staff and among units	.75	.22	2.342	.025	.37
Holds people accountable for their actions and results	.00	.19	-2.675	.012	.42
Is more interested in doing good than looking good	.00	.19	-2.675	.012	.42
Is positive, encouraging and realistically optimistic	.75	.19	2.608	.013	.41


**Significant Differences of Behaviors that the Commanding General Exemplifies
Commanding General vs. Staff**

	CG Mean	Staff Mean	t value	Sig.	r value
Keeps cool under pressure	.00	.25	-3.215	.003	.50
Sees the big picture; provides context and perspective	.00	.53	-5.927	.000	.73
Employs units in accordance with their capabilities	.00	.19	-2.675	.012	.43
Gets out of the headquarters and visits the troops	.00	.44	-4.910	.000	.66
Sets a high ethical tone; demands honest reporting	.00	.25	-3.215	.003	.40
Is consistent and predictable in his behavior	.00	.16	-2.396	.023	.40

**Significant Differences of Behaviors that the CG Should Work On to Improve His Leadership
Commanding General vs. Staff**


	CG Mean	Staff Mean	t value	Sig.	r value
Knows how to delegate and not "micromanage"	.00	.16	-2.396	.023	.40
Builds and supports teamwork within staff and among units	.00	.25	-3.215	.003	.50
Holds people accountable for their actions and results	.00	.22	-2.946	.006	.47

Leader Behavior Preferences (LBP) Worksheet
Top 12 Percentages of Most Important Leader Behaviors
All Participants N=77




- 3. Keeps cool under pressure.
- 5. Clearly explains missions, standards, and priorities.
- 6. Sees the big picture; provides context and perspective.
- 22. Can make tough, sound decisions on time.
- 13. Gets out of the headquarters and visits the troops.
- 29. Is positive, encouraging, and realistically optimistic.
- 1. Adapts quickly to new situations and requirements.
- 25. Builds and supports teamwork within staff and among units.
- 7. Sets high standards without a “zero defects” mentality.
- 15. Sets a high ethical tone; demands honest reporting.
- 17. Knows how to delegate and not “micromanage.”
- 12. Can handle “bad news.”

Leader Behavior Preferences (LBP) Worksheet
Top 12 Percentages of Leader Behaviors that Differentiate
"Good" vs. "Poor" Leaders
All Participants N=77



- 3. Keeps cool under pressure.
- 5. Clearly explains missions, standards, and priorities.
- 22. Can make tough, sound decisions on time.
- 13. Gets out of the headquarters and visits the troops.
- 17. Knows how to delegate and not "micromanage."
- 12. Can handle "bad news."
- 1. Adapts quickly to new situations and requirements.
- 6. Sees the big picture; provides context and perspective.
- 16. Will share the risks and hardships of his soldiers.
- 25. Builds and supports teamwork within staff and among units.
- 27. Is more interested in doing good than looking good.
- 7. Sets high standards without a "zero defects" mentality.

Leader Behavior Preferences (LBP) Worksheet
Top 12 Percentages of Leader Behaviors Commanding General Exemplifies
Staff Only N=73



6. Sees the big picture; provides context and perspective.
5. Clearly explains missions, standards, and priorities.
13. Gets out of the headquarters and visits the troops.
22. Can make tough, sound decisions on time.
3. Keeps cool under pressure.
1. Adapts quickly to new situations and requirements.
7. Sets high standards without a “zero defects” mentality.
29. Is positive, encouraging, and realistically optimistic.
12. Can handle “bad news.”
17. Knows how to delegate and not “micromanage.”
8. Encourages initiative and welcomes new ideas.
15. Sets a high ethical tone; demands honest reporting.

Assessment of Selected Aspects of the Command Climate (ACC)

The following table indicates how strong the relationships between the Commanding Generals' responses to each question of the ACC. (A positive Pearson Correlation coefficient indicates that an increase in one variable [or question] is associated with an increase in another variable [or question].) The Pearson Correlation coefficient can be interpreted as follows: 1.0 a perfect relationship, 0 no relationship. For example, the Pearson Correlation coefficient between questions A and B is .87, therefore as question A is rated higher, question B will be rated higher as well. The Pearson Correlation coefficient between questions D and F is .258, a relatively low correlation coefficient, which means there is a weak a relationship between the two variables. If D is rated high, one would not be conclude that F would be rated high because of the weak relationship between the two variables.

**Correlation Matrix of How
Commanding Generals Viewed the Command Climate**

	A.	B.	C.	D.	E.	F.	X.
A. A strong, healthy focus on mission accomplishment	--	.870	.577	.775	-.333	.333	.333
B. Clarity of standards, goals, and priorities		--	.905	.405	.174	.522	.522
C. A reliable, timely, open flow of key information			--	.000	.577	.577	.577
D. An appreciation for initiative and innovation				--	-.775	.258	.258
E. Consideration for the well-being of people					--	.333	.333
F. A prevailing sense of mutual trust and confidence						--	1.000
X. Overall assessment of the climate							--

In the table below the “Mean” is the average score of the Commanding Generals for each question, and the “Std. Deviation” is a measure of the variation of the scores around the mean score.

**Descriptive Statistics of How
Commanding Generals Viewed the Command Climate**

Question	Mean	Std. Deviation	N
A. A strong, healthy focus on mission accomplishment	4.75	.500	4
B. Clarity of standards, goals, and priorities	4.25	.957	4
C. A reliable, timely, open flow of key information	3.5	.577	4
D. An appreciation for initiative and innovation	3.5	1.291	4
E. Consideration for the well-being of people	4.75	.500	4
F. A prevailing sense of mutual trust and confidence	4.25	.500	4
X. Overall assessment of the climate -	4.25	.500	4

The following table indicates how strong the relationships between “All Others” responses (besides the Commanding General) to each question of the ACC. Again, the Pearson Correlation coefficient between questions A and B is .617, which is relatively strong. Therefore, as question A is rated higher, question B will be rated higher as well.

Correlation Matrix of How All Others Viewed the Command Climate


	A.	B.	C.	D.	E.	F.	X.
A. A strong, healthy focus on mission accomplishment	--	.617	.469	.587	.403	.564	.677
B. Clarity of standards, goals, and priorities		--	.478	.472	.276	.468	.668
C. A reliable, timely, open flow of key information			--	.498	.343	.467	.578
D. An appreciation for initiative and innovation				--	.452	.523	.687
E. Consideration for the well-being of people					--	.551	.607
F. A prevailing sense of mutual trust and confidence						--	.714
X. Overall assessment of the climate							--

In the table below the “Mean” is the average score of the Commanding Generals for each question, and the “Std. Deviation” is a measure of the variation of the scores around the mean score.

Descriptive Statistics of How All Others Viewed the Command Climate


Question	Mean	Std. Deviation	N
A. A strong, healthy focus on mission accomplishment	5.39	.832	72
B. Clarity of standards, goals, and priorities	5.21	.855	72
C. A reliable, timely, open flow of key information	4.32	.869	72
D. An appreciation for initiative and innovation	4.89	.897	72
E. Consideration for the well-being of people	5.13	.903	72
F. A prevailing sense of mutual trust and confidence	5.08	.801	72
X. Overall assessment of the climate	5.11	.797	72

How Commanding General Views the Command Climate vs.
 How Commanding General Thinks
 All Others View the Command Climate




- A. A strong, healthy focus on mission accomplishment
- B. Clarity of standards, goals, and priorities
- C. A reliable, timely, open flow of key information
- D. An appreciation for initiative and innovation
- E. Consideration for the well-being of people
- F. A prevailing sense of mutual trust and confidence
- X. Overall assessment of the climate

How Commanding General Views the Command Climate vs.
How All Others View the Command Climate




- A. A strong, healthy focus on mission accomplishment
- B. Clarity of standards, goals, and priorities
- C. A reliable, timely, open flow of key information
- D. An appreciation for initiative and innovation
- E. Consideration for the well-being of people
- F. A prevailing sense of mutual trust and confidence
- X. Overall assessment of the climate

How Commanding General Views the Command Climate vs.
 How Subordinate Commanders View the Command Climate



- A. A strong, healthy focus on mission accomplishment
- B. Clarity of standards, goals, and priorities
- C. A reliable, timely, open flow of key information
- D. An appreciation for initiative and innovation
- E. Consideration for the well-being of people
- F. A prevailing sense of mutual trust and confidence
- X. Overall assessment of the climate

How Commanding General Views the Command Climate vs.
How the Staff Views the Command Climate



- A. A strong, healthy focus on mission accomplishment
- B. Clarity of standards, goals, and priorities
- C. A reliable, timely, open flow of key information
- D. An appreciation for initiative and innovation
- E. Consideration for the well-being of people
- F. A prevailing sense of mutual trust and confidence
- X. Overall assessment of the climate

Campbell Leadership Descriptor© Scales

Commanding General Description of “Self”

	N	Min.	Max.	Mean	Std. Deviation
Vision	4	13	18	15.75	2.062
Management	4	14	19	16.50	2.082
Empowerment	4	14	18	16.50	1.732
Diplomacy	4	11	18	15.50	3.109
Feedback	4	15	19	16.25	1.893
Entrepreneurialism	4	9	20	15.50	4.655
Personal Style	4	13	19	17.00	2.708
Personal Energy	4	13	19	16.50	2.646
Multicultural Awareness	4	10	18	15.75	3.862

Commanding General Description of “Good Leader”

	N	Min.	Max.	Mean	Std. Deviation
Vision	4	17	20	18.25	1.258
Management	4	18	19	18.50	.577
Empowerment	4	16	20	18.50	1.732
Diplomacy	4	14	19	16.50	2.082
Feedback	4	16	20	18.50	1.732
Entrepreneurialism	4	14	20	18.00	2.828
Personal Style	4	17	20	18.50	1.291
Personal Energy	4	15	19	17.75	1.893
Multicultural Awareness	4	14	20	16.75	2.500

Commanding General Description of “Poor Leader”

	N	Min.	Max.	Mean	Std. Deviation
Vision	4	9	14	11.50	2.887
Management	4	7	19	11.50	5.260
Empowerment	4	10	11	10.25	.500
Diplomacy	4	9	15	11.75	2.754
Feedback	4	6	13	9.75	3.304
Entrepreneurialism	4	9	17	12.75	3.500
Personal Style	4	10	13	11.50	1.291
Personal Energy	4	9	14	11.00	2.160
Multicultural Awareness	4	10	14	11.75	2.062

Staff Description of “Self”

	N	Min.	Max.	Mean	Std. Deviation
Vision	32	13	19	15.84	1.505
Management	32	14	20	16.63	1.621
Empowerment	32	12	19	15.88	1.862
Diplomacy	32	11	20	15.94	2.169
Feedback	32	13	19	15.72	1.571
Entrepreneurialism	32	11	19	14.25	2.200
Personal Style	32	14	20	16.69	1.693
Personal Energy	32	10	19	16.03	2.024
Multicultural Awareness	32	10	20	14.72	2.317

Staff Description of “Good Leader”

	N	Min.	Max.	Mean	Std. Deviation
Vision	32	16	20	18.84	1.051
Management	32	17	20	18.97	1.031
Empowerment	32	13	20	17.78	1.641
Diplomacy	32	15	20	18.31	1.554
Feedback	32	15	20	18.13	1.314
Entrepreneurialism	32	13	20	17.19	2.039
Personal Style	32	17	20	18.94	.982
Personal Energy	32	15	20	18.31	1.491
Multicultural Awareness	32	14	20	17.53	1.984

Staff Description of “Poor Leader”

	N	Min.	Max.	Mean	Std. Deviation
Vision	32	5	14	10.09	2.680
Management	32	5	19	10.94	3.663
Empowerment	32	5	12	8.97	1.713
Diplomacy	32	5	17	10.75	2.615
Feedback	32	5	15	9.53	2.110
Entrepreneurialism	32	5	19	11.59	3.406
Personal Style	32	5	14	10.00	2.185
Personal Energy	32	5	19	11.53	3.263
Multicultural Awareness	32	5	17	10.63	2.756

Staff Description of “Commanding General”

	N	Min.	Max.	Mean	Std. Deviation
Vision	29	13	20	18.07	1.963
Management	29	13	20	17.72	1.980
Empowerment	29	8	20	16.41	3.157
Diplomacy	29	11	20	17.90	2.366
Feedback	29	14	20	17.34	2.092
Entrepreneurialism	29	13	20	18.00	2.138
Personal Style	29	13	20	18.45	2.181
Personal Energy	29	12	20	17.34	2.742
Multicultural Awareness	29	12	20	18.17	2.237


Campbell Leadership Descriptor © (CLD)
Items from the Campbell with the Greatest Differentiation
Between “Good” leader from “Poor” leader
Commanding General (N=4)

	#	Items from Campbell With the Greatest Differentiation Between “Good” leader from “Poor” leader (N=4)
1	(22)	A Good Teacher
2	(12)	Mentoring
3	(1)	Farsighted
4	(14)	Supportive
5	(33)	A Visible Role Model
6	(37)	Energetic
7	(39)	Publicly impressive
8	(24)	Listens well
9	(31)	Credible
10	(36)	Balanced
11	(21)	A good coach
12	(3)	Persuasive
13	(7)	Delegating
14	(18)	Trusted
15	(34)	Optimistic
16	(15)	Trusting
17	(4)	Resourceful
18	(26)	Adventuresome
19	(30)	Globally Innovative
20	(28)	Durable
21	(32)	Experienced
22	(40)	Internationally Resilient
23	(9)	Focused
24	(6)	Dedicated
25	(23)	Candid and Honest
26	(17)	Tactful
27	(5)	Has a Global View
28	(20)	Culturally Sensitive
29	(35)	Looks at Global Picture
30	(8)	Dependable
31	(10)	Systematic
32	(27)	Creative
33	(2)	Enterprising
34	(16)	Diplomatic
35	(38)	Physically Fit
36	(29)	Good Fund Raiser
37	(19)	Well-Connected
38	(25)	Numerically Astute
39	(11)	Encouraging
40	(13)	Perceptive


Campbell Leadership Descriptor © (CLD)
Items from Campbell with the Greatest Differentiation
Between “Good” leader from “Poor” leader
Division Staff (N=32)

	#	Items from Campbell With the Greatest Differentiation Between “Good” leader from “Poor” leader (N=32)
1	(18)	Trusted
2	(11)	Encouraging
3	(15)	Trusting
4	(21)	A Good Coach
5	(22)	A Good Teacher
6	(31)	Credible
7	(3)	Persuasive
8	(24)	Listens Well
9	(1)	Farsighted
10	(12)	Mentoring
11	(34)	Optimistic
12	(4)	Resourceful
13	(33)	A Visible Role Model
14	(5)	Has a Global View
15	(23)	Candid and Honest
16	(13)	Perceptive
17	(9)	Focuses
18	(39)	Publicly Impressive
19	(20)	Culturally Sensitive
20	(35)	Looks at Global Picture
21	(10)	Systematic
22	(32)	Experienced
23	(36)	Balanced
24	(8)	Dependable
25	(37)	Energetic
26	(7)	Delegating
27	(28)	Durable
28	(14)	Supportive
29	(16)	Diplomatic
30	(27)	Creative
31	(2)	Enterprising
32	(6)	Dedicated
33	(40)	Internationally Resilient
34	(17)	Tactful
35	(38)	Physically Fit
36	(30)	Globally Innovative
37	(26)	Adventuresome
38	(19)	Well-Connected
39	(25)	Numerically Astute
40	(29)	Good Fund Raiser


**Campbell Leadership Descriptor © (CLD)
 Division Commander's Description of a Good Leader vs.
 Staff Description of a Good Leader**



**Campbell Leadership Descriptor © (CLD)
 Commander's Description of a Poor Leader vs.
 Staff Description of a Poor Leader**



**Campbell Leadership Descriptor © (CLD)
 Staff Description of a Good Leader vs.
 Staff Description of a Poor Leader**



END OF APPENDIX B

APPENDIX C

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- For those interested, a [more extensive bibliography is available at](#) the Department of Command, Leadership, and Management, U.S. Army War College).

END OF APPENDIX C