Joint Publication 3-57

Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Operations

8 February 2001
## Report Documentation Page

Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1. REPORT DATE</th>
<th>2. REPORT TYPE</th>
<th>3. DATES COVERED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>08 FEB 2001</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE</th>
<th>5a. CONTRACT NUMBER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Operations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>6. AUTHOR(S)</th>
<th>5b. GRANT NUMBER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)</th>
<th>5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Joint Chiefs of Staff Washington, DC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)</th>
<th>10. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S ACRONYM(S)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>11. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S REPORT NUMBER(S)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Approved for public release, distribution unlimited</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The original document contains color images.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>14. ABSTRACT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>15. SUBJECT TERMS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:</th>
<th>17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT</th>
<th>18. NUMBER OF PAGES</th>
<th>19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. REPORT</td>
<td>unclassified</td>
<td>UU</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. ABSTRACT</td>
<td>unclassified</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. THIS PAGE</td>
<td>unclassified</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>195</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The original document contains color images.
1. Scope

The doctrinal concepts contained in this publication provide guidance for the planning and conduct of civil-military operations (CMO) by joint forces. Furthermore, these concepts should guide joint force commanders in the use of civil affairs assets and other specialized forces uniquely capable of contributing to the execution of CMO, refining CMO plans, and keeping US Government agencies informed of Department of Defense capabilities to support US objectives through carefully planned and executed CMO.

2. Purpose

This publication has been prepared under the direction of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It sets forth doctrine to govern the joint activities and performance of the Armed Forces of the United States in joint operations and provides the doctrinal basis for US military involvement in multinational and interagency operations. It provides military guidance for the exercise of authority by combatant commanders and other joint force commanders (JFCs) and prescribes doctrine for joint operations and training. It provides military guidance for use by the Armed Forces in preparing their appropriate plans. It is not the intent of this publication to restrict the authority of the JFC from organizing the force and executing the mission in a manner the JFC deems most appropriate to ensure unity of effort in the accomplishment of the overall mission.

3. Application

a. Doctrine and guidance established in this publication apply to the commanders of combatant commands, subunified commands, joint task forces, and subordinate components of these commands. These principles and guidance also may apply when significant forces of one Service are attached to forces of another Service or when significant forces of one Service support forces of another Service.

b. The guidance in this publication is authoritative; as such, this doctrine will be followed except when, in the judgment of the commander, exceptional circumstances dictate otherwise. If conflicts arise between the contents of this publication and the contents of Service publications, this publication will take precedence for the activities of joint forces unless the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, normally in coordination with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has provided more current and specific guidance. Commanders of forces operating as part of a multinational (alliance or coalition) military command should follow multinational doctrine and procedures ratified by the United States. For doctrine and procedures not ratified by the United States, commanders should evaluate and follow the multinational command’s doctrine and procedures, where applicable and consistent with US law and policy.

For the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

S. A. FRY
Vice Admiral, U.S. Navy
Director, Joint Staff
Intentionally Blank
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ................................................................. vii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• General ................................................................. I-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Civil-Military Operations and Levels of War ................................ I-4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Objectives of Civil-Military Operations ................................... I-7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Summary ...................................................... I-23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER II ORGANIZATION AND COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS FOR CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• General ................................................................. II-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Organizations Providing CMO Capabilities .......................... II-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Special Operations Forces ........................................ II-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Engineering ............................................................ II-10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Health Service Support ........................................... II-12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Transportation ...................................................... II-13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Military Police and/or Security Police Forces .................. II-16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Organizing for Civil-Military Operations .......................... II-17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER III PLANNING CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SECTION A. BASIC PLANNING .................................................. III-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• General ................................................................. III-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Planning Factors and Constraints ................................ III-4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Interagency Coordination ............................................. III-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Oversight of CMO Planning and Activities ..................... III-6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Environmental Considerations ...................................... III-7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Operational Considerations ........................................ III-8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Measures of Effectiveness .......................................... III-9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SECTION B. OTHER FUNCTIONAL AREAS .................................. III-11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Public Affairs ........................................................ III-11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Legal ................................................................. III-14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Logistics .............................................................. III-18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Financial Management ............................................ III-22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Information Gathering ............................................... III-22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Communications .................................................. III-24</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table of Contents

- Information Operations ...................................................................................................... III-27
- Religious Ministry Support .......................................................................................... III-28

SECTION C. SPECIALIZED PLANNING ........................................................................... III-29
- Multinational Operations ............................................................................................... III-29
- Consequence Management Operations .......................................................................... III-31
- Termination and Transition Operations (Exit Strategy — POL-MIL Plan, if developed) ................................................................. III-32
- Complex Contingency Operations ................................................................................. III-35
- Planning Civil Affairs Activities .................................................................................... III-37

CHAPTER IV INTERAGENCY COORDINATION

- General ......................................................................................................................... IV-1
- Civil-Military Relations ............................................................................................... IV-5
- Organizing for Interagency Operations .......................................................................... IV-7
- United Nations Operations .......................................................................................... IV-19

APPENDIX

A Service Capabilities ...................................................................................................... A-1
B Presidential Decision Directive-56, Managing Complex Contingency Operations ................. B-1
C Planning Considerations for Civil Affairs Activities .................................................... C-1
D References .................................................................................................................. D-1
E Administrative Instructions ........................................................................................ E-1

GLOSSARY

Part I Abbreviations and Acronyms ................................................................................. GL-1
Part II Terms and Definitions ......................................................................................... GL-6

FIGURE

I-1 Range of Military Operations ...................................................................................... I-2
I-2 Possible Escalation Indicators ................................................................................... I-8
I-3 Civil Military Missions in Support of Major Regional Conflicts and Other Combat Operations .................................................................................. I-10
I-4 Post Conflict Synchronization Matrix ......................................................................... I-21
II-1 Concept of Civil Affairs Employment ..................................................................... II-4
II-2 Principles of Civil Affairs Activities .......................................................................... II-6
II-3 Specialized Engineering Capabilities ........................................................................ II-11
II-4 Health Service Support Activities in Civil-Military Operations ............................. II-14
II-5 Military Police and/or Security Forces Activities ..................................................... II-16
II-6 Possible Joint Task Force Subordinates ................................................................... II-18
II-7 Possible Joint Civil-Military Operations Task Force Responsibilities ................ II-19
II-8 Notional Joint Civil-Military Operations Task Force ........................................ II-21
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>II-9</td>
<td>Possible Joint Special Operations Task Force Commander</td>
<td>II-23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III-1</td>
<td>Civil-Military Operations General Planning Considerations</td>
<td>III-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III-3</td>
<td>Examples of Force Protection and/or Security Measures of Effectiveness</td>
<td>III-12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III-4</td>
<td>Legal Issues</td>
<td>III-19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III-5</td>
<td>Information Gathering</td>
<td>III-23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III-6</td>
<td>Planning Factors for Multinational Forces</td>
<td>III-30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III-7</td>
<td>Sample Checklist for Termination Planning</td>
<td>III-33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III-8</td>
<td>Transition Criteria Issues</td>
<td>III-34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III-9</td>
<td>Sample Checklist for Transition Planning</td>
<td>III-36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV-1</td>
<td>Notional Composition of a Civil-Military Operations Center</td>
<td>IV-13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV-2</td>
<td>Civil-Military Operations Center Functions</td>
<td>IV-14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV-3</td>
<td>Comparison Between Humanitarian Operations Center, Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Center, and Civil-Military Operations Center</td>
<td>IV-15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
COMMANDER’S OVERVIEW

• Provides an Overview of Civil-Military Operations (CMO)
• Discusses Organization and Command Relationships for CMO
• Provides an Overview for the Planning of CMO
• Discusses Interagency Coordination as it Relates to Civil-Military Relations

Overview

Civil-military operations (CMO) are an inherent responsibility of command to facilitate accomplishment of the commander’s mission.

Commanders’ authority for undertaking CMO ultimately derives from a National Command Authorities decision.

Joint force commanders (JFCs) plan and conduct CMO to facilitate military operations and help achieve political-military objectives derived from US national security interests.

CMO are applicable at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war.

Civil-military operations (CMO) encompass the activities that joint force commanders (JFCs) take to establish and maintain positive relations between their forces, the civil authorities, and the general population, resources, and institutions in friendly, neutral, or hostile areas where their forces are employed in order to facilitate military operations and to consolidate and achieve US objectives. Civil affairs personnel bridge the gap between the military and civilian environment.

Factors such as mission, policy determinants, and relationship between the government, nongovernmental, and private organizations of the affected country and the United States also influence the authority to conduct CMO.

Establishing and maintaining military-to-civil relations as part of the missions tasked to a JFC entails interaction between US, multinational, and indigenous security forces, as well as government and nongovernmental organizations. In some instances, JFCs also may have to interact with civilian businesses in the operational area that have an influence on the local government, economy, and/or populace.

The focus at each level of war may differ within the same operation both in time and activity. Strategic planning is offset to ensure that the environment is shaped to achieve the
CMO enhance military effectiveness.

Properly executed CMO can reduce friction between the civilian population and the military force. The objective is to minimize interference with military operations by the civilian population. When possible, a second objective is to reduce military interference with the civilian populace.

JFCs may conduct numerous types of CMO:

Foreign humanitarian assistance

Foreign humanitarian assistance is conducted to relieve or reduce the results of natural or manmade disasters or other endemic conditions.

Populace and resource control

Populace and resource control assists host nation governments or de facto authorities in retaining control over their population centers and resources to preclude complicating problems that may hinder accomplishment of the JFC’s mission.

Nation assistance operations

Nation assistance operations involve civil or military assistance rendered to a nation by US forces within that nation’s territory during peacetime, crises or emergencies, or war, based on agreements mutually concluded between the United States and that nation.

Military civic action

Military civic action involves activities intended to win support of the local population for the foreign nation and its military. Military civic actions are predominantly conducted by indigenous military personnel, while US forces provide advice, supervision, or technical support.

Emergency services

Emergency services are all those activities and measures designed or undertaken to: minimize the effects upon the civilian population which would be caused by a disaster; deal with the immediate emergency conditions which would be created by any such disaster; and effect emergency repairs to, or the emergency restoration of, vital utilities and facilities destroyed or damaged by any such disaster.

Civil administration

Civil administration is a unique action undertaken by US commanders only when directed or approved by the National Command Authorities (NCA). Civil administration support consists of planning, coordinating, advising, or assisting those activities that reinforce or restore a civil administration that supports US and multinational objectives in friendly or hostile territory.
Executive Summary

**Domestic support operations** usually occur after a Presidential declaration of a **major disaster** and are designed to supplement the efforts and resources of state and local governments and voluntary organizations. The US military normally responds to domestic emergencies in support of another agency.

### Organization and Command Relationships

**The organization and command relationships for conduct of CMO are highly variable.**

While the principles of effective command and control and staff operations apply to CMO just as they do for any other military operation, national objectives (the primary mission of the joint force), environmental conditions, and availability of resources will determine the options available to JFCs.

**Every US military organization has some capability to perform CMO.**

Certain types of organizations are particularly suited to conduct CMO and will form the nucleus of any CMO effort. These units are typically civil affairs and psychological operations units. Others such as (but not limited to) special operations forces, engineers, health service, transportation, and military police and security forces act as enablers.

**In most scenarios, joint task forces will conduct CMO.**

Joint task forces (JTFs) may take many forms and sizes and be employed across the range of military operations in air, land, or maritime environments.

**JFCs may establish joint civil-military operations task forces (JCMOTFs) or joint special operations task forces (JSOTFs) when the scope of CMO requires coordination and activities beyond that which other representation on the staff could accomplish.**

Mission needs may require the consolidation of assets capable of performing unique CMO under one subordinate JTF, a joint civil-military operations task force (JCMOTF), or a joint special operations task force (JSOTF).

**A JCMOTF is a means for JFCs to meet their legal obligations and moral considerations to civilians within an operational area.**

A JCMOTF is composed of units from more than one Military Department or US agency and is formed to carry out CMO in support of a theater campaign or other operations.

The JCMOTF may be developed to meet a specific CMO contingency mission (e.g., civil administration) or support humanitarian or nation assistance operations, a theater campaign of limited duration, or a longer duration CMO concurrent with or subsequent to regional or general conflict, depending on NCA or theater guidance.
A JSOTF is a joint task force composed of special operations units from more than one Service, formed to carry out a specific special operation or prosecute special operations in support of a theater campaign or other operations.

It is the responsibility of combatant commanders to plan and conduct CMO.

Planning and coordination of CMO facilitates mission accomplishment.

To establish centralized direction and staff cognizance over planning, coordinating, and conducting CMO, the JFC may establish a distinct CMO staff element.

JFCs and their subordinate commanders must address force protection during all phases of deliberate and crisis action planning.

CMO planners play a major role in termination and transition operations.

A JSOTF normally is formed around elements from the theater special operations command or an existing special operations forces unit with augmentation from other Service special operations forces. A JSOTF may be established and deployed as a complete package from outside the theater.

Planning

CMO contribute to shaping the battlespace and supporting the geographic combatant commander’s theater engagement plan.

CMO planning will enhance the transition to civilian control from the outset of an operation.

CMO planning is based on national policy and reflects legal obligations and constraints found in the US Constitution, statutory law, judicial decisions, Presidential directives, departmental regulations, and the rules and principles of international law, especially those incorporated in treaties and agreements applicable to areas where US forces are employed.

This may be in the Operations Directorate, a separate CMO Directorate (J-code), or a member of the commander’s personal staff. The complex nature and importance of CMO normally require the direction and oversight of a full-time staff (typically civil affairs elements).

All aspects of force protection must be considered and threats minimized to ensure maximum operational success. JFCs and their subordinate commanders must implement force protection measures appropriate to anticipated threats based on threat and vulnerability assessments. They should then complete a risk assessment with the information obtained, measured against mission requirements.

In order for CMO planners to accomplish termination and transition planning, there must be a clearly identifiable end state and transition or termination criteria for the operation must be developed.
### Presidential Decision Directive-56, Managing Complex Contingency Operations

Presidential Decision Directive-56, *Managing Complex Contingency Operations*, was initiated to integrate the political, military, humanitarian, economic, and other dimensions of United States Government (USG) planning for complex contingencies.

### Interagency Coordination

By understanding the interagency process, JFCs will be better able to appreciate how the skills and resources of the various USG agencies interact with nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), international organizations, and regional organizations to assist in mission accomplishment. Civil-military relations can create economic, political, and social stability as they encourage the development of the affected nation’s materiel and human resources.

The integration of political, economic, civil, and military objectives and the subsequent translation of these objectives into demonstrable action have always been essential to success at all levels of operation.

Interagency coordination forges the vital link between the military and the economic, political and/or diplomatic, and informational entities of the USG as well as NGOs and international organizations. Successful interagency coordination and planning enables these agencies, departments, and organizations to mount a coherent and efficient collective operation — unity of effort must be achieved.

### Political advisor or foreign policy advisor.

The Department of State assigns geographic combatant commands a political advisor (POLAD) or foreign policy advisor (FPA). This person provides diplomatic considerations and enables informal linkage with embassies in the area of responsibility and with the Department of State.

The POLAD or FPA supplies information regarding policy goals and objectives of the Department of State that are relevant to the geographic combatant commander’s theater strategy.

### Interagency Structure in Foreign Countries

The Chief of Mission (i.e., the Ambassador) has authority over all elements of the USG in country, except forces assigned to a combatant command. Other key USG organizations under the Chief of Mission’s cognizance in place...
within most nations include the US Defense Attaché Office and a security assistance organization (if present).

The Ambassador is the senior representative of the President in foreign nations and is responsible for policy decisions and the activities of USG employees in the country. The Ambassador integrates the programs and resources of all USG agencies represented on the Country Team.

Country Team

The Country Team system provides the foundation for rapid interagency consultation, coordination, and action on recommendations from the field and effective execution of US missions, programs, and policies. The Country Team typically includes political, economic, administrative, and consular officers as well as a public affairs officer, regional security officer, the United States Defense Representative or Country Representative, and communications staff. Attachés from the Department of Defense, Department of Agriculture, and other USG agencies often are represented on the team.

Organizing for Interagency Operations

Humanitarian operations center

Humanitarian operations center (HOC). The HOC is primarily an international and interagency policy making and coordinating body that does not exercise command and control but seeks to achieve unity of effort among all participants in a large foreign humanitarian assistance operation.

On-site operations coordination center

On-site operations coordination center (OSOCC). The United Nations may establish a structure called the OSOCC as a support organization to a HOC. The OSOCC assists in gathering, evaluating, collating, and disseminating HOC information. The OSOCC also may provide facilitation services for HOC meetings.

Humanitarian assistance coordination center

Humanitarian assistance coordination center (HACC). In a humanitarian assistance operation, the combatant command’s crisis action organization may organize as a HACC. The HACC assists with interagency coordination and planning, providing the critical link between the combatant commander and other USG agencies, NGOs, and international and regional organizations that may participate in a humanitarian assistance operation at the strategic level.

Civil-military operations center

Civil-military operations center (CMOC). A CMOC is an ad hoc organization, normally established by commanders to assist in the coordination of activities of engaged military forces
Executive Summary

Civil-military cooperation (CIMIC). CIMIC reflects the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s broad approach to security.

Civil-military cooperation (CIMIC). CIMIC covers a wide variety of activities ranging from sustaining life to restoring government.

CIMIC requires an organization containing three elements: a staff to plan and advise the commander, a CIMIC group to conduct the CIMIC operations, and additional resources, which will be drawn from the force for specific tasks.

CONCLUSION

This publication provides the guidance for the planning and conduct of CMO across the range of military operations.
Executive Summary

Intentionally Blank
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

“. . . the fundamental challenge facing the Defense Department, indeed the Nation, is to continue to meet the challenges of shaping the security environment and responding to the full range of crises in the near term while at the same time transforming our forces and capabilities to meet the demands of an uncertain future.”

William S. Cohen
Secretary of Defense

1. General

The above quotation reflects the importance of the Armed Forces of the United States continuing and expanding their involvement in civil-military operations (CMO). The US military contributes to shaping the security environment and addresses threats to US interests by conducting CMO using a variety of types of units. Joint force commanders (JFCs) integrate civil affairs (CA) (i.e., those specialized units trained to plan and conduct CA activities) with other military forces (e.g., maneuver, health service, military police, engineering, transportation, and other special operations forces) and civilian organizations (both governmental and nongovernmental) to provide the capabilities needed for successful CMO. While CA are the “bedrock” facilitating application of these selected capabilities, this joint publication (JP) reflects the transition from a primarily CA approach to the broader and over-arching concept of CMO.

For additional information on CA and CA activities, refer to JP 3-57.1, Joint Doctrine for Civil Affairs.

a. Civil-Military Operations. “Civil-military operations” are the activities of a commander that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces, governmental and nongovernmental civilian organizations and authorities, and the civilian populace. CMO can occur in friendly, neutral, or hostile operational areas to facilitate military operations and achieve US objectives. CMO may include performance by military forces of activities and functions which are normally the responsibility of local, regional, or national government. These activities may occur prior to, during, or subsequent to other military actions. They may also occur, if directed, in the absence of other military operations. CMO may be performed by designated CA, by other military forces, or by a combination of CA and other forces. Figure I-1 shows the wide range of military operations that CMO need to support.

• CMO are conducted to minimize civilian interference with military operations, to maximize support for operations, and to meet the commander’s legal responsibilities and moral obligations to civilian populations within the commander’s area of control. CMO are conducted across the range of military operations to address root causes of instability and in a reconstructive manner after conflict or disaster, or may be conducted in mitigating circumstances to support US national security objectives. CMO may also include psychological operations (PSYOP) and CA activities.

• All CA activities support CMO. They are performed or supported by CA and embrace the relationship of military forces with civil authorities,
Chapter I

nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), international organizations, and populations where military forces are present. CA activities may involve the application of CA functional specialty skills in areas normally the responsibility of the civilian government. Examples of CA activities supporting CMO are foreign nation support, populace and resource control, humanitarian assistance (HA), military civil action, emergency services, and support to civil administration.

For more information on CA activities and CA, refer to JP 3-57.1, Joint Doctrine for Civil Affairs.

- CMO occur in virtually every operation across the range of military operations. CMO may be conducted to support a counterinsurgency program, and serve as a catalyst to affect all foreign internal defense (FID) programs. The relative effort and resources devoted to CMO vary with the nature and type of the joint force’s primary mission.

- **During war**, CMO will be important for supporting combat operations where goals include winning quickly with as few casualties as possible, achieving national objectives and concluding hostilities on terms favorable to the US and its multinational partners. Accordingly, wartime scenarios are uniquely challenging for CMO. For example, while Germany and South Korea both emphasize “stay-put” policies for their civilians in the event of war, in reality tens of millions of civilians will be in the operational area and many of them will take to the roads and countryside to flee the fighting, generating population and resources control (PRC) requirements and concurrently impacting military mobility and security.

---

### Figure I-1. Range of Military Operations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Military Operations</th>
<th>General US Goal</th>
<th>Examples</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>War</td>
<td>Fight &amp; Win</td>
<td>Large-scale Combat Operations: Attack / Defend / Blockades</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Noncombatant</td>
<td>Deter War &amp; Resolve Conflict</td>
<td>Peace Enforcement / NEO Strikes / Raids / Show of Force Counterterrorism / Peacekeeping</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Support</td>
<td>Promote Peace</td>
<td>Antiterrorism / Disaster Relief Peacebuilding Nation Assistance Civil Support / Counterdrug NEO</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Legend**
- NEO Noncombatant Evacuation Operations
During the onset of combat operations, resources devoted to CMO will be small in comparison to those directed at warfighting. Additionally, nonmilitary players such as NGOs and international organizations that may have been present prior to the conflict will likely find their capacities exceeded by the increased need for relief. Military forces must therefore be prepared to assume responsibility in organizing the relief effort and achieving unity of effort among the myriad of nonmilitary players likely to be present. CA are specifically trained and organized to provide the coordination necessary to facilitate this mission. In such situations, CMO can make significant contributions.

Conversely, when the joint force’s primary mission is CMO, resources devoted to support combat forces may be minimal in comparison to that of forces and assets with specific capabilities to provide relief to the populace in the operational area. Many military operations other than war (MOOTW) will fall between these two extremes with a balanced effort to provide stability using both combat forces to defeat hostile forces and CMO assets to strengthen the civilian infrastructure.

b. Authority to Conduct Civil-Military Operations

A commander’s authority for undertaking CMO ultimately derives from a National Command Authorities (NCA) decision. Factors such as mission, policy determinants, and the relationship between the government of the affected country and the United States also influence the authority to conduct CMO.

The requirement to conduct CMO or exercise control in a given area or country may arise as a result of military operations, an international cooperative agreement, or an agreement between the United States Government (USG) and the governing authorities of the area or country in which US forces may be employed.

- International law, including the law of armed conflict (LOAC), affords military commanders certain rights and imposes certain responsibilities. These include authority to establish civil administrations and to control or conduct governmental matters both during and after hostilities.

- Dedicated CA, by virtue of their area and linguistic orientation, cultural awareness, experience in military-to-host nation (HN) advisory and assistance activities, as well as in civil-oriented functions paralleling governmental functions, are important in CMO.

- These forces are designed to secure support from the civilian population, fulfill important civil requirements consistent with military missions, and create as positive an effect as possible on friends, allies, and governing authorities.

- Achieving unity of effort becomes more complicated with the increasing number of nonmilitary players (e.g., NGOs,
international organizations, other
government agencies, and United
Nations [UN] agencies) involved in
operations. The problem of integrating
and coordinating their activities and
efforts are further complicated by
divergent organizational cultures and
fields of interest competing with the
military for scarce theater resources.
Coordination and deconfliction must be
managed on a priority basis.

- One of the most difficult problems for
the JFC in CMO is the need to coordinate
the activities of the military units with
multiple civilian organizations each
having their own purpose.

d. Coordination. As a fundamental
precept, CMO must be closely coordinated
with the Country Team and other USG
agencies. Most military responses or efforts,
especially those in MOOTW, require the
military-civil partnership that provides for
successful CMO.

e. Responsibility. CMO are an inherent
responsibility of command in order to
facilitate accomplishment of the
commander’s mission. CMO encompass the
activities that JFCs take to establish and
maintain relations between their forces and
the civil authorities and general population,
resources, and institutions in friendly, neutral,
or hostile areas where their forces are
employed. JFCs plan and conduct CMO to
facilitate military operations and help achieve
politicomilitary objectives derived from US
national security interests. Establishing and
maintaining military-to-civil relations as part
of the missions tasked to a JFC entails
interaction between US, multinational, and
indigenous security forces, and governmental,
nongovernmental, and international
organizations. In some instances, the JFC also
may have to interact with civilian businesses
in the operational area that have an influence
on the local government, economy, and/or
populace. These activities occur before,
during, subsequent to, or in the absence of
other military actions.

f. During extended combat operations, the
only military forces available to conduct CMO
may be CA. The other military forces that
usually conduct CMO (e.g., maneuver units,
health service, engineers, and transportation)
may not be available due to the requirements
of combat operations. CMO conducted by
CA only will be of limited scope.

Additional discussion of CMO is contained
in JP 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations, and
JP 3-07, Joint Doctrine for Military
Operations Other Than War.

2. Civil-Military Operations
and Levels of War

a. CMO are applicable at the strategic,
operational, and tactical levels of war, but
the focus at each level may differ within
the same operation, both in time and
activity. In CMO the distinction between
strategic, operational and tactical levels is
often moot. An infantry private operating at
the tactical level may take actions that have
strategic implications, such as treating
representatives of organizations not
recognized by the US as a member of the local
ruling government. Further, the civilian
organizations that the military works with do
not always distinguish between the various
levels. The NGO worker that talks with the
lieutenant may report the conversation to the
NGO leadership in Washington, who may
then discuss the conversation directly with the
White House the next day. It is the lack of
distinction among the various levels that
makes CMO of command interest to the JFC.

b. To achieve the benefits of multi-tiered
CMO, JFCs promulgate their intent early and
include appropriate CMO guidance to staffs
and subordinate commanders. Planners
develop CMO plans from the top down with
sufficient lead-time to enable subordinate commands to produce detailed supporting CMO plans that are in harmony with the JFC’s overall CMO objectives. While the effort at each level may be focused on different specific objectives, the plans are mutually supporting and synergistic.

“Clearly, future efforts to terminate small wars will involve extensive civil-military operations (CMO). The experience of Panama shows that neither of the organizations created by the military to conduct CMO was fully capable of achieving interagency unity of effort. Both COMCMOTF [commander, civil-military operations task force] and MSG [military support group] failed because they were wholly military. Interagency organization is required to conduct restoration operations in the aftermath of a small war. Such an organizing concept might be equally useful in other circumstances, such as counterinsurgency.”

John T. Fishel
Civil Military Operations
In the New World

• Strategic. At the strategic level, the CMO focus is on larger and long-term global or regional issues such as economic development and stability.

• Operational

  • At the operational level, CMO support the strategic CMO objectives while focusing on immediate or near-term issues such as health service infrastructure, noncombatant evacuation operations (NEOs), movement, feeding, and sheltering of dislocated civilians, police and security programs, synchronization of CMO support to tactical commanders, and integration of interagency operations with military operations.

  • Operational commanders allocate and distribute resources that enable subordinate commanders to execute CMO.

• Tactical

  • Tactical-level commanders perform CMO functions in support of the JFC’s CMO guidance and to accomplish their own tactical objectives.

  • Tactical-level CMO normally are more narrowly focused and have more immediate effects. These may include local security operations, processing and movement of dislocated civilians, and basic health service support (HSS).

c. It is important that CMO plans and considerations be incorporated early in the planning process for any operation. CMO must be a part of an overall national strategy, formulated and managed through interagency and multinational coordination and integrated with strategic, operational, and tactical-level plans and operations. Evaluation of the plan and information from the theater or regional level will be a continuous part of this process.

d. Active and participatory promotion at the strategic, operational, and tactical planning levels ensure effective CMO. Integration of CMO into theater operation plans in concept format (CONPLANs), functional plans, operation plans (OPLANs), and campaign plans ensures all government activities are coordinated, and that strategic, operational, and tactical level CMO are conducted to the maximum effect.

  • During complex contingency operations, the interagency community must develop and promulgate a political-military (POL-MIL) plan in compliance with Presidential Decision Directive-56


Chapter I

(CIVIL MILITARY OPERATIONS IN PANAMA)

1-504th PIR [Parachute Infantry Regiment] D-Day mission called for an air assault to seize and hold the hilltop garrison at Tinajitas. By nightfall, the “Red Devils” had accomplished their physically demanding task, and the following morning combat patrols eliminated remnants of the PDF [Panamanian Defense Forces] still attempting to harass them from nearby positions. Geographically isolated from the rest of their brigade, the unit found themselves in an unexpected position. The civilian population expected them to perform government functions until the new regime could establish control. Battalion medics started health care programs while the rifle companies moved out to distribute MREs [meals, ready to eat] to the needy and help civilian workers get the local power plant back into operation. The unit won the trust of the population, leading directly to successful programs to recover weapons and persuade former PDF soldiers to turn themselves in. The battalion returned from Panama with a clear sense of the need to train on CMO [civil-military operations].

As [Operation] JUST CAUSE moved from initial combat to CMO, units became responsible for running major cities and towns. This follow-on mission for combat arms commanders required identifying what was important in terms of rebuilding a local infrastructure, reestablishing law and order, and dedicating resources to unfamiliar tasks. These unfamiliar tasks included food distribution and medical treatment of the local population, law enforcement, garbage collection, and traffic control. Commanders looked for ways to care for the population and for methods to gain their support and cooperation. Successful CMO were critical. CMO conducted by SF [special forces] units in conjunction with conventional forces were extremely effective.

SOURCE: Operations Bulletin No. 90-9
Center for Army Lessons Learned

(PDD-56), Managing Complex Contingency Operations, which designates a lead agency for the mission, and ensures coordination among the various agencies of the USG.

- For the PDD-56 POL-MIL plan process, the Department of Defense (DOD) participants are the Office of the Secretary of Defense (SecDef) and the Joint Staff. Combatant commander and subordinate JFC participation, if any, in the POL-MIL plan, will be through the Joint Staff. Further, the National Security Council’s (NSC’s) POL-MIL plan provides guidance on a number of issues and requires interpretation with regard to the portions that relate to the military.

Accordingly, the instructions to the combatant commander and subordinate JFCs for implementing the POL-MIL plan will be issued by the NCA through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

- This POL-MIL plan should be the base document of a combatant commander’s plan.

- Planning for the conduct of CMO can produce the maximum effect when planned and coordinated at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels.

For further detail concerning complex contingency operations refer to Chapter III, “Planning Civil-Military
Introduction


e. The primary mechanism for coordinating CMO within an echelon and between echelons is the CA annex and the CA unit OPLANs. Since CMO and CA involves the activities of a number of staff functions and subordinate units, it is necessary to have a single document to identify, consolidate, deconflict, and synergize the activities of the various sections and units (e.g., engineers, health service, and transportation).

f. The successful conclusion of a campaign or operation is based on more than an assessment of military factors. An assessment of all political, military, economic, and information factors must be conducted to determine if the required end state has been achieved.

- Peace operations are increasingly complex due to the difficulty of integrating military operations with foreign humanitarian assistance (FHA) programs (United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees [UNHCR], World Food Program, United Nations Children’s Fund, et al.), the protection of human rights (United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights [UNHCHR]), and economic rehabilitation (United Nations Development Programme), in addition to divergent interests of former warring factions. The formulation of a coherent rehabilitation and reconstruction plan is imperative prior to the start of military operations. A coherent rehabilitation and reconstruction plan/strategy also gauges the level of improvement in the quality of life of the populace through normality indicators, which reflect the overall level of success of the operation.

- Planners must be cognizant that all missions are dynamic and, therefore, the relative effort devoted to CMO may change with planned phases or unanticipated political or environmental influences. For example, CMO might only play a supporting role through the decisive engagement phase of a war, but the exit strategy could rely heavily on successful CMO efforts to establish a stable environment for the governing authorities upon the departure of US combat forces.

- Unforeseen changes or shifts in effort may arise from failure to anticipate changes in the military or political situation or from unexpected change in the environment such as flooding or other natural disasters. Unforeseen changes are most dangerous when the joint force mission unexpectedly changes from CMO to combat operations. Joint force planners in a CMO environment must identify indicators of possible escalation as early as possible, allocate resources for monitoring those indicators, and anticipate shifts with sufficient warning to posture the force for a significant mission change. Such anticipatory planning and positive action may in fact prevent the mission change by identifying the problem early and allocating forces or designating a specific response to it, thus defusing the problem before it escalates. Possible indicators to monitor include, but are not limited to, those depicted in Figure I-2.

3. Objectives of Civil-Military Operations

a. CMO are a continuum of possible activities that must be considered based on the desired level of civilian support, the availability of resources to execute possible CMO, and the inadvertent interference by the local population.
Chapter I

b. Objectives

- **Support National Objectives.** The US national security objective is supported by CMO through the conduct of various activities such as nation assistance, FHA, and military civic action (MCA). These activities are particularly suited to support the development of a country’s material and human resources or to assist the HN in achieving its political, economic, and informational objectives.

- **Enhance Military Effectiveness.** Support of military operations by the indigenous civilian population enhances military effectiveness. Properly executed CMO can reduce potential friction points between the civilian population and the military force. The objective is to reduce interference with military operations by the civilian population. Success is achieved through such activities as relocating noncombatants away from areas of combat and through public information programs that publicize these activities to the local population as part of coordinated PSYOP and public affairs (PA) operations. Properly planned, coordinated, and executed CMO activities lead to proactive support of the military operation by the civilian population.

- **Reduce the Negative Impact of Military Operations on Civilians.** Often, casualties of war are inflicted not only on military forces but on the civilian populace. Casualties, suffering, and hardship on noncombatants often have far-reaching effects that may negate or delay achievement of US national or coalition objectives. Commanders have a moral and a legal obligation to prevent unnecessary suffering of noncombatants. The fulfillment of these obligations helps to more effectively achieve long-term objectives.

c. Types and Nature of Civil-Military Operations. CMO can be broadly separated into support to military operations and support to civil operations, though at times those become intertwined depending upon the...
nature of a particular operation and its potential to expand from a civil to a military mission.

- Support to Military Operations

- CMO include a variety of key roles that impact mission accomplishment. Some roles are required by international law. For example, the need to minimize the effects of the military operation on the civilian population. Other roles originate to facilitate military operations.

- Conflict in the 21st Century is likely to involve civil interface more than it did in previous conflicts. Because the US has substantial military power, adversaries may rely upon asynchronous warfare to avoid direct confrontation with the US combat power. Their targets and means may be more civilian than military. Second, there is less distinction between civilian and military institutions, infrastructures, and systems than before while dual-use is becoming more prevalent. Thirdly, strategic centers of gravity and operational decisive points are population hubs instead of military forces and remote terrain features. As more people and power migrate to densely populated urban centers, the military force is very likely to be fighting in densely populated urban centers than jungles or deserts. Consequently, CMO will be a critical feature of future conflicts.

- CMO planners must forecast CMO requirements by analyzing the mission to determine specific tasks. This includes establishing guidance for the specific CMO mission and developing estimates of the situation to include staff studies. Special, functional-oriented studies may be needed on certain topics. Planners must consider their knowledge of CMO, geographic areas of specialization, language qualifications, civil sector functional technical expertise, and contacts with civilian organizations. This will allow for timely and critical information on the civilian capabilities and resources in the operational area and information and insights gained from civilian contacts and professional knowledge that is more extensive than the information collected from military intelligence channels.

- The CMO mission in support of major regional conflicts and other combat operations varies with the phases of the operation, as shown in Figure I-3.

- Dislocated civilians (DC) can pose significant problems during combat operations. CMO is responsible for planning DC operations and to support the combat task. In addition, successfully carried out DC operations minimize the civilian interference with military operations, protect civilians from being combat hazards, prevent the outbreak of disease, alleviate human suffering and provide for the centralized control of DCs.

- CMO will assist the commander’s military operations through coordination with civilian agencies in implementing measures to locate and identify the population centers. CMO will also coordinate with the civilian agencies to create, restore, and maintain public order. In additional CMO activities will coordinate, safeguard, mobilize, and use civilian resources (such as labor, supplies, and facilities). CMO will provide the coordination for the immediate life sustaining services to civilians in the immediate battle area and assist with the planning for the control of diseases that might endanger the military force. CMO will also assist with minimizing civilian movements which would interfere with
military operations and ensure the equitable distribution of humanitarian supplies and services.

- CMO is also responsible for analyzing considerations to eliminate or mitigate potential adverse effects on the populace by identifying populated areas to avoid and developing schemes of maneuver and fires to minimize contact with populated areas. CMO assets areas are also utilized to designate dislocated civilian routes and facilities to minimize contact with combat force and the employment of PSYOP to mitigate adverse effects of combat on the civilian populace. CMO involves taking action to maintain or restore law and order to protect the control of both public and private property.

- CMO can contribute to foreign and host-nation support (HNS). Logistic planners identify projected shortfalls and communicate needs to the CMO planners. CMO planners then identify the availability of goods and services within theater, to include location, lines of communications (LOCs), quantities available, and cost. CMO responsibilities range from identifying resources and assisting other staff agencies in their procurement to activating preplanned requests for wartime support from the civilian sector.

- Populace and Resources Control. PRC assists HN governments or de facto authorities in retaining control over their population centers, thus precluding complicating problems that may hinder accomplishment of the JFC’s mission. This includes external support for control of civil unrest and restoration of basic public services (security, water, food supply, shelter, electricity, sanitation, and

Figure I-3. Civil Military Missions in Support of Major Regional Conflicts and Other Combat Operations
Introduction

basic health services care), the lack of which can precipitate civil unrest.

• PRC may include the use of CA, military police (MP) and/or security forces, PSYOP, and logistic support for the movement, collection, housing, feeding, and protection of DC. PRC operations are designed and conducted to detect, isolate, and neutralize belligerents. HN police or military forces normally carry out these operations, but US forces are frequently called on to conduct PRC operations until HN forces are available to relieve them.

• PRC by the joint force in a joint operations area (JOA) or area of responsibility (AOR) is necessary when civil authorities or agencies are either unable or unwilling to undertake that responsibility. In friendly territory, US forces conduct such operations with the consent of the local government. In hostile territory, they are conducted in accordance with international law and the LOAC. Successful PRC mobilizes the population and material resources; denies the enemy ready access to the population and to both internal and external sources of supply; and provides security for the population. PRC measures seek to reduce, relocate, or access population resources that may impede or otherwise threaten the success of ongoing and follow-on military and supporting logistic operations. PRC can be applied across the range of military operations and at all levels of war.

• Populace controls include curfews, movement restrictions, travel permits, registration cards, and resettlement. Resource controls include licensing, regulations, checkpoints, ration controls, and inspection of facilities. Peacekeeping, peace enforcement, and combat operations, including complex contingency operations, require some type of PRC. Commanders’ responsibilities to respect and protect the civilian populace and national resources are prescribed in the international LOAC and other international human rights law. Furthermore, commanders will comply with the LOAC during armed conflict, and will apply LOAC principles during operations categorized as MOOTW.

• Operations involving dislocated civilians are a special category of PRC. “Dislocated civilian” is a broad term that includes a displaced person, an evacuee, an expellee, or a refugee. The movement and physical presence of DC, who most likely require some degree of humanitarian aid such as food, water, shelter, clothing, and similar items, can hinder military operations. DC operations are conducted to: (1) minimize local population interference with military operations by coordinating with civil authorities or government ministries and agencies to implement population and resource controls; (2) protect civilians from combat operations; (3) mitigate and control the outbreak of disease among DC; and (4) centralize the large populations of DC into selected and controllable areas.

• Under the category of support to military operations, CMO planners will likely find themselves involved in MOOTW. Most MOOTW by their very nature involve the civilian contact with the military, and therefore require CMO to some extent. Some MOOTW, such as nation assistance, are inherently CMO. Conversely, some MOOTW, such as raids and strikes, may have limited impact on the civil sector and therefore may have limited or no CMO requirements. Specific CMO implications for MOOTW are dependent on the mission, type of
Chapter I

operation, desired end state, and the characteristics of the civil sector in the operational area. Representative CMO activities in support of some MOOTW include, but are not limited to: (1) Counterinsurgency. CMO involve decisive and timely employment of military capabilities to perform traditionally nonmilitary activities that assist the HN in depriving insurgents of their greatest weapon — dissatisfaction of the populace. CMO activities can support diplomatic, political, economic and informational initiatives of the HN and other USG agencies to foster stability. The goal of CMO activities is to isolate the insurgents from the populace, thus depriving them of recruits, resources, intelligence, and credibility. To maximize effectiveness, CMO plans and actions must be an integral part of the early counterinsurgency activities. CMO may include aspects of CA and HA. CMO to support counterinsurgency may also include disaster relief, civil defense, counterdrug operations, and counterterrorism. It is also important to note that all CMO is enhanced by the proper use of PSYOP. (2) Security Assistance (SA). CMO support to SA can include training foreign military forces in CMO and civil-military relations. (3) Peacekeeping Operations. CMO in peacekeeping operations maintain a productive relationship between the military peacekeeping force, civilian organizations participating in the peacekeeping operation, and the civilian governments and population in the peacekeeping operational area. CMO activities also interact with PSYOP activities to ensure an understanding among the populace of US goals and actions. (4) NEO. CMO requirements during a NEO include providing area experts, civil sector functional experts, and linguistically-qualified personnel to augment State Department civilians, special operations forces (SOF), or contingency forces conducting the NEO. CMO activities in support of NEO include providing liaison with the embassy on the behalf of military forces in the operational area and on the behalf of US civilians in the operational area. In addition, CMO forces support the evacuation sites by providing holding areas for non-US nationals denied evacuation. CMO elements also coordinate the nonmilitary assets within the commanders’ capabilities and authority.

• Support to Civil Operations

• Foreign Humanitarian Assistance. Although Department of Defense Directive (DODD) 5100.46, Foreign Disaster Relief, calls these activities “foreign disaster relief,” the equivalent term “foreign humanitarian assistance” is used throughout this publication based on guidance provided in JP 3-07.6, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Humanitarian Assistance.

• The purpose of FHA is to relieve or reduce the results of natural or manmade disasters or other endemic conditions such as disease, hunger, or privation that might present a serious threat to life or loss of property. FHA provided by US forces is generally limited in scope and duration.

• The US military has provided rapid and robust assistance on numerous occasions. US forces generally supplement or complement the efforts of the HN civil authorities or agencies that may have the primary responsibility for providing HA by conducting operations limited in scope and duration. The primary factor for the conduct of FHA is the funding available by the lead US agency.
Introduction

The Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA), within the Bureau of Humanitarian Response in the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) has primary responsibility for the US response in FHA operations. US military forces only participate after direction from the President, a specific request from the Secretary of State, or in emergency situations in order to save human lives where there is not sufficient time to seek the prior initial concurrence of the Secretary of State. (1) If a USAID Mission is present in a country, it can play an important role in developing longer-term reconstruction strategies critical to building the foundation for a country’s transition to sustainable development. Numerous activities are key to postconflict recovery but may not be addressed by disaster assistance response teams (e.g., democracy and/or governance and economic policy and market reforms). (2) USAID’s Office of Transition Initiatives. This relatively new office provides rapid field response to complex emergencies, particularly to priority conflict-prone and postconflict countries. The Office of Transition Initiatives staff has experience with both humanitarian operations and political development. Typically, the Office of Transition Initiatives manages field operations through local and/or indigenous NGO, and can be a key actor in demobilization of ex-combatants; human rights monitoring; promoting alternative media; training newly elected officials; peace and reconciliation message development; quick impact projects that demonstrate the benefits of peace; participatory decision making at the local level; support to civil society organizations; and building better relationships between civil and military organizations.

Military forces may assist with relief, dislocated civilian support (displaced

REPAIRING A RELATIONSHIP

The 353rd Special Operations Group from Kadena Air Base, Japan, flew 19 tons of disaster relief aid across the Pacific Nov. 11, to assist in Vietnam’s worst flooding in a century. . . . For the US Air Force to come back here on Veterans Day is pretty sweet, said United States Ambassador Douglas Peterson. This also signifies how far we’ve come in building our relationship with Vietnam. We’re looking toward the future as opposed to the past. . . . There was a real timeliness issue involved in getting this shipment here. Special Operations Command Pacific saw we were going to be a bit slow going through routine channels. Understanding the urgency, they offered the services of the 353rd. . . . The Vietnamese don’t have K-loaders and special ramp services . . . but they did have something that worked — volunteers. Hundreds of international Red Cross workers joined Vietnamese soldiers and policemen as they transferred the goods from pallets to waiting trucks. . . . This is not going to go unnoticed, said Ambassador Peterson. I’m constantly evaluating how relations between the United States and Vietnam add up. In some instances, it seems we haven’t always delivered. Today we delivered. Watching American C-130s come back in this capacity is a great thing.

SOURCE: Tip of the Spear
Vol. 2, No. 12
December 1999
persons, evacuees expellees, or refugees), and security or technical assistance. The latter might include such short-term tasks as communications restoration, relief supply management, provision of HSS, humanitarian demining assistance, and high priority relief supply delivery. The US military may conduct humanitarian demining and mine awareness training to develop long-term indigenous structures capable of educating the local populace to protect themselves from land mines and unexploded ordnance and to return the land to more productive uses. Specific relief programs include the Excess Property Program, which makes available nonlethal DOD property; the program defined by the McCollum Amendment, which authorizes transportation and distribution of humanitarian relief for DC; the Denton Space Available Transportation Program, which allows military transport of private donations; and Title 10 United States Code, 401, Humanitarian and Civic Assistance (HCA) provided in conjunction with military operations. Assistance under HCA must fulfill unit-training requirements that incidentally create humanitarian benefits. FHA often is conducted simultaneously with other types of operations, such as peace operations or nation assistance.

Commanders at all levels must be aware of the implications of providing support to civil authorities and the civilian population. Despite the urgency of the situation affecting the local population, the need to manage scarce resources may limit the support that can be provided. Military logistic support in humanitarian or disaster relief operations is not inexhaustible nor is it at the automatic disposal of international organizations, NGOs, and UN agencies. Military resources for CMO are allocated based on a specific mission. Additional assistance responsibilities should not be assumed without an evaluation of the resources involved and the specific approval of the JFC as these resources may be required for priority military tasks. Civil authorities, not in the chain of command, above the JFC may direct resources to FHA without regard to the effect on the military operation. Planning to minimize this possibility is a critical element of any operation. Once approved, FHA must be coordinated with all organizations and agencies involved in the operation.

- The primary responsibility for the well being of a population rests with the lawful government or de facto authorities of the affected state. Where the government or authorities are unable or unwilling to protect or support their populations with the appropriate assistance (failed state), an international humanitarian response may take place. This may take the form of consensual FHA to a functioning civil infrastructure, usually with the concurrence of the government (adequate or fragile states) or may take the form of humanitarian action in a civil war situation or complex emergency situations where consent to humanitarian operations is incomplete (e.g., Somalia).

For further detail concerning FHA, refer to DODD 5100.46, Foreign Disaster Relief, and JP 3-07.6, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Humanitarian Assistance.

- Nation Assistance Operations. Nation assistance is civil or military assistance (other than FHA) rendered to a nation by US forces within that nation’s territory during peacetime, crises or emergencies, or war, based on agreements mutually concluded between
the United States and that nation. Nation assistance operations support a HN by promoting sustainable development and growth of responsive institutions. The goal is to promote long-term regional stability. Nation assistance programs often include, but are not limited to, SA, FID, and HCA. All nation assistance actions are integrated through the US Ambassador’s Country Plan.

- Nation assistance operations support USG efforts to assist and complement the HN with internal programs to promote stability, develop sustainability, and establish institutions responsive to the needs of the populace. They contribute to improved or strengthened diplomatic ties between the United States and the HN, and further US national security objectives.

For further detail in regards to nation assistance, refer to JP 3-07, Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War.

- **Military Civic Action.** MCA involves activities intended to win support of the local population for the foreign nation and its military. MCA may employ indigenous or paramilitary forces as labor and is planned as a series of short-term projects with the long-term goal of fostering national development. Properly planned, executed, and promulgated in close cooperation with local authorities, military, and community leaders, MCA projects result in popular support.

- MCA may involve US supervision and advice but the visible effort will be conducted by the local military. MCA is an essential part of military support to a FID program to assist the local government develop capabilities to provide for the security and well-being of its own population.

- MCA helps eliminate some of the causes of civilian unrest by providing economic and social development services such as education, training, public works, transportation, communications, health, and sanitation. Some examples are: (1) constructing or repairing schools, health clinics or community buildings; (2) providing health care; (3) repairing and building roads; or (4) by distributing agricultural implements and/or tools, seeds, and providing access to a water source for cultivation to promote the welfare of the populace.

- MCA projects require interagency cooperation, coordination, controlling, and monitoring to succeed. The JFC and staff must be aware of legal and financial limitations in authorized projects. The success of MCA is dependent on a close relationship between civil agencies and the joint force staff, as well as the synergy created by the CA, PSYOP, and PA elements.

- Provide MCA Assistance. MCA assistance guides or assists HN forces on projects useful to the local population. Such projects contribute to the local community’s economic and social development and improve the standing of the military forces with the population. These activities could include education, training, public sanitation, and others.

- MCA programs offer the FID planner CMO opportunities to improve the HN infrastructure and the living conditions of the local populace while enhancing the legitimacy of the HN government. These programs use predominantly indigenous military forces to enhance the economic and social development of the nation. These programs can have excellent long-term benefits for the HN by developing needed skills and by enhancing the
legitimacy of the host government by showing the people that their government is capable of meeting the population’s basic needs. MCA programs also can be helpful in gaining public acceptance of the military, which is especially important in situations requiring a clear, credible demonstration of improvement in host-military treatment of human rights. MCA is a tool that combatant commanders and subordinate JFCs should use whenever possible to bolster the overall FID plans.

**MCA Coordination and Control.** Coordination for MCA missions is slightly less involved than for FHA and HCA missions. First, the US level of involvement is generally less than that required for other types of FID missions. Second, the program is essentially a US military to HN military project. If the US military support to MCA is provided through SA, normal SA coordination procedures apply. If it is provided through a separate combatant commander’s initiative using operation and maintenance funds, most of the coordination will be internal to the command.

**MCA Employment Considerations.** Many of the considerations on the use of US military personnel to conduct other CMO activities also apply to MCA support. The essential difference is that in MCA, HN military and/or government personnel perform tasks that are visible to the indigenous population in order to garner popular support while US personnel provide training and advice. In addition to this general point, commanders also should consider the following employment guidelines when planning or executing MCA programs: (1) Select projects that are simple and achievable and can be maintained by the HN. If the HN military is unable to accomplish the mission, confidence in the local government and military may be significantly damaged; (2) HN forces will do the work required to accomplish the mission; (3) Because of the nature of MCA missions, commanders normally will include CA, PSYOP, other SOF trainers, and combat support and combat service support elements to support MCA missions; (4) Coordinate projects with the Country Team. The USAID representative should be consulted for assistance on any major MCA developmental project and should be informed of all MCA efforts.

For further detail relating to MCA, refer to JP 3-07.1, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Internal Defense (FID).

**Civil Preparedness and/or Emergency Operations.** Civil preparedness and/or emergency operations are those activities and measures designed or undertaken to: (1) minimize the effects upon the civilian population caused or which would be caused by a disaster; (2) deal with the immediate emergency conditions which would be created by any such disaster; and (3) effect emergency repairs to, or the emergency restoration of, vital utilities and facilities destroyed or damaged by any such disaster.

**Disaster preparedness is primarily the responsibility of the civilian government and its agencies.** It deals essentially with preparations for the immediate emergency conditions created by a disaster. The effectiveness of disaster preparedness plans and organization has a direct impact on ongoing CMO. Support by the military of FHA planning and exercises in disaster preparedness will result in public support for the military or government in disaster relief operations. Protocol I to the
Geneva Conventions defines civil defense as “the performance of some or all of the undermentioned humanitarian tasks intended to protect the civilian population against the dangers, and to help recover from the immediate effects of hostilities or disasters and also to provide the conditions necessary for its survival.” These tasks apply to domestic and international environments and cover: (1) warning, (2) evacuation, (3) management of shelters, (4) rescue, (5) health services, (6) firefighting, (7) detection and marking of danger areas, (8) decontamination and similar protective measures, (9) provision of emergency accommodation and supplies, (10) emergency assistance in the restoration and maintenance of order in distressed areas, and (11) emergency disposal of the dead.

** Civil Administration. ** Civil administration is an action undertaken by US commanders when directed or approved by the NCA. DODD 5530.3, *International Agreements*, does not delegate authority to negotiate and conclude agreements. When approved by the NCA, agreements should be negotiated and concluded in accordance with DODD 5530.3, *International Agreements*. Civil administration support consists of planning, coordinating, advising, or assisting those activities that reinforce or restore a civil administration that supports US and multinational objectives in friendly or hostile territory.

- CA units are trained and organized to plan and conduct essential CA activities to assist commanders in the most effective policy implementation concerning reorganizing or reconstituting government structures.

- Regardless of the program adopted, military commanders should be aware that the manner in which they carry out established policies has a significant bearing on subsequent courses of action (COAs) designed to achieve US national security objectives.

- Support to civil administration has domestic and international considerations. Support to civil administration fulfills obligations arising from domestic laws and jurisdiction rights as well as HN laws, international treaties, agreements, memoranda of understanding as well as obligations under international law, including the LOAC.

- ** Civil Administration in Friendly Territory. ** Civil administration missions in friendly territory are undertaken pursuant to an agreement with the government of the area concerned.

- Governments of friendly territories may request military forces to perform basic government functions across the range of military operations. As situations stabilize, the functions performed by the joint force return to civilian agencies. Generally, the transition is gradual and requires detailed, long-range planning.

- The JFC, assisted by his or her legal staff, negotiates a support arrangement for civil administration with a foreign nation’s government when authorized by the NCA. The arrangement to provide civil administration support outlines the expected nature, extent, and duration of the support; defines the limits of authority and the liability of military personnel; and defines the civil-military relationships that will exist.
**Civil Administration in Hostile or Occupied Territory.** In a civil administration by an occupying power, also called military government, international law contains provisions as to the authorities of the occupying power and the obligations of the submitting government. Furthermore, the exercise of executive, legislative, and judicial authority by the occupying power will be determined by policy decisions at the highest level and may even involve an international policy making group. Emphasis on CA activities to implement long-range plans increasingly influences or replaces measures intended to satisfy short-range needs. Consistent with established policy, a sound local administration is developed, always subject to the authority of the occupying power. An informed populace is fostered through news media, public discussion, and the formation of political parties.

**Nations may be required to conduct civil administration activities across the range of military operations, acting on the authority of a nation, alliance, coalition of nations, or the UN.** The territory under administration is effectively under military control. The occupying force has an obligation under various treaties, such as the 1949 Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, and customary international law to ensure public order and safety and the just and effective administration of, and support to, a hostile or occupied territory. Specific obligations are laid out in these conventions and must be complied with by the occupying force.

**Within its capabilities, the occupying force must maintain an orderly government in the occupied territory and must have, as its ultimate goal, the creation of an effective civilian government.** Subject to requirements of the military situation, the JFC must analyze military activities likely to increase tensions in the occupied territory as well as those likely to facilitate and accelerate a return to a civil administration. This is especially important in multi-ethnic, multi-race, or multi-cultural environments where a chosen COA will almost invariably be seen as partisan by one or more of the parties to a conflict.

**Support to Peacetime Theater Engagement.** Geographic combatant commands need to respond to ongoing changes in the regional military, economic, and political situations by refining their theater peacetime engagement strategy. The strategy should seek to integrate the efforts of the geographic combatant commands with those of other USG agencies, NGOs, and other civilian institutions in the region, to obtain the shared goal of a peaceful, stable, and prosperous society.

**The Theater Engagement Plan (TEP) serves as the blueprint of the command’s strategy to achieve US goals and objectives.** Theater engagement planning is a complex and dynamic process. The goal of the TEP is to develop a comprehensive and integrated set of engagement activities that, when executed, shape the environment and lead to the accomplishment of theater goals. The TEP provides a means for integrating Defense programs to meet geographic combatant command’s objectives while also ensuring support and consistency with other USG programs for countries in the theater.

**The TEP is formulated through a process linking ends, ways, and means, to create an integrated strategy allowing the geographic combatant commands to...**
positively shape the environment and effectively respond to the demands of a dynamic environment. It is a broad, overarching document that describes specific goals and objectives, integrated programs, specific projects, engagement activities, and measures of effectiveness (MOE). The TEP provides clear direction and a common vision and also guides the way we do business every day. TEP includes operational activities, exercises, and other foreign military interaction. Operational activities and exercises will likely involve CMO in some form. Other foreign military interaction often involve military interaction with the HN civil sector, usually through the Country Team.

- Civil support operations may be more acceptable to both US and the HN than pure military program. These civil support programs, therefore, can provide a means of access to countries that otherwise may not be open to the US military.

- Theater engagement planning is a very complex process that takes significant time and resourcing to develop and execute. It requires a focused, balanced interagency process to maximize the return of the investment of scarce resources. It requires a theater strategy coordinated between multiple actors. It requires the integration of various programs managed by different agencies with sometimes differing opinions. Finally, it requires a common vision. No matter how well the strategy or plan is developed, its success will be limited unless all the resources, consistent policies, and detailed interagency coordination and cooperation are in place.

- Post Conflict Operations. Post conflict operations are primarily CMO. When war termination objectives are achieved, the usual military goal is to redeploy forces from the operational area. However, international law, moral requirements, and national policy may require the military to restore essential civilian services and to ensure minimum civil stability.

- The JFC will need to assess the post conflict environment — to include the governance, civil security, humanitarian, economic and commerce, social and cultural and infrastructure components since all contribute to civil stability. Usually conflict has destabilized the civil sector to some extent. It will be necessary to conduct civil reconstruction to some degree.

- The most critical civil component is governance: who will provide civil administration of the occupied or liberated area? The decision on who the post conflict governing authorities will be is not usually a military decision. However, the military will be expected to support the designated governing authorities. Options for post conflict governing authorities may be to return governance to former authorities, to install a new government, to establish an international organization as an interim governing body, or, as a last resort, to establish an interim military government until a civilian government can be formed.

- Governance is more than just identifying the senior policy makers and administrators. Governance also includes the need to reestablish the operations of governmental organizations. Activities such as reopening schools and the reestablishment of garage removal systems are required by international law and are essential tasks to the strategy for
achieving civil stability. The JFC must ensure that sufficient resources are available to monitor the reestablishment of essential services and, if necessary, to support the governing authorities capacity to reestablish such services.

- While the responsibility is not necessarily the military’s, often the military is the only stabilizing force with sufficient resources in the area immediately after conflict. Support from the other USG agencies, international organizations, NGOs, the commercial sector, and, most importantly, from local groups will be needed to stabilize the society.

- Planning for post conflict operations prior to the combat phases will help ensure that civilian organizations are mobilized and prepared to assume responsibility for post conflict operations. Most civilian organizations focus on their own specific interests. However, the civil security requires that the total dimension be considered. Without a comprehensive, holistic assessment, gaps could be created. Further, some civilian organizations may duplicate efforts. Figure 1-4 is an example of a Post Conflict Synchronization Matrix that could be used to promote unity of effort.

- One critical factor is that the ultimate desired end state is transfer of responsibility to a local government that is capable of providing for the needs of its populace. Therefore, post conflict planning should keep the ultimate desired end state as their focus. This may require the JFC to use CA to build up the local government’s capacity.

- **Domestic Support Operations (DSO).** DSO usually occur after a Presidential declaration of a major disaster and are designed to supplement the efforts and resources of other federal agencies, state and local governments, and voluntary organizations. The US military normally responds to domestic emergencies in support of other federal agencies, e.g., Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) or the Department of Justice. On the other hand, the Department of Defense is the primary agency or lead federal agency (LFA), responsible for public works and engineering under the Federal Response Plan.

- When local or state governments are overwhelmed or do not possess a special capability (e.g., fire fighters, health service, chemical defense, explosive ordnance disposal (EOD), military working dog, etc.), the local or state government may submit a request for assistance from the nearest DOD installation. This emergency may not obtain a level to be a Presidentially declared disaster. Installation commanders may respond under immediate response under imminently serious conditions. DOD installation commanders may provide support to save lives, prevent human suffering, or to mitigate great property loss. Commanders should notify the DOD Executive Secretary through the chain of command, who shall notify the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and any other appropriate officials, and follow guidance in DODD 3025.1, Military Support to Civil Authorities, and 3025.15, Military Assistance to Civil Authorities.

- The term domestic emergency refers to emergencies affecting the public welfare and occurring within the 50 states, District of Columbia, Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, Guam, Mariana Islands, the Republic of Palau, and the Trust
Territory of the Pacific Islands, or any political subdivision thereof, as a result of enemy attack, insurrection, civil disturbance, earthquake, fire, flood, or other public disasters or equivalent emergencies that endanger life and property or disrupt the usual process of government.

**Types of Emergency Responses.** Types of response to domestic emergencies include crisis management, consequence management (CM), and technical operations. These responses can occur simultaneously, sequentially, or independently of each other. (1) **Crisis Management.** This response occurs under the primary jurisdiction of the federal government. The agency with primary responsibility or LFA for response to acts of terrorism, for example, is the Federal Bureau of Investigation of the Department of Justice. Crisis management response in such cases involves measures to resolve the hostile situation, and to investigate, and prepare a criminal case for prosecution under Federal law. (2) **Consequence Management.** This type of response occurs under the primary jurisdiction of the affected state and local government. The Federal government provides assistance when required. When situations are beyond the capability of the state, the governor may request federal assistance from the President. The President may direct the Federal government to provide supplemental assistance to state and local governments to alleviate the suffering and damage resulting from disasters or emergencies. The agency

![POST CONFLICT SYNCHRONIZATION MATRIX](image-url)

Figure I-4. Post Conflict Synchronization Matrix
with primary responsibility for coordination of federal assistance to state and local governments is FEMA. CM involves measures to **alleviate the damage, loss, hardship, or suffering caused by emergencies.** It includes measures to restore essential government services, protect public health and safety, and provide emergency relief to affected governments, businesses, and individuals. (3) **Technical Operations.** Technical operations involve measures to identify and **assess the threat** posed by the hazardous material, to **provide consultation** to decision makers concerning the implications of the hazardous material for crisis and CM, to **neutralize** the material, and to **provide decontamination assistance.** Technical operations may be triggered prerelease in support of the crisis management response and continue postrelease in support of the CM response. The LFA for technical operations depends upon the material involved and the location of the incident.

- **DSO** are divided into two broad categories: **military support to civil authorities (MSCA)** and **military support to civilian law enforcement agencies (MSCLEA).**

- **Military Support to Civil Authorities.** MSCA are those activities and measures taken by DOD components to foster mutual assistance and support between the DOD and any civil government agency in planning for, or in the application of resources for response to, the consequences of civil emergencies. In MSCA, the Department of Defense, in coordination with FEMA, generally supports Federal agencies that have primary responsibility. This coordination is effected between the Defense Coordinating Officer and the Federal Coordinating Officer.

- **Military Support to Civil Law Enforcement Agencies.** MSCLEA includes **military assistance for civil disturbances** and other types of support to civilian law enforcement agencies (e.g., key asset protection program, interagency assistance — training support to law enforcement agencies, response to use of weapons of mass destruction [WMD]). The use of the military in law enforcement roles is a sensitive topic and significant restrictions apply to such use. When the Department of Defense provides MSCLEA, the Department of Justice is generally the LFA.

- **Command arrangements for military forces conducting most DSO** differ from those for other operations. In most cases, the forces involved respond to **direction and guidance from the Secretary of the Army, the DOD executive agent through the Director of Military Support, the executive agent’s action agent to the combatant command (US Joint Forces Command, US Southern Command, or US Pacific Command).** However, specific approval authority and procedures in DODD 3025.15, *Military Assistance to Civil Authorities*, apply in the case of sensitive support requests, acts or threats of terrorism, and requests for support from civilian law enforcement authorities, or when forces involved are assigned to combatant commands. In the specific event of a WMD incident or accident, all federal forces, less joint special operations task force (JSOTF) and US Army Corps of Engineers elements normally will be directed by and
coordinated through the Commander, Joint Task Force Civil Support, upon SecDef approval.

For further detail relating to MSCA and MSCLEA, refer to DODD 3025.1, Military Support to Civil Authorities (MSCA), DODD 3025.15, Military Assistance to Civil Authorities (MACA), DODD 5525.5, DOD Cooperation with Civilian Law Enforcement Officials, and JP 3-07.7, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Domestic Support Operations.

4. Summary

In summary, the following vignette supports the importance of the Armed Forces of the United States continuing and expanding their involvement in CMO.

CMO NEWS BRIEFING

. . . the 26th MEU [Marine expeditionary unit] has withdrawn from the American area of operations. They began the changeover with the elements of the 1st Infantry Division out of Germany on about the 5th of July. That process lasted about five days. We call that a “right seat ride” where we bring in the new unit and they pair up with the outgoing unit. They patrol together, operate together so that the new unit gains situational awareness. It’s a very effective technique. It allows the new unit then to quickly grasp the general area of operations, the nuances, the peculiarities of the situation and provides a good change over.

The 26th MEU then began the withdrawal and completed that by nightfall on the 11th of July. They are reconfiguring in Macedonia and soon will head for the reembarkation upon the ship off the coast of Greece. So that turnover went exceedingly well.

The 18th Airborne Infantry Battalion from Poland came in at just about the same time. They are occupying an area formerly occupied by US forces, the 2nd Battalion 505th Parachute Infantry Regiment from Fort Benning. We have put them in the Kacanik area down near the border with Macedonia. Again, that changeover was a right seat ride, approximately five days, and the Polish battalion now has assumed their duties in that area. They have control of that specific area and the area to the west which is the opstina, an opstina being a county, of Strpce. So they are in place and they are operating at this time. . . .

In terms of operations, again, first priority force protection and the establishment of a safe and secure environment. Since last we talked I would tell you that the situation is better. The amount of lawlessness, the amount of violations of good order, law and order is down, but it is still not to the point we want it. There are still far too many instances of houses being burned, vacant houses, throughout the entire area and instances of random shooting. So we are working hard to clamp down on that. We now have a full military police battalion in the area and that has been very beneficial in providing that policing function that they are highly trained for.

We have opened several, I believe at this time four, I guess it’s five today, five US police stations collocated with information operations offices where information is provided to all the residents. It’s collocated with a military police
desk sergeant, if you will, so there is access to the military police if the residents have a problem, any resident, Serb or Albanian. They can come in, provide that information, and then we will go investigate or go fix or correct whatever the problem is that could be occurring out in any of the small towns or neighborhoods in these areas. So we’ve still got some work to do, but again the safe and secure environment here today on D+31 or K+22, K being the day the undertaking was signed with the UCK [Ushtria Clirimtare E Kosoves/Kosovo Liberation Army]. I think that we’re farther ahead than I thought we’d be, but we’ve still got a ways to go.

Turning to the humanitarian aid and the civic administration and reconstruction. Humanitarian aid — we are now finding that by and large with all the refugees practically now have returned. There are some isolated cases where food or water is in short supply and we work closely with the UNHCR [United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees] to alleviate that as soon as we find out. So we have a reasonably good line of communication, an ability to surge quickly to answer the need for humanitarian support from the returned refugees.

The civic administration, civic functioning starting to come back on line. It needs support, it needs help. It is not capable of sustained operation. Most communities now have at least 12 hours of water turned on a day. Electricity is still in a brown-out mode, there is not full power anywhere. And there are spot shortfalls of different requirements for fuel for buses, for example, refuse removal in some of the towns. We’re having to provide assistance or work through the various IO [international organizations] and NGO [nongovernmental organizations] to get that done.

The last component of that civic administration is an assessment of all the towns in our area, and that’s several hundred that have enough of a population to need some kind of a civic service. So we can determine what each town’s status is with regard to those type of utilities and services, and where the priority lies for immediate work with the United Nations missions in Kosovo and their various organizations, or if it’s humanitarian, UNHCR. . . .

I would tell you that the Serb enclaves by and large are more withdrawn than the Albanians. You move through a Serb town or village. They don’t come out and welcome you like the Albanians do. They are not as friendly. But where we have made the distinct effort, and we do that, to go in and provide them with information. We go in with military police, our soldiers, and try to talk to them and explain we’re there to protect everyone, we’re there to help everyone if we have to, and if they need it. We’ve sent medical, what we call MEDCAP [medical civic action program], medical capability, and a DENTCAP [dental civic action program], dental capability. Move it out, ask if anyone is sick or anyone needs medical attention, they take advantage of that. So where you try to make an overt effort as much as you can, they will open up. . . .

The UN Mission in Kosovo [UNMIK] is assigned in the civil administration area. There are four pillars under UNMIK. The pillar of civil administration they have assigned an individual by the name of Fisher who is a temporary hire. He’ll be leaving in a couple of weeks and we will get a replacement. So he is located in
Gnjilane. And anything we need to do with civil administration we will coordinate through him. He is now starting to bring the organizations in that will support his efforts in that functional area.

In the way of combat engineers, we have one combat engineer battalion, and essentially they do engineering support tasks for the maneuver battalion. We have several, a robust construction capability. We have both horizontal and vertical engineer construction battalions. We’ve got a SeaBee battalion here that does a lot of vertical construction work, and we’ve got Army engineer battalions here, construction battalions who have the equipment and capability to do a lot of horizontal construction road building and building of hard stands to put buildings or helicopter roads or things like that down. Right now both of those battalions are on the ground and working. They are working to construct our base camps, where we will live here in Kosovo.

In addition we have two construction, engineer construction companies that will be deployed from the continental United States. I believe one from Fort Lewis and one from Fort Riley. And they bring again a very robust construction capability to assist in the construction of these base camps. So when all is said and done there will be about three construction battalions.

We also have in that construction arena a contractor, Brown & Root, that will provide construction capability also — both horizontal and vertical. Then we’ll have our top end engineers who will support the units out on the patrols and the movement in the countryside. With regard to whether our engineers support any civic reconstruction, we do that on an emergency basis now. We’re not looking at any long-term plan to do that. We believe that will be done by the international organization, and the nongovernmentals that will work with UNMIK. Again, the notion there is whenever you can reinvest locally in the community, the economy will prosper much more than using military engineers.

SOURCE: Brigadier General John Craddock
Commander, Task Force Falcon
DOD News Briefing 13 July 1999
CHAPTER II
ORGANIZATION AND COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS FOR CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS

“Unified planning, centralized control, and a single point of responsibility are the very minimum requirements for a unity of effort which will offer success. . . . Unity of effort, however, is extremely difficult to achieve because it represents the fusion of civil and military functions to fight battles which have primarily political, objectives. . . . All the political, economic, psychological, and military means must be marshalled as weapons under centralized coordination and direction.”

John J. McCuen
The Art of Counter-Revolutionary War

1. General

a. The organization and command relationships for conducting CMO are highly variable. While the principles of effective command and control (C2) and staff operations apply to CMO just as they do for any other military operation, national objectives, the primary mission of the joint force, environmental conditions, and availability of resources will determine the options available to the JFC. CMO are conducted to minimize civilian interference with military operations, to maximize support for operations, and to meet the commander’s legal and moral obligations to civilian populations within the commander’s area of control.

b. The JFC organizes the force to optimize its ability to plan, coordinate, and conduct CMO. Priorities based on the JFC’s primary mission present challenges for effective CMO under various operational environments throughout the range of military operations. Other challenges effect balancing organization for CMO with requirements for force protection and potential mission change.

c. Traditionally, in a hostile or uncertain environment, administration, logistics, and CMO (typically CA) staff elements collocate in the rear area where the majority of their activities take place, while the operations and intelligence staff elements are positioned forward where the focus of their interests lie. In an uncertain to permissive environment, the logistic and CMO focus is operational area-wide and looks forward and to the rear. The activities of these staff sections are the heart of the operation, and therefore the focus of the operations staff’s activities and the intelligence staff’s collection efforts.

- The CMO officer (typically a CA officer) and staff may be collocated with the operations and intelligence staff elements and the information operations (IO) cell to more efficiently exchange information and requirements. Additional C2 structures (including a civil-military operations center [CMOC]) and communications may be required to facilitate interagency coordination.

See Chapter IV, “Interagency Coordination,” for more information on CMOCs.

- Subordinate organizations structured toward providing CMO support require robust communication and liaison capabilities. They often possess minimal security and self-sustainment capabilities. Because CMO are inherently conducted in unstable
environments, this factor is an important part of the vulnerability and risk assessments conducted during planning, and must be monitored on a continuous basis.

- Whether established as a joint civil-military operations task force (JCMOTF) or a joint task force (JTF) with a CMO mission, the force must have sufficient intelligence resources to provide warning of potential mission shifts. JCMOTFs will be discussed in further detail subsequently in this chapter.

2. Organizations Providing CMO Capabilities

Every US military organization has some capability to support CMO. Certain types of organizations are particularly suited to this mission and will form the nucleus of CMO efforts. These units are typically CA and PSYOP units. Others, such as, but not limited to, other SOF, engineers, HSS, transportation, and MP and security forces, act as enablers.

3. Special Operations Forces

"US special operations personnel from Special Operations Command-South (SOC SOUTH), based in Panama, rescued more than 500 people using Zodiac boats to reach flooded areas not accessible by vehicle. The flood victims were transported to safety by UH-60 helicopters."

News Release
Office of Assistance Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs) Number 566-98

a. Unless otherwise directed by the Secretary of Defense, all SOF based in the continental United States (CONUS) are under the combatant command (command authority) (COCOM) of the Commander in Chief, United States Special Operations Command (USCINCSOC). SOF assigned to a theater are under the COCOM of the geographic combatant commander. The term “SOF” specifically includes and is always applied to:

- Army special forces groups
- Army ranger battalions
- Army special operations aviation units
- Navy sea-air-land teams (SEALs)
- Navy SEAL delivery vehicle teams
- Navy special boat units
- Air Force special operations wings

“Many of the skills in the special operations forces inventory are directly applicable to supporting friendly democratic regimes. With their linguistic ability and cross-cultural sensitivities, SOF [special operations forces] can quickly establish an effective working rapport with foreign military and paramilitary forces and, when required, government officials. In this capacity, SOF is a force multiplier for US ambassadors and country teams throughout the world. Specifically, SOF (especially civil affairs, psychological operations, and Special Forces) can assess appropriate host nation projects, conduct disaster or humanitarian assistance planning seminars, and assist interagency coordination, foreign liaison, and public information programs. This support for democratization assists friendly nations and supports mutual national interests.”

Annual Report to the President and the Congress 1998

- PSYOP forces of the Army and Air Force
- CA of the Army.
- CA and PSYOP forces play crucial roles in successful CMO. CA and PSYOP are
mutually supportive within CMO. During MOOTW, PSYOP support various CA activities (e.g., establish populace control measures) to gain support for the HN government in the international community, and reduce support or resources to those destabilizing forces threatening legitimate processes of the HN government. **PSYOP maximize these efforts** through information products and programs. PSYOP publicize the existence or successes of these CMO to generate target population confidence in and positive perception of US and HN actions.

b. Civil Affairs

- **Concept of Employment for US Army CA**

  - **CMO** staffs at every level, augmented by periodic and regular deployments of US Army Civil Affairs Plans, Policy, and Program Teams; Civil Affairs Planning Team-As, and Civil Affairs Planning Team-Bs are continuously reviewing and, if necessary, updating plans and orders. The organic CMO staffs, augmented by CA planning teams as necessary, maintain situational awareness by participating in their respective supported command and staff updates as well as relevant crisis action exercises. An important element of this deliberate or crisis action planning process focuses on developing a recommended CA task organization, to include identifying needs for functional specialists. This recommendation is validated by the supported combatant commander who includes it in the request for deployment of forces from the Joint Staff. The forces will be sourced once the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) validates the request and the Secretary of Defense orders the deployment of those forces.

  - **USSOCOM** validated mission taskings are received by the United States Army Special Operations Command where they again are validated to ensure they meet SOF mission criteria. If validated, they are forwarded to the United States Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command where they are again validated and resourced. The United States Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command assigns the mission planning authority to a regional CA command or, in the case of missions that require rapid deployment, to the Active Component (AC) CA battalion. AC CA task-organize to address specific mission requirements and deploy to the operational area or directly to the supported unit. This rapid response capability enhances the supported commander’s efforts to achieve timely interagency coordination that ultimately leads to a strong unity of effort.

  - Following the rapid deployment of AC CA and initial CA assessments that either validate or invalidate the original CMO estimate, a long-term plan is developed that articulates the specific functional skills required to support the mission. This plan is formulated with significant input from CONUS-based CA functional specialists who are consulted on a continuous basis (note: the functional specialists should only deploy when and/or if there is a specific need for their expertise). The results of this assessment and recommended task organization flow from the geographic combatant commander to USCINCSOC for validation, feasibility assessment, and eventual resourcing. Resourcing will generally be provided by the regionally aligned CA command.
Concurrently, requests for the Presidential Reserve Callup Authority (if required) or other authorities for mobilization, are initiated through the Joint Staff and the Department of Defense. When authorized, CA elements are mobilized and deployed. Mission hand-over and/or transition occurs when the Reserve Components (RC) CA arrive. The AC CA are either redeployed or reassigned in theater, as needed. See Figure II-1 for further amplification.

For further detail concerning CA policy and responsibilities see DODD 2000.13, Civil Affairs, and JP 3-57.1, Joint Doctrine for Civil Affairs.

- **Civil Affairs Activities.** CA activities are inherently civil-military in nature.
While they may be integral parts of both MCA and CMO, they are not synonymous with either.

CA activities refer to activities performed or supported by CA that (1) embrace the relationship between military forces and civil authorities in areas where military forces are present; and (2) involve the application of CA functional specialty skills in areas normally the responsibility of civil government to enhance conduct of CMO. Use of dedicated CA and the conduct of CA activities will enhance planned CMO by helping to ensure civil or indigenous understanding of, and compliance with, controls, regulations, directives, or other measures taken by commanders to accomplish the military mission and attain US objectives.

CA activities, however, are distinguishable from CMO insofar as the former are characterized by applications of functional specialties in areas normally the responsibility of indigenous government or civil authority. CA activities may extend to assumption of governmental functions required in an occupied territory during or immediately subsequent to hostilities.

Policies. The pattern and objectives of CA activities in friendly, neutral, hostile, or occupied countries in any given area will correspond with applicable international and domestic law and depend on such variables as US foreign policy, the requirements of the military situation, participation of multinational forces, and other factors. In general, CA (individuals and units) are used to implement US foreign policy and achieve US objectives in the context of military strategy and force capabilities. Specific guidance as to policy, plans, procedures, and doctrine to be followed in any given country can be modified during the onset of hostilities or after the outbreak of an armed conflict as circumstances warrant. In the absence of guidance, military commanders take the initiative to request guidance and be prepared to execute command CA activities and support US objectives.

Policy Flow. Because of the POL-MIL nature and sensitivity of CA activities undertaken by US commanders, whether in a joint or multinational context, their conduct is governed by deliberate policy developed and promulgated by the NCA. Policy decisions are generally transmitted to commanders through command channels. Guidance for specific policies concerning the degree of civil-military interaction to be followed in any operational area is transmitted from the NCA through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

US Commanders Serving as Multinational Commanders. Policies normally are developed by agreement between member nations of a multinational force and provided to commanders through a council of ministers or a similar policy making body of which the United States is a participant. Should multinational CMO guidance be in conflict with international law or specific national instructions, commanders must immediately request guidance through US channels.

Geographic Combatant Commanders. Policies concerning the scope of CMO and procedural guidance normally are covered in an Executive Order or by a policy directive originating within the NSC. Commanders receive guidance transmitted through the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Commanders provide
guidance to subordinate commanders, including specific instructions regarding the exercise of authority for CA activities. Commanders need to maintain close liaison with US diplomatic representatives abroad to ensure effective coordination and delineation of CA responsibilities and activities.

- **Principles.** Certain general principles apply to all CA activities. They are the basis for initial planning purposes in the absence of specific guidance. These principles are listed in Figure II-2 and described below.

- **Mission.** CA activities are conducted in support of military operations to assist commanders in fulfilling international law obligations to civilians, or to further the national and international policies of the United States.

- **Command Responsibility.** Responsibility for the conduct of CA activities, including civil administration if directed by higher authority, is vested in the senior military commander, guided by directive, national policies, military strategy, and international law, including applicable agreements.

- **Continuity and Consistency of Policy.** Essential to the success of CA activities, in light of their inherent complexity and political sensitivity, is a comprehensive and clear USG policy transmitted through command channels.

- **Reciprocal Responsibilities.** Under Article 64 of the Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, the commander of an occupying force has the legal right to require the inhabitants within an

---

### Figures

**Figure II-2. Principles of Civil Affairs Activities**

- Mission
- Command Responsibility
- Continuity and Consistency of Policy
- Reciprocal Responsibilities
- Economy of Personnel and Resources
- Humanitarian Considerations
operational area to comply with directives necessary for the security of the occupying force and proper administration of a given area. In return, the inhabitants have the right to freedom from unnecessary interference with their property and individual liberties.

**Economy of Personnel and Resources.** The activities of CA should be limited, where possible, to those involving coordination, liaison, and interface with existing or reestablished civilian authorities. Maximum use of local or indigenous resources should be made consistent with satisfaction of minimum essential civil requirements.

**Humanitarian Considerations.** The use of force beyond that required to fulfill the mission is prohibited. Military commanders plan operations that strive to ensure minimum suffering for noncombatants, and comply with approved rules of engagement (ROE), and the LOAC.

**Assets**

- AC or RC CA are organized, equipped, and trained to carry out specific CA activities in support of CMO.
- CA personnel assigned or attached to geographic combatant commands.
- Other AC and RC personnel possessing functional specialty skills applicable to CA activities across the range of military operations.

**Appendix A, “Service Capabilities,” discusses CA assets in more detail. This also includes CA assets that do not belong to USSOCOM.**

For further detail concerning Service capabilities, refer to JP 3-33, Joint Force Capabilities. See JP 4-05, Joint Doctrine for Mobilization Planning, for information relating to mobilization and demobilization.

**Support to Civil-Military Operations.** CA activities may range from coordinating for the removal of civilians from a combat zone, through efforts to interface between US forces and multinational forces and HN and other governmental or nongovernmental agencies, to the exercise of full military control over an area or hostile government or population. The variety of CA activities to support the requirements for CMO necessitates flexibility in CA organization, planning, and execution.

c. **Psychological Operations.** PSYOP are operations planned to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, and objective reasoning and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals. The purpose of PSYOP is to induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and behavior favorable to the originator’s objectives. The general objectives of joint PSYOP are: reduce efficiency of opposing forces; further US and/or multinational efforts by modifying or influencing attitudes and behavior of selected audiences; counter hostile propaganda; facilitate reorganization and control of occupied or liberated areas in conjunction with CMO; obtain the cooperation of allies or coalition partners and neutrals in any PSYOP effort; and support and enhance FHA, FID, and/or foreign nation assistance military operations.

**Psychological Operations Activities**

- **Strategic PSYOP.** Strategic PSYOP are conducted as part of international public information activities as defined
by PDD-68. This interagency effort is designed to influence foreign attitudes, perceptions, and behavior in favor of US goals and objectives. These programs are conducted predominantly outside the military arena but can use DOD assets and are supported by military PSYOP. Military PSYOP with potential strategic impact must be coordinated with national efforts.

**Operational PSYOP.** Operational PSYOP are conducted prior to and during war or conflict, and at the conclusion of open hostilities in a defined geographic area to promote the effectiveness of the area commander’s campaigns and strategies.

**Tactical PSYOP.** Tactical PSYOP are conducted in the area assigned to a tactical commander during conflict and war to support the tactical mission against opposing forces.

**Consolidation PSYOP.** Consolidation PSYOP are conducted in foreign areas that are inhabited by an enemy or potentially hostile populace and occupied by US forces, or in which US forces are based, to produce behaviors by the foreign populace that support US objectives in the area.

**Policies**

- Traditionally, DOD missions and activities have been established in Federal statute or, in the absence of statutory authority, through the broad constitutional powers of the President as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces. The President, using constitutional and statutory authority, may issue documents that provide direction to the Executive Branch. Two national security directives apply directly to PSYOP. Additionally, the Department of Defense promulgated a DODD pertaining to the conduct of PSYOP.

**Perfidy vs Ruse.** The Hague and Geneva Conventions prohibit treachery and perfidy. Perfidy involves injuring the enemy by using their adherence to the LOAC. Perfidy degrades the protections and mutual restraints developed in the interest of all parties, combatants, and civilians. Combatants find it difficult to respect protected
persons and objects if they believe or suspect that their adversaries are abusing the LOAC to gain a military advantage. For example, the broadcasting to the enemy that an armistice had been agreed upon, when in fact no such agreement exists, would be perfidy. In contrast, ruses are acts that are intended to mislead an adversary or to induce him to act recklessly through some means other than taking advantage of the enemy’s adherence to the LOAC. The following are examples of lawful ruses: the use of camouflage, decoys, mock operations, and misinformation and/or disinformation. Bilateral defense treaties may have agreements concerning the conduct of PSYOP by the signatories. Use of PSYOP also may be regulated under status-of-forces agreements (SOFAs). A current list of treaties and other international agreements in force is found in Department of State Pub 9433, Treaties In Force.

• Assets. Each Military Service has the inherent capability to support US foreign policy objectives with organic assets for production and/or dissemination of PSYOP products. Planning guidance is contained in the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP), Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES), and Service doctrine. Plans should address the use of strategic, operational, tactical, and consolidation PSYOP as aspects of the overall strategy for conducting the war.


• Support to Civil-Military Operations. PSYOP can provide key support and information when effectively integrated into CMO. PSYOP can provide support in the following areas.

• Develop information for CA concerning the location, state of mind, and health of civilians and the physical characteristics of the operational area.
• Disseminate information concerning the safety and welfare of the civilian population.

• Influence a civilian population’s attitude toward US policy and prepare it for CA involvement in post conflict activities.

• Maximize CA efforts in the area of FHA by exploiting the goodwill created by US efforts in the area of health services and veterinary aid, construction, and public facilities activities.

• During disaster-relief operations, PSYOP may foster international support for US host governments and may coordinate publicity for US efforts.

• Conduct assessments before and after the operation to determine the most effective application of effort and document the results.

• Provide direct support to CA units conducting emergency relocation operations of DCs and for operation of the DC camps.

“Moreover, because of their special capabilities, forward global presence, regional orientation, language skills and cultural awareness, traditional SOF [special operations forces], civil affairs, and PSYOP [psychological operations] units offer an important capability for facilitating the transition from peacetime engagement to small-scale contingencies to major theater war — and back again.”

4. Engineering

Engineers have a critical role in CMO, since military operations typically include the engineer activities of nonmilitary organizations as well as military forces. If the experiences of the Gulf War, Somalia, Haiti, Hurricane Andrew, and Bosnia are repeated in future military operations, engineer operations will include many DOD civilians as well as the services of NGO, international organizations, other USG agencies, and contractors. The total engineer force of military active and reserve, civilian, contractor, HN and allies constitute the primary resources commanders can draw upon to accomplish the engineer mission.

a. Capabilities. Engineer units support the JFC through combat engineering, topographic engineering, and general engineering, including construction. Each
Service has engineering units and capabilities to meet specific operational needs. Within Service limitation, US military engineer units provide specialized capabilities as depicted in Figure II-3. In addition, technical engineering support and contract support are provided by a variety of supporting organizations within Service limitations. The HN may also have certain engineering capabilities specifically adapted to the local environment. Hired contractors and multinational military engineers in an immature theater also can provide valuable capabilities that may not be available in US engineer units. This mixture of capabilities may change during phases of the operation. Therefore, capabilities must be managed across Service lines throughout the course of an operation.

For further detail concerning Service capabilities and other related engineer activities, refer to Appendix A, “Service Capabilities,” JP 3-33, Joint Force Capabilities, JP 3-34, Engineer Doctrine for Joint Operations, and JP 4-04, Joint Doctrine for Civil Engineering Support.

b. Support to Civil-Military Operations. Within a joint force, engineers may operate with other governmental, nongovernmental, and international agencies and organizations participating in the operation. Given the multitude of organizations and capabilities involved, it is important that the joint force engineer coordinate with these organizations to ensure resources are focused on accomplishing the mission. Establishing and

---

**SPECIALIZED ENGINEERING CAPABILITIES**

- Firefighting services
- Well-drilling
- Underwater construction
- Construction and repair of airfields and ports
- Maintenance of lines of communications
- Explosive Ordnance Disposal (limited)
- Environmental assessments
- Erection of bare base facilities
- Construction of fuels and water supply
- Power generation
- Facilities engineering and management
- Real estate management
- Waste Disposal

---

Figure II-3. Specialized Engineering Capabilities
maintaining effective liaison with all participating agencies is critical to achieving unity of effort. The CMOC can be a focal point within the joint force for coordination with these agencies and organizations.

5. Health Service Support

The use of HSS resources has historically proven to be a valuable low-risk asset in support of CMO. HSS is generally a noncontroversial and cost-effective means of using the military element to support US national interests in another country. The focus of HSS initiatives, although possibly targeted toward the health problems in the operational area, is not normally curative, but primarily long-term preventive and developmental programs that are sustainable by the HN. HSS operations conducted to enhance the stability of a HN must be well coordinated with all concerned agencies and integrated into the respective US Embassy plans. Independent, unplanned health service civic action programs should not be undertaken.

Refer to JP 4-02, Doctrine for Health Service Support in Joint Operations, for more details on HSS.

a. Health Service Support Activities. HSS activities in support of CMO include health services and dental treatment, veterinarian and preventive medicine services, health services logistics, and aeromedical evacuation. However, consideration must be given to the differences when planning for CMO, for example, legal and policy issues regarding the treatment of foreign civilians; greater focus on preventive medicine and prevention and treatment of diseases rather than combat casualties, and significant patient population differences, (e.g., normal military population, pediatric, and relative health status of the local population and environmental/infrastructure conditions).

b. Policies. Based upon the HSS estimate of the situation, and in coordination with the component command surgeons, the joint force surgeon must plan for health services policies and procedures that can be best adapted to the joint operation.

- Geographic combatant commanders are ultimately accountable for coordinating and integrating HSS within their theaters. Medical intelligence can provide the combatant commander an occupational and environmental threat analysis to
ensure force health protection of the deployed assets during CMO.

- Where practical, dual use of available health services assets will be accomplished to support CMO requirements and military operations.

c. **Assets.** The Services have organic health services support capabilities that can be applied to CMO.

*For further detail concerning Service capabilities, refer to Appendix A, “Service Capabilities,” and JP 3-33, Joint Force Capabilities.*

d. **Support to Civil-Military Operations**

- There are several HSS activities appropriate during CMO as illustrated in Figure II-4. In addition, all HSS activities listed in the JP 4-02 series should be considered.

- HSS activities enhance HN stability by:
  - Developing HSS programs tailored for the HN; (e.g., appropriate and affordable).
  - Developing sustainable training and acquisition programs.
  - Increasing the effectiveness of other USG agency programs such as USAID and United States Information Agency.
  - Recommending and coordinating health services education opportunities for HN personnel.
  - Improving the economic well-being through veterinary medicine and animal husbandry.

6. **Transportation**

There are many types of transportation resources available to the JFC that are used, activated, and augmented across the range of military operations. **These military and commercial resources include airlift, sealift, land surface transportation, overseas resources (including vehicles), port operations, pre-positioning programs, and intermodal resources.** The Commander in Chief, US Transportation Command (USCINCTRANS) is assigned the mission to provide common-user air, land, and sea transportation for the Department of Defense,
both in times of peace and in times of war. In this capacity, except for those assets that are Service-unique or theater-assigned, or HN transportation support assets the JTF or geographic combatant commander has negotiated, USCINTRANS exercises COCOM of the strategic transportation assets of the Military Departments and is the DOD Single Manager for Transportation. USCINTRANS aligns traffic management and transportation single manager responsibilities to achieve optimum responsiveness, effectiveness, and economy for the supported combatant commander. Geographic combatant commanders who have transportation assets assigned to their commands should ensure the assets are managed, controlled, and capable of full integration into the Defense Transportation System (DTS). Security of transportation assets at forward locations is a JFC responsibility.

For further information on the DTS, refer to JP 4-01, Joint Doctrine for the Defense Transportation System.

a. **Transportation Activities.** Transportation organizations plan, coordinate, conduct, monitor, and control inter- and intratheater movement of personnel and materiel.

b. **Policies.** The Military Departments retain the responsibility for organizing, training, equipping, and providing the logistic support (including Service-unique transportation) of their respective forces. These forces and other Defense agencies also depend on common-user military transportation services. In this role, the Army,
Navy, Coast Guard, Air Force, Marine Corps, Defense Logistics Agency, and other Defense agencies are all generically called shipper services. Each Service is responsible for establishing transportation policy for the movement of equipment and supplies funded by the applicable shipper service and for administrative support and performance of transportation operations assigned by combatant commanders at either their local shipping installations or throughout the theater.

c. **Assets.** The JFC conducting CMO has available the transportation structure organic to the components of the joint force as well as support provided by US Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM). Organic transportation varies with force composition but typically will include trucks, helicopters, and possibly watercraft.

*For further detail concerning Service transportation assets and capabilities, refer to Appendix A, “Service Capabilities,” and JP 3-33, Joint Force Capabilities.*

---

**EQUIPMENT REQUIREMENTS IN CIVIL MILITARY OPERATIONS**

In the aftermath of Hurricane MITCH, the devastated nations of Central America requested helicopter support to distribute relief supplies as well as conduct search and rescue operations in areas that had been cut off by land slides, road washouts, and bridge damage. As USSOUTHCOM [US Southern Command] planners executed Operation FUERTES APOYO, a strictly civil-military operation; helicopter units were the first to deploy, and were followed by engineer and bridging units. The ability of helicopters to access remote areas was critical during the emergency phase of the operation, when the priority of effort was to save lives. Later, during rehabilitation and restoration phases, as roads were cleared and bridges repaired, helicopters redeployed as less expensive ground transportation could again be utilized.

*SOURCE: United States Southern Command — Hurricane MITCH 1998*
d. **Support to Civil-Military Operations.** Military transportation organizations can be invaluable in certain types of CMO. These units can be used to distribute food, water, and health services supplies; conduct health services evacuation; and move refugees to a safe environment. Additionally, some of these organizations have the technical expertise to assist in restoration of civilian transportation infrastructure. The versatility of military transportation assets (air, sea, and land) allows the JFC to select the mode of transportation most appropriate for the situation.

7. **Military Police and/or Security Police Forces**

   MP and/or security police (SP) have the requisite training, experience, and equipment to perform CMO activities. Aside from having firepower, mobility, and communications necessary to conduct combat support operations, MP and/or SP also have a wealth of experience in exercising authority in tense circumstances without escalating the tension. Their signature as a police force, rather than a combat force, often defuses tension between the joint force and the parties in conflict.

   a. **Military Police and/or Security Police Forces Activities.** MP and/or SP activities include a wide range of specialized and routine operations in support of the joint force. Typical activities are shown in Figure II-5.

   b. **Policies.** Commanders must have a clear understanding of the legal basis and limits pertaining to employment of MP and/or SP and law enforcement activities in a foreign country. They must also provide appropriate direction to subordinate commanders.

   c. **Assets.** The Services are organized with a variety of MP and/or SP organizations providing the joint force with significant capabilities.

   For further detail on Service MP and/or SP capabilities, refer to Appendix A, “Service Capabilities,” and JP 3-33, Joint Force Capabilities.

---

**MILITARY POLICE AND/OR SECURITY FORCES ACTIVITIES**

- Convoy defense
- Patrolling and manning checkpoints
- Reaction force
- Liaison to civilian police forces
- Investigations of criminal activity
- Handling, processing, safeguarding, and accounting for hostile individuals
- Physical security and preservation of order
- Dislocated civilian processing
- Populace and resource control
- Force protection

Figure II-5. Military Police and/or Security Forces Activities
d. **Support to Civil-Military Operations.** MP and/or SP force structure and training are well suited for CMO roles. MP and/or SP can perform or assist in functions that include staffing checkpoints, liaison with police forces, traffic control, enemy prisoners of war (EPWs) and dislocated civilian camps, and force protection operations.

- Commanders must exercise caution not to create an unintended impression on the civilian population that US forces, particularly MP and/or SP, are exceeding their legal and moral limits in conducting police activities. Frequent consultation between the Ambassador, joint force Staff Judge Advocate (SJA), provost marshal, CA representatives and appropriate Federal agencies, HN, and NGO representatives can prevent misunderstandings and enhance cooperation in conducting MP and/or SP activities.

- Training and support of foreign police forces is tightly governed by statutory regulations. This includes restrictions on funding sources for support of training of foreign police forces. Commanders must ensure that they have a clear understanding of these restrictions when planning CMO that include training and/or reestablishing the police force of a foreign nation.

8. **Organizing for Civil-Military Operations**

a. **Joint Task Force**

- In most scenarios, JTFs will conduct CMO.

- Commanders, joint task force (CJTFs) may establish JCMOTFs or JSOTFs when the scope of CMO in the JOA requires coordination and activities beyond that which other representation on the staff could accomplish.

- Figure II-6 illustrates possible JTF subordinates.

*For further JTF guidance, refer to JP 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF), and JP 5-00.2, Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and Procedures.*

b. **Joint Civil-Military Operations Task Force.** A JCMOTF is a means for a JFC to plan, coordinate, and conduct CMO in support of his assigned mission.

- A JCMOTF is composed of units from more than one Military Department or US agency and is formed to carry out CMO in support of a theater campaign or other operations. Although the
JCMOTF is not a CA organization, there may be a requirement for strong representation of CA-trained personnel. Because of their expertise in dealing with NGO, international organizations, and other governmental agencies, they will greatly enhance the opportunity for success. The JCMOTF may be established to carry out missions of limited or extended duration involving military forces’ interface with civilian populations, resources, or agencies and military forces’ coordination with other government agencies, multinational and affected country forces, UN agencies, NGOs, and international organizations.

The JFC designates the JCMOTF commander.

- The JCMOTF may be developed to meet a specific CMO contingency mission or support humanitarian or nation assistance operations, a theater campaign of limited duration, or a longer duration CMO concurrent with or subsequent to regional or general conflict, depending on NCA or theater guidance.

- Figure II-7 depicts some of the possible responsibilities of the JCMOTF.
POSSIBLE JOINT CIVIL – MILITARY OPERATIONS
TASK FORCE RESPONSIBILITIES

- Advising the commander, joint task force (CJTF) on policy, funding; multinational, foreign, or host nation (HN) sensitivities; and their effect on theater strategy and/or campaign and operational missions.

- Providing command and control or direction of military HN advisory, assessment, planning, and other assistance activities by US joint forces.

- Assisting in establishing US or multinational and military-to-civil links for greater efficiency of cooperative assistance arrangements.

- Performing essential coordination or liaison with HN agencies, Country Team, United Nations agencies, and deployed US, multinational, and HN military forces and supporting logistics organizations.

- Assisting in the planning and conduct of civil information programs to publicize positive results and objectives of military assistance projects, to build civil acceptance and support of US operations, and to promote indigenous capabilities contributing to recovery and economic-social development.

- Planning and conducting joint and combined civil-military operations training exercises.

- Allocating resources and sustaining and coordinating combat support or combat service support elements, including necessary medical, transportation, military police, engineer, and associated maintenance and communications capabilities.

- Advising and assisting in strengthening or stabilizing civil infrastructures and services and otherwise facilitating transition to peacekeeping or consolidation operations and associated hand-off to other United States Government (USG) agencies, international organizations, or HN responsibility.

- Assessing or identifying HN civil support, relief, or funding requirements to the CJTF for transmission to supporting commanders, Military Services, or other responsible USG agencies.

- Establishing combat identification standing operating procedures and other directives based on CJTF guidance.

Figure II-7. Possible Joint Civil-Military Operations Task Force Responsibilities
**Chapter II**

- **JCMOTF Staff Organization.** Figure II-8 depicts a notional JCMOTF.

  - The composition of this organization should be representative of the forces comprising the JCMOTF. A JCMOTF may have both conventional and SO forces assigned or attached to support the conduct of specific missions.

  - A JCMOTF normally is a US joint force organization, similar in organization to a JSOTF or JTF and is flexible in size and composition, depending on mission circumstances. It normally is subordinate to a JTF.

  - In rare instances, a JCMOTF could be formed as a standing organization, depending on NCA or theater guidance and resource availability.

  - A JCMOTF can be formed in theater, in the CONUS, or in both locations, depending on scope, duration, or sensitivity of the CMO requirement and associated policy considerations.

- **Advantages of a JCMOTF**

  - Consolidated and coordinated CMO
  - Unity of command and effort
  - Allows the JFC to focus on warfighting while the JCMOTF focuses on CMO and transition

- **Disadvantages of a JCMOTF**

  - Lack of synchronization between the joint force and JCMOTF commanders
  - Duplication of effort (if JTF is established to conduct CMO mission)
  - Increased force (personnel and logistic) requirements

- **c. Joint Special Operations Task Force**

  - At the recommendation of the theater special operations command (SOC) commander, the JFC may establish a JSOTF. A JSOTF is a JTF composed of

---

*A member of the 568th Security Squadron briefs convoy personnel during Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR.*
Figure II-8. Notional Joint Civil-Military Operations Task Force
JOINT SPECIAL OPERATIONS TASK FORCE

- A joint task force composed of special operations units from more than one Service
- Formed to carry out a specific special operation or prosecute special operations in support of a theater campaign or other operations
- May have conventional nonspecial operations units assigned or attached to support the conduct of specific missions

Establishment of a JSOTF is appropriate when SOF C2 requirements exceed the capabilities of the theater SOC staff. A JSOTF normally is formed around elements from the theater SOC or an existing SOF unit with augmentation from other Service SOF. A JSOTF may be established and deployed as a complete package from outside the theater. The theater SOC commander may form a JSOTF and then pass tactical control to a Service or functional component requiring SOF support. When a JSOTF is formed and augmented by one or more foreign units, the designation becomes a combined JSOTF.

- The JSOTF commander will control assigned SOF as well as any conventional forces provided by the JFC in support of specific missions. Figure II-9 depicts possible JSOTF commander responsibilities.

POSSIBLE JOINT SPECIAL OPERATIONS TASK FORCE COMMANDER RESPONSIBILITIES

- Advising the joint force commander (JFC) on the proper employment of special operations forces (SOF) and assets
- Planning and coordinating special operations (SO) and employing designated SOF in support of the JFC's concept of operations
- Issuing planning guidance
- Analyzing various courses of action
- Coordinating the conduct of SO with the other joint task force component commanders and subordinate task forces
- Evaluating the results of SO
- Focusing on operational-level functions and their span of control
- Synchronizing sustainment for SOF
- Establishing combat identification standing operating procedures and other directives based on JFC guidance
- Functioning as a supported and supporting commander, as directed by the JFC

Figure II-9. Possible Joint Special Operations Task Force Commander Responsibilities
Intentionally Blank
CHAPTER III
PLANNING CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS

“The goal should be to assist in developing the capability of the nation to provide effective government administration and services so that the democracy, the economy, and the health of the people can flourish.”

Colonel W.W. Mendel and Colonel S.K. Stewman
Planning for Haiti

SECTION A. BASIC PLANNING

1. General

It is important that CMO plans and considerations be incorporated into the crisis action and deliberate planning processes. It is the responsibility of combatant commanders to plan and conduct CMO. CMO contribute to shaping the battlespace and supporting the combatant commander’s TEP. In certain situations, CMO planning enhances the transition to civilian control from the outset of an operation.

a. Planning

• Planning and coordination of CMO facilitates mission accomplishment. CMO planning is based on national policy and reflects a variety of legal obligations such as the provisions of the US Constitution, statutory law, judicial decisions, Presidential directives, departmental regulations, and the rules and principles of international law, especially those incorporated in treaties and agreements applicable to areas where US forces are employed.

• CMO must be a part of an overall national strategy or in the case of some complex contingency operations, a POL-MIL plan. This is formulated and managed at the interagency level and cascades into theater or regional plans and operations.

Maintaining routine access and dialogue with Department of State (DOS) representatives, senior leaders, and the interagency community is critical.

“There is a trade-off between limiting the personnel involved in the planning process and operational security. Limiting access to the plan increases operational security and is frequently necessary. However, limiting access to the plan makes it very difficult to involve the non-government and other agencies with significant roles. This trade-off will have a significant impact on planning and execution. Planners must assess constantly the timing for bringing other organizations into the planning process. Frequently this process can be expedited by preparing a sanitized briefing that can be more widely distributed.”

Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY
Joint After Action Report (JAAR)

b. Deployment, Employment, and Redeployment Planning

• Selection of forces to perform CMO in support of an OPLAN, CONPLAN, or operation order (OPORD) should be based on a clear concept of CMO mission requirements. JOPES integrates all elements of deliberate or crisis action CMO planning, and identifies, resources, and phases CMO required forces.

• General planning considerations are shown in Figure III-1.

c. Military Operations Other Than War. Plans for MOOTW are prepared in a similar manner as plans for war. The mission analysis and command estimate process is as critical in planning for MOOTW as they are in planning for war. Of particular importance in the planning process for MOOTW is the development of a clear definition, understanding, and appreciation of all potential threats. Oftentimes, the threats may be unique and disproportional or have the appearance of being asymmetrical to the US operations being conducted. For this reason, efforts should be made to include an intelligence element in the first deployment package. Although the possibility of combat may be remote in many types of MOOTW, commanders should always plan to have the right mix of forces available to quickly transition to combat operations or evacuations. Additionally, when conducting noncombat operations, commanders must consider the feasibility and means of redeployment, possibly to another theater, to conduct other operations.

For further detail concerning MOOTW, refer to JP 3-07, Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War.

d. War. Greater authority for CMO should be reflected in the planning assumptions. Certain areas may be
devastated and lack self-sufficiency in facilities, services, and personnel as a result of hostilities. US and multinational forces may be required to distribute emergency food, clothing, shelter, and health services supplies to civilians. At the same time, identification of CMO requirements derived from analysis of both current operational and conflict termination or consolidation missions may entail any combination of the planning considerations identified above for contingencies or crisis-response operations.

e. **Conflict Termination or Consolidation Considerations.** Planning considerations concerning use of CMO forces include, but are not limited to, the following.

- The post conflict mission objectives.
- The need for and roles of integrated military-civilian organizational and oversight elements or agencies.
Chapter III

- The extent of devastation and the potential of the defeated country to regain its place in the family of nations.

- The complexity and duration of stability and reconstitution assistance efforts often require counteracting local violence and mobilizing indigenous resources toward self-sufficiency.

- The availability of indigenous leaders and civil servants.

- The desires and objectives of other governments.

- The degree of US domestic political support to involve US military forces in nation assistance activities, regardless of identified needs.

- The use of the US military in rescuing failed states.

“We expected things to be bad, but we couldn’t believe how bad it really was. The combination of corruption, lawlessness, and neglect created an economic decline that had been exacerbated by the economic embargo imposed on the military dictatorship. Institutions and infrastructure were for the most part non-existent. All that was holding the country together was fear of the Fad’H [Forces Armee d’Haiti] which, once deposed, was impotent and ignored by the Haitian people. Under these and similar circumstances, the operational concept under which military forces provide needed functions and gradually turn them over to civilians (assistance groups or local nationals) needs to be fleshed out.”

Interagency and Political-Military Dimensions of Peace Operations: HAITI — A Case Study
National Defense University

f. Joint Universal Lessons Learned System. Planners should review CMO lessons learned from previous operations and exercises. In turn, upon completion of operations, it is the responsibility of the command to ensure lessons learned are appropriately recorded for future use by other joint forces.

2. Planning Factors and Constraints

Some operational and environmental factors that may complicate the US military’s relationships with foreign civilians and constrain the conduct of CMO include, but are not limited to, the following.

a. Differing legal institutions, customs, social relationships, economic organizations, and concepts of fundamental rights.

b. Public communications media controlled, censored, or considered inconsistent with US standards.

c. Universal public education considered undesirable for economic or cultural reasons such as poverty, religion, race, or caste.

d. Ownership of land or other forms of wealth-producing property.

e. Religious, cultural, and legal practices.

f. Lack of adequate education or resistance by affected groups that results in poor health and sanitation or inefficient agricultural or industrial practices.

g. Effects of labor, procurement, or contracting commodities upon the population, economy, and governmental services.

h. Dislocation of civilian populations and damage to facilities and infrastructure requiring military assistance, especially in areas of public health, DC care and control, civilian supply, public safety, and humanitarian relief.
i. Humanitarian motives prompting US personnel to furnish relief or assistance that may conflict with local law, religion, or cultural standards.

j. Availability of US and HN civil communications resources to support CMO when competed for by information news agencies.

3. Interagency Coordination

“The most practical mechanism for ensuring that some coherent strategic design and planning does take place is the system of civil military operations centers (CMOCs), developed to establish and maintain operational contact among the military and humanitarian participants in a complex operation. While the CMOC system was not intended for the purposes of strategic design, its operational usefulness is clear to most of the humanitarian agencies, a usefulness which could advance the notion of joint planning. Perhaps the most important effort that commanders could make to encourage the coordination of strategy and its execution would be to include a few representatives of the major humanitarian agencies in their operations planning process. It is here that some degree of coherent interagency coordination might take place. Commanders do not have the authority, expertise, or resources to correct the dysfunctional organizational response structure, but they can make an effort to contribute in a modest way to its solution through the CMOC and their own operations planning process.”

Andrew S. Natsios
Commander’s Guidance: A Challenge of Complex Humanitarian Emergencies

DOS officials and chiefs of diplomatic missions, depending on policy guidance and the operational environment, have a primary or collateral interest in CMO or requirements entailing coordination with HN government officials. CMO annexes or portions of plans and orders should clearly delineate responsibilities, constraints, and limitations in light of other agencies’ established parameters and emphasize the importance of coordinating CMO concerns and intent.

a. The nature of CMO requires focusing on sociological, economic, and political factors, as well as military mission requirements, in foreign or HN areas where US military forces are present. It also may entail research, surveys, planning, and coordination of both DOD and non-DOD organizations and agencies.

b. Other governmental elements, international organizations, NGOs, religious organizations, commercial interests, and private institutions may be working toward common or associated objectives, or even divergent or conflicted objectives, especially during conditions other than war and periods immediately after cessation of hostilities. Close coordination and cooperation with these groups may reduce costs, prevent duplication, lessen the friction of potential rivalry, and improve results. This is as true in MCA that originate from USG country plans as in humanitarian or disaster relief contingency or crisis-response operations. Such activities usually entail sensitivities, political consensus, central funding, authorization to use indicated resources, and joint participation with non-DOD, HN, NGOs, and international organizations.

c. The nature of CMO require that the military interface military command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I) systems with the intra- and interagency hierarchies, which network with US and HN commercial networks to augment DOD communications that are supporting CMO. CMO requires detailed planning to support information exchange between the joint force and other USG agencies, HN authorities, and NGOs or international organizations operating
in the JOA. This will include both voice and data traffic, and will include the ability to support “reachback” to functional experts and agencies not deployed to the JOA.

d. The Country Team is a forum for planning and control and a means of generating the close cooperation and liaison essential for unity, cohesion, and effectiveness of effort.

Interagency coordination is discussed in greater detail in Chapter IV, “Interagency Coordination.”

4. Oversight of CMO Planning and Activities

To establish centralized direction and staff cognizance over planning, coordinating, and conducting CMO, the JFC should establish a distinct CA staff element on his staff, not create a new CMO staff section. The complex nature and importance of CMO normally require the direction and oversight of a full-time staff (typically CA elements) whose concerns include, but are not limited to, the following:

a. Helping formulate recommendations for CMO policy and implementing measures to gain or maintain civil or indigenous support of US forces employed.

b. Coordinating support for the Country Team and other USG agencies and organizations involved in planning and interfacing with the HN for support to CMO.

c. Ensuring that CMO related data are included in Annex A, “Civil Affairs” (or in a separate CMO annex) of plans and orders.

d. Preparing CMO estimates and assessments of the impact of military operations on the civilian environment; also, planning and conducting surveys as a basis for these assessments.

e. Identifying appropriate priority information requirements in support of CMO into command intelligence programs.

f. Coordinating with legal and other appropriate staff officers to assist in ensuring compliance with legal requirements, funding authorities, and including existing SOFA or other international agreements that may be in effect; identifying and recording information associated with injury, death, or damage to property to facilitate the payment of compensable claims; and identifying areas of environmental contamination for future remediation.

g. Developing recommendations regarding the FID needs of HNs.

h. Planning and coordinating civil information activities in conjunction with PA, PSYOP, and other appropriate staff officers, to advance community relations and international information programs supporting regional and US objectives.

i. Identifying CMO requirements and resources to support USG and military contingency and crisis-response operations and civil administration programs, as required.

j. Assisting in developing and coordinating appropriate CMO support to humanitarian or disaster relief and SA programs, consistent with US policy and mission requirements.

k. Arranging for the provision of mobile CMO survey and instructional teams to support command and US SA missions.

See Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual (CJCSM) 3122.03, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System Vol II: (Planning Formats and Guidance), for further guidance on developing plans and orders.
Planning Civil-Military Operations

• Mobile survey and instructional teams are coordinated through the Security Assistance Office of the combatant command and other major commands. International military education and training (IMET) funds, under certain conditions, can fund survey teams. For example, in the US Southern Command’s AOR, IMET funds are used by the Defense Institute of International Legal Studies (DIILS), to conduct a three-phased program.

- During Phase I, a legal team conducts an in-country survey to validate the need and nature of training.

- During Phase II, HN representatives travel to DIILS to finalize training to be conducted.

- During Phase III, education is provided in country, preferably utilizing the “train-the-trainer” method.

• Another vehicle for arranging mobile CMO survey or instructional teams is the foreign military sales (FMS) program. FMS can be financed using Foreign Military Financing, a US program of funding, or the HN can pay for it. If Foreign Military Financing or IMET funds are requested, the DOS determines if US funds will be disbursed. Combatant commanders recommend use of funds to the Defense Security Cooperation Agency, which in turn requests authorization for funding from the State Department.

• Finally, whichever funding source is utilized, whenever US forces train foreign military forces, all foreign military members receiving training must be vetted for human rights violations. To help facilitate the screening and selection process for US-sponsored training programs, the DOD, in coordination with DOS, has developed supplemental guidelines for use by military commanders and security assistance organizations. These guidelines are intended to be helpful in scrutinizing candidates for records of human rights abuses, drug trafficking, corruption, criminal activity, and other activities inconsistent with US foreign policy goals.

1. Determining specific CMO assets required to support subordinate joint and theater Service component headquarters and forces.

m. Coordinating with theater-apportioned forces to schedule their participation in exercises, operations, and overseas deployment in support of CMO.

5. Environmental Considerations

“Protecting the environment has become steadily more important during the past several decades. The international community is increasingly vigilant in its oversight of the environmental consequences of military operations. JAs [Judge Advocates] must ensure that leaders are both cognizant of the rules and the importance of complying with these rules. Failure to comply with environmental law can jeopardize current and future operations, generate domestic and international criticism, produce costly litigation, and even result in personal liability of both the leader and the individual soldier.”

Operational Law Handbook

a. CMO should be conducted with appropriate consideration of the environment in accordance with international treaties and other international agreements and applicable US policies and regulations. Early planning
is essential to ensure all appropriate environmental reviews have been completed prior to initiating operations.

b. The SJA must advise the JFC regarding environmental law issues and be prepared to train the force in the applicable environmental issues.

6. Operational Considerations

a. **Force Protection.** Force protection is the security program designed to protect Service members, civilian employees, family members, facilities, information, and equipment, in all locations and situations, accomplished through planned and integrated application of combatting terrorism, physical security, operations security (OPSEC), personal protective services, and supported by counterintelligence and other security programs.

“*Force protection in Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY encompassed both protection against potentially hostile forces and measures necessary to prevent casualties from health and sanitation problems. The MNF [multinational force] commander maximized his efforts to ensure the protection of US personnel from both internal and external threats. Clear ROE [rules of engagement], fully understood by all JTF [joint task force] personnel, were essential to effective and successful force protection.***

**Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY: US Forces In Haiti**

b. Physical security measures deter, detect, and defend against threats from terrorists, criminals, and unconventional forces. Measures include fencing and perimeter stand-off space, lighting and sensors, vehicle barriers, blast protection, intrusion detection systems and electronic surveillance, and access control devices and systems. Physical security measures, like any defense, should be overlapping and deployed in depth.

c. Effective OPSEC measures minimize the “signature” of joint force activities, avoid set patterns, and employ deception when patterns cannot be altered. Although strategic OPSEC measures are important, the most effective methods manifest themselves at the lowest level. Commanders discourage terrorist activity by varying patrol routes, staffing guard posts and towers at irregular intervals, and conducting vehicle and personnel searches and identification checks on a set but unpredictable pattern.

d. Personnel security measures range from general measures of antiterrorism to specialized personal protective services. They include common-sense rules of on- and off-duty conduct, use of protective clothing and equipment, use of hardened vehicles and facilities, employment of dedicated guard forces, and use of duress alarms.

e. JFCs and their subordinate commanders must address force protection during all phases of deliberate and crisis action planning. All aspects of force protection must be considered and threats minimized to ensure maximum operational success. **JFCs and their subordinate commanders must implement force protection measures appropriate to anticipated threats** based on threat and vulnerability assessments. They should then complete a risk assessment with the information obtained, measured against mission requirements.

f. Supported and supporting combatant commanders must ensure that deploying forces receive thorough briefings concerning the threat and personnel protection requirements prior to and upon arrival in the theater.
g. JFCs and their subordinate commanders must evaluate the deployment of forces and each COA for the impact of terrorist organizations supporting the threat and those not directly supporting the threat, but seeking to take advantage of the situation.

h. In addition to force protection, the joint force also may provide security for other personnel and assets. If not clearly stated in the mission, the extent of this security should be addressed in the ROE, to include protection of:

- USG, NGOs, and international organizations personnel and equipment;
- Affected country personnel and assets;
- Relief convoys, supplies, and main supply routes;
- Relief distribution centers;
- Stocks of supplies; and
- Ports and airfields.


7. Measures of Effectiveness

a. MOE may assist commanders, agency officials, and local authorities to gauge the progress of the mission. The key question is whether the military is doing what it is expected to do in terms of the mission and situation. MOE focus on whether military efforts achieve the desired result of the specific mission assigned to the force. MOE provide commanders and higher authorities a means to evaluate the contribution of military efforts to the more encompassing and overarching desired end state. More importantly, MOE provide a baseline of indicators on how well the military achieves its specific (possibly limited) goals according to its mission statement. Such measures are situation dependent, often requiring readjustment as the situation changes and higher level guidance develops. MOE normally are discrete, quantifiable, and...
helpful in understanding and measuring progress. MOE may be developed for quantitative or qualitative standards as means to evaluate operations and guide decision making. Accurate and effective MOE contribute to mission effectiveness in many ways. They help identify effective strategies and tactics and points at which to shift resources, transition to different phases, or alter or terminate the mission. MOE assist the commander in determining when all or part of the mission has been accomplished, permitting the redeployment of some or all forces performing CMO.

“MOE [Measures of effectiveness] in military operations are defined as tools used to measure results achieved in the overall mission and execution of assigned civil tasks, compared to stated strategic and operational objectives.”

Civil-Military Cooperation in Peace, Emergencies, Crisis and War

b. Developing MOE. There is no single all-encompassing checklist for MOE; therefore, MOE will vary according to the mission. However, commanders and staffs should keep certain factors in mind when developing and using MOE. Planners should ensure that MOE are as follows.

• **Appropriate.** MOE should correlate to the audience objectives. If the objective is to present information to those outside the command, MOE should be general and few in number; if the objective is to assist on-scene commanders, then MOE should be more specific and detailed.

• **Mission-related.** MOE must correlate to the mission. If the mission is relief, MOE should help the commander evaluate improvements in living standards, mortality rates, and other related areas.

• **Measurable.** Quantitative MOE reflect reality more accurately than non-quantitative MOE, and hence, are generally the measure of choice when the situation permits their use. When using non-quantitative MOE, clear measurement criteria should be established and disseminated to prevent mismeasurement or misinterpretation.

• **Numerically Reasonable.** Avoid establishing excessive MOE; they become unmanageable or collection efforts outweigh the value.

• **Sensitive.** MOE should be sensitive to force performance and accurately reflect changes related to joint force actions. Extraneous factors should not greatly affect established MOE.

• **Useful.** MOE should detect situation changes quickly enough to enable the commander to immediately and effectively respond.

c. Possible MOE. MOE in CMO could include the following.

• Drops in mortality rates in the affected population below a specified level per day.

• Increase in water available to each disaster victim per day to various levels established for human consumption, to support sanitation measures, and for livestock consumption.

• Decrease in the number of displaced persons in camps to a level sustainable by the affected country or non-US military organizations. Another aspect of this MOE is the increase in the number of persons per day returning to their homes.
• Decrease in incidence of disease to an acceptable or manageable level.

• Increase in the presence and capabilities of NGOs and international organizations.

"During Operation SUPPORT HOPE, the joint force tracked several specific measures of effectiveness (MOE) to ascertain when it had accomplished its assigned mission. These MOE included: (1) The refugee population in Goma dropped from 1,200,000 on 26 Jul 94 to 575,000 on 26 Aug 94. (Numbers of refugees were estimates only.) (2) The estimated mortality rate in Goma camps, based on bodies buried per day, dropped from 6500 per day on 27 July 94 to less than 500 per day on 1 August 94. (3) Cargo capacity at Kigali airfield increased from virtually zero on 30 Jul 94 to 300-600 tons per day on 26 Aug 94. (4) The number of United Nations agencies, nongovernmental organizations, and private voluntary organizations represented in Kigali grew from six on 22 July 94 to over 60 on 26 August 94. This increase represented adequate nonmilitary capability to provide foreign humanitarian assistance."

JP 3-07.6, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Humanitarian Assistance

d. MOE only are limited by the imagination of commanders and their staffs. However, they should exercise a certain degree of caution and judgment when using statistical indicators alone. These indicators may vary widely in interpretation, may be valid only for a specific time, place, or group of people, and may not have a direct correlation to effectiveness. Quantitative MOE may not capture qualitative changes, which may be more important in restoring normalcy. Engagement with local, national, and international HNS and NGO elements can often assist CMO planners in crafting qualitative MOE.

e. The last prerequisite for success entails establishing and monitoring MOE for CMO that are useful at strategic, operational, and tactical levels.

f. Figure III-3 (extracted from Civil-Military Cooperation in Peace, Emergencies, Crisis and War) provides an example of MOE concerning force protection and/or security. It is provided for illustrative purposes only.

SECTION B. OTHER FUNCTIONAL AREAS

8. Public Affairs

“It is vital that we lay the ground work for the future end state while maintaining a high degree of agility and flexibility as we deal with change and development in-country over time. We will speak with one voice from command. Clarity and consensus are key. The Public Affairs Officer [PAO] is the focal point for all media activities. While we must develop good relations with the media, we will coordinate all media activities with the senior representative of the Secretary General. The PAO will be a force multiplier.”

United Nations Mission In Haiti In The Service Of Peace

American public support is critical to the success of CMO. This support is gained by providing the news media access to both military personnel and unclassified information. PA personnel escort the news media whenever they are in the operational area. PA personnel provide American and international news media information concerning joint force operations. The JFC and the public affairs officer (PAO) are the sole official spokespersons for the command. All news media queries should be referred to the PAO. In performing duties as an official spokesman, the PAO’s membership in the
JTF’s IO cell will enable PA activities to be integrated, coordinated, and deconflicted within the full spectrum of planned IO. The coordinated efforts between PA, CA, and PSYOP representatives in the JTF IO cell are important. Whatever is released through one of these channels will be available to, and have an effect on, all audiences. If information released to the HN populace by CA and PSYOP personnel conflicts with information released to American forces through PA channels, the result could be loss of credibility for all involved and a negation of any positive accomplishments.

a. General

- The mission of joint PA is to expedite the flow of accurate and timely information about the activities of US joint forces to the public and internal audiences. The media and military journalists will conduct first-hand and after-the-fact reporting of joint

---

### EXAMPLES OF FORCE PROTECTION AND/OR SECURITY MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>EXAMPLES OF SPECIFIC FORCE PROTECTION/SECURITY MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mission-level measures of effectiveness</td>
<td>1. Number of threats to the lives of civilian and military personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Number of operations security breaches and types i.e., verbal, electronic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. Number of political incidents/corruption at each level of government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4. Number and level of changes to the military alert status</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Task-performance measures of effectiveness</td>
<td>1. Area patrolled divided by total area requiring patrolling</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Numbers of convoys escorted divided by convoy escort requirement in terms of forces, police, weapons, and vehicles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. Number of criminal-related incidents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4. Number of facilities targeted by belligerents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level of effort measures</td>
<td>1. Number, size, and types of patrols by road, sea, and air</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Number of convoys escorted and size of forces assigned to convoy escort</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transition measures</td>
<td>Percentage of security requirements assumed by host nation or follow-on forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General indicators</td>
<td>1. Cost of material damage sustained in confrontations with belligerents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Number of police in communities deployed to maintain law and order</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. Number of incidents involving the military or the local police, or both</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

Figure III-3. Examples of Force Protection and/or Security Measures of Effectiveness
operations. Information given to the news media must be consistent with national and OPSEC and must respect the privacy of the members of the force. PA personnel should communicate with Service members, civilian employees, and family members to create an awareness of organizational goals and inform them of significant developments affecting them and the organization. As appropriate, PA personnel need to coordinate with the Country Team.

- PA and CA personnel assist in the dissemination of information to local populations. PA personnel have the responsibility to deal with local media outlets and will assist CA personnel with passing information to the appropriate audiences through those media outlets.

- **Coordination is required** to ensure that the information released by one staff element **does not conflict with or complicate the work of the other** (PA, CA, and PSYOP messages are different, but they must not contradict one another or the credibility of all three will be lost).

- US CMO elements will assist with **DC, public administration, public health, and public works** in concert with local authorities and/or NGO and international organizations. By their nature, their missions and their positive results are of interest to the local populace and their media representatives.

- PA elements also have the responsibility, through command information outlets, to keep military elements informed of DC, methods and procedures for their orderly withdrawal from the operational area, and any other information on this issue deemed appropriate by the JFC.

- Today’s technological environment provides the media greater access to military operations. Commanders should consider media impact during planning and execution of all operations. Planning should facilitate the interaction between the military and the national and international press organizations. Each nation has its own viewpoint on media freedom and access, and the JFC, who also may be the multinational force

![A press conference is conducted in Sarajevo, Bosnia-Herzegovina during Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR.](image-url)
commander, should consider this during planning. Respect for the viewpoints of other nations must be demonstrated, even if they are contrary to that of the United States. **Simplicity should be the driving factor in planning for media support in a multinational environment.** Commanders should plan for regular media access. Ground rules need to be established which are clear and maintain appropriate OPSEC. Media considerations will be channeled through a media coordination center at the JFC level, which should be staffed by representatives from participating nations. The JFC’s media coordination center will work on an integrated basis with representative international organizations operating within the operational area. Media operations must be synchronized and coordinated both within the US military chain of command and through multinational military channels.

- Predeployment media training for military and civilian personnel (media included) is essential. JFCs employ the IO cell to ensure early and continuous coordination among PA, CA, PSYOP, and OPSEC so their messages are not contradictory and damaging to the credibility of the JFC or compromising the essential elements of friendly information. Planners should include PA and public information officers in the planning process. JFCs should develop a policy for releasing information on incidents, especially casualty reports. Joint force policy should distinguish between situations where the victims are from one nation or from several nations.

b. Information tasks in support of CMO might include the following.

- Coordinate releases to the media with all appropriate agencies to ensure consistency of information to the local population.

- Develop and disseminate media releases about CMO efforts to local, national, and international media, as well as to command information outlets.

- Assist media in covering known CA activities. It may not always be in the United States’ best interest to take credit for all activities. Highlighting the participation of the affected nation or civilian group and/or organization may lead to a quicker and sounder solution to the situation.

- In cooperation with CA elements, ensure the publication and broadcasting of information to protect DC.

For further detail concerning PA, refer to JP 3-61, Doctrine for Public Affairs in Joint Operations.

9. Legal

Many aspects of CMO require scrutiny by legal experts. Key members of both the planning and operations staffs and legal advisors should review and assist in preparing SOFA, ROE, plans and/or orders, as well as any agreements or memoranda of understanding established between US forces and the affected country or nonmilitary organizations inherent in CMO. Legal personnel must know the legal status of relief workers from the numerous agencies involved, DC, and refugees. CMO involve a myriad of statutory, regulatory, and policy considerations, both foreign and domestic, in addition to the normal constraints associated with deployments and operations. The SJA is usually in the best position to access these sources.
The SJA of the joint force will provide legal support and services during all phases of CMO. In the planning phase, SJAs provide advice and assistance in the preparation and review of CMO plans for consistency with US law, NCA guidance, and the rules and principles of international law, including treaties, other international agreements, and the laws of the place where US military forces will conduct operations.

SJAs review the legal section of area studies and assessments and of plans and orders compiled before deployment or hostilities. SJAs also provide predeployment training to personnel and units preparing to conduct CMO. This training should include:

- **Law of Armed Conflict.** That part of international law that regulates the conduct of armed hostilities. It protects combatants and noncombatants from unnecessary suffering, and safeguards the basic rights of all civilians, any prisoner of war, the wounded, and the sick. The LOAC encompasses all international law for the conduct of hostilities binding on the United States or its individual citizens, including treaties and international agreements to which the United States is a party, and applicable customary international law. Some treaties include the 1949 Geneva Conventions and the 1907 Hague Conventions and Regulations, among others. The Department of Defense is committed to ensure its personnel understand, observe, and enforce the LOAC and the United States’ obligations under the LOAC.

- **Human Rights Violations and Reporting Requirements.** Military personnel should be trained to recognize human rights violations using the standard Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, to avoid aiding in any violations and to report violations to their chain of command. (1) Human rights refers to freedoms, immunities, and benefits that, according to widely accepted contemporary values, every human being should enjoy in the society in which he or she lives. Human rights may be thought of as that body of international and domestic law that protects the citizen from abuses by the state. USG policy supports the promotion of all human rights. Commanders should be particularly cognizant of gross human rights violations, which include: torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment, prolonged arbitrary detention without charges or trial, causing the disappearance of persons by the
abduction and clandestine detention of those persons, and other flagrant denial of the right to life, liberty, or the security of person. (2) CMO personnel who observe a gross human right violation should report it through their chain of command. Each geographic combatant commander may have additional reporting policies.

**Rules of Engagement.** ROE are directives that delineate the circumstances and limitations under which US forces initiate or continue engagement with hostile forces or elements. **ROE define when and how force may be used.** Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3121.01A, *Standing Rules of Engagement (SROE) for US Forces*, provides ROE that apply to US forces during all military operations. **For each specific operation, the JFC, in conjunction with the joint force Operations Directorate (J-3) and legal advisor, develops ROE** (as soon as possible after notification of the deployment) **within the framework of the standing rules of engagement (SROE).** In many situations, the mission may require specific ROE measures in addition to the basic SROE. Supplemental measures in the SROE enable the commander to obtain or grant those additional authorities or restraints necessary to accomplish the mission. The JFC must submit the changes through the chain of command to the appropriate approving official. **When multinational forces are under US control, US commanders need to ensure that those forces interpret the ROE in the same manner as US forces.** When multinational forces are involved in the operation, but not under US control, US commanders should request that those forces adopt ROE similar to those in effect for US forces. US commanders must understand the differences in the various participating countries’ ROE and the impact on operations.

**Military Justice.** JP 0-2, *Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)*, assigns responsibility to the JFC for the discipline and administration of military personnel assigned to the joint organization. This is shared by the commanders of the Service forces. The Uniform Code of Military Justice, Service regulations, and the Manual for Courts-Martial provide the foundational laws, regulations, and procedures by which that responsibility is exercised. (1) Within a combatant command, each Service component commander is primarily responsible, subject to the regulations of the combatant commander, for the internal administration and discipline of that Service’s component forces. In the same respect, the JFC normally should exercise administrative and disciplinary authority through Service component commanders. JFCs who wish to personally exercise full administrative and disciplinary authority over all military personnel assigned to the joint force may request that such authority be granted by the combatant commander. This grant of authority is termed “reciprocal” authority. (2) Military justice is administered in accordance with the Uniform Code of Military Justice, Manual for Courts-Martial, and applicable Service directives. Directives and regulations implementing the Uniform Code of Military Justice, aside from the Manual for Courts-Martial, are, for the most part, promulgated by the separate Services. As a result, the appropriate response to a particular incident may vary according to Service. (3) Authority. The Uniform Code of Military Justice (Articles 22-24), Rules for Courts-Martial 201, and Service regulations grant authority to convene
courts-martial and impose non-judicial punishment. Service regulations establish policies and procedures for the delegation of these authorities and the authority of senior commanders to limit or withhold these authorities from subordinate commanders. For the JFC, the primary concern is the exercise of jurisdiction over members of a different Service from the commander. (4) Convening courts-martial. Rules for Courts-Martial 201(e) promulgates several authorities which extend courts-martial convening authority to commanders of joint forces. (5) Combatant commanders, and those officers empowered by the Secretary of Defense to convene courts-martial, may convene general courts-martial over members of any of the Armed Forces. The Secretary of Defense may empower any commanding officer of a joint force to convene courts-martial, and such commanding officers may convene general courts-martial for the trial of members of any of the Armed Forces. Combatant commanders are further empowered to authorize a commanding officer of a subordinate joint command to convene courts-martial for the trial of members of other Armed Forces.

**Status of Forces.** The status of forces is an important concern of commanders operating overseas. Numerous legal issues affecting the success of the operation must be resolved, including HN criminal and civil jurisdiction, authority to conduct law enforcement activities including trials by courts-martial, claims against the United States or US personnel, authority for US forces to carry arms and use force, force protection, entry and exit requirements, customs and tax liability, contracting authority, authority to provide health care without a local medical license, vehicle registration and licensing, communications support, facilities for US forces, hiring of local personnel, authority to detain or arrest, and provisions for transferring custody. The SJA provides legal advice concerning status of forces issues, to include the provisions of current agreements, the need for additional agreements, and the procedures for obtaining agreements.

**Environmental Law Issues.** The complexity of environmental law issues requires the joint force SJA staff to have expertise (or ready access to expert assistance) in environmental law. Political sensitivity dictates keen attention to this area. Legal advisors and commanders must be familiar with agreements between the US and participating nations as well as international conventions signed by participating nations. Although US domestic environmental laws do not apply overseas, the SJA must be familiar with Executive Order 12,114, DODD 6050.7, *Environmental Effects Abroad of Major Departments of Defense Actions*, DODD 6050.16, *DOD Policy for Establishing and Implementing Environmental Standards at Overseas Installations*, Department of Defense Instruction (DODI) 4715.5, *Management of Environmental Compliance at Overseas Installations*, DODI 4715.8, *Environmental Remediation for DOD Activities Overseas*, and the Department of Defense Overseas Environmental Baseline Guidance Document, which establish environmental regulations for overseas activity.

- During the combat phase, SJAs address legal issues concerning population control measures; targeting to minimize unnecessary collateral damage or injury to the civilian population; treatment of DC, civilian internees (CIs), and detainees; requests for political asylum
and refuge; acquisition control of private and public property for military purposes; PSYOP and their effects on the civilian population; and other operational law matters as necessary.

- During the stabilization phase, SJAs may provide legal services concerning such matters as claims submitted by local civilians, disaster relief, and HCA issues.

- Additionally, the joint staff SJA and the civil affairs SJA will be called upon to give advice and assistance on matters relating to civil administration within a friendly or enemy country. SJAs also may provide counsel regarding the creation and supervision of military tribunals and other activities for the proper administration of civil law and order. In addition, legal services may be necessary with respect to the issue of a local court’s jurisdiction over US military personnel and activities.

b. In summary, Figure III-4 highlights some of the legal issues that may impact on joint force operations.

For further detail pertaining to legal support to joint operations, refer to JP 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF), and JP 1-04, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Legal Support to Military Operations.

10. Logistics

a. General. Logistic planners should assess CMO logistic requirements and affected country and theater support capabilities. Attendant risks and logistic objectives also should be identified. Emphasis must be placed upon locating logistic bases as close as possible to the recipients. Logistic planners should avoid locating distribution points in major population centers to reduce movement of large portions of the population from traditional economic and social areas. **All potential supply sources should be considered**, including affected country, commercial, coalition, and pre-positioned supplies. Lessons learned indicate that logistics and the associated support facilities and infrastructure necessary to sustain CMO are frequently underestimated. CMO often are logistics and engineering intensive. Therefore, **the overall logistic concept should be closely tied into the operational strategy and be mutually supporting.** This includes:

> “Logistics planning should be done at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. . . . Planners must identify critical or key issues unique to a specific operation plan they must support. These issues include the increased demand associated with an expanding force; critical supply items; constricting bottlenecks; control of all means of transportation (including that provided by allies and host nations); and the sourcing of supplies and services from coalition sources.”

**JP 4-0, Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations**

- Identifying time-phased material requirements, facilities, and other resources. Remote and austere locations may require deployment of materials handling equipment and pre-positioned stocks.

- Identifying support methods and procedures required to meet air, land, and sea lines of communications.

- Establishing procedures for coordinating and controlling material movements to and within the operational area. Priorities may be established using apportionment systems, providing the commander flexibility to reinforce priority efforts with additional assets.
Planning must include logistic support that normally is outside the bounds of military logistics, such as support to the civilian populace (e.g., women, children, and the aged). CMO forces often are going to provide support for these categories of individuals, and planners must take appropriate steps...
early on to ensure proper aid is administered.

- Planning also should consider the potential requirements to provide support to nonmilitary personnel, e.g., NGO, international organizations.

b. Contracting Support. Although discussed under the logistic section, the joint force Director for Force Structure, Resource, and Assessment, Joint Staff (J-8) and/or Comptroller may perform contracting, if established by the JFC.

- General. Providing support to the joint force and its subordinates may require contracting interaction with foreign governments, commercial entities, and NGO. Contracting can be an effective force multiplier of combat service support for deployed forces. When properly used, contracting is another essential tool of the JFC in support of the mission. Logisticians should be thoroughly familiar with contracting options available through the Navy’s Emergency Construction Capabilities Contract Process (CONCAP), the Army’s Logistics Civilian Augmentation Program (LOGCAP), the Air Force Contract Augmentation Program (AFCAP), acquisition cross-Service agreement (ACSA), or HNS resources. Contracting can bridge gaps that may occur before sufficient organic support units can deploy, or it can be used to reduce the logistic footprint. It also is valuable where no HNS agreements exist, or where HNS agreements do not provide for the supplies or services required. Close coordination with CA, finance and accounting activities, and legal support also is essential.

- Contracting Support Plan. The JFC may want to develop a contracting support plan to provide the following information.
  - Outline the procedures and policies for implementation of contracting support in the operational area, assuring full utilization of HNS, LOGCAP, AFCAP, ACSA, and CONCAP resources.
  - Ensure that contracting solutions receive consideration during logistic planning and become part of the plan or order.
  - Identify joint force subordinate commands’ requirements that may be met by HNS, LOGCAP, CONCAP, AFCAP, ACSA, or contracting support.
  - Develop an area database containing all available data concerning local resources. The database may include area studies, locally developed logistic support data, a complete listing of existing LOGCAP, CONCAP, and HNS agreements available in the operational area, and recommendations from State Department Foreign Service personnel. Information also may come from the United States or civilian organizations (NGO and international organizations) familiar with the area. This part of the contracting support plan must be continually updated.
  - Address force protection and quality control aspects of contracting, to include inspection of goods received to ensure against sabotage, poisoning, or other terrorist-style actions and fraud.

- Joint Force Contracting Office(s). The JFC may establish a joint contracting office(s), staffed by personnel from all the Services operating in the operational area (to include linguists and interpreters when required). A joint force contracting
office would be responsible for the following:

- Including some or all of the warranted contracting officers in the operational area. If more than one contracting office is required, contracting officers may have to be assigned to other smaller joint contracting offices to provide support on an area basis.

- Providing coordination and cooperation among Services that maintain parallel contracting organizations within the operational area. Precluding inter-Service competition for local supplies or services, and obtaining the most advantageous prices through consolidation of requirements to more effectively utilize scarce personnel resources. **Military forces should not compete for scarce civilian resources.**

- Establishing coordination and cooperation with CA, finance and accounting activities, and legal support.

- Providing contracting representatives to the joint force Logistics Directorate organizational structure.

- It is critical, upon mission termination or redeployment, that the joint force ensures all records or files are closed out and submitted to the supported combatant commander for disposition. In addition, logisticians must consider which equipment and supplies may be left behind at the completion of the mission.

c. **Non-US Local Civilian Hire**

- Local national civilian labor may be utilized in support of military operations. **Procurement of local national civilian labor will be in accordance with DOD contracting regulations** and is normally the responsibility of component commands. The joint force Manpower and Personnel Directorate, as well as the J-8 and/or Comptroller (if established by the JFC), will be involved in the procurement of local national labor.

- **Day Labor Pay.** HN employee and day labor pay are provided through arrangements with the HN or by a designated component of the joint force. The JFC has the authority to hire HN employees and day labor and to make

*Bosnian civilians employed by a US military contractor work on a construction project during Operation JOINT FORGE.*
payments. If required, this can be delegated to contracting officers. The Department of State determines payment rates. These rates, if available, should be obtained by the supported combatant commander and provided to the joint force J-8 and/or Comptroller in the planning phase of an operation.


11. Financial Management

“The joint force J-8 and/or comptroller must perform two key functions for the commander: first, ensure that resources are available when and where they are needed; second, aid the commander in maintaining his or her fiscal responsibilities.”


a. The joint force J-8 and/or Comptroller ensure that financial management support is provided for CMO. Financial management objectives include:

- Ensure quick and efficient mission-essential funding;
- Reduced impact of joint operations funding requirements on readiness;
- Mission success uncompromised by funding shortfalls; and
- Detailed financial management plans and coordinated efforts.

Financial managers may be collocated with the joint force logistics officer to consolidate efforts in the use of JFC fiscal resources.

b. Financial managers identify, acquire, distribute, control, and account for funds. Financial management operations include banking liaison and currency support, contracting payments for procurement/local vendor services/HNS, disbursing, cost-capturing, and non-US pay support (including EPW/CI).

c. DSO is normally conducted by DOD units under a cost reimbursement basis from either the LFA, the local or state civil governmental authority requesting assistance, or under a cost share of both of the previous. Joint force or lead Service comptroller should provide cost data capturing requirements and forwarding procedures to all installations and units supporting the civil authority. Installations and units should be prepared to gather cost data and submit to the joint force comptroller management for proper reimbursement under the Stafford Act, Economy Act, or other reimbursement vehicle.

For further detail pertaining to financial management, refer to JP 1-06, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Financial Management During Joint Operations.

12. Information Gathering

a. As depicted in Figure III-5, information gathering during CMO should be broadly focused and may include areas concerning political, military, paramilitary, ethnic, religious, economic, health services, environmental, and criminal indicators. The primary effort must be to answer the commander’s priority information requirements to include those related to force protection. The unique aspects of CMO require that analytic assets available to the
commander be used to fuse or integrate that information, from whatever source, needed to guide participating organizations in achieving the CMO overarching goals. Nonmilitary and non-US elements also must be considered in both collection and dissemination.

b. It is important to remember that, in order to accomplish their mission, non-US military organizations, NGOs, and international organizations may require access to classified information. The authority to allow these organizations access exists in National Disclosure Policy-1, National Policy and Procedures for the Disclosure of Classified Military Information to Foreign Governments and International Organizations, DODD 5230.11, Disclosure of Classified Military Information to Foreign and International Organizations, and applicable Director of Central Intelligence guidance.

- Information must be readily accessible to those who need it, while still adhering to the security standards of need-to-know and protection of classified information and intelligence sources and methods.

- Because of NGOs’, international organizations’, and other organizations’ and agencies’ sensitivities regarding negative perceptions generated by working with military organizations, the term “information” should be used in place of “intelligence.”

- There are significant legal restrictions concerning the use of military information assets to collect information.
on US citizens or to employ certain collection techniques.

“As the 21st century approaches, we must also be cognizant of the changing roles and missions facing the Armed Forces of the United States and ensure that intelligence planning keeps pace with the full range of military operations. The future battlefield will demand high levels of joint interoperability and force enhancement, and the value of intelligence support as an exploitable multiplier cannot be overstated.”

General John M. Shalikashvili
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1993-1997

- DODD 5200.27, Acquisition of Information Concerning Persons and Organizations Not Affiliated With the Department of Defense, strictly regulates the use of military intelligence assets to collect information on US citizens. During disaster assistance operations, intelligence personnel and assets may be used for liaison and other support activities.

- Intelligence capabilities may, with authority from the Department of Defense: (1) Acquire information about threats to the physical security of DOD personnel, installations, operations, official visitors, or for force protection. (2) Analyze and disseminate information to disaster relief personnel and disaster field offices. (3) Support disaster field office operations using intelligence estimate procedures and skills.

- In DSO, the emphasis may be on acquiring information about threats to the physical security of DOD personnel, installations, operations, official visitors, or for force protection.

- An intelligence architecture for the operation will be required so the commander can use fused, all-source information to visualize the operational area. Normal tasking and reporting channels will provide the basis for this architecture, but provisions will have to be made for working with governments for which no previously established intelligence agreements exist and for exchanging security related information with public and private international organizations, as well as HN entities. National, theater, and tactical collection systems can be tasked to provide current imagery or other information pertaining to the crisis. Imagery — such as that provided to all interested parties via the Internet on an “Open Skies” basis during recovery from Hurricane MITCH in 1998 — can be used to assess transportation networks or locate large groups of dislocated civilians.

- Regardless of the mechanism(s) employed to integrate and process the information relevant to CMO, it is essential that all parties involved participate in a common effort to share operationally relevant information. This process is not the intelligence function per se, but rather a necessary step in achieving the operation’s goals.

For further detail concerning intelligence support to joint operations, refer to JP 2-0, Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Joint Operations, and JP 2-01, Joint Intelligence Support to Military Operations.

13. Communications

Any force deploying to an operational area must bring or coordinate for the ability to communicate. This should include the capability to communicate in secure and nonsecure modes using voice, data, and video teleconferencing through a combination of military and commercial systems. The ability
Planning Civil-Military Operations

to communicate with all military forces, NGOs, international organizations, UN agencies, HN agencies, and religious and other organizations is essential during CMO.

“[Command, control, communications, and computers] C4 systems planners must continually prioritize and choose from among the individual joint and Service system capabilities that support different needs across the range of military operations. Different conflict levels impose different, and sometimes contentious, requirements on the C4 systems that support them. Various conflict levels can occur simultaneously over a wide geographic area, and require different options and responses.”

JP 6-0, Doctrine for Command, Control, Communications, and Computer (C4) Systems Support to Joint Operations

b. Communications Security. Communications may be secured against monitoring through encryption or codes. Physical hardening, OPSEC (to include physical security), and redundancy reduce system failures stemming from sabotage and elements of nature. Communications security also will be complicated by the need to coordinate with other agencies (US and non-US) and multinational forces. A policy for the release of classified information should be considered early in the planning process and introduced as soon as practical in an operation. It is important to remember that non-US military organizations may require access to classified material to accomplish their missions. Procedures for the release of classified information to support CMO must be established before it negatively affects the mission. These organizations often are force multipliers in CMO.

c. Frequency Management. Communication planners must include frequency management and coordinate radio frequency spectrum requirements at the earliest planning stage to help assure mission success. Also, multinational forces and nonmilitary agency frequency requirements need to consider security precautions and coordinate accordingly. Lastly, host governments strictly control their sovereign spectrum use.

d. Interoperability. Identify communications equipment interoperability among all participants. Nonmilitary agencies may have their own communications networks, and the degree of sophistication will vary. These may include commercial leased circuits and satellite services, and high frequency radio equipment. Commercial satellite services can provide worldwide voice, data, and facsimile communications. This system can provide an excellent communications link between both nations, regional organizations, another military force, or civilian organizations.
military and nonmilitary organizations. Regardless of the systems available to military and nonmilitary organizations, it is critical that CMOCs are equipped with communication equipment that facilitates coordination with all participants. CMOC communications requirements must be identified early. Deployment planners should use commercial off the shelf equipment to meet end user requirements. The need for interoperability of communications equipment in CMO also may necessitate using unclassified communications means during the operation. The key to success is evaluating the use of all available means of communicating (military, commercial, and HN) to put together a network that supports CMO. Every situation will be unique.

e. Reports. JFCs should standardize similar communication reports to increase efficiency of operations.

f. Lessons Learned. These are some of the critical communications lessons learned from Operation PROVIDE COMFORT in northern Iraq and Turkey:

- Obtain adequate communications equipment to provide basic mission essential service.
- Employ additional equipment, and reconfigure connectivity to provide direct routing to principal destinations.
- Add equipment to provide multiple routes to prevent site isolation.
- Have sufficient equipment to support jump capabilities, respond to new missions, and avoid critical shortages.
- Build in redundancy.

For further detail relating to communications support to joint operations, refer to JP 6-0, Doctrine for Command, Control, Communications, and Computer (C4) Systems Support to

**SOURCE:** Haiti Command and Control Lessons Learned: The Transition from Military to Commercial Communications
A MEMORABLE OCCASION

In July 1997, a civil affairs direct support team (DST) commander who regularly worked with the mayor of the town outside the base camp was invited to attend the dedication of a memorial in the town square. Being the senior representative of the Stabilization Force (SFOR) on the scene, he was asked to say a few words on what was a very solemn and very significant event for the people of the town. Local media were on hand to capture the event, and, potentially, to broadcast or print the remarks of the DST commander through the region. Being knowledgeable of the SFOR information operations (IO) themes, the DST commander was able to confidently give a short speech, which both reinforced the IO themes and strengthened the working relationship between the SFOR and the community.


14. Information Operations

a. General. IO are concerned with affecting adversary information and information systems while protecting one’s own information and information systems. To accomplish this goal, IO planners work to integrate and deconflict various capabilities and activities to achieve IO objectives that support the JFC’s mission objectives. CMO is one of the activities that must be integrated to successfully accomplish IO.

b. Information Operations and Civil-Military Operations

- Information provided by friendly, adversary, and neutral parties has a significant effect on CMO planners’ ability to establish and maintain relations between joint forces and the civil authorities and general population, resources, and institutions in friendly, neutral, or hostile areas.

- Depending on the nature and mission of specific joint operations, other joint force capabilities and activities used to conduct IO may complement or support CMO efforts. Working through the IO cell on a joint staff, CMO planners seek to ensure that other capabilities and activities related to IO are consistent with and supportive of CMO objectives. At the same time, the IO cell can deconflict CMO with the other capabilities and activities conducting IO.

c. Information Operations Cell. CMO planners should ensure that they take an active part in IO cell meetings and planning efforts to ensure that CMO considerations and concerns are clearly understood and addressed.

- The IO cell, in coordination with other elements of the joint force staff, develops and promulgates campaign or operation IO guidance for plans that is passed down to the components or subordinate JTFs for decentralized execution.

- The IO cell is formed from select representatives from each staff
The joint force chaplain has the responsibility to plan, coordinate, and implement all the religious support within the joint force for the JFC. In addition to advising the JFC on moral, ethical, and quality of life issues, the chaplain advises on all religious matters relating to religious ministry support. The focus of religious ministry remains the members of the joint force. The stress and uncertainty of such environments and missions tend to expand the need for direct ministry to these Service members. The joint force chaplain also is responsible for the following:

- Developing joint religious ministry support plans in support of the operation. (This includes preparation of the Appendix 6, “Religious Ministry Support,” under Annex E, “Personnel”, of the JFC’s OPLANs, OPORDs, or campaign plans, to include appropriate tabs.)
- Identifying religious ministry support team requirements, including:
  - Personnel staffing and augmentation requirements; and
  - Facilities, equipment, transportation and communication requirements.
- Organizing the religious ministry support teams to provide comprehensive religious ministry support, which includes:
  - Coordinating religious ministry with Service component command chaplains;
  - Coordinating logistic support requirements; and
  - Coordinating appropriate training for religious support personnel.

For further guidance on IO, refer to JP 3-13, Joint Doctrine for Information Operations.

15. Religious Ministry Support

“For further guidance on IO, refer to JP 3-13, Joint Doctrine for Information Operations.”

“Because there may be no precise boundary where one condition (military operations other than war and war) ends and another begins, changes in religious ministry support activities will be more a matter of changing intensity and emphasis than of dramatically altered duties. Chaplains and enlisted religious support personnel support the accomplishment of operational objectives through one or more of the following activities: advising, supporting, coordinating, analyzing, planning, writing, training, supervising, and evaluating. By performing these activities, chaplains facilitate the commander’s religious ministry support plan during a wide range of operations.”

JP 1-05, Religious Ministry Support for Joint Operations
Planning Civil-Military Operations

SECTION C. SPECIALIZED PLANNING

16. Multinational Operations

a. With the ever-increasing involvement with multinational forces, it is imperative that the US military forces fully understand the special considerations arising when working with military and paramilitary forces of other nations.

“The United States employs a national security strategy committed to protecting its own national security interests and achieving strategic objectives by directing all the elements of national power (political, economic, information, and military) toward the strategic end state. The National Security Strategy states that, while US forces retain unilateral capability, whenever possible they will seek to operate alongside alliance or coalition forces, integrating their capabilities and capitalizing on their strengths, to promote regional stability throughout the world. Therefore, US commanders should expect to conduct operations as part of a multinational force (MNF). US forces may participate in these multinational efforts across a range of military and civil operations in concert with a variety of US governmental agencies, military forces of other nations, local authorities, and international and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs).”

b. Religion plays a pivotal role in the worldview of many people and has a significant effect on the goals, objectives, and structure of society. It is important for the JFC to have an understanding of the religious groups and movements within the operational area and the potential impact that they have on the accomplishment of the assigned mission. CA cultural affairs teams provide this support to the JFC and staff.

For further detail regarding Service capabilities and religious support to joint operations, refer to Appendix A, “Service Capabilities,” and JP 1-05, Religious Ministry Support for Joint Operations.

b. Political and military intentions of multinational partners will impact planning and operations. Nations’ agendas and interests will differ from those of the United States in many ways. In many instances, multinational forces (MNFs) will not be able to influence the planning effort without prior approval of their home country and its commitment to the concept of operations and mission.
c. Additional factors should be considered when planning with an MNF. Figure III-6 highlights some of these factors.

d. To effectively and efficiently plan with a MNF, the JFC must recognize and accept the differences between US and MNFs and work to develop a harmonizing approach to the planning effort. The JFC must make MNFs feel as if they are part of a team. Where possible, the JFC should develop standardization procedures to reduce uncertainty among MNFs. A lexicon of mutually agreed upon terminology should be developed and distributed to ensure enhanced operability and maximum understanding by all militaries, NGOs, international organizations, religious organizations, and others.

e. In addition to operating as part of a joint force, Army civil affairs units must be prepared for combined operations with land, air and naval forces of allied governments. Unity of effort in combined operations proceeds from the political and strategic leadership of the alliance. Allied governments normally develop directives covering a

---

“Differences in defining terminology results in differences in procedures.”

Captain Peter Feist, German Navy North Atlantic Treaty Organization Joint Analysis Team

---

**Figure III-6. Planning Factors for Multinational Forces**

- Force capabilities
- Command, control, and communications—will there be problems with transfer of authority?
- Logistics—will the United States have to provide support and to what extent?
- Level of training
- Deployment capability—will US transportation assets be required?
- Procedures for collecting, dissemination, and sharing intelligence (information)
- Status of existing agreements—have there already been agreements established that the joint task force will be expected to support?
- “Degree of risk”—what is acceptable to multinational forces (may be politically driven)?
- Cultural and historical background
Combined command’s POL-MIL objectives. They include objectives and policies for the conduct of CMO. Army CA personnel may provide staff augmentation for joint or combined headquarters in support of multinational CMO. US military standard staff planning and coordination as well as interagency coordination activities are the most likely mission support activities that CA elements will undertake in the joint or combined environment. Senior level combatant command or Service component plans, policies and programs teams are best suited for conducting joint/combined operations due to the rank and experience of these team members.

For further details concerning operating with multinational forces, refer to JP 3-16, Joint Doctrine for Multinational Operations.

17. Consequence Management Operations

a. CM includes those measures taken to protect public health and safety, restore essential public services, and provide emergency relief to victims of, or individuals threatened by the consequences of a chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear (CBRN) accident or incident. CM may occur before or after the occurrence of a CBRN event. CM includes planning, assessment, and actions to identify, organize, and transport emergency responders, supplies, and equipment to an event site.

b. When an incident occurs, the CM process continues until surviving casualties become patients, the threat of further casualties has been minimized, FHA is being provided, and local public safety has been reestablished. At that juncture, the CM process can be terminated and restoration activities may begin.

c. CM will be planned and executed for locations within US territory and in foreign countries as directed by the NCA. Support of domestic CM will be provided through the United States Joint Forces Command as MSCA. CM overseas will be coordinated through the US Department of State’s Consequence Management Program, with assistance to a particular foreign government coordinated through the appropriate US embassy. The geographic combatant commander within whose AOR the accident occurs will be the embassy’s primary military point of contact.

d. JFCs provide CM guidance in plans and orders.

18. Termination and Transition Operations (Exit Strategy — POL-MIL Plan, if developed)

“Before forces are committed, JFCs [joint force commanders] must know how the NCA [National Command Authorities] intends to terminate the operation and ensure its outcomes endure. . . . During postconflict operations, JFCs may transfer control to other authorities and redeploy forces. JFCs should identify postconflict requirements as early as possible so as to facilitate transition and to permit the simultaneous redeployment of forces no longer required.”

JP 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations

a. Termination or transition occurs when either the mission has been accomplished or when the NCA so directs. CMO planners play a major role in termination and transition.

- If developed, an interagency POL-MIL plan under PDD-56, Managing Complex Contingency Operations, will provide a comprehensive end state and transition exit strategy to guide follow-on planning.

- Criteria for termination or transition may be based on events, MOE and/or success, availability of resources, or a specific date. A successful harvest or restoration of critical facilities in the crisis area are examples of events that might trigger termination of the mission. An acceptable drop in mortality rates, a certain percentage of dislocated civilians returned to their homes, or a given decrease in threat activity against the FHA operation are statistical criteria that may prompt the end of US forces’ involvement.

- When other organizations (such as international organizations, HN, UN, NGO, LFA, OFDA, FEMA, Federal Bureau of Investigation, and state or local government) have marshalled the necessary capabilities to assume the mission, US forces may execute a transition plan.

- Transition may occur between the US joint force, another military force (e.g., United States, multinational, or affected country), regional organization, the United Nations, or civilian organizations. A detailed plan addressing the various FHA functions and to whom they will transition will greatly reduce the turmoil typically associated with transition. A comprehensive transition plan includes specific requirements for all elements involved in the transition, summarizes capabilities and assets, and assigns specific responsibilities.

  - An unclassified transition plan written in easily understood terms is particularly required when transitioning to nonmilitary organizations. Organizing the plan by specific FHA functions (such as provision of food, restoration of facilities, and health services) also enhances the transition.

  - The joint force staff should periodically review the transition plan with all organizations that have a part in it. This will help ensure that planning assumptions are still valid, and determine if changes in the situation require changes in the transition plan.

  - Termination plans should cover transition to post-disaster or emergency activities and conditions, as well as disposition of military forces. OPORDs and
termination plans should be prepared simultaneously and in conjunction with the deployment plan, with the termination plan serving as a supporting plan to the OPORD. See Figure III-7 for a sample checklist for termination planning.

b. Transition Planning. CMO planners play a major role in transition planning and, based on their expertise, may be the best group to perform this function. In order for these planners to accomplish this task, a clearly identifiable end state and transition or termination criteria for the operation must be developed.

- Transition planning is an integral part of operation planning and mission analysis.

- Transferring control of an operation from US military to a nonmilitary organization or another military force requires detailed planning and execution. Mission analysis (analysis of mission statement),

SAMPLE CHECKLIST FOR TERMINATION PLANNING

- Has the end state been achieved?
  - Have stated operations objectives been accomplished?
  - Have the underlying causes of the conflict been considered, and how do they influence termination planning?
  - Has the joint force commander identified postconflict requirements?

- Can forces be safely withdrawn from the joint operations area? What are the force protection requirements?
  - What additional support will be required for redeployment?
  - What is the policy for redeployment? What is the relationship between postconflict requirements and the redeployment of the joint force?
  - What is the policy for evacuation of equipment used by the joint force?

- Has the coordination for redeployment of the joint force been conducted with appropriate commands, agencies, and other organizations?

- Has consideration been given as to when Reserve Component forces will be released?

- Has transition planning been accomplished in the event that operations are transitioning to another military force, regional organization, United Nations, or civilian organization?

- What arrangements have been made with other organizations to accomplish the postconflict activities? For example, will there be humanitarian, governmental, and infrastructure assistance requirements?

- Will the joint force be expected to support these types of activities?

Figure III-7. Sample Checklist for Termination Planning
an identifiable end state, interagency POL-MIL plan (if developed), and the national policy will all play an important role in the transition process. Transferring control of an operation is situationally dependent and each one will possess different characteristics and requirements.

• Transition planning must be initiated during the initial phases of operation planning to ensure adequate attention is placed in this critical area — plan for transition when planning for intervention.

• As the redeployment phase for US forces approaches, it is important that force protection remain the number one priority. The redeployment phase of the operation can be the most hazardous in force protection, because the tactical focus tends to shift toward redeployment and away from task force protection.

• Areas that will impact significantly on the development of a transition plan are:
  • Identification of issues;
  • Key events (past and present);
  • Work required to accomplish the transition; and
  • A thorough knowledge of the organization or force taking over control of the operation.

• The issues in Figure III-8 may have an impact on transition planning.

• CA will play an integral role in both transition planning and the process. In any major operation, there will be significant interface with and impact upon the civilian populace and the local government. CA personnel must insure

---

**TRANSITION CRITERIA ISSUES**

- Who will determine when the transition begins or is complete?
- Who will fund the transition?
- What US forces, equipment, supplies, or other resources will remain behind?
- Who will support US forces that remain behind?
- Can intelligence be shared with incoming force or organization?
- Will new rules of engagement be established?
- Will ongoing operations be discontinued or interrupted?
- Will joint force engineer projects be halted?
- Will the United States be expected to provide communications capabilities of the incoming force or organization?

---

*Figure III-8. Transition Criteria Issues*
that the gains made in this area are not lost in the transition process. CA planners must be involved in transition planning from the beginning. The CMOC prepares to hand over its role as the facilitator between US forces and international organizations, NGOs, other USG agencies, and local government agencies. CMOC personnel prepare a transition plan that includes all ongoing projects and coordination, points of contact for all agencies with which the CMOC has worked, possible resources, and any other information that may facilitate the transition process.

*CMOC is discussed in more depth in Chapter IV, “Interagency Coordination.”*

- All CMO assets involved in a mission must be prepared to assist in the planning and execution of transition operations. It is imperative that all teams and/or sections develop historical files to aid in the transition process. **The transition process must be considered from the initial planning of the mission.**

- Figure III-9 depicts a sample checklist for transition planning.

19. Complex Contingency Operations

a. PDD-56, *Managing Complex Contingency Operations*, was initiated to integrate the political, military, humanitarian, economic, and other dimensions of USG planning for complex contingencies.

b. PDD-56, *Managing Complex Contingency Operations*, defines complex contingency operations as peace operations such as the peace accord implementation operation conducted by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in Bosnia (1995-present) and the humanitarian intervention in northern Iraq called Operation PROVIDE COMFORT (1991) and FHA operations, such as Operation SUPPORT HOPE in central Africa (1994) and Operation SEA ANGEL in Bangladesh (1991). Unless otherwise directed, PDD-56, *Managing Complex Contingency Operations*, does not apply to domestic disaster relief or to a relatively routine or small-scale operation, nor to military operations conducted in defense of US citizens, territory, or property, including counterterrorism and hostage-rescue operations and foreign internal armed conflict. In recent situations as diverse as Haiti, Somalia, Northern Iraq, and the former Yugoslavia, the United States has engaged in complex contingency operations in coalitions, either under the auspices of an international or regional organization or in ad hoc, temporary coalitions of like-minded states. While never relinquishing the capability to respond unilaterally, PDD-56, *Managing Complex Contingency Operations*, assumes that the United States will continue to conduct future operations in coalitions whenever possible.

c. There is a direct link between complex contingency operations and CMO. The *intent of PDD-56, Managing Complex Contingency Operations*, is to synchronize and coordinate the operations of agencies through effective interagency management at the strategic level and using special mechanisms, most notably a POL-MIL plan. Integrated planning and effective management of agency operations early in an operation provide an interagency framework at the national strategic level for follow-on theater and operational level planning, avoids delays, reduces pressure on the military to expand its involvement in unplanned ways, and creates unity of effort within an operation that is essential for success of the mission.

d. Planning and preparations for CMO at the operational level should reflect the considerations set forth in the operations POL-MIL plan as outlined at the strategic level in
PDD-56, *Managing Complex Contingency Operations*. More than combat operations, CMO can benefit from existing two-way communication between these levels. A combatant commander’s intent and guidance for CMO should not be promulgated without input from the POL-MIL plan. Conversely, the POL-MIL plan will provide utility and functionality to a JTF when it incorporates capabilities, constraints, and ideas from the field before it is promulgated. Such coordination assures synchronization and unity of effort for both the strategic and operational objectives or end state. While no formal process has been established for this exchange under PDD-56, *Managing Complex Contingency Operations*, it is to the advantage of theater and JTF headquarters to register
views from the operational level with the Joint Staff as early as possible in this comprehensive, civil-military planning process.

“The need for complex contingency operations is likely to recur in future years, demanding varying degrees of US involvement. PDD-56 [Presidential Decision Directive-56] calls for all US Government agencies to institutionalize what we have learned from our recent experiences and to continue the process of improving the planning and management of complex contingency operations. PDD-56 is designed to ensure that the lessons learned — including proven planning processes and implementation mechanisms — will be incorporated into the interagency process on a regular basis. The PDD’s intent is to establish these management practices to achieve unity of effort among US Government agencies and international organizations engaged in complex contingency operations.”

**Synopsis**

*Presidential Decision Directive-56, Managing Complex Contingency Operations*

For an overview of PDD-56, refer to Appendix B, “Presidential Decision Directive-56, Managing Complex Contingency Operations.”

### 20. Planning Civil Affairs Activities

CA activities are inherently civil-military in nature and while they are integral parts of CMO and MCA, they are there own separate entity. CA activities are characterized by applications of functional specialties in areas normally the responsibility of indigenous government or civil authority. CA activities may extend to assumption of governmental functions required in an occupied territory during or immediately subsequent to hostilities. Refer to Appendix C, “Planning Considerations for Civil Affairs Activities.”

See JP 3-57.1, Joint Doctrine for Civil Affairs, for more information on CA activities.
Intentionally Blank
CHAPTER IV
INTERAGENCY COORDINATION

"US Armed Forces as a whole must be multi-mission capable; interoperable among all elements of US Services and selected foreign militaries; and able to coordinate operations with other agencies of government, and some civil institutions."


1. General

In CMO, interagency coordination may be one of the top priorities. By understanding the interagency process, JFCs will be better able to appreciate their role in it. An appreciation of the skills and resources of various USG agencies and an understanding of how they interact with NGOs, international organizations, and regional organizations are critical to mission accomplishment. Civil-military relations can create economic, political, and social stability as they encourage the development of the affected nation’s materiel and human resources. JFCs utilize Annex V, “Interagency Coordination,” of plans and orders to provide guidance for incorporating the interagency community into military operations.

a. Interagency Operations at the National Level

• The integration of political, economic, civil, and military objectives and the subsequent translation of these objectives into demonstrable action have always been essential to success at all levels of operations.

• The new, rapidly changing global environment that is characterized by regional instability, the challenges of pluralistic governments, and unconventional threats will require even greater interagency cooperation within a fully functioning civil-military relationship. Military operations must be synchronized with those of other agencies of the USG, as well as with foreign forces, NGOs, international organizations, and regional organizations. These actions must be mutually supporting and proceed in a logical sequence. In order to successfully undertake interagency operations, the roles and relationships among various Federal agencies, combatant commands, state and local governments, Country Teams, and engaged organizations must be clearly understood.

"...two attributes of [military] operations other than war that are likely to influence command and control and thus affect directly the outcome of the mission: the absence of an obvious continuum or linear relationship between the strategic, operational, and tactical consequences of action, and the requirement for interagency coordination, even at relatively low echelons. The article uses the 1992 Los Angeles riots to illustrate some of the unique characteristics of this type of mission: the situation was ‘amorphous and ambiguous,’ the use of force was greatly restrained, coordination with nonmilitary entities was often required at battalion and lower echelons, and political considerations governed military actions at even the individual level."

Christopher M. Schnaubelt
Lessons in Command and Control from the Los Angeles Riots
• Interagency coordination forges the vital link between the military and the economic, political and/or diplomatic, and informational entities of the USG as well as NGOs and international organizations. Successful interagency coordination and planning enables these agencies, departments, and organizations to mount a coherent and efficient collective operation — unity of effort must be achieved.

“Planning frequently will have to be accomplished in an ambiguous environment. Crises will arrive quickly and require a rapid response, often in the absence of coalition consensus or complete US political guidance. But, the United States cannot afford improvised responses to crises. To prevent ‘ad hocery,’ the United States must develop a sound and rigorous policymaking apparatus and process, and adhere to it. The interagency process must be made to work routinely in an effective manner.”

William T. Johnsen
Strategic Study Institute
Pandora’s Box Reopened: Ethnic Conflict in Europe and Its Implications

• The common thread throughout all major operations, whether in war or MOOTW, is the broad range of agencies — many with indispensable practical competencies and major legal responsibilities — that interact with the Armed Forces of the United States.

• The intrinsic nature of interagency coordination demands that planners consider all instruments of national power and recognize which agencies are best qualified to employ these instruments to achieve the objective. This consideration is especially necessary because the security challenges facing the United States today are growing in complexity, requiring the skills and resources of many organizations.

• Because the solution to a problem seldom, if ever, resides within the capability of just one agency, campaign plans, OPLANs, or OPORDs must be developed to leverage the core competencies of all available agencies, synchronizing their efforts with military capabilities toward a single objective. The NCA employ the Armed Forces of the United States when they have deemed it necessary to use military means to promote national interests. The use of the military instrument of national power as a component of the national security strategy takes the form of military objectives. These objectives need to be coordinated with associated diplomatic, economic, and informational objectives. The military instrument often plays a supporting role to other national agencies. Understanding how military coordination efforts interface with other organizations toward mission accomplishment is key to the success in joint operations and unified actions.

“It is essential to appreciate the strength of what I call bureaucratic faultlines-policy areas where agencies have overlapping responsibilities and very distinctive institutional interests and perspectives. The most important faultline of this sort occurs at the intersection of political and military affairs. . . . What is required is not coordination in an administrative or technical sense but the integration of divergent (and sometimes mutually antagonistic) perspectives through the active exercise of strategic thought.”

Carnes Lord
Strategy and Organization at the National Level, Grand Strategy and the Decisionmaking Process
Each organization brings its own culture, philosophy, goals, practices, and skills to the interagency table. This diversity is the strength of the interagency process, providing a cross-section of expertise, skills, and abilities. In one coordinated forum, the process integrates many views, capabilities, and options.

b. Procedures for Effective Cooperation

The Administrator of USAID usually is designated as the USG humanitarian assistance coordinator for emergency response. However, various agencies’ different and sometimes conflicting goals, policies, procedures, and decision making techniques make unity of effort a challenge. Some NGOs may, in fact, have policies that are purposely antithetical to both the US military forces and USG agencies. Although there is no overarching interagency doctrine that delineates or dictates the relationships and procedures governing all agencies, departments, and organizations in interagency operations, PDD-56, Managing Complex Contingency Operations, provides an overview of the management and planning of complex contingency operations under the direction of the Deputies Committee. Nor is there an overseeing organization to ensure that the myriad of agencies, departments, and organizations have the capability and the tools to work together. Moreover, PDD-2, Organization of the National Security Council, provides that other senior officials shall be invited to attend meetings of the NSC where appropriate. PDD-2, Organization of the National Security Council, creates a hierarchy of interagency committees, from the Principals Committee and, under it, the Deputies Committee, to Interagency Working Groups, which are established by the Deputies Committee as needed.

The interagency process often is described as “more art than science,” while military operations tend to depend on structure and doctrine. However, some of the techniques, procedures, and systems of military C2 can assist in obtaining unity of effort if they are adjusted to the dynamic world of interagency operations. Unity of effort can only be achieved through close, continuous interagency and interdepartmental coordination and cooperation, which are necessary to overcome confusion over objectives, inadequate structure or procedures, and bureaucratic and personal limitations. At the combatant command level, the political advisor (POLAD) or foreign policy advisor (FPA) to the commander can be of great assistance in interagency coordination. Each combatant command is allocated an Army CA Command staffed with functional experts in a range of critical civilian skills. The civil sector functional experts are knowledgeable in working with the civilian agencies responsible for their functional sector. As such they are already experienced in the responsibilities of such agencies.

c. Political Advisor and/or Foreign Policy Advisor

Frequently, the Department of State assigns geographic combatant commands a POLAD or FPA. This person provides diplomatic considerations and enables informal linkage with embassies in the AOR and with the Department of State.

The POLAD and/or FPA supplies information regarding policy goals and objectives of the Department of State that are relevant to the geographic combatant commander’s theater strategy.
The POLAD and/or FPA provides the commander the following additional capabilities:

• Uses regional knowledge and language skills to assist the combatant commander in translating political objectives into military strategy;

• Coordinates with, and facilitates cooperation between, the primary US political and military personnel or their designated representatives; and

• Moves more freely and works more easily with different participants than military personnel.

Under certain circumstances, a JTF also may have a POLAD and/or FPA, as occurred in Haiti.

d. Interagency Structure in Foreign Countries

• The Chief of Mission (COM) (i.e., the Ambassador) has authority over all elements of the USG in country, except forces assigned to a combatant command. Other key USG organizations in place within most nations include the US Defense Attaché Office (USDAO) and the Unified States Defense Representative — both part of the Country Team. In some countries, a single military office may perform these two functions. Security assistance organizations also perform important functions. It is important to understand the differences between these agencies in theater interagency coordination.

• Chief of Mission. As discussed, the COM is the senior representative of the President in a foreign nation and is responsible for policy decisions and the activities of USG employees in the country. The COM integrates the programs and resources of all USG agencies represented on the Country Team. The COM has extraordinary authority and a de facto coordinating mechanism that can be tailored to each crisis as it arises, based upon the substance of the problem with little need for written rules. COMs must interact daily with the Department of State’s strategic-level planners and decision makers. Additionally, the COM functions at both the operational and tactical levels where recommendations and considerations for crisis action planning are provided directly to the geographic combatant commander and subordinate JFCs. While forces in the field under a geographic combatant command are exempt from the COM’s statutory authority, the COM’s political role is important to the success of military operations involving Armed Forces.

• US Defense Attaché Office. Service attaches comprise the USDAO. The Defense Attaché normally is the senior Service attaché assigned to the embassy. While keeping the combatant commander informed of their activities, Defense Attaches are rated and funded by the Defense Intelligence Agency. These attachés are valuable liaisons to their HN counterparts. The attachés also serve the Ambassador and coordinate with, and represent, their respective Military Departments on Service matters. The attachés assist the FID program by exchanging information with the combatant commander’s staff on HN military, social, economic, and political conditions.

• Security Assistance Organization. These are Department of Defense elements located in a foreign country with assigned responsibilities for carrying out SA management functions.
These include military assistance advisory groups, military missions and groups, offices of defense and military cooperation, liaison groups, and defense attaché personnel designated to perform SA functions.

- The Country Team. The Country Team system provides the foundation for rapid interagency consultation, coordination, and action on recommendations from the field and effective execution of US missions, programs, and policies. The Country Team typically includes political, economic, administrative, and consular officers as well as a PA officer, regional security officer, and communications staff. Attachés from the Department of Defense, Department of Agriculture, and other USG agencies, as well as the United States Defense Representative, often are represented on the team, as is USAID (Office of Transition Initiatives, Food for Peace, OFDA, and other USAID personnel also may play key roles) in country. The Country Team often is less than adequate for every need. It may not exist (e.g., Cuba), or it may be inoperative due to damage or casualties from a natural or manmade disaster. The relationship with military chains of command is frequently ad hoc. Coordination is necessary to better achieve unity of effort.

- The Country Team concept encourages agencies to coordinate their plans and operations and keep one another and the COM informed of their activities.

- Although the US area military commander (the combatant commander or a subordinate) is not a member of the diplomatic mission, the commander may participate or be represented in meetings and coordination conducted by the Country Team.

- The JFC should request that a joint force liaison officer participate in a Country Team’s meetings, when appropriate.

For further detail on interagency coordination at the national level, refer to JP 3-08, Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations.

“For all our experience and compassion, we in the relief and development business do not have the capacity to deal with such large-scale catastrophes without help. Help from the military is not something we should begin to take for granted or rely upon in all cases. But there are extraordinary circumstances that call for responses — manpower, equipment, expertise, transport and communication capacity — that only the military can deploy.”

Philip Johnston, President and Chief Executive Officer, CARE

2. Civil-Military Relations

a. Civilian Relief and Development Assets. Military forces characteristically arrive “late in the day” in a complex contingency operation. Both UN and non-UN international organizations have typically been working in the affected area for months or years. International organizations that have been doing development work usually shift or are augmented by emergency international organizations to deal with the onset of a complex humanitarian emergency. The international community has mandated specific international organizations with operational responsibilities and accountabilities in the relief and development sectors. In general these international organizations discharge their accountabilities best when they fund and implement the bulk
of their programs through competent NGOs, as opposed to implementation through sometimes problematical host-government ministries. International organizations, especially the UN operational agencies (UNHCR; World Food Program; United Nations Children’s Fund; and UNHCHR), are accountable to emergency victims and the international community for the success of the overall operation. NGOs, however, normally have only a limited financial accountability to their source of funding, i.e., lead international organizations, donor governments, and/or private contributors. This legally mandated system of responsibility and accountability within the civilian asset structure can be disciplined and made to function best when:

- Concerned governments, especially donor states, respect the accountability mandates they have assigned to international organizations, make the bulk of their financial contributions follow these mandates, and hold these international organizations accountable.

- Proliferation of unfocused, unsuitable implementing NGOs is controlled through a formal tripartite accreditation process involving the NGO, the host country, and the lead UN emergency organization.

- Military personnel view the accountable international organizations as their primary supported agencies and contacts and view NGOs as the implementing agency tier of the larger international organizations framework.

b. The Nature of NGOs. Many NGOs have established strong reputations for professional performance and good stewardship of increasingly scarce resources. While some NGOs are multi-purpose, most specialize in sectors such as emergency relief (including food, health services, sanitation, and self-reliance sub-specialties), rehabilitation and development, or advocacy (e.g., early warning, prevention, international organizations reform, human rights). NGO funding during the Cold War came largely from private sources, with significant amounts of operational costs underwritten by the international organizations with which they partnered. After the Cold War, there has been a marked shift to direct government funding of NGOs — for example, from the USAID in the United States and from the European Community Humanitarian Office in Western Europe. This funding shift, together with difficulties in enforcing UN agency accountabilities, has served to complicate the civil-military interface for military commanders and CA personnel.

c. The Civil-Military Interface. Military personnel must adhere to the following principles when dealing with NGOs:

- Military personnel need to understand and try to facilitate the principles of civilian operational and financial accountability as they apply to international organizations and NGOs.

- Civilian agencies possess comparative operational advantages for emergency relief work. Also, military costs average ten times the cost for civilian agencies to perform the same relief functions.

- The range of tasks military personnel could legitimately be called upon to perform should be part of the civilian mission planning process at the highest national and/or international organizations levels. Views of operational level commanders must be solicited and discussed at this early stage, rather than after deployment.

- Legitimate military tasks that must be considered in the mission-planning phase include:
• **Protection** (going beyond force protection to possible protection of civilian relief and human rights workers, protection of relief LOCs and relief operation sites, (health services and food); and, exceptionally, protection of emergency victims);

• **Logistics** (long haul transport of such time-sensitive items as civilian water purification capabilities and, by exception, retail transport of relief articles and personnel while the civilian transport system is catching up);

• **Engineer and communication services** (restoration, maintenance of relief LOCs, short-term communications, air traffic control, and airport management services — again, while civilian capabilities are catching up).

- Complex humanitarian emergencies often are accompanied by a rapid influx of NGOs. Current laxness in civilian accreditation and accountability standards may result in excessive independent action on the part of some NGOs. These problems are best resolved through direct military contact with the lead and/or accountable international organizations or with national government (both donor and host) representatives in theater — rather than attempting to correct the offending NGOs directly.

- Military information on threats and logistic matters can be especially useful to international organizations and NGOs and should be shared as much as possible. While some international organizations and NGOs may be reluctant to share similarly vital information with the military, it is worth attempting to cultivate a climate of respect and trust to facilitate such exchanges. International organizations and NGOs are uniquely suited to help the military regarding local conditions due to their long familiarity with the people and the region.

- Sharply differing civilian and military perspectives usually mitigate against achieving a common operating culture. However, military acceptance that civilian tasks in many modern emergencies constitute the main operational effort and military tasks are in support of this main effort can assist greatly in achieving a compatible culture in the field.

- It is important that each member of the civil-military organization act impartially with respect to factions and parties to civil strife. FHA must be rendered to all victims on an impartial basis.

- Intense civil-military communication and coordination is vital throughout all the phases of mission planning, deployment, operations, and transition (exit). Any attempt to substitute compartmentalized civilian and military planning and operations for comprehensive campaign planning virtually decrees prolongation and/or failure of overall mission accomplishment and indeterminate delay in permitting the military component to make an exit.

### 3. Organizing for Interagency Operations

CMO involve the interaction between civilian organizations with military organizations. **JFCs will need to establish coordination mechanisms with the civilian organizations.** Some coordination can be accomplished by forming a CMOC where civilian organizations can send their representatives to coordinate with the military force. However, the CMOC has inherent limitations and cannot meet all of the civil-
military coordination requirements of the JFC. Depending on the situation, the JFC may dispatch military personnel to civilian organizations to serve on civilian-led coordinating groups. Other times, the JFC may need to establish a functionally-oriented military-led coordination group. Civilian groups should lead those coordinating groups that are primarily involved in achieving civil objectives. The military should take the lead in forming groups involving military objectives.

Civil military coordination will need to be accomplished at all applicable levels. While the military makes a distinction between strategic, operational, and tactical levels, civilian organizations, however, may not make such distinctions and may have the same individuals representing the organizations at more than one level.

The military may need to participate or to be an observer in a number of civil-sector functional groups. Some groups may be existing groups. Others may have been formed specifically in response to the crisis by civilian organizations. The military may also form a military-led coordinating group or facilitate the formation of a civilian-led functional coordinating group if one does not exist for a vital functional area.

Functional coordinating groups may be needed to be formed for each of the civil sector functional areas. Further, sub-groups may be formed to coordinate a specific issue or project. For example, the group coordinating infrastructure repair may have a separate working group concentrating on just the reopening of an airport. Potential coordinating groups are: Governance Coordinating Group; Civil Security Coordinating Group; Humanitarian Coordinating Group (e.g., the Humanitarian Operations Center (HOC) and the Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Center); Economic and Commerce Coordinating Group; Social and Cultural Coordinating Group; Information Coordinating Group; and Infrastructure Coordinating Group.

Several temporary staff organizations can be established to support the joint force during interagency operations. Examples of such organizations follow.

a. Historically, a number of ad hoc or tailored staff organizations have been implemented to meet the requirement for the JFCS role in interagency operations. During the deliberate planning cycle, commanders at all levels should consider the potential structure and manning necessary to meet the increased demands of the interagency process. An interagency staff framework that is planned, coordinated and exercised under the deliberate planning cycle would significantly ease staff actions during crisis action planning.

National objectives can no longer be unilaterally attained by any one government entity. The interagency process is designed to ensure coherent, unified strategic and operational objectives for multiple agencies.

b. Humanitarian Operations Center

- The HOC is primarily an international and interagency policy making and coordinating body that does not exercise C2 but seeks to achieve unity of effort among all participants in a large FHA operation. Close joint force coordination with the affected country, UN, and other key members of the humanitarian relief community forms the core of FHA operations. Effective coordination is the key to successful turnover of FHA responsibilities to the affected country or UN, NGOs, and international organizations.

- The HOC normally is established under the direction of the government of the affected country or the UN, or possibly
OFDA during a US unilateral operation. HOCs, especially those established by the UN, are horizontally structured organizations with no C2 authority, and all members are ultimately responsible to their own organizations or countries.

- A HOC may be established by an HN government that is fully in charge, yet has a limited capacity to coordinate massive international (civil and military) assistance. Most countries have an Emergency Operations Center (EOC) to manage disaster response within its borders. When it becomes apparent that the magnitude of a disaster will exceed the HN’s capacity to manage it unilaterally, it may want to establish a HOC to facilitate the coordination of international aid. The HOC director will be from the HN in these cases and will establish priorities for international (military and civil) assistance in close coordination with the EOC. The HOC may collocate with the EOC to facilitate information sharing and coordination. Typically, over the course of the relief effort, international military assistance will phase out over time in favor of international relief organizations (NGOs and international organizations), and the HOC would be stood down as the nature of the response ultimately falls within the management capacity of the EOC or designated HN ministry/agency.

- The HOC coordinates the overall relief strategy; identifies logistic requirements for NGOs, UN, and other international organizations; and identifies, prioritizes, and submits requests for military support to a joint force through the CMOC.

- **During large-scale FHA operations, a HOC may be established to accomplish this coordination.** The country affected by a disaster and in need of FHA normally will have a ministry designated as the senior point of coordination for all FHA activities. Ministries involved could include the Ministry of Health, Ministry of Defense, or an emergency management office within a ministry. These ministries will establish the priority needs for their country and solicit assistance bilaterally or through the UN for international assistance from donor countries and relief organizations.

- In a failed state situation, such as Somalia (1993) or Rwanda (1994), the UN may have the responsibility to establish overall coordination of the FHA effort. Increasing representation and participation from the various relief agencies and donor countries at the HOC will better coordinate FHA efforts.

- The HOC should consist of representatives from the affected country, the US Embassy or Consulate, joint force (most likely from the CMOC), OFDA, UN, NGOs, international organizations, and other major players in the operation. The structure of a HOC can be formal or informal.

- HOCs may have political significance and authority when directed by the affected country, or may be less intrusive if established by the UN. The HOC normally is collocated with the appropriate lead or UN headquarters conducting the operation.

- **HOCs may establish working groups and committees** based on the FHA situation. These groups and committees discuss and resolve issues including relief material prioritization, health services, sanitation, health, and other related areas.
The UN may establish a structure called the On-Site Operations Coordination Center (OSOCC) as a support organization to a HOC. The OSOCC assists in gathering, evaluating, collating, and disseminating HOC information. The OSOCC also may provide facilitation services for HOC meetings.

An end state goal of the HOC is to create an environment in which the HN, UN, and NGOs can assume full responsibility for the security and operation of the entire relief effort.

For further detail concerning a HOC, refer to JP 3-07.6, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Humanitarian Assistance, and JP 3-08, Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations.

c. Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Center (HACC)

Effective coordination is the key to successful turnover of FHA responsibilities to the affected country or the UN, NGOs, and international organizations. In an FHA operation, the combatant command’s crisis action organization may organize as a HACC. The HACC assists with interagency coordination and planning, providing the critical link between the combatant commander and other USG agencies, NGOs, and international and regional organizations that may participate in an FHA operation at the strategic level. Normally, the HACC is a temporary body that operates during the early planning and coordination stages of the operation. Once a CMOC or HOC has been established, the role of the HACC diminishes, and its functions are accomplished through the normal organization of the combatant command’s staff and crisis action organization. If a combatant commander chooses to organize a HACC, liaisons from other USG agencies (e.g., USAID and/or OFDA and US Public Health Service), US Army Corps of Engineers representatives, key NGOs, international and regional organizations, and host country agencies also may be members of the HACC in large scale FHA operations.

d. Civil-Military Operations Center

A joint force must be able to work with all organizations and groups to accomplish a mission. A relationship must be developed between military forces, USG agencies, civilian authorities, involved international and regional organizations, NGOs, international organizations, and the population.

Conceptually, the CMOC is the meeting place of these elements. Not a new concept, the CMOC has been effectively employed as a means to coordinate civil and military operations and plays an execution role. The organization of the CMOC is theater- and mission-dependent — flexible in size and composition. A commander at any echelon may establish a CMOC to facilitate coordination with other agencies, departments, organizations, and the HN. In fact, more than one CMOC may be established in an operational area (such as occurred in Rwanda), and each is task-organized based on the mission.

The transition from conflict to post conflict or during FHA may require the supported commander to shift support priorities toward accomplishment of the CMO mission.
"Possibly the most practical mechanism for ensuring coherence and cooperation is the CMOC [the civil-military operations center]... the civil-military operations center attached to a Joint Task Force, where operational contact in the field between military and humanitarian participants in complex emergencies can take place. As many of you know, there is no ‘one size fits all’ for the CMOC. The way a commander makes use of it depends on the situation. Commanders have used the CMOC to reach out to host-country nationals in a locality as well as to NGO [nongovernmental organizations] and international organizations, to offer a forum for airing problems as well as a vehicle for shaping expectations realistically regarding what forces in the field can and cannot do. The flexible, situation-specific CMOC may well be the instrument of choice for broad international and other coordination in the field."

Under Secretary of State
Thomas R. Pickering
Exercise EMERALD EXPRESS 98

- During Operation SUPPORT HOPE in Rwanda, the United Nations deployed an OSOCC, which had essentially the same functions as a CMOC and provided a clearinghouse for transmitting CMOC responsibilities to the United Nations. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, a Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) Center performs basically the same functions as a CMOC. A discussion of CIMIC Center appears subsequently in this section.

- A CMOC may be formed to:
  - Carry out guidance and JFC decisions regarding CMO;
  - Exchange information;
  - Perform liaison and coordination between military capabilities and other agencies, departments, and organizations to meet the needs of the populace;
  - Provide a partnership forum for military and other participating organizations; and
• Receive, validate, and coordinate requests for support from the NGO and regional and international organizations. The CMOC then forwards these requests to the joint force for action. **It is important to remember that these organizations may decide to attend CMOC meetings but may choose not to consider themselves members of the CMOC to maintain the perception of their neutrality.** Many of these organizations consider the CMOC as a venue for interagency discussions but not as an interagency forum.

• A CMOC can be tailored to the specific tasks associated with the collective national or international mission. In establishing the CMOC, the JFC should build it from a nucleus of organic assets and CA, logistic, legal, and communications elements. The JFC should invite representatives of other agencies that include the following.

  • Liaisons from Service and functional components and supporting infrastructure, such as ports and airfields.
  • USAID and/or OFDA representatives.
  • Department of State, Country Team, and other USG representatives.
  • Military liaison personnel from participating countries.
  • Host country or local government agency representatives.
  • Representatives of NGOs and regional and international organizations (e.g., UNHCR and International Committee of the Red Cross).
  • The composition of a notional CMOC is illustrated in Figure IV-1. It is not the intent of this figure to emphasize the CMOC as the center of coordination for all activities but rather to illustrate organizations that a JFC may cooperate with and hold discussions with concerning an ongoing operation.

• Political representatives in the CMOC may provide avenues to satisfy operational considerations and concerns, resulting in consistency of military and political actions. Additionally, the CMOC forum appeals to NGOs because it avoids guesswork by providing these organizations a single-point of coordination with the military for their needs, ensuring that the unified efforts of a joint force and the relief community are focused when and where they are most needed. Although US forces may be latecomers compared to many relief agencies and international organizations, they bring considerable resources with them.

  • It is incumbent on the military not to dictate what will happen but to coordinate a team approach to problem resolution.

  • **A JFC cannot direct interagency cooperation among engaged agencies.** However, working together at the CMOC on issues like security, logistic support, information sharing, communications, and other items, can build a cooperative spirit among all participants.

  • The CMOC usually conducts daily meetings to identify participants capable of fulfilling needs. Validated requests go to the appropriate joint force or agency representative for action.

  • Figure IV-2 depicts some of the CMOC functions.

  • A joint force PAO representative should attend daily CMOC meetings. As an active member of the CMOC, the PA
A representative should strive to obtain a group consensus on messages and press releases. This will not be an easy task. However, the PA representative still should attempt to provide information that is noncontradictory in nature.

- The officer in charge of the CMOC typically reports to the CMO officer on the J-3 staff. He might also be assigned to the J-3, the chief of staff (COS), or the commander of the JCMOTF, if established. During certain operations, such as the conduct of FHA, the JFC might assign a deputy commander or the COS as the Director of the CMOC, perhaps with another officer assigned to provide detailed supervision of its operation. As with any other staff officer, the CMOC officer requires access to the JFC based on the situation and mission.

For further detail concerning a CMOC, see JP 3-07.6, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Humanitarian Assistance, JP 3-08, Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations, and JP 5-00.2, Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and Procedures.
"If for no other reason than self-interest, the CMOC [civil-military operations center] must become the priority because it represents — through close coordination with the NGO [nongovernmental organizations] and the rest of the humanitarian community — the military’s best chance to design and control its exit strategy."

Chris Seiple  
_The US Military/NGO Relationship in Humanitarian Interventions_

- Providing nonmilitary agencies with a focal point for activities and matters that are civilian related
- Coordinating relief efforts with US and/or multinational commands, United Nations, host nation, and other nonmilitary agencies
- Providing interface with the US Information Service, US Agency for International Development (USAID), and the Country Team
- Assisting in the transfer of operational responsibility to nonmilitary agencies
- Facilitating and coordinating activities of the joint force, other on-scene agencies, and higher echelons in the military chain of command
- Receiving, validating, coordinating, and monitoring requests from humanitarian organizations for routine and emergency military support
- Coordinating the response to requests for military support with Service components
- Coordinating requests to nonmilitary agencies for their support
- Coordinating with Disaster Assistance Response Team deployed by USAID/Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance
- Convening ad hoc mission planning groups to address complex military missions that support nonmilitary requirements, such as convoy escort, and management and security of refugee camps and feeding centers
- Convening follow-on assessment groups

**Figure IV-2. Civil-Military Operations Center Functions**

e. See Figure IV-3 for a comparison between a HOC, HACC, and CMOC.

f. **Domestic Support Operations**

- During DSO, the Emergency Support Team (EST) is the interagency group that provides general coordination support to the FEMA Regional Operations Center (ROC) staff, Emergency Response Team-Advance (ERT-A) Element, and Emergency Response Team (ERT) response activities in the field.
Interagency Coordination

Operating from the FEMA National Headquarters in Washington, DC, the Domestic Emergency Support Team is responsible for coordinating and tracking the deployment of Initial Response Resources, Disaster Field Office (DFO) kits, and other responder support items to the field. The EST serves as the central source of information at the headquarters level regarding the status of ongoing and planned Federal disaster operations. The EST attempts to resolve policy issues and resource support conflicts forwarded from the ERT. The EST also provides overall resource coordination for concurrent multi-State disaster response activities. Emergency Support Function (ESF) primary agencies send staff to the EST or opt to coordinate response support activities from their own agency EOCs.

- In DSO, the ROC staff coordinates Federal response efforts until an ERT is established in the field and the federal coordinating officer (FCO) assumes coordination responsibilities. Generally operating from the FEMA Regional Office, the ROC establishes

---

**Figure IV-3. Comparison Between Humanitarian Operations Center, Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Center, and Civil-Military Operations Center**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ESTABLISHING AUTHORITY</th>
<th>FUNCTION</th>
<th>COMPOSITION</th>
<th>AUTHORITY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HOC</td>
<td>Coordinates Overall Relief Strategy at the National (Country) Level</td>
<td>Representatives from: Affected Country, United Nations, US Embassy or Consulate, Joint Task Force, Other Nonmilitary Agencies, Concerned Parties</td>
<td>Coordination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HACC</td>
<td>Assists with Interagency Coordination and Planning at the Strategic Level. Normally is disestablished once a HOC or CMOC is established</td>
<td>Representatives from: Combatant Command, Nongovernmental Organizations, International Organizations, Regional Organizations</td>
<td>Coordination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMOC</td>
<td>Assists in Coordination of Activities at the Operational Level with Military Forces, US Government Agencies, Nongovernmental and International Organizations, and Regional Organizations</td>
<td>Representatives from: Joint Task Force, Nongovernmental Organizations, International Organizations, Regional Organizations, US Government Agencies, Local Government (Host Country), Multinational Forces, Other Concerned Parties</td>
<td>Coordination</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Representatives from:
- Affected Country
- United Nations
- US Embassy or Consulate
- Joint Task Force
- Other Nonmilitary Agencies
- Concerned Parties

* A Commander at any echelon may establish a CMOC
communications with the affected State emergency management agency and the EST; coordinates deployment of the ERT-A Element to field locations; assesses damage information and develops situation; and issues initial mission assignments. The ROC is activated by the FEMA Regional Director based on the level of response required. It is led by a ROC Director and consists of FEMA staff and ESF representatives, as well as the Regional Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officer who assists in coordination of requests for military support. Financial management activity at the ROC will be monitored and reported by the Comptroller.

- For DSO, the DFO is the primary field location in each affected State for the coordination of Federal response and recovery operations. It operates 24 hours per day, as needed, or under a schedule sufficient to sustain Federal operations. The FCO and state coordinating officer (SCO) collocate at the DFO, along with Federal agency regional representatives and state and local liaison officers, when possible. Once the DFO is ready for use, the ERT-A Element and/or Emergency Response Team-National is augmented by FEMA and other Federal agency staff to form a full ERT. The ERT is the principal interagency group that supports the FCO in coordinating the overall Federal disaster operation. Located at the DFO, the ERT ensures that Federal resources are made available to meet state requirements identified by the SCO. The size and composition of the ERT can range from FEMA regional office staff who are primarily conducting recovery operations to an interagency team having representation from all ESFs primary and support agencies undertaking full response and recovery activities. The ERT organizational structure encompasses the FCO’s support staff and four main sections (Operations, Information and Planning, Logistics, and Administration). Requests for military support at the DFO are processed through the Defense Coordination Officer (DCO), the military official specifically designated to orchestrate DOD support. To ensure a coordinated and consistent DOD disaster response, the DCO is the single point of contact in the field for coordinating and validating the use of DOD resources (excluding those provided by the US Army Corps of Engineers when operating as the primary agency for ESF #3 — Public Works and Engineering, and those of the National Guard forces operating under State control). The DCO:

  - Is the designated DOD on-scene member of the ERT;
  - Coordinates requests for assistance and mission assignments with the FCO or designated representative, normally the ERT Operations Section Chief; and
  - Is supported on scene by a Defense Coordinating Element, composed of administrative staff and liaison personnel, including the service Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officers, who normally will collocate with the ERT Operations Section.

- Specific responsibilities of the DCO (subject to modification based on the situation) include validating requirements for military support (i.e., determining if the military could and should support the request); forwarding mission assignments to the appropriate military organization(s); and assigning military liaison officers to provide technical assistance to applicable activated ESFs. The DCO, through appropriate military channels, refers
problematic/contentious military support issues to the Director of Military Support (DOMS). The DOMS facilitates the resolution of issues at the national level.

g. NATO Civil-Military Cooperation. CIMIC reflects the NATO’s broad approach to security. Allied operations are increasingly required to take account of social, political, cultural, economic, environmental, and humanitarian factors when planning and conducting military operations. These pressures, intensified by the cultural gap between military and civilian organizations, demand a dedicated means of communication between the two. It is no longer sufficient to rely on ad hoc arrangements to achieve cooperation. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Implementation Force established CIMIC Centers to provide a location for NGOs to meet and coordinate with the military.

“The CIMIC [Civil-Military Cooperation Center] organization was to focus on liaison with the civilian organizations from the governmental to local opština level to regenerate national regulations and promote limited nation building. The structure was also to provide an avenue for the numerous aid agencies to interface with the military on support arrangements related to their projects in theater.”

Lessons From Bosnia: The IFOR Experience
Institute for National Strategic Studies

Civil-Military Cooperation:

“The means by which allied commanders establish and maintain formal relations with the national authorities, populations, international and nongovernmental organizations in their area of interest.”

Allied Joint Pub 1

• CIMIC covers a wide variety of activities ranging from sustaining life to restoring government. CIMIC functions normally are divided into the following three groups:

  • Pre-operational. Prior to an operation, the CIMIC task is to prepare the allied force to deal with the civilian conditions it will encounter in the operational area. It involves three functions: (1) Planning. The CIMIC staff writes the commander’s CIMIC Plan, normally an annex to the OPORD. The plan is based on an assessment of the operational area. This assessment should cover such areas as political and cultural history of the affected area; state of the government, public administration and services; the media; the industrial, agricultural, and economic capacity of the region; and the involvement, capability, and structure of international organizations and NGOs operating in the area. (2) Advice. The CIMIC staff briefs the commanders and their staffs on civilian conditions in the operational area. Emphasis must be placed on how the civilian population and institutions will impact the military operations and vice versa. (3) Education. The CIMIC staff must ensure that allied forces entering the operational area possess the best possible understanding of the civilian situation.

  • Operational. The main CIMIC task is to ensure effective civil-military cooperation in execution of the commander’s CIMIC plan. The following six functions comprise the operational phase: (1) Communication. Effective and constant communication is CIMIC’s fundamental function. CIMIC must provide the means to communicate. (2) Information. CIMIC functions as a civil-military information exchange. It
provides commanders with the most current data on civilian organizations in the operational area. It also, within security restrictions, provides civilian organizations with similar information concerning the military force and its planned operations. (3) Coordination. CIMIC’s goal is to enable proper coordination between the military and civilian sides. (4) Agreements. CIMIC’s function is twofold; to bring the relevant military and civil agencies together in the first place, and then give appropriate advice concerning providing goods or services to each other. (5) Assessment. CIMIC provides commanders a perspective of how the military force and its operations are viewed from the civilian side. (6) Operations. In most situations, CIMIC operations will be conducted in support of the overall military plan. However, in some situations, CIMIC operations will dominate the entire scenario (e.g., FHA — natural disaster). In order to execute these six functions, substantial and regular interface is required with the multitude of agencies in the operational area. CIMIC centers are established at the operational and tactical levels solely for the purpose of communication and coordination of effort. There is a CIMIC center that supports various levels of command (e.g., brigade, division, and corps) up to the highest level of command in the operational area with no other purpose than to keep the military “on the same sheet of music” as all the players in the civilian sector. This hierarchy is critical for mission execution. It recognizes that, like the military, the civilian sector, including the interagency community, has the equivalent of strategic, operational, and tactical reach. The commander or his and/or her representative always attends the CIMIC meetings in concert with the lead CMO staff. This system and these meetings are totally separate from the daily meetings held in the CMOC for the direct coordination of relief.

- **Transitional.** Based on the overall concept of operations, CIMIC’s role is to ensure the smooth transition to civil authority. The goal is to have the least possible disruption to civilian life.

- **Staff Relationship.** CIMIC is a commander’s responsibility. To be effective, however, CIMIC must develop close working relationships with those other staff sections that interact with the CIMIC function.

- **Organization.** CIMIC requires an organization containing three elements: a staff to plan and advise the commander, a CIMIC group to conduct the CIMIC operations, and additional resources, which will be drawn from the force for specific tasks.

- **Staff.** The specific organization of the CIMIC staff will vary from headquarters to headquarters. The CIMIC staff members are not necessarily from specialist backgrounds, but must have broad military experience and be capable of explaining military requirements to civilian organizations and vice versa.

- **Command.** A CIMIC group normally is aligned to a NATO land component command and supports the NATO land component command’s subordinate commands at every level. Its primary task is to conduct CIMIC operations in accordance with the supported commander’s CIMIC’s plan. It will be made up of a C2 headquarters and civil area functional specialists to perform those tasks that fall outside the range of skills and experience of the military. These specialists will be essential in communicating with civilian
organizations and providing technical advice. It is responsible for prioritizing, allocating, and deploying its own limited resources and for ensuring that its disparate and widely-dispersed elements maintain direction, concentration, economy, and unity of effort. If directed by appropriate command authority, the CIMIC group may support other allied joint force component commands or the allied joint force theater headquarters.

**Resources.** Although both the CIMIC staff and the CIMIC command will require basic equipment to operate, the majority of CIMIC resources will be found within the force. They may be placed under operational control (OPCON) of the CIMIC command for the duration of the force’s mission but will, more usually, be task-organized for specific CIMIC operations.

4. United Nations Operations

a. Coordination with the UN begins at the national level with the Department of State through the US Representative to the UN. The US Representative to the UN is a member of the NSC and participates in the formulation of policy matters relevant to the UN and its activities. The US Representative is assisted at the US Mission to the UN by a military assistant who coordinates appropriate military interests primarily with the UN’s Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) and Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO).

b. The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, The United Nations Participation Act of 1945, and Executive Order 10206, Support of Peaceful Settlements of Disputes, authorize various types of US military support to the UN, either on a reimbursable or nonreimbursable basis.

c. US military operations in support of the UN usually fall within Chapter VI, “Pacific Settlement of Disputes,” or Chapter VII, “Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression,” of the UN Charter.

d. The UN normally will conduct peace operations or FHA under the provisions of a resolution or mandate from the Security Council or the General Assembly. Politicians and diplomats trying to reach compromise develop mandates. Because of this, military commanders often have found it difficult to translate these mandates into workable mission orders. Commanders can use the interagency process and the POL-MIL plan (if developed) to feed back their concerns through the political apparatus of the UN. Though not always successful, clarity of mission should always be sought from the Ambassador or UN Resident Coordinator, as appropriate.

e. The UN headquarters coordinates peace operations and FHA around the world. **It does not, however, have a system for planning and executing these operations that is comparable to that of the United States.** The UN organizational structure consists of the headquarters and the operational field elements. Thus, there is a strategic- and tactical-level equivalent to the Armed Forces of the United States, but no operational counterpart.

f. At the headquarters, the Secretariat plans and directs missions. Either the UNDPKO or the UNOCHA serves as the headquarters component during emergencies. Additional support by temporary augmentation from the Joint Staff and Service headquarters staffs may be provided for specific requirements. UN special missions, such as the UN Protection Force in Bosnia-Herzegovina, operate under the direction of the UN Secretary General (SYG).
g. Field-level organization often is based on the Resident Coordinator system administered by the UN Development Program in conjunction with the UNOCHA. The Resident Coordinator mobilizes and manages the local UN humanitarian resources and provides direction for the field relief effort.

“Unique to this mission was the fact that an American commander was dual-hatted as Commander of both UN Forces and US Forces. . . . Note that while US Forces were under operational control of UNMIH [United Nations Mission in Haiti], national command of these forces was never relinquished as was the case for all other nations contributing forces to UNMIH. This relationship was satisfactory since the goals and objectives of the US and the UN remained the same throughout the mission. To allay concerns of the troop-contributing nations with respect to these command relationships, the FC [force commander] and the Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) visited UN Headquarters to inform national representatives of the operational concept and the Commander’s Intent for the operation. This joint appearance by the top leaders of the mission served to reassure contributing nations about the employment of their forces in the mission.”

h. In serious emergencies, the UN SYG may appoint a Special Representative who reports to the SYG directly, as well as advises UNDPKO and UNOCHA at UN headquarters. The Special Representative may direct day-to-day operations, as was the case in the UN operation in Cambodia.

i. The JFC deploying to a contingency site may discover the need for a direct channel to either the Resident Coordinator, the Special Representative of the Secretary General, or both. The arrangements between the joint force and UN forces should be set forth in the appropriate execute order.

j. UN-sponsored operations normally employ a force under a single commander. The force commander is appointed by the SYG with the consent of the UN Security Council and reports directly to the SYG’s Special Representative or to the SYG. In any multinational operation, the US commander will retain command authority over all assigned US forces. The US chain of command will flow from the NCA through the combatant commander. On a case-by-case basis, the President will consider placing appropriate US forces under the OPCON of a competent UN commander for specific UN operations authorized by the Security Council.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Annex</th>
<th>Service Capability</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>Civil Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>Engineering</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>Health Service Support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>Military Police and/or Security Police Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E</td>
<td>Psychological Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>Religious Ministry Support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G</td>
<td>Transportation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H</td>
<td>United States Coast Guard</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1. General

The purpose of this appendix is to provide an overview of some of the Service capabilities that would most likely support CMO.

*For further detail concerning Service capabilities, see JP 3-33, Joint Force Capabilities.*

2. Service Capabilities

Each annex to this appendix will discuss a different Service capability. For example, Annex A to Appendix A, “Civil Affairs.” Annex H to Appendix A, “United States Coast Guard,” discusses United States Coast Guard capabilities that do not readily fit into the other annexes of Appendix A but nonetheless provide support to CMO.
Service capabilities can provide extensive support to civil-military operations.
1. United States Army

All US Army CA stationed in CONUS are assigned by the Secretary of Defense to USCINCSOC who has COCOM over assigned forces.

   a. **Active Component.** USSOCOM maintains one Army AC CA battalion consisting of regionally oriented companies and structured to deploy rapidly and provide initial CA support to military operations. It is immediately available for contingencies and is prepared for a variety of operational environments worldwide. The unit’s primary mission is to provide rapid, short-duration CA support for contingency operations. It is not designed or resourced to provide the full range of CA functional specialty skills. Unit organization may be task-organized to support theater-specific mission requirements.

   b. **Reserve Component.** USSOCOM maintains more than 95% of its Army CA in the RC. RC CA units vary in size, organization, and capability and consist of commands, brigades, and battalions. Units are headquarters and headquarters-size organizations and are designed around professional specialties. These units provide functional assistance, advisory, or coordinating skills at a level of expertise not structured in Army organic staffs and units. As with AC units, RC units may be task-organized for specific requirements. Their functional skills and experience in advisory and assistance roles with HN counterparts can be applied to augment the AC force, support conventional and special operations, and support or conduct civil administration missions. RC CA units can be expected to arrive in theater 30-45 days after Presidential Reserve Callup Authority for contingencies or upon mobilization.

2. United States Marine Corps (USMC)

   a. USMC commands have the capability to plan and conduct CMO across the range of military operations. Dedicated CA structure is maintained entirely within the RC and consists of two Civil Affairs Groups (CAGs), each commanded by a colonel. While every effort is made to recruit and train Marines with a broad variety of military and civilian skills, each member of the CAG is a CA generalist. The CAGs are organic to the Marine expeditionary force (MEF): they augment and reinforce the capabilities of the MEF or other Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF). USMC CAGs are not apportioned separately under the JSCP, but are attached when a MEF is provided to a combatant command for planning or operations. Each CAG is regionally oriented to the projected employment of the MEF it supports. MAGTF commanders request USMC CA support via their Marine Corps component commander. USMC CA also actively participate in theater engagement efforts when made available by their component commanders.

   b. CMO is typically first centrally planned by the MAGTF staff for decentralized execution by assigned forces. Each MAGTF has organic air, ground, C2, and logistic capabilities that provide immediate and integrated CMO options to the JFC. Operational maneuver from the sea, implementing ship-to-objective maneuver and sea-based logistics, enables rapid execution of CMO, without the need to first establish extensive infrastructure ashore. Initial CA support to a deployed MAGTF might first be provided by qualified Marine volunteers, prepared to deploy within days of a validated request, even if no selected callup is authorized. Further support may next be
provided by additional volunteers, by selected callup of CAG elements for contingencies, or by mobilization of entire CAGs. Regardless of size, USMC CA elements will require support from the MAGTF in such areas as transportation, health services, supply, and messing. However, even when CA are assigned, the MAGTF remains a self-sustaining force.

c. USMC CMO is performed in order to directly support the MAGTF’s assigned mission, which is typically of limited duration, performed under austere conditions, and expeditionary in nature. These missions might include NEO, the offload of maritime pre-positioning ships, HA in response to complex emergencies, amphibious operations, or employment as an enabler for follow-on operations. These types of limited contingency operations will rarely allow for exhaustive coordination of details or extensive planning prior to execution. Instead, the MAGTF must understand the goals and priorities of the JFC, ambassadors, and US Country Teams for the JOA. This appreciation of specifics allows CMO that independently supports the NCA’s intent on the ground. CA and CMO are initially focused on confirming, updating and disseminating the assessment of the situation, providing an initial response to emergencies, stabilizing the JOA, and enhancing the legitimacy of the force. Even initial CA plans prepare for a transition of responsibilities to other agencies, whether other US military forces, other USG agencies, international organizations, or NGOs. Marine CA also are prepared to assist a supported Navy commander. This support might be required when amphibious shipping is tasked to transship evacuees, provide emergency HSS to civilian casualties, or control sea approaches, pier space, or cargo handling.

d. As a self-contained, combined arms force, the MAGTF may become involved in sustained operations ashore. These situations will allow more detailed coordination, both with the combatant commander’s theater CA assets, and with international organizations, NGOs, and USG agencies operating in the MAGTF’s area of operations. Deployed CA (and those accessed via reach-back) facilitate mission accomplishment by focusing on noncombatants. They leverage the MAGTF’s resources, especially in C2 systems, by integrating the complementary capabilities of other agencies in order to achieve success and allow timely redeployment of the force. Throughout, Marine CA efforts help the commander to meet moral and legal responsibilities while accomplishing the military mission.

3. United States Air Force (USAF)

a. The USAF does not maintain CA units. However, a variety of functional organizations and capabilities within the Air Force Reserve Command and Air National Guard (ANG) as well as the active force, can support or complement CA activities. These include legal, air mobility, chaplain, supply, health services (to include dental care and preventive medicine services), security forces, intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance, civil engineering, bioenvironmental, and meteorological specialists who can provide operations and staff support. In supporting combatant commanders, the USAF upon request can provide specially qualified personnel for service in Army or joint CA units as specialists in matters of primary concern to the USAF. CA-specific functions are solely performed by the ANG judge advocates. When required, CA liaisons should be provided to the USAF Headquarters and each deployed Aerospace Expeditionary Force (AEF).

b. Air National Guard Readiness Center. Access to ANG personnel with CA-related skills is accomplished through the Air National Guard Readiness Center, an active Air Force unit, that exercises administrative
control over such personnel ordered to active
duty under conditions short of full
mobilization.

c. **Air Force National Security and Emergency Preparedness (AFNSEP) Agency.** Although not a CA organization, AFNSEP can play a significant role for the USAF concerning CA activities. AFNSEP oversees, and assists commanders in implementing the Air Force’s MSCA, MSCLEA, Continuity of Operations, and National Security Emergency Preparedness programs. The overall purpose of these programs in the Air Force is to support civil authorities’ abilities, in an all-hazards environment, in minimizing the loss of life and property by providing sufficient capabilities at all levels of government to meet essential defense and civilian needs during any national security emergency. AFNSEP is comprised of a team of active and reserve personnel. The agency’s responsibilities include the 50 States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, Guam, American Samoa, the Federated States of Micronesia, the Marshall Islands, the Northern Mariana Islands, the Republic of Palau, and the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands. In general, however, the concepts for CMO that apply to AFNSEP regard only DSO, and consequence management including WMD or terrorism events.

*JP 3-07, Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War, JP 3-07.7, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Domestic Support Operations, and AFDD 2-3, Military Operations Other Than War, details the type of activities in which AFNSEP is most commonly involved.*
Intentionally Blank
1. United States Army

a. The US Army has a wide variety of engineer units at division, corps, and theater level that provide particular technical capabilities required to accomplish essential, diversified tasks throughout the depth of the theater. The engineer architecture forms these units into an organization that is responsive to commanders at all echelons.

b. Engineer organizations range in size from brigade to team and include specialized functions such as water well-drilling, real estate management, diving, quarrying, and fire-fighting as well as the more standard mission of providing mobility, countermobility, and/or survivability (M/CM/S) enhancement.

c. Army engineers are capable of integrating into a joint force and supporting other Services as well as multinational and civilian organizations.

2. United States Marine Corps

a. The MEF is supported by an engineer support battalion (ESB) that is organic to the force service support group (FSSG) contained within the MEF. The ESB is structured to facilitate task organization and provide general engineering and combat service support to the MEF. The ESB is organized to plan, coordinate, and supervise general engineering (GE) support functions. The GE support includes enhancing the MEF’s M/CM/S, in addition to conducting the MEF’s EOD missions.

b. The Marine division is supported by one combat engineer battalion (CEB), which provides combat engineering support and limited GE support through task-organized combat engineer elements. The mission of the CEB is to enhance the M/CM/S of the Marine division. The Marine division contains three infantry regiments, and a combat engineer company that normally supports each regiment. The CEB and combat engineer company both enhance the movement of operational forces in much the same manner as the ESB. The Marine aircraft wing has engineer capabilities embedded in the Marine wing support squadrons (MWSS). These support squadrons possess capabilities for the construction and maintenance of airfields, fuel handling, materials handling, and limited vertical and horizontal construction. They also can provide mobile electric power and can purify water to potable standards. Engineer requirements exceeding MWSS capabilities are augmented by the ESB. The Marine division, wing, and FSSG structure outlined here is similar for I and II MEF. The organizational structure for engineering support for III MEF is similar but slightly reduced due to a smaller end strength.

3. United States Navy (USN)

a. The Naval Construction Force (NCF), whose personnel are called “SEABEEs,” is a responsive, mobile, versatile engineer force, capable of accomplishing diverse civil and military engineering tasks. The NCF provides

- ESB can conduct limited counter obstacle missions.
- ESB is the primary engineering unit to support CMO.

b. Engineer organizations range in size from brigade to team and include specialized functions such as water well-drilling, real estate management, diving, quarrying, and fire-fighting as well as the more standard mission of providing mobility, countermobility, and/or survivability (M/CM/S) enhancement.

c. Army engineers are capable of integrating into a joint force and supporting other Services as well as multinational and civilian organizations.
the JFC with a flexible expeditionary engineer tool kit of operational response options capable of supporting a wide range of missions. The NCF primarily supports the MAGTF and Navy ashore forces as directed by existing OPLANs. The NCF also supports component missions specified by the combatant commanders. NCF capabilities enable the JFC to optimize the effectiveness of dedicated Armed Forces in MOOTW, while at the same time preserving and enhancing the ability to fight and win major theater wars.

b. NCF units enhance the MAGTF through complementary, not duplicative, support. NCF units are highly skilled specialists capable of executing projects of a more sophisticated and permanent nature than normally accomplished by Marine Corps engineer battalions. Their capabilities include the following.

- Military construction engineering support to geographic combatant commanders, the USN, and the USMC.
- Battle damage repair.
- Construct and maintain expeditionary airfields, main supply routes, advanced bases and port facilities, ammunition supply points, deliberate bridging, as well as a wide range of other combat support and combat service support facilities.
- In a contingency environment, provide organic capability for defensive military operations and sustainment for independent operations.
- In a peacetime environment, provide combatant command Navy component commanders with contributory support and geographic combatant commanders with recovery operations, FHA, peace operations, and other MOOTW support with a rapid, expeditionary engineering response capability.

c. NCF units are under the OPCON and administrative control of the fleet commanders. The 2d Naval Construction Brigade (NCB) is comprised of active and reserve Naval Construction Regiments (NCRs), naval mobile construction battalions (NMCBs), a naval construction force support unit (NCFSU), a construction battalion maintenance unit (CBMU), construction battalion units (CBUs) and an underwater construction team (UCT) assigned to the Commander in Chief, Atlantic Fleet. The 3rd NCB is comprised of similar units assigned to the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet. Two amphibious construction battalions (ACBs) are under the OPCON of the fleet commanders in chief. Two CBUs plus their respective Reserve Augment detachment are assigned to support each deployed Naval Fleet Hospital.

d. Possible Force Compositions

- **NMCB.** Constructs advance base facilities in support of the USN, USMC, and other Armed Forces in military operations. Provides repair, maintenance, and construction support during contingency, emergency, or recovery operations.
- **CBMU.** Provides follow-on public works operations, maintenance and repair at existing advanced base shore facilities or facilities constructed by NMCBs in contingency operations.
- **CBU.** Provides construction, operation and maintenance support to a 500-Bed Combat Zone Fleet Hospital during military operations. Each hospital requires two CBUs plus their respective Reserve Augment detachment. Provides repair and maintenance support to US
shore installations during peacetime and have a secondary mission to conduct disaster recovery missions.

- **UCT.** Provides underwater engineering, construction, repair, and inspection support. Performs complex inshore and deep ocean underwater construction tasks, including ocean bottom surveys for potential underwater facilities.

- **NCFSU.** Provides construction and engineering support for NCF units, including specialized civil engineering support equipment, material, repair parts, and technical expertise.

- **NCR.** Exercises C2 over subordinate NCF units, providing planning, coordination, and oversight. Deploys when two or more subordinate NCF units deploy to a theater.

- **NCB.** Provides forces to fulfill operational requirements of a combatant commander exercising C2 over subordinate NCRs. Deploys when two or more subordinate NCR units (e.g., five or more NMCBs) deploy to a theater.

- **ACB.** Provides over-the-shore logistic movement and construction support to amphibious forces, as part of the Naval Beach Group.

4. United States Air Force

a. The Air Force engineering mission is to provide the necessary assets and skilled personnel to prepare and sustain global installations as stationary platforms for projecting aerospace power across the range of military operations. Air operations are highly dependent on operating bases; consequently, engineering planners must participate in all stages of operational planning for bases to be available when they are needed. Air Force engineering units can deploy either as a part of an AEF, or as detached units operating in support of specific missions and operational taskings. The USAF civil engineering mission in support of a typical OPLAN includes rapid runway repair, emergency war damage repair to other essential facilities, force beddown, operations and maintenance, crash rescue and fire suppression, EOD, nuclear, biological, and chemical operations, and construction management of emergency repair of war damage and force beddown that are necessary for employing USAF forces and weapons systems. These engineering forces are organized either as Prime Base Engineer Emergency Forces (Prime BEEF), or Rapid Engineers Deployable Heavy Operations Repair Squadron, Engineers (RED HORSE) units. During any type military operation, engineer requirements will be numerous and military engineers may be stretched beyond their capability. A force multiplier for Air Force engineering is the AFCAP that allows civil engineers to focus on the most critical missions.

b. Prime BEEF is the primary organizational structure for supporting both mobility and in-place contingency requirements. The principle objective of deploying Prime BEEF teams is to beddown and support an AEF. Force beddown generally divides into three categories — aircraft, personnel, and infrastructure support. Aircraft support provides the maintenance shops, hangars, squadron operations centers, munitions storage, fuel storage, and other facilities directly supporting the flying mission. Personnel support provides the housing, feeding facilities, latrines, showers, administrative offices, and other indirect support facilities. Infrastructure support provides the utility systems, solid and hazardous waste disposal, roads, and communications that serve the beddown site. Beddown locations range from main operating bases with adequate existing facilities to bare bases with no facilities other than runways,
taxiways, and aircraft parking aprons. Tasks accomplished by Prime BEEF units include airfield support, fire protection, fuel systems setup and support, EOD functions, force protection, base defense, base denial, rapid runway repair, facility repair, and utility repair.

c. The AFCAP provides commanders with another option to relieve military engineers, particularly for critical high threat or critical missions. AFCAP has installation support capabilities that mirror the Air Force engineering and Services functional capabilities. AFCAP can provide all the installation support services and operations inherent in the Air Force engineering and Services functional areas, except aircraft crash-fire-rescue; EOD; nuclear, biological, and chemical operations; field operations and mortuary affairs. AFCAP may be used after an initial military beddown response, for facility erection and construction requirements, or to support recovery operations at existing locations across the full spectrum of conflicts.

d. RED HORSE squadrons and their associated unit type codes configurations provide highly mobile, largely self-sufficient, rapidly deployable echelons to support major force beddown requirements and to repair heavy war damage. RED HORSE units are stand-alone squadrons not tied to peacetime base support. They provide Air Force component commanders a dedicated, flexible, airfield and base heavy construction and repair capability that allows the geographic combatant commanders to move and support missions as the air order of battle dictates. RED HORSE units accomplish major construction in forward locations, often in advance of the main deploying force. They provide heavy horizontal (earth moving and pavements) and vertical (facility and utility skills such as petroleum, oils, and lubricants; structural; mechanical; and power generation) engineer capability, and possess special capabilities such as quarry operation (blasting and rock crushing), well drilling, concrete and/or asphalt batch plant operations, specialized building construction (K-Spans), and constructive explosive operations. RED HORSE units also are required to be current in a variety of other capabilities across the range of military operations.

See JP 3-34, Engineer Doctrine for Joint Operations, and JP 4-04, Joint Doctrine for Civil Engineering Support, for more information on Air Force engineering capabilities.
1. Overview

a. An assessment of total HSS requirements for CMO comes from careful mission analysis, resource application, and an adequate survey of existing health service infrastructure. This health service assessment should then be coordinated within the theater HSS community.

b. In joint and multinational settings, the HSS objective conserves fighting strength by minimizing the effect of wounds, injuries, and disease on units or the affected patient populations’ ability to function. Aggressive preventive medicine programs supported by commanders at all levels and a phased HSS system together achieve this objective.

c. Commanders should be aware of overall preventive health measures or programs and ensure personnel participate in them to help alleviate the need for health service intervention and conserve the fighting strength. HSS arranges the interventive aspect of force health protection into “levels of care.” Each level reflects an increase in health service capabilities while retaining the capabilities found in the preceding level. The system is designed to provide a continuum of care from the point of wounding, injury, or illness through successive levels of care to definitive rehabilitative hospitals. Depending upon the maturity of the theater and the operational mission, four levels of health service care may be provided with the remaining level provided in CONUS or other safe havens.

• Level I. Unit Level Care. It may include self aid, buddy aid, combat lifesaver skills, examinations, and emergency lifesaving measures such as maintenance of airway, control of bleeding, prevention and control of shock, and prevention of further injury by trained personnel. This level may include an aid station with physicians and physician assistants. Treatment at aid stations includes restoration of the airway by invasive procedure, use of intravenous fluids, and application of splints and bandages. These elements of health service management prepare patients for return to duty or for transportation to a higher level of care. Supporting health service units are responsible for the evacuation of patients from supported treatment facilities.

• Level II. A team of physicians or physician assistants supported by appropriate health service or nursing staff administers care. As a minimum, this level of care includes basic resuscitation and stabilization, and may include a forward resuscitative surgical capability, basic laboratory, limited x-ray, pharmacy, and temporary holding facilities. At this level, examinations and observations are accomplished more deliberately than at Level I. This level includes applying emergency procedures, such as resuscitation to prevent death, loss of limb, or loss of body functions. Patients are treated and returned to duty, or for patients who require comprehensive treatment, surface or air evacuation is available to facilitate them receiving the required treatment. This is the first level where group O liquid packed red blood cells will be available for transfusion.

• Level III. Care administered requires clinical capabilities normally found in a health service treatment facility typically located in a lower-level enemy threat
environment. The health service treatment facility is staffed and equipped to provide resuscitation; initial wound surgery and post operative treatment. This level of care may be the first step toward restoration of functional health, as compared to procedures that stabilize a condition or prolong life. It does not have the crisis aspect of initial resuscitative care and can proceed with greater preparation and deliberation. Blood products available may include fresh frozen plasma, platelets, frozen group O red blood cells, and group A, B, and O liquid packed red blood cells. Those patients whose health service conditions are such that they can recover within the time permitted by the theater health service evacuation policy are returned to duty from this level.

- **Level IV.** Care at this level provides the same surgical capability as in Level III, and further therapy during the recovery phase for those who can return to duty within the theater evacuation policy. This level of care may only be available in mature theaters.

- **Level V.** Care is definitive, convalescent, restorative, and rehabilitative and normally is provided by military, Department of Veterans Affairs, CONUS Civilian hospitals or other DOD-approved safe havens.

2. **United States Army**

a. CA units have health service personnel assigned with the duties of providing evaluation, advice, and coordination of HSS within the existing infrastructure. They do not possess a robust HSS capability. Particular emphasis is placed upon preventive medicine (PVNTMED) with emphasis on sanitation and disease prevention, veterinary medicine and prevention of zoonotic diseases. Consequently, CA units are dependent on theater HSS assets applied in conjunction with HN and NGO capabilities.

b. HSS capabilities are addressed through the ten functions of: Health service C4I, hospitalization, primary care, patient movement, force (population) health protection (i.e., PVNTMED), veterinary services, health service logistics (including blood services), dental services, combat stress control, and laboratory services. These functions, although not necessarily available at each level, are nevertheless considered throughout the continuum of the health care system by the health service planner or surgeon. The special forces medical sergeant (SFMS) is specially trained to provide regionally focused culturally sensitive HSS.

For an in-depth overview of the SFMS and other providers in Army SO, refer to FM 8-43, Combat Health Support in Army Special Operations Forces.

c. Health care professionals assigned to CA units, NGOs, and government agencies must work in synchronized fashion through the CMOC and must adhere to the principles of HSS while undertaking the tasks of assessment and application of relief effort resources. The principles include: conformity with the overall relief intent; proximity to the affected population; readiness and flexibility to changing mission requirements; mobility for rapid movement to the relief population; continuity of care to provide optimum uninterrupted care through each level; and coordination which insures HSS resources are effectively employed; standards of HSS to meet standards that are acceptable to all participating Services; capability of HSS and health service risk must be capable from the outset of an operation to meet the demands of the predicted casualty rates; levels of health service care that must be available to all forces; provision of life- and limb-saving surgery to enable the patient to receive Level II care as soon as
possible and to reach life- and limb-saving surgery as fast as possible; and interdependence of treatment and patient movement determined by the operational environment.

*HSS principles are addressed in detail in JP 4-02, Doctrine for Health Service Support in Joint Operations.*

### 3. United States Marine Corps

a. The US Navy Medical Department provides HSS within the Marine Corps. US Navy hospital corpsmen are trained as emergency medical technicians in trauma medical care and life support, and receive additional training in field sanitation, use of intravenous fluids, and advanced combat casualty evacuation and transportation. They are assigned to the headquarters and service companies of Marine battalions in the battalion aid stations and are further assigned to provide direct support to platoons and squads.

b. Aid stations are highly mobile health service units that provide routine health care and initial resuscitation to traumatic casualties. Within the FSSG, the health service battalion has the capability to provide Levels I and II health care.

c. The health service battalion provides health service and surgical support that exceeds the organic capability of the division, wing, and FSSG. The health service battalion is composed of one headquarters and support company and three surgical companies.

d. The dental battalion is the source of dental services to the MEF, by attaching task-organized dental sections and detachments to elements of the MAGTF. Battalion personnel maintain dental readiness during exercises, deployments, MOOTW, and war. In an operational environment, dental personnel’s primary function is to provide emergency dental care, and if mission specifics allow, dental health maintenance.

e. Maintenance and management of health service and dental equipment and supplies (Class VIII) is the responsibility of the medical logistics company (MEDLOGCO), supply battalion, FSSG. The MEDLOGCO provides maintenance of health service equipment and centralized acquisition, storing, stock rotation, and construction of health service supply sets in support of HSS units based on specific mission needs. Forty-five days of the MEF’s 60-day Class VIII requirement is maintained with the MEDLOGCO and 15 days are held aboard maritime pre-positioning force assets.

### 4. United States Navy

a. The Navy’s fleet health service system supports the five levels of health service care. Levels I and II are provided by the combat forces as part of their table of organization and/or staffing documents. Levels III and IV are the responsibility of the combatant commander provided from Service component resources in support of all casualties generated by the operational situation. Level V may be located in CONUS or DOD-approved and designated safe havens. Patients are evacuated to the level that will provide the level of care required in order to expedite their return to duty.

b. The Navy health service department provides support to both the fleet and the Marine forces under a variety of conditions. These conditions vary from highly mobile, low-capability support such as the type provided by a hospital corpsmen assigned to a Marine rifle company, to a shore-based, highly capable CONUS hospital.

c. The Bureau of Medicine and Surgery has under its claimancy eight overseas hospitals. These hospitals are located along the sea LOCs and have been established to provide general HSS to active duty personnel and
dependents located in the areas. Under contingency situations, the three Pacific hospitals will function as Level IV facilities. Based on their physical design, these facilities have the capability of expanding their bed capacity to accommodate casualties.

d. Casualty Receiving and Treatment Ships. Certain amphibious ships, particularly the general purpose amphibious assault ships and general purpose amphibious assault ship (with internal dock) class ships, are designed to provide advanced HSS to the landing force during amphibious operations. These casualty receiving and treatment ships have laboratory (including blood) and radiology capabilities in support of surgical suites. During amphibious operations, these ships are staffed with surgical and nonsurgical personnel, including health service technicians, needed to provide extensive trauma support.

e. Hospital Ships. Hospital ships are designed to provide a mobile and flexible, rapidly responsive, acute care health service capability in support of amphibious and Navy forces, and disaster relief operations. Functioning under the provisions set forth in the Geneva Conventions, they have the capability to deploy 12 major operating rooms and 1,000 beds with appropriate staffing.

f. Fleet Hospitals. Fleet hospitals have 500 beds and are equipped and staffed to provide extensive health service and surgical resuscitation care for combat casualties. These facilities are intended for placement in the rear of the combat zone or in the communications zone and are self-supporting.

5. United States Air Force

a. The Air Force Medical Service (AFMS) deploys modular field health service units and equipment packages to accomplish care in AEF operations. The AFMS provides an infrastructure designed to field and sustain a medically ready force throughout the entire range of military operations. AFMS assets are tailored to meet specific operational and environmental requirements and include light, lean, modular health service units, with expandable increments, and a fixed-wing aeromedical evacuation (AE) system. This postures the AFMS to cover the full range of global engagement and enlargement, to include democratic nations. The AFMS is primarily engaged in humanitarian assistance, disaster response, and traditional war-winning operations. Personnel typically include physicians, nurses, technicians, dentists, bioenvironmental engineers, public health personnel, and health service administrators. AFMS functions encompass a variety of force health protection activities. This includes delivery of patient care services to include primary health service care, dental care, and surgical services, health surveillance and risk assessment activities, AE, and preventive medicine services. AFMS assets may be used to support a primarily health service mission under humanitarian, civic, or other multinational efforts. AFMS personnel participate at the start of force employment planning and AEF operations. Their guidance is considered when deciding final employment locations. Health service surveillance teams are critical assets in this process and can report on health threats at deployment locations. AEF wing commanders each have a health service group commander on staff responsible for ensuring all health services assets are ready to support a total or partial wing deployment. AFMS health service capabilities include the Expeditionary Medical Support (EMEDS) and Air Force Theater Hospital (AFTH) assets.

b. The AFMS is responsible for two primary operational health support systems: AE and Air Force Theater Hospitalization.

- The EMEDS/AFTH is a modular, tailorable, incrementally deployable asset providing prevention, stabilization, and AE preparation, sustainment, and
specialty care. The EMEDS/AFTH is designed to support deployed forces or specific requirements of a select population group across the entire range of contingency operations. This modular approach provides the commander flexibility to tailor a health support package while reducing the airlift requirements for health service forces in theater.

• AE supports the entire spectrum of global patient movement. The global AE system provides oversight of casualties transiting the AE system from point of origin to destination. AE enables patients to be rapidly evacuated and transported to the most appropriate level of care.

1. United States Army

a. MP perform five functions in any combination needed to accomplish the mission in both joint and multinational operations. These functions are:

- **Maneuver and Mobility Support Operations** — support to river crossing operations, breaching operations, passage of lines, straggler and dislocated civilian control, route reconnaissance and surveillance, main supply route regulation enforcement.

- **Area Security Operations** — reconnaissance, rear area and sustainment operations security, response force operations, critical asset, site, and high risk person security.

- **Law and Order Operations** — law enforcement, criminal investigation and US Customs operations.

- **Internment and Resettlement Operations** — EPW and CI handling, PRC, and US military prisoner operations.

- **Police Intelligence Operations** — intelligence preparation of the battlefield, police liaison with federal law enforcement agencies, HN, and other agencies.

c. USACIDC investigates violations of international agreements on land warfare and provide forensic science support to other USACIDC units in the theater. In addition, at the direction of the commanding general of USACIDC or higher authority, they conduct special investigations.

2. United States Marine Corps

a. A Marine Corps MP company is assigned to the division, wing, and FSSG. A provost marshal assigned to the MAGTF command element coordinates their efforts. While MP assets are currently resident within each MAGTF subordinate element, a variety of task organizations and control options may be employed by the MAGTF commander depending on the mission and situation. The MP company’s sole purpose is to provide security support to the MAGTF; thus, it is dependent upon the other organizations for administration, supply, maintenance, health services, and food service support.

b. The security support provided to the MAGTF commander encompasses the following operations:

- **Antiterrorism/force protection support (AT/FP)** — Vulnerability assessments to identify command areas that are vulnerable to terrorist attack. Criminal and tactical information gathering. Assist AT/FP training.

- **Traffic control maneuver and mobility support** — Route reconnaissance and surveillance; main supply route regulation and enforcement; area damage control identification; and information collection, reporting, and dissemination.
• **Area security** — Security and protection of LOCs, critical assets (airfields, service support areas, etc.), physical security, and MAGTF rear areas.

• **EPW and civilian internee operations**, US military prisoner operations; dislocated civilian and straggler control.

• **Law and order** — Services to assist the MAGTF commander in maintaining good order and military discipline including law enforcement, criminal investigations, customs support, and MP information control.

3. **United States Air Force**

   a. USAF SP provide both law enforcement and security functions for the Air Force. Air bases and/or installations, as do other rear area facilities, face a ground threat that, for planning purposes, is divided into three threat levels.

   b. Agents, saboteurs, partisans, and terrorist groups pose the Level I threat. Safeguarding nuclear weapons and other high priority resources against this threat is the primary mission of the Air Force SP. The SP are specifically organized, trained, and equipped to defend the base against the Level I threat.

   c. The Level II threat includes tactical units smaller than battalion size, particularly unconventional warfare forces (for example, Special Purpose and/or Special Designation Forces and Ranger-Commandos) whose primary tasks are covert reconnaissance and sabotage missions to disrupt friendly sortie generation. These forces may also use standoff weapons from outside the base boundaries, or they may infiltrate the base and employ explosive devices, silent killing techniques, and other methods to accomplish their objectives. Equipped with a diversity of weapons, they possess the capability of engaging in combat with friendly ground defense forces, if necessary, to accomplish their mission. However, these enemy forces normally operate covertly in small groups, avoiding detection to increase their probability of success. SP are organized, trained, and equipped to defend against the Level II threat.

   d. The Level III threat is posed by tactical military units of battalion size or larger resulting from overt enemy heliborne, airborne, amphibious, or ground force operations. A Level III threat probably will include an air base as part of a larger, coordinated plan, rather than as an individual or separate target. Friendly force response to the Level III threat involves the commitment of the requisite tactical combat forces to destroy the threat.

   e. The primary ground threat to air bases is posed by Level II forces. The enemy is capable of conducting Level II actions against many bases simultaneously. Accordingly, air base ground defense forces are specifically organized, trained, and equipped to defeat the Level II threat while maintaining a limited capability to detect, delay, and disrupt Level III threat forces until the arrival of friendly tactical combat forces.
1. United States Army

a. PSYOP are planned operations conveying selected information and indicators to foreign audiences and are intended to influence the emotions, motives, objective reasoning, attitudes and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals. The purpose of PSYOP is to induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and behaviors favorable to US national policy objectives. PSYOP support the combatant commander’s intentions at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of warfare across the range of military operations from peace through conflict to war and during post conflict operations. USCINCSOC exercises COCOM of CONUS-based Active Army and Army Reserve PSYOP forces and, when directed, provides trained and ready PSYOP personnel to geographic combatant commanders and US ambassadors. The geographic combatant commander exercises COCOM over all assigned military PSYOP assets. C2 of PSYOP forces is normally executed by the establishment of a joint psychological operations task force (JPOTF) directly under the JFC. The Army PSYOP capability consists of one strategic Active Component PSYOP group and two tactical Reserve groups.

b. Psychological Operations Group (POG). The POG plans, coordinates, and executes PSYOP activities at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. A POG is structured to support conventional and special operations forces deployed worldwide. It can operate up to two Psychological Operations Task Forces at the combatant command and the JTF level. A POG contains the following organizations.

- Regional PSYOP Battalion (POB). A regional POB provides cultural and linguistic expertise and is capable of providing simultaneous PSYOP support to two or more organizations within the combatant command.

- Dissemination PSYOP Battalion. Dissemination POBs provide audio, visual, and audiovisual materials production, signal support, and media broadcast capabilities to the POG, JPOTF, and tactical PSYOP units. The dissemination POBs can simultaneously support two separate operational areas at the combatant command level.

- Tactical PSYOP Battalion (TPB). TPBs provide tactical PSYOP support to corps-level units and below and select special operations and conventional task forces at Army-level equivalent-sized units. The TPB develops, produces, and disseminates tactical products within the guidance (themes, objectives, and target audiences) assigned by the JPOTF and authorized by the product approval authority (combatant commander or subordinate JFC). The TPB’s capabilities include dissemination of PSYOP products by loudspeaker message, leaflet, handbill and face-to-face communications.

- Enemy Prisoner of War/Civilian Internee PSYOP Battalion. This POB collects and evaluates PSYOP-relevant intelligence directly from EPW/CIs through interrogations, face-to-face communications, and pre- and post-testing of PSYOP products and campaigns.
c. In addition to supporting CMO, PSYOP can also support the SO missions of FID, unconventional warfare, direct action, special reconnaissance, and counterterrorism. PSYOP also support the SO collateral activity, and humanitarian demining operations.

For additional information, refer to JP 3-53, Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations.

2. United States Marine Corps

The USMC has the capability to execute both audible and visible actions designed to convey specific impressions to the enemy. These PSYOP can include broadcasts from either shore-based or airborne loudspeaker systems. Furthermore, the KC-130 or helicopter assault support assets organic to the MAW can conduct leaflet dissemination. PSYOP expertise within the Marine Corps resides principally within the RC. The CAGs form PSYOP detachments from personnel drawn from the CAG, or trained for PSYOP. The CAGs, when activated, require support from the MAGTF command element’s support unit in such areas as supply, health services, mess, and transportation.

3. United States Navy

a. Capabilities to produce audiovisual products are available from Fleet Imaging Command, Pacific; Fleet Combat Camera, Atlantic; various film libraries; Naval Media Center; and limited assistance from ships and aircraft of the fleet. A Naval Reserve PSYOP audiovisual unit assigned to the United States Joint Forces Command also is available to provide support.

b. Navy personnel assets have the capability to produce documents, posters, articles, and other material for PSYOP. Administrative capabilities ashore and afloat exist to prepare and produce various quantities of printed materials. Language capabilities exist in naval intelligence and among naval personnel for most Asian and European languages.

4. United States Air Force

a. The USAF has a variety of assets capable of conducting or supporting PSYOP. Some are specifically modified for the PSYOP role. A limited number of EC-130 COMMANDO SOLO aircraft have PSYOP as their primary mission and are equipped for airborne broadcasts of radio and television signals. MC-130 COMBAT TALON and COMBAT SHADOW are capable of leaflet airdrop missions.

b. Most all other USAF aerospace assets have the inherent capability to support PSYOP. USAF satellites and aerial reconnaissance photos can be used to support PSYOP targeting and discredit adversary claims or intentions. C-130 and HC-130 aircraft can be configured for leaflet airdrop operations. Additionally, USAF fighter aircraft can dispense leaflets by dropping M-129 leaflet bombs.
1. **United States Army**

   a. The commander provides religious support through a ministry team (MT) which consists of at least one chaplain and one chaplain assistant. The MT helps soldiers, families, and authorized civilians exercise their religious beliefs and practices. The MT is central to the organization and functioning of the chaplaincy and organic to units in the Army. Religious activities of the MT include worship (services, rites, ceremonies, sacraments, and ordinances), pastoral care (visitation, ministry of presence, counseling, family life support, and the care of wounded and dying soldiers), religious education, and spiritual fitness training.

   b. To ensure the free exercise of religion, all chaplains provide religious support to soldiers, their family members, and authorized civilians. Chaplains provide support according to the tenets of their faith group. If unable to provide support because of faith restrictions, chaplains seek the required support from other chaplain sources.

   c. **Unit Ministry Team (UMT).** The UMT is assigned to units organized according to a table of organization and equipment. It deploys with its unit and provides religious support for all units in the commander’s operational area during each stage of force projection. Comprehensive religious support requires the assignment and deployment of UMTs in combat, combat support, and combat service support units at all echelons beginning at the battalion. The UMT deploys with the unit to provide religious support to all elements of the task force. When tactically feasible, based on an assessment of the situation, battalion UMTs move forward to provide religious support to all elements of the battalion: companies, platoons, squads, and teams.

   d. **Unit Support.** Support given to the unit of assignment and to all those attached to the unit. The team normally gives first priority to this mission.

   e. **Area Support.** Support given to soldiers, members of other Services, and authorized civilians who are not a part of the team’s unit, but who are operating within the same area of operations without organic or available religious support.

   f. **Denominational Support.** Support given to soldiers and other authorized persons of the chaplain’s own denomination for the exercise of their religion. Limited assets and availability determine denominational support. Denominational support is often provided on an area basis.

2. **United States Marine Corps**

   a. Religious ministry for the Marine Corps is provided by UMT. A UMT consists of a Navy chaplain and a Navy enlisted religious program specialist. A UMT is assigned to a Marine Corps battalion and higher headquarters (regiment, division, and Marine expeditionary unit) to provide direct support to the battalion, subordinate companies, and attachments.

   b. **Unit Support.** Support provided to the unit of assignment and to those attached to the unit. The UMT normally gives first priority to support of the assigned unit and provides support to other units when directed by the commander.
c. **Area Support.** Support provided to Marines, members of other Services, and authorized civilians who are not assigned to the UMT’s unit, but are without direct religious support, as directed by the commander. A regiment, Marine expeditionary unit, or higher command normally coordinates area religious support.

d. **Faith Group Specific Support.** Support provided to Marines and other authorized persons of the chaplain’s own religious faith group to meet certain prescribed sacramental requirements and for the exercise of their religion. The unit chaplain coordinates all faith group specific and/or sacramental religious support by identifying such requirements and arranging for other military chaplains, civilian clergy, and/or command appointed lay readers to meet the requirements when the unit chaplain is not approved and/or qualified to administer the required sacrament. Faith group support is often provided on an area basis.

3. **United States Navy**

US Navy provides ministry support to the fleet, the Marine Corps, and the Coast Guard. Navy ministry teams support Navy forces ashore on an area basis. Larger Navy ships deploy with a chaplain aboard who provides ministry to the group by moving from ship to ship. Ships without chaplains aboard conduct lay services when a chaplain is not available.

4. **United States Air Force**

a. Air Force chaplains provide religious ministry across the range of military operations and in a wide range of geographic locations. The combatant commander should appoint a command chaplain from one of the Services, assigned or attached to the staff, to coordinate religious ministry activities in support of the joint mission. The command chaplain of a combatant command may be appointed to serve as the JTF chaplain upon establishment of a JTF. The Air Force Service component commander is responsible for religious ministry support activities within the component command. The Air Force Service component commander may appoint a chaplain to his staff to coordinate these activities. Other Chaplain Service (CS) teams supporting the Air Force component of a joint force are assigned to the deployed wing and provide religious support to the assigned wings and squadrons.

b. Air Force CS teams provide essential religious support to deployed forces, that includes worship opportunities, pastoral care, and advising commanders on religious, spiritual, ethical, and moral issues. CS teams plan, coordinate, and execute a comprehensive CS ministry during FHA operations as well as all levels of conflict in the operational area. These activities include being a visible reminder of the Holy; providing a pluralistic, pastoral, moral, religious, and spiritual ministry to Air Force personnel in support of maximum Air Force combat effectiveness. CS teams provide timely ministry to Air Force personnel facing the trauma of mass casualties, battle fatigue, and other combat-related stress. Chaplains coordinate, as required, with HN civil or military religious representatives in order to facilitate positive and mutual understanding. CS teams also ensure that EPWs and CIs receive ministry and care appropriate to their needs.

*For further detail regarding religious support to joint operations, refer to JP 1-05, Religious Ministry Support for Joint Operations.*
ANNEX G TO APPENDIX A
TRANSPORTATION

1. United States Army

The US Army has many transportation capabilities (ground, sea, and air) to assist in CMO. Below is an overview of the Army’s rotary-wing capability.

a. Army aviation units, such as the assault, general support and medium lift helicopter companies, provide airlift for combat, combat support, and combat service support operations. An assault or general support helicopter company provides airlift of personnel and cargo, and a medium lift helicopter company is employed primarily to airlift heavy or outsize cargo loads. The medium lift helicopter company also provides supplementary airlift of personnel and a means to evacuate damaged or crashed aircraft or other sensitive equipment. The inclusion of Army aircraft in the logistic transportation system has added a mode that can provide rapid movement of cargo over broad areas with little hindrance from natural or manmade barriers.

b. The corps aviation brigade provides the corps organic aviation assets. A corps aviation brigade is organic to each Army corps. Each corps aviation brigade is designed, tailored, and configured for the specific missions of that corps.

c. A division aviation brigade (heavy, light, airborne, air assault) is a component of each Army division. The principal purpose of the aviation brigade is to provide C2 and maximize the employment of all aviation assets within the division. Each divisional aviation brigade is designed, configured, and tailored to meet the tactical requirements of that division.

d. Air is the most flexible of transportation modes. While ground transport normally will be the primary means of support for combat operations, air LOCs become increasingly important as the intensity and depth of operations increase. Airlift relieves combat units from total dependence on ground LOCs which can become congested or interdicted and allows rapid support to the maneuver force with minimum regard to terrain peculiarities. There are, however, limitations to the capabilities of airlift. Airlift aircraft are affected by changing weather conditions and must have air corridors relatively free from enemy air defense weapons and enemy combat aircraft. Additionally, weight and size limitations for airlift may reduce the allowable cargo load.

2. United States Marine Corps

The US Marine Corps has many transportation capabilities (ground and air) to assist in CMO. Below is an overview of the Marine Corps’ aviation capability.

a. The MAGTF ground combat element and most of the MAGTF’s combat support and combat service support elements are air transportable. Assault support aircraft organic to the aviation combat element (ACE) of the MAGTF include fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft. The ACE employs assault support aviation capabilities to accomplish functional responsibilities while acting as an integral part of the MAGTF. Command, control, and communication facilities for assault support employment ashore are organic to the ACE. MAGTF assault support aircraft transport personnel and cargo, provide utility combat support, and conduct other air support activities, which facilitate landing force
operations. Assault support is provided through all phases of amphibious operations from support afloat, through the ship-to-shore movement, and during subsequent operations ashore. Aircraft are employed to satisfy MAGTF combat and combat service support requirements.

b. Combat missions consist of helicopterborne assaults to seize critical terrain, isolate pockets of enemy resistance, attack enemy flanks and rear areas, or conduct raids or patrols. Combat service support missions include supply or resupply of troops, movement of equipment, non-combat movement of troops, messenger and liaison service, and casualty and prisoner of war evacuation.

c. **Marine Light/Attack Helicopter Squadrons (HMLA).** The HMLA, operating the UH-1N utility helicopter, is organized to conduct operations as a squadron or as a detachment as part of an ACE. The mission of the HMLA is to provide combat utility helicopter support during amphibious operations and during subsequent operations ashore.

d. **Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron (HMM).** The HMM, operating the CH-46E helicopter, is organized to conduct operations as a squadron, normally containing twelve aircraft. Though an ACE is task-organized to meet specific mission requirements, the HMM is usually the nucleus organization to which detachments from other aviation units attach to conduct an assault support intensive mission (e.g., amphibious assault, forcible entry operation, and NEO). The mission of the HMM is to provide assault transport of combat troops in the initial assault waves and follow-on stages of amphibious operations and subsequent operations ashore.

e. **Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron (HMH).** The HMH, operating the CH-53D and/or CH-53E helicopter, is organized to conduct operations as a squadron, normally containing sixteen aircraft. Most often the HMH is tasked to provide aircraft detachments to an ACE, providing the heavy lift capability. The mission of the HMH is to provide assault helicopter transport of heavy weapons, equipment, and supplies during amphibious operations and subsequent operations ashore.

f. **Marine Aerial Refueler and Transport Squadron (VMGR).** The VMGR, operating the KC-130F multi-mission tanker/transport aircraft, is organized to conduct operations as a squadron, normally containing twelve aircraft. The KC-130F provides in-flight refueling for both fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft, and can conduct rapid ground refueling when required. The KC-130F also is used to perform aerial delivery of troops and cargo, emergency resupply into unimproved landing zones, and casualty evacuation missions. The VMGR normally will be tasked to provide the number of aircraft necessary to fulfill ACE mission requirements.

3. **United States Air Force**

a. **Air Mobility Forces.** Air mobility forces include airlift, air refrueling, and the global air mobility support system (GAMSS) forces. As a component of the DTS, they transport personnel and materiel by air to deploy, sustain, employ, redeploy, or provide direct maneuver of military or nonmilitary forces and organizations, as authorized by the NCA or designated subordinate commanders. These air mobility forces provide the NCA with a rapid global mobility capability core to US ability to protect national interests. This ability to rapidly and flexibly project combat power and influence anywhere in the world increasingly hinges on US air mobility capability. Air mobility’s ability to project force in both a lethal and nonlethal manner lies at the heart of our national military strategy. Air mobility forces are a critical
Transportation

component of US military capability, and because of their high demand and/or low density nature, every effort must be made to ensure they are used as efficiently and effectively as possible. Air mobility forces provide four basic missions to support strategic, operational, and tactical requirements: passenger and cargo movement; combat support, employment, sustainment; AE, and SO support. Each of these missions can be supported by either intertheater or intratheater operations.

b. Air mobility forces can be employed across the range of military operations. Air mobility forces can bring constructive force to a humanitarian crisis by transporting medical and CA personnel and equipment.

c. The Airlift System. The airlift system is an integrated system that incorporates all aspects of intertheater, intratheater, and JTF-dedicated airlift to form a seamless delivery system. Collectively, it offers the user a seamless delivery system to move the user’s personnel, patients, and/or cargo.

d. Classifications of Airlift Operations. The National Air Mobility System is a broad and comprehensive system comprised of both private sector and USG components. Together these components provide the C2 infrastructure, assets, personnel, and industrial base required to create and sustain an air mobility system capable of meeting the nation’s requirements.

- **Intertheater Airlift.** Intertheater airlift provides the airbridge that links theaters to CONUS and to other theaters, as well as airlift within CONUS. Due to the intercontinental ranges usually associated with these missions, intertheater platforms are normally longer range and have larger airlift capacity. Air Mobility Command’s (AMC’s) arsenal of aircraft include the C-5, C-9A, C-12, C-17, C-21, C-130, C-141, KC-10, and KC-135. AMC also will utilize commercial lease contracts adding another dimension to their global airlift capability. Most intertheater air mobility forces are under the command of USCINCTRANS and provide common-user resources, sourced from the Department of Defense or Civil Reserve Air Fleet, to conduct operations into or between theaters. Intertheater air mobility operations are conducted in response to requests from the combatant commands and Services in accordance with guidelines set by the NCA. This system is heavily dependant upon the GAMSS comprised of fixed, permanent, but limited en route support locations and mobile forces deployed under the Global Reach Laydown strategy to either augment permanent locations or establish new locations where none had existed before. This dependency dictates careful forethought if the GAMSS is to sustain any significant deployment, sustainment, or redeployment effort. Equally so, intertheater airlift and air refueling forces are limited assets that must be used with significant forethought if NCA taskings are to be met in accordance with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff priority system and flexibility retained to meet the two near-simultaneous MTW or multiple smaller contingency national security strategies.

- **Intratheater Airlift.** Intratheater airlift provides delivery of personnel and materiel within the geographic combatant commander’s AOR. This classification of mission generally requires aircraft capable of operating under a wide range of tactical conditions including austere, unimproved airfield operations. Intratheater airlift assets are those assets assigned or attached to a geographic combatant commander. These assets include (but are not limited to) the C-130,
C-9, and C-21 aircraft. The theaters also have the option of contracting commercial lift for their use.

- Intratheater air mobility forces, under the COCOM of designated geographic combatant commanders or under the control of their designated subordinate commanders, provide common-user resources to conduct operations within operational areas.

- **Intratheater air mobility operations may be controlled by one of two C2 concepts.** In a mature theater, with a durable air mobility mission and permanently assigned air mobility forces, the combatant commander may establish an air mobility operations control center through which OPCON and/or tactical control of theater assigned or attached forces is exercised. During normal operations, the Air Mobility Operations Control Center (AMOCC) is the theater Air Force component commander’s single C2 layer for planning, coordinating, tasking, and executing day-to-day theater air mobility operations. During contingency or crisis operations C2 mechanisms expand. This expansion of C2 systems requires the AMOCC to interface with both the air mobility division within the air operations center, the director of mobility forces (DIRMOBFOR), as necessary, the combat operations and combat plans divisions within the air operations center to ensure seamless mobility operations.

- In a theater in which the AMOCC has not been established, the theater Air Force component commander normally will establish an air mobility control organization (typically, an air operations center) within the theater C2 structure to plan, coordinate, task, and execute theater assigned air mobility assets.

- **Prior to a JTF being established, theater requirements are usually met through theater-assigned forces and controlled through a theater-specific command and control node. This node is typically an AMOCC. A JTF mission often will require air mobility augmentation by theater assigned and/or attached air mobility forces and/or USTRANSCOM assigned air mobility forces. With the concurrence of the geographic combatant commander, theater assigned and/or attached air mobility assets normally will be made available to the CJTF for tasking, while tactical control will normally be delegated and exercised by the Air Force component commander and implemented through the DIRMOBFOR. Intratheater air mobility operations are conducted in response to taskings from the combatant commander or designated subordinate commanders and primarily fill theater operational requirements. Close coordination is required between the intertheater and intratheater air mobility sub-systems. Successful movement and delivery of personnel, materiel, and fuel are dependent upon a seamless interface of intertheater and intratheater sub-systems. The Air Force component commander and DIRMOBFOR must ensure that the intratheater sub-system is both organized to properly interface with the intertheater sub-system offload and onload points and capable of handling the air mobility flow into and out of the theater.

- **Lead Mobility Wings (LMW).** In response to HA/disaster relief (DR) crises and NEOs, Air Mobility Command has designated five LMWs to provide a short-notice deployment capability for mobility reception. Each LMW fields a HA/DR/NEO trained Initial Response Team (IRT). The focus of this cross-functional
team is the establishment of a US military presence in forward airfields for the reception of relief personnel, supplies, and equipment, or the extraction of noncombatants — essentially an air mobility operation. When requested by a supported geographic combatant commander, this 32-member IRT, sourced from an on-call LMW, arrives at an airfield in the disaster area to provide mobility expertise and leadership, assess the requirements for follow-on relief forces, and establish a reception base to serve as a conduit for relief supplies or the repatriation of noncombatants. The IRT is attached to the joint task force established by the supported geographic combatant commander.

- **Operational Support Airlift (OSA).** OSA is a special classification of airlift operations providing timely movement of key decision makers and cargo. Generally, these platforms are smaller sized business type aircraft. The aircraft assigned to the combatant commanders perform theater airlift or other missions in direct support of their theater assigned combat units, while USTRANSCOM manages the CONUS-based assets as a common-user transportation pool.

e. **Delivery Methods.** There are two methods in which airlift aircraft deliver their payloads: airland and airdrop. A number of planning factors and the JFC’s objectives will determine which method is most appropriate.

- **Airland.** Airland delivery is the method where an aircraft lands at an objective area and unloads its cargo. The offloading of personnel and cargo is done entirely on the ground. It is the most efficient and least expensive way to use available airlift capacity. Therefore, airland is normally considered the preferred mode of delivery. Airland operations include airlift to well-established airbases, as well as tactical deliveries to unimproved, dirt strip landing zones.

- **Airdrop.** Airdrop is another option of aerial delivery. It involves the aerial delivery of personnel, equipment, and supplies into an objective area from an in-flight aircraft. There are several procedures for airdropping personnel, equipment, or supplies from an airborne platform. Most of these procedures involve the use of parachutes to deliver loads to the ground such as heavy equipment airdrop, container delivery system airdrop, and personnel airdrop.

f. **Aeromedical Evacuation.** AE is the movement of patients under medical supervision to and between medical treatment facilities by air transportation. Movement of patients normally requires specially qualified aeromedical crewmembers to accompany the patient, special air traffic control considerations to comply with patient driven altitude and pressurization restrictions, and special aircraft systems medical equipment. Patient Movement Requirements Centers (PMRCs) provide patient regulating services. Patient regulating includes accounting for bed availability, medical airlift capability, and patient in-transit visibility. PMRCs assume the responsibilities formerly performed by the Armed Services (or Joint) Medical Regulating Offices and USAF AE coordination centers (AECCs). The AECC is a coordination center, within the joint air operations center’s airlift coordination cell, which monitors all activities related to AE operations execution. It manages the medical aspects of the AE mission and serves as the net control station for AE communications. It coordinates medical requirements with airlift capability, assigns medical missions to the appropriate AE elements, and monitors patient movement activities.
4. United States Navy

The US Navy has many transportation capabilities (air and sea) to assist in CMO. Below is an overview of the Navy’s aviation and sea capabilities.

4.1 United States Navy

a. Navy organic airlift assets support CMO operations when not in conflict with existing Navy mission requirements. Navy aircraft identified to support CMO missions include C-9Bs, DC-9s, C-130Ts, C-20s, and C-40As. Navy rotary-wing aircraft as well as carrier-on board airlift are potential CMO resources which may also be available for search and rescue, evacuation, and airlift support. Fleet combatant commanders, through appropriate subordinate command scheduling and coordinating offices, have the responsibility to determine the availability of these organic assets.

b. Existing Navy sealift resource may also support CMO requirements as well as provide temporary holding facilities. Depending on mission requirements as well as location of ships, the Navy may also be able to provide vertical airlift support on all ships with landing platform capabilities, including aircraft carriers, amphibious ships, and combatants. Navy assets may also be able to support the ferrying of personnel by small vessels from shore-to-ship or shore-to-shore.
1. United States Coast Guard’s Combatant Command Support Roles

The United States Coast Guard provides support to both domestic and overseas CMO across the range of military operations. Its national defense role is to provide non-redundant, complementary resources that support the National Military Strategy. Coast Guard forces can provide capabilities over a range of naval warfare duties, including: battle group operations; sealift escort; search and rescue; surveillance and interdiction; visit, board, search and seizure; aids to navigation; peace operations support; force protection of military shipping at US sea ports of embarkation and overseas ports of debarkation.

2. Secretary of Defense and Secretary of Transportation Memorandum of Agreement

In October 1995, the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Transportation, along with the Chief of Naval Operations and the Commandant of the Coast Guard signed a Memorandum of Agreement that identifies unique national defense capabilities that the Coast Guard can bring to bear as a force provider. These Coast Guard capabilities are as follows.

a. Maritime interception operations
b. Military environmental response operations
c. Port operations, security and defense
d. Peacetime military engagement

3. Maritime Interception Operations

United States Coast Guard cutters may be employed to enforce sanctions against another nation. Functions conducted against vessel traffic include intercepting, boarding, searching, diverting, and seizing. For example, cutters are provided to the United States Central Command to enforce sanctions against Iraq.

4. Law Enforcement Boarding Teams

Coast Guard law enforcement detachments (LEDETs) are experts at the visit, board, search, and seizure mission. The smooth integration of Coast Guard LEDET capabilities into DOD maritime sanctions enforcement missions is based on a foundation built from more than 20 years of Coast Guard and Navy drug interdiction experience. These LEDETs provide commanders and allied maritime interdiction forces with a capability that complements sanctions enforcement or blockading missions. LEDETs have played a key role enforcing maritime sanctions in Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM, off Bosnia, and near Haiti. In addition, they have conducted training for numerous US Navy and allied ship boarding teams.

5. Military Environmental Response Operations

Marine pollution incidents have the potential to disrupt defense operations, ruin national economies, and damage natural resources. The US Coast Guard is the LFA for prevention and response to marine
pollution incidents. It is ready to respond to major oil spills. Resources that may be employed to respond include strike teams, oil recovery systems installed in buoy tenders, airborne sensors, and an extensive database of worldwide response capabilities. C2 elements also may be provided to oversee environmental operations.

6. Pollution Strike Teams

For military environmental response operations, the Coast Guard offers three rapidly deployable pollution strike teams with equipment configured to be quickly loaded onto military aircraft. The strike teams are composed of highly skilled personnel who can integrate into joint force staffs as consultants and advisors in the event of a massive pollution incident that may disrupt the ability of US and allied forces to conduct military operations. These strike teams can operate under the most severe conditions, including chemical incidents, and are recognized internationally for their expertise and achievements.

7. Port Operations, Security and Defense

Domestic port security and protection have long been a core Coast Guard mission. However, emerging threats to the US homeland have prompted an increased Coast Guard focus on protection of domestic ports and the US maritime transportation system from asymmetric warfare and terrorist threats. At the end of the Cold War, and in the wake of Operation DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM, geographic combatant commanders recognized a need for deployable port security and harbor defense. To meet that need, the Coast Guard’s Maritime Defense Zone mission has been expanded from protection of US ports to include overseas ports.

8. Port Security Units

Port security units (PSUs) conduct port operations and security missions in support of national defense needs. The PSU provides waterborne and limited land-based antiterrorism and force protection for shipping and critical port facilities at both ends of US sea LOCs. PSUs are scheduled to arrive early and designed to be rapidly deployed by aircraft on short notice. They have deployed to Bahrain for Operation DESERT STORM and Haiti for Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY and Korea, Turkey, Portugal, and Panama for exercises. To conduct port operations and security, Coast Guard forces typically join the Naval Coastal Warfare organization. This organization includes Navy Mobile Inshore Undersea Warfare Units and Harbor Defense Command Units, PSUs and patrol boats, and possibly Army and/or Marine Corps security forces.

9. Waterways Management

Through waterways management, the Coast Guard operates to ensure the safe and efficient use of America’s seaports of embarkation and waterways to provide a reliable re-supply of deployed US military forces. Likewise, an efficient maritime transportation system that provides safe movement of cargo and the safe operations of ports and vessels also is vital to the security and economic health of most nations of the world. It also is vital to outside CONUS joint operations that other nations maintain suitable seaports of debarkation and efficient waterways to support the US military re-supply effort. The Coast Guard can provide expert consulting, training and coordinating services to help ensure that other nations can safely operate their ports and provide for the expeditious movement of vessels.
10. Maritime Navigation

Coast Guard sea going buoy tenders can deploy overseas to mark or remark navigation channels. They combine a heavy lift capability with a relatively shallow draft. Coast Guard aids to navigation experts can be deployed to seaports of debarkation as navigation system designers, to repair existing aids to navigation systems, or to coordinate navigation services of host or allied forces. Extremely accurate differential global positioning systems will soon be made air deployable to ensure the precise marking of channels in ports of debarkation. This aids to navigation mission is an excellent means of outreach to many nations. The Coast Guard has provided services to Portugal, France, Germany, England, and Ireland on a professional exchange with those nations’ navigation agencies. Another navigation service is polar icebreaking. Coast Guard breakers have long supported the movement of military cargoes, polar research, and peacetime engagement missions worldwide.

11. Peacetime Military Engagement

The December 1997 National Defense Panel’s Report to Congress recommended that the Coast Guard be a model for other nations. This includes a stronger contribution to geographic combatant commanders in international programs, exercises, and other activities. The goal is to build trust, strengthen military-to-military ties, and improve regional stability. Since 1986 the Coast Guard has deployed about 600 mobile training teams to over 65 countries. Annually, the Coast Guard trains about 2000 students in-country and another 300 in Coast Guard schools located in the United States. Peacetime engagement activities are natural for the Coast Guard because the Coast Guard interacts with a large and diverse number of agencies in host countries. Additionally, Coast Guard forces and missions closely match those of many HNs, and the presence of Coast Guard forces is often more desirable because of its worldwide humanitarian reputation. Coast Guard cutters routinely participate in various training events and exercises with Pacific, Asian, Central, South American, West African, Mediterranean, Baltic, and Black Sea navies and coast guards. The Coast Guard routinely works with the Russian Border Guard, China, and Japan to improve enforcement and protection of living marine resources.

12. Model Maritime Service Code

The Coast Guard helps other nations create legal authority for naval forces to conduct law enforcement missions. It developed the international Model Maritime Service Code to serve as a foundation document for the creation or improvement of a nation’s fundamental legal authority. The Coast Guard helps maritime states that are faced with many challenges and issues including coastal defense, navigation, regulation of shipping, search and rescue, marine environmental protection, vessel traffic management, customs, immigration, anti-smuggling enforcement, and vessel safety. The model legal code has enabled the coastal forces of many nations to function with new law enforcement and regulatory powers. Many nations now have coast guards, or navies with coast guard powers, which can thwart numerous threats to their security.

13. Air Support

The Coast Guard has an inventory of 92 HH 65 Dolphin and 42 HH 60 Jayhawk helicopters and 41 HU 25 Guardian and 30
HC 130 Hercules fixed-wing aircraft. In addition, two armed MH-90 Enforcer helicopters are currently operating and future expansion to eight aircraft is planned. Equipment suites are updated and include global positioning system, military satellite communications, night vision, side looking airborne radar, oil spill sensors, and forward-looking infrared radar. These aircraft can support the JFC in many military mission areas including naval coastal warfare and peacetime engagement. In addition, Coast Guard aircraft and crews can provide expertise in search and rescue, maritime patrol, aerial delivery of rafts, pumps, data marker buoys, oil spill dispersants, and rescue swimmers.

14. Support to Peace Operations

The Coast Guard, as a military force and maritime law enforcement agency, can lend support to both the civilian and military components of joint or multinational peace operations. This includes boarding vessels at sea laden with large numbers of refugees or conducting basic search and rescue coverage. This also may involve counter arms or contraband smuggling, the protection of civilian vessels from piracy, port security, waterways management, and navigation services. The Coast Guard can provide a vital link with numerous agencies, both domestic and international, to assist maritime states overcoming the challenges to meet its obligations under international law.
Annex A  Political-Military Plan
1. Purpose

The purpose of this appendix is to provide an overview of PDD-56, *Managing Complex Contingency Operations*, and to illustrate a sample POL-MIL plan.

2. PDD-56, *Managing Complex Contingency Operations*

The following is an extract from the Synopsis of PDD-56, *Managing Complex Contingency Operations*, that explains the planning process.

a. PDD-56, *Managing Complex Contingency Operations*, calls upon the Deputies Committee to establish appropriate interagency working groups to assist in policy development, planning, and execution of complex contingency operations. Normally, the Deputies Committee will form an Executive Committee (ExCom) with appropriate membership to supervise the day-to-day management of US participation in complex contingency operations. The ExCom will bring together representatives of all agencies that might participate in the operation, including those not normally part of the NSC structure. When this is the case, participating agency representatives normally will augment both the Deputies Committee and the ExCom. In addition, the chair of the ExCom normally will designate an agency to lead a legal and fiscal advisory sub-group whose role is to consult with the ExCom to ensure that tasks assigned by the ExCom can be performed by the assigned agencies consistent with legal and fiscal authorities. This ExCom approach has proved useful in clarifying agency responsibilities, strengthening agency accountability, ensuring interagency coordination, and developing policy options for consideration by senior policy makers. The guiding principle behind the ExCom approach to interagency management is the personal accountability of presidential appointees. Members of the ExCom effectively serve as functional managers for specific elements of the USG response (e.g., refugees, demobilization, elections, economic assistance, police reform, and public information). They implement the strategies agreed to by senior policy makers during interagency coordination and report to the ExCom and Deputies Committee on any problems or issues that need to be resolved.

b. In future complex contingency operations to which the United States contributes substantial resources, PDD-56, *Managing Complex Contingency Operations*, calls upon the Deputies Committee to establish organizational arrangements akin to those of the ExCom approach. PDD-56, *Managing Complex Contingency Operations*, requires that a POL-MIL plan be developed as an integrated planning tool for coordinating USG actions in a complex contingency operation. The POL-MIL plan will include a comprehensive situation assessment, mission statement, agency objectives, and desired end state. It will outline an integrated concept of operations to synchronize agency efforts. The plan will identify the primary preparatory issues and tasks for conducting an operation (e.g., congressional consultations, diplomatic efforts, troop recruitment, legal authorities, funding requirements and sources, media coordination). It also will address major functional tasks (e.g., political mediation/reconciliation, military support, demobilization, humanitarian assistance, police reform, basic public service, economic restoration, human rights monitoring, social development, public information).
c. With the use of the POL-MIL plan, the interagency community can implement effective management practices, namely, to centralize planning and decentralize execution during the operation. The desired unity of effort among the various agencies that is created through the use of the POL-MIL plan contributes to the overall success of these complex operations. When a complex contingency operation is contemplated in which the USG will play a substantial role, PDD-56, *Managing Complex Contingency Operations*, calls upon the Deputies Committee to task the development of a POL-MIL plan and assign specific responsibilities to the appropriate ExCom officials. Each ExCom official will be required to develop their respective part of the plan, which will be fully coordinated among all relevant agencies. This development process will be transparent and analytical, resulting in issues being posed to senior policy makers for resolution. Based on the resulting decisions, the plan will be finalized and widely distributed among relevant agencies. 

PDD-56, *Managing Complex Contingency Operations*, also requires that the POL-MIL plan include demonstrable milestones and measures of success, to include detailed planning for the transition of the operation to activities that might be performed by a follow-on operation or by the host government. According to PDD-56, *Managing Complex Contingency Operations*, the POL-MIL plan should be updated as the mission progresses to reflect milestones that are or are not met and to incorporate changes in the situation on the ground. When a POL-MIL plan is developed and adopted by the Deputies Committee, it provides a valuable instrument for achieving unity of effort among the USG agencies involved in a complex contingency operation. It does not obviate or preclude follow-on planning at the operational level. The latter is indispensable and provides a degree of detail and specificity that a POL-MIL plan cannot provide. Operational planners, however, can look to the interagency POL-MIL plan for a start-to-finish concept of the mission that describes how each element (military and civilian) fits within the broadest purposes of a mission.

A sample POL-MIL plan is at Annex A to Appendix B, “Political-Military Plan.”
Political-Military Plan  
Operation XXXX

I. Situation

A. Threats — Actions of a Syndicate and other crime lords have resulted in a breakdown in governance and law and order in Country X, posing a threat to neutral and efficient operation of the causeway. Armed forces from Country X have invaded Country Y and occupy significant portions of that country. Associated transnational security threats include drug trafficking, organized crime, human rights violations causing forced migration (both internal and external), and general societal breakdown associated with civil strife.

B. Friendly Assets to Counter These Threats

1. Military forces of the United States

2. States in the region prepared to offer political, diplomatic, and basing/transit support to Country Y and US initiatives in the region

3. Organization of American States support of political initiatives

4. Humanitarian, human rights, and emergency response international organizations, including the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, and the International Committee of the Red Cross

5. UN and other reconstruction and development agencies, including the World Bank, the UN Development Programme (UNDP), United Nations Children’s Fund, and the World Health Organization

6. Emergency relief and developmental nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), both expatriate and indigenous, include the Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere, OXFAM-UK, Catholic Relief Services, Salesmen Missions, United Methodist Committee on Relief, US Catholic Conference, Medecins Sans Frontieres (Doctors Without Borders) USA, World Vision International, and the Country Y Red Cross

7. United States Agency for International Development (USAID), plus some other national economic development organizations
C. US Interests in the Region of Conflict

1. Neutral and efficient operation of the causeway, enabling full support of US force projection requirements

2. Protection of life and property of US Nationals

3. Stable and friendly governance in the region, especially in Country X

4. Stemming transnational crime and trafficking in illegal narcotics destined for the United States

5. Respect for the Rule of Law and protection of human rights in the region

6. Economic growth and prosperity in the region

II. Mission. Maintain assured US access to an efficiently operated causeway. Roll back Country X aggression and restore the territorial integrity of Country Y. Create a climate of respect for international norms of conduct, respect for the Rule of Law, and transition to democratic governance and sustainably secure societies in the region.

III. Execution

A. Concept of Operations. Since peaceful resolution of the crisis appears unlikely, the critical path to mission accomplishment now encompasses a two-phase operation.

1. The Crisis Phase is a predominantly military operation with sufficient force to assure US access to an efficiently operating causeway. Concurrently, US forces will roll back the aggression of Country X combatants out of Country Y and restore the territorial integrity of the Country Y state. US military authorities will quantify to a maximum extent the humanitarian and rehabilitation impacts of their military action. These impacts will be communicated expeditiously to appropriate emergency international organizations responsible for assistance to refugees, displaced persons, and affected populations in conflict situations. The same information communicated to development organizations such as the World Bank and the UNDP will trigger and facilitate discharge of their post-conflict responsibilities.

2. In the Post-Conflict Phase, a largely civilian Regional Transition Assistance Group will provide guidance and capacity-building assistance leading to recovery from conflict impact in Country Y and to an eventual turnover of governance and rehabilitation tasks to indigenous authorities in Country X. US military presence in the Post-Conflict Phase will be limited to the security component required to protect the achievements of the Crisis Phase and provide security space to assure accomplishment of the Post-Conflict Phase objectives.
B. Responsibilities and Accountability of Participating Agencies

1. US Department of State

   a. Develop and implement the Political-Diplomatic Annex to the Political-Military (POL-MIL) Plan (Annex A; to be provided).

   b. Engage appropriate United Nations and other international relief and development organizations, familiarize them with US objectives in this contingency, and enlist their constructive participation to the end of achieving sustainable security and a climate for reconstruction, development, and stability in the region.

   c. Achieve maximum financial burdensharing through use of the United Nations Consolidated Appeals process to avoid undue stress on US taxpayers in underwriting the costs of both emergency humanitarian and rehabilitation assistance in Country X and Country Y.

2. US Department of Defense — Office, Joint Chiefs of Staff

   a. Assure maximum visibility and familiarity with this POL-MIL plan in the military mission planning process at every level.

   b. Assure full and effective two-way communication on this plan between the strategic level in Washington, the operational level (combatant commander, commander, joint task force) in the theater, and the American Embassy Country Teams.

   c. Determine the military support requirements that humanitarian emergency and rehabilitation/development organizations may require in discharging their responsibilities.

   d. Assure that these support requirements also include the input of NGO acting as implementing partners with the accountable international organizations.

3. US National Security Advisor, National Security Council

   a. Take charge of the US interagency process in developing and implementing this POL-MIL plan.

   b. Discipline the process prescribed in Presidential Decision Directive-56 to assure immediate reaction to any requirement to amend the POL-MIL plan; assure that Washington-level and operational-level mission planning and analysis are engaged with each other and in harmony with this plan, and assure, through the State Department, the full engagement of appropriate international and nongovernmental organizations with the outlines of this plan.
4. USAID

   a. Provide input to military mission planning to assure maximum support for, and minimum interference with, follow-on reconstruction and development activities in Country X and Country Y.

   b. For emergency response to needs of refugees, internally displaced and internally affected populations, assure that disaster assistance response teams integrate fully into US interagency teams (e.g., multi-agency assistance teams) dispatched to the capitals of Country Y and Country X. Assure that any NGO proposals funded by USAID are supportive of and in harmony with the plans and programs for which the lead UN agency — UNHCR — is being held accountable.

   c. Prepare the Reconstruction and Development Plan (Annex B; to be provided).

IV. Operational Support. The range of tasks which military forces may be called upon to perform to support the objectives of this Plan.

   A. Develop and implement the military Operation Plan XXXX (Annex C; to be provided).

   B. For the Crisis Phase, prepare advance estimates of humanitarian and rehabilitation impacts associated with military operations in theater. Civil affairs assessments of likely numbers of civilian victims affected, and sectoral requirements to meet their emergency needs (water, food, shelter, sanitation, preventive and curative medical services) have to be developed by the joint task force (JTF), and communicated to the civilian international organizations for planning and action (this is accomplished in Annex G, Civil Affairs to a military plan or order). State Department will convey this impact/requirements assessment to the UN Emergency Relief Coordinator at UN Headquarters. JTF commander will communicate this assessment to the lead international emergency response organization in the field through the humanitarian operations center and civil-military operations centers (to assure in the Crisis Phase that appropriate civilian agencies are prepared and committed to meeting emergency humanitarian relief requirements, and concurrently, to relieve the JTF commander of responsibility for meeting these civilian requirements out of military assets).

   C. The civil affairs component of the military operation plan needs to encompass the full range of tasks military forces could be called upon to perform — in addition to the emergency relief tasks cited in paragraph 2 above which should NOT be tasked to military forces. Prudence dictates that planners consider how they might accomplish one or more of these tasks if and when ordered, but these should not be construed as specified tasks. Rather, planners should evaluate these tasks and advise higher headquarters of additional assets that may be required if these tasks were to be assigned.

   1. Range of potential military tasking during the Crisis Phase:

      a. Security for relief convoys, relief articles distribution points, and/or sites for immunization operations.
b. Temporary security for camps or clusters of refugees and internally displaced persons.

c. Logistic support, e.g., wholesale and retail transport of relief items, only until broken or interrupted civilian systems can be restored or augmented.

d. Engineer support on a limited short-term basis, to open or maintain critical humanitarian supply routes.

e. Possible apprehension of drug cartel leaders and others who may be indicted for crimes against humanity.

f. Possible security for UN human rights monitors in their “Neighborhood Watch” operations; security for forensic experts gathering evidence at sites of atrocities, e.g., mass graves, and possible security for humanitarian and human rights officials in the course of their inspection duties in insecure areas.

2. Range of potential military tasking during the Post-Conflict Phase. Military-civil affairs assessments of rehabilitation requirements will be key to informing and jump-starting the work of the appropriate national, international and indigenous rehabilitation and development agencies (e.g., USAID, World Bank, UNDP, host-government ministries). Assessments by these bodies will come in time, but usually take so long that initial rehabilitation strategies and plans will probably rely heavily on Civil Affairs groundwork. Civil affairs assessments will cover the following elements:

a. Residual Humanitarian Impact and Requirements:

(1) This could include physical protection requirements for disaffected civilians unwilling to return to their country or to their homes due to well-founded fear of persecution and physical threat (and incapacity of civilian police). Other sectoral assessments will include water systems; medical services; shelters and food together with recommendations for the appropriate civilian agency response to these needs.

(2) Probably the key military support for humanitarian requirements in this transition phase is to support the return of refugees and internally dislocated civilians. Civil affairs community-based surveys need to focus on security, economic, and societal aspects of determining suitability of communities to receive returnees. This information will be vital to the responsibility of the UNHCR to manage the overall returnee program.

b. Infrastructure. This assessment will include communications, transportation, sanitation, water systems, and medical services.

c. Economy and Social Infrastructure. To include employment opportunities, small business financing, overall banking system, and statutory incentives/disincentives for investment and economic development.
d. Environmental Impact. Assessment of the damage incurred and actions required to restoring the environment to its approximate pre-conflict condition.

e. Civil affairs assessments for the above sectors will be communicated to the appropriate UN and other international organizations humanitarian and development agencies through the State Department and the USAID.

f. Other Military Responsibilities in the Transition to Stability Phase. A small, tailored military presence should be prepared to facilitate the planning and start the implementation of the international humanitarian and development agency responsibilities in Country X and Country Y. The goal is to achieve a seamless transition from a predominantly military to a predominantly civilian international presence, to access the necessary resources, and to build sufficient capacity among indigenous agencies to give stability and prosperity a chance in the region.

V. Command and Control

A. In the Crisis Phase, the President exercises his responsibilities through the National Command Authorities. Crisis management and control in the Washington interagency arena is the responsibility of the National Security Advisor.

B. In the Post-Conflict Phase (transition to stability), National Command Authorities arrangements remain in place. The National Security Advisor continues to drive the interagency process. The President has designated the Administrator, USAID, as the President’s Representative for Reconstruction and Development, Country X — Country Y.

C. In the operational area for the Crisis Phase, military control will be exercised through the National Command Authorities. The President’s Representative for Reconstruction and Development will coordinate civilian responsibilities for reconstruction and development.

D. Post-conflict coordination in the field will be facilitated with the creation of Executive Steering Groups (ESGs) in both Country X and Country Y. Ambassadors in capitol, Country X and capitol, Country Y will chair their respective ESGs. ESGs will include representatives from the country teams, senior military representatives, appropriate representation from host-country development and planning ministries, and international organizations, plus NGO representatives as observers.

For the President of the United States
APPENDIX C
PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS FOR CIVIL AFFAIRS ACTIVITIES

Certain CA units are task-organized around the functional specialty areas which correspond to those civilian sectors likely to have an impact on CMO. This appendix will address the relevancy of the functional areas in transition planning.

1. Government Areas of Consideration

a. Legal

• Relevant to operation of foreign judiciary and legal systems and to matters related to international law that may be in effect.

• Relevant to operation of US laws governing military support to Federal, state, and local authorities.

b. Public Administration. Relevant to operations and/or use of civil agencies and organizations.

c. Public Education. Relevant to operations and/or use of civil educational systems and programs.

d. Public Health. Relevant to operations and/or use of civil health services facilities, management of patients and disease controls, and other preventive health measures or systems.

e. Public Safety. Relevant to operations and/or use of civil law enforcement, security, and emergency services and facilities.

2. Economics and Commerce Areas of Consideration

a. Economic Development

• Relevant to:

  • Operation and/or use of civil government price and commodity controls, rationing, and key industries;

  • Assessments of existing economic and commercial structure and its effects on planned military operations; and

  • Rehabilitation and/or reconstruction of the economic commercial infrastructure.

• Relevant to operations and/or use of civil work force agencies and personnel.

• Relevant to operations of civil budgetary agencies and to formulation and/or implementation of associated monetary fiscal policy.

b. Civilian Supply

• Relevant to coordination, acquisition, and distribution of:

  • Civil sector resource support for essential military needs; and

  • Military provisions essential to meet minimum civil population needs.
3. Public Facilities Areas of Consideration

a. Public Communications. Relevant to operations and management of civil government and private postal services, telephone, telegraph, radio, television, and public warning systems.

b. Public Transportation. Relevant to operations and/or use of available civil transportation assets, including rail, highways, ports, and airfields.

c. Public Works and Utilities. Relevant to operations and maintenance of civil public works and utilities such as gas, waterworks, and sewage or refuse.

4. Special Areas of Consideration

a. Cultural Relations

- Identifying and safeguarding cultural property that is of personal, private, or national value.

- Relevant to policies and procedures regarding safeguarding significant civil cultural traditions and properties.

b. Civil Information. Relevant to development of effective indigenous informational institutions and programs and support to US informational programs, including formulation, coordination, and dissemination of information required notices or proclamations to the civil population.

c. Dislocated Civilians

- Relevant to operations and care and control measures (e.g., shelter, screening, evacuation) to facilitate military operations and meet humanitarian requirements.

- Relevant to operations and/or use of civil relief agencies and other organizations providing supplies and other support to civil population.

d. Emergency Services. Relevant to operations and/or use of civil emergency welfare and relief services; coordinated civil-military public safety; nuclear, biological, and chemical attack warnings; casualty treatment and evacuation measures; and disaster relief and recovery actions.

e. Environmental Management. Relevant to the rehabilitation, establishment, delivery, and maintenance of government environmental management systems and agencies.

For more information, refer to JP 3-57.1, Joint Doctrine for Civil Affairs.
The development of JP 3-57 is based upon the following primary references.

1. Treaty obligations of the United States, to include:

a. The Geneva Conventions for the protection of War Victims of August 12, 1949 (1949 GC), which include the following treaties to which the USG is a party:

- Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in the Armed Forces in the Field (GWS).
- Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea (GWS SEA).
- Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (GPW).

b. Hague Convention No. IV Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, October 18, 1907.

2. Federal Statutory Laws


d. Title 10, USC 401, *Humanitarian and Civic Assistance Provided in Conjunction with Military Operations*.

e. Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, PL 93-288, as amended (codified in Title 42 USC 5121, et. Seq., as well as individual agency statutory authorities).

3. Presidential Decision Directives (PDD)

a. PDD-2, *Organization of the National Security Council*. 
Appendix D


d. PDD-62, *Protection Against Unconventional Threats to the Homeland and American Overseas*.

4. DOD Directives

a. DODD 2000.13, *Civil Affairs*.

b. DODD 2100.3, CH-1, *United States Policy Relative to Commitments to Foreign Governments under Foreign Assistance Programs*.

c. DODD 2310.1, *DOD Program for Enemy Prisoners of War (EPOW) and Other Detainees*.

d. DODD 3025.1, *Military Support to Civil Authorities (MSCA)*.

e. DODD 3025.12, *Military Assistance for Civil Disturbances (MACDIS)*.

f. DODD 3025.14, *Protection and Evacuation of US Citizens and Designated Aliens in Danger Areas Abroad*.

g. DODD 3025.15, *Military Assistance to Civil Authorities (MACA)*.

h. DODD 5100.1, *Functions of the Department of Defense and Its Major Components*.

i. DODD 5100.46, *Foreign Disaster Relief*.

j. DODD 5100.77, *DOD Law of War Program*.

k. DODD 5125.1, *Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs (ASD [RA])*.

l. DODD 5132.3, *DOD Policy and Responsibilities Relating to Security Assistance*.

m. DODD 5160.54, *Critical Asset Assurance Program (CAAP)*.

n. DODD 5200.27, *Acquisition of Information Concerning Persons and Organizations Not Affiliated with the Department of Defense*.

o. DODD 5230.11, *Disclosure of Classified Military Information to Foreign and International Organizations*.

p. DODD 5525.1, *Status of Forces Policies and Information*.

q. DODD 5525.5, *DOD Cooperation with Civilian Law Enforcement Officials*.
r. DODD 5530.3, *International Agreements*.

s. DODD 6050.7, *Environmental Effects Abroad of Major Departments of Defense Actions*.

t. DODD 6050.16, *DOD Policy for Establishing and Implementing Environmental Standards at Overseas Installations*.

5. **DOD Instructions**

a. DODI 4715.5, *Management of Environmental Compliance at Overseas Installations*.

b. DODI 4715.8, *Environmental Remediation for DOD Activities Overseas*.

6. **DOD Manuals**

DOD 3025.1, *DOD Manual for Civil Emergencies*.

7. **Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Memoranda, Instructions, and Handbook**


b. CJCSI 3110.12, *Annex L (Civil Affairs) to the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan*.

c. CJCSI 3121.01 W/CH 1, *Standing Rules of Engagement (SROE) for US Forces*.

(Secret)

d. CJCSI 3214.01, *Military Support to Foreign Consequence Management Operations*.

e. CJSCI 5810.01, *Implementation of the DOD Law of War Program*.

f. CJCSM 3122.03, *Joint Operation Planning and Execution System Vol II: (Planning Formats and Guidance)*.

g. CJCS Handbook 5260, *Commander’s Handbook for Antiterrorism Readiness*.

8. **Joint Publications**

a. JP 0-2, *Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)*.


c. JP 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*.

Appendix D


g. JP 2-0, Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Joint Operations.

h. JP 2-01, Joint Intelligence Support to Military Operations.

i. JP 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations.

j. JP 3-05, Doctrine for Joint Special Operations.


l. JP 3-05.3, Joint Special Operations Operational Procedures.

m. JP 3-07, Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War.


q. JP 3-07.4, Joint Counterdrug Operations.


s. JP 3-07.6, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Humanitarian Assistance.


u. JP 3-08, Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations.

v. JP 3-13, Joint Doctrine for Information Operations.

w. JP 3-16, Joint Doctrine for Multinational Operations.

x. JP 3-33, Joint Force Capabilities.

y. JP 3-34, Engineer Doctrine for Joint Operations.


cc. JP 3-57.1, *Joint Doctrine for Civil Affairs*.


ee. JP 4-0, *Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations*.


gg. JP 4-02, *Doctrine for Health Service Support in Joint Operations*.


ii. JP 4-04, *Joint Doctrine for Civil Engineering Support*.


kk. JP 5-0, *Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations*.

ll. JP 5-00.1, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Joint Campaign Planning*.

mm. JP 5-00.2, *Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and Procedures*.


9. **Multi-Service Publications**


b. FM 100-19/FMFM 7-10, *Domestic Support Operations*.

c. DA PAM 690-80/NAVSO P-1910/MCO P12910.1, *Use and Administration of Local Citizens in Foreign Areas During Hostilities*.

10. **Department of the Army Publications**

a. AR 190-8, *Enemy Prisoners of War, Civilian Internees, Retained Personnel, and Other Detainees*.

Appendix D

c. FM 8-43, *Combat Health Support in Army Special Operations Forces*.
d. FM 19-40, *Enemy Prisoners of War, Civilian Internees, and Detained Persons*.
f. FM 41-10, *Civil Affairs Operations*.
g. FM 100-5, *Operations*.
h. FM 100-25, *Doctrine for Army Special Operations*.

11. Department of the Navy Publications


12. Department of the Air Force Publications

c. AFDD 2-3.1, *Foreign Internal Defense*.
d. AFI 10-801, *Assistance to Civilian Law Enforcement Agencies*.
e. AFI 10-802, *Military Support to Civil Authorities*.
f. AFI 10-212, *Air Base Operability Program*.
h. AFI 32-4001, *Disaster Preparedness Planning and Operations*.
i. AFI 51-401, *Training and Reporting to Ensure Compliance with the Law of Armed Conflict*.
k. AFPD 51-4, *Compliance with the Law of Armed Conflict*.
l. AFPD 51-7, *International Law*. 
13. USMC Publications

a. NAVMC 2890, *Small Wars Manual*.

b. FMFM 7-34, *Civil Affairs*.

c. FMFRP 7-34-2, *Civil Affairs Operations*.

d. FMFRP 14-3, *Operational Concept for Marine Expeditionary Units (Special Operations Capable) (MEU (SOC))*.
1. User Comments

Users in the field are highly encouraged to submit comments on this publication to: Commander, United States Joint Forces Command, Joint Warfighting Center Code JW100, 116 Lake View Parkway, Suffolk, VA 23435-2697. These comments should address content (accuracy, usefulness, consistency, and organization), writing, and appearance.

2. Authorship

The lead agent for this publication is the US Special Operations Command. The Joint Staff doctrine sponsor for this publication is the Director for Operations (J-3).

3. Supersession

This publication supersedes JP 3-57, 21 June 1995, Doctrine for Joint Civil Affairs.

4. Change Recommendations

a. Recommendations for urgent changes to this publication should be submitted:

   TO: JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC/J7-JDETD/
       USCINCSOC MACDILL AFB FL/SOOP-JD/
       USCINCJFCOM NORFOLK VA/JW100/

   Routine changes should be submitted to the Director for Operational Plans and Joint Force Development (J-7), JDETD, 7000 Joint Staff Pentagon, Washington, DC 20318-7000, with info copies to the USJFCOM JWFC.

b. When a Joint Staff directorate submits a proposal to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that would change source document information reflected in this publication, that directorate will include a proposed change to this publication as an enclosure to its proposal. The Military Services and other organizations are requested to notify the Director, J-7, Joint Staff, when changes to source documents reflected in this publication are initiated.

c. Record of Changes:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CHANGE NUMBER</th>
<th>COPY NUMBER</th>
<th>DATE OF CHANGE</th>
<th>DATE ENTERED</th>
<th>POSTED BY</th>
<th>REMARKS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
5. Distribution

a. Additional copies of this publication can be obtained through Service publication centers listed below (initial contact) or the USJFCOM JWFC in the event that the joint publication is not available from the Service.

b. Only approved joint publications and joint test publications are releasable outside the combatant commands, Services, and Joint Staff. Release of any classified joint publication to foreign governments or foreign nationals must be requested through the local embassy (Defense Attaché Office) to DIA Foreign Liaison Office, PSS, PO-FL, Room 1A674, Pentagon, Washington, DC 20301-7400.

c. Additional copies should be obtained from the Military Service assigned administrative support responsibility by DOD Directive 5100.3, 1 November 1988, Support of the Headquarters of Unified, Specified, and Subordinate Joint Commands.

Army: US Army AG Publication Center SL
1655 Woodson Road
Attn: Joint Publications
St. Louis, MO 63114-6181

Air Force: Air Force Publications Distribution Center
2800 Eastern Boulevard
Baltimore, MD 21220-2896

Navy: CO, Naval Inventory Control Point
700 Robbins Avenue
Bldg 1, Customer Service
Philadelphia, PA 19111-5099

Marine Corps: Commander (Attn: Publications)
814 Radford Blvd, Suite 20321
Albany, GA 31704-0321

Coast Guard: Commandant (G-OPD), US Coast Guard
2100 2nd Street, SW
Washington, DC 20593-0001

Commander
USJFCOM JWFC Code JW2102
Doctrine Division (Publication Distribution)
116 Lake View Parkway
Suffolk, VA 23435-2697

d. Local reproduction is authorized and access to unclassified publications is unrestricted. However, access to and reproduction authorization for classified joint publications must be in accordance with DOD Regulation 5200.1-R, Information Security Program.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AC</td>
<td>Active Component</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACB</td>
<td>amphibious construction battalion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACE</td>
<td>aviation combat element (MAGTF)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACSA</td>
<td>acquisition cross-Service agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AE</td>
<td>aeromedical evacuation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AECC</td>
<td>aeromedical evacuation coordination center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AEF</td>
<td>Aerospace Expeditionary Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFCAP</td>
<td>Air Force Contract Augmentation Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFMS</td>
<td>Air Force Medical Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFNSEP</td>
<td>Air Force National Security and Emergency Preparedness Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFTH</td>
<td>Air Force Theater Hospital</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMC</td>
<td>Air Mobility Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMOCC</td>
<td>Air Mobility Operations Control Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANG</td>
<td>Air National Guard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AOR</td>
<td>area of responsibility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AT/FP</td>
<td>antiterrorism/force protection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C2</td>
<td>command and control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C4I</td>
<td>command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CA</td>
<td>civil affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAG</td>
<td>Civil Affairs Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBMU</td>
<td>construction battalion maintenance unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBRN</td>
<td>chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBU</td>
<td>construction battalion unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEB</td>
<td>combat engineer battalion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CI</td>
<td>civilian internee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIMIC</td>
<td>civil-military cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CJCSI</td>
<td>Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CJCSM</td>
<td>Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CJTF</td>
<td>commander, joint task force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CM</td>
<td>consequence management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMO</td>
<td>civil-military operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMOC</td>
<td>civil-military operations center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COA</td>
<td>course of action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COCOM</td>
<td>combatant command (command authority)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COM</td>
<td>chief of mission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONCAP</td>
<td>Construction Capabilities Contract Process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONPLAN</td>
<td>operation plan in concept format</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONUS</td>
<td>continental United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COS</td>
<td>chief of staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CS</td>
<td>Chaplain Service (Air Force)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Term</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DC</td>
<td>dislocated civilians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DCO</td>
<td>defense coordination officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DFO</td>
<td>Disaster Field Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DIILS</td>
<td>Defense Institute of International Legal Studies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DIRMOBFOR</td>
<td>director of mobility forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOD</td>
<td>Department of Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DODD</td>
<td>Department of Defense Directive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DODI</td>
<td>Department of Defense Instruction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOMS</td>
<td>Director of Military Support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOS</td>
<td>Department of State</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DR</td>
<td>disaster relief</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DSO</td>
<td>domestic support operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DTS</td>
<td>Defense Transportation System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EMEDS</td>
<td>Expeditionary Medical Support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EOC</td>
<td>Emergency Operations Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EOD</td>
<td>explosive ordnance disposal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EPW</td>
<td>enemy prisoner of war</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ERT</td>
<td>emergency response team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ERT-A</td>
<td>emergency response team - advance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESB</td>
<td>engineer support battalion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESF</td>
<td>emergency support function</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESG</td>
<td>executive steering groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EST</td>
<td>emergency support team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ExCom</td>
<td>executive committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FCO</td>
<td>federal coordinating officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FEMA</td>
<td>Federal Emergency Management Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FHA</td>
<td>foreign humanitarian assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FID</td>
<td>foreign internal defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FMS</td>
<td>foreign military sales</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FPA</td>
<td>foreign policy advisor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FSSG</td>
<td>force service support group (USMC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GAMSS</td>
<td>global air mobility support system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GE</td>
<td>general engineering</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HA</td>
<td>humanitarian assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HACC</td>
<td>humanitarian assistance coordination center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HCA</td>
<td>humanitarian and civic assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HMH</td>
<td>Marine heavy helicopter squadron</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HMLA</td>
<td>Marine light/attack helicopter squadron</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HMM</td>
<td>Marine medium helicopter squadron</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HN</td>
<td>host nation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HNS</td>
<td>host-nation support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HOC</td>
<td>humanitarian operations center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HSS</td>
<td>health service support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMET</td>
<td>International military education and training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IO</td>
<td>Information operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRT</td>
<td>Initial Response Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J-3</td>
<td>Operations Directorate of a joint staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J-8</td>
<td>Director for Force Structure, Resource, and Assessment, joint staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JCMOTF</td>
<td>Joint civil-military operations task force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JFC</td>
<td>Joint force commander</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JOA</td>
<td>Joint operations area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JOPES</td>
<td>Joint Operation Planning and Execution System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JP</td>
<td>Joint publication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JPOTF</td>
<td>Joint psychological operations task force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JSCP</td>
<td>Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JSOTF</td>
<td>Joint special operations task force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JTF</td>
<td>Joint task force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LEDET</td>
<td>Law enforcement detachment (USCG)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LFA</td>
<td>Lead federal agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LMW</td>
<td>Lead mobility wing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOAC</td>
<td>Law of armed conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOC</td>
<td>Line of communications</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOGCAP</td>
<td>Logistics Civilian Augmentation Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M/CM/S</td>
<td>Mobility, countermobility, and/or survivability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAGTF</td>
<td>Marine air-ground task force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MCA</td>
<td>Military civic action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEDLOGCO</td>
<td>Medical logistics company</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEF</td>
<td>Marine expeditionary force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MNF</td>
<td>Multinational forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOE</td>
<td>Measures of effectiveness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOOTW</td>
<td>Military operations other than war</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MP</td>
<td>Military police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSCA</td>
<td>Military support to civil authorities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSCLEA</td>
<td>Military support to civilian law enforcement agencies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MT</td>
<td>Ministry team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MWSS</td>
<td>Marine wing support squadron</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCA</td>
<td>National Command Authorities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCB</td>
<td>Naval construction brigade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCF</td>
<td>Naval construction force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCFSU</td>
<td>Naval construction force support unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCR</td>
<td>Naval construction regiment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEO</td>
<td>Noncombatant evacuation operation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Nongovernmental organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NMCB</td>
<td>Naval mobile construction battalion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSC</td>
<td>National Security Council</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Glossary

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OFDA</td>
<td>Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPCON</td>
<td>operational control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPLAN</td>
<td>operation plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPORD</td>
<td>operation order</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPSEC</td>
<td>operations security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSA</td>
<td>operational support airlift</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSOCC</td>
<td>on-site operations coordination center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PA</td>
<td>public affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAO</td>
<td>public affairs officer/office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PDD</td>
<td>Presidential Decision Directive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PMRC</td>
<td>patient movement requirements center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POB</td>
<td>psychological operations battalion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POG</td>
<td>psychological operations group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POLAD</td>
<td>political advisor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POL-MIL</td>
<td>political-military</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRC</td>
<td>populace and resources control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prime BEEF</td>
<td>Prime Base Engineer Emergency Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSU</td>
<td>port security unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSYOP</td>
<td>psychological operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PVNTMED</td>
<td>preventive medicine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RC</td>
<td>Reserve Component</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RED HORSE</td>
<td>Rapid Engineers Deployable Heavy Operations Repair Squadron, Engineers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROC</td>
<td>regional operations center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROE</td>
<td>rules of engagement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SA</td>
<td>security assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCO</td>
<td>state coordinating officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEAL</td>
<td>sea-air-land team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SecDef</td>
<td>Secretary of Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SFMS</td>
<td>special forces medical sergeant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SJA</td>
<td>Staff Judge Advocate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SO</td>
<td>special operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOC</td>
<td>special operations command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOF</td>
<td>special operations forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOFA</td>
<td>status-of-forces agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SP</td>
<td>security police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SROE</td>
<td>standing rules of engagement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SYG</td>
<td>Secretary General (United Nations)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TEP</td>
<td>Theater Engagement Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPB</td>
<td>tactical psychological operations battalion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UCT</td>
<td>underwater construction team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UMT</td>
<td>unit ministry team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDPKO</td>
<td>United Nations Department for Peacekeeping Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNHCHR</td>
<td>United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNOCHA</td>
<td>United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USACIDC</td>
<td>United States Army Criminal Investigations Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAF</td>
<td>United States Air Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USCINCSOC</td>
<td>Commander in Chief, United States Special Operations Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USCINTRANS</td>
<td>Commander in Chief, United States Transportation Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USDAO</td>
<td>United States Defense Attaché Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USG</td>
<td>United States Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USMC</td>
<td>United States Marine Corps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USN</td>
<td>United States Navy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USSOCOM</td>
<td>United States Special Operations Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USTRANSCOM</td>
<td>United States Transportation Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VMGR</td>
<td>Marine aerial refueler and transport squadron</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WMD</td>
<td>weapons of mass destruction</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
antiterrorism. Defensive measures used to reduce the vulnerability of individuals and property to terrorist acts, to include limited response and containment by local military forces. Also called AT. (JP 1-02)

civil administration. An administration established by a foreign government in (1) friendly territory, under an agreement with the government of the area concerned, to exercise certain authority normally the function of the local government, or (2) hostile territory, occupied by US forces, where a foreign government exercises executive, legislative, and judicial authority until an indigenous civil government can be established. Also called CA administration. (JP 1-02)

civil affairs. Designated Active and Reserve component forces and units organized, trained, and equipped specifically to conduct civil affairs activities and to support civil-military operations. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

civil affairs activities. Activities performed or supported by civil affairs that (1) enhance the relationship between military forces and civil authorities in areas where military forces are present; and (2) involve application of civil affairs functional specialty skills, in areas normally the responsibility of civil government, to enhance conduct of civil-military operations. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

civil affairs agreement. An agreement which governs the relationship between allied armed forces located in a friendly country and the civil authorities and people of that country. (JP 1-02)

civil defense. All those activities and measures designed or undertaken to: a. minimize the effects upon the civilian population caused or which would be caused by an enemy attack on the United States; b. deal with the immediate emergency conditions which would be created by any such attack; and c. effectuate emergency repairs to, or the emergency restoration of, vital utilities and facilities destroyed or damaged by any such attack. (JP 1-02)

civil-military operations. The activities of a commander that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces, governmental and nongovernmental civilian organizations and authorities, and the civilian populace in a friendly, neutral, or hostile operational area in order to facilitate military operations, to consolidate and achieve operational US objectives. Civil-military operations may include performance by military forces of activities and functions normally the responsibility of the local, regional, or national government. These activities may occur prior to, during, or subsequent to other military actions. They may also occur, if directed, in the absence of other military operations. Civil-military operations may be performed by designated civil affairs, by other military forces, or by a combination of civil affairs and other forces. Also called CMO. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

civil-military operations center. An ad hoc organization, normally established by the geographic combatant commander or
subordinate joint force commander, to assist in the coordination of activities of engaged military forces, and other United States Government agencies, nongovernmental organizations, and regional and international organizations. There is no established structure, and its size and composition are situation dependent. Also called CMOC. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

civil requirements. The computed production and distribution of all types of services, supplies, and equipment during periods of armed conflict or occupation to ensure the productive efficiency of the civilian economy and to provide to civilians the treatment and protection to which they are entitled under customary and conventional international law. (JP 1-02)

combatant command. A unified or specified command with a broad continuing mission under a single commander established and so designated by the President, through the Secretary of Defense and with the advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Combatant commands typically have geographic or functional responsibilities. (JP 1-02)

combatant command (command authority). Nontransferable command authority established by title 10 (“Armed Forces”), United States Code, section 164, exercised only by commanders of unified or specified combatant commands unless otherwise directed by the President or the Secretary of Defense. Combatant command (command authority) cannot be delegated and is the authority of a combatant commander to perform those functions of command over assigned forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations, joint training, and logistics necessary to accomplish the missions assigned to the command. Combatant command (command authority) should be exercised through the commanders of subordinate organizations. Normally this authority is exercised through the subordinate joint force commanders and Service and/or functional component commanders. Combatant command (command authority) provides full authority to organize and employ commands and forces as the combatant commander considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions. Operational control is inherent in combatant command (command authority). Also called COCOM. (JP 1-02)

combatant commander. A commander in chief of one of the unified or specified combatant commands established by the President. (JP 1-02)

combat service support. The essential capabilities, functions, activities, and tasks necessary to sustain all elements of operating forces in theater at all levels of war. Within the national and theater logistic systems, it includes but is not limited to that support rendered by service forces in ensuring the aspects of supply, maintenance, transportation, health services, and other services required by aviation and ground combat troops to permit those units to accomplish their missions in combat. Combat service support encompasses those activities at all levels of war that produce sustainment to all operating forces on the battlefield. Also called CSS. (JP 1-02)

combatting terrorism. Actions, including antiterrorism (defensive measures taken to reduce vulnerability to terrorist acts) and
counterterrorism (offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism), taken to oppose terrorism throughout the entire threat spectrum. (JP 1-02)

complex contingency operations. Large-scale peace operations (or elements thereof) conducted by a combination of military forces and nonmilitary organizations that combine one or more of the elements of peace operations with include one or more elements of other types of operations such as foreign humanitarian assistance, nation assistance, support to insurgency, or support to counterinsurgency. (This term and its definition are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

counterintelligence. Information gathered and activities conducted to protect against espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage, or assassinations conducted by or on behalf of foreign governments or elements thereof, foreign organizations, or foreign persons, or international terrorist activities. Also called CI. (JP 1-02)

counterterrorism. Offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism. Also called CT. (JP 1-02)

Country Team. The senior, in-country, United States coordinating and supervising body, headed by the Chief of the United States diplomatic mission, and composed of the senior member of each represented United States department or agency, as desired by the Chief of the US diplomatic mission. (JP 1-02)

dislocated civilian. A broad term that includes a displaced person, an evacuee, an expellee, or a refugee. (JP 1-02)

displaced person. A civilian who is involuntarily outside the national boundaries of his or her country. (JP 1-02)

domestic emergencies. Emergencies affecting the public welfare and occurring within the 50 states, District of Columbia, Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, US possessions and territories, or any political subdivision thereof, as a result of enemy attack, insurrection, civil disturbance, earthquake, fire, flood, or other public disasters or equivalent emergencies that endanger life and property or disrupt the usual process of government. The term domestic emergency includes any or all of the emergency conditions defined below: a. civil defense emergency — A domestic emergency disaster situation resulting from devastation created by an enemy attack and requiring emergency operations during and following that attack. It may be proclaimed by appropriate authority in anticipation of an attack. b. civil disturbances — Riots, acts of violence, insurrections, unlawful obstructions or assemblages, or other disorders prejudicial to public law and order. The term civil disturbance includes all domestic conditions requiring or likely to require the use of Federal Armed Forces pursuant to the provisions of Chapter 15 of Title 10, United States Code. c. major disaster — Any flood, fire, hurricane, tornado, earthquake or other catastrophe which, in the determination of the President, is or threatens to be of sufficient severity and magnitude to warrant disaster assistance by the Federal Government under Public Law 606, 91st Congress (42 United States Code 58) to supplement the efforts and available resources of State and local governments in alleviating the damage, hardship, or suffering caused thereby. d. natural disaster — All domestic emergencies except those created as a result of enemy attack or civil disturbance. (JP 1-02)

domestic support operations. Those activities and measures taken by the Department of Defense to foster mutual
assistance and support between the Department of Defense and any civil government agency in planning or preparedness for, or in the application of resources for response to, the consequences of civil emergencies or attacks, including national security emergencies. (JP 1-02)

**evacuee.** A civilian removed from a place of residence by military direction for reasons of personal security or the requirements of the military situation. (JP 1-02)

**executive agent.** A term used in Department of Defense and Service regulations to indicate a delegation of authority by a superior to a subordinate to act on behalf of the superior. An agreement between equals does not create an executive agent. For example, a Service cannot become a Department of Defense Executive Agent for a particular matter with simply the agreement of the other Services; such authority must be delegated by the Secretary of Defense. Designation as executive agent, in and of itself, confers no authority. The exact nature and scope of the authority delegated must be stated in the document designating the executive agent. An executive agent may be limited to providing only administration and support or coordinating common functions, or it may be delegated authority, direction, and control over specified resources for specified purposes. (JP 1-02)

**expellee.** A civilian outside the boundaries of the country of his or her nationality or ethnic origin who is being forcibly repatriated to that country or to a third country for political or other purposes. (JP 1-02)

**force protection.** Security program designed to protect Service members, civilian employees, family members, facilities, and equipment, in all locations and situations, accomplished through planned and integrated application of combatting terrorism, physical security, operations security, personal protective services, and supported by intelligence, counterintelligence, and other security programs. (JP 1-02)

**foreign humanitarian assistance.** Programs conducted to relieve or reduce the results of natural or manmade disasters or other endemic conditions such as human pain, disease, hunger, or privation that might present a serious threat to life or that can result in great damage to or loss of property. Foreign humanitarian assistance provided by US forces is limited in scope and duration. The foreign assistance provided is designed to supplement or complement the efforts of the host nation civil authorities or agencies that may have the primary responsibility for providing foreign humanitarian assistance. Foreign humanitarian assistance operations are those conducted outside the United States, its territories, and possessions. Also called FHA. (This term and its definition are provided for information and are proposed for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02 by JP 3-07.6.)

**foreign internal defense.** Participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. Also called FID. (JP 1-02)

**host nation.** A nation which receives the forces and/or supplies of allied nations and/or NATO organizations to be located on, to operate in, or to transit through its territory. Also called HN. (JP 1-02)

**host-nation support.** Civil and/or military assistance rendered by a nation to foreign
forces within its territory during peacetime, crisis or emergencies, or war based on agreements mutually concluded between nations. Also called HNS. (JP 1-02)

**humanitarian and civic assistance.** Assistance to the local populace provided by predominantly US forces in conjunction with military operations and exercises. This assistance is specifically authorized by title 10, United States Code, section 401 and funded under separate authorities. Assistance provided under these provisions is limited to (1) medical, dental, and veterinary care provided in rural areas of a country; (2) construction of rudimentary surface transportation systems; (3) well drilling and construction of basic sanitation facilities; and (4) rudimentary construction and repair of public facilities. Assistance must fulfill unit training requirements that incidentally create humanitarian benefit to the local populace. (JP 1-02)

**humanitarian assistance.** Programs conducted to relieve or reduce the results of natural or manmade disasters or other endemic conditions such as human pain, disease, hunger, or privation that might present a serious threat to life or that can result in great damage to or loss of property. Humanitarian assistance provided by US forces is limited in scope and duration. The assistance provided is designed to supplement or complement the efforts of the host nation civil authorities or agencies that may have the primary responsibility for providing humanitarian assistance. Also called HA. (JP 1-02)

**humanitarian assistance coordination center.** A temporary center established by a geographic combatant commander to assist with interagency coordination and planning. A humanitarian assistance coordination center operates during the early planning and coordination stages of foreign humanitarian assistance operations by providing the link between the geographic combatant commander and other United States Government agencies, nongovernmental organizations, and international and regional organizations at the strategic level. Also called a HACC. (This term and its definition are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

**humanitarian operations center.** An interagency policymaking body that coordinates the overall relief strategy and unity of effort among all participants in a large foreign humanitarian assistance operation. It normally is established under the direction of the government of the affected country or the United Nations, or a United States Government agency during a United States unilateral operation. The humanitarian operations center should consist of representatives from the affected country, the United States Embassy or Consulate, the joint force, the United Nations, nongovernmental and international organizations, and other major players in the operation. Also called HOC. (This term and its definition are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

**information operations.** Actions taken to affect adversary information and information systems while defending one’s own information and information systems. Also called IO. (JP 1-02)

**interagency coordination.** Within the context of Department of Defense involvement, the coordination that occurs between elements of Department of Defense, and engaged US Government agencies, nongovernmental organizations, and regional and international organizations for the purpose of accomplishing an objective. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)
**internal defense and development.** The full range of measures taken by a nation to promote its growth and to protect itself from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. It focuses on building viable institutions (political, economic, social, and military) that respond to the needs of society. Also called IDAD. (JP 1-02)

**international organizations.** Organizations with global mandates, generally funded by contributions from national governments. Examples include the International Committee of the Red Cross, the International Organization for Migration, and United Nation agencies. (This term and its definition are provided for information and are proposed for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02 by JP 3-07.6.)

**joint civil-military operations task force.** A joint task force composed of civil-military operations units from more than one Service. It provides support to the joint force commander in humanitarian or nation assistance operations, theater campaigns, or a civil-military operations concurrent with or subsequent to regional conflict. It can organize military interaction among many governmental and nongovernmental humanitarian agencies within the theater. Also called JCMOTF. (This term and its definition are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

**joint force.** A general term applied to a force composed of significant elements, assigned or attached, of two or more Military Departments, operating under a single joint force commander. (JP 1-02)

**joint special operations task force.** A joint task force composed of special operations units from more than one Service, formed to carry out a specific special operation or prosecute special operations in support of a theater campaign or other operations. The joint special operations task force may have conventional nonspecial operations units assigned or attached to support the conduct of specific missions. Also called JSOTF. (JP 1-02)

**joint task force.** A joint force that is constituted and so designated by the Secretary of Defense, a combatant commander, a subunified commander, or an existing joint task force commander. Also called JTF. (JP 1-02)

**law of war.** That part of international law that regulates the conduct of armed hostilities. Also called the law of armed conflict. (JP 1-02)

**lead mobility wing.** An Air Mobility Command unit designated to provide an on-call 32-member cross-functional initial response team (IRT) for short-notice deployment in response to humanitarian crises. When requested by a supported geographic combatant commander, this IRT arrives at an airfield in the disaster area to provide mobility expertise and leadership, assess the requirements for follow-on relief forces, and establish a reception base to serve as a conduit for relief supplies or the repatriation of noncombatants. The IRT is attached to the joint task force established by the supported geographic combatant commander. (This term and its definition are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

**military civic action.** The use of preponderantly indigenous military forces on projects useful to the local population at all levels in such fields as education, training, public works, agriculture, transportation, communications, health, sanitation, and others contributing to economic and social development, which would also serve to improve the standing of the military forces with the population. (US forces may at times advise or engage
in military civic actions in overseas areas.)

(JP 1-02)

**National Command Authorities.** The President and the Secretary of Defense or their duly deputized alternates or successors. Also called NCA. (JP 1-02)

**nation assistance.** Civil and/or military assistance rendered to a nation by foreign forces within that nation’s territory during peacetime, crises or emergencies, or war based on agreements mutually concluded between nations. Nation assistance programs include, but are not limited to, security assistance, foreign internal defense, other US Code title 10 (DOD) programs, and activities performed on a reimbursable basis by Federal agencies or international organizations. (JP 1-02)

**operational control.** Transferable command authority that may be exercised by commanders at any echelon at or below the level of combatant command. Operational control is inherent in combatant command (command authority). Operational control may be delegated and is the authority to perform those functions of command over subordinate forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission. Operational control includes authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations and joint training necessary to accomplish missions assigned to the command. Operational control should be exercised through the commanders of subordinate organizations. Normally this authority is exercised through subordinate joint force commanders and Service and/or functional component commanders. Operational control normally provides full authority to organize commands and forces and to employ those forces as the commander in operational control considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions. Operational control does not, in and of itself, include authoritative direction for logistics or matters of administration, discipline, internal organization, or unit training. Also called OPCON. (JP 1-02)

**peacekeeping.** Military operations undertaken with the consent of all major parties to a dispute, designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an agreement (ceasefire, truce, or other such agreement) and support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term political settlement. Also called PK. (JP 1-02)

**peace operations.** A broad term that encompasses peacekeeping operations and peace enforcement operations conducted in support of diplomatic efforts to establish and maintain peace. Also called PO. (JP 1-02)

**Presidential Reserve Callup Authority.** Provision of a public law (US Code, Title 10 (DOD), section 12304) that provides the President a means to activate, without a declaration of national emergency, not more than 200,000 members of the Selected Reserve and the Individual Ready Reserve (of whom not more than 30,000 may be members of the Individual Ready Reserve), for not more than 270 days to meet the support requirements of any operational mission. Members called under this provision may not be used for disaster relief or to suppress insurrection. This authority has particular utility when used in circumstances in which the escalatory national or international signals of partial or full mobilization would be undesirable. Forces available under this authority can provide a tailored, limited-scope, deterrent, or operational response, or may be used as a precursor to any subsequent mobilization. Also called PSRC. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)
private voluntary organizations. None. (This term and its definition will be removed from the next edition of JP 1-02.)

psychological operations. Planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals. The purpose of psychological operations is to induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and behavior favorable to the originator’s objectives. Also called PSYOP. (JP 1-02)

refugee. A civilian who, by reason of real or imagined danger, has left home to seek safety elsewhere. (JP 1-02)

security assistance. Group of programs authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, as amended, or other related statutes by which the United States provides defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services by grant, loan, credit, or cash sales in furtherance of national policies and objectives. Also called SA. (JP 1-02)

security assistance organization. All Department of Defense elements located in a foreign country with assigned responsibilities for carrying out security assistance management functions. It includes military assistance advisory groups, military missions and groups, offices of defense and military cooperation, liaison groups, and defense attaché personnel designated to perform security assistance functions. Also called SAO. (JP 1-02)

special operations. Operations conducted by specially organized, trained, and equipped military and paramilitary forces to achieve military, political, economic, or informational objectives by unconventional military means in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive areas. These operations are conducted across the full range of military operations, independently or in coordination with operations of conventional, non-special operations forces. Political-military considerations frequently shape special operations, requiring clandestine, covert, or low visibility techniques and oversight at the national level. Special operations differ from conventional operations in degree of physical and political risk, operational techniques, mode of employment, independence from friendly support, and dependence on detailed operational intelligence and indigenous assets. Also called SO. (JP 1-02)

special operations command. A subordinate unified or other joint command established by a joint force commander to plan, coordinate, conduct, and support joint special operations within the joint force commander’s assigned operational area. Also called SOC. (JP 1-02)

special operations forces. Those active and reserve component forces of the Military Services designated by the Secretary of Defense and specifically organized, trained, and equipped to conduct and support special operations. Also called SOF. (JP 1-02)

status-of-forces agreement. An agreement which defines the legal position of a visiting military force deployed in the territory of a friendly state. Agreements delineating the status of visiting military forces may be bilateral or multilateral. Provisions pertaining to the status of visiting forces may be set forth in a separate agreement, or they may form a part of a more comprehensive agreement. These provisions describe how the authorities of a visiting force may control members of that force and the amenability of the force or
its members to the local law or to the authority of local officials. To the extent that agreements delineate matters affecting the relations between a military force and civilian authorities and population, they may be considered as civil affairs agreements. Also called SOFA. (JP 1-02)

terrorism. The calculated use of unlawful violence or threat of unlawful violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological. (JP 1-02)

unconventional warfare. A broad spectrum of military and paramilitary operations, normally of long duration, predominantly conducted by indigenous or surrogate forces who are organized, trained, equipped, supported, and directed in varying degrees by an external source. It includes guerrilla warfare and other direct offensive, low visibility, covert, or clandestine operations, as well as the indirect activities of subversion, sabotage, intelligence activities, and evasion and escape. Also called UW. (JP 1-02)
All joint doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures are organized into a comprehensive hierarchy as shown in the chart above. Joint Publication (JP) 3-57 is in the Operations series of joint doctrine publications. The diagram below illustrates an overview of the development process:

**STEP #1 Project Proposal**
- Submitted by Services, CINCs, or Joint Staff to fill extant operational void
- J-7 validates requirement with Services and CINCs
- J-7 initiates Program Directive

**STEP #2 Program Directive**
- J-7 formally staffs with Services and CINCs
- Includes scope of project, references, milestones, and who will develop drafts
- J-7 releases Program Directive to Lead Agent. Lead Agent can be Service, CINC, or Joint Staff (JS) Directorate

**STEP #3 Two Drafts**
- Lead Agent selects Primary Review Authority (PRA) to develop the pub
- PRA develops two draft pubs
- PRA staffs each draft with CINCs, Services, and Joint Staff

**STEP #4 CJCS Approval**
- Lead Agent forwards proposed pub to Joint Staff
- Joint Staff takes responsibility for pub, makes required changes and prepares pub for coordination with Services and CINCs
- Joint Staff conducts formal staffing for approval as a JP

**STEP #5 Assessments/Revision**
- The CINCs receive the JP and begin to assess it during use
- 18 to 24 months following publication, the Director J-7, will solicit a written report from the combatant commands and Services on the utility and quality of each JP and the need for any urgent changes or earlier-than-scheduled revisions
- No later than 5 years after development, each JP is revised

---

**JP 1**
- JOINT WARFARE

**JP 0-2**
- UNAAF

**JP 1-0**
- PERSONNEL

**JP 2-0**
- INTELLIGENCE

**JP 3-0**
- OPERATIONS

**JP 4-0**
- LOGISTICS

**JP 5-0**
- PLANS

**JP 6-0**
- C4 SYSTEMS

---

**ENHANCED JOINT WARFIGHTING CAPABILITY**

---

**JOINT DOCTRINE PUBLICATION HIERARCHY**