AUTONOMY of the Air Arm

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Air University

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   This book describes early efforts to create an independent Air Force. The Air Service became a combatant arm of the Army in 1920, and in 1926 the Air Corps was created. Over the years, proposals to establish an independent air arm met stout resistance from the War Department General Staff. The Army reorganized after Pearl Harbor, and the Army Air Forces gained autonomy within the framework of the War Department. 199 pp., photos, notes, appendices, bibliography, index

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Foreword

The question of how best to organize the United States Army’s air arm had been contentious from the time of the First World War. Legislation to give the air arm greater autonomy or even independence had been introduced in the Congress in the interwar years. Although independence would not be achieved until after World War II, the air arm during the interwar period made remarkable progress towards this goal. In 1926 the Army Air Corps was established, and in 1934 the Baker Board directed the formation of the General Headquarters Air Force, giving the Army air arm a measure of autonomy. On the eve of the Second World War, the War Department created the Army Air Forces. Although falling short of independence, these were important steps forward on the road to the creation of today’s global Air Force.

R. Earl McClendon’s classic *Autonomy of the Air Arm* describes the Army air arm’s struggle for autonomy over almost forty years, from 1907 to the close of World War II. McClendon’s narrative details the contentious evolution of the Army Air Forces (AAF) in March 1942 as a fully coequal branch with the Army Ground Forces (AGF). Following the end of the war, President Harry S. Truman firmly positioned himself in favor of “air parity” and an independent Air Force. McClendon emphasizes that “for the first time in the history of American aviation the Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces definitely took a stand in favor of an independent military air arm.” Truman’s firm leadership on this issue ultimately resulted in passage of the National Security Act of 1947. After four decades of prolonged gestation, the United States Air Force was born.

RICHARD P. HALLION
Air Force Historian
Preface

At the present time, in accordance with the provisions of the National Security Act of 1947, the United States military air arm occupies a position coordinate with the Army and Navy in the system of national defense. As a part of the National Military Establishment the United States Air Force under the Department of the Air Force corresponds, respectively, to the United States Army under the Department of the Army and the United States Navy under the Department of the Navy. Developments leading immediately to the adoption of the act in question, a complete analysis of the terms of the measure, and a survey of the steps taken towards its implementation await an appropriate study by way of objective examination and review. It is reasonable to assume meanwhile that the innumerable problems which have arisen, and will continue to arise, in connection with the present organization of the United States Air Force, and its relation to the other branches of the armed services, may be understood best against a background of knowledge relating to the struggle for autonomy on the part of the military air arm, the beginnings of which long antedated the adoption of the National Security Act of 1947. Prepared primarily for the use of the faculty and students of the Air University, the present work is an attempt to provide such a study.

Almost from the time in 1907 when the Aeronautical Division was activated in the Signal Corps aviation enthusiasts, both within and without the service, commenced agitation for a separation of military aeronautics from its parent body. Through means of an executive order this was accomplished in 1918 as a war measure. Two years later by statutory action the Air Service, as it then was called, became a combatant arm or line of the Army. In 1926 the Air Corps was created. Meanwhile the movement for freedom or autonomy definitely had assumed two major forms: The suggestion of a separate executive department of aeronautics (variously indicated by such titles as “air” and “aviation”); and that of a department of national defense, in which military aviation would be coordinate with the regular ground and the sea forces. For more than twenty years after the end of World War I such proposals encountered stout resistance on the part of those who wielded the reins of authority in the traditional departments relating to national defense and the respective units under their jurisdiction, particularly the War Department General Staff; and they amassed but relatively little strength in the halls of Congress.
During the middle thirties a “compromise” was effected in the activation of the General Headquarters Air Force. Advocates of an independent air arm made considerable headway towards their ultimate goal with the creation of the Army Air Forces shortly before the United States became an active belligerent in World War II. Then by virtue of the reorganization of the Army, which was effected soon after Pearl Harbor, and the exigencies of the military situation the Army Air Forces gained what amounted virtually to complete autonomy within the framework of the War Department. Since this development was based fundamentally upon a temporary war measure, however, without further action on the part of Congress the position of the air arm eventually would have reverted to its former status.

Although having dealt with what at times proved to be a highly controversial subject, and one on which considerable warmth of feeling was exhibited, the writer ventures to express the hope that an attempt to be altogether objective in his approach has been successful. A cursory examination of the attached bibliography will reveal the general nature and scope of the sources which have been consulted. As may be noted, these cover mainly various executive agencies of the government, particularly that of the War Department; the Army itself; the air arm, indicated at different at times by different titles; Congress; and public opinion in general. Off-hand it may appear that the latter has been slighted somewhat, in view of the fact that the bibliography does not carry a listing of newspapers. As a matter of fact, however, that important source of information has not been neglected altogether. Many of the articles and editorials in the periodicals which have been listed as references were based either directly or indirectly upon news stories and editorials appearing in the daily press. Moreover, as is well known, members of Congress are wont to buttress their arguments with these statements of fact and opinion, with the result that in many cases the whole texts of such documentary evidence find their way to the pages of the Congressional Record.

R. EARL McCLENDON
December 1948
NOTE TO THE REVISED EDITION

This study appeared originally in a limited number of typewritten copies. Subsequent interest in a wider circulation prompted the preparation of a second edition. The author then seized the opportunity to elect a number of desirable though minor revisions throughout the entire work. By far the greater portion of them were altogether insignificant with respect to the subject matter involved, being restricted to slight changes in organization and phraseology in the endless effort to improve composition and style. A few were based upon documentary materials inaccessible to the writer at the beginning. Though it tended to round out the purely narrative aspects, the new evidence did not elect the main theme nor alter in any wise conclusions which had been drawn. A correction made in the title, incidentally, should indicate clearly that the terminal date for the study (and this for both editions) approximates the beginning rather than the end of the year 1946.

It seems appropriate to state here that in the interval between the appearance of these two editions the author has spent considerable time working on what is expected will become a sequel to this volume. As presently conceived, it consists principally in a history of the immediate background, and the first two years of the “unification” of the armed forces of the United States, as provided in the National Security Act of 1947 and subsequent amendments.

R. Earl McClendon
November 1950
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Autonomy of the Air Arm
Chapter 1

Introduction

The Genesis of the present United States Air Force as an organization may be established as 1 August 1907 when Brig. Gen. James Allen, Chief Signal Officer of the Army, upon the recommendation of his Executive Officer, Major George O. Squier, announced the creation of the Aeronautical Division within the Signal Corps. According to a pertinent office memorandum, this unit was set up to handle all matters relating to "military ballooning, air machines, and all kindred subjects." Captain Charles deF. Chandler, long interested in military aeronautics, was placed in charge of the new division; while two enlisted men were assigned to duty under his immediate direction. The Army's interest in and experimentation with military aeronautics, however, long antedated the formation of the Aeronautical Division in the Signal Corps. A Balloon Corps, for example, was created during the period of the War Between the States; and then there was the Balloon Detachment which served as a unit for a short period in the Spanish-American War. Both of these organizations currently were deactivated. Yet the Signal Corps, that branch of the Army most concerned, maintained an active interest in the study of military aeronautics. Brig. Gen. Adolphus W. Greeley, who was appointed Chief Signal Officer in 1887, not only promoted the observation balloon service but also encouraged Dr. Samuel Pierpont Langley in his aeronautical researches. During the period from 1892 to 1907 both Greeley and his successor, General Allen, called attention to the developments along this line at home and abroad, and urged the adoption of appropriation measures which would enable the Signal Corps to take full advantage of aeronautical experimentation as related to military reconnaissance.

Immediately following the turn of the century interest in military aeronautics was enhanced somewhat by the experimentation of Langley and the Wright brothers and the rise of ballooning as a sport. The latter was evidenced by the activities of the newly organized Aero Club of America which, however, was interested as well in the more serious business of helping to promote the progress of aviation in general. During the spring
of 1907 the Signal Corps purchased a balloon from the Louis Goddard firm in Paris. and in June detailed two enlisted men to aeronautical duty. Meanwhile, in view of the work of such men as Langley, the Wright brothers, and Alexander Graham Bell, the Army's interest in aeronautics had turned chiefly to the heavier-than-air machine and controlled power flight. It was not until August 1909, however, that the War Department acquired its first airplane, which was purchased from Orville and Wilbur Wright after having passed what for the time were rather rigid endurance and speed tests.

From its very inception the Aeronautical Division of the Signal Corps was beset by two quite common though major problems. One was a lack of sufficient funds, and the other inadequate personnel. As a matter of fact, the money necessary for the purchase of the original military airplane could not be secured through direct appropriation of Congress; but the Army was able to divert funds which had been earmarked for more general purposes. During the next four years the Signal Corps received annually relatively minor sums for aeronautical purposes. The first legislative appropriation for military aviation as such, however, was not forthcoming until March 1911 when for the fiscal year 1912 Congress voted to allow the Signal Corps as much as $125,000 to purchase, maintain, operate, and repair "airplanes and other aerial machines." As indicated by the records, this figure was in line with the appropriations for 1913 and 1914.

The financial problems which faced the Aeronautical Division of the Signal Corps in its early history were no more critical than those which were presented by the personnel factor. In his annual report for 1910 the Chief Signal Officer pointed out that only one officer, a lieutenant, and nine enlisted men were assigned duty in connection with aviation. By the summer of 1912 the entire air service consisted of twelve officers and thirty-nine enlisted personnel. As General Allen explained, moreover, all officers detailed to the Aeronautical Division must of necessity be detached from the regiments or branches of the service to which they belonged. With such uncertain status, therefore, they were subject to relief or removal from aviation duty at any time. A much needed remedy lay in legislation which would provide sufficient personnel so that officers assigned to aviation service would be allotted regularly to the Signal Corps.

Despite the repeated requests on the part of the cognate military authorities, the national legislature was slow to make provision for the increased personnel needs of the Signal Corps as related to the newly-organized Aeronautical Division. Between January 1909 and February 1913 no less than five bills drawn up for that purpose made their appearance in Congress, but none received the approval of that body. Eventually, on 2 March 1913 a general War Department appropriation bill allowed the aviation service a minimum of thirty commissioned personnel and provided
also that the pay and allowances should be increased by “thirty-five per centum for such officers as are now or may be hereafter detailed...on aviation duty.” Specifying that they should consist of lieutenants selected from the line of the Army, a law of 18 July 1914 increased to 60 the maximum number of aviation officers and made as well an allowance of 260 enlisted men. It arranged also for the training of aviation students selected from among unmarried lieutenants, not over 30 years of age, from the line of the Army; created the ratings of junior military aviator and military aviator; set up a graduated scale of increases in flying pay for those classes; and provided for the payment of benefits to widows or other designated beneficiaries of aviators killed in line of duty. Each military aviator should have the rank, pay, and allowance of one grade higher than his line commission. Not to be overlooked in this connection is the fact that the law in question actually created within the Signal Corps an Aviation Section charged with the responsibility of operating all military aircraft, together with pertinent appliances, and the duty of training officers and enlisted men in matters relating to military aviation.

The Act of 18 July 1914 not only gave the United States air arm statutory recognition for the first time, but also provided the basic pattern for that organization during the next several years. In order to clarify the discussion immediately following, however, as well as to indicate the general theme for the whole survey, it seems appropriate at this point to stress the fact that this study is not designed as a complete history of military aviation in the United States, for the period indicated, nor even a treatise on the different organizational forms assumed by the air arm. Rather, the aim is to trace as accurately and concisely as possible the story of the struggle for progressively greater degrees of autonomy on the part of this air arm, denoted at different intervals by such titles as Aeronautical Division, Signal Corps; Aviation Section, Signal Corps; Military Aeronautics; Air Service; Air Corps (at times with the General Headquarters Air Force as a coordinate component); and the Army Air Forces. The trends may be outlined briefly. First, there was a period of agitation for separation from the Signal Corps, which extended well beyond the date of our entrance into World War I. In point of time this dovetailed somewhat with a movement for complete separation from the Army. The latter really took two forms. Ardent enthusiasts insisted at first upon a Department of Aeronautics: but when that appeared unlikely of attainment some urged the creation of a Department of National Defense in which aviation would hold a position coordinate with those of the Army and Navy. Neither was accomplished at the time, of course, but in 1926 the air arm was organized as a Corps of the War Department. Taking one form and then another, the controversy continued during the following years, but with varying degrees of intensity as the Air Corps and the General Headquarters Air Force, subsequently orga-
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nized as the Army Air Forces, achieved a considerable degree of freedom of action and prestige based upon the concept of air power as an offensive arm. After Pearl Harbor temporary autonomy within the War Department was made possible by virtue of the President's special war powers. As events developed, this proved to be the immediate precursor of parity, with the Army and Navy, in accordance with the National Security Act of 1947 adopted early in the post-World War II period.

Naturally, no study of the struggle for autonomy on the part of the air arm in the United States would be feasible without devoting some consideration to the broader aspects of military aviation in general. For the earlier part of the period, moreover, a preliminary discussion seems necessary, even at the cost of a certain amount of repetition. As a prelude to the main theme, therefore, the remaining portion of this introductory chapter will be devoted to a brief resume of the history of military aeronautics down through the passage of the Army Reorganization Act of 1920, with particular emphasis upon the changes which were made in the organizational structure.

As has been noted, the Act of 18 July 1914 which created the Aviation Section of the Signal Corps provided the basic organization for military aeronautics in the United States over a period of several years. During that time, however, due largely to events connected with World War I, there were certain definite developments which paved the way for some material changes in the structure. To these we now turn.

In a naval appropriation measure approved on 3 March 1915 Congress created the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics. Its duty, as stated succinctly, was to supervise and direct the scientific study of the problems of flight. Consisting of a maximum number of twelve, the members of the Committee, subject to appointment by the President of the United States, were to be allotted as follows: Two from the Aviation Section of the Signal Corps; two from the office in the Department of the Navy which had charge of naval aeronautics; one each from the Smithsonian Institution, the United States Weather Bureau, and the Bureau of Standards; and a maximum of five additional persons skilled in aeronautical engineering or its allied sciences. As originally constituted one month later, the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics had as representatives of the Aviation Section of the Signal Corps Brig. Gen. George P. Scriven, who in 1913 had succeeded General Allen as Chief Signal Officer; and Colonel Samuel Reber. Its first naval aviation members were Captain Mark L. Bristol, U.S.N., in charge of the Naval Aeronautical Service; and Naval Constructor H. C. Richardson, U.S.N. As a matter of common knowledge, in the following years, especially in the early period of its existence, this Committee rendered valuable advice and aid in matters relating to aviation in the armed forces.
INTRODUCTION

Partly as the result of a movement to separate aeronautics from the Signal Corps and partly, one may say, because of the very poor showing made by the air arm on the punitive Mexican expedition during the spring of 1916, the National Defense Act adopted in June of that year included provisions which affected advantageously the status of the Aviation Section as related to personnel. Increasing the number of officers allowed, section 13 of this law distributed the total as follows: One colonel, one lieutenant colonel, eight majors, twenty-four captains, and one hundred fourteen first lieutenants. It also eliminated restrictions relative to the detail of married officers and those over thirty years of age and offered inducements in the form of rank and flying pay to men volunteering for aviation duty from civilian life. Meanwhile a deficiency act of 31 March 1916 had allowed the Aviation Section $500,000, the largest sum that had been appropriated at any one time for Army aviation. This was followed in August, however, by a grant of $13,281,666 for the fiscal year 1917.

Another board which had an important, though indirect, effect upon the organization of military aeronautics in this country was the Council of National Defense authorized by Congress on 29 August 1916 for the purpose of coordinating the "industries and resources for the national security and welfare." Membership consisted of the secretaries of War, Navy, Interior, Agriculture, Commerce, and Labor. The law specified that the Council should be supplemented by an Advisory Commission made up of a maximum of seven "civilian" members, each of whom should have special knowledge relative to some industry, public utility or the development of some natural resources. In view of his subsequent services in the interest of military aeronautics, Howard E. Coffin, the automobile manufacturer of Detroit, probably was the outstanding man on this Commission, although it included such well-known figures as Bernard Baruch, Samuel Gompers, Julius Rosenwald, and Daniel Willard.

In March of 1917, just one month before the United States entered the First World War, the Council of National Defense was reorganized so as to include the Advisory Commission. Each of the seven members was made chairman of a group of activities on which he was well-informed, with subcommittees created for particular lines or phases of activity. In theory at least, one of these groups served as a nucleus for the composition of the Aircraft Production Board which, upon the recommendation of the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics, was created by the Council of National Defense on 16 May 1917 to help meet the industrial needs of aviation by investigating the sources of supply and assisting in the standardization of materials and parts. Really an advisory board to the Aviation Section of the Signal Corps, and that without legal status, the Aircraft Production Board originally consisted of Brig. Gen. George O. Squier, Chief Signal Officer since February 1917; Admiral D. W. Taylor, Chief of
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the Bureau of Construction of the Navy; and four civilian members: Howard E. Coffin, E. A. Deeds, R. L. Montgomery, and S. D. Waldon. Coffin became its first chairman. With especial reference to the types of planes selected for large scale production the Aircraft Board was ably assisted by the Joint Army and Navy Technical Board, which was set up by the secretaries of War and Navy.

The Aircraft Production Board existed as such for some four months, during which time, incidentally, it sponsored the initial production of the far-famed Liberty Motor. Meanwhile Congress, following frantic calls on the part of our European allies for aircraft, and the subsequent increase in public interest, passed what for the time were huge appropriation bills for military aeronautics: $10,800,000 in May 1917; $43,450,000 in June; and $640,000,000 in July. Incidentally, however, the Signal Corps found itself in the rather anomalous position of being wholly dependent in its most important function upon the committee of a committee which was in itself a purely advisory body. Consequently, several of the civilian members of the Aircraft Production Board were commissioned as officers in the Aviation Section. Among them were Deeds and Montgomery. General Squier placed the former at the head of the Equipment Division, Signal Corps, which was created on 29 August 1917 for the purpose of formulating the general aerial program of the Army.

At this time also, as will be taken up appropriately, there was further demand for the formation of a separate department of aeronautics. Partly to offset that movement, partly to alleviate further the awkward situation of the dependence of the Signal Corps upon a committee of an advisory committee, and in an effort to make possible a greater degree of coordination between the respective departments, the secretaries of War and Navy, with the full consent of the Chairman of the Aircraft Production Board and the approval of the President of the United States, recommended legislation which would give the latter agency more authority than it held simply as a subcommittee of the Council of National Defense. As a result, Congress, by virtue of a law which was approved on 1 October 1917, created the Aircraft Board. Strictly speaking, this act merely enlarged the old Aircraft Production Board. Yet the new Aircraft Board was placed under the jurisdiction of the War and Navy departments rather than the Council of National Defense; and instead of six its maximum membership was set at nine. These included the Chief Signal Officer and two other Army officers selected by the Secretary of War; the Chief Constructor of the Navy and two other Navy officers chosen by the Secretary of Navy; and three civilians, one of whom was slated as chairman, to be appointed by the President. The functions of the Aircraft Board, generally similar to those laid down for its predecessor, were listed as expanding and coordinating industrial activities pertaining to aircraft and parts thereof produced in the
United States, and “to facilitate generally the development of the Air Service.” The law distinctly specified, however, that the power of actually entering into contracts remained with the proper authorities in the departments making the purchases.\textsuperscript{19}

As indicated by the brief analysis of the act which has been given above, the Aircraft Board was strictly an advisory body. This was recognized by the Judge Advocate General and by the Secretary of War who on 25 February 1918 issued a directive listing the specific duties of the Board as those which made it an agency to study requirements and the placing of contracts, and also identified it as a clearinghouse for information between the Signal Corps and the General Staff of the Army, and between the Army and Navy.\textsuperscript{20} By this time too the press and public opinion in general over the country began to seethe with criticism of the Aviation Section of the Signal Corps and the Aircraft Board because extravagant claims previously made with reference to the future production of aircraft simply could not be realized.\textsuperscript{21} These factors, not to say an effort to counteract another move for a separate department of aeronautics, were responsible for some fundamental changes in the internal structure of the air arm.

A preliminary step in the virtual reorganization of military aviation came on 24 April 1918 when the War Department announced that thereafter the Chief Signal Officer would devote himself exclusively to the administration of signals. In effect also two new units were created in the Aviation Section. The Division of Military Aeronautics, under Brig. Gen. William L. Kenly, was placed in charge of the training of aviators and the use of military aircraft. Production problems were assigned to a Division of Production under the directorship of John D. Ryan, the President of the Anaconda Copper Company, who a few days previously had taken charge of the Equipment Division of the Signal Corps. Ryan at the time was also Chairman of the Aircraft Board which continued to exist as an advisory body. Separation of functions with respect to designing and engineering, the announcement stated, would be worked out between the two divisions as experience dictated.\textsuperscript{22}

Changes effected by War Department action on 24 April were enhanced by the provisions of an Executive Order issued some four weeks later. The Overman Act, approved on 20 May 1918, authorized the President for the period of the duration of the war and six months thereafter to make such “redistribution of functions among executive agencies” as he might deem necessary for the successful prosecution of the war.\textsuperscript{23} By virtue of this authority the Commander-in-Chief removed aviation from the Signal Corps entirely, authorized the Division of Military Aeronautics to procure and train the necessary flying and ground forces, and created the Bureau of Aircraft Production to provide planes, engines, and equipment. There was no change in key personnel. As a matter of fact the Director of
the Bureau of Aircraft Production was the former Director of the Division of Production, who *ipso facto* was the Chairman of the Aircraft Board. As actually constituted, the Bureau of Aircraft Production was made up for the most part of the former Equipment Division of the Signal Corps, which now became the Equipment Division of the new component. Commenting favorably upon the reorganization which had been effected by authority of the Overman Act, some twelve months later General Peyton C. March, Chief of Staff, stated that the division of the “Aviation Section...into the Bureau of Aircraft Production and the Department of Military Aeronautics...facilitated production and served to coordinate, for the first time, the air program with the Army as a whole...[and] resulted in a marked and general increase in the efficiency of that service.

Although those who had been responsible for the changes made in the organization of the air arm during the spring of 1918 may have visualized the ultimate fusion of the Division of Military Aeronautics and the Bureau of Aircraft Production to one unit under a single director, the phraseology of the Executive Order of 21 May did not clearly indicate such. A War Department order issued three days later, moreover, stated that no “Chief of Air Service” in charge of both agencies would be appointed as long as the Bureau of Aircraft Production existed as a separate bureau. Meanwhile, however, the duties of such a Chief of Air Service would be performed by the Director of Military Aeronautics unless specifically assigned to the other unit.

As may have been expected, immediately following the changes which have been outlined, an inherent organizational defect showed up in the form of inadequate liaison between the two branches of the aviation service. The reason was obvious. The Bureau of Aircraft Production was responsible for the production of airplanes while the Division of Military Aeronautics was held accountable for their operation and military efficiency. Yet the method of selecting a type to be manufactured as well as that of deciding whether a given plane was suitable for military use remained undetermined. Thus neither set of officials could be held responsible for the final production of an acceptable plane for the front. Eventually this situation was solved in part by agreement to the effect that the types of plane to be put into production would be selected mutually by the two agencies; but before a plane could be sent into combat it must undergo a military test acceptable to the Division of Military Aeronautics. Considerable time was lost, however, before the authorities agreed upon this policy which might easily have been established in the beginning by a unified agency.

A definite step was taken in that direction when on 28 August 1918 Secretary of War Newton D. Baker announced the appointment of Ryan in the dual role of Second Assistant Secretary of War and Director of Air Ser-
vice. In this capacity he was given supervision, control, and direction over both the Division, of Military Aeronautics and the Bureau of Aircraft Production, with full power to coordinate their activities and develop their programs. This really meant the responsibility of procuring and furnishing to the Army in the field all material and personnel required for the Air Service. Ryan’s appointment as Director of Air Service was of especial significance to the air arm since, in addition to unifying under one head the two coordinate divisions in control of military aeronautics, it gave aviation greater recognition in the council of the Secretary of War. Thus, in the words of a contemporary observer of the period, the Air Service enjoyed “a prestige above that or any other branch of the military establishment.”1 Its position, as well as that of Ryan, was enhanced even more by the fact that during this same month the United States Spruce Production Corporation, the successor to the Spruce Production Division of the Signal Corps, formed earlier to facilitate the supply of airplane lumber from civilian sources, was created under the control of the Director of Aircraft Production.2

As will appear also, the creation of the Office of the Director of Air Service on 28 August 1918, with Ryan as the incumbent, was designed in part to meet a renewed demand—both congressional and popular—for an Air Service altogether separate from the War and Navy Departments. It so happened that Ryan resigned soon after the signing of the Armistice on 11 November, before his new appointment had become fully effective in actual operation. His resignation created a rather complicated situation, for it left vacant not only the Office of the Director of Air Service but also those of the Chairman of the Aircraft Board and the head of the Bureau of Aircraft Production. Under existing laws and orders not all of his powers could be transferred to a new Director of Air Service nor an Acting Director of Aircraft Production. These circumstances brought about the initial step in the reorganization of the postwar Air Service to make it conform to what the existing authorities regarded as the proper peacetime basis. Following the recommendation of the secretaries of War and Navy, while on the high seas bound for Europe in March 1919, President Woodrow Wilson signed an executive order providing for the dissolution of the Aircraft Board which no longer functioned as such. It also placed the Bureau of Aircraft Production immediately under the Director of Air Service and vested upon the office rather than the man (as was the case with Ryan) the powers conferred by law and executive order upon the Director of Aircraft Production, so that its functions and prerogatives might be assumed by any duly appointed successor.3

Meanwhile, Maj. Gen. Charles T. Menoher, who had served with distinction in the American Expeditionary Forces as Commander of the Forty-Second (Rainbow) Division and later the Sixth Army Corps, was brought
home to succeed Ryan as Director of Air Service. Menoher's position was strengthened somewhat, of course, by the Executive Order of 19 March 1919. For some time to come, however, the whole organization was to remain upon a rather tenuous basis; for, as the reader will recall, both the creation of the Air Service *per se* in May 1918 and the reorganization in March of the following year were based upon executive order. It was not until 11 July 1919 that it received even a temporary or semi-statutory authorization for separate existence. This was in the form of an emergency appropriation to suffice through the fiscal year 1920. A similar provisional authorization permitting the Air Service to retain until 30 June 1920 its emergency officers constituting some ninety *per centum* of the commissioned personnel was delayed until 17 September 1919. Complaints about these conditions were registered by both the Chief of Staff of the Army and the Director of Air Service, the latter stating that his organization during this period suffered from the uncertainty of its future, losing many valuable officers who would have remained had it "been possible to offer them such certainty of opportunity as...granted by the Army Reorganization Act of June 4, 1920."

Reference was made by General Menoher to a law passed by Congress following extensive debates, hearings, and the reports of special investigating boards and committees during the latter part of the year 1919 and the first half of 1920, all relating either directly or indirectly to the question of a separate department of aeronautics. The Army Reorganization Act of 1920 "created" an Air Service which at the same time, along with the Infantry, Cavalry, Field Artillery, Coast Artillery Corps, the Corps of Engineers, and the Signal Corps, was made a combatant arm or line of the Army. It became also a supply branch. Increasing the personnel involved, the law allowed one Chief of Air Service with the rank of major general; 1,514 officers in grades from colonel to second lieutenant; and 16,000 enlisted men. It made further provisions for flying pay (an increase of 50 *per centum* while on duty requiring frequent and regular aerial flights), specified that not more than 10 *per centum* of the officers in each grade below that of brigadier general should be non-fliers, and required that in all cases flying units should be commanded by flying officers.

The Army Reorganization Act of 1920 made no changes in the existing organic structure of the Air Service other than to abolish the Division of Military Aeronautics which, incidentally, had existed in name only during the fiscal year beginning on 1 July 1919. The Bureau of Aircraft Production, however, for several years continued to function in the settlement of its war contracts and claims, and to discharge the responsibilities placed upon it by the creation of the United States Spruce Corporation. Stated briefly, the preceding pages represent an attempt to sketch the history of the organization of the military air arm of the United States through
such initial stages as the Aeronautical Division, Signal Corps; the Aviation Section, Signal Corps; the Division of Military Aeronautics-Bureau of Aircraft Production Board combination; and, finally, the creation of the Air Service. This discussion should provide a fairly adequate background for a treatment of the different organizational structures in the period from 1920 to 1945. The latter, however, will be diffused appropriately with the central theme of the whole study. Meanwhile the chapters which follow immediately will be devoted exclusively to the developments in the history of the struggle for greater autonomy on the part of the air arm for the period covered by this introductory section.
Chapter 2

Early Developments, 1913–1917

According to the available evidence, the first official suggestion relating in any way to the idea of a greater degree of autonomy for the air arm of the United States Army came some three years after the Aeronautical Division of the Signal Corps had been created in August 1907. It was negative in character. Stressing the need for increased appropriations and additional personnel, matters previously touched upon in this study, the Chief Signal Officer in his annual report for 1910 expressed the view that under the existing circumstances it would be impossible to furnish more officers and men for the absolutely necessary training required in “airmanship.” Apparently General Allen had in mind no plan to alter the structure of the Aeronautical Division nor the relationship of that unit to its parent body; for he believed that if adequate funds were made available and additional personnel allowed, the existing organization could be made to work efficiently.

Almost three more years were to elapse before there was a definite proposal to change the fundamental basis of the aviation service in this country. This came on 11 February 1913 in the form of a bill introduced in the House of Representatives by James Hay, the Chairman of the Committee on Military Affairs. It offered as a substitute for the Aeronautical Division of the Signal Corps an Aviation Corps which would be a part of the line of the Army, subject equally with the other branches to the supervision of the Chief of Staff. The Aviation Corps would be charged with the duty of operating all military aircraft and the responsibility of training all personnel in matters pertaining to military aviation. All pertinent records in the Signal Corps were to be transferred to the new unit, for which also the Quartermaster Corps would be required to furnish the necessary material and supplies. The measure called for a maximum of 33 officers, including 1 major, 2 captains, and 30 first lieutenants, to be detailed from other branches of the service; specified that the commandant should be an officer who had displayed especial skill and ability as a military aviator; and provided for the operation of an aviation school for officers and enlisted men. Finally, the bill would allow additional flying pay in the amount of fifty $
centum for all aviator personnel, and the payment of benefits to the beneficiaries of flyers killed in the line of duty.\(^2\)

For the time, the Hay bill was so extreme as to be called a "radical measure" even by Henry Woodhouse, one of the most ardent aviation enthusiasts in the country.\(^3\) The War Department in general opposed the measure; while, apparently quite perturbed over the prospects, the Acting Chief Signal Officer, then Col. George P. Scriven, sought the opinion of Lt. B. D. Foulois and other Signal Corps officers in an effort to bring about the defeat of the proposal.\(^4\) So far as the records reveal, the verdict at this time was unanimous in opposition. From Lieutenant Foulois, for instance, came an individual reply which, in view of his subsequent activities with military aeronautics, proved to be quite interesting. He felt that at the time military aviation had not developed to the point where it should be organized as a separate unit of the Army. Until aviators had acquired special skill and ability in military aviation, moreover, Foulois believed that a non-flier should remain at the head of the service.\(^5\)

Complying undoubtedly with the request for a statement of their opinions, an undetermined number of Signal Corps officers expressed in no uncertain terms their opposition to the Hay bill. These men believed that the proposed legislation looking towards the transfer of aviation to the line of the Army "is unnecessary, inadequate, and instead of increasing the efficiency of aviation, will set it back for a number of years." They asserted that the Signal Corps was the first organization in the world to recognize the utility of aeronautics and to take the steps necessary for applying it to the military art. In the United States military aviation definitely was a part of the Signal Corps, and dependent upon it. Continuing, this group of officers held that in

the administration and operation of military aeronautics the flier of the machine is but a part of the entire organization. There must be facilities for proper theoretical and practical instruction; there must be suitable tactical organization; and there must be a suitable engineering force connected with it to properly select the machines and materiel, all of which exists in the Signal Corps. It would seem that to properly administer and use this important adjunct to the art of war, there must be an organization which is composed both of fliers and those who are skilled in the important details of the art, but not necessarily actual fliers of machines. While aviation is in its first stages of development in the Army it would appear to be an act of folly to swap horses while crossing the stream, or, in other words, to place aviation on a new and untried basis.\(^6\)

This stand against a separate Aviation Corps was supported officially by a board, composed of officers then on duty connected with aeronautics in Washington, which Colonel Scriven called together as of 24 February.
Directed to study and report on legislation considered necessary for the aeronautical work of the Signal Corps, this board recommended a measure generally similar to Representative Hay's proposal with the conspicuous exception of the suggestion that aviation be separated from the Signal Corps and made a part of the line of the Army. Apparently, however, this was a studied omission. Particularly significant is the fact that the group included Henry H. Arnold, then a second lieutenant in the 29th Infantry. Meanwhile Brig. Gen. William Crozier, Chief of the War College Division of the General Staff, voiced strong opposition to the Hay bill. He contended that the adoption of such a proposal would necessitate the duplication not only of airplanes, but also a system of procuring, storing, and handling aeronautical equipment. Trained personnel, moreover, were already available in the Signal Corps. This officer also opposed making military aeronautics a part of the line of the Army because he felt its functions more appropriately fitted in with the work of a staff corps. In these opinions General Crozier was upheld by Maj. Gen. Leonard Wood, Chief of Staff, and Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson.

As might have been expected in the face of such pronounced opposition, the Hay bill never emerged from the Committee on Military Affairs of the House of Representatives. With the glaring exception of the provision relating to an Aviation Corps as a separate line of the Army and the amount of flying pay allowed, however, the essential provisions of the proposal were included in the War Department appropriation bill which was approved on 2 March 1913. Representative Hay doubtless was encouraged by what little advantage in the interest of military aviation his previous efforts may have gained; for on 16 May following he reintroduced his Aviation Corps bill.

The opposition accorded the second Hay bill was no less intense than that offered to the first. Assistant Secretary of War Henry S. Breckinridge regarded military aviation as "merely an added means of communication, observation and reconnaissance" which "ought to be coordinated with and subordinated to the general service of information and not erected into an independent and uncoordinated service." In stating the views of the War Department, Secretary Breckinridge asserted that the adoption of the measure in question would complicate matters by requiring that certain functions already being performed by one branch of service be divided three ways—among the Signal Corps, the Aviation Corps, and the Quartermaster Corps. The first would be called upon to transmit information which previously the second had secured, while the third must furnish all necessary supplies. By such a division of functions, moreover, the type of technically trained personnel already existent in the Signal Corps must be provided in the other two branches. Destined for a long time to come to "be an auxiliary of the line," military aviation was still in an infant stage. Its immedi-
ate future, therefore, could best be handled by the Signal Corps. Here Secretary Breckinridge struck a note which sounded in the testimony of all who appeared before the Committee in August to oppose the bill. That is to say, with respect to the suggestion of separating military aviation from the Signal Corps they confined their arguments to the immediate present, reserving the right to change their point of view as a result of possible developments.

This list included several Signal Corps officers headed by Colonel Scriven. Although naturally favoring an increase in aviation personnel at the time, the Chief Signal Officer felt that whatever might be the ultimate disposition of military aeronautics in the United States its immediate future rested with the Signal Corps. That branch of the service possessed the technical information and machinery necessary for the performance of the work involved, as well as the personnel essential for duty as staff members and administrative heads of the aviation service. Aviators, on the other hand, were young men who did not have the requisite scientific knowledge and mature judgment. Finally, enlarging upon a view expressed previously by Secretary Breckinridge, Colonel Scriven asserted that, since military aviation was merely an added means of reconnaissance, observation, and communication (supplementary or additional to those effected by wire, wireless telegraph, and the telephone), it should be coordinated with and subordinated to the general service of information rather than erected as an uncoordinated and independent unit.

Lieutenant Foulois thought it was still too early to create an Aviation Corps as a separate line of the Army, but stated that such a development was only a question of time. Lieutenant Arnold felt that since under the circumstances the Signal Corps was doing all it could for aviation the situation was altogether satisfactory. Of unusual interest in view of his subsequent fight for a separate air force was the stand against removing the control of aviation from the Signal Corps taken by Capt. William Mitchell at these hearings. The two, he stated in substance, were not altogether different. Aviation had shown that as a branch of reconnaissance service it was still in an experimental stage. If we are going to build up that service, he asked, "What is the use of trying to create a separate branch for this purpose?" That would retard its development. On the other hand, the best thing that could be done for military aeronautics at the time, Mitchell thought, was to increase the number of officers in the Signal Corps and give aviators inducements in the form of rapid promotion. Mitchell believed, however, that eventually the Signal Corps might be absorbed by the Air Service; or, as he said: "Instead, as some people think, of the aeroplanes being an adjunct of the lines of information, the lines of information may grow to be an adjunct to the aeroplanes, and very probably will."
Capt. Paul Beck was the only Signal Corps officer to testify in favor of the Hay bill. It was his contention that aviation did not logically belong to the Signal Corps, and never would. Of the four military purposes of the airplane-reconnaissance, fire control for artillery, aggressive action, and occasional transportation-only reconnaissance was a function of the Signal Corps; and even it was not exclusive to that branch. Insisting that regular Signal Corps officers were not trained to fly the machines, Beck claimed that there should be as few intermediaries as possible between the men doing the work and those controlling it. He stated that aviation should be removed from the Signal Corps because there was no certainty that it would attain size or importance under the existing organization. The longer the Signal Corps controlled military aeronautics, he added, the stronger would become its hold; and there would be less likelihood that aviation would ever come into its own. Finally, Captain Beck asserted that the Signal Corps claim to a technical knowledge of aviation was "a gigantic bluff," a statement which General Scriven in subsequent testimony branded as "not only offensive but...untrue." This little tiff between Beck and his superior, incidently, might be regarded as a forecast of the friction which was to grow so intense between the younger and older Army officers over the general question of the place of aeronautics in the military machine.

Evidence seems to indicate that the members of the House Committee on Military Affairs and other responsible officials, both civil and military, were attempting conscientiously to make plans for a substantial air service in this country. During the late spring and early summer of 1913 the principal question in the minds of all concerned was whether this could be done best within or without the pale of the Signal Corps. The August hearings left no doubt as to what was the majority view of the members of that branch on the question. Because of that intense opposition Representative Hay was willing to drop his current proposal. Prevailing opinion, generally speaking, held that the crying need of aviation was additional personnel for its parent organization which in that respect had become exceedingly hard-pressed after 1900 with the rapid development of radio-telegraphy and aeronautics. "Those who have witnessed the efforts made by the heads of the Signal Corps to develop aviation without entirely slighting other matters," wrote the aviation zealot Woodhouse in July 1913, "can only admire their attitude." Some months later Secretary of War Lindley M. Garrison said:

The more pressing needs of the service in other directions have limited the activities of the department [War Department] in developing an adequate air fleet and training personnel, but its intention is to develop this service in the near future as rapidly as circumstances will permit...
the aeronautical service is for trained officers and men. It has been impractical
in the past to detail a sufficient number for this important duty owing to the
demands of the service in other lines of work. The immediate requirements of
the aeronautical service have been met by the Military Committee of the House
in a bill which looks to the creation of an aviation branch in the Signal Corps
which will be given sixty officers and two hundred sixty enlisted men for this
purpose. If this matter receives the approbation of Congress, the department
will be in a position to push the development of this most important branch of
the military establishment.19

The bill to which Secretary Garrison made reference was one which
the House Committee on Military Affairs, acting upon the recommendation
made by the Chief Signal Officer following the hearings in August 1913,
had substituted for the Hay proposal.20 Encountering relatively little oppo-
sition in either house of Congress, this was the measure which on 18 July
1914, instead of creating a separate air corps, gave statutory recognition to
the Air Service as the Aviation Section of the Signal Corps, and provided
the basic organization for military aeronautics in the United States during
the next four years.

Within some two weeks after the passage of the Act of 18 July 1914
Europe went to war. This conflict itself plus the accompanying threats to
the peace and security of the United States, which eventually brought about
the entry of that nation into the maelstrom, naturally affected developments
in the American Air Service. Although for the most part these related to
general growth and organization per se, which have been sketched briefly
in the preliminary portion of this treatise, there was some further activity
bearing upon the question of a greater degree of autonomy for the air arm.
The relatively meager developments in that respect from the time of the
outbreak of the First World War until the United States became an active
belligerent in that struggle will be discussed in the remaining portion of
this chapter.

Basic to a clear understanding of any aspect of the question is a con-
ception of the ever-widening rift between a number of young aviation offi-
cers and their superiors, because of certain restrictions placed upon the
former by the Chief Signal Officer and the general apathy of the General
Staff and high War Department officials towards military aviation in itself.
Aviators found considerable support among certain air-minded organiza-
tions, such as the Aero Club of America and its affiliate groups, as well as
numerous individuals, including some members of Congress. The net
result was the beginning of a concerted movement to separate the Aviation
Section from the Signal Corps.

The initial impetus to be recorded here seems to have emanated from
outside Congress or any other governmental agency, civil or military; and
was based upon the thesis, not to say statement of fact, that essentially aviation was larger than its parent organization. Thus, to use a trite figure of speech, for the Aviation Section to remain any longer as a part of the Signal Corps would permit the tail to wag the dog. Progress in the science of military aeronautics, particularly as was shown by the experiences of World War I, indicated that much of the work of the aviator lay more appropriately outside the sphere of activities of the Signal Corps. Such, for examples, were range-finding, bombing, and aerial combat. Congress through midyear 1916 at least had shown a disinclination to allow larger appropriations for the Aviation Section than for the rest of the organization, even though such were justified; for (and here we are reminded of "Billy" Mitchell's "prediction") that would make the Signal Corps an adjunct of aviation. Thus for the good of the armed services as a whole the two should be separated. Reflecting the attitude of an economy-minded administration so far as military appropriations were concerned, however, Congress had failed to take the necessary action because of the expenses involved. At least, these were the opinions and conclusions reached by such aviation partisans as the aeronautical editor of the New York Tribune, the Aerial Age Weekly, and Alan R. Hawley, President of the Aero Club of America.  

Meanwhile, with the apparent view of helping to pave the way for legislation providing for an independent air service, early in January 1916 Senator Joseph T. Robinson introduced a resolution providing that a joint committee of Congress investigate the Aviation Section of the Signal Corps. By way of documentary and oral testimony before the Senate Committee on Military Affairs in support of his resolution, Senator Robinson made some rather severe charges which may be summarized briefly. True conditions relating to the Aviation Section, he said, had been withheld deliberately from high authorities in the War Department. Misrepresentations as to the progress being made by aviators, moreover, purposely and repeatedly were made to the department. Favoritism had been shown certain officers. Actual investigation showed that the number of qualified flyers was but little over one-half that claimed by the Signal Corps. Most of the deaths resulting from military flights were due to the use of antiquated equipment. And, finally, the training received by aviation personnel in many respects was quite defective.  

Although it passed the Senate and received the approval of the Committee on Military Affairs of the lower house of Congress, the Robinson resolution failed to receive a majority vote in the House of Representatives. Consequently, the joint committee to investigate the Aviation Section never was created. Yet in a manner of speaking Robinson's charges struck home. Shortly after they were made, the Chief Signal Officer commented on the allegations in a communication to the Adjutant General. Therein General Scriven blamed friction existing within
the Signal Corps upon a “personnel of aviation officers...unbalanced as to grades, young in years and in service, and deficient in discipline and the proper knowledge of the customs of the service and the duties of an officer.” The motive behind their “unmilitary, insubordinate, and disloyal acts” was an ambition to set up a new and independent organization for aviation. The Chief Signal Officer denied the accusations made before the Senate Committee on Military Affairs; but at the same time recommended that the War Department initiate action to revise the law of 18 July 1914 with the view of eliminating restrictions as to age and marital status imposed on aviation personnel. This, he thought, would tend to bring into that service older officers with more experience, and would reduce the number of difficulties which had beset the progress of military aviation.

In the above report Scriven presented but little information regarding the actual situation in the Aviation Section of the Signal Corps. Further evidence, however, reveals the fact that court-martial proceedings against Lt. Col. Lewis E. Goodier, Judge Advocate of the Western Department, had exposed “deplorable” conditions which may well have formed the bases of Senator Robinson’s charges. According to an announcement by Secretary Baker on 17 April 1916, in addition to a presidential censure for Goodier, the trial prompted the War Department to pass another upon General Scriven because of his failure to supervise personally the disciplinary features of administration. Col. Samuel Reber, the Chief of the Aviation Section, received an official reprimand for showing disrespect to a coordinate branch of government, failing to observe proper restraints with regard to the personnel and pay of members of the aviation group, observing poor business methods as related to disposal of government property in the form of discarded machines, and for lacking that degree of loyalty to his superior officer which would have saved General Scriven and himself “from censures now involved and this branch of the service from the public doubt and criticism which has [sic] affected it unfavorably.” Relieved from duty in connection with aviation, this officer was supplanted temporarily by Captain Mitchell.

Meanwhile Secretary Baker had directed the General Staff to make a thorough investigation of the Aviation Section of the Signal Corps. Appearing before the Committee on Military Affairs of the lower house of Congress on 8 April, however, he stated the primary difficulty with the service as he understood it was the impatience of young and eager men at the regulations and restrictions imposed by their superiors, officers who knew little or nothing about flying. There had been some indiscreet comment, “tall talk” as he described it, but this had never led to insubordination. These young men, Baker continued,
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are said to desire a separate service for aviation, separating it from Signal Corps work. and that involves two questions. A very large part of the control of any branch of the Army is administrative and disciplinary, and has nothing to do with the technical question of actual operation. So what you need in the Aviation Corps [sic] is not to have another Corps, but a man of mature yet severe judgment and trained disciplinary ideas to restrain the exuberance of youth.

The Secretary of War apparently had his man in mind; for he indicated that Lt. Col. George O. Squier, Signal Corps, then a military attache in London and an official observer on European battlefields, had been recalled to replace General Scriven as Chief Signal Officer. At the same time he announced an intention, “so far as the War department is concerned, to reorganize the entire Aviation Section.” This led to an impression that the War Department planned to separate military aviation from the Signal Corps, which was enhanced by a statement made a few days later.

In an announcement on 17 April, the Secretary of War was reliably reported as saying that although theretofore the military air arm had been regarded as a purely auxiliary service for scouting, carrying messages, and to a limited extent in controlling gunfire, experiences in the European war had shown that it could serve effectively on the offensive as well. In the near future, he predicted, the United States likely would add armored and armed airplanes and other fighting craft to its air fleet. In such case a new organization must be created to handle this new fighting arm in order that its work might be coordinated with the other service forces. Therefore, the time had come when it would be wise to consider changing the relations of the Aviation Section to the Army.

Regardless of whatever pertinent long-range plans Secretary Baker may have had in mind, the fact remains that at this time the Aviation Section was not divorced from the Signal Corps. Strictly speaking, then, it may appear that Senator Robinson’s resolution and the subsequent agitation failed to accomplish the desired end. Undoubtedly, however, they served to direct attention on certain crying needs of aviation. These were deficiencies which, as has been noted, were remedied in part by section 13 of the National Defense Act of 3 June 1916. Meanwhile a more ambitious proposal to alter the status of military aviation in this country was initiated by Congressman Charles Lieb of Indiana, who on 28 March 1916 introduced what proved to be the first of a long series of bills providing for the creation of a Department of Aviation.

Stated somewhat succinctly, Lieb’s proposal envisioned for aviation a separate executive department with its head, the Secretary of Aviation, a regular member of the President’s Cabinet. Functions and duties of the new department were to include the development and improvement of the sci-
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ence of flying, the supervision and promotion of all aviation matters as related to the Army and Navy, the expansion of commerce as might be found practicable in the public interest, and the collection and dissemination of related information. To the Department of Aviation would be transferred the Aviation Section of the Signal Corps and the Office of Naval Aeronautics of the Navy, together with all that pertained to those agencies. The latter involved not only land, buildings, equipment of every kind, and all official records; but also, for a temporary period, all personnel. Finally, within the new department Representative Lieb would have the following bureaus: Aeronautical Research, Construction, Land Operations, Learning, Motor Power, Naval Aeronautics, Personnel and Accounts, and Signal Corps.29

This was no fly-by-night idea with Lieb, who was tremendously impressed with the needs of American aviation as accentuated by the outbreak and progress of the war in Europe. In a vein probably more prophetic than he realized the congressman was reported to have said shortly after the introduction of his bill that in "time it is possible... the new air warfare will be perhaps of so tremendous a character that, who knows, it might supersede Armies and Navies."30 Apparently few members of Congress accepted Lieb's views; for on the same day it was brought up, this proposal to create a Department of Aviation was decently interred in the Committee on Military Affairs of the House of Representatives.31 The fact that it was introduced, however, indicated that a movement for a separate organization for aviation had found some strength in the national legislature, though probably not commensurate with that which had been generated outside the pale of government.32 It was evident, too, that in case the United States was brought into the whirlpool of war the question of a reorganization of the air arm would be considered seriously by the executive branch of the government, more specifically that part of it immediately in charge of military affairs.

Meanwhile after making a study of conditions prevailing in the Aviation Section, the General Staff recommended the eventual separation of the Air Service from the Signal Corps. This met the approval of both the Secretary of War and the Chief Signal Officer. Writing as of 3 October 1916, however, the latter stated, that military aviation should not be separated from any technical corps until it was able to stand alone. That time, he added, had not yet come. General Scriven felt that experiences gained in this country and reports received from abroad revealed the necessity for a number of changes and additions to any organic law contemplating a separate air service. He stood ready to recommend such alterations whenever the question should be taken up.33 Consideration was renewed in Congress again, probably before the Chief Signal Officer (in the person of Maj. Gen. George O. Squier after 14 February 1917) anticipated; for early in the following April Representative Murray Hulbert of New York and Senator
Morris Sheppard of Texas introduced in the House and Senate respectively identical bills calling for the consolidation of American aviation into an organization to be known as the Department of Aeronautics. Except for this terminology the proposals were virtually identical to that which Congressman Lieb had made twelve months earlier. Hulbert's and Sheppard's measure came on the very eve of the entrance of the United States in World War I. Further discussion of this dual proposal logically falls in the succeeding chapter.
Chapter 3

The Impact of the War Years, 1917–1918

The "joint bill" providing for a Department of Aeronautics with a cabinet member at its head, which was introduced in Congress just before the United States entered the First World War, never emerged beyond the committee stage. There is little reason to suppose, however, that this proved to be a disappointment to its authors, Senator Morris Sheppard and Congressman Murray Hulbert. In fact it is difficult to believe that the sponsors of the proposal really expected to succeed in altering materially the organizational status of military aeronautics; but they did hope to arouse public opinion to an awareness of its needs, so as to stir up an interest in increased appropriations. At the outset, though, the proposal amassed surprising strength.

Hearings on the bills were conducted during June and July. One of the leading witnesses to support the idea of a Department of Aeronautics was Rear Admiral Robert E. Peary who, without deprecating the importance of a command of the sea, believed that the American air service of the near future would be more vital to our safety than the Navy and Army combined. In a brief flight of rhetoric designed to emphasize his conviction that a separate department of aeronautics should be created the well known naval officer said that the old maxim, attributed to Themistocles, "He who commands the sea commands all," must in time give way to a new one, "He who commands the air commands all."

Others who appeared before the Senate Committee in behalf of the Hulbert-Sheppard bill included Lt. Col. W. B. Reese (an English officer), Maj. Gen. George W. Goethals, Howard E. Coffin, and Representative Fiorello H. La Guardia. Although their efforts did not avail in securing the adoption of the Hulbert-Sheppard proposal, it is clearly evident that the enhanced importance attached to aviation as a result of these hearings was responsible in large measure for the exceptionally large appropriations which during the summer of 1917 Congress passed in the support of military aeronautics. As the reader will recall, the last of these bills, which was
approved in July, amounted to the unprecedented sum of $640,000,000. Incidentally, in appreciation of his effort on behalf of aerial preparedness President Wilson presented to Hulbert the pen with which this measure was signed. Late in the summer Secretary of War Baker and Secretary of Navy Josephus Daniels, acting with the concurrence of Coffin, recommended a revised form of the Hulbert-Sheppard bill, which also met the approval of President Wilson. The substitute measure proposed only minor changes in the organizational structure of the Air Service. These involved a slight shift in the composition of the Aircraft Production Board, and its transfer from the jurisdiction of the Council of National Defense to the War and Navy Departments. The functions of the board, however, were to be entirely industrial, having no relation whatever to matters of personnel, maintenance, service, or repair. Such matters would remain under the control of the regular military and naval authorities who normally would not be expected to have an intimate knowledge of the manufacture of aircraft or of the industrial organization necessary for such large-scale production as were necessitated by the existing emergency. The increasing demands incident to American participation in World War I placed an unusually heavy load upon the Signal Corps which, in the opinion of the high authorities concerned, must be relieved of the purely industrial and manufacturing part of the program. As he presented this proposal to the Senate Committee on Military Affairs as of 1 August 1917, Chairman Coffin clearly indicated what the heads of the War and Navy Departments thought of the Hulbert-Sheppard bill when he wrote:

A separate department of aeronautics has been under consideration in committees of the Senate and House. The need for the coordination in the production of aircraft for the various departments has been recognized. The creation of a separate department of aeronautics would seem ill-advised at this time. That is, I believe, the view of both the Secretaries of War and Navy. The establishment of the “air board” as a coordinating influence between the departments would seem the best means for meeting the imperative industrial necessities of the situation and will be supplemental to and work harmoniously with existing governmental machinery.

Secretaries Baker and Daniels had their way. The draft of the proposal they had prescribed was amended slightly by Congress and eventually enacted into law as the Act of 1 October 1917 which created the Aircraft Board. The year 1918 was replete with proposals and suggestions for a greater degree of autonomy on the part of the military air arm of the United States. For the sake of clarity however, these developments must be considered against a background of inquiry and investigation. As has been noted
briefly, the Aviation Section of the Signal Corps and the Aircraft Board were subjected to considerable criticism over a period of several months beginning around mid-February when it became apparent that exaggerated claims which had been made relative to aircraft production simply were impossible of fulfillment. The details of that disturbing story are not strictly relevant to this review, however, and thus will not be related here. Suffice it to say that this circumstance was the primary cause for the series of investigations which was set in motion.

Following a suggestion by the Chairman of the Aircraft Board, the War Department on 12 March 1918 announced the appointment of an investigating committee headed by H. S. Marshall to make a survey of the industrial phases of the aeronautical program. Simultaneously the Aircraft Board indicated that W. S. Gifford, Director of the Council of National Defense, would act in a like capacity for the Board itself. Soon thereafter it was revealed through the medium of the press that a “semiofficial,” secret investigation was being conducted by Gutzon Borglum who, in a sort of preliminary report, charged gross inefficiency and even criminality in the aircraft production program. On 28 March, after several days of debates on the subject, the Senate Committee on Military Affairs began what proved to be a rather hurried, superficial investigation of the situation. A more extended inquiry by a subcommittee of this Committee started on 29 May 1918. Three weeks earlier the Department of Justice began a thorough exploration of the whole subject, which, at the personal request of President Wilson, was conducted under the immediate direction of former Justice Charles Evans Hughes.

Once more the Aero Club of America injected itself into the official aviation picture. On 2 April the head of that organization by way of a letter to President Wilson asserted in substance that the aircraft production program was at the point of collapse. Those in charge of it, Hawley said, had failed to make good; and there was no reason to expect better results without some organizational changes. He proposed as the “only solution to all the problems of building the air forces needed to win the war” a separate Department of Aeronautics which, generally comparable to the British plan, should be independent of but cooperate closely with the War and Navy Departments. Until the time when such a permanent arrangement could be elected the executive of the Aero Club urged as a temporary expedient the immediate appointment of an Assistant Secretary of War and an Assistant Secretary of Navy to represent their respective departments on the Aircraft Board.

After making a hurried inquiry extending over a period of only thirteen days, on 10 April the Senate Committee on Military Affairs announced certain findings and recommendations. The majority report blamed the “gravely disappointing situation” with respect to the aircraft program
partly upon an alleged ignorance of the art of producing completed combat planes, and the failure to organize the effort in such a way as to centralize authority and bring about quick decisions. According to this opinion, the production of aircraft should be removed entirely from the control of the Signal Corps and placed in the hands of one executive officer, appointed by the President and responsible to him. Doubtless having in mind a possible future air organization completely divorced from the Army and Navy, these senators deplored the fact that no broad plan looking to later development had been laid down, and urged that those in charge of American aviation should look ahead constantly and devise plans for continued expansion. It should be explained here that these views did not represent the opinions of all the members of the Committee. On the other hand, a minority report after summarizing the major achievements incident to the aviation program stated that since the Signal Corps was accomplishing an unparalleled task with capacity, energy, enthusiasm, and patriotism, its record was "one of which every American can be justly proud." Incidentally, as a matter of record, that segment of the American public which may have been confused by the misleading statements of government officials regarding airplane production must have been completely bewildered by the conflicting opinions expressed in these two reports!

On 15 April Congressman Norman J. Gould introduced in the House of Representatives a bill providing for an organization which would have been a sort of compromise between the proposal of the Senate Committee on Military Affairs a few days earlier and Lieb's suggestion of April 1916 for a Department of Aviation (largely duplicated in substance by the Hulbert-Sheppard measure). In lieu of the Aviation Section of the Signal Corps and the Office of Naval Aeronautics, Gould proposed an Office of Aircraft Administrator, directed by an officer holding that same title to be appointed by the President. Vested with full control over all government activities dealing with aeronautics, the Aircraft Administrator would have as his general duties the encouragement of aircraft production and the development of the science of flying. To his office would be transferred not only the Aviation Section of the Signal Corps and the Office of Naval Aeronautics of the Navy Department, but also in the discretion of the President, "from time to time...the whole or any part of any bureau, division, or other branch of the Government engaged in work pertaining to aeronautics."

Killed by inaction in the House Committee on Military Affairs, the Gould bill, like the immediately preceding recommendations, failed to accomplish its immediate objective. One should not conclude, however, that these proposals, the investigations, and the complaints relative to the aviation program which were made in the late winter and early spring of 1918 were altogether ineffective. As expressed by Brig. Gen. William L. Kenly, an officer who figured prominently in the subsequent changes
which were consummated, it had become quite obvious by this time that the system whereby the Aviation Section served as a subsidiary branch of the Signal Corps was functioning inefficiently. Then, as he also pointed out, the British and French, perceiving that the United States was encountering the same kind of obstacles which had plagued them, recommended a separate, independent air service similar to the air ministries they had felt obliged to establish. Consequently, an initial step was taken in a rearrangement of duties designed to effect more independence and a greater concentration of authority. The reader will recall that on 24 April the War Department issued a statement announcing the creation of two units within the Aviation Section: A Division of Production under John D. Ryan and the Division of Military Aeronautics with General Kenly in charge. Thereafter the Chief Signal Officer would devote himself exclusively to Signals.

A second step in the process of reorganizing the administration of the Air Service was made possible by the Overman Act of 20 May 1918 which empowered the President to make such redistribution of functions among executive agencies of the government as he might think necessary for the successful prosecution of the war. This statute, as was previously pointed out, enabled President Wilson to remove aeronautics completely from the jurisdiction of the Signal Corps and to place the functions relevant to the Aviation Section in the hands of two different units: The Division of Military Aeronautics for securing the training of the necessary personnel and the Bureau of Aircraft Production for providing the planes, engines, and equipment. Thus was created "a fourth...arm of the Service," in the opinion of General March, then Chief of Staff, who regarded it not as "a staff corps or a supply corps, as the Signal Corps was primarily, but an individual independent fighting unit."

General March's comment may be regarded as ill-advised; for, as observed in the introductory section of this study there was a definite lack of unity within the military air arm as reorganized by the Executive Order of 21 May 1918. The existing division of authority between the Division of Military Aeronautics and the Bureau of Aircraft Production was minimized in no wise, moreover, by the subsequent War Department Order specifying that so long as the latter existed as a separate entity no Director of Air Service in charge of both agencies would be appointed. It is true that during the ensuing weeks the two bureaus worked out a policy which provided a fair degree of cooperation as related to their respective functions; yet a divided authority still remained. This was clearly discernible to all informed persons concerned, including members of the Senate Committee on Military Affairs, which was still involved with its investigation of the aircraft program. That applied particularly to Senators James A. Reed of Missouri, and Harry S. New of Indiana, members of the subcommittee actually conducting the inquiry, who were influenced in a large measure
also by General William S. Brancker, the Controller General of Equipment for the British Air Ministry, then but recently on a special mission to the United States.

As was but logical, the question quickly turned to the broader subject of a separate department to deal with problems of aviation production. In a statement made to the Associated Press just prior to his return to England in midsummer of 1918 General Brancker urged that the United States profit by the experience of his own government and create a cabinet position of "Air Controller," without writing for public opinion to force the issue "as in our case." Obviously, as he pointed out, despite the existence of various subordinate agencies it was necessary to bring before the heads of the War and Navy Departments for settlement certain general problems which could be handled more efficiently by an official whose exclusive function was aviation. This view received the hearty concurrence of Senators Reed and New. By way of an interview as of 1 August the latter called attention to the divided authority in our aircraft program which he felt must be eliminated before the number of planes necessary to win the war could be produced. The only solution, the spokesman said, "is to have some powerful central authority that would take care of the entire program; for it was virtually impossible to coordinate perfectly two great departments. Suiting his actions to his words, Senator New at the same time introduced in the upper body of Congress a bill which would create for the period of the war and one year thereafter a Department of Aeronautics in charge of a Secretary of Aeronautics who would be a regular member of the President's Cabinet. According to the proposal, this new department should have "direct and complete control of all matters pertaining to the designing, purchase, and manufacture and production of aircraft and aircraft equipment intended for the use of the Army, the Navy, and the Marine Corps of the United States." 

Although the New bill would set up an independent Department of Aeronautics only insofar as production of aircraft was concerned (and that for a limited time), recommendations for a full-fledged Department of Aviation were included in the report made by the entire subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Military Affairs. Besides Reed and New, the group consisted of Senators Charles S. Thomas, of Colorado, Chairman; Hoke Smith, of Georgia; and Joseph Frelinghuysen, of New Jersey. The report in question was made on 22 August 1918 after the group had visited a number of manufacturing plants in different sections of the country; examined training and testing fields; and secured testimony from manufacturers, fliers, officers, and inspectors.

In view of all the circumstances the Thomas subcommittee report deserves a rather full analysis. It charged that a substantial portion of the $640,000,000 appropriation voted by Congress in July 1917 had been
wasted. Because of many errors and blunders, which were recounted in full, the report stated that "it must be admitted that our aeroplane program has, up to the present, presented many aspects of failure." Nevertheless, much good work had been accomplished for which credit should be given; besides, due allowance must be made for mistakes of judgment which were unavoidable in the organization of a new branch of service. Complete fairness, however, required the admission that Congress originally made an error in placing the problems of aircraft production and administration under the jurisdiction of the Signal Corps.

Coming nearer the heart of the matter so far as this study is concerned, the subcommittee report insisted that to a large extent failures in the aircraft program would have been avoided if it had been under the control of one person, with production problems subordinated to skilled aeronautical engineers and practical fliers who could design and test the machines. It noted with satisfaction the efforts made for cooperation and coordination between the Division of Military Aeronautics and the Bureau of Aircraft Production, and expressed the belief that definite progress had been made. Yet so long as it remained dual in character a divided authority would continue to plague the whole organization. Influenced by the opinions of every person consulted, the subcommittee agreed to recommend a one-man control. Continuing in this vein, the report read:

...Your committee therefore believes that the importance and magnitude of aviation as a permanent branch of our military organization requires one directing and responsible head both for its efficiency and speedy development. Its classification with the Army and Navy as a distinct arm of the service is essential to this end.

Even though it may have been comparatively insignificant when the European hostilities broke out in 1914, the subcommittee held, aviation had become indispensable in modern warfare. Without aircraft no army could hope any longer to triumph, or even escape defeat; without aircraft the most powerful navy must remain on the defensive. The report called attention to the fact that Great Britain (and, as it said, France) but recently had organized an air department whose minister held rank as an officer of the cabinet. Then it continued:

We should do likewise—create a department of aviation under the control and supervision of a secretary, and ranking with those of the Army and Navy. We would thus place power and responsibility in the hands of a single man, organize a service not alone for this war but for all time, and establish for the forces of the air the same policy of administration that has so long governed those of the land and of the seas.
Maintaining further that training for aviation was as distinct and technical as that provided at West Point or Annapolis, the senators making up this subcommittee concluded this phase of their report by saying that:

"The creation of the department of the air would unify the service, thus removing all friction between the Army and Navy divisions of the service by subjecting both to the control of a common head. Differences between them under present conditions are unavoidable, and, while more disagreeable than serious so far, they will arise from time to time, tending to seriously disturb the service, besides interfering with production."

It was on 28 August 1918, less than a week after the above recommendation was made, that the War Department announced the appointment of John D. Ryan as Second Assistant Secretary of War and Director of the Air Service. In this dual capacity he was given complete supervision and control over both the Division of Military Aeronautics and the Bureau of Aircraft Production. This action, of course, fell somewhat short of complying with the suggestion of the New bill, that of the subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Military Affairs, and many previous proposals to set up an independent executive department of air. As a matter of fact, it undoubtedly was designed in part at least to counteract the strong popular and congressional demand for such an organization. At the same time, to a greater extent probably than the authorities realized, this was a step in that direction, a move towards a separate air service which might well have been consummated during this period had the termination of the war been delayed for any appreciable length of time. Assuming that the struggle had continued longer, it is difficult to understand how the huge air strength which was being built up could have been administered effectively by an Assistant Secretary of War. The mere volume of work itself would have prompted, not to say necessitated, a separate department. As it was, however, Ryan had hardly been settled in his new job when the Armistice was signed. Ten days later he resigned before any further moves toward consolidation were made.

Meanwhile on 25 October the report of the Hughes Investigating Committee had been made public. It not only blamed the weaknesses and failures of the aircraft program upon such factors as a lack of knowledge and experience, ignorance as to precise equipment required, changes in design and appliances, and a shortage of trained mechanics; but also, like the two previous reports, called attention to the administrative and organizational weaknesses of the air arm. That arraignment, however, made but relatively little impression upon a public which was more inclined simply to breathe a sigh of relief that no serious charges of fraud and corruption had resulted from the inquiry. This factor had a negative effect upon any general demand for the creation of a separate department of aeronautics.
The passing of the emergency with the signing of the Armistice a few days later, moreover, seemed to eliminate it altogether for the time being. Within the organization of the military air arm itself, however, the idea was not allowed to slumber even while the initial celebrations incident to the close of the war were still in progress; for on 15 November an inter-office memorandum recommended that everyone connected with the Air Service be enlisted in an effort to establish by law an “Air Department, with a secretary who shall have the same relation to the Federal Government and the same powers as every other Cabinet secretary.”21 As will appear, moreover, during the early stages of the postwar reconstruction period agitation was to show up again, and that in a form more persistent than ever.
Chapter 4

Preliminary Adjustments
Following World War I

With the close of World War I a new element was injected into the controversy respecting the position of aviation in the armed forces of the United States. This was the aviator returned from overseas service. A composite picture would represent him as one who, convinced that warfare in the future would be increasingly dependent upon air power, regarded the air force not only as an offensive weapon, but also a striking arm. In fact, he believed that aviation represented a third and equal, not to say superior, branch of warfare. Naturally, then, the tendency was for him to favor more freedom for and fewer restrictions upon the administration of the organization to which he had belonged. This naturally would involve a separate department of aeronautics; or, as developed in time, some form of a department of national defense in which military aviation would occupy a coordinate status. Since few of these experienced aviators possessed a formal military or naval training and background, however, they were viewed somewhat in the nature of “upstarts” by the old-line personnel steeped in the traditions of the services.

The end of the First World War also brought into sharper focus this older group as opponents of any move which would increase the position, power, or prestige of the air arm. It was made up of high-ranking dignitaries, including the heads of the War and Navy Departments, members of the General Staff, and others in responsible administrative positions of leadership, who regarded aviation simply as an auxiliary to Army and Navy operations per se, rather than a separate element of national defense. Consequently, they wished to keep it in a subordinate role. Non-fliers for the most part, some of them were inclined to be jealous of aviators and regarded the air arm as a threat to their own established prerogatives. Others tended to assume an attitude of indifference towards and contempt for air power. By far the greater number of them were opposed to the establishment of any agency which would increase materially the autonomy or freedom of military aviation. Being in the majority, and at the same time
occupying positions of dominance and control, at this stage of the conflict they had a definite advantage over the crusaders for air power. The issue was squarely joined between the two groups, however, as early as the spring of 1919.

With a view of gaining the maximum of advantage from the experiences of the war, while they were fresh in the minds of those who had participated in them, General John J. Pershing on 19 April 1919 appointed a board instructed to consider the “lessons to be learned...in so far as they affect tactics and organization.” Relevant conclusions of this Dickman Board, as it was called, may be summarized briefly. Nothing brought out in World War I indicated that aerial activities could be carried on independently of ground troops so as to affect materially the outcome of war as a whole. Nor did it seem likely that air forces would ever supplant ground and naval forces unless such a proportion of the population became “air-faring” as are now known as “sea-faring people.” Until such time the question of the expensiveness of material and provisions for aerial power in relation to other forces must be considered. As long, moreover, as existing conditions prevailed ground forces would continue to be the dominant factor in warfare. Under these circumstances, therefore, authority must be vested in the commander of the ground forces, and “aviation must continue to be one of the auxiliaries of the principal arm, the Infantry.” For the present all questions of air strategy and tactics as well as the employment of aviation should be governed by the well-known and established principles of military art, in which superior officers must be thoroughly grounded, so that this important air auxiliary would be used always in pursuance of the paramount object.

A more thorough investigation of the whole question of the position of the air arm in the system of national defense was initiated on 1 May 1919, when Secretary of War Baker directed Assistant Secretary of War Benedict C. Crowell to organize a mission for the purpose of studying aviation problems as they had developed in the principal allied countries during the war. To aid him in executing the assignment Crowell selected an able group, including Howard E. Coffin, still on the Council of National Defense; a member of the General Staff; a representative of the Air Service; a naval officer; and several executives of the aircraft industry. During the late spring and early summer this group visited Great Britain, France, and Italy, conferring with various cabinet ministers, high-ranking Army and Navy officers, and leading aircraft manufacturers. Following this thorough investigation of all forms of organization, production, and development as related to aviation, the American Aviation Mission, as it was commonly called, submitted a report on 19 July 1919.

The general tone of the findings of the Aviation Mission indicated a keen awareness of the rapid development of aeronautics, together with its
far-reaching effects upon the practice of warfare; a desire for the government of the United States to reap the greatest possible benefit from the huge expenditures made during the late war; and considerable concern for the prospects of commercial aviation. Members of the mission were favorably impressed with the steps taken in England, France, and Italy, by way of centralizing the organization of military aeronautics. This applied particularly to the first-mentioned country where the Royal Air Force was being built along lines which would make it co-equal with the Army and Navy. America, the report warned, might well study the British organization, the product of the best brains in the British Empire, "which has been born of five bitter years of trial, mistake, experience, and progress."

The Crowell Mission recommended for the United States the concentration of all air activities, military, naval, and civilian, into a National Air Service co-equal in importance and representation with the Departments of War, Navy, and Commerce. It would have responsibility for development and utilization of aircraft in the interest of national security, as well as the advancement of commercial aviation and communication. In addition to a Secretary for Air and an Assistant Secretary, both civilians, the National Air Service would have by way of organization six or more divisions or departments, including Civil Aeronautics, Military Aeronautics, Naval Aeronautics, Supply and Research, Finance, and Technical, each under a chief or director; and an Air Council made up of the afore-mentioned officials and other persons as deemed advisable by the Secretary for Air.

An important part of the proposal of the Aviation Mission, though supplementary to the concept of the National Air Service itself, was the suggestion of an air college and other similar institutions, open alike to military, naval, and civilian personnel. The curricula in these schools, as well as the matters of assignment, promotion, and pay in the National Air Service, should be arranged so as to insure an attractive career to a capable young man, whether he elected to remain in the Air Service or to return to the Army, the Navy, or to civil life. It was stipulated further that all personnel and equipment as might be assigned by the National Air Service to military or naval establishments should automatically pass under the control of such command. Under the operational direction of the National Air Service itself would remain only independent projects unrelated to military and naval fighting fronts, and such personnel and equipment as would form a surplus to the needs of the land and sea forces.

The members of the Aviation Commission realized that many objections would be raised to their major proposal, but believed that none of them should prove to be insurmountable. With the possible exception of the naval officer, who attached several relatively minor reservations to his signature, all of them apparently were convinced of the need for a separate air department. Officially, however, the proposal did not advance beyond the
War Department. In making public the report Secretary Baker showed that he had a clear conception of the significance of aircraft in general and the fact that for a while at least the development of aviation of necessity must depend upon government subsidy. He also appreciated the importance of military aeronautics and believed that nothing should be left undone to develop both its scientific and practical aspects, especially so as to make possible quantity production in time of emergency. The Secretary of War did not believe, however, that a centralized air service would solve the problems. In his own mind at least, the reasons were obvious. Both the planes and pilots required for defense purposes were different from those needed in commercial aviation. Particularly did the necessary forms of pilot training differ. Since service pilots were trained to operate in coordination with each other, their efficiency depended upon the "most intense and constant associated training." Therefore, a separation of the Air Service from the Army or Navy would eliminate that effectiveness in military operation which "rests upon the concentration and singleness of authority, command, and purpose." As he viewed the whole question, in other words, Secretary Baker was unwilling to sacrifice the science of military aeronautics upon the altar of government subsidy to aviation. He maintained instead that aid for the new industry could be administered through means of a special agency designed for that purpose; and in that general connection he mentioned the activities of the Joint Army and Navy Technical Board.

Years later an aviator just returned from Europe in 1919, and who at the time favored a separate department of air, wrote that the rejection of the Crowell report gave American aviation a blow from which after two decades it hardly had begun to recover. Busy mustering out four million citizen soldiers and sailors, and "slightly dizzy with victory and post-war security," he added, army and navy officials were either too preoccupied to study the document or feared that the proposed agency would threaten their prerogatives. Yet, as respects the War Department certainly, the objections to a separate department of aeronautics cannot be brushed aside so easily, not to say contemptuously. Officially, as a matter of fact, Secretary Baker consistently opposed such a plan. For the purpose at hand additional statements which he made in that connection require brief analysis.

Touching upon the matter of an independent air service in his annual report for the fiscal year 1919, the Secretary of War made it clear that in his opinion the problems regarding the necessary degree of centralization in the agencies of development and control posed questions to which suggested answers based either upon doubt or enthusiasm were open to objection. Dogmatism certainly would be out of place. Although calling attention to the relatively small-scale activities of the aeroplane as an implement of direct attack in fighting maneuvers, strategic bombing, and low-flying
machine-gun operations, Baker contended that its only indispensable roles in the First World War were those relating to observation and the control of artillery fire. He admitted that the picture might change at any time and noted that air armament in use at the time of the Armistice already had become practically obsolete. Yet there was no reason to believe that future functions of the air arm would be other than “essentially military” in character. Certainly so far as concerned land operations at present, they were simply an “extension into the air of the modes of attack, counter-attack, and defense land armies are accustomed to use.” Land forces, Secretary Baker asserted, were essential for the maintenance and control of the air arm, and in some measure for defense even against air attack. Those who realized the extent to which victory in warfare depended upon concentration in the control of combined operations, he added,

will perceive the seriousness with which any proposal must be viewed which undertakes to separate services which must be so instantly knit together when the time for action arrives. Nobody would think of suggesting that artillery should be a separate service, or cavalry, in any other sense than that they should have their experts giving special attention to their development, but all the time in immediate cooperation with the other services and under the control of a single command. Nor would temporary control, asserted merely for the purpose of combined operations, be enough. The whole purpose of military training and discipline is to inculcate a series of habits of cooperation and obedience which will leave as little as possible to be learned when the hour of trial comes. The uniform, the spirit of membership in the Army, the fellowship of constant association, the experience of constant cooperation, the knowledge which each arm of the service has of the functions of the other arms of the service, the ways they fit into, supplement, and support one another, the extent to which they can be relied upon, all form parts of the material of success.

For these reasons it would be preferable to have the military air arm and the land army fight as one unit than as combined forces. To separate the respective soldiers and officers into different commands would make for rival services, with the whole train of evils which such competition created. Secretary Baker did not believe, moreover, that the future prospects of the independent effectiveness of aircraft as an agency of warfare was such as to justify reliance upon it, except to the detriment of the traditional military arms. Finally, and here many would suggest that his sense of what was dogmatic had deserted him, the Secretary of War asserted positively that as yet the backbone of military effort was the infantry. To support its functions of advance and occupation all other arms, on land, on the sea, and in the air, should serve as mere auxiliaries.⁸
AUTONOMY OF THE AIR ARM

The views of the War Department on the question of a separate air service at this time coincided generally with those held by the Department of the Navy. This showed up, for instance, in an article prepared for publication by Franklin D. Roosevelt, Assistant Secretary of the Navy. Therein Roosevelt's primary interest, it appears, lay in the preservation intact of the naval air arm; but he touched as well upon the broader aspects of the whole question. He favored full cooperation and interchange of plans between the army air service and the naval air arm; but not unification of the two, for which there was absolutely no need. Disaster, Secretary Roosevelt thought, would follow removal of command from either branch in favor of a third organization. Further, with particular reference to the Army, he said:

...The Army must control its air service. The ability to coordinate all branches of the service, combining its activities at the will of the Commander-in-Chief, is one of the fundamentals of strategy. Scouting, patrolling, reconnaissance and defensive programs in which the air force plays the predominant part, cannot be divorced from a united command.... The separation of the air force of a great army from the absolute control of the Commander-in-Chief would be disastrous and should no more be thought of than the separation of the Motor Transport Service, the Chemical Warfare Branch or the Quartermaster Department....

Secretary Baker's official attitude towards a proposed independent air service (not to say the Navy viewpoint) was influenced in large measure no doubt by the views of high-ranking military personnel, particularly the recommendations of the Menoher Board, which was convened following the introduction of additional relevant bills in Congress. Although a total of eight such measures were brought up within fifteen months after the Armistice, only three require analysis here. The first of these was introduced in the lower house on 28 July 1919 by Representative Charles F. Curry of California.

In broad outline the Curry bill was similar to the proposal which was made by the Crowell Mission just a few days earlier: although, as may be expected, it went into more detail. The suggested legislation provided for an executive Department of Aeronautics under a Secretary of Aeronautics who would be entrusted with the responsibility of promoting all matters pertaining to aeronautics, "including the purchase, manufacture, maintenance, and production of all aircraft for the United States," and charged with the performance of "all duties heretofore assigned to the War, Post Office, and Navy Departments in so far as they relate to aviation." By specific mention this assignment included the administration of an aeronautical academy for the training of cadets and of such aircraft factories as might be required for the manufacture of aeronautical equipment and material.
By way of an actual air arm the bill provided for a Regular Air Force, under a Chief of Operations with a rank of major general; a Reserve Air Force; and a National Guard Air Force, while in service of the United States. The Regular Air Force should consist of a line and a staff. The line was to be a combat force, operating independently or with land or sea forces. In case of joint action, however, details of air units were to be subject to the command of the forces to which they were assigned. The Regular Air Force staff would consist of several divisions, such as Operations, Administration, Legal, Engineering, Supply, and Medical. The task of preparing plans for national defense by the air force was to be performed by the Operations Division of this air staff.\(^\text{11}\)

Somewhat similar to the Curry proposal, but more general and less detailed in its provisions, was the bill introduced in the Senate on 31 July by Harry S. New. It made provision for an executive Department of Aeronautics, with the major function of handling all aeronautical matters for the Army, Navy, Coast Guard, Post Office, or any other government agency which in the interest of the public might be regarded as desirable. Senator New's measure provided also for a United States Air Force consisting of military personnel serving in or assigned to the Department of Aeronautics. Under the direction of the President the head of the Department of Aeronautics, to be known as Director, might assign aeronautical units to duty with the Army and Navy; but while so attached they would be under the exclusive control of the respective military or naval commanders.\(^\text{12}\)

On 8 August 1919 the Secretary of War convened a board of Army officers consisting of Maj. Gen. Charles T. Menoher, the Director of the Air Service, and four artillerymen to investigate, with particular reference to the New and Curry bills, the advisability of creating a separate department of air. In order to become thoroughly acquainted with the problem the board studied telegraphic reports requested from some fifty division, corps, and Army leaders, who actually had operated with air units under their command; examined much additional written evidence from boards, commissions, and individuals; and consulted a number of witnesses in person. Among those appearing before the board was Brig. Gen. William Mitchell, now a veteran combat aviator with a brilliant record and formerly Chief of Air Service, A.E.F., who along with General Leonard Wood and several other officers of high rank definitely took an affirmative stand on the question. A majority of those whose testimony was considered, however, as well as the members of the board itself, held the opposite view. At least the verdict which was rendered on 27 October counselled against a separate department of aeronautics. Yet it held that a single agency should be made responsible for the procurement, though normally not the production, of government aircraft and that another be created for the purpose of development work as related to research and experi-
mentation in all phases of aviation. Although regarding an air force as an essential combat branch, the Menoher Board insisted that acting independently, it could not accomplish a decision against forces on the ground, much less win a war against a civilized nation. Therefore, an air force should be controlled by a commander-in-chief of operations on the same footing, so far as practical, with the infantry, artillery, and cavalry. To do otherwise would violate the fundamental principle of unity of command.\textsuperscript{13}

Although certain enthusiastic exponents of strong air power later charged the Menoher Board with partisan tactics in securing the testimony involved,\textsuperscript{14} its report carried weight not only with the War Department, as was noted, but also, apparently, with Congress to which it was referred.\textsuperscript{15} At least, all of the current proposals to create a department of aeronautics eventually were allowed to die by inaction. In modified forms, however, the Curry and New bills were reintroduced in October.\textsuperscript{16} During the winter of 1919–1920 extended hearings were held on these two, on the similar bills subsequently introduced, and on various Army reorganization bills currently under consideration, all of which elicited testimony both for and against a separate department of aeronautics.\textsuperscript{17} A detailed analysis of all these proceedings cannot be presented here. For the purpose of the present discussion it will suffice to give the names of the leading advocates of the idea, the outstanding opponents, and summaries of the arguments offered. Although in charge of a subcommittee conducting hearings and not a witness before it, Representative La Guardia, himself a returned aviator with some renown, should be mentioned along with those favoring an independent air service at this time. Eliminating from consideration here a number of both Army and Navy aviators who, according to La Guardia and others, could not or would not express their convictions because of pressure from above, the list included such as General Mitchell, Maj. Foulois, Col. C. deF. Chandler, Col. Henry H. Arnold, Benedict Crowell, S. S. Bradley, and Glenn L. Martin arrayed against them were Secretary Baker, General Menoher, General March, General John J. Pershing, and Maj. Gen. [James W.] McAndrew.\textsuperscript{18}

Arguments presented pro and con produced few or no new ideas, and are subject to quick summary. Proponents of the idea of a separate air department held that military aviation no longer was a mere auxiliary of other forces, but an important striking arm in itself. General Mitchell said, for instance, that its principal function was to obtain a decision over the aviation of the enemy, essentially an air problem. Then, touching briefly upon what later became a near-crusading matter with him, Mitchell asserted that if allowed to develop properly the air arm could carry the war in the air to such an extent as to make navies almost useless. Next, from both the strategic and tactical points of view, it was necessary to have final authority for aviation vested in those who were interested in and operated
an air force as such. More or less openly inviting court-martial, in this general connection Major Foulois charged that the General Staff, through lack of vision, because of inadequate knowledge, or by deliberate intent, had subordinated military aviation to the needs of the other combat arms. The Air Service, he said, had developed entirely upon its own initiative. Another argument presented on behalf of a separate air service was the assertion that a duplication of expense was incident to a lack of central control. Again, England’s experience had been successful; and to substantiate this assertion, proponents of the proposal cited statements made by Winston Churchill, Britain’s Secretary of State for War and Secretary of State for Air; Maj. Gen. Hugh Trenchard, Chief of Staff, R.A.F.; and certain British and French air attachés. Lastly, an independent air service would lend encouragement to a vitally necessary commercial industry and prevent its breakdown.10

Those who opposed an individual department of aeronautics held that the major justification for the existence of an air force was its liaison with other branches. This would be hampered by the creation of a separate air organization. General Menoher, for instance, regarded the air service as a mere auxiliary unit, and not a decisive one at that; while General Pershing said that not for a long time to come could it be an independent arm. Next, a decentralization of control, with the high command denied the power to utilize the air service as it saw fit, would result in a decrease in the efficiency of the Army as a whole. The Quartermaster Corps, it was said, was competent to make contracts for and purchase all the aircraft needed by the Army in peacetime. The independent air service in Great Britain, opponents of the idea argued, had not been eminently successful. The majority of the Navy air service, they pointed out, was opposed to a separate department of aeronautics. Any normal lack of cooperation between Army and Navy authorities would be eliminated by the revived Joint Army and Navy Board. And, finally, a highly centralized aerial organization would not be conducive to the encouragement of aircraft manufacturing activities.20

A further observation on the views of the Commander-in-Chief of the American Expeditionary Forces should be made here. He had appeared on 31 October before a joint session of the Military Affairs Committees of the two houses of Congress. Apparently misinterpreting a statement in his testimony to the effect that it might be very well to include under one head the appropriations for military and naval aeronautics and the development of commercial aviation, the press and public in general seemed to conclude that General Pershing favored a separate air organization.21 In order to clear up the misapprehension, General Menoher wrote to request further statement of his views. Pershing’s reply left no doubt whatever as to his position in the matter. The only view he had expressed with respect to the air service for military purposes, the General wrote, was that it should be
established as a separate branch within the Army, on the same basis as that of the infantry or the field artillery. An air force should be created as a separate arm of the service, coordinate with the infantry, cavalry, and artillery; but not as a combatant force distinct from the Army and Navy. Although an essential, indispensable combat branch of the Army, a military air force, General Pershing insisted, “acting independently can of its own account neither win a war at the present time nor, so far as we can tell, at any time in the future.” Nor could it obtain a decision against ground forces. An air force, therefore, should be trained and controlled under precisely the same conditions of Army command as other combat arms. Like all branches of a military organization, an air force must know the needs of the other units, “be in full sympathy with them, think in the same military atmosphere, and have the same esprit de corps in order that effective battle control may be established.”

Meanwhile the Senate Committee on Military Affairs reported favorably on the revised New bill, which was an attempt both to carry out the recommendations of the American Aviation Mission and to meet the most important objections which had been raised against the proposal to set up a separate department of aeronautics, and was the second and last of the eight relevant measures immediately under review to advance thus far in the legislative process. After a short period of debate, which indicated that the Senate would defeat the measure, Senator New asked that it be recommitted for further consideration. This was done, but nothing came of it. For the time being no other comparable legislation was brought up, although soon another congressional committee was to make strong recommendations for the accomplishment of the objectives common to the several bills which have been reviewed.

In the early summer of 1919 the House of Representatives organized the Select Committee on Expenditures in the War Department, probably better known as the Graham Committee by virtue of its chairman, Representative William J. Graham. A subcommittee of three, with James A. Frear as the chairman, was directed to investigate the expenditures specifically related to aviation during the period of World War I, after pursuing its study over a period of more than six months, the Frear subcommittee made a report which was adopted by the whole body. By far the greater portion of the findings of the aviation subcommittee is altogether irrelevant to the subject specifically under review. The reverse holds true, however, with respect to one of its major conclusions.

According to the majority report of this subcommittee, the “striking failure of the War Department to rise to the aircraft emergency” had made necessary the creation of a separate bureau or department of aeronautics, with a capable, progressive official at the head, wherein all governmental aerial activities should be centered. For the adequate development of avia-
tion in this country such an agency should cooperate fully with the War, Navy, Post Office, and Interior departments. This was the general opinion expressed by virtually every witness examined on the subject of the future of the American Air Service. The list included military officers from the general class down through lieutenant; private citizens familiar with the subject; and many experienced aviators. Among the latter should be mentioned such names as Foulois, Kenly, La Guardia, Mitchell, and, for the first time in these pages, that of Capt. Edward V. Rickenbacker.

As noted, Congress took no action on the recommendation of the Select Committee on Expenditures in the War Department relating to a basic reorganization of military aeronautics. Nor, of course, did the administration. Instead, the War Department continued to push the proposals which, as pointed out in the preliminary chapter of this study, were enacted into law as a part of the Army Reorganization Act of 1920, thereby giving statutory recognition to the Air Service and making it one of the regular combatant arms or line of the Army. The act did not alter the existing relationship between the Air Service and the General Staff. After months of agitation, therefore, the latter agency, representing the very epitome of the old order in the War Department structure and military circles in general, had won a veritable triumph over the proponents of a separate department of aeronautics. At the end of the post World War I readjustment period, however, the contest really had just begun.
Chapter 5

Creation of the Army Air Corps

Subsequent to the Army Reorganization Act of 1920 the first important legislation affecting the general organization of military aeronautics in the United States was the Air Corps Act of 1926. During this interval the controversy respecting the exact status of aviation within the armed forces was to a large degree simply a continuation of that which had characterized the period immediately preceding. Numerous bills found their way to the legislative hopper, followed by congressional hearings and committee reports; special boards, after conducting extensive investigations, announced their conclusions; and underneath it all the jurisdictional conflict between the Air Service and the older military departments continued unabated. Although, with major exceptions to be noted where applicable, the arguments and fundamental points of view remained about the same. It appeared that the cleavage was more sharply pronounced between the trained aviators and the old-line army men. At least the former, bound together by practical experiences as well as common grievances and objectives, eventually came to control the Air Service as such. The traditional clique, however, continued to dominate the General Staff, the major policy-controlling body of the War Department.¹

So much of the developments relating to the question of a greater degree of autonomy for the air arm during this period revolved either directly or indirectly around the colorful figure, not to say dramatist, General "Billy" Mitchell, that a brief resume of some of his major activities seems necessary at this point. Assistant Chief of Air Service for the greater part of the time, General Mitchell failed to persuade his superior officers wholly to accept his point of view regarding the importance of military aviation. Then he tried other tactics. In addition to appearing before congressional committees and special aircraft boards, he engaged in lecture tours, gave interviews to the press, contributed magazine articles, and even wrote books, in order to tell the public what he thought about air power.² It was also due largely to the initial prompting of this former commander of World War I Air Service activities overseas that during the early years of
this decade the question of the effectiveness of aerial bombardment became a subject of heated controversy between the Army and Navy. The major issue was the vulnerability of naval vessels to attack from the air. The means of reaching a decision took form in a series of bombing tests against "enemy vessels" off the Atlantic Coast, in some of which Mitchell himself actively participated. Although at the time naval authorities may not have been so ready to agree, and many years were to pass before their significance was fully appreciated, the experiments indicated that the "effectiveness of bombing aircraft against battleships of all types [was] very positive and that against this means of destruction there is no adequate defense other than that provided by pursuit airplanes."

In military aviation circles it is a matter of common knowledge, of course, that Mitchell's continued crusade in favor of military aeronautics combined with his "feud" against the Navy eventually brought about not only his dismissal as Assistant Chief of Air Service, but also a court-martial during the latter part of 1925, resulting in a suspension from rank, command, and duty, with a forfeiture of all pay and allowances for five years. Soon thereafter he resigned his commission, but kept up the fight for air power. Less well known perhaps is the extent to which Mitchell's activities and influence actually effected the proposed changes in the organizational structure of the Air Service during this period.

Whether "Billy" Mitchell was a prophet or a martyr is relatively immaterial so far as this study is concerned. Significant, however, is the fact that a large section of the American public seemed to regard him as both. Repeated series of Mitchell headlines in the press tended to swell the mailbags of members of Congress, thus producing indirectly flurries of what President Calvin Coolidge contemptuously called "Mitchell Resolutions." Although, naturally, most of them died in committee, they served as a nucleus for subsequent significant legislation. For a person of Mitchell's convictions and experiences in the realm of air power it was unreasonable to suppose that the airplane would do anything less than revolutionize the technique of modern warfare. The operation of the machines required a specialized knowledge and training not acquired at West Point or Annapolis. Moreover, military aeronautics posed problems in administration and organization altogether unfamiliar to either of the existing departments. It was but logical, therefore, that the Air Service should be given some form of a separate administrative organization.

As late as 1921 General Mitchell still favored a separate Department of Aeronautics, which he would charge with the responsibility of developing "all matters relating to the Air" and make co-equal in all respects with the Departments of War and Navy. Stated succinctly, the plan envisioned three major divisions. First, was the Air Force Division, to be responsible for the administration and operation of an elective air force which could be mobi-
lized with rapidity in the event of an outbreak of war, inasmuch as the "first battles of the future will be held in the air." With an adequate number of airplanes assigned to the Army and Navy, and a sufficient number of airplane carriers for the latter, Mitchell believed that within a few years it would be unnecessary to maintain most naval surface craft, such as battleships, battle cruisers, and torpedo boats. The Air Force Division would be broken down into five sections, as follows: Administration, Training and Operations, Equipment, Medical, and Legal. Second, a Supply Division, designed to devise, obtain, stock and issue all stores required by air troops, would be divided into Engineering, Procurement, and Finance sections. Lastly, the Division of Civil Aeronautics expected, as the designation implies, to foster the development of commercial aviation, which would be subdivided into such sections as Law, Air Traffic, Civil Air Development, and Operations. General Mitchell's plan was not wholly dissimilar to some which previously had been proposed in Congress, especially that of Representative Curry, who on 24 February 1921 reintroduced his former measure with certain modifications, and presented it again on 19 April. Meanwhile Julius Kahn of California, a member of the lower house, had submitted a similar proposal on 11 April. Like so many of their precursors, however, each of these bills died aborning in a committee of the legislative body in which it originated. The incoming administration was quick to take its stand against any such proposal. Within less than a month after his inauguration President Warren G. Harding, acting upon recommendations worked out in a conference attended by the Secretary of War, the Secretary of Commerce, the Assistant Secretary of Navy, the Postmaster General, the Chief of Air Service, the Director of Naval Aviation, and a representative of the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics, called upon the chairman of the last-mentioned organization to appoint a subcommittee to study the question of cooperation among the various branches of the government concerned with aviation; and to make an appropriate report on its findings. The Chief of Air Service, still in the person of General Menoher, and Maj. W. G. Kilner sat upon this subcommittee which maintained representation as well from the Navy, Post Office, and Commerce Departments, and the aeronautical industry in general.

After deliberating over a period of less than two weeks the subcommittee made its report which included among other things certain things pertinent to this study, summarized as follows: (1) Since aviation is inseparable from the national defense and necessary to the success of both the Army and Navy, each should have complete control of the character and operations of its own air service. The Army Air Service, therefore, should be continued as a coordinate combatant branch of the Army, under the Secretary of War, utilized in cooperation with the Navy Post, Office, and other government agencies. Similarly the air service of the Navy and the
control of naval aeronautics should be centralized in a Bureau of Aeronautics in the Department of Navy. (2) There should be created in the Department of Commerce a Bureau of Aeronautics, for the purpose of regulating air navigation as well as executing such policies as may be adopted for the encouragement of civil and commercial aviation. (3) The Air Mail Service should be maintained and extended under the Postmaster General. President Harding wholeheartedly approved this report of the subcommittee of the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics which on 19 April 1921 he transmitted to Congress in close conjunction with a special message recommending the indicated legislation. In vain did several members of the subcommittee, including Major Kilner of the Air Service, insist that the President's assignment justified the consideration of a department of air, a unified air service, or an independent air force.

Considerably more than a year was to elapse before further serious attempts were made by legislation to change the organic structure or relative position of the Air Service in the national defense system. These will be taken up following a brief discussion of the Lassiter Board and its work. In his annual report for 1932 the Chief of Air Service, now in the person of Maj. Gen. Mason M. Patrick, also one-time Chief of Air Service, A.E.F., made complaint, as stated in substance, that his organization was virtually demobilized by way of both personnel and general facilities; and that thus it was unable to meet many normal peace-time demands, much less play its role in any national emergency. He explained that the general situation, which previously had been called to the attention of the War Department, could be remedied only by congressional action. Some months later, General Patrick had occasion to make more detailed recommendations for improvements in American military aviation. Basing his statements in part upon the results noted in airplane war maneuver tests held in Hawaii during 1922, he asserted that the authorized strength of the Air Service was wholly inadequate. General Patrick would divide this component of the Army into two main groups: observation squadrons and balloon companies whose function was to assist combatant branches of the Army; and pursuit, bombardment, and attack units, designated as the Air Force, which operated more or less independently of the ground troops. Legislation providing for an increase in personnel was sorely needed, particularly for this second element which was woefully under-officered and undermanned. Holding, finally, that air defense from land bases should be handled by the Army, while the Navy limited its activities to the sea, General Patrick stressed the need for a clearcut distinction between the mission of the Army Air Service and that of the Navy air units in coast defense.

On 17 March 1923 Secretary of War John W. Weeks convened a board of General Staff officers under the chairmanship of Maj. Gen. William Lassiter to consider Patrick's recommendation. Five days later, after inter-
viewing numerous aviation experts, this group issued a report which concurred essentially with the views presented by the Chief of Air Service. In order to bolster an aircraft industry regarded as already inadequate to meet even peacetime requirements and diminishing so rapidly that soon it would practically disappear, as well as to build up an Air Service which, due to a reduced personnel and a lack of planes, was in a critical condition, the Lassiter Board advocated a ten-year continuing program of expansion. Probably the most significant phase of the report, however, was the general indorsement of General Patrick's idea of a division of task forces. According to the Lassiter Board, an observation air service should be an integral part of divisions, corps, and armies; while an air force of attack and pursuit aviation ought to bear the same relation to each field army. Yet both should maintain a reserve under the command of general headquarters. A bombardment and pursuit aviation force, on the other hand, would best be retained under general headquarters for assignment to missions, either in connection with or independent of ground troops, as circumstances might warrant. This latter force, the board stated, should be organized into large units, insuring great mobility and independence of action. In the opinion of a member of the General Staff, expressed some months later, from the viewpoint of aerial combat this organization should meet the “desires of the proponents for an independent Air Service,” and that without sacrificing unity of command. Two decades later an Army Air Forces historian pronounced it as the concept of the strategic air force which was hailed as a new type of aerial combat unit when introduced in the North African campaign during the spring of 1943.

Although it met the approval of the Chief of Air Service and in substance eventually became the War Department's policy on Air Service organization, as such the Lassiter Board recommendation never was translated into legislation. On sending it to the Joint Army and Navy Board for consideration the Secretary of War suggested that in relation to their respective needs the Navy air appropriation mentioned was larger than that for the Army, and should be reduced proportionately. He also thought that the Army and Navy aviation program should be considered by a joint committee in Congress rather than the usual pertinent subcommittees. These suggestions did not meet the approval of the Secretary of Navy; so, technically speaking, the document remained with the Joint Army and Navy Board. As late as September 1925, Maj. Gen. John L. Hines, the Chief of Staff, inferred that the War Department would be willing to prepare for the consideration of Congress proposed legislation based upon the Lassiter Board report; but he insisted that it could not be done without an increase in the budget. Certainly his immediate predecessor would have gone no further; for in his last report as Chief of Staff, dated 12 September 1924, General Pershing reiterated in no uncertain terms his well-known convic-
tion that military aviation should remain an auxiliary arm, available for independent use or otherwise, but always under the orders of the commander-in-chief of the armies.  

The work of the Lassiter Board was not without its educational value, for prior to the passage of the Air Corps Act its report was reviewed by several other groups intent upon investigating military aeronautics. The first of these to be noted here was the so-called Lampert Committee, consisting of nine congressmen taken from the House Military and Naval Affairs Committees and named for its chairman, Representative F. H. Lampert of Wisconsin. Known officially as the Select Committee of Inquiry into Operations of the United States Air Services, it was organized on 24 March 1924 with the view of investigating the financial affairs of all branches of aeronautics. Examining more than 150 witnesses during a period of something over eleven months, the Committee broadened its field of inquiry into what may be regarded as an extensive examination of the Air Service organization per se. In the resulting testimony, which totals nearly 4,000 pages bound in six volumes, can be found the now traditional complaints of Air Service personnel; various plans and suggestions for an improved organization; and the numerous arguments of the experts who hoped to keep aviation subordinate to the Army and Navy. All in all, the hearings seemed to revolve around the key testimony presented by General Mitchell.

Rating the United States at not above fifth place among the air powers of the world, Mitchell placed the blame for the weakened condition of the Air Service squarely upon the General Staff. It had been informed time and time again of this situation by the Chief of Air Service. As was noted above, however, the annual report of that official had become a sort of repetitious review of what had not been accomplished. This condition, Mitchell asserted, was traceable to the fact that the Air Service was organized in such a way as to protect military agencies which had “vested interests against aviation.” The Chief of Air Service, having responsibility but little or no authority, was virtually powerless. Planning for aviation really was in the hands of officers who neither by inclination nor training were Air Service men. General Mitchell deplored the fact that, spread out among three departments, War, Navy, and Post Office, aviation in each instance was subordinated to another function regarded as a major aim. Much of his testimony related, of course, to the Navy. He contended, for instance, that if given and allowed to direct the annual expenditure of $50,000,000, just one-half the sum required to build one battleship plus the necessary supporting vessels, the Air Service could within two years control the air in any decisive theater of operations.

By way of specific suggestion for improvement of military aviation, General Mitchell recommended a Department of Aeronautics, co-equal with the Army and Navy, charged with the responsibility of handling all
aeronautical matters. At the same time he indicated his general approval of an idea or plan which later he, along with others, was to espouse wholeheartedly. Stated in substance, this was a department of national defense, administered by a secretary holding cabinet rank, with coordinate subdivisions for Air, Army, and Navy.  

It would be impracticable to present here even a list of the more important witnesses who at this time respectively upheld and decried General Mitchell’s views regarding the position of the air arm in the defense system of the United States. Howard E. Coffin agreed with him, as did Major Reed Landis. General Patrick offered his Air Corps plan, to be analyzed later, in which he was supported among others by Maj. Carl Spaatz; but both of them favored the ultimate establishment of the unified air service. There were a few others who came out on Mitchell’s side; but, generally speaking, War Department officials along with the General Staff, together with the Navy Department and its General Board, took issue with his ideas. Whether or not purposely and consciously, they undoubtedly influenced the stand taken by some of the younger officers in the respective services.  

On 14 December 1925, some nine months after concluding the hearings, the Lampert Committee made its report to Congress. Therein, with respect to the subject specifically under review in this study, it indicated that consideration had been given to the following plans relating to Air Service organization: (1) A unified air force operating independently of the Army and Navy, but providing units to those services as needed; (2) a separate air force operating in addition to individual air units required for Army and Navy tactics; (3) aviation corps in both the Army and Navy; (4) the installation of assistant secretaries in the War, Navy, and Commerce Departments; and (5) a Department of National Defense specially charged, under a civilian secretary, with the coordination of the defenses of the nation. After careful consideration the Committee agreed to endorse this last-mentioned idea which, as stated, through its unity of command would harmonize our national defense system, reduce expenditures for supplies, and prevent needless duplications, promote understanding, lessen friction between our different military arms, and provide a uniform and equalized system of pay, promotion, and retirement. It should decrease the overhead of maintenance and decrease the number of organizations and bureaus within the departments. It should promote the interchange of effort in peace and war; it should work for economy, and strength in our national defense. It would train and habituate our military organizations in peace time, for that cooperation that is essential in time of war.  

Here, though not specifically stated in so many words, ardent devotees of air power might argue that coordinate branches of Air, Army, and Navy
AUTONOMY OF THE AIR ARM

in the proposed department of national defense were definitely implied. Certainly one member of the Committee had that in mind.24

For more immediate action the Lampert Committee recommended that Congress determine the respective fields of operation for the Army and Navy air arms; the establishment of separate and all-inclusive budgets for the two groups; and adequate representation of both air services on the General Staff of the Army and the General Board of the Navy, respectively, by members who would firmly "support the full use of aviation for the defense of the country."25

Neither Congress nor the War Department took any immediate action upon the recommendations of the Lampert Committee, the effects of which in fact to a large degree had been nullified by developments occurring even before the report was presented. Reference is made primarily to matters relating to the President's Aircraft Board, more commonly known as the Morrow Board, which upon the request of the secretaries of War and Navy President Coolidge appointed on 12 September 1925 for the purpose of studying the "best means of developing and applying aircraft in national defense." The group when convened consisted of Dwight W. Morrow, who became chairman; Howard E. Coffin; Senator Hiram Bingham, formerly a colonel in the Air Service; a retired major general of the Army, a retired rear admiral; a judge of the Circuit Court of Appeals; two members of the lower house of Congress; and a member of the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics.26

During the course of the hearings, conducted over a period of four weeks beginning near mid-September, the Morrow Board examined over one hundred witnesses, including actual aviators who made up a majority of the total; other military and naval personnel; cabinet heads and staff members representing the departments of War, Navy, Commerce, and Post Office; members of Congress: representatives of the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics; and leaders of the aircraft industry. As was inevitable, the status of the Air Service as such in the over-all defense organization proved to be one of the foremost questions raised during these discussions. Again, "Billy" Mitchell, now reduced in rank to that of a colonel, was a star witness. In addition to his regular oral testimony he proceeded to read a thirty-thousand word statement reviewing the whole air power muddle. At this time also Mitchell came out unqualifiedly in favor of a department of national defense, a proposal for which he outlined in some detail.27 Among the score of other witnesses who took a stand in support of some form of an independent status for the Air Service were General Patrick, Colonel Foulois, Maj. Henry H. Arnold, and Major Kilner.28 On the other hand, a much larger number of those who had occasion to express themselves on the subject opposed any change in the status quo. These included Secretary of War Weeks; Acting Secretary of War Dwight F.
Early Military Aviation: Leaders and Legends

TOP: Lt. Benjamin D. Foulois, in 1911 the Army’s virtual “one-man” air force, at the controls of one of its first aircraft, the Wright Model B. He eventually became a major general and served as Chief of the Air Corps from 1931 to 1935. In 1964 he was awarded a special Medal of Recognition from Congress for his “more than fifty years of service to the development of aviation.”

BOTTOM, LEFT: Capt. Benjamin D. Foulois, fourth from left, with his fellow officers of the 1st Aero Squadron in front of their Curtiss JN–3, 1915. Foulois almost single-handedly organized the 1st Aero Squadron when political chaos in Mexico led to trouble along its border with the United States. The squadron took part in Gen. John J. Pershing’s 1916 punitive expedition into Mexico against the banditry of revolutionist Pancho Villa. The squadron’s less than spectacular operations there were, nonetheless, instructive and demonstrated how seriously understaffed and underfunded the Army’s air arm actually was.

BOTTOM, RIGHT: Brig. Gen. Mason Patrick, 1918. He was appointed by Gen. John J. Pershing, Commander-in-Chief of the American Expeditionary Force, to be Chief of its Air Service during World War I. His outstanding leadership brought badly needed efficiency and improved management to an air arm whose Army had only fifty-five planes when America entered the war. Most were obsolete and not combat worthy by European standards.
Early Military Aviation: Leaders and Legends

OPPOSITE, TOP: Brig. Gen. William “Billy” Mitchell, the prophet of air power, in his Thomas-Morse MB–3 fighter. He was the son of a Wisconsin senator who became a tireless champion of strategic bombing and one of the greatest and most controversial figures in military air history. He began his Army career as a private at the outbreak of the Spanish-American War and was later commissioned a lieutenant in the Signal Corps. Before the United States entered World War I, he was sent to France as an aeronautical observer with British and French forces and was thus the first American military representative to fly behind enemy combat lines. During the war he commanded a brigade of the first U.S. air units, reorganized and assigned to the Chateau-Thierry area, to enter combat.

OPPOSITE, CENTER: The ex-German battleship Ostfriesland being hammered by air attack. During June and July of 1921, both the Navy and War Departments wanted to ascertain how seacraft would stand up under aerial bombardment. Mitchell was certain that aircraft could sink even the most powerful battleships. In a test held on July 21, 1921, a flight of Martin bombers carrying 2,000-pound bombs sent the derelict Ostfriesland to the bottom within twenty minutes. The demonstration, held before dignitaries, reporters, and observers, vindicated Mitchell and proved his contentions on the potential of aerial bombardment. It also marked the end of the battleship, a fact sadly highlighted when Japan attacked Pearl Harbor.

OPPOSITE, BOTTOM: The court-martial of Billy Mitchell, 1925. By 1924 Gen. Mitchell was waging a vocal and vigorous campaign to convince the public of the importance of air power and the necessity of an independent air force. Instead of working quietly through normal military channels, he made his case openly in speeches and writings, soon antagonizing Congress, the President, the Secretaries of War and Navy, and the General Staff. When his term as Assistant Chief of the Air Service expired and was not renewed, he had to assume his permanent rank of colonel and an assignment as Air Corps Officer with the Eighth Corps Area at Fort Sam Houston, Texas. He did not relent, but became more outspoken, charging that the losses of a Navy P–9 and the balloon Shenandoah were the fault of U.S. military “incompetency” and “criminal negligence.” In the end, he was court-martialed, found guilty of insubordination, suspended from rank, command, and duty, and sentenced to forfeiture of pay for five years. The President granted some relief regarding pay, but Mitchell resigned from the Army on February 1, 1926, continuing his crusade on air power and its future in warfare in articles, books, speeches, and interviews.
Early Military Aviation: Leaders and Legends

TOP: In World War I Capt. Edward V. “Eddie” Rickenbacker, with his ground crew and a SPAD XIII fighter in France, 1918, achieved an outstanding twenty-six kills against enemy aircraft as a member of the 94th Aero Squadron. World War I created a whole new kind of Army hero—the air ace, whose exploits captured and held an adoring public’s attention and generated support for the post-war continuation and integration of aviation within U.S. military operations.

CENTER: Lt. Frank J. Luke and a SPAD XIII fighter, France, 1918. During two weeks in September 1918 he destroyed fourteen enemy balloons and four aircraft in furious dogfights. He shot down three more balloons before being forced down over Germany, where he was killed returning fire after refusing to surrender to his enemies. He received a posthumous Medal of Honor, the sole Air Service member so recognized while the war still raged.

BOTTOM: The first post-World War I Director of the Army Air Service Maj. Gen. Charles T. Menoher. After having served as Commanding Officer of the 5th Field Artillery during the war, he was named to his new position in 1918. From it he was forced to confront a demobilization that cut into the air arm drastically. He also presided over an investigative board, one of the earliest of the numerous Army departmental and congressional boards convened between 1920 and 1945, on the place of the air arm in the nation’s defense structure. Its recommendation against the creation of a separate department of air brought him into serious conflict with his second in command, the fiery Brig. Gen. William “Billy” Mitchell.
TOP: Flight of the Question Mark. The 1920s and 1930s brought a spate of outstanding flight records that made such names as Charles Lindbergh, Richard Byrd, Amelia Earhart, Jimmy Doolittle, and Bernt Balchen famous. On New Year's Day, 1929, with the flight of the Question Mark, the Air Corps, determined to set the world flying endurance record and garner publicity and support, employed aerial refueling, introduced in an earlier historic 37-hour flight by Capt. Lowell Smith and 1st Lt. John Richter. The arduous flight of the Question Mark, a Fokker C-2A trimotor transport, began and ended at Los Angeles Metropolitan Airport in Van Nuys, California. Shown being refueled by one of two Douglas utility tankers, the Question Mark stayed aloft for 150 hours, 40 minutes, and 40 seconds. Despite the flight's importance, its demonstration of aerial refueling's promise in extending aircraft range was not fully exploited by the air arm until 1947.

BOTTOM: The Question Mark's crew. Its members became celebrated for overcoming fatigue, fog, rough weather, darkness, lack of radio communications with the ground (the necessary equipment was deemed too heavy to include on the flight), and the dangers of the refueling process. Left to right: Sgt. Roy Hooe, Lt. Harry Halverson, Capt. Ira Eaker, Maj. Carl Spaatz (later spelled Spaatz), and Lt. Elwood Quesada.
The Interwar Years: Technology and Testing

TOP: Lt. James H. "Jimmy" Doolittle, left, and Harry F. Guggenheim, right, with a Vought Corsair, one of the blind flying research aircraft of the Guggenheim Fund for the Promotion of Aeronautics. Doolittle was detailed to head the Fund's Full Flight Laboratory at Mitchel Field in New York. There, on September 29, 1929, he made what was the most significant test flight since the Wright brothers' at Kitty Hawk, North Carolina, in 1903—the first blind, instruments-only flight in aviation history. Blind flying involved the use of instruments to aid flyers when fog or clouds obscured the horizon—their vital reference point. The Air Corps worked with private industry to develop various instruments—altimeters, artificial horizons, gyrocompasses, and radio homing-range and marker-beacon indicators. Doolittle performed the test in a Consolidated NY-2 with a special hood over the forward cockpit; his sight was thus confined to the instrument panel in which the experimental devices were installed. He was accompanied by a safety pilot, Lt. Benjamin Kelsey, both in practice runs and the actual test.

BOTTOM: The enclosed hood over the forward cockpit of the NY-2 in which Lt. Doolittle tested the new navigational equipment being perfected for blind flying.
TOP, LEFT: On July 19, 1934, Lt. Col. Henry H. "Hap" Arnold, sent by Air Corps Chief Gen. Benjamin D. Fulois, led a squadron of Martin B–10s from Washington D.C. to Alaska to demonstrate that the air arm could move tactical units quickly to distant locales and back. Ten planes landed in Fairbanks, Alaska, on July 24. They covered 8,290 miles round-trip, 4,500 miles in just over twenty-five hours, 990 miles from Juneau to Seattle non-stop. Arnold is shown wearing the insignia of the flight on his jacket.

TOP, RIGHT: One of the B–10s of the U.S. Army Air Corps’ Alaskan Flight descends beneath the clouds to obtain air map images of the territory between Fairbanks and Anchorage known as Broad Pass.

BOTTOM: GHQ Air Force Commander, Maj. Gen. Frank M. Andrews, left, congratulates Maj. Caleb V. Haynes, right, for his successful return to Langley Field, Virginia, after a special humanitarian mission to Santiago, Chile. Flying Boeing’s XB–15, fully loaded with medical supplies to aid victims of a powerful earthquake that had struck there on January 24, 1939, Haynes departed Langley February 4 and arrived in Santiago February 6. Since 1920 the Air Corps had engaged in several such goodwill flights which enhanced its prestige as they tested its new long-range aircraft.
The Interwar Years: The Air Corps on Trial

TOP: In 1934 Secretary of War George H. Dern appointed a special board to discuss both the Air Corps' overall ability to meet its many responsibilities and its eventual autonomy. Besides defending the country from attack and invasion, the Air Corps undertook numerous civil operations: relief and rescue, forest fire spotting, aerial photographing and mapping, scientific research, assisting farmers, and flying the mail. The Corps was experiencing some difficulties, particularly flying the mail, which it had been ordered to take over under Executive Order, in February 1934, from commercial carriers; their contracts had been cancelled when Congress expressed doubt about whether they had been won without favoratism. The Corps, however, because of several tragic accidents, soon proved a disappointment. The Baker Board (named for its chairman, former Secretary of War Newton Baker) found, in essence, that while the Corps should not be separated from the Army, it would, despite its best efforts to carry out its missions with the resources it was allocated, require better training and equipment and the resolution of personnel inequities. Seated, left to right: Maj. Gen. Benjamin Fulois, Carl Compton, Newton Baker, George Dern, Maj. Gen. Hugh Drum, George Lewis, and Maj. Gen. George Simonds. Standing, left to right: Brig. Gen. John Gulik, James Doolittle (at that time a civilian), Edgar Gorrell, Brig. Gen. Charles Kilbourne, and Clarence Chamberlin.

BOTTOM: Air Mail being loaded on board a Douglas B-7 at Oakland, California. The Air Corps flew the mail from February 10 to June 1, 1934, when commercial carriers again took up the task.
Advocates of Air Autonomy

From its earliest years the idea of the nation's military air arm as an independent service, co-equal with the Army and the Navy, had many advocates, uniformed and civilian, government and non-government. Those pictured (Assistant Secretary of War for Air Robert A. Lovett, TOP LEFT; and leading Air Corps Officers Henry H. Arnold, TOP RIGHT; Carl A. Spaatz, CENTER LEFT; Frank M. Andrews, CENTER RIGHT; George H. Brett, BOTTOM LEFT; and Joseph T. McNaurney, BOTTOM RIGHT) favored full autonomy and were called to testify before numerous War Department and congressional committees and investigative bodies which revisited the issue throughout the interwar years. They realized as the United States headed inexorably toward war that the push for full separation of the air arm from the Army should be postponed until after the conflict was concluded and won by the Allies. However, they were able through what was termed the McNarney Reorganization to achieve the creation on March 2, 1942, of the U.S. Army Air Forces, an absolutely necessary streamlining. The McNarney Reorganization recommended the provision, under the Secretary of War and the Chief of Staff, of a ground force, an air force, and a service of supply and command, all with headquarters in Washington, D.C. The U.S. Army Air Corps and GHQ Air Force effectively ceased to exist.
The Interwar Years: Aircraft Evolution

During the interwar years the Army air arm helped develop and test in astonishing technological leaps every phase of aircraft. These ranged from the relatively fragile wooden biplanes that introduced aerial bombardment to the combat of World War I, to the sturdy all-metal fighters and bombers that flew in the deadly formations of World War II.

Douglas World Cruisers.

The Boeing P-12 (shown camouflaged for war games), an early Army Air Corps fighter.

The Curtiss P-36 Hawk, which led to the wartime P-40.
A formation of Douglas B–18As, among the first monoplane bombers.

The Republic P–47 Thunderbolt, an excellent fighter-bomber.

A formation of North American P–51 Mustangs, developed in the early years of World War II.
World War II: The Air Arm Proves Its Case

TOP: The United States was plunged sooner than it expected into World War II when Imperial Japan's naval pilots proved, tragically and decisively, the effectiveness of air power over sea and ground power at Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941. The U.S. Army and Navy had to fight on two fronts, the Atlantic and Pacific, holding the line in Asia while following a "Europe First" war-waging strategy against the Nazis. The air arm went all out to meet America's need for a long-range strategic armada and spectacularly demonstrated its importance to the nation's defense.

TOP: On April 18, 1942, in a bold and imaginative joint operation, B-25 Mitchell bombers led by Lt. Col. James H. “Jimmy” Doolittle launched from the carrier Hornet and raided Tokyo, the capital and heart of the Japanese empire. The Mitchells are shown prior to take-off on the carrier’s deck.

BOTTOM: Lt. Col. Doolittle, center, with his crew of Tokyo Raiders after force-landing in China, are hosted by government officials. Doolittle’s raid electrified and cheered America and forced Japan to withdraw large numbers of aircraft to defend the home islands.
World War II: The Air Arm Proves Its Case

TOP: The Boeing B-17 Flying Fortress. A mainstay of America's heavy bomber strength, the B-17 was a further development of the XB-15. The F variant was sent into action in Europe on January 27, 1943, with the Eighth Air Force's first U.S. aerial attack of World War II against Germany's heartland over Wilhelmshaven. Grievous losses in its numbers and crews in bold daylight raids against factories at Schweinfurt, Wiener Neustadt, and Regensburg in August and January 1943 led to modifications and the G variant, the most-produced. Its "chin" turret below the nose holding two .50-inch machine guns greatly improved its defensive capabilities.

BOTTOM: The Consolidated B-24 Liberator, often referred to as the workhorse of World War II's heavy bombers. More B-24s were produced, not only for the U.S. Army Air Forces, but U.S. Navy and Allied Air Forces as well, than any other type of American aircraft. Its employment in Europe and in the Pacific, particularly in island-hopping campaigns, hastened the end of hostilities considerably.
TOP: The Boeing B-29 Superfortress. This long-range very heavy bomber was not deployed until 1944 in the Pacific. In late 1943 the Allies decided against using it in Europe, choosing instead to concentrate it in the new XX Bomber Command from bases in India and China against targets in Japan. Its fire-prone engines rendered it at first disappointing at high altitudes, but it was very successful in low-altitude incendiary raids over Tokyo in March 1945, where formations destroyed nearly one-quarter of the city in a single attack. It was specially modified to undertake atomic missions with the 393d Bombardment Squadron (VH) of the 509th Composite Group. From Tinian Island its crews trained in it and conducted simulated missions. On August 6, 1945, seven B-29s were sent on the first atomic raid: Enola Gay (which dropped its 9,700-pound bomb at 31,600 feet over Hiroshima), a reserve plane, three weather reconnaissance planes, and two observer and recording planes. Three days later Bock's Car dropped the second atomic bomb over Nagasaki.

BOTTOM: Brig. Gen. Curtis E. LeMay. LeMay, whose name is synonymous with America’s strategic air power, rose quickly through the ranks of U.S. Army Air Forces officers. Among his many war-time accomplishments were his pioneering initiatives to improve the bombing accuracy of B-17s in Europe with straight-in runs and formation patterns, and his organizing and heading of the B-29 bombardment activities of the XX Bomber Command in the China-Burma-India Theater, where he became Chief of Staff of the Strategic Air Forces in the Pacific. He directed the fire-bombing of the Japanese home islands, stripping down the B-29 to lighter weight for low-level action. His modification of the plane and its effective employment in the Tokyo raids contributed significantly to the defeat of Japan.
World War II: The Air Arm Proves Its Case

The U.S. Army Air Forces bought its right to full autonomy with the blood of its members. Because of their sacrifice, which did so much to end World War II, opposition to a separate Air Force evaporated.
Creation of the Army Air Corps

Davis; Maj. Gen. John L. Hines, Chief of Staff; Brig. Gen. Hugh A. Drum, Assistant Chief of Staff; the Secretary of Navy; Chief of Naval Operations, E. W. Eberle; and many regular service personnel. The relative preponderance of Navy officers included on this side of the question may have indicated a continued disinclination on the part of that group freely to state their individual opinions contrary to Navy Department policy, despite official assurances that they do so in any event without prejudice.

In addition to the views expressed by the witnesses examined, while preparing its report, dated 30 November 1925, the Morrow Board had the opportunity to study the work of previous similar investigating agencies. These included the hearings before, but not the report of, the Lampert Committee, which, as noted, was not released until two weeks later. Whether or not, as has been suggested, the Morrow Board was set up for the purpose of nullifying the recommendations of the other with respect to Air Service organization, it is difficult to understand how, after making studies of the same general subject, two different groups could arrive at such diametrically opposite conclusions.

On the question of a greater degree of autonomy for the air arm the Morrow Board report represented the traditional military, General Staff, War Department administrative point of view. It opposed the creation of an independent department of aeronautics on the grounds that, in accordance with hallowed American principles, military and civilian activities should remain separate. Similarly, a department of national defense, consisting either of only the Army and Navy, or one comprising those two plus a department of air, fell under the ban, largely because of the "added complexity" necessitated by such a super-organization. Besides, in order to present their special views to the President and Congress both the War and Navy Departments insisted on retaining their own cabinet members. The objection of the Morrow Board to a separate department of air coordinate with the Departments of War and Navy was based in large measure solely upon the testimony of high-ranking officers that the Army and Navy each needed its own air service which could not function efficiently unless it trained and operated as an integral part of a single command. Then, with regard to a separate independent air force, the report continued:

...We do not consider that air power, as an arm of the national defense, has demonstrated that its value—certainly not in a country situated as ours—for independent operations is of such a character as to justify the organization of a separate department. We believe that such independent missions as it is capable of can be better carried out under high command of the Army or Navy, as the case may be.

Morrow and his associates, however, recognized the fact that military aviation performed the double function of rendering auxiliary services to
other branches of the Army, and that of providing an air force capable of acting alone on separate missions. They recommended, therefore, that the name be changed from Air Service to Air Corps. The board insisted that the Air Service already maintained the same degree of independence, and was subject to the same degree of control by the Secretary of War and the General Staff, as other branches, such as the artillery, cavalry, and infantry. It recommended however, that aviation be given a special representation on the General Staff. Finally, for particular emphasis in this survey, the President’s Aircraft Board advocated the appointment of an additional Assistant Secretary of War, with duties specifically related to aviation, and suggested that it might be well to duplicate such an officer in the Departments of Navy and Commerce. 35

As between the Lampert Committee report and that of the Morrow Board the issue was squarely joined. The one, representing generally the point of view of the extreme protanogists of air power, precipitated in Congress a series of bills providing for a department of national defense. 36 The other, although symbolizing the old order, did provide the suggestion of a compromise to the War Department which could evade the issue no longer.

Probably the most significant of those bills patterned after the recommendation of the Lampert Committee to be presented at this time was that offered early in December 1925 by Representative C. F. Curry. In a manner of speaking, this proposal would reconstitute the original form of the national defense organization by abolishing the Navy Department and restoring its functions to the Department of War. The name would be changed to the Department of Defense. At the head was to be a Secretary of Defense, assisted by three undersecretaries representing respectively the coordinate branches of the Air Service. Each undersecretary should have an assistant secretary. A major contribution of this bill was a somewhat detailed plan for the internal organization of the air branch, which would be composed of four divisions: (1) Civil Aeronautics; (2) Supplies; (3) Research; and (4) an Air Force. The latter would consist of a line (i.e., corps, divisions, brigades, wings, et cetera) and a staff made up of supply, engineering, medical, and legal branches. Finally, the proposal provided that the Air Force personnel receive training which would make possible a combatant force capable of operating with either the armed land or naval forces, with the two combined, or independently. 37

Fairly early during this session of Congress also Representatives John P. Hill and W. F. James each introduced a bill proposing a department of national defense generally similar to that offered by Curry. 38 Then the so-called Air bill, which incorporated the recommendations of the Morrow Board and bore the official sanction of the War Department, was submitted by Representative John M. Morin. 39

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The initial stages of the committee hearings on these bills revealed the same line-up of opposing forces and the same arraignment of arguments for and against the proposal to emancipate the Air Service as had accompanied previous similar measures. Any form of independent status for aviation, whether as an autonomous Air Service or a coordinate branch within a department of national defense, would violate the fundamental principle of unity of command. That, in general, was the position taken by the War Department. The opposite view was upheld by such individuals as Mitchell, La Guardia, Patrick, and Landis, with the latter speaking this time for the American Legion. It is necessary at this point to clarify the view of General Patrick, however, for the Chief of Air Service was indirectly responsible for the introduction a few days later of a compromise measure which placed him officially in a somewhat different position. This will require a brief backward glance in point of time.

In a letter addressed to the Adjutant General on 19 December 1924 General Patrick had said:

I am convinced that the ultimate solution of the air defense problems of this country is a united air force; that is, the placing of all of the component air units and possibly all aeronautical development under one responsible and directing head. Until the time when such a radical reorganization can be effected, certain preliminary steps may well be taken, all with the ultimate end in view.

As one of the “preliminary steps” he recommended the creation of an Air Corps under the Secretary of War somewhat along the same lines as the Marine Corps under the Secretary of Navy. The principal changes to be elected under such a reorganization may be outlined as follows: (1) An all-inclusive budget showing definitely the entire cost of aviation activities; (2) proper control and administration of related matters by officers competent as a result of air experience to handle them; and (3) a correction of the injustices suffered by junior officers because of the operation of the existing single promotion list.

As was brought out before the Morrow Board, after something more than nine months the War Department had taken no action whatever on this suggestion of the Chief of Air Service, and then it simply directed him to make a complete exposition of his proposals “in about four working days.” Mention has been made of the fact, however, that the War Department bill subsequently introduced in Congress was patterned after the recommendation of the Morrow Board. Meanwhile, before that group General Patrick had expressed his conviction that the “ultimate ideal solution” of the problem would be a department of national defense, with the three coordinate branches—the Army, the Navy, and the Air. This he repeated in substance on 26 January 1926 when appearing before the Committee on Military
Affairs of the House of Representatives which was considering the various aviation bills then but recently introduced. At the same time he continued to advocate as a temporary expedient the creation of an Air Corps directly under the Secretary of War. Formulated at the request of the Committee, his concrete suggestions on that score joined the other air force measures in the form of a bill presented on 28 January by Representative J. M. Wainwright of New York.

Although ostensibly an attempt at compromise between Morin’s air bill and a proposal for a department of national defense, the Wainwright measure actually made but little concession to the War Department. It would set up, under the direction of an Assistant Secretary of War for Air, a “United States Air Corps” which was to draw up its own budget, control all maintenance and training activities, and take over all aerial operations from land bases. Appointed from among flying personnel by the President, the Chief of the Air Corps was to have greater powers than the existing prototype. Although a near-autonomous organization, the Air Corps at the direction of the President might provide units to serve with the Army, Navy, or Marine Corps. Personnel and organizational details were similar to those which had been suggested for the air unit in Curry’s proposal for a department of national defense.

Naturally, both the War and Navy Departments opposed the Wainwright measure. In fact, the expressions of disapproval on the part of Army and Navy officers were so consistent and vehement as to raise again the question of freedom of speech on the part of service personnel before investigating bodies. Even though it hastily assumed the proper stand in that connection, at the same time the War Department, as was reliably reported, conducted an investigation into the alleged propaganda activities designed to affect favorably legislation relating to the Air Service. Then, as though to counteract the proposal of the Chief of Air Service and that of Representative James (which, incidentally, had followed the Wainwright bill in the legislative mill), it came out on 11 February with another measure which in reality was a revision of the Morin air bill.

A quick summary at this point should clarify the major issues under review. Through the medium of various bills which were introduced during the first two months of the first session of the sixty-ninth Congress (that is, from 7 December 1925 through 11 February 1926), the Committee on Military Affairs of the lower house of the national legislature was called upon to consider three distinct proposals relating to military aviation: 1) A department of national defense, providing for an air force on a coordinate basis with those on land and sea; (2) a department of air which would set up a third defense agency in this country; and (3) an Air Corps in the Army somewhat analogous to the Marine Corps in the Navy. In addition, there were bills designed to effectuate the recommendations of the President’s
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Aircraft Board, the Lassiter Board, and other such agencies. The committee rejected all of them as such. The details of its actions do not concern us here, with one major exception. The proposal for a single department of national defense was rejected by a narrow vote of eleven to ten, at a time when the House likely would have followed the committee in taking affirmative action.48

After having made a study of the principles underlying all the pertinent proposals which had been made, the House Committee on Military Affairs on 29 March came out with a plan of its own. This was the Air Corps bill, a compromise measure in which was incorporated "as many as possible of the desirable features suggested," consistent with what a majority of the committee felt would be for the best interests of national defense as a whole.49 Debated, amended, and then approved in the House, the proposal moved across the Capitol to the Senate where it went through the same process. The debates, long and acrimonious at times, produced no new arguments worthy of notice here, either on the part of those who wanted an independent air arm or those who preferred to keep it subjected wholly to the War Department. Eventually the matter was brought before a conference committee for the purpose of ironing out the differences between the versions passed by the two houses.50 Finally the bill became a law on 2 July 1926.

Based fundamentally upon the recommendations made by the Morrow Board, the Air Corps Act of 1926 changed the name Air Service to Air Corps, thereby emphasizing as the major role of that branch the maintenance of an air force possessing great potential striking ability, rather than the performance of auxiliary services to the other branches of the Army. The regular strength of the new organization remained as had been established by the Army Reorganization Act of 1920: that is, 1,514 officers in grades from colonel to second lieutenant inclusive, and 16,000 enlisted men. In the new set-up the administrative staff consisted of an additional Assistant Secretary of War slated to perform such duties related to aviation as might be assigned to him by his superior; a Chief of Air Corps with the rank of major general; and three brigadier generals as assistants. Also, each of the War Department General Staff divisions was to include an air section headed by an Air Corps officer. That particular arrangement, however, was to prevail for a period of only three years, at the end of which time, as was anticipated, there would be a sufficient number of eligible Air Corps officers as to render unnecessary such a positive arbitrary provision. Significant, too, is the fact that the Chief of Air Corps, at least two of his assistants, and no less than 90 per centum of the officers in each grade below that of brigadier general were to be flying officers. All flying units, moreover, were to be commanded by such rated personnel. Additional pay of officers and men engaged regularly and frequently in aerial flights was to
be continued. The law directed that the Secretary of War make a study of the alleged injustices done Air Service officers by the single promotion list of the Army, and later report to Congress thereupon. And, lastly, it authorized a five-year program of expansion in Air Corps personnel and equipment.51

This brief resume of the Air Corps Act of 1926 shows clearly that in the final analysis the War Department had won another victory. The nearest approach to administrative freedom for the air arm as provided in the law was the addition of an Assistant Secretary of War to aid in fostering military aeronautics, with the possible implication that he would have complete direction of the new corps. In due time the position was filled ably by the appointment of F. Trubee Davison. Yet, since his duties were not specifically outlined, Secretary Davison's powers were limited to those which his superior might be willing to delegate to him. The budget, moreover, was to be controlled wholly from the office of the Secretary of War.

Naturally, despite certain advantages which had been gained, the act in question did not satisfy those who desired autonomy for the air arm, either in the form of a separate executive department or that of a branch in a department of national defense coordinate with those of land and sea forces. For instance, Representative La Guardia is reported to have said that he would never quit fighting for a single department of national defense with the three services, air, land, and water, on equal bases.52 Agreeing at the time that the Air Corps Act would be "a long step in the right direction," General Patrick some two years later wrote that although conditions were better than ever before, he did not feel that the final solution of the "vexing question as to the best organization for our air forces" had been reached. That, he still believed, should take the form of a "Department of National Defense, with a Cabinet Minister at its head and under him the three military branches, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, each with an Assistant Secretary in charge." Such an organization would make for both economy and efficiency.53

Writing two years later still, but long before any further fundamental reorganization of the Air Corps had been effected, the intrepid "Billy" Mitchell, now a private citizen, asserted that in all other leading countries "air, land and water are under independent ministries," organized under either a department of national defense or a committee. This made possible a degree of coordination in which each branch of service had its own voice in formulating plans and programs. In the United States, however, "there is an indescribable mess about defense arrangements." Since there was no air commander and no similarity of instruction between the air services of the Army, Navy, Marines, or Coast Guard, he added, nobody knew who had charge of anything.54
Chapter 6

The Establishment of the General Headquarters Air Force

As the result of a general insufficiency of appropriations the five-year program of expansion for the Air Corps, as provided in the act of 2 July 1926, initially was delayed and subsequently subjected to continuous interference and postponement. During this period, however, as well as for the next several years, the Air Corps made substantial progress. Climaxing a series of related developments, moreover, the establishment of the General Headquarters (GHQ) Air Force on 1 March 1935 marked a definite step towards the creation of an autonomous air arm within the United States Army. A survey of these events logically forms a specific unit in the history of the struggle on behalf of an independent status for military aeronautics.

During the nine-year period between 1926 and 1935 the struggle for what ardent military aviation enthusiasts regarded as a more efficient organization of the air arm logically divides itself into two distinct phases. Prior to 1933 there was a continued strong effort to secure a unit which would be separate from the War Department. This was characterized by specific proposals alternating between suggestions for a separate organization for aeronautics and plans for a department of national defense with air occupying a position coordinate with those held by the Army and Navy. As will appear, however, in the last two years a majority of the Air Corps officers seemed reconciled to the idea that for the time being at least their attempt to gain complete separation from the Army was a hopeless proposition. Shifting their emphasis, therefore, they made more determined efforts to secure an air tactical organization, such as later was provided in the GHQ Air Force, and pressed demands for a separate promotion list, a separate budget, and an air staff.

Events connected with the two distinct phases of the period will be taken up appropriately. First, however, the reader's attention is directed to certain general developments in aviation history which, though somewhat removed from the central theme of this study, do have an important bearing
upon most any aspect of the subject. Then, certain related matters touching on the history of the Air Corps require brief mention.

In the years immediately following the adoption of the Air Corps Act remarkable progress was made in all phases of aeronautics. Both military personnel and private fliers chalked up outstanding record-breaking flights. Long range endurance tests and refueling experiments were conducted, while the practicability of instrument flying was successfully demonstrated. These achievements plus the personality appeal of outstanding airmen aroused to unprecedented heights public interest in aviation, stimulated technological developments in aeronautics, and brought about the organization of numerous aircraft companies which turned out planes with progressively increased cruising speeds and load capacities. As regards commercial aviation, definite progress was made in airline transportation with the gradual emergence of a veritable network of transcontinental airways across the United States. Concurrent developments in radio and in weather reporting helped to increase the safety of flying and thus to build up public confidence in aviation.

Meanwhile the Air Force idea, involving the suggestion of observation, bombardment, and pursuit units, which was planted by General Patrick and the Lassiter Board as early as 1923, had begun to bear fruit in the form of a development of the concept of military air power as a striking force. As pointed out in the previous chapter, the jurisdictional conflict between the Army and Navy and the internal struggle within the War Department itself had prevented the early consummation of the relevant recommendations; yet the idea persisted. Used more and more by military men, the expression “command of the air” came to mean an ability to strike effectively at the enemy’s bases of operations and supply, as well as to maintain superiority in reconnaissance and combat. To members of the Air Corps especially this concept of air power, enhanced as it was by the gradual evolution of the heavy bomber capable of making long range attacks upon enemy installations, naturally seemed somewhat incongruous with the status of an air arm organized as a mere auxiliary of the Army. Now more than ever regular airmen envisioned phases of modern warfare in which infantry movements would be supported by advanced fleets of bombers operating under the jurisdiction of an organization either wholly independent of or coordinate with the existing War Department. In the Air Corps Training Center, moreover, flying cadets received instruction in the concept of offensive air power; while those who long had fought for a separate air force never lost sight of their ultimate objective.

The feeling of discontent and unrest among members of the Air Corps was enlarged by the failure to maintain the five-year program. A few figures will indicate the extent of this deficiency. As eventually set up the plan (delayed one year at the beginning) provided that by 30 June 1932 the air
arm should have 1,800 serviceable airplanes with an actual allotment of 1,650 officers and 15,000 enlisted men. This was calibrated so that at the end of the first year there should have been 1,186 planes, 1,100 officers, and 9,590 enlisted personnel. At that time, however, the Air Corps was short 247 planes (although the greater part of that number was on order), 86 officers, and 76 men below officer rank. Comparable shortages were revealed for each of the succeeding years, until at the end of the five-year program on 30 June 1932 they stood as follows: serviceable planes 129, officers 396, and enlisted personnel 1,600 (an approximation).3

Dissatisfaction over the lagging five-year program was heightened by the fact that the appurtenant Air Corps appropriations were scaled down in the Office of the Secretary of War and the Bureau of the Budget, rather than in Congress.4 This naturally increased the demand on the part of the Air Corps for a separate budget. At all times during the period immediately under review, likewise, the single promotion list for the whole Army continued to be a source of grievance to the personnel of the military air arm. Disregarding the normal World War I "hump," which tended to affect all branches of service, the basic explanation is quite simple. Because of the extensive training which was required during that earlier emergency, Air Service trainees were delayed several months in receiving their commissions. Having thus been placed lower on the promotion list, Air Corps officers, generally speaking, remained junior to those of other arms who perhaps had entered service at the same time, or even later. The situation was enhanced by virtue of the fact that subsequently some of the ground officers had transferred to the Air Corps. Since the performance of duties connected with this arm was more hazardous, on a proportional basis the vacancies were more numerous in this arm than in the others. Yet the promotions among the lower grades resulting therefrom were spread among all the branches of service. Stated succinctly, the net result was that many Air Corps officers were performing duties all out of proportion to their rank. This naturally lowered the morale of the airmen and caused the resignation of many officers whose services the Army could ill afford to lose. In accordance with the Air Corps Act of 1926, the War Department early set up a board of officers for the purpose of making a thorough investigation of the whole matter and reporting thereon. Although accomplished, this produced no conclusive action. Congress, which also wrestled with the thorny problem, fared no better. The Furlow bill providing a separate promotion list for the Air Corps met with the approval of the House of Representatives, but bogged down in the Senate, which later offered its own solution to the question. In the end, however, no legislation was enacted.5

During the period from July 1926 to March 1935, Congress actually devoted but little time to consideration of legislation bearing directly upon the organizational status of the Air Corps as a part of the armed forces of
The United States. True enough, a large number of such bills found their way into the legislative hopper. The majority proposed a separate department of air. Others recommended a department of national defense. Some of them would provide within this superstructure coordinate divisions for Air, War, and Navy. The remainder simply would consolidate therein the existing departments of War and Navy, and thus affect the Air Corps only indirectly. None of these bills as such ever reached the floor of either house of Congress; while but two were studied at length by any congressional committee. Only the latter requires further consideration here.

The two bills in question related to a department of national defense. The relative emphasis placed on that form of organization at the time, coinciding as it did with the early stages of the economic depression which began in 1929, indicated a shift in the basic argument of those who wished to create a separate branch for aviation. Inasmuch as any reasonable proposal which gave promise of reducing government expenditures appealed to both Congress and the general public the question of adequate defense was subordinated to economic considerations; for undoubtedly there were grounds for argument that it would be less expensive to operate two or more units as coordinate divisions in one department than to maintain them as individual organizations.

The two aforementioned bills providing for departments of national defense were introduced on 8 December 1931 and 5 January 1932, respectively, by Congressman William Williamson and Representative Joseph W. Byrns. Instead of being referred to the Committee on Military Affairs, which previously had proved to be the “grave-yard” of so many similar proposals, they were routed to the recently organized Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments. Therein hearings commenced on 21 January following. A perusal of the printed record of these proceedings, which were conducted at intervals over a period of four weeks, indicates that the only real proponents of the measure were their sponsors and Representative John J. McSwain. Their most vociferous opponent was Congressman Charles H. Martin, a retired Army officer who was at one time an Assistant Chief of Staff. It was his expressed opinion that if Congress allowed greater freedom to “those air birds,” whom he characterized as the “most extravagant, undisciplined, expensive people on earth,” it would have to organize “something like the Bureau of the Budget to take care of the appropriation to keep them going.” He urged the committee not to turn the Air Corps officers loose on a “long-suffering public” and insisted that to combine their air services would do incautious harm so the Army and Navy.

The leading military witness at the hearings was General Foulois who but recently had succeeded Maj. Gen. J. E. Fechet as Chief of the Air Corps. While refuting the charge of extravagance and inefficiency in his organiza-
General Foulois very properly took Congressman Martin to task for his exaggerated statements, but was unwilling to sanction the proposed legislation under consideration. In lieu of the immediate creation of a department of national defense, for which he did not think existing conditions were propitious, the Chief of Air Corps would take an intermediate step by setting up an organization which might best be identified under the designation of a separate department of aeronautics. Both Secretary of Navy Charles Francis Adams and Secretary of War Patrick J. Hurley opposed the bills, but in so doing, one may add, they contributed nothing new to the traditional arguments on that score.

Although not appearing as a witness, General Douglas MacArthur, Chief of Staff, wrote a member of the committee while the hearings were in progress that no measure proposed in recent years seemed to be fraught with "such potential possibilities of disaster for the United States" as a project for amalgamating the War and Navy Departments into one bureau of government. This was particularly true in view of the existing international situation, he said, for the prospect of victory on the part of the United States would be endangered by the consummation of such a proposal. Do that, the Chief of Staff concluded, "and every potential enemy of the United States will rejoice." A few months later General MacArthur devoted a considerable portion of his annual report to a denunciation of the plan to organize a department of national defense, with subdivisions for Air, Army, and Navy, primarily on the ground that what minor economies (if any) might result would be more than offset by decreased efficiency on the part of the armed forces of the United States. In summarizing one section of this discussion, he said:

...Governmentally, we have today, from the standpoint of national strategy and policy, the strongest possible organization for war. It seems almost incomprehensible that this organization, which incidentally has been the envy of soldiers, sailors, and statesmen abroad, should be tampered with in its major elements in favor of a highly speculative experiment.

Neither the Byrns bill nor that which had been offered by Congressman Williamson made its way back to the floor of the House of Representatives. Sometime later, however, the former was incorporated bodily in a separate measure. Indicated as Title 6 of the Economy Bill for 1932, it came up for debate on the floor of the House the latter part of April. As on the previous occasion, Representative Martin denounced the proposal in the most extreme terms. Its strongest advocates were Congressmen La Guardia and Byron B. Harlon who stressed the economy features, which, as estimated, would effect an annual saving of from $50,000,000 to $100,000,000. After a rather stormy session, Title 6 of the Economy Bill
was eliminated completely by a vote of 163 to 135. Bringing to a close the first regular Congressional debate on the question of a department of national defense, this represented the only collective action taken prior to 1945 by either house of Congress on this succession of legislative proposals. Within the next two years other comparable bills were brought up. They received but relatively little Congressional attention, however, for by this time the majority of the Air Corps enthusiasts definitely had shifted their interest towards the attainment (temporarily, at least) of the more limited objectives which have been mentioned—an air tactical organization; a separate promotion list; a separate budget; and an air staff.

Prospects for the accomplishment of these aims were enhanced materially by a series of seemingly unrelated events which should be introduced at this point. Reference is made to the election of Franklin D. Roosevelt as President of the United States; the reorganization of the Army, together with the development of proposed defense plans; and, finally, the air mail controversy which came to a climax in the winter of 1933–1934. These developments will be discussed as appropriate in the order mentioned.

As a pioneer in the beginning of naval air strength while Assistant Secretary of the Navy during the Wilson administrations, President Roosevelt early had developed an interest in flying which eventually made him an aviation enthusiast. In 1933 he became not only the first flying Chief Executive, but also the first occupant of the White House to exhibit a cogent interest in the possibilities of a striking air force. This naturally encouraged the advocates of a strong Air Corps, not to say the aviation industry in general, as may be illustrated by the following excerpts from an “open letter” which appeared currently in a well-known aeronautical journal:

The aviation industry is proud, Mr. President in the knowledge that in you America has achieved its first flying Chief Executive. In the industry’s struggle of recent years not the least formidable of the obstacles in the path to progress was the necessity of dealing... with a great many people who had never flown, who did not intend to fly, and who therefore were completely lacking in all of that first-hand knowledge which is so essential to an honest understanding of aviation. The handicap of proving the cause of flying to a non-flier long has been recognized by everyone in the industry as the almost impossible task. In the knowledge that they are dealing with an airplane owner and airplane user...the men in aviation have cause for special confidence....

In the months immediately following Roosevelt’s inauguration one of the frequent visitors at the White House was William Mitchell, who was quoted as saying on 1 September 1933 that the administration planned to survey “the entire aviation situation of the United States this next winter.” As the months passed, however, he seemed to become somewhat
impatient at the slow progress which was being made in the interest of military aeronautics. Yet there is no doubt that over a period of time the President's influence was of inestimable value to aviation in general; and, as we shall note, during his first administration he was responsible for the creation of two major commissions which made a study of the nation's air problem.

As a part of a general preparedness program, generally comparable to that which engaged the attention of various democracies in view of the rising tide of fascist militarism, long before the election of Franklin D. Roosevelt, the Army had launched a plan of reorganization. In this country the General Staff consolidated into four field armies the tactical units hitherto under the jurisdiction of the nine corps areas. The motivation for the creation of this "four-Army plan," as stated, was a desire to weld the existing military units into "an integrated machine capable of instantaneous response" to the orders of the Commander-in-Chief. Subsequently, elaborate secret defense plans were drawn up; and on 3 June 1933 the Air Corps was called upon to indicate how the air arm might best participate in the proposed program. Compliance with these instructions from the War Department was made over the signature of Brig. Gen. Oscar Westover, Acting Chief of Air Corps, following several weeks of intensive study. Renouncing the idea that all air force activities must tie in with ground operations and stressing the initial air defense of the coast to a distance of 200 to 300 miles off-shore, Westover's plan proposed as a means of protection for seven designated areas a detail of planes which, controlled by a General Headquarters Air Force and coordinated with a radio communication and alarm system along the shore, would operate as a coastal defense unit. Meanwhile the striking arm of the Air Force, consisting of either bombardment, attack, or pursuit planes (or in a combination of two or all three of these types, as the occasion might warrant) would be held in abeyance for use as needed. This suggested grouping of the Air Force units was not intended as a permanent distribution: but rather was offered as a temporary disposition pending the location of the main enemy threat, after which it would be rearranged accordingly.

At the instance of the Secretary of War, the Westover plan was reviewed by a typical General Staff board, headed by the Deputy Chief of Staff, General Drum. With the exception of the Chief of Air Corps, the Drum Board, as it was called, consisted altogether of ground officers. Declaring that the Air Corps report was based upon a considerable misunderstanding of the problem," this group decided to formulate and present in lieu thereof some recommendations of its own. On the whole the Drum Board report, which came out in October 1933, minimized the importance of air power, although it stressed the necessity of bases in all land operations. What is more important, moreover, the board recommended a
"General Headquarters Air Force" to be used as a strategic force for long range reconnaissance, for the restriction of comparable movements on the part of a foe, and for the demolition of major installations within enemy territory. From the tactical point of view it would be brought into play as a support for ground forces before, during, and after battle. Naturally this approval of the GHQ Air Force idea served as a stimulus to further Air Corps plans for that type of organization. Yet the Drum Board, though estimating that anything less than a force of 2,320 serviceable planes would be insufficient to meet all "reasonably possible requirements," limited its recommendation in that respect to the relatively small number of 1,800 such planes, on the grounds that it could not urge an increase in Air Corps materiel at the expense of the other arms and services. Likewise, it refused to recommend additional Air Corps personnel at the time, but did suggest that appropriate estimates be kept on hand in case possible national defense requirements indicated an increase in numbers.

Before any final action had been taken with respect to the creation of the GHQ Air Force public attention was focused in a large degree upon the military air arm and its problems as a result of the air mail controversy. A brief statement of that issue will suffice here. Prolonged criticism directed against the method of awarding contracts to private companies for carrying air mail was followed by several special investigations. Convinced thereby that they had been drawn up not only in violation of law but also as a result of collusion and fraud, the Postmaster General promptly annulled the existing agreements. In order to forestall a complete cessation of this service President Roosevelt ordered the Air Corps to transport the air mail over vital routes during the emergency. Something approaching a complete debacle followed. Without proper equipment, adequate ground organization, or experience in handling scheduled transport service, and plagued by extremely bad flying weather, the Air Corps faced an almost impossible situation. Numerous accidents within a period of three weeks resulted in a loss of ten lives. Needless to state, the air arm was subjected to a tremendous barrage of criticism, emanating in large part from Republican critics of the administration and from individuals who formerly had held fat air mail contracts.

Had it not been for the tragic loss of life involved one might be inclined to say that the air mail episode proved to be a blessing in disguise for the Air Corps. Indirectly, at least, it influenced the creation of two more special investigating bodies, which though discounting the idea of a separate department of the air or even a separate air force, did bring into sharper focus the inadequacies of aviation in general and sanctioned some of the more limited objectives of the Air Corps. Appointed on 17 April 1934, the first of these was the War Department Special Committee on the Army Air Corps, commonly known as the Baker Board in recognition of its chairman,
the former Secretary of War Newton D. Baker. The full complement all told consisted of six civilians and six Army officers. Among the latter were General Drum and General Foulois. As on previous similar War Department commissions, among the military personnel the nonfliers far outnumbered the aviators.25

Stated summarily, the Baker Board was convened for the purpose of making a "constructive study and report" upon the operations of the Air Corps as an agency of national defense in peace and war, together with an analysis of its proper relation to civil aviation. Piling up well over 4,000 pages, it spent 25 days taking testimony from 105 witnesses (representing the "best available civilian, naval, and military thought on aviation") who supported their ideas with a total of 250 primary documents. These, along with written statements presenting solicited views from over 500 different Air Corps officers, were filed as exhibits to the record.26

Although it may not have been "the best study ever made of our Army Air Corps," as characterized later by Secretary of War George H. Dern, the Baker Board Report which was dated 18 July 1934 on several counts proved to be a very significant document. Delving briefly into the history of national defense since World War I, it stated that the most important consideration under review was the advisability of creating a department of air or a department of national defense; and it listed fourteen bodies as having made special studies of the question. Seven of them, as pointed out, had concluded that aerial activity could not be carried on independently; and it added that only one, the Lampert Committee, had recommended separation through the organization of a department of national defense. Strangely enough, however, the Baker Board failed even to mention the American Aviation Mission which unequivocally had argued the creation of a department of air.27

The board held that to concentrate the control of all aviation matters in the hands of one executive department would "violate our traditional policy" of maintaining as separate functions civil and military agencies. A consolidation of all defense aviation either in a separate executive department or as a coordinating unit in a department of national defense, identified as a purely European arrangement, was regarded as entailing a "financial burden...far greater" than under the existing system.28 In addition, the matter of efficiency should be taken into consideration. Admitting that aviation had enhanced the power of defense where the belligerent powers were geographically contiguous to one another, and the power of defense if they were widely separated, Baker and his associates stressed, however, what they deemed to be vital limitations of military aviation: The necessity of either land or floating bases; the inability alone to capture and hold enemy positions; problems of supply, including replacement of aircraft; contingency upon weather conditions for practicable operations; the necessity for
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protection by other forces except when actually in the air; and the limited load capacity of airplanes. Continuing in this general vein, they declared that the

“air invasion of the United States” and the “air defense of the United States” are conceptions of those who failed adequately to consider the effect of ocean barriers and other limitations. Aircraft in sufficient numbers to threaten serious damage can be brought against us only in conjunction with sea forces or with land forces which must be met by forces identical in nature and equally capable of prolonged effort.

The Baker Board insisted that a separation of the air arm from the Army would violate the principle of unity of command, which it held as indispensable in the successful prosecution of war. The military adviser to both the Commander-in-Chief and the Secretary of War was the Chief of Staff. Application of the “principle of unity of command and control...applies to and must rest in” his hands. As advisers he had the General Staff; the chiefs of various arms and services; the Army corps area, and overseas commanders. To organize the Air Corps into a body independent of this established control and cooperation would lead to “failure resulting from lack of common objectives, confusion and cross purposes.” The board admitted, however, that it might be well to increase the number of Air Corps officers on the General Staff and suggested that such action be taken without delay.

The Baker Board was inclined to blame the office of the Assistant Secretary of War for Air (which, incidentally, had been left vacant following the inauguration of Roosevelt in 1933) for the emphasis placed upon the proposal to make the Air Corps an independent branch in the War Department, responsible solely to its head, and thus exempt from the supervision of the General Staff. Coupled therewith, according to the report, were the demands on the part of the Air Corps for a separate promotion list, an individual budget, and direct command of all combat units. This apparent unanimity of opinion of the air officers who had urged these limited objectives, it continued, likely was “influenced by action of those formerly advocating complete separation of the Air Corps from the Army but who had become convinced that such action could not be consummated.” Finally, an inimical attitude towards this group was indicated in the comment that the manner in which the written opinions submitted to the Board “were gathered tends to weaken greatly the effect of the testimony.”

Although it denied most of their claims for aerial warfare, the Baker Board did make an important concession to the airmen. Expressing general accord with the Drum Board as related to the conception of tactical employment, it recommended the creation of a General Headquarters Air Force, made up of all air combat units and auxiliaries thereto, which would be
trained as a homogeneous unit capable of operating either in close cooperation with the ground forces or independent thereof. Responsible to the General Staff, the GHQ commander, preferably a leader with adequate flying experience, should have jurisdiction over such matters relating to his component as organization, the maintenance and operation of technical equipment, unit training, and maneuvers. No change was recommended for the position of the Air Corps as a branch of the Army. According to the suggestion of the Baker Board, however, its combat force would be separated from the supply and formal training functions. The latter, as suggested, would remain with the Chief of Air Corps, operating under normal War Department coordination and direction.31

A study of the hearings and report concerned indicates several probable reasons why the Baker Board recommended the GHQ Air Force. In the first place, it appears that this proposed reorganization was intended to weaken, not to say silence altogether, the clamor for a separate air force. Secondly, there was a hope that it would head off a possible recommendation by the Federal Aviation Commission—to be discussed presently—for a separation of the air arm from the rest of the Army. Finally, it was designed to strengthen the grip of the General Staff on the Air Corps. The action has been viewed also as a rebuff to the Chief of the Air Corps, who was regarded as favoring a separate Army and Navy air force. General Foulois, however, signed the report with no apparent reservations, as did all the members of the Board with one exception. The lone dissenter in that respect was at the time a civilian, James H. Doolittle, whose brief "minority report" is worth noting in some detail here. After expressing a firm belief in aviation and its future, he said:

...I am convinced that the required air force [that necessary for national security] can be more rapidly organized, equipped and trained if it is completely separated from the Army and developed as an entirely separate arm. If complete separation is not the desire of the committee, I recommend an air force as a part of the Army but with a separate budget, a separate promotion list and removed from the control of the General Staff. These are my sincere convictions. Failing either, I feel that the Air Corps should be developed and expanded under the direction of the General Staff as recommended above.35

The second major investigating body to concern itself with aviation problems during the period immediately under review was the Federal Aviation Commission, which was created in accordance with the Air Mail Act of 12 June 1934 for the purpose of making an appropriate survey and then submitting to Congress, not later than 1 February 1935, its report in the form of a recommendation for a "broad policy covering all phases of aviation and the relations of the United States thereto." With Clark Howell,
editor of the *Atlanta Constitution*, as chairman. This group, consisting exclusively of civilians, was appointed shortly before the report of the Baker Board was released. Having made rather exhaustive preliminary preparations, the Howell group late in September commenced a series of hearings which eventually involved nearly 200 witnesses, including cabinet members, congressmen, personnel from those branches of the government service actively interested in aviation, representatives of the aeronautics industry, and members of aviation societies. It also studied the records and reports of the many previous similar investigating agencies, from the Crowell Mission of 1919 on down through the Baker Board, and, in fact, held personal consultations with several members of the last mentioned group.

There is ample evidence to support the conviction that the Howell Commission muted an excellent opportunity to do something for military aeronautics. Its membership was free from dominance by the General Staff. The information gathered was rather extensive. Public opinion in general, moreover, certainly was not averse to a separate air force. Had their study been completed prior to the publication of the Baker Board report and before the plans to establish the GHQ Air Force had been formulated, it is altogether probable that Howell and his associates would have recommended an autonomous air organization. As it was, their report, dated 22 January 1935, stated that the commission preferred to “refrain from comment” until the experiment in the form of a GHQ Air Force had been allowed opportunity for adequate trial. It noted, however, that there was good reason to believe that aircraft had passed “beyond their former position” solely as useful auxiliaries; and that thenceforth they should be utilized as important means of exerting directly the “will of the Commander-in-Chief.” In that connection, the report continued:

> We have no doubt that there will be a progressively greater measure of independent action of aircraft in military operation as the capacities of aircraft increase. We interpret the present proposals as a step towards provision for such increased independence...Further steps may in due course become necessary. If the degree of independence provided under the present plan is so used as to lead to the development of an effective strategy of air force employment...the desirability of further organizational changes may in due course become apparent.

Apparently the Howell Commission gave no consideration to the oft-repeated proposal of a separate department of aeronautics. At the same time, though generally counselling against a unified department of national defense, it noted that the existing degree of mutual understanding between the Army and Navy was less than might be desired. This difficulty, the report held, was not the result of any peculiar defects in the division of functions between the two services. In countries where there were three of
them, with an independent air force providing the third, it continued, "opportunities for conflict of opinion about who is to do what and how seem to be no less marked than under our own two-service arrangement." Holding that the whole matter lay beyond the scope of its investigation, the Howell group made no pertinent recommendation in that respect other than that the question be made the subject of extended examination by some appropriate agency in the near future.  

Meanwhile, acting in general accord with the suggestions of the Drum Board and the recommendations of its Special Committee on the Army Air Corps, the War Department was fast completing plans for the organization of the new tactical unit. As announced in a letter issued by the Adjutant General on the last day of the year 1934, the GHQ Air Force was scheduled for activation as of 1 March 1935. Air combat units then scattered through the corps areas were to be consolidated into one force which, with respect to tactical instruction, training, and employment, would be under the control of a commanding general subject only to the General Staff (and theater commanders in time of war). Corps area commanders would retain administrative jurisdiction, including courts-martial, in time of peace over bases where such tactical units were stationed. Supply and training functions, as indicated, would remain under the control of the Chief of Air Corps. Headquarters of the GHQ Air Force was to be located at Langley Field, Virginia, while those of the subordinate wings would be set up at Langley Field; Barksdale Field, Louisiana; and March Field, California.  

At the appointed time the new organization came into being, under the command of Brig. Gen. Frank M. Andrews, a member of the General Staff, and one-time Chief of the Training and Operations Division, Office of the Chief of Air Corps. An expedient and a compromise at best, the GHQ Air Force left the military air arm with a number of problems which would not have survived the creation of a separate air force. In the first place, its commanding officer was still subordinate to the high command of the Army. Neither a separate budget nor a separate promotion list had been obtained. The fact that the corps area commanders retained administrative control, including courtsmartial jurisdiction, in their respective districts restricted the authority to be wielded over his own personnel by the Commanding General of the GHQ Air Force. Lastly, the division of authority between that officer, who had jurisdiction over the purely combat element, and the Chief of Air Corps, who controlled matters of supply and training, provided a basis for future discord.  

It would be too much to say that anyone connected with the Air Corps was wholly pleased with the establishment of the GHQ Air Force. Few of them, however, likely took such a dim view of the situation as that held by William Mitchell. Testifying before the Federal Aviation Commission on 24 November 1934, the former brigadier general referred to the proposed orga-
nization as "nothing but a subterfuge" which "merely divides aviation into more parts" than it already had. Probably the majority of the airmen at this time agreed on the whole with the opinion attributed meanwhile to Col. Henry H. Arnold. Although concurring generally with General Mitchell on the desirability of an independent air force, the future Commanding General of the Army Air Forces expressed himself as believing that under the new arrangement soon to be set up conditions would change to meet most of the objectives theretofore espoused by himself and others who felt like him. The proper thing to do, therefore, was to give the GHQ Air Force a trial for at least two years before insisting upon a complete separation of the air arm from the rest of the Army. Six years later he took occasion to state that in the light of intervening developments the creation of the GHQ Air Force had proved to be a wise and forward-looking step. Soon after that air component first was organized General Foulois expressed the same general opinion, adding, in substance, that up until that time it was the best thing that had been done to build up a proper air defense of the United States; but evidently he too hoped for a more fundamental change in the future.

The attitude of Colonel Arnold, General Foulois, and other Air Corps officers who at this early date apparently were reconciled to the existence of the GHQ Air Force as a stepping stone to their ultimate objective, occupied a sort of intermediate position between the stand taken by the extremists who still insisted upon the immediate creation of a separate air force on the one hand and that of the Army General Staff on the other. In his succeeding annual report the Chief of Staff deplored the fact that for so many years the matter of the higher organization of the Air Corps had been the subject of continuous spirited contention and debate which, he said, had produced a lack of continuity and stability in policy, impeded progress, and created dissensions where perfect harmony should have prevailed. General MacArthur felt, however, that an excellent solution had been reached in the creation of the General Headquarters Air Force. This arrangement, he stated categorically, under existing circumstances was "ideally suited to the country's needs"; and, so far as organization was concerned, it was fully capable of "performing every mission that could be carried out by an Air Force organized separately from the Army." Besides, without the necessity of having to set up a complete supply and maintenance system, and being the recipient of many essential services which otherwise it must provide for itself, the GHQ organization was more economical than an independent air force would be.

The Chief of Staff expressed the hope that in order to insure a continuity in policy for a reasonable period the authorities concerned would refuse to consider for at least five years any suggested change in the status quo of the General Headquarters Air Force. With that understanding there
would be no occasion for the introduction of what the Chief of Staff regarded as "false or irritating issues that not only impede progress but for the moment at least are inconsequential." Yet General MacArthur made a definite concession to the future by adding that if after the five-year period had elapsed existing conditions indicated the wisdom of analyzing once again such matters as basic organization and control, a thorough consideration of appropriate proposals would be altogether in order. As events were to prove, however, fundamental changes in the organic structure of the military air arm were made earlier than was deemed best by the Chief of Staff in 1935.
Chapter 7

The Air Corps and the GHQ Air Force, 1935–1941

As was brought out in the preceding chapter, over and above the fact that it failed to provide a separate organization for military aeronautics, with the establishment of the General Headquarters Air Force on 1 March 1935 the War Department set up the basic conditions for two major problems which served to plague the Air Corps at intervals over a period of more than six years. Reference is made, first, to the arrangement whereby the corps area commanders retained administrative control, including courts-martial jurisdiction, in their respective districts. Restricting the authority exercised over his own personnel by the Commanding General of the GHQ Air Force, of course, had a direct bearing upon the degree of autonomy wielded by the military air arm. Then there was the division of responsibility between the component comprising the purely combat element and the Office of Chief of Air Corps which controlled matters of supply and training. As events were to prove, this factor was a veritable source of discord within the Air Corps itself. Discussions relative to these two problems will be taken up next. Then follows a brief survey of the movement for an independent air arm as it developed in the period from 1935 to 1941.

One of the most poignant current comments upon the unsatisfactory relations between the Air Corps stations and the respective corps area commanders was that made by Lt. Col. Ralph Royce, Commanding Officer at Selfridge Field, Michigan, on 25 November 1935. Writing the Commanding General of the Sixth Corps Area, Colonel Royce pointed out that he was responsible to four different commanders: The Chief of Air Corps for personnel and technical inspection; the Chief of the Materiel Division on matters relating to maintenance; the Commanding General of the GHQ Air Force with respect to technical training and development of group and service squadrons; and, finally, the corps area commanders for questions relating to court-martial and the non-Air Corps troops at the station. Insisting
that it was difficult even under the most favorable circumstances for the station commander to carry on his work without sometimes unintentionally displeasing one of his four superiors, Royce favored a reorganization which would bring the air arm under a unified command. Whether it be placed under the Chief of Air Corps or the Commanding General, GHQ Air Force, was relatively immaterial. Unity was the important consideration. Six weeks later the Browning Board which had been appointed to study matters relating to Air Corps personnel digressed slightly in its report to comment upon corps area problems. Although discovering no intentional interference by any corps area commander with air force operations, it had noted some minor misunderstandings. There was little or no reason for the existing means of control, the report stated in substance, since the corps area commanders apparently could give the air force no help other than that which they rendered "exempted" stations. Inasmuch as the arrangement imposed a dual responsibility on station commanders as well as divided control over them, moreover, the board believed that the proper solution would be to place all air force stations with all their personnel and units "solely under the Air Force chain of command."

While the report of the Browning Board was under consideration the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, came out in opposition to an exempted status for the Air Corps stations. Holding that the confusion under the current arrangement was more apparent than real, he suggested that the air force combat units be placed under the field force army commanders. Meanwhile, however, General Frank M. Andrews, the Commanding General of the GHQ Air Force, had expressed himself as favoring the complete exemption of the Air Corps stations from corps area control. Eventually the Deputy Chief of Staff supported the Browning Board and General Andrews in their recommendations; and on 8 May 1936, with the exception of court-martial jurisdiction, the Air Corps stations were exempted from corps area control. As will appear, they were placed back under the corps area commanders on 19 November 1940, but removed once more on 21 June 1941. The War Department attitude on this issue, incidentally, partially reflected the stand it took on the larger question of a separate air force.

The problem presented by the division of authority within the Air Corps per se received the attention of the high military authorities directly concerned as quickly as did that which was involved in the exempted stations controversy. Eight months after the GHQ Air Force had been created its commanding officer decried the fact that his organization, although without an authorized voice in securing the means to the end, was responsible for combat efficiency; while, on the other hand, the Office of the Chief of Air Corps, with no responsibility for achieving the desired results, controlled the funds, selected the equipment and personnel, and prescribed the tactics and methods of employing combat units. Among several remedies
suggested for the more efficient coordination of Air Corps activities General Andrews believed the best solution would be the creation of the General Staff of an Air Division headed by an Assistant Chief of Staff responsible for military aviation. Besides furnishing the necessary superior control and equipping the General Staff properly to handle air matters, the Air Division, he felt, would tend to quiet the move for a separate air force, unify the Air Corps, and prevent the "recurrence of such conditions as made it necessary" to create the GHQ Air Force. Although finding merit in some of General Andrews' suggestions, General Westover, the newly appointed Chief of Air Corps, on 17 January 1936 expressed a conviction that the best way to achieve a unity of control would be to place the GHQ Air Force under the Chief of Air Corps who would have full responsibility to the Chief of Staff.

A position generally similar to that held by General Westover had been announced a few days earlier by the Browning Board which was mentioned above. This group pronounced the GHQ Air Force as a worthy organization which should be continued. Among other things, however, the division of responsibility between it and the Office of the Chief of Air Corps lacked simplicity, caused confusion, increased the overhead for administration, and split the whole organization into factions. A consolidation of the military air arm under one head, preferably the Chief of Air Corps, would permit the Commanding General, GHQ Air Force, to "devote his maximum effort to training and a minimum to administration." In April 1936 a special Air Corps board which had been convened to study the problem agreed substantially with the Browning Board report regarding a complete amalgamation of the major components of the air arm for administrative purposes. On such matters the Commanding General of the GHQ Air Force should report directly to the Chief of Air Corps and not to any lower echelon of his office. Yet because of a peculiar circumstance which presented the aspect of a lack of complete unity on the part of the board, the authorities deemed it best not to use this report as a basis of recommendation. Meanwhile in a memorandum to General Malin Craig, General MacArthur's successor as Chief of Staff, the Chief of Air Corps again had recommended that the GHQ Air Force be subordinated to the jurisdiction of his office. To this officer the reasons seemed quite logical. The War Department desired that all air matters be decided within the air arm of which the Chief of Air Corps was the head, and for which he was responsible. The GHQ organization, moreover, constituted only 40 per centum of the Air Corps; and it was reasonable to assume that the larger element should take precedence over the smaller. A few days later Maj. Gen. George S. Simonds, the Deputy Chief of Staff, proposed that the Chief of Air Corps be given some of the functions of a deputy chief of staff. In such a position he would have more authority but no jurisdiction over the
Commanding General, GHQ Air Force. Neither suggestion was accepted. Continued inaction on the part of the higher authorities led General Andrews to believe that the War Department was not making an honest effort to settle the Air Corps problems. Because of what he regarded as the failure of a study made under the direction of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, to come to grips with the real issues involved, the GHQ Air Force leader felt constrained to say that it appeared that the G-3 section entertained a fear that the Air Corps "might grow to overshadow other elements of the War Department," even though for the time being the major effort in national defense should consist in the maximum development of air power.

Following a dormant period of several months, as judged by the available evidence, the discussions relative to the division of responsibility between the two components of the Air Corps were resumed late in the spring of 1937. In a report dated 1 May, General Westover insisted that the Chief of Air Corps during time of peace should be designated also as Chief of Aviation, General Headquarters; and as such be placed in the chain of command between the Chief of Staff and the Commanding General, GHQ Air Force. On the same day, however, the latter officer offered opposing views. He insisted that the Office of the Chief of Air Corps was a service unit, and thus should not be superior to a combat element. For all practical purposes, with respect to the coordination of air activities the Chief of Air Corps had assumed a function of the General Staff. Therefore, even though it had no legal authority over the GHQ Air Force, by acting as a superior air general staff the Office of the Chief of Air Corps could "exert a high degree of control over the instrument it is intended to serve." General Andrews had no specific recommendations to offer at this time. He was convinced, however, that divided as it was the air arm could not mold an effective fighting force; and that the creation of an agency to remedy the existing condition should not be regarded as preferential treatment for the Air Corps.

Although disinclined to offer a detailed rebuttal to the charge that the Office of the Chief of Air Corps had acted in the nature of a general staff over the GHQ Air Force, the following November General Westover indicated a strong conviction that the air arm should remain in a subordinate position to the Army proper. Then in a report the Adjutant General he added:

The Chief of the Air Corps and his staff are a part of the War Department and, as such, endeavor to advise the Chief of Staff personally and the General Staff on all matters affecting the Air Corps as a whole in the best interests of the Army and National Defense. The final decision is and
always has been that of the Chief of Staff and not the Chief of Air Corps."

A few weeks before the above "reply" was made by the Chief of Air Corps, General Andrews had asserted that the weaknesses of the organization were accentuated by the "continual differences" over personnel, equipment, and funds. These problems were practically insoluble, he felt, as long as the heads of the two elements remained on the same echelon of command. This time he had three possible solutions to offer: 1) The creation of a Chief of Aviation with immediate jurisdiction over both the service and the tactical units; 2) the appointment of a Deputy Chief of Staff for Aviation; or 3) the subordination of the GHQ Air Force to the Chief of Air Corps. The Commanding General, GHQ Air Force, considered the last of these proposals as least desirable but felt that it would have the merit of placing upon the Chief of Air Corps the direct responsibility for his actions and recommendations affecting the GHQ Air Force and other tactical units.

The War Department took no remedial action following General Andrews' latest suggestions. Nor does it appear that the specific issue was raised again seriously for more than a year. On 23 February 1939, however, the Chief of Air Corps (now in the person of Maj. Gen. Henry H. Arnold who had succeeded to the post after the tragic death of General Westover in an air crash in September 1938) again recommended that he be designated Chief of Aviation, GHQ. This would enable the air arm to organize in such a manner as to provide an operating staff which would be immediately available in the event of hostilities without disrupting the normal routine of the office. The existing command status and internal organization of GHQ Air Force would remain unaffected; but the new arrangement would expedite the transaction of business between the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Air Corps. Immediate positive action followed General Arnold's proposal; for on 1 March 1939 the Office of the Chief of Air Corps and the GHQ Air Force were placed under the jurisdiction of the Chief of Air Corps, although his command duties were not affected, the head of the combat element was made responsible directly to the Chief of Air Corps rather than the Chief of Staff, though in the event of hostilities the tactical air units were to be controlled by the theater commanders.

Thus after a period of four years the War Department finally decided to eliminate the division of responsibility between the two elements of the Air Corps. This action was extremely important at the time; for in view of the accelerated expansion program then in the immediate offering it was essential to have the utmost coordination with respect to equipment, training, and personnel. Unfortunately, however, this centralization within the air arm was destined to be short-lived. Contrary to the advice of General
Arnold, on 19 November 1940 the GHQ Air Force was removed from the jurisdiction of the Office of Chief of Air Corps. \(^8\) The deleterious effects of this redivision of administrative responsibility were ameliorated in part by the appointment of General Arnold as acting Deputy Chief of Staff for Air, which put that outstanding airman in a strategic position to utilize his strong qualities of leadership and influence in an attempt to coordinate the efforts of the two elements of the military air arm. \(^9\)

It was on 19 November 1940 also that, as was noted previously, the War Department again placed air station complements under the control of the corps area commanders. With this removal of the exempted status of the air stations the concept of the employment of air power as a separate force naturally received a setback. To this reversal of policy, incidentally, many airmen raised stronger objections than was indicated with respect to the failure to keep the two elements of the Air Corps under one head. \(^6\)

In still another way the relationship of the air arm to the War Department was changed by the action taken in November 1940. The GHQ Air Force as an element of the field units was placed under the control of the general commanding the field forces; and four air districts were created. The latter were replaced four months later by a corresponding number of continental air forces in four air defense commands. Although he was given numerous responsibilities, the Commanding General, GHQ Air Force, still later was placed directly under the control of General Headquarters, an agency established at the Air War College in July 1940 to assist the Chief of Staff in his capacity as commanding general of the field armies. \(^2\)

Although viewed with considerable disfavor by those who were directly responsible for military aviation, the channels of control set up for the Air Corps in November 1940 lasted for well over six months. One of the first to offer an official protest was Maj. Gen. George H. Brett, Acting Chief of Air Corps, who on 26 December 1940 stated that the existing arrangement would be disastrous in case of war. The "best brains" of the military air arm, he maintained, must submit matters to a superior staff which lacked an adequate knowledge of air problems. Since responsibility and authority were not commensurate, it would be impossible to perform the arduous tasks confronting the organization so long as the division between the two elements existed. By way of a possible solution to some of the problems General Brett proposed that the Undersecretary of War be given more specific controls over procurement; and that three Assistant Secretaries of War be appointed, one representing the ground forces; another, the air arm; and a third, the services common to the other two. \(^2\)

Although apparently no action was taken as a result of the suggestion of the acting Chief of Air Corps, on the following day Robert A. Lovett received appointment as Special Assistant to the Secretary of War to serve primarily as a representative of the Undersecretary of War with regard to all matters.
of Air Corps procurement. Incidentally, the redesignation of Lovett’s position in April 1941 as Assistant Secretary of War for Air filled a vacancy which had existed since 1933.\textsuperscript{23}

Meanwhile, in the words of Secretary Henry L. Stimson, the War Department had been giving consideration to a reorganization of the Air Corps in “order to make it as modern as the instrument it uses.” To that end in March he directed that

steps be taken to place our air arm under one responsible head, and that plans be worked out to develop an organization staffed and equipped to provide the ground forces with essential aircraft units for joint operation, while at the same time expanding and decentralizing our staff work to permit Air Force autonomy in the degree needed.

Autonomy of the air arm rather than segregated independence, however, in the opinion of the Secretary of War was the best means of obtaining successful results. Nor, as he wrote three months later, could he see any “magic” in a separate or independent air force.\textsuperscript{24}

Wheels soon were set in motion in an effort to carry out the instructions of the Secretary of War; and an agreement was reached on 20 June 1941.\textsuperscript{25} This took form in Army Regulation 95–5, which created the Army Air Forces. Headed by a Chief, who was also Deputy Chief of Staff for Air, this organization was set up for the purpose of coordinating all activities relating to military aviation. The Chief, Army Air Forces, acting through the Chief of Staff, was made responsible to the Secretary of War for establishing and executing all relevant plans and policies. Under his jurisdiction in turn the Chief of Air Corps and the Commanding General, Air Force Combat Command (which had superseded the GHQ Air Force) had charge, respectively, of matters relating to service and combat. Incidentally, the administrative problems connected with the Air Force Combat Command were simplified somewhat by the transfer to the commanding general not only station control but also court-martial jurisdiction over his personnel.

The Chief, Army Air Forces, was to have the assistance of an Air Staff, the creation of which was in line with Secretary Stimson’s policy of decentralizing staff work and providing the Air Forces a greater degree of autonomy. The current AR 95–5 also created an Air Council for the purpose of reviewing and coordinating periodically all major aviation projects of the Army. The Council consisted of the Assistant Secretary of War for Air; the Chief of Army Air Forces; the Chief, War Plans Division, War Department General Staff; the Chief of Air Corps; the Commanding General, Air Force Combat Command; and such other members as might be appointed by the Secretary of War. \textsuperscript{26}
Although the reorganization of June 1941 may be regarded as the first significant advance in the movement for autonomy of the air arm since the creation of the GHQ Air Force in 1935, it left much to be desired. In the first place the creation of the Army Air Forces did not solve wholly the fundamental problem of a division of functions between the Office of Chief of Air Corps and the Air Force Combat Command. The Chief of the one and the commanding general of the other remained on the same echelon of command. Since the Chief of the Army Air Forces and the Chief of Air Corps were charged with the fulfillment of many identical functions, moreover, it was but inevitable that conflicts would arise because of the poorly delineated spheres of jurisdiction. Secondly, the relationship between the new structure and the War Department was defined none too clearly. For instance, the Air Staff, the War Department General Staff, and the “staff” of the Office of Air Corps all were engaged with supply and service problems; while the War Department General Staff, General Headquarters, the Air Staff, and the Air Force Combat Command Staff had divided responsibility with regard to tactical and combat matters. These situations naturally tended to provoke friction between the various units. Finally, as may be judged from the above-mentioned factors, the degree of autonomy granted the air arm was not regarded as sufficient for satisfactory operations. Many felt that it still was restricted to an unreasonable degree by the General Staff. The latter, to mention a further complicating factor, was regarded as an administrative agency by General Headquarters which considered itself as responsible for strategic plans. The conflict between these two agencies weakened still further the position of the Army Air Forces."

As will appear, the desire for further freedom of action and the increased pressure of expansion (which were minimized in no wise, of course, by the direct participation of the United States in World War II) eventually resulted in sweeping changes relating to the organizational structure of military aeronautics. The remainder of this chapter, however, will be devoted to a consideration of the movement for its complete liberation from the War Department during the period from 1935 to 1941. This discussion will center chiefly around the attitude of leading airmen, expressions of opinion from outside the bounds of official circles, and developments within Congress.

Up until the time of his death in September 1938 General Westover as Chief of Air Corps consistently opposed any form of independence for the military air arm. Speaking before a meeting conducted under the auspices of the Air Defense League on 14 January 1937, for instance, he stated that "any measures to create a separate air department of the government, or even a separate set-up of aviation within the War Department, would at this time be a step backward." Instead, the proper way to provide for air defense
would be to continue the development of the existing organization accord-
ing to approved programs. In this address and in an article which he
released in October of the same year for the information of all flying per-
sonnel General Westover praised the War Department for the way in which
it had handled the administration of the military air arm since the creation
of the Aeronautical Division within the Signal Corps back in 1908. As a
part of the article also he wrote:

We of the arms and services must bear well in mind that there sits at the seat
of government a group of men who have impartially at heart the well being
of all of us and whose perspective is not clouded by too close an association
with any one element. Their programs and plans are more than likely to have
good reason and sound common sense in strong support. It behooves every
intelligent military man to find out what that program is and support it with-
out equivocation. For several years now I have been in a position to be con-
versant with the War Department's plans and policies for military aviation
and I can say positively, I cannot emphasize too strongly, that the military
leaders are fully conscious of what the nation needs for air defense and they
are sparing no effort to provide it.

Here also, and once again in an address which he delivered before a
convention of reserve officers at Oakland, California on 23 September, the
Chief of Air Corps stressed the value of coordinated teamwork between the
various combatant arms of the service in a manner which would have done
credit to General Pershing or Secretary of War Baker back in post-World
War I days.

Few or none of the other high ranking Air Corps officers shared
General Westover's extreme attitude regarding a separate or coordinated air
force. As judged by the available evidence, however, during this period
none of them openly advocated changing the basic relation between the Air
Corps and the War Department. In the early years this passive stand was
due in part, it seems, to a calm resignation after March 1935 that an inde-
pendent air organization had been lost or at least postponed indefinitely,
which was coupled with a determination to allow ample time for the GHQ
Air Force to prove its merit. During the latter stages, as it appeared, the air
arm gradually was acquiring a fair degree of autonomy, if not indepen-
dence. Then too there was a general reluctance, more particularly after the
outbreak of World War II, to commence any agitation which might interfere
in the least with the current general preparedness program.

Soon after the GHQ Air Force was established General Andrews pre-
pared an address apparently intended for delivery to his subordinate officers
which contained the following statement:
Now just a word about the past. Some of us perhaps believed in an independent air force. Some thought perhaps that an air defense could be best developed as a separate part of the War Department not under the General Staff, and others perhaps had still other plans, but now that the decision has been made, and by the President himself, to develop our air power as an integral part of the Army, it is up to us to get behind that plan and push it loyally to success. Gentlemen, I give it to you as my sincere belief that a separate Air Corps is a dead issue for many years to come. The GHQ Air Force is a part of the Army and it is our interest and duty to keep that fact constantly in mind, for therein for many years at least I believe lies the best chance of developing Air Power and the best interest of National Defense.  

As has been indicated, late in 1934 General Arnold expressed the view that before setting up an independent air arm it would be well to give the GHQ Air Force a thorough trial; and that a few years later he felt that the creation of that component had been a wise and forward-looking move. During the spring of 1935 he indicated his belief that "this thing called a 'department of national defense' is bound to come," but that it would require several years and considerable planning before an efficient organization of that kind could be elected. At the same time he was quick to dismiss the suggestion of a separate department of aeronautics with a statement to the effect that as yet the Air Corps was unable to stand alone.  

Obviously, the next several years brought little or no change in Arnold's position. While testifying early in 1939 before the Senate Committee on Military Affairs with reference to a bill designed to provide more effectively for the national defense, he was confronted with the pointed inquiry as to whether the "air service" should be a separate department. His reply was, "I would prefer not to answer that question, sir." Pressed further, however, he added:  

With the expansion that is confronting the Air Corps now I would dislike very much for us to be thrown out on our own without any of the help and assistance we can get right now from the rest of the War Department. That is the way we feel now.  

Clearly enough, the trend of his whole testimony on this score indicated that, because of practical considerations, for the time being the Chief of Air Corps opposed any basic change in the relationship between the military air arm and the War Department. Something over twelve months later he evinced the same conviction in a purely personal note to a friend and fellow officer. Writing early in 1941, following a period characterized by considerable agitation for an air component coordinate and commensurate with the Army and Navy, the then Deputy Chief of Staff for Air in conjunction with Col. Ira C. Eaker expressed the hope that if eventually accom-
The separate air force idea is not something to be rushed at pell-mell or hell-bent-for-leather. It must not be approached with the state of mind that everything now in existence, or which has been done is wrong. The Army and Navy, the older services, deserve great credit for the tremendous strides they have made in the development of military and naval aviation. There are many essential services which older and established bureaus, departments or subdivisions of the Army and Navy now perform for the air arm. It may be that there are intermediate steps between the present organization and the ultimate which it would be wiser to take than spring at once to a complete separation of the air arm from the land and sea forces. The recent appointment of a Deputy Chief of Staff for Air, to serve as advisor to the Chief of Staff in air matters, and in placing of the General Headquarters Air Force under the direct command of the Commanding General of the field armies may be a step in that direction.35

Shortly after the above statement appeared in print, as the reader will recall, with the establishment of the Army Air Forces another very important step indeed was taken towards the goal of an autonomous air force. Their rank and position naturally gave considerable weight to whatever Generals Westover, Andrews, and Arnold had to say about a reorganization of the air arm, although it is not to be presumed that they spoke for all military aviation personnel.36 Certainly the cause of an independent air service, in the form either of a separate or a coordinate department of aviation, did not lack adherents during this period. Attention now is to be focussed briefly upon a few of the leading private unofficial individuals and unofficial organizations favoring such a change. Then follows a discussion of the movement in Congress.

Extremely critical of the general organization of the air services, Ken Dodge, President of the Air Defense League, early in 1939 made a distinction between what he called Army and Navy special-purpose aviation and the air forces in general. The latter he would place immediately under a separate administration for air defense, for the time being allowing the Army and Navy to retain their separate air segments. Later, Dodge thought, air power should be made coordinate with the Army and Navy in a single department of national defense which would include an additional unit for industrial mobilization.37 Early in his campaign Wendell Willkie, the Republican presidential nominee in 1940, advocated a unified air service. He would begin with a new cabinet post, the Department of the Air Force; but his ultimate objective was
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a single cabinet officer at the head of a Department of Defense, with Under Secretaries for Army, Navy, and the Air Force.²⁸  

One of the most forceful advocates of united air power at this time was the former naval aviator Maj. Al Williams, world traveller and prolific writer on the subject of aviation, who allegedly resigned his commission in the Marine Corps Reserve as a result of pressure brought to bear because of his frequent articles critical of the Navy’s air policies which appeared in the columns of the Scripps-Howard newspapers.²⁹ With an isolationist (not to say anti-administration) point of view, but withal a background of experience and a fund of information recently gained from first-hand observation abroad, as a principal speaker on the 1940 National Defense Day program held under the auspices of the National Aeronautics Association, Williams made some very pointed remarks on the administration of the air services. Stating that it would be the sheerest folly for the United States to set up a system of national defense without first organizing a separate and independent air force “which can plan, develop, and operate real American air power without interference and restraint from the Army and Navy,” he continued, in part:

The complete answer, as I see it, is (and I can almost feel the gallant spirit of General Billy Mitchell at my shoulder as I say these words): The United States must have a separate air force under a three-way Department of National Defense—Army, Navy, and Air. The development of true American air power must no longer be left in the jealous hands of the land Army and the sea Navy and politicians. To do so is to court the present plight of England, and eventual disaster.

In addition to a regular cabinet member at the head of each of the three divisions of national defense Williams recommended a Supreme Council of Defense headed by the President and consisting of members of Congress.³⁰  

Not to be overlooked in this connection is the attitude of Maj. Alexander P. de Seversky, the well known aeronautical engineer and former pilot. Bitterly critical of the War Department’s failure to give air power a more important role, in an article prepared shortly before the Army Air Forces organization was created Major de Seversky had among others the following pointed remarks to make:

In the higher reaches of our military service the idea of an independent Air Force has never been regarded as a matter for discussion. It has simply been treated as insubordination and squelched...The martyrdom of General William Mitchell was accomplished publicly and demonstratively in order to warn other “rebels.” The intimidation has in large measure been successful. Nevertheless, there are other “General Mitchells” today, kept down,
"exiled" to distant posts, or forced out because they demand the emancipation of Air Power....This is not a dispute over a division of authority but a basic question of organization which goes straight to the heart of our defense program. The only question is whether we shall put our aviation house in order now or wait until we are forced to do so by looming disasters. Those of us who see the handwriting in the skies know that what we ask for cuts across the bureaucratic habits and comforts of a generation. But we know also that the change must be made if we are to survive in this aviation age. America...cannot [take first place in the air] until Air Power is recognized as a primary service rather than an auxiliary and adjunct of older weapons, and divorced from the Army and Navy commands.41

High on any list of agencies finding fault with the subordination of the air service to the War Department and the land Army was the Aero Digest, a monthly publication issuing in New York, to which frequent citation has been made in this study. Normally it carried an excellent general news coverage on aeronautical matters, and for several years had favored a change in the organizational status of military aviation. During the six-year period immediately under review, however, its interest in an independent air force seemed to increase perceptibly. Although the journal had an anti-administration and an isolationist point of view, the vigorous and consistent campaign which it conducted in favor of the air arm by means of its editorial policy and through numerous feature articles was impaired but slightly, if any, by political prejudice and national bias.42

During the years immediately following the creation of the GHQ Air Force relatively few attempts were made to change by law the relation of the air arm to the War Department. Up until 1 March 1939, in fact, only two bills proposing a separate department of air were introduced in Congress; and these came early in the period. Neither was reported from committee, while one of them was denounced actively by the Chief of Air Corps.43 Within the same four-year period also only five department of national defense proposals were brought up in Congress. Introduced on 14 August 1935 by Representative Gerald J. Boileau, the first of these would have limited the activities of the proposed department to defense purposes only.44 The bill never emerged from the committee, but its sponsor renewed his proposal nearly two years later. Stymied once more by committee inaction, Representative Boileau on 13 August 1937 in the Committee of the Whole House offered an amendment to a bill for the reorganization of government agencies which in effect would have accomplished the purpose of his earlier proposals. This time his effort was defeated by a count of 122 to 51.45 Meanwhile, having been submitted on 19 March 1937, another department of national defense bill was buried in committee.46 A similar fate likewise awaited the other two which were introduced early in 1939.47
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During the meantime the military authorities had occasion to pass judgment upon a proposal which would remove the Air Corps from the supervision of the General Staff and place it directly under the Secretary of War. The bill met the wholehearted disapproval of the Chief of Air Corps, General Westover, who, as has been indicated thought the interests of national defense could be served best by leaving the Air Corps as a part of the Army. The Secretary of War likewise announced his opposition to the measure. Characterizing it as a revival of the old controversy of a separate unified air corps, which has been frequently agitated since the close of the World War, Secretary Harry H. Woodring asserted that he was unalterably opposed to any changes in the existing organization of the War Department.

The period from 1 March 1939 until 19 November 1940, when the Office of the Chief of Air Corps and the GHQ Air Force were under the administrative jurisdiction of the Chief of Air Corps, was characterized among other things by still further decreased activity on the part of congressional advocates of either a department of national defense or a separate air force. During this interval only four bills of the former type and three of the latter made their way into the national legislative mill. All of these proposals died in committee. So did two joint resolutions which would have created special commissions for the purpose of surveying resources and requirements relating to defense with a view to the advisability of establishing a department of national defense and supplementary agencies.

As the aerial expansion program progressed, any existing duplication of effort and overlapping of functions appeared more and more inexpedient. Consequently, the removal of the GHQ Air Force from the administrative jurisdiction of the Office of Chief of Air Corps on 19 November 1940 produced increased concern in Congress over the organizational status of the military air arm. This showed up in a veritable deluge of measures designed to liberate the Air Corps from the control of the War Department. Within the next seven months, to be more specific, there were no less than six bills providing for a department of national defense, with Air, Army, and Navy on coordinate levels, and seven for a separate department of aeronautics. In addition, there were two suggestions for the establishment of a commission or committee for the purpose of making a study on which to base recommendations for a change in the position of the air arm in the system of national defense. None of these proposals ever emerged from committee, nor during the period involved even formed the subject for public hearings. Some of the sponsors, however, never seemed to tire of plugging for their respective measures at every opportunity. These efforts consisted mostly in including by way of "extension of remarks" in the Congressional Record copies of editorials, articles, and other documents endorsing the cause they advocated. It was in such manner, for instance, that some of Major de Seversky's opinions on the question of independent air power...
officially were called to the attention of Congress. Probably the strongest congressional argument in favor of a separate or coordinate air force during this session, however, was made by Representative J. G. Scrugham on 29 April 1941 in connection with a conference report on the naval appropriations bill for 1942. Attacking the existing organization as failing to develop aviation tactics for offensive aerial warfare, he asserted that millions of dollars were being wasted through duplication; that the "hydraheaded air authority" had committed many errors; and that the time had come for Congress to take action in creating a separate air force. This was the only solution, Scrugham insisted, because even though "the reasons for unified air organization have increased tenfold...the powers of the dead hand of entrenched bureaucracy have likewise multiplied and constitute a formidable opposition."

Despite the agitation carried on in Congress the War Department remained adamant. Commenting as early as 20 February upon the proposals to create a department of national defense, acting Secretary Robert Patterson asserted that the existing organization (which, he insisted, could maintain a proper coordination of air and ground effort) was altogether satisfactory. Nothing so far had occurred in the current European struggle to warrant a change to a department of national defense. Admittedly, there were some advantages to the idea as well as to that of a separate air force; but the disadvantages were greater. Besides, Secretary Patterson thought, the confusion and delay incident to such a reorganization, if effected immediately, "might well result in a national tragedy." In a somewhat more brusque manner Secretary Stimson a few weeks later indicated the department's disapproval of a committee or commission to make a study of national defense as a basis of possible recommendations for organizational changes. He felt that such an agency could be nothing more than an intermediary between regular congressional committees on the one hand and executive agencies, including the War Department, on the other. After reminding the Chairman of the House Committee on Military Affairs that in the past many investigating bodies had submitted recommendations against a department of national defense, Secretary Stimson stated that should a revision of the "National Defense Act appear to be desirable in the interests of national defense, the War Department will request such revision without delay." Then later, in expressing opposition to certain specific proposals for a separate department of air, but applicable to all, the Secretary of War said:

The matter of the proper form of organization of military aviation has been under careful consideration by the War Department for some time, and a reorganization of the Air Corps has recently been elected, giving
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the air arm reasonable autonomy within the framework of the War Department."50

In this comment reference was made, of course, to the issuance on 20 June 1941 of AR 95–5, creating the Army Air Forces, an organization which in contrast to an independent air force Stimson at the time described as a more modern and efficient method of creating air power under the system of government prevailing in the United States."60
Chapter 8

Autonomy for the Army Air Forces

The action by which the War Department on 20 June 1941 had created the Army Air Forces was labelled by some air enthusiasts as an obvious stopgap designed to forestall a probable drastic shake-up on the part of Congress. It must be admitted that circumstances lend considerable credence to this point of view. Early in 1939, as will be recalled, after several measures providing for some form of independence for the air force were introduced, an inapt division of responsibility in the Air Corps had been corrected. And then following the appearance of similar bills in much larger number—considering the time element involved—the military air arm was granted a degree of autonomy greater than it had ever possessed. Too many other factors were involved, however, to establish a close correlation between the actions of the War Department in this respect and any attitudes inherent in Congress. There is no proof, moreover, that up until this time more than a relatively small minority of the members of that body actually favored either a separate department of aeronautics or a department of national defense in which air would occupy a position coordinate with each of the other two major branches. Besides, as a matter of record, proposals of such a nature had been appearing in the national legislature at intervals over a period of more than twenty years.

Regardless of what may have been the reasons, and again the factors were numerous, a sharp decrease in the number of legislative measures concerning an independent or a coordinate air arm followed the reorganization of military aeronautics on 20 June 1941. From that date until 9 March 1942, when the Army Air Forces gained virtually complete theoretical autonomy within the framework of the War Department, only two relevant bills were introduced in Congress. Since they were jettisoned in the usual manner these measures require no further consideration here. During this nine months period, however, air-minded members of Congress who favored a change relative to the basic position of the Army Air Forces in the pattern of national defense freely inserted their views in the Record, along with
statements of the opinions and actions of various agencies, associations, clubs, newspapers, journals, and individuals advocating the same general cause. Other than to point out that the measure of self control provided in AR 95-5 was regarded as inadequate, an analysis of the arguments presented thereby would be repetitious in a degree wholly unwarranted at this stage in the present study. It may be said, however, that public support for a separate air force increased greatly. At the same time, despite the fact that the burden of proof fell upon those who wished to make a change, there were some who took the opposite view. These included Capt. Eddie Rickenbacker who felt that because of the existing emergency any immediate fundamental change in the relation of the military air arm to the other armed forces would be a fatal mistake.

The opinion of the prominent World War I ace on the matter of a separate air force seemed to coincide on the whole with the views of the leading administrative Army Air Forces officials, even though the latter were not wholly satisfied with the progress which had been made in the reorganization of 20 June 1941. Apparent concern, lest agitation in Congress for action on the relevant measures then pending in that body affect adversely the current preparedness program, led to special conferences with the Assistant Secretary of War for Air which resulted in a decision to oppose for the time being the creation of an independent air force. Closely connected therewith was a belief that though the War Department would oppose all of the bills then before Congress, it might be willing to sponsor legislation for the air arm if it were less fundamental in nature. Certain of the air force officers, therefore, had undertaken to prepare measures with the ultimate view of submission to the lawmakers. Preliminary to this self-appointed task they prepared an analysis of the weaknesses of the existing military air organization.

In the first place, they questioned the legality of the Army Air Forces structure on two major counts. As alleged, there was a conflict between AR 95-5 and section 5 of the National Defense Act in that the former allotted to the Air Staff functions which Congress previously had designated for the War Department General Staff. Then in violation of sections 2 and 13a of the statute in question the position of the Chief of Air Corps as head of the combatant arm had been impaired by the superimposition of another authority; viz., the Chief of the Army Air Forces. Since, unfortunately, his power to reorganize the executive departments had expired, the President was unable to correct the situation. Over and above its legal status, moreover, the Army Air Forces did not possess real autonomy inasmuch as the Air Staff was restricted by the General Staff, which in turn shared certain responsibilities regarding the preparation of strategic plans with General Headquarters. In a manner of speaking this gave the Army Air Forces two masters. The military air arm, finally, had not been given direct access to
the "housekeeping services," nor control over its budget and finances. Whatever merits the organization possessed or hoped to retain depended under existing law upon the War Department itself. Since, therefore, the Army Air Forces had decided to oppose a move for a separate status the most feasible procedure seemed to lie in a frank admission of the existing situation and the creation of a truly autonomous air force operating under the principle of unity of command.9

The War Department seemed to be less receptive to the idea of a "truly autonomous air force" than the airmen had hoped; for it rejected outright a proposal of the Chief of Air Staff, Brig. Gen. Carl Spaatz, for a reorganization which would eliminate General Headquarters and create three autonomous arms: Ground forces; air forces; and a service command.9 A subsequent suggestion designed to accomplish the same general purpose, and drawn up as a basis for congressional action, fared no better.10 Meanwhile, however, the Army Air Forces had submitted still another proposal which, favorably received by the General Staff, formed the basis for the reorganization of the War Department as of 9 March 1942. To this we now turn.

Primarily because of the effective manner in which it combined principles of organization and strategy, particular interest is attached to the plan which General Arnold offered on 14 November. Therein he pointed out the fact that the development of the air force as a new and coordinate member of the combat team had altered the method of applying the basic principles of modern warfare. Concerned in the past with only one decisive striking arm, the military commander now had two. They could function together at a single time and place, but also were capable of operating individually in regions remote from each other. The Chief, Army Air Forces, therefore, stressed the necessity of "streamlining" the war machine so as to provide unity of command not only within each of these fighting arms, but also over both of them. With the creation of the Army Air Forces, he said, this had been accomplished so far as the air arm itself was concerned. To attain the full objective, however, the various ground units should be placed under one commander, and a superior coordinating staff set up to embrace both air and ground personnel. This would prove to be of invaluable assistance in enabling the General Staff to deal effectively and impartially with the two coordinate fighting agencies, each of which would have its own individual staff. Finally, the plan proposed that the air forces and the ground forces should have equal access to the common services and supply arms, to be grouped under still another commander.11

The War Plans Division of the General Staff concurred in the broad principles and the general organization which the Chief of the Army Air Forces had outlined, and immediately initiated plans for a detailed study of the whole proposal. Within a few days, however, the United States became
an active belligerent in World War II. Although this development may have emphasized the need for a thorough overhauling of the War Department machinery, at the same time it injected the factor of delay into the program dealing with the systematic or formal consideration of any fundamental changes. Eventually Maj. Gen. Joseph T. McNarney, an air officer of exceptionally varied service who but recently had returned from a tour of duty abroad, was designated to head the War Department Reorganization Committee. Acting with characteristic efficiency and dispatch, on 31 January 1942 he submitted a brief memorandum outlining certain proposed changes and suggestions for converting the new organization. The Chief of Staff forthwith approved these recommendations. 12

In order to carry out the specific recommendations of the McNarney Committee it was necessary, of course, to secure the sanction of the Secretary of War and the President. After innumerable conferences—some of which undoubtedly had been held prior to 31 January—this was accomplished in the form of Executive Order No. 9082, dated 28 February 1942, which in turn was based upon the authority granted in Title I of the First War Powers Act, 1941, signed on 18 December. 13 The relevant Executive Order was implemented on 2 March followed by War Department Circular No. 59, the salient provisions of which as relate to the Army Air Forces lend themselves to convenient summary.

Effective on 9 March 1942, the War Department and the Army were to be organized so as to provide, under the Secretary of War and the Chief of Staff, a War Department General Staff, a Ground Force, an Air Force, and a Service of Supply Command, all with headquarters in Washington. The duties, functions, and powers which theretofore had pertained to the Commanding General, Air Force Combat Command (formerly the GHQ Air Force) and the Chief of Air Corps were transferred to the Commanding General, Army Air Forces. His complete jurisdiction, in accordance with policies prescribed by the Chief of Staff, should involve the normal prerogatives of command—as authorized by law, Army Regulations, and custom—over individuals and units assigned to the air forces. Of particular significance, the stated "mission" of the Air Forces, as specified in the Circular, was

to procure and maintain equipment peculiar to the Army Air Forces, and to provide air force units properly organized, trained and equipped for combat operations.

Procurement and related functions were to be performed in accordance with the direction of the Undersecretary of War. The same held true with respect to the mission of the Services of Supply, which was designed to pro-
vide requisites for military activities except those “peculiar to the Army Air Forces.”

It should be noted in passing that this streamlined version of the War Department organization, more particularly as related to the General Staff, was somewhat similar to that which had prevailed in the Army Air Forces since its creation on 20 June 1941. Just before the War Department Reorganization Act went into effect this was pointed out by General McNarney who asserted that the arrangement whereby General Arnold had been placed in charge of the Air Forces and given his own staff had “worked out very well.” Testifying before the Senate Committee on Military affairs, the Chairman of the War Department Reorganization Committee presented an excellent summary justification of the need for the changes which were in the immediate offing, when he added:

We found that General Arnold made many decisions which formerly had to go to the General Staff. However, there was one unfortunate result—we actually had two General Staffs. We had an air staff and a ground staff. The recognized War Department’s General Staff was purely a ground staff and General Arnold’s the air staff, was concerned with aviation exclusively. In this day of air-ground fighting, two isolated staffs cannot properly provide the commander with the assistance he must have. Furthermore, the Army Air Forces were still to some extent a stepchild in the War Department. All material decisions made by the General Staff had to be presented to the Chief of Staff. They were worked out by the General Staff which had the ground viewpoint. A change there was indicated.

Designated as the “first team” to run the revamped War Department machine were General George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff; Lt. Gen. Leslie J. McNair as Commanding General, Army Ground Forces; Maj. Gen. Brehon D. Somervell as Commanding General Services of Supply; and, of course, General Arnold, Commanding General, Army Air Forces. The streamlined General Staff, radically reduced in size, consisted about equally of ground, service, and air personnel; while each of these commands had its own individual staff. Through the reorganization elected in March of 1942, then, the Army Air Forces at last had achieved theoretical autonomy within the framework of the War Department. On the very face of it, however, this was a tentative arrangement; for both the First War Powers Act, 1941, and Executive Order No. 9082 had fixed the terminal date of such an organization as six months after the duration of the current world struggle.

In addition to its tentative status as a coordinate part of the military machine the position of the Army Air Forces was minimized by still another factor. This was the restatement of its mission. As it so happened, between 7 December 1941 and 9 March following, the Air Force Combat Command
as a combat agency really had ceased to exist. Two of the four air forces had been assigned to actual theaters of operation, where air units had been placed under the control of theater commanders, whether air, ground, or naval officers; while the other two had become training agencies almost exclusively. Thus with one of its components virtually eliminated and its mission designated as an agency "to procure and maintain equipment peculiar" to itself, and to provide air force units, properly organized, trained, and equipped for combat operations, it would appear that the Army Air Forces was regarded primarily as a supply and training agency concerned but indirectly with combat operations and strategic planning; and that the jurisdiction of its commanding general was confined to certain of the units within the continental United States. There is every reason to suppose, however, that the key officers of the Army Air Forces regarded the latest statement of its mission as nothing more than a "paper" restriction. Developments proved that they were correct.

It is well known that the progress of World War II (and that before as well as after the United States became actively engaged in the struggle) proved beyond a doubt that air power, including defensive air supremacy, was a vital factor in the successful conduct of any type of major operation. This clearly indicated for the Commanding General of the Army Air Forces a definite and direct influence in both the planning and operational stages of combat activities. Such was recognized in no small measure, of course, early in 1942 when General Arnold along with General Marshall, Admiral William D. Leahy (Chief of Staff to the President), and Admiral Ernest O. King (Chief of Naval Operations) were established as members of the newly created Joint Chiefs of Staff which was formed to resolve the military and related political and economic matters of mutual concern. This group in association with the accredited Washington representatives of the British Chiefs of Staff, when meeting for regular consultations, made up the Combined Chiefs of Staff. Stated briefly, in formulating and supervising the execution of over-all plans and policies relating to such matters as the determination of general requirements based upon approved estimates, allocation of critical materials, assignment of transportation facilities, and the strategic conduct of the war, the work of these two bodies greatly affected the functions of the General Staff and the War Department in the United States. To say the least, therefore, the inclusion of its commanding general in their deliberations enhanced the position of the Army Air Forces far beyond the status implied in the stated mission of the air arm as given in War Department Circular No. 59, 2 March 1942. President Roosevelt himself made that quite clear when he wrote:

...My recognition of the growing importance of air power is made obvious by the fact that the Commanding General of the Army Air Forces is a member of
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both the Joint and Combined Chiefs of Staff. The Air Forces, both in the Army
and in the Navy, have a strong voice in shaping and implementing our national
military policy.¹⁹

The position actually held by the military air arm received still further
recognition on 21 July 1943 with the issuance of War Department FM
100–20, Command and Employment of Air Power. On the matter of the
relationship of the different forces this manual categorically stated that:
“Land power and air power are coequal and interdependent; neither is an
auxiliary of the other.” With respect to the doctrine of employment it
asserted, among other things, that the first requirement of any major land
operation was to gain air superiority. By way of a preface to a statement on
command of air power the document pointed out that inherent flexibility
was the greatest asset of air power. In order fully to exploit this quality, as
well as the ability to deliver decisive blows, an air force commander should
exercise command of air power, although it might be delegated through a
superior commander who had charge of both ground and air operations in
a given theater. Air units were not to be attached to ground units, however,
unless the latter were operating independently or “are isolated by distance
or lack of communication.”²⁰ It would appear that this statement on the rela-
tive position and employment of military aviation provided adequate offi-
cial sanction for the oft-repeated contention that far from being merely an
auxiliary of the ground forces the air arm in reality was a striking force in
its own right.²¹

The position which the Army Air Forces had attained through mid-
summer of 1943 remained substantially unchanged for the duration of the
war. Its permanent status, however, was as yet undetermined; for, as has
been pointed out, the most recent changes by which it had advanced toward
autonomy within the War Department, not to say equality with the ground
Army and the Navy, were based upon temporary war powers of the
President and general developments incident to the exigencies of the mili-
tary situation. Consequently, there was but little respite in the movement to
secure congressional action, which would anchor the newly acquired gains
in the bedrock of statutory basis.

During the last nine months of 1942 and through the next two years
there was but relatively little congressional comment on the question of the
organization of the nation’s armed forces. Even so, within that period
nearly twenty different measures, each looking towards the creation of a
separate air force or a three-way department of national defense, were in-
troduced in Congress. Some of them were “repeat performances”; and all
died in committee, without benefit of hearing.²² Therefore, we may dismiss
them from further consideration here and turn our attention to the develop-
A U T O N O M Y  O F  T H E  A I R  A R M

ments, mostly within the higher brackets of the Army and Navy establishments, which led eventually to unification in 1947.

Spurred in no small measure by a growing manifestation of public interest in the question, Senator Pat McCarran on 20 August 1943 (after the issuance but prior to the announcement of FM 100–20) wrote the President a letter urging immediate action to provide a “unified, coordinated, autonomous air force that can make most effective use of the air power with which we must win the war.” If more authority than the President already possessed were necessary, he said, then an appeal should be made for Congress to take further action. It was in reply to this letter that President Roosevelt stated, in substance, that the measure of his recognition of the increasing importance of the air arm was indicated by the inclusion of the Commanding General, Army Air Forces, on the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Combined Chiefs of Staff. At the same time, however, the Chief Executive assured Senator McCarran that the whole subject was under constant consideration at the White House. As he was careful to point out, the Commander-in-Chief did not consider that the ultimate had been accomplished with respect to the organization of the military machine. Yet he feared that any drastic change in the structure “at a time when we are bending every effort toward bringing the war to a rapid conclusion, might result in serious disruption of the war effort.”

It would be difficult to determine positively from the evidence available at present whether the President intended the statement addressed to Senator McCarran as a definitive declaration of administrative policy on the question of a separate air force at that time. Nor, since he was stricken fatally in the spring of 1945, do we know what course of action he would have taken in the immediate postwar period. Beyond a shadow of a doubt, however, at the time of his death the Chief Executive had moved a long way from the position which as Assistant Secretary of the Navy he had taken on the same general question as it shaped up in the days following the First World War.

The idea of a single department of national defense received a considerable boost in the late summer of 1943 with a pronouncement by Admiral Henry E. Yarnell, former Commander-in-Chief, United States Asiatic Fleet, who had been called from retirement to duty in the office of Admiral King. Holding that the final test of war had shown that a separate air force would be altogether inapt, Admiral Yarnell advocated a “Department of War” with a civilian head and a military chief of staff. Stated succinctly, each of the two main divisions of the department designated respectively as material and operations, would have special branches for Army, Navy, and Air. Incidentally, this plan agreed in broad principle with an “unofficial” suggestion made some months earlier by a group of officers on the War Department General Staff, and it was followed by a somewhat elaborate
examination of the question, together with a more detailed proposal, emanating from this same unit of the military organization.

Stressing the need of a single department of national defense to coordinate the various agencies of the nation’s armed forces, the Special Planning Division of the General Staff in a study dated 11 October 1943 asserted that the absence of a real unity of command had hampered the prosecution of the war. Naturally admitting of compromise and delay, the various stopgap arrangements such as temporary committees and coordinating agencies lacked the necessary quality of prompt and decisive action. Both economy and national security, the report continued, demanded that the armed services be coordinated under a unified command; and that each should be assigned its proper role and mission, as a player on a well-balanced team. Requiring the elimination of all overlapping functions, this could be attained best in a single Department of War.

In brief outline, the plan generally recommended a “Department of the Armed Forces” under a secretary directly responsible to the President. Occupying coordinate ranks in the succeeding echelon would be three Undersecretaries, one for the Army, another for the Navy, and the third for Air. Each of these major branches would have a Chief of Staff. In conjunction with a Director of Common Supplies and a Chief of Staff to the President they would make up a unit or council to be known as the “Chiefs of Staff.” Such an organization, the Special Planning Division of the General Staff believed, would shorten the war; promote unity of command; elect much needed economies; eliminate duplication in operations; and improve general efficiency. It urged acceptance of the idea as a whole, but cautioned the War Department to move slowly in working out the details. When no action had been taken after six months, the Special Planning Division insisted that intelligent planning for demobilization demanded an immediate decision on the matter, and that the mission of the various components be defined at least in broad outline.28

Meanwhile an approach to the whole question of postwar planning had been made from an entirely different angle. On 28 March 1944 the House of Representatives set up the Select Committee on Post-War Military Policy. A few days later this group, better known as the Woodrum Committee (named for its chairman, Representative Clifton A. Woodrum of Virginia), began hearings on the third item of its agenda, a single department of the armed forces. Stated more specifically, it was interested in studying the principle of unity of command as practiced in World War II with the view of determining how it might be “applied as a part of future military policy.” The first phase of the investigation was concluded on 19 May following.30

As viewed in relation to this present study, the key testimony before the Woodrum Committee was that offered by Brig. Gen. Heywood S. Han-
sell, Jr., who in presenting the views of the Army Air Forces stressed the need for a unification of land, sea, and air forces under one head for the purpose of flexibility and coordination in operation, together with economy and simplicity in administration. Then, continuing, he added:

Those of us who have seen this war fought, either in the several theaters or on the planning and executive staffs, realize that there is no place in modern war for a separate air force, for a separate army, or for a separate navy. The Army Air Forces advocate, and strongly recommend, the integration of the nation's fighting forces into a single united organization. Hence, our conviction demands unity rather than separation. We believe that current history supports this conclusion.

The advantages to be derived from unity of command in combat operations are so apparent as to require little exposition. In one form or another we have acquired a degree of unity of command in all the theaters of war today. However, the achievement of that unity on the field of battle has been reached with great difficulty, and has resulted in delay with its attendant wastage. Furthermore, unity of command on the field of battle is not enough. In order to achieve real unity of effort the foundations for that unity must stem from unity in basic training, doctrine, and equipment.  

The Assistant Secretary of War for Air, Robert A. Lovett, commented favorably upon the degree of Army-Navy cooperation during the existing world struggle, stating that in Washington alone there were well over seventy committees (topped by the Joint Chiefs of Staff) which functioned in that connection. Such, however, was not sufficient; for, largely because of the pressure by the two services to discharge somewhat overlapping responsibilities in the shortest space of time and in face of desperate need, there "has been less efficient use of military manpower and facilities than would be tolerated under peacetime conditions or in future wars." In the past there had been a tendency to shy away from a serious consideration of a unified service, primarily because of the differences of opinion as to the place of the air arm in the system of national defense. Sober judgment had been difficult because of excessive partisanship, extravagant claims made by fanatics both in and out of the service, and a lack of "battle experience." Secretary Lovett had been convinced that World War II was, as future wars likely would be, "a series of combined operations in each of which Ground, Sea, and Air Forces must be employed together and coordinated under one directing staff and under one over-all command."  

Based upon the assumption that no immediate reorganization of the armed forces would be effected, the views expressed by General Hansell and Secretary Lovett were generally upheld by all War Department and
Army personnel who appeared before the Woodrum Committee, including such others as Secretary Stimson; Undersecretary of War Patterson; General McNarney, now Deputy Chief of Staff; and General Somervell. That was not the case, however, with the Navy group. During the earlier stages of the hearings Undersecretary of the Navy James V. Forrestal (soon, upon the death of the Honorable Frank Knox, to become Secretary, expressed complete accord with the desirability of a thorough examination of the operation of the nation’s war machinery, but explained that he was “not prepared to say that the Navy believes that the consolidation into one department is desirable.” Generally speaking, the views of Secretary Forrestal received the support of the several other witnesses for the Navy Department, with the glaring exception of Admiral Yarnell who took this occasion again to endorse his idea of a single department of national defense. Interestingly enough also, at this time, Josephus Daniels, Secretary of the Navy during the period of World War I, offered testimony in favor of a single department of national defense, but the available record does not show whether he would advocate or even support an arrangement whereby air would occupy a position coordinate with the two traditional branches.

At the conclusion of that phase of its hearings relating to a reorganization of the armed forces the Woodrum Committee submitted a report stating, among other things, that it did not believe the time opportune to consider legislation undertaking to write the pattern of any proposed unification, “even indeed if such consolidation is ultimately decided to be a wise course of action.” Before any final plan of reorganization should be elected Congress ought to have the benefit of the judgment and experience of many of the commanders in the field. A medium for securing that advice and counsel on a fairly large scale had but recently been initiated; for on 9 May 1944 the Joint Chiefs of Staff appointed a committee of outstanding army and naval officers to make a thorough examination of the practicability of maintaining the armed forces on the following basic systems of organization: 1) Two departments—War and Navy; 2) three departments—War, Navy, and Air; and 3) one department—that of War or of Defense.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff Special Committee for the Reorganization of National Defense made a careful study over a period of ten months, which involved extended interviews, investigations, and discussions. The committee toured the European, Mediterranean, Pacific, and Southwest Pacific theaters of operation, consulting fifty-six key military and naval personnel; while twenty-four such individuals appeared as witnesses before the group in Washington, where it held nearly one hundred separate meetings. A report was made 11 April 1945.

The majority of the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Special Committee paid due regard to the ever increasing degree of cooperation on
the part of the War and Navy Departments, together with their numerous agencies and far flung forces, and coordination of effort between them as World War II had progressed. Most important of all, the report held, the two services had learned to understand each other better and to work together as a team, which had caused them to realize that no one branch is sufficient unto itself. Their own travels had indicated to the committee, however, that in areas where unity of command had been established complete integration of effort had not been achieved, because of the inconsistencies, lack of understanding, jealousies, and duplications existing in all theaters of operation. The progress which had been accomplished, moreover, was effected largely through the broad powers granted to the President. These would lapse six months after the war; and unless comprehensive changes were made prior to that time the two major services would revert to their pre-war status, thus losing the gains in efficiency and cooperation which the tentative changes had made possible. For that reason the majority committee report urged prompt statutory action so as to retain the improvements obtained by executive order and administrative procedure.39

The plan proposed was a “single department system of organization of armed forces,” embodying the following principal features: 1) A civilian secretary, directly under the President, as the head of the Department of Armed Forces; 2) an undersecretary, as chief assistant to the Secretary, charged primarily with the administration of business matters; 3) several assistant secretaries, with “such duties as may be assigned”; 4) a military commander of the Armed Forces, who also would be Chief of Staff to the President; 5) three coordinate combat branches, Army, Navy, and Air, with a commanding general each at the head of the first and last, and an admiral commanding the second; and 6) a U. S. Chief of Staff (consisting of the Secretary of the Department, Commander of the Armed Forces, Commanding General of the Army, Admiral of the Navy and Commanding General of the Air Forces to advise the President on matters of military strategy and the allotment of funds to the three divisions of the armed forces.40

The committee maintained that the statutory creation of a coordinate Air Force would merely give formal recognition to a situation which, having evolved through practical experience, really existed already in the form of the Army Air Forces. The complete military strength of the country could not be applied without the full development of air power. So far as this report was concerned, however, that concept embraced more than could be included in the coordinate air division which it recommended. For, as stipulated, so far as could be foreseen, naval aviation as then constituted, should remain an essential part of the sea forces. Likewise, such air activities as those necessary for liaison, artillery-spotting, and technical reconnaissance, should be an integral and essential part of the ground forces.41
Although not accepted by the senior member, the recommendation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Special Committee for a single department of the armed forces of the United States met the approval (as was stated in the text of its report) of Generals of the Army Douglas MacArthur and Dwight D. Eisenhower, Admirals Chester V. Nimitz and William F. Halsey and numerous other leading military and naval personnel.\(^2\) The conclusions in question, however, were not revealed until well after the cessation of hostilities with Hitler's forces in Europe and the Japanese empire in the Far East. Meanwhile there were other significant developments in the history of the movement for the unification of the armed forces.

On 6 January 1945 Senator Lister Hill had introduced a bill providing for a Department of the Armed Forces in lieu of the existing War and Navy Departments. A civilian secretary at the head of the organization would be assisted by three undersecretaries, one each for Army, Navy and Air. The bill made provision further for a United States Chief of Staff composed of a Chief of Staff of the Army (and also the Chief of Staff to the Commander-in-Chief); a Chief of Staff of the Navy; and a Chief of Staff of the Air Forces. An officer of general or flag rank would be designated as Director of Supply. The following October Senator E.C. Johnson offered a bill which would substitute for the Departments of War and Navy a Department of Military Security, with a secretary at the head, broken down into the following six divisions, each in charge of an undersecretary: Scientific Research and Development; Army; Navy; Air; Procurement; and Military Intelligence. Until such time as otherwise provided by Congress, the President would be empowered to take such action as he might deem necessary, not inconsistent with existing laws, to perfect the organization of the Department of Military Security and coordinate its activities.\(^3\) As will appear, the Senate Committee on Military Affairs later conducted hearings on these two proposals. During the year 1945, however, there were two other single department of armed forces bills and four separate department of air measures which failed to receive that degree of consideration.\(^4\)

Meanwhile the Department of the Navy had sponsored a special investigation relative to the position of the military air arm in the machinery of national defense. Motivated by a conviction that instead of merely offering negative criticism the opponents of the proposal to consolidate the War and Navy departments should attempt the formulation of a plan which would be more effective in accomplishing the objective sought, on 15 May 1945 Senator David I. Walsh, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Naval Affairs, suggested that Secretary Forrestal initiate a study with a view of determining whether a planning and coordinating agency, with no executive authority whatever, might not be preferable to the proposed Department of National Defense.\(^5\) The Secretary of Navy commissioned
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Ferdinand Eberstadt, former Chairman of the Army and Navy Munitions Board and Vice Chairman of the War Production Board, to conduct the investigation. He completed the study with the assistance of a large staff, consisting mostly of naval personnel and employees, and made a report to Secretary Forrestal during the latter part of September.  

Somewhat involved with respect to the scope of the specific subject matter treated, the Eberstadt report touched mainly upon such questions as the conduct of World War II, with special emphasis upon Army-Navy cooperation; organizational trends within the two existing defense departments; the history of military and naval air power; and national security and the postwar military organization. In addition, it outlined the movement for the unification of the armed forces during the previous twenty-five years; and, of course, presented certain conclusions and recommendations. The Eberstadt group counselled against a single department of national defense, but at the same time it recommended the organization of the nation's military forces into three coordinate departments: War, Navy, and Air. This would entail the creation of a separate "Military Department for Air," to which would be transferred generally all of the existing functions, jurisdictions, operations, and powers of the Army Air Forces, as well as military air transport. There should be no impairment, however, in the relations between the fleet and the aircraft which "serve with it," nor should the Army surrender control over such air components as were peculiar to its needs. With the Joint Chiefs of Staff as the major link, the report recommended, furthermore, that the departments be knit together closely by committees; and it placed considerable emphasis upon the need for other similar agencies, funneling principally through a National Security Council, immediately under the President, for the purpose of correlating the armed forces with the civilian departments.  

Secretary Forrestal was not ready at once to accept the pertinent conclusions and recommendations which were indicated in the Eberstadt report. This was brought out on 22 October when he testified before the Senate Committee on Military Affairs on the Hill and Johnson bills. Then the Secretary of Navy expressed his opposition to a Department of National Defense; nor was he prepared to accept the proposal that air power warranted the creation of a separate department on parity with War and Navy. He did agree, however, that steps should be taken to prevent the Army Air Forces from reverting automatically to its pre-war status. In that respect Forrestal was in complete accord with an opinion expressed three days earlier by General Arnold who sounded a note on which this study may well be brought to a logical conclusion. Testifying in favor of a single department of national defense, the Commanding General of the Army Air Forces reviewed for the committee in brief, terse language the developments which had occurred with respect to the military air arm dur-
ing the war years. At the time of the French collapse before the German onslaught in 1940 it had consisted of two components: An Air Corps (corresponding to the Artillery, Cavalry, Infantry, and other such branches of the Army) whose basic functions were procurement of materiel and operation of bases, subject to the supervision by Army Corps areas; and the GHQ Air Force, a combat organization directly under the Chief of Staff. There was no air command, nor an air force with the complete air mission. After Pearl Harbor the President's war powers made possible certain changes which theretofore could not have been accomplished. Then in the reorganization of the Army Air Forces on 9 March 1942. Secretary Stimson and General Marshall—to both of whom, incidentally General Arnold paid "sincere tribute"—took advantage of an opportunity to create an air arm which was co-equal with the ground forces. At about the same time the witness had begun his service on the Joint Chiefs of Staff. These various steps provided for fundamental air power the nearest approach to a coordinate status with the Army and Navy that was possible under existing law. Unless, therefore, "action is taken by this committee and the Congress," General Arnold forcibly pointed out, within "six months after the termination of hostilities" the Army Air Forces would revert to the status which existed at the time the United States became an active participant in World War II.49

Hearings on the two unification bills continued over a period of two months. In addition to that of General Arnold the proposal for a single department of national defense received the endorsement of numerous other War Department representatives, including Secretary of War Patterson General Marshall; General Omar N. Bradley; General Spaatz; and Lt. Gen. J.L. Collins who presented a specific plan which had been based generally upon the proposal previously submitted by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Supporting Secretary Forrestal in opposition to a single department of national defense and other features of unification, but in favor of a "coordination" principle as generally set forth in the Eberstadt report, were such other Navy personnel as Assistant Secretary H.S. Hensel, Admiral King, Admiral Leahy, Admiral Halsey, and Admiral Nimitz.50

The Senate Committee on Military Affairs failed to submit a report on the unification bills which formed the basis of these hearings. Two days after they had been concluded, however, President Harry S. Truman, in a lengthy message to Congress advocated legislation which would combine the War and Navy Departments into "one single Department of National Defense," along the lines proposed by the Committee of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the plan outlined by General Collins. A detailed analysis of the President's suggestions for the reorganization of the administration of the nation's armed forces cannot be given here. Yet both timeliness and significance characterized some of the supplementary observations which he
made. Among these was a reminder to the effect that when the United States entered World War II there were two separate and independent departments, with no well-defined habits of collective action or coordination; nor was air power organized on a basis of parity with the ground and sea forces. Expedients for overcoming these defects—improvisations which may well have spelled the difference between defeat and victory—took form in the creation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and certain changes made in the organization of the War and Navy Departments under the temporary War Powers Act. And then, as though echoing the words uttered a few weeks earlier by General Arnold, President Truman asserted that unless "the Congress acts before these powers lapse, these departments will revert to their pre-war organizational status." The Chief Executive was interested in providing "parity" for air power, which, he said, had developed to such an extent that its responsibilities were equal to those of the land and sea forces and its contributions to strategic planning fully as great. He asserted that the appropriate status for the Army Air Forces could be achieved advantageously either in one department or three, but not in two; and, as between one and three, the former positively would be more desirable.31

In such a manner for the first time in the history of American aviation the Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces definitely took a stand in favor of an independent military air arm. Though far from providing the initial impulse, the President's message of 19 December 1945 contributed considerable impetus to a series of developments within the executive and legislative branches of the government which led directly, if belatedly, to the adoption of the National Security Act of 1947. Thus, as events proved, theoretical autonomy within the framework of the War Department established as an expedient during the war years, proved for the Army Air Forces to be only the prelude to a permanent status coordinate with the Army and Navy in a system of national defense, designated initially as the National Military Establishment.
Appendices
OFFICE MEMORANDUM NO. 6

An Aeronautical Division of this office is hereby established, to take effect this date.

This division will have charge of all matters pertaining to military ballooning, air, machines, and all kindred subjects. All data on hand will be carefully classified and plans perfected for future tests and experiments. The operations of this division are strictly confidential, and no information will be given out by any party except through the Chief Signal Officer of the Army or his authorized representative.

Captain Charles DeF. Chandler, Signal Corps, is detailed in charge of this division, and Corporal Edward Ward and First-class Private Joseph E. Barrett will report to Captain Chandler for duty in this division under his immediate direction.

J. ALLEN

Brigadier General,
Chief Signal Officer of the Army
Appendix B

An Act To increase the efficiency of the aviation service of the Army, and for other purposes.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress, assembled, that there shall hereafter be, and there is hereby created, an aviation section, which shall be a part of the Signal Corps of the Army, and which shall be, and is hereby, charged with the duty of operating or supervising the operation of all military air craft, including balloons and aeroplanes, all appliances pertaining to said craft, and signaling apparatus of any kind when installed on said craft; also with the duty of training officers and enlisted men in matters pertaining to military aviation.

Sec. 2. That, in addition to such officers and enlisted men as shall be assigned from the Signal Corps at large to executive, administrative, scientific, or other duty in or for the aviation section, there shall be in said section aviation officers not to exceed sixty in number, and two hundred and sixty aviation enlisted men of all grades; and said aviation officers and aviation enlisted men, all of whom shall be engaged on duties pertaining to said aviation section, shall be additional to the officers and enlisted men now allotted by law to the Signal Corps, the commissioned and enlisted strengths of which are hereby increased accordingly.

The aviation officers provided for in this section shall, except as hereinafter prescribed specifically to the contrary, be selected from, among officers holding commissions in the line of the Army with rank below that of Captain, and shall be detailed to serve as such aviation officers for periods of four years, unless sooner relieved, and the provisions of section twenty-seven of the Act of Congress approved February second, nineteen hundred and one (Thirty-first Statutes, page seven hundred and fifty-five) are hereby extended so as to apply to said aviation officers and to the vacancies created in the line of the Army by the detail of said officers therefrom, but nothing in said Act or in any other law now in force shall be held to prevent the detail or redetail at any time to fill a vacancy among the aviation officers authorized by this Act, of any officer holding a commission in the line of the Army with rank below that of captain, and
who during prior service as an aviation officer in the aviation section, shall have become especially proficient in military aviation.

There shall also be constantly attached to the aviation section a sufficient number of aviation students to make, with the aviation officers actually detailed in said section under the provisions of this Act, a total number of sixty aviation officers and aviation students constantly under assignment to, or detail in, said section. Said aviation students, all of whom shall be selected on the recommendation of the chief signal officer from among unmarried lieutenants of the line of the Army not over thirty years of age, shall remain attached to the aviation section for a sufficient time, but in no case to exceed one year, to determine their fitness or unfitness for detail as aviation officers in said section, and their detachment from their respective arms of service which under assignment to said section shall not be held to create in said arms vacancies that may be filled by promotions or original appointments: Provided, that no person, except in time of war, shall be assigned or detailed against his will to duty as an aviation student or an aviation officer: Provided further, That whenever, under such regulations as the Secretary of War shall prescribe and publish to the Army, an officer assigned or detailed to duty of any kind in or with the aviation section shall have been found to be inattentive to his duties, inefficient, or incapacitated from any cause whatever for the full and efficient discharge of all duties that might properly be imposed upon him if he should be continued on duty in or with said section, said officer shall be returned forthwith to the branch of the service in which he shall hold a commission.

Sec. 3. That the aviation officers hereinbefore provided for shall be rated in two classes, to wit, as junior military aviators and as military aviators. Within sixty days after this Act shall take effect the Secretary of War may, upon the recommendation of the Chief Signal Officer, rate as junior military aviators any officers with rank below that of captain, who are now on aviation duty and who have, or shall have before the date of rating so authorized, shown by practical tests, including aerial flights, that they are especially well qualified for military aviation service; and after said rating shall have been made the rating of junior military aviator shall not be conferred upon any person except as hereinafter provided.

Each aviation student authorized by this Act shall, while on duty that requires him to participate regularly and frequently in aerial flights, receive an increase of 25 per centum in the pay of his grade and length of service under his line commission. Each duly qualified junior military aviator shall, while so serving, have the rank, pay, and allowance of one grade higher than that held by him under his line commission, provided that his rank under said commission be not higher than that of first lieutenant, and, while on duty, requiring
him to participate regularly and frequently in aerial flights, he shall receive in
addition an increase of 50 per centum in the pay of his grade and length of ser-
vice under his line of commission. The rating of military aviator shall not be
hereafter conferred upon or held by any person except as hereinafter provided,
and the number of officers with that rating shall at no time exceed fifteen. Each
military aviator who shall hereafter have duly qualified as such under the pro-
visions if this Act shall, while so serving, have the rank, pay, and allowances
of one grade higher than that held by him under his line commission, provided
that his rank under said commission be not higher than that of first lieutenant,
and, while on duty requiring him to participate regularly and frequently in aer-
ial flights, he shall receive in addition an increase of 75 per centum of the pay
of his grade and length of service under his line commission.

The aviation enlisted men hereinbefore provided for shall consist of twelve
master signal electrician's, twelve first-class sergeants, twenty-four sergeants,
seventy-eight corporals, eight cooks, eighty-two first-class privates and
forty-four privates. Not to exceed forty of said enlisted men shall at any one
time have the rating of aviation mechanician, which rating is hereby estab-
lished, and said rating shall not be conferred upon any person except as here-
inafter provided: Provided, That twelve enlisted men at a time shall, in the dis-
ccretion of the officer in command of the aviation section, be instructed in
the art of flying, and no enlisted man shall be assigned to duty as an aerial flyer
against his will except in time of war. Each aviation enlisted man, while on
duty that requires him to participate regularly and frequently in aerial flights,
or while holding the rating of aviation mechanician, shall receive an increase
of fifty per centum in his pay: Provided further, That, except as hereinafter
provided in the cases of officers now on aviation duty, no person shall be
detailed as an aviation officer, or rated as a junior military aviator, or as a mil-
itary aviator, or as an aviation mechanician, until there shall have been issued
to him a certificate to the effect that he is qualified for the detail or rating, or
for both the detail and the rating, sought or proposed in his case, and no such
certificate shall be issued to any person until an aviation examining board,
which shall be composed of three officers of experience in the aviation service
and two medical officers, shall have examined him, under general regulations
to be prescribed by the Secretary of War and published to the Army by the War
Department, and shall have reported him to be qualified for the detail or rat-
ing, or for both the detail and the rating, sought or proposed in his case: Pro-
vided further, That the Secretary of War shall cause appropriate certificates
of qualification to be issued by the Adjutant General of the Army to all officers
and enlisted men who shall have been found and reported by aviation examin-
ing boards in accordance with the terms of this Act, to be qualified for the
details and ratings for which said officers and enlisted men shall have been
examined: Provided further, That except as hereinbefore are provided in the
cases of officers who are now on aviation duty and who shall be rated as junior military aviators as hereinbefore are authorized, no person shall be detailed for service as an aviation officer in the aviation section until he shall have served creditably as an aviation student for a period to be fixed by the Secretary of War; and no person shall receive the rating of military aviator until he shall have served creditably for at least three years as an aviation officer with the rating of junior military aviator: Provided further, That there shall be paid to the widow of any officer or enlisted man who shall die as the result of an aviation accident, not the result of his own misconduct, or to any other person designated by him in writing, and amount equal to one year's pay at the rate to which such officer or enlisted man was entitled at the time of the accident resulting in his death, but any payment made in accordance with the terms of this provision account of the death of any officer or enlisted man shall be in lieu of and a bar to any payment under the Acts of Congress approved May eleventh, nineteen hundred and eight, and March third, nineteen hundred and nine (Thirty-fifth Statutes, pages one hundred and eight and seven hundred and fifty-five), on account of death of said officer or enlisted man.

Approved, July 18, 1914.
Appendix C

An Act For making further and more effectual provision for the national defense, and for other purposes.

* * * * *

Sec. 13. THE SIGNAL CORPS.—The Signal Corps shall consist of one Chief Signal Officer, with the rank of brigadier general; three colonels; eight lieutenant colonels; ten majors; thirty captains; seventy-five first lieutenants; and the aviation section, which shall consist of one colonel; one lieutenant colonel; eight majors; twenty-four captains; and one hundred and fourteen first lieutenants, who shall be selected from among officers of the Army at large of corresponding grades or from among officers of the grade below, exclusive of those serving by detail in staff corps or departments, who are qualified as military aviators, and shall be detailed to serve as aviation officers for periods of four years unless sooner relieved; and the provisions of section twenty-seven of the Act of Congress approved February second, nineteen hundred and one, are hereby extended to apply to said aviation officers and to vacancies created in any arm, corps, or department of the Army by the detail of said officers therefrom; but nothing in said Act or in any other law now in force shall be held to prevent the detail or redetail at any time, to fill a vacancy among the aviation officers authorized by this Act, of any officer who, during prior service as an aviation officer of the aviation section, shall have become proficient in military aviation.

Aviation officers may, when qualified therefor, be rated as junior military aviators or as military aviators, but no person shall be so rated until there shall have been issued to him a certificate to the effect that he is qualified for the rating, and no certificate shall be issued to any person until an aviation examining board, which shall be composed of three officers of experience in the aviation service and two medical officers, shall have examined him, under general regulations to be prescribed by the Secretary of War and published to the Army by the War Department, and shall have reported him to be qualified for the rating. No person shall receive the rating of military aviator until he shall have served creditably for three years as an aviation officer with the rating of a junior military aviator.
Each aviation officer authorized by this Act shall, while on duty that requires him to participate regularly and frequently in aerial flights, receives an increase of twenty-five per centum in the pay of his grade and length of service under his commission. Each duly qualified junior military aviator shall, while so serving, have the rank, pay, and allowances of one grade higher than held by him under his commission if his rank under said commission be not higher than that of captain, and while on duty requiring him to participate regularly and frequently in aerial flights he shall receive in addition an increase of fifty per centum in the pay of his grade and length of service under his commission. Each military aviator shall, while so serving, have the rank, pay, and allowances of one grade higher than that held by him under his commission if his rank under said commission be not higher than that of captain, and while on duty requiring him to participate regularly and frequently in aerial flights he shall receive in addition an increase of seventy-five per centum of the pay of his grade and length of service under his commission: Provided further, That the provisions of the Act of March second, nineteen hundred and thirteen, allowing increase of pay and allowances to officers detailed by the Secretary of War on aviation duty, are hereby repealed: Provided further, That hereafter married officers of the line of the Army shall be eligible equally with unmarried officers, and subject to the same conditions, for detail to aviation duty, and the Secretary of War shall have authority to cause as many enlisted men of the aviation section to be instructed in the art of flying as he may deem necessary: Provided further, That hereafter the age of officers shall not be a bar of their first detail in the aviation section of the Signal Corps, and neither their age nor their rank shall be a bar to their subsequent details in said section: Provided further, That, when it shall be impracticable to obtain from the Army officers suitable for the aviation section of the Signal Corps in the number allowed by law the difference between that number and the number of suitable officers actually available for duty in said section may be made up by appointments in the grade of aviator, Signal Corps, and that grade is hereby created. The personnel for said grade shall be obtained for especially qualified civilians who shall be appointed and commissioned in said grade: Provided further, That whenever any aviator shall have become unsatisfactory he shall be discharged from the Army as such aviator. The base pay of an aviator, Signal Corps, shall be $150 per month, and he shall have the allowances of a master signal electrician and the same percentage of increase in pay for length of service as is allowed to a master signal electrician.

The total enlisted strength of the Signal Corps shall be limited and fixed from time to time by the President in accordance with the needs of the Army, and shall consist of master signal electrician’s, sergeants, first class; sergeants; corporals; cooks; horseshoers; private, first class; and privates; the number in
each grade being iced from time to time by the President. The numbers in the various grades shall not exceed the following percentages of the total authorized enlisted strength of the Signal Corps, namely: Master signal electrician’s, two per centum; sergeants, first class, seven per centum; sergeants, ten per centum; corporals, twenty per centum. The number of privates, first class, shall not exceed twenty-five per centum of the number of privates. Authority is hereby given the President to organize, in his discretion, such part of the commissioned and enlisted personnel of the Signal Corps into such number of companies, battalions, and aero squadrons as the necessities of the service may demand.

Approved, June 3, 1916.
Appendix D

An Act To create the Aircraft Board and provide for its maintenance.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That for the purpose of expanding and coordinating the industrial activities relating to aircraft, or parts of aircraft, produced for any purpose in the United States, and to facilitate generally the development of air service, a board is hereby created, to be known as the Aircraft Board, hereinafter referred to as the board.

Sec. 2. That the board shall number not more than nine in all, and shall include a civilian chairman, the Chief Signal Officer of the army, and two other officers of the Army, to be appointed by the Secretary of War; the Chief Constructor of the Navy and two other officers of the Navy to be appointed by the Secretary of the Navy; and two additional civilian members. The chairman and civilian members shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.

Sec. 3. That said board and tenure of office of the members thereof shall continue during the pleasure of the President, but not longer than six months after the present war. The civilian members of the board shall serve without compensation.

Sec. 4. That the board is hereby empowered, under the direction and control of and as authorized by the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy, respectively, on behalf of the Departments of War and Navy to supervise and direct, in accordance with the requirements prescribed or approved by the respective departments, the purchase, production, and manufacture of aircraft, engines, and all ordnance and instruments used in connection therewith, and accessories and materials therefor, including the purchase, lease, acquisition, or construction of plants for the manufacture of aircraft, engines, and accessories: Provided, That the board may make recommendations as to contracts and their distribution in connection with the foregoing, but every contract shall be made by the already constituted authorities of the respective departments.

Sec. 5. That the board is also empowered to employ, either in the District of Columbia or elsewhere, such clerks and other employees as may be necessary
to the conduct of its business, including such technical experts and advisers as may be found necessary, and to fix their salaries. Such salaries shall conform to those usually paid by the Government for similar service: Provided, That by unanimous approval of the board higher compensation may be paid to technical experts and advisers. The board may rent suitable offices in the District of Columbia or elsewhere, purchase necessary office equipment and supplies, including scientific publications and printing, and may incur necessary administrative and contingent expenses, and for all of the expenses enumerated in this paragraph there shall be allotted by the Chief Signal Officer of the Army for the fiscal year nineteen hundred and seventeen and nineteen hundred and eighteen the sum of $100,000, or so much thereof as shall be necessary from any appropriation now existing for or hereinafter made to the Signal Corps of the Army, and such appropriation is hereby made available for these purposes: Provided further, That except upon the joint and concurrent approval of the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy there shall not be established or maintained under the board any office or organization duplicating or replacing, in whole or in part, any office or organization now existing that can be properly established or maintained by appropriations made for or available for the military or naval services: Provided further, That a report shall be made to Congress on the first day of each regular session of the salaries paid from this appropriation to clerks and employees by grades, and the number in each such grade.

Approved, October 1, 1917.
Appendix E

War Department Announcement, 24 April 1918

Mr. John D. Ryan has accepted the directorship of aircraft production for the Army.

A reorganization of the Aviation Section of the Signal Corps has been also effected, of which the principal elements are as follows:

(General Squier, as Chief Signal Officer, will devote his attention to the administration of signals; a Division of Military Aeronautics is created, under the direction of Brig. Gen. William L. Kenly. The Aircraft Board, created by act of Congress, remains an advisory body, as it has been in the past, with Mr. Ryan as its chairman. This arrangement is made with the entire concurrence of Mr. Howard Coffin, who remains a member of the Advisory Commission of the Council of National Defense and will render assistance and counsel to the Aircraft Board and Mr. Ryan.

The Division of Military Aeronautics will have control of the training of aviators and military use of aircraft. The exact division of functions in the matter of designing and engineering will be worked out as experience determines between the Division of Military Aeronautics and the Division of Production.

This announcement involves no change of personnel in the present Equipment Division of the Signal Corps, of which W. C. Potter is chief, and which will continue under his direction.
Appendix F

PRESIDENTIAL ORDER OF MAY 21, 1918

By virtue of the authority in me vested as Commander in Chief of the Army and by virtue of further authority upon me specifically conferred by "An act authorizing the President to coordinate or consolidate executive bureaus, agencies, and offices, and for other purposes, in the interest of economy and the more efficient concentration of the Government," approved May 20, 1918, I do hereby make and publish the following order:

The powers heretofore conferred by law or by executive order upon and the duties and functions heretofore performed by the Chief Signal Officer of the Army are hereby redistributed as follows:

I.

(1) The Chief Signal Officer of the Army shall have charge, under the direction of the Secretary of War, of all military signal duties, and of books, papers, and devices connected therewith, including telegraph and telephone apparatus and the necessary meteorological instruments for use on target ranges, and other military uses; the construction, repair, and operation of military telegraph lines, and the duty of collecting and transmitting information for the Army by telegraph or otherwise, and all other duties usually pertaining to military signaling; and shall perform such other duties as now are or shall hereafter be devolved by law or by Executive order upon said Chief Signal Officer which are not connected with the Aviation Section of the Signal Corps or with the purchase, manufacture, maintenance, and production of aircraft, and which are not hereafter conferred, in special or general terms, upon other officers or agencies.

(2) A Director of Military Aeronautics, selected and designated by the Commander in Chief of the Army, shall hereafter have charge, under the direction of the Secretary of War, of the Aviation Section of the Signal Corps of the Army, and as such shall be, and he hereby is, charged with the duty of operat-
ing and maintaining or supervising the operation and maintenance of all mili-
tary aircraft, including balloons and airplanes, all appliances pertaining to said
aircraft and signaling apparatus of any kind when installed on said aircraft, and
of training of officers, enlisted men, and candidates for aviation service in mat-
ters pertaining to military aviation, and shall hereafter perform each and every
function heretofore imposed upon and performed by the Chief Signal Officer
of the Army in, or in connection with, the Aviation Section of the Signal Corps,
except such as pertains to the purchase, manufacture, and production of air-
craft and aircraft equipment and as is not hereinafter conferred, in special or
general terms, upon the Bureau of Aircraft Production; and all airplanes now
in use or completed and on hand and all material and parts, and all machinery,
tools, appliances, and equipment held for use for the maintenance thereof; all
lands, buildings, repair shops, warehouses, and all other property, real, per-
sonal, or mixed, heretofore used by the Signal Corps in, or in connection with,
the operation and maintenance of aircraft and the training of officers, enlisted
men, and candidates for aviation service, or procured and now held for such
use by or under the jurisdiction and control of the Signal Corps of the Army;
all books, records, files, and office equipment heretofore used by the Signal
Corps in, or in connection with, such operation, maintenance, and training; and
the entire personnel of the Signal Corps as at present assigned to, or engaged
upon work in, or in connection with, such operation, maintenance, and train-
ing, is hereby transferred from the jurisdiction of the Chief Signal Office and
placed under the jurisdiction of the Director of Military Aeronautics; it being
the intent hereof to transfer from the jurisdiction of the Chief Signal Officer to
the jurisdiction of the said Director of Military Aeronautics every function,
power, and duty conferred and imposed upon said Director of Military
Aeronautics by subparagraph (2) of paragraph I hereof all property of every
sort of nature used or procured for use in, or in connection with, the functions
of the Aviation Section, of the Signal Corps placed in charge of the Director of
Military Aeronautics by subparagraph (2) of paragraph I hereof, and the entire
personnel of the Signal Corps in charge of the Director of Military Aeronautics
by subparagraph (2) of paragraph I hereof.

(3) An executive agency, known as the Bureau of Aircraft Production, is
hereby established, and said agency shall exercise full, complete, and exclu-
sive jurisdiction and control over the production of airplanes, airplane engines,
and aircraft equipment for the use of the Army, and to that end shall forthwith
assume control and jurisdiction over all pending Government projects having
to do or connected with the production of airplanes, airplane engines, and air-
craft equipment for the Army and heretofore conducted by the Signal Corps of
the Army, under the jurisdiction of the Chief Signal Officer; and all material
on hand for such production, all unfinished airplanes and airplane engines, and
AUTONOMY OF THE AIR ARM

all unfinished, unattached, or unassembled aircraft equipment; all lands, build-
ings, factories, warehouses, machinery, tools, and appliances, and all other
property, real, personal, or mixed, heretofore used in or in connection with
such production, or procured and now held for such use, by or under the juris-
diction and control of the Signal Corps of the Army; all books, records, files,
and office equipment used by the said Signal Corps in or in connection with
such production; all rights under contracts made by the Signal Corps in or in
connection with such production; and the entire personnel of the Signal Corps
as at present assigned to or engaged upon work in or in connection with such
production are hereby transferred from the jurisdiction of the Signal Corps and
placed under the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Aircraft Production, it being the
intent hereof to transfer from the jurisdiction of the Signal Corps to the juris-
diction of the said Bureau of Aircraft Production every function, power, and
duty connected with said production, all property of every sort or nature used
or procured for use in or in connection with said production, and the entire per-
sonnel of the Signal Corps, as at present assigned to or engaged upon work in
or in connection with such production.

Such person as shall at the time be chairman of the Aircraft Board created
by the Act of Congress approved October 1, 1917, shall also be the executive
officer of said Bureau of Aircraft Production, and he shall be, and he hereby is,
designated as Director of Aircraft Production, and he shall, under the direction
of the Secretary of War, have charge of the activities, personnel, and properties
of said bureau.

II.

All unexpended funds of appropriations heretofore made for the Signal
Corps of the Army and already specifically allotted for use in connection with
the functions of the Signal Service as defined and limited by subparagraph (1)
of Paragraph I hereof shall be and remain under the jurisdiction of the Chief
Signal Officer; all such funds already specifically allotted for use in connec-
tion with the functions of the Aviation Section of the Signal Corps as defined
and limited by subparagraph (2) of Paragraph I hereof are hereby transferred
to and placed under the jurisdiction of the Director of Military Aeronautics for
the purpose of meeting the obligations and expenditures authorized by said
section; all such funds already specifically allotted for use in connection with
the functions hereby bestowed upon the Bureau of Aircraft Production, as
defined and limited by subparagraph (3) of Paragraph I hereof, are hereby
dered to and placed under the jurisdiction of said Director of Aircraft
Production for the purpose of meeting the obligations and expenditures autho-
APPENDIX F

rized by said bureau in carrying out the duties and functions hereby transferred to and bestowed upon said bureau; and in so far as such funds have not been already specifically allotted to the different fields of activity of the Signal Corps as heretofore existing, they shall now be allotted by the Secretary of War in such proportions as shall to him seem best intended to meet the requirements of the respective fields of former activity of the Signal Corps and the intention of Congress when making said appropriations, and the funds so allotted by the Secretary of War to meet expenditures in the field of activity of the Aviation Section of the Signal Corps are hereby transferred to and placed under the jurisdiction of the Director of Military Aeronautics for the purpose of meeting the obligations and expenditures authorized by said section; and the funds so allotted by the Secretary of War to meet the expenditures in that part of the field of activity of the Signal Corps, which includes the functions hereby transferred to the Bureau of Aircraft Production, are hereby transferred to and placed under the jurisdiction of the Director of Aircraft Production for the purpose of meeting the obligations and expenditures authorized by said bureau.

III.

This order shall be and remain in full force and effect during the continuance of the present war and for six months after the termination thereof by the proclamation of the treaty of peace, or until theretofore amended, modified, or rescinded.

Under this order Mr. John D. Ryan continued as Director of Aircraft Production and Maj. Gen. William L. Kenly became Director of Military Aeronautics.
Appendix G

An Act To amend an Act entitled "An Act for making further and more effectual provision for the national defense, and for other purposes," approved June 3, 1916, and to establish military justice.

* * * * *

Sec. 2. COMPOSITION OF THE REGULAR ARMY.—The Regular Army of the United States shall consist of the Infantry, the Cavalry, the Field Artillery, the Coast Artillery Corps, the Air Service, the Corps of Engineers, the Signal Corps, which shall be designated as the combatant arms or the line of the Army...

* * * * *

Sec. 13a. AIR SERVICE.—There is hereby created an Air Service. The Air Service shall consist of one Chief of the Air Service with the rank of major general, one assistant with the rank of brigadier general, one thousand five hundred and fourteen officers in grades from colonel to second lieutenant, inclusive, and sixteen thousand enlisted men, including not to exceed two thousand five hundred flying cadets, such part of whom as the President may direct being formed into tactical units, organized as he may prescribe: Provided, That not to exceed 10 per centum of the officers in each grade below that of brigadier general who fail to qualify as aircraft pilots or as observers within one year after the date of detail or assignment shall be permitted to remain detailed or assigned to the Air Service. Flying units shall in all cases be commanded by flying officers. Officers and enlisted men of the Army shall receive an increase of 50 per centum of their pay while on duty requiring them to participate regularly and frequently in aerial flights; and hereafter no person shall receive additional pay for aviation duty except as prescribed in this section: Provided, That nothing in this Act shall be construed as amending existing provisions of law relating to flying cadets.

* * * * *

Sec. 127a. MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS.—Hereafter no detail, rating or assignment of an officer shall carry advanced rank except as otherwise
specifically provided, That in lieu of the 50 per centum increase of pay provided for in this Act any officer or enlisted man upon whom the rating of junior military aviator or military aviator, has heretofore been conferred for having specially distinguished himself in time of war in active operations against the enemy, shall, while on duty which requires him to participate regularly and frequently in aerial flights, continue to have the rank, pay, and allowances and additional pay now provided by the Act of June 3, 1916, and the Act of July 24, 1917.

* * * * *

Approved, June 4, 1920.
Appendix H

An Act To provide more effectively for the national defense by increasing the efficiency of the Air Corps of the Army of the United States, and for other purposes.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the Act entitled “An Act for making further and more effectual provision for the national defense, and for other purposes,” approved June 3, 1916, as amended, be, and the same is hereby, amended so that the Air Service referred to in that Act and in all subsequent Acts of Congress shall be known as the Air Corps.

Sec. 2. COMPOSITION OF THE AIR CORPS.—That section 13a of the Act entitled “An Act for making further and more effectual provision for the national defense, and for other purposes,” approved June 3, 1916 as amended, be, and the same is hereby, amended by striking out the same and inserting the following in lieu thereof:

Sec. 13a. AIR CORPS.—There is hereby created an Air Corps. The Air Corps shall consist of one Chief of the Air Corps, with the rank of major general; three assistants, with, the rank of brigadier general; one thousand five hundred and fourteen officers in grades from colonel to second lieutenant, inclusive; and sixteen thousand enlisted men, including not to exceed two thousand five hundred flying cadets, such part of whom as the President may direct being formed into tactical units or bands, organized as he may prescribe: Provided, That the Chief of the Air Corps, at least two brigadier generals, and at least 90 per centum of the officers in each grade below that of brigadier shall be flying officers: Provided further, That in time of war 10 per centum of the total number of officers that may be authorized for the Air Corps for such war may be immediately commissioned as nonflying officers; Provided further, That as soon as a sufficient number can be trained, at least 90 per centum of the total number of officers authorized for the Air Corps for such war shall be flying officers: Provided further, that hereafter in time of peace in order to insure that the commissioned officers of the Air Corps shall be properly qualified flying officers and, for the purpose of giving officers of the Army an
opportunity to so qualify, the Secretary of War is hereby authorized to detail to
the Air Corps Officers of all grades and such officers shall start flying training
immediately upon being so detailed, but hereafter such officers shall not
remain detailed to the Air Corps for a period in excess of one year or be per-
manently commissioned therein unless they qualify as flying officers:
Provided further, That any officer who is specifically recommended by the
Secretary of War because of special qualifications other than as a flyer may be
detailed to the Air Corps, for a period longer than one year, or may be perma-
nently commissioned in the Air Corps, but such officers, together with those
flying officers who shall have become disqualified for flying, shall not be
included among the 90 per centum of flying officers: And provided further,
That nothing in this Act shall be construed to limit the number of officers in
each grade that may be detailed to the Air Corps for training as flying officers
except that the total number of officers allotted to the Air Corps shall not be
exceeded. Flying units shall in all cases be commanded by flying officers.
Wherever used in this Act a flying officer in time of peace is defined as one
who has received an aeronautical rating as a pilot of service types of aircraft:
Provided, That all officers of the Air Corps now holding any rating as a pilot
shall be considered as flying officers within the meaning of this Act: Provided
further, That hereafter in order to receive a rating as a pilot in time of peace an
officer or an enlisted man must fly in heavier-than-air craft at least two hun-
dred hours while acting as a pilot, seventy-five of which must be alone, and
must successfully complete the course prescribed by competent authority: And
provided further, That in time of war a flying officer may include any officer
who has received an aeronautical rating as a pilot of service types of air craft
and also in time of war may include any officer who has received an aeronau-
tical rating as observer. Officers and enlisted men of the Army shall receive an
increase of 50 per centum of their pay when by orders of competent authority
they are required to participate regularly and frequently in aerial flights, and
when in consequence of such orders they do participate in regular and frequent
aerial flights as defined by such Executive orders as have heretofore been, or
may hereafter be, promulgated by the President: Provided, That nothing in this
Act shall be construed as amending existing provisions of law relating to fly-
ing cadets. On and after July 1, 1929, and in time of peace, not less than 20 per
centum of the total number of pilots employed in tactical units of the Air Corps
shall be enlisted men, except when the Secretary of War shall determine that it
is impractical to secure that number of enlisted pilots.

* * * * *

Sec. 5. AIR SECTIONS OF THE GENERAL STAFF.—That section 5 of
the Act entitled “An Act for making further and more effectual provisions for
the national defense, and for other purposes,” approved June 3, 1916, as
amended, be, and the same is hereby, amended by adding the following paragraph at the end thereof:

“That for the period of three years immediately following July 1, 1926, there is hereby created in each of the divisions of the War Department General Staff an air section to be headed by an officer of the Air Corps, the duties of which shall be to consider and recommend proper action on such air matters as may be referred to such division.”

* * * * *

Sec. 7. APPOINTMENT OF CHIEF OF THE AIR CORPS.—That the third sentence of section 4c of the Act entitled “An Act for making further and more effectual provision for the national defense, and for other purposes,” approved June 3, 1916, as amended, be, and the same is hereby, amended by adding thereto the following:

“And provided further, That during the period of seven years immediately following July 1, 1926, any appointment as Chief of the Air Corps shall be made from among officers of any grade of not less than fifteen years’ commissioned service, and from those who have demonstrated by actual and extended service in such corps that they are qualified for such appointment; and as assistants from among officers of not less than fifteen years’ commissioned service of similar qualifications: Provided, That the Chief of the Air Corps shall make recommendations to the Secretary of War for the appointment of his assistants.”

Sec. 8. FIVE-YEAR AIR CORPS PROGRAM.—For the purpose of increasing the efficiency of the Air Corps of the Army and for its further development the following five-year program is authorized:

PERSONNEL.—The number of promotion-list officers now authorized by law in the grade of second lieutenant of the Regular Army, is hereby increased by four hundred and three, and the number of enlisted men now authorized by law for the Regular Army is hereby authorized to be increased by six thousand two hundred and forty: Provided, That the increase in the number of officers and enlisted men herein authorized shall be allotted as hereinafter provided. The present allotment of officers to the Air Corps is hereby authorized to be increased by four hundred and three officers distributed in grades from colonel to second lieutenant, inclusive, and the present allotment of enlisted men to the Air Corps is hereby authorized to be increased by six thousand two hundred and forty enlisted men. The President, is authorized to call to active service, with their consent, such number of Air Corps reserve officers as he may deem
necessary, not to exceed five hundred and fifty, 90 per centum of whom shall serve for periods of not more than one year, and 10 per centum for periods of not more than two years. Provided, That nothing contained in this section shall affect the number of reserve officers that may be called to active duty for periods of less than six months under existing law.

EQUIPMENT.—The Secretary of War is hereby authorized to equip and maintain the Air Corps with not to exceed one thousand eight hundred serviceable airplanes, and such number of airships and free and captive balloons as he may determine to be necessary for training purposes, together with spare parts, equipment, supplies, hangars, and installations necessary for the operation and maintenance thereof. In order to maintain the number specified above, the Secretary of War is hereby authorized to replace obsolete or unserviceable aircraft from time to time: Provided, That the necessary replacement of airplanes shall not exceed approximately four hundred annually: Provided, That the total number of airplanes and airships herein authorized shall be exclusive of those waiting salvage or undergoing experiment or service tests, those authorized by the Secretary of War to be placed in museums and those classified by the Secretary of War as obsolete: And provided further, That the total number of planes authorized in this section shall include the number necessary for the training and equipment of the National Guard and the training of the Organized Reserves as may be determined by the Secretary of War.

METHOD OF INCREASE.—The total increase in personnel and equipment authorized herein shall be distributed over a five-year period beginning July 1, 1926. Not to exceed one-fifth of the total increase shall be made during the first year, and the remainder in four approximately equal increments. The President is hereby authorized to submit to Congress annually estimates of the cost of carrying out the five-year program authorized herein: Provided, That a supplemental estimate for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1927, may be submitted to cover the cost of the first annual increment.

* * * *

Sec. 14. That if any section or provision of this Act shall be held to be invalid, it is hereby provided that all other sections and provisions of this Act not expressly held to be invalid shall continue in full force and effect. No provision of this Act shall be retroactive and the provisions hereof shall take effect upon date of approval thereof, except as otherwise provided for herein, and all Acts or parts of Acts contrary to the provisions of this Act or inconsistent therewith be, and the same are hereby, repealed.

Approved, July 2, 1926.
Appendix I

ARMY REGULATIONS
No. 95–5

WAR DEPARTMENT
Washington, June 20, 1941.

ARMY AIR FORCES
GENERAL PROVISIONS

Composition ............................................ 1
Organization ............................................. 2
Duties of the Chief of the Army Air Forces .......... 3
Duties of the Commanding General, Air Force Combat Command ..................... 4
Duties of the Chief of the Air Corps .................... 5
The Air Council ........................................ 6
Superseding of conflicting regulations .................. 7

1. Composition.—The Army Air Forces shall consist of a Chief of the Army Air Forces and such number of general and other officers, aviation cadets, warrant officers, enlisted men, and other personnel as may be prescribed by law, or in the absence of such prescription, by the President.

2. Organization.—a. The Army Air Forces shall consist of the Headquarters Army Air Forces, the Air Force Combat Command, the Air Corps, and all other air units.

b. The Headquarters Army Air Forces shall consist of the Chief of the Army Air Forces and such staff as he may deem necessary.

c. The Air Force Combat Command shall consist of a commander thereof with the necessary staff and subordinate agencies and facilities, together with such tactical and auxiliary units and troops as may be assigned or attached thereto.
d. The Air Corps shall consist of a Chief thereof with the necessary staff and subordinate agencies and facilities, and the units, troops and personnel which may be assigned or attached thereto.

3. Duties of the Chief of the Army Air Forces.—The Chief of the Army Air Forces pursuant to policies, directives, and instructions from the Secretary of War is charged with the following duties:

   a. The control of the activities of the Air Force Combat Command and of the Air Corps, the preparation of plans pertaining thereto, the supervision and coordination of training of all other air units, and the inspection essential to the fulfillment of these duties.

   b. The determination of requirements of the Army Air Forces with respect to personnel, materiel, equipment, supplies and facilities, and the preparation of necessary plans for the development, organization, equipment, training, tactical operations, supply and maintenance thereof, including oversea garrisons and task forces for theaters of operations and the assignment of personnel and material thereto.

   c. The determination of the Army Forces, financial requirements and the control and supervision of funds appropriated for this purpose.

4. Duties of the Commanding General, Air Force Combat Command.—The Air Force Combat Command, pursuant to policies, directives, and instructions from the Chief of the Army Air Forces, is charged with the following duties:

   a. The control of all aerial operations of the Air Force Combat Command, except for those units thereof assigned or attached to task forces, oversea garrisons or other commanders.

   b. The preparation of plans, when directed by the Chief of the Army Air Forces, for defense against air attack of the continental United States.

   c. Recommendations to the Chief of the Army Air Forces with respect to requirements for personnel, materiel, equipment, supplies, and facilities to maintain or improve the efficiency of the Air Force Combat Command.

   d. The organization of the Air Force Combat Command, its preparation for combat including operational training, and the development of doctrines of air tactics and technique of the Air Forces.

   e. The tactical inspection of Air Force units assigned or attached to other commanders, when directed by higher authority.

   f. Such supply and maintenance activities, essential to the operation of the Air Force Combat Command, as may be prescribed by the Chief of the Army Air Forces.

   g. Recommendations to the Chief of the Army Air Forces relative to Tables of Organization of all elements of the Air Force Combat Command.
AUTONOMY OF THE AIR ARM

h. The command and control of all Air Force Combat Command stations (Air bases) and all personnel, units, and installations thereon, including station complement personnel and activities.

i. Court-martial jurisdiction over all elements of the Air Force Combat Command.

5. Duties of the Chief of the Air Corps.—The Chief of the Air Corps, pursuant to policies, directives, and instructions issued by the Chief of the Army Air Forces, is charged with the following duties:

a. The supervision, unless otherwise delegated, of all activities in connection with research, development, procurement, storage, supply, maintenance, and final disposition of military aircraft, accessories, supplies, facilities, and appurtenances used in connection therewith (except for items which are specifically charged to other agencies of the War Department) including technical inspection and the issuance of pertinent technical instructions.

b. Determination of the Army Air Forces’ requirements in equipment, facilities, and other materiel supplied by other arms and services for installation in military aircrafts, or for use in connection therewith; and passing upon the design, specifications, and performance tests thereof; installing the same and maintaining such portion thereof as is not required to be maintained by the arm or service which supplied it.

c. Providing the War Department with the basis for requirements of personnel, equipment, and stores to be furnished by other arms and services to the Army Air Forces.

d. Preparation of estimates for the Army Air Forces’ appropriations and such control and supervision of funds so appropriated, as may be delegated.


f. Preparation of plans governing the construction of stations of the Army Air Forces.

g. Training of personnel in primary, basic, and advanced pilot functions and specialized nonpilot functions of combat crews, and in all duties involving the care, supply, and maintenance of aeronautical materiel, whether aircraft or equipment and facilities installed thereon or used in connection therewith, and the establishment, operation, and maintenance of schools and allied facilities essential thereto.

h. Recommendations to the Chief of the Army Air Forces relative to Tables of Organization of all elements of the Air Corps.

i. The command and control of all Air Corps stations and all personnel, units, and installations thereon, including station complement personnel and activities.
6. The Air Council.—a. Creation and function.—For the purpose of periodically reviewing and properly coordinating all major aviation projects of the Army, and passing on matters of current policy, there is hereby created The Air Council.

b. Composition.—The Air Council will be composed of the Assistant Secretary of War for Air, ex-official, the Chief of Army Air Forces who will be president of The Air Council, the Chief, War Plans Division (War Department General Staff), the Commanding General, Air Force Combat Command, the Chief of Air Corps, and such other members as may be appointed from time to time by the Secretary of War.

7. Superseding of conflicting regulations.—The provisions of other regulations in conflict with these regulations are hereby superseded.

(A.G. 321.91 (6-18-41).)

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF WAR:

G. C. MARSHALL,
Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:
E. S. ADAMS,
Major General,
The Adjutant General.
Appendix J

EXECUTIVE ORDER 9082

REORGANIZATION OF THE ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES AND TRANSFER OF FUNCTIONS WITHIN THE WAR DEPARTMENT

Under and by virtue of the authority vested in me by Title I of the First War Powers Act, 1941, approved December 18, 1941 (Public Law 354, 77th Congress), and as Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy and as President of the United States, it is hereby ordered as follows:

1. The Army of the United States is recognized to provide under the Chief of Staff a ground force, under a Commanding General, Army Ground Forces; an air force, under a Commanding General, Army Air Forces; and a service of supply command, under a Commanding General, Service of Supply; and such overseas departments, war forces, base commands, defense commands, commands in theaters of operations, and other commands as the Secretary of War may find to be necessary for the national security.

2. The functions, duties, and powers of the Chiefs of the following named branches of the Army of the United States are transferred to the Commanding General, Army Ground Forces: Infantry, Cavalry, Field Artillery, and Coast Artillery Corps (except those relating to procurement, storage, and issue).

3. The functions, duties, and powers of the Commanding General, General Headquarters Air Force (Air Force Combat Command) and of the Chief of the Air Corps are transferred to the Commanding General, Army Air Forces.

4. The functions, duties, and powers of the Chief of Coast Artillery relating to procurement, storage, and issue are transferred to the Commanding General, Services of Supply.

5. Any officers holding offices the functions, duties, and powers of which are transferred by this order shall be reassigned to suitable duties but shall continue to hold their respective offices until vacated.
6. The Secretary of War is authorized and directed to prescribe such func-
tions, duties, and powers of the commanders of the various forces and com-
mands of the Army of the United States and the agencies of the War
Department and to issue from time to time detailed instructions regarding per-
sonnel, funds, records, property, routing of correspondence, and other matters
as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this order. Such duties by
the Secretary of War are to be performed subject always to the exercise by the
President directly through the Chief of Staff of his functions as Commander
in-Chief in relation to strategy, tactics, and operations.

7. This order shall become effective on March 9, 1942 and shall remain in
force during the continuance of the present war and for six months after the
termination thereof.

THE WHITE HOUSE,

February 28, 1942.
Appendix K

Circular No. 59

WAR DEPARTMENT
Washington, March 5, 1942

WAR DEPARTMENT REORGANIZATION

1. The President has approved a reorganization of the War Department and the Army, effective March 9, 1942. Pending the issuance of detailed instructions and changes in regulations, a summary description of the new organizations is furnished for the information and guidance of all concerned.

2.a. The War Department and the Army will be organized so as to provide under the Secretary of War and the Chief of Staff a War Department General Staff, a Ground Force, an Air Force, and a Services of Supply Command, all with headquarters in Washington, D.C., and in addition thereto such number of oversea departments, task forces, base commands, defense commands, commands in theaters of operations, and other commands as may be necessary in the national security. Charts A, B, C, and D, illustrate the organization of the War Department, the Army Ground Forces, the Army Air Forces, and the Services of Supply. It is anticipated that the experience of the first three months under the new organization will indicate the desirability of minor modifications within the principal subdivisions. Recommendations will be submitted accordingly.

b. The functions, duties, and powers of the chiefs of the following arms are transferred to the jurisdiction of the Commanding General, Army Ground Forces: Infantry, Cavalry, Field Artillery, and Coast Artillery Corps (except those relating to procurement, storage, and issue).

c. The functions, duties, and powers of the Commanding General, GHQ Air Force (Air Force Combat Command) and the Chief of the Air Corps are transferred to the jurisdiction of the Commanding General, Army Air Forces.
d. The functions, duties, and powers of the Chief of Coast Artillery relating to procurement, storage, and issue are transferred to the jurisdiction of the Commanding General, Services of Supply.

e. Supply arms and services of War Department offices and agencies will come under the direct command of the Commanding General, Services of Supply as indicated below:

(1) Those parts of the office of the Under Secretary of War engaged in functions of procurement and industrial mobilization.
(2) The Budget Advisory Committee.
(3) The Surgeon General.
(4) The Chief of Engineers (except with respect to civil functions, for which he will report directly to the Secretary of War).
(5) The Chief Signal Officer.
(6) The Quartermaster General.
(7) The Chief of Ordnance.
(8) The Chief of Chemical Warfare Service.
(9) Present supply functions of the Chief of Coast Artillery, and the military and civilian personnel assigned thereto.
(10) The Chief of Finance.
(11) The Judge Advocate General. (Except with respect to courts martial and certain legal matters for which he will report direct to the Secretary of War.) The Commanding Generals, Army Ground Forces and Army Air Forces may request legal opinions from The Judge Advocate General direct.
(12) The Adjutant General.
(13) The Provost Marshal General.
(14) The Chief of Special Services.
(15) The Chief of Chaplains.
(16) All corps area commanders.
(17) All general depots.
(18) Ports of embarkation, staging areas, and regulating and reconsignment stations for oversea shipments.

* * * * *

6. ARMY AIR FORCES.—a. Under policies prescribed by the Chief of Staff, the Commanding General, Army Air Forces, is charged in general with the functions, responsibilities, and authorities of command authorized by law, Army Regulations, and custom over individuals and units assigned to the Army Air Forces.

b. The mission of the Army Air Forces is to procure and maintain equipment peculiar to the Army Air Forces, and to provide air force units properly orga-
organized, trained, and equipped for combat operations. Procurement and related functions will be executed under the direction of the Under Secretary of War.

c. The following duties are specifically assigned to the Army Air Forces:

(1) The operation of Army Air Forces replacement training centers and schools, including officer candidate schools, for the training of personnel in pilot functions and specialist nonpilot functions of combat and ground crews and in all duties involving the care, supply and maintenance of aeronautical materiel.

(2) The provision of basic training for individuals in the Army Air Forces inducted in excess of replacement training center capacity.

(3) The organization of air force tactical units as directed by the War Department.

(4) The training of all tactical units assigned to the Army Air Forces.

(5) The organization, equipment, and training of such task forces.

(6) The development of tactical and training doctrine, tables of organization, tables of basic allowances, military characteristics of aircraft, weapons, and equipment and operational changes needed in equipment, aircraft, and weapons peculiar to the Army Air Forces.

(7) The discharge of personnel functions pertaining to the Army Air Forces.

(8) The assignment of officers of the Army Air Forces including Army Ground Forces and Services of Supply personnel on duty therewith.

(9) The supply of air force personnel and equipment peculiar to the Army Air Forces, to the Army Ground Forces, Services of Supply, defense commands, theaters of operation, and oversea forces in accordance with policies announced by the Chief of Staff.

(10) The approval of general plans governing the construction of stations of the Army Air Forces.

(11) The submission to the Commanding General, Services of Supply, of such recommendations on construction, shelter, training aids, movements, supply, equipment, real estate, estimates of funds, and such other matters as may be necessary.

(12) The control of the expenditure of funds allocated to the Army Air Forces.

(13) The development jointly with the Commanding General, Army Ground Forces, of ground-air support, tactical training, and doctrine in conformity with policies prescribed by the Chief of Staff.

(14) The installation of such specialized air force equipment and materiel as may be provided by the Services of Supply and the maintenance of such portion thereof as is not maintained by the Services of Supply.

(15) The preparation of proposals and recommendations for conducting the design competitions authorized by law.
(16) The command and control of all Army Air Forces stations and bases not assigned to defense commands or theater commanders and all personnel, units, and installations thereon, including station complement personnel and activities.

(17) The supervision of all air force activities in connection with the research, development, procurement, storage, supply, maintenance, and final disposition of military aircraft, accessories, supplies, facilities, and appurtenances used in connection therewith, including technical inspection and issuance of pertinent technical instructions.

(18) All aerial operations of the Army Air Forces except for those units thereof assigned or attached to other commands.

(19) The minimization of the administrative activities of the Army Air Forces by utilizing the services available in the Services of Supply to the maximum degree consistent with proper control of the Army Air Forces.

(20) The use of judicious shortcuts in procedure to expedite operations.

*   *   *   *   *
Appendix L

FIELD SERVICE REGULATIONS
COMMAND AND EMPLOYMENT OF AIR POWER

CHAPTER I
GENERAL

SECTION I
DOCTRINE OF COMMAND AND EMPLOYMENT

1. Relationship of Forces.—LAND POWER AND AIR POWER ARE CO-EQUAL AND INTERDEPENDENT FORCES; NEITHER IS AN AUXILIARY OF THE OTHER.

2. Doctrine of Employment.—THE GAINING OF AIR SUPERIORITY IS THE FIRST REQUIREMENT FOR THE SUCCESS OF ANY MAJOR LAND OPERATION. AIR FORCES MAY BE PROPERLY AND PROFITABLY EMPLOYED AGAINST ENEMY SEA POWER, LAND POWER, AND AIR POWER. HOWEVER, LAND FORCES OPERATING WITHOUT AIR SUPERIORITY MUST TAKE SUCH EXTENSIVE SECURITY MEASURES AGAINST HOSTILE AIR ATTACK THAT THEIR MOBILITY AND ABILITY TO DEFEAT THE ENEMY LAND FORCES ARE GREATLY REDUCED. THEREFORE, AIR FORCES MUST BE EMPLOYED PRIORITALLY AGAINST THE ENEMY'S AIR FORCES UNTIL AIR SUPERIORITY IS OBTAINED. IN THIS WAY ONLY CAN DESTRUCTIVE AND DEMORALIZING AIR ATTACKS AGAINST LAND FORCES BE MINIMIZED AND THE INHERENT MOBILITY OF MODERN LAND AND AIR FORCES BE EXPLOITED TO THE FULLEST.

3. Command of Air Power.—THE INHERENT FLEXIBILITY OF AIR POWER IS ITS GREATEST ASSET. THIS FLEXIBILITY MAKES IT POS-
SIBLE TO EMPLOY THE WHOLE WEIGHT OF THE AVAILABLE AIR
POWER AGAINST SELECTED AREAS IN TURN; SUCH CONCENT-
TRATED USE OF THE AIR STRIKING FORCE IS A BATTLE WINNING
FACTOR OF THE FIRST IMPORTANCE. CONTROL OF AVAILABLE AIR
POWER MUST BE CENTRALIZED AND COMMAND MUST BE EXER-
CISED THROUGH THE AIR FORCE COMMANDER IF THIS INHERENT
FLEXIBILITY AND ABILITY TO DELIVER A DECISIVE BLOW ARE TO
BE FULLY EXPLOITED. THEREFORE, THE COMMAND OF AIR AND
GROUND FORCES IN A THEATER OF OPERATIONS WILL BE VESTED
IN THE SUPERIOR COMMANDER CHARGED WITH THE ACTUAL
CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS IN THE THEATER, WHO WILL EXERCISE
COMMAND OF AIR FORCES THROUGH THE AIR FORCE COMMAN-
DER AND COMMAND OF GROUND FORCES THROUGH THE
GROUND FORCE COMMANDER. THE SUPERIOR COMMANDER
WILL NOT ATTACH ARMY AIR FORCES TO UNITS OF THE GROUND
FORCES UNDER HIS COMMAND EXCEPT WHEN SUCH GROUND
FORCE UNITS ARE OPERATING INDEPENDENTLY OR ARE ISO-
LATED BY DISTANCE OR LACK OF COMMUNICATION.

SECTION II
MILITARY AVIATION

4. GENERAL CATEGORIES.—Aviation of the United States Army,
referred to herein as military aviation, falls into two general categories as fol-
loows:

a. Aviation directly under command and control of the Commanding
General, Army Air Forces. Included in this category are—

(1) All nontactical elements of the Army Air Forces such as those used for
training, research, development, test, procurement, storage, issue,
maintenance, and transport.
(2) All tactical units of the Army Air Forces not assigned to a theater or
task force Commander.

b. Aviation directly under command and control of other commanders. (The
Commanding General, Army Air Forces, has such technical command of this
aviation as is necessary for the control and supervision of training and the sup-
ply and maintenance of equipment peculiar to the Army Air Forces.) This cat-
egory consists of air forces assigned to theater or task force commanders.

5. TYPES OF TACTICAL AVIATION.—In accordance with the purpose for
which various types of aircraft are ordinarily employed, tactical aviation is
organized, trained, and equipped to engage in offensive and defensive air op-
erations. Corresponding to the means with which equipped, tactical aviation is
AUTONOMY OF THE AIR ARM

divided into bombardment, fighter, reconnaissance, photographic, and troop-carrier aviation.

a. Bombardment aviation is the term applied to all aircraft designed for the air attack of surface objectives, and the organizations equipped with such aircraft.

b. Fighter aviation is the term applied to all aircraft designed for offensive air fighting, and the organizations equipped with such aircraft. (Fighterbomber aircraft are fighters modified so that they may attack surface objectives.)

c. Reconnaissance aviation is the term applied to air units which perform the service of information for military commands. The function of reconnaissance aviation is to secure information by visual and photographic means and to return this information for exploitation.

d. Photographic aviation is the term applied to air units which perform photographic reconnaissance missions beyond the responsibilities or capabilities of reconnaissance aviation and special photogrametric mapping missions for engineer topographic troops.

e. Troop carrier (including gliders) is the term applied to air units which carry parachute troops, airborne troops, and cargo.

f. The tactics and technique of performing the functions of air attack, air fighting, and air reconnaissance are set forth in FM 1–10, 1–15, and 1–20. Communication procedure essential to air force operations is contained in FM 31–35 and FM 1–45.

SECTION III
ORGANIZATION

6. IN A THEATER OF OPERATIONS.—In a theater of operations, there will normally be one air force. This air force will be organized in accordance with the task it is required to perform in any particular theater and, therefore, no set organization of an air force can be prescribed. However, the normal composition of an air force includes a strategic air force, a tactical air force, an air defense command, and an air service command. An air force may also include troop carrier and photographic aviation.

7. OF AVIATION UNITS—a. Tactical air units of the Army Air Forces from the smallest to the largest are designated flight, squadron, group, wing, division, command, and air force. The method of assignment and employment of the air forces necessitates a highly flexible organization within tactical units.

b. (1) The flight is the basic tactical grouping or unit of the Army Air Forces and consists of two or more airplanes.

(2) The squadron is the basic administrative and tactical unit and consists
APPENDIX L

of three or four flights, depending upon the type of aviation.

(3) The group, composed of three or more squadrons, is both tactical and administrative; it contains all the elements essential for its air operations.

(4) The wing is the next higher unit of the Army Air Forces and its functions are primarily tactical.

(5) Two or more wings may be combined to form an air division.

(6) An “air command,” may include divisions, wings, groups, service and auxiliary units, and is both tactical and administrative.

(7) The air force is the largest tactical unit of the Army Air Forces. It may contain a strategic air force, a tactical air force, an air defense command, and an air service command. It requires aviation engineer units for the construction and maintenance of air bags.

c. Units are designated according to their primary functions; for example, reconnaissance squadron, Fighter group, bomber wing, air service command.

d. Ordinarily the group is the largest unit of the Army Air Forces that will operate in the air as a tactical entity under the command of one individual. Many air operations are conducted by smaller units. Reconnaissance and photographic missions, and less frequently bombardment missions, may be carried out by single airplanes with the required fighter cover.

e. In addition to tactical units, units are organized for the purpose of maintenance and supply and for facilitating air operations. These units comprise personnel of the Army Air Forces and Army Service Forces who are trained for rendering service for the Army Air Forces. The maintenance and service units serving an air force are collectively designated the air service command.
Notes

Chapter 1

Introduction

1. A copy of Office Memo, OCSigO, 1 August 1907, is printed in Charles deF. Chandler and Frank P. Lahm, How Our Army Grew Wings (New York, 1943), pp 80–81, note 6. See Appendix A, this study. A recent diligent search in the Signal Corps files for this period, now in the National Archives, failed to reveal a manuscript of this memorandum. It may be substantiated, however, by innumerable references in addition to that listed above. A contemporary source, for instance, is Memo for CSigO by Captain Charles deF. Chandler, 15 August 1907, in Sig. C. files, 18067/30, in National Archives.

2. As may be judged, of course, this study makes no pretension of covering thoroughly the early developments in aeronautics and military aviation. The same holds true with respect to a citation of authorities. General substantiation for the above summary statements may be found in the annual reports of the Chief Signal Officer. For more specific references, see The Signal School, United States Army, Historical Sketch of the Signal Corps, 1860–1934 (Fort Monmouth, N. J., 1934), pp 9–47, passim; Lt. Clayton Russell, Brief History of the Air Corps and Its Late Developments (Ft. Monroe, 1927), pp 3–9; Arthur Sweetser, The American Air Service (New York and London, 1919), pp 1–11; Chandler and Lahm, How Our Army Grew Wings, pp 12–178, passim; and John Goldstrom, A Narrative History of Aviation (New York, 1942), pp 24–45. An extremely brief account accompanied by appropriate pictures is to be found in Historical Office of the Army Air Forces, The Official Pictorial History of the AAF (New York, 1947), pp 10–24.

In this connection attention of the reader who may be interested is called to Orville Wright, “How We Made the First Flight,” in Flying, II (December 1913), pp 10–12, 35–36, an article presenting for the first time in print (as stated by the editor) some of the details of, and incidents attending, the Wright brothers’ flight of 17 December 1903. Accompanying the account are several photographs of early flights reproduced for the first time.

3. The Statutes at Large of the United States of America, from...1789 (60 vols to date; vols 1–17, Boston, 1845–1873; vols 17–60, Washington, 1873–1947), XXXVI, p 1038. The specific title of this work has varied slightly. It will be cited hereafter simply as United States Statutes at Large.

It should be explained here that the contract for the Wright plane was drawn up in 1908. The delay in delivery was due to an accident in September of that year during the progress of the preliminary trials at Fort Meyer, Virginia, a mishap which cost the life of Lt. Thomas E. Selfridge, Aeronautical Division, Signal Corps, and resulted in serious injury to Orville Wright. See Annual Report of the Chief Signal Officer 1908, p 39.

Data relative to the paucity of funds allowed for aeronautical purposes during the years 1907 through 1911 may be checked conveniently in ibid, p 38; ibid 1909, p 28; ibid 1910, pp 24–25; and ibid 1911, p 23. It appears that during these early years Congress rather freely voted all that was
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requested by the higher military authorities for the Aeronautical Division. One reason advanced for this apparent neglect of military aviation was the fact that a reorganization of the Army was in progress. The Chief of Staff and the Secretary of War felt that priority should be given to that matter, which, incidentally, included the problem of building up stores of such vitally necessary material, as ammunition, field artillery, and guns. Henry Woodhouse, “Prospective Developments in U.S. Army Aeronautics,” in *Flying, II* (July 1913), pp 7–11. Extracts from this article—though somewhat erroneously cited—are printed in 63 Congress, 1 Session, House of Representatives, Hearings [on] H.R. 5304: *Aeronautics in the Army* (Washington, 1913), pp 259–262. See also [Secretary of War] Lindley M. Garrison, “Aircraft as a Military Asset,” in *Flying, III* (June 1914), p 133.


5. *Annual Report of the Chief Signal Officer* 1910, p 26; *ibid* 1912, p 26; Bissell, *History of the Air Corps and Its Late Developments*, p 10. It is interesting to note in this connection that soon after the Army had acquired its first plane three officers were assigned to the Signal Corps: Lieutenants Frank P. Lahm, Frederick E. Humphreys, and Benjamin D. Foulois. The first two were returned to their own branches of service, Calvary and Engineers respectively, before the third had completed his pilot training. Under the circumstances then Lt. Foulois found it necessary to teach himself to solo. SeeAAF Historical Office, *Pictorial History of the AAF*, p 26.

6. *United States Statutes at Large*, XXXVII, p 705. Dates for the introduction of the appurtenant bills which failed of passage were 26 January 1909, 22 March 1909, 5 January 1910, 9 March 1912, and 11 February 1913. For brief but adequate statements concerning these proposed measures see Army Air Forces, AC/AS, Intelligence, Historical Division, *Army Air Forces Historical Studies No 25: Organization of Military Aeronautics, 1907–1935* (MS, prepared in 1944), pp 6–10. This work will be cited hereafter simply as AAF Historical Studies No 25.

7. *United States Statutes at Large*, XXXVII, pp 514–517. See Appendix B of the present treatise.


9. Other members of the Committee included Charles D. Walcott, Secretary of the Smithsonian Institution; Charles F. Marvin, Chief of the United States Weather Bureau; S.W. Stratton, Chief of the Bureau of Standards; Byron R. Newton, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury; Joseph S. Ames, Johns Hopkins University; W. F. Durand, Leland Stanford University; John F. Hayford, Northwestern University; and Michael I. Pupin, Columbia University. A complete list of the members is given in an editorial, “President Appoints Advisory Board,” in *Aerial Age Weekly*, I (12 April 1915), p 82.

10. *United States Statutes at Large*, XXXIX, pp 174–176. Appendix C, this study is a copy of Section 13.


13. President Wilson made the appointments in October 1916. The other two members were Dr. Franklin H. Martin from Chicago and Hollis Godfrey of Philadelphia. *Aerial Age Weekly*, IV (23 October 1916). p 141.

14. See Resolution of the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics, 12 April 1917 in *Third Annual Report of the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics* (No 3 in a series from 1915 to date, Washington, 1918), p 17; and Resolution of the Council of National Defense, 16 May 1917, in AAG 334.8, Aircraft Board. Cf also Historical Section, Army War College, *The Signal Corps and Air Service* (Washington, 1922), pp 36–37; Bissell, *Brief History of the Air Corps*, pp 18, 19; and Sweetser, *The American Air Service*, pp 48–49. Deeds, formerly with the National Cash Register Company, was president of the Delco Company; Montgomery was connected with a Philadelphia financial concern; and Waldon had been associated with the Packard Motor
Car Company.
16. United States Statutes at Large, XL, pp 42, 187, 247. An interesting report on avia-
tion expenditures during World War I is given in Colonel Edgar S. Gorrell, “America’s
First World War Appropriation,” in U.S. Air
Services, XVIII (May 1933), pp 24–27.
17. Sweetser, The American Air Service,
pp 93–94; Historical Section, Army War
College, The Signal Corps and Air Service, p 38.
18. See Howard E. Coffin to George E.
Chamberlain, Chairman, Senate Committee
on Military Affairs, 1 August 1917, in, and 65
Congress, 1 Session, Senate Report No 106;
and President Woodrow Wilson to S. Hubert
Dent, Jr., Chairman, House of Represen-
tatives Committee on Military Affairs, 3
August 1917, in 65 Congress, 1 Session,
19. United States Statutes at Large, XL,
pp 296–297. A copy of the law is included
herewith as Appendix D.
20. See 66 Congress, 2 Session, House
of Representatives, Hearings on United Air
Service (Washington, 1921), pp 366–367. The
Judge Advocate General had ruled that the
functions of the Aircraft Board were advisory
and recommendatory only.
21. Sweetser, The American Air Service,
pp 74–84, 210–217; AAF Historical Studies
22. A copy of the announcement
included here with as Appendix E is printed
in Annual Report of the Director of Military
Aeronautics 1918, pp 4–5. Cf also Historical
Section, Army War College, The Signal
Corps and Air Service, p 35; and an editorial,
VII (May 1918), p 94.
23. United States Statutes at Large, XL,
pp 556–557.
24. The text of Executive Order 2862,
21 May 1918, is included in Annual Report of
the Director of Military Aeronautics 1918, pp
5–7. See Appendix F, this study.
25. Historical Section, Army War College,
The Signal Corps and Air Service, p 38.
Army 1919, p 22. It should be explained that
meanwhile the Aircraft Board continued to
serve the Navy in the same capacity as it had
functioned formerly with relation to both the
Army and the Navy.
27. It is true that the Director of Military
Aeronautics, according to this document, had
“charge, under the direction of the Secretary
of War, of the Aviation Section of the Signal
Corps of the Army.” Yet the Bureau of
Aircraft Production was given “full, com-
plete, and exclusive jurisdiction and control
over the production of airplanes, airplane
gines,” et cetera.
28. WD GO No 51, 24 May 1918.
29. Annual Report of the Director of
Military Aeronautics 1918, p 7. It appears that
fittingly enough the arrangement effected was
the result largely of an aggressive stand taken
by the Division of Military Aeronautics.
Colonel Henry H. Arnold, the Assistant
Director prepared for his chief a memora-
andum stating in substance that this unit must
control the determination of the design of the
equipment with which it was to operate. The
question of which was the actual supply orga-
nization was of no significance, he insisted,
but the quality of the material used was of
vital concern. See memo for General William
L. Kenly by Col. H. H. Arnold, 6 June 1918,
in AAG 321.9A, Organization of the Division
of Military Aeronautics.
30. WD GO No 81, 28 August 1918.
Technically speaking, as Second Assistant
Secretary of War, Ryan replaced Edward R.
Stettinius who was then a special representa-
tive of the War Department in France. See
also an editorial, “Second Assistant Secretary
of War, John D. Ryan, Given Full Charge
Over All Aircraft Work,” in Flying, VII
(September 1918), p 720.
31. Sweetser, The American Air Service,
p 238.
32. The organization of the United
States Spruce Production Corporation was
based technically upon the Army appropria-
tion Act of 30 June 1918, Annual Report of
the Chief of Air Service for the Fiscal Year
33. Cablegram, Gilbert F. Close to S/W,
19 March 1919, in AAG 334.8, Aircraft
Board; WD GO No 52, 18 April 1919. Cf AAF Historical Studies No 25, pp 36–37. The Chief of Staff had occasion later to state that the consolidation at this time of the Division of Military Aeronautics and the Bureau of Aircraft Production into the Air Service under the Director of Air Service "still further increased" the efficiency of the air arm. Report of the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, 1919, p 22.

34. See an unsigned article, "General Menoher New Air Service Chief," in Flying, VII (January 1919), p 1145.


37. This law also discontinued the practice of allowing advanced rank to aviation personnel, except that in lieu of the increase in flying pay men who for reasons of having performed distinguished service during war had been appointed junior military aviator or military aviator might continue with the rank, pay, allowances, and additional pay provided by the acts of 3 June 1916 and 24 July 1917. For pertinent provisions of the Army Reorganization Act of 1920, see United States Statutes at Large, XLI, pp 719, 768–769, and 785. Extracts are presented herewith in Appendix G.


39. Annual Report of the Chief of Air Service...1923, p 3. Major Oscar Westover was appointed Director of the Bureau of Aircraft Production on 10 February 1921. See Annual Report of the Chief of Air Service...1923, pp 3–4. As of the beginning of the fiscal year 1924, however, the Bureau of Aircraft Production itself existed in name only, for the sole purpose of fulfilling its duties relating to the Spruce Corporation. It was not even mentioned in the subsequent reports of the Chief of Air Service.

Chapter 2

Early Developments, 1913–1917

1. Annual Report of the Chief Signal Officer 1910, pp 26–27. It was at this time that the Signal Corps had only one lieutenant and nine enlisted men on duty in connection with aeronautics.

2. 62 Congress, 3 Session, Congressional Record, 11 February 1913, p 3025. Designated as H.R. 28728, the bill did not indicate the number of enlisted men to be allowed for the Aviation Corps.

3. See his "Prospective Developments in U.S. Army Aeronautics," in Flying, II (July 1913), pp 7–11. Woodhouse actually referred here not to the bill presented by Hay on 11 February, but to one he introduced the following May. As will appear, however, the two were identical.

4. On 14 February Colonel Scriven sent the following telegram to Lieutenant Foulois then stationed at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: "Telegraph tomorrow your recommendation regarding establishment of aviation corps as part of the line instead of the Signal Corps. Information needed immediately for a hearing before Congressional Committee." At the same time telegrams were sent to "Signals" at San Diego, California, and Augusta, Georgia, directing that each officer prepare for immediate dispatch his recommendations regarding the proposal. Copies of these telegrams are in Sig. C. files, 29278, in National Archives.

5. Foulois to Scriven, 17 February 1913, in Sig.C. files, 29278, in National Archives. In addition to his telegram Lt. Foulois wrote the Acting Chief Signal Officer a rather lengthy letter on the subject.

6. See an undated and unsigned manuscript, in Sig.C. files, 29278, in National Archives.

7. Sig. C. files, 360—Air Service, in National Archives. Members of the group
other than Arnold were Major E. Russell, Signal Corps; Captain T. B. Hennessy, Field Artillery; 1st Lt. Harry Graham, 22nd Infantry; 2nd Lt. T. D. Milling, 15th Cavalry; and 2nd Lt. W. C. Sherman, Corps of Engineers.

8. Chief, War College Division, WDGS (approved by the C/S to S/W, 15 February 1913, in Sig. C. files, 29278, in National Archives; and Stimson to Hay, 20 February 1913, in AG 321.91, Organization.

9. See supra, p 4. To a certain extent also those provisions of this law relating to the Aeronautical Division of the Signal Corps were influenced by a proposal made by the War Department on 14 March 1912. See 62 Congress, 2 Session, House Document No 718, p 80.

10. Technically a new measure, of course, it was designated as H.R. 5304. See 63 Congress, 1 Session, Congressional Record, 16 May 1913, p 1623. Note also Henry Woodhouse, “Prospective Development of United States Aeronautics,” in Flying, II (October 1913), pp 11–13.

11. Breckinridge to Scriven, 7 August 1913, in Sig. C. files, 29278, in National Archives.

12. Breckinridge’s views on this bill were set forth in Asst. S/W to Hay...18 August 1913, Sig. C. files, 29278, in National Archive; and 63 Congress, 1 Session, House of Representatives, Hearings on H.R. 5304, pp 22–23.

13. 63 Congress, 1 Session, House of Representatives, Hearings on H.R. 5304, pp 6–9. A summary of the hearings on this proposal, conducted from 12 through 16 August, is to be found in Major G. R. Perrera, A Legislative History of Aviation in the United States and Abroad (typed study prepared in the Office of the Chief of Air Corps. 1940), pp 3–8.

14. 63 Congress, 1 Session, House of Representatives, Hearings on H.R. 5304, pp 50–53, 89, respectively.

15. Ibid, pp 76–85. For the quotation, see p 83. Other officers who testified against the Hay bill at this time included Lt. Col. Samuel Reber, Major Russell, Captain Hennessy, and 2nd Lt. Milling, Ibid, pp 26, 62, 97, 99. A subsequent biographer of “Billy” Mitchell relates that during the well-known court martial trial 12 years later when the crusader for air power was reminded of his earlier stand against a separate Air Corps, he simply replied, “I never made a worse statement.” Isaac Don Levine, Mitchell: Pioneer of Air Power (New York, 1943), pp 83–84.

16. 63 Congress, 1 Session, House of Representatives, Hearings on H.R. 5304, pp 38–40, 45. Having in mind possible disciplinary action for Captain Beck because he “undoubtedly... intended to bring the Signal Corps of the Army into disrepute,” Colonel Scriven even went so far as to prepare for the Chief of Staff a memorandum describing the whole incident related to the “gigantic bluff” charge. Memo for the Chief of Staff by the CSO, 14 August 1913, in Sig. C. files, 29278, in National Archives. There is evidence, however, to support a belief that the memorandum was never dispatched.

17. See a statement he made some three years later. 64 Congress, 1 Session, House of Representatives, Hearings of Army Appropriation Bill 1917 (Washington, 1916), p 852.

18. “Prospective Developments in U.S. Army Aeronautics” in Flying, II (July 1913), pp 7–11.

19. “Aircraft as a Military Asset,” in ibid, III (June 1914), p 133.

20. 63 Congress, 2 Session, House Report No 132; and Woodhouse, “Pro-spective Development of United States Army Aeronautics,” in Flying, II (October 1913), pp 11–13. This substitute measure also took the designation of H.R. 5304.

21. Statements of Gordon Bruce, aeronautical editor of The New York Tribune, are quoted in an editorial, “Flying Corps to be Separated from the Signal Corps?”, in Aerial Age Weekly, I (3 May 1915), p 149. See also another editorial, “The Separation of the Air Service from the Signal Corps Great Britain’s Latest,” in ibid (31 May 1915), pp 245–246; and Alan R. Hawley, “The Inner Trouble in the U.S. Army Air Service,” in Flying, V (May 1916), pp 163–164. In his article Hawley states in substance that the Secretary of War and the Chief of Staff wanted to ask for larger appropriations for the Air Service

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but were told “to conform with the administration’s policy to not spend for the Army more than was spent the preceding year.” Otherwise, the Democrats might be defeated in the election of 1916. According to some of its own members, Congress, normally willing enough to provide adequately for aviation, was not likely to vote more funds than were asked by the administration. Therefore, for the good of the service, the obvious thing to do was to change the administration. One editorial, for the curiously illogical reason indicated in the title, went so far even as to suggest the election of Theodore Roosevelt as President of the United States. “A Roosevelt Administration in 1907 Gave the United States Army the First Airplane Ever Used for Military Purposes—Another Roosevelt Administration Seems to be the only Hope to Give the U.S. Army and Navy Their Much Needed Air Service,” in Aerial Age Weekly, III (15 May 1916). See also two others; “Change the Administration!” in ibid (8 May 1916), p 237; and “Congress Allowed as Much for Aéros as Asked by Secretary Baker;” in ibid (12 June 1916), pp 389–390. On 8 April 1916 the Secretary of War himself said that despite some feeling in the Aviation Section, Congress had, “been as generous as the state of the art justified.” 64 Congress, 1 Session, House of Representatives, Hearings on Army Appropriation Bill 1917, p 846.

22. 64 Congress, 1 Session, Congressional Record, 5 January 1916, p 494.

23. See 64 Congress, 1 Session, Senate Report No 153, pp 1–5. On 18 February 1918, in one of his two appearances before the Committee, Robinson buttressed some of his charges by producing copies of letters which passed between Colonel Samuel Reber, the head of the Aviation Section of the Signal Corps. and the officer in command of the station at San Diego, California, concerning which the charges that had been made largely related.

24. 64 Congress, 1 Session, House of Representatives Report No 369.

25. Draft, 3rd Ind. (Basic unknown), CSSigO to AG, February 1916, in Sig. C. files, 41804, in National Archives. At this time the Chief Signal Officer mentioned disparagingly the “gigantic bluff” statement made by Captain Beck before the House of Representatives Committee on Military Affairs in August, 1913.

26. The above summary statements of a portion of the War Department announcement in question are based upon an unsigned article, “Flying Corps to be Separated From the Signal Corps?”, in Aerial Age Weekly, III (24 April 1916), p 173. which apparently was assembled from a news item in the public press, as for instance, in the New York Times, 18 April 1916.

27. 64 Congress, 1 Session, House of Representatives, Hearings on Army Appropriation Bill 1917, pp 838–840.


29. 64 Congress, 1 Session, Congressional Record, 28 March 1916, p 5054. A copy of the bill is printed in Flying, V (April 1916), p 108, and is followed on the succeeding page by a warm approval in an article by Alan R. Hawley and Henry Woodhouse, “Why There Should be a Department of Aeronautics and a Secretary Cf Aviation.” This in part takes the form of an open letter to Representative Lieb complimenting him for his efforts in behalf of military aeronautics. See also Aerial Age Weekly, III (10 April 1916), pp 109–110.


31. 64 Congress, 1 Session, Congressional Record, 28 March 1916, p 5054.

32. Here the reader’s attention is called to the fact that largely motivated by one of its members, Rear Admiral Robert E. Peary, the Aero Club of America at its annual meeting on 13 November 1916 adopted a resolution favoring a “Department of Aeronautics,” which in essence would have been quite similar to Congressman Lieb’s Department of Aviation. See Aero Club of America 1917 (New York, 1917), pp 131–132; and an unsigned article, “Constructive Program of Aero Club Announced,” in Flying V, (December 1916), pp 449–451. The president of this organization was empowered to
appoint a committee to wait on the President of the United States with the view of encouraging him to support such a program.


34. 65 Congress, 1 Session, *Congressional Record*, 2 April 1917, p 121; *ibid.*, 4 April 1917, p 189; and 65 Congress, 1 Session, Senate, *Hearings on S.80: Department of Aeronautics* (Washington, 1917), pp 3–5.

Chapter 3

*The Impact of the War Years, 1917–1918*

1. 64 Congress, 2 Session, *Senate Document No 687*, p 5.

2. Prior to his appearance before the Senate Committee on Military Affairs on this occasion Peary at his own expense had toured the country from coast to coast delivering addresses supporting the measure in question. See W. H. Hobbs, *Peary* (New York, 1936), pp 438–439.


4. $10,800,000 had been appropriated in May, and $43,500,000 in June. See *supra*, p 8. Following these developments an editorial in the *Aerial Age Weekly* read in part as follows: Appreciating the need of bringing out the facts about the tremendous value of aeronautics and the vital necessity of starting on a substantial aerial program Senator Sheppard and Congressman Hulbert started the hearings...on the Hulbert-Sheppard Bill and brought forth the endorsement of leading authorities of not only the plan to train thousands of aviators and build tens of thousands of aeroplanes but also a strong general endorsement of the Hulbert-Sheppard Bill.” “$640,000,000 Aeronautic Appropriation Passes House of Representatives Without Dissenting Vote,” in V (23 July 1917), p 627.

5. See caption underneath a photograph of the Congressman which appeared in *ibid.* (10 September 1917), p 962.

6. Coffin to George E. Chamberlain, 1 August 1917, in 65 Congress, 1 Session, *Senate Report No 106*, pp 1–2. Italics are the present author's. Coffin accompanied his own letter by one each from Secretary Baker and Secretary Daniels approving the substitute proposal. Baker to Chamberlain, 31 July 1917, and Daniels to Chamberlain, 31 July 1917, in *ibid.*, pp 2, 3. See also President Wilson to S. Hubert Dent, Jr. [Chairman, House of Representatives Committee on Military Affairs], 2 August 1917, in 65 Congress, 1 Session, *House Report No 161*, p 2.


8. Sweetser, *The American Air Service*, pp 210–218, presents a fairly complete account of these disappointing revelations.

9. *Ibid.*, pp 213–218. Further and more complete substantiation for the initiation of these investigations may be noted in a group of editorials or unsigned articles published contemporaneously in a leading aeronautical journal: “Investigations Into the Aeroplane Situation,” in *Aerial Age Weekly*, VII (8 April 1918), p 207; “President Wilson Orders Judicial Aircraft Investigation,” in *ibid.* (13 May 1918), pp
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435–437, 450–469; “Senate and Department of Justice Investigating Aircraft Situation,” in *ibid* (20 May 1918), pp 489–490, 510; “Charles E. Hughes to Cooperate in Aircraft Investigation,” in *ibid* (27 May 1918), p 582; “The Aircraft Investigation,” in *ibid* (3 June 1918), pp 578, 606; and “The Aircraft Investigations,” in *ibid* (10 June 1918), p 624. As revealed in the article listed next to the last, an exchange of views between Hughes, Attorney General Thomas M. Gregory, and the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Military Affairs, indicated an agreement for coordination between these two investigating agencies. It appeared that the Senate would limit itself to current developments, while Hughes would have a clear field in dealing with the past. The broad scope of this inquiry may be noted in [United States Department of Justice], *Abstract of Aircraft Investigation*, by Honorable Charles E. Hughes and the Attorney General (Washington, 1919).

10. Hawley to President Wilson, 2 April 1918, included in an unsigned article, “Inner Problems of Aircraft Situation and Their Solution,” in *Flying*, VII (May 1918), pp 342–343. Hawley took this occasion to say that the British Government had passed through the same difficult phases which the United States was experiencing in connection with the Air Service. In England also there had been “scandals and charges, counter charges and confusion.” After three years of trying different plans, however, “the military and naval authorities and other branches of the...Government came to the conclusion that the only solution was a separate Department of Aeronautics with an Air Ministry at the head, whose functions are identical with the duties of the War Minister and the First Lord of the Admiralty.”


16. 65 Congress, 2 Session, *Congressional Record*, 1 August 1918, p 9186. For the views of General Brancker and the two senators, as well as a copy of the New bill, see an unsigned article, “Senators Propose Air Ministry,” in *Aerial Age Weekly*, VII (12 August 1918), pp 1058–1059. As reported in amended form by the Committee on Military Affairs in September, the measure would give the proposed Department of Aeronautics control of the operation as well as the production of aircraft. On the other hand, it eliminated the chief of the department from cabinet rank. 65 Congress, 2 Session, *Senate Report No 570*, p 1. Cf J. M. Spaight, *The Beginnings of Organized Air Power* (London and New York, 1927), p 251.

17. A full account of the investigation made is presented in 65 Congress, 2 Session, *Senate, Hearings...on Aircraft Production* (2 vols, Washington, 1918).

18. 65 Congress, 2 Session, *Senate Report No 555*, pp 1–17. The longer quoted sections were taken from page 17. Full copies of the report were printed in *Aerial Age Weekly*, VIII (2 September 1918), pp 1213, 1214, 1235–1237, 1239, 1241; and in *Flying*, VII (September 1918), pp 721, 723–726, 736, 774.

19. With respect to these expressions of opinion regarding the near “approach” towards an air department, Cf Spaight, *The Beginnings of Organized Air Power*, pp 249–250; and Sweetser, *The American Air Service*, p 238. The latter quotes a part of Ryan’s letter of resignation as follows: “I have not taken over the actual direction of Military Aeronautics and my connection with it has not made any real change in its
operations.” He had spent the month of September on an inspection trip to Europe.


The investigators did recommend a court-martial trial for Colonel E. A. Deeds and a criminal prosecution of three other officers, all on relatively minor counts. Subsequently, a War Department board which, in the opinion of Secretary Baker, accomplished “the thorough inquiry which Judge Hughes had in mind” for Colonel Deeds ruled against an actual trial for that former member of the Aircraft Board, a finding which was approved by the Secretary of War. See Baker to Chairman, Committee on Military Affairs, House of Representatives, 16 January 1919, with enclosures, in Aerial Age Weekly, VIII (27 January and 3 February 1919), pp 980, 996–997, 1009, 1040–1041, 1050.


Chapter 4

Preliminary Readjustments Following World War I

1. A few specific observations should serve to substantiate and clarify the above generalizations. As expressed by Clinton Gilbert, the journalist, the Air Service had been placed in the “command of a man [General Menoher, an artilleryman] who had never flown. Above him was a General Staff which had never flown. Above it was a Secretary of War who had never flown and who was bound to take his opinions from the highest uniformed officers. The same was substantially true of the Navy. Rank in both branches of the service, he jointed out, not only gave validity to opinions, but also silenced contrary views. Quoted in Levine, Mitchell, p 175.

Speaking as a witness before a subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Military Affairs in the late summer of 1919, Howard E. Coffin asserted that the General Staff was “not only not in favor of a progressive [air] policy, but they have no appreciation of the value of it, or of the industrial and commercial development.” With the exception of some veteran aviators who may have been added to that body, Coffin continued, he would “go further and say that since the beginning of my connection with the Air Service, as a member of the Advisory Commission of the Council of National Defense, there has never been a man on the General Staff...who knew anything about the Air Service or cared whether he did.” See 66 Congress, 1 Session, Senate, Hearings on S.2691 S.2693 S.2715: Reorganization of the Army (2 vols. Washington, 1919), p 998. Testifying before the same group two weeks later, Major B. D. Foulois, who was at one time Chief of Air Service, A.E.F., said that during his years of service in aviation work (which, as will be recalled, dated back to 1908) he had “heard many high ranking of officers of the Army frequently refer to aviators as being ‘temperamental as prima donnas,’ ‘too young for their rank,’ ‘lacking in discipline,’ etc.” “I have always resented these remarks,” he added, “and always will.” Ibid, p 1265.

2. General Joseph T. Dickman presided over a board composed of superior officers of the American Expeditionary Forces. It reviewed the findings of a number of subordinate boards, each of which consisted of senior officers in a given branch of service. A copy of the report of the Dickman Board is printed in 69 Congress, 1 Session, House of Representatives, Hearings on Department of Defense and Unification of Air Service (Washington,
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1926), pp 917–999. For the above summary statements, see pp 918, 953.

3. A record of the activities and findings of this group is on file in AAG 321.9A–1, Separate Air Service. Under the title of Report of American Aviation Mission it was printed as Exhibit A, pp 18–31, in 66 Congress, 2 Session, House of Representatives, Hearings on United Air Service (Washington, 1921), to which subsequent citations in this study will be made. See p 30 for the list of members involved which, in addition to the two that were mentioned above by name, included Lt. Col. James G. Blair of the General Staff; Colonel Halsey Dunwoody, Air Service; Captain Henry C. Mustin, United States Navy; S. S. Bradley, General Manager of the Manufacturer’s Aircraft Association; George H. Houston, President of the Wright-Martin Airplane Corporation; and C. M. Keys, Vice-President of the Curtiss Aeroplane and Motor Corporation.

Incidentally, the work of the Crowell group was given rather wide current publicity. In convenient form, for instance, it appeared as a reprint from the Aircraft Journal, 23 August 1919, under the title Report of the American Aviation Mission; and a copy of it was presented to the English Parliament “by command of His Majesty” as Report of the American Aviation Mission (London, 1919).


5. For the significant proposal that was made, see Report of the American Aviation Mission, pp 21 ff. Stated in substance, the reservations affixed by the one member would preserve the identity of naval and marine corps aviation personnel, give the Navy complete freedom in making provision for naval aviation equipment, and submit for further study a proposal for an independent defensive air force.

The sincerity of the chairman of the Mission is indicated beyond a doubt by a statement made the following December: “A year ago,” he said, “I was thoroughly convinced that the Army ought to retain all its aviation activities.” Apparently his views were subject to change, however, for at the time of embarking for Europe he had no definite opinion on the matter. Then, continuing, the Assistant Secretary of War said, “an intensive and careful study of the subject during all of last summer has made me change my mind entirely” in favor of an air department. See 66 Congress, 2 Session, House of Representatives, Hearings on United Air Service, pp 5, 510.

6. This statement of the Secretary of War was attached to the report of the Mission. See Report of the American Aviation Mission, p 31.


8. Annual Report of the Secretary of War 1919, pp 68–75. Note also the testimony of this cabinet officer before a congressional committee on 15 December 1919. At the time he referred, among other things, to his attitude towards a separate air service as expressed in the pertinent annual report. 66 Congress, 2 Session, House of Representatives, Hearings on United Air Service, pp 383–404.

9. Written by a future President of the United States, “Why Naval Aviation Won” first appeared in the U.S. Air Service for July of 1919. There is a reprint in the U.S. Air Services, XXXIV (May 1949), pp 13–14. It may be assumed, of course, that the author “cleared” the article with Secretary Daniels, a well-known opponent of a separate air service at the time.

10. As a check on the proposals which will not be discussed individually, see H.R. 16195, 65 Congress, 3 Session, Congressional Record, 28 February 1919, p 4677. H.R. 9804, 66 Congress, 1 Session, Congressional Record, 8 October 1919, p 6582; H.R. 10380, ibid, 5 November 1919, p 7998; H.R. 11206, 66 Congress, 2 Session, Congressional Record, 15 December 1919, p 611; and H.R. 12134, ibid, 29 January 1920, p 2229.

11. See 66 Congress, 1 Session, Congressional Record, 28 July 1919, p 3292. A copy of this bill, H.R. 7925, was printed under the heading, “Bill Introduced to Establish a Department of Aeronautics,”
in *Aerial Age Weekly*, IX (11 August 1919), pp 1003–1004, 1021, 1030. Incidentally, it set up a maximum commissioned and enlisted strength for the Regular Air Force and the commissioned strength for the Reserve.


14. For instance, while testifying subsequently before a subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Military Affairs, Major Foulois asserted that of fifty telegrams requesting opinions on the subject only four were sent to Air Service officers, of whom only two were practical fliers. The others went to infantry and artillery personnel who knew nothing of aviation. He said also that the Menoher Board allowed twenty high ranking flying officers who appeared before it only three and one-half hours to present their side of the case. 66 Congress, 1 Session, Senate, *Hearings on S.2691 S.2693 S.2715: Reorganization of the Army*, pp 1268–1269.


16. The revised Curry proposal has been cited as H.R. 9804. For the second New bill (a revision of S.26939), see 66 Congress, 1 Session, *Congressional Record*, 30 October 1919, p 7738. It was written in conformance with certain views presented in hearings before the Senate Committee on Military Affairs. See 66 Congress, 2 Session, *Senate Report No. 325*, p 2.

17. For the later bills providing for a separate air organization, see *supra*, p 49, note 10. As will appear, an Army Reorganization Act was approved eventually on 4 June 1920.

18. See 66 Congress, 2 Session, House of Representatives, *Hearings on United Air Service*. It appears that a subcommittee of the House Committee on Military Affairs, with La Guardia as chairman, turned its attention mainly to the suggestion for a separate air organization; while a corresponding Senate subcommittee, with Senator J. W. Wadsworth presiding, concentrated mostly on the broad question of a reorganization of the Army.

With respect to the question of “free speech” on the part of military and naval personnel, La Guardia, testifying before a later congressional committee, said:

Why, gentlemen, when I was on the Committee on Military Affairs, conducting hearings on the Curry bill—I was acting chairman of the subcommittee—these Army men would come and tell me the whole story, but they would not testify. The Navy fliers would come and tell me the story, but they could not testify to it. It’s the old idea; the General Staff decides. And whatever corresponds to the General Staff in the Navy they decide, and the younger officers must go along.


As related to this fairly early period it would appear that Major Foulois was a veritable firebrand on the whole question. The
General Staff he felt, had failed utterly to accord aeronautics its just place in the military organization. Otherwise the United States would have had a relatively efficient air force even as early as 6 April 1917. As a result of practical experience, he said, "I can frankly state that in my opinion, the War Department has earned no right or title to claim future control over aviation or the aircraft industries of the United States."

"Is it any wonder," the former Chief of Air Service, AEF asked, "that practical flying officers who have been risking their lives for the past 11 years in the development and use of this new weapon are so keenly anxious to see aviation and aircraft development taken away from the Army and placed under a separate control...? Is it any wonder that a few of us dare to risk the charge of insubordination...and the possible charge of conduct prejudicial to good order and military discipline in order that our cause may be heard?"

Then with an attitude comparable to that which has been ascribed to Patrick Henry in his address to the Virginia Burgesses, Foulois added that if what he had said could be construed as insubordination he was ready to stand before any military court and take his chances of punishment "in a cause which, in my opinion, will develop and go ahead in spite of every effort to impede its progress." 66 Congress, 1 Session, Senate, Hearings on S.2691 S.2693 S.5715: Reorganization of the Army, pp 1260, 1265–1266. Major Foulois gave full publicity to his views. A large portion of his testimony from which the above extracts were taken, for instance, was included in an article, "Past Failures—What to do about Them," which he published in U.S. Air Service, II (November 1919), pp 18–21.

General Mitchell at this time took an entirely different attitude towards the higher military authorities. Testifying before La Guardia's subcommittee on 20 December 1919, he said that the relations of air officers, "insofar as aviation is concerned, with other branches of the Army, with the General Staff and the Secretary of War, and with officers who are not flying officers are most cordial." Nor did Mitchell insist for the time being upon cabinet rank for the suggested department of aeronautics. That, he felt, naturally would come later on. 66 Congress, 2 Session, House of Representatives, Hearings on United Air Service, pp 420, 47.

20. 66 Congress, 2 Session, House of Representatives, Hearings on United Air Service, pp 389, 406, 418, 425–426. General Menoher testified that he understood the British separate air organization was likely to "go under unless our separate air service came through..." In that case, he felt the British should abandon their plan. For a summary of the arguments in question, see Perara, A Legislative History of Aviation, pp 28–31.

21. For instance, in connection with an editorial devoted to Senator New's revised bill providing for a separate department of aeronautics, which appeared in U.S. Air Service, II (November 1919), p 5, General Pershing was quoted as stating before the joint meeting of the two congressional committees that "it might be well to consolidate the Air Force, military, naval and commercial, under a single head as an assistance to progress." What he really said, according to the official record, is that if Congress is of the opinion that general aviation should be encouraged, as I am, then the appropriations for commercial, naval, and military aviation might very well be included under one head, to be used first for the development of observation, reconnaissance and combat service in the Army and Navy, and second, for the development of commercial aviation which would include procurement of planes for all purposes and the encouragement of invention, and all that sort of thing. 66 Congress, 1 Session, House of Representatives, Hearings on S.2691 S.2693 S.2715: Reorganization of the Army, p 1573.

22. Menoher to Pershing, 16 December 1919, in AAG 321.9A, Separate Air Service: New and Curry bills; Pershing to Menoher, 12 January 1920, in ibid. With appurtenant comments these letters are printed in Report of the Director of Air Service, 1920, pp 10–11. They also appear
in numerous congressional documents.

23. The committee suggested certain amendments. See 66 Congress, 2 Session, Senate Report No 325; 66 Congress, 2 Session, Congressional Record, 8 December 1919, as amended by the committee, provided for a department organized in four divisions: Military Aeronautics, Civil and Commercial Aeronautics, Supplies, and Research. Nothing in the measure would prohibit the Army and Navy from maintaining specialized air units for observation, direction of gunfire, photographic purposes, et cetera. The Department of the Air would have charge of all other flying training. Regular air units might be attached to land and sea forces; but in time of war or threatened hostilities any units so assigned should be under the control of the respective army or naval commanders. Cf an editorial in U.S. Air Service, II (November 1919), p 5.


25. Not altogether idle, however, the proponents of an independent air service did try in a rather circuitous manner to make some headway towards their objective. A suggested amendment to the Army appropriation bill for 1921 provided that naval aviation be restricted to operations actually attached to the fleet, leaving the Army in control of such activities from all shore bases. This would have constituted a minor step at least in the direction of a consolidation of air power. Due partially to the opposition of the War and Navy Departments the attempt was defeated. As eventually adopted the law allowed the Navy to control aerial “shore stations whose maintenance is necessary for operations connected with the fleet, for construction and experimentation and for training personnel.” See 66 Congress, 2 Session, Congressional Record, 24 May 1920, pp 7524, 7529; ibid, 2 June 1920, p 8178; and United States Statutes at Large, XLI, p 954.

26. 66 Congress, 1 Session, House of Representatives, Hearings Before Subcommittee No 1 (Aviation) of Select Committee on Expenditures in the War Department (2 vols, Washington, 1919). The actual hearings, involving some six weeks, ended at Portland, Oregon on 13 September

27. The Frear subcommittee report on aviation was printed as, 66 Congress, 2 Session, House Report No 637, in two parts. Part I, accepted officially by the full Select Committee on Expenditures in the War Department, represents the findings of the majority of the subcommittees while Part II, which was signed by Representative C. F. Lea, expresses the minority view. For the recommendation of the majority regarding a separate air service, see Part I, p 70. Representative Lea, taking the contrary position in that respect, presented in summary fashion the orthodox War Department arguments to buttress his position. He did favor what might be called a civilian air department. See Part II, p 70. The majority report, minus several appended documents, was published “serially” in Aerial Age Weekly, beginning with X (1 March 1920), p 720, and concluding with XII (20 September 1920), p 52.

Chapter 5

Creation of the Army Air Corps

1. Lt. Col. B. D. Foulois was responsible for the statement that as late as September 1925, after seventeen years “of effort for proper recognition of the air branch of the Army,” the Air Service had only two out of a total of eighty-two officers on the General Staff. See U.S. President’s Aircraft Board, Aircraft: Hearings Before the President's
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Aircraft Board (4 vols, bound in 2, Washington, 1925), p 491. Hereafter this work will be cited simply as Hearings Before the President’s Aircraft Board.


3. Annual Report of the Chief of Air Service 1924 (Mimeograph form), pp 90–95. The list of vessels which were sunk or destroyed during these maneuvers included several captured German destroyers and submarines; the German cruiser Frankfurt; the German battleship Ostfriesland; and the obsolete American battleships Alabama, New Jersey, and Virginia. The last two ships, incidentally, were on the list to be scrapped under the terms of the Four Power Treaty drawn up at the Washington Conference in 1922. In addition to the reference given above further substantiation for this brief statement regarding these bombing “attacks” may be found in an unsigned article, “Aerial Bombing Tests Now Historic,” in U.S. Air Service, VI (August 1924), pp 19–21; another, “2000-lb Bomb Sinks Alabama,” in ibid, (September 1921), p 13; Captain A. W. Johnson, U.S.N., “Lessons from the Bombing—a Navy View,” in ibid, (October 1924), pp 29–33; Maj. Gen. Mason M. Patrick [Chief of Air Service], “Without Adequate Air Force We Invite A National Disaster,” in ibid, VIII (October 1923), pp 11–14; and same, “The Airplane Versus the Battleship,” in The Military Engineer, XV (November–December 1923), pp 530–531.


7. 67 Congress, 1 Session, Congressional Record, 11 April 1921, p 91. See also an editorial, “American Aviation Policy,” in Aerial Age Weekly, XIII (2 May 1921), p 171.


9. Sidney B. Waldon to Charles D. Walcott, 8 April 1921, a copy of which was included in Memo for General Mitchell by Major W. G. Kilner. Chief of Operations Division, Air Service, 3 August 1921, MS, U.S. Air Force Historical Division.

10. Annual Report of the Chief of Air Service for 1922 (Mimeograph form), pp 5–7, passim, and 41–46. Patrick blamed a part of his troubles upon what he regarded as the, “unfortunate” phraseology of a provision of the Army Reorganization Act of 1920 specifying that not more than “10 per centum of the officers” in each grade below that of brigadier general who failed within a year after assignment to qualify as pilots or observers could be allowed to remain in the Air Service. While preferable that a high percentage of the officers should be qualified for flying duty, it was the desire of this organization that, in each grade, not to exceed one-tenth of the total number should be non-fliers. A correct interpretation of the provisions in question, however, carried an entirely different meaning, eliminating potentially a number of officers extremely valuable to the service because of their special technical or administrative abilities. For similar complaints voiced by Patrick’s predecessor, General Menoher, see Annual Report of the Chief of Air Service for 1924 (Mimeograph form), pp 6–8, passim, and 49–52.

11. 1st Ind (AG to Chief of Air Service, 25 November 1922), General Patrick to AG, 6 February 1923, in AG 319.12, Hawaiian
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12. A full copy of the Lassiter Board Report may be noted in AG 334.7. Drum Board. The ten year peacetime expansion program which it advocated would entail an annual appropriation of $25,000,000; an increase in personnel to 4,000 officers, 2,500 flying cadets, and 25,000 enlisted men; and equipment totaling 38 balloons, 2,500 flying planes, and 20 airships.


15. See Hearings Before the President's Aircraft Board, pp 97–98.


17. 63 Congress, 1 Session, House of Representatives Report No 1653, p 1.

18. 63 Congress, 1 Session, House of Representatives, Hearings Before the Select Committee of Inquiry into the Operations of the United States Air Services. AAF Historical Studies No 25, p 64, presents a good summary statement on these hearings. As stated, the War Department was inclined to believe that the sole purpose of the committee was the corroboration of "Billy" Mitchell's views.

19. For these pointed statements by Mitchell, see 68 Congress, 1 Session, House of Representatives, Hearings Before the Select Committee of Inquiry into the Operations of the United States Air Services, pp 1915, 1888, 2777.


22. Representative Randolph Perkins, prosecuting attorney for the Lampert Committee, later stated that because of a fear of failure to receive promotion or recognition there was a definite tendency among Army and Navy men to present what he called "collective evidence" indicating the doctrine of their respective departments, rather than to give their own personal convictions. Asserting that they would not tell what they actually thought, he said, three navy lieutenants asked that they not be put on the witness stand. Reminded that they were protected, one added, "It's a long distance from here to Guam." See 69 Congress, 1 Session, House of Representatives, Hearings on Department of Defense and Unification of Air Service (Washington, 1926), p 325. Comment upon Perkins' experience is to be found in an editorial, "The Duty and Opportunity of the N.A.A.,” in Aeronautical Digest, VIII (May 1926), p 264. Admiral William S. Sims testified before the Committee that, of course, the Secretaries of War and Navy would insist that their officers were free to say what they pleased; "but," he added, "you take your chances afterwards..." General Mitchell said that the "services" looked with displeasure upon the expressions of individual opinions when contrary to the policies outlined by the departments concerned. Consequently, fearing disciplinary measures, officers (particularly those in the naval service) hesitated to testify; and, he added, did not offer the best evidence when they did. Representative La Guardia amply corroborated the opinions of the other three men. For the views of Sims, Mitchell, and La Guardia on this score, see 68 Congress, 1 Session, House of Representatives, Hearings Before the Select Committee of Inquiry into the Operations of the United States Air Services, pp 3007, 1652, 1667.

On the other hand, Commander Richard E. Byrd, Bureau of Aeronautics, Navy Department, gave conflicting testimony on this matter. Speaking before the House Committee on Military Affairs, 3 February 1925, he asserted that it was absurd to say that naval officers were afraid to express their real convictions because of intimidation by "higher-ups." "No man living," Byrd continued, "could muzzle" Commander Kenneth
Whiting or Commander H. C. Richardson. The future Antarctic explorer felt that what progress he had achieved was due to his practice of speaking the absolute truth to his senior officers. Before "the higher-ups" knew anything about the subject he and Commander Whiting had decided against a united air service. because they regarded it as absolutely unworkable. 68 Congress, 2 Session, House of Representatives, Hearings on Air Service Unification: H.R. 10147 and H.R. 12285, pp 221–222.


24. See the "Special Concurring Report by Mr. [Frank E.] Reid," in ibid, pp 24–25.


26. Coolidge to Curtis D. Wilbur, Secretary of the Navy, and Dwight F. Davis, Acting Secretary of War, 12 September 1925, in U.S. President's Aircraft Board, Report of President's Aircraft Board (Washington, 1925), p 1. This report, which appeared also as 69 Congress, 1 Session, Senate Document No 18, will be cited hereafter by title only. For additional information regarding the appointment of the Morrow Board, see H. F. Ranney, "President Coolidge Names Board of Nine Men to Decide Aviation's Needs," in U.S. Air Services, X (October 1925), pp 23–25, and a group photograph facing p 23.

27. See Hearings Before the President's Aircraft Board, II, pp 495–633, for the greater part of Mitchell's testimony.

28. Ibid, I, pp 72–73; II, pp 476, 655–656; and I, p 371, respectively.

29. Ibid, I, pp 9–10, 8, 17; III, pp 1268–1269; I, pp 114–116, 190–191, particularly. Many witnesses had no occasion to express themselves on this subject.

30. There is some evidence to indicate a tendency on the part of the Morrow Board to encourage witnesses who opposed plans which would give the Air Service any form of independent status, and a belief that the War Department itself dictated certain corroborative testimony given before it by Army officers. See AAF Historical Studies No 55, p. 71. Both the Acting Secretary of War and the Secretary of Navy, however, assured Chairman Morrow that personnel from their respective departments called as witnesses were free to express their personal convictions. Davis to Morrow, 26 September 1925, and Wilbur to Morrow, same date, in Hearings Before the President's Aircraft Board, I, pp 366–367.


32. Report of the President's Aircraft Board, pp 6, 12.


36. Not to be overlooked completely in this connection is the fact that during the preceding session of Congress two bills providing for a separate department of aeronautics, H.R. 10147 and H.R. 12285, were introduced. The second, however, was a revision of the first and had been offered by the same member. Representative Curry. 68 Congress, 2 Session, House of Representatives, Hearings on Air Service Unification: H.R. 10147 and H.R. 12285, pp 1, 363. Also during this period the members of the lower house considered a resolution providing for the investigation of the advisability of creating a department of defense with "undersecretaries of the Army, Navy, and the air." 68 Congress, 2 Session, Congressional Record, 26 February 1925, p 4793, and ibid, 27, February 1925, pp 4931–4932.

37. 69 Congress, 1 Session, Congressional Record, 7 December 1925, p 405. A copy of this bill, H.R. 447, is printed in 69 Congress, 1 Session, House of Representatives, Hearings on Department of Defense and Unification of Air Service, pp 1329–1347. On the next day Curry introduced another department of aeronautics bill which took the designation H.R. 4084, and was a modification of his previous H.R. 12285. See ibid, pp 1349–1367; and 69 Congress, 1 Session, Congressional Record, 8 December 1925, p 530.

38. These were H.R. 46 and H.R. 9044, respectively, ibid, 7 December 1925, p 396, and 8 February 1926, p 3579. Copies of these bills are printed in 69 Congress, 1 Session, House of Representatives, Hearings on Department of Defense and Unification of
One major difference between them and Curry's bill is that Hill and James would have four undersecretaries subordinate to the Secretary of Defense, one each for Army, Navy, Air, and National Resources, in Hill's; and for Army, Navy, Air, and Supply, in James'. Cf George S. Carll, Jr., "Congress Struggling With the Air Problem," U.S. Air Services, XI (March 1926), pp 45-47.

39. This was H.R. 7916, 69 Congress, 1 Session, Congressional Record, 18 January 1926, p 2339. A copy of the bill is printed in 69 Congress, 1 Session, House of Representatives, Hearings on Department of Defense and Unification of Air Service, pp 1367, 1370. It differed from the Morrow Board recommendation mainly in proposing the appointment of three assistant chiefs of Air Service (Air Corps) in the rank of brigadier general, and providing that not more than ten per centum of the officers in each lower rank might be non-fliers. The bill took form also in S. 3321, which was presented by Senator James W. Wadsworth of the Committee on Military Affairs. 69 Congress, 1 Session, Senate Report No 224.

40. Their testimonies are to be found in 69 Congress, 1 Session, of Representatives, Hearings on Department of Defense and Unification of Air Service. To give a complete list of page citations here would be altogether impracticable. For statements in opposition to the proposed changes, however, see particularly pp 96-97, 173, 189, 344-345, 508, 511-512, 636, 831; and for voiced approval, note especially pp 262-265, 278, 383-388, 400, 419-423, 775.

41. As a part of Colonel Mitchell's prepared testimony, the greater portion of this letter is printed in Hearings Before the President's Aircraft Board, II, pp 603-604.

42. This was in general Patrick's words, ibid, II p. 1198.

43. Ibid; 69 Congress, 1 Session, House of Representatives, Hearings of Department of Defense and Unification of Air Service, pp 260, 270-274. The ideas of the Chief of Air Service on this subject were set forth clearly in a lecture at the Army War College on 9 November 1925, Maj. Gen. M. M. Patrick, The Army Air Service (G-3 Course No 9, Mimeograph form, Washington Barracks, 1925).


45. See ibid, pp 448, 496-499. Included here is a copy of a letter, Secretary of War Davis to Morin, 10 February 1926, presenting pertinent criticisms of the bill. Therein Davis took occasion to list eight specific investigations relating to the question of a separate air organization, including some which have been regarded as of sufficient significance to be included in this study: (1) The Crowell Mission; (2) the Dickman Board; (3) the Menoher Board; (4) the Congressional Committee which drafted the Act of 4 June 1920; (5) the Lassiter Board; (6) a Special Board convened by the Secretary of Navy, 1925; (7) the Morrow Board; and (8) the Lampert Committee. Only the first one listed, he pointed out, had taken an affirmative stand on the matter. The next six definitely had opposed the idea, while the last one recommended a department of national defense but not a separate air service. Here, of course, the Secretary of War ignored the pointed recommendation of one of the members of the Lampert Committee, which was included with the regular report. See supra, p 68, note 24.

In connection with the opposition to the Wainwright measure, see also George S. Carll, Jr., "Congress Will be Guided by Morrow Report," in U.S. Air Services, XI (April 1926), pp 21-25.

46. AAF Historical Studies No 55, p 77; George S. Carll, Jr., "Congress Struggling With the Air Problem," in U.S. Air Services, XI (March 1926), pp 45-47. As stated, the investigation was ended by the decisions to reprimand Majors Henry H. Arnold and H. A. Dargue, and to transfer from duty in Washington the former who was "the chief of the information division" of General Patrick's office. See also Levine, Mitchell, p 373.
Chapter 6

The Establishment of the General Headquarters Air Force

1. No attempt will be made here, of course, to give adequate documentation for the above sweeping generalizations on the developments in aviation. A helpful brief statement by a group of men who made a thorough investigation of the subject is given in U.S. Special Committee on Air Corps, Final Report of Wac Department Special

Committee on Army Air Corps (Washington, 1934), pp 5–7. This was the well-known Baker Board Report and, subsequently, will be cited as such. On this matter, also see AAF Historical Studies No 25 p 81.

3. The above figures were derived from annual reports of the Assistant Secretary of War for Air, as incorporated in those of his superior. *Annual Report of the Secretary of War for 1927*, p 4; *Annual Report of the Secretary of War for 1928*, p 68; and *Annual Report of the Secretary of War for 1932*, p 44. See also the *Annual Report of the Chief of Air Corps for 1935* (Mimeographed form), chart facing page 4. Exclusive of the totals on planes, which he omitted here, the Chief of Air Corps presented figures essentially substantiating those which were cited. Slight variations depended largely upon whether at times a count was made of officers detailed to the Air Corps and flying cadets in the case of enlisted men. These in no wise affect the general picture of Air Corps strength.

One seeming discrepancy with respect to the whole situation, however, should be clarified. As noted, the law of 2 July 1926, like the Army Reorganization Act of 1920 before it, specified an enlisted strength of 16,000. Yet the expansion program set up in the Air Corps Act set a goal of 15,000 at the end of five years (or six, allowing for the twelve months initial delay). The explanation lies in the fact that at the beginning of the five year period there was an actual enlisted strength of only 8,769 including flying cadets. *Annual Report of the Chief of Air Corps for 1927* (Mimeographed form), p 16. The same general condition applied as respects the officer strength. As it so happened, though, the number scheduled for the end of the five years exceeded that which existed at the beginning.

4. This seems amply demonstrated by data present in Army Air Forces, AC/AS, Intelligence, Historical Division, *Army Air Forces Historical Studies No 22: Legislation Relating to the AAF Materiel Program, 1939–1944* (MS, prepared in 1944), on chart between pp 3 and 4. and Appendix I, Table 1. The Assistant Secretary of War for Air drew such a conclusion. Cф *the Baker Board Report*, p 73, however, which held that the blame for the failure to provide the necessary funds was due largely to the Bureau of the Budge and Congress.

5. Data on the subject of a separate promotion list for the Air Corps sufficient for the purpose at hand may be gleaned from reports of the Assistant Secretary of War for Air. See *Annual Report of the Secretary of War for 1927*, pp 43, 53; *Annual Report of the Secretary of War for 1928*, p 67; *Annual Report of the Secretary of War for 1929*, p 87. and *Annual Report of the Secretary of War for 1931*, p 32. Cф an editorial, "They Have Earned It" in *Aero Digest*, XII (April 1928), p 518; and Ralph W. Cram, "The Human Equation in the Air Corps as Related to Its Claim for a Separate Promotion List," in *ibid*, (June 1928), pp 924–925, 1050-1052. A case illustrating the baneful effect of the single promotion list upon an Air Corps officer was brought out by Lt. Lester J. Maitland while testifying before a congressional committee in the spring of 1928. At that time he had been on flying status as an officer for over ten years. According to the existing list, however, he was not due for promotion as captain until July 1932; and would not attain his majority until 1948. after 31 years of service! See 70 Congress, 1 Session, House of Representatives, *Hearings on H.R. 12199: Promotion and Retirement* (Washington, 1928), pp 30–31.

6. All told, no less than a score of these bills were introduced during the period indicated. In this instance it obviously would serve no useful purpose to give the specific dates concerned or to list the precise legislative designations. For expressions of general interest in the proposed revision of the organization of military aeronautics during the period, however, see [Congressman] John J. McSwain, "A Single Department of National Defense" in *Aero Digest*, X (January 1927), pp 9, 73–74; [Representative W. F. James], "United States in Danger of Attack from the Air" in *U.S. Air Services*, XVI (July 1927), p 56; an editorial, "Unified Defense." in *Aero Digest*, XIII (July 1928), p 76; Frank A. Tichenor..."Air—Hot and Otherwise" in *ibid*, XVII (September 1930), pp 50, 70; and Warren B. Francis, "Aeronautics and the Last Session of Congress." in *U.S. Air Services*. XVI (April 1931), pp 44–45.

7. 72 Congress, 1 Session, Congressional Record, 8 December 1931, p 174. *Ibid*. 5 January 1932, p 1338. They were
designated as H.R. 4742 and H.R. 7012
Copies of these bills are printed in 72
Congress, 1 Session, House of Representa-
tives, *Hearings on Department of National
Defense: H.R. 4742 and H.R. 7012* (Was-
ington, 1932), pp 1–2 and 280–282, in the
order listed.

8. *Ibid.* Making a point of what he regar-
ded as an unnecessary duplication of
effort and expense, Congressman Byrns
called attention to the fact that the Army and
Navy each had an airport, existing side by
side, at nearby Boiling Field. Then he added,
"I have been told by gentlemen of reputation,
that it is impossible for one machine shop to
borrow a tool from the other machine shop
over there—because it is contrary to regula-


10. For the testimony in question, see
*ibid.*, pp 103–134.

11. See *ibid.*, pp 49–80, 83–98,
263–278.

12. MacArthur to Charles H. Martin, 18
February 1932, in *ibid.*, pp 248–249.

13. Annual Report of the Secretary of
War 1932, pp 94–112. See especially p 98.

14. They were defeated in committee by
the vote of eleven to eight. See 79 Congress,
1 Session, Senate Committee Print, *Unifica-
tion of the War and Navy Departments and
Postwar Organization for National Security*
(Washington, 1945), p 243. This work is
familiarly known as the *Eberstadt Report*,
the designation by which hereafter it will be
cited.

15. For the debates and final count see
72 Congress, 1 Session, *Congressional
Record*, 30 April 1932, pp 9318, 9339.

16. This was brought out in the *Eber-
stadt Report*, p 185. True enough, soon after
his bill had been rejected by the Committee
on Expenditures in the Executive Depart-
ments, Byrns secured permission to speak
briefly on it before the whole House. Then
and there he criticized, among other things,
the action by which the method had been
referred to the committee in question. 72
Congress, 1 Session, *Congressional Record*,
23 February 1932, pp 4515–4516. Inciden-
tally, this may have influenced the action by
which the proposal for a department of
national defense was incorporated in the
Economy Bill of 1932.

17. Frank A. Tichenor, "A Message to
President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Members
of his Cabinet and to Members of the 73rd
Congress" in *Aero Digest*, XXII (March
1933), p 22.

18. Gavreau and I. Cohen, *Billy
Mitchell* (New York, 1942), pp 208–211,
213, 216; Levine, *Mitchell*, p 392. When
requesting a White House appointment later
that same month Mitchell wrote that he
believed "that the sooner we discuss aero-
nautical matters the better, as they are cer-
tainly not improving. I think I can explain the
whole matter to you in a comparatively short
time." Mitchell to Roosevelt, 24 September
1933, MS, Roosevelt Papers. Official File
249, Aeronautics, the Franklin D. Roosevelt
Library.

19. After a conference with Roosevelt
in the summer of 1935 Mitchell when talking
with friends commented on the fact that the
President's desk was covered with all sorts of
"gimcracks," including miniatures of ships'
clocks, steering wheels, life preservers, and
other things which reflect a man's love of the
sea. "I wish," he was quoted as saying, "I
could have seen an airplane model in that
collection." Gavreau and Cohen, *Billy
Mitchell*, p 291.

20. Memo for Commanding Generals
of the Four Field Armies by General Douglas
MacArthur, Chief of Staff, 22 October 1932,
in AG 320.2 (8-6-32) (1), See 1-a.

21. AG to C/AC, 3 June 1933, in AG
334.7, Drum Board.

C/AC, to AG, 13 July 1933, included at
Exhibit I of Report of the Special Commit-
tee, General Council on Employment of
Army Air Corps under Certain Strategic
Plant [Drum Board Report], in *ibid*.

23. See pertinent sections of the Drum
Board Report as previously identified, in
*ibid*. Members of the board other than Drum
and Foulois were Maj. Gen. John W Gulick,
Chief of Coast Artillery, Brig. Gen. Charles
E. Kilbourne, Assistant Chief of Staff, War
Plans Division; and Maj. Gen. George S.
Simonds, Commandant, the Army War College. Extracts from the Drum Report are printed in the Baker Board Report, pp 13–14.

24. See the copy of a speech delivered on 25 July 1934, by the Second Assistant Postmaster General, in the form of a Post Office News Release, 26 July 1934, Archives, United States Air Force, Historical Division. Note also the Baker Board Report, pp 60–61, and Exhibits 5, 6, 7.


26. For this analysis of the purpose and scope of the investigation undertaken by the board, see ibid., pp 1–3. Various subcommittees made first-hand observations of outstanding developments in the art of aviation at such stations as Langley Field, Wright Field, and Randolph Field, and at different airplane factories.

27. Ibid, pp 4–5. The investigating bodies listed included such as the Dickman Board, the Mehoer Board, the Lampert Committee, the Lassiter Board, the Morrow Board, the House of Representatives Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments (1932), the Drum Board, et cetera, all of which have been analyzed in the present study. Secretary Dem's opinion of the Baker Board Report was expressed in Annual Report of the Secretary of War 1935, p 10.

28. Baker Board Report, pp 15–18. The idea of merging all civil and Army aviation in one executive department, leaving the Navy with its own air component was also objectionable to the board. It looked with favor, however, upon the suggestion of a Federal commission relating solely to the control of civil aviation.

29. Ibid, p 15. See also pp 12, 14, 24.


31. Ibid, p 27. It is interesting to note here that about the time the report of the Baker Board was placed on record the Secretary of War announced that the Office of the Assistant Secretary of War for air had not been filled "because the Air Corps, like other branches of the Army, now functions directly under the Chief of Staff, to the mutual benefit of the Air Corps and the Army as a whole." Annual Report of the Secretary of War 1934, p 4. As expressed before the Finletter Commission, however, former Secretary F. Trubee Davison held a different opinion about the matter. He believed that failure to fill his office as well as that of the corresponding position in the Navy Department was due unquestionably to the "jealousy of the older services." See his testimony on 1 December 1947, in U.S. President's Air Policy Commission, Unclassified Testimony before the President's Air Policy Commission, September 15—December 3, 1947, Typescript form, 6 vols (Washington, 1947), pp 2644–2645.


34. AAF Historical Studies No 25, p 95 and note 19. Incidentally, this work presents a fair summary of the Baker Board Report. See pp 93–96; and Cf Perara, Legislative History of Aviation, pp 57–60. The brief review of that document given in the present study purposely omits some of the more trite and traditional criticisms made of the proposals for a separate department of aeronautics, a coordinate air unit in a department of national defense, and lesser changes, which had been urged by aviation enthusiasts.

35. Baker Board Report, p 75. General Foulouis who but recently had been under fire by the House Committee on Military Affairs for alleged misconduct and inefficiency was criticized by some Air Corps officers for signing the Baker Board Report. See an editorial, "General Benny Foulouis" in U.S. Air Services, XIX (July 1934), p 10; and another, "General Foulouis Wants the Record" in ibid (September 1934), p 16.

36. 74 Congress. 1 Session, Senate Document No 15: Federal Aviation Commission, pp 1, 254. This document, which was printed separately at Washington in 1934, will be cited hereafter as Federal Aviation Commission. Regular members besides
Howell were Edward P. Warner, Albert J. Berres, Jerome C. Hunsaker, and Franklin K. Lane, Jr. J. Carroll Cone acted as executive secretary. For the provision of the law in question, see United States Statutes at Large, XLVIII, pp 933-939.

37. Before the commission began taking testimony Chairman Howell visited Europe where he studied governmental administration of aeronautical matters in four different countries. Meanwhile for the purpose of observing conditions relating to the assignment several other members of the group set out on a 13,000-mile aerial tour, with stops in more than one-half the states in the American union, and in ten foreign countries within the Caribbean area. Federal Aviation Commission, pp 1–2, 119. Upwards of 4,000 typed pages of record resulted from the open hearings. U.S. Federal Aviation Commission, Reporter’s Minutes...Public Hearings (Washington, 1934). In addition the executive hearings produced over 1,000 pages which are still regarded as “confidential in nature,” MS, in custody of the Civil Aeronautics Administration Library, United States Department of Commerce.

38. Federal Aviation Commission, pp 119–120.

39. Ibid, p 123. The report of the Federal Aviation Commission included at least three other recommendations which ought to be mentioned in this connection. First, both the personnel and equipment of the air forces (i.e., of the Army and Navy) should be further developed and, where necessary, expanded in accordance with fixed programs of regular growth. Next, though not proposing separate budgets as such, it suggested that funds for equipment should be allocated directly to the authorities in charge of aeronautical development, and subsequently transferred to other branches or offices if necessary. Finally, since it had expired on 1 July 1934, the authority to select a Chief of Air Corps from among all the officers of long service in that arm should be reviewed and applied as well to the proposed “Commanding General of the General Headquarters Air Force.” Ibid, pp 121, 124, 139–141. Fully one-fourth of the entire report was devoted to the question of the organization of national defense together with that of military and naval aeronautical material. Excellent digests of sections of the document and comments thereupon are found in an unsigned article. “Recommendations of the Aviation Commission,” in Aero Digest, XXVI (February 1935), pp 29–30, 32, 34, 36, 75; and an editorial, “National Defense Organization” in U.S. Air Services, XX (March 1935), pp 9–11.

40. AG 320.2 (12–19–34) Misc (Ret) -C. 31 December 1934. Cf Perara, A Legislative History or Aviation, p 62. and Exhibit A, p 1. The first draft of the announcement was made on 19 December 1934. With respect to the location of the Headquarters, GHQ, and the three wings, see Annual Report of the Chief of Air Corps for 1935, p 6.

41. U.S. Federal Aviation Commission, Reporter’s Minutes...Public Hearings, pp 4135–4136. In a “My dear Franklin” letter, written soon after offering the testimony mentioned above, Mitchell wrote that Howell had suggested that he see the President before the latter held a conference with the members of the Aviation Commission, which was scheduled for 10 December. The crusader for air power expressed the belief, among other things, that a constructive aviation policy could be inaugurated in the session of Congress then about to convene; but he added, this could not be done along the lines advocated by the Army, the Navy, or what he called the government-supported Manufacturers Aircraft Association. Mitchell to Roosevelt, 1 December 1934, MS, Roosevelt Papers, Official File 249, Aeronautics, the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library.

More temperate criticism of the GHQ Air Force organization, which probably reflected fairly accurately the better informed element of public opinion on the question, may be noted in an editorial, “Not All Men Believe in the Baker Board” in U.S. Air Services, XIX (November 1934), pp 7–8; and Cy Caldwell, “Our Air Force” in Aero Digest, XXVII (December 1945), pp 15–16, 70.

42. U.S. Federal Commission, Repor-
ter's Minutes...Public Hearings, p 4141. Here Chairman Howell summarized a portion of Arnold's statement made a few days earlier before the commission in what must have been an “off the record” testimony.


44. This was brought out in an unsigned article, “Chief of the Air Corps Declares G.H.Q. Force a Forward Step” in Air Corps News Letter, XVIII (1 February 1935), p 31.


Judging from a semi-official statement which he made, the Deputy Chief of Staff, Maj. Gen. George S. Simonds, took a position on this matter which more nearly approached the view of the Air Corps officers than it did that of General MacArthur. As of 1 June 1935, General Simonds wrote that regardless of future developments in machines, weapons, tactics, and organization, the creation of the GHQ Air Force was the proper thing to do at the time. A step in any other direction, he added, could be “compared to stepping off a precipice in order to take the shortest line, whereas by developing a road as we go along, we are more sure of reaching the proper destination.” See his article, “My Visit to the Air Corps,” in Air Corps News Letter, XVII (June 1935), pp 1–2.


Chapter 7

The Air Corps and the GHQ Air Force, 1935–1941

1. 1st Ind (Basic unknown), Lt. Col. Ralph Royce to CG. Sixth Corps Area, 25 November 1935, in AG 320.2 (9–13–34), pt 1, see 1-b. See also Army Air Forces, AC/AS, Intelligence, Historical Division. Army Air Forces Historical Studies No 10: Organization, of the Army Air Arm, 1935–1943 (MS, prepared in 1944), pp 6–7. This work will be cited hereafter simply as AAF Historical Studies No 10.


4. Memo for Chief of Staff by Brig. Gen. F. M. Andrews, 2 November 1935, in AG 320.2 (11–2–35). This communication was accompanied by a semi-personal letter from Andrews to Simonds. See also Army Air Forces, AC/AS, Intelligence, Historical Division, Army Air Forces Historical Studies No 46: Organization of Military Aeronautics, 1935–1945 (MS, prepared in 1946), p 4. The companion volume to AAF Historical Studies No 25 will be cited henceforth as AAF Historical Studies No 46.

5. Memo for Deputy Chief of Staff by Brig. Gen. Oscar Westover, 17 January

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1946, in AG 320.2


7. Colonel Hugh J. Knerr, a representative of General Andrews, signed the report but later withdrew his signature on the grounds that since his superior did not agree wholly with the proposals involved, he had no right to sanction it. The majority of the other members felt, however, that General Andrews' attitude in this instance should not affect Colonel Knerr's position; and, in fact, another representative of the GHQ Air Force, Brig. Gen. H. C. Pratt, accepted the board's findings. See AAG 321.9 Board Reports (Bulk); AAG 321.9B, Organization GHQ Air Force...Air Corps; and AG320.2 (9–13–34) pt 1, see 1–b.

8. Memo for Chief of Staff by Maj. Gen. Oscar Westover, 25 April 1936, in AG 320.2 (9–13–34) pt 1, see 1–b; Memo for Chief of Staff by Maj Gen. George J. Simonds, Deputy Chief of Staff, 29 April 1936, in ibid.


17. In a special message to Congress on 12 January 1939, President Roosevelt stated that military aviation was increasing at such a fast pace, with regard to range, speed, and capacity of airplanes, that our aircraft defense estimates should be revamped completely. He recommended an appropriation of $300,000,000 to provide a minimum of 3,000 additional planes of various types; and a sum sufficient to train annually 20,000 more pilots. This message is printed in 76 Congress, 1 Session, Senate, Hearings on H.R. 3791: National Defense (Washington, 1939), pp 1–3. In response thereto the House of Representatives on 15 February following passed a bill authorizing the Secretary of War to equip and maintain for the Air Corps 5,500 serviceable planes, and provide for an adequate number of air personnel. Following approval by the Senate the bill became law on 3 April 1939. See United States Statutes at Large, LIII, pp 555–560.


20. Memo for the Chief of Staff by Brig. Gen. Wade Haislip, AC/S, G–1, 15 March 1941, in AG 320.2 MCM (11–14–40); and 1st Ind (AG to Chief of Air Corps, 17 February 1941), Brig. Gen. Carl Spaatz, Assistant C/AC, Plans to AG, 12 March 1941, in ibid.

National Security and the General Staff, (Washington, 1946), p 317. A careful distinction should be made, of course, between “General Headquarters” and “General Headquarters, Air Force.”

22. Memo for Chief of Staff (through Acting Deputy Chief of Staff for Air) by Maj. Gen. G. H. Brett, 26 December 1940, cited in AAF Historical Studies No 10, p 17.

23. For Lovett’s appointment as Special Assistant to the Secretary of War; see Memo for the Deputy Chief of Staff by the Secretary of War, 29 December 1940, in AAG 020.2, Office, Secretary of War. The reader will recall that the position of Assistant Secretary of War for Air originally had been created and filled in 1926.

24. Stimson to Robert R. Reynolds, Chairman, Senate Committee on Military Affairs, 20 June 1941. Through the courtesy of Senator Pat MCCarran of Nevada, the writer was privileged to see the original of this letter, as well as other important documents on the history of military aviation, in an aeronautics file which Senator MCCarran maintained in his Washington office, the United States Senate Office Building. On the same day that he wrote Senator Reynolds, incidently, Secretary Stimson addressed an identical letter to Representative Andrew J. May, Chairman of the House Committee on Military affairs.

25. It appears that early in May the Air Corps presented a plan embodying many features which eventually were adopted. According to the suggestion the capstone of the military air arm would be the Assistant Secretary of War for Air, together with the War Planning Staff. One of the members of the latter group, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Air, should be designated also as Chief of Aviation. Immediately subordinate to him in the latter capacity would be an Air Council composed of the Chief of the Air Corps (the presiding officer); the Chief of the Air Staff; the Commanding General, GHQ Air Force; the Chief of Air Services; and such other members as might be appointed. Below the Air Council the proposal envisioned a Headquarters, Office of the Chief of Air Corps to supervise the activities of the Commanding General, GHQ Air Force and the Chief of Air Service. It was not until after numerous communications had passed between the responsible offices, and at least one major conference was held, that the plan which finally was adopted had emerged. Then it was far from being wholly satisfactory to the air personnel. See AAF Historical Studies No 46, pp 20–22.

26. A copy of AR 95–5, Army Air Forces, 20 June 1941, is included herein as Appendix I.

27. Generally paralleling the organization of the War Department General Staff, the Air Staff had divisions for personnel, military intelligence, operations and training, and material and supply; and also a special war plans division, a budget section, and a statistics section. Outside the Air Staff proper were an air adjutant general and an air inspector.

Substantial analysis of AR 95–5, 20 June 1941, and discussions thereof are to be found in AAF Historical Studies No 10, pp 18–21; and AAF Historical Studies No 46, pp 22–24. For an excellent brief contemporary statement, see an unsigned article, “Army Sets up Autonomous Air Command” in U.S. Air Services, XXVI (August 1941), p 19.


30. Quoted in U.S. Office of Air Force History, The Army Air Forces in World War II (7 vols projected, 3 completed, Chicago, 1948), I, p 67, second note. There is a suggestion in the work cited that Air Corps leaders were influenced to accept a compromise on organization with the hope that
they might clear the way for a long-range bomber program in which General Andrews was particularly interested.

31. Supra, p 97.


34. "There are so many pros and cons to the question of establishing a Department of National Defense," he wrote, "that I cannot comment on it at this time. It requires considerably more careful consideration than I can give. Right at this minute it looks to me as if it might be a serious mistake to change the existing set-up when we are all using every facility available in order to take care of the present expansion of the Air Corps." Maj. Gen. H. H. Arnold to General Walter P. Story, 14 June 1940, in AAG 032 M, Legislation. This letter was in response to an inquiry from General Story, then but recently returned from abroad, seeking information regarding the attitude of the Chief of Air Corps on S. 4050 which proposed a Department of National Defense. See Story to Arnold, 8 June 1940, in ibid.

35. Arnold and Baker, Winged Warfare, pp 244–245. In a previous section of their book the authors had presented a dispassionate summary of valid arguments on both sides of the question relating to an independent status for the air arm. See pp 83–87.

36. Again, during this period, there appeared the charge that many Army and Navy officers, having in mind what had happened to General Mitchell, refused to express an honest conviction on the question of an independent air force which they thought might be contrary to the opinion of the General Staff of the Army or the Navy High Command. This was brought out, for instance, in an editorial, "The Sword of Damocles," in Aero Digest, XXXIX (August 1941), p 46, which in part stated that "aviation officers in the Army and Navy simply cannot come out for an independent Air Force. And whenever they are called upon to testify, you might bear this in mind and pay no attention to what they may have to say. The truth is in them. But the welfare of their wives and their children, not to mention their own careers, will not let it come out."

37. Dodge was testifying before the House of Representatives Committee on Military Affairs with reference to the bill proposing increased appropriation for national defense, 76 Congress, 1 Session, House of Representatives, Hearings on an Adequate National Defense as Outlined by the Message of the President of the United States (Washington, 1939), pp 113–122.

38. Willkie's plan was outlined generally in an editorial in the Washington Daily News, 28 August 1940, reprinted in 76 Congress, 3 Session, Congressional Record, Appendix, pp 5326–5327.

39. See an editorial, "Hitler Ahoy!", in Aero Digest, XXXVII (August 1940), p 100; and a section of Cy Caldwell's column, "Personalities," in ibid (September 1940), p 120. Williams' literary contributions included articles for such magazines as Cosmopolitan and the Saturday Evening Post. His book, Air Power, was published at New York in 1940.

40. A copy of Major Williams' address is printed in 76 Congress, 3 Session, Congressional Record, Appendix, pp 3400–3402. An abbreviated form appears as Major Al Williams, "Real Air Power for the Defense of the United States" in U.S. Air Services, XXV (June 1940), pp 18–19, 40.

41. "Ordeal of American Air Power" in American Mercury, LI (July 1941), pp 7–14, 127. The text of this article appeared in the Congressional Record as of 20 June 1941, 77 Congress, 1 Session, Appendix, pp 2991–2993. Evidence of de Seversky's direct efforts to spread his doctrines among members of Congress were noted in his letters of 16, 17, and 23 June 1941, with enclosures, to Senator Pat McCarran in the
latter's aeronautics files, United States Senate Office Building.

42. The titles of a few typical editorials and articles which illustrate the point may be cited here. Among the former were: "A Herculean Task For a Busy Executive," XXXVII (October 1940), pp 80, 113; "An Air Secretary 'In Order,"' ibid (November 1940), pp 32, 41; and "A New Ministry of the Air," XXXVIII (February 1941), p 41. Pertinent articles, all by Cy Caldwell, were: "United We Stand-Divided We Stand for Anything," XXVII (November 1935 ), pp 16–17, 68, 70: "The New Deal in War... XXX (April 1937), p 21; "Phantom Wings of the Air Corps," ibid (July 1937) p 30; and "The Ghost of General Douhet," XXXVIII (February 1941), pp 43, 45, 48.

43. H.R. 7041 was presented by Congressman J. J. McSwain, an ardent aviation enthusiast, on 27 March 1935, and H.R. 8729 by Representative Ernest Lundeen on 29 June Following, 74 Congress, 1 Session, Congressional Record, 27 March 1935, p 4557; ibid, 29 June 1935, p 10458. Having occasion to comment upon the latter bill, General Westover stated that unamended it would "wreck the National Defense of the United States," and thought that it should be opposed vigorously by both the Air Corps and the War Department. Ibid, 2nd Ind (Sam Rayburn to S/W. 15 July 1935), C/AC to AG, 23 July 1935 in AAG 032 1, Legislation. Judging by his well known attitude, the Chief of Air Corps undoubtedly held the same attitude towards H.R. 7041.

44. 74 Congress, 1 Session, Congressional Record, 14 August 1935, p 13195, H.R. 7341 proposed by Congressman McSwain a few months earlier suggested a "College of Defensive Strategy," to which Army, Navy, and Air Force officers would be detailed for instruction. Ibid, 8 April 1935, p 5282.

For the whole period 1935 to 1941, incidentally, a fairly detailed discussion of the legislative proposals for changing the status of the military air arm is given in AAF Historical Studies No 4, pp 9–15, 24–36.

45. 75 Congress, 1 Session. Congressional Record, 5 January 1937, p 31; ibid, 13 August 1937, pp 8870–8871.

46. Ibid, 19 March 1937, p 2532. H.C. Luckey, the sponsor of the latter bill, a few days earlier introduced a resolution which among other things would have resulted in the appointment of a committee for the purpose of recommending after appropriate study the best method of organizing and coordinating the three armed services—Army, Navy, and Air. Ibid, 1 March 1937, p 1710. The following August Representative H.P. Koppleman sponsored a resolution looking towards the creation of a board to make a study respecting appropriate changes, eliminations, or consolidation in the military, naval, and air forces. Ibid, 17 August 1937, p 9193.

47. Like Representative Boileau's bills, these two would have limited the activities of the proposed department to defense purposes only. See 76 Congress. 1 Session, Congressional Record, 30 January 1939, p 967; ibid, 15 February 1939, p 1446.

48. It was submitted by Representative J.M. Wilcox of Florida on 18 January 1937. See 75 Congress, 1 Session, Congressional Record, 18 January 1937, p 289. This bill also died in committee.

49. Memo for AC/S, G–3 by C/AC, 3 February 1937, in AG 580 (1–19–37). The reader will recall that at this time within the air arm there was a division of responsibility between the Chief of Air Corps and the GE4Q Air Force. General Westover felt that the purpose of that part of the bill in question which would place full control under the Office of the Chief of Air Corps should be elected in time of peace by a War Department directive. The memorandum cited above was in effect a long statement prepared for General Westover's use should hearings on the bill be conducted by a congressional committee.

50. H. H. Woodring to Lister Hill, 16 April 1937, ibid. As an interesting aftermath, the Office of the Chief of Air Corps on 12 May asked permission to circulate this letter of the Secretary of War For the information and guidance of Air Corps officials. The request was returned with the
suggestion that it be resubmitted on 1 August. After this was done the decision announced—with no assigned reason—was to the effect that the information involved could be communicated by oral means only. This General Westover proceeded to do. Memo for AG by Brig. Gen. H. H. Arnold, 12 May 1937, (1st Ind AG to C/AC, 20 May 1937; 2nd Ind C/AC to AG, 31 July 1937; 3rd Ind AG to C/AC, 24 August 1937), in AAG 030, Misc President—Congress.

51. For the department of national defense measures, see H.R. 5139, 76 Congress, 1 Session, Congressional Record, 20 March 1939, p 3013; S.4050, 76 Congress, 3 Session, Congressional Record, 27 May 1940, p 6873; H.R. 10364. Ibid, 15 August 1940, p 10462; and H.R. 10366. Ibid. Those suggesting a separate department of air may be listed as follows: S.4022, Ibid, 21 May 1940, p 6471; H.R. 10049, Ibid, 10 June 1940, p 7907; and H.R. 10121, Ibid, 20 June 1940, p 8759.

52. H. J. Res. 417, 76 Congress, 3 Session, Congressional Record, 10 January 1940, p 262; and H. J. Res. 469, Ibid, 22 February 1940, p 1863. The author of the first mentioned resolution, Representative J. E. Van Zandt, on several occasions called the attention of the House of Representatives to his proposal, thereby expressing his firm support for a single department with coordinate subdivisions for Air, Army, and Navy. Ibid, Appendix, pp 3229–3240, 3362, 3420, 3556.

53. In this connection one should not overlook the effect of the evidences of German air superiority as was indicated by victories in Greece and Crete.


55. Reference has been made to the article; “Ordeal of American Air Power,” American Mercury, LIII (July 1941), pp 7–14, 127. See supra, p 115. For examples of other extensions of remarks supporting the bills for a separate air force, and a department of national defense, see 77 Congress, 1 Session, Congressional Record, Appendix, pp 1201–1242, 2645–2646, 2725–2726, 2742–2743, 2792–2793, 2798.

56. Ibid, 29 April 1941, p 3406.

57. Robert Patterson, Acting S/W, to Robert R. Reynolds, Senate Committee on Military Affairs, 20 February 1941, in AAG 032. Legislation, Army Air Forces. Evidence indicates that the basic portion of this letter was typed from a draft prepared in person by General George C. Marshall, the Chief of Staff. It should be considered in connection with another, Patterson to David I. Walsh, Senate Committee on Naval Affairs, 20 February 1941, in Ibid.

58. Stimson to Andrew J. May, 22 March 1941, in AAG 032, Legislation, Army Air Forces.


60. Stimson to Robert R. Reynolds. Senate Committee on Military Affairs, 20 June 1941, noted in aeronautics file. Senator Pat McCarran, United States Senate Office Building.
Chapter 8

Autonomy for the Army Air Forces

1. See, for instance, an unsigned article, "General Arnold Heads Army Air Forces" in U.S. Air Services, XXVI (July 1941), p 41.

2. It is to be understood that many of the proposals which were submitted throughout the period can be counted as separate bills only in a technical sense. That is, several of them were introduced two or more times, with varied designations of course, in different sessions of Congress. As may have been noted, none of them as such amassed sufficient strength as to receive official consideration outside of committee. The content of one, which for tactical purposes had been incorporated in an entirely different bill, was killed by a decisive vote on the floor of the lower house. See supra, p 85. On this question of the relation between the moves in Congress in the years 1939 to 1941 and the actions of the War Department, however, Cf AAF Historical Studies No 46, p 35.

3. S. 1702, one of the usual department of national defense bills, was introduced within a few days after the establishment of the Army Air Forces. 77 Congress, 1 Session, Congressional Record, 30 June 1941, p 5700. The other, H.R. 6576, provided for the creation of a department of national defense, in modified form, to be set up as a regular post in the President's cabinet. It would include, among other things, a central defense command, zone commands, and a department of air force. 77 Congress, 2 Session, Congressional Record, 10 February 1942, pp 1183–1185.

4. AAF Historical Studies No 46, pp 35–39, presents a rather comprehensive discussion of this evidence. Again Major Al Williams and Major Alexander de Seversky freely expressed their opinions as individuals, and likewise the Aero Digest as a publication. Soon after Pearl Harbor in an "I told you so" attitude this journal, delving into its files as far back as 1925, by way of quotations and reprinted articles called attention to previous expressions of opinion on the question of a separate and independent air force by such individuals as General Mitchell. General Arnold, Congressman McSwain, Representative James, and its editorial writers. For instance, XL (February 1942), p 58, reproduced an article, "Awake America," prepared by the then Colonel Mitchell for the July 1926 issue, in which the author came out strongly in favor of a department of national defense, with subdivisions for air, land, water, and munitions. In connection with its reappearance the editor stated that had Mitchell's advice been followed the "Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor would not have suffered a $500,000,000 loss in less than one hour...See also Frank A. Tichenor's three different articles, all bearing the title, "An Open Letter to Congress," which were published in XL (February 1942), pp 60, 62, 219–220; ibid (March 1942), pp 57–59; and XL (May 1942), pp 59–60, 274.

5. The news story in an interview with Captain Rickenbacker, dated 14 November 1941, may be noted in 77 Congress, 1 Session, Congressional Record, Appendix, p 5438.

6. The following observation of a leading airman as related to the creation of a separate air force may be of some significance: "Organization is created for purposes of direction and control and is not an end in itself. It will never serve as a substitute for capable leadership. On the other hand, a proper concept of air-ground forces by task force commanders should enable effective conduct of field operations under the present or the proposed organization of the air arm." Memo for Brig. Gen. H. H. Arnold by Brig. Gen. Carl Spaatz, 22 August 1941, in AAG 321.9, Separate Air Service.

7. See Notes on a Conference with Mr. Lovett, 6 October 1941, in AAG 032 N–2, Legislation. With respect to measures "pending" in Congress reference is made primarily to bills and resolutions which had been presented prior to the issuance of AR 95–5.
Some members were chafing because their proposals had received no attention at the hands of committees to which they had been referred.

8. For this brief analysis of the weakness inherent in the Army Air Forces organization as of 20 June 1941, see Notes on AR 95-5 and present degree of autonomy of the Air Forces, by Major G. R. Perara, 25 September 1941, in AAG 032 N-2, Legislation. Proposed revisions of AR 95-5, 20 June 1941, are filed in AAG 300.3, Army Regulations.

9. Memo for AC/S. WPD, by C/AS, 24 October 1941, in AAG 321.9DH, Organization, Army Air Forces. See also AAF Historical Studies No 46, pp 43-44.

10. Ibid, pp 44-45. Generally speaking, this proposal made provision for an Army Air Forces organization to be composed of a combat command, a service command, various air forces, and an air staff, all under the Chief of Staff and the Secretary of War. A Commanding General, AAF, would have strategic direction of air operations in air theatres, as well as control of budgetary and financial matters. No Air Force Combat Command units could be detached without his approval. The ground and air forces would be on an equal status, and have the same access to service and supply agencies. Several draft copies of such a proposal are to be found in AAG 032 N-2, Legislation.

11. A copy of General Arnold’s plan is printed in Nelson, National Security and the General Staff, pp 337-341. As explained in the preface to this work, General Nelson participated in the activities of the War Department reorganization committee which culminated in the sweeping changes made on 9 March 1942. Much of the material in the chapter devoted to this subject, moreover, was based upon personal knowledge, conversations with other officers, and hitherto unpublished documents. See p 396, footnote 2, Unless designated otherwise any part of it, therefore, may be regarded as a primary source.

12. Nelson, National Security and the General Staff, pp 314-348. Incidentally, because of the existing emergency the Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations and Training actively opposed any major changes in War Department Organization at this time.

Before taking over the work of directing the War Department Reorganization Committee, General McNamney served on the Roberts Commission designated to investigate the Pearl Harbor attack. During the two month interval preceding the McNamney memorandum of 31 January the Army Air Forces experienced some uneasy moments as plans for the reorganization were in the mailing. Soon after the declarations of war General Headquarters was authorized to deal directly with both the Chief, AAF, and the Commanding General, AFCC, regarding air enforcements. In the opinion of General Arnold this would tend to reduce the Army Air Forces to a planning, procurement, training, and supply agency, with its combat and relevant service units under different commands. Other conflicting spheres of jurisdiction included the responsibility of air defense of the United States. In this critical period General Arnold thought it was essential that functions and responsibilities of the Army Air Forces be clearly defined. See AAF Historical Studies No 46, pp 46-47, note 13.

There was evidence that otherwise the opinions of many airmen on the subject of War Department structural changes were in a status of flux during the weeks immediately following American entrance into World War II. For instance, in reply to a request from the Chief of Staff for recommendations for organizational changes that might be effected by the President under the First War Powers Act of 18 December 1914, the Air War Plans Division submitted a plan which would remove the air arm from the jurisdiction of the War Department, creating coequal air, ground, and naval arms, with unity of command provided by a coordinator of common services. Stated briefly, this suggestion of the Air War Plans Division compared very favorably with the proposed department of national defense which often had been advocated. In fact, it was coupled with the suggestion that legislation be initiated for the purpose of setting up a Department of National Warfare. Ibid, pp 47-48.
13. A copy of the First War Powers Act, 1941, is included in *United States Statutes at Large*, LV, pp 838–841. The text of Executive Order No 9082 is produced herewith as Appendix J.


17. In this connection note AAF Historical Studies No 46, p 41.

18. On 10 June 1942, for instance, the Chief of Air Staff wrote that the “main objective of the Army Air Forces is to operate effectively against the enemy the maximum number of organized units and airplanes possible.” Memo for all AAF units by Maj. Gen. M. F. Harmon, 10 June 1942, in AAG381, War Plans.

19. Roosevelt to Senator Pat McCarran, 7 September 1943. Original noted in aeronautics file, Senator Pat McCarran, United States Senate Office Building.

   Like Topsy, the war-time Joint Chiefs of Staff, of course, “jest growed.” No one, seemingly, had a clear understanding as to what actually constituted its charter or articles of organization. Admiral Leahy, who as the representative of the Commander-in-Chief early presided over the body subsequently wrote, he had “heard that in some file there is a chit or memorandum from Roosevelt, setting up the Joint Chiefs;” but, he added, “I never saw, it.” *I Was There* (New York, 1950), p 102. General Nelson, in his *National Security and the General Staff*, pp 397–405, touches generally upon the development of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Combined Chiefs of Staff, and discusses the functions performed by them.

20. Italics as given above are the present author’s. It seems worth noting, however, that most of that portion of the document which formed the basis of the above statements were emphasized by the use of capital letters throughout. Chapter I of FM 100–20 is included herewith as Appendix L.

21. Another, if relatively minor, step which contributed to the freedom of the air arm was initiated late in 1943 with the approval of a plan to eliminate all arms and service branch distinctions within the Army Air offices. This was characterized by General Arnold as “a most important milestone” which would enable the organization to build a better integrated, a more efficient, and a harder hitting machine. The consummation of the plan increased the strength of the AAF by some 600,000, including personnel of the quartermaster, ordnance, signal, and other arms and services already functioning within its ranks. At the same time it tended to conserve manpower and provide a greater degree of flexibility. See an editorial, “Arms and Services” in *Air Force*, XXVII (January 1944), p 1; and H. H. Arnold to all Personnel of the Army Air Forces, [6 November 1943] in *ibid*, on back cover. Cf Army Air Forces, AC/AS. Intelligence, Historical Division, *Army Air Forces Historical Studies No 28: Development of Administrative Planning and Control of the AAF*, (MS, prepared in 1945), pp 78–85.

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H.R. 3226, ibid, 17 September 1943, p 7637; H. J. Res. 203, ibid, 7 December 1943, p 10399; S. 1956, 78 Congress, 2 Session, Congressional Record, 29 May 1944 p 5074; H.R. 86, 79 Congress, 1 Session, Congressional Record, 3 January 1945, p 20; H.R. 504, ibid, p 26; H.R. 549, ibid, p 29; H.R. 550, ibid, p 27; and S. 84, ibid, 6 January 1945, p 78. CfAAF Historical Studies No 46, p 52.

23. For the purpose at hand, AAF Historical Studies No 46, pp 54–56, 65–66, presents adequate evidence of this development during the war years. Through means of a section of the press, Gallup poll indices, and other outlets. Also the Aero Digest, to mention here only one journal, kept up its agitation for an independent air arm. See, for instance, the following editorials: “To the Members of the New Congress” in XLII (December 1942), pp 117, 271; “Air Power Fights Stupidity,” XLIII (August 1943), pp 145, 305; “A Golden Opportunity,” XLV (1 June 1944), pp 65, 130; and “If the Administration Has Nothing to Hide...,” XLVI (1 September 1944), pp 71, 146–147.

24. McCarran to Roosevelt, 20 August 1943, noted in aeronautics file, Senator Pat McCarran, United States Senate Office Building.

25. Roosevelt to McCarran, 7 September 1943, in ibid.

26. His earlier attitude was discussed in Chapter IV, pp 48–49, above. Senator McCarran characterized the President’s letter as “non-committal, not encouraging, and at the same time not discouraging.” At least it stimulated him to persevere in the matter; for some three months later, at a time when he at least thought such would not impede the war effort, he urged the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Military Affairs to conduct hearings on S. 30, a department of aviation bill which he had introduced the previous January. McCarran to Major Charles T. Malone, 24 September 1943, and same to Robert R. Reynolds, 20 December 1943 respectively, ibid.


28. For a brief, but well documented discussion of the “unofficial” suggestion made by officers of the General Staff, the more complete report and recommendations of the Special Planning Division of that body, and the subsequent statement relative to demobilization plans, see AAF Historical Studies No 46, pp 58–61.

29. 78 Congress, 2 Session, House of Representatives, Hearings on Proposal to Establish a Single Department of Armed Forces (Washington, 1944), Pt I, pp 1, 2, 322. The personnel of this committee consisted of seven members of the House Committee on Military Affairs; seven from its Committee on Naval Affairs; and nine “outsiders,” in the sense that they belonged to neither of the major committees relating to the armed forces. Attention should be called to the fact that the Woodrum group was an investigating, not a legislative committee; for it was not concerned with either a pending or future bill or resolution.


32. Secretary Stimson thought it important that the general principle of consolidation be adopted as soon as possible but added that a great military organization could not be changed at a critical moment of war “any more than you could change the engine of an airplane while it was in flight.” General McNamara preferred that necessary enabling action provide for a consolidation not later than six months after the close of hostilities. Ibid, pp 32 and 41, respectively. McNamara also furnished the committee with a chart of a proposed department of armed forces which, incidentally, proved to be identical with that submitted by the General Staff on 11 October 1943. Ibid, p 38. Harold D. Smith, Director of the Budget, also favored the single department. See his statement in ibid, pp 295–304.

33. Ibid, pp 122, 124.

34. Ibid, pp 265–273. Other naval offi-
cens to testify included Vice Admiral R. S. Edwards, Chief of Staff; Admiral F. J. Horne, Vice Chief of Naval Operations; Ralph A. Bard, Assistant Secretary of Navy; Artemus L. Gates, Assistant Secretary of Navy for Air; and Lt. Gen. A. A. Vandergrift, Commandant, United States Marine Corps. *Ibid*, pp 137, 145, 171, 221, 177, ff, respectively.

35. For Daniels' testimony see *ibid*, pp 241–253.


37. For a copy of this directive, see enclosure in William D. Leahy (For the Joint Chiefs of Staff) to the Secretary of the Navy 19 May 1944, as printed in 78 Congress, 2 Session, House of Representatives, *Hearings on Proposal to Establish a Single Department of National Defense*, Pt I, pp 141–144.

38. The committee consisted of Admiral J. O. Richardson (retired) as senior member; Rear Admiral M. F. Schoeffel, Staff Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet; Maj. Gen. W. F. Tompkins, Director, Special Planning Division, WDSS; Maj. Gen. H. L. George, Commanding General, Air Transport Command; and Colonel F. Trubee Davison, Chief, Special Projects, Army Air Forces, as alternates. Its report is printed in 79 Congress, 1 Session, *Senate Hearings on S. 84... [and] S. 1482...:Department of Armed Forces [and] Department of Military Security* (Washington, 1945), pp 411–439. For the pertinent data presented herewith, see pp 412, 436–439. A list of all the witnesses interviewed is included therein.


42. *Ibid*, p 411. Admiral Richardson offered a brief minority report which indicated that he opposed not only the creation of an air force coordinate with the Army and Navy, but also the establishment of a single department of national defense. The former, he thought, would inevitably draw the naval aeronautical units out of the "fabric of the Navy into which it is ultimately woven," and thus be prejudicial to the effectiveness of the armed forces as a whole. The organizations making up the War and Navy Departments, Admiral Richardson pointed out, were the result of experiences extending over a period of more than 150 years. Existing agencies of such maturity and magnitude should not be overhauled unless there were indisputable evidence that such changes were desirable and would accomplish the ends sought. Far from being convinced that such would be the result, Admiral Richardson gave it as his opinion that since their interests were so divergent and their activities so distinct, a single department of defense would hamper the full and free development of both the Army and Navy. He was charitable enough to say, however, that if those in authority decided to adopt such a system, he could conceive of no better plan than that which had been recommended by his colleagues on the Committee. See *ibid*, pp 434–436.

43. Copies of these two bills, S. 84 and S. 1482, in the order named, are printed in *ibid*, pp 2 and 2–4, respectively.

44. The first two of these six measures were designated H.R. 86 and H.R. 550, and may be noted in 79 Congress, 1 Session, *Congressional Record*, 3 January 1945, pp 20, 27. For the other four measures, H.R. 504, H.R. 549, H.R. 4949, H.R. 4950, see *ibid*, pp 26, 27; and *ibid*, 11 December 1945, p 11855.


46. See Forrestal to Eberstadt, 19 June 1945, in *ibid*, p 1; and Eberstadt to Forrestal, 25 September 1945, in *ibid*, pp 1–2.

47. For the above general observations, see *ibid*, pp 3–47, 57–84, 198–240.


50. See *ibid*, pp 156 ff, for the War Department plan as presented by General Collins. The Table of Contents of this document furnishes a convenient guide to the page references for the testimonies of the other witnesses mentioned. It is to be noted that the positions assumed by Admirals Halsey and Nimitz represented a reversal of policy over the stands they had taken with
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respect to the recommendation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

51. President Truman's message to the Congress, 19 December 1945, is printed in 79 Congress, 1 Session, Congressional Record, Appendix, pp 12398–12401.
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