Evolving Role of National Guard for Homeland Security

by

Lieutenant Colonel Steve Mahoney
United States Army National Guard
Aviation

Colonel Eugene Smith
Project Advisor

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U.S. Army War College
CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013
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**Steve Mahoney**

**U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Carlisle, PA, 17013-5050**

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**See attached**
Paper will review how the National Guard has developed its role in Homeland Security from the time of the World Trade Center attack to present, and then look to national emerging trends to see how this role may change in the near term. The goal is to look at the NG Homeland Security role and recommend immediate steps which will help to most effectively lead to furthering the National Guard’s support role in the future.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT ................................................................................................................................................ iii

EVLQVING ROLE OF NATIONAL GUARD FOR HOMELAND SECURITY ........................................ 1
   BACKGROUND ................................................................................................................................ 1
   ANALYSIS .............................................................................................................................................. 4
   RISKS .................................................................................................................................................. 9

PROGRAMMATIC OPTIONS ................................................................................................................... 9

COURSES OF ACTION ............................................................................................................................. 10

RECOMMENDATIONS ............................................................................................................................. 12

ENDNOTES .............................................................................................................................................. 15

BIBLIOGRAPHY ....................................................................................................................................... 19
EVOLVING ROLE OF NATIONAL GUARD FOR HOMELAND SECURITY

The National Guard is uniquely capable to provide support for Homeland Security missions as a “bridge” capability between lower levels of support and full military involvement. It can accomplish this mission, in addition to its traditional wartime and State emergency missions, but needs additional mission clarity and organizational refinement to be ready to provide support.

BACKGROUND

Our Government has done well forming a structure to respond to future terror threats, which includes the National Guard in a supporting role for Homeland Security. The National Guard has far greater involvement in deployments for current operations, continuation of its traditional State emergency support role, and the expanded role required supporting Homeland Security. The National Guard can support all these requirements, but needs a more clearly defined mission and organization to allow it to meet all requirements. There is a need to further develop the concept of National Guard support for Homeland Security.

Definition for the terms “Homeland Security” and “Homeland Defense” is still evolving. For this paper, Homeland Security is defined as, “a concerted National effort to prevent terrorist attacks within the United States, reduce vulnerability of the US to terrorism, and minimize the damage & assist in the recovery from terrorist attacks.”

Homeland Defense is defined as, “the protection of US territory, domestic population, and critical defense infrastructure against external threats and aggression. This includes routine, steady-state activities designed to deter aggressors and to prepare US military forces for action if deterrence fails.” The Department of Defense is the Lead Federal Agency for requirements under Homeland Defense, whereas it is a supporting element for the Lead Federal Agency for civil support under Homeland Security.

The Homeland Security support role is an expansion in responsibility, as is the current level of deployment of the National Guard versus its historical role prior to the attack on the World Trade Center. “The role of the U.S. military, especially the Army, is to make up for any shortfalls in civilian capabilities.” As LTG Blum, Chief of the National Guard, pointed out in an interview with Lou Dobbs on 12 January, 2005, “The National Guard is no longer the cold war strategic reserve envisioned prior to 9/11; it is a force American can and should take with it on every military operations. So the National Guard is currently deployed far more, while also supporting a greatly expanded mission for Homeland Security.” This has led some to conclude that:

“The National Guard is facing an identity crisis. During the Cold War, National Guard members had a clear mission. They were "weekend warriors" who backed up active-duty personnel and helped mop up after natural disasters when
called upon by state governors. That role began to change with... a spike in military peacekeeping missions throughout the 1990s... But the Guard’s increasing homeland security role since Sept. 11 has created confusion.6

The National Security Strategy of the United States outlines our top priority as “defense of our nation against its enemies.”6 This singular priority broadened following the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, leading to creation of a National Strategy for Homeland Security which further defined the defense of our nation as a priority within our borders.7 This defense requirement was further detailed in the Quadrennial Defense Review which states that “United States Armed Forces will protect the U.S. Domestic population, its territory, and its critical defense-infrastructure... and be prepared to respond in a decisive manner to acts of international terrorism committed on U.S. territory.”8 This is accomplished through many means, but one of the primary military forces to support these requirements is the National Guard. This is offset by the long standing primary mission of the National Guard, “The purpose of Reserve components is to supplement the active components — that is, by providing additional forces to meet the strategic requirements that the active components are unable to fill themselves. In general, this means providing additional units that are essentially mirror images of their active component counterparts.”6

The National Guard, in a role not mirrored through the Reserves, also maintains a additional primary role in support of their State Governors to be prepared for activation to support needs within the State. This primarily takes the form of short term activations for disaster relief support. A key point is that, “The debate over future roles of the National Guard is often conducted through an examination of either the federal or state mission while excluding the impact of one on the other. This approach does not acknowledge the synergy and dynamics of these two simultaneous National Guard missions.”10 This quote is important in that review of the additional missions for the National Guard is very likely to ignore synergies between previous federal and state missions.

The additional role to support Homeland Security, which increases the National Guards level of activity rather than being a totally new mission, is one which came to the forefront following the September 11, 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center. Air National Guard forces provided defense against additional terrorist airline suicide bombing as an expansion to an already existing mission. Army National Guard forces were used for a variety of missions to include: additional security at high value installations (airports, military installations, government facilities, etc), emergency support at locations like the World Trade Centers, and to conduct nuclear and chemical agent testing shortly following an attack. These missions were
predominantly new to the National Guard as part of their evolving requirements starting after 9/11. These roles have grown substantially with the establishment of the U.S. Northern Command (U.S. NORTHCOM) and the Department of Homeland Security.

Though broad command and control is provided through these agencies, primary control of forces has generally remained with the States. Missions are passed from the Department of Homeland Security, to the Secretary of Defense office, which then sends the mission requirement through the National Guard Bureau for final assignment to National Guard state units.

The still evolving roles of the Department of Homeland Security and U.S. NORTHCOM go far beyond what the many separate governmental agencies could have accomplished alone in integrating many federal, state and local actors needed to support this very wide mission. The scope of this mission is seen in the reality that, “Terrorists always have the initiative: it’s they who determine the time, place, and method of attack. Defenders . . . must anticipate all contingencies. Terrorists need provide only one.”

1

The mission to support Homeland Security is taking place during a period of greatly increased utilization of the National Guard to support its Active Army support mission in a variety of locations around the world. This increased operations tempo has increased stress on the National Guard system, adding to complexity when considering the role to support Homeland Security. As one author noted, “the National Guard has been sustaining record numbers of soldiers on extended active duty supporting missions both overseas and in the Continental United States (CONUS). While they have served admirably, some are concerned that they can not sustain the pace of the recent past and take on a Homeland Security mission simultaneously.”

2

This critical short-term reality should not be a long term factor when considering future missions. In the end, resources will need to be aligned to ensure missions can be accomplished. As the Chief of the National Guard Bureau points out, “Even though nearly one-third of its men and women are deployed overseas, the Guard has enough soldiers to do its job to help protect the country against attack.”

3

It will always be a management issue to ensure forces are available for all missions, but as GEN Blum says:

“A common theme I hear from the governors is, ‘We understand the need for the National Guard to be the reserve of the Army and the Air Force, but please be sensitive to ensuring we have enough of the force remaining back home so the governors can meet their needs for homeland defense and homeland security here at home.’ I’ve given the governors assurances that we can maintain that balance.”

4
At the same time, issues have arisen which have “lead the Department of Defense (DOD) to review whether changes are needed to their (National Guard and Reserves) missions and capabilities.”

ANALYSIS

One of America’s objectives, an End, is to ensure our Homeland Security is maintained. The National Guard is one of the key assets, Means, intended to support meeting this End. It does this through providing support, Ways, as already described in the summary above.

It is likely that a Homeland Security incident would be hard to distinguish from any other local emergency, and first responders (fire, ambulance, police) will always be first to respond. Their capability may suffice for most incidents, even if a terrorist related Homeland Security incident arises. If their capability is exceeded, then other agencies respond to assist. As their capability is exceeded, the National Guard may be called in to assist. This is the normal process for emergencies as they develop. This process is, and should be, exactly that same for a terrorist related incident. The type of military support needed is frequently of a supporting nature to emergency services and commonly includes support to restore order (a law enforcement support role which may be beyond the role allowed for non-National Guard military due to the Posse Comitatus Act).

A primary question is if the current levels of funding, training, equipment in use are aligned for all the missions envisioned for the Guard? The National Guard has basic preparedness to support a wide variety of contingencies, in part because general security and support are generic tasks almost any National Guardsman can perform, and these frequently represent a majority of the support needed. The National Guard is geographically widespread, functionally diverse in personnel and equipment capabilities and prepared to handle at least some missions on a moments notice. The question is how effective the National Guard can be, long term, at supporting Homeland Security given its: changing historical role, level of deployments, equipment and personnel force structure, training, and how Guard soldiers are activated (Title 10 vs. Title 32). Some have asked if the National Guard is inadequately prepared (for its Homeland Security role) because of its focus on conventional warfare along with a concern about the Guard not being available for a Homeland Security mission due to deployment overseas. What must be considered is if the way we are using the National Guard can allow it to continue to effectively support both wartime (Active Army support) and Homeland Security missions. Some even suggest limiting the National Guard to an exclusive Homeland Security role. This is considered along with having the National Guard take over the lead role in
Homeland Security. It is important to realize that, as mentioned in a recent War College briefing, “Many of the ways we have done things in the past are not right for us now, and are wrong for our future.”

The changing historical role of the National Guard was pointed out well by LTG Blum, Chief of the National Guard Bureau, when he said “This is not your father’s National Guard.” He highlighted this change by saying that:

We are one Army. This is the first time in the history of the United States that it has been that way. The National Guard comprises about 40 percent of the forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, and at least 120 of them have died since military operations began. In the years after World War II, the National Guard was a strategic reserve to a military around a draft – in place to allow ample time for other forces to be formed. The so called “weekend warriors” were the bench players who occasionally were called but more likely served a weekend a month and during vacations in their home states.

A portion of the difficulties faced in accomplishing its mission is due to many who still see the National Guard in this old outdated mode – seeing it as an inexpensive force for an unlikely mission – seeing it as a low priority force subject to budget cuts – and providing inequitable treatment (older equipment, less training) within the military. The fallacy of this is obvious when seen from the perspective of many recent deployments, higher level funding and equipping that has actually been provided to the National Guard.

The change to National Guard forces is clearly stated by George Cahlink:

During the Cold War, National Guard members had a clear mission. They were “weekend warriors” who backed up active-duty personnel and helped mop up after natural disasters when called upon by state governors. That role began to change with the fall of the Berlin Wall. . . . Guard members have become a quasi-full-time military force regularly called up by the president to patrol no-fly zones in Iraq for as long as 6 months at a stretch and drive Humvees through the dusty roads of the Balkans on 2-year deployments.

This highlights the significant changes seen in the National Guard in recent years, with even more significant stress to the National Guard driven by a continuously increasing rate of deployment. As an example, as of April 2004 the Pennsylvania National Guard had almost 25% of its force deployed to 12 countries to include year long deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan. By mid-2005, Pennsylvania will have contributed well over half its 20,000 National Guard soldiers and airmen to deployments since 9/11. In the Senate version of the National Defense Authorization Bill this year, it calls for, “A national commission to examine the strain of current operations on the National Guard and Reserves and recommend productive solutions.” The key point is that this high rate of deployment affects the National Guard’s ability to perform its Homeland Security mission in two profound ways.
Homeland Security missions can take forms as simple as guarding a site, to as complicated as NBC monitoring. The high rate of deployment of these “part-time” soldiers is a factor in National Guard ability to meet other Homeland Security requirements. Since a basic need for Homeland Security is to have an adaptable force able to meet unforeseen missions, the high rate of deployment means some missions would not be able to be fully supported. In the end, a way will be found to get the job done as the Homeland Security mission is here to stay. As the Honorable Paul McHale recently said, “Protection of critical infrastructure will likely become a core National Guard mission during the next decade. The Defense Department is working closely with the National Guard Bureau to ensure Army Guard forces will be “mission ready” to provide immediate land security forces within their own states.”

This was further detailed by General Eberhart, former Commander U.S. NORTHCOM, when he stated that, “we can’t provide for the homeland defense and the homeland security of this great nation . . . without the Guard.” The U.S. NORTHCOM mission is to “conduct operations to deter, prevent, and defeat threats and aggression aimed at the United States, its territories and interests within the assigned areas of responsibility (AOR).” At the same time, the Homeland Security mission is viewed as an incremental mission, with little thought of reducing the National Guard current role to support the active Army for defense missions. When asked about this incremental role, the Adjutant Generals confirmed their desire to support Homeland Security, and that they do not want this roll to become the only mission for the National Guard.

A concern, now being discussed widely, is that the high rate of deployment may significantly hurt the National Guard’s ability to retain and recruit soldiers to meet requirements. The recent National Guard shortfall in recruiting, the first in many years, points to the potential risk continued high deployment rates may mean to the National Guard’s ability to meet mission requirements. “One chief concern is that overtaxed reservists may burn out and leave the armed services completely, say defense and military officials.” Reasons for the National Guard shortfall are not entirely clear at this point. One measurable shortfall is in the number of active duty soldiers joining the Guard after their active duty assignment is complete. It could be that departing soldiers see the high rate of Guard deployment and see no advantage to this rather than staying in the active force. A counter idea might be that they are just tired from frequent active duty deployments and Guard deployments are not part of their decisions. This does not necessarily mean the National Guard should be expanded in number of personnel. The short term answer to expand the National Guard may cause the United States to have an excessively large force once, or if, the current high operations tempo subsides. James Carafano is likely to be accurate when he points out:
When the military announced the call-up of 5,600 from the Individual Ready Reserve, critics cried foul. Noting that IRR’s are not assigned to units and do not do regular training, the critics sought to depict these citizen-soldiers as the military equivalent of couch potatoes. Dragging them off to war proves we don’t have enough troops, they argued. Au contraire. It really means that the system is working. We have a large pool of reserves (about 47% of the force) exactly for moments like this, when we need to rapidly expand.29

Equipment issues are another facet of the problem. The National Guard has historically been under-equipped with older equipment. National Guard forces are organized to meet their wartime support requirement and merely given Homeland Security missions as somewhat ad-hoc requirements. The issue of older equipment may not be critical if the Homeland Security support requirement does not demand the increased capabilities that come with newer equipment. But, if the mission requires any more than a “warm body” to get the job done, then equipment shortcomings may be critical. This specific issue has been partially solved through creation of dedicated emergency response teams for such missions and NBC monitoring, but will only be known as a definite problem if the Guard is not ready when some unforeseen Homeland Security requirement materializes. The nature of National Guard forces being applied to the Homeland Security mission is driven by their basic requirement and funding to be prepared for wartime missions in support of the United States.

At least to this point in history, terrorist acts have been rare exceptions around which to plan defenses. These point to not needing a large number of dedicated forces for the Homeland Security role. Some dedicated roles, such as the Chemical, Biological and Radiological Response Teams will be needed, but are few in number. For most National Guard forces the plan has been for, “most forces to be dual-missioned, not apportioned solely for homeland security requirements.”

A key point in preparing the National Guard to meet the Homeland Security mission is training. There are several separate issues here. First is a fact that the vast majority of soldiers in the National Guard are attending drills one weekend a month and for two weeks each summer. The emphasis at these training assemblies runs from wartime mission training to meeting a variety of administrative requirements. The issue is one of training time. A common cry, even prior to picking up the Homeland Security mission, was that there was not enough time to fully train. This is only exasperated by the substantial training requirements to meet a greatly varied Homeland Security threat. The second issue is training funds. The vast majority of funding is required to meet the wartime training mission. Little is earmarked for Homeland Security, with the seeming assumption that either wartime mission training will suffice for Homeland Security, or that time will be available to train up as Homeland Security specific
missions present themselves. This does not mean that nothing is being done to address this. As an example, “The Army is seeking to transition training technologies to the National Guard for homeland security applications.” This is just one of many initiatives being considered as this role develops and the Guard evolves to meet the challenge.

Unique to the National Guard is how the soldiers are activated to meet Homeland Security requirements. There are three choices to activate soldiers: State Active Duty, Title 10 and Title 32. State Active duty is called for by the Governor, primarily for State specific emergency missions. This type of duty is not governed by the Federal Government, results in significantly reduced pay and benefits and is only intended for short duration State needs. Title 10 is full federalized service making the National Guard soldiers the equivalent of Active Duty soldiers. While this brings full pay and benefits to the soldiers, they lose their link back to the State and come with restrictions on use outlined in the Posse Comitatus Act. Title 32 is the pay method currently in use for most Homeland Security missions. This sidesteps limitations of Posse Comitatus, though it carries risks for the soldier that employers are not required to rehire the soldier on return from duty and several other benefits are curtailed. The advantage of Title 32 is it allows more freedom of use for roles more closely aligned with law enforcement. Disadvantages for the soldier are currently being reviewed to align closer with Title 10 benefits while keeping the freedom of action allowed under Title 32. The constitutional limitation on use of National Guard under Title 10 is based on concerns about possible military action against the Federal Government, a risk which seems unlikely to materialize in our modern age.

There has been significant discussion on the restrictions of the Posse Comitatus Act (PCA). It is a short act which simply states:

“Whoever, except in cases and under circumstances expressly authorized by the Constitution or Act of Congress, willfully uses any part of the Army or the Air Force as a posse comitatus or otherwise to execute the laws shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than two years, or both.”

The PCA, though dating back to 1878, is still in use with specific exceptions having been defined over time. Prior to the PCA, the military had been used for a number of law enforcement type activities to include: enforcing law in Louisiana after the Civil War, keeping two competing groups from becoming de facto governments in Arkansas, suppressing violators of the Ku-Klux-Klan Act in South Carolina and being used at many locations in the country to help keep polls open for all (but with some stating belief that the military many have influenced results of elections.) PCA has a number of benefits, to include: keeping politicians from improper use of the military for their own personal advantage, keeping military available for its primary mission to defend the nation, and recognizes that most in the military are not trained for
law enforcement. Exceptions to PCA have been occasionally added to allow Active Duty military to support in specific instances. This Act creates an important separation in missions between National Guard and Active Duty military when used for Homeland Security missions.

RISKS

Our nation’s overriding End is to provide for the security of our people. This is being accomplished through numerous methods, of which National Guard support is one of the Means. The End and Means, in this specific case, are aligned well. But, active debate and study is needed to review the exact role of the National Guard to meet specific Homeland Security requirements. The risk is if the Way is in balance with our use of the National Guard to meet our Homeland Security objectives.

There are many varied risks associated with this complicated issue. These include risks from our ability to maintain the force for our future given the high operations tempo, to risks of inadequate resources (equipment and training), to clear definition of all Homeland Security missions the National Guard must be ready to execute (which directly effect training required), to the overriding risk of not being adequately prepared to meet wartime mission requirements. The issues are complicated and are interconnected in their effects.

PROGRAMMATIC OPTIONS

Balancing competing requirements, to improve Homeland Security preparedness requires consideration of three variables which are commonly used for large business or military programs. These variables are the cost, quality and schedule needed to meet the objective. It is generally assumed that any two of the three can be optimized, while the third would be exponentially bad. That is why the three must be balanced. An example would be a program where high performance standards and short schedule for fielding (quality and schedule) drive program cost very high. The analogy works well when it is recognized that, in the real world, no program ever optimizes two of the three variables. They are always balanced against realities or limits that drive the decision. Regardless, the variables of cost/quality/schedule are good for analysis purposes when considering courses of action.

Funding will be limited based on some overall limitation on funds and on the National Guard ability to receive and appropriately use the funds. The level of equipment and training, along with more clearly defined missions, will determine the quality of execution of the mission. Though it would be great to have the National Guard immediately ready to meet Homeland Security mission requirements, this must be balanced given the other two variables and other wartime roles which compete for time needed to develop new abilities to meet emerging threats.
If the current level of effort, or a further expanded role, is maintained, then it is likely that some additional funding will be required.

The quality portion of the analogy aligns with the actual Homeland Security missions the National Guard is expected to accomplish. A simplified mission, with reduced requirements, would drive reduced stress on the National Guard thereby reducing the need to make further change. The opposite will be seen if the mission expands further, driving cost and schedule issues. It is a reasonable premise that the wartime Active Army role and the overall Homeland Security missions will remain major requirements. So it will be necessary to determine how to balance these roles, given the fact that assets for both missions are the same for either mission. This has the potential for major effects on the ability to conduct the Homeland Security mission while simultaneously having major forces deployed in the Active Duty Army support role.

Schedule is essentially training, resource allocation, or a priority issue. Funding, time in the training program and prioritization of effort will drive when a level of expected capability is reached. Training will be an issue depending on the similarity of the Homeland Security requirement to the unit Active Duty Army capability. If these are closely aligned, as may be seen with an MP company in a Homeland Security crowd control role, versus a more difficult task if a unit such as a maintenance unit was tasked to provide the same level of capability. Resource allocation may be a factor given limited training locations and experts on the HS role. Until a cadre of experienced people is developed (following more detailed mission definition), gaining broad capability will be difficult. Priority is a particularly acute problem when limited training assemblies (1 weekend a month and 2 weeks per year) are already full for an Army support mission. Meeting the training requirements is possible as long as the technical requirements remain limited or when only a limited number of soldiers are required for a specialized type of training – such as the Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Response Teams.

All three areas are related, with each influencing the other. The numerous complications, such as the need to be ready to meet wartime missions, impact greatly on the ability to meet Homeland Security requirements. The nature of the threat will also drive the path to be taken.

**COURSES OF ACTION**

There is not an easy path defining courses of action. As each of the driving variables listed above is changed, they affect the others in marked ways. Based on this, several reasonable courses of action stand out for consideration.

The first course of action is to emphasize controlling cost. This control would be accomplished through limiting time and resources to be made available to support the National
Guard in the HS role. The advantage is retaining of funding to support other pressing requirements for the Federal government and possible lowering of risk associated with rushing forward to meet new mission requirements without fully thinking through how all agencies within and outside the Government will need to interact to ensure efficient use of resources. Disadvantages are that the time needed to train and prepare for Homeland Security missions, when they do arise, may be extended. Funding will always be limited in some manner, so this course of action would optimize by working to provide a very limited capability over time. The risk is not being adequately prepared should a larger Homeland Security mission need resources that would not be ready or available.

A second course of action would be to realign missions with the possibility that the National Guard, as it exists today, be adjusted to align with an exclusive Homeland Security mission. This course would require the Active Army to pick up surge capability currently served by the National Guard. Though this would not be impossible to implement, the primary question that will need to be answered is if there will be sufficient HS missions to justify making this mission the exclusive role of the National Guard. Dividing missions between a greatly changed National Guard, active forces, and Reserves would be exceedingly complicated, and probably very expensive, while having the advantage of providing some clear dividing of missions. The costs to expand the Active Duty military if the National Guard is not available for wartime support, and the on-going cost of maintaining a National Guard force exclusively assigned the Homeland Security mission, with limited likely use, make this an unlikely course to implement.

A third course of action would be to conduct a planned and limited National Guard call-up that would allow dedicated time for unit training for the National Guard HS mission. This would optimize schedule, allowing the NG to be ready as quickly as possible for future threats. The disadvantage is a combination of incremental cost and stresses (quality) on a force that may already be stretched beyond long term acceptable limits.

It is most likely that some variant on the courses of action will be taken. Specific essential missions will likely be added - driving up cost. Overall schedule for training will be adjusted as emerging threats are defined or changed over time. With funding limitations driving either a shifting of mission priorities to others or general scope reduction, some balancing of missions will be required. There is active review being done now to determine how to balance the National Guard mission. This is being done through review at the Department of Homeland Security, U.S. NORTHCOM, and within the National Guard. This is being done while the Government is conducting a review of all governmental functions for Homeland Security.
“More than three years after 9/11, confusion still exists over which departments are primarily responsible for core Homeland Security efforts, according to government auditors. Departments and agencies are addressing every initiative within the National Strategy for Homeland Security, GAO found.”

In the end, intent of all will be to maximize National Guard support while avoiding huge cost increases.

The National Guard is well suited to support military requirements for Homeland Security within States. From its overall military capability, linked to states by law and tradition, wide dispersion within States, and local command structure ability, National Guard ability to serve as a Means for Homeland Security is understood. There is no single answer to aligning the mission as a Way to be a perfect answer. Any solution will need continuous adjustment to meet changing requirements. “Long-term needs to fight the global war on terrorism, and meet other demands as well, are difficult to predict.”

RECOMMENDATIONS

Based on current perceived conditions, I recommend several key decisions be made. First, don’t make immediate changes to the size of the National Guard solely due to the current high level of deployment. It is not clear if this will continue, nor if force retention levels will decline substantially. Second, the Department of Homeland Security and Department of Defense need to more clearly define the Homeland Security role that must be met by the National Guard within each State – and ensure funding, training and equipment are provided for any increased missions. As both organizations are still new, this detailing is likely to come following more analysis. Third, Congress should resolve issues regarding Title 10 and Title 32 benefits to ensure soldiers are not abused through lack of appropriate benefits for Title 32. Fourth, ensure equipment and personnel balance for each State is aligned for both wartime and Homeland Security missions. This is likely to require dedicating some forces exclusively for each role to ensure adequate forces are available for all missions. Fifth, along with HS mission review, consider needed modification to the Posse Comitatus Act to ensure appropriate active duty military resources are available when needed. Sixth, do not consider separating the National Guard for an exclusive Homeland Security mission. The secondary costs and risks of this option seem both unlikely to be neither viable for serious consideration, nor doable within the near term. Seventh, establish a ready reaction force (either active or National Guard) that will be ready (equipped and trained) to respond for a large scale military need for Homeland Security. Depending on requirements given to this force, it could be a mission which moves periodically from unit to unit, thereby retaining an overall deployable military for war time
requirements. This aligns with efforts already underway, but possibly needing further long term definition. Eighth, a national training team, created from National Guard personnel, would serve as a good resource to drive a similar level of training across the States and possibly assist U.S. NORTHCOM and the Department of Homeland Security to better understand capabilities existing within individual States. As the Legislative Director of the NGAUS stated, “The readiness of the Guard at short notice depends on proper funding and equipment.” These high level recommendations will require more detailed review and continued adjustment as the situation changes, but will serve as a starting point for better balancing of actions to meet Homeland Security support needs by the National Guard, ensuring the force is maintained and capable to meet mission requirements.
ENDNOTES


14 Ibid., 2.


18 Ibid., 5.

19 The ideas in this sentence are based on remarks made by a speaker participating in the Commandant's Lecture Series.


21 Ibid., 2.


28 Ann Scott, "Reservists Now Play Central, not Backup, role; National Guard and Reservists Face Longest Call-up Since Vietnam, Straining Families and Employers,"; 3 September 2003; [database on-line]; available from PROQUEST; accessed 29 September 2004.


34 *Posse Comitatus Act*.


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