MORE EFFECTIVE PUBLIC DIPLOMACY IN THE ARAB AND MUSLIM WORLD

by

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ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: Michael J. Zwiebel

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The U.S. Government should resurrect within the foreign affairs agencies a construct similar to the old U.S. Information Agency. This new agency, called the Public Diplomacy Agency, should be tightly coupled to the State Department in both policy and management, as the model provided by the current State-USAID relationship. The Public Diplomacy Agency, in a tripartite relationship with the State Department and USAID, could be a more effective instrument for achieving U.S. objectives for wielding the information instrument of national power. With Presidential appointment of the Director and Congressional appropriation of funding, this independent agency will have the agility to execute its mission and yet be accountable to national security policy and the public.

Favorable perceptions of the U.S. in the Arab and Muslim regions of the world have been on the decline since prior to the attacks of 11 September 2001. Combat Operations in Afghanistan and Iraq have not helped change these perceptions, particularly with religious extremists. Consequently, the U.S. Congress directed the State Department to reassess its public diplomacy efforts in these regions. This paper reviews recent State Department public diplomacy efforts and recommends a new agency that can more effectively employ the information element of national power.
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MORE EFFECTIVE PUBLIC DIPLOMACY IN THE ARAB AND MUSLIM WORLD

Who has anything against life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness?

- Iranian citizen

The U.S. Government should resurrect within the foreign affairs agencies a construct similar to the old U.S. Information Agency (USIA). This new agency, called the Public Diplomacy Agency (PDA), should be tightly coupled to the State Department in both policy and management, as the model provided by the current relationship between the State Department and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). The Public Diplomacy Agency, in a tripartite relationship with the State Department and USAID, could be a more effective instrument for achieving U.S. objectives for wielding the information instrument of national power. With Presidential appointment of the Director and Congressional appropriation of funding, this independent agency will have the agility to execute its mission and yet be accountable to national security policy and the public.

Favorable perceptions of the United States in the Arab and Muslim regions of the world were on the decline prior to the attacks of September 11th. Operations Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan and Iraqi freedom in Iraq have not helped change these perceptions, particularly with religious extremists. Accordingly, the U.S. Congress directed the State Department to reassess its public diplomacy efforts in the Arab and Muslim regions. The State Department then established an advisory group, which produced a report with recommendations in September 2003 calling for a “transformation of public diplomacy” through increased funding to establish a new strategic direction for public diplomacy. The report supported National Security Policy; it recommended that the President and Congress should lead this new public diplomacy initiative.¹

This paper reviews public diplomacy as a form of “soft power”, showing how it can be used to promote the U.S. national interests in the Arab and Muslim world. It assesses the State Department’s progress in its public diplomacy efforts since the advisory group published its report over one year ago. Recent public diplomacy efforts are illustrated through three examples of recent efforts. Likewise, several assessments of public diplomacy are provided from academics, former government officials, and non-governmental organizations. Furthermore, Congressional testimony by State Department officials attests to progress since September 2003. Finally, a review of several organizational models suggests a more effective organization for the use of public diplomacy as a national instrument of power.
SOFT POWER

When one thinks of sovereign state power, the first thought is likely that of military capabilities. But the sovereign state has many instruments of power available to it, including diplomatic, informational, military, and economic instruments. In *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics*, Joseph Nye provides some useful observations on power and its relationship to the sovereign state. He describes power as “the ability to influence the behavior of others to get the outcomes you want”. Influence can be accomplished through “hard power” or forceful means, such as military action or economic restrictions. Nye then describes an alternate source of power – “soft power”. He explains that soft power uses attraction to “get the outcomes you want without the tangible threats or payoffs.”

According to Nye, a state’s means for soft power are derived from three sources: culture, political values, and foreign policy. A person can be attracted to or repulsed by the cultural values, political views, or foreign policies of another country. Although not an exclusive replacement for hard power, soft power can serve to strengthen applications of hard power and may be less expensive. To make soft power work effectively, a state must carefully select the methods used to attract others to its interest. This appeal can be directed at the state or at individual citizens. One form of soft power employed by the United States is public diplomacy; it was used during the Cold War to communicate American values inside Communist countries and to neutral countries and allied countries as well.

PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

The United States Information Agency Alumni Association (USIAAA), formed by members of the former United States Information Agency, provides information on public diplomacy. According to it, the term “public diplomacy” was first used in 1965 by Edmund Gullion, Dean of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University. A brochure from the Edward R. Murrow Center for Public Diplomacy at Fletcher describes public diplomacy:

Public Diplomacy … deals with the influence of public attitudes on the formation and execution of foreign policies. It encompasses dimensions of international relations beyond traditional diplomacy; the cultivation by governments of public opinion in other countries; the interaction of private groups and interests in one country with those of another; the reporting of foreign affairs and its impact on policy; communication between those whose job is communication, as between diplomats and foreign correspondents; and the processes of inter-cultural communications.

In June 1997, the Planning Group for Integration of the United States Information Agency into the State Department provided its own definition for public diplomacy focused on conveying
public policy to foreign audiences: “public diplomacy seeks to promote the national interest of the United States through understanding, informing and influencing foreign audiences.” By distinguishing the term public diplomacy from other common terms used for information exchange, the USIAAA provides a better understanding of the term. It compares public diplomacy with public affairs by suggesting that public affairs focus primarily on domestic audiences, whereas public diplomacy focuses on foreign audiences. Diplomacy is thus distinguished from public diplomacy based on the receiving audience. Whereas diplomacy focuses on government-to-government relations, public diplomacy focuses on influencing foreign public audiences. USIAAA does not attempt to distinguish public diplomacy from propaganda. Rather, it candidly admits that public diplomacy is a form of propaganda based on facts.

According to the 1987 U.S. Department of State Dictionary of International Relations Terms, “public diplomacy refers to government-sponsored programs intended to inform or influence public opinion in other countries; its chief instruments are publications, motion pictures, cultural exchanges, radio and television.” The Department of State can use a variety of media in its public diplomacy efforts to convey the U.S. national values to foreign publics. Some examples are information exchanges, English language education programs, student exchange programs, collaboration with indigenous or non-government organizations, and radio and television media. The USIAAA Public Diplomacy web site provides some specific examples of the programs used today. Telecommunication technology innovations such as the Internet and satellite broadcasting provide direct information exchange to remote areas; these new media now offer an effective means to employ soft power.

Public diplomacy is one of the national instruments of power employed to implement the U.S. National Security Strategy. By winning over the hearts and minds of individuals within a state, the U.S. Government can use public diplomacy to move a state toward more democratic forms of government. If the United States can successfully use public diplomacy for this purpose, then it achieves one of the National Security Strategy objectives, that to “expand the circle of development by opening societies and building the infrastructure of democracy.”

Using public diplomacy, the United States Information Agency was very successful during the Cold War in conveying the enduring values of the United States within communist countries. After the Cold War, as the threat of communism subsided, the United States Information Agency was downsized. Eventually its functions were merged into the Department of State. The U.S. marginalized their ability to brandish soft power and relegated public diplomacy to a lesser priority.
After the attacks of September 11\textsuperscript{th}, the US became engaged in combating terrorist-backed religious extremists originating in Arab or Muslim-dominated countries. In many of these countries there is a general lack of understanding and, in some cases, total rejection of Western ideals. The interests of the United States are often misunderstood. Joseph Nye suggests that the foundation for this terrorism lies in the unrest in the Middle East and that this unrest is really a struggle between Islamic moderates and extremists. He claims that the United States and its allies will win only if they adopt policies that appeal to those moderates and use public diplomacy effectively to communicate that appeal.\textsuperscript{10} To counter religious extremists, all elements of national power can be used. But public diplomacy can be used particularly to win over moderates and reduce the influence of the extremists. The U.S. Government, in its national policy decisions, should give increased emphasis to the use of public diplomacy as an instrument of national power.

**ADVISORY GROUP ON PUBLIC DIPLOMACY**

In a June 2003 supplemental appropriations bill, the U.S. House Appropriations Committee directed the State Department to “engage the creative talents of the private sector ... to develop new public diplomacy approaches and initiatives ... [and] establish an advisory group on public diplomacy for the Arab and Muslim world to recommend new approaches, initiatives, and program models to improve public diplomacy results.”\textsuperscript{11} In response, Colin Powell, the Secretary of State at that time, established the Advisory Group on public diplomacy for the Arab and Muslim World in July 2003.

The Advisory Group, chaired by Edward P. Djerejian, the former Ambassador to Syria and Israel, consisted of a core group of 13 people with a variety of backgrounds - including foreign service, academia, medical, news media, public affairs, legal, and business. Working between July and September of 2003, the group expanded on the work of at least seven other studies that were conducted between September 2001 and October 2003. They met with many specialists both domestic and international in the public, private, and non-governmental arenas. They conducted visits to Egypt, Syria, Turkey, Senegal, Morocco, UK, and France and had teleconferences with key individuals in Pakistan and Indonesia. In October 2003, the group produced a report of their findings offering recommendations to the State Department with regard to public diplomacy.

The Advisory Group’s report, *Changing Minds Winning Peace, A New Strategic Direction for U.S. Public Diplomacy in the Arab and Muslim World*, is frequently referred to as the Djerejian Report. It begins by claiming that at a time when it is needed most, the U.S. public
diplomacy capability is inadequate due to outmoded techniques and inadequate resources and strategic direction. The report flatly asserts that “the U.S. today lacks the capabilities in public diplomacy to meet the national security threat emanating from political instability, economic deprivation, and extremism, especially in the Arab and Muslim World.” Although this report focused on Arab and Muslim areas, the group claims many of their recommendations apply to public diplomacy in general.

The Advisory Group report emphasizes that state-to-state diplomacy is not changing attitudes of citizens and that public diplomacy is necessary to win the hearts and minds in the Arab and Muslim world. Obviously, recent U.S. policies and actions in Afghanistan, Iraq, and the Arab-Israeli conflict, have affected how Americans are perceived. The Advisory Group views the Arab’s and Muslim’s lack of understanding of American culture as a fundamental problem. It claims that Arabs and Muslims are exposed to a heavily filtered media where in messages are not usually translated into their native languages (e.g., limited TV stations, restricted and filtered access to Internet). However, globalized technologies such as satellite TV are breaking down these barriers. The Group was frequently told by Arabs and Muslims that they like American values and technologies, but do not like what the American government is doing.

Current public diplomacy techniques are not getting the word out either. The report observes that even though Egypt is the second largest recipient of U.S. foreign assistance, Egyptian citizens give more credit to the Japanese for the development of an Opera House in Cairo than to the United States, which provided the funds for the development of critical infrastructure within Egyptian cities. The Report found that even though broadcast media, specifically television, is the most effective means to disseminate ideas, U.S. policies or positions are usually absent from Arab and Muslim media programs.

Using information from a September 2003 General Accounting Office report on public diplomacy, the Djerejian Report provides statistics on favorable public opinion of the United States collected by several opinion research firms. The data summarized in the following table indicates that favorable public opinion has been declining over the past several years. The GAO Report also states that a Zogby International survey released in April 2002 showed that Arabs and Muslims had a favorable view of American movies, television, science and technology, and education, but were opposed to American policy toward Muslim countries.
TABLE 1. CHANGING FAVORABLE VIEW OF THE UNITED STATES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>2002 (%)</th>
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<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>61%</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>11%</td>
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</table>

The Advisory Group Report provides detailed information on current public diplomacy activities and provides specific organizational, financial, and programmatic recommendations to transform the State Department’s public diplomacy efforts. The Report suggests that all public diplomacy programs should have some demonstrable measures of effectiveness before being implemented – but it does not make specific recommendations on such measures. The Report recognizes some current creative ideas that need to be expanded. The “American Corners” program establishes cultural centers within cities that offer free access to the internet and books on American culture along with English language classes. There are several Arabic language radio programs (e.g., Radio Sawa) and magazines (e.g., Hi) in addition to an Arabic language TV network (e.g., Alhurrah) that includes regional programming. A new initiative, the American Knowledge Library, is designed for massive translation of books related to American culture, science and democracy philosophies.

Despite these efforts by the State Department, the Report concludes that U.S. public diplomacy is not making enough impact. The advisory group recommends that the State Department transform its public diplomacy efforts through increased funding and establish a new strategic direction for public diplomacy that directly supports National Security Policy and is led by the President and Congress. The Report sets up the ‘Ends’ (better understanding of U.S. national values among the Arab and Muslim population), ‘Ways’ (establish and execute a strategic plan) and ‘Means’ (increased levels of funding) for more effective public diplomacy in that Arab and Muslim world.

AGENCIES USING PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

A variety of organizations use public diplomacy to promote U.S. interests. The State Department sponsors many of them, including the Broadcast Board of Governors and the United States Agency for International Development. Other independent organizations contribute to this effort, such as a small Syrian organization called Dar Emar.
The Broadcast Board of Governors (BBG), an independent federal agency which supervises all U.S. government-supported nonmilitary international broadcasting, is an effective public diplomacy instrument that uses broadcast communication capabilities to reach foreign audiences. Radio and TV stations such as the Voice of America (VOA), Radio Sawa, and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) broadcast in 85 languages to over 100 million people around the world. Broadcasting in over fifteen Arab and Muslim countries, Radio Sawa is considered one of the most innovative public diplomacy initiatives, according to the BBG website.

Both the Advisory Group and the recent 9/11 Commission have recognized that effective public diplomacy can influence moderates within Arab and Muslim countries. The 9/11 Commission asserts that, "Recognizing that Arab and Muslim audiences rely on satellite television and radio, the government has begun some promising initiatives in television and radio broadcasting to the Arab world, Iran, and Afghanistan. These efforts are beginning to reach large audiences." Emphasizing the need for BBG programs to counteract religious extremist movements in the region, the 9/11 Commission observes that, "Local newspapers and the few influential satellite broadcasters - like al Jazeera - often reinforce the jihadist theme that portrays the United States as anti-Muslim."

According to the BBG, "Radio Sawa, a 24/7 station, has garnered large audiences of young people in the region with its mix of news, information and Western and Arabic music." However, the Djerejian Report criticized Radio Sawa for simply appealing to youthful Arab musical tastes and not influencing the larger public. The BBG argues that the Advisory Group does not understand the BBG's mission to promote and sustain freedom and democracy by broadcasting accurate and objective news and information about the United States and the BBG's role to serve as an example of high quality American journalism. Contrary to the findings in the Djerejian Report, a February 2004 ACNielsen survey observed a 38 percent listenership in over five countries. The survey found that "the percentages of adults (age 15 and older) listening to Radio Sawa on a weekly basis are 73 percent in Morocco, 42 percent in Kuwait, 35 percent in UAE, 27 percent in Jordan, 11 percent in Egypt and 41 percent in Qatar." Further, 80% of Radio Sawa's listeners consider it a reliable news source. Finally, Radio Sawa's listeners view the United States more favorably than do non-listeners, according to an October 2003 ACNielsen survey. According to an Alan Richards' monograph, the age demographics in many Middle Eastern countries is heavily skewed towards the younger generation with over 50% of the populations in many countries under the age of 20. Appealing to a youthful audience appears to be the right target audience.
Despite criticisms on the effectiveness of the BBG in the Djerejian Report, both the Advisory Group and the 9/11 Commission recommend increased levels of funding to the BBG for new broadcasting programs. The Middle East television station Alhurra, created in February 2004, is a recent effort of new BBG funding. Alhurra is currently operational directing its programming at Arabic-speaking viewers in 22 countries across the Middle East.26

Another organization contributing to public diplomacy is the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). An independent government agency under the direction of the Secretary of State, USAID provides humanitarian, development, and democracy assistance to developing countries and countries affected by disaster and poverty.27 The USAID relies on partnerships with voluntary organizations, indigenous organizations, universities, American businesses, international agencies, other U.S. and foreign government agencies to improve the lives of people in developing countries. The USAID plays a key role in carrying out United States foreign policy by helping to expand democracy and free trade markets.

The Djerejian Report criticizes a legal restriction on USAID that denies its ability to promote the good work it is doing. The Report notes that “USAID is generally prohibited from using program funds to disseminate information about its activities” and “a great deal of USAID’s work is public diplomacy.”28 The USAID has since established an Office of Public Diplomacy within its Bureau of Legislative and Public Affairs. According to an April 2004 USAID Press release, “The Office of Public Diplomacy helps to coordinate and infuse the development and humanitarian message of USAID to the U.S. Government, the American People and the Arab world.”29 This press release introduced Walid Maalouf as the new director for Public Diplomacy for Middle Eastern and Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI) Affairs.

Mr. Maalouf has experience in international affairs. He served as the alternate United States Representative to the United Nations 58th General Assembly. A USAID press release highlights his credibility within the Middle East: “He was an integral part of the Middle East team at the Mission and the first U.S. Representative to deliver a speech at the U.N. in Arabic.”30 Maalouf’s new Office for Public Diplomacy within USAID has taken quick action to engage the Arab communities. At a media summit in May 2004 with key Arab press correspondents and Arab-American publications, Maalouf declared, “USAID’s new diplomacy initiative is committed to presenting a more accurate image of America to the greater Middle East and promoting a better understanding of the policy goals of Presidential Initiatives and the mission of USAID.”31 The press release for this event states that, “This media summit was the largest exchange between Mideast-American correspondents and U.S. officials and was the first of several outreach events to the Arab and Moslem communities in the United States.”32
Besides government-sponsored public diplomacy, efforts by private citizens seek to establish better relations between Muslims and Americans. In his article "The Jerusalem Report," Yigal Schleifer describes how Syrian Ammar Abdulhamid is using his non-governmental organization, Dar Emar, to promote a better understanding of American culture and democracy in Syria. Dar Emar is translating appropriate English texts in an attempt to educate Syrian citizens about American culture and the philosophical foundations of democracy. Abdulhamid states "When you have an intense project of translation, it leads to dialogue and questioning and hopefully a renaissance will come out of that ... If you want positive change in Syria, there is no substitute for positive engagement."3 In his article, Schleifer describes future Dar Emar projects: "Through his NGO, Dar Emar (www.daremarm.org), Abdulhamid will next summer publish several thousand copies of translated writings of John Locke, the 17th century philosopher father of liberal democracy."4

Abdulhamid's Dar Mar web site provides specific details of his many proposed programs. One program, Project Etana, attempts to bridge the knowledge gap between Western and Arab Worlds and provide insight into Western culture. The effort will translate into Arabic many classical and modern western works, especially in history, science, and humanities. Speaking about his efforts, Abdulhamid admits, "This is not easy, nor should it be … my first idea was that we don't understand America even Muslims living in America don't understand it, so forget about Syrians living in Syria under a socialist government."5

ASSESSMENTS OF PROGRESS

Much has been written about soft power, public diplomacy, and the Djerejian Report, providing both pros and cons for recent efforts in these areas. The Council on Foreign Relations, founded after the 1919 Paris Peace Talks to promote knowledge of foreign policy, focuses on broadening America's understanding of the world and U.S. foreign policy. Through the Council's publication, Foreign Affairs, and its various sponsored forums, the Council encourages a wide range of views, but avoids serving as advocate for specific policy.6 The Council's Web site provides a question-and-answer page on terrorism that discusses the implications of Public Diplomacy and its recent impact on terrorism. Citing a 2002 Gallup survey conducted in nine Muslim countries, the Council concludes that America has an image problem abroad that could hinder the war on terrorism.7

The Council's Terrorism Q&A Web Site opines that current U.S. Government public diplomacy efforts are insufficient, lacking the effectiveness of those used during the Cold War. It does acknowledge some of the recent significant efforts to reach Arab and Muslim audiences,
such as appearances by Secretary of State Colin Powell, National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice, and Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld on al-Jazeera and former Ambassador to Syria Christopher Ross appearing on al-Jazeera speaking in Arabic. To improve the U.S. public image in the Arab and Muslim world, the Council suggests that public diplomacy should be integrated into the U.S. foreign policy development processes. This statement suggests that having public diplomacy deeply embedded within the Department of State is apparently not working and needs more attention at the strategic level.

Kathy R. Fitzpatrick of DePaul University has addressed the enhancing effects of soft power on other instruments on national power. "As a nation we may have the mightiest military and the most sophisticated technology," she argues, "but such strengths ultimately will not matter if we fail to capture the minds and hearts of people around the world with the enduring story of freedom and democracy." She points out that we must first educate ourselves about other countries before we attempt to change their views. She recognizes that for public diplomacy to be effective, it must be considered when developing foreign policy. She warns against the dangers of "diplomatic chaos" a phase she uses to explain the confusion experienced by foreign citizens when U.S. policies and goals shift each time a new President is elected. She declares it is "no wonder foreign citizens get confused about what this country really stands for." 

John Brown of the Institute of Communication Studies, University of Leeds, provides an assessment of the Djerejian Report in his article Changing Minds, Winning Peace: Reconsidering the Djerejian Report. He claims that the Report was too easy on the State Department. Brown believes that many of the public diplomacy challenges discussed in the report are not new; they have existed since World War II. He recognizes that accurate measurement of the effectiveness of public diplomacy is difficult, if not impossible, but claims the Report does not make any specific recommendations to address the problem. Brown critically observes that the Report recommendations are unimaginative, simply calling for continuation of existing programs, more bureaucracy, and more funding. Nevertheless, Brown proposes that program assessment is not as important as acknowledgement that public diplomacy programs are inexpensive and life would be more dangerous without them. He recommends that foreign officers should be empowered to implement public diplomacy solutions that they feel will work for their regions. Brown also suggests that Americans should be reminded that cultural differences play a significant part in foreign policy, so public diplomacy should be considered in development of foreign policy.

Again, a suggestion that public
diplomacy is not given sufficient emphasis at the strategic level within the State Department organizational structure.

Joseph Nye, former Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, is a recognized expert on international affairs and the effects of soft power. In a June 2003 article in Foreign Policy, he claimed that anti-Americanism has increased in recent years, while U.S. soft power has been reduced. One of the goals of the Nation Security Strategy is the promotion of democracy, yet Nye stated, "democracy ... cannot be imposed by force." Nye thus proposed a time-phased strategy to develop effective public diplomacy. He proposed a short-term focus on communicating current events through broadcast media. He acknowledges that Radio Sawa is working, but recommends that the United States needs a larger voice on Arab media, such as al-Jazeera television. In the near term, the United States should develop and communicate strategic themes or messages that depict the United States as a democratic nation interested in helping Muslim nations. He cited Bosnia and Kosovo as recent examples of American intervention on behalf on Muslims. Nye advocated long-term efforts in cultural and educational exchanges. He believes that partnerships with governments, businesses, universities, and foundations can be exploited to encourage cultural understanding and exchange of information. Nye claimed that the largest failure of United States public diplomacy is its under funding.

Danielle Pletka, Vice President of Foreign and Defense Policy Studies for the American Enterprise Institute, has argued that democracy is on the rise in Arab countries and said, "democracy is the talk of the Arab world ... democracy is now at the center of debate in Arab capitals." Asserting that change is underway, she states, "the Arab League has embraced a series of ... reforms; the Saudis have announced plans for municipal elections starting in November; and the Bahrainis and Qataris are making real changes to their political systems." She warns that the presence of politically restrictive governments and low literacy rates among the citizens in the region are obstacles to expansion of democracy. She also provides evidence that some Arab citizens want reform and are looking to outside organizations to impose it. Likewise, she notes that Palestinian scholar, Daoud Kuttab argued that "Arab democrats have failed to reach their goals through their own efforts" and they should welcome support from outsiders, "irrespective of the messenger." Although Pletka claims that President Bush is making "headway" in the promotion of democracy in Arab countries, she charges that his efforts are not aggressive enough. Many of the concerns she raises can be addressed by doing a better job of directly articulating U.S. values to Middle Eastern citizens. Public diplomacy initiatives can help to secure the recent democratic gains against extremists who violently oppose such change.
STATE DEPARTMENT ACTIVITIES

State Department Officials in testimony before Congress have defended public diplomacy efforts undertaken by the State Department since the Djerejian report. The Undersecretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, Margaret Tutwiler told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on February 2004 that U.S. Government public diplomacy efforts "must do a better job reaching beyond the traditional elites and government officials." She described the effort to improve America’s image as a difficult challenge that will “take years of hard, focused work." Patricia Harrison, Assistant Secretary of State for Educational and Cultural Affairs, also offered testimony regarding public diplomacy efforts focused on Arabs and Muslims to the House International Relations Committee in August 2004. Noting the State Department’s strategic ends for public diplomacy, she stated, “the foundation of our public diplomacy strategy is to engage, inform, and influence foreign publics in order to increase understanding for American values, policies, and initiatives." She asserted that the ways to achieve these ends are “through traditional programs and all the tools of technology, involving both public and private sectors” along with “daily briefings and public outreach by our missions around the world.”

The testimony of Undersecretary Tutwiler and Assistant Secretary Harrison describe many new efforts to employ public diplomacy. These efforts include changes in funding and organization and new programs for exchange, education, information, and broadcasting. The details of these efforts are to numerous to cover; therefore, only a few of the more significant examples are provided. Public diplomacy funding has been refocused to the heavily Muslim regions of the Middle East and South Asia, so today 25% of all funding for exchange programs now focus on this region, as compared to 17% in 2002. Organizational changes include establishing an Office of Policy, Planning, and Resources for Public Diplomacy. An interagency Policy Coordinating Committee (PCC) on Muslim Outreach focused on strengthening coordination with the Department of Defense and other agencies. The Fulbright Scholarship Program is now operational within Iraq and Afghanistan (the program was absent in Afghanistan for 25 years). The USAID is working to ensure recipients of their programs know that assistance comes from the United States. Thirty public diplomacy officers have been assigned to the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad making it the largest public diplomacy operation in the world. The Alhurrah television network is now broadcasting in 22 counties in the Middle East.

The U.S. has taken great efforts to expand U.S. influence in the Arab and Muslim world through public diplomacy efforts. The U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy provides some of these details in its 2004 Report. The report concludes that “significant progress has been made in many areas, but there is still much that can be accomplished” and “[t]he agencies
and structures of public diplomacy need to be properly coordinated to achieve maximum efficiency.

The commission states that U.S. public diplomacy is making an impact and suggests that it can benefit from a strategic level influence.

Despite being one of the four DIME (Diplomacy, Information, Military, and Economic) instruments of national power, the information element does not have enough attention at the strategic level. The State Department has cabinet level influence and execution responsibility for the Diplomacy element. Likewise, the Department of Defense has cabinet level influence and execution responsibility for the Military element. Only recently, the information element attained strategic level policy attention with the creation of the White House Office of Global Communications. Although the State Department employs public diplomacy to execute the Information element of national power, it does not share the same top-level attention within the State Department as diplomacy or international development.

In October 1998, the State Department merged with the previously independent USAID and USIA organizations. The former USIA, a public diplomacy organization, promoted U.S. national interests through a variety of international information, education, and cultural programs. Today, the functions and authority of the former USIA linger within the Office of the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs Office. In contrast, the USAID remained an essentially intact organization within the State Department receiving only overall foreign policy guidance from the Secretary of State. Interestingly, the USAID maintained its previous public diplomacy functions within the Office of Public Diplomacy under the Bureau of Legislative and Public Affairs. Hinting of a need for reform, the State Department recently established a policy-coordinating committee for public diplomacy to ensure synchronization between the two State Department organizations.

According to Edgar Schein, a prominent organizational theorist, coordination of effort is one of the four essential elements that must be present for an organization to perform effectively. The establishing of an internal policy-coordinating committee for public diplomacy attempts to achieve this coordination of effort within the State Department. Schein defines another of his essential elements, authority structure, as having a suitable organizational structure or chain of command that gives one the rights to direct the actions of others. The State Department has public diplomacy functions split between organizations having different chains of command. Without a proper authority structure, it will be difficult to achieve coordinated public diplomacy efforts effectively.

The State Department should apply the organizational model used during the USAID - State Department merger to establish an independent Public Diplomacy Agency. Similar to
USAID, this new agency would have a director appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate as well as its own funding appropriated by Congress. The Director of the Public Diplomacy Agency, receiving strategic policy guidance from the Secretary of State, will have the agility of independent funding and the coordination of effort and authority structure to realize strategic direction over U.S. public diplomacy initiatives.

CONCLUSIONS

Since the Advisory Group published its report on the use of public diplomacy to influence the hearts and minds of the Arab and Muslim people, the U.S. State Department has made improvements. Surveys have demonstrated that the most efficient public diplomacy instrument to get that American message to the Arab and Muslim publics is broadcast communications. The State Department and the Broadcast Board of Governors have made great progress in this area. Probably the most difficult challenge for the State Department will be to develop feedback mechanisms to measure effectiveness of the myriad of public diplomacy programs. In the face of this challenge, we should maintain an awareness that without any of the public diplomacy efforts the world would be a more dangerous place.

Although the State Department has made improvements in wielding the information element of national power, public diplomacy initiatives continue lack adequate funding, coordination with other foreign affairs agencies and strategic direction. Despite these imperfections, the State Department has demonstrated the necessary knowledge and processes for execution of public diplomacy through the recent expansion of U.S. influence in the Arab and Muslim world.

The State Department has the tools for public diplomacy but lacks an efficient organizational structure to provide strategic focus. An organizational change within the state department can ensure that public diplomacy policy is effectively coordinated at the department level and will allow for greater influence at the cabinet or strategic level. The U.S. Government should resurrect within the Foreign Affairs Agencies a construct similar to the old U.S. Information Agency. This new agency, called the Public Diplomacy Agency, should be tightly coupled to the State Department in both policy and management similar to the USAID organizational model. The Public Diplomacy Agency, in a tripartite relationship with the State Department and USAID, will be a more effective instrument for achieving U.S. objectives for wielding the information instrument of national power. With the Director appointed by the President and independent funding appropriation, this agency will have the authority and flexibility to more effectively execute public diplomacy and yet remain accountable to the public.
The State Department – USAID model worked exceptionally well for the recent tsunami relief efforts in Asia, it could certainly create a more effective organization for employing the information element of national power and ensuring the Arab and Muslim World hear a consistent U.S. message.


3 Ibid.

4 Ibid.


6 Ibid.

7 Ibid.


11 Advisory Group, 6.

12 Ibid., 13.

13 Ibid., 22-24.


15 Advisory Group, 8.


18 Ibid.

19 Ibid.

20 Advisory Group, 29


23 ACNielsen conducted the surveys using face-to-face interviews in Arabic during February 2004 in all countries except Qatar, which was conducted during July and August 2003. The sample size was 5737 adults with an age 15 years and older. There is a 2.9 percent margin of error. See note 22 for source.


28 Advisory Group, 66

30 Ibid.


32 Ibid.


34 Ibid.


38 Ibid.


40 Ibid., 416.


42 Ibid.


44 Ibid.

45 Ibid.

47 Ibid.

48 Ibid.

49 Ibid. Daoud Kuttab’s comments were published in the London-based Arabic daily Al Hayat.


52 Ibid.

53 Department of State, “Tutwiler Emphasis Need to Reach Beyond Foreign Elites.”


55 Ibid., 40.


57 Ibid., 183.
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