USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

THE NATIONAL GUARD SOUTHEAST ASIAN STATE PARTNERSHIP PROGRAM: PROVIDING SUPPORT TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY AND THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM

by

Colonel Robert J. Coy
United States Army National Guard

Colonel Keith Ferrell
United States Marine Corps
Project Adviser

This SRP is submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the Master of Strategic Studies Degree. The U.S. Army War College is accredited by the Commission on Higher Education of the Middle States Association of Colleges and Schools, 3624 Market Street, Philadelphia, PA 19104, (215) 662-5606. The Commission on Higher Education is an institutional accrediting agency recognized by the U.S. Secretary of Education and the Council for Higher Education Accreditation.

The views expressed in this student academic research paper are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

U.S. Army War College
CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013
## Report Documentation Page

Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1. REPORT DATE</th>
<th>2. REPORT TYPE</th>
<th>3. DATES COVERED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>17 MAR 2005</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>-</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The National Guard Southeast Asian State Partnership Program Providing Support to the National Security Strategy and the Global War on Terrorism</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>5a. CONTRACT NUMBER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>5b. GRANT NUMBER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>5d. PROJECT NUMBER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>5e. TASK NUMBER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>6. AUTHOR(S)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Robert Coy</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Carlisle, PA, 17013-5050</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Approved for public release; distribution unlimited</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>See attached.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>14. ABSTRACT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>See attached.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>15. SUBJECT TERMS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. REPORT unclassified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. ABSTRACT unclassified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. THIS PAGE unclassified</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>18. NUMBER OF PAGES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>30</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98) Prescribed by ANSI Std Z39-18
This paper examines the role of the National Guard's State Partnership Program in support of the 2002 National Security Strategy of the United States and the Global War on Terrorism and why the program should be expanded in Southeast Asia, specifically in Malaysia and Vietnam. The paper also argues that the State Partnership Program is a proven soft power tool that is available to the Regional Combatant Commander to assist in shaping his theater strategy.
# Table of Contents

ABSTRACT .................................................................................................................................................. iii

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT .............................................................................................................................. vii

THE NATIONAL GUARD SOUTHEAST ASIAN STATE PARTNERSHIP PROGRAM: PROVIDING SUPPORT TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY AND THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM ................................................................................................................................. 1

BACKGROUND .......................................................................................................................................... 2

ANALYSIS OF THE PROGRAM .................................................................................................................. 3

SPP IS A SOFT POWER TOOL ..................................................................................................................... 5

SPP SUPPORT TO THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM ........................................................................... 7

WHY EXPAND THE SPP IN SOUTHEAST ASIA? ................................................................................ 9

EXPANSION INTO MALAYSIA .................................................................................................................... 11

EXPANSION INTO VIETNAM ...................................................................................................................... 12

ARGUMENTS AGAINST EXPANSION .................................................................................................... 13

CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................................................... 14

ENDNOTES .............................................................................................................................................. 15

BIBLIOGRAPHY ....................................................................................................................................... 19
I want to thank the "Citizen Soldiers" who have dedicated much more than one weekend a month and two weeks in the summer to defend the United States and support the Global War on Terrorism.
THE NATIONAL GUARD SOUTHEAST ASIAN STATE PARTNERSHIP PROGRAM: PROVIDING SUPPORT TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY AND THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM

The world has fundamentally changed since the State Partnership Program was founded and the partnership program must continue to adapt to remain relevant and effective.¹

- Col Mark L. Kalber,
Chief National Guard Bureau – International Affairs

The National Guard State Partnership Program (SPP) has been in existence for eleven years. After getting its start in United States European Command (USEUCOM), it has now expanded to United States Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM), United States Central Command (USCENTCOM), and United States Pacific Command (USPACOM). The purpose of this paper is to examine the current role of the National Guard’s SPP in support of both the 2002 National Security Strategy (NSS) of the United States and the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). It also explains the use of the SPP as a soft power tool available to the Regional Combatant Commander (RCC) to assist in shaping his theater strategy, enabling him to secure and maintain a peaceful outcome without reverting to military force. Finally, this paper argues why the program should be expanded in Southeast Asia, specifically in Malaysia and Vietnam.

I recommend that the Department of Defense (DOD), the National Guard Bureau (NGB), and USPACOM immediately expand the program within Southeast Asia to Malaysia and Vietnam, in order to increase security in the region. In addition to country expansion, the DOD, NGB, and USPACOM should also increase the areas of cooperation to include additional military-to-military exchanges, training in how to respond to domestic emergencies, and training in security operations. One approach would be for the DOD to direct and fund expanded state involvement in the SPP by civilian leaders. Professional exchanges and traveling contact visits with state officials from all branches of government could help reinforce the democratic transitions under way in each partner nation. The SPP through its state contacts should continue to encourage experts from the private and non-profit sectors to participate, again under the direction of the RCC, to ensure that these and other efforts meet United States’ foreign policy objectives.²

At the most recent Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit, President Bush stressed economic and security issues are linked, and terrorism cannot be divorced from trade. He also insisted that APEC incorporate security issues in parallel with trade and investment. Additionally, he acknowledged the military support provided by Thailand and the Philippines to Iraq’s reconstruction.³ This is noteworthy because these two Southeast Asian countries (which
supported us in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF)) are both active partners in the SPP.

BACKGROUND

The SPP is an outgrowth of the USEUCOM’s Joint Contact Team Program, a program of bilateral activities with the militaries of Central and Eastern Europe and newly independent states. In 1993, the NSS directed the DOD to take an active role in shaping the international security environment by strengthening emerging nations, promoting democracy, fostering prosperity, and enhancing security. The 1993 NSS stated that nations that have stable governments, strong economies, and professional militaries would develop into prosperous democracies, while nations with corrupt governments, failing economies, and self-serving militaries would devolve into chaos and conflict.

The SPP was formed out of the 1993 NSS. The DOD chose the National Guard (NG) to participate in this directive because it brings a unique dual federal and state mission and a unique citizen-soldier relationship to a partner country. The SPP also opens access to state resources at the political, economic, and cultural levels which are not readily accessible through the active force. Furthermore, the ability of the program to extend beyond the sphere of the military sets it apart from other security initiatives. The importance of the SPP was highlighted in the summer of 2002, when the Commander of USEUCOM, General Joseph Ralston, described the SPP as a significant portion of their overall theater engagement strategy to foster stability and democracy in Eastern Europe.

The program has six security cooperation objectives:
1. Improve military interoperability between the United States and partner nations
2. Demonstrate military subordination to civil authority
3. Demonstrate military support to civilian authorities
4. Assist with the development of democratic institutions
5. Foster open market economies to help develop stability
6. Project and represent United States humanitarian values

In the SPP, a state is partnered with a country based on guidance in the RCC’s Theater Security Cooperation Plan (TSCP). A host nation submits a request for support through the United States Ambassador of that country. The ambassador then formally requests the RCC and the NGB to match the country with a state. The Combatant Commander consummates the relationship between the state and the foreign country based upon relevant political, military, and socio-economic criteria that benefit the foreign nation, the state, and the United States as a whole. Through this relationship, the states have an opportunity to develop and foster military-to-military relationships that build security through professional exchanges; business-to-
business relationships which build prosperity through trade agreements; and political-to-political relationships that strengthen the political processes leading to stable governments. In addition to assisting the DOD and the RCC’s Theater Security Cooperation Plan, individual states also participate in the program because it benefits them to do so. States gain directly from the training the SPP provides for their own NG units as well as indirectly through the access and contacts the program offers. The federal government pays almost the entire bill in the form of direct congressional appropriations to the NGB, including virtually all the costs of each state’s NG unit’s participation.

**ANALYSIS OF THE PROGRAM**

Our Nation’s cause has always been larger than our Nation’s defense. We fight, as we always fight, for a just peace—a peace that favors liberty. We will defend the peace against the threats from terrorists and tyrants. We will preserve the peace by building good relations among the great powers. And we will extend the peace by encouraging free and open societies on every continent.

- President George W. Bush
2002 National Security Strategy

One of the aims of the 2002 NSS is to make the world safer. To do this, it targets three goals: (1) political and economic freedom; (2) peaceful relations with other nations; (3) and respect for human dignity. In order to achieve these goals, the NSS prescribes eight objectives:

1. Champion aspirations for human dignity
2. Strengthen alliances to defeat global terrorism and work to prevent attacks against us and our friends
3. Work with others to defuse regional conflicts
4. Prevent our enemies from threatening us, our allies, and our friends, with weapons of mass destruction
5. Ignite a new era of global economic growth through free markets and free trade
6. Expand the circle of development by opening societies and building the infrastructure of democracy
7. Develop agendas for cooperative action with other main centers of global power
8. Transform America’s national security institutions to meet the challenges and opportunities of the twenty-first century

The SPP program is a valuable tool in the RCC’s tool box. It directly and indirectly supports objectives 2, 5, 6, and 8 of the 2002 NSS through its participation in the RCC’s TSCP, through its relationship with the partner nation’s military, and by laying the ground work for additional state government/partner nation exchanges.
Colorado's partnership with Slovenia is a good example of how the SPP directly supports the second NSS objective of assisting the DOD to “Strengthen(ing) alliances to defeat global terrorism and work to prevent attacks against us and our friends.” Colorado has been actively involved with Slovenia since 1995, supporting numerous contact teams, military-to-military exchanges, and familiarization visits with Slovenia's political leaders and its defense ministry. These activities were originally aimed at supporting the country's expected bid to enter the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Because of the partnership, in 1995, Slovenia began the annual planning and review process for joining NATO under the alliance's Partnership for Peace program. The Colorado National Guard assisted in this process and also provided instruction and resources in mutually identified areas such as logistics, force organization, aviation and airfield management, air base development, communications, professional development, employer-employee relations, and personal training. As a result, by 1997, Slovenia had been admitted to NATO, and Slovenian Armed Forces were serving on the ground in a NATO Stabilization Force peacekeeping operation in Bosnia. More importantly, due in large part to the success of USEUCOM's TSCP with Slovenia (of which the SPP has played a major role), Slovenia has been a strong supporter of the war on terrorism. Following the September 11, 2001 attacks, Slovenian leaders pledged their support in the war on terrorism by sharing intelligence about potential terrorist links in Bosnia-Herzegovina and offering the country's elite mountain training center as a training area for United States forces.

From the very beginning of the program in 1993, the SPP has incorporated specialized expertise in areas such as information technology systems, logistics support, legislative and public affairs, personnel management, and organizational development. This aspect of the SPP has proven to be a valuable tool that indirectly supports the fifth objective of the 2002 NSS, “Ignite a new era of global economic growth through free markets and free trade.” The NG is not the only U.S. governmental agency supporting this objective, but it is a perfect DOD support for this kind of assignment because of its “citizen soldier” military force. These citizen soldiers bring expertise from their private sector jobs that are not often found in the active military. The NG's involvement also offers two other advantages. First, it facilitates the political participation of the governors as well as other state officials, and secondly, since the federal government is already financing nearly the entire bill for state NG operations, it can now leverage those resources to assist partner nations without requesting new congressional appropriations.

The SPP through its partnerships indirectly supports the NSS's sixth objective to, “Expand the circle of development by opening societies and building the infrastructure of democracy,” the SPP through its partnerships indirectly support this objective. For example, the State of
Michigan did not limit its partnership with Latvia simply to a military role, but also strengthened its bond with the community and the people. When Michigan volunteered to become a partnership state, the Adjutant General committed the personnel and resources to make the program successful and reached out to groups within Michigan to participate in this unique engagement opportunity. Following a Governor and Civic Leaders visit in 2000, the civic community donated a handicap accessible bus to a Riga children’s rehabilitation center that previously had had no transportation for the disabled children attending school there. The support to the Latvian community has also included monetary and clothing donations to assist civic support programs throughout Latvia. Beginning in March 2002, Michigan resourced a Bilateral Affairs Officer within the Office of Defense Cooperation in the United States Embassy. The Michigan NG and Latvia have recognized the SPP potential through the use of the new office during Latvia’s transition to its newly approved force structure. The personal and professional bonds established over almost a decade of partnership between both militaries and community have enriched both Latvia and Michigan.¹⁵

“Transform(ing) America’s national security institutions to meet the challenges and opportunities of the twenty-first century,” is the eighth objective. The DOD has already transformed parts of the military department from being strictly a war-fighting organization to an organization that can use its military to partner for peace. Through their state partnership, the state of New Jersey sponsored a weeklong NG sponsored Civil-Military Emergency Planning (CMEP) Workshop with Albania. According to the Department of the Army, this was the first CMEP event of this scale that was totally planned, organized and executed by the NG through the SPP. The purpose of the event was to explain and demonstrate the United States’ structures, processes and doctrine for civilian and military cooperation in order to prepare for life-saving and humanitarian response to catastrophic emergencies and disasters.¹⁶ Indirectly, the NG supported this eighth objective by demonstrating its transformation from strictly a war-fighting force to a humanitarian response organization.

From the state-partner nation examples outlined above, successes have been generated by the SPP in orchestrating state involvement by the NG, state officials, civilian leaders, and the participation of the state’s citizenry within the private and non-profit sectors. In support of the 2002 NSS, the DOD, the NGB, and the RCC should ensure that these relationships continue.

**SPP IS A SOFT POWER TOOL**

The SPP is a soft power tool used by the United States Government to affect the behavior of others without coercing them with military power or threats. Soft power, as defined by Joseph
S. Nye Jr., in his book, *Soft Power: The Changing Nature of Power*, is a co-optive power, or the ability to shape what others want through the attractiveness of one’s culture and values. According to Nye, who is the recognized expert on this topic, soft power of a country rests primarily in three resources: (1) its culture, (2) its political values, and (3) its foreign policies. Through the SPP, the United States exports its culture, its political values, and its foreign policies through state and foreign national interactions, therefore increasing the probability of securing and maintaining a peaceful outcome without reverting to military coercion.

Nye further defines soft power as a means to mobilize cooperation from others without threats or payments. Soft power is also dependent on how we frame our national objectives. Policies broadly inclusive with far-sighted definitions are more attractive to foreign nations than are policies which take a narrow and myopic perspective. According to Nye’s definition, the 2002 NSS does take a wide perspective, but some of the objectives may also cause some consternation with countries or individuals who do not support globalization or free markets, including countries which knowingly harbor and support terrorism.

Tied into Nye’s definition of soft power is the importance of connecting third world countries to the global community. According to Ellen Frost, a former government official and a current fellow at the Institute for International Economics in Washington D.C., in her article, *Globalization and National Security: A Strategic Approach*, “No government can stop it [globalization], but an important goal of United States foreign and defense policy should be to help channel it in benign directions.” She goes on to say that our government should forge a globalization strategy that includes not only commercial, financial, technological, military, political, environmental, and social aspects, but also cultural, religious, psychological, educational, and historical perspectives. One of the great aspects of the SPP is that its gives each state guard the opportunity to facilitate these types of strategies through its state governments and local businesses.

According to Thomas P.M. Barnett, a professor at the Naval War College, “Asymmetrical warfare in the 21st Century is not going to come from near-peers like China, who are rapidly integrating into the global economy,... The real asymmetrical challenge will come from globalization's disenfranchised: those left behind from globalization's advance.” He further states that our biggest threat is from non-state actors waging war against the global system and these non-state actors finding sanctuary in non-globalized nation-states. Countries which are connected with the U.S. are more likely to be stable and less of a threat to the U.S. and our way of life. Within Southeast Asia, he identifies four countries of interest to the United States which are failing to connect with the globalized mainstream. Those countries are Thailand, the
Philippines, Indonesia, and Vietnam. Currently, the SPP is integrated within Thailand and the Philippines to assist their militaries as well as their governments become better connected to the United States. For example, the state of Washington assisted the Thai government establish an emergency management system allowing them to quickly alert others in the event of a catastrophe, and the state is currently assisting the government in setting up a 911 call center as well as helping them meet the requirements of the Maritime Security Act at their ports.

SPP SUPPORT TO THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM

We will strive to build an international order where more countries and peoples are integrated into a world consistent with the interests and values we share with our partners—values such as human dignity, rule of law, respect for individual liberties, open and free economies, and religious tolerance. We understand that a world in which these values are embraced as standards, not exceptions, will be the best antidote to the spread of terrorism. This is the world we must build today.

- President George W. Bush
National Strategy for Combating Terrorism

The SPP through its military and civil relationships supports the 2002 NSS and the 2003 National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (NSCT). The NSCT focuses on identifying and defusing threats before they reach our borders, and to accomplish this, the government will use all the instruments of power available to include diplomatic, economic, information, as well as military resources.

Instability and conflict among nations often arise from diverse causes. Ethnic hatred, unequal economic opportunities, and political discrimination within countries can lead to instability. Nations, which lack the means of political dissent, can nurture radical ideologies that appeal to those who feel threatened by existing norms and arrangements. The United States’ security is best guaranteed when other nations are secure, free, and prosperous, and when they respect human rights and the rule of law. As a country, the U.S. Government realizes that it cannot accomplish this alone, and that is why it is committed to working with allies and new partners in combining strength and resources in order to achieve this shared security.

In fighting the GWOT, the partnerships that have been forged through the SPP have become very important. For example, SPP partnerships in two former Soviet republics, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, helped the RCC facilitate the deployment of 4,000 United States and coalition troops to the area to support operations against Al Qaeda and Taliban fighters in Afghanistan. In the country of Georgia, United States Special Forces trained 200 Georgian fighters in mountain fighting, urban combat, and other counter-terrorism activities, again building
on previous SPP training and relationships. SPP partnerships have also aided the collection and sharing of intelligence on Al Qaeda and other terrorist organizations and have helped provide forward bases and logistical support to the allied military campaign. In addition, NG sources report that SPP relationships have enhanced political support for the U.S. led war efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan. Former defense secretary William Perry put it best when he stated that such military-to-military contacts can constitute an aspect of preventive defense by developing contacts and helping to shape the outlook of foreign military officers to be more in line with that of the United States.

The U.S. must diminish the underlying conditions from which terrorists can exploit: resolving regional disputes, fostering economic, social, and political development, setting up market-based economies, and establishing rules of law. Promoting these conditions requires the U.S. with its friends and allies to support democratic values, and to instill economic freedom. An example of this long-term view to combating terrorism is the approach USPACOM has adopted to tackle the GWOT. In the near term, using their military might with their partner nations, they are attempting to destroy the terrorist cells where they exist. In the long-term, through implementation of their TSCP, they are dedicated to removing the conditions that breed terrorism by improving governance, training security forces, and bettering the way of life of the local populace. The SPP’s six security cooperation objectives support these long-term efforts by demonstrating military subordination to civil authority, demonstrating military support to civilian authorities, and by fostering open market economies to help develop stability. The NG system serves as an excellent example of a professional military force that is subordinate to civilian authority that can be used in domestic emergencies or to fight and win wars. Also, some states partnered with countries in Latin America and the Caribbean, have had success in facilitating business relationships between state economic developers, the U.S. Embassy economic officer, and the country’s department of commerce.

Some skeptics might say that whatever the merits of the SPP and its soft power characteristics, it has little role to play in this GWOT. Osama Bin Laden and his followers are not attracted, but are repelled by American culture, values, and policies. It was military power that defeated the Taliban government in Afghanistan, and soft power will never convert fanatics. However, the United States cannot use its military might in every country; therefore, success also depends on close civilian cooperation. The SPP, through its civilian and military exchanges, has proven to be a tool through which a RCC can foster this cooperation and diminish the international environment that allows terrorism to flourish.
WHY EXPAND THE SPP IN SOUTHEAST ASIA?

According to Admiral Thomas Fargo, the commander of USPACOM from 2 May 2002 to 26 February 2005, “Southeast Asia is a crucial front in the War on Terror.” The destabilization of the governments of this region—moderate, secular, legitimately elected, with large Muslim populations—would sentence the region to decades of danger and chaos.

In addition to the GWOT, many Southeast Asian countries want a United States strategic presence in the area; although such a desire may not be expressed publicly nor does it usually involve a request for United States forces or bases. Even Vietnam has sought to move past the war and create a closer relationship with the United States that goes beyond economic ties.

The state-partner nation relationship is important in assisting the economic development of the partnered country. Economic and financial weakness is a serious political/military source of concern in the GWOT for four reasons:

1. Economic and financial weakness makes economies more vulnerable to financial turmoil.
2. Economic insecurity can rapidly lead to social and political instability.
3. Economic weakness makes economies more vulnerable to geopolitical shocks.
4. Economic weaknesses might convince the leadership of a failed state that it has no stake in globalization and the status quo and has nothing to lose by attacking its neighbor.

The SPP is one of the ways available to the RCC to establish governmental and business relationships within Southeast Asia and therefore help provide some economic security.

Dr. Leif Rosenberger, the Economic Advisor to USPACOM, states the military has a vested interest in preventive defense, which he defines as reducing poverty and investing in social and economic development. Through USPACOM, the United States forms partnerships with other Asian countries and other organizations to provide humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, and other areas for economic reconstruction and development. “This economic instrument of power helps to reduce the social and economic injustice that in turn fans incendiary conditions for military conflict. … building prosperity and creatively avoiding military conflict via preventive defense is far better than the most decisive military victory.” Successful economic development strategies are necessary to attain a peaceful security environment in Asia.

The drawdown of the U.S. air and naval forces in the Pacific following the end of the Cold War showdown with the Soviet Union, the closure of American bases in the Philippines, and the deployment of significant numbers of USPACOM forces to the USCENTCOM in support of OIF
and OEF, have all reduced the presence of U.S. forces in the Pacific. This may create a perception of reduced U.S. commitment to the security of the region. However, theater engagement, including the SPP, is a means to offset this perception and enhance regional economic and political stability. The SPP can be an effective and inexpensive tool in the TSCP for providing valuable opportunities to gain familiarity with locations where United States forces may someday be sent in response to a crisis.

In addition to assisting the partner nation enhance regional economic and political stability, another benefit of the SPP is collaborating with the host nation's military in joint and combined training and education opportunities. There is an increasing synergy between transnational threats like terrorism, illicit drugs, trafficking in humans, piracy, and especially the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). Since transnational threats are a continuing concern in the Pacific region, specifically from terror organizations like Al Qaeda and Jamaal Islamiyah, these combined training and education opportunities provide an important relationship that can possibly be leveraged by each partner.

To combat these transnational threats, Admiral Fargo did not view military action as the sole or even the primary instrument of national power. The war on terrorism cannot be won by attrition alone since terrorists can multiply faster than they can be captured or killed. Thus, his long-term effort is focused on strengthening the region's democratic institutions that provide security at the economic, social, educational, law enforcement, and basic services levels. The GWOT will tip in our favor once sound governance prevails, and citizens begin to value their institutions more than they fear the terrorists. The SPP can assist him in this endeavor. For example, the state of Hawaii is currently assisting the Philippine Armed Forces through training and a professional education program focused on WMD and Counter-drug interdiction.

Colonel Max Brewer, a senior NGB advisor to the program, views the benefit of the SPP military-to-military contacts as "the relationships between governmental and non-governmental civilian organizations within the partners. Through the SPP, many [partner] countries have established successful governmental, business, educational, and medical relationships with counterpart agencies from the partner state." Because of these past successes and the more recent success with our partnership between Hawaii and the Philippines and Guam and the partnership between Washington State and Thailand, the DOD, NGB, and USPACOM should immediately consider expanding the program within Southeast Asia, specifically to Malaysia and Vietnam.
EXPANSION INTO MALAYSIA

Malaysia is a very multi-racial country with Chinese Buddhists, Indian Hindus, and Malay Muslims. Because of these racial mixes, social harmony is a difficult challenge. The overall social structure is currently fragile and therefore is an instability factor in the country. In addition to its social structure, Malaysia is encouraging capitalism, hoping its economy will remain dynamic and robust, and therefore generate economic activities with increasing productivity. In theory, this increase in productivity would also reduce economic disparities among the races. The majority of the Malaysian people are employed in the government services, with a small fraction involved in both large and small private businesses. Their most recent economic challenges led to the formulation of two major economic policies: the New Economic Policy and the successive National Development Policy. These two economic policies were formed to enhance the growth of the domestic development of the country and to improve the living standards of the Malay race that are less prosperous than the Chinese Malay. The government leaders realize that in order to combat terrorism, they must eradicate hard core poverty and reduce relative poverty amongst their various ethnic races.

Aside from the social and economic reforms, the Malaysian government is striving to improve the psychological dimension of the population. For example, they are striving to improve job opportunities, education, schools, healthcare, road networks, and village civil halls. Village Civil Halls provide the people the ability to organize goodwill social and cultural events as well as educational activities.

Finally, in order to ensure Malaysia remains internally secure, in 1985 the government adopted a concept of comprehensive security. This concept incorporates political, military, economic, social, cultural, and psychological dimensions, where the government places emphasis on both military capability and strengthening the socio-economic and political basis of national security. The SPP is a perfect match to partner with Malaysia. Its influence extends beyond the borders of Southeast Asia. The country currently holds the chairmanship of the Organization of Islamic Conference and the Non-Aligned Movement and regionally, it is an influential leader, focused on the terror threat of Jamaal Islamiyah. According to Colonel Hasny Bin Md Salleh, a Malaysian officer in the 2004 United States Army War College class, Malaysia cannot handle the transnational terrorist fight alone. The Malaysian government must work with other regional countries as well as with the U.S. in sharing intelligence and expertise. In conjunction with Malaysia, the U.S. established the Southeast Asia Center for Counter Terrorism in Malaysia. The center will be run "like an institute, holding training programs, workshops, and seminars to
help the region implement antiterrorism measures.” Additionally, Christopher LaFleur, our U.S. ambassador to Malaysia, has said the U.S.-Malaysian relationship is on “a decidedly positive path.” In his confirmation hearing before the Senate, LaFleur quoted Malaysian Prime Minister Abdullah's July 2004 pronouncement that Malaysia’s current relations with the United States are “the best we’ve ever had.” We have ever-greater cooperation in areas such as counterterrorism, regional and international security, and economic prosperity.

Because of this improved relationship, the DOD, the NGB, and USPACOM should encourage the establishment of a state partnership with this important Southeast Asian country. The NG is in a unique position to support the Regional Combatant Commander’s TSCP through implementation of its six security cooperation objectives with Malaysia.

EXPANSION INTO VIETNAM

The U.S. has a unique relationship with Vietnam stretching back to the Vietnam War. In August 1995, the U.S. reestablished diplomatic ties with Vietnam and began limited military-to-military exchanges focused on the search for U.S. military personnel Missing in Action (MIA) from the Vietnam War. Even with the success of these limited military exchanges, Vietnam is still a little cautious to expand ties with the United States.

In 1998, the Stanley Foundation, a non-profit, non-partisan, private operating foundation that focuses on promoting and building support for principled multilateralism in addressing international issues, sponsored a forum in Queenstown, Maryland, titled, Emerging from Conflict: Improving U.S. Relations with Current and Recent Adversaries. In this forum, the general consensus was that the DOD needs to develop increased military-to-military cooperation with the Vietnamese Ministry of Defense. Specifically, the participants made the following recommendations:

1. Military contacts and exchanges should continue to be developed in line with the comfort levels of both countries and their defense establishments.
2. These military contacts, exchanges, and cooperation should, as feasible and agreed between the countries, be expanded to include joint activities and technical assistance on demining and unexploded ordnance, treatment of those wounded by mines and late exploded ordnance, and perhaps cooperation in research on the effects of Agent Orange on military and civilian personnel.
3. Measures should be taken to increase English language study within the Vietnamese military.
Admiral Fargo has stated, “...our military-to-military relationship with Vietnam is progressing on a modest but positive vector.”61 USPACOM shares a number of security concerns with Vietnam, including counter-narcotics, counter-terrorism, and peacekeeping.62 This is where the SPP can be of assistance. A state-partner nation program can enhance these efforts and support the TSCP by demonstrating an effective civil-military co-operation.

Vietnam’s Deputy Prime Minister, Nguyen Tan Dzung, made the following statement after receiving the new U.S. Ambassador to Vietnam on February 1, 2005, “Vietnam attaches importance in building long-term and stable relations with the U.S. on the basis of mutual respect for national independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity, non-interference in other’s internal affairs, and the equality and interests of each nation.”63 Mr. Dzung also said that his country wishes to further improve the two countries’ bilateral cooperation, including cooperation in searching for MIA’s, and in HIV/AIDS and drug prevention activities.64

There are some concerns, however, with increased military-to-military cooperation. Vietnam is anxious about Chinese power and influence throughout Asia. It remains very careful in its relationship with China and continues to proceed cautiously on such issues as military-to-military cooperation with the U.S. so as not to appear threatening to China or any other country. Vietnam also does not want to hinder its developing relationship with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).65

Even with this caution, it appears that Vietnam would welcome more U.S. military-to-military cooperation. The SPP is a perfect match since it is a soft power tool that does not provide a threatening footprint to China nor any other regional nation.

ARGUMENTS AGAINST EXPANSION

The arguments against immediate program expansion primarily focus on money and mission creep. The DOD needs to conserve its limited funds to fight the current battles in OEF and OIF, and the individual states are short of manpower with the deployment of their soldiers and airmen to the Middle East. A further impediment of immediate expansion is discussed by Major Mark Bour in his Masters Thesis from the Naval Post Graduate School, National Guard Engagement in the Pacific: No Threat to Security. Major Bour states that there are some Asian-Pacific countries “that are in no hurry to give up their current form of government, embracing instead a form of culturalism that prejudices or outright rejects Western ideals.”66 This can become an issue since a major premise of the SPP is that the NG will not intrude upon any nation that does not first invite such activity.67 However, with Malaysia and Vietnam, we
currently have established limited military-to-military exchanges, and our diplomatic relations have improved greatly over the past eight years.

There is another concern with expansion, though. Expanding the SPP and other Western engagement activities to this region carries the risk of upsetting China and raising concerns among our current and potential allies, even though the program maintains a small operational footprint and its objectives lend benign support for emerging democratic institutions.66

In refute of this argument, China to date has not attempted to force the U.S. out of South Korea nor Japan. South Korea and Japan are two of our strongest allies as well as trading partners, and we currently have military bases in both countries. China is also our third largest trading partner and firms located in China are now the second largest supplier of imports to the United States, having gone ahead of Japan in 2002. The U.S. has long been the single largest export market for firms located in China, taking over thirty percent of total exports produced in China.69

CONCLUSION

America is a country that really does have to be committed to values and to making life better for people around the world.... It’s not just the sword, but it’s the olive branch that speaks to those intentions.70

- Dr. Condoleezza Rice
National Security Advisor

In conclusion, the viability of the SPP has been demonstrated in numerous occasions through USEUCOM, USSOUTHCOM, and USCENTCOM, and it is gaining a foothold in USPACOM, specifically in the Philippines and in Thailand. Because of the radical Islamic fundamentalism that is growing in this region and the lack of globalized economies, the NG has a unique opportunity to fully partner with USPACOM in promoting democracy, economic security, and military cooperation in its area of operation. Through some careful expansion, the program can become a well resourced tool the DOD can use to support the NSS.

In the future, the United States will need more, not fewer allies to meet the challenges posed by international terrorism, WMD, and other threats. Strategic building policies such as the SPP can help bring more allies and coalition partners into the fold while moving the United States toward another increasing vital source of protection: a more free and prosperous world.71

WORD COUNT=5823
ENDNOTES


4 Kalber, 1.


6 Kalber, 1.


9 Ibid.

10 Owens and Eid, 6.


12 Ibid., 2.

13 National Guard Bureau, J5 (IA).

14 Ibid.

15 Ibid.

16 Ibid.

17 Joseph S. Nye is a recognized expert on Soft Power and has written scholarly books and papers on the subject.

18 Ibid., 60-61.
20 Ibid.
21 Delaney, 1.
23 Ibid., 165-166.
24 Ibid., 87.
25 Colonel Ronald Weaver, SRP Coordinator for Washington State National Guard; telephone interview by author, 8 September 2004.
26 Ibid., 87.
28 Ibid., 15.
32 Owens and Eid, 5.
35 The ideas in this paragraph are based on remarks made by a speaker participating in the Noon Time Lecture Series at the United States Army War College.
36 Delaney, 1.
37 Ibid., 2.
38 Nye, 130-131.
Southeast Asia is comprised of the Indochinese and Malay peninsulas and several nearby island groups. The region is bordered on the north by China, on the east by the South Pacific Ocean, on the south by the Indian Ocean, and on the west by the Indian Ocean, the Bay of Bengal, and the Indian subcontinent. Southeast Asia includes the countries of Brunei, Myanmar (formerly known as Burma), Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam.


43 Rosenberger, 8-9.

44 Ibid., 10.


46 Ibid.

47 Congress, 1-2.

48 *National Guard Bureau, J5 (IA).*

49 Owens, 157.


52 Ibid., 8.


54 Congress, 33.

55 Salley, 10-13.


Ibid.


Ibid.


Ibid.


Owens and Eid, 6.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


Kalber, Mark L. "FY 02 Annual Review of the Chief, 1 Oct 2001 - 30 Sept 2002." National Guard 

Lardy, Nicholas R. "United States China Ties: Reassessing the Economic Relationship," 

Maddaloni, Chris. "National Guard State Partnership Program, Past, Present, and Future." White 


Merdeka, Suara. Malaysia Set to Launch Antiterrorism Center, 28 May 2003. Available from 
18 February 2005.

Meyers, Richard B. National Military Strategy of the United States of America. The Pentagon, 
2004.

Muna, Riefgi. "Landscape of Regional Cooperation: Its Meaning for a Security Sector Reform 
1-12.

2004.

Olivera, Bruce. The Citizen Soldier in the United States National Security Calculus. Strategy 


3 September 2004.


Accessed 13 November 2004
Rodriguez, Cathy M., LTC. USPACOM Desk Officer, NGB. Telephone interview by author, 21 September 2004.


