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by
Paul D. Taylor
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RADM Rodney P. Rempt, USN provided counsel in designing the event, spoke at dinner after the simulation and participated in the seminar session. Hank Kamradt participated in all aspects of designing and executing the event and Lawrence Modisett, Carl Carlson and Lynda Miller, all of the Decision Strategies Department, facilitated arrangements over a period of several months. Garry Holmstrom, Bill Doud and Paul James prepared and presented the materials that described various proposed missile defense architectures. Dennis Callan prepared and briefed the hypothetical scenarios. Several of these colleagues, along with Joan Corbett, offered helpful comments on a draft of this report. Elizabeth Davis, Arthur Lamoureux and Joseph Bara provided expert graphics support for this report, the event and briefing materials. Capitol Court Reporting, Inc. prepared a verbatim record of discussions during the simulation and seminar.

Washington officials responsible for missile defense or regional affairs in a wide range of foreign affairs agencies helped design the simulation. Dr. Kathleen Molony, Director of the Fellows Program of the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs at Harvard University, facilitated the participation of about half of the country representatives.

An indispensable contribution to the effort came from the Weatherhead Fellows, the diplomats assigned in Washington and the scholars who came to Newport to spend two days working hard and conscientiously to think through from their countries’ perspectives some of the issues related to designing, developing and using missile defense systems.

My gratitude as project director and author of this report extends to all the people mentioned above, who deserve to share credit for any merits of this effort but not its shortcomings.

PDT
Foreword

RADM Rodney P. Rempt, USN
President of the United States Naval War College

For nearly half a century, the United States has treated the threat of attack by a foreign ballistic missile differently than other threats. In fact, exclusive reliance on deterrence has been an exception to the response that people have adopted to counter new military technology throughout the ages.

Almost since man first raised a rock in his hand, the target’s first reaction has been to seek protection from the threat. The shield against that first missile was what we call simply a shield. When catapults were invented, higher fortress walls were not long in coming. When attackers learned how to approach by sea or air, defenders developed mines, submarines and anti-aircraft weapons to destroy attacking ships and aircraft before they could deliver their ordnance. By contrast, the initial response to ballistic missiles was deterrence, i.e. to prevent governments from using their missiles by threatening to retaliate in a manner so punishing that they would lose any exchange they might be foolish enough to start.

The success of the strategy of mutually assured destruction in achieving strategic stability and avoiding the use of ballistic missiles by any major power during the Cold War raises the question of why missile defense should be considered now. There are three reasons to do so:

- Some countries or terrorist groups that might come into the possession of ballistic missiles may not be as deterred by the threat of retaliation as was the Soviet Union.
- Strategic stability through a strategy of mutually assured destruction may be more elusive in a world of multiple missile states or entities than in the bipolar world of the Cold War.
- The technology needed to build an effective missile defense system has matured to the point that it is at hand, even if the financial investment it may require remains a point of contention.

Given this state of play, the International Simulation on which this document reports came at a timely moment. It was intended to learn about the attitudes and interests of other countries, not merely to convince others of the U.S. perspective. These research purposes were well served by the event. Because participants in the simulation were people who come from the countries they represented, the pages that follow contain a wealth of insights about how others view the development and use of missile defenses. I commend this report to anyone who wants to understand more about how U.S. interests and those of our friends and allies could best be served by the way the U.S. Government proceeds on missile defense.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This simulation/seminar brought experts from seventeen countries and the European Union to the Naval War College to spend a day and a half exploring international reactions to the development, deployment and use of various missile defense architectures. Most participants were senior diplomats or civil servants. The three who were not officials were country experts who represented China, Iran and North Korea; they themselves had extensive experience in those countries and continuing contact.

Playing the role of country delegates, participants commented extensively on proposed missile defense architectures and responded to the crises created by the hypothetical threat of launches of missiles carrying weapons of mass destruction from North Korea and Libya. In the seminar phase of the event, participants stepped out of roles and shared their analyses both anonymously in writing and in oral discussion of what transpired in the simulation and its significance.

Among the principal insights emerging from the event were:

- The effects of missile defense on coalitions were mixed.
- Some countries worried about the consequences of ending the ABM Treaty (the event took place the week before the announcement of the U.S. decision to withdraw).
- Some viewed a policy of nuclear Mutually Assured Destruction as stabilizing and comforting.
- Some saw national missile defense as destabilizing and conducive to a strategic arms race.
- Some expressed the view that a ground-based system to protect North America could lead the United States toward unilateralism.
- Importantly, though, theater systems seemed to pull countries together.
- Most wanted to get under a protective umbrella.
- This interest could be leveraged into burden sharing and could exploit other countries’ desire to share in missile defense technology.
- Several countries strongly urged the development of institutional arrangements to give them a say in deployment and operational decisions.
- Combining forward-deployed theater-wide systems with land-based missile defense of North America allayed the concerns of some participants about a North America only system.
- Some representatives nonetheless seemed to resent the fact that they might be dependent on the United States for missile defense.
- In both crisis scenarios, participants opined that missile defense could buy time for diplomacy to be conducted.
- In the Korean scenario, some expressed the view that preemptive strikes against missile sites could disperse WMD.
- In the Libyan scenario, some thought that diplomacy could help separate terrorists from the Government of Libya.
- Preemptive strikes were thought by some to risk triggering additional attacks in Europe by terrorist sleeper cells there.
• Missile defense seemed to provide for many an attractive alternative to preemption.
• It was also evident to some that while defense could augment, it could not substitute for, an offensive capability.
• Defense alone might frustrate an adversary’s will but it might not convince him to do our will.
• The event suggested that some countries might have difficulty engaging with the United States to explore the ramifications of missile defense until the deployment of specific architectures appears more inevitable than it seems today.
• When that threshold is crossed, they may be eager to engage.
BACKGROUND

The Missile Defense Project

The Missile Defense Project of the Naval War College has been organized to explore a wide range of technical, operational and politico-military aspects of missile defense issues. The International Simulation, on which this document reports, brought to Newport a distinguished group of participants in a simulation event to examine hypothetical, but potentially significant, future contingencies related to missile defense options and possible international responses to them. The purpose of the simulation was research, i.e., to consider how countries might react to certain developments and to consider options that may be available to governments to avoid undesirable consequences.

The International Simulation Series

The International Simulation Series is sponsored and conducted by the Center for Naval Warfare Studies of the U.S. Naval War College. Its events are politico-military simulations designed to explore regional, national and international perspectives on current or future issues. While generally oriented around issues of national security, the simulations are not war games, but rather they are designed to simulate crisis prevention, response, management and resolution.

The unique and valuable contributions made by the series stem from the players, who are mid- to high-ranking diplomatic, defense, and academic experts from a wide variety of nations. Their career experiences, coupled with their insights on national/regional perspectives, give the events an authenticity and flavor that simply cannot be duplicated in any other setting.

Exercise Objectives and Organization

The primary goal of the simulation was to explore the relationships and interactions among nations in response to certain hypothetical, but plausible, contingencies and crises. Specific objectives were to:

- Explore regional and global security issues.
- Explore defense issues and policies.
- Explore crisis prevention, response and resolution issues and policies.
- Elicit representative national perspectives on regional and global issues.
- Exercise conflict prevention, management and resolution techniques.
- Enhance understanding of the opportunities and constraints on national policies.
- Enhance participant exchange.
Most of the first day was devoted to employing gaming techniques to replicate diplomacy in a mock international meeting. Diplomats, civil servants and scholars were invited to participate in the roles of national delegates. While many participants were cast in the roles of representatives of their countries of origin, they did not speak for their actual governments. The event was conducted privately, under an understanding that any remarks would be shielded from public attribution to any individual. The session the second day took the form of a seminar in which participants were able to step out of roles, discuss key lessons learned during the simulation the first day and consider outcomes other than the ones evoked by the simulation.

Thanks to the cooperation of the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs of Harvard University, the roles of the representatives of approximately half of the countries in the simulation were played by a distinguished selection of Weatherhead Fellows, who were active diplomats or senior civil servants. Diplomats currently assigned in Washington acted as the representatives of most of the other countries. In the three cases not covered by nationals who were current officials, those roles were played by U.S. citizens whose expertise on the countries was based on having lived there or visited extensively and having maintained close contact. While representatives were not expected to convey their government’s current policies, because the events in the simulation were hypothetical and cast in the future, they were asked to conduct the diplomacy that in their judgment their country would pursue in response to the events posited in the scenario. Their job was especially demanding, because they not only had to speak as though they were carrying out instructions, they also had to make the decisions that would normally be made in capitals and conveyed to diplomatic representatives for execution.

The scenarios used throughout were hypothetical. While they were intended to be plausible, the scenarios were not a prediction of future developments by the Naval War College or any agency of the U.S. Government.
THE EVIDENT THREAT OF BALLISTIC MISSILES

As background for the simulation, the sponsors reminded participants that countries around the world had acquired ballistic missiles as shown by an illustrative representation.

Ballistic Missiles of the World

DISCUSSION OF MISSILE DEFENSE ARCHITECTURES

Participants were asked to assume that they were their countries’ representatives attending an international conference on missile defense convened on December 7, 2005. Recognizing that such a conference and the specific set of countries in attendance were somewhat implausible artifacts, participants were encouraged to accept this construct as a vehicle for examining important issues related to missile defense.

An assumption for the meeting was that Russia and the United States had agreed in 2002 to amend the Anti-Ballistic Missile--ABM--Treaty to permit testing but not deployment of components of nationwide and mobile missile defense systems.

The representative of the European Union chaired the international meeting.
Proposal I - Enhanced Theater-Wide Defense

The United States delegation introduced a proposal for an Enhanced Theater-Wide Defense system. This proposal was designed to address an intermediate category of the ballistic missile threat of the type shown below.

**BALLISTIC MISSILE**

A U.S. briefer explained that sea-based missile defense systems of the United States were undergoing evolutionary development. The result of this progression was a two-tiered approach with Navy area systems providing coverage against short-range missiles while the Enhanced Theater-Wide system would add defense against medium and long-range missiles.
The presentation by the U.S. delegation launched an extensive session in which other countries’ delegates sought clarification of various issues related to the proposed Enhanced Theater-Wide Defense system. Several significant points emerged:

- The system would not deal with intercontinental ballistic missiles.
- Using hit to kill warhead technology, one interceptor would be needed for each threatening missile.
- Able to intercept only outside the atmosphere, the intercept would have to be accomplished within a window of a few minutes.
- Consultations on an intercept with other governments or even with the U.S. national command authority would not, therefore, be likely after the launch of a threatening missile.
- National command and control would be exercised through pre-established rules of engagement that would govern the actions of the commander of the individual ship carrying out the intercept.
- Overhead sensors could include space-based components.
- Other countries’ sensors, including radars, could effectively be integrated into the early warning network on which this system depends.
- In the European region, the system could be declared and integrated into the NATO structure.
- Allied countries could cooperate on technological and financial aspects of developing the system.
Formal Discussion of the Proposed Enhanced Theater-Wide Defense System

Note: the remarks attributed to country representatives are in the words of the speakers, edited only slightly for clarity or brevity.

CHAIR: We have a proposal by the United States for a mid-range missile defense system, which they submit is compliant with the ABM Treaty as amended. It apparently provides no protection for the United States and will be deployed at sea in international waters. It does not posit any technological sharing with allies or other nations nor does it posit any cost sharing though contributions are, of course, welcome. There will be cooperation with other nations in the use of advance warning systems. The actual firing will be decided as I understand it on a command by negation where the ultimate decision will be that of the commander of the vessel. The system is highly mobile and can be moved with relative speed across the globe. Members of the European Union have coordinated a position among themselves and now have a consensus position which they will present through the offices of the President of the Union, which is the Kingdom of Spain. So the European Union will take the floor and the member states can then intervene and make brief supplementary points as they require.

CHINA: The Chinese are in what I see as kind of a Goldilocks situation at this time unfortunately because the American missile defense system would not have major impact on the Russian Federation, which still has the largest ICBM and nuclear force. The so-called rogue states are not yet developed, so the Chinese are left somehow in the middle. We see a close connection between missile defense capability and the U.S. decision to develop a closer relationship with Taiwan. China would like to see more clarification of this not only with the United States but also between China and some of the U.S. allies. The explanation in this proposal does not necessarily convince us that it would enhance security across the Taiwan Strait. With the new independence of the government in power in both the executive and the parliament, I think the problem would increase. The enhanced security of the United States with missile defense would provide a greater sense of insecurity for China.

CROATIA: Croatia is not opposed to the proposed ETW coverage and is sympathetic with common use. Croatia would welcome U.S. ships with ETW coverage in its Adriatic ports for logistic support but strictly observing environmental norms.

DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF KOREA--DPRK: The DPRK would naturally oppose the proposed missile defense system. I believe the United States should thank my government because my government provides the rationale and justification for you to develop this system. Whether what you believe is founded on realism or not, that is a different matter. The perception is that my country is an untrustworthy, rogue, terrorist state with massive military capability and I appreciate your recognition of that. If my country were only a starving little country, then no one would even notice it. Now you recognize this as a formidable entity to negotiate with and counterattack. This development that the United States proposes is quite dangerous.
not only to regional but to global security. I can see China responding very quickly to the United States and further U.S.-Japanese collaborative development or research on this project will immediately trigger China to counter it. We will most likely see a vigorous arms race between Japan and China. Then countries like North Korea and South Korea and countries of Southeast Asia will be left out of the arms race and will suffer great consequences. I think regionally and globally this is nightmare scenario.

SPAIN: On behalf of the European Union, I would like to welcome the proposal of the United States and to state that we are very open to study it and, subject to further consultation, we may wish to discuss several criteria. First, we consider that the deployment or future deployment of the system would be subject to arrangements in NATO as a NATO asset or under European Union security and defense policy. And, of course, that arrangement would cover also the possibility of associating countries close to NATO to participate and to interact in this area. It also underscores the importance of further study of the possibilities of cooperation in the development of the system. In any case, notwithstanding that every member state of the European Union would have to make its own commitment, we would be ready to examine the possibilities of opening port facilities for permanent harboring of vessels deployed in the area.

EGYPT: For the past 25 years, Egypt has been a strategic ally and partner of the United States in the Middle East and the main contributor to the stability of the Middle East. Egypt supports the United States in its legitimate right to defend its territory and its allies, but Egypt at the same time sees the ABM Treaty as a cornerstone in preserving strategic stability and keeping the arms control system intact. Egypt has been a main supporter of the Russian Federation’s Draft Resolution that has been presented to the General Assembly of the United Nations for the past five years which calls for the preservation and strengthening of the ABM Treaty. Egypt has its own concerns in the Middle East with a neighbor next to it having the capabilities of launching SRBM’s and MRBM’s and SLV’s reaching most Egyptian cities. Therefore, Egypt finds itself in a position that it should register a reservation about the feasibility and the political ramifications of the U.S. proposal.

FRANCE: As you know, among Europeans and among allies, France is perhaps with Canada one of the countries least convinced about a national missile defense system. We too are very concerned with missile proliferation. We would like to know more about the real threat against which this proposal is designed. We are also very concerned about shifting the balance of power and the real risk of an arms race. So we need to have more consultation also with other big countries, for instance, the Russian Federation and China.

GERMANY: I whole-heartedly associate myself with what has been said by the distinguished delegate from Spain as President of the European Community. As the representative of a member country of the European Community, I would just add the following points. We are, of course, very much in favor of cooperation on that system within NATO. I think it’s essential that we consult and that the United States shares information on this project with us. We should also try to do that in a way that
other countries that are not members of NATO might feel interested in associating themselves with the project. It also should be done in a way that the arms control architecture which is in place right now should not be jeopardized, especially so with respect to the further development of the program in respect to the ABM Treaty and the treaty on the peaceful use of outer space. And I would particularly underline the point made about the possibilities or the willingness on the part of the United States to envision technological sharing of project.

GREECE: I would like to make five points. First, this whole project must be a matter for European/American discussion. Second, after the eleventh of September, the most important thing is for the western world to stay in discussion with international institutions like NATO. Third, we would like more discussion about the political conditionalities and the rules of using these weapons, because we may have no time to consult after an attack but we have enough time before an attack to discuss the rules for using these weapons. Fourth, I have to mention that Greek public opinion will have big problems with this kind of weapon because public opinion is very afraid of militarization of the sea, so an argument saying that the weapon will not be on the land but the sea is not a very good argument for a country like Greece with more than 1,200 islands. And last, I think we have to develop cooperation in sharing intelligence and technology and maybe Europe can produce part of these weapons.

INDIA: India believes that every nation has the right to decide in its own security interests what is best for itself and for its allies and also to contemplate a system that is defensive in scope. However, there are some pitfalls here. The coverage that is envisioned in such a system could be theater missile defense for large countries but literally national missile defense for smaller countries and there is also the danger that certain countries would be provided a shield and others would have to rely on the best intentions of others. Testing and deployment are close phases which follow one another and there is the danger of proliferation. As our American friend said, it might be very expensive to acquire a defense system. Then certain countries would actually be tempted to go in for offensive weapons and the proliferation aspect has to be looked into. India does not find it conceivable to be in an adversarial relationship with the United States. We have very good relations with the United States. We have very good relations with the Russian Federation and we want to have a very good relationship with China, so we do believe that it is in the interests of all of us that India, the United States, the Russian Federation and China actually sit down and work to eliminate their fears, if there are any amongst them, because everyone will be affected if these key countries are unable to work out something. So we would like this to be done with the discussions between all countries and we would like to be involved and also we would like to see that this is not going to have any adverse implications. At this time, I think there are quite a few reservations which do need to be ironed out.

IRAN: As an Iranian representative here, I believe that it is important to distinguish between the real threat versus the perception of it. People have a lot of perceptions about countries that are threatening them that may not be true and could create problems. Second, I think cooperation should be extended to unfriendly countries...
specifically as opposed to just friendly nations. And, third, I think the United States has
to recognize the right of even unfriendly countries to counter measures which means you
have to accept the right to proliferation of missile defense. Finally, I think the best
defense against missiles is a regional approach. It has to include diplomatic, economic
and political measures as opposed to only a military approach and, of course, this is a part
and parcel of that larger picture. A regional system that brings allies and adversaries
together under U.S. leadership could perhaps provide a context for missile defense
systems. Perhaps we need a little more strategic thinking within which this defensive
mechanism could be placed.

JAPAN: First of all, I have to register some reservation about whether this
really is a realistic scenario for ongoing cooperation between Japan and the
United States, but as far as Japan is concerned, there is no reason to oppose the proposal.
First of all, Japan deploys neither ballistic missiles nor weapons of mass destruction and
we are facing the danger of a proliferation of missiles. We have witnessed the launching
of missiles by China as well as North Korea, so we have no reason to oppose the
deployment of missile defense by the U.S. Navy. However, given the action from our
neighboring countries, we suggest that United States should at least have some dialog
with China, the Russian Federation and other countries.

PORTUGAL: As representative of a country of the European Union, I would,
of course, support my Spanish colleague and join my European colleagues and
just emphasize the need for further consultation on this issue, not only bilateral
consultation but consultations with allies and other countries that are interested.

KOREA: As a matter of principle, the Republic of Korea sees the proposal in a
positive light. Since Korea is under constant threats of North Korean short-
range missiles and the North Korean medium range missile affects the allies' defense
posture, we believe that the proposal affects the defense of Korea. However, as the
proposal has regional implications, Korea would advise the United States to proceed with
the proposal in close consultation with other regional powers.

RUSSIAN FEDERATION: The position of the Russian Federation is quite
clear. Well, we are against the modification of the ABM Treaty of 1972 to
allow the deployment of a missile defense system. If the ABM Treaty becomes
irrelevant, from the political point of view there are no more disarmament agreements
between the former Soviet Union--the Russian Federation--and the United States because
they will have become irrelevant. We will have an arms race because some countries
wishing not to have their nuclear potential become zero will start to enhance their nuclear
capability. Thus we will lose major international legal instruments which are prohibiting
nuclear proliferation, missile proliferation, biological and chemical proliferation.
Everyone is free to defend themselves as they choose. As for theater missile defense, the
Russian Federation is very much for cooperation but cooperation through the
international community and we reiterate the importance of adherence to the European
missile defense initiative which envisions the participation of all countries with their
national potentials for missile defense.
**SPAIN:** In principle and as long as we share information, we will consider that deployment of the system proposed does not violate the ABM Treaty and taking that into account, we would desire to enhance a variety of our national military capabilities with the United States and the possibility of enhancing an advanced system of detecting any possibility of attacks to the NATO area. My country is willing to start bilateral negotiations to establish a mechanism to oversee the deployment of those new vessels in the area and a bilateral treaty between the United States and Spain.

**UNITED KINGDOM:** The United Kingdom wishes to join its European partners in welcoming this proposal for theater defense and in particular so far as our area is concerned, we would like to join in welcoming the commitment of the United States of America to declare these assets in our area to be NATO assets with all that implies: consultation on doctrine, rules of engagement, threat assessment and so forth. We also welcome the fact that the United States although not proposing technology sharing has also not ruled it out. We recognize, of course, that this system has wider implications than those purely of the NATO area and, therefore, that a wider international architecture will also be needed and we look forward with our other NATO and European partners to contributing to that architecture.

**UZBEKISTAN:** I can say that each new independent country should be very careful in the area of security. I mean in the context of our very powerful neighbors that this American proposal is very attractive for us. Uzbekistan has been working very closely with the American military system since September 11, 2001, in its new alliance in Central Asia. We are ready to start the project but in the new political context. Central Asia is far from international waters so we can’t accept this project as it was displayed here with the ships. I can see two reasons why this project can be very attractive to Uzbekistan and maybe other Central Asian states. First, to a newly independent country that has a lot of problems in developing a defense capability, it can be very attractive from the financial side. Second, in the context of current military cooperation, we would like to study this project as it relates to a threat from non-state actors.

**UNITED STATES:** We have discussed primarily the technical aspects of the system and we will be getting into the political context and particularly the consultative process. The multi-lateral and bilateral scenario is obviously dependent on the geographic region in which a given crisis occurs. It also depends, therefore, on the constellation of those who are immediately involved as well as those who are more generally interested and concerned and how one approaches that degree of multi-lateral versus bilateral consultation and cooperation. The ABM Treaty in various scenarios and what the implications are, whether it’s amended or whether one envisions a withdrawal in accordance with its provisions, would lead to a need for a very intensive and general discussion of a new security architecture to replace what currently exists. How is that done in a way to encompass not only each nation’s security interests but also larger groupings of countries? What is the process by which that might come about?
CHAIR: If I may just draw out one or two themes, not conclusions, and we’re certainly not going to vote on this, all delegations have expressed concern for global security and the problem of proliferation and I think all delegations have also expressed concern over unilateral action and see the desire for cooperation in this field to a greater or lesser extent. Now, where there is perhaps divergence among delegations is in looking at the issue from the point of view of the national interest. That leads certain delegations to be against the proposal and other delegations to be dubious, not necessarily against, not necessarily in favor, but they require further study and consultation. Some delegations tend to view the proposal favorably. There is a tendency to view it favorably subject to the possibility of cooperation and consultation with the United States on the development and the deployment. So within that, there are all sorts of shades of gray and subtleties and I think there’s a global concern looking at the domestic or regional aspects that actually leads to divergence of views.
Proposal II - Enhanced Theater-Wide Defense Plus Ground-Based System

The United States delegation briefed the conference on a proposal encompassing Enhanced Theater-Wide Defense plus a Ground-Based System.

An 8000Km missile placed here would put at risk this area

New York 7478km
Ottawa 7390 km
London 2332 km
Washington 7801km
Paris 1990km
Moscow 3165km
Johannesburg 6748km
Brasilia 8439km
Beijing 8712km
Tokyo 10573km
New Delhi 6038km
Riyadh 3381km
Tehran 3503km
Islamabad 5487km
Approximate 8000km TBMD Range

Proposal II, ETW with Ground Based System

Architecture
– Same as Proposal I, plus
– Ground Based System (GBS) defends North America, U.S. territory plus additional areas
  • Ground based radars in Alaska, New England, Hawaii, Puerto Rico
  • Interceptors in Alaska
  • Fire control radars in Alaska, New England
– Employs overhead sensors
  • Forward deployed ships also provide search and tracking
– Complementary technologies employ two different systems to defeat ballistic missiles

ETW Plus Ground Based Coverage

Proposal II

International Cooperation
• Port visits would support forward deployed naval units
• U.S. and allied naval forces could share responsibility for protecting forces
• Possibility of sharing information and data bases among allies to optimize use of missile interceptors
  – Defended areas would be negotiated among allies
  – Potential defense in depth; response coordinated among allies
• Predicted launch points could be provided by U.S. to allow allies’ strike forces to attack missile launchers
• Home porting of missile defense ships could provide predictable presence and deterrence

Benefits
• Same as Proposal I, plus
• Combination adds defense in depth
• Allows more ships forward to defend allies while improving North American defense
  – Allows missile defense to get closer to threats, to fire sooner, and with greater effect
• Home porting of missile defense ships
  – More predictable deterrent to ballistic missile attack
  – U.S. presence on allied territory provides tangible U.S. commitment
  – Rapid response
Participants’ questions to the U.S. briefer elicited several points of explanation of Proposal II for Enhanced Theater-Wide Defense Plus a Ground-Based System:

- This proposal contains all of the elements of the first proposal with the addition of a ground-based system to provide missile defense for the United States and some of Canada and Mexico.
- The ground-based portion of this system would be designed to handle intercontinental ballistic missiles, and the sea-based system would still be able to defend against medium range missiles in the theaters where missile defense ships were located.
- Designing the ground-based system would be the responsibility of the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (now Missile Defense Agency) rather than a single U.S. service.
- Sea-based radars could provide accurate early detection and tracking of an attacking missile to complement overhead sensors in support of the ground-based system.
- A missile defense ship could try to intercept a missile in the ascent phase of flight, which would be difficult, and the ground-based system would have another opportunity to intercept the attacker on its descent, while still outside the atmosphere.
- The combined system would be designed to handle a small number of threats, fewer than ten missiles.
- The United States believes missile defense would deter an aggressor from using missiles by reducing the likelihood that an attack could achieve its purpose.
CHAIR: We take as a given that we maintain our views which apply to the first proposal for the second one and that we just address issues which are specific [different aspects of] the second proposal, so what we have on the table here is a proposal which comprises the first proposal and complements or supplements it with an extra dimension; that is to say a land-based and fixed system which has the object of the defense of the North American continent. The diplomatic context in which this is based is that the present ABM Treaty is no longer in force and that some sort of new agreement will have been reached. However, the United States has given assurance that its defense is still based on deterrence. This new proposal addresses two different targets, the targets which were addressed in the first proposal plus intercontinental missiles which are aimed at North America and it proposes to defend two different types of areas; the areas that were defended by the ships in the first proposal plus defense of North America against intercontinental ballistic missiles but not against shorter range ones.

CHINA: The Chinese reaction to this is even more alarmed. Our twenty-some old fashioned silo-based liquid-powered ICBM’s will be the immediate kind of target for this missile defense, while the Russian Federation can still overwhelm this system at any point in the future, and the so-called rogue states, including North Korea, have yet to develop any ICBM’s. So for the Chinese, there are two major policy debates going on. Number one, China as a current nuclear state is the only one to have a policy of no first use of its nuclear weapons against any nuclear powers, and it has never used nuclear weapons against non-nuclear powers. Perhaps China should consider the first use of nuclear weapons as any other nuclear state. Second, maybe China should consider a major qualitative and quantitative boost of the Chinese ICBM system. That has been under review and the debate is on how much how soon. The next generation of mobile solid fueled missiles would be in operation, so a national missile defense system would accelerate that, without question. And the problem with the Chinese is that the United States has never clarified whether its missile defenses would cover Taiwan. If not, the Chinese wouldn’t be bothered. It is between the United States and Japan and other allies, but since the United States has never officially declared that Taiwan is not an area that will be defended, the Chinese will have reservations and need clarifications. The current "don’t ask, don’t tell" policy actually implies that China, as a Foreign Affairs article by Robert Manning indicated, is a forgotten nuclear power. So China believes it is actually an unspoken target of missile defense.

CROATIA: Regarding American concerns of protecting its citizens and territory especially after September 11, 2001 and presuming that the ABM Treaty is satisfactorily amended, Croatia doesn’t oppose the American proposal for ETW defense coupled with ground-based capability.

DPRK: Yes, we have military technology, because the great leader Kim Il Sung upon painful realization that military preparedness was so important to defend a country against being colonized and subjected to all kinds of humiliations as we
experienced during the Japanese period, developed our capability to defend ourselves. But there is no proof that we have nuclear weapons although the United States intelligence community propagandizes that we are a nuclear threat. We may develop a capability in the future hopefully. As a diplomat, I enjoy the ambiguity somewhat because it is a currency. The very perception that we may have some military capability gives us political leverage. In fact, it gives us some recognition in the international community. We have no intention to get involved in conflict especially directly or indirectly with the United States. We know America can destroy us overnight. We're not going to risk that. We would like to normalize relations with the United States and, in fact, it was very close when Mr. Clinton himself was about to visit my capitol. That engagement policy would have been very nice. We have serious problems -- economic problems, starvation. All we want is to participate in the international monetary system and be able to induce economic development. I realize you need to demonize someone and North Korea serves very nicely there, but that kind of propaganda will have severe repercussions, believe me.

SPAIN: On behalf of the European Union, I would like to express our opinion that more clarification from the United States is in order to resolve some of the concerns that we have right now. The Union is concerned about the validity of the threat assessment that has been put forward. We are seriously concerned about the possibility of proliferation or an arms race that could be provoked by the initiative. We are very concerned about the risk that NATO countries will be exposed to retaliatory action by a rogue state. We don't see the added value for global stability and security in the proposal of the United States but, of course, as I previously said, we are open to further consultation in order to assess the possibility of development.

EGYPT: Egypt understands the global threats posed against the United States be they from state actors or non-state actors. And Egypt also understands the responsibilities that the United States has to undertake, especially after the events of 9/11, but Egypt cannot overlook the fact that the ABM Treaty would be violated by this proposal. Nor can we overlook the fact that the ABM Treaty has been working for the past 35 years, preserving the whole architecture of the disarmament and arms control systems in the world. Egypt thinks that it's time for the international community to come up with new verification measures if the ABM Treaty is to be violated or killed. I have to remind the delegates here that Egyptians have to wake up every morning with a neighboring country having some nuclear capabilities and able to launch a nuclear warhead on some short and medium range ballistic missiles and not knowing if they are going to use it or not and the only thing keeping them from doing that is the whole system and the whole architecture of disarmament and arms control that was valid for the past 35 years. So what worries us actually are the consequences of deploying such a system for countries like our neighbor country. Egypt thinks that its relationship with the United States has matured enough over the past quarter of a century to differ on some issues, and I should say that this is one of those issues.

GREECE: It is typical of the way that the European Union is fashioned that the big countries always say their position is the position of the whole European
Union. That is a big problem. We have had a very bad experience with the behavior of the big countries of the European Union and the problem with the ABM Treaty is that the big countries reach a position through the European Union and then they negotiate with the United States. They don’t even have a second discussion with the not-so-big countries of the European Union.

INDIA: I passed up the opportunity of commenting on what my Chinese colleague said in the morning about India and by implication Pakistan but now this time he has talked about nuclear weapon states and I thought I should say that India is a nuclear weapon state, too. We also have a no first use policy like you do and we are looking at a second strike capability if we are hit. Having said that, I return to the present context as regards the NMD proposal we have seen the United States put forward. The kind of scenarios posited and the fact that the proposed missile defense is not going to be effective against highly sophisticated weapons and saturation of weapons rules out the Russian Federation. If the system works against between one and ten missiles, it keeps China with a question mark and focuses on middle level states and others who might be crazy or foolish enough to attack the United States. For that, they do have a right to defend themselves. I would only like to add to my earlier [cautions] that this step must be undertaken in consultation with key countries and India would like to be engaged in this process.

IRAN: Now, as an Iranian representative, first I want to request my colleagues not to use the concept of rogue state. We do recognize that it's America’s business to defend itself, so Iran has no problem with that part of it and Iran particularly likes this proposal because it involves the big powers. I think this ground-based concept will, in fact, take a little bit of the pressure from the smaller states who are trying to create defensive measures with missiles and put the problem right where it should be, with the United States, the Russian Federation, China, and perhaps even India at some future point. So from that perspective, Iran welcomes this proposal and supports it, but Iran looks forward also to being a participant in this whole process.

JAPAN: At this moment we are not quite sure of the implications for the overall balance between the United States and other countries and especially before making a decision on this point, I would like to hear the views of the Russian Federation. We might seek consultations with the United States later on.

KOREA: Having listened to the delegate from the DPRK, I disagree on some points but I will not make any counter argument at this point for the benefit of moving forward with this proceeding. The Government of the Republic of Korea understands that Proposal II is one the United States needs to cope with the threat that has surfaced in the post-Cold War era. North Korea’s launch of long-range rockets in 1998 showed that a new type of threat is not just hypothetical. One of the fringe benefits Korea can anticipate from this proposal is that it would make it easier for the United States to use ship-based assets off the coast of North Korea.

RUSSIAN FEDERATION: Well, the Russian Federation has to fend for itself
and the strategic situation in the world continues to deteriorate. Plans for deployment of
global missile defenses have become true and thus the Russian Federation has to seek
means to preserve the potential effectiveness of its own long-range nuclear missiles. The
ABM Treaty is not only gone but in this case the Russian Federation has to confront a
paradoxical situation for itself. On the one hand, there are good agreements between the
Russian Federation and the United States on the reduction of offensive nuclear weapons.
At the same time there is a great attempt to construct a U.S. defensive capability so the
Russian Federation has no other choice but to look for another recourse. The Russian
Federation also wants to [warn] the international community that there is a clear danger
of the delivery of weapons into space, weapons of mass destruction, as the defense
system suggests a strong outer space component. The consequences of such a delivery
would be disastrous for the survival of mankind. In comparison with this situation,
Chernobyl would be innocent child’s play.

UNITED KINGDOM: I’d like to join my European Union colleagues in
thanking the United States for this extremely thought provoking proposal which
we look forward to discussing for many years. Given that there has been some concern
expressed that this proposal might de-link the United States and its European allies within
NATO, in that it would protect against a certain threat but not provide such defense for
Europeans, it occurs to my government that American citizens may also believe that the
theater-wide defense which the United States has kindly offered would protect us against
a threat and not the United States. Therefore, I have been instructed by Her Majesty’s
government to make clear that if any state were so foolish as to launch a limited nuclear
attack against the United States, it should expect instant retaliation from the United
Kingdom.

UZBEKISTAN: Uzbekistan is the first post-Soviet country to have American
troops in its territory and we are ready for new cooperation in military affairs
within the framework of the Uzbekistan initiative that was announced four years ago to
create a nuclear free area in Central Asia. That is very important for us, located between
very powerful nuclear countries.

CHAIR: This second proposal really does change the world as we see it. I think all
delегations have expressed concern that it changes the present system of alliances.
Concerns have also been expressed as to the definition of the threat which it addresses
and the degree of response and the integrated nature of the response that the United States
would have to that threat. What is interesting is that those nations which had concerns
with the first proposal have even more concerns with the second one, and those states
which had reservations about the first proposal tend to have reservations about the second
proposal also, and [even] those states which generally welcomed the first proposal have
some reservations about new aspects of the second proposal.
Proposal III - Global Missile Defense System

The U.S. delegation briefed the conference on a third proposed architecture, to provide missile defense on a global scale.

Proposal III - Global Missile Defense System

Architecture

- Same as Option II
  - Missile defense ships, U.S. ground based missile defense
- Plus Allied participation to form Global Missile Defense System
  - Expanded network of search radars, fire control radars, etc.
  - Allied missile defense ships
- Overhead sensors from several countries
- Centralized command, control and information system
  - Information distributed to each nation

Proposal III

International Cooperation

- Same potential as Proposal II, plus
- Additional Search Radars would be helpful in this global system
  - Japan, Republic of Korea, Singapore
  - Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Kuwait
  - Spain, Norway, Italy, Turkey
- Additional Fire Control Radars would be helpful in this global system
  - Japan, Singapore
  - United Kingdom, Italy
- Additional Interceptors would be helpful in
  - Republic of Korea, Singapore
  - Germany, United Kingdom
- Additional missile defense ships as each nation determines
- Allied satellite technology and satellites
- Shared R&D and production of radars, interceptors, communications

Proposal III

Benefits

- Same as Proposal II
  - Mobile, international waters, protects allies, serves as deterrent
- Active shared defense, with a nation’s participation based upon geography, threat assessment, technology benefits and allied cohesion
- Allies less dependent upon U.S. than under other proposals
- Improved effectiveness of missile defense through shared data and resources
- Improved missile defense at a lower cost than unilateral approaches
- Increased potential for R&D and production activities

Delegates’ questions on Proposal III drew out several clarifications:

- A country would have to make its own decision on whether or not it wished to participate in this missile defense system.
- Organization and operation of a Global Missile Defense System would require extensive multilateral cooperation.
• A Global Missile Defense System could be established without first implementing the systems described above in Proposals I and II.
• The optimal placement of ground-based radars and other components of the system would depend on the location of the threatening launch sites and area to be defended.
• Sea-based components could be moved in response to changes in the location of the threat or changes in the areas to be defended.
Formal Discussion of the Proposed Global Missile Defense System

CHAIR: What I suggest is that we make our views known on Proposal III and that those views be informed by those already expressed about Proposals I and II and that we concentrate on the specific characteristics of Proposal III.

CHINA: The third proposal raises more questions because this is still something very unique and new. One sure thing is that it creates a division between allies and non-allies, good and bad guys, which seems to be more problematic for the Chinese. I'm wondering how definitions would be reached on rogue states, allies and non-allies. At a more philosophical level, I think the question of security and how the notion of security is defined and whether it means U.S. security or allied security alone or the security for many other countries which have legitimate governments recognized by the United Nations. Another more general question is why the United States is so good at making weapons or weapon systems but not so interested in diplomacy or selling its policies to the rest of the world.

CROATIA: Viewing the United States as its ally, Croatia has no objection to the global missile defense system proposal or to being part of it but has fears regarding the spread of missile defense to allies only and further alienating non-allies, which might contribute to dangerous divisions in our world. Croatia would be in favor of global defense, which would hypothetically at least include all countries, so as to contribute to achieving the end of arms races once and for all and create a safe and secure world.

DPRK: I would just like to say a few words about Proposal III in comparison with Proposal I and II from the point of view of North Korea. Certainly North Korea would object to all three, each for different reasons. We are against Proposal I more than any other for one reason. We have no problem with the United States defending itself. The United States can prosper, it can be the world's only super power, but we are very sensitive to South Korea because we have been engaged in what may be called a legitimate competition. It is very difficult to accept a South Korea with American technology and an alliance which gives it a shield from any kind of external threat while we are left vulnerable. So in comparative terms, our national security is threatened. Proposal II is fine as far as the immediate North Korean national interest is concerned. Let America defend itself from any adversarial missiles. I can tell you that we have no desire to launch against the United States nor do we have the technological capability, so it's fine, but the degree of our objection would be minimal but still an objection. Number III is fine as long as my country is not singled out as a terrorist and rogue regime and we are not permanently targeted. I would like to see a genuine global system that would include us as well, but we object to the way it's proposed right now because it will be highly divisive in the world.

SPAIN: On behalf of the rest of my colleagues in the European Union, I can say we find the proposal very attractive. It provides for a global system of protection against any threat but we feel the need to continue consultations and exchange
of information regarding the threat assessment and, of course, the possibilities of provoking an arms race. So several of the concerns expressed on the second proposal are still alive for the third one.

EGYPT: Egypt finds this new initiative of the United States quite innovative and in principal does not object to the new proposal. The only concern Egypt would have is when such a system is applied in a very fragile region like the Middle East, where one country, namely Israel, has occupied territories for the past 34 years, my government’s understanding is that information sharing would be critical. Unless the political unrest in the Middle East is dealt with and a series of confidence building measures are addressed, Egypt’s concern would remain. So, therefore, Egypt suggests that intensive bilateral consultations with the U.S. should begin immediately in the framework of our strategic partnership.

FRANCE: We need further discussion because we would like to know more about how this proposal can fit within the European defense policy which has been in the making, and also we are very concerned about an arms race. The talks we have had with major powers in East Asia indicate that they are sure that an arms race will be spurred if such a system is applied.

GERMANY: We in Germany are also very concerned about the proliferation of ballistic missile technology and of weapons of mass destruction, so we need to address those issues. I think the American proposal is an interesting one that needs further discussion. We should especially look at threat assessments and look not only at capabilities but also maybe at intentions of other countries. And when we’re talking about the strategic implications of all this, we should also keep in mind that there are political factors that drive regional destabilization and proliferation and so we should not only look at capabilities to defend but we should also look at political frameworks that could have an impact on this whole issue.

GREECE: We are very thankful for the very interesting American proposal. Second, we recognize the security role of America in the world today. Third, we have to discuss further this kind of proposal especially in terms of its impact on the European region and on the balance between Greece and Turkey.

INDIA: The first two proposals appear to be more defensively oriented. This third one seems far too open-ended, almost utopian and I mean as my French colleague here did hint somewhat that the Americans would like to offer protection to those who would like to come under their orbit and those who are undecided or who choose to remain by themselves would perhaps come under a lot of pressure. Now, there is also doubt about command and control. Who is going to be more or less controlling such a system? The ground rules for a security apparatus covering the whole world are far from established. It’s also a question of what do you perceive as security, which cannot be decided in isolation. You also have to ask how the other side looks at its security. We really would like to know how this system would operate, whether it would
be situated within a system which has some basic ground rules or it would have its own dynamic.

IRAN: As a representative of the Iranian government, I remind you that we live in a very dangerous neighborhood. Over the last 20 years, we have done our best to provide for our self-defense but unfortunately this self-defense has been misinterpreted as demonstrating aggressive intentions. Iran over the last 150 years has never invaded a nation in the area. Iran has been invaded, however, over the last 150 years several times by Russians, Iraqis just recently and Afghans most recently. Iran has never initiated a conflict with its neighbors. We like the idea of this multi-national missile defense system and we would like to participate in it. However, we have serious problems with the United States, of course, and until and unless our relationship with the United States is normalized, it would be impossible for us to participate. We do believe that relations with the United States could be normalized.

JAPAN: In 1998, our government entered into a joint U.S.-Japan study to explore the technical feasibility of developing TMD. Our consideration is exclusively defense oriented in response to the military build-up by other countries. We are in principle open-minded about the opportunity for other countries to be provided a shield of missile defense but in order to put this proposal into practice, I would suggest that the scope of this proposal should be more made clear and that technological research should be explored.

PORTUGAL: Portugal would like to just reinforce the idea of further consultations on this idea, namely in terms of political and military strategic decisions.

KOREA: A major threat to my country originates from North Korea. North Korea is a key potential enemy. Thousands of artillery pieces and missiles are aimed at us. There is nothing much to do about artillery shells, but as to short range ballistic missiles, booster phase intercept by ship-based vehicles would be an effective answer. Because of the geographical characteristics of the Korean Peninsula, land-based assets may not be an effective tool to deal with incoming North Korean missiles. Seoul is just a few minutes away from North Korean artillery and missiles and there is very little early warning time, so Korea takes ship-based assets more seriously.

RUSSIAN FEDERATION: The idea of global ballistic missile defense in our understanding is a new idea and it seems to us to be of certain interest. We would like to study it, and if the question is about broad cooperation without artificial division of states into categories such an idea could find support. If we are speaking about the exchange of data on research and development, this could find support. The Russian Federation could contribute to such efforts. There is on the table a suggestion for creation of a center for exchange of data on missile launches between the United States and the Russian Federation. Meanwhile, I would like to note that such an idea requires a lot of financial efforts, technological efforts, political efforts. There are good efforts on creating a global system of nonproliferation of missile and missile technologies and at
least we have something in our hands today. Why should we not concentrate our efforts on just these real things?

**SPAIN:** Some issues need further explanation, basically the question of sharing costs.

**UNITED KINGDOM:** The United Kingdom welcomes this imaginative vision and we look forward to working closely with the United States in realizing its practical aspects. As other comments have made clear, the problems that are likely to arise are outside the European area. One can, for example, imagine that states with missile systems may not be equally confident that they would benefit from the data and other protection that ultimately will depend on the United States and that this vision depends on making them equally available to both. It is the understanding of our government that this proposal is not intended to downplay the necessity of continuing to engage closely in nonproliferation efforts and the resolution of underlying political problems elsewhere in the world and that this is an additional proposal which does not detract from these vital efforts.

**UZBEKISTAN:** For Uzbekistan as a newly independent country, it is very important to view proposals in the regional context as I said before, and I think we are open to discuss possible participation in this new proposal. This proposal allows for different countries to create a new system of cooperation that may be important for us.

**UNITED STATES:** We have been struck by the repeated urging of all parties whatever their positions on the specifics of any of the proposals about the necessity for intensive consultations and deliberations in terms of examining the specifics of any given proposal and exploring their implications.

**CHAIR:** Well, thank you very much and that concludes our deliberations on the three proposals. If I could just highlight one or two issues that this third proposal has raised, it would seem that many delegations welcome this third proposal insofar as it presupposes that the United States will be engaged in discussion and cooperation with other nations. That would seem to be a good thing. On the other hand, a number of delegations worry how such a global or multi-national, multilateral system will play out in regions which have a greater or lesser degree of fragility and there are, of course, concerns as to how this will be done, how the cooperation will work out in practice and how it's to be implemented. Finally, there is, of course, the consideration that this form of discussion with the United States may divide the world into those under the wing of the United States and those not under the wing of the United States.
CRISIS SIMULATION

Participants were asked to assume that the date was December 7, 2009 and that a missile defense system of the type described in U.S. Proposal II was in place, i.e. Enhanced Theater-Wide Defense Plus a Ground-Based System in North America. A briefer posited a scenario encompassing two crises. He asked participants to assume that, unless a development was specifically mentioned in his presentation, the situation in 2009 was similar to that prevailing on December 7, 2001.

North Korea

The historic June 2000 summit between North Korean leader Kim Jong-il and ROK President Kim Dae-jung was followed by several years of intermittent meetings between North and South Korean officials. In early 2009, in a joint communiqué, North and South Korea announced that, due to the effectiveness of their rapprochement and the mutual trust that had been evolving, the relationship would now progress from a reconciliation phase, and discussions would now center on reunification.

In the summer of 2009, the Commander of the DPRK’s 108 Corps, headquartered near Hamhung in the country’s northeast, announced that his military district was seceding from the DPRK and hereafter would be referred to as the Democratic People’s Autonomous Northeast Region of Korea. The general said reunification was anathema to true patriots and it would make North Koreans second-class citizens, whose new role in life would be as slave laborers to South Koreans. Missile forces which appear to be under the control of the rebels include a number of mobile No Dong MRBM and SCUD C SRBM missiles and launchers and the fixed facilities associated with the Taepo Dong 1 and 2 missile programs. Seoul and Pyongyang are consulting on appropriate steps to deal with the rebellion.
In response to the crisis, the United States has alerted its forces on the Peninsula and has commenced movement of naval forces from Japanese homeports toward the area. Also in consultation with the ROK government, U.S. Air Force fighter aircraft have commenced deployment from Okinawa to Taegu and from Missawa, in northern Honshu, to Osan airbase, southeast of Seoul.

Meanwhile, intelligence experts abroad make public certain estimates they have prepared on the characteristics of missiles thought to be in the hands of North Korean rebels:

- No Dong/Taepo Dong launch facility in rebel hands
- Secession television broadcasts images of Taepo Dong-2 on the launch pad with announcement of impending research satellite launch
- Rebellion spokesman warns that all available means will be used “to halt aggressive movement of unfriendly forces”
TAEPO DONG-2 RANGE 8000km

Taepo Dong-1:
Range: 1600km
Inventory: 3

No Dong:
Range: 1300km
Inventory: 6

Scud C:
Range: 600km
Inventory: 10

Autonomous Region Ballistic Missile Inventory and Ranges

CW/BW WARHEADS AVAILABLE
The briefer turned his attention from Asia to North Africa and reviewed hypothetical developments in Libya. In 2003, Col. Qadhafi had peacefully passed from the scene. A militant, rabidly anti-western military faction eventually won the resultant struggle for power. In the intervening years, this new Libyan regime had sought to increase its stature in the Arab world by reverting to the sort of support for terrorists which had resulted in international sanctions against Libya in the 1990’s. This had included funding, training and basing for a number of terrorist organizations. The new Libyan regime continued Qadhafi’s pursuit of missile capabilities. With the aid of foreign technical and production assistance, this effort had resulted in the fielding of two ballistic missile systems, the SCUD C and a 2100 km Medium Range Ballistic Missile, based on North Korean No Dong technology and probably purchased wholesale from North Korea in the period 2005-2007.

A recent series of suicide bombing attacks on the subways of Berlin, Paris and London have resulted in a significant loss of life. Although no credible claims of responsibility have been forthcoming, European and U.S. intelligence agencies have been able unequivocally to attribute them to a militant multi-national group. For some years now, this group has been given refuge by the Libyan Government.

Members of NATO have resolved to take military action against these camps and the terrorist leadership

### Libyan Military Modernization

- **Extensive Tactical Ballistic Missile Program**
  - SCUD C, 600km
  - MRBM, 2100km

- **WMD:**
  - Chemical
  - Biological
  - Nuclear

### Libyan Situation

- **Terrorist attacks in Berlin, Paris, London**
  - Significant loss of life
  - Attributable to militant multi-national group
  - Based in Libya

- **NATO agreement to strike bases/leadership**

- **Libyan threat of retaliation:**
  - Use of all means
  - Includes missiles and chemical weapons
within Libya and have commenced preparations to carry out those attacks.

In response, the Libyan regime has announced that it will not hesitate to employ all the means at its disposal to protect its sovereignty. Its announcement pointedly referred to missiles which can reach major European capitals and the prospect of using chemical weapons.
Delegates’ Treatment of the Crises

CROATIA: First, in North Korea, we must stop the army that is advancing to the separatist area so that the rebel forces do not launch missiles.

UNITED KINGDOM: May I make a proposal? If we’re dealing with these two situations sequentially and we are dealing first of all with the situation in North Korea, may I suggest that we ask the North Korean representative here to say what he suggests is needed in this particular situation where a group of rebels is acting on his government’s sovereign territory. We do not recognize them; we recognize Pyongyang as the legitimate government. What is it that his government would like the international community to do?

CHAIR: What I suggest we do is [recognize that] we’ve got two situations going on at the same time. We have the Russian Federation, China, Korea and Japan on the map there that are directly threatened or at risk, plus we have the fact that the United States has the capability to --

CHINA: To defend itself.

CHAIR: To defend to a greater or lesser extent against some of those threats.

GERMANY: Europe is concerned, too.

CHAIR: Europe is concerned, too, but indirectly.

CROATIA: They are busy with Libya.

CHINA: China would be immediately affected. Any instability on the Korean Peninsula has always been strongly felt by the Chinese. It is reasonably sound to imagine that the American continent and American troops in both Japan and Korea would be more adequately protected by the newer generations of missile defense including the Patriot and ship-based systems, so the Americans are actually less vulnerable to such breakaway or instability than perhaps any other powers. Japan, too, will be less vulnerable because it shares technology with the United States and enjoys the benefit of an American military presence in the key areas. The Russian Federation has already developed theater missile defense. The Chinese are more vulnerable and may also hypothesize that in this scenario it will be in the interest of the United States to let the factions in North Korea weaken themselves. If the North Korean regime pleads for help, even invites the American military and the Patriot missile batteries to Pyongyang, the Americans may not necessarily be eager to send those units. Then the South and the Americans could take advantage of a much weaker North Korea and the threat would be greater to those powers on the Asian mainland rather than the maritime powers of Japan.
and the United States. The Chinese are not prepared for this. The official policy has been that the Chinese Government would oppose the source of instability from any side, north and south and at this time you have the northern regime split. The Chinese traditionally do not want to intervene in the internal affairs of any country. There are limits to how much the Chinese can influence North Koreans so I think the Chinese would be more likely to jump in if it were shown that the rebel side had weapons of mass destruction.

KOREA: This is a crisis and a challenge but compared with other scenarios, this doesn’t seem to be that nightmarish. North Korea proper is much weakened in military terms so some people on our side may be very tempted to strike a deal with North Koreans or take some action in the area that the Government of North Korea is controlling. So I believe the most important thing at this stage is the diplomatic undertaking between the North Korean regime and China, the Russian Federation and the United States. Also the secessionist group would try to undertake diplomatic activities to assure its survival.

CHAIR: And we will assume that you consider that whatever military action you undertake jointly with the North Koreans would be sufficient to contain the threat?

KOREA: Right, but, of course, the Korean military is under an alliance with the United States and our forces are combined with the United States. We have to discuss the matter with the United States, too.

RUSSIAN FEDERATION: When this serious situation arises for us and for every nation, it’s impossible to make an accurate assessment of the situation, [but] the threat should not be exaggerated. The SCUD-C system is a modification as far as I know of the German V2 and it simply cannot be upgraded physically to a long-range missile. If a nation managed to take possession of such a weapon, a missile equipped with mass destruction weapons in the hands of rebels near the boundaries of the Russian Federation, we see several ways to respond. First, as it involves rebels that threaten not only their own central government but also other nations, it requires an international response. In what form? Let’s recall that on September 11, 2001, the first call to President Bush was President Putin and his suggestion was that we should at least not upset the strategic stability. So the concern of the Russian Federation is that the regional conflict should not be exaggerated to a strategic conflict. And in this case, we suggest immediate consultations among the P-5 nuclear states in order to contain this crisis and then to see what can be done. It could be either a bilateral dialog between the two Koreas or it could be a regional dialog but in any case military action against this threat should be deferred until [after] attempting a political settlement.

JAPAN: I’m not quite sure about the statement made by the Chinese representative that Japan is less vulnerable than China since we have no missiles or weapons of mass destruction to counter the threat from the rebels in the north. In any case, we can only play a supportive role in this situation, so first of all, we acknowledge
that some sort of diplomatic negotiation should be held including a convening of the UN Security Council.

DPRK: We would like to know more about the rebels. Are they true believers in Kim Il Sungism? Are they primarily military colonels and generals? Are they people who have a vested interest in maintaining the system in terms of political power, economic position and so forth? Are they pragmatic people? Are they ideological people? Are they fanatics? I think the external responses should depend on the answers to those questions. If you have fanatical people there believing in true Kim Il Sungism, then it's going to be very hard to negotiate with them. If, however, you have more pragmatic people trying to defend their assets, then it will be easier to negotiate.

CROATIA: The first thing we have to do is stop this army. I've heard there is a hostile army approaching the separatist region and so we must stop it to defuse the tension.

GERMANY: We're not neighbors but we are still concerned about the situation in the area of the Korean Peninsula. Nevertheless, it seems to me that for the time being, the problem in the area is, especially in comparison to the other scenario, limited inasmuch as we have here a situation that is still within the state. There is a danger of escalation, so I think a first attempt should be made on a regional approach to get a solution in the area. And if this regional approach fails, then we should try to have some sort of quarantine around this and maybe try to use some economic pressure and sanctions. It's quite different from the other theater where we already have some very serious international consequences of terrorism that has taken place. So it seems to me that if we want to address these two things together, we should first address the Libyan issue because here something very serious has happened and we have to take action against that. As far as the Libyan scenario is concerned, we should put an ultimatum to Libya [and demand that it] immediately close the bases for this terrorist attack. This ultimatum could be delivered by a country that has some sort of regional appeal, such as Egypt. Then if that fails, it seems to me that some sort of military action would be inevitable. If we make an ultimatum, we have to back it up by some sort of military force, otherwise it is not credible.

UNITED STATES: It would seem to me that if the Proposal II capability is in place it buys time for diplomacy, first of all, and it then also makes more possible the emphasis on a regional approach starting with the Koreans themselves and then involving the immediate neighbors in terms of a diplomatic track one, track two, engagement while you move the military capability into place to deal with a worst case scenario in case they do fire off a missile. Having that capability to respond may reduce the pressure for a preemptive military strike to take out that capability and preempt a regionally led diplomatic solution. What it also does in the Korean scenario is allow you to move immediately to address a more pressing threat in terms of a series of terrorist incidents that have already occurred and to deal with a separate set of approaches and weapons, again led by the parties who are most likely to have an ability to reach the Libyan leadership. In one scenario, the Proposal II missile defense structure may be
stabilizing and in the other it may be neutral or even destabilizing if it undercuts a perceived delivery system and puts the emphasis on a terrorist device such as a conventional weapon enveloped by nuclear material, a dirty bomb of some kind.

**FRANCE:** We are very concerned about what happens in Korea and North Korea and, in fact, we are much less optimistic than our German counterpart. We have very reliable information saying that those rebel people are backed by Chinese, some elements, and I would like to ask our Chinese delegate, is it true and if it's not true, will the Chinese government oppose the use of these U.S. military means to eventually counter the launch of missiles from those territories?

**CHINA:** How much would the Chinese have collaborated with the Americans to contain or get rid of the missiles? I think the best way to predict the future is to go back to history. The history of the Korean War still haunts many neighboring states including China and has an effect on South Korea’s mindset. Our South Korean colleague suggests a diplomatic solution be sought before a military solution. The Chinese strongly believe that a lesson of the Korean War is that both sides overreacted, first the Americans and then Mao and others. The shadow of that is still there, so the first requirement is to use diplomatic means to defuse the crisis and learn about the true situation. The next level perhaps is to think about multilateral approaches. It’s very hard to imagine that the Chinese would go so far as to invite the U.S. military to collaborate unless something extraordinary happened. The Chinese will move immediately to close the border with North Korea because the crisis will trigger a large number of refugees. Given the state of U.S.-China relations with regard to Taiwan, it is hard for China to collaborate with the United States. But I think the neighboring states, particularly the Russian Federation, should work with China to defuse the crisis, to understand the situation, to collaborate. We need to share information through our hotlines, intelligence and border defense.

**FRANCE:** That means you will object to any kind of use of force in this crisis?

**CHINA:** In the past, the United States often employed military force whether in Korea, Iraq, Yugoslavia or Afghanistan on a kind of a hit and run basis while China and the Russian Federation have to live with such cases that force may not necessarily be able to resolve. A non-military solution will always be high on the agenda for the Chinese, so we would want to avoid any overreaction to such a scenario. The Chinese don’t want to jump into this conflict unless the Chinese territory itself is seriously threatened, when even then I doubt that we would send troops.

**RUSSIAN FEDERATION:** A question to North Korea. Did you ask for international assistance in combating these groups or do you think it is a question of your own sovereignty?
DPRK: I have to assume that the discontented faction are remnants of the main government and they have the military capability with all these weapons. On what basis, on what justifiable grounds can other countries come intervene? Just because they possess these weapons?

INDIA: It’s ironic that a preponderance of democratic countries are already jumping to the use of force. I think the way that our Russian and Chinese friends have said is first to understand the problem and to see if there is a way to address the issues. The international reaction should be to defuse the situation to see if something can be worked out and have a measured response because they have enough material to do damage. Diplomacy has to be given full play before things get out of hand.

GREECE: I’m thinking about an example that comes not only in Korea but in other countries, in which fanatical people or movements, for example, in Pakistan could take over very important weapons so I think we have to look at the problem not as a separatist movement but as a movement which has weapons to attack outside their country. We have to calculate the worst-case scenario. The second thing is to decide whether we have time to take more diplomatic actions or we have to attack immediately if we have very fanatical groups which already have lost a war and would like only to make a last attack or blackmail others with these weapons. The third step is to work with our own public opinion to prepare our publics for what we are going to do. The fourth step is to work with allies and put through international institutions a plan with all the possibilities. There will be countries which think that we are under time pressure and we don’t need a decision by the United Nations or by NATO. And then we have to determine if we can destroy the enemy without starting a war.

UNITED KINGDOM: We have two very different situations here and for different reasons neither of them should be exaggerated as a security threat. In North Korea, a group of people have certain capabilities but the threat that they have made is to launch a research satellite which is of less than frightening dimensions to most of us. The representatives here of both Koreas have not shown any great impatience to use force against this particular group. What would, of course, be of considerable threat to this region would be a large scale use of force, for example, by bombing which released biological or chemical warfare agents which this group in North Korea allegedly has and which might spread across the border to China and the Russian Federation. The policy should be one of containment; condemnation of this group and containing them in this what is after all a not very viable area for a modern state. The second issue that we have to address is one in which my own government, my own country, happens to be a victim. We have had from the international brigade based partly upon Libyan soil bombings in London as well as other cities and this is something where international reaction is, of course, appropriate and the decision to take action has been taken. I assume after the example of the attack on the United States some years ago that this was why Article Five was invoked. Article Five of the NATO Treaty was invoked in response to the terrorist attack in my country and Germany and other NATO countries and it is under Article Five, therefore, that NATO has decided to attack those terrorist bases in Libya. And it is true that we have had threats from the Libyan regime that they...
will use all means to defend their sovereignty, but their sovereignty is not going to be under attack. Terrorist bases in their country are going to be under attack under decisions already taken by NATO. It is not even the Libyan regime which is under attack. This situation contrasts, for example, again with the example of al-Qaida and the Taliban regime, which some countries may remember from a few years ago. So NATO knew the capability of the Libyan regime when it took its decision. Nothing it seems to me has changed remotely apart from a certain amount of bluster by the Libyan Government, a regime that frankly my government is not prepared to take seriously.

**IRAN:** One big problem is that the United States and countries around the world are concerned about North Korea largely because of this proliferation issue, and they always go to North Korea and say stop selling to Iran, to Iraq and other countries. Iran is sitting here and playing a waiting game and saying we hope that the situation will resolve itself because otherwise we will be losing a major partner in military trade.

**GERMANY:** The missile defense system buys time to a certain extent and we thus have a possibility of an ultimatum that can be put to the Libyan government.

**SPAIN:** In the case of Korea, it’s really a matter of time, buying time by having the missile defense system in place. On the contrary, in the case of Libya, the system is totally irrelevant, it gives no leverage in negotiations because the risk is of terrorists in Europe against whom it provides no special protection. It’s like the cells of terrorists living in the United States; you have no special protection against that so that does not buy you time. That only helps you suffer fewer losses in a military action.

**UNITED STATES:** If you look at preemptive strike, the impact of having this system in the case of North Korea is that you are less likely to preempt and in Libya, it’s either neutral or makes you more likely to preempt.

**KOREA:** The situation in North Korea presents the international community a couple of possibilities. One is continued civil war between the regime and the rebel group. This scenario still has a possibility that a rebel group will act violently with its missile and other military hardware. In a second scenario, two separate states exist in the northern part of the peninsula, one being dangerous and another being even more dangerous. And a third possibility is that the rebel group may take over all of North Korea. Having said this, I believe the international community’s purpose and goal should be to thwart the rebel group’s move. So we would prefer a diplomatic solution.

**UNITED STATES:** An interesting question has arisen over whether missile defense could serve to bring about an American isolationism or unilateralism, which are variants of the same phenomenon, or conversely whether it is more likely to strengthen the U.S. commitment and linkage to its allies both in NATO and Japan. Over the last 60 years, the American people have come to learn that there is no freedom, there is no security in isolation and that it is only together with our allies and friends around the
world that we have been able to preserve and protect those fundamental freedoms to which we are all committed. It’s this shared burden and shared responsibility of dealing with the common threat that provide for our security, and they will understand when the American President makes this perfectly clear to them in his State of the Union address. That is a fascinating question whether missile defense itself reinforces the linkage and the commitment or serves to undermine it and obviously it’s like whether the glass is half full or half empty. I would tend to think that it reinforces it in that it deals with the public perception of are you fulfilling your obligation to the American people to defend and protect, provide for the common defense, and if you can answer that question in the affirmative, I think it’s likely to have a much more positive impact in terms of continued American engagement, be it diplomatic or military.

RUSSIAN FEDERATION: We have to distinguish between when a missile in the Libyan case, for example, is launched and intercepted. This is one situation and another situation is when there is a threat that someone who possesses weapons can use them. They imply different reactions.

CHINA: The missile defense factor seems either to reinforce or reduce the temptation to go unilateral. A more confident or militarily capable United States might also consider the use of force in a scenario when it judged that its casualties would be markedly reduced. If you look at Vietnam, I think that public opinion became a major counter to the use of force largely because of the body bags coming home in large numbers. In 1973, when Nixon declared that the next year the draft would be over, the campus-based protests reduced sharply. Since public opinion really cares about the casualty rate, missile defense would become a factor in the minds of the public whether or not it reduces casualties. If Americans felt more secure they might become more isolationist or unilateralist in the use of force, so I think the Libyan and Korean cases are very different. In the Libyan case, Europe acts largely as an entity. The enemy was external. The target is external. In Asia, it is a more complicated situation in which you find the potential target candidates like China and Taiwan, Japan and the Russian Federation all behave differently according to different interests. I think in the Asian case, you don’t have a unified kind of a group like NATO, providing a security structure. Instead there are different powers with different interests so that influences the first round of reaction to the crisis to be more diplomatic rather than military. So the way countries respond to such crises not only depends on the U.S. missile defense capability but also on the regional situation.

CHAIR: We have got Proposal II. It’s paid and it’s deployed and the question is how it’s going to work and do we like it, does it help or does it make it worse. In the case of Korea, it looks as if Proposal II is perhaps not so bad. We have four countries that are likely to have blood spilled in enormous quantities. They have perhaps a community of interest but the interesting thing is I haven’t heard yet that there is a community of interest in the continuation of the unification process of Korea or reunification, call it what you will. In other words, the Russian Federation and China, sorry but you have been sitting on the fence on this about Korea unification. Now, I assume that the two parts of Korea have a congruence of interest and you would really like to get together after so many
years but you do have this local difficulty up in the north. All four, the two bits of Korea and China and the Russian Federation, would prefer a world in which the Koreas are united and can live peacefully and happily ever after, how do we work in the United States with their missile defense as a factor?

**DPRK:** Peaceful unification would be preferable but then that would preempt any interest in developing missile defense on the part of the United States. In the current crisis, the rebels are not going to give up quietly. They are going to exert some damage. It’s almost a suicidal thing. Now given that, the Chinese representative made a good point and I would like to add to that the complexity of the scene there in East Asia. Public opinion in South Korea does not support unification. There is a resurgent nationalism in all of Korea especially in the younger segment of the population. Americans may win the military battle but as far as winning public support, I’m not sure. The North Korean rebels are not going to be isolated from the international community in different parts of the world.

**CHAIR:** Could a possible Russian Federation or Chinese position be that this is a regional difficulty that needs to be contained? Could we tolerate, not necessarily approve nor encourage but tolerate, American involvement with missile defense over and beyond the existing military capability they have in the region insofar as it enables the regional players, those with a direct interest to sort out a diplomatic solution between themselves to this crisis?

**CHINA:** I see two issues here. You mentioned earlier the unification issue. The other is American’s role during this process of unification, but I think our main issue has been crisis resolution rather than unification. The Chinese official policy has been that unification in which a unified Korea maintains a medium-sized military is something the Chinese cannot only tolerate but peacefully live with. The question is what kind of unification. If it is a violent unification on the basis of either implosion or explosion or from outside pressure which causes instability and crisis in the Korean Peninsula, that would be a problem, so the process of unification perhaps is more important in this case than the final result. The bottom line is stability. With regard to the U.S. role, I think this unification would immediately impact on the United States military presence on the Korean Peninsula. The Chinese position is that this is a matter between the Koreans and the Americans but if unification resulted somehow in projecting U.S. military forces to the Chinese border, the Chinese would like to be consulted, but these are two issues apart from this crisis situation.

**RUSSIAN FEDERATION:** If the unification of Korea resulted from a peaceful process, I can hardly imagine that the Russian Federation would somehow oppose it. But if there is really a military threat from a small group and they possess missiles, we would of course welcome the United States as a party in the efforts to intervene in a tense situation with political and military potential. In this case, as I understand it, there is a missile defense system in place and we don’t rule out the possibility that the military presence could facilitate a settlement of the situation.
KOREA: I think the heart of the matter here is how to deal with the potentially dangerous rebel group so I've just said the prime goal is to defeat this group. Some Korean people might view the crisis as an opportunity to go ahead with our unification plans. So the comment by the Chinese delegate is a bit different from our point of view. Even though North Korea and South Korea are recognized by the international community as two separate countries, for us it's one nation based on our constitution. So for many Koreans, we see North Korea as China sees Taiwan. If a similar thing happened in Taiwan, China's approach would be quite different from the one China's delegate mentioned.

CHAIR: With that we will move to the desert. Let's talk about Libya.

EGYPT: First of all, I don't believe that Proposal II is relevant here at all. Knowing the Libyans as Egyptians do, this would drive them more to use all their 15 to 20 SCUD Charlies immediately. Now the situation is like this: Egypt is the most affected country obviously being the direct neighbor of Libya. Libya is a very important country having one of the major oil reserves and supplies of the world, very important to the U.S. and the West. Egyptian cities are mostly in the range of the SCUD Charlies of Libya. We are not sure whom they are going to target but knowing the Libyans, they can do it so we have one million Egyptians living in Libya currently in the year 2009 and we have extreme economic problems between the two countries that should be taken into account. Now, Egyptian intelligence has detailed maps of all the locations of the terrorist camps in Libya and all the missiles they have and the weapons of mass destruction and we are ready to cooperate with NATO. What we are asking for is the following: we need a period of four weeks, to exert our own pressure on the Libyan regime to surrender the terrorists they have and to abolish the terrorist camps they harbor. We also believe that as the largest Arab country, we can exert pressure through the Arab League on the Libyan regime. So before the NATO strikes, we just are asking for this period of time. Now, we also suggest an immediate meeting between Egypt and U.S. and NATO intelligence and military authorities to discuss all the options including any joint military action. We must not antagonize the Arab world in this case. Iraq has been sanctioned for the past 18 years, from '91 to today, and we don't want another Iraq here so we must form a broader global coalition and I think it would not be difficult. Egypt can do that at least within the Arab world. What we need from NATO is evidence that the Libyan regime is the main one responsible for harboring the terrorists behind the attacks in Berlin, Paris and London and we need to show it to the Arab street. We need that immediately. You will just have to trust our intuition and knowledge of the area. We think we are the regional player which can best deal with this problem.

GREECE: What is the influence from the Libyan fundamentalists?

EGYPT: I don't think they have great influence. They had great influence in the 70s.
CHAIR: You, Egypt, claim to be especially at risk and have a special interest and responsibility for the solution. You also claim that the missile defense system, option two, is irrelevant and doesn’t help and if anything could make matters worse. You also ask NATO to refrain from a classic military intervention for a specified time so that the Egyptians can take their own measures in the way they know best according to the information they received. Okay. Who else feels threatened?

PORTUGAL: As a member of the European Union, my country would like to see some sort of initiative from the European Union to solve this issue before any air strikes. I understand Egypt has a particular interest here but there are other countries in the region. I see Morocco, I see Algeria, I see Tunisia and I think we should build on these countries as well.

IRAN: With all due respect to my Egyptian colleague, I think you are taking too much credit for what Egypt can do. Over the last 20 some years, in all of the conflicts in the Middle East, Egypt has been incapable of doing anything.

GREECE: Egypt has asked to give them four weeks but didn’t say what happens in these four weeks. Would we have terrorist incidents in Berlin, Paris and London during these four weeks or not?

EGYPT: It is our responsibility not to have any terrorist action in these four weeks.

GERMANY: Why do you need four weeks?

CROATIA: Why don’t we start now?

GREECE: You have everything under control.

EGYPT: God created earth in six days. Of course we need time. You’re not dealing with a sane government here.

CHINA: Do the European Union, NATO members need to produce concrete evidence to show the connection between Libya and those bombs? This is almost a mission impossible that you demand concrete evidence.

EGYPT: Why is it mission impossible?

CHINA: Because you need that evidence to show that Libya is responsible and then you will go to the leaders and say let’s work for four weeks, but we don’t know how long these investigations will require.
EGYPT: It’s already proven that Libya is behind that.

GREECE: We have not as good relations with Libya as Britain and Italy but we have a good relationship. In the ’80s and ’90s we had meetings between Qadhafi or the Government in Libya and Mitterrand. That was 1984 and we are afraid that we will be attacked by the new government of Libya because there is a NATO base in Crete and another one in Sicily. When the United States found bin Laden in Sudan, Pakistan stated that if the Americans would give them time they would get him out of there, but five years later we know what happened. Bin Laden was not under control from Pakistan but we are afraid that part of Pakistan was under control from bin Laden, so I’m very afraid maybe this new movement in Libya has a part of the new state in Libya. We have a good agreement with Egypt, a security agreement. We are working together but I cannot be sure that we have the time to give to the Egyptian government. At the same time, we have to take measures so that no one can attack Sicily and Crete where NATO is situated. It’s not the same with Korea, it’s not only a question of missiles, it is terrorism.

CHAIR: If I understand you correctly, you’re forming the view that perhaps the existence of option two in the region can allow NATO forces to forestall their attacks and allow Egypt a window of opportunity.

INDIA: This second situation is more in the nature of what the United States did many years ago in that coalition against terrorism which still is very relevant and this is not something which a particular country or even a group of countries perhaps could do to sort out a problem of this nature. It is terrorism which is an invisible enemy. So in this, India is also very much concerned and would like to be involved with sharing information. When you’re dealing with terrorists, you don’t know where they are going to move their assets at night. There is no guarantee that you will be able to get them in four week’s time and if you have some information where you are in a position to pinpoint them, that is the time you have to act.

UNITED STATES: I think I have discovered at least two relevant positives for the Proposal II systems. First, the missiles, if they were to be launched, could hit not only Egypt but, of course, Israel and others in the region and there is always the possibility of an Israeli response immediately with or without particular warheads. That could create a situation that then causes further complications so what you have is a stabilizing aspect by having a missile defense capability in the region not only to protect Europe but also to protect the Middle East from an accidental or deliberate strike. Secondly, it could give you the possibility of being able to delay but again, here you’ve got both the overt military threat that one is preparing against as well as the unconventional terrorist threat where Proposal II is less relevant or not relevant at all. There you get into the question of what our Indian colleague raised in terms of the need to take direct immediate preemptive action, so you have two different kinds of threats to which you are challenged to respond.

EGYPT: I would like to urge the U.S. to use its good offices with the Israelis to
exercise their highest degrees of constraint in this situation. I think we have learned from the lessons of Desert Storm in 1991 when the Iraqi SCUD missiles hit Israel and the hardest thing to do at that time was not to hit back. So I would urge the U.S. delegate to exert pressure on the Israelis once more, because the Libyans might try to escalate this into an Arab-Israeli conflict again and we don’t want this to happen. Now, two points regarding the Indian delegate’s intervention. I think Egypt is the number one country in the Middle East which dealt with the terrorism problem for at least the last 25 years.

**INDIA:** And we have the same problem.

**EGYPT:** But not in the Middle East. We have enough experience to know how to deal with them or so we would like to think and unfortunately such terrorism was also perpetrated by some supposedly brother Islamic states in the region that tried to export the revolution to us.

**IRAN:** He means Iran, thank you. He means me.

**EGYPT:** If you can suggest one more nation in the world which can have more leverage than Egypt on the Libyan regime, I would go with that. Our Egyptian lives are at stake here so I would not mind if you can --

**INDIA:** No, I’m not saying that. I’m not saying your efforts are not good enough but this is not something that can be done alone by anybody. Terrorism is not something you get rid of in a day because you know where the locations are and you know what resources they have.

**EGYPT:** I’m not sure any country in the world would have enough intelligence about Libyan terrorists.

**INDIA:** Exactly but certainly it would be very useful if this was put to good use and if terrorism was given a body blow and eliminated.

**UNITED KINGDOM:** The stabilizing or destabilizing effects of Proposal II have not, in fact, been tested in either of these two crises because what we have almost entirely been talking about has been Proposal I which is only by accident also part of Proposal II. So far a sort of four-week window in which Egypt or other countries might attempt to use their good offices in Libya has been proposed. Delegates will remember that in those dim days of 2001 the United States waited for at least four weeks before launching any military action and that is the sort of normal time it takes to prepare sensible military action. I don’t think we have ever been talking about simply bombing for the sake of bombing, but, you know, I do think that very little has changed that should affect NATO’s decisions already made to take military action when appropriate. If this situation is not resolved, we will see what we can do to give Egypt the evidence that it wants. Here is a country which is supporting people who have attacked our countries and they are trying to protect themselves by at least suggesting that they will use missiles and
weapons of mass destruction if we respond. Now, I don’t believe that the present Libyan government is suicidal. I certainly don’t believe that it’s suicidal about its own nation. You know, this is not a fanatical Islamist organization of the type that al-Qaida once was so what we are faced with here is a situation of classic deterrence. They know what would be likely to happen to them if they were to use weapons of mass destruction. We were in this situation during the Gulf War when the United States, if I remember correctly, gave slightly veiled warnings but nonetheless unmistakable ones about what would happen if Saddam Hussein used missiles and weapons of mass destruction against Israel or anyone else. I assume that colleagues in Europe would welcome a repetition of such warnings and if they did not come from the United States, they could come from other countries concerned. So I see nothing that has significantly changed apart from an offer from Egypt to achieve our goals by other means within a given time frame, and I’m sure that I misheard one of our partners who had agreed to military action. I must have misheard the delegate from Portugal who I thought was suggesting that military action was inappropriate, but I can see nothing that has changed here, nothing in terms of deterrence on either side. The Libyans were aware that we had certain capabilities and we were aware that they had certain capabilities. We have taken our decisions, the timing I hope will not be affected one way or another while the Egyptians kindly carry out their activities. We wish them luck.

EGYPT: I hope you don’t bomb our envoys when they are in Tripoli during your bombing.

UNITED KINGDOM: One million Egyptians don’t have to return rather quickly from Libya. I would imagine that if I was living within SCUD Charlie range, I would be somewhat reassured that there was some capability against the missiles. On the other hand, I think that the fundamentals are the same as they would have been without the missile defense. A country which threatened to use weapons of mass destruction would also have to face the fact that it might face very grave consequences and graver consequences than it could, in fact, inflict. Therefore, one would simply have to ask whether the regime was suicidal or not. In the case of Libya, there is nothing here to suggest that it is a suicidal regime or that it is prepared to inflict suicide on its country. No doubt there have been such regimes in the world in the past but there is nothing here to suggest that this is one of them.

UNITED STATES: What you are likely to get is not retaliation with WMD. In other words, carrying out the threat that if you use WMD, we will do so as well. I think there is likely to be a preemptive conventional strike against any remaining missiles as well as military targets.

PORTUGAL: I just wanted to clarify with my British colleague that we are still within NATO. So my comments were more directed to our Egyptian colleague and intended to find ways of doing what we have to do in a manner that would avoid antagonizing the Arab world. We are fully behind NATO and I would see my country very favorable to military intervention in this issue.
EGYPT: By avoiding a preemptive strike, which is what Egypt is trying to do, we avoid antagonizing the Arab world.

PORTUGAL: But even with a preemptive strike you can still do some public diplomacy.

CHAIR: Can I just ask a further supplemental to Egypt? You started your interventions by saying that you considered that option two would exacerbate the problem and would somehow encourage the Libyans to use their missiles as opposed to further terrorist action. The terrorists have already acted and they will continue to do so until you stop them. You say the existence of this system would encourage them to use their SCUDS but I seem to think that you’re contradicting your initial view now.

EGYPT: The Patriots never stopped Saddam Hussein from --

CHAIR: But we’re talking about something better now.

CHINA: Can I ask both the European and NATO representative and Egyptian whether a UN authorization would make a difference in case of the use of force? I understand that NATO would act anyway, like in Kosovo with or without any United Nations authorization. But if the UN authorized something, like in the case of September 11, would that make a difference in the reactions of Egyptians and also if that is the case, to what degree the Egyptian government would share intelligence?

EGYPT: We would share it a hundred percent if we had a UN resolution.

GERMANY: In view of the significant losses of life that have taken place in the metros and the subways in Berlin and Paris and London, there can be no doubt that the UN Security Council will allow any military action that is necessary in this respect and, in fact, in this perspective, NATO has taken already its decision which is allowed anyway under Article 51 of the UN Charter. Here we have the military track that is NATO and then we have sort of a diplomatic track that Egypt is following. We must make sure that those two tracks work closely together. NATO has taken the decision to act and it must be communicated to the Libyan authorities that this is a credible threat and there is no way out of it.

EGYPT: That is probably the main deterrent we are going to use with the Libyans and remember here, we are protecting our national interests, not the Libyan regime. We are protecting the lives of one million Egyptians so it is in our own national interest.

CHAIR: A number of issues have surfaced and we have brought up some problems in an interesting way. The existence of option two missile defense would seem to mean that the United States remains an important player on the world stage so it doesn’t lead to
isolationism of the United States. And, secondly, when faced with two different threats, there are different assessments. With the first threat in the Korean theater where the use of force has not been decided already, the existence of the missile defense system could enhance a diplomatic solution by buying time. On the other hand where the use of force has already been decided for particular reasons to counter terrorism, the view has been expressed that the missile defense system could encourage the use of missiles by the naughtly state. That assessment if I understand it is based on particular knowledge of a special situation but isn't based on the assumption or the belief that the existence *per se* of the missile defense system would cause such a state to use its missiles. But the contrary view has been expressed that this missile defense system could indeed allow other solutions to be sought, maybe through the good offices of Egypt in this particular case, and could in certain circumstances reduce the possibility of retaliatory strikes for the use of weapons of mass destruction and could in a particular context attenuate the effects of a sort of wild card and the response of somebody like Israel. So it could be a useful tool for the containment and control of the crisis, but those are just a few ideas.
OUT OF ROLE DISCUSSIONS

On the second day of this event, the format was changed from that of the first day, in which participants played roles in response to hypothetical scenarios, to that of a seminar in which participants spoke in their individual capacities. The seminar encompassed both anonymous written comments, via networked computers and collaborative software and oral discussion.

The Missile Threat Posed by the Hypothetical Crises

Countries naturally took most seriously the threat of missiles that could reach their territories, but several also were concerned about threats to the populations or territories of allies beyond their own geographic area. Some opined that the kind of missile threats posited by the scenarios could seriously destabilize situations that might already be delicate. One European participant commented that the Korean situation could develop into a general confrontation involving several nuclear powers, something that his country would view with deep seriousness. Another observed that North Korea served as a buffer state between Russia and China and U.S. forces. Thus a collapse of North Korea or a serious crisis there would be of great concern.

A participant from North Africa said the Libyan crisis was especially serious because the threat of a strike by NATO pushed the Government of Libya to the wall. Another member of the group responded that Libya might, therefore, be tempted to fire its missile inventory under "use it or lose it" reasoning. This prompted a comment that there was no evidence that the Libyan regime was irrational and that while the speaker could imagine that Libya would try to employ its missiles for coercion, i.e. to deter attack, it was unlikely that it would fire them and risk the threat of even more serious retaliation from NATO, which clearly had a military superiority.

Some European representatives noted that the crisis involving Libya was more than a threat because terrorists had already carried out deadly attacks on their homelands. It was also noted that in a shrinking world, no country might be beyond the reach of the effects of crises of the sort discussed, even if the missiles might not reach it. One participant pointed out that North Korea was closer to Oslo and Munich than to Sydney.

Several participants called for a multifaceted response to the threats, involving diplomatic negotiations and public diplomacy. Recognizing the forcing function of a shared threat, many advocated intensive diplomatic work among countries in the region of a threat as potentially more productive than broader negotiations. Several participants commented that the existence of missile defense would buy time for diplomacy and expand the options available for addressing the threat. In particular, coercive threats that an attack might be launched unless others accepted an ultimatum of an adversary might be minimized by missile defense. One official suggested that the available missile defense assets should be positioned during the Libyan crisis in a location from which they could protect countries in the region against coercion by Libya while diplomacy was underway.
One participant commented anonymously that he was not convinced that missile defense was cost effective or that threats of the sort posited could not be addressed by conventional means.

**The Response of the International Community**

Participants were generally, but not uniformly, satisfied that the international community had acted wisely, as indicated by the roles countries played the day before. Their response had included intelligence sharing and intensive diplomacy to get a better understanding of the intentions of the rebel commander in North Korea and the relationship between the Government of Libya and the terrorists resident on its territory. The interest in supporting the offer of Egypt to engage in urgent negotiations with Libya was widespread. At the same time, some members of NATO wanted to proceed with detailed preparations for military action to respond to the attacks in Europe. No consensus emerged on when such action should begin. Some delegates wanted to give diplomacy a chance to resolve the crisis before striking militarily; one noted that the experience of responding to the attacks of September 11, 2001 showed that several weeks were required to prepare an effective attack in any case. It was suggested that this period should be used also for extensive consultations to provide the informational basis for building and operating a strong coalition. The military and diplomatic tracks could be flip sides of the same coin and reinforce one another.

Many participants commented that the existence of missile defense supported diplomacy and provided time for it by reducing the risk that pausing to negotiate could expose potential targets to attack. Diplomacy could be an alternative to attacking militarily. In the case of Libya, a diplomatic approach had an advantage over a military response in that was not likely to provoke further violence by terrorist sleeper cells in Europe. One official saw a military strike against terrorist targets in Libya as inevitable in view of the serious provocation of the terrorist strikes in Europe and thought, therefore, that the existence of missile defenses was irrelevant. In the case of the threat from North Korean territory, no participant suggested that the flow of U.S. forces from Japan into South Korea should be suspended to avoid attack. Several people thought that a diplomatic solution might be difficult because the demand of the rebel commander that the process of unification be halted was unreasonable. One Asian participant commented that what struck some as irrational North Korean thinking might be just another type of rationality. Other countries found Korean unification so appealing, he argued, that they might have a hard time understanding that not every Korean would see it that way. An expert on the region commented that the rebel commander in North Korea would likely be more aggressive in carrying out threats to use missiles under his control if he felt a threat of force from outside, especially if he thought the only alternatives were a collapse of the North Korean system or absorbing a military attack. Concern over the dangerous potential of tensions in the Korean Peninsula led many participants to favor close consultation among the United States and governments in the region, including Pyongyang, to explore possible solutions and forge a coordinated approach.
A participant said that those who favored missile defense needed to recognize that if the concept were to be accepted internationally people would have to shift their thinking from one strategy of MAD--Mutually Assured Destruction--to another MAD--Mutually Assured Defense. A partial defense, one that protected some players in the world and left others vulnerable, could undermine the global system of deterrence and, therefore, be destabilizing.

One official observed that he found it strange that some in the seminar seemed to believe that just because missile defenses were carried on military platforms, employing them would be perceived as equivalent to employing offensive weapons. Their use was in no way an offensive act, and he could not conceive that they would not be used if they were available and missiles were fired against targets of interest to the defenders. Another added that if effective missile defense existed he would consider it to be the duty of a government to employ it if it could possibly enhance the defense of its country.

One participant called missile defense in these situations fundamental to maintaining alliance solidarity and ensuring that the alliances endured. Once missile defense was readily available, in the view of one official, defense would come to figure prominently in the array of options. Another official argued that, because the sole justification of having armed forces in a democratic society was to ensure the life and liberty of the citizenry, when a nation was under serious threat it was the duty of government to take whatever action was necessary, either through a preemptive strike or alternative means such as missile defense.

If there were no missile defense, opined one participant, rogues would be prompted to procure and use missiles, especially to coerce others at a cost well below acquiring an army, navy or air force. Another countered that he was unconvinced that a rogue state could coerce a nuclear power even if it could influence a non-nuclear state.

Several participants asserted that a global defense system would require a global political and diplomatic framework to legitimize and control its use, what one person called "global governance." Others alluded to the need to create or modify international institutions to arrange for the development, deployment and utilization of missile defenses.

**Crisis Management without Missile Defense**

Participants differently significantly in their judgments over whether their government’s reactions in the crises would have been different had missile defenses not been in place. Most thought that missile defenses provided time and cover within which diplomacy could be conducted and, therefore, made it less likely that military force would be used to retaliate for the terrorist attacks in Europe or to strike preemptively against the threat of a missile attack from the rebel North Korean commander. One participant said that in the absence of missile defense the only choices would have been to acquiesce or to attack.
Some others thought that the availability of missile defenses would not have made a difference because their first reaction would have been to try to negotiate a diplomatic solution. It was commented that the Libyan threat to use its missiles was not credible because no Government of Libya would choose to commit suicide, i.e. that the prospect of retaliation with deadly force would be sufficient to deter Libya. Two participants observed that missile defense would do nothing to protect Europe against further terrorist attacks or South Korea against artillery in North Korea (although there was nothing in the scenario to suggest that the rebel commander who was making threats had artillery within range of South Korean targets).

One participant suggested that the existence of missile defenses could complicate the security picture in several ways, by triggering a new arms race, a heightened sense of insecurity on the part of the "have-nots" and complex trade-offs between offensive and defensive capabilities.

**Countries’ Preferred Ways to Deal with Missile Threats**

The overwhelming number of participants responded to the question "what do you think is the best way for your country to deal with any missile threats to its interests?" with "missile defense." Some went on to comment that missile defense needed to be combined operationally with surveillance and other intelligence and strategically with arms control and non-proliferation efforts and deterrence based on a strong offensive force, capable of carrying out a second strike. Several participants stressed the need for international cooperation on all of these activities so as to share costs and provide a more effective effort against those who might launch missiles.

One participant commented that even theater missile defense systems could amount to strategic national defense for many countries. He cautioned that this characteristic could result in greater proliferation and a breakdown of classic deterrence. Another argued that the threat of retaliation should still be an effective deterrent against a direct missile attack. Where missile defense could make a difference, he argued, could be in giving assurance to non-nuclear states whose response to a missile threat might otherwise be uncertain.

Another participant said he had been struck during the simulation by comments that seemed to indicate that many people were more comfortable in a world in which an ABM Treaty held developments in check than they would be with defensive capabilities with which countries could defend themselves. A colleague responded that in his view the Cold War was not necessarily a better world but it was a more balanced world. The second half of the Twentieth Century was more peaceful than the first half, at least in terms of the involvement of the great powers in direct conflict. He added that the world might be experiencing something unique in history in that the dominant power, the United States, was unhappy with the *status quo* and was seeking to change it by abandoning the ABM Treaty and other international commitments.
Willingness to Share the Burden

Many participants expressed the view that missile defense systems should be developed multi-nationally even if the United States was assumed to have the lead role. Several said their countries would be anxious to cooperate on technology and one commented that his country would expect technological cooperation to give it a voice in deployment and operational decisions. One official commented candidly that his country did not possess the means to contribute substantially "but would be willing to be under the defense umbrella." A few participants acknowledged a free rider effect in which countries might benefit from missile defense even if they did not contribute to it. None mentioned contributions that their countries might make by providing sites for components of a missile defense system even though the briefings on architectures had identified some notional examples.
POLICY CONCLUSIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES

Recognize the nature of other countries’ resistance to missile defense: Advocates of missile defense should bear in mind that resistance to missile defense stems from several doubts based in the beliefs that:

- There is no credible threat of a missile attack against the United States or U.S. interests, especially in view of other means of attack,
- The strategy of deterrence based on a threat of mutually assured destruction that succeeded in preventing a missile attack during the Cold War is still available,
- The technology needed for effective missile defense is not proven,
- Development of such technology will be prohibitively expensive even if the technical problems can be overcome and
- Development and deployment of missile defense may be destabilizing because it will stimulate some other countries to attempt to preserve the effectiveness of their existing missile arsenals by increasing the number or the performance of their missiles.

Thus any attempt to encourage other countries to appreciate U.S. missile defense programs needs to address these concerns. In particular, sharing evidence of why the people who would create current or future missile threats cannot be deterred by the prospect of retaliation is important.

Define architectures: The current simulation also demonstrated the persuasive value of defining missile defense architectures as soon as possible. Doing so will remove the requirements that a system has to be defended against all the arguments that might be posited against any and all missile defense systems. In the cases of countries like the Russian Federation and China, which have missile inventories quite different from those against which systems currently under discussion for development by the United States are designed, specific information about proposed architectures could be useful in dampening diplomatic opposition and perhaps even deferring decisions in those countries to undertake modifications of their missile inventories to defeat proposed U.S. defenses.

Address with other countries key politico-military issues of theater missile defense: A powerful and unexpected result of the simulation/seminar was that even though U.S. investments in theater missile defense are intended to be deployed abroad, to protect allied targets as well as U.S. forces, not all otherwise-well-informed foreign officials had a good informational basis for appreciating the value of theater systems to the defense of allied territory. This insight suggests a determined effort should be made to consult with key countries on the deployment and employment of theater missile defense systems. Such consultations should focus on developing agreed rules of engagement and command and control arrangements. These consultations may lead to the adoption of permanent institutional changes in NATO or other organizations to govern the multinational aspects of missile defense.
Seek the benefits of consultation on theater missile defense: If other countries can be led to a conclusion that theater missile defense serves their security interests, they may become willing to share the technological and financial burdens of creating the systems and to provide sites for sensors or other facilities that will make any system more robust. Reiterating the point above, other countries’ faith in theater missile defense will be closely related to their sense that they have a serious say in how it will be used. The discussions in Newport suggest that countries’ attitudes toward missile defense for North America will in turn be shaped by their perceptions of how theater missile defense can help them.

A concluding comment about the dynamics of negotiating on missile defense with allies: If the United States adopts a pro-active approach to consulting with its allies on missile defense, it can take advantage of several felicitous factors:

- Theater missile defense will be available before North American defense is developed and the appeal of one can create an atmosphere of acceptance for the other.
- Before systems can be constructed and deployed, they have to be defined, so the interest of other countries in learning specific characteristics can be met, hopefully sooner rather than later.
- The combination of consulting with allies and providing for their defense can put a lie to the oft-heard assertion that missile defense will push the United States toward unilateralism.
- Other countries will find things to like about missile defense more easily once they are convinced that missile defense is destined to become a reality.