NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA

THESIS

THE EVOLUTION OF JAPAN’S CONSTITUTION AND IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. FORCES ON OKINAWA

by

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December 2004

Thesis Advisor: Edward A. Olsen
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The Evolution of Japan’s Constitution and Implications for U.S. Forces on Okinawa

This thesis assesses the developing factors in Japan’s constitutional debate after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. It examines the myriad issues influencing the reinterpretation or potential revision of Article 9 of Japan’s constitution and what implications revision would have on Japan-based U.S. forces stationed primarily in Okinawa.

This thesis argues that Tokyo’s reinterpretation or revision of Article 9 of Japan’s constitution would not require a major withdrawal of U.S. forces from Okinawa. Regional threats still validate the half-century old U.S.-Japan Security Alliance and most of its current structure. The major questions the thesis addresses are how and why Japan is reinterpretting or may revise its constitution, what dangers threaten Japanese and American security and interests, and how Okinawa’s bases contribute to the security and stability of the region and at what price. Furthermore, this thesis evaluates the validity of perceptions regarding U.S. troops on Okinawa, and it seeks to clarify the situation on Okinawa.

This thesis’ arguments set the stage for a policy-prescriptive conclusion which is predicated on six individual premises. A major point is the validation of a viable and proven U.S. expeditionary force to remain stationed within Japan. Also, it offers practical recommendations for what is next for U.S. forces on Okinawa, including maintaining the status quo with certain adjustments, overhauling public relations and media interactions, and examining the merits of Kadena Air Base and Ie Island for the relocation of Marine Corps Air Station Futenma.
THE EVOLUTION OF JAPAN’S CONSTITUTION AND IMPLICATIONS FOR U. S. FORCES ON OKINAWA

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from the

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ABSTRACT

Okinawa serves as a strategic base for U.S. forces in maintaining regional security and protecting Japanese and American interests based on the 1960 Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United States and its 1951 predecessor. This thesis assesses the developing factors in Japan’s constitutional debate after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. It examines the myriad issues influencing the reinterpretation or potential revision of Article 9 of Japan’s constitution and what implications revision would have on Japan-based U.S. forces stationed primarily in Okinawa.

This thesis argues that Tokyo’s reinterpretation or revision of Article 9 of Japan’s constitution would not require a major withdrawal of U.S. forces from Okinawa. Regional threats still validate the half-century old U.S.-Japan Security Alliance and most of its current structure. The major questions the thesis addresses are how and why Japan is reinterpreting or may revise its constitution, what dangers threaten Japanese and American security and interests, and how Okinawa’s bases contribute to the security and stability of the region and at what price. Furthermore, this thesis evaluates the validity of perceptions regarding U.S. troops on Okinawa, and it seeks to clarify the situation on Okinawa.

This thesis’ arguments set the stage for a policy-prescriptive conclusion which is predicated on six individual premises. A major point is the validation of a viable and proven U.S. expeditionary force to remain stationed within Japan. Also, it offers practical recommendations for what is next for U.S. forces on Okinawa, including maintaining the status quo with certain adjustments, overhauling public relations and media interactions, and examining the merits of Kadena Air Base and Ie Island for the relocation of Marine Corps Air Station Futenma.
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<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3d FSSG</td>
<td>3d Force Service Support Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>3d MEB</td>
<td>3d Marine Expeditionary Brigade</td>
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<tr>
<td>31st MEU</td>
<td>31st Marine Expeditionary Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AAFES</td>
<td>Army/Air Force Exchange Service</td>
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<tr>
<td>AFN</td>
<td>Armed Forces Network</td>
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<tr>
<td>ACSA</td>
<td>Acquisition and Cross Serving Agreement</td>
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<td>ACUNS</td>
<td>Academic Council on the United Nations System</td>
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<tr>
<td>ATWG</td>
<td>Army Transformation War Game</td>
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<tr>
<td>BBC</td>
<td>British Broadcasting Company</td>
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<tr>
<td>BRAC</td>
<td>Base Realignment and Closure</td>
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<td>BRI</td>
<td>Business Reform Initiative</td>
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<tr>
<td>BMD</td>
<td>Ballistic Missile Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C4ISR</td>
<td>Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CVID</td>
<td>Complete, Verifiable, Irreversible, Dismantling</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DFAA</td>
<td>Defense Facilities Administration Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DeCA</td>
<td>Defense Commissary Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DMZ</td>
<td>Demilitarized Zone</td>
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<tr>
<td>DoD</td>
<td>Department of Defense</td>
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<tr>
<td>DODDS</td>
<td>Department of Defense Dependents Schools</td>
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<tr>
<td>DOS</td>
<td>Department of State</td>
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<tr>
<td>DPJ</td>
<td>Democratic Party of Japan</td>
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<td>DPRI</td>
<td>Defense Policy Review Initiative</td>
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<td>DPRK</td>
<td>Democratic People’s Republic of Korea</td>
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<td>DRMO</td>
<td>Defense Reutilization Marketing Office</td>
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<tr>
<td>EMW</td>
<td>Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare</td>
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<tr>
<td>ESG</td>
<td>Expeditionary Strike Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>GOJ</td>
<td>Government of Japan</td>
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<tr>
<td>GPP</td>
<td>Gross Prefectural Product</td>
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<tr>
<td>FRF</td>
<td>Futenma Replacement Facility</td>
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<tr>
<td>IAEA</td>
<td>International Atomic Energy Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICBM</td>
<td>Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile</td>
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<tr>
<td>IGPBS</td>
<td>Integrated Global Posture Basing Study</td>
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<tr>
<td>JDA</td>
<td>Japan Defense Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>JFIP</td>
<td>Japan Facilities Improvement Project</td>
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<tr>
<td>JFY</td>
<td>Japanese Fiscal Year</td>
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<tr>
<td>JGSDF</td>
<td>Japan Ground Self-Defense Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>JMSDF</td>
<td>Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>JRC</td>
<td>Joint Reception Center</td>
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<tr>
<td>JSC</td>
<td>Joint Staff Chief</td>
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<tr>
<td>JSDF</td>
<td>Japan Self-Defense Force</td>
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<td>KPA</td>
<td>Korean People’s Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>LDP</td>
<td>Liberal Democratic Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>MAGTF</td>
<td>Marine Air-Ground Task force</td>
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<td>MCAS</td>
<td>Marine Corps Air Station</td>
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<td>MCBJ</td>
<td>Marine Corps Bases Japan</td>
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<td>MD</td>
<td>Missile Defense</td>
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<tr>
<td>MEF</td>
<td>Marine Expeditionary Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>MLC</td>
<td>Master Labor Contract</td>
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<tr>
<td>MOA</td>
<td>Memorandum of Agreement</td>
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<tr>
<td>MOFA</td>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>MPF</td>
<td>Maritime Prepositioning Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>MPS</td>
<td>Maritime Prepositioning Squadron</td>
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<tr>
<td>MSG</td>
<td>Marine Security Guard</td>
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<tr>
<td>MTDP</td>
<td>Mid-Term Defense Program</td>
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<td>MTW</td>
<td>Major Theater Wars</td>
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<td>MWLKL</td>
<td>Marine Wing Liaison Kadena</td>
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<tr>
<td>MWR</td>
<td>Morale, Welfare, and Recreation</td>
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<tr>
<td>NAF</td>
<td>Non-appropriated Fund(s)</td>
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<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>NBC</td>
<td>Nuclear Biological Chemical</td>
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<tr>
<td>NDPO</td>
<td>National Defense Program Outline</td>
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<tr>
<td>NDS</td>
<td>National Defense Strategy</td>
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<tr>
<td>NMS</td>
<td>National Military Strategy</td>
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<tr>
<td>NPT</td>
<td>Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty</td>
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<tr>
<td>ODA</td>
<td>Overseas Development Assistance</td>
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<tr>
<td>OEF</td>
<td>Operation Enduring Freedom</td>
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<td>OIF</td>
<td>Operation Iraqi Freedom</td>
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<tr>
<td>OIST</td>
<td>Okinawa Institute of Science and Technology</td>
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<tr>
<td>OPG</td>
<td>Okinawa Prefectural Government</td>
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<tr>
<td>OSD</td>
<td>Office of the Secretary of Defense</td>
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<tr>
<td>PAC-3</td>
<td>Patriot Advanced Capability III</td>
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<tr>
<td>PCS</td>
<td>Permanent Change of Station</td>
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<tr>
<td>POI</td>
<td>Period of Instruction</td>
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<tr>
<td>PRC</td>
<td>People’s Republic of China</td>
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<tr>
<td>QDR</td>
<td>Quadrennial Defense Review Report</td>
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<tr>
<td>R&amp;D</td>
<td>Research and Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>ROK</td>
<td>Republic of Korea</td>
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<tr>
<td>ROKA</td>
<td>Republic of Korea Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>SACO</td>
<td>Special Action Committee on Okinawa</td>
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<tr>
<td>SATI</td>
<td>Security Alliance Transformation Initiative</td>
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<tr>
<td>SFTZ</td>
<td>Special Free Trade Zone</td>
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<tr>
<td>SHAPE</td>
<td>Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SM-3</td>
<td>Standard Missile III</td>
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<tr>
<td>SOFA</td>
<td>Status of Forces Agreement</td>
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<tr>
<td>SOG</td>
<td>Special Operations Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>TRA</td>
<td>Taiwan Relations Act</td>
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<td>TRADOC</td>
<td>Training and Doctrine Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>UAV</td>
<td>Unmanned Aerial Vehicle</td>
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<tr>
<td>UDP</td>
<td>Unit Deployment Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN PKO</td>
<td>United Nations Peacekeeping Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNSC</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNTAC</td>
<td>United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia</td>
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<tr>
<td>USFJ</td>
<td>United States Forces Japan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USFK</td>
<td>United States Forces Korea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>Union of Soviet Socialist Republics</td>
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<tr>
<td>VFA</td>
<td>Visiting Forces Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WMD</td>
<td>Weapons of Mass Destruction</td>
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I. INTRODUCTION

A. THESIS QUESTION

The year 2004 marks the 150th anniversary of Commodore Matthew C. Perry’s conclusion of the Treaty of Kanagawa in 1854 thereby accomplishing the mandate of U.S. President Millard Fillmore to “open” Japan. It is ironic that in 2004 the issues of 1854 revisit Japan and dominate debate within the power circles of Tokyo today. The issues are eerily reminiscent and echo the concerns of the former Tokugawa shogunate—Japan’s security and future. Today, Japan is rethinking how it participates in its own defense and its place in the international community. Japan’s options in addressing these concerns are what the debates focus on, and they start with revising the half-century old pacifist constitution.

Japan’s constitution has never been amended to reflect changes in Japanese society since its adoption in 1946. Revising the constitution—specifically Article 9 which renounces war and prohibits Japan in exercising collective defense—is a course which the incumbent Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi advocates. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War 13 years ago, polls indicate that the Japanese, as a nation, express the need to revise their constitution in order to adequately provide for their own defense in the post-September 11, 2001 or 9/11 world (see Appendix A).

The debate on constitutional revision and related issues such as the deployment of Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) to Iraq has commanded Japan’s attention for quite some time now. The ruling party, opposition parties and polling data indicate that the Japanese are ready to revise their 58 year-old constitution but how far and in what direction are pending questions. In April 2004, the kidnapping and subsequent release of five Japanese civilians by terrorists in Iraq tested Japan’s resolve to stay the course and act as a world power. This delicate debate and fragile resolve regarding constitutional revision could recoil quickly should things go bad for the Japanese, such as the killing of JSDF members in Iraq. The lynchpin in the constitutional debate is the threat to Japan and to the stability of East Asia. As the debate progresses, the United States listens attentively as it transforms the Department of Defense (DoD) and wrestles with finding
the best force structure to address future threats and contribute to the security of Japan and the stability of East Asia.

The purpose of this thesis is to assess the developing factors in Japan’s constitutional debate that will affect the future U.S. presence on Okinawa. Its hypothesis is that Tokyo’s future reinterpretation or revision of Article 9 of Japan’s constitution will not invalidate the presence of U.S. forces on Okinawa. Regional threats with potential instability and a limited JSDF vindicates the half-century old U.S.-Japan Security Alliance and most of its current structure. The major questions it addresses are how and why Japan is reinterpreting its constitution, what dangers threaten United States and Japanese security and interests, and how Okinawa’s bases contribute to the security and stability of the region and at what price. This thesis assesses the proposition that the attacks of September 11, 2001 fueled the current drive to put talk into action and that regional threats have increased the momentum. Additionally, this thesis evaluates the validity of perceptions regarding U.S. troops on Okinawa, and it seeks to clarify the situation on Okinawa.

B. RELEVANCE OF TOPIC

This topic is important to Japanese and American interests since Okinawa serves as a strategic base for U.S. forces in maintaining regional security and stability. Thirteen years after the end of the Cold War several current and mid-range threats to regional security and stability are present that must be addressed. As the U.S. military contemplates reshuffling its forces in South Korea and other places around the globe, care must be taken to follow the evolution of Japan’s constitutional debate so that the bulk of U.S. forces in Japan, stationed on Okinawa, are not rendered ineffective and create a power vacuum in East Asia to be filled by a hostile power.

C. METHODOLOGY

This thesis’ arguments set the stage for a policy-prescriptive conclusion. The basic methodology uses a case studies process in tracing past and current geopolitical, social, and military trends and events. To assess the validity of the hypothesis the evidence derives from a variety of professional academic writings, journalistic literature, government sources and interviews of key figures. The thesis builds on Naval

**D. ORGANIZATION**

Chapter I opens with an overview of the thesis argument and explains the methodology of the thesis.

Chapter II provides the background of the thesis, using Major Stephen E. Duke’s June 2001 thesis, *Japan’s Constitution, Prospects for Change: Impact on U.S. Presence in Japan* as the starting point. From there this chapter addresses key facts, events, and trends since September 2001 and focuses on the implications of the reinterpretation or revision of the Japanese Constitution towards Okinawa. This chapter concentrates on events after September 2001 as they affect the security alliance between Japan and the United States. This chapter also examines Japan’s defense program and the forces behind constitutional change and, the key events and timelines associated with this issue. Furthermore, this chapter also examines U. S. policy and cooperation with the Japanese participating in their own security and trends encouraging Japan to become a more “normal nation.”

Chapter III is an in-depth analysis of the “burden” of Okinawa. The goal of this chapter is to provide an objective picture of local sentiment on Okinawa regarding U.S. forces based there. The chapter provides a cursory review of the history of Okinawa since World War II and elucidates misperceptions that have formed about the U.S. military. Finally, the chapter highlights the prefectural political machine’s activities and media attacks on the U.S. military.

Chapter IV seeks to frame accurately the current and mid-range threats to Japan’s and the United States’ security and interests in the region that validates a strong security alliance and shapes it for the future. This chapter focuses on potential belligerents and
the menacing actions on the Korean Peninsula as well as the growing influence of the People’s Republic of China which poses a potential long range threat and also influences the future of the U.S.-Japan alliance. Other potential flash points, such as the Taiwan Straits, are examined. The chapter assesses these both from the perspective of the U.S.-Japan alliance and then from that of potential adversaries’. Chapter IV concludes by assessing the need for a strong U.S.-Japan Security Alliance as the remedy to these threats.

Chapter V draws on the preceding analysis to propose the way ahead. A major point is the validation of a viable and proven U.S. expeditionary force to remain stationed within Japan. Essentially, this chapter attempts to answer the question posed frequently by Deputy Commander of United States Forces Japan (USFJ), Brigadier General Timothy Larsen, “what’s next?” It offers practical recommendations for what is next for U.S. forces on Okinawa, including status quo with certain policy adjustments, overhauling public relations and media interactions, and examining the merits of Kadena Air Base and Ie Island for the relocation of Marine Corps Air Station Futenma.
II. REVELATIONS OF A CHANGING CONSTITUTION

A. DESCRIBING THE MOOD

What tends to happen both in Japan and in the United States is that the dangers that threaten the freedom both nations enjoy, and how that freedom was obtained and sustained, are easily forgotten. An analogy of a police department in any town or city in the United States combating crime hammers this point home. As the citizenry of a community demands swift action to stem a rise in crime, local government leaders listen attentively to the needs of its police force to combat the unacceptable levels of crime. Budgets are redrafted and the crime-fighting authorities are provided with a full range of resources which, over time, yield the intended results and the praise of the citizenry for the success of the police for bringing crime levels down to unprecedented levels. As the public becomes comfortable in the stability of low crime levels, attention drifts to other community issues which become the focus of the local leaders. Here is where the problem begins. Police officials are forced to justify their budgets and are inherently handicapped by being unable to quantify their services. At the end of the day, the typical police department does not produce a product. It cannot stand proud next to an item and say, “this is what we produced with the taxpayer’s dollars.” It is nearly impossible to quantify all the crime that was deterred or the incidents that were made less severe had the police not been there. The police are ipso facto put on the defensive and find themselves on a slippery slope down towards budget cuts. The funds that once helped them combat crime are now put into other priorities within the community and after time, crime rates gradually go up again.

This is essentially what is happening in Japan among the voting public with regards to U.S. forces stationed in Japan, primarily on Okinawa. The problem is that both nations cannot gamble the analogous scenario at a national level. This argument should not be looked upon as the U.S. military being the “police force.” More accurately, the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance is the “police force” and the U.S. military is one of the many budgetary items. This force continues to maintain stability and deterrence in the region and makes potential adversaries pause before acting aggressively, such as on the Korean Peninsula or in the Taiwan Straits.
B. 9/11 SHAPES THE ENVIRONMENT

Commodore Perry’s arrival into Edo Bay (Tokyo Bay) in 1853 sparked what became known as the Meiji Restoration, which officially began in 1868. The arrival of Perry’s “black ships” began a period during which Japan wrestled with its policy of sakoku or seclusion and its inferior technology that could not resist Western imperialism, which was carving up parts of East Asia in the mid-19th century and that led to the imposition of unequal treaties upon Japan by the United States in 1854 by Perry and again in 1858 with the American Counsel Townsend Harris. Once Japan found its direction, it sought to modernize by adopting Western technology, reorganizing its society, and changing its structural norms in order to prevent further unequal treaties and protect its sovereignty. ¹

The events of September 11, 2001 and the subsequent United States led global war on terrorism seem to have put Japan in a position similar to that brought about by Perry 150 years ago. Just as Perry’s arrival forced Japan to deal with tough issues, 9/11 has forced Japan to debate and assess its future global role as an economic superpower, a position in which it cannot assert its political power without contributing more than just cash. The effects of 9/11 have caused the United States to accelerate the transformation of the U.S. military and to ask Japan to participate more in its own defense and the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance by sharing more risk.

Revising the Japanese Constitution is not a new issue and has been a subject of debate for many years in Japan. The consequences of 9/11 and the breach of the 1994 Agreed Framework by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) in 2002 changed the importance of this issue and reinvigorated the debate process in Japan, becoming the source of pressure for the Japanese to reconcile their ambiguous position with regard to the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance as articulated in the previous section.

Prior to the terrorist actions on September 11, 2001, Stephen E. Duke argued that, “…it is not a matter of if but when Japan will revise its current peace constitution to revise Article 9 and make Japan a normal nation capable of collective defense and

meeting the responsibilities of a true alliance.”

Duke assessed political and domestic trends shaping the debate of constitutional revision in Japan. The following sections and chapters assesses the effects since September 11, 2001 and focuses on the implications for U.S. forces on Okinawa, where 60 percent of U.S. forces in Japan are based.

C. CALCULATING NATIONAL DIRECTIONS

1. Background on Japan’s Constitutional Debate and Defense Issues

After the 1991 Persian Gulf War, Japan experienced a backlash from the international community, which expected more assistance from the economic giant in defeating Saddam Hussein’s army. Japan eventually contributed 13 billion U.S. dollars to the war effort but realized that this contribution was looked upon as checkbook diplomacy and was not what the world expected from the second largest economic power. Criticism of Japan’s role in the 1990-1991 Persian Gulf War first stunned the Japanese public for the lack of appreciation by the world community. But it also caused the Japanese to realize that they enjoyed a security blanket and prosperous way of life that they were not required to defend with Japanese blood.

This realization in Japanese society caused the Government of Japan (GOJ) to study how it could participate in and contribute to in global affairs commensurate to its economic power. The result was a review on the restrictions of the Japanese Constitution, specifically Article 9, which states:

Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based in justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation.

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3 There are roughly 45,000 U.S. military personnel and 54,600 civilian personnel and family members based in Japan under the sub-unified command of U.S. Forces Japan (USFJ), subordinate to U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM). Of that, about 27,000 military personnel or 60% and, 26,000 family members and U.S. civilian employees are based in Okinawa. This information is compiled from various Department of Defense websites and from http://usfj.mil; Internet; accessed 12 August 2004. These calculations are corroborated by Okinawa Prefectural Government (OPG), see OPG. OPG Online [home page on-line]; available from http://www3.pref.okinawa.jp/site/view/contview.jsp?cateid=14&id=589&page=1; Internet; accessed 23 July 2004.


and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes. In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.\(^6\)

After decades of living under this constitution, many Japanese had been effectively pacified and did not believe in their right to exercise collective defense, thereby espousing a pacifist position. Recognizing that Japan’s political and diplomatic role in world affairs could be marginalized should it continue with the image of checkbook diplomacy, the GOJ convened a commission, “the Ozawa Commission,” to study the issue and recommend a way ahead.\(^7\)

Japan’s ruling party (Liberal Democratic Party (LDP)) chairman at the time, Ichiro Ozawa, favored allowing the JSDF to participate in United Nations peacekeeping operations (UN PKO) and interpreted the Japanese Constitution as not prohibiting the Japan Self-Defense Forces from such missions, citing the constitution’s preamble; “…we shall secure for ourselves and our posterity the fruits of peaceful cooperation with all nations…”\(^8\) The result was the International Peace Cooperation Bill, also known as the peacekeeping operations bill or “PKO Bill,” which was passed into law by the Japanese Diet in June 1992 and gave the “legal authority for the JSDF to participate in all UN peacekeeping operations.”\(^9\) Since 1992, the JSDF has been actively involved in UN PKO missions, starting with the dispatch of an engineer battalion to Cambodia for the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC).\(^10\) Since then, the JSDF has participated in about ten UN PKO missions throughout the world in places such as Central America, the Middle East, Africa, India and elsewhere.

During the 1990’s, Japanese financial contributions along with participation in UN PKO missions may have been acceptable for the international community considering the constraints of the Japanese Constitution. But internal debate on the restrictions of Article 9 did not fade away. Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi

\(^7\) Ishizuka, 11.
\(^8\) Borton, 490.
\(^9\) Ishizuka, 13.
campaigned on the issue of constitutional revision among other major issues concerning
the Japanese in 2001 and again in 2004. After 9/11 and the subsequent United States led
global war on terrorism, the constraints of the Japanese Constitution became a
dominating issue in Japan and between the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance.

2. Japan Participating in its Own Security?

As Duke professed, “it is not a matter of if but when Japan will revise or
reinterpret its constitution to authorize Japanese forces to participate in collective
defense.”

This is what essentially occurred in July 2003, when the Japanese Diet
passed a series of special measures bills allowing the JSDF to participate in the United
States led, not just United Nations led, global war on terrorism in Operation Iraqi
Freedom (OIF). Although the JSDF is limited to overseas development assistance
(ODA) missions, this reinterpretation of the constitution was a colossal step forward for
Japan as it allowed Japanese forces to deploy outside Japan without UN sponsorship for
the first time since 1945.

In the aftermath of 9/11, Prime Minster Koizumi’s efforts to promote
constitutional revision picked up steam and engendered the LDP Research Commission
on the constitution. Other political parties in Japan have joined in, establishing their own
constitutional research teams. Polls indicate that the Japanese are ready to revise the
constitution, specifically Article 9, but polls also indicate that governmental institutions
may be going faster than the public is prepared to go (see Appendix A). The military
attaché at the Embassy of Japan in Washington, Colonel Takeo Yamaoka, points out the
paradox that up until the 1990’s Japan was extremely slow in evolving its defense policy


12 The JSDF provided logistical assistance to U.S. forces during Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in
Afghanistan under a different agreement called the Acquisition and Cross Servicing Agreement (ACSA).
The ACSA sets forth a framework concerning the reciprocal provision of supplies and services between the
Self-Defense Forces of Japan and the U.S. Armed Forces. The ACSA, previous to the revised April 2004,
applied to bilateral exercises and training, United Nations peacekeeping operations, humanitarian
international relief operations and operations in response to situations in areas surrounding Japan. The
amended ACSA of April 2004 version, applies to a wider range of activities, such as (1) operations in
armed attack situations or situations in which an armed attack is expected, and (2) operations to further the
efforts of the international community to contribute to international peace and security and to cope with
large-scale disasters or for other purposes. The provision of supplies and services by the Self-Defense
Forces of Japan requires a domestic legal basis for each of its activities. See MOFA. MOFA Online [home
and focused on its fast running economy--what he explained as “the tortoise” (defense policy) and “the hare” (the economy). However, since the adoption of the “PKO law” in 1992, the growing nuclear weapon threat of North Korea since 2002, the threat of terrorism after 9/11 with the subsequent passing of the anti-terrorism Special Measures Law in July 2003, and passage of the Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq Law in December 2003, coupled with the downturn of the Japanese economy in the 1990’s, the “hare” has now become defense policies and the “tortoise” is the economy.13

These advances in defense issues may be too fast for the Japanese public to adjust to. The Self-Defense Forces are attempting to help the public catch up by gaining their attention and educating them on military and defense matters. Years of the public not paying attention to defense issues have caused some turbulence, as polls show that the Japanese demonstrated some ambivalence regarding the dispatch of JSDF personnel to Iraq (see Table 1) and the risks in defense of Japanese interests (see Table 2). Furthermore, Table 3 suggests a split in the Japanese public to fight and defend their country should a threat manifest within or towards the Japanese home islands; evidence that generations of Japanese who have grown and lived under a “peace constitution” for over a half a century has had interesting effects.

Table 1. **Polls in Support or Not in Support of the SDF Dispatch to Iraq**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*From:* Compiled by author from various sources as noted below, June 2004.14

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14 December 2003, taken and reported by the Mainichi Shimbun on 26 January 2004. First set of January 2004 data, taken by the Yomiuri Shimbun in a Japan nationwide face-to-face public opinion survey conducted 24-25 January
Table 2. Should the SDF Withdraw if Casualties are Sustained in Iraq

\begin{center}
\begin{tabular}{c c c}
\hline
Year & Yes & No \\
\hline
2004 Feb & 54 & \textbf{38} \\
2004 Mar & 55 & \textbf{37} \\
2004 Sep & 80 & \textbf{17} \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{center}

From: Compiled by author from various sources as noted below, September 2004.\textsuperscript{15}

Table 3. Sense of Moral Duty to Defend Japan

\begin{center}
\begin{tabular}{l c}
\hline
If Japan were attacked, do you feel you have a moral duty to fight to defend your country, or do you not feel this way? \\
\hline
Have moral duty to fight & 47\% \\
Do not feel this way & 30 \\
Don’t know & 23 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{center}


\textsuperscript{15} February 2004, taken by Kyodo News on 6-7 February 2004 in a telephone-based opinion survey across Japan and reported in the Tokyo Shimbun on 8 March 2004. March 2004, conducted on 6-7 March 2004 in a telephone-based public opinion survey with the aim of calling a total of 1,000 voters across Japan on a computer-aided random digit sampling (RDS) basis. Answers were obtained from 1,070 persons and reported in the Mainichi Shimbun on 8 March 2004. June 2004, conducted 12-13 June 2004 in a telephone-based public opinion survey with the aim of calling a total of 1,000 voters across Japan on a computer-aided random digit sampling (RDS) basis. Answers were obtained from 1,054 persons and reported in the Yomiuri Shimbun on 15 June 04. September 2004 survey was conducted September 27-28 over the telephone on a computer-aided random digit dialing (RDD) basis. This RDD formula chose people for the survey from among all eligible voters throughout Japan on a three-stage random-sampling basis. Effective answers were obtained from 972 persons (55 percent) and reported Asahi Shimbun on 29 September 2004.
Table 1 is closely related to Japanese public support for Prime Minister Koizumi (see Table 4), which explains the LDP’s tenuous ability to stay in power after the July 11, 2004 Upper House elections, in which the LDP lost a seat and the main opposition party, the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) or Minshuto, gained twelve seats. Table 4 demonstrates Koizumi’s waning support on domestic issues such as slow pension or social security reform in an aging society, scandals within his cabinet, and other issues such as security. The LDP does not maintain a majority in the Japanese Diet, but Koizumi is able to keep his post thanks to the coalition the LDP has with the New Komeito party. After weathering two elections, Koizumi has expressed confidence about continuing his reforms in several press briefings.

Table 4.  **Polls Demonstrating Support for Prime Minister Koizumi’s Cabinet**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Method</th>
<th>Sample Size</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Mar</td>
<td>Telephone</td>
<td>Nationwide</td>
<td>March 2004, conducted on 6-7 March 2004 in a telephone-based public opinion survey with the aim of calling a total of 1,005 voters across the nation on a computer-aided random digit sampling (RDS) basis. Answers were obtained from 1,070 persons and reported in the Mainichi Shimbun on 8 March 2004.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Jul 05</td>
<td>Telephone</td>
<td>Nationwide</td>
<td>5 July 2004, conducted by Nikkei Research between 30 June and 4 July 2004 by telephone. The poll targeted all males and females, 20 years-old and over, across Japan, on a computer-aided random digit dialing (RDD) basis or otherwise on a telephone directory sampling (TDS) basis. On an RDD basis, a total of 9,055 households with one or more eligible voters were called in Tokyo, Kanagawa, Chiba, Saitama, Osaka, Fukuoka, and Okinawa, and answers were obtained from 4,919 persons or 54.3 percent. On the TDS basis, a total of 29,900 persons...</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Although polls indicate that the Japanese are ready for constitutional revision, “the Japanese Diet has not clearly identified Japanese national security interests and how they are to be ensured, due primarily to the schism between conservatives and leftists over basic national policies during the Cold War.”

Koizumi’s narrow victory in July 2004 and the decline of support in his cabinet and its efforts towards reforms may prove to stall the constitutional revision effort. The issue of revising the constitution, especially Article 9, will not go away, however. Lessons from the experience of the global war on terrorism are already being examined by the Japanese.

In 2003, Koizumi directed the Japan Defense Agency (JDA) to review the National Defense Program Outline (NDPO). The purpose of the NDPO is to prescribe a defense policy for Japan taking into account the current international context for preserving the sovereignty and peace of Japan in accordance with the constitution and the “three non-nuclear principles.”

The motive for reviewing Japan’s defense is to assess and adjust its capabilities to deal with terrorists and ballistic missiles. Anything more will require a revision of the constitution or, as was done in 2003, a reinterpretation of the constitution followed by the introduction of special measures laws.

The Japanese Diet, the LDP and the opposition parties have all established research commissions to draft proposals for revision of the constitution. Even the private sector has taken interest in constitutional revision. Groups such as the Japanese Business

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21 In 1976, The Japanese Government signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and officially declared the adoption of the Three Non-Nuclear Principles, introduced by Prime Minister Sato during his premiership between 1968-1972, which refers to the principles of “not possessing nuclear weapons, not producing them and not permitting their introduction in Japan.” Han Jiang asserts in Beijing’s Zhongguo Guofang Bao 13 April 2004 article titled, “Is Japan Allowing US Nuclear-Powered Aircraft Carrier To Enter Its Port?” that Japan may be signaling its willingness to abandon its Three Non-Nuclear Principles due to the presumed introduction of the nuclear-powered CVN-77, USS George Bush to the 7th Fleet based in Yokosuka Naval Base, Tokyo Bay as the USS Kitty Hawk’s replacement in 2008.
Federation (Keidanren) have inaugurated study groups. The key controversial issue is Article 9 of the constitution, which Deputy Secretary of State Richard L. Armitage stated has become an obstacle for Japan to use military power to provide for its collective defense and become a more “normal country.” The slow and deliberate bottom-up decision-making process intrinsic of Japan has manifested in the process of constitutional revision. The absence of a revised constitution is prohibiting the government from adopting a strategic roadmap with regards to becoming a “normal country” by shaping its military for providing for its collective defense. Japan holds the initiative in this regard while the United States searches for the best recipe in terms of force structure in East Asia, anticipating a unified Korea, peacefully or forcefully, and a revised Japanese Constitution. Chapter V contains options for the governments of Japan and the United States to adopt with respect to the U.S. force structure in Japan.

3. The Pentagon’s Transformation and its Relationship to Japan

Transformation in DoD is not new. However, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfield institutionalized it shortly after President Bush took office in January 2001 and directed a bottom-up review of DoD. The U.S. Army, under General Shinseki’s leadership took a progressive approach towards transforming its “heavy” divisions, built for fighting the Soviet Army in the European theater, into lighter expeditionary brigades. The Air Force also looked at becoming more expeditionary and had already developed stealth aircraft, among other initiatives, which have been shaping the battlefield for years now. The Navy and Marine Corps have been leading the way in transforming capabilities that are based on the requirements of anticipated future missions. Shortly

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23 In accordance with international law, collective defense is the right to use force to stop armed attack on a foreign country with which it has close relations, even when the state itself is not under direct attack. See, JDA, “National Defense Program Outline,” JDA Online [home page on-line]; available from http://www.jda.co.jp/e/policy/f_work/f_work Him; Internet; accessed 6 April 2004.

24 The term was first used by Ichiro Ozawa and refers to the division of labor in economic terms. This term has mutated in meaning as occidentals have used it in various ways to describe Japan’s international and political situation. Takehiro Funakoshi, First Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Embassy of Japan Washington, DC stated during an interview on 12 May 2004 that officially, the Government of Japan has never used the term “normal country” since it has never considered itself abnormal.


26 Former Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army under President Clinton and Secretaries of Defense William Perry and William Cohen.
after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, DoD released its report on the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), which advocates more of a capabilities-based, joint-operating military.27

The 2001 QDR shifts away from the 1997 QDR strategy of fighting two major theater wars (MTW)28 and synergizes all the prior efforts of the armed forces to transform in accordance with one roadmap and places tasks and goals for each service on four pillars--strengthening joint operations, experimenting with new approaches to warfare, exploiting U.S. intelligence, and developing transformational capabilities through increased and wide-ranging science and technology.29 Prior to this, the services had their own ideas on how to transform and struggled with breaking the old school of large land armies built to fight a rival superpower in favoring lighter, task-organized units.30 Furthermore, Secretary Rumsfield raised the stakes by challenging each of the services to structure themselves to deploy to a distant theater in 10 days, defeat an enemy within 30 days, and be ready for an additional fight within another 30 days, yielding Rumsfield’s “10-30-30” objective.31

The groundwork for establishing broader national direction was laid in the September 17, 2002 National Security Strategy of the United States of America. In it, the President outlined America’s international strategy, commitment to work with other nations to defuse regional conflicts, and echoed the transformation of DoD and other

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28 Charles M. Perry and Toshi Yoshihara, The U.S-Japan Alliance: Preparing for Korean Reconciliation and Beyond (Everett, MA: Brassey’s, 2003), 167.

29 Ibid., 32.

30 As an observer at the U.S. Army Transformation War Game (ATWG) held at the U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA., between 22-26 April 2002, I took note of top ranking U.S. Army leadership from various commands such as Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Commanding General, General Abrams and others, and many retired generals invited as senior mentors, wrestle and passionately debate over what priorities the Army must take to transform and to what it must transform into in order to meet the future needs of the United States. Marine representatives interpreted the Army’s approach as a clear challenge to the Marine Corps, as the Army sought to become light and expeditionary and tied to more naval capabilities as the Marines. Additionally, Marine representatives witnessed the lack of buy-in from the Air Force to transform to meet the Army’s future airlift requirements.

national security institutions to meet the threats of the twenty-first century.\textsuperscript{32} In these two documents, the United States is set for the course Washington will take. \textsuperscript{33} This may assist the Japanese in finding their own way toward developing a strategic outlook for its own defense, which may include the reinterpretation or revision of their constitution.

When assessing the transformation of DoD and its implications for the constitutional debate in Japan and for the JSDF, other issues must be considered. Most notable is the disproportional distribution of U.S. forces in Japan, specifically in the 47\textsuperscript{th} prefecture of Japan--Okinawa. Chapter III will lay out the details of the unequal distribution of forces on Okinawa and the burden assumed by the Okinawans. In an April 2004 visit to Japan, Vice President Richard Cheney stated:

\textbf{The United States is considering transforming its forces on the global scale. U.S. forces might be realigned in the next several years. We would like to give consideration to the sentiments of residents (near U.S. bases in Japan), who are eager to end the friction.}\textsuperscript{34}

This is not a new policy for the United States with respect to its forces in Okinawa, as the December 2, 1996 Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) Final Report did exactly what the Vice President said. However, this now indicates that U.S. forces throughout all of Japan will not be excluded from the DoD global transformation in spite of the slow progress in Japan’s constitutional debate. All units and bases will be reviewed.

Finally, another issue closely related to the DoD transformation process is the base realignment and closure (BRAC) process, which is influenced by the Pentagon’s Integrated Global Posture Basing Study (IGPBS). BRAC originally focused on military bases within the United States without regard to the outcome of the IGPBS. But, it was later determined that BRAC decisions relative to U.S. military bases could and should not


\textsuperscript{33} In 2004 the Secretary of Defense released the National Defense Strategy (NDS) of the United States of America which contained the goals and objectives of the 2001 QDR and the President’s 2002 National Security Strategy of the United States of America. On 13 May 2004, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff released the National Military Strategy (NMS) of the United States of America which provides guidance on the strategic direction of the Armed Forces of the United States of America and serves to implement the Secretary of Defense’s NDS.

\textsuperscript{34} \textit{Yomiuri Shimbun} (Tokyo), 14 April 2004.
be made without knowledge of future world-wide positioning of forces. The IGPBS is a study of how DoD should be positioned and structured overseas. Specifically IGPBS was engendered to determine what should be CONUS-based and what should be forward deployed.35

According to Christopher Johnstone, country director for Japan, Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), bringing these two national processes together officially commenced in December 2002 with the “2 plus 2” meeting and the subsequent informal talks dubbed the Defense Policy Review Initiative (DPRI). These informal bilateral talks provide a five-phase structure for Japanese and U.S. officials to share ideas on how the alliance should proceed. The details of the process are not public, but the phases consist of, first, reviewing strategic developments in Asia and ensuring that both sides agree with the current situation; second, a discussion of roles and missions in context of the alliance; third, a discussion of military force structure in Japan (U.S. and Japanese); fourth, a discussion of bases; and lastly, a discussion of managing local issues with local communities. At the time of this writing, the bilateral talks are in phase three.37 (See Appendix B for a diagram on how these national transformational processes are related).

4. Tailoring Transformation for U.S. Forces in Asia

At of the time of this writing, evidence of U.S. forces transforming in Asia includes the announcement of the U.S. Army’s 2nd Infantry Division moving further south, away from the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) and away from North Korean artillery

35 Brigadier General W.J. Williams, Assistant Deputy Commandant, Installations and Logistics (Facilities), Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, Washington, DC, during an interview by author, Washington, DC, on 14 May 2004, stated that much of BRAC analysis should be completed prior to the U.S. Presidential election in November 2004 but the approval of the outcome and the follow-on process may be contingent on the election should a new administration take office. Additionally, BGen Williams indicates that the Pentagon is experiencing “push back” from the Congress who believes that due to the current war of terrorism and other pressures and world events, the U.S should not engage in the BRAC process at this time; however, DoD believes that there is excess physical capacity with regards to bases and facilities and wishes to conduct the BRAC process to better transform DoD and efficiently use existing bases, facilities, and structure.

36 “2 plus 2” refers to the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of State meeting with Japan’s Minister of Foreign Affairs and Director General of the Japan Defense Agency.

range in the Republic of Korea. Additionally, other indications are the relocating of the U.S. Army’s First Corps from Fort Louis, Washington to Camp Zama, Kanagawa Prefecture, Japan and a possible realignment of the command structure at USFJ.

In proposing options to DoD for U.S. force structure in Asia, specifically in Japan, in accordance with the 2001 QDR and the national security strategy, it is important to identify the factors which influence changes in Asia. Perry and Yoshihara have identified four main factors. First, “any U.S. involvement in a high-intensity conflict would severely strain America’s ability to fulfill its other commitments.” Second, “the possibility that adversaries could attempt to deny U.S. military access to overseas bases and forward-deployed forces will become an increasingly [complicated] problem.” Third, “the emergence of the Asia-Pacific region as a principal theater of operations…will play a major role in shaping the Pentagon’s new strategy.” Fourth, “the operational environment in which U.S. forces will be fighting in the twenty-first century will be radically different from that of the Cold War era.” I would add a fifth: U.S. forces stationed overseas, particularly in Asia where young Americans are not as culturally or ethnically familiar with the Japanese and other regional countries, as they are with Europe, must adopt a fundamental change in how they operate and contribute to the community of their host nation. All of these strategies and factors must be part of the formula for reaching the best options for U.S. military presence in Japan.

D. EQUAL BURDEN-SHARING EQUALS RECIPROCITY

There are many variables which the Japanese are considering in the debates about constitutional revision. Recurring questions are the issues of reciprocity and burden-sharing. United States Secretary of State Colin L. Powell and Deputy Secretary of State Richard L. Armitage have both said publicly that Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution is an obstacle to strengthening the U.S.-Japan alliance. Both of these top U.S. diplomats have stated that the issue of constitutional revision is a matter for the Japanese themselves.

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40 Perry and Yoshihara, 167-168.
to decide. Furthermore, both have stated that the United States supports Japan’s permanent membership on the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and that there is no linkage between revising Article 9 and UNSC permanent membership.

The Japanese are seriously wrestling with this issue because in many regards they realize there is a linkage. All permanent Security Council members are required to use military force for the good of the international community, something that the Japanese are restricted from doing by their constitution. A remedy to this issue being examined by Ichiro Ozawa of the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) is to create a special UN standby force. The DPJ is in favor of constitutional revision, but its views of revision differ from the views of the LDP. Essentially, the DPJ advocates a revision of the constitution in order to allow the JSDF to use force on overseas missions based on UNSC resolutions. A special UN standby force would be the result and would remedy the issue of reciprocity by participating in collective security. An analysis of this option concludes that this course of action is predicated on a viable U.S.-Japan Security Alliance as the cornerstone of Japan’s defense and suggests that Japan would not want to exercise collective defense and make a more reciprocal alliance with the United States.

Another remedy that may gain more attention is reinterpretation. Osaka University postgraduate Professor Kazuya Sakamoto states that “Article 9 of Japan’s constitution only prohibits Japan from using force-or threatening to use force- as a means of settling international disputes. That’s why I see no need to revise the constitution.” Under careful analysis, this “reinterpretation” allows Japan to use force for collective defense, which is recognized by international law to be Japan’s right. This implies however, that the force Japan may use and under what conditions it may be deployed must be thoroughly articulated and possibly made into law.\(^\text{42}\) In some respects, defining the force and parameters for using force under the existing constitution may provide little change from the status quo.

As the debates progress, it appears that many in Japan aim to internationalize the JSDF in proceeding toward a more reciprocal relationship with both the United States and with the United Nations. To do this, constitutional reinterpretation or revision is

\(^{42}\text{Sankei (Tokyo), 29 July 2004.}\)
required. Japan also seeks a permanent seat on the UNSC, and to do this many believe they must reinterpret or revise their constitution. Japan’s restrictive constitution handicaps it from projecting the diplomatic and political influence it could have, considering its economic power. These were not objectives during the Cold War, as Japan focused on economic reconstruction under the security blanket of the U.S-Japan Security Alliance. This alliance, however, put Japan in a position where its foreign policy was subordinated to that of another country. Japan realizes that this is in part due to the security alliance not being reciprocal with the United States, as it is between the United States and the members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

Considering this and the emergence of China and India as economic competitors, Japan wishes to be in a position to influence and participate more effectively in world affairs. As a result, polls indicate that most Japanese citizens and lawmakers believe that a change to the Japanese constitution is required. Along these lines, former Chief Cabinet Secretary Yasuo Fukuda connected the deployment of JSDF troops to Iraq in early 2004 with Japan’s national interests. Fukuda stated:

> It’s extremely important for Japan to give lots of attention to relations with other countries. Japan, a resourceless island nation, sells good quality products it manufactures using other countries’ resources and then sells to other countries. This has been the major driving force to support the Japanese economy. For this reason, the world needs to be stable and peaceful. We must think hard about whether it is a good thing for Japan to stand on the sidelines. Japan’s responsibility for the international community is being tested.  

A vexing situation for Japan with respect to constitutional revision is its relationship with the United States. Many in Japan worry that should the constitution be revised to provide for the use of collective defense, the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance would evolve into a more reciprocal alliance by which Japan may be committed to supporting the United States in trouble spots throughout the globe. Furthermore, many believe that not changing the constitution to do more, as Fukuda asserts above, may leave Japan alone when its time of need comes.

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E. THE CHALLENGES OF THE JAPAN DEFENSE AGENCY

Based on trends and developments of the 1990’s and considering the historic dispatch of JSDF personnel to Iraq in 2004, this section examines some of the challenges of the JSDF. The leitmotif in this section is that even with a reinterpreted or revised constitution permitting Japan to exercise collective defense, the JSDF is not at the level of readiness to replace the capabilities of U.S. forces in Japan.

Ostensibly, besides the size of forces, the gap in technology and equipment is the most salient difference between the JSDF and U.S. forces. Primarily, and as a result of the pacifist constitution, the JSDF does not have aircraft carriers, long range strategic bombers, offensive long range ballistic missiles, high altitude spy planes, or other major armaments associated with offensive warfare. However, in light of the North Korea nuclear weapons threat (see Chapter IV) ballistic missile defense (BMD) has become a goal as announced by Prime Minister Koizumi at the Japan-U.S. summit meeting on May 23, 2003, and as indicated in a formal decision by the Japanese Cabinet on December 19, 2003. The Japan Defense Agency’s Mid-Term Defense Program (MTDP) for FY2001-FY2005 recognized that Japan must address the “growing proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles,” but it was not until after the first round of the six-party talks on August 28, 2003, when North Korea suggested it had nuclear weapons that Tokyo became more active in BMD development. As a result, the Koizumi Cabinet directed the JDA to work with the United States to develop the technology of building “its own [layered] BMD system through upgrading and joint operation of currently deployed destroyers equipped with the Aegis system and the Patriot surface-to-air missile systems.”

Current gaps in the BMD of Japan is that Japan cannot provide a round-the-clock shield against ballistic missile attack due to logistical limitations and the impossibility of keeping their few Aegis ships out to sea for more than a month at a time. Along these

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44 Defense of Japan 2003, 383.

45 Aegis, which means shield, is the U.S. Navy’s latest surface combat system. Aegis was designed and developed as a complete system, capable of engaging in simultaneous warfare on several fronts -- air, surface, subsurface, and strike. Anti-Air Warfare elements include the Radar System AN/SPY-1B/D, Command and Decision System, and Weapons Control System.

lines, U.S. forces in Japan will begin in 2005 by assisting Japan with patrolling the Sea of Japan with Aegis destroyers loaded with Standard Missile III (SM-3) intercept missiles, until the Japanese BMD system is better developed with the introduction of the FPS-XX radar, which is forecasted for 2007.\textsuperscript{47} The FPS-XX is a warning and control radar system which uses electronic scanning to control the orientation of electromagnetic waves and designed to detect ballistic missiles, such as North Korea’s \textit{Nodong}.\textsuperscript{48} Furthermore, Patriot Advanced Capability III (PAC-3) units in Japan can not cover all of Japan’s islands and as a consequence, they cover only certain cities and military installations. Hence, Japan is developing their future BMD system by up-grading their Aegis-equipped ships, the future FPS-XX radar, SM-3 and PAC-3 systems. The BMD gap highlights the importance of the U.S-Japan Security Alliance, an alliance which is providing the capability to cover this gap. Even if the Japanese Constitution is reinterpreted or revised sooner rather than latter, this type of assistance under the security alliance will still be required until Japanese BMD technology and equipment is fully developed and tested.

A Special Forces capability is an area that the Japanese began to address in 2004. In light of the rising threat of international terrorism the JDA announced on March 29, 2004 the creation of a new 300-man, Special Operations Group (SOG) of the JGSDF based at Narashino in Chiba Prefecture, near Tokyo. The SOG is under the direct control of the director-general of the JDA in dealing with terrorist and guerilla attacks. Additionally, the JGSDF reinforced the 1\textsuperscript{st} Airborne Brigade with 400 more troops and modifying their mission to augment the SOG. These are steps in a direction to give Japanese leaders more capabilities and options to deal with emerging threats to their homeland. These units have the potential to evolve into expeditionary forces and become the core Japanese forces for overseas special operations missions, but they are still too small and too inexperienced to address the wide spectrum of potential missions and they lack joint training and military-to-military relationships.


In accordance with Japan’s 1995 NDPO, the JSDF began to restructure from 180,000 to 160,000 troops of which 145,000 are active-duty. Furthermore, the JSDF has reorganized its force levels from 13 divisions and 2 combined brigades to 9 divisions and 6 brigades, evidence of an emphasis to become lighter and more capable of addressing different threats. The purpose of those reforms was to “provide high quality and [a more] effective” JSDF.49 With the current review of the NDPO, Koizumi is looking at furthering the “JSDF transformation” with downsizing heavy weapons systems and shape a leaner, more technologically savvy fighting force. With a reinterpreted or revised constitution, an adjustment in the U.S-Japan Security Alliance where Japan will assume a larger role in burden-sharing should be anticipated. As a result, Japan will have to review its force levels in order to meet the challenges of an expanding role of participating in its own defense.

Closely linked to personnel strength is the requirement for advanced equipment and technology for precise and efficient use of a leaner force. Apart from the nuclear umbrella, Japan lacks large budget items found in the American inventory and currently available to Japan’s defense. This effectively handicaps Japan from dropping the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance, even with a reinterpreted or revised Japanese Constitution. Although there is little doubt that Japan could acquire items such as amphibious shipping and vehicles, maritime prepositioning squadrons (MPS) and other types of combat shipping, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV), and stealth aircraft, including space-based reconnaissance systems, it would take years to obtain and competently employ them. Additionally, besides the many items currently being developed by the United States as part of its military transformation, such as tilt-rotor aircraft, Japan lacks a self-contained expeditionary force with the logistics to conduct up to 60 days of continuous combat operations without re-supply, a capability offered only through the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance. Even though Japan actually has a technologically advanced military, the United States is still way ahead in terms of command, control communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) and many research and development (R&D) efforts focusing on network-centric warfare, which is causing a

49 JDA, *JDA Online* [home page on-line]; available from [http://www.jda.co.jp](http://www.jda.co.jp); Internet; accessed 6 April 2004.
“digital divide” between the United States and Japan, including other allies.\textsuperscript{50} The Pentagon’s accelerated transformation of U.S. forces after 9/11 may outpace Japan’s defense evolution, possibility validating a greater need for the alliance which contains many capabilities and advantages for both nations, even with a reinterpreted or revised Japanese Constitution.

It is conventional wisdom that Japan could launch a massive recruitment drive in a sluggish economy and purchase or manufacture many of the items listed above, including nuclear weapons.\textsuperscript{51} However, the intervening variable is in joint training and the competence required for interoperability in expeditionary and low-intensity to mid-intensity conflicts intrinsic to post-Cold War threats. The JDA has already identified the deficiency of “jointness” and announced in the \textit{Defense Program for FY2003: An Overview}, that the JDA will enhance joint operational capabilities. Japan’s SDF conducted joint training in early 2004, the first joint exercise since 1998, which exposed the lack of experience and interoperability of the three services of the SDF. Fundamental differences must be worked out, such as map reading, communications and computer systems, practicing takeoff and landing of JGSDF aircraft on Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) shipping, and military terminology indicative of a required crawl, walk, run approach, to become a streamlined joint force as Koizumi envisions. Consequently, the development of BMD will compel the JSDF to modernize and integrate their roles in critical areas.\textsuperscript{52} Japan has taken a monumental first step in addressing this deficiency by creating the post of Joint Staff Chief (JSC) in Japanese fiscal year (JFY) 2005, which is different from the current JSC chairman, who acts only

\textsuperscript{50} \textit{Defense of Japan} 2003, 41.

\textsuperscript{51} Serving in the JSDF is not very popular in Japan. An example is when 82 JGSDF members were asked not to wear their uniforms and change into civilian attire upon their return to Japan via Narita International Airport in Tokyo from ODA missions in Iraq on 7 August 2004. In a 12 June 2004 \textit{Asahi Shimbun} poll, 48% of the Japanese public answered that the SDF is close to the public with 50% giving negative answers. Additionally, 11% of the Japanese public believes that the SDF is currently unconstitutional, while another 49% say the constitution should be amended to allow for the SDF’s existence. The U.S. Department of State, \textit{Office of Research}, Opinion Analysis, “An End to Japanese Pacifism?” by James S. Marshall, reported on 20 August 2003 that seven-in-ten (68%) thought that the SDF should continue to emphasis disaster relief as their primary mission. Interestingly, more Japanese (58%) believe that the SDF should protect the nation from attack, up from 45% in 2000, prior to 9/11.

as a liaison. The incumbent of the new post will actually be in command of the three SDF services and will also control personnel management and the budget.\textsuperscript{53}

This section underscores the importance of maintaining a strong U.S.-Japan Security Alliance, even with a reinterpreted or revised Japanese Constitution allowing for Japan to exercise collective defense and accepting a wider burden-sharing role. Furthermore, in addition to exercising collective defense and providing for its homeland security, other activities such as participation in collective security operations and PKO missions with the United Nations will test Japan’s resolve to participate more in global affairs. Should the Japanese reject this role in the future, the U.S-Japan Security Alliance remains as their insurance policy to fall back on. This option will be kept open by Tokyo because, as outlined in previous sections, the Japanese public may not be ready to follow the pace of change that the Japan Defense Agency is advocating.

\textsuperscript{53} Takeo Yamaoka, Colonel, JGSDF, Military Attaché, at the Embassy of Japan, Washington, DC, interview by author, 12 May 2004.
III. OKINAWA’S BURDEN

A. BACKGROUND

Okinawa’s rich and exotic history spans centuries of documented trade and strife and is replete with tales of farmers repulsing invaders, engendering the art of karate. Okinawa, the main island of the Ryukyu (Liu-ch’iu in Chinese) island chain, south of Kyushu, Japan was the center of the former Ryukyu Kingdom, and the town of Shuri was its capital. Okinawa is “inhabited by a people who in language and culture are a variant of the Japanese people,” and are identified today as the largest minority in Japan. The former Ryukyu Kingdom, with its own distinct line of kings, had tributary relations with China for centuries. It continued under tight control after it was subjugated by the Shimazu daimyo of Satsuma, Kyushu, Japan and ruled as a vassal domain since 1609. In 1879, shortly after the onset of the Meiji Restoration, Japan claimed the 160 islands which make-up the Ryukyu island chain as Okinawa Prefecture, the 47th prefecture of Japan, and eventually made Naha City on the main island of Okinawa the prefecture’s capital.

From April to June 1945, Okinawa was the site of the last battle of World War II, with mop-up operations continuing into August that year. In 1940, the population on the island of Okinawa was 435,000, and in the Battle of Okinawa, a tragic 130,000 Okinawan civilians were killed in the crossfire. In 2004, the population of Okinawa prefecture is estimated at 1.3 million people living on fifty islands with the majority on the main island of Okinawa.

There are countless memorials, scarred landscape, and stories recalled by aging war survivors who are constantly reminded of war by the incessant sight of American and Japanese military bases on Okinawa. The American bases have remained in one form or

55 Ibid., 409.
another since 1945. To the surprise of the Okinawans, bases remained even after reversion of Okinawa to Japan in 1972 following the 1969 Nixon-Sato Summit.

Among the U.S. military forces stationed on the 66 mile long island are all four branches of the U.S. Armed Forces. The majority of the forces are Marines, followed by the Air Force, and small numbers of Army and Navy personnel. The major units are the III Marine Expeditionary Force (III MEF) of roughly 18,000 Marines on Okinawa with additional subordinate units in mainland Japan, and the Air Force’s 18th Wing of about 7,000 airmen.\footnote{Kadena Air Base, Kadena Air Base Online [home page on-line]; available from \url{http://www-02.kadena.af.mil/18wg/staff/18wgpa/PAWeb/facts.htm}; Internet; accessed 25 May 2004.} The Army’s 10th Area Support Group has over 1,000 personnel and the Navy’s Fleet Activities, coupled with naval personnel assigned to the U.S. Naval Hospital and administered under a separate chain-of-command on Okinawa, total several thousand naval personnel. The total number of U.S. military personnel on Okinawa fluctuates slightly, but tends to be under 30,000 active-duty members with about 24,000 family members and civilian personnel.\footnote{USFJ, USFJ Online [home page on-line]; available from \url{http://usfj.mil}; Internet; accessed 12 August 2004.}

This history and these facts trigger Okinawans to see themselves as a Japanese colony leased to the United States. Okinawans host over 60 percent of U.S. forces in Japan and provide 75 percent of the land required for bases in Japan, but Okinawa itself only accounts for 0.6 percent of the total land mass of Japan.\footnote{OPG, “Basic Thoughts on Military Base Reduction and Realignment,” OPG Online [home page online]; available from \url{http://www3.pref.okinawa.jp/site/view/contview.jsp?cateid=14&lid=592&page=1}; Internet; accessed 16 August 2004.} However, when considering all the bases and facilities required for U.S. forces in Japan, joint use facilities in mainland Japan is the intervening variable, and as a result, the statistics change to only 23.5 percent of the total land required for U.S. bases in Japan is actually in Okinawa. Nevertheless, this actual or perceived unequal distribution of forces between mainland Japan and Okinawa has resulted in Okinawans accusing Tokyo of selling them out. While the rest of Japan expresses sympathy for Okinawa, it espouses a not-in-my-backyard attitude towards relieving Okinawa of some of the U.S. military bases. Over the years, Okinawans have called this unequal distribution of forces, consumption of
scarce land, incidents and accidents involving U.S. military personnel and other problems, real or invented, a “burden.” Okinawans assert that they have shouldered an unequal share of the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance, which provides a security blanket for all of Japan, for too many years and that this burden must be lessened if not equally shared by mainland Japan.

B. UNCOVERING PERCEPTIONS

1. The “Connect-the-Dots” Experience

Okinawans have articulated the burden well over the years by enlightening visitors of their “connect-the-dots” experience. The incumbent governor, Keiichi Inamine, explains the experience as a series of incidents and accidents caused by or involving U.S. military personnel dating back to 1945. A visitor may perceive local attitudes towards an incident or accident as disproportionate to the case, too emotional, and simply an over-reaction. However, Okinawans will see the case as the latest in a long string of similar incidents and accidents, some of which, from the Okinawan perspective, had been brushed aside and gone unpunished by American officials acting in accordance with an antiquated Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA).

An example of the “connect-the-dots” experience is the crash of a U.S. Marine Corps CH-53D Sea Stallion helicopter into Okinawa International University on August 13, 2004. Okinawans connect this crash with a U.S. Marine Corps UH-1N helicopter crash on Camp Hansen in July 1998; a U.S. Air Force F-15 jet crashing after take-off on Kadena Air Base in April 1994; a U.S. jet crash into an Okinawan’s house in December 1961 resulting in deaths and injuries; and finally a U.S. military airplane’s crash into an

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61 Eleven percent of all the islands which comprise the Prefecture of Okinawa are used for U.S. military bases and facilities. On the actual main island of Okinawa Prefecture, which is the island of Okinawa, 19 percent of the land is used for U.S. military bases and facilities.

62 Along with the “connect-the-dots” experience, the SOFA is just another irritable issue which Okinawans believe they receive the “short-end of the stick” because they have a larger and more concentrated military presence than other prefectures in Japan. Many Okinawan and mainland Japanese officials have joined and called for the revision of SOFA because they see it as allowing extraterritorial privileges and for it being forced upon Japan at a disadvantageous time. The current SOFA is a result of Article VI of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United States of America signed on 19 January 1960 in Washington, DC.
elementary school in June 1959, resulting in the deaths and injuries of many Okinawan children.\textsuperscript{63}

The “connect-the-dots” experience fuels a victimization sentiment that blinds Okinawans to any other perspective. This is evident when Americans who are killed or injured in accidents while in service of the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance receive little to no public concern from Okinawans.\textsuperscript{64} Instead, Okinawans focus their efforts on drawing attention to the “constant” danger Okinawans are subject to, seeming to completely disregard the Americans lives that were at risk. Their diverted attention is the alibi they use for their indifference towards American lives, but the irony is that these actions are actually contrary to the commonly recognized benevolent character of individual Okinawans.

2. The Lack of Continuity

On the U.S. side, there is a lack of continuity on the issues that make-up the burden of Okinawa. A cause for this appears to be the short amount of time many U.S. service members serve on Okinawa and in mainland Japan. This is particularly true for the Marine Corps, which deploys units from the United States to Okinawa on six-month cycles under the unit deployment program (UDP). Additionally, most other Marines who serve on Okinawa report there with individual orders for a one-year tour of duty in which they join their unit on Okinawa. These lengths of service on Okinawa serve operational and administrative purposes; however, they fail to create the buy-in needed to become a part of the local community and thus, good neighbors. Chapter V examines the need and efforts of the Marine Corps to create more community buy-in from its Marines, especially the younger Marines who spent shorter amounts of time on Okinawa. Nearly half of the


\textsuperscript{64} The safety and well-being of the pilots and crew of the 13 August 2004 CH-53D helicopter crash and, past similar events, on Okinawa received token public concern from Okinawans.
entire U.S. military population in Japan is 25 years old or younger and many are concentrated on Okinawa with short tours of duty.

The lack of continuity is also prevalent among senior military personnel. Due to the very nature of high operational tempo and needs of the individual services, personnel frequently rotate billets and are unable to foster mature, professional relationships with local officials. Furthermore, constant rotation of billets effectively handicaps the ability to create the in-depth knowledge and expertise required to handle delicate issues rooted in deep historical context and perpetuates the perception that the U.S. military lacks consideration for the interests of the local populace. This perception undermines gestures of good will and attempts to be a good neighbor by the U.S. military.

3. No Direct Benefits Realized

Through in-depth dialogue with Okinawans, it becomes apparent that an overwhelming majority of Okinawans do not realize the direct, tangible benefits of having U.S. forces stationed on Okinawa. Over 12,000 Japanese nationals on Okinawa are employed on U.S. military bases, either funded by the Government of Japan or the United States government, or through non-appropriated funded (NAF) activities, such as Morale, Welfare, Recreation (MWR) and other similar organizations. For the most part, these are well-paying jobs with handsome benefits and are fiercely competed for by the local populace. Okinawa prefecture suffers from high unemployment—7 percent, while the rest of Japan is at 4.6 percent. There are many other tangible economic benefits that Okinawans do appreciate and enjoy which is a direct result of U.S. forces being stationed on Okinawa. It is estimated that U.S. military presence injects about $1.4 billion into the Okinawan economy or at least 5 percent and as much as 10 percent of Okinawa’s Gross Prefectural Product (GPP).

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67 The Okinawa Prefectural Government’s most up-to-date and available public report on the impact of the U.S. military presence on the prefectural economy is six years-old (1998), which reports that the U.S. military presence accounts for 5 percent of the gross prefectural product. See, OPG, OPG Online [home page on-line]; available from http://www3.pref.okinawa.jp/site/view/contview.jsp?cateid=14Sid=658&page=1; Internet; accessed 2 October 2004. A 1999 study by the Nansei Shoto Industrial Advancement Center indicates that U.S. presence could account for 10 percent of the GPP.
Regardless of the lucrative financial and other appealing opportunities U.S. forces bring to Okinawa, the situation is absorbed as a matter of routine and is played down by the inability for the local populace to compare and contrast their economic situation without U.S. forces there. Current generations of working-age Okinawans possess no experience of life without U.S. forces on Okinawa, over 59 years. Therefore, it is quite simple for the idea to germinate that Okinawans do not benefit in proportion to having 60 percent of Japan-based U.S. forces stationed on the small tropical island. There is a declining number of Okinawans and mainland Japanese who remember the days of war and subsequent threats from the former Soviet Union which were deflected by the security umbrella cast by the United States. Furthermore, younger generations of Okinawans have little comprehension of the costs of freedom, which is in stark contrast to the older generation who were caught in the crossfire of the last battle of World War II. This is partly due to the lack of formal education on this subject throughout Japan and also due to very low levels of Okinawans serving in Japan’s Self-Defense Force and therefore most Okinawans possess no direct knowledge or experience of the challenges to preserving their freedoms from external threats.

Present-day Japanese opponents of the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance recognize these cultural subtleties and have cleverly retarded progressive drives for better understanding of the direct contribution to Okinawans by U.S. forces by exploiting accidents and minor incidents and using them to invalidate all positive community contribution, participation, and interaction. These often minor events are seized upon and gradually mutate into invented problems which eventually overshadow the benefits of having U.S. forces on Okinawa. The maxim “all good deeds are undone by one bad deed” fits perfectly here, except the presumed bad deed is often distorted.

An example of an invented incident was the case of an alleged .50-caliber machine-gun round fired from a U.S. Marine Corps range (range 10, in the Central Training Area) and landing in a farmer’s pineapple field in northern Okinawa in June 2002.68 The incident caused a storm of complaints by Okinawan community leaders of the hazards of Marine Corps training on Okinawa. This prompted Marine Corps officials to host a briefing and demonstration of the safety measures taken by the Marine Corps for

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Okinawan community leaders and investigators in order to ease their safety concerns posed by conducting live-fire on the training ranges. The investigation concluded that there were “no witnesses nor scientific evidence to prove that it was a stray round from [Marine Corps] ranges,” and leaving many officials, both American and Japanese, to believe that the .50-caliber machine-gun round was very old and perhaps a war remnant.

The actions taken by U.S. Marine Corps officials in response to the stray round incident of 2002 may have been seen as unnecessary, frivolous and inconvenient. However, they demonstrate a growing trend among U.S. officials in Okinawa to make the extra effort in order to alleviate concerns expressed by the local populace and community leaders. These extra efforts taken by U.S. officials to alleviate concerns raised from probable invented incidents indicate an overall reversal of how the complaints of Okinawans are handled. In the past, Okinawans’ calls for explanations and changes were greeted by U.S. forces and Government of Japan officials with references made to the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty and the Status of Forces Agreement. These bureaucratic responses were perceived as the standard and stagnant party line attached to lofty ideas that hold no significant meaning to the common Okinawan. As a result, some Okinawans felt that their complaints were not taken seriously. Today, many Okinawans still feel that their complaints are not taken seriously, which may contribute to consternation among a larger segment of the Okinawan community when another incident or accident occurs, no matter how significant or whether real or invented.

4. The Economic Contribution of U.S. Forces

Closely related to the above section and one that aggravates the situation on Okinawa and the Okinawans’ relationship with Tokyo is the economy. Okinawa’s main industry is tourism, which prior to 9-11 was only susceptible to inclement weather, but now vulnerable due to the fear of terrorism directed at the U.S. military bases. Furthermore, Okinawa has the lowest per capita income in Japan. As of 2001, Okinawans average nearly half the income of those who live in Tokyo. This is

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69 Kaori Martinez, GS-11, Community Relations Specialist, AC/S G-5, Marine Corps Base, Camp Smedley D. Butler, during an e-mail interview on 20 September 2004.


compounded by the highest unemployment rate in Japan, as previously reported. The lack of well-paying full time employment is a problem for Okinawa. This is indicated by the fact that Okinawa has the highest ratio (6.2 percent) in Japan for those who have changed a job and is in the top five prefectures in Japan for those who have quit a job due to low wages and benefits. The Okinawa prefectural government and the U.S. military are the top two full-time employers on Okinawa. Okinawans acknowledge that the bases provide jobs, contracts and construction, land rental, and spending by U.S. military personnel totaling a contribution of 5 to 10 percent of Okinawa’s Gross Prefectural Product (GPP). These data actually demonstrate that U.S. military bases are not the “burden” they are made out to be, but actually contribute something practical to the local community. However, those who are more vocal in opposing the bases focus on the disparity between Okinawa, the poorest prefecture, and the rest of mainland Japan by using figures such as the above employment and per capita income numbers. Politicians highlight them also and use them as bargaining chips in order to gain concessions from Tokyo. The politicians and others who are more vocal in opposing U.S. military presence are the minority in Okinawa and find that being vocal in opposing U.S. military presence has its benefits. A farmer whose land was used to build Kadena Air Base protests annually to Tokyo, “not that he really wants his land back…but to pressure the [central] government to increase his compensation check.”

5. Inter-Service Discord and its Influence on Public Opinion

There is yet another factor which is rarely discussed but shapes the perception on who is the irritant in the security alliance--American inter-service discord. Although discord is mild, it is embarrassingly noticed by Japanese and Okinawan officials. In an interview conducted by the Japanese newspaper Mainichi with the former director-general of the Japan Defense Agency, Mr. Shigeru Ishiba had this to say about Secretary Rumsfield’s push to do something about Marine Corps Air Station Futenma, “…I believe in the Defense Department, there are forces opposing reform.”

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75 Mainichi (Tokyo), 08 April 2004.
shed light on an issue which may be becoming more obvious. As the Marine Corps searches for ways to “lessen the burden” on Okinawa and transform with the rest of DoD, the Air Force on Okinawa may not be embracing change and may be clinging to antiquated basing models.

Through in-depth observation and conversations with many Japanese, and Okinawans alike, I detected an attitude which ranked the U.S. Armed Forces in a hierarchy, in traditional Confucian76 manner. Hiroshi Kitamura wrote about this sense of hierarchy and its psychological derivatives in his 1971 publication, *Psychological Dimensions of U.S.-Japanese Relations*. Kitamura stated, “the first element is the Japanese tendency to view their foreign relations hierarchically, in terms of “high” and “low” (jo ge kankei), just as Japanese usually view their personal relations.”77 Polls between December 1992 and November 2000 clearly demonstrate that Okinawans desire the return of the U.S. Air Force’s Kadena Air Base above all others.78 However, the results of these polls do not manifest in official demands to remove the Air Force from Okinawa, why? It may be due to the U.S. Marine Corps’ larger footprint with many smaller bases, called camps, spread throughout the island. With bases and camps spread throughout the island of Okinawa (see Figure 1), the Marine Corps is the largest target upon which to anchor anti-base movements. There is yet another dimension to this-- it is that the Air Force is seen as too formidable to deal with by Okinawans.

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76 Confucianism concerns itself with humanistic ethics and virtues. A touchstone of Confucianism is the promotion of organizing society into an order of hierarchical authority with an emphasis on status.


Figure 1. U.S. Military Bases on Okinawa
(From: Facilities Engineer’s, Marine Corps Base, Camp Smedley D. Butler)
Hideomi Kinoshita of Kyodo’s, Washington, DC Bureau stated that the Japanese, including Okinawans, see the U.S. military services through a Japanese cultural filter that ranks them in a hierarchical ladder, validating Kitamura’s assertions. Kinoshita stated that the Japanese rank the Navy on top, followed closely by the Air Force and then by the Army. According to Kinoshita, the Marine Corps holds a distant last place, as it is seen as the paradigm of militarism and brings back bitter memories of Imperial Japan which pitted Okinawans in the middle of the fiercest battle of the Pacific Campaign in World War II.79 Okinawans are not anti-American but they are anti-military and still live with the harsh memories of World War II. The U.S. Marine Corps’ intense warrior-like subculture is an affront to Okinawans and as a result the Marines are relegated to an inferior status. Reinforcing Japanese views of higher status is the ability for the Japanese to point to the seat of authority for USFJ on Yokota Air Base and take note of the top U.S. military leader in Japan, commander of U.S. Forces Japan, as always being an Air Force general, who is also the commander of 5th Air Force.

Kinoshita stated that these views are not openly discussed because many Japanese find it difficult to excuse this type of discrimination. I also found that there are mixed feelings among Japanese towards the Marines in Japan, where there is an overwhelming sense of admiration for the Marines Corps as an institution. Many nationalist-minded Japanese who espouse the culturalist perspective towards national structures recognize that the U.S. Marine Corps possesses a proud fighting legacy and upholds a code of core values reminiscent of the revered samurai code; however, this is not the fashionable position to take openly in pacifist Japan.

Okinawans also put a lot of meaning into localized actions, such as how Kadena Air Base officials forbid Marines to patronize Air Force enlisted clubs, fearing outbreaks of fights amidst bravado talk mixed with intoxication, but the same restriction is not imposed on airmen at Marine enlisted clubs. Okinawans are also amused by Air Force and Marine officials being split regarding the enforcement of liberty control measures for U.S. service members on Okinawa. For example, the common denominator in crime and incidents involving U.S. service members on Okinawa is intoxication and underage consumption of alcohol. One example is the Air Force’s imposition of the alcohol

consumption age of 20, consistent with Japanese law, but the Marine Corps enforces U.S.
alcohol consumption age standards on its members—21.

The absence of a Marine attaché at the U.S. embassy in Tokyo until the
establishment of the position in January 2002 may have also marginalized the advocacy
of Marine issues in Japan in the past. The Marine Corps had no official liaison with the
Political Affairs branch of the Japanese Defense Agency and was essentially hedging for
proper representation from the naval attaché at the U.S. embassy in Tokyo and through
Headquarters USFJ. A Marine Corps press release said, “the Marine Corps decided [in
1998] that it would be best for the Marine Corps to have a Marine representative in the
U.S. embassy to present [the Marine Corps] point of view... [such as its] large presence
and SACO...” Dissension came in the form of voices within DoD reasoning that Japan
did not have a Marine Corps and therefore there was no reason to have a Marine
liaison.80

During a command brief at Headquarters USFJ in the summer of 2001, there was
an inaccurate portrayal of the political and social situation facing U.S. forces on Okinawa
that included a negative emphasis on the Marines, similar to what is heard in biased
portions of the Japanese media. This USFJ command brief was the same brief given to
key U.S. government leaders who had little exposure and no continuity regarding U.S.
forces in Japan and travel there for fact-finding and familiarization. Upon hearing the
brief, Marine Brigadier General, Timothy R. Larsen81 requested a review of the brief to
reflect the true and accurate situation on Okinawa and invited the key staff of USFJ to go
to Okinawa for familiarization tours and briefs on a regular basis.

Over the years, Okinawans have framed their opinion on which service offers the
path of least resistance by finding “ammunition” to protest against. The U.S. Marine
Corps has been singled out and “ammunition” derives from its larger footprint, higher
number of troops, and other military subcultural issues. The point here is that these
perceptions among voting Okinawans have shaped their view on which is the dominant
military service and therefore harder to protest against, and which is the weaker.

80 Press release abstract provided by Colonel David P. Rann, Marine Attaché, American Embassy
Tokyo during an e-mail interview on 18 April 2004.

81 At that time, Brigadier General T. R. Larsen was the Commanding General of Marine Corps Base,
Camp Smedley D. Butler and Deputy Commander of Marine Corps Bases Japan which consists of all the
Marine installations in Okinawa and mainland Japan.
Okinawans’ attitudes towards the different branches of the U. S. Armed Forces shape their overall opinion, and this public opinion is reflected in polls and votes. Politicians study polls and those who appeal to the individual voter’s perceptions and beliefs will most likely win their vote. Many local politicians in Okinawa campaign on base issues. Although it has been found that extremely negative campaigning against U.S. military forces has not won many votes, more moderate campaigning has. One-issue candidates campaigning on an anti-base theme are not winning elections for mayor, nor for governor. Conversely, the “moderates” who do win elections find no adverse public relations fallout to viscerally criticize U.S. forces and make consistent calls for SOFA reform among other demands. In June 2003, Mayor Iha won his office as mayor of Ginowan City in Okinawa on the pledge of a total reversion of the Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Futenma within five years.

In sum, this type of discord is not alien within DoD and has existed on Okinawa since the last battle of World War II took place there in 1945. It is noted here for the sole purpose of acknowledging that it influences a Confucian-based society and shapes its demands at the expense of the Marines. Discord within DoD, no matter how subtle, adds to psychological distortion and the understanding of this dynamic will enable us to “appreciate the differences in their [Okinawan] ways of thinking and patterns of behavior, but also to understand the motives and decisions behind them. This is important to keep in mind when the option for integrating Marine Corps Air Station Futenma, which is encroached by the congested city of Ginowan, into Kadena Air Base is


83 The 1996 SACO Final Report already provides for MCAS Futenma to be returned to the Government of Japan; however, the Governor of Okinawa insists on a 15-year use limit which has stalled the process.

84 Mainichi (Tokyo), 13 April 2004.

85 American Inter-service rivalries were strong during World War II in the Pacific “Island-hopping” Campaign. The commander of the U.S. landing force (U.S. Tenth Army comprised of Army and Marine units) on Okinawa in 1945 was U.S. Army Lieutenant General Simon B. Buckner. Buckner represented the inability among some commanders to appreciate the different strengths and capabilities each service possessed. As a result, at times the different services were not properly synergized and employed. For details of inter-service discord in the Battle of Okinawa, see Nicholas Evan Sarantakes, Keystone, (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2000), 3-23.

86 Kitamura, 36.
examined in Chapter V. Underscoring this issue is an article which quoted Masahide Ota, House of Councilors member and former Governor of Okinawa, in a Japanese newspaper that he recalled discord between the U.S. Air Force and Marine Corps when listening to U.S. Forces Japan Commander, Air Force Lieutenant General Thomas C. Waskow, during a speech regarding MCAS Futenma and Kadena Air Base consolidation at the Japan Press Club in August 2004.87

C. TILLING THE FIELDS OF ANIMOSITY AND DISCONTENT

1. The Japanese Media, Incidents and SOFA

The Japanese media, particularly on Okinawa, warrant attention as they are likely to degrade the views towards U.S. forces. “The influence of the press on Japanese public opinion and also on political circles is substantial…”88 Professor Robert D. Eldridge of Osaka University recognized the tendency of the local media in Okinawa to report effectively from the “viewpoint of local residents, particularly under adverse conditions,” but added that constant reporting of only negative issues and no coverage of issues that would place U.S. forces “in a favorable light” open the Okinawan media to claims of being biased.89

An example of how the media unfairly and prematurely cast a negative light on U.S. forces is when a U.S. service member is suspected of committing a crime and is in U.S. custody. It begins with Okinawa Prefectural Government officials undermining the orderly disposition of suspected or actual criminal offenders as outlined in the SOFA, in accordance with Article VI of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States of America and Japan, by demanding the transfer of custody of a suspected individual before indictment by the Japanese courts as required by the SOFA. Okinawa Prefectural Government officials make this demand anticipating the U.S. response to be unfavorable and citing proper and agreed upon procedures as stipulated by the SOFA. The local press actually exploits this opportunity to aggravate Okinawan opinion by playing on their emotions and reporting incomplete information. Many

87 Nihon Keizai (Tokyo), 5 September 2004, 2.
Okinawans and mainland Japanese alike are not familiar with the details of the SOFA and are thereby prejudiced against U.S. military presence when they hear or read pejorative details such as the “refusal” of U.S. military authorities to transfer custody of a suspect without reporting the context of the refusal or the procedure agreed to in the SOFA.

The transfer of suspects and the handling of incidents and crimes, among other issues are the sources for calls to revise the SOFA. Actually, both the U.S. and Japanese governments agree that the SOFA should be revised with respect to how it is implemented, but both sides have such different perspectives and views on the contents and scope of the revisions that very little is done to satisfy both sides. As a result of the 1995 abduction and rape of an Okinawan schoolgirl by U.S. servicemen, U.S. authorities agreed to transfer the custody of individuals suspected of having committed heinous crimes, such as murder and rape, prior to indictment by Japanese courts, called “sympathetic consideration.” Following the 1995 rape incident, the U.S. and Japanese governments agreed to the formation of the 1996 Special Action Committee on Okinawa, which addressed eight other SOFA related issues.

Today, calls for SOFA reform are as loud as ever, citing the crash of a Marine Corps CH-53D Sea Stallion helicopter on August 13, 2004 and the subsequent handling of the crash scene. Again, OPG officials and the media criticized the U.S. military for its handling of the incident and accused the U.S. side of infringing on the sovereignty of Japan by not allowing Japanese authorities to examine the wreckage, which was on Japanese territory. Just as in the custody-related issue as described above, OPG officials and the media failed to explain and report the agreed upon procedures requiring the U.S. side to take control of the incident scene and the wreckage. The “connect-the dots” syndrome that Okinawans experience when they hear of another aircraft crash and how it


91 In accordance with the Protocol to Amend Article XVII of the Administrative Agreement, signed at Tokyo on 28 February 1952, under Article III of the Security Treaty Between the United States and Japan, agreed view number 20 was approved and effective on 22 October 1953. Agreed View No. 20 states, “In those instances where United States military aircraft crash or are forced to land on public or private property outside facilities and areas in use by the United States Armed Forces, appropriate representatives of the United States Armed Forces shall be permitted to enter private or public property without prior authority, provided that every effort shall be made to avoid unnecessary damage to such private and public property…”
was handled in the media encourages local officials to press for more compensation in order to “lessen the burden.”

2. **In Search of Okinawa’s Goal**

Chapter II charts the basic intent of how DoD wants to transform; however, the United States does not know how Japan’s Self-Defense Force will evolve until the constitutional debate stabilizes into a more certain path. As the United States transforms along the policies described in Chapter II and as Japan seeks to clarify its future direction, Okinawa must define how to remedy the “burden” caused by the large number of U.S. forces on Okinawa.

Proposing a viable solution to the burden has not been adequately addressed by Okinawan government officials. The OPG should adopt a policy which communicates a viable solution to addressing the “burden” caused by the stationing of U.S. forces in Okinawa for over a half century. This is not likely to happen because the issue of U.S. forces on Okinawa is a political tool which Okinawan office seekers use to gain attention, and it will continue to be portrayed as a touchstone issue in order to ensure Okinawa remains politically relevant in Japan. Supporting this assertion are the actions of the OPG after it had agreed on the relocation of MCAS Futenma to Henoko, in northern Okinawa, in 1999. After many of the key issues regarding the relocation of MCAS Futenma appeared to embark on a positive path based on agreement, Governor Inamine stalled the whole process by insisting on adding a 15-year use limit to the new facility,

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92 Other contemporary issues which Okinawans cite as a reason to revise SOFA are issues regarding noise pollution, violations of the Parking Space Law, soil contamination, and payment of claims among other “illegal” privileges cited by Okinawans and mainland Japanese alike drawing reference to imperialist-imposed extraterritorial privileges.

93 Takehiro Funakoshi, First Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Embassy of Japan Washington, DC stated during an interview by author, Washington, DC, on 12 May 2004 that the official Government of Japan position is that “lessening the burden” equates to no one specific remedy and should be considered on the individual issue on a case-by-case matter. Essentially, in some cases “lessening the burden” may equate to land return while in other cases it may equate to troop reduction or other remedies.

94 On 16 November 2003 OPG submitted a petition to visiting U.S. Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfield, on only generalized measures for the U.S. military to take to “lessen the burden.” OPG is yet to adopt an official resolution and communicate it to GOJ or USG on how to systematically “lessen the burden.” See, OPG, “Promoting Resolution of Issues Concerning U.S. Military Bases on Okinawa, “ OPG Online [home page on-line]; available from http://www3.pref.okinawa.jp/site/contents/attach/4587/Petition20031116.pdf; Internet; accessed 17 August 2004.

thereby creating more political mileage. After the 1996 SACO Final Report\textsuperscript{96} appeared to adequately address the concerns and demands of Okinawans, eight years later it appears from the voices of the political elite in Okinawa that efforts of the 1996 SACO did virtually nothing.

In addition to gaining economic and other concessions from Tokyo and Washington, Okinawan officials have been encouraged to maintain their focus on base issues as they have received more attention from national leaders from both Japan and the United States in the past ten years than ever before. Washington may have galvanized Naha’s rhetoric by sending national leaders to pay visits or office calls to the governor of Okinawa instead of keeping them oriented towards Tokyo.

Okinawa is dependent on economic assistance from Tokyo and will always cling to the U.S. base issue as a political expedient in leveraging concessions from the central government and, to some degree-- the United States. As long as the economic standards are lower than in mainland Japan, Okinawa will make demands to “lessen the burden,” and permanent solutions to issues or problems, which may be unrealistic goals of occidental officials involved in East Asian affairs, will be difficult to find. If both governments fail to grasp and maintain continuity regarding this issue, then policymakers may be swayed from the core issues and adopt the perspective of a casual bystander or observer. To the unsuspecting bystander and casual observer in the United States and mainland Japan, this political game of \textit{kabuki},\textsuperscript{97} portrays U.S. forces, particularly Marines, as an irritant to the security alliance. Adopting this position may erode and damage the real capabilities of the security alliance to deter aggression.

In sum, a key finding in this thesis is that Okinawans contend that they never had a say about the basing of U.S. forces on their small island and, as a result, believe they have been marginalized by Tokyo and Washington. In other words, this is an “arranged marriage” between Okinawa and the U.S. military by Tokyo and Washington. This understanding should assist the U.S. side and mainland Japanese to empathize with

\textsuperscript{96} The 1996 SACO Final Report addressed 27 initiatives in four categories including eight SOFA initiatives, three operations and training initiatives, five noise reduction projects and eleven land return initiatives.

\textsuperscript{97} Stephen E. Duke, Lieutenant Colonel, USMC, Japan Desk Officer, Headquarters Marine Corps often refers to this process as a \textit{kabuki} play. \textit{Kabuki} is a traditional Japanese popular drama with singing and dancing performed in a highly stylized manner.
Okinawa’s past experiences, such as the memories of World War II which, for many Okinawans is in a perpetual state connected to the U.S. military presence and the occasional incidents and accidents. Knowing their past experiences, along with Okinawa’s lower economic standards compared with the rest of mainland Japan, will enable all concerned to understand why and how Okinawans make demands to “lessen the burden.”
IV. THE THREATS

A. TENSION IN THE LAND OF THE MORNING CALM

In March 2003, United States Senator Richard Lugar opened a hearing before the Committee on Foreign Relations and had this to say about regional implications of the changing nuclear situation on the Korean peninsula:

Given North Korea’s extreme isolation, in past years it has been tempting to deemphasize its impact on Northeast Asia outside of the Korean Peninsula. Commerce and economic development have moved forward in the region almost without reference to North Korea. But the continuation of North Korea’s nuclear weapons program will force its neighbors to adopt new security strategies—perhaps including the acquisition or repositioning of nuclear weapons… The North Korean nuclear weapons program could spark a Northeast Asian arms race that is fed by the interlocking anxieties of each of its neighbors.

At the time of this writing, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK/North Korea) poses the most menacing military and state-sponsored terrorist threat to the United States and its Asian allies.

1. Troubled Historical Backdrop and Mounting Animosities

After partially unifying Japan, Hideyoshi Toyotomi launched an invasion of Korea in May 1592 which was repulsed. Bruce Cumings’ book, Korea’s Place in the Sun, recalls a second attempt by Japan which was launched in 1597 which was also repulsed but at great expense to the Korean “Choson” state. The Koreans aided by the Chinese drove off the invading Japanese, but not before the Japanese took the ears of tens

98 The English name for Korea, “Land of the Morning Calm,” is an attempt to lend relationship to China or the “Middle Kingdom,” and Japan or the “Land of the Rising Sun.” This is done in order to suggest that the tensions in the Korean peninsula are not contained within the peninsula, but in fact affects other countries throughout the Asia-Pacific region.


of thousands of Korean and Chinese soldiers back to Japan and buried them in Kyoto until they were unearthed and returned to Korea as recently as 1994.\textsuperscript{101}

Many people believe that in order to understand the cultures and people of East Asia one must see them through the filter of Confucianism. Although there is validity in this, one need not use Confucian teachings as a crutch to understand how events that occurred centuries ago, as explained above, can be relived and agitate relations between Koreans and Japanese today.

Fast-forwarding to the 19\textsuperscript{th} Century one will find the germination of contemporary animosities between the Korean people and its neighbors. As the Meiji restoration rapidly brought Japan into prominence, the Japanese became attracted to the European and American practice of colonialism. July 1894 marked the beginning of the Sino-Japanese War which essentially was a struggle for dominance over Korea. This war ended with the defeat of the Chinese and the sowing of a Meiji genre renovation in Korea at the hands of the Japanese.\textsuperscript{102}

Within a year of sweeping reforms and the Japanese backing of a palace coup which resulted in the murder of the queen and some of her court, Marius B. Jansen points out in his book, \textit{Japan and China: From War to Peace}, “the Japanese and reform became odious in the eyes of Korean upper classes.” \textsuperscript{103} Jansen also articulates how the Japanese mandate for Koreans to cut off the topknot of their hair, in order to follow a path to modernization, was met with stiff resistance and served as an anti-Japanese issue for Koreans to rally around. A year later in 1896, after the puppet Korean king sought refuge in the Russian legation in Seoul and turned against the Japanese, Russia and Japan entered into an agreement to withdraw their troops from Korea. This was followed by the 1898 Nishi-Rosen agreement to preserve Korean independence.\textsuperscript{104} This pause of Japanese domination served as a time to undo all that the Japanese “reformed” during their domination.

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{101} Bruce Cumings, \textit{Korea's Place in the Sun: A Modern History} (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1997), 77.
\item \textsuperscript{102} Marius B. Jansen, \textit{Japan and China: From War to Peace} (Rand McNally, 1975), 116.
\item \textsuperscript{103} Ibid., 118.
\item \textsuperscript{104} Ibid., 119.
\end{itemize}
The end of the 19th Century brought promise for the Koreans in that the Russians effectively placed the Japanese in check on the Korean peninsula and blocked any aspirations of economic gain through dominance. The situation however did not sit well with the Japanese. It was foreordained that Russia, which had penetrated Manchuria and northern Korea economically, would clash with Japan. This occurred in the 1904-1905 Russo-Japanese War, which concluded with the defeat of the Russian naval force at Port Arthur and the defeat of the Russian Army in Manchuria. Japan established a protectorate over Korea and began in earnest to restart reform to modernize Korea. In 1910, Japan annexed Korea as a colony.105

Koreans rejected Japanese influence believing that the Japanese were less cultured and descendants of Korea. Basically from the Korean perspective, everything good with Japanese culture and society derived from Korean and Chinese influence and therefore should interact with Korea in a filial manner. It offended the Korean standards of justice and Confucian filial obligations for the Japanese to press their will onto them. Here lies the seeds of contemporary animosities between Korea and Japan which persist today.

Stewart Lone and Gavan McCormack capture the intensifying animosity and feeling of inferiority in their book, Korea: Since 1850. Here they cite a Korean who expresses his ambivalent feelings about Japan’s victory over Russia in 1905 and the subsequent forced reintroduction of Japanese influence into Korea:

As a Korean, I have no special reason for rejoicing over the uninterrupted successes of Japan. Every victory is a nail in the coffin of Korean independence… Yet as a member of the Yellow Race, Korea—or rather I—feel[s] proud of the glorious successes of Japan. She has vindicated the honor of our race. No braggart American, no arrogant Briton, no vain glorious Frenchman, will be, from now on, able to say that the Yellow man is incapable of great things.106

Lone and McCormack explains this expression as ambivalence that has existed between Korean and Japanese relations, serving concurrently to provide Koreans with an incentive to catch up with their larger neighbor, but also reminding them of their relative

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economic and technological inferiority. This ambivalence would not be limited to Korea-Japan relations, as it currently haunts Republic of Korea (ROK/South Korea) and U.S. relations over how to deal with the DPRK and its current nuclear threat.

Imperial Japan would exercise Machiavellian control over the Korean peninsula for the next 35 years until their defeat in World War II by the Allied Powers. Annexation blackened Japan’s reputation in East Asia; Lone and McCormack succinctly capture this 35 year colonial rule:

..the Chinese press warned of similar Japanese designs on Manchuria, and even Japanese intellectuals acknowledged the failure of what for some of them had been good intentions. …contact with Japan had witnessed a mix of social chaos but expanding horizons; great wealth for some, impoverishment for others; growing violence and, ultimately despair. For better or worse, however, the traditional state and monarchy were no more. 108

Korean and Japanese rivalry which nearly always resulted in Japan’s dominance over Korea had lasting effects between them and is evidenced with the strain in relations following World War II. Cumings points out the quota system Japanese colonial leaders established for the so-called comfort girls. Cumings states:

…to understand the true horror of the “comfort women” issue, why it was covered up by Japan and also left alone for so many years by the South Korean government; to open up inquiry on this sexual slavery would be to find that many women were mobilized by Korean men. Japan fractured the Korean national psyche, pitting Korean against Korean with [lasting] consequences… 109

2. Partition and Shifting Animosities Towards the West

At the urging of the United States, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) entered the war in the Pacific by declaring war on Japan on August 08, 1945. As the ink was drying on the Instruments of Surrender in Tokyo Bay, Soviets were spreading into the Korean peninsula, driving the Japanese out. After the United States refused a Soviet role in the occupation of Japan, the Truman administration hastily

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107 Ibid., 42.
108 Ibid., 47.
109 Cumings, 179.
110 USSR declared war on Japan on 8 August 1945 but went into effect the next day, 9 August 1945.
devised a plan to limit the Soviet influence in Korea. Author and journalist Don Oberdorfer stated in a lecture on February 25, 2004 in Monterey, California that the United States was focusing on the occupation of Japan and was not prepared to deal with the Soviet spread into Korea. In the evening hours of an August night in 1945, two colonels from the War Department, one of whom was Dean Rusk, were instructed to draw a line across the Korean Peninsula where the United States and the Soviet Union would divide occupation duties. The Truman administration felt they did not have leverage to compel the Soviets to get out of Korea because they were already there, and not a single American soldier had even set foot into Japan yet for the Japanese occupation. Oberdorfer further stated that Dean Rusk wrote in his memoirs that he had no preparation for the task assigned and that he and the other colonel only had a *National Geographic* map to work on. They looked at the map and attempted to find a natural feature to use as a reference for the dividing line but could not find one, so they drew a line at the 38th parallel. The Truman administration subsequently announced that the United States would take the surrender of Japanese troops up to the 38th parallel and the Soviets down to this line. Stalin ordered his troops to stop at the 38th parallel as he did not want to have difficulties with the United States at that time. This line was supposed to be temporary, however a war fought between 1950-1953 did not change the boundary and over a half-century later the peninsula still remains divided.\(^\text{111}\)

The results of that late August night in Washington in 1945 sowed the seeds for two states. North Korea, which espoused the failed Soviet-brand of communism, is now limping along under a Korean-brand of Communism or Stalinism (totalitarianism). The Soviet Union had installed Kim Il-Sung, a guerilla leader who resisted Japanese colonial rule, and founded the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea on September 9, 1948. The other state is South Korea, which espoused a Korean-brand of the Western ideals of democracy and capitalism under the American sphere of influence. The United States ushered in and supported Syngman Rhee in the South and the Republic of Korea (ROK)


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was proclaimed on August 15, 1948. 112 Today, South Korea’s GDP per capita is 18 times North Korea’s and equal to the lesser economies of the European Union. 113

The Korean War was the first major Cold War battle. Kim Il-Sung convinced Moscow and Beijing that he could quickly unify the peninsula and launched an attack which formally began the war on June 25, 1950. The North made rapid gains and it seemed as if victory was at hand. The Americans had a hard time working with the South. Animosities were the culprit here in that the South Koreans believed that the United States treated them through a Japanese filter and therefore Japan had a hand, behind the scenes, in U.S. policy towards the ROK. Cumings cites conversations that General Wedemeyer had with Koreans in that many [Koreans] had turned to the left not because they liked communists but because they could not stomach pro-Japanese collaborators. The general was also told that “communists had their hold on people because of the memory of their anti-Japanese [positions]; communism here has been nurtured with the fertilizer of nationalism.” 114 The war ceased with an armistice on July 27, 1953 and established the demilitarized zone. The Korean War further complicated international relations between the United States, the United Nations, and Mao’s People’s Republic of China (PRC). China’s introduction to the war strained Sino-U.S. relations until the 1970’s and is still a reminder of their position regarding the two Koreas.

At the immediate conclusion of the Korea War there existed distrust and fierce animosities fueled by an orgy of national patriotism both in the North and South. Centuries old Korean distrust of the Japanese was strong; there was the loathing of Koreans by Japanese; there was the hate of the Japanese by the Russians, and the Japanese claim of the Kurile Islands unresolved with the Russians. The West experienced China’s tolerance for North Korea and the international community experienced Sino-U.S. and Soviet-U.S. relations entering a new visceral level. United States and ROK relations forged ahead and relations between the United States and the DPRK were virtually non-existent as they remain today. This was the reality of the Cold War.

112 Cumings, 200.
114 Cumings, 203.
There is yet another time of severe tension and strain between ROK and Japan relations with the 1974 assassination attempt of President Park Chung-hee by a Korean resident of Japan. The incident resulted in the death of Park’s wife and nearly broke off diplomatic relations between the two neighbors as Korea held Japan partly to blame for the incident. The incident was defused with the clandestine intervention of American diplomats.115

Another serious clash which underscores the continuing tensions and festering animosities was the killing of two American officers and beatings of other American and ROK personnel in Panmunjom’s Joint Security Area in 1976 by North Korean soldiers, known as the “tree cutting” incident. This incident infuriated the Ford Administration calling for North Korean blood. Intelligence confirmed that Kim Il-Sung had prepared his country for retaliation from the United States and readied the North for war. The U.S. fearing a general outbreak of war in Korea exercised restraint and eventually got an admission of regret from Kim Il-Sung. The United States did exercise an impressive show of force however, and did finish what the American and ROK personnel aimed to do the day they were attacked by axe and pipe wielding North Koreans—chop down a poplar tree which was obstructing the line of sight of American and ROK sentries.116 This incident over a tree highlights the depth of tensions and animosity that has prevailed since the armistice signing in 1953.

Tracing these patterns of animosity through history is important and relevant to this thesis. It adds clarity as to why certain issues are so difficult to overcome and resolve between the nations which today make-up the six-party talks. Anecdotes of animosity could be further articulated; however, it should be sufficient to have provided ample evidence of problems that seek vindication from all nations mentioned above.

Even though the Korean people as a whole find plenty of energy to indicted Japan on many past and present transgressions towards Korea, it is the Republic of Korea which looked the other way in order to open the path towards trade and economic prosperity with Japan. At the urging of the United States, the ROK sought to normalize relations with Japan in the mid-1960’s. This effort was achieved by Japan’s payment of “grants

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116 Ibid., 76.
and loans,” which the ROK accepted as reparations. Tokyo’s leaders insisted that the aid should not be labeled as reparations, as it would appear as if Japan had done something wrong. Nevertheless, other outstanding issues were worked out and a treaty which benefited the ROK was ratified by the ROK National Assembly on August 14, 1965.117

The U.S.-ROK-Japan relationship has been economically strong, but Japan’s government leaders have experienced many embarrassing cases of “foot-in-the-mouth disease,” which has agitated both Koreas and China. Cumings points out that many Japanese leaders cling to the idea that they did wonders for Korea during the colonial period, while issuing apology after apology to China, and to a lesser extent Korea, for Japan’s wartime behavior, a pattern that continues today.118 One example is when Takami Eto, lower-house member and former Japanese Cabinet minister, declared in 2003 during a speech at a political-party function that estimates suggesting 300,000 civilians were massacred by the Japanese army in the Chinese city of Nanking in 1937 and 1938 were “pure fabrication, a big lie.” Despite these hiccups, relationships between Japan and neighboring countries are peacefully thriving and there are signs that Japan and the ROK are attempting to bridge their past differences. Even within military circles there is evidence of mutual cooperation. The Japan-Korea young officers exchange program is a way to promote understanding and confidence between the Japanese Ground Self-Defense Force and the Republic of Korea Army (ROKA) through visits at units and exchange of opinions between young officers of both forces. Since 2000, the ROKA delegation has visited Japan three times. 119

Even though past animosities are present in daily life between neighboring countries in Northeast Asia, it is the DPRK which is the pressure-cooker that overheats and ignites crisis. The DPRK has no formal relations with the United States but holds a permanent mission at the United Nations in New York. It is here that this thesis will examine the current threat that radiates from the DPRK which is complicated by past animosities.

117 Cumings, 320.
118 Ibid.
3. DPRK’s Known Military Capabilities

The population of the DPRK is reportedly 22,466,481 120 less than half the population of the ROK and 1/7th of Japan’s. Yet, the DPRK is estimated to have a military half the troop strength of the United States’, which has a population of over 250,000,000. The Korean People’s Army (KPA) is the fifth-largest armed force in the world, just behind the PRC, the United States, Russia and India121 but is not even ranked in the top 25 most populous countries in the world. Additionally, the DPRK’s crippled economy is estimated to spend 33.9 percent of its GDP122 on the military, in support of the belief in keeping the “Army first.”

Through unclassified sources there is little data on the conventional capabilities of the KPA; however, what is known of the DPRK’s military strength has earned it the status of being the most militarized country in the world.123 In the past, the forward massing of troops along the demilitarized zone next to South Korea, the large army numbering 1.17 million active-duty personnel backed by a ready-reserve force of 7.45 million,124 improving missile technology, and concentration of artillery aimed at the South Korean capital of Seoul were the sources of anxiety. Today, the larger threat looming is the possibility of marrying the North’s developing missile technology with the unconfirmed nuclear weapon capability that the DPRK is believed to possess. This is the most troubling threat for the other states which make-up the six nations involved in talks with the DPRK. A volatile regime, which is isolated and diplomatically ostracized, bent on practicing brinksmanship to get what it wants; a nation which is economically strained with a hungered population, armed with nuclear weapons who would sell the weapons of

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123 Bermudez, 1.

124 Ibid.
mass destruction (WMD) to the highest bidder. In 2001, the DPRK earned $560 million in missile exports.\textsuperscript{125}

In 1994 the DPRK pushed the United States to the brink of war because it was using a Soviet-provided power reactor at Yongbyon to enrich uranium for making plutonium for nuclear weapons. Tensions receded with an agreement called the Agreed Framework between the United States and the DPRK. The United States suspected, but could not confirm, that the DPRK had enough time and unaccounted for material to have made one or two nuclear bombs. The United States knew that the DPRK had sought nuclear weapons technology, and knew that they asked the People’s Republic of China to provide it since Mao’s regime successfully exploded their 1\textsuperscript{st} nuclear device in 1964.\textsuperscript{126}

In October 2002 the United States Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs James A. Kelly confronted Kim Jong-Il’s regime with evidence that the North was defying the 1994 Agreed Framework by continuing the uranium-enriching program.\textsuperscript{127} Kim Jong-Il’s regime admitted to the breach and subsequently withdrew from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), expelled the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors, rendered IAEA’s monitoring devices ineffective and reopened the nuclear plant to make plutonium. This marks the beginning of the current crisis on the Korean peninsula.

Pyongyang announced that they restarted the Yongbyon reactor for the purpose of producing electricity; however, the five-megawatt reactor is not connected to any power grid.\textsuperscript{128} Complicating this matter is the DPRK’s proven short-range Rodong missiles which were test-fired into the Sea of Japan on February 24 and then again March 10, 2003. Prior to this, in August 1998 the DPRK had test-launched a Taepodong ballistic missile over Japan and into the Pacific Ocean. In December 2003, the United States intercepted a ship bound for Yemen loaded with North Korean Scud missiles, proof that the DPRK was willing to sell proven military technology. There is also evidence that the


\textsuperscript{126} Oberdorfer, 252.

\textsuperscript{127} Doug Bandow, \textit{Wrong War, Wrong Place, Wrong Time: Why Military Action Should Not Be Used to Resolve the North Korean Nuclear Crisis}. Cato Institute, 12 May 2003, 2.

\textsuperscript{128} Ibid.
DPRK is working on developing its Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile (ICBM), the Taepodong 2 program with ambitions for it to carry a nuclear warhead. All this evidence adds clarity to the DPRK’s activities (see Appendix C for a chronology of the DPRK’s threatening actions). The question that was being asked by many U.S. officials was how did the North obtain the technology to enrich uranium and produce plutonium? This of course is still being investigated but all leads points towards Pakistan’s Nuclear Energy Minister, Abdul Qadeer Khan (A.Q. Khan), who admitted in early 2004 to selling nuclear secrets to North Korea, something North Korea denies.

Since the DPRK was confronted with this issue, U.S. officials estimate that the North may have up to another five or six nuclear weapons for a total of six to eight, citing the removal and unaccountable 8,000 spent fuel rods from the Yongbyon reactor. On February 4, 2003, the Honorable Richard L. Armitage, Deputy Secretary of State testified in front of the United States Senate’s Committee on Foreign Relations regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Korean peninsula and stated:

North Korea’s (Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, or DPRK) programs to develop weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery are a fundamental obstacle to that appealing vision for the future. They are also a threat to the international community, regional security, U.S. interests, and U.S. forces, which remain an integral part of stability in the region. It is time for North Korea to turn away from this self-destructive course. They have nothing to gain from acquiring nuclear weapons-and much to lose. Indeed, every day, the people of that country are paying a terrible price for these programs in international isolation and misspent national resources.

It is this potential nuclear problem which poses a serious threat to the United States and Northeast Asia. The Bush administration has succeeded in persuading Japan, South Korea, China, and Russia to adopt a common goal in dealing with this threat.

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Washington Post’s foreign affairs journalist, Philip P. Pan reported that the common goal calls for the complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantling (CVID) of North Korea’s nuclear programs (civilian and/or military) before engaging into discussions with the North for security assurances and economic aid.¹³³ Not quite a pluralistic and resolute goal, some evidence suggests that the United States may acquiesce to Seoul’s calls to rethink its CVID position and to adopt a “more moderate approach to inducing North Korea to change its policies.”¹³⁴

Other developments continue to trouble the United States and its allies. Shortly after the close of the 2nd round (February 25-28, 2004) of the six-party talks in Beijing, a Japanese newspaper, Sankei, reported on March 10, 2004 that an undisclosed military source unveiled a plan in which North Korea may be collaborating with Iran, another “axis of evil” country, to construct an underground facility in order to manufacture a centrifugal machine for developing enriched uranium in North Korea’s northwestern city of Kwisong.¹³⁵ This is consistent with other reports which suggest that “as the talks drag on, North Korea might continue building its nuclear arsenal.”¹³⁶

4. The Pressures Shaping DPRK’s Actions

a. Economy

Following the Korean War, the economies of the North and South grew at a relatively similar strength and pace, and in some areas, the North’s economy far outpaced the South. But by the early 1970s the DPRK’s prewar Japanese-based industries and economy began to wane. The DPRK turned to Japan and the west to purchase turnkey factories,¹³⁷ and began to incur debt which its economy could not repay, estimated to be at $12 billion in 1996 by the CIA.¹³⁸


¹³⁵ Sankei (Tokyo), 10 March 2004.


¹³⁷ Cumings, 424.

¹³⁸ CIA, “The World Fact book,” CIA Online [home page on-line]; available from
economic reforms took hold and began to soar past the North’s. Cumings articulates that the collapse of the socialist bloc deprived the North of major markets; however, “unlike every other communist state, North Korea never joined COMECON, the socialist would-be common market.”

This may account for the North’s economy not going into total ruin, but it did deliver a major blow to its economy which is a contributing factor to the current nuclear weapons problem.

The North’s economy continues to slump despite attempts to rethink its autarkic economic system in the 1990’s by welcoming foreign investment. The North’s economic troubles were addressed on June 5, 2003 during a hearing on life inside North Korea before the Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the United States Senate. The Honorable Andrew S. Natsios, Administrator, U.S. Agency for International Development had this to say about North Korea’s economy:

In June of 2002, the regime in North Korea introduced a number of economic reforms. These reforms, which included raising the prices of staple food commodities, increasing wage rates, and devaluing the [North Korean] Won, were apparently intended to stimulate the agricultural sector and promote increased industrial productivity. Unfortunately, the reforms instituted by the regime in North Korea have not improved the economic situation in the country.140

b. Energy

Intimately related to the North’s economy is the need for energy. Energy is a monumental issue in North Korea and is also a major contributing factor for the current nuclear weapons problem. The North has been reluctant to be dependant on oil in the past. Current sources indicate that the DPRK uses petroleum products chiefly for its military. The North, like the South, has no natural reserves of oil to speak of and imports nearly all of what it consumes. In 2001, the CIA estimated that the DPRK consumes 85,000 bbl/day. The North does have coal and hydropower as natural resources, and in 2001 it was estimated by the CIA that 29 percent of the DPRK’s electricity was produced


139 Cumings, 420.

by fossil fuel and the other 71 percent was by hydro. Cumings asserts that the North’s reluctance to seek energy through petroleum is due to a perception that the United States has too much influence on global oil and does not want that influence to negatively affect or control the DPRK. Kim Il-Sung was once quoted, “we are not yet in a position to depend on imports…[To do so] means allowing a stranglehold on our jugular.”

The DPRK defends its use of the Yongbyon plant in order to address its growing energy demands. The DPRK’s deputy foreign minister, Kim Gye Gwan stated:

> we do have an atomic power industry which has a lot of purposes, and we cannot give it up. We need this nuclear energy in different aspects. We need it in medical areas. We need it in agricultural areas as well as for electricity. We cannot afford to forgo all these activities.

Figure 2 demonstrates the energy disparity between the DPRK and neighboring countries.

![Figure 2. View of the DPRK at Night from Space](http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/dprk/dprk-dark.htm)

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142 Cumings, 426.

143 The rail system in the North is electrified, as are city buses and subways.

c. Food

Another strain for the DPRK is the food shortage which has plagued the North for years now. Prolonged excessive military spending has contributed to food storages and deteriorating living conditions. International food aid has stemmed the trend toward mass starvation since the mid-1990’s; however, Oberdorfer suspects between 1-2 million people have perished from starvation in the last decade. The rest of the population has been victimized by malnutrition. The United States has led the way by contributing food to the DPRK, first seen in large scale by the Clinton Administration and continued with the Bush Administration. President Bush is sympathetic to the North Korean people and is committed not to punish them as a means to oust Kim Jong-Il and his regime. President Bush has affirmed his position not to use food as a bargaining chip in the current nuclear weapons problem with the DPRK as long as the food is reaching the masses and not going straight to the DPRK military.

The benevolence the United States has demonstrated through food aid to the people of the DPRK is distorted and manipulated by the Kim regime in order to control the masses. In a case of “information contamination,” Natsios stated in his testimony before the Committee on Foreign Relations of the U.S. Senate on June 05, 2003 that starting in 1997, the United States labeled each bag (est. 30 million total at that time) of American food with a message written in Korean, “gift of the people of the United States.” Refugees have since reported that the Kim regime explained the American food aid as reparations for damages caused during the [Korean] war. This is an attempt of damage control by the Kim regime. They see information such as the above message on the food bags as “information contamination” since it is contrary to the information the regime communicates to the masses and therefore calls for an explanation which complements the “party line.”

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146 President George W. Bush or the 43rd President of the United States.
In March 2003, the ROK pledged to send 1.3 million tons of rice to the North over a three-year period. Despite the U.S and ROK aid, the North is losing other sources of aid. Japan, the second largest economy in the world has introduced sanctions on the DPRK in February 2004, a move which is supported by the United States. Approximately 80 percent of the Japanese public supported economic sanctions on North Korea according to a Jiji Press Company poll.149 Japan revised the Japanese Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Control Law allowing Japan to independently impose economic sanctions on the DPRK. These initiatives became law on June 14, 2004 and are known as the “port entry ban” law which essentially blocks North Korean ships from entering Japanese ports.150 This move was done in part to apply pressure to the North, but enforcing this law appears to be contingent on the progression of the six-party talks and further threatening actions taken by the DPRK.151 Japan has also increased smuggling surveillance at its ports. Japan’s Sankei newspaper reported on March 09, 2004 that Japanese police have identified the Japanese southwestern city of Fukuoka as a key smuggling route for North Korea. Investigations have repeatedly led Japanese authorities to Fukuoka’s port as a means of smuggling out stolen 4WD vehicles, missile-related components, used bicycles and household electrical appliances, and trailer beds which are suspected to be converted into mobile missile launching pads by the DPRK. This type of smuggling, especially that of used bicycles and household electrical appliances, are believed to be further signs of a strained North Korean economy. Additionally, Japanese authorities suspect pro-DPRK Korean residents in Japan of facilitating the smuggling.152

All of the above pressures are directly linked to the current nuclear weapons problem being experienced. Marcus Noland, a senior fellow at the Institute for International Economics in Washington, DC, wrote for the British Broadcasting Company (BBC) News Online:

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151 Ibid.
152 Sankei (Tokyo), 9 March 2004.
[one could surmise that North Korea’s] nuclear program is merely a bargaining chip to be traded away to extract political and economic concessions from the U.S.--a kind of atomic “trick or treat.”  

The United States has responded to this threat by insisting on North Korea complying with the calls for complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantling of their nuclear programs, a different position than that of 1994.

These contributing factors to the nuclear weapons problem are being used as a terrorist tool by Kim’s regime. Since the end of the Cold War, the DPRK has been less predictable and has not projected a clear vision for its future. This waning vision has triggered the DPRK to rely more on brinksmanship as its foreign policy. The above problems fuel their motive for this type of desperate action. Their actions mimic those of a guerilla or rebel group chipping away at a larger power by presenting menacing threats, in the case of the DPRK—nuclear weapons with obscure intentions to use or sell. These actions are clearly indicative of a terrorist state.

5. Aspects of China’s Position

China’s influence on this issue is larger than the information available for mass consumption leads one to realize, as the popular media tends to gloss over China’s role. The media projects China as simply hosting the six-party talks, first in August 2003, then in February 2004, and in June 2004. There are underlying reasons for this though. Koreans see themselves as being cultural kin of China and believe China to be their Asian big brother who understands Korea and is more likely to be trusted. China and both Koreas also have a relationship that is relatively free of intense animosities.

Beijing however has its own reasons for ensuring the DPRK is nuclear weapons free. Unlike the United States, which characterizes the DPRK’s actions as irrational and crazy, China assesses the DPRK’s posturing as a reaction towards their fears and vulnerabilities. Instead of adopting a firm and inflexible position towards the DPRK, China, along with South Korea, usually will “respond to them by consulting with each


other and trying to devise means that will cause the DPRK to alter its way of thinking and acting.”\textsuperscript{155} The instability that the DPRK continues to perpetuate in Asia may have a dampening effect on the economy and trade between China and its Asian and Western trade partners. China has a lot to gain with a peaceful outcome of the six-party talks. Koreans believe that the Chinese can be a better mediator and the Chinese welcome this role as it seeks to “re-Asianize” Asia with Beijing as its leader. There is evidence of this as the Republic of Korea has stronger economic relations with the Chinese than with the Japanese, which is the 2\textsuperscript{nd} largest economy in the world. Additionally, the tendency towards the normalization of ROK-PRC relations demonstrates that even though the ROK is vehemently anticommunist, they are framing their foreign policy as not to be anti-Chinese. Another issue which the Chinese wish to keep in check is the hemorrhaging of North Korean refugees flowing into its borders. Beijing wishes to stem this problem by stabilizing the problems in the DPRK.\textsuperscript{156}

The United States government has been very conscious of the growing influence China is experiencing in Asia and has worked towards balancing this influence. The maturing influence could embolden Beijing to act more forcefully towards Taiwan. As recently as January 2004, the United States’ Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Richard Myers embarked on an Asian trip which included the PRC, Japan, Australia, and Mongolia. General Myers had frank discussions with his Chinese counterpart regarding the mounting Chinese missile build-up opposite Taiwan. Additionally, Myers signaled his intent on building stronger military-to-military ties between the United States and the PRC. General Myers was quoted:

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\text{…the better the American and Chinese militaries know each other, the less chance there will be for either side to “miscalculate or misunderstand” each other if there are incidents in the future.} \textsuperscript{157}
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\textsuperscript{155} Ibid.


Myers had been referring to the April 2001 U.S. Navy EP-3 aircraft colliding with a Chinese F-8 aircraft over the East China Sea. Essentially, Myers delivered the Bush administration’s message that, “for sustained progress and prosperity you need a stable and secure environment.”

6. **President George W. Bush’s Administration**

Since the attacks of September 11, 2001, the Bush administration has pursued a strong and determined policy of dealing with terrorists and protecting the United States and its interests. The Bush administration has accomplished a lot in making the world safer. The Taliban is no longer in control of Afghanistan and democratic elections were held there on October 9, 2004. Iraq has been liberated from a brutal dictator who had been dealing out menacing threats to the United States since 1991 and returned to the people of Iraq a sovereign state on June 28, 2004. Libya, a country within an extended “axis of evil” has agreed to abandon its WMD program and open its facilities to international inspectors. It can be argued that Muammar Gaddafi was convinced of Bush’s resolve to make the United States and the world safer and capitulated.

This is all evidence that the United States is speaking a new language that other countries understand. Unfortunately, it is not the language of diplomacy and negotiations, but action and force. The United States has been plagued by a reputation of not having the resolve to stick things out when the situation becomes difficult. Many countries believe that the way to get the United States “out of its affairs” is to send a few American troops home in body bags. Unfortunately, some of these perceptions were proven true during several events in the 1990’s such as the smashing of the Kurdish uprising in Iraq, and the failed humanitarian efforts in Somalia and Haiti. The events of 9/11 have made the United States more resolute and have consequently surprised many rogue nations, such as Libya.

It is plausible to infer that Kim Jong-Il has taken the U.S. led invasion into Iraq as a matter of unfinished business from the former Bush administration\(^\text{159}\) and that the current Bush administration will not stop there, but will finish what was started in 1950 in Korea. This may lend weight to an argument that the actions of the current Bush

\(^{158}\) Ibid.

\(^{159}\) President George Herbert Walker Bush or the 41\(^{st}\) President of the United States.
administration has triggered panic in Kim’s regime which has degraded and perhaps engendered the current nuclear weapons problem. It could be argued that in order for Kim to keep the United States out of the DPRK it has to advance the idea that they possess nuclear weapons.

7. Japan: Nuclear Weapons Concerns and Abductions

The title of this section captures the primary issues Japan holds with the DPRK. These issues constitute another variable which contribute to the complexity of the overall problem radiating out of the Korean peninsula. The Japanese have other troubling issues such as the North’s firing of Taepodong missiles over Japan in 1998 and the “mystery ship” incident that occurred off Amami Island in 2001, both prove to be security problems for Japan. However, it is the issue of the abductions of Japanese citizens by North Koreans and the mounting nuclear missile threat that monopolizes the Japanese media.

Prime Minister Koizumi and other Japanese government officials have heard the Japanese call for resolution on these issues and are supported by the U.S. government which has unofficially called these events acts of terrorism. Tokyo has repeatedly asserted that both these issues must be resolved on the truth and without glossing over the facts or diplomatic normalization between the two countries will not be realized anytime soon.\(^\text{160}\) The issue of abductions came to light in October 2002 when five abducted Japanese citizens were permitted a brief visit to Japan and ended up staying, but their eight family members were left behind and not permitted by Pyongyang to reunite. Additionally, there are ten other Japanese victims that are uncounted for. Koizumi went to Pyongyang on May 22, 2004 and secured the release of most of the remaining family members,\(^\text{161}\) but the fate of the other ten is still undetermined. These developments coincided with the DPRK’s admission to restarting a nuclear arms program.


\(^\text{161}\) Three people who did not return with Prime Minister Koizumi were Sergeant Charles Jenkins, an American soldier who deserted into North Korea, and his two children whose mother is a Japanese citizen, Hitomi Soga, who returned to Japan in 2002 and received national attention about the abductions.
8. South Korea’s Ambivalence

A sticky issue which has caused disagreement between Seoul and Washington is how to deal with the North Korean brand of foreign policy. The Republic of Korea has been favoring a more fraternal and reconciliatory approach, which for the United States, is reminiscent of failed appeasement policies of the past as this was specifically attempted in 1994 with the DPRK.

The ROK’s defiance towards the United States’ firm CVID policy with the DPRK is a risk and complicates the discussion process. Officially, they have agreed with the United States and other participants in the six-party talks that the DPRK must first ensure the complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantling of their nuclear programs (civilian and/or military) before engaging into discussions with the North for security assurances and economic aid. However, many ROK officials continue to call upon the United States for concessions towards the DPRK, undermining the whole process.

The ambivalence South Korea has demonstrated above is superficial compared to the more complicated strife South Korea wrestles with in regards to their northern brothers. Koreans are torn on wanting to unite the peninsula and become one again. Both Koreas have officially grappled with the issues of unification since the early 1970’s. This concept has evolved into what is seen as a destined goal and instituted with Ministries of Unification in both Koreas. The South first called this policy towards unification the Sunshine Policy, and is now relabeled the Policy of Peace and Prosperity, by the South Korean President—Roh Moo-Hyun. The North’s top foreign policy focus is in fact on inter-Korea issues and the unification agenda also. Where the South diverges from the North is on the issue of the economic effects of absorbing the North. The South paid close attention to the difficulties experienced by West Germany in absorbing the East after the fall of the Berlin Wall and has been sobered by the thought of taking in over 20 million hungry Northerners. Additionally, journalist Michael Paranzino asserts that the South has developed a case of the *Stockholm Syndrome*, where an abductee gradually comes to identify themselves with their captor. Paranzino asserts that after years of being in the gun-sights of the North, the Southern leadership has been

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“traumatized” into adopting a safe course of appeasement, rather than a more firm course.\textsuperscript{163}

South Koreans also have mixed views on U.S. presence in the South as they blame the United States as the biggest obstacle towards unification, while others see the United States as a necessary evil in order to keep Northern aggression in check. This ambivalence by and large can be linked to age. The difference in age and past experiences is the most salient difference in views towards U.S.-ROK relations and positions towards the DPRK.\textsuperscript{164} Older South Koreans, who experienced the communist insurgency of the North and the aid of Americans to halt the Northern takeover of the South 50 years ago are in favor of U.S. presence.\textsuperscript{165} As for the younger generation of South Koreans, who have not fought for freedom as their parents and grandparents did, they favor more radical and nationalist views which are hostile towards the United States. This divorce in views between the age groups has caused the reordering of international politics in South Korea and the consequential ambivalent posture towards the United States which is a key factor in shaping the global transformation of U.S. forces.

9. U.S.-ROK-JAPAN Defensive Deterrent

This section is an attempt to assess the conventional military actions taken by the United States, ROK, and Japan in response to the threats projected from North Korea. The United States maintains bilateral security relationships with both the ROK and Japan. All three nations share similar security concerns and are economically connected to each other. A security threat to one of these nations will have consequential effects upon the others, and it is for this “domino effect” that these three nations cooperate towards regional security and harmony.

In maintenance of the bilateral security treaty the United States has with South Korea, conducted combined military exercises annually. Major exercises such as BEAR


HUNT and TEAM SPIRIT, which began shortly after the “tree cutting” incident in 1976, were cancelled following the 1994 Agreed Framework as a concession to the North. Pyongyang saw those major annual exercises as a threat and provocative aggressive act. As a consequence and as a gesture to demonstrate no aggressiveness by the United States and ROK, those exercises ceased. However, other exercises between the United States and ROK are still conducted regularly, but at a toned-down scale.

In April 2003, the Bush administration began to send signals to Pyongyang and other hostile nations throughout the globe. As the war in Iraq entered its second week, the United States sent stealth fighters to South Korea to participate in training exercises which were to remain there upon conclusion of the exercises. Additionally, as U.S. forces were operating in Afghanistan, combating terrorism in the Horn of Africa, participating in peacekeeping operations in East Timor, participating in clandestine operations in the Philippines, operating with NATO in Kosovo, and fighting a major war in Iraq, other U.S. forces continued to execute regularly scheduled joint and combined exercises throughout Asia, mainly with Japan-based forces and with elements based in the United States. Some of the larger exercises included BALIKATAN in the Philippines and COBRA GOLD in Thailand. These exercises sent strategic messages that the United States was force to be reckoned with, in that it had the capability to protect its interests worldwide and simultaneously.

The United States continued to posture itself with respect to North Korea by announcing the repositioning of some of its 37,000 troops stationed in South Korea, and moving them farther away from North Korean artillery range and, having some of them participate in OIF with the U.S. Central Command. As recently as February 22, 2004, the U.S. Pacific Command has moved six B-52 Stratofortress bombers with 300 support personnel from North Dakota to Anderson Air Force Base in Guam. This was the first time since the Vietnam War that Guam had a continuous B-52 presence on its U.S. bases. Former commander of U.S. Pacific Air Forces, General William Begert was quoted that such moves are a way of “buying-down risk.”

The American troops stationed in South Korea are predominately Army and Air Force assets which form the bulk of United States Forces Korea (USFK). Hours away

from any potential incident in Korea are the American forces based in Japan which constitute United States Forces Japan (USFJ), a mix of Marine, Navy, Air Force and Army troops totaling about 50,000 personnel many of which stationed on the island of Okinawa. These forces are able to intervene in hostilities on the Korean peninsula by agreements made in 1969 in the Nixon-Sato summit in Washington. Japan recognized the vital role U.S. forces on Okinawa played in regional security and agreed that should an attack occur against South Korea, the security of Japan would be “seriously affected.” Prime Minister Sato stated:

…therefore, should an occasion arise for the United States forces in such an eventuality to use facilities and areas within Japan as bases for military combat operations to meet the armed attack, the policy of the government of Japan towards prior consultation would be to decide its position positively and promptly on the basis of the foregoing recognition.\(^{167}\)

Victor Cha asserts in his book, *Alignment Despite Antagonism*, that this statement was the essence of a “Korean clause” that sprang out of the Okinawa reversion discussions and marked a first example of close cooperation between Japan and the ROK in that Japan recognized a direct security link between the two countries.\(^ {168}\) Cha stated that the “Korean clause,” “granted the United States unconditional access to the Okinawan bases in the event of renewed hostilities against the ROK.” This is evidenced today as the preeminent U.S. expeditionary force in Japan is the III Marine Expeditionary Force (III MEF) stationed in Okinawa with smaller elements in mainland Japan, Hawaii and South Korea, and conducts regular exercises with the ROK military. One of the missions of III MEF is going to the defense of South Korea which can have the bulk of its 22,000 man force in Korea within two days, see Figure 3.

Since the events of September 11, 2001, Japan has also recognized the need to take more ownership in its own security with respect to threats from North Korea. Japan’s markets have been very sensitive towards regional threats in recent years. Following every test missile firing by the DPRK, Tokyo responded negatively. With the urging and support of the United States, Japan has taken steps to assert more leadership

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168 Ibid.
and share in the responsibility of maintaining international peace and stability by deploying its Self-Defense Forces overseas. But in addressing the North Korean threat, Japan has recently taken steps to purchase PAC-3 surface-to-air guided missiles. Additionally, Japan is addressing the gaps in its security with tracking North Korean Rodong missiles and plans for shooting them down with ground-based radar and missile defense technology in partnership with the United States. At the time of this writing, the Self-Defense Force’s ground radar cannot track ballistic missiles; however, the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force’s American-made Aegis ships can track Rodong missiles but cannot shoot them down.169

Figure 3. III MEF Time-Distance to Korea
(From: III MEF Command Brief of May 2001)

B. THE GROWING INFLUENCE OF CHINA

Assessing the potential long term threat to the region and global affairs of a growing China is accomplished by examining “China’s economic emergence and how that translates into comprehensive national power.”170 It has become apparent that near to mid-term threats, such as terrorism and the nuclear threat of the DPRK, are having a stronger influence on the constitutional debate in Japan and the shaping of the U.S.


military. As such, China’s influence or perceived threat will be addressed only in general
terms in this thesis and not in detail as was done for the DPRK.

1. China’s Superheated Economy

Evidence of China’s growth and influence is in the expanding Chinese economy
which Citigroup predicts will grow a staggering 8.5 percent in 2004. Signs of slowdown
in some areas of the Chinese economy can be found due to administrative controls
Beijing has implemented. Lending, investment, and consumption, which rose to 3.8% in
April 2004 and is predicted to keep rising in 2004, are all factors which are contributing
to a strong and fast growing Chinese economy.\footnote{Mukul Munish, The Standard. “China GDP to Grow by 8.5pc: Citigroup.” The Standard Online [home page on-line]; available from \url{http://www.thestandard.com.hk/thestandard/news_detail_frame.ctm?articleid=48900\&intc}; Internet; accessed 29 June 2004.} It was noted in a statement made by
Senator Richard G. Lugar, “…that at current growth rates, the size of China’s economy
will double every 10 years.”\footnote{Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Examining the Effects and Consequences of an Emerging China: Hearing before the Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations, 108\textsuperscript{th} Cong., 1\textsuperscript{st} sess., 19 March 2003, 3.} Consumption of natural resources such as oil has already
strained relations between Beijing and Tokyo and China’s large population is partly
blamed for contributing to the 50 percent increase in gasoline prices in the United States
in 2004. The Japanese newspaper *Yomiuri Shimbun* reported that China halted petroleum
exports to Japan from its Daqing oil field in Heilongjiang Province because Japan refused
to pay a price hike. This is the first halt of oil exports from China to Japan since 1973.\footnote{Yomiuri Shimbun (Tokyo), 27 February 2004.} Then, in March 2004, China replaced Japan as the second largest importer of oil behind
the United States.\footnote{Special Press Summary, “Asia’s Economic Resurgence and the Oil Crunch Executive Summary,” prepared by Carl O. Schuster, available the United States Pacific Command’s Virtual Information Center, 8 June 2004.} The *Yomiuri Shimbun* also reported that Japan and China are also
competing to win routes for construction of oil pipelines from Russia and eastern Siberia.
In response to China’s rapid economic growth Japan will reduce its assistance to Beijing
by 20% a year based on 2004’s aid of 96.7 billion yen or $896 million USD.\footnote{CNA. “Tokyo-Beijing Relations Worsening: Mac Report.” CNA Online [home page on-line]; available from \url{http://www.cna.comtw/eng/}; Internet; accessed 29 June 2004.}

It is China’s growing economy with its increasing appetite for oil and other
natural resources which is the cause for concern as is already evidenced between China
and Japan. Towards securing these resources, it is inevitable that China’s military will be the beneficiary of China’s growing economy as it is destined to modernize.\textsuperscript{176} It is therefore apparent that competition for contracts and price hikes are not the only sources of friction, age old territorial disputes are becoming more sensitive and gaining more regional attention.

2. Territorial Disputes

Territorial disputes over islands and sea lanes in East Asia continue to plague many states. There is an ongoing problem with the many claims over the Spratly Islands, especially between the Republic of the Philippines and China. There are unresolved issues between Japan and Russia over the Kurile Islands and also between Japan and the ROK regarding Ullung Island. There are even territorial disputes between China and the ROK. These disputes make the news occasionally and are largely overshadowed by the larger dispute between China and Taiwan; however, territorial disputes between two major powers such as China and Japan could rapidly escalate in a time of heightened tensions.

In March 2004 there was such a case which commanded media attention in East Asia when Chinese protestors illegally entered Uotsuri Island in the Senkaku Island group (Diaoyu Islands in Chinese) which is claimed by Japan and China. This was a time that oil prices were being contested between the two states, Japanese aid to China had receded, Chinese outrage over Japanese businessmen going on a sex tour in Zhuhai city, and outrage over a controversial skit by Japanese students in Xian City, in addition to the Chinese irritation of the perceived insensitivity of Koizumi’s visits to the Yasukuni Shrine\textsuperscript{177} all fueled a new round of anti-Japanese feelings in China.\textsuperscript{178}


\textsuperscript{177} Yasukuni Shrine was founded in Tokyo in 1869 as \textit{Tokyo Shokonsha} and renamed to its present name in 1879. The Shrine was erected to commemorate Japan’s war dead; all those who sacrificed their lives in battles and incidents since the Meiji Restoration in order to make Japan a better and great nation. The controversy surrounding this Shinto shrine is that in 1978 fourteen war criminals, including the World War II-era prime minister, Hideki Tojo, were enshrined there and since the mid-1970’s sitting Japanese prime ministers have been visiting the shrine prompting political rivals and other Japanese constitutional pundits to accuse the prime ministers of violating the principle of separation of church and state.

On March 24, 2004 seven crew members of a Chinese boat went ashore at Uotsuri Island, which Japan, China, and even Taiwan claim sovereignty over. These crew members (Chinese nationals) went to protest China’s claim over the island and were promptly arrested by the Japanese Coast Guard. It is difficult to gauge if the viewpoints and actions of these seven protestors represent a large portion of the Chinese populace as one of the arrested protestors was previously arrested in August 2001 for vandalizing government property at the Yasukuni Shrine in Tokyo, suggesting that these activists are professionals dedicated to their anti-Japanese views. Nevertheless, this was the first time Japanese authorities arrested Chinese nationals for landing on the Senkaku Islands and resulted in a backlash in Beijing as protestors burned Japanese flags in front of the Japanese Embassy and prompted Koizumi to publicly state that the Senkaku Islands are the sovereign territory of Japan and called upon the Government of the PRC to prevent future occurrences. Even Washington inserted itself into the quarrel by announcing that “the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty applies to the Senkaku Islands.” The act of seven “professional” protestors, possibility acting independently, irritated three nations and received media attention for weeks, such is the sensitivities permeating between China and Japan and the United States. Incidents such as this with the United States backing Japan is what causes China to view the U.S-Japan Security Alliance as one aimed against China.

3. View of the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance

The incident on Senkaku Islands is not the first time the United States has asserted itself in support of the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance to the chagrin of the PRC. In April 2001 a U.S. Navy EP-3 surveillance aircraft, which departed from Kadena Air Base in Okinawa, collided with a Chinese fighter-jet in the skies over the East China Sea resulting in the crash of the Chinese plane and death of its pilot and the emergency landing of the U.S. Navy plane on Hainan Island. This incident resulted in high tensions between Beijing and Washington as responsibility for the incident was levied upon each other. This incident caused Beijing to question the activities of U.S. forces in East Asia.

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and the surveillance of the Chinese littorals as infringing on the sovereignty of China and acting in a provocative manner.

Incidents such as the April 2001 “EP-3 incident”, the March 2004 “Senkaku Islands incident”, and lesser known incidents such as a Chinese Navy 2,100-ton Ming-class submarine navigating in waters near Japan in November 2003 in which it was first spotted by a U.S. Navy EP-3 aircraft and reported to the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force, are cases which reinforce Beijing’s view that the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance in its contemporary structure is aimed at the PRC. This will be a challenge which must be carefully managed as the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance is transformed and is complicated by the mounting positioning of missiles opposite Taiwan. Although the Chinese may see the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance aimed at them, this study finds that the larger challenge to be overcome is to convince the Japanese people that a security alliance between the United States and Japan is still required should Korea unify peacefully and the Japanese Constitution revised to allow for collective defense without deteriorating relations with Beijing. This is a task that will be articulated in Chapter V as terrorism and a fledgling Japanese military will still require the presence of U.S. forces and the U.S. nuclear deterrence to contribute to the security and stability of the region for the foreseeable future.

4. The Taiwan Straits

The U.S-Japan Security Alliance and the U.S. nuclear deterrence is best measured by the effects it has had in promoting an obscure U.S. one-China policy, which has been defined by three joint communiqués and the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), all of which do not recognize China’s claim to Taiwan but do not support Taiwan’s goal to claim independence. The issue of Taiwan, “which from the PRC perspective is always the

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182 Asahi (Tokyo), 05 June 2004.
most sensitive issue in [the U.S.-PRC] relationship,”

185 goes back to the 1949 Chinese civil-war where China sees the issue of Taiwan as a quest to preserve their union just as the United States fought a civil war in the 19th Century for the same purpose. It was not until 1978 when the United States normalized relations with China that the United States passed the Taiwan Relations Act, which enables the United States to prevent the forcible reunification of Taiwan with the PRC by supporting Taiwan’s democracy and defense capabilities. It has been communicating the same position now for over two decades. That position is maintaining the status quo.186 Even though China has deployed about 450 short-range ballistic missiles opposite Taiwan and held naval exercises in waters near Taiwan, it has not moved against the island the PRC calls a “renegade province.” The United States’ position with Taiwan may be put to the test should the recently reelected and nearly assassinated Taiwanese President Chen Shui-bian go forth with a referendum in 2006 to declare independence and establishing a new constitution in 2008. It is public knowledge that China will declare war against Taiwan should Taipei declare independence and it is most likely that the United States will go to Taiwan’s aid.187

If the United States is successful in restraining Taiwan’s ambitions, then it is the growing economic influence of China, one that President Bush has called a “strategic competitor,” that may test the United States’ one-China policy and force Washington to adopt a less ambiguous position, one which may cause instability in the region. For now, Washington has been performing preventative maintenance by counseling Beijing on the erosion of democracy in Hong Kong and the anxieties Taiwanese have in seeing this as their future should Taiwan decide to join the PRC. This effort may help ease the mounting tensions between Taipei and Beijing and serve the United States’ goal to maintain the status quo which is in keeping with Japan’s goal of regional stability and


maintaining non-governmental working relations with Taiwan by espousing neither a “two China policy” nor a “one China policy.”

C. CONCLUSION

The transformation of the U.S. military, debate about constitutional revision in Japan, and potential redefining of the U.S.-Japan alliance are processes that are indicative of the importance world powers attach to shaping national institutions for an unpredictable future in global affairs. Near to mid-term threats and the assessment of the current international situation are more comprehensible and has been a barometer to gauge the directions and speed for the processes of conversion for those institutions. It has been in this context that this chapter assessed the near and mid-term threats to Japan and U.S. security and interests in Northeast Asia. As the United States and Japan continue to work with the other nations concerned with resolving the nuclear weapons threat posed by the DPRK, paying careful attention to the PRC is prudent. Conduits to China’s institutions and society are required in order to keep open windows to the development of their military, economic sector, and governmental policies. This is important, in part, to ensure that Beijing will adhere to international norms and laws when it achieves superpower status.

In closing, past animosities still festering, the DPRK’s faltering economy, the need for energy and food, the ROK’s ambivalence, the United States led war on terrorism, and unresolved issues with Japan all complicate the situation. The third round of six-party talks held on June 21-22, 2004 in Beijing failed to produce the results they sought. North Korea and other nations kicked this issue down the road further until after the U.S. Presidential election in November 2004. National-level elections were held in South Korea, Japan and the United States in 2004, and all parties now know who they are dealing with for the foreseeable future. It is unlikely that this issue will be further prolonged and delayed without some sort of resolution within the next four years.

188 Sankei (Tokyo), 4 April 2004.
V. THE WAY AHEAD: OPTIONS FOR WASHINGTON AND TOKYO

A. SUMMARY OF THE ABOVE CHAPTERS

The preceding chapters sought to examine how and why Japan is debating and studying the issue of constitutional revision by examining the effects of 9/11 and Japan’s goal of participating more in global affairs and its own security. In doing so, key variables such as the “burden” of Okinawa, where the bulk of U.S. forces in Japan are concentrated, have been examined and the near to mid-term threats to United States and Japanese security and interests have been thoroughly articulated. Henceforth, this chapter will provide a policy-prescriptive “way ahead” for U.S. military transformation in Japan, specifically Okinawa, which considers Japan’s constitutional progression along with concerns on Okinawa, in order to address the threats in East Asia.

B. PREMISE FOR ACTIONABLE OPTIONS

The actionable options asserted below are predicated on the current transformational processes both nations are undergoing and the DPRI process which informally joins them. It is my assertion that the below options can be the outcome of the DPRI discussions. While this chapter may not cover all the points that require adjustment, I believe it covers the most pressing ones. My premises for the following options are broken down into six points. First, both the U.S. and Japan concur on the threats to the national interests of both nations and that a strong security alliance must be maintained to guard against those threats and maintain stability in East Asia.

Second, U.S. forces in Japan must be considered in strategic terms but smaller ways towards becoming better neighbors, through localized efforts, should not be dismissed as insignificant contributions to the overall maintenance of the alliance. In order to be better understood and accepted among the communities in Japan, U.S. forces must re-think their actual presence and weight them against the impact and sensitivities of their host nation neighbors.

Third, U.S. Marines are not an irritant to the alliance but a key to its success in promoting stability to the region and giving would-be belligerents pause to act aggressively. Members of the Pentagon’s Joint Staff and Office of the Secretary of
Defense stated that the physical presence of Marines in Japan has proven effective in deterring aggression. Japanese officials have also echoed this assessment. Mr. Hideki Yamaji, Visiting Fellow, Center for Northeast Asian Policy Studies, Foreign Policy Studies Program, The Brookings Institution in Washington, DC, stated that U.S. Marines are not an irritant and that their presence have added to the stability of East Asia and towards building confidence between the military services of East Asian nations. Mr. Yamaji further stated, “stability in East Asia cannot be maintained without the U.S. Marine Corps.”

The First Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at the Embassy of Japan in Washington, DC, Takehiro Funakoshi stated in an interview on May 12, 2004 that the Government of Japan recognizes that the physical presence of U.S. Marines plays an important role in the deterrence of aggression.” Mr. Funakoshi added that GOJ is not wedded to the role of each individual service but more so to the overall capabilities of USFJ, with or without a Marine Corps. The Government of Japan’s bottom-line is that it does not want to reduce the overall deterrence or operational effectiveness of USFJ.

The reason asserted with unique continuity as to why the Marines are not an irritant but a key contributor is the unique and proven capabilities a Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) offers to the security alliance. Grant Newsham captures the various expressions of a MEF contributing to the security alliance as follows:

…modern war is a combined arms activity. The most effective and least costly approach combines air, ground, and sea capabilities. Each can do what the other cannot. III Marine Expeditionary Force (III MEF) on Okinawa and mainland Japan is the only immediately deployable ground force in a massive operational area stretching from Hawaii to Africa. In war and other contingencies (especially humanitarian intervention, disaster relief, peacekeeping operations, and noncombatant evacuations) you must have people on the ground to seize terrain, to engage enemy forces, or to aid and assist people. This cannot be accomplished by simply sending ships to cruise offshore or planes to fly overhead.

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191 Funakoshi, 12 May 2004.

192 Grant Newsham, “Marines on Okinawa are Indispensable,” Sentaku Magazine, August 2002. Lieutenant Colonel Grant Newsham is an East Asia Regional Affairs Officer for Marine Forces Pacific, and assigned as a reservist to the U.S. Embassy, Tokyo. He is a former U.S. Foreign Service Officer and was
Fourth, while the United States is nudging Japan to participate more in its own security and to become more involved internationally and, as long as both Koreas move ahead with plans to unify and become a lesser threat towards stability in East Asia, there should be an anticipation for calls in Japan to lessen the U.S. military footprint in Japan and equalize the security burden-sharing. Mr. Yamaji asserts that it would be impolitic in Japan if actions to adjust the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance are not taken in light of these developments. This is especially true in Okinawa where polls consistently demonstrate that more reduction, albeit moderate reduction, with respect to U.S. military presence are desired.193

Fifth, closely related to the fourth premise and key to continued effective U.S. presence in Okinawa is the need for a formal process of reconciliation between Tokyo and Okinawa. On May 19, 2002, during the Commemoration of the 30th Anniversary of the Reversion of Okinawa, U.S. Ambassador Howard Baker thanked Okinawans for shouldering the burden of U.S. military bases for many years.194 His thanks was not enthusiastically welcomed as Okinawans contend that they do not want thanks for something they claimed to have no say. Okinawans responded that the U.S. military bases were forced upon them by mainland Japan which continues to perpetuate a “not-in-my-backyard” position regarding the basing of U.S. forces in Japan. There must be a defining moment where Tokyo reconciles with Okinawa for shouldering the weight of the U.S. military presence in Japan and acknowledges the contributions Okinawans have made towards the maintenance of security for Japan. Japan, and the rest of Asia, could learn how to take the first step towards reconciliation from Europe as Germany’s Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder attended the World War II D-Day commemoration at Normandy, France on June 6, 2004.

Sixth and often forgotten during peacetime, is how U.S. installations in Japan support the many war plans and contingencies that may arise in the region. This is what I call the “blind spot” that fails to receive consideration when analysts and government assigned as such to the U.S. Embassy in Tokyo from 1993 to 1997. As a civilian, he is an Executive Director of Morgan Stanley-Tokyo.


officials search for ways to better package the security alliance. Finding a force structure which projects an effective force capable of accomplishing a myriad of tasks in accordance with the security alliance while addressing evolving community concerns during peacetime, is not a task which can be approached in a tacit manner. A senior Marine official pointed out that peacetime operational tempo bears no resemblance to wartime or contingency requirements. Along these lines, there is little, in terms of force structure, to remove from Japan, specifically Okinawa and the Marines based there. The political reality of Okinawa makes this especially difficult and a factor which may undermine the U.S. deterrent posture in Asia should the strategic importance of Okinawa be brushed aside. In the words of an anonymous senior U.S. military official:

…there are no pieces to give up on Okinawa. There is no “fat” in III MEF force structure or any other service organizations on Okinawa. III MEF is less than half the size of the other two Marine expeditionary forces. Still, the Marines on Okinawa are the only general purpose forces forward-based in the region that are available to project power or respond to any event on short notice throughout the region.195

In short, we must look at the entire picture of the issues this thesis is attempting to assess, and not forget to look at a very important piece—the “blind spot” or wartime requirements.

C. THE INDEPENDENT VARIABLES

Independent variables which may influence this process are actual Japanese Constitutional reinterpretation or revision, Korean unification, or both, sooner rather than later. The outcome of the November 2004 U.S. Presidential elections and a subsequent halt or reversal of the DoD bottom-up review and transformation of military forces was another independent variable. Other independent variables are:

- Internal turmoil in China and a downturn in the Chinese economy.
- Another major incident between the United States and Japan such as the February 9, 2001 collision between the U.S. Navy’s nuclear attack submarine, USS Greenville with the Japanese fishing boat the Ehime Maru near Hawaii.

195 Source wishes to remain unnamed from an interview with author via e-mail correspondence from Monterey, California on 4-5 June 2004.
• Japanese overreaction to the killing of Japanese troops in Iraq and potential misperception of a remilitarized Japan. ¹⁹⁶

• Costs associated with transformation in the United States and in Japan towards packaging the optimal force and security alliance for the future may be too expensive for Japan’s sluggish economy. Japan’s 15 year recession has taken a toll on defense spending as evidenced in Japan’s procurement of front-line equipment which has steadily dropped for over a decade, ¹⁹⁷ (see Appendix D). Japan Facilities Improvement Program (JFIP) which contributes nearly $1 billion annually towards the maintenance and construction of facilities on U.S. bases in Japan has been redefined with limits in order to save GOJ funds ¹⁹⁸ and has dropped slightly between FY 2002 and FY 2003. ¹⁹⁹ As Japan pursues missile defense (MD) technology with a laggard economy, it may be constrained to adopt radical adjustments to the current force structure and facilities of U.S. and Japanese forces in Japan.

• Negative local reaction to increased military presence in mainland Japan. It is no secret that mainland Japanese have been accused by Okinawans that they have a case of “not-in-my-back-yardism,” or “NIMBY.” Lieutenant Colonel Duke explains, “GOJ acknowledges the need to relocate some forces from Okinawa to mainland Japan and even to realign some U.S. forces in mainland Japan elsewhere in Japan; however, GOJ is reticent to pursue them because of the significant push back that would take place from the local communities.” ²⁰⁰

¹⁹⁶ Colonel Takeo Yamaoka, Military Attaché, Embassy of Japan, Washington, DC, interview 12 May 2004, stated that the Japanese public has reacted favorably after witnessing how well Japanese troops have been received in Iraq and pointed out that their role and limited success thus far is indicative of a transformed Japanese “military” and should quell concerns of a potential return to an aggressive military such as it was pre-1945. It should be noted however, Japanese troops did not operate in the Middle East prior to 1945 and there are no World War II memories of Imperial Japanese Forces in the Middle East as there is in Northeast and Southeast Asia.


¹⁹⁸ In 2000 a provision in a Special Measures Agreement is that Japanese Facilities Improvement Program (JFIP) funds can no longer be used for “revenue producing” projects. Examples of projects disallowed in the FY01 program were Army and Air Force Exchange Service warehouses, exchanges, commissaries, and gymnasiums. The effect of this provision is that additional military construction (MILCON) funding will be required for the Services, Defense Logistics Agency, Army and Air Force Exchange Service, Navy Exchange, Defense Commissary Agency, and DoD Schools to support Quality of Life initiatives for U.S. service members in Japan. Statement of Admiral Dennis C. Blair, U.S. Navy, Commander, U.S. Pacific Command before The Senate Armed Services Committee on Fiscal Year 2002 Posture Statement, 27 March 2001.

¹⁹⁹ Defense of Japan 2003, 438.

D. ACTIONABLE OPTIONS

1. Status Quo

The proponents of the status quo are found within the official positions of both governments at the time being. Various mainstream media outlets in Japan report the announcements of key GOJ officials, such as former Foreign Minister Yoriko Kawaguchi, who stated that there is every intention to pursue and complete the agreed terms of the 1996 SACO. The U.S. government officially asserts this position also but displays more flexibility to pursue broader changes with U.S. force structure in Japan and changing roles for the JSDF. Deputy Secretary of State Armitage stated, “at present, there is no change in our position to observe the [SACO] agreement.”

The status quo is the safe position for both governments to take until the DPRI process can find a better way ahead. Both governments agree that changes to the security agreement are in order and both sides have many ideas but both sides cannot agree on the way ahead. Mr. Yamaji points out an example of this in regards to changes in the SOFA. Mr. Yamaji stated that both governments wish to make changes in the implementation of the current SOFA; however, the changes are so different and far apart that both governments cannot come to agreement and therefore maintain the status quo.

Along with completing the 27 initiatives of the 1996 SACO Final Report, DoD has been pursuing Visiting Forces Agreements (VFA) and Memorandums of Agreement (MOA) in Southeast Asia and reintroducing military forces into Guam. The Marine Corps’ General James Jones, Commander of Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) and U.S. European Command, asserts that the United States should adopt smaller, less expensive basing throughout the world dubbed the “lily pad” concept. The trend of adopting VFA’s and “lily pads” in Southeast Asia could evolve with USFJ acting as a regional hub of operations. In sum, maintaining the status quo is predicated on waiting to see how key issues such as Korean unification and Japanese

203 This concept is not new but the softer language of calling the concept “lily pads” is a better approach than something along the lines of “police boxes” which lends to the perception that the United States is the global policeman.
Constitutional reinterpretation or revision actually unfold; a de facto wait and see position (see Appendix E).

2. Security Alliance Transformation Initiative (SATI) 204

This model precisely addresses the premises I arrived at in this study (see Appendix F). The following are detailed dependent variables which should not require a revised treaty. 205 The 1996 SACO Final Report was an agreement which offers flexibility which a treaty does not. The Security Alliance Transformation Initiative (SATI) could be the result of the DPRI process and since it is not a total revision of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States of America and Japan, it could be as flexible as the 1996 SACO Final Report.

a. SATI’s Dependent Variables

(1) Land Return and Consolidation. The report titled, The Technical Assessment of the Feasibility of Relocating the Operational Capability of MCAS Futenma to Kadena Air Base Proper conducted on July 29, 1996 by the Director of Operations (J3), USFJ must be restudied by an agency outside of the Department of Defense. An objective study by an impartial entity must be conducted in order to ensure the study is not conducted on a defensive footing. The study should be anchored on a positive approach towards assessing on how the task of integrating air operations of the Air Force and Marine Corps in Okinawa onto Kadena Air Base can be done, and evolving the base into a genuine joint U.S. base with the future possibility of inviting JSDF units onto the huge installation also. This should be a study which is shared by the United States and Japan and should consider the additional feasibility of shifting some 18th Wing functions from Kadena Air Base to Yokota Air Base.

204 The acronym S.A.T.I in this precise spelling has no meaning in Japanese. The syllable TI; however, is pronounced and recognized as chi in Japanese, consequently SACHI(TI) means happiness in Japanese.

205 Stephen E. Duke, Lieutenant Colonel, USMC, Japan Desk Officer, Headquarters Marine Corps explained during an interview by author, Washington, DC, 13 May 2004, that the 1996 SACO Final Report was a report that outlined recommendations for realigning forces on Okinawa and measures to reduce the impact of the U.S. military on Okinawa which both countries agreed to adopt.
The tone of the 1996 study was generally incredulous, but it did acknowledge the possibility of shifting certain air operations to nearby Ie Island which will limit some of the excess air traffic. The report also confirmed available acreage for “absorbing the rotary wing functions from MCAS Futenma to Kadena AB” and also for “the projected future capability of the [Marine Corps’] MV-22.” The use of the large runway on Ie Island should not be dismissed due to its austere environment but embraced as an opportunity for economic revitalization. The 1996 study however, failed to address that a consolidation of MCAS Futenma into Kadena Air Base would actually enhance certain operations such as aircraft ordnance upload and download. It has been standard procedure for Marine aircraft from MCAS Futenma to conduct all ordnance uploading and downloading at Kadena Air Base and as a result, must fly from MCAS Futenma to Kadena Air Base to pick-up ordnance and then fly to the training ranges. Consolidation would eliminate a certain amount of air traffic required for that task along with other logistical requirements and conceivably, enhance ordnance operations during contingencies.

Restudying the integration is imperative considering the 2001 QDR and the transformation of the U.S. Armed Forces. Kadena Air Base is based on a Cold War-era base model and, as the Air Force transforms itself towards becoming more capabilities-based, so should efforts for a new and clean look at its bases in Japan be taken, specifically Kadena Air Base. A stellar paradigm for the future of Kadena Air Base and other U.S. bases overseas is Misawa Air Base, located in Aomori Prefecture, in northern Japan. Misawa Air Base is a joint, bilateral installation with all four U.S. services stationed there along with the Japan Air Self-Defense Force. Misawa Air Base is also home to the Misawa Airport, which runs Japan Air System, a civilian airline

206 Ie Island is located off the northwest coast of Okinawa and the Marine Corps operates a sizeable airfield and range (Ie Shima Training Facility) for a variety of training operations. Operational Support Detachment (OSD), Ie Shima is a 13-man unit which maintains the airfield and ranges which consists of over 800 acre range, 5,000 foot unimproved coral runway, 1,200 foot V/STOL runway, 1,100m x 700m parachute drop zone and other training resources. Source: Marine Corps Base, Camp Smedley D. Butler, AC/S G-3, OSD fact sheet of July 2000.

which has four daily flights out of Misawa.\footnote{James L. Bressendorff, First Lieutenant, USAF, Public Affairs Officer, 35th Fighter Wing, Misawa Air Base, Japan, in an e-mail interview by author on 28 April 2004.} At the time of this writing, there is a U.S. Navy tenant command and limited Marine Corps operations on Kadena Air Base, supported by a small detachment, Marine Wing Liaison Kadena (MWLK). These operations are important but are small in scale and not what the base could evolve into considering the wide range of operations conducted at Misawa Air Base, a much smaller installation. Conducting a fresh non-partisan study, sanctioned by the governments of Japan and the United States will de facto suspend the completion of the 1996 SACO Final Report in regards to the Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF) plan in Henoko.

As the original 1996 SACO Final Report is on schedule for completion by 2008, except for the issue of MCAS Futenma, the completion of an updated and favorable study of the integration of MCAS Futenma\footnote{According to Stephen E. Duke, Lieutenant Colonel, USMC, Japan Desk Officer, Headquarters Marine Corps, Washington, DC, in an interview by author on 13 May 2004, there has been discussions about moving the flight operations from MCAS Futenma elsewhere as an interim solution for meeting Ginowan city concerns regarding noise and safety at MCAS Futenma while at the same time, not fully returning the installation, until a replacement facility can be built. Essentially maintain it as a UN base in “warm” status until the replacement facility can be built and the UN flag shifted. (The concept of just maintaining a base is called a “warm base”). Until a replacement facility can be built this will enable PACOM to maintain an operational airfield capability should they need it in a contingency. In my view, this option poses risks and challenges in Okinawa because once a precedence is set anywhere in Japan, especially Okinawa, it is near imposssible to reverse it, such as the 1995 halt to artillery firing on Okinawa and numerous provisions contained within the SOFA which have not been exercised by the U.S. in many years. Clear definitions of contingencies and open communication will be required should this option be pursued.} into Kadena Air Base could be the impetus of a potential second round of SACO or the Security Alliance Transformation Initiative (SATI).\footnote{Professor Edward A. Olsen of the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, advised against calling this process “SACO II” since the term may be looked upon unfavorably because it suggests creating a new process when the original process (1996 SACO) is not finished.} A second round of SACO or SATI should not be limited to Okinawa but should consider all of USFJ. SATI, embraced by both GOJ and USG could serve as a strategic way ahead and the result of the DPRI which synergizes the transformation efforts of both nations’ armed forces in accordance with the existing security treaty.

(2) **Camp Kinser, Okinawa.** Whether MCAS Futenma integrates into Kadena Air Base or relocates to Henoko, Okinawans will shift there attention to another Marine Corps installation perched on a prime piece of real-estate on the outskirts
of Shin Naha (New Naha)-- Camp Kinser. Third to Kadena Air Base and MCAS Futenma, Camp Kinser is the installation most Okinawans would like to see returned\textsuperscript{211} as it is the most prominent U.S. facility in the heavily congested southern part of Okinawa. Camp Kinser’s major tenant command is the Marine Corps’ headquarters of 3d Force Service Support Group (3d FSSG) and contains numerous facilities warehousing warfighting supplies for III Marine Expeditionary Force (III MEF) and other tenant commands such as the Defense Reutilization Management Office (DRMO), headquarters offices for the Defense Commissary Agency (DeCA) branch in Okinawa, warehouses for the Army/Air Force Exchange Service (AAFES), and other smaller activities. The leitmotif here is the DoD transformation, and the sea-basing concept the Navy and Marine Corps are continually pursuing. The U.S. Navy’s strategic vision, \textit{Sea Power 21}, is the Navy’s bid to transform itself into projecting decisive joint capabilities. The concept of sea basing is one of the three required capabilities in achieving transformation in the Navy and one which is intimately linked to the Marine Corps’ Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare (EMW) concept. The emerging sea basing concept includes:

\begin{quote}
...providing joint force commanders with global command and control and extending integrated logistical support to other services. More than a family of platforms afloat, sea basing will network platforms together and promote interoperability among the Expeditionary Strike Group (ESG), the Maritime Prepositioning Force (MPF), the Combat Logistics Force, and emerging high-speed sealift and lighterage technologies.\textsuperscript{212}
\end{quote}

As these concepts are evolving and developing technology to support them, a close examination should be conducted on placing the combat logistical power of 3d FSSG on ships, such as high-speed vessels ported at White Beach. This will call for the expansion of White Beach. Other facilities which cannot be embarked on ship should be moved to Camp Hansen where space will be afforded in the void of the Marine artillery regiment and where a significant portion of III MEF units, which 3d FSSG supports, reside and maintain their equipment. Family housing and related facilities will need to be expanded in the northern areas of Okinawa if all of Camp Kinser is returned.


\textsuperscript{212} Marine Corps Concepts and Programs 2003, 8.
An enormous side benefit for returning Camp Kinser and relocating vehicle maintenance units to the northern installation of Camp Hansen, is the decrease of the uneasy spectacle of large military vehicle convoys on the small congested roads of southern Okinawa. This effort will greatly diminish the risk of accidents which has plagued motorists on Okinawa for years, as young service members drive large American built vehicles on unfamiliar pavement and on the opposite side of the road.

(3) Marine Troop Relocation and Reduction from Okinawa.

Along with the current study of relocating a Marine artillery regiment from Okinawa to Camp Fuji, the headquarters elements of the Marine artillery regiment should be relocated to Camp Zama, Kanagawa Prefecture, where housing and facilities exist and can be expanded for families and is in close proximity to Camp Fuji.

In addition, to moving the Marine artillery regiment to Camp Fuji, I propose that one of the Marine Corps infantry unit deployment program (UDP) battalions also be relocated to Camp Fuji where land exists for expansion of facilities and infrastructure. Training opportunities are limited on Okinawa due to the 1997 halt to artillery firing on Okinawa and land return in accordance with the 1996 Saco and the adherence to a “sensitive days” calendar, (see Appendix G). In 2000, III MEF participated in 77 training events of which 74 occurred off Okinawa. Some of these training events occurred on Camp Fuji where restrictions and limits to training also exist. The point is that there are limits to training everywhere in Japan and the best training opportunities are found in bilateral or multilateral exercises throughout East Asia. The stationing of an infantry battalion at Camp Fuji should not erode readiness and the viability to expand the existing runway at Camp Fuji to be able to handle troop transport planes, such as a C-130, should also be considered. Additionally, by moving troops to Camp Fuji, they are only a few hours away by ground transportation from existing troop transport capabilities at Yokosuka Naval Base and Yokota Air Base.

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213 The “sensitive days” calendar serves to bracket acceptable days of the year for training on Marine installations in Japan with consideration given to the local community so that military training is conducted on days which will not be disrespectful or an affront to Japanese/Okinawan holidays, anniversaries, and other politically or culturally sensitive days.

214 Earl B. Hailston, Lieutenant General, USMC (Retired), former Commanding General III MEF in an 11 May 2001 briefing at Headquarters III MEF, Camp Courtney, Okinawa, Japan.
A future alternative from moving one infantry UDP battalion to Camp Fuji is keeping one infantry UDP battalion at its home station in Hawaii. This will leave three infantry UDP battalions on Okinawa, one of which is assigned to the 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit (31st MEU). When a full brigade of Marines, 3d Marine Expeditionary Brigade (3d MEB), is to be assembled, the remaining two infantry UDP battalions on Okinawa could constitute itself with the infantry battalion from Hawaii wherever needed and form as a brigade with the remaining elements of the brigade’s Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF). This option may become more feasible once the Sea Basing concept is realized and matures and deserves a separate study to fully address the risks, political implications, and available strategic lift which is already in short supply.

The two immediate preceding options address a demand which is gaining more attention than land return\textsuperscript{215} in post-1996 SACO, which is to “lessen the burden” by relocating troops off Okinawa. Considering moving one of the infantry UDP battalions along with moving a Marine artillery regiment will considerably lighten the “footprint” on Okinawa.

(4) \textit{Best neighbors, not just good neighbors (Community Buy-In)}.

Current initiatives which should be sustained are efforts to create more “buy-in” towards the community from young service members and military families living in Okinawa and the rest of Japan. Through my observations and experience as a military policeman, there are higher occurrences of incidents involving younger (18-20 year old) male, service members who are stationed on Okinawa without their families and for less than a year. On September 19, 2003, Headquarters Marine Corps released a new policy aimed at sustaining operational readiness but carried the by-product of creating an environment where Marines had the time to get to know the community they live in and become a more responsible member of that community. Specifically, the policy was changed to create greater continuity, unit stability and individual maturity, cultural knowledge and familiarity with local and regional military forces, governments and private citizens, and to improve knowledge of continuing operational requirements. Marine Administrative message 529/2003, III MEF and MCBJ Assignment Policy,

\textsuperscript{215} Land return and consolidation must be careful not to create traffic problems on Okinawan’s narrow and already congested roads.
announced the Marine Corps will begin the transition in FY-2004 to the DoD standard\textsuperscript{216} for permanent change of station (PCS) assignments to Okinawa and Iwakuni, Japan, which are 36-month tours for those accompanied by family members and 24-month tours for those who are not accompanied by family members.\textsuperscript{217}

(5) \textbf{Environmental Concerns.} Another noteworthy and maturing effort is evident with respect to the environment. The Marine Corps remains pro-active by using the latest technology to address environmental concerns. The Marine Corps maintains a full-time environmental staff on Okinawa to address a myriad of issues, such as the effects of range fires to rectifying past disposal practices dating back to the immediate post-World War II years with the discovery of chemical irritants and barrels buried with hazardous material by the U.S. Army. The most salient environmental concern which must continue to be addressed is soil erosion, commonly referred to as \textit{akatsuchi} or “red-soil runoff.” According to Okinawa Prefecture’s 2001 “Annual Red Soil Outflow Amount Survey,” only eight percent of the island’s red soil erosion comes from U.S. bases, a decrease of more than 27\% since 1998. Red-soil runoff from Marine Corps training ranges is a concern which is being addressed with success by the Marine Corps with intense aerial-hydroseeding and other re-vegetation efforts such as the planting of Wedelia plants. According to Larry Soenen, soil scientist with the U.S. Forest Service, “…the Wedelia plant is very durable and fire resistant. This plant can stand up to the shooting Marines need to do on the ranges.”\textsuperscript{218}

(6) \textbf{U.S. Funded Jobs.} All of USFJ should take note of the example Marines have set as they civilianize positions in accordance with the transformation. In keeping with specific guidance from Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, the Marines have made great strides towards taking Marines out of garrison service and support roles and returning them to combat related duties. Seeing an

\textsuperscript{216}DoD directive 1315.7 directs that the standard overseas tour will be 36 or 24 months for locations with quality-of-life reasonably comparable to U.S. standards.


opportunity to contribute an economic boost to local communities in Okinawa, the Marine Corps turned these jobs which Marines once did into permanent civilian positions fully funded by the Marine Corps. Since 2001, the Marine Corps has provided an additional 357 full-time positions as bus drivers and cooks in support of Marines on Okinawa.\(^{219}\) As a bonus, the Marine Corps was able to return a battalion-size amount of Marines back into the combat-related roles they were originally intended for. As of March 2004, GOJ employed 8,813 Japanese nationals as base employees throughout all U.S. military bases on Okinawa. It is important to note that even 357 jobs are significant and appreciated, especially when funded by the United States and expansion of the Master Labor Contract (MLC)\(^{220}\) by GOJ is not feasible during a sluggish Japanese economy. In Japanese fiscal year 2003, 15,582 Japanese nationals applied for 675 jobs on U.S. military bases on Okinawa and of those, all 675 were hired into full-time positions.\(^{221}\) Continuing along this trend should be fully pursued and studied in accordance with DoD’s Business Reform Initiative (BRI) and the overall transformation.

(7) **Public Affairs.** Of utmost importance is the need for a different approach towards public affairs and the acceptance that our efforts should not be only to inform the American military community but that of our surrounding local communities in accordance with a sincere approach towards being a great neighbor. There are many outlets on U.S. military bases to keep English speaking people informed; however, the surrounding communities of U.S. military bases in Japan are dependent on their local media sources, which are more often biased against the U.S. military and do not offer the whole story or counter-balancing stories to issues and events. Brigadier General Larsen began to address this gap towards keeping the local communities informed by starting the publication of a bilingual, quarterly magazine called *Okinawa Wa*, or “Big Circle,” in 2002. Funding is small and distribution is limited to a small portion of the population of key Japanese officials and civic leaders. Perhaps expanding this initiative with the Japanese Self-Defense Force and other U.S. military forces on

\(^{219}\) Statistics provided by Larry Brantley, Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff G-4, Marine Corps Base, Camp Smedley D. Butler during an e-mail interview by author, Monterey, California, 20 April 2004.

\(^{220}\) The Master Labor Contract (MLC) is an agreement between GOJ and USG regarding the employment of GOJ funded Japanese national employees for U.S. military bases in Japan. USFJ reports a total of 23,500 Japanese employees on U.S. military bases throughout all of Japan, including Okinawa.

\(^{221}\) *Okinawa Times* (Naha), 20 April 2004.
Okinawa could provide the funding and readership for a monthly publication. Other recommendations to increase outreach and readership/viewership are as follows:

- Make base newspapers bilingual in order to keep Japanese base employees and their families informed, this will spill over into other sectors of the local community who will find interest in being able to read U.S. base newspapers.222

- Make all U.S. military websites in Japan bilingual. Much progress has already been made towards this effort in 2004. On July 12, 2004, USFJ reported a Japanese-language version of the USFJ website located at [http://usfj.mil/j_index.html](http://usfj.mil/j_index.html). Prior to this announcement, Marine Forces Japan and Naval Forces Japan launched Japanese-language versions of their websites, [http://www.kanji.okinawa.usmc.mil/](http://www.kanji.okinawa.usmc.mil/) and [http://www.kanji.cnfj.navy.mil](http://www.kanji.cnfj.navy.mil) respectively. This effort should be sustained and further developed with all branches of the U.S. Armed Forces in Japan. Japanese who are interested in hearing from the U.S. side on various issues can now find an official U.S. website in Japanese. This is important as these websites will counter the unofficial and biased, anti-military websites which have proliferated in Japan. Many of the unofficial websites are rumor-type of sites which perpetuate sensational reports as facts. Furthermore, there are unofficial websites established by Japanese base workers who are frustrated at the lack of official U.S. news media, in Japanese, counteracting the biased reports of Japanese media and websites, such as, [http://home.interlink.or.jp/~mabe/](http://home.interlink.or.jp/~mabe/).

- Consider having a Japanese speaking announcer on the Okinawa-based Armed Forces Network (AFN) FM radio station 89.1. Having segments in complete Japanese is not practical, but having a bilingual announcer who is able to repeat news such as events and incidents in Japanese will be of great benefit since the radio station is frequently listened to by Okinawans for its Western music.223

Mr. Funakoshi gave encouraging comments on other existing community relations initiatives mainly from the U.S. Marines on Okinawa which should

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222 DoD should examine *Pacific Stars and Stripes*’ mission and enforce high and ethical standards of reporting in Japan and avoid tabloid style reporting in order to call attention to itself as a relevant newspaper. *Pacific Stars and Stripes* has been known to report on unsubstantiated and uncollaborated data which communicated incorrect and false information to base communities and surrounding local communities.

223 According to Marine Gunnery Sergeant G.T. Fontana, Station Manger for Det. 11, *American Forces Network (AFN) Okinawa*, in an e-mail interview 23 May 2004, there is no official polling data on the exact number of Japanese listeners; however, 400,000 (estimate) out of Okinawa’s 1.3 million population live within the transmitting signal of *AFN Okinawa* and are considered the “shadow audience.”
continue, such as the English teaching program in schools and the prospects for expansion, volunteerism at orphanages, and beach clean-ups.\textsuperscript{224}

(8) \textbf{Cultural Training}. Finally regarding community relations, the cultural training of Marines reporting for duty on Okinawa may be flawed. Depending how a Marine is assigned to Okinawa determines how they receive cultural training. Marines who report to Okinawa with their family on an accompanied\textsuperscript{225} tour will spend a full day in a newcomer’s orientation. Marines who deploy to Okinawa with their units for a typical six-month period on the unit deployment program will receive briefs in a pre-deployment training package before leaving their home base in the United States and then again upon arrival by local authorities such as military police and community relations liaisons. Marines who report to Okinawa individually for a one-year unaccompanied\textsuperscript{226} tour will receive a series of briefs within a one-week span while temporarily assigned to the Joint Reception Center (JRC) on Okinawa until they are delivered to their permanent units. It is estimated that between 9,500-10,000 personnel transit through the JRC annually.\textsuperscript{227} It is my assertion that cultural training is not as effective as it could be in this third group of Marines and sailors which is mainly composed of young (18-20 year-old) and low ranking personnel on their first assignment in the military. Most of these Marines and sailors are jet-lagged and what they retain is a basic fear of making a mistake and not wanting to venture off-base. These fears are quickly dispelled as soon as they make relationships with Marines who have been on Okinawa for a while. Since the Marine Corps is an expeditionary force and frequently deploys its personnel overseas it should consider institutionalizing a similar period of instruction (POI) used by Marine Security Guard (MSG) School in Quantico, Virginia for instructing their Marines on cultural sensitivities associated with overseas assignment in a diplomatic environment. Institutionalizing a similar POI in recruit training along with existing pre-deployment training may create a foundation upon which Marines can

\textsuperscript{224} Other initiatives are the hosting of base open-houses (festivals) and Special Olympics hosted by the U.S. Air Force on Kadena Air Base.

\textsuperscript{225} Accompanied tour implies a command-sponsored, three-year assignment with family.

\textsuperscript{226} Unaccompanied tour implies a one-year assignment without command-sponsorship for family.

\textsuperscript{227} Michael F. Jackson, CWO4, USMC, Personnel Officer, Marine Corps Base, Camp Smedley D. Butler, Okinawa, Japan, in an e-mail interview with author, 2 June 2004.
become better educated and ready to learn specifics about Okinawa, Japan, or any other location they are assigned too.

3. U.S. Department of State

Efforts from the U.S. Department of State (DOS) outside ordinary diplomatic dialogue to implement programs or take actions which could strengthen the security alliance and facilitate understanding between the U.S. military and local communities or, to counter biased and inflammatory media coverage has been mild. The U.S. Embassy’s staff in Tokyo and the Consul General of the U.S. Consulate, Naha, Okinawa have been heavily engaged in talks and discussion; however, implementation of programs or ways to communicate facts to the local community has been assumed by the U.S. military.

An example of where the Department of State could exercise their diplomatic resources is with the graduate school initiative on Okinawa, known as the Okinawa Institute of Science and Technology (OIST). Although the U.S. military has no official role with bringing this international graduate school to Okinawa, GOJ has asked USG for support by providing space for the children of the OIST staff to attend the U.S. military’s Department of Defense Dependents Schools (DODDS) on Okinawa, which the U.S. military has agreed to provide on a space available basis and with payment of the tuition.228

Sincere concern for Okinawans is exemplified by the leadership and initiative of U.S. military commanders. The Commander of Marine Forces Pacific, Lieutenant General W.C. Gregson has provided a contractor, Okinawa Education Initiatives Project Coordinator, to assess the possibility to implement two projects linked to OIST. First, was a team-teaching program within the local high schools on Okinawa; the Marine Corps has the goal to provide native English speakers to aide the Japanese teachers in teaching English. The second project is to establish an international school that will provide education for the OIST staff children and local Okinawans.229 These programs among others which the Marine Corps and the rest of USFJ have been consistently implementing, with goals towards strengthening the alliance and giving something back

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228 Kaori Martinez, GS-11, Community Relations Specialist, AC/S G-5, Marine Corps Base, Camp Smedley D. Butler, during an e-mail interview on 24 May 2004.

229 Ibid.
to Okinawans in particular, are indicative of the things that the State Department could and should consider initiating.

4. Options for the Japanese to Consider

As the constitutional debate and the review of the NDPO progresses in Japan, Tokyo has already made some plans to transform the JSDF, first, with plans to establish a joint headquarters and also with the speculation that the JDA will evolve into a ministry. Additionally, the Japanese are debating the future roles and missions of the JSDF. I propose that GOJ transform the JSDF into a joint operating task-force with expeditionary capabilities to augment U.S. forces in combined/joint task forces. Bush administration officials’ views on the evolution of the JSDF are compared to the Marine Corps’ three-block war concept. General Charles Krulak, U.S. Marine Corps Commandant between 1995-1999, once termed a "three-block war" as a scenario where troops find themselves engaged in a spectrum of operations, from humanitarian missions, through peace keeping and peace enforcement-type actions, to full-blown combat--sometimes within the space of three city blocks. A senior Bush administration official asserted that the Japanese will be able to do one of those blocks in the future.

a. JSDF on U.S. Bases in Japan

In coordination with the United States, discussion should be initiated for establishing training detachments as tenant commands on U.S. bases in Japan. Having Japanese units on U.S. bases in Japan may help by putting more of a Japanese face onto the installation and assist the JSDF by providing them with better facilities. This creates the opportunity to make a Japanese officer the Deputy Camp Commander of U.S. installations and even use Japanese resources and troops to assist in force protection. Colonel Yamaoka believes that this should be pursued and stated that Japanese officers could act as a buffer between local community concerns and U.S. military officials. Furthermore, Colonel Yamaoka believes that the JSDF should transform its roles and missions towards an expeditionary air-ground task force operating with naval forces such as the U.S. Marine Corps. Being collocated with Marine units would be a benefit if that

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231 Source wishes to remain unnamed from an interview with the author in Washington, DC on 14 May 2004.
is the direction Tokyo wishes to take. Mr. Yamaji believes there are some dangers in this however, due to the JSDF being still politically inexperienced and may be improperly influenced by local community leaders.

b. JSDF on U.S. Bases in the United States

Allowing JSDF detachments as tenant commands in the United States at the various services’ learning centers may assist the JSDF to professionalize itself into a more joint and capable force. Precedence with foreign militaries in the United States has already been established with the introduction of German Air Forces in Holloman Air Force Base, Alamogordo, New Mexico in 1996. \(^{232}\) Mr. Yamaji stated that allowing Japanese forces, with a SOFA, may be the start to making the alliance more reciprocal.\(^{233}\) Having Japanese detachments on military bases within the U.S. may create opportunities for U.S. forces to learn from them also, beginning with cultural issues and martial arts.

c. Economic Development

Hiroshi Kitamura said it best 33 years ago:

…it the Japanese should try to reduce the amount of attention directed toward the United States to a level proportionate to the reality of each problem… Japanese attention to any problem involving the United States is generally so high and so overplayed by the Japanese press that political and economic circles cannot handle problems with due consideration for their actual importance on a scale of national interest.\(^{234}\)

A 2001 poll reports that the economy is of equal concern with the U.S. military base issue in Okinawa\(^{235}\) and higher in the rest of Japan. Interestingly, in a recent poll conducted

\(^{232}\) On 1 May 1996, the German Air Force Tactical Training Center was established in concept with the 20th Fighter Squadron which provides aircrew training in the F-4F Phantom II. The TTC serves as the parent command for two German air crew training squadrons. The F-4 Training Squadron oversees all German F-4 student personal affairs, and provides German instructor pilots to cooperate in the contracted F-4 training program provided by the U.S. Air Force (20th Fighter Squadron). A second TTC unit, the Tornado Training Squadron, provides academic and tactical flying training, by German Air Force instructors, for German Tornado aircrews. The first contingent of Tornado aircraft arrived at Holloman in March 1996. More than 300 German Air Force members are permanently assigned at Holloman to the TTC—the only unit of its kind in the United States. The German Air Force Flying Training Center activated March 31, 1996. Holloman AFB, “Holloman AFB History,” Holloman AFB Online [home page on-line]; available from http://www.holloman.af.mil/hafb/basehistory.html; Internet; accessed 23 May 2004.

\(^{233}\) Yamaji, 12 May 2004.

\(^{234}\) Kitamura, 37.


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by the University of Tokyo and the *Asahi Shimbun* the issue of U.S. military bases did not register as an important issue or concern (see Table 5).

Table 5. **Poll Representing the Most Important Issues Facing the Japanese Today**

**Question:** Aside from whether you are for or against, pick as many issues as you think are important from among the following 13 items.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Japan should build up its defense capability</td>
<td>248</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan should reinforce its security alliance with the U.S.</td>
<td>119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan should not hesitate to strike first if and when an armed attack is predicted</td>
<td>162</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan should play its international role as a permanent member of the U.N. Security Council</td>
<td>175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan should dispatch SDF personnel to help with Iraq's reconstruction</td>
<td>234</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It would be better to downsize the government even though its services, such as social welfare, may deteriorate</td>
<td>122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japanese companies should retain lifetime employment</td>
<td>139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Job security with public works is needed for local districts</td>
<td>155</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>For the time being, the government should increase public spending to stimulate the economy instead of curtailing budget appropriations for a fiscal turnaround</td>
<td>244</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The government should raise the consumption tax rate for its sustainable pension systems</td>
<td>434</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The government should privatize its 3 postal services</td>
<td>190</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The government should stop building new highways and the existing highways should be toll free</td>
<td>228</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voting rights should be granted to foreign nationals with permanent residency status</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*From:* The survey was conducted by the University of Tokyo and the *Asahi Shimbun* on a face-to-face basis to follow up 1,978 effective respondents among 3,000 persons who were sampled out of the nation's voting population on a stratified two-stage random-sampling basis for a previous survey conducted September 15-16, 2003. A questionnaire form was mailed to them between November 8 and 9, 2003 and answers were obtained from 1,233 persons (62.3 percent). All 1,233 respondents did not necessarily answer all questions. The total percentage does not reach 100% due to rounding.

Tokyo has made token periodic and seasonal concessions to Okinawa in the form of hosting the 2000 Group of Eight (G-8) Summit on Okinawa, lowering expressway tolls, and promoting the tourism industry in Okinawa, which is at the mercy of seasonal typhoons. In April 2002, Tokyo passed the Okinawa Promotional Special
Measures Law which allowed for the creation of a Special Free Trade Zone (SFTZ) on Okinawa, the only free trade zone in Japan. The purpose of the SFTZ is “to encourage business enterprises to establish facilities in Okinawa and promote trade.” The incentives and subsides available for enterprises who would partake in the SFTZ are attractive but, limited partly due to space and restrictions to types of business. This initiative is on the right track but has yet to draw large-scale international interest. Perhaps, expanding the actual free trade zone to other areas on Okinawa and better international advertising and promotion of other laws and programs, such as the Okinawa Industrial Location Promotion Act, designated at attracting foreign investment, may prove beneficial.

The Minister of State for Okinawa and Northern Territories Affairs, the Okinawa Policy Council, the Okinawa General Bureau, and the Okinawa Prefectural Government should consider promoting an industry base in Okinawa capitalizing on the indigenous talent there such as glass making and textiles. In addition for researching and planning for the future graduate school-OIST, a debate and study should be considered for promoting an international karate and sports academy on Okinawa, possibly in partnership with the JSDF and USFJ. An international karate and sports academy could be attractive towards Japanese Olympic training and future venues should the Olympics go to Japan in the future. Perhaps introducing casinos to Okinawa will generate steady tourism and revenue even during periods of inclement weather due to typhoons.

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237 The Okinawa Industrial Location Promotion Act, Factory Location Law (designates potential industrial sites on Okinawa which offers preferential tax treatment), and the Okinawa Prefectural Ordinance for the Promotion of Industrial Sites Act qualifies for national and offers prefectural subsides and financing for industrial factories and enterprises in manufacturing, overland freight transport, warehousing, packing, wholesale, software, data processing services, information services, designing, and natural science research institutions in Okinawa Prefecture.

238 The Okinawa General Bureau was established as a general branch office of the national government. It carries out the local work of the regional offices of ministries and agencies including the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, and the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport. See, CAO, “Policies on Okinawa,” *CAO Online* [home page on-line]; available from http://www.cao.go.jp/okinawa.pdf; Internet; accessed; 23 July 2004.
E. CONCLUSION

This thesis sought to provide policy-prescriptive options for U.S. forces in Japan, specifically Okinawa. In doing so, this thesis illustrated all the processes involved and taken by GOJ and the U.S. government and other psychological and cultural issues which shape the environment. This thesis calls for Japan to determine its national direction and for Okinawa to define a viable solution in practical terms. The options suggested offer flexibility in light of potential independent variables and are asserted with the goal of moving the security alliance towards a more reciprocal relationship.

While Japan continues to debate constitutional revision, its foreign policy and defense continues to be subject to United States approval. This “back seat” position in world affairs handicaps Japan from making an effective drive for permanent membership in the UNSC and limits Japan’s ability to deal more independently with regional neighbors. As a result, Japan will continue to be portrayed as not being a “normal country” in some circles and its interests marginalized.

An obvious recommendation from this thesis is for a continued U.S.-Japan Security Alliance in one form or another. The effects of 9/11 and the uncertainty of North Korea and China validates a strong security alliance, able to adjust to meet the needs of both nations. This thesis has provided some adjustment options for both nations to consider.

An issue which is not addressed in this thesis but should be addressed in a separate future thesis is the reaction of regional neighbors to the change in U.S. force structure in Japan should SATI or a variant of SATI be adopted. Japanese officials are pointing at the limited successes they have achieved in Iraq with the JSDF’s overseas developmental assistance missions; however, regional critics of a militarily stronger Japan will be sure to point out that Japan has never operated in the Middle East prior to World War II and as a result, there are no bitter memories or animosities directed towards Japan as it currently exists in East Asia.
APPENDIX A  POLLING DATA

Political Parties’ Opinion Regarding Amending the Constitution

A joint questionnaire survey of lawmakers in the House of Representatives, conducted by the Yomiuri Shimbun and Professor Jun Iio's office at the National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies (GRIPS), discovered a substantial difference of views between the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and its coalition partner, the New Komeito party, over basic policies.

LDP: 94 percent were in favor of amending Article 9.
New Komeito: 33 percent in favor of amending Article 9.

In this regard, respondents were asked to answer if they thought the Constitution should be amended so that Japan can participate in collective defense.

-As a result, 66 percent of the respondents answered "yes."
-In the LDP, "yes" reached 90 percent.
-In the New Komeito, however, three-fourths answered "no."

Japanese Public’s Opinion Regarding Amending the Constitution

First Sample:

Sixty-five percent of respondents FAVOR a revision of the Constitution, of this, 52 percent cite that Japan could not fully contribute to the international community under the current Constitution. From: Yomiuri Shimbun (Tokyo), 2 April 2004.

Second Sample Grouping:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Support For Constitutional Revision Polls</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sep 00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In Favor to Revise the Constitution (% in favor)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

From: September 2000 and August 2001 from Office of Research, Stretching the Security Consensus in Japan, Department of State, Washington, DC, 20 September 2001. April 2004 from the Yomiuri Shimbun poll reported 2 April 2004. June 2004 from the Tokyo Shimbun poll reported 23 June 2004, of this 29.1 percent of the respondents are in favor of revising the constitution to include Article 9; however, 48.7 percent are in favor of revising certain parts of the constitution but not Article 9.

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This appears to be the direction and end-state.

- Future Transformation of the JSDF
- Future U.S.-Japan Security Alliance and shape of USFJ
- Future Transformation of DoD
- Integrated Global Posture Basing Study (IGPBS)
- September 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review
- September 17, 2002 National Security Strategy of the United States of America
- Constitutional Debate in Japan (Cabinet, Diet, public)
- PM Koizumi’s Cabinet
- 2003 Review of the National Defense Program Outline
- 2005 Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) Committee
- September 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review

See footnote 33
APPENDIX C  CHRONOLOGY OF RECENT THREATENING ACTIONS BY THE DPRK

(Compiled by author, September 2004)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>June 1993</td>
<td>DPRK test-launched a <em>Nodong</em> 1 missile into the Sea of Japan (Advertised at 600 miles range, but blew at exactly 300 miles). Basically, <em>Nodong</em> 1 was a SCUD missile modified with more engines for greater range making it a medium-range missile. Experts not sure whether the precise targeting of the missile was accidental or an indication of the North’s technological advances.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993-1994</td>
<td>DPRK is discovered to have been using a Soviet-provided power reactor at Yongbyon to enrich uranium for making plutonium for nuclear weapons and brings the United States and the DPRK to a new level of tension. The creation of the Agreed Framework diffuses the situation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 1996</td>
<td>DPRK soldiers invaded the Panmunjom Joint Security Area.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 1996</td>
<td>Incidents occurred of DPRK submarines infringing upon ROK territorial waters.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 1997</td>
<td>DPRK soldiers crossed the DMZ and fired at ROK forces.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 1998</td>
<td>Incidents occurred of DPRK submarines infringing upon ROK territorial waters.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 1998</td>
<td>DPRK test-launched a <em>Taepodong</em> ballistic missile over Japan and into the Pacific Ocean.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 1998</td>
<td>ROK forces sank a North Korean submarine that had intruded into ROK’s southern waters.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 1999</td>
<td>Two suspicious boats presumed to be North Korea spy ships located off of Japan’s Noto Peninsula. Warning shots and bombs were dropped from a Japanese P-3C airplane.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 1999</td>
<td>Shooting incidents arose between ROK and DPRK patrol boats.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21-22 December 2001</td>
<td>A suspicious boat observed in waters southwest of Japan’s Kyushu Island, suspected of being a North Korean spy ship.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 2002</td>
<td>Shooting incidents arose between ROK and DPRK patrol boats.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
October 2002  Assistant Secretary of State James A. Kelly confronted Kim Jong-Il’s regime with evidence that the DPRK was violating the 1994 Agreed Framework by continuing to enrich uranium. The DPRK subsequently withdrew from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), expelled the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors, and disabled the IAEA’s monitoring devices and reopened the Yongbyon plant to make plutonium.

October 2002  Five abducted Japanese citizens were permitted a brief visit to Japan and ended up staying, but their family members were left behind and not permitted to reunite by Pyongyang until May 2004.

February 2003  A DPRK MiG-19 transgressed the Northern Limit Line (NLL).

24 February & 10 March 2003  DPRK test-launched short-range Rodong missiles.

March 2003  Four DPRK fighter aircraft approached a U.S. military aircraft.

July 2003  North and South Korean Troops exchange fire between guard posts on the DMZ.

December 2003  The United States intercepted a ship bound for Yemen loaded with North Korean Scud missiles.

August 2004  Reports from Jane’s Defence Weekly that the DPRK has developed a land-based, road-mobile and ship or submarine launched medium-range ballistic missile by using the Soviet R-27, (NATO classification SS-N-6), which was a submarine launched ballistic missile. The land-based model is estimated to have a range of 2,500 to 4,000 kilometers and the sea-launched version has an estimated range of at least 2,500 kilometers. The R-27 is a single-stage, liquid-propellant, sub-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) that became operational in the Soviet Navy in 1968. It weighs 14,200kg and is 9.65m in length, with a diameter of 1.5m. The original version carried a single nuclear re-entry vehicle (RV), with a 200kT payload. These systems have the capability of striking everywhere in East Asia including U.S. soil.
APPENDIX D  JAPAN’S PROCUREMENT FUNDING FOR FRONT-LINE EQUIPMENT

(From: Defense Program for FY 2003: An Overview, Japan Defense Agency)

3. Procurement fundings for Front-line Equipment (in budget authority)

Unit: 100 million yen, %
( ): Growth Rate
APPENDIX E  STATUS QUO MODEL

(Compiled by author, May 2004)

Based on conventional wisdom the below timelines are advocated.

- **10-20 Years**
  - Wait & see Korean Unification

- **5-10 Years**
  - Await Constitutional Change

- **1-10 Years**
  - “Lily Pads”

- **4 Years w/o MCAS Futenma**
  - Complete 1996 SACO
Favorable study will start “SATI”

- Re-study MCAS Futenma merger into KAB and Ie Shima
- Return MCAS Futenma and move Marine Air Op’s to KAB and Ie Shima
- Move some 18th Wing assets to Yokota Air Base
- Move Marine Artillery Regiment to Camp Fuji and its HQ to Camp Zama
- Return Camp Kinser and move 3d FSSG to Camp Hansen and on ships
- Community Relations Efforts
- Japanese tenant commands within the United States
- Move Infantry UDP to Camp Fuji or keep it at Kaneohe Bay
APPENDIX G  MARINE CORPS BASE, CAMP S.D. BUTLER, OKINAWA, JAPAN, SENSITIVE TRAINING DAYS FOR FY 2003

(From: Assistant Chief of Staff G-3, Marine Corps Base, Camp Smedley D. Butler)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1. New Years Holiday</th>
<th>1-3 January</th>
<th>Island Wide</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2. National Center Test for University Admissions</td>
<td>18-19 January (1000-1730)</td>
<td>Island Wide</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Lunar New Years Day</td>
<td>1-3 Feb</td>
<td>Island Wide</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Examination of Okinawa Prefecture University of Arts</td>
<td>3-7 February (0930-1700)</td>
<td>Shuri, Naha City</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Examination of Okinawa Women’s Junior College</td>
<td>5 February (0930-1500)</td>
<td>Nagata, Naha City</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Examination of Okinawa International University</td>
<td>6-7 February (0930-1500)</td>
<td>Ginowan, Ginowan City</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Examination of Okinawa Christian Junior College</td>
<td>7 February (0900-1700)</td>
<td>Onaga, Nishihara Town</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Examination of Okinawa University</td>
<td>9-10 February (0900-1600)</td>
<td>Kokuba, Naha</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Examination of Meio University</td>
<td>11 February (1300-1600)</td>
<td>Biimata, Nago City</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Examination of Okinawa Prefecture College of Nursing</td>
<td>25 February (1000-1700)</td>
<td>Yogi, Nago City</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Examination of University Ryukyu</td>
<td>25-26 February (0830-1700)</td>
<td>Senbaru, Nishihara</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Examination of Okinawa Prefecture University of Arts</td>
<td>25 February - 1 March (0930-1700)</td>
<td>Shuri, Naha City</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Examination of Okinawa International University</td>
<td>6 March (0930-1600)</td>
<td>Ginowan, Ginowan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. Examination of Okinawa University</td>
<td>9 March (0900-1600)</td>
<td>Kokuba, Naha City</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. Examination of Okinawa Women’s Junior College</td>
<td>10 March (0930-1500)</td>
<td>Nagata, Naha City</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. Examination of Prefecture High Schools</td>
<td>10-11 March (0800-1630)</td>
<td>Island Wide</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Event</td>
<td>Date/Time</td>
<td>Location</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Examination of Okinawa Prefecture College of Nursing</td>
<td>12 March (100-1700)</td>
<td>Yogi, Naha City</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19. Examination of University Ryukyu</td>
<td>12-13 March (0900-1830)</td>
<td>Senbaru, Town of Ryukyu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20. Hamarauri</td>
<td>4-6 April</td>
<td>Kin Blue Training Area/Gimbaru</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21. Anniversary of Reversion of Okinawa to Japan</td>
<td>15 May</td>
<td>Island Wide</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22. Memorial Day for War Victims</td>
<td>23 June</td>
<td>Island Wide</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23. Examination of Okinawa Christian Junior College</td>
<td>1 August (0900-1700)</td>
<td>Onaga, Nishihara Town</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24. Lunar Obon Festival</td>
<td>10-12 August</td>
<td>Island Wide</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25. Anniversary of the End of the War</td>
<td>15 August</td>
<td>Island Wide</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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