

AN ANALYSIS OF THE INDIAN GOVERNMENT'S
COUNTERINSURGENCY CAMPAIGN
IN JAMMU AND KASHMIR

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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

ABSTRACT

AN ANALYSIS OF THE INDIAN GOVERNMENT'S COUNTERINSURGENCY CAMPAIGN IN JAMMU AND KASHMIR, by MAJ Matthew J. Van Wageningen, 91 pages.

The Indian government is involved in the longest and most costly counterinsurgency campaign that is conducted by a nation state in modern history. The Kashmir conflict is complex and contains a conflict of interests with multiple players struggling for a variety of agendas that include independence of Kashmir by the separatists, preservation of a secular nation fought for by India, and unification of a Muslim state contested by Pakistan. This study analyzes in depth the insurgency in Jammu and Kashmir and the Indian governments and security forces response to these conditions. This paper focuses on the Indian government's counterinsurgency campaign strategy from 1989 to present and critiques the use of the instruments of national power in defeating the insurgency.

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ACRONYMS

APHC	All Parties Hurriyat Conference
AAC	Awami Action Committee
HUA	Harkat-Ul-Ansar
HUM	Hizbul Mujahideen
J&K	Jammu and Kashmir
ISI	InterService Intelligence
JKLF	Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front
LoC	Line of Control
SAARC	South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) dispute between India, Pakistani, Kashmiri separatists, and foreign fighters represents a war of insurgency that is being fought for many complex reasons. The origins of this conflict can be traced to the partition of India and Pakistan in 1948 by the British. The controversy arose when both India and Pakistan claimed J&K as part of their new countries). Pakistan claimed Kashmir because they both have a majority Muslim population and share cultural ties, and India laid claim because Kashmir's ruling prince decided to join India after coming under attack from Pakistani military forces. As a result, Kashmir became a flashpoint between India, Pakistan, and Kashmiris, who all claim the region (see figure 1). In 1989, this conflict took on a new dimension when the Kashmiris began a military insurgency in order to gain freedom from India. In human terms, the results of this insurgency equate to an estimated 400,000 displaced Kashmiri Hindu refugees, current deployment of 600,000 Indian soldiers to Kashmir, at a minimum thirty active Kashmiri insurgent organizations, and at least 40,000 killed on all sides since 1989 (Medhurst 2002, 285-289). A case study of this insurgency in Kashmir that started in 1989 can provide military scholars insight into which approaches are needed to conduct a successful counterinsurgency operation by analyzing the Indian government's attempts to use instruments of national power to win this conflict.



Figure 1. Map of Kashmir

Source: The University of Texas, On-line Library; available from <http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/kashmir.html>; Internet; accessed on 4 February 2004.

Research Questions

Primary Question: Is the Indian government's counterinsurgency campaign in Kashmir effective, and if not, why not?

Secondary Question: Is the Indian government using the correct combination of the instruments of national power as a means to defeat the insurgency in Kashmir?

British Rule and Partition

To understand the war on insurgency in Kashmir, the history of J&K must be reviewed and examined. In 1846, the British colonial rulers of India gave the Prince Maharaja Singh rule of the State of J&K. The problem with the British choice of Maharaja Singh as the ruler was, that they did not take into account the religion of the Maharaja and his government officials, who were Hindu, in a region that was over seventy percent Muslim. The perception of the majority of the Muslim Kashmiris during the rule of the Maharaja and his family can be characterized as one of unfairness and suppression by the ruler. The Muslim majority viewed the Maharaja and the Hindu minority as self-serving, which was demonstrated by the fact that a Hindu minority population and government owned most of the land, controlled the education system and government, and thus oppressed the Muslim majority (Bose 2003, 16-19). This inequality of the Muslim majority in J& K would become the building block for the secessionist movement that would first make its appearance in 1932, when a Muslim named Mohammed Abdullah started a peaceful political movement, the J&K Muslim Conference, whose political goal was to gain equal rights for the Muslim majority (Bose 2003, 16-19).

With the end of the colonial rule in August 1947, the British government partitioned India and Pakistan into two states that best reflected the religious makeup of the former colony (Wirsing 1994, 14-15). The British followed general guidelines that would ensure that former states with Hindu majorities would be part of India and that Muslim majority states would belong to Pakistan. In addition, the ruler of each new state would agree to the status of the partition (Ganguly 1997, 8-9). Nevertheless, the Maharaja Hari Singh believed that an independent J&K was possible, believing he had the legal right to decide the fate of his state (National Public Radio 1999).

The idea of an independent J&K was destroyed during the first week of October 1947, when Muslim rebels from J&K and Pakistani regular army forces on leave, disguised as tribesmen, started a revolt among the Muslim population (Asthana 2001, 61; Ganguly 1997, 9-10). Initially, this uprising was successful and captured the territory that is presently considered occupied Pakistani Kashmir, which includes the city of Muzaffarabad. Rebel forces then consolidated gains and attacked Srinagar, the summer capital of Kashmir, thus directly threatening the J&K government. These attacks resulted in atrocities committed against the Hindu minority throughout Kashmir and a direct threat to the Maharaja's rule, which forced him to reach out for military assistance from the former colonial ruler, Lord Mountbatten, and the new Indian government in New Delhi (Asthana 2001, 60-61). The new Indian government was hesitant to fulfill the Maharaja's request, since without an official request for accession into the new country of India that was ratified by the people of J&K, the Indian Army could not legally respond (Rajawat 2003, 7-9). Lord Mountbatten, the British Colonial magistrate, and India's new Prime Minister Nehru finally agreed that the Indian Army could deploy because of the rebellion

in J&K, and that after the situation was secure the vote on accession into India or Pakistan would take place (Ganguly 1997, 10).

The First Indian-Pakistani War, 1947 to 1949

The result of the Indian and Pakistani intervention into Kashmir would be the first of three wars over the disputed region. In October 1947, Indian paratroopers landed in Srinagar, repulsed the rebel army, and reversed Pakistani gains, while at the same time India took its case to the United Nations to get a mandate for immediate Pakistani withdrawal. The United Nations passed two resolutions that ordered a ceasefire, withdrawal of Pakistani forces from Kashmir, a minimization of Indian forces in J&K, and a vote from the Kashmiri people to decide to which country to accede, known as a Plebiscite (Schofield 1996, 24-25). “The Plebiscite is the 1948 United Nations resolution that called for internationally supervised process whereby the future status of the state of J & K shall be determined in accordance with the will of the people” (Bose 2003, 39). However, India refused to allow a free vote, fearing that the Muslim majority would vote to join Pakistan (Schofield 1996, 24-27). As a consequence, neither side withdrew its forces from the region, thereby splitting Kashmir in two. The armed conflict ended in 1949 when the United Nations mediated a ceasefire that drew a 500-mile border, splitting J&K into the regions of Indian-and Pakistani-occupied Kashmir depicted on today’s maps, thus setting the stage for the longest dispute in the history of the United Nations.

The Second Indian-Pakistani War, 1965

In May 1965, Pakistan began Operation Gibraltar, an operation that used a small number of Pakistani soldiers who infiltrated Indian Kashmir in order to incite and lead the local Kashmiris to rise up against the Indian government (Ganguly 2001, 43). This

offensive action against the Indian government drew an immediate response by the Indian Army, which counterattacked across the Ceasefire Line (CFL). The next five months of fighting resulted in no territorial gains for both countries and another ceasefire brokered by the United Nations. Pakistan attacked Kashmir, assuming mass popular support existed in Kashmir and thus a popular uprising would quickly gain support and result in the overthrow of the Indian government (Ganguly 2001, 43-45). However, few Kashmiris joined the ranks of the Pakistani Army and the popular uprising that Pakistan envisioned never occurred.

East Pakistan and the Third War Between Pakistan and India in 1971

In 1971, India and Pakistan fought their third war but this one over Bangladesh, formally East Pakistan, when India intervened on the Bangladeshi rebels' behalf, which were fighting for independence from Pakistan (National Public Radio 2004a). The results of this war led to the Simla Accord, which renamed the ceasefire line in Kashmir to the Line of Control (LoC) and established an internationally recognized border. With the exception of the dispute about the Siachen glacier, this agreement has lasted until today. This third war also caused Pakistan to lose interest in Kashmir for the next decade, demonstrated by not publicly advocating the Kashmiris' right to self-determination and not providing any significant external support to separatists (National Public Radio 1999). "However, the Pakistani government, led by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, secretly began the formulation of a strategy that sought to regain control of lost Kashmiri territory out of revenge for the loss of Bangladesh, which would begin to manifest itself in the 1980s" (Singh 2001, 183).

The 1980s: The Road to Insurgency

During the 1980s, the hope of the Kashmiris to resolve the dispute with India peacefully quickly began to fade with a drastic shift in New Delhi's politics, led by Prime Minister Indira Gandhi. Gandhi feared that if more self-rule were given to any Indian Muslim State, then other heavily populated Muslim states would demand the same and security and secularism would be at risk (Ganguly 2001, 90-91). This resulted in a severe crackdown on Kashmir's self-determination by banning secessionist groups and controlling local elections in order to prevent autonomous movements from gaining power and to ensure that New Delhi would have centralized control over local politics (Ganguly 1997, 84-90). In addition, laws such as the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities Prevention Act were put into effect to crack down on anti-Indian efforts and to afford local law enforcement the right to search and detain pro-secessionists arbitrarily (Ganguly 1997, 84-90). The culmination of these anti-secessionist efforts occurred in 1987, when the Indian government failed to conduct fair elections (National Public Radio 2004a). This unfair election was the catalyst causing secessionists to turn to low-level violence to voice their discontent with New Delhi. From 1988 to 1989, the police had to regularly put down strikes, growing protests, and organized violence by the Kashmiri youth and secessionists (Akhtar 1991, 48-49). The lawlessness of the region increased daily until 1990, which caused the economic situation to worsen. This further fed the spiral of violence, causing many young Kashmiris to become militant (Akhtar 1991, 68-69).

The final turning point occurred in December 1989, with the kidnapping of the daughter of a local minister who was appointed by New Delhi. The situation in Kashmir

quickly deteriorated and the Indian Army and the first insurgent organizations were involved in the first battles of the civil war. In addition to local Kashmiri insurgents fighting the Indian government, foreign fighters began to arrive on the scene from Afghanistan, Pakistan, and other Muslim countries from around the Middle East to assist the insurgents in their struggle against the Indian rule (Singh 2001, 184-185). Moreover, for the first time in Kashmiri history, thousands of Hindus began to flee Kashmir after becoming the target of ethnic violence (Ganguly 1997, 107-108; National Public Radio 1999). By early 1990, Indian Army intelligence quickly realized that the situation in Kashmir was no longer just local terrorism, but rather a growing insurgency, which was supported externally by Pakistan through training, material, intelligence, and recruitment by the Pakistani Intelligence Service, as well as infiltration of foreign fighters (Schofield 2003, 154-156). This resulted in the Kashmir Disturbed Act of 1990, which essentially put Kashmir under marshal law. Indian Army and police forces were now free to conduct unrestrained counterinsurgency operations and to use any means necessary to regain control (Ganguly 1997, 112).

1990s: India's Counterinsurgency Operations

In the early 1990s, the insurgency in Kashmir was marked by the complete breakdown of civil authority, the loss of control of large parts of the Kashmir Valley to Muslim insurgents, and the Indian military conducting full-scale counterinsurgency operations, with 300,000 soldiers battling dozens of insurgency groups across J&K (Ganguly 1997, 122; Akhtar 1991, 87-89). In addition, relations with Pakistan became tenuous because of the external support given to the Kashmiri insurgents by Pakistani InterServices Intelligence (ISI). As a result, the Indian government's response to the

insurgency focused on a military solution for two primary reasons. First, the government feared that the intervention of Pakistan would worsen the situation, either through direct support by Pakistani paramilitary forces or by indirect support, such as training and supplies. Second, New Delhi wanted to be known for being unbreakable on the issue of terrorism and insurgency in order to deter other problem states from following such violent attempts to achieve autonomy, thus further shattering the secular Indian society (Ganguly 1997, 128-130). Therefore, New Delhi provided the best of its military to the Kashmir crisis and gave it full power to conduct the war with few constraints. However, an unrestrained Indian military had both positive and negative effects on the war throughout the 1990s. By 1996, most of the Kashmiri insurgent guerrilla operations were soundly defeated across J&K, clearly confirmed by Kashmiri insurgent tactics switching dramatically from regular direct attacks on the Indian Army to terrorism against the Kashmiri people. However, the Indian Army's successful counterinsurgency campaign did little to win the general popular support of the Kashmiris. This was reflected in the continual resistance of the Kashmiri people, boycotting all elections from 1996 on, and the continued passive and active support given to the military and political insurgent groups operating in Kashmir.

1999: Kargil War

In spring 1999, India and Pakistan fought their third war over Kashmir after Pakistan attacked the LoC in the Kargil region of Kashmir with regular Pakistani troops and insurgents. With the defeat of the guerillas in Kashmir in 1996, Pakistan feared that the insurgency was slowly dissipating over time, with most Kashmiris losing the will to continue the insurgency. Therefore, Pakistan needed to show its determination and

support to the Kashmiri insurgents who were still fighting and hoped to inspire passive Kashmiris to renew aspirations of self-determination (Ganguly 2001, 121-122). In addition, the international pressure and support for the Kashmiris were losing energy, with many external support groups and Islamic governments beginning to believe the insurgency was lost (Ganguly 2001, 121-122).

2004: Possible Peace and SARRC

The Kashmir insurrection that started in 1989 can be traced back through a long complex history driven by demands of self-determination and a general perception of unfair treatment felt by Kashmiri people. After fourteen years of fighting, the insurgency is still ongoing despite a massive Indian military counterinsurgency campaign and the continued control and influence on Kashmiri local affairs of state by the Indian Federal Government. Pakistan also continues to assist the insurgency, at least tacitly, through continuous moral and material support that provides the resources that fuel the militant aspect of the conflict. The result of these factors is the continued Kashmir crisis with little hope for peace in the foreseeable future. However, January of 2004 brought dramatic new developments with Pakistan and India during the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation meeting in Islamabad. Both countries agreed for the first time in years to build a map for peace over the conflict setting in motion a series of events that offers a possible solution for all parties involved. Nevertheless, both countries have been here before only losing the opportunity nationalism, pride or terrorism which derailed possible peace efforts.

Importance of the Conflict

In human terms, the Kashmir conflict to date has claimed the lives of an estimated 40,000 to 80,000 people and left another 400,000 as refugees (Medhurst 2002, 286-289). The importance of this conflict varies for the three involved players. For India and Pakistan, both nuclear nation states, the loss of Kashmir is unacceptable because of domestic political reasons. For India, Kashmir is an integral part of its secular nation state and it believes that the loss of Kashmir could result in other Muslim states demanding autonomy or independence, thus destroying a secular India (Ganguly 1997, 128-130). Pakistan views Kashmir as the most important national political issue, which evokes strong views from the military, government, the general public, and Islamic extremists, who are unlikely to give it up as a national agenda (Ganguly 2001, 128-129). The Kashmiris themselves are divided on their vision of self-determination. A common stance on the accession into Pakistan or independence from India is not only argued in Kashmir, but fought over between rival insurgent groups. For the rest of the world, Kashmir may represent the most dangerous existing conflict, because it is ultimately being fought and supported by two nuclear states, which have been at war four times since their creation. Therefore, the Kashmir issue must be settled, but peace can only possibly come if the insurgency is stopped, either by force or by *détente*.

Limitations of the Thesis

This thesis will focus on the counterinsurgency campaign that has been conducted by the Indian government from 1989 to the present. This study will not address if the counterinsurgency operation is just or if the Indian occupation is legal under United Nations mandates of 1948. This is an analysis of the effectiveness of the

counterinsurgency campaign which uses the Bard O'Neil model, outlined in his book *Insurgency and Terrorism: Inside Modern Warfare*, to define the elements of the Kashmir insurgency. The conclusions in this thesis will use the instruments of national power paradigm--diplomatic, informational, military, and economic--as the criteria to analyze the success of the Indian government's response. The examination will focus only on the Indian government policies and its counterinsurgency strategy. A limited amount of time will be the major constraint in this study. Therefore, using a research design that would involve empirical observation, document analysis, elite interviewing, univariate data analysis, or descriptive statistics is precluded. The study will be limited to defining a research question and concepts, proposing explanations and specifying units of analysis on which conclusions are based on. The final product will closely look like a case study that draws conclusions from other published works and documents on the subject of Kashmir.

Delimitations

This thesis will not analyze events prior to 1989, the Pakistani-Indian nuclear stand off, or other South Asian issues that embroil these nuclear nation states. The Pakistani-Indian dispute over the Siachen glacier in Kashmir will not be addressed because of its location and the fact that it offers little strategic significance to the counterinsurgency campaign. This study will also not address the Chinese stance on Kashmir and the land it annexed in this region supported by Pakistan. The Kargil War of 1999 will not be analyzed, due to its conventional nature and insignificance with regard to the counterinsurgency campaign. Finally, the issue of human rights will not be

discussed because of the questionable accuracy of information distributed by all parties involved in the conflict.

Key Terms

Counterinsurgency: “Those military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat insurgency” (US Army 1997, 83).

Insurgency: “An organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through the use of subversion and armed conflict” (US Army 1997, 40).

Instruments of National Power: “Instruments of National Power are the tools nation states use to influence the behavior of other nation states within the current international system. These instruments represent tangible resources that can be purposefully crafted, manipulated, altered, and balanced. These instruments are diplomatic, information, military, and economic” (Davis 2003, 177-188).

Kashmir Valley: “The Part of the state of J&K that lies in the valley of the Jhelum river and includes the towns and villages of Handwara, Baramulla, and Sopore to the northwest, Anantnag to the southeast and Srinagar in the center. (National Public Radio 1994, 3).

Line of Control: “The 740-kilometer dividing line between Indian J&K and Azad Jammu and Kashmir-Northern areas. It originated in January 1949 as a ceasefire line at the end of the first Indian-Pakistani war, was slightly altered during the December 1971 war, and was renamed to the Line of Control by intergovernmental agreement in July of 1972” (Bose 2003, 295).

Secessionist Insurgents: “Secessionist insurgents renounce the political community of which they are apart and create a new independent political community” (O’Neil 1990, 19).

Terrorism: “The calculated use of violence or threat of violence to inculcate fear: intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or theological” (US Army 1997, 154).

Traditionalist Insurgents: “Traditionalist insurgents seek to displace the political system and replace it with a political structure that is rooted in ancestral ties or religion. Traditionalists want to create political structures that were seen in the past that are characterized by low autonomy and power in the hands of an autocratic leader who is supported by the military and clergy ” (O’Neil 1990, 18-19).

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

This chapter of the thesis will give an overview of the periodicals and books covering the conflict in Kashmir that were used in the research. These works focus on three primary areas and are characterized as military, political, and historical in nature. The military literature is used to gain insight into the tactical and operational aspects of the counterinsurgency operations that have occurred and are ongoing in Kashmir. The second area of literature primarily focuses on the political atmosphere that has created or contributed to the conditions that exist in Kashmir and offer possible explanations for the current atmosphere. The third area of literature is historical in nature and focuses on the causes of the conflict, and the evolution of the insurgency.

Bard O'Neil, *Insurgency and Terrorism: Inside Modern Revolutionary Warfare*, Brassey's, Incorporated, 1990 (Military). This reference is the foundation for understanding any insurgency and how to combat it. Bard O'Neil outlines the steps that are necessary for critically analyzing any insurgency by using a detailed approach in defining all aspects of an insurgency. O'Neil's hypothesis is that most nation states' answer to any insurgency is to react with a military solution and not to use any other instruments of national power to combat it. He states that the correct combination of instruments of national power can only be applied after the insurgency is defined and understood in detail, such as insurgent type, goals, strategic approach, and support base. The book uses case studies to demonstrate the author's theory and highlights the fact that the different elements of national power must constantly be adjusted in response to a

particular insurgency. This book is the foundation of this research paper, in that it uses O'Neil's model to analyze the current insurgency in Kashmir.

Mamta Rajawat, *Kashmir: Shadow of Terrorism*, 2003 (Military and Political). This book is written by an Indian-born journalist who analyzes the war from her own standpoint of having witnessed the war firsthand. Thus, Rajawat provides an empirical view on the war that most authors do not have, since the security situation precludes most scholars from observing the war firsthand. Rajawat examines the conflict between India and Pakistan and Kashmiri separatists from its beginnings after the British partition until the time of the book's writing. The book focuses on the conflict from a political standpoint, closely examining Kashmir's and New Delhi's politics and the role these politics play in the roots of the insurgency. It is one of the few works that address in depth the need of the Indian national authorities to use all instruments of national power to defeat Kashmiri insurgents and how to stop the negative information campaigns about Indian counterinsurgency efforts in Kashmir. The book also addresses India's current need to employ assertive economic and diplomatic tools in order to overcome the government's shortcomings in the past. The only element not addressed in detail, are any changes that are needed for the Indian Army's strategic approach in combating insurgents. This work is written from an Indian perspective and is a complete analysis of the politics and many underlying issues associated with the conflict.

Samay Ram, *Tackling Insurgency and Terrorism*, 2002 (Military). Retired Indian General Samay Ram has extensive experience in counterinsurgency operations in Sri Lanka, Punjab, and J&K. He wrote the book more as primer for future counterinsurgency commanders than for scholars studying such conflicts. Most of this book is written from

personal experience conducting counterinsurgency operations and explains the need for field commanders to understand the correct use of information on local populations as a key aspect to winning the moral battle as well as enemy propaganda techniques. Human rights abuses are also addressed and its negative effects on the soldiers' morale. Surveys of Indian soldiers are used to demonstrate the effects of fighting a long-term counterinsurgency on the soldiers and leaders. The value of the book for the scholar is its clear explanation of the constraints under which the army operates to fight against an insurgency. General Ram also depicts a current picture of ongoing counterinsurgency operations in Kashmir and the Indian subcontinent. The book is balanced, considering the fact that it is written by an enemy of Kashmiri insurgents.

K. Santhanam, *Jihadis in Jammu and Kashmir*, 2003 (Military). This is a reference book that is mandatory for any research that is done on Kashmir. It is written by a group of antiterrorism experts at India's Defense Studies and Analyses Institute and is the only book that identifies all current insurgency groups operating in Kashmir and supporting groups in Pakistan. It provides the name, size, key personal, and goals of all insurgency groups in Kashmir and offers key insight into the difficulty of identifying insurgent groups and their goals in Kashmir because of the continuously changing political environment in the region. The book may be the only unclassified work written on this subject that allows a researcher to gain a true estimate for the scope and complexity of the current insurgent organizations.

N.C. Asthana and Anjali. Nirmal, *Terrorism, Insurgencies and Counter-Insurgency Operations*, 2001 (Military and Political). This is a lengthy book, written by a former Indian Army commander in Kashmir and a political scientist who both have

empirical observation of the conflict. Asthana and Nirmal are insurgency experts, but write from an Indian perspective. The book outlines the tactics of insurgents at the strategic and tactical level and the countermeasures that are needed to defeat these tactics, covering every element of terrorism and counterinsurgency. The authors address the Kashmir crisis and recognize the fact that major mistakes have been made militarily. This book is a thoroughly researched work that outlines the Kashmir conflict in detail and provides information about all ongoing counterinsurgency operations in India and how many of the insurgencies in India can be traced directly to Pan-Islamic fundamentalism. It is an important work to fully understand the difficulties India has been facing since its partition in 1947 in dealing with insurgencies, and explains why military approaches are usually the only option the Indian government is left with. These authors primarily focus on military approaches to defeating the insurgency in Kashmir and in parts of India, but they also advocate possible diplomatic and political solutions after the insurgents are defeated militarily.

Sumit Ganguly, *The Crisis in Kashmir: Portents of War, Hopes of Peace*, 1997 and Sumit Ganguly, *Conflict Unending*, 2001 (Historical and Political). The two books are written by one of the world's leading expert on Kashmir, who is a Professor at the University Of Indiana, and both books offer essentially the same information on Kashmir, but do explore different details of the conflict between Pakistan and India. Both books outline the conflict, starting from the partition but ending with different time periods 1997 and 2001 respectively. Ganguly explores the Pakistani-Indian conflict and Kashmir war from a unique historical and human perspective and addresses the causes of the conflict from the aspect of what the author calls political mobilization. According to his

theory, the reason the Kashmiri insurgents demand more self-determination is because they became more educated and were given the experience of free elections in the late 1970s to early 1980s. Once these rights were revoked in the 1987 elections, the educated Kashmiris reverted to violence and insurgency out of desperation. These works are a detailed account of the political and informational aspect of this phenomenon and fully accounts for the Pakistan's role and importance in this conflict. These references are essential in any research done on this phenomenon because they explore the most important cause for this insurgency, the human factor.

Robert Wirsing, *India, Pakistan and the Kashmir Dispute: On Regional Conflict and its Resolution*, 1994 (Historical and Political). This book is written by an American political scientist and college professor and focuses on the analysis of the Kashmir dispute and the precarious role Pakistan plays in it. It details the entire conflict and examines both India's and Pakistan's motivations since the conflict started fifty years ago until 1994. Wirsing's approach to research and questions asked is probably the most unbiased and offers possible solutions for both countries to solve the conflict. His analysis is not likely to meet either India's or Pakistan's approval, since his primary question is whether either country has a legal claim to Kashmir. The book covers the insurgency in detail on a strategic level and focuses on how to end this conflict, with the solution residing solely with the central governments of both India and Pakistan. The only shortcoming with this particular work is that it is ten years old and only tracks developments until 1994.

Robert Wirsing, *Kashmir in the Shadow of War: Regional Rivalries in a Nuclear Age*, 2003 (Historical and Political). This recent work by Wirsing covers the latest events

and nuclearization of the subcontinent by India and Pakistan. Wirsing also addresses the changes in the Kashmiri insurgents' goals and identity as Pakistan separates itself from the insurgents because of the United States' pressure in the post 11 September world. This book is perhaps the most up-to-date resource on the current strategic setting in the region and is an essential asset to any research conducted on the topic.

Eric S. Margolis, *War at the Top of the World: The Struggle for Afghanistan, Kashmir and Tibet*, 2002 (Historical and Political). Eric Margolis is an American writer and traveler who offers a new approach to the conflict in Kashmir and other parts of war-torn regions of the Himalayas. This book critically analyzes the roots of jihad when it first came to modern warfare in Afghanistan during the Soviet occupation. A clear link is established between the rise of foreign fighters entering the conflict in Kashmir and the end of the Soviet occupation in Afghanistan in 1989. Margolis's argument is that unemployed trained foreign fighters who were not allowed to return to their countries were left with no other choice but to find a new war, this time in Kashmir. This theory is backed up with numerous interviews of Mujahideen who fought in both Afghanistan and Kashmir, providing personal accounts of the motivations and methods to support the insurgents. Margolis also explores the roots of the Kashmir conflict and India's attempts to fight it. This book looks at the conflict from an Indian and Mujahideen perspective and the complicated issues that surround this insurgency. No solutions for the conflict in Kashmir are offered, but Margolis does outline the dangers that the insurgency brings to one of the most volatile regions in the world.

Sumantra Bose, *Kashmir: Roots of Conflict, Paths to Peace*, 2003 (Historical and Political). Bose is a British University professor who outlines the origins, development,

and current situation in Kashmir in a well-researched and unbiased manner. He is a consultant to the US State Department on issues about Kashmir, regularly offering strategic advice on key strategic issues on South Asia that are highlighted in this work. It is a reference book on all issues of Kashmir ranging from ethnic diversity to ongoing military operations. Bose's theory is that India's failed attempts to promote democracy in Kashmir and the radical Hindu government are the main causes of the conflict, and that the only solution is a severe diplomatic and political reform. The strength of this work is the thorough analysis of the historical religious and ethnic complexities that make up Kashmir which provide the foundation that fuels the conflict. Final conclusions in this work emphasizes that the Kashmir conflict can only be solved with the participation of all parties involved. This work is unique because of the interviews of all parties involved were used while writing it, thus making it essential to the study of Kashmir conflict and its possible resolutions.

Victoria Schofield, *Kashmir in Conflict*, 2003 (Historical and Political). Victoria Schofield is an American author who provides a historical view of Kashmir combined with current accounts of the conflict. She begins with an in-depth history of the state and follows events through 2001. This book's focus is on the deep ethnic and cultural issues that divide J&K and identifies how these issues affect all parties involved, including Buddhists, Hindus, and Sikhs. The author allows the reader to identify with all sides of this conflict and outlines the hardships it has created for all involved parties including the situation of the Pakistanis and people of Pakistan controlled Azad Kashmir face which is a topic that is not covered in most works done on the subject. Schofield's final conclusion on the situation is that too often the conflict and any possible solution are derived from

the Pakistani and Indian standpoint, leaving out the Kashmiris themselves. By using in-depth research and interviews, she makes it clear that the Kashmiris themselves must be included in any negotiation or peace will not be achieved.

Kaia Leather, “Kashmiri Separatists,” 2003 (Historical and Political). Kaia Leather is an American researcher who captures the Kashmir war by focusing on all issues associated with the crisis. The paper broadly covers numerous issues that include separatist movements, the role of Pakistan and India, and provides a noncombatant perspective. The role of the United States in the conflict and its critical role in any future solution are addressed. Although this is a short paper, it contains the latest data on the major armed insurgent groups and the Hurriyat conference. This thesis is a fine work and contains a brief synopsis of large amounts of information and uses references from numerous sources.

Prakash Singh, *Kohima to Kashmir: On the Terrorist Trail, 2001* (Military). Prakash Singh is a retired career police officer from the Indian security forces. His numerous years of experience fighting separatists in the Assam region and Kashmir are the empirical basis for writing this book. Although most of the book is focused on Assam and his battles with separatist activity in this Indian state, he also spends a large portion of the book dedicated to his time serving as a commander of the largest paramilitary group in Kashmir, the Border Security Force. The author writes from first person experience and focuses on the limitations and difficulties he encountered attempting to secure the LoC, while simultaneously fighting insurgents in the Kashmir valley. Singh exposes the sharp differences he experienced with New Delhi about what the most

effective methods are to fight insurgents in Kashmir. Overall, Singh views the Kashmir conflict as a battle for India's survival between secularism and fundamentalism.

Shaheen Akhtar, *Uprising in Indian-held Jammu and Kashmir*, 1998 (Historical and Political). This book is written by a Pakistani author and published by the Institute of Regional Studies in Islamabad. It traces the roots of the conflict and offers explanations for the current crisis from a distinctly Pakistani view. Akhtar offers a different viewpoint for possible causes, strategies of insurgents, and possible outcomes of the conflict that is not written about in many books. Nevertheless, the book is grounded in fact and uses references from Indian, Pakistani, and international sources. This brief book is a necessary reference when researching the subject to gain an appreciation of the Pakistani and Kashmiri motivations and aspirations that continue to play such an important role in this conflict.

The current literature on the Kashmir conflict provides numerous well-researched insights into the conflict, but none uses the instruments of national power to measure an effective Indian government response. The research gap that exists in dealing with the issue of counterinsurgency in Kashmir appears to be due to the fact, that most authors write what is most familiar to them and, therefore, only look for answers in their profession, rather than analyzing this problem within the context of a combination of military, informational, diplomatic, and economic instruments. Military authors often believe that the answer lies in a new doctrine or weapons, and political and social scientists see the answer in solving the human dimension of the conflict. Most works offer their own solution to how to end the insurgency in Kashmir by looking for solutions using only one or two instruments of national power, but not a combination of all four.

CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Bard O'Neil's model, outlined in the book *Insurgency and Terrorism: Inside Modern Revolutionary Warfare*, will be used to analyze the Kashmir insurgency. The model's framework, with a foundation that is solidly grounded in history, is designed to analyze any insurgency. This framework will be applied to analyze the Indian government's effectiveness in counterinsurgency operations in Kashmir. The model is made up of seven steps, beginning with the definition of the type of insurgency that is being fought and ending with the government's response to counter the insurgency by using the instruments of national power. O'Neil emphasizes that this is not a cookie cutter solution to define insurgent wars, but provides basic guidelines that will assist scholars and politicians with the definition of the type of insurgency in order to understand its scope. This chapter will outline O'Neil's model and describe how it will be applied to estimate the success of the counterinsurgency effort in Kashmir.

Step One: Definition of the Type of Insurgency in Kashmir

The first step in the analysis of the Kashmir insurgency is to define what type of insurgency the Indian government is fighting. The types of insurgents that O'Neil outlines are: (1) anarchists, whose ultimate goal is to eliminate all institutionalized political arrangements; (2) egalitarians, whose objectives are equality and an equal distribution of the central control; (3) traditionalists, who seek to displace the political system and replace it with a primordial system, such as an ancestral or religious system; (4) pluralists, who want to achieve individual freedom for everybody and set up a political system that supports this; (5) secessionists, whose ultimate aim is to set up a new

political community; (6) reformists, who want more political, social, and economic benefits without rejecting the political system currently in place; and (7) preservationists, who seek to maintain the current political system, but want to engage in violence against nonruling groups who are demanding more rights or benefits (O'Neil 1990, 17-21). An assessment will be conducted to determine the type of insurgency in Kashmir in order to determine if the Indian government has defined correctly the type of insurgency it is fighting.

For the purpose of this thesis, there are four possible barriers that can make the identification of the type of insurgency with which the Indian government is dealing difficult and unclear. These barriers are outlined in the O'Neil model as goal transformation, goal conflict, misleading rhetoric, and goal ambiguity (O'Neil 1990, 21-23). Goal transformation occurs when new leaders emerge as the Kashmir insurgency matures and change the overall goal of the insurgent organization. Goal conflict takes place when Kashmiri insurgent groups disagree on whether the final goals of the insurgency should be accession into Pakistan or independence. Misleading rhetoric occurs when Kashmiri insurgents release misleading information intentionally or by accident, thereby causing confusion in the analysis of the ultimate goals of the insurgents by the Indian government. Goal ambiguity applies when numerous different Kashmiri insurgent splinter groups issue information about the insurgent goals, but no faction is clearly in control of the insurgency (O'Neil 1990, 21-23). An assessment will be conducted on these barriers in Kashmir to determine if they are causing the Indian government to misunderstand the goals of the insurgents and thus use the wrong approach in planning its strategy.

Finally, the form of warfare the Kashmiri insurgents are using must be identified. The types of warfare that are available to Kashmiri insurgent organizations are terrorism, guerrilla war, conventional war, or a combination of these (O'Neil 1990, 24-27). Once the type of insurgency and form of warfare being executed by the Kashmiris is defined, an analysis will be conducted to assess if the Indian government has come to the same conclusion.

Step Two: Assessing the Kashmiri Insurgents' Strategic Approach

The next step in the model is to determine which strategy the Kashmiri insurgents are using. The O'Neil-model outlines four types of strategies insurgents can use. The first is the conspiratorial strategy, in which a small elite organization uses a low level of violence. The second is a protracted popular war strategy, which uses political means, mass organization, and gradual escalation of violence. The third is the military-focused strategy, which, with military primacy, concentrates on guerrilla or conventional warfare to conduct the campaign. The last is the urban warfare strategy, which applies to small organizations attacking urban centers (O'Neil 1990, 31-36). It is essential that the strategy of Kashmiri insurgents is identified correctly, so that the Indian government's counterstrategy can be assessed on the tactical and operational level.

Step Three: Assessing the Environment of the Kashmiri Insurgents

The physical and human environment in which the insurgents operate affects the Indian government's strategy and radically dictates the campaign plan which the Indian government is executing. The physical environment is broadly defined as the terrain and climate, as well as the transportation, telecommunications, and utilities infrastructure (O'Neil 1990, 53-59). The human environment is characterized as the economic,

political, ethnic, and religious conditions that exist in the insurgents' area of operations (O'Neil 1990, 59-67). These physical and human conditions will directly affect the Kashmiri insurgents' ability to conduct lethal and nonlethal operations against the local populace and the Indian government and the ability of Indian counterinsurgency forces to interdict insurgent forces. Therefore, an assessment of the Kashmiri physical and human environment will assist to determine the effectiveness of current and future Indian counterinsurgency operations in Kashmir.

Step Four: Assessing the Popular Support of the Kashmiri People

Gaining and maintaining popular support is the center of gravity for both opponents during any insurgency and therefore the efforts of both sides must be focused on this key task in order to have any hope of victory. O'Neil's model divides this critical topic into three distinct categories: active and passive support, the role of leaders and masses, and the techniques insurgents use to gain this support (O'Neil 1990, 70-74). In the analysis section of this thesis, the scope of the insurgency will be estimated at least in general terms, in order to identify the size of the popular support and means the insurgents use to gain support in order analyze the Indian government's response.

Passive support is given by that portion of Kashmir's populace that identifies with the insurgents and gives moral support by not actively assisting Indian security forces and participating in civil disobedience. However, these passive supporters are unwilling to provide material support due to fear of retribution from Indian forces or competing insurgent organizations. Active Kashmiri supporters are the foot soldiers who battle Indian forces or are covert forces that provide financial, medical, or intelligence support

to the foot soldiers. Active supporters are hard to distinguish from the passive supporters because they operate in secrecy among the Kashmiri civilian populace.

The Kashmiri leadership can be divided into two groups characterized as the political and operational leaders. The political leaders, who are highly educated and nonviolent, provide leadership on the national and international scene in order to win international support for the insurgents' cause (O'Neil 1990, 73-74). The second group is the operational leaders who use their intellectual ability to plan and conduct military operations against the Indian security forces. Both types of leaders are essential to Kashmir's insurgency campaign in building popular support against the Indian government and by using political and military means to defeat the Indian government. The masses are defined as the foot soldiers and fight for the insurgency at the operational and tactical level. They are the key component of the insurgency and conduct day-to-day operations through direct action (O'Neil 1990, 73-74).

The O'Neil model outlines how insurgents employ seven different methods, or a combination of these, to win the support of the local population: (1) charismatic attraction, which is the ability of the leaders to derive respect from the locals by being seen as superheroes or larger than life; (2) esoteric appeal, which is driven by intellectuals who appeal to the realities of economic or political conditions in which the masses suffer; (3) exoteric appeal, which highlights the grievances of the masses; (4) terrorism, which is used to demonstrate the government's weakness or the insurgents' strength, to which the masses comply with fear; (5) provocation of government repression, which is the insurgents' attempt to drive government forces to take reprisals against the masses for crimes and atrocities they commit and then to use the reprisals as

propaganda to incite a conflict; (6) demonstration of potency, which is the insurgents' attempt to win support by helping the people through material support, such as education or economic means; and (7) coercion, which is used to force the people to provide material support (O'Neil 1990, 74-85). An analysis of the insurgents' means used to win the support of the Kashmiris is conducted to establish how difficult it is for the Indian government to counter the insurgents' efforts with its own campaign to win the support of the populace.

Step Five: Assessing the Organization and Unity of Kashmiri Insurgents

The O'Neil model outlines three structural dimensions of the insurgent organization that must be examined: scope, complexity, and cohesion (O'Neil 1990, 90-98). When determined these dimensions reveal current threat the Kashmiri insurgents pose to the Indian government and security forces fighting in Kashmir and their progress. An analysis of the scope, complexity, and cohesion of the Kashmiri insurgency is conducted in order to reveal if the Indian government has identified possible weaknesses of the insurgents which can be exploited, such as membership base, lack of cohesion in common purpose, and lack of complexity when conducting basic functions, thus allowing key facets to be destroyed.

Scope refers to the number of fighters, leaders, and political cadres that comprise an insurgency organization over a period of time (O'Neil 1990, 90-91). These numbers in Kashmir have changed over time, due to the mature nature of this insurgency and ongoing counterinsurgency operations in the region. However, the scope still directly affects the Indian government's responses to use military and political means and must be continually adjusted. Therefore, the scope of the Kashmir insurgency will be estimated in

this study to determine the effectiveness the Indian counterinsurgency response and strategy.

Complexity refers to the ability of an insurgency to coordinate and synchronize the efforts of the organization (O'Neil 1990, 91-95). Kashmir insurgents organize and conduct activities, such as training, intelligence, planning, and execution of operations. The complexity of these activities will be analyzed to gain an understanding of the level of difficulty the Indian Army is facing, when both fighting the insurgents and attempting to destroy their intelligence, finance, and recruiting operations.

Cohesion is the element of an insurgency that directly affects the ability of an organization to conduct large-scale operations over time (O'Neil 1990, 98). The cohesion of the Kashmiri insurgents will be examined to determine if they are a closely linked organization with a common purpose and conduct operations that are focused on achieving a common end. The relationship of political and operational elements of the insurgency will also be examined to determine if their operations and goals support each other.

Step Six: Assessing Foreign and Pakistani External Support

The detection and identification of external support are critical for the success of any counterinsurgency effort. External support can take the form of moral, material, political, or sanctuary support (O'Neil 1990, 111-124). Once the type and provider of Kashmiri support is identified, the Indian government must react by using the instruments of national power to stop the external support. An analysis will be conducted as to the nature of the external support the Kashmiri insurgents are receiving from Pakistan and other countries and whether India has used the appropriate means to stop this support.

Step Seven: the Indian Government's Response

After an analysis of the Kashmiri insurgency is conducted using O'Neil's model to clearly identify and define its elements, the Indian response is assessed. This assessment uses military, diplomatic, economic, and informational criteria as the measures that will be used to determine if the Indian government's counterinsurgency campaign in Kashmir is effective. This analysis will answer the following question. Is the Indian government using the correct combination of the instruments of national power as a means to defeat the insurgency in Kashmir or is it conducting the counterinsurgency as a military campaign alone to achieve success?

O'Neil's insurgency model as applied to the Kashmir conflict (see figure 2):




Figure 2. O'Neil Model Modified

Source: O'Neil, Bard. 1990. *Insurgency and terrorism: Inside modern revolutionary warfare*. Herndon, Virginia: Brassey's, Inc.

CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS

Step One: Definition of the Type of Insurgency in Kashmir

This section of the thesis will outline the types of insurgency that currently exist in J&K and the methods of warfare the insurgents are using. It also focuses on the problems to identify the true goals of these groups due to goal transformation, which has often occurred in many of the groups as the insurgency matured.

Secessionist Insurgent Groups

Kashmir's secessionists are broken into two opposing camps: those that want independence from India and to become part of Pakistan, and those that want to form an independent nation of Kashmir. One of the most active of the secessionist insurgent groups is the Hizbul Mujahideen (HUM), which is headquartered in Srinagar and strongly supported by Pakistan. "This group is the most powerful secessionist organization, whose goal is the secession of Kashmir by armed warfare in order to merge with Pakistan" (Santhanam 2003, 117). The other major secessionist group is the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF), whose headquarter is in Anantnag and goal is independence from India without joining Pakistan (Pelton 2000, 539). Currently, no accurate estimates exist to delineate the number and strength of secessionist groups that are pro-independence or pro-accession into Pakistan. "Most of the other secessionist organizations are splinter groups that drift in and out of favor and alliance with these two leading insurgent groups" (Wirsing 1994, 132).

Kashmir's Traditionalists

The traditionalist insurgents have the lowest numbers of active members and are perhaps the least known by both the Indian government and the international community. It is unclear which of the traditionalist insurgent groups has the largest membership, but the current leader is the Harkat ul Ansar (HUA), which advocates Islamic supremacy of the world (Pelton 2002, 540). "This and other traditionalist insurgent organizations believe in the concept of ummah, the unification of holy warriors under the flag of the jihad" (Ram 2002, 146). Kashmir traditionalists are bound in strong religious Muslim traditions and want the sharia law and other traditional systems, as recently seen in the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. Kashmir traditionalists' ambition for power is not restricted to the Indian state of Kashmir, but instead these insurgents want total domination of the world under the power of the Koran. Common enemies of these insurgents are all non-Muslims, but India, the United States, and Israel are considered the worst infidels (Santhanam 2003, 101). The followers of these insurgents are seen primarily in rural areas of Kashmir, but also in urban areas where Islamic fundamentalist schools, known as Madarssas, operate. In addition, this insurgent group also attracts many followers outside the borders of India, who come from the Middle East, former Soviet Republics, and North Africa, as well as from major terrorist organizations such as the Al Qaida (Singh 2001, 196-197). The traditionalist type of insurgency in Kashmir has low membership numbers compared with the secessionist group, but may present the largest danger to India in the future, because of the element of extreme fundamentalism they bring to the insurgency as currently seen in Palestine and Iraq.

Barriers to Identification of the Kashmiri Insurgent Goals

Kashmiri insurgents are characterized as highly fragmented and are fundamentally divided on the issue of independence or accession into Pakistan (Wirsing 1994, 131). The reason for this is due to barriers of misleading rhetoric, goal transformation, and goal conflict among the different insurgent groups. This chapter of the thesis will address barriers that complicated the identification of the goals of the insurgency since 1990.

Misleading Rhetoric and Information

Kashmiri insurgents' release of information is characterized as political messages, terrorist threats, and propaganda. In the early days of the counterinsurgency campaign, the Indian Army was challenged to sort out relevant from inaccurate or deliberately misleading information as the insurgents developed means to communicate with the Indian government. However, since 1993, both the Indian Army and Kashmiri insurgents have developed informal means to communicate by using the All Parties Hurriyat Conference (APHC) to pass information as their political representative (Santhanam 2003, 215-223). Additionally, to avoid misleading rhetoric, Pakistani media often publish news articles with the tacit permission of the Pakistani government or large Kashmiri insurgent groups who want to transmit a message to the Indian government on issues involving the conflict. An example of common information exchange now are political messages that are generated by Pakistan, or terrorist threats that are generated locally in Kashmir by means of carriers or the local press. These methods allow the Indian government and Army and the Kashmiri insurgents to understand each other's rhetoric and true intentions. This information system is characteristic of a mature insurgency

which indicates that all parties understand how to inform each other of their intentions if needed.

Goal Identification

In the early days of the insurgency, the Indian Army and government were challenged to conduct an accurate goal identification of the traditionalist and secessionist groups, but this was quickly overcome by both Indian intelligence and the use of mass media by the insurgents to proclaim their goals. As a result, today's insurgents' goals are well understood by all sides involved in this conflict, with little reason for any party to question what final outcome the insurgents are demanding.

Goal Transformation of Kashmiri Insurgents

Goal transformation is common in Kashmir among the numerous insurgent groups that operate throughout the region. It is most common for pro-independent movements to change their goals to a pro-accession stance. The reason for this change is primarily the financial and material support provided by Pakistan, which will be discussed in more detail later in the thesis. For instance, many organizations such as the JKLF, whose original goal was independence, received extensive pressure from Pakistan and other pro-accession insurgents to change its goal to accession into Pakistan or otherwise face loss of all external support (Bose 2003, 125-127). This Pakistani cohesion also extended to the traditionalist insurgents by offering support to organizations such as the HUA, with the understanding that these traditionalist groups would not support a pro-independence stance.

At times, goal transformation by different Kashmiri insurgent groups has caused false impressions in the Indian Intelligence community about goals, influence, and power

of the numerous organizations operating in Kashmir (Asthana 2001, 84-85). The inability to accurately identify changing goals of the insurgent groups was seen primarily in the early days of the insurgency and caused problems for the Indian Army in effectively combating its enemy. However, this issue still remains a minor challenge to the Indian Army today, as many insurgent groups disappear or fold into other larger groups, thus changing their goals as well.

Goal Conflict among Kashmir's Insurgents Groups

With the evolution of the pro-accession movement by traditionalists, but also various secessionist groups, goal conflict among the various insurgency groups has occurred continuously in Kashmir since 1993. The reason for this can be directly traced to Pakistan, whose external support introduced two new elements into the Kashmir conflict. First, Pakistan introduced foreign fighters and Madarssas to the Kashmir insurgency, which inspired some Kashmiri insurgents to abandon their secessionist stance and become traditionalists who advocate the new goal of "Jihadi." (Santhanam 2003, 22-24). Second, Pakistan lost patience with the JKLF due to its numerous defeats at the hands of the Indian Army during the early 1990s and its refusal to advocate accession as the group's main goal. As a result, in 1993 the HUM became the dominant leader in the insurgency scene supported by Pakistan (Ganguly 1997, 143-144).

Types of Warfare

This section focuses on the forms of warfare that Kashmiri insurgents are currently using to fight the Indian government. Understanding the forms of warfare being used is essential because of the requirements and problems it causes for the Indian Army.

Once the form of warfare is established, the Indian Army's response is evaluated with regard to its effectiveness.

Limited Guerrilla Warfare

In Kashmir, limited guerrilla warfare is conducted primarily in rural areas and is fought against by regular Indian Army forces and special police units that operate primarily in the Kashmir valley. Guerrilla warfare in Kashmir is characterized by small insurgent units operating in small groups which use limited visibility and wooded terrain to move from safe havens to positions of advantage to execute hit and run tactics on soft targets, while avoiding Indian Army forces. The guerillas are primarily ethnic Kashmiris, but are augmented by foreign fighters that include Afghan Taliban, Pakistani nationals, and Arabs. The numbers of actual guerrillas in the Kashmir valley vary depending on different sources, but the Indian government and most noted sources put the number between 4,000 to 5,000 guerrillas (Ram 2002, 141). Kashmiri guerrillas are known for targeting police forces, local government officials and their relatives, and destroying infrastructure including buses, bridges, and government buildings (Ram 2002, 39-42). However, after strong counter guerilla efforts by the Indian Army, many of the insurgent organizations in Kashmir have abandoned this form of warfare as too costly, since they have lost most direct engagements. Currently, the primary insurgent organizations that use limited guerrilla warfare as means in Kashmir are the HUM and the HUA (Santhanam 2003, 94-114, 117-130).

Terrorism

Kashmiri insurgents attack teachers, police, and ministers, and destroy shops, houses, and hotels of Kashmiri Hindus or pro-Indian government supporters. These

terrorist attacks have amounted to over 8,000 private dwellings and 4,831 shops destroyed by arson until 2002 (Medhurst 2002, 288). These objectives are legitimate in the insurgents' view and serve specific purposes, such as to erode the will of pro-Indian Kashmiris who continue to support the Indian government, destroy the morale of the Indian military in Kashmir, and force Kashmiri Hindus to leave Kashmir (Ram 2002, 140-145). These attacks are also conducted against Kashmiri Muslims who are considered moderates by the insurgents, since many Muslim moderates want to negotiate and find a peaceful solution to the Kashmir problem. As a result, the insurgents attack such moderate family members to intimidate and to disseminate terror as a warning to all who deal with the Indian government.

Terrorism is also being exported outside of J&K by attacking both the Indian central government in New Delhi and the Indian commercial airline industry. In December 1999, the Indian Airline flight 814 was hijacked by Harkat-ul-Ansar, who demanded the release of several imprisoned Kashmiri insurgents (Singh 2001, 204-205). Although, this hijacking was not the first by Kashmiri separatists, it ultimately led to the release of imprisoned insurgents. Another example of terrorism was the attack on the Indian Parliament on 13 December 2001. During this attack five Kashmiri insurgents from Jaish-e-Mohammed attacked the parliament building in New Delhi with automatic weapons and grenades in a suicide attack, killing eight staff members (Santhanam 2003, 198). These terrorist actions are not new to the Indian government and people, but are becoming bolder in nature. Because of the lack of success using guerrilla tactics, terrorism has become a cheap and efficient alternative for Kashmiri insurgents that are demonstrated daily against Kashmiris and the Indian government and military.

Step Two: Assessing the Kashmiri Insurgents' Strategic Approach

The Kashmiri insurgent's strategic approach is analyzed to determine if it has any chance of success against the Indian Army, which clearly has an overmatch capability to defeat a nonstate actor by using conventional tactics and weapons. This chapter will discuss the approaches used by Kashmiri insurgents from 1989 to 2003 and how these strategies have changed with regard to the Indian government's responses over time.

Conspiratorial Strategy

The conspiratorial strategy was used in 1990, when Kashmiri government employees and transportation workers joined general strikes thereby shutting down the state government. These general strikes were led from within the local Kashmiri government, with the conspirators hoping to attain secession or maximum autonomy from India, by using their influence to impede all civil administration. When the strikes failed to completely collapse the local government the conspirators in the local government stayed on strike as insurgents murdered 170 loyal Indian government employees who continued to try to run local services (Asthana 2001, 78). This approach initially had some success and demonstrated a united front to the Indian government and international community. The Indian government's response to this was slow and ineffective, which resulted in large gaps in government services and legislature, and led many Kashmiris to believe this strategy was working. However, the conspiratory approach lacked the military strength to back it. The Indian government's counterstrategy was to use the military as an interim government and to then bring in legislature from the Federal government or hire non-Muslims to fill most government jobs. Consequently, the conspiratorial strategy had a short existence and was effectively countered by the end of

1992 by use of marshal law and a replacement of the Kashmiri government by the federal government and military.

Protracted Popular War Strategy

From 1989 to 1996, Kashmiri insurgent groups conducted the protracted popular war strategy, which begins with terrorism, transitions to guerilla warfare, and finally evolves to a full conventional war. The event that initiated this strategy was the murder of four unarmed Air Force officers in Srinagar on 24 January 1990 by the JKLF, which signified a change in tactics to terrorism (Bose 2003, 111-112). The Indian government's response to the initiation of the strategy was to enter Kashmir with 150,000 security forces in order to attempt to regain control of the civil government and to reestablish general order (Schofield 1996, 40). These security forces were not trained in conducting counterinsurgency, but instead used tactics that focused on conventional warfare. This resulted in a campaign that targeted the entire population, thereby causing a large loss of innocent civilian life and property (Bose 2003, 112-114). The Indian government failed to correctly define the strategy of Kashmiri insurgents from 1989 to early 1992 and thus gave the insurgents the opportunity to enter the next phase of warfare. Thus in 1992 there was a transition to the next phase of protracted popular warfare throughout Kashmir, guerilla warfare. The leading insurgent organization, JKLF, actively battled Indian counterinsurgency forces both in rural and urban areas. In addition, numerous other splinter insurgent organizations began to appear armed, trained, and willing to fight. The key aspect that allowed the insurgents to begin more direct operations against Indian counterinsurgency forces were the lines of communications and supply that were firmly

put into place with the help of the ISI (Wirsing 1994, 119-121). This assistance gave Kashmiri insurgents the means to conduct very aggressive guerilla warfare.

In 1996, the popular protracted war strategy was defeated during the guerilla phase for numerous reasons. First, the Indian Army conducted aggressive counterinsurgency operations, using an overhauled Indian intelligence service that finally identified most of the insurgents' organizations and their key leaders. As a result, the Indian Army and special counterinsurgency units were able to target and attack suspected insurgent strongholds. Furthermore, other situations drastically affected the insurgents' guerilla operations. The JKLF fought with other insurgent organizations over the issue that the original platform of a free Kashmir should be replaced with the new agenda to join Pakistan (Santhanam 2003, 167-170). This infighting, which already started in 1991, was instigated by the ISI to push the new platform of a united Pakistan and Kashmir and would only serve to derogate a united insurgency effort. The final factor that eliminated the protracted war strategy was the Indian government's successful attempt to hold an election in 1996, despite its low turn out of 46 percent of the population (Asthana 2001, 83). Finally, in 1996 the JKLF was defeated and most guerilla groups that had been formed in the stalemate phase disbanded. The HUM, the sole survivor that was still actively conducting limited guerilla operations, was being hunted by the Indian Army (Bose 2003, 136).

Political Strategy

With the rise of numerous insurgent organizations throughout Kashmir in 1993, a political arm of the insurgents, the APHC, was established in order to speak with one voice and gain international acceptability for the cause (Schofield 2003, 159-160). The

APHC came into existence during one of the most difficult periods of the Kashmiri insurgency for the Indian government. In 1993, insurgents took control of the Hazratral shrine in Srinagar and became involved in a month-long standoff with Indian security forces (Wirsing 1994, 134). This became a national issue due to this site being considered sacred to India's 140 million Muslims. However, the APHC negotiated a peaceful settlement with both sides and gained international respect as peace makers. The result was the national and international recognition of the political wing of the Kashmiri insurgents, which the Indian government has never been able to discredit.

The existence of the APHC causes problems for both India and Pakistan, because the organization represents an independent organization that has little allegiance to Pakistan; at the same time, it has international recognition, so that India cannot ignore it. Although the group is unpopular to many Kashmiri insurgent organizations, it still commands authority, because it has open lines to the local Kashmiri government and New Delhi. Since its inception, the APHC has played a key role in all negotiations with New Delhi and will continue to do so because of its legitimization as a peacemaker in 1993 (Leather 2003, 18-20). As a consequence, the Kashmiri insurgents have a recognized voice for their cause that cannot be removed.

Urban Warfare Strategy

This strategy mainly takes place in the city of Srinagar, where terrorist attacks occur regularly, and focuses on the Indian Army and a dense and multiethnic population. Srinagar offers numerous targets that include Hindus, government workers, military, police, and the few tourists that still visit Kashmir. The purpose of this urban warfare strategy is to erode the support of the Kashmiri people for the Indian government by

creating insecurity and mistrust of local police and government, so that the insurgency gains momentum. Conducting counterinsurgency operations in Srinagar is a difficult task, because of the large population of noncombatants and dense urban sprawl (Ram 2002, 140). This environment has allowed the insurgents to tie up large numbers of Indian Army forces in Srinagar and thus expand their operations into the rural areas. Insurgents have turned Srinagar into a city under siege, as described in the book *War on Top of the World* by Eric Margolis. “Intifida has turned the streets of the once vibrant, colorful city into a semi ghost town. As I walked through the grim, deserted streets I met wary patrols of Indian army, police and paramilitary troops. Sandbagged Indian checkpoints, manned by nervous, trigger happy troops, and guarded unimportant intersections and government buildings. I see similar pall and fear and raw tension fall over other cities at war: Algiers, Bogotá, and Kabul. Srinagar is clearly a city under siege” (Margolis 2002, 112). Attacks in Srinagar still occur daily, which usually result in full scale battles that end up taking place between large numbers of Indian soldiers and small numbers of insurgents.

The Indian Army and security forces in Srinagar consist of thirty-two battalions comprised of Border Security Forces, the Rashtriya Rifles Special Counterinsurgency Units, a Special Operations Group, and the Central Reserve Police Force. These units are the most seasoned counterinsurgency units in the Indian military, which operate daily in and around Srinagar. The tactical approach to fighting the insurgency is to patrol Srinagar dismounted and to use numerous stationary posts to secure critical sites. These forces rely on federal law enforcement and intelligence units to gain information on insurgent meeting places and safe houses and then conduct raids to eliminate them. However, this counterstrategy is not effective, because most of the insurgent activity is conducted

clandestinely and thus usually leaves Indian security forces in a reaction mode to such insurgent attacks as improvised explosive devices, ambushes, and suicide bombings.

The urban warfare strategy that is primarily conducted in Srinagar is a successful insurgent strategy which is applied in a violent manner. The primary weakness in the government's counter strategy is the lack of the use of local police to fight the insurgents, but instead use primarily Indian security forces that are not from Kashmir. Thus, the violence is largely viewed by the residents as war between the Indian government and insurgents, and lacks the emotional effect of local Kashmiri police fighting against this terrorism and sustaining casualties. The local police must be used to conduct counterinsurgency operations in Srinagar. This would remove the violence from appearing to be instigated by the Indian army. In addition the local police would have better access to intelligence allowing a more proactive approach to fighting this insurgent strategy. Nevertheless, urban warfare in the congested city of Srinagar using terrorism as its primary method of warfare is a situation that is untenable for any military response.

Rural Warfare Strategy

Although the rural warfare strategy is being attempted by the insurgents in Kashmir, scholars studying insurgency theory do not characterize this as a defined strategic approach. The characteristics of this approach in Kashmir include attacking public transportation, tourism, local police, and government in rural areas. However, the strategy avoids engaging regular army forces and mid to heavily secured installations and formations. This rural warfare takes place in all areas of Kashmir outside the general area of Srinagar and was adopted by default since 1996, after the defeat of large guerilla operations by successful Indian counterinsurgency operations. Although many rural areas

in Kashmir are under government control at certain times, this has not stopped either the movement of Kashmiri insurgents and supplies to and from the LoC or the continuous violence in what is commonly referred to as the Kashmir Valley and the region of Jammu (Asthana 2001, 83-84).

The Indian Army's counterstrategy to fight insurgent rural warfare strategy is a massive deployment of 210 battalions consisting of an estimated 300,000 men, thus comprising the same array of forces as in Srinagar (Rikhye 2002). These forces are not mobile, but instead are fixed to an area of operations assigned to each unit. The primary tactics of these units is to conduct search and attack or cordon and search operations, both of which rely on surprise and involve encircling a target area and then combing the area for insurgents. These forces are mainly relegated to stationary guard to protect infrastructure and posts. This strategy is consuming hundreds of thousands of Indian soldiers, but appears to have stopped freedom of movement of insurgents and forced the insurgents to flee to the mountains from urban and village areas.

The rural warfare strategy, however, appears to have only limited success for the insurgents because it is missing the key aspect of building popular support among the rural Kashmiris, which uses the local populace as leverage to increase the scope and intensity of operations against government forces. This lack of support occurred because the insurgents were forced to leave the villages and living areas due to the massive troop deployment and relentless counterinsurgency operations of the Indian Army. The lack of support is an interesting phenomenon, since the terrain and environment favor the insurgents. This is a success for the Indian counterinsurgency campaign since the terrain and environment actually favor the insurgents.

Step Three: The Human and Physical Environment of the Kashmiri Insurgents

Kashmir's environment is diverse in all regards in relation to terrain, weather, infrastructure, ethnicity, religion, and economic dimensions. All of these facets are unique and some, such as the ethnic and religious make-up, are key elements that are directly attributed to the conflict in Kashmir. Other factors, such as terrain, weather, and economic conditions, are secondary conditions, but also assist in keeping the conflict ongoing in regards to the duration and scope.

The Physical Environment

The location of Kashmir and the physical environment are significant factors in why both India and Pakistan lay claim to the area and will not forfeit it for the sake of peace for both strategic and economic reasons. Kashmir borders Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, and China. Whoever controls this area also controls the water sources of three rivers: the Jhelum, the Chenab, and the Indus, which are critical for both Pakistan and India (National Public Radio 2004a). In addition, the economic value of the terrain of Kashmir is unlike the rest of India and South Asia. "Kashmir itself lies in isolation from the rest of a dry and overpopulated India from which it is separated by the Himalayas and Karakoram mountains and is characterized by water, trees, and fertile plains" (Margolis 2001, 56-57). Thus, Pakistan and India have enormous economic and strategic stakes in the area due to the physical environment.

Pakistani-controlled Kashmir is called Azad Kashmir and translates into "Free Kashmir." This area borders most of Indian-controlled J&K along the UN-demarcated LoC. The area of Azad Kashmir is 13,296 square kilometers and constitutes one-third of the original state of J&K before the partition of India by Great Britain in 1947 (Rajawat

2003, 83-87). The main geographic issue in Azad Kashmir for the Indian counterinsurgency campaign and the continuous military standoff between the Indian and Pakistani Armies is the LoC. The LoC is over 700 kilometers long and provides approximately 150 covered and concealed crossing points for Kashmiri insurgents to enter and exit Indian Kashmir (Asthana 2001, 94-97). The significance of the LoC and the role it plays in the Kashmir insurgency is arguable, but it does offer some resupply routes and access to sanctuary to insurgents, and the control of this border effectively fixes 70,000 Indian troops to preclude its use.

Indian controlled Kashmir more complex in size and terrain and borders Pakistan and China and has border disputes with both countries over the exact geographical boundaries of J&K and what India believes is an illegal occupation of the state of J&K by these two countries (Rajawat 2003, 64). The territory constitutes two-thirds of the original state of J&K, is 139,000 square kilometers large, and is made up of the three regions: Kashmir, Jammu, and Ladakh (Bose 2003, 8-11). The terrain is very diverse and is characterized by mountains over 3,000 meters in height, the hill country, which is between 300 meters and 3,000 meters, and finally the valleys and plains (J&K Government India 2003). The Kashmir valley comprises all types of terrain and is also bisected by the Jhelum River and numerous other streams and lakes (J&K Government India 2003). Its hills and mountains contain large amounts of dense foliage with some undergrowth. In contrast, the Jammu region is primarily a valley and plain area with some hill country and mountain ranges that separate it from Kashmir and Ladakh. The Ladakh region is predominantly a high mountain area which covers the largest land mass of the entire state of J&K with glaciers and the Himalayan range (J&K Government India

2003). The main cities in Kashmir are Baramulla, Anantnag, and Srinagar, the summer capital of Kashmir. In the region of Jammu, the main urban area is Jammu city, the winter capital of J&K.

Climate in Kashmir

The climate in Kashmir is extreme, with high temperatures in the summer months and extreme lows in the winter months. The area has four seasons, with short falls and springs and longer winters and summers. The annual precipitation in Kashmir averages 650.5 millimeters, with most precipitation falling in the winter as snow (J&K Government India 2003). In the winter months the snowline drops to 1,000 meters, causing much of the valley to be snowbound from as early as October to as late as April. As a result, during this time most infiltration and resupply conducted along the LoC is completely stopped because of the snow, so that much of the day-to-day operations take place in the Kashmir valley and in Srinagar.

Kashmir's Transportation, Telecommunications, and Utilities Infrastructure

Kashmir's infrastructure, such as telecommunications, radio and television stations, power stations, and public transportation, is in various states of decay or development, depending on the specific security situation of the general area. Generally, the infrastructure in Kashmir is developed similarly to other states in India. Electric power exists in all cities and villages, but some remote mountainous areas are without both electricity and telecommunications. Most Kashmiris have access to radio, while fewer residents have access to television, with an estimate of one television per sixty-five residents (Ganguly 1997, 35-37). The telecommunication system in Kashmir is developed well and even many small villages have pay phones. However, the Indian government

also has managed to delay mobile communications in J&K, because of fear of advanced telecommunications being used by Kashmiri insurgents for command and control (Joshi 2002). Public transportation in Kashmir is readily available, with a bus network throughout J&K and a developed airport in Srinagar. The Indian national railways has still not connected Jammu with Srinagar and this restricts movement of products and people between Srinagar and Jammu city to road or air. An improved road network is limited to the valleys, due to the mountainous terrain and sensitive border area with Pakistan, but the Indian national highway crosses both J&K. The Indian government has spent numerous resources to develop J&K at the same rate with the rest of India.

Human Environment

Kashmir's human dimensions are complex and may be one of the primary causes of this conflict. The complexity of this dimension was dismissed by the Indian government until after the violence started in 1989, and it is still the most overlooked dimension that must be dealt with if the insurgency is going to end. To understand the human environment in Kashmir, an analysis is conducted on the religious, ethnic, economic, and political composition of J&K.

Religious and Ethnic Composition of the Population

The four main religions found in J&K are Muslim, Hindu, Buddhist, and Sikh, whose followers vary in size and concentration depending on the region and population estimates. Breakdown of the religious make-up of J&K reveal that two-thirds are Muslim, one-third is Hindu, and that Ladakh is primarily Buddhist. Breaking down the data further by regions within J&K indicates that the Kashmir valley is overwhelmingly Muslim and that Jammu is mainly Hindu, with a Muslim and Sikh minority. These are

however, estimates since the last official census was conducted in 1981. The reasons for this are twofold: the lack of security prevents the Indian government from conducting a census in the Kashmir valley, and it is reluctant to publish data that show a Muslim majority living in this region, thus adding merit to secessionist and traditionalist claims that the Muslim majority deserves more rights due to ethnic and religious majorities (see table 1).

Table 1. Overview of the Population and Religious Makeup in Jammu and Kashmir

	<i>Population</i>	<i>Muslim</i>	<i>Hindu</i>	<i>Buddhist</i>	<i>Sikh</i>
Kashmir	4,700,000	96%	<4%	0%	<.05
Jammu	4,500,000	38%	65%	<2%	<5%
Ladakh	200,000	49%	<.05%	51%	1%

Source: J&K Government India 2002, Jammu and Kashmir population distribution 1981 and subsequent growth, available from <http://kashmiristudygroup.org/awayforward/mapsexplan/population.html>, Internet, accessed on 22 November

Ethnic Composition

The ethnic identity of J&K is also as diverse as the religious make-up of the area, which is primarily due to the geography of the region. Kashmir's identity with India was limited throughout its history, due to its remote location surrounded by mountain peaks. The area was originally Buddhist and then converted to Hinduism. It remained Hindu until the fourteenth century, when Muslim conquerors drove the Hindu rulers from Kashmir and converted the majority of the Kashmiris to Islam which remained until today (Margolis 2002, 64-67). From this time on, Kashmir's ethnic identity emerged with

a religion and language that is very different from the rest of present day India. Even the Hindus who continued to live and rule in Kashmir established their own identity, calling themselves Kashmiri Pandits, and share a close ethnic culture with Kashmiri Muslims (National Public Radio 1999). Furthermore, the Kashmiris have their own language and even look different from the Indians, being fair complected, and have their own cultural and ethnic identity.

Jammu's ethnicity is linked closely to that of India, which is multi-ethnic, but with a Hindu majority that follows the caste system of present day India (Bose 2003, 8-11). Thus, Jammu is very different from Kashmir, because it shares an ethnicity that resembles India, while Kashmir is distinctly homogenous in ethnic heritage and thus very different from other Indian Muslim states. In the last area of J&K, known as Ladakh, ethnicity was also influenced by its remoteness and severe isolation from the rest of Kashmir and India. Ladakh is closely related to Tibet in language and culture, but also has a small Sikh and large Shia Muslim population (Margolis 2002, 69-70).

Economic Situation

Economic discrimination against the Muslim majority existed in Kashmir for years, with the Hindu and Sikh elite minority controlling most real estate and commerce. Numerous scholars attribute this economic discrimination as a factor contributing to the rise of the insurgency in 1989, a theory which is widely accepted. However, since the late 1990s, Kashmir's economic situation has vastly changed with the Indian government's mass investment in utilities, healthcare, and education. Conversely, the dividend of these investments is long term and has not given Kashmir's economy the immediate boost it needs. In addition, major expenditures amounting to as much as sixty percent of all local

government money are consumed by security and counterinsurgency costs (Ganguly 1997, 1-3). Furthermore, Kashmir's economy is primarily based on farming, handcrafts, and rugs, which yield low economic return. As a result, much of the youth in the Kashmir valley is unemployed and thus easily recruited into Kashmiri insurgent organizations. The data in table 2 indicate that unemployment is a major factor in recruiting, with twenty-four percent of all Kashmiri insurgents being jobless when joining the insurgency (Medhurst 2002, 162).

Table 2. Reasons and motivations for Kashmiri's Joining the Insurgency

FORCE OR THREAT	15%
PEER/FAMILY PRESSURE	10%
GENTLE PERSUASION	12%
ATTRACTION	10%
RELIGION	20%
ENEMY AGENT	0.25%
OPPORTUNIST	8.75%
JOBLESS	24%

The lack of any external foreign investment in Kashmir can also be attributed to the poor security situation, and also discourages any return of tourism, which once yielded as many as 700,000 visitors per year in the 1980s (Pelton 2000, 544). The Indian government will have to address this issue if the insurgency is going to be defeated in the long term. A survey that was conducted in J&K in 2002 revealed that ninety-three percent of those questioned believe that economic development would bring peace to the state (Mori.com surveys, 2002). However, no reconstruction or economic development committees have been established by the Indian government to plan and design such development in Kashmir. Consequently, investment and economic development can only

occur in a secure area that has a good telecommunications and transportation network. The security of the Kashmir valley is still debatable.

Politics

The politics of Kashmir are complicated and the subject of thousands of books and documentaries. The key players in Kashmir's politics are the Indian and Pakistani governments, the Kashmiri people, and numerous other actors represented by the Hurriyat conference. Kashmiri political agendas revolve around four platforms: an independent Kashmir, Kashmir's accession into Pakistan, a semiautonomous Kashmir that is still part of India, or Kashmir's remaining in India as a province. A plebiscite on this issue has never occurred as stipulated by United Nations resolutions and probably never will, due to India's fears of other Muslim states within India demanding the same right (Rajawat 2003, 310). Nevertheless, the plebiscite issue is perhaps the most passionate for all parties involved. However, any solution must be forged on diplomatic grounds, and the Indian Army must be the organization that provides the safe environment to promote this issue, but not manipulate or coerce it.

Step Four: Assessing the Popular Support for the Insurgency

“Bernard Fall wrote in the book *The Two Viet Nams* that in his empirical study gathered from three guerilla battlefields, on three continents over three decades, civilian support is the essential ingredient of a successful insurgency” (O’Neil 1990, 70). The popular support for the insurgency in Kashmir will be discussed in terms of active and passive support, the role of the Kashmiri intellectual elite, and the representative Kashmiri citizens, who are essentially farmers, merchants, and unemployed. An analysis

is conducted on the scope of the popular support in Kashmir and the methods the insurgents use to gain and maintain support.

Kashmiri Active Support

Kashmiri active support includes those men, women, and children who are either active foot soldiers or provide direct support to insurgents, such as logistics and intelligence, or who assist in civil disobedience, such as strikes, demonstrations, or participation in funeral processions of slain insurgent leaders. Depending on different sources the numbers of active Kashmiri insurgents range from 12,000 to 100,000 sympathizers in just one organization, the Awami Action Committee (AAC), which is located in the Kashmir valley (Santhanam 2003, 85). Although few of the members of the AAC are foot soldiers, they are actively pursuing self-determination. The only region in which Kashmiri insurgent support has dissipated to nearly zero is Ladakh, where the insurgency never really took root from 1989 on.

Kashmiri active supporters predominately participate in providing intelligence on Indian security force movements and patterns, rendering safe housing for resting of wounded insurgents, hiding ammunition and weapons, and acting as messengers rather than participating in direct action such as bombings or attacks. The actual foot soldiers who conduct direct action may be as few as 4,000 to 5,000 soldiers, with few being involved in violence on a regular basis (Ram 2002, 141). However, this small army of Kashmiri insurgents is lethal and well armed, and understands the effects of its operations.

The most effective active support for the insurgency may be the Kashmiris who are unafraid to conduct civil disobedience or demonstrate against the Indian government.

This was recently seen in January 2004, when an estimated 4,000 to 6,000 people in Srinagar joined in the funeral procession of the prominent HUM insurgent commander Ghulam Rasool Dar, who was killed by Indian security forces days earlier (J&K Government India 2004). This demonstration is an indicator of the insurgency's active support that flourishes throughout the Kashmir valley. There is no lack of active support in the Kashmir valley, but the failure to break this support is not the lone responsibility of the Indian Army and security forces; it is also shared with the Indian government. In fact the large presence of Indian Army soldiers in Kashmir and their aggressive behavior against the Kashmiris in the early days of the counterinsurgency has probably increased the support for the insurgency rather than stopped it.

Passive Support

Passive support is exemplified by those who are not involved in the Kashmiri insurgency in any active way, but give quiet approval to the insurgents by ignoring what they see around them. These passive supporters may not assist or even give insurgents moral support, but they also provide no information on insurgent activities to the Indian Army and security forces. Intelligence is the key factor that is necessary for Indian counterinsurgency units to act first in arresting insurgents, stopping future bombings and attacks, and finally eliminating financial channels. Kashmiri passive support exhibits itself in the general state of mistrust that is caused by fourteen years of violence between Indian forces and Kashmiris, which has inflicted an estimated 40,000 to 80,000 dead on both sides combined. "The Kashmir valley is a constant reminder to the locals of the war and its aftermath is the hundreds martyrs' cemeteries that exist with most dates on the graves reading 1990 to 1994 during the guerilla struggle" (Bose 2003, 139-140).

In general, Kashmiris are tired of the war, but still provide little or no intelligence to Indian security forces because of memories of the past and the present poor atmosphere between security forces and the locals. The Kashmiris possess vital information on obvious insurgent activity, such as movement of unfamiliar people, subversive conversations in tea houses and mosques and other activity. Without these sources, attaining such intelligence will be impossible, because Indian security forces cannot assimilate into the local culture. Thus, Indian Army and security forces will continue to have a very difficult time gathering operational intelligence in Kashmir if the local population is not embraced and some level of trust regained (Rajawat 2003, 117). The lack of intelligence still forces Indian Army and security forces to use what are termed “heavy handed” methods, which include the cordon and search technique and mass arrest and detainment of locals without apparent justification. As a result, at least a high level of anxiety is a constant factor among the Kashmiris, which only reinforces passive support.

The Role of Intellectuals

The intellectual elite is essential to keeping the Kashmiri insurgency alive by providing a strategic vision, designing communication networks, planning future operations, and building the moral support of the masses to continue to resist the Indian government. In practical terms, the intellectuals are also the insurgency’s leadership and can be grouped into two categories: operational and political leaders. The operational leaders are the intellectuals who lead insurgent organizations such as the HUM, commanded by Syed Salahuddin, and use violence as their primary means to resist (Santhanam 2003, 117). The political leaders are members of the Hurryat Conference,

who have no link to violence. The role of both leaderships and its importance to the Kashmir insurgency cannot be overstated. These leaders have managed to continue to resist the Indian government's and military's efforts to destroy the Kashmiri insurgents, by adapting to evolving Indian government strategies to deal with the insurgency.

The general leadership of the insurgents has been highly successful in two facets. First, operational commanders understand the limitations of their organizations and therefore only escalate violence within the capabilities of their organizations by using an urban and rural warfare strategy. Second, the lack of success of the Indian-sponsored elections in Kashmir is a critical source of friction between the Indian government and the Kashmiri people. Although New Delhi continues to claim a moral victory by proclaiming successful elections, and Kashmiris continue to boycott the elections in an act of disobedience, inspired and led by Kashmiri insurgent political leaders. The 2002 elections had mixed results. Although there was a high voter turnout in Ladakh and Jammu, the voter turnout in Kashmir was nonexistent in Srinagar and low in the countryside, except where some Kashmiris came voluntarily or were forced by the Indian Army to go to the polling centers (Bose 2003, 230). Thus, the elections are a clear indicator that political insurgent leaders are able to execute a strategic plan, despite strong cohesion from the Indian government and military. The intellectual leadership has created many barriers for both the Indian government and military.

The Kashmiri People

The people of J&K certainly are not aligned on the issues that have faced this state since 1947. The support of the current insurgency predominantly comes from the five million Kashmiri Muslims who live in the Kashmir valley and the northern areas of

Jammu. But they are not united in their following of one insurgent leader or a particular stance on the future of Kashmir. However, the one uniting aspect is the common culture that joins the people of the Kashmir valley and demands an end to Indian intervention into local politics and Kashmir's destiny. This aspect is strong enough to continue the resistance against the Indian government's attempts to pacify and control the region. As a result, the intellectuals appear to have to do very little leading to keep the insurgency alive. The strong ethnic tradition that binds the Kashmiri people, known as "Kashmiriyat," is perhaps the most important factor in sustaining the popular support that the Indian government must overcome (Akhtar 1991, 63-65).

Techniques Kashmiri Insurgents Use to Gain Support

The first Kashmiri insurgent organization to turn to violence was the JKLF in 1988, which made exoteric appeals to the people of Kashmir to join the insurgency against the Indian government (Akhtar 1991, 75). This exoteric appeal made by the JKLF and other insurgent groups were based on the need for self-determination and nationalism because of unequal treatment from the Indian government in the areas of politics, economics, and justice (Wirsiing 1994, 118). This appeal was successful, since most Kashmiris lived in or perceived a situation of vast inequality, which quickly led to massive strikes and violence against the Indian government.

Since 1989, Kashmiri insurgent leaders turned to additional methods to gain and maintain support, such as provocation of government repression, terrorism, and coercion. Whether planned or not, provocation of the Indian government to commit repression occurred in the early years of the war, when insurgents bombed government infrastructure, killed government leaders, and engaged in ethnic violence against

Kashmiri Pandits (Schofield 2003, 156-157). The Indian government's retaliation was seen in the numerous laws that were enacted, such as the Kashmir Disturbed Areas Act and other actions that amounted to martial law, resulting in numerous brutal acts against noncombatants (Ganguly 1997, 112). These extreme measures only acted to reinforce the beliefs of the Kashmiri people that they were in fact being governed unfairly and unequally.

Another method Kashmiri insurgent groups have used to gain support is terrorism against their own people as means to persuade noncooperation with the Indian government and security forces and other Kashmiri insurgent groups (see table 2). Finally, coercion is a method that is difficult to gauge, because the coerced rarely report the threats. However, Kashmiri independent newspapers are regularly threatened not to publish negative reports about Kashmiri insurgent organizations.

Step Five: Assessing the Organization and Unity of Kashmiri Insurgents

An analysis of the current state of scope, complexity, cohesion, parallel hierarchy, and unity of the Kashmiri insurgents is done to reveal if the Indian government has identified weaknesses of the insurgents. However, the main problem with estimating scope, complexity, and cohesion in Kashmir or any insurgency is that insurgency is clandestine in nature (O'Neil 1990, 90-91). Therefore, this assessment will be drawn from historical data and estimates.

Scope

Estimates on the scope of the insurgency can be misleading and must be examined against more meaningful data, such as the number of attacks against Indian forces over time, or the number of terrorist attacks over a particular period, which is not

available, because the Indian government does not disclose such data. Moreover, any data provided by the Indian government can also be considered tainted, since providing such facts could help insurgent leaders to assess their effectiveness. Therefore, estimations about the scope of any insurgency are dangerous, and wrong conclusions can be drawn from such estimates as simple body counts, lack of activity, or Indian Army casualties. In reality, the scope of the insurgency is practically impossible to estimate using statistics alone. The Indian government estimates that only 4,000 to 8,000 active insurgents remain in J&K and uses the large election turn-out in 2000 as the indicator to show that the scope is declining (Medhurst 2002, 284; Schofield 2003, 192-193). The only, perhaps somewhat reliable means to estimate the scope of this insurgency comes from the free press of India and Kashmir. They both consistently report that violence has been occurring daily since 1997, which indicates that the scope of the insurgency must be relatively large.

Complexity

The complexity of the insurgency refers to the relationship between the military wing of the Kashmiri insurgents and the political wing, the APHC, for coordinating military operations and political actions to achieve maximum effects against the Indian government. In general, the insurgency has not achieved any synchronization of efforts between the APHC and military wings. This is due to the goal conflict of pro-independence or pro-accession, which is the main issue that separates the political and military wing and also causes conflicts within each wing itself. The result of this goal conflict has been devastating for the Kashmiri insurgency and has caused military and political efforts to be unfocused and at times destructive.

The Indian government has exploited this lack of synchronization, as most recently seen at the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), held in Islamabad in January 2004. After six years of no formal communications, Pakistan and India finally agreed to discuss the Kashmir issue, with huge concessions made by Pakistan to make such negotiations possible. However, the APHC was not even consulted to take part in any talks that may decide Kashmir's future. The APHC may have been unable to earn a right to participate in these mediations due to the lack of a unified effort on the part of it and the military wing over the past years. As a result, the Indian government does not fear that the APHC is able to coordinate and use any military wing to force the Indian government to let the insurgents participate in any negotiation.

Parallel Hierarchy

Parallel hierarchy occurs when critical state functions are duplicated by the insurgents, such as schools, hospitals and a government in exile, and when the establishment of critical logistics and training facilities is set up in other countries or sanctuaries (O'Neil 1990, 90). This hierarchy is normally established to recruit fighters and to win financial support from international sources, such as foreign governments and moral supporters (O'Neil 1990, 90). Kashmir's insurgent organizations began to establish these structures early in the conflict by using a parallel logistics system in Kashmir and creating the political party of the APHC and the education system known as madarssas, which are Islamic fundamentalist schools that teach theological studies focused on the premise of the jihad. All these parallel systems exist to prevent the Indian government from gaining firm control over the Kashmiri people. This is strength of the insurgency that the Indian government has not been able to prevent or eliminate. The existing

Parallel hierarchy is the only area that the Indian government has not effectively dealt with and therefore the APHC, strong logistics systems, and Madarssas continue to strengthen the insurgents' membership base.

Cohesion

Kashmiri insurgents have not had a unified command since 1993, when the JKLF ceased to be the leading insurgent organization due to its unwillingness to change its pro-independence stance to a pro-accession stance. As a result, Pakistan abandoned the organization and began to support numerous other Kashmiri insurgent organizations. As a consequence, at one time, as many as 150 insurgent organizations, now estimated as thirty or fewer, have operated simultaneously in Kashmir under no unified command (Asthana 2001, 84; Santhanam 2003, 7-8). The intent of the ISI was to create multiple insurgent organizations that supported the accession of Kashmir into Pakistan, which could be controlled by Pakistan. Nevertheless, the effects of the lack of cohesion and no unified command element have undermined the efforts of all insurgent groups and ultimately led to the defeat of the popular protracted warfare strategy in 1996 and continue to weaken the insurgency.

The Quest for Unity

Neither the APHC, nor the numerous military wings of Kashmiri insurgents exercise central control over the insurgency in Kashmir. For many years Pakistan did control military operations by "proxy," but it has lost this power for numerous reasons, including the United States' pressure to abandon support of terrorism following 11 September (Ganguly 2001, 138-143). The problem is that many of the powerful military organizations, such as HUM, do not recognize the APHC as their legitimate

representative because of the disagreement over pro-independence and pro-accession. The Indian Army and security forces have used the quest for unity as an opportunity to promote infighting among the insurgent organizations to make some rival insurgent groups appear to be cooperating with the Indian government. This infighting has prevented the emergence of a unified insurgent command structure, which has kept the insurgency weak and prevented it from gaining meaningful international support for the cause. This lack of cohesiveness and un-unified and uncoordinated approach is the strongest weakness of the insurgency and has been effectively exploited by the Indian government by causing infighting among the insurgents themselves.

Step Six: Assessing External Support Provided to the Kashmiri Insurgents

This section of the thesis will address the forms of assistance Kashmiri insurgents have received from Pakistan and other external supporters in the waging of the insurgency. This support can be classified into the following areas: moral, political, material, and sanctuary support, and support from foreign fighters who provide their services.

Moral Support

In the Kashmir insurgency, moral support is characterized as the support for the ultimate objectives of the Kashmiri insurgents. This support has taken different forms, but has manifested itself in three primary areas that are related to religion, rhetoric, and sympathies associated with the insurgents' causes. Islamic fundamentalists throughout the Islamic world have voiced their approval and support of the Kashmiri insurgents' plight and goals, and have depicted the Kashmiri Muslims as a persecuted people dominated by a Hindu government (Asthana 2001, 200-203). Thus, worldwide support is

gained by this rhetoric which is seen primarily in mosques and during religious festivals, such as the hajji, when prayers are offered for Kashmiri martyrs who have died for the jihad. In Kashmir, this message of external moral support is reported by pilgrims returning from hajji, read on the internet, and appears in the Islamic press. In addition, foreign fighters living among the Kashmiris are also a source of inspiration, and spread stories of worldwide Islamic support. This religious support is closely associated with rhetoric and sympathies that are very forceful and are transmitted daily by Pakistan and Gulf States via radio, television, press, and the internet. Pakistani rhetoric and themes are well timed and directed not only at Kashmir, but also at the international community to both provide moral support for Kashmiri insurgents and put India under strong moral pressure (Asthana 2001, 217-218). “The issues routinely used for raucous harangues range from human rights violations in Kashmir, the Kashmiri’s right to self determination, persecution of Muslims in India and a comparison of Kashmir with that of East Timor and Palestine” (Asthana 2003, 217).

The effects of this moral support are not measurable, but this information campaign by no doubt influences at a minimum the young and undereducated Kashmiri people, and reinforces that the insurgency is receiving strong support from the outside world. Information and propaganda operations also are being conducted by the Indian government using the internet, television, and radio to offset this external moral support, but have been secondary to military and paramilitary operations because of the unquantifiable dividends of these information operations.

Material Support

Kashmiri insurgents have received material support in numerous forms, such as weapons, explosives, training, intelligence, and money. This external assistance has been directly lobbied on the Kashmiris' behalf by Pakistan (Huntington 1997, 274). In addition, other organizations that provide material support are Islamic fundamentalist groups with deep financial backing from Islamic charities and rich Persian Gulf States. Furthermore, Kashmiri exile organizations in Western Europe, such as the Friends of Kashmir, and in the United States, such as the Kashmir American Council, provide support by raising money.

Funding is the most essential element of external support and provides weapons, explosives, safe houses, food, bribes, and the deep logistics network that delivers these tools of war to Kashmir through Pakistan or even India itself. The cost to fund this insurgency is estimated to be \$125 million to \$250 million per year and is provided mainly by Pakistan and other sources (Chalk 2001). Pakistan is thought to provide twenty-five percent of this money, with the most coming from worldwide contributions that are collected from Islamic charities (Santhanam 2003, 35). This money is moved into India by two primary methods that make it difficult for the Indian government to find and freeze assets. First, the ISI facilitates the movement of some funds by using couriers, but the majority of these funds are moved through Islamic charities. The second method to move money into Kashmir is the use of the Hawala, a system of exchanging money in much of South Asia and the Middle East that involves the transfer of money by rich money brokers by verbal agreement only, thus making the tracking virtually impossible (Santhanam 2003, 35-36). The raising and funding of money for Kashmiri insurgent

organizations and the failure of the Indian government to stop this is a significant factor that has allowed Kashmiri insurgents to remain a threat against such overwhelming odds.

Foreign Fighter Support

Another unique characteristic of active support is the large representation of foreign fighters. These active supporters appeared in the early 1990s and are still a strong variable that significantly increases the strength of the insurgency in Kashmir (Asthana 2001, 89-90). Foreign fighters from Afghanistan, Pakistan, and the Middle East bring three primary strengths that are not prevalent in the local Kashmiris. First, foreign fighters are usually well trained in terrorist organization and tactics, such as finance, reconnaissance, and targeting. Second, they are usually Islamic extremists who believe in jihad and are not afraid of death, often having no home to return to making them very lethal (Asthana 2001, 89-90). Finally, they are not afraid to attack targets that involve innocent Kashmiri loss of life as collateral damage. Therefore, this group, whose strength is estimated at 1,800 in J&K at present, poses a real danger to the Indian Army and security forces (Asthana 2001, 89).

Sanctuary

Azad Kashmir and Pakistan constitute a sanctuary for Kashmiri insurgents that provide two vital features, without which it would be impossible to conduct an insurgency in Kashmir. First, Pakistan allows new recruits to attend training in the fundamentals of insurgency. Such advanced training in weapons and explosives would be difficult to conduct in Kashmir with any degree of effectiveness due to the Indian Army's troop density and scope of counterinsurgency operations throughout Kashmir. Currently, there are estimated to be ninety-one active insurgency training camps in Azad Kashmir

that support the Kashmiri insurgents (Chalk 2001). Second, since the Indian Army has been not been able to completely close down the infiltration and exfiltration routes along the LoC, Kashmiri insurgents continue to have safe haven. The effectiveness of this sanctuary in Azad Kashmir is a contributing factor that has not been solved in India's counterinsurgency campaign.

Political Support

Pakistan provides the only official political support in the world by actively backing the goals of the Kashmiri insurgents. Pakistan openly advocates the ambitions of the Kashmiri people and supports these goals at the United Nations on an international front. As a consequence, Pakistan has internationalized the issue, so that other governments have been forced to become involved in order to avoid a conflict between the two South Asian nuclear powers. To offset this Pakistani political internationalization of the Kashmir issue India has made a case directly to the United States that Kashmir is India's war on terrorism and that insurgents are not rebels but internationally supported terrorists.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Diplomatic Efforts

The Indian government's diplomatic efforts to solve the Kashmir conflict in the past fourteen years may be characterized as nonexistent. This is largely to blame on Pakistan's open policy to support Kashmiri separatists with extensive material and moral resources, thus waging a war by proxy against India thus forcing India to respond militarily rather than with diplomatic tools. Nevertheless, the Indian government has been criticized as being relentless in its pursuit to destroy the separatist movement in Kashmir and openly defiant to all international efforts to try to mediate a solution. To successfully fight and end an insurgency, counterinsurgency campaigns must use meaningful diplomatic measures as an additional tool to bring the insurgents to the negotiation table, even if this is just to sign surrender terms when the insurgents have been defeated militarily. However, until 2004 India had not reached a point in the Kashmir counterinsurgency campaign where it could use diplomatic means to reach a settlement with Pakistan and the insurgents because of the lack of international support for the Indian counterinsurgency campaign and the overall strength of the insurgency.

The SAARC of 2004 marked the turning point in the Kashmir conflict, because Pakistan finally agreed to pursue a dialogue with India on the Kashmir issue, by setting a timetable for future mediations and Pakistani President Musharraf's signaling to his Parliament that territorial claims on Kashmir and the support of the insurgency are a policy that needs to be abandoned. India has reciprocated with important moves by agreeing to meet with the APHC in New Delhi in the winter of 2004 thus acknowledging

a possible diplomatic solution and by opening the public transportation between Pakistan and India. Pakistan has finally been forced into a position to negotiate with India. This is largely due to three factors that had not existed until after 11 September. First, the Islamic fundamentalists that Pakistan has supported in Kashmir are now beginning to threaten Pakistan's moderate Islamic existence by attempting to overthrow the government and force Muslim extremism on the moderates. Second, after 11 September, the United States declared a global war on terrorism and as a result Pakistan was forced to stop all open assistance for the separatists in Kashmir. Finally, Pakistan financially cannot afford to anymore pursue its proxy war against a more powerful India and simultaneously develop its economy to compete with other South Asian economies.

India has reached the point where it must use diplomatic means and engage both Pakistan and the Kashmir separatists. Prior to this time, Pakistan pursued a military-only approach and was as unyielding as India to negotiate. Current events are demonstrating that India understands the current opportunity and the need for diplomatic means to bring a solution to this conflict.

Information

India's information operations have focused on educating the Indian and international audience on the disastrous effects of terrorism that have been inflicted by the Kashmiri separatists. The Indian government used the events of 11 September to appeal to the international world to support their cause and used Kashmir as an example of the devastation of international terrorism. In addition, the Indian government has done an excellent job of keeping international media out of Kashmir and restricted external international monitoring agencies from observing counterinsurgency operations in order

to avoid condemnation for the violent nature of many of these operations. This information operation has been successful in gaining international and national support to bring condemnation against Pakistan, but now this campaign must be refocused towards the Kashmiris themselves in order to persuade them that being part of a secular India is the best option for all parties involved. To win back the popular support in J&K will be a difficult task if it takes into account the fourteen years of continual violence that have marked the Kashmiri people. This effort must begin with huge investments in education to counter the negative effects of the madarssas and Muslim extremism being injected in the Kashmiri society by media and the internet.

Military

The Indian military has been criticized by its own government and people for failure to bring an end to the war in Kashmir by destroying the insurgency. This criticism was only justified in the early days of the conflict, when the military's response was slow and inadequate. By 1996, the military had adjusted to the insurgents' strategy and forced the Kashmiri insurgents to go underground, leaving them no other means but to use terrorism as their primary method to fight the Indian government.

Critics use two primary indicators as measures of failure of the Indian military. First, the huge deployment of 600,000 soldiers is used as indicator of a failed strategy. Critics use the size of the deployment to fight a small number of insurgents as a measure that the current strategy is not working. From a military standpoint this is false, since the area of operations for the Indian Army is 122,000 square kilometers large and contains the 700-kilometer-long LoC, which needs to be monitored continually. This area is enormous and difficult to control even if the insurgents only number 3,000 to 5,000.

The second major criticism from military analysts uses the fourteen year duration of the insurgency as an indicator of strategy failure. Again, this criticism is incorrect, because, the Indian Army not only has to fight the separatists, but also to deter incursions by the Pakistani Army. In fact, the Indian military has been able to relentlessly keep the pressure on the insurgents and on Pakistan by deploying this large force over a long period. This consistent pressure compounded with other variables that followed 11 September, as discussed in the previous paragraph, has been successful in bringing Pakistan and the APHC to the negotiating table. Although the Indian military's strategy has been costly in terms of human life and property, it can be characterized as success by relegating the insurgents to terrorism and preventing a conventional war. Therefore, from a military standpoint, a large and continuous Indian deployment was in fact needed to adequately control this difficult terrain in order to effectively fight a small number of insurgents that are favored by the terrain and receive significant material and moral support. Finally, to successfully bring the insurgency to a complete end, the military strategy to pursue the insurgents should be continued and maximum military pressure applied to prevent traditionalists from derailing the APHC and negotiations with Pakistan.

Economic

India is rapidly developing into a global economy and this success must be shared with Kashmir by investing in education, and infrastructure, and a establishing a feasible economic development plan. Although India is trying to boost the Kashmiri economy by expanding healthcare, transportation, and media, a high unemployment rate and lack of any existent economic development committee and strategy for the area will continue to

feed the growth of radical Islamic fundamentalism. Economic development is a vital key to the counterinsurgency campaign in Kashmir and must be executed with the same vigor as the military strategy. These economic efforts have taken a back seat to other tools to fight the insurgency, but now must be reinvigorated to capitalize on the military success. Therefore, a national economic recovery and reconstruction plan that focuses on encouraging tourism and international investment in order to reduce unemployment, the recruiting base for insurgents.

Conclusions

The Indian government's counterinsurgency campaign in Kashmir is effective largely due to the government's use of a massive military response during the last fourteen years. The military has defeated the insurgents' attempts to transition to guerilla warfare and has forced the insurgency to use terrorism as its main means to gain support among the Kashmiris and the international world. This Indian military response was and is still necessary until Pakistan formally denounces and completely stops all material and moral support for the Kashmiri insurgents and as long Islamic extremists and nationalists continue to exist in Kashmir. Pakistan's external support is the lifeline for the Kashmiri separatist movement, without which the separatists will be forced to negotiate a cease fire and peace settlement.

The Indian government's mixture of instruments of national power that is used as a means to defeat the insurgency in Kashmir has been criticized by the international community for excessive use of the military in conducting the counterinsurgency in Kashmir. However, given the extent of the external support, the popular support, and the scope and complexity of the insurgency, the Indian government was given few choices

but to use the military as primary method to respond. India could have submitted to the insurgents' demands under the threat of terrorism, thus setting a precedent in its fragile secular country for other states to also withdraw from the republic. To prevent this situation, the government's response was to use a heavy military response, which was supported by secondary efforts using information and economic instruments and to reserve diplomatic options until Pakistan would withdraw its support and claims for Kashmir. It appears the time for diplomacy has arrived, and the final judgment on India's correct use of all instruments of national power will be reserved until the future. Only then, the sincerity and seriousness of India's use of diplomacy to find a final solution to the conflict can be judged. However, to increase the chances of success for diplomacy, the instruments of information and economic tools must be reinforced and the current military strategy must remain.

Recommendations

1. Military: Continue the military strategy pursuing insurgents and applying maximum military pressure to force the traditionalist insurgents from derailing the APHC and Pakistani negotiations.
2. Military: Expand the Kashmiri local police to take on a more prominent role in leading the fight against the insurgency and Islamic extremism.
3. Economic: Establish a national economic recovery and reconstruction plan that focuses on encouraging tourism and international investment in order to reduce unemployment, the recruiting base for insurgents.

4. Diplomatic: Exercise maximum diplomatic moderation and go towards the Pakistani and Kashmiri political representatives by giving in on some issues of self autonomy.

5. Information: Develop an information campaign that focuses on reconciling the Kashmiri and Indian government in order to begin winning back popular support in J&K.

6. Military and or Information: Continue to use the military and information as the primary instruments of national power to fight Islamic extremists and traditionalists who will continue to exist in Kashmir regardless of any peace deal with separatists.

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