ROLE OF NATIONAL GUARD SPECIAL FORCES IN THE NEW ENHANCED SPECIAL FORCES GROUP

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree

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by

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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)
ABSTRACT

ROLE OF NATIONAL GUARD SPECIAL FORCES IN THE NEW ENHANCED SPECIAL FORCES GROUP, by MAJ Harrison B. Gilliam, 77 pages.

The scope of this thesis is to define an appropriate alignment and force integration of National Guard Special Forces in the transformation of Special Forces into the new Enhanced Special Forces Group. The current force alignment is relevant to historical linkage and has not shifted with the demographic and force shifts of the past twenty years. The current alignment and mission scope of National Guard Special Forces is rooted in the Cold War paradigm and needs to be adjusted to fit the need of a Global Scout.
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

We are an Army at war, serving a nation at war. To win this war and be prepared for any other task our nation may assign us, we must have a campaign-quality Army with a joint and expeditionary mind-set. A fundamental underpinning of this mind-set is a culture of innovation.

General Peter J. Schoomaker, Chief of Staff, Army

No organization is more tailored to project this capability for the regional combatant commander than Special Operations Forces (SOF). The capability to go into denied, politically sensitive areas as a self-sustaining force makes Special Forces (SF) the weapon of choice in the war on terrorism. Subsequently, SF units have received an abundance of tasks to execute in the global war on terrorism (GWOT), which they are conducting today in thirty-five countries around the world. However, the problem is that there is not enough active duty or reserve soldiers in SF to maintain this constant rate of employment (Robinson 2003, 4). The high use of SF has forced the US Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) to rely heavily on its reserve component force. The current Special Operations Combatant Commander, General Bryan D. Brown, stated, “Our National Guard Special Forces units are taking the lead in combating any threat our forces may encounter. Without the 19th and 20th Special Forces Groups (A), we would not be able to maintain our worldwide presence” (Brown 2002, 181). Unfortunately, these units are still organized under cold war doctrine, which does not support the current demand and operational tempo.

In order to fully understand the looming problem, it is important to understand how the reserve SF units were designed to fit into the force structure. The SF is a
relatively new branch of the Army, becoming its own branch in April 1986 under the
*Gold-Water Nichols Act* (US Army Special Forces Command 2003, 6). This act was born
out of a report published by the Senate Armed Services Committee, which had conducted
a two-year review of the armed services. The review had been requested due to the
problems with “Operation Desert One” and the Invasion of Grenada. The next year, the
Nunn-Cohen amendment established USASOC with oversight of all SOF (US Army
Special Forces Command 2003, 9). Previously, SF and its predecessors had a limited
history dealing with traditional military organizations. From its founding, SF has been
part of the Infantry and did not regularly deal with National Guard or Reserve Forces.
Even though there were four Reserve Special Forces Groups at that time, US Special
Operations Command, who had been empowered to utilize these forces, was still
struggling with this concept into 1993. In his 1993 end of tour report, US Special
Operations Command (USSOCOM) Commander, General Stiner, stated, “Command and
Control of National Guard units within the command, had been a major obstacle that he
as the commander had not been able to overcome” (Collins 1993, 117). The missions and
operations, that SF units are trained and expected to conduct, make them a required asset
by all the regional combatant commanders. The requirement for SF soldiers around the
world and the limited number of SF soldiers available has led the combatant commanders
to rely on National Guard Special Forces as a viable option for their war-fighting and
contingency planning. This is not a new paradigm due to the events of 11 September.
National Guard Special Forces have been utilized in every operation since Desert Storm
in 1991. The events of 11 September have only manifested the need for more SF and
USASOC reliance on these forces.
Problem Statement

Currently there are seven Special Forces Groups in the US Army and National Guard system. Five are in the active component, and two are in the National Guard. The Special Forces Group is similar to a brigade size element made up of three battalions and fifteen companies. The Special Forces Group has about 1,500 soldiers in its ranks. There are 1,500 soldiers in each of the seven groups, equaling approximately 10,500 available forces. Out of a total Army strength, active and reserve of approximately 1,400,000 soldiers, SF makes up less than one percent of the total Army force structure (Burlas 2004). Out of these 10,500 SF soldiers, 2,000 of these soldiers stand in the ranks of the National Guard. National Guard Special Forces make up even a lesser percentage than the active component in the Army. The National Guard Special Forces is one third of the SF available to the Geographical Combatant Commanders (GCC). With the current need for SF and the long training requirement to become qualified, the US Army Special Forces Command (USASFC) is tasking the National Guard with increasing frequency to conduct the missions assigned by the GCC for the GWOT that were originally tasked to the active component (Collins 1999, 56). These tasks come to the National Guard in the form of: presidential select reserve call-up, which are usually up to 180 to 270 days; temporary tours on active duty, which can be up to a year; partial mobilizations, which are up to two years; and full mobilizations, which are duration of a conflict plus six months to demobilize. The full mobilization has yet to be utilized for Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) or Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). All of these requirements require the National Guard soldiers to leave their families and current civilian employment. This is happening more and more to the detriment of the National Guard soldiers and their
civilian lives. Soldiers are finding it more difficult to hold down a civilian career and remain in the National Guard due to increased deployments and mobilizations. Under the "Soldiers and Sailors Relief Act," employers are required by law to hold a mobilized soldier’s job with the same pay, benefits, and seniority upon the soldiers return to that employer (Tyson 2002, 3). This is an adequate law, but it does not protect the employee from biases and missed advancement opportunities. For a majority of the soldiers, there is not a clause to make up the loss of pay incurred upon putting on their uniform. Currently, every National Guard Special Forces unit has been activated since 11 September 2001. It appears that this trend will continue until the soldiers complete the two years under a partial mobilization. Lieutenant General Kennsinger, Commander USASOC, has stated that as his role as SOF provider to the GCC’s, his command is exhausting the use of reserve SOF. This is to include the National Guard Special Forces assets being used to conduct the GWOT (Kennsinger 2004). As active component SF are shifted from their usual regional alignment, National Guard Special Forces soldiers have been used to conduct those regional missions. This type of rotation policy for National Guard soldiers cannot continue without a paradigm shift for using these assets. This thesis will offer a solution that will demonstrate a way to align National Guard forces to better utilize the current force structure, so that it will be available for the regional combatant commanders.

**Thesis Statement**

The Army National Guard Special Forces should be tasked and organized in order to support the transformation process underway to construct the enhanced Special Forces Group and SOF Vision 2010. In order to do this, four sub-issues must be addressed;
demographics, command and control, and DTA. This alignment needs to be established using the principles of war: Economy of Force and Unity of Command. National Guard and active component integration will be critical for the success of the transformation of SF in the Army’s transformation process and its ability to project forces into the regional commanders’ area of operations in a timely and sustainable manner.

Significance of the Study

Time is perhaps the most critical element involved in the creation of competent SOF: time to select, assess, train and educate personnel; and time to gain the experience necessary to perform operations with a reasonable assurance of success. Since competent forces cannot be created instantly, decision-makers must plan ahead to create forces that are sufficient in size, capability and speed of response. (US Army Special Forces Command 2003)

The scope of this thesis is to define an appropriate alignment and force integration of National Guard Special Forces in the transformation of SF into the new enhanced Special Forces Group. The current force alignment is relevant to historical linkage and has not shifted with the demographic and force shifts of the last twenty years. As previously stated, SF is a relatively new branch of the Army, coming into existence with its own command structure in 1986 under the Gold-Water Nichols Act (US Army Special Forces Command 2003, 9). Prior to this, SF fell under the Infantry and was treated as a branch of the Infantry. As the active Army transforms, so must the reserve forces in order to maintain the changing pace and scope of the modern battlefield and the employment optempo. The current alignment of National Guard SOF does not effectively use the economy of force and unity of command, which is needed to enhance National Guard capabilities and enhance the Guard’s ability to conduct full spectrum operations for the Theater Special Operations Command Commanders. For example, currently 19th Special Forces Group (A) supports two regional combatant commanders and 20th Special Forces
Group (A) supports just one GCC. This leaves two of the five regional combatant commanders without any allocated National Guard Special Forces. This thesis will demonstrate the ways, means, and purpose to align the National Guard Special Forces. But first, it is important to understand what is needed to create and maintain SF.

The SOF truths are: (1) Humans are more important than hardware; (2) Quality is better than quantity; (3) SOF soldiers cannot be mass-produced; and (4) Competent SOF cannot be created after emergencies occur. With the creation of the all-volunteer force in 1973, and with the 40 percent drop in the active force size since the Gulf War, reserve component units have become far more integral to the full range of military operations (Tyson 2002, 2). The requirement for more forces cannot be realized with paper plans and slides. The Army cannot merely increase production of SOF overnight because it has a sudden increase in demand. Subsequently, the Army must ask just how much can the SF pipeline produce. With an approximate average of 375 soldiers graduating from the SF qualification course per year, the requirement to fill current units is difficult. Increasing production to fill new SF units under the current limitations is not practicable. The retention rate of a Special Forces Group in the active component is between 64 and 83 percent across the board (Bownas, 2001, 9). With those numbers, the Special Warfare Training Group has difficulty attempting to fill the positions of soldiers lost to normal attrition let alone the transformational goal of one additional active battalion per group. Even with its plan to graduate 750 soldiers a year, the Special Warfare Training Group will not meet the need for the enhanced Special Forces Groups by 2008, as projected.

Because of the recent successes in OEF, OIF, and other areas of interest; SOF has been called the “Force du Jour” of the GCC (Drew 2003). President Bush has increased
the USSOCOM budget by 20 percent to $6 billion (Robinson 2003, 4). But just increasing the budget does not equate to the ability to produce more SOF forces. So if adding money and resources cannot immediately buy adequate numbers of SF soldiers, what is the option? Improve the utilization of the force currently available.

Current alignments and direct training affiliations (DTA) do not fully integrate the National Guard Special Forces with the active component SF. Modification of this affiliation with the active component, if properly established, would help offset this imbalance. The benefits of a realignment of the force include not only a clearer command and control, but also a unity of effort that will make this the force that it needs to be and allow it to grow into in the next twenty years. The four major areas to be considered for realignment will be: (1) Demographics: A region’s ability to recruit and retain the needed numbers of personnel to maintain strength in SF units; (2) Geographical location: A National Guard unit’s location to an active component unit in order to facilitate training, resources, and equipment management; (3) Command and control: The role of the National Guard battalion in the enhanced Special Forces Group and SOF transformation into 2020 and beyond; and (4) Function: The role of the National Guard Group Headquarters in the SOF future.

Assumptions

Several assumptions have to be made to understand the current alignment and historical use of National Guard Special Forces, and how changing them will benefit SF overall.

A valid assumption is that in future operational and threat environment the need will continue to grow for SF soldiers. If history is to repeat itself, then it is obvious that
the need for SF soldiers and the ability to recruit and train them is severely imbalanced. The assumption is that supply will be able to meet the demand (Prairie 2002, 33).

It is also reasonable to assume that the fiscal increase that is currently being enjoyed by SF will not continue, because the emphasis could be placed with other units or programs similar to the cuts made in the early and mid-1990s.

Historical Background

The USSOCOM’s role in the GWOT has increased. USSOCOM may now plan and execute operations with other commands in support. Historically, USSOCOM has acted in a force provider role, supplying trained and ready SOF units in support of the GCC’s objectives (Department of State 2003). This fact, combined with manpower and funding increases programmed for USSOCOM in the 2004 budget, reflects the increased role of SOF in the prosecution of what has become known as the GWOT.

A clear understanding of SOF units, missions, and organizational structure will provide context for the research presented. The description of the SOF community will assist in understanding the strengths and weaknesses, as well as the environments within the environments that each exists.

All Army SF are assigned to USASFC located at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. It is comparable to a division size command organized under the Commander of the USASOC. The USASFC exercises command of nineteen deployable SF battalions through its seven subordinate groups. As previously mentioned, the groups are similar in structure to conventional brigade size elements not by size but by structure. There are two battalions not assigned to USASFC: one battalion is in the European Command (EUCOM), and one battalion is assigned to Pacific Command (PACOM). 

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As stated previously, this study will focus on US Special Forces. USASOC also includes Civil Affairs, Psyops, Ranger, and Aviation forces. These units share many qualities and skills, however their primary missions are fundamentally different, and all have reserve portions except for the ranger elements. It is important to understand the doctrinal structure of SF and its organization to facilitate the understanding of the recommended changes to this structure that should be adopted.

US Special Forces are structured into five active component and two Army National Guard Special Forces Groups. Each Special Forces Group has a geographical focus. The operational elements are language trained and have extensive training on the customs and culture of their respective areas of responsibility (AOR). The five active component Special Forces Groups are the 1st, 3rd, 5th, 7th and 10th. The Army National Guard Special Forces Groups are the 19th and 20th. Each Special Forces Group is comprised of three battalions. During combat operations, a Special Forces Group may serve as a Joint Special Operations Task Force, a Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force, or as an Army Special Operations Task Force (ARSOTF) (Department of the Army 1980, 3-5).

Each battalion has three companies, each with six Operational Detachments Alphas (ODA). The ODA is the primary operational element of US Special Forces. An ODA is commanded by a SF Captain and consisting of eleven other soldiers, who are a subject matter expert, within their career management field 18. The disciplines present in an ODA are operations, intelligence, communications, weapons, engineer, and medical. The team members are cross trained within disciplines, which include the ability to speak the regional languages, be culturally diverse, and to conduct extended operations behind
enemy lines. The ODA is capable of operating as a split team when required. (Department of the Army 1999, 3-9).

In order to adequately discuss how to best integrate and support ARSOF, the doctrinal missions must be understood. The core tasks of SF are unconventional warfare (UW), foreign internal defense, special reconnaissance, direct action, and counterterrorism (Department of the Army 1999, 3-10). Only foreign internal defense, UW, direct action, and counterterrorism will be discussed due to the low probability of explosive ordnance disposal support to special reconnaissance missions.

The SF ODAs spend the majority of their efforts conducting foreign internal defense assisting the legitimate government of a host nation improve stability through countering lawlessness or internal insurgency. These efforts also aid in regional engagement, with the host nation through joint exercises, training assistance programs, and humanitarian operations (Department of the Army 1999, 3-18). These programs are normally undertaken in support of the GCC’s theater objectives and under the Theater Special Operations Command. They allow SF to develop ties with civilian and military leaders in the host nation. As a result of these programs, ARSOF is often the only force available to the combatant commander when the deployment of conventional forces would not be welcomed by the host nation or would be politically untenable.

The UW encompasses a wide range of combat operations (military and paramilitary) all conducted in enemy held territory or other denied areas. These may include training and working with local guerillas or militia, sabotage of enemy facilities, intelligence collection, or extended guerilla warfare. In most instances, UW operations incorporate indigenous or surrogate forces. Synchronized UW operations support the
Joint Force Commander by extending his operation beyond enemy lines (Department of the Army 1999, 3-26). Under the UW rubric, other doctrinal tasks are executed as well.

The direct action mission is an offensive combat operation, most closely resembling a raid, intended to accomplish specific objectives with a limited amount of time in the target area. SF ODAs may conduct direct action missions in support of UW objectives or as independent operations supporting strategic or GCC’s operational objectives. Typical direct action missions take place at distances beyond that of conventional forces and often with effects disproportionate to the size of the element responsible. Examples of direct action operations include: destruction of critical enemy facilities; seizure of sensitive materials; terminal guidance of aerially delivered precision fires and sabotage; or the capture or killing of enemy combatants in denied or sensitive areas (Department of the Army 2001, 3-40).

The core task of counterterrorism was added (replacing the task of combating terrorism) in an effort to more accurately describe the distinctive offensive role that SOF plays in support of the Department of Defense Combating Terrorism program. Counterterrorism is a core task for all ARSOF, as well as for US Special Forces. Counterterrorism operations are fundamentally offensive in nature and are undertaken in an effort to prevent, deter, or respond to terrorism. These may include: hostage rescue; recovery of sensitive materials; or attacks directed at terrorist infrastructure (US Special Operations Command 2003; Department of the Army 1999, 3-42). Previously, these types of operations were withheld for specific SF Operational Detachments or Special Mission Units. This change in task and mission structure highlights the recent additional focus within USSOCOM on counterterrorism. Figure 1 gives the structure of USASOC in
a line and chart diagram. The portion that will be exclusively researched is USASFC, the two star command in USASOC that all SF, the “Green Berets,” belong.

Figure 1. Army Special Operations Organizational Structure

Limitations

The limitations and delimitations assist in establishing the parameters of what information this thesis includes and does not include respectively with hopes to assist further research on this topic by other interested individuals. The following limitations describe the scope of research contained within this thesis.

A major limitation is the lack of academic information on the subject. There seems to be substantial information dealing with Army transformation but as for the transformation of SF and the National Guard very little could be found.

The study was limited to only unclassified information, which restricted the research in the amount of information dealing with recent activations and mobilization issues that are still classified.

Being stationed at Fort Leavenworth for the duration of the research, severely limited the ability to branch into a larger SOF population and research material.

Delimitations

The following delimitations describe the relevance of the research not contained in this thesis. The scope of recruiting and retention that needs to be covered in this area is vast, and an entire project could be afforded this topic. Time was delimitation, while being here for less than a year with additional reading and research required, took time away from the thesis research. Assumptions are always a factor that one places on a research topic, and this thesis was no different.

Summary

With the world’s ever-changing and increasingly complex environment and emerging asymmetric threats, the Army SF will need a force that can be an integral part
of the transforming Army. Transforming the National Guard Special Forces into the force structure during this transformation will truly unify the force that has trained together, worked together, and knows each other before they meet on the battlefield covering each others flanks. Integrating through the planned transformation with the National Guard now with all SOF forces is the only relevant action to be taken (US Army Forces Command 2003, 4-9).
CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW

Introduction

The literature review is laid out to support the development of this thesis and subordinate sections. This thesis research should establish the current alignment of National Guard Special Forces with the active component and its part in the Enhanced Special Forces Group Vision. Subordinate questions needed information on the other variables that deal directly with this realignment of forces and the paradigms that it breaks and problems that arise from the shift. This chapter systematically lays out the sources into major groups that support the research and answer the thesis question and subordinate questions.

Literature Review Source Review

Existing literature has been organized into two groupings. Grouping one dealt with National Guard location, demographical criteria, and command and control. Grouping two focused on the remaining questions that dealt with force structure, DTA, mission, and training resources.

To help understand the complete picture, the current National Military Strategy dated 2002, the National Security Strategy dated 2001, and the Army white paper on Army Transformation have been referenced to provide a better picture of the Army transformation and strategic strategy. These documents are instrumental in giving the background and vision into how threat and strategic environment drive the Army’s transformation mind-set. In dealing with the threat environment and supporting the question of continued need of SF into the future, a very good resource is the December
1997 National Defense Panel’s *Transforming Defense: National Security in the 21st Century*. Also useful for this insight was the Hart-Rudman Commission on National Security that investigated the perceived threat scenario the US could face in the near future. An outstanding US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) white paper document published in October 2000, entitled *Future Operational Threat Environment: A View of the World in 2015*, gives a detailed look at the possible scenarios the military will face and why the Army’s Transformation plan is time critical in order to remain technologically advanced to deal with the threats. From this thought has come the contemporary operational environment. The contemporary operational environment will lead the way in the development of training for brigades and battalions at the combat training centers. These assisted in the overall picture into the vision of the new transforming Army. This perspective was critical in the justification of the alignment of SF and National Guard Special Forces.

The key documents that are critical to the other questions are a SF white paper dated 3 October 2003 entitled *Concept Plan Force Design Update, Army Special Operations Task Force (East and West)*. This paper is a key document in USASOC vision on dealing with National Guard Special Forces command and control structure. The paper discusses transitioning the 19th and 20th Special Forces Group (A) command structure into Joint Special Operational Task Forces that can be used to round out the Theater Special Operations Command during crisis and combat situations. The fallout for the six National Guard Special Forces battalions is that without the command and control of National Guard structure this becomes the responsibility of the active component. The paper is used as the justification for this shift in forces through the SOF Vision 2010 and
the Way Ahead, after action reports from OEF, which currently are still classified, but are
instrumental in that every SF National Guard Battalion has rotated through this combat
tour and one of the National Guard Special Forces Group has acted as the Combined
Joint Special Operations Task Force. The other document is TRADOC PAM 525-5,
which provides a framework to transform SF operations and capabilities as part of the
Army’s Transformation Plan. Also out of USASFC from Special Warfare Training Group
is the Institutional Training Expansion Plan. This plan gives the framework that allows
for the training capacity to provide and sustain at least 100 percent force fill of active
component enlisted career management field 18 by fiscal year 2010 and posture for
additional SF growth. The Institutional Training Expansion Plan strategy is to develop a
fiscal year 2004 to 2005 bridging plan to the fiscal year 2006 to 2011 Program Objective
Memorandum that identifies the minimum essential requirements to position the
command for future force structure growth. This paper looks at the complete plan to
restructure SF ability to train it force into the next twenty years but fails to mention the
National Guard. It also discusses the growth for SF and the need to increase training
output of students from a current output of 550 yearly to 750 students by fiscal year 2006.
This is substantial growth in a short period of time and concern for the National Guard,
which is relinquishing class seats and the instructor to student ratio guides published by
TRADOC.

Numerous articles found in the research using ProQuest have been used to
balance the facts and assumptions made during the research. An interesting article in the
Guardian dated 18 September 2003 titled “Army Chief See Reserves, Guard As Vital,”
deals with the Chief of Staff of the Army’s call for a continued use of the guard and
reserves in the foreseeable future citing, “It’s inescapable that the Reserve and the Guard component will have an increasingly important role” (Powell 2003, 5). General Brown stated in Army Magazine “US Army Special Operations: Fighting and Supporting The Global War on Terrorism” October 2002, “Our National Guard Special Forces units are taking the lead in combating any threat our forces may encounter. Without the 19th and 20th Special Forces Groups (A), we would not be able to maintain our worldwide presence” (Brown 2002, 5). The author paraphrases this quote in chapter 1 and states it again here to show the significance of this statement from the current Commander of US Special Operations Command. In the article, General Brown goes into great detail about the many successes of SF executing the GWOT, and how National Guard Special Forces have been involved from the beginning. Additionally, many commanders have echoed General Brown’s sentiments, that SF could not make it without the Reserve Forces.

Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, in an article in Defense Daily dated 21 August 2002, titled “Rumsfeld: War Against Terror Provides ‘Impetus’ For Transformation,” states that transformation will likely result in fundamental changes in force structure and systems and could include a “rebalancing of the U.S. portfolio of capabilities and forces.” Secretary Rumsfeld also notes the important role of SOF in the GWOT, which, with similar endorsements from the president himself, will lead to continued benefits in upcoming budgets for transformation. Less than a year later, Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld in an article in the Washington Times, 14 July 2003 states his displeasure of DOD relying on the reserves too much to conduct operations. Secretary Rumsfeld has ordered that this imbalance be looked at immediately to fix this issue. Even in a best-case approach, the earliest a shift in reserve usage could not be expected until
2007 to 2008. At the time of the article, over 204,000 reservists were on active duty. Of those approximately 2,000 of them were National Guard Special Forces making up 1 percent.

Another key topic is the status of the six National Guard Battalions Unit Status Report from the period ending September 2001 to the period ending January 2004. These numbers illustrate a major issue that will begin to affect the National Guard Forces after continuous call-ups and deployments and that is retention. The impact of these numerous deployments and call-ups on National Guard soldiers and their ability to balance this commitment needs to be addressed. Different articles and thesis dealing with recruiting and retention and, as mentioned previously, the Special Warfare Training Group plan to enhance SF growth in the active component fail to mention the National Guard. Key pieces of literature that have helped break the surface on the Special Warfare Training Group model are theses written by Lieutenant Colonel Mark Lauber, “Relating the Size of Special Forces To the Size of the Recruiting Pool,” dated 1999 and Major Mike Bownas, “Selectivity Criteria and Quality Goals in Special Forces Recruiting” dated June 2001. Both theses are useful relating to demographics and geographical location of the National Guard Special Forces units. The census and demographic studies that deal with the shifting of populations in the US show how well the current locations are for recruiting soldiers to fill the vacancies. The operations office from National Guard Bureau provided the documentation of current demographic alignment of national SF units and those points of contact at each of those locations. The shift of populations in the next ten to twenty years will be a major factor in the National Guard’s ability to recruit
and retain soldiers, and the census forecast documents show where units are currently located and projected moves to enhance units’ survivability.

Summary

Little data was available dealing directly with the use of National Guard Special Forces in relation to force structure, command and control, and demographics. The DTA shows that some thought has been put towards a training relationship. While this is an important first step, it fails to address other SF National Guard issues that will need to be resolved for transformation to achieve the desired impact.
CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Introduction

Since current documentation and study does not include vital considerations specific to SF National Guard units regarding the availability, training, and responsiveness of reserve component soldiers, the research and application approach was selected to fill in those gaps. The primary research question is: How should US Army Special Forces Command utilize National Guard Special Forces in the Enhance Special Forces Group and Army transformation? The methodology distinguished the subordinate questions as reasonable, feasible, and attainable to support the primary question.

Research Methodologies

A combination of two research methodologies proved to be most useful. They were participant observation and questionnaire and or interviewing techniques. The participant observation methodology is very practical due to the authors experience and time in National Guard Special Forces units. Jorgenson writes on participant observation that, “It focuses on the meanings of human existence as seen from the standpoint of insiders. The world of everyday life, as viewed from the standpoint of insiders, is the fundamental reality to be described by participant observation” (Jorgenson 1991, 14). As an “insider,” this author has served in a National Guard Special Forces Battalion for over ten years, and has held the following positions in a National Guard Special Forces Battalion Operational Detachment; Executive Officer, Operational Detachment Commander, Battalion Adjutant, Battalion Operation Officer, Support Company Commander, and Battalion S-3. This author has been mobilized on two separate
occasions for Operation Uphold Democracy and OEF. Both of these were force integrations with active Army SOF and had major issues with prior training and logistical constraints. He was in the first National Guard Battalion that participated in the concept of proof test that aligned a National Guard Battalion in an active component Special Forces Group in 1995. This experience allowed him to view the current alignment of National Guard Special Forces and its influence in fighting these nations’ wars.

Jorgsonson goes onto say, “This methodology seeks to uncover, make accessible, and reveal the meanings people use to make sense out of their daily live. I have lived the life of a SF Guard soldier and can show the insights of the everyday life” (1991, 15).

The second methodology used was that of questionnaire and interview process. This method allows for a varied view of the questions from National Guard and active component soldiers that have been involved in this service in numerous positions of command, operations, and logistics. Feeling as a well-versed insider in this subject, the attempt with the interviews was to remove the biases and beliefs from others in the same community, who have witnessed similar or the same events but from their perspective. Yin references this to the multiple sources of evidence and credits this technique as being a very beneficial means to collect data (Yin 1991, 95). The interview technique is to build questions from the subordinate questions that will be answered from the participants’ observer role and then to analyze the responses from others to verify and reinforce those views. The field of interviewees chosen was five active duty SF officers and five National Guard officers. The five active duty officers have trained with, deployed, and went to combat with National Guard Forces. The average experience of these five soldiers in SOF units was seven years. The five National Guard soldiers interviewed
range from a traditional drill soldier to a current active guard reserve officer who has served on active duty. The average years of experience for these soldiers was fourteen years in SF units. As the participant observer with ten years experience, this group is a well-balanced mix with a wide variety of insight and bilateral views. Keeping the number of interviewees low, but diverse, allows for the control of variables that could lead to unnecessary analyzes and unrelated observations. Gathering the information from the interviewees allows a general flow from related questions, to observations made by the author to the related question that was answered. Careful consideration was paid to not allowing ego, knowledge, and emotions to influence the data collected and interviews conducted. Yin writes, “This method of research is one of the hardest portions of case study research and a pitfall which must be avoided” (Yin 1991, 92).

The questions were developed using Oppenheim’s work on this methodology that states, “Each question has a job to do, and that job is the measurement of a particular variable, as laid down in the questionnaire specification” (Oppenhiem 1992, 145). The interview questions bring out the analysis that is key to the thesis and subordinate question. A review of the questions shows that simplicity and open-ended thought would hopefully draw out a more detailed response from the interviewee. This approach is a key to obtaining the answer, one desires, without posing restrictions on the interviewee. The soldiers interviewed for this thesis are as follows:

1. Colonel Joe DiBartolomeo, USASOC Staff officer, twenty-eight years active and National Guard Special Forces service

2. Colonel Dave Bowman, Commander Special Operations Detachment Europe, twenty-six years of National Guard Special Forces experience
3. Lieutenant Colonel Kurt Crytzer, Commander 2/19th Special Forces Group (A), eighteen years active and National Guard experience

4. Major Rick Drew, Battalion S-3, 1/20th Special Forces Group (A), twenty years active and National Guard service

5. Major Mike Silvers, Group Ops Officer, 19th Special Forces Group (A), twenty years of National Guard service

6. Major Rick Rhyne, Student CGSOC, sixteen years active component service, ten years in SF

7. Major Steve Johnston, Student CGSOC, eighteen years active component service, nine years in SF

8. Major Ken Parks, Student CGSOC, seventeen years active component service, eleven years in SF

9. Major Rusty Nance, Student CGSOC, fifteen years active component service, ten years in SF.

These are the questions they were given:

1. What do you envision is the role of National Guard Special Forces in the new Enhanced Special Forces Group? Can you give and describe how you think National Guard SOF forces should be aligned in USASFC?

2. Provide examples of operations (OEF, OIF, Bosnia, Joint Combined Exercise Training, Joint Chiefs of Staff, or others) that your unit either worked with or you commanded National Guard SOF units.

3. What was the strengths and then weakness that you saw with National Guard SF units?
4. What were some prescribed notions that you had about National Guard Forces? Where they proven true or false? Explain.

5. What do you understand about National Guard SOF structure, wartrace, and command and control?

6. What is the largest doctrinal structure the National Guard SOF should be mobilized? (For example SFOB, FOB, ODB, or ODA)

7. What was the command relationship between the National Guard SOF and active elements?

8. What is your understanding of DTA, and how should it be used with National Guard SOF?

9. If you had not had National Guard SOF manpower, where would you have gotten the forces to conduct your mission? Could you have conducted it without them?

10. Were there any compatibility issues with National Guard training, equipment, or any other distracters with your mission?

**Analyze Data**

Upon receiving answers to the questions above, the patterns formed were in the size and unit configuration that should be mobilized from the National Guard. The soldiers interviewed knew next to nothing about the new Enhanced Special Forces Group and the plan to increase all of SF over the next five years by over 2,500 soldiers. Major Rusty Nancy, one of the active component soldiers stated, “I would have to understand my own unit’s role in the enhanced Special Forces Group prior to figuring out how the National Guard should be used.” All soldiers interviewed had either been mobilized as a National Guard soldier or worked as an active component soldier directly with the
National Guard on missions and operations. Across the board, all ten soldiers noticed the lack of modern equipment for the National Guard. It was evident that the active component had to provide the equipment, which caused the National Guard soldiers to feel inferior because of the equipment shortage. This rolled into the question about compatibility and the active component soldiers being so short-handed for some operations that if National Guard soldiers had not been available, either soldier would have stayed longer or missions would have been conducted at levels that posed security and safety issues. Question number six was a consensus across the active component soldiers and the National Guard soldiers in that only up to a battalion size element should be mobilized to support operations. This has been the general rule in this author’s twelve years as a National Guard soldier and usually it is only at the company level that National Guard units are mobilized. Major Rusty Nance felt from his experience “that only up to a Company unless the Battalion was augmented with active component soldiers.” Another trend was the lack of organizational knowledge of the National Guard from the active component soldiers. Four to five interviewed stated that their knowledge of guard structure, wartrace, and command and control was very weak. This author found this to be very interesting in that the National Guard is set up on exactly the same modified table of equipment and the historical relationships of the two National Guard Groups have been established the same for the last ten years. Maj Rick Rhyne, the one soldier who felt he understood this piece, made sure to caveat that “he had no idea how the National Guard was commanded and controlled.” The DTA question showed a pattern that was clear in that the only soldiers that had a reply were the soldiers from the 2/19th National Guard and soldiers from the 5th or the 3rd Special Forces Group that had a DTA with this
unit. The other active component soldiers and even the other National Guard soldiers had no real comment about the subject due to lack of understanding parameters of the subject.

**Strength and Weaknesses**

One of the definite strengths of using participant observation is the strong relationship that a researcher has with the subject and his ability to understand the problems and issues first hand. Using interview questions from others that have the same background and experience allows analyze from other participant observation from those individuals. Yin relates this strength to assess being a member of group that would be hard to penetrate and be accepted to gather the information for the research. SOF units are very private and definitely meet this definition. The depth of this experience is a vast knowledge of information that academia researchers try to gauge test subjects and forecasting this time. Another strength was the location of a number of the panel. Being able to interview and having relationships with the panel allows for manipulation of the events as they happen in the process. Being fellow students, the availability to interview, and re-exam issues with them was extremely valuable. The access as being a member of the group also gives you the insider knowledge and acceptance instead of outsiders preconceived conceptions you know the reality (Yin 1991, 93).

A major weakness of participant observation is the bias that experience and knowledge of a subject nurtures and is, as Yin states, the main source of frustration with academia researchers. Yin also states, that as the investigator you may have to assume positions of advocacy contrary to the scientific matter you are trying achieve. Also, the researcher has to watch for becoming what is referred to as Stockholm syndrome; you become to close to your subject. Finally, the researcher must avoid giving undue attention
to an area that is close to the researcher but relatively unimportant to the research overall. This is an area of concern for this research due to the participant observation that has been done was with one SF National Guard battalion. Also, the researcher has not been a member of an active duty SF battalion for more than six months at a time and still kept affiliation with parent National Guard unit. The generalization of the subject in that the subject is very Army SOF centric limits the scope of ideas and theories possible to research (Yin 1991, 93).

Conclusion

The research effort for this thesis incorporated two sound methods that will allow the author to analyze and answer the question from his perspective as a participant observer and through interview questions from others with similar experience and as themselves as participant observers.
CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS

We’re going to move before the other guy, moves, and we’re going to reach out and touch him at his place, not ours. We’re going to have to be strategically more agile.

General Peter J. Schoomaker, Chief of Staff, Army

The value of SOF has been known for sometime. Even the creation of the SF as a branch in 1986 was a vision realized. This vision added one active Special Forces Group, but lost two reserve groups and shows a lack of a holistic understanding regarding the value and unique problems involved in manning, training, and employing National Guard Special Forces.

As noted earlier, both the USSOCOM commander and the USASFC commander have considered National Guard SOF vital in conducting today’s missions and maintaining the current operation tempo. This chapter will provide insight to a plan that provides growth in the overall Special Forces Group (A) design to facilitate effective worldwide engagement, improve joint and coalition operational capability. Experiences during OEF and OIF emphasize the absolute necessity for additional manpower in the Special Forces Group (A) beyond the current active force in order to conduct sustained joint and coalition warfare in the existing or future campaigns (US Army Special Forces Command 2003). The force design update programmed for SF does little to explain or develop the role National Guard Special Forces will assume in this transition. This transition is best captured by the concept of a new enhanced Special Forces Group.

The current Special Forces Group (A) structure is insufficient to conduct sustained worldwide UW operations without significant augmentation. Special Forces
Group (A) are not robust enough to unilaterally and simultaneously plan and coordinate command and control combat elements with allied and coalition forces in sustained UW operations in up to four remote and geographically dispersed operational bases with its current force structure. While Vision 2010 from April 1997 addressed the need for capable forces to be able to meet the threat that would arrive on current and future battlefields as an integrated team, the National Guard is not mentioned. By using quality people that are superbly trained and educated to operate in an ambiguous environment in peace, deterrence, and crisis resolution, it failed to even mention active component and reserve component integration (US Army Special Operation Command 1997, 2-3).

The SOF Vision 2010 and the SOF future force goes into great detail to explain and validate the needed transformation in the SOF community. The Capstone concept supports the Army’s view best described in draft TRADOC Pam 525-3-0. It is also based upon the Army Vision and the Chief of Staff of the Army’s Objective Force white paper and it is compatible with Joint Vision 2020. The Objective Force is described in TRADOC Pam 525-3-0 as a full-spectrum force, organized, manned, equipped, and trained to be more strategically responsive, deployable, agile, versatile, lethal, survivable, and sustainable across the entire spectrum of military operations. Objective Force units will conduct operational maneuver from strategic distances; deploy through multiple, unimproved points of entry, forcibly if necessary; overwhelm hostile anti-access capabilities; and rapidly impose its will on the enemy. They will arrive in the theater of operations immediately capable of conducting simultaneous distributed and continuous combined arms operations throughout the battle space, day and night, in any terrain. They
will employ the full range of national and joint capabilities to see first, understand first, act first, and finish decisively at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels.

In 1993, General Stiner stated that one of the hardest jobs during his tour, as Commander of USSOCOM, was the command and control of National Guard Special Forces (Collins 1999, 46). With the increase in all forms of operations looming in the future, General Stiner knew that this would be a crucial item to provide the force that would be needed in the next ten years. In fact, since the 20th Special Forces Group (A) was mobilized for Operation Desert Storm, the National Guard Special Forces has been viewed as the gap filler for USASFC the force provider of SF. In the midst of what would become one of the busiest times in reference to deployments and operations for SF, two complete groups were disbanded and the colors retired. The QDR in 1995 disbanded two SF reserve groups, which were the 11th and the 12th Special Forces Group (A). Even with an increase in operational tasks and the assistance by National Guard Special Forces conducting joint combined exercise training, Joint Chiefs of Staff and Peacekeeping operations, there were no relations between active and guard forces. The first attempt to develop a like program was in 1995 to 1996 when the 2/19th Special Forces Group (A) was assigned to the 5th Special Forces Group (A) with a wartrace and DTA. The 2/19th Special Forces Group (A) was filling the void that the deactivation of the 12th Special Forces Group (A) had left in CENTCOM. This proof of concept was developed to establish if a National Guard battalion could be separated from its National Guard Special Forces chain of command and work with an active component headquarters that would command it during a war. The 2/19th was written into the CENTCOM war plan under the 5th Special Forces Group (A) SOF task organization. This gave the 2/19th as a National
Guard SOF unit authorization to plan, train, and develop tactics, techniques, and procedures from a real world mission letter with opportunities to train in the AOR, which the element would conduct combat operations. This relationship lasted for four years. During a review of CENTCOM JSCP, it was decided that a National Guard battalion could not mobilize, train-up, and deploy into CENTCOM within the allotted time. The National Guard soldiers were not involved in this planning or decision, and the 2/19th was written out of the JSCP and replaced with a battalion from the 3rd Special Forces Group (A). This thought process was proven invalid in December 2001, when the 2/19th Special Forces Group (A) was mobilized, processed, and arrived at Fort Campbell, Kentucky in ten days and deployed its first elements into OEF in fifteen days. Since the 3rd Special Forces Group (A) lost a battalion to CENTCOM plans, the initiation was made to fill the void in EUCOM plans. The decision transferred the 2/19th to EUCOM, where it was written into contingency plans and given responsibility to conduct engagement in Northern Africa. This brief description of the relationship of the 2/19th Special Forces Group (A) is just an example of one of the six National Guard battalions that USASFC has to mobilize and use as a force. This is how the battalion is currently aligned and the task organization for the remaining National Guard SOF units will be explained.

Analysis of the current force structure of the National Guard is divided into four areas that shape the role the National Guard plays as one-third of the Green Berets in the Army inventory and will facilitate a force arrangement that emphasizes economy of force and maneuverable options for the future.
The exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of the mission. Command and control functions are performed through an arrangement of personnel, equipment, communications, facilities, and procedures employed by a commander in planning, directing, coordinating, and controlling forces and operations in the accomplishment of the mission. (Department of the Army 2003, 1-2)

To understand the command and control of the National Guard Special Forces is relevant to describe the task organization of the active forces and roles and responsibilities of these forces in the world. No National Guard unit has responsibility solely for any geographical area, thus understanding the roles, of active component SF responsibilities to the GCC, is critical. As stated previously, there are five active component groups.

The 1st Special Forces Group (A) is based at Fort Lewis, Washington, with one group headquarters and two battalions 2nd and 3rd. The 1st Battalion is forward deployed in Okinawa, Japan. The 1st Special Forces Group (A) is responsible for operations in PACOM.

The 3rd Special Forces Group (A) is based at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, with one group headquarters, and the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Battalions. The 3rd Special Forces Group (A) is dual proportioned to CENTCOM and EUCOM.

The 5th Special Forces Group (A) is based at Fort Campbell, Kentucky, with one group headquarters and the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Battalions. Prior to 11 September, the 5th Special Forces Group (A) always maintained a company element forward in Kuwait; this was a rotating company mission. The 5th is responsible for SOF operations in CENTCOM.

The 7th Special Forces Group (A) is based at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, with one group headquarters, and the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Battalions. Like the 5th Special Forces
Group (A), the 7th has a company stationed forward in Puerto Rico. The 7th is responsible for operations in Southern Command (SOUTHCOM).

The 10th Special Forces Group (A) is based at Fort Carson, Colorado, with one group headquarters, and the 2nd and 3rd Battalions. Like the 1st Special Forces Group (A), the 10th has one battalion forward deployed and stationed in Stuttgart, Germany. The 10th Special Forces Group (A) is responsible for operations in EUCOM (US Special Operations Command 1998, 2-9).

Understanding the active component geographic concerns is critical to understanding the existing gaps left by the current alignment of National Guard SOF plays in this arrangement. The 19th Special Forces Group (A) with one group headquarters and the 1st and 5th Battalions are responsible for assisting in operations in PACOM with the 1st Special Forces Group (A). The 20th Special Forces Group (A) with one group headquarters and the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Battalions are responsible for operations in SOUTHCOM with the 7th Special Forces Group (A). As previously mentioned, one National Guard Battalion the 2/19th is apportioned to EUCOM working with the 3rd Special Forces Group (A). The problem with the current alignment has been evident since 11 September, with CENTCOM having no National Guard Forces aligned to support operations in its AOR. Yet, all of the National Guard forces have deployed and conducted combat operations in support of OEF and OIF. Of the six National Guard battalions, only one had trained and was partially equipped to conduct operations in that environment. Figure 2 shows the world broken out by commands.
Based on this alignment of the 19th Special Forces Group (A) and the 20th Special Forces Group (A) alignment, communications between the National Guard organizations is difficult, but command and control is even more challenging. Not only is geography a problem for command and control, but the units of each command have different missions and regional alignments. For example, the 2/19th Special Forces Group (A) has a completely different mission through the JSCP then the rest of the 19th Special Forces Group (A) and its other two battalions. The 19th Special Forces Group (A) headquarters and the 1st and 5th Battalions are JSPC to PACOM AOR. The 2/19th Special Forces Group (A), as mentioned, is JSCP to work with EUCOM. This does not occur anywhere else in USASFC command where a unit’s higher headquarters war time focus is different from a subordinate unit. All of the 20th Special Forces Group (A) and
its three battalions are focused on SOUTHCOM and have relations with the 7th Special Forces Group (A) for which they will work in theater. The issue arises when discussing command and control is when the 19th Special Forces Group (A) is focused with its limited full time assets and time on PACOM, then who is focusing on EUCOM for the 2/19th.

The other major issue with command and control is just being in the National Guard structure. The 19th and 20th Special Forces Group (A) headquarters cannot legally command any units that are not located in their state. There is a memorandum of agreement on crossing state lines for training guidance and mission essential task list development, but there is no actual Uniform Code of Military Justice or punishment for a National Guard commander in West Virginia for failure to follow a directive from a group commander in another state. This is not only a problem for the National Guard across states lines. The active component also suffers in trying to influence command and control of a National Guard SF unit. Today in USASOC doctrine, the National Guard is under USASFC for training and readiness oversight only. That small dotted line in a line and task organization chart does not look like much, but in the Army, when ownership equals funding, equipment, and readiness resources, it demonstrates a major issue with the National Guard (Department of the Army 1999, 2-3). USASFC has pushed a majority of the oversight requirements on the National Guard Bureau and the individual States, which has caused a lack of wartime guidance when it comes to force integration at the operational level. Although National Guard SF teams and companies at the tactical level integrate very well with active component units, the active units distrust the skill and ability of the National Guard battalions and groups to command and control at the
operational level. Three out of the five active component soldiers interviewed felt that National Guard SOF units should not be mobilized above the company level, and the other two stated that they would accept battalions with certain caveats. All of the National Guard soldiers interviewed felt that National Guard Special Forces units, up to battalion size elements, should be mobilized to support the active component. This pattern may have developed because active SF soldiers have not routinely worked with National Guard elements at the battalion level. One way that USASFC has tried to bridge this misperception is through direct involvement with a DTA.

The authorization for DTA is housed in USASFC Regulation 350-1. This training regulation also directs and establishes a responsibility for all training conducted in SF.

“The DTA program is a mutually beneficial training alignment that facilitates the needs of active component and AR National Guard Groups to meet mission and training requirements. Direct coordination between the DTA aligned units to plan and schedule training is authorized. Active component units provide the DTA aligned Army National Guard units with training assistance, assistance in developing their annual training plan, attendance at group training management seminars, and provide observers and or evaluators for selected key CONUS and OCONUS training events as directed by the Commanding General. Active component units will take an active role in the development and direction of the Army National Guard unit’s annual training” (US Army Forces Command 2002, chap 3, 3-7, 8).

What this regulation is actually saying is that a DTA establishes dedicated year round training relationships between active component and Army National Guard units. Direct coordination between DTA aligned units, for example: Special Forces Group S-3
to Special Forces Group S-3, to plan and schedule training is authorized; however, coordination does not constitute approval. Active component units provide DTA aligned Army National Guard units with training assistance and evaluation during CONUS or OCONUS exercises and annual training requirements. What it actually does is establish a relationship between two elements that might or might not have the same wartime mission and the capability to mutually support each other in training activities.

There are three active DTAs right now in USASFC: the 19th Special Forces Group (A) elements with the 1st Special Forces Group (A), the 20th Special Forces Group (A) with the 7th Special Forces Group (A), and the 2/19th Special Forces Group (A) with the 5th Special Forces Group (A). A newly proposed DTA that is being considered at USASFC is as follows:

1. Headquarters 20th Special Forces Group (A) is not aligned with any active component Special Forces Group (A). Headquarters 20th Special Forces Group (A) will be prepared to execute the missions of an ARSOTF in support of global contingencies.

2. The 1st Battalion, 20th Special Forces Group (A) is aligned with the 3d Special Forces Group (A).

3. The 2nd Battalion, 20th Special Forces Group (A) is aligned with the 10th Special Forces Group (A).

4. The 3d Battalion, 20th Special Forces Group (A) is aligned with the 7th Special Forces Group (A).

5. Headquarters 19th Special Forces Group (A) is aligned with the 1st Special Forces Group (A). Additionally, be prepared to execute the missions of an ARSOTF in support of global contingencies.
6. The 1st Battalion, the 19th Special Forces Group (A) and the 5th Battalion, 19th Special Forces Group (A) are aligned with the 1st Special Forces Group (A).

7. The 2nd Battalion, the 19th Special Forces Group (A) is aligned with the 5th Special Forces Group (A) (US Army Forces Command. 2002, chap 3, 3-7, 8).

The world’s ever-changing and increasingly complex security environment demands a national military strategy that will lead to a truly transformed force structure, rather than rehashed ideas of the past (Carstens 2003, 2). USASFC proposed DTA is definitely taking a step in the right direction for transformation, but the DTA does not take into consideration enough wartrace and mission specific issues that units need to develop mission essential task lists and yearly training guidance.

One of the key objectives of a DTA is the mutual sharing of training resources and training requirements. This portion of the DTA is key, as SF units cannot effectively train without mutual support from another SF unit in a training support and resource role. USASFC Regulation 350-1 explains in great detail how the elements will share and merge resource intensive items in a pool for use by all the forces at a minimal cost. SOF elements at the group level will be responsible for researching, acquiring, and or maintaining Special Forces Group (A) AOR-specific limited use equipment that is not issued to ODAs due to cost, such as government mobility vehicles, mountaineering equipment, ski and snow shoe equipment, snow mobiles, all-terrain vehicles, extreme cold-weather suits, and pack animal equipment.

Also depending upon each Special Forces Group (A)’s AOR, this section will maintain subject matter expertise on the use and maintenance of the equipment. This section will provide training on this equipment to ODAs to ensure proper use and
maintenance during isolation and facilitate their preparation and support during operations. This section is also responsible for sustainment and training of survival and evasion tactics, techniques, and procedures to include the survival, evasion, resistance and escape level B Program. This is a great program. For the active component elements, it will be a burden off of the battalions to maintain all of this gear and mechanical experience. For the National Guard elements, the geographical distance of units to their DTAs become a large issue (US Army Special Forces Command 2003). Under the current configuration, if gear were issued now for use, the 5th Special Forces Group would get three sets of gear and the 19th Special Forces Group (A) would get three sets of gear. The set for the 2/19th Special Forces Group (A) would go to Utah, which makes it unfeasible for the 2/19th units to use this equipment due to geographical location.

Another major issue facing both active component and National Guard units is training space and recourses. Like the equipment pool, the idea of purchasing and increasing the availability of ranges is great, except that the National Guard units without a relationship will have a hard time working usage agreements on the posts where these ranges are built. Estimated construction cost per Special Forces Group (A) for administrative storage and operations space is $40 million, a total of $280 million for seven Special Forces Group (A)s. The estimated construction cost for maintenance bay and motor pool space is based on two additional maintenance bays at a cost of $2 million per Special Forces Group (A) or a total cost of $14 million for the seven Special Forces Group (A)s. The total for all seven Special Forces Group (A)s is $308 million (US Army Special Forces Command 2003).
The above benefit of both programs will not be fully realized or integrated by the National Guard forces due to the geographical misalignments in the current DTA. In order to resolve the issue of National Guard SF unit location, as well as current DTA, alignment needs to be discussed and examined.

National Guard Special Forces units are dispersed over fourteen states. The two National Guard groups are evenly divided with each one having seven states with units from their command. The dispersion of the units is mainly a remainder of the reserve SF units that were left after the deactivation of the 11th and 12th Special Forces Group (A)s in the mid-1990s. There are three more states that have SOF forces located in them; theses are intel and weather support units that will not be discussed in this thesis.

The 19th Special Forces Group (A) is made up of three National Guard battalions across seven states. A majority of its units, two battalions are geographically located west of the Mississippi River and one battalion is east. The 19th Special Forces Group (A) is headquartered in Salt Lake City, Utah: the 1/19th Special Forces Group (A) headquarters and two companies are located in Utah and one company is located in the State of Washington. The 2/19th Special Forces Group (A) is headquartered in Huntington, West Virginia, with: one company in Kingwood, West Virginia; one company located in Columbus, Ohio; and one company in Middletown, Rhode Island. The 5/19th Special Forces Group (A) is headquartered in Denver, Colorado, with two companies in Colorado. The other company from the 5th Battalion is located in California (National Guard Bureau 2003).

The 20th Special Forces Group (A) is headquartered in Birmingham, Alabama, with one battalion 1st headquartered in Huntsville, Alabama, and two companies in
Alabama. The 1/20th 3d company is located in Massachusetts. The 2/20th Special Forces Group (A) is headquartered in Mississippi with two companies in Mississippi and one company in Maryland. The 3/20th Special Forces Group (A) is headquartered in Florida with two companies in Florida and one company in Virginia (National Guard Bureau 2003).

Figure 3 gives an excellent display of the National Guard forces and allows for the analysis of these locations. Looking at these locations now begs the question, are these units in the proper place to maximize DTA and recruiting and retention of soldiers in the next ten years.

Figure 3. Army National Guard Special Forces Locations

Source: National Guard Bureau, Army Readiness Office, 2003, E-mail from First Lieutenant Mario Pucci, Washington, DC.
A National Guard unit cannot relocate merely because it is convenient for training. Another issue that must be considered is demographical layout. The National Guard must be able to recruit and retain soldiers in the vicinity of the unit’s home station. As the need for SOF soldier’s increases and the competition to recruit these soldiers grows, National Guard SOF will have to assess its current locations and abilities to recruit from these locations. Figure 3 shows where the current forces are located in the United States. This alignment does not facilitate the change in demographics in the last ten years. As of March 2002, there are currently 282 million people in the United States. Of that 282 million, 100 million live in the South; 64 million in the West; 63 million in the Midwest; and 53 million in the Northeast. Table 1 shows the breakout of the region and the states that they encompass for this population. Any human resource expert will state that to recruit a force for your company you must find where that force is and go get it.

Table 1. US Population by Region, 1990-2002

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Change, 1990–2000</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>April 1, 1990</td>
<td>April 1, 2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>248,709,873</td>
<td>281,421,906</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northeast</td>
<td>50,809,229</td>
<td>53,594,378</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Midwest</td>
<td>59,668,632</td>
<td>64,392,776</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South</td>
<td>85,445,930</td>
<td>100,236,820</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West</td>
<td>52,786,082</td>
<td>63,197,932</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


While looking at the region is important, one must get down to the state demographics to see the real impact of demographics on the ability to recruit and retain National Guard SF soldiers. As an example, the state of Utah has a group headquarters, a battalion headquarters, and two companies. This makes up over 40 percent of its force, but the state of Utah is ranked 34th for population with only 2.3 million people. If you look at Utah in a geographical compared in relation to large urban population, then it is a full day’s drive from a large metropolitan area in the south in Las Vegas or to the east to Denver. The one company that comes from the battalion in Utah is located in Washington, which has 6 million people and ranks 15th in population. This company continues to have one of the strongest recruiting and retention numbers in the group. On the opposite end of this spectrum, the Battalion in West Virginia has a headquarters, and one company in West Virginia equaling over 60 percent of its force in a state that only has 1.8 million and is ranked 37th in population. What West Virginia has is the capability to recruit soldiers within a four-hour commute from Cleveland, Columbus, Cincinnati,
and Pittsburgh, four of the fifteen largest metropolitan cities in the nation. The diversity of this battalion’s position gives it access to over 22 million personnel to recruit from, and a better job market to assist in retention. This analysis can be done across the board to include Colorado, which has the same element in it as Utah with a separate company in California. Colorado having 75 percent of the battalion force in state that only has 4.5 million and is 22nd; where as, the one company in California with 35 million and 1st for population has 25 percent of that force. The imbalance of force has continued to grow as the population shifts and moves to other areas of the country. The 20th Special Forces Group (A) has similar unbalanced forces, and it has affected the ability for both of the groups to recruit and retain soldiers to the levels of readiness that are required for National Guard SOF. Table 2 breaks out by state the numbers for each state that has National Guard SOF.

While demographics impacts both recruitment and retention, another factor must be considered when looking at retention. That factor is deployment, which currently means GWOT. Special Forces Group (A) expect to be deployed worldwide across the spectrum of conflict during both peacetime and in war. The US has recently been forced to deal a series of increasingly lethal asymmetric threats. The emergence of a renewed unconventional threat in the form of international terrorist organizations, located in unstable nations with resources critical to the US national interests, mandates the requirement for additional Special Forces Group (A) structure (US Army Special Forces Command 2003). Now that the SF has to deal with the GWOT, its ability to work in peacetime cycles has become next to untenable. Looking at the military operating skill qualifier (MOS Q) rate of six National Guard battalions, all the battalions showed
decreases in their MOS Q and strength numbers. Four of the six battalions had not yet fully established the effect of the unit’s first year activation. The numbers for the first battalion mobilized were an average look and are the best gauge so far for the other units in predicting whether the soldiers decide to stay in or get out after the stop loss is lifted and they are demobilized see table 3.

Table 2. Population by State

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>July 2002 pop.</th>
<th>Pop. rank, 2002</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alabama</td>
<td>4,486,508</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>California</td>
<td>35,116,033</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colorado</td>
<td>4,506,542</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Florida</td>
<td>16,713,149</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illinois</td>
<td>12,600,620</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maryland</td>
<td>5,458,137</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Massachusetts</td>
<td>6,427,801</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mississippi</td>
<td>2,871,782</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ohio</td>
<td>11,421,267</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rhode Island</td>
<td>1,069,725</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Utah</td>
<td>2,316,256</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Virginia</td>
<td>7,293,542</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Washington</td>
<td>6,068,996</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Virginia</td>
<td>1,801,873</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total U.S.</strong></td>
<td><strong>288,368,698</strong></td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3. Unit Status Report

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Assigned</th>
<th>Available</th>
<th>MOSQ</th>
<th>Senior Grade</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>April 2003</td>
<td>143%</td>
<td>136%</td>
<td>103%</td>
<td>131%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 2003</td>
<td>149%</td>
<td>138%</td>
<td>92%</td>
<td>125%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 2003</td>
<td>145%</td>
<td>128%</td>
<td>78%</td>
<td>122%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 2004</td>
<td>145%</td>
<td>110%</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>108%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This battalion size unit dropped over 23 percent MOS Q in less than a year after being demobilized in December 2002, when stop loss was lifted off the unit 90 days after demobilization. This battalion had the highest MOS Q and strength numbers of the six National Guard battalions prior to 11 September. Of significant note, the unit’s assigned strength remained relatively steady, in fact even rising 2 percent in the same time frame. This indicates that the issue may not be the ability to recruit but the ability to retain the qualified soldiers already in the units.

Another area that needs to be addressed dealing with GWOT and National Guard usage is the question of role of the National Guard forces. USASFC was not prepared for an event like 11 September 2001. It immediately had to develop a plan to sustain a long duration conflict. One of the interviewed soldiers comments dealing with National Guard usage sums it up very well. “I do not believe units have been utilized wisely. The active component wants fillers and the National Guard Bureau stands on its soap box about not being fillers but giving units” (Crytzer 2003). The common trend across the interviews about this subject was the lack of knowing and understanding shortfalls and abilities.

The modern state’s ability to wage sustained war depends directly on its ability to mobilize its physical resources over extended periods (Koistinen 1997, 1). It should now be apparent that National Guard SF units need to be realigned to improve command and
control and integration for training and employment with the active force. It should be
obvious that demographics and GWOT are having an impact on National Guard SF unit’s
readiness that must be addressed.

SF must organize its units so that they reflect current realities and incorporate the
capabilities employed by the potential adversaries (Prairie 2002, 99). SOF must fully
integrate to do so, it must establish a relationship prior to a conflict, and that will a small
shift of force structure.
CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Our challenge of the 21st century is to defend our cities and infrastructure from new forms of attack, while projecting a force over long distances to fight new and perhaps distant adversaries. To do this, we need rapidly deployable, fully integrated joint forces, capable of reaching distant theaters quickly and working with our air and sea forces to strike adversaries, swiftly, successfully and with devastating effect.

Donald Rumsfeld

Thesis Statement

It is apparent now that the Army National Guard Special Forces must be tasked organized in order to support the transformation process underway to construct the Enhanced Special Forces Group and SOF Vision 2010. This alignment must consider using command and control, DTA, and demographic. National Guard and active component integration will be critical for the success of the transformation of SF in the Army’s transformation process and its ability to project forces into the regional commander’s area of operations in a timely and sustainable manner.

A potential solution of how the National Guard SOF can be better utilized for future operations to include the current GWOT is in modifying the current DTA, adjusting command and control, and locating units by demographics. These are broad issues, and the scope of each subject was narrowed significantly to vector in the main premise of this thesis. Through direct observations and information collected through interviews, a relatively simple solution exists on more responsive, better trained, and mission ready force in the twenty-first century.
Looking at USASOC 350-1 and its guidance in SOF active component and reserve component integration, strides are currently being made in the training environment. For the first time, USASOC 350-1 is being signed by Lieutenant General Shultz, Chief National Guard Bureau, and Lieutenant General Kennsinger, Commander, USASOC. This is the first time that National Guard command has demonstrated that, for missions, training, and resourcing USASOC will be the focal point for SF National Guard units. This relationship has previously been unofficial and was formed out of necessity because National Guard Bureau lacked the capability to adequately support SOF mission requirements and training. This lack of capability has led directly to a clearer more defined role of the active component SOF unit in the command and control of National Guard SOF.

The current command and control of the National Guard as mentioned earlier in no way adheres to unity of command and economy of force from the principles of war. In fact, upon close observation and dissection of the other seven principles of war, the current alignment does not follow any of them. With forces aligned to all the GCCs but in no respect to geography or DTA alliance, then just what factors were used in determining the alignment as it currently exists. The only logical explanation is due to historical factors and the Cold War paradigm, which has outlived its intended purpose.

The command and control could be dissected and literally become a line and diagram chart that would be a simple example of simplicity that would be supported by geography, demographics, and regional needs across the operational spectrum. With the current operational tempo and the growing need for SOF increasing, the time to understand and look at the alignment is now. Figure 4 is the same world map broken out
by GCC as used earlier, except it reflects geography and demographics. The alignment also shows the relevance of the alignment in conjunction with the importance of the DTA. Figure 5 shows an alignment for JSCP that would be mutually supporting with DTA, and demographics.

Figure 4. Proposed World Map by GCC Locations

*Source:* NIMA 5, no. 1077, February 2002
Direct Training Affiliation

With the DTA, which USASFC Regulation 350-1 establishes, the main intent is to align units to work together in training for better integration during combat. The following list takes into account the DTA, but reflects a DTA that coincides with a command and control alignment that facilitates the use of National Guard SOF in a regional engagement. This command and control alignment regionalizes units so that the DTA is more than just a training alliance of convenience. The DTA is important and needs to carry through into command and control based on the GCC and mission. The list following proposes the command and control under USASFC which functions for training in peacetime and for missions during deployment.

Under USASFC 350-1, the author has addressed the DTA relationship that has been directed and how it is currently arrayed in chapter 4. The DTA of units to the active component groups is a great step in realizing a total force with common goals, but the DTA suggested in USASFC 350-1 does not take into account current alignment or
geographical locations. The alignment that the author suggests would be as follows with an explanation of its benefits over the directed alignment in the current regulation:

1. Headquarters 20th Special Forces Group (A) would be an ARSOTF element with responsibility for executing the missions of an ARSOTF in support of SOCEUR and SOCCENT, referred to as ARSOTF East (US Army Special Forces Command 2003).

2. The 1st Battalion, 20th Special Forces Group (A) is aligned with the 3rd Special Forces Group (A).

3. The 2nd Battalion, 20th Special Forces Group (A) is aligned with the 5th Special Forces Group (A).

4. The 3rd Battalion, 20th Special Forces Group (A) is aligned with the 7th Special Forces Group (A).

5. Headquarters 19th Special Forces Group (A) would be an ARSOTF element with responsibility for executing the missions of an ARSOTF in support of SOCPAC and SOCSOUTH, and referred to as ARSOTF-West (US Army Special Forces Command 2003).

6. The 1st Battalion, 19th Special Forces Group (A) is aligned with the 1st Special Forces Group (A).

7. The 5th Battalion, 19th Special Forces Group (A) is aligned with the 10th Special Forces Group (A).

8. The 2nd Battalion, 19th Special Forces Group (A) is aligned with the 5th Special Forces Group (A).

In looking at the DTA positions, geography needs to be addressed, primarily proximity to the post and units that National Guard SOF elements would be aligned.
Placing the 2/20th, which is headquartered and has units in Mississippi, against the 10th Special Forces Group (A), located at Fort Carson, does not make sense in a resource responsible culture, especially when you have the 5/19th Special Forces Group (A) headquartered and located in Colorado with the 10th Special Forces Group (A). The availability of any of the 20th Special Forces Group (A) elements to conduct training with the DTA element is already strained from the start, the obstacle of time and distance is equated against the alignment. National Guard soldiers are not, by National Guard Bureau regulation, allowed to travel more than one-third of its drill training time to get to a training location (National Guard Bureau 1991, 2).

The other main issue with the alignment as directed by Regulation 350-1 is that the alignment has little to no bearing in perspective to assignment by the JSCP for war planning. The 2/20th has no assignment at this time with EUCOM, so the alignment with the 10th Special Forces Group (A) has no bearing on planned employment. It merely pairs a National Guard unit with an active component Group. This paper’s proposed alignment takes into account the command and control relationship, the JSCP assignment, and the demographic considerations that were mission under the current arrangement. The reason the DTA needs to be aligned on the same premise of JSCP, wartrace, and regional alignment is the differences in tactics, techniques, and procedures that each theater has which are as obvious as, language and cultural skills and as unique to a SFG (A) as desert or artic survival (US Army Special Forces Command 2003). The active component groups’ expertise will not be available to soldiers from the National Guard if the geographical shift does not occur. This shift would resolve the point made in all of the responses from the panel, that the National Guard lacked the equipment and
training on the current gear to help minimize the needed time to mobilize a unit. Lieutenant Colonel Bowman with over twenty-five years experience as a SF noncommissioned officer and officer stated, “Equipment compatibility has always been and issue since we typically are one or two generations behind on essential items” (Bowman 2004).

The shift also must resolve the issues arising in the next ten years with population shifts, and the need for the National Guard to be able to have a recruiting base that will support the unit’s ability to maintain strength and MOS Q goals. A shift will need to be made in the locations of units to support the National Guard’s ability to field a force that will be a vital force for the GCC. Currently all the units meet the end strength goals set forth by National Guard Bureau which is 100 percent assigned strength with 100 percent authorized, but they can only report about 85 percent MOS Q. At the time of this writing, none of the National Guard battalions were able to report C-1 status. Many variables affect this number, to include active duty stop-loss, GWOT mobilization issues, and the unit’s ability to retain soldiers after numerous GWOT deployments. The one factor that appeared to remain unaddressed was of declining populations and proximity of National Guard SF soldiers to those areas. With the shift of populations over the next ten to twenty years, National Guard Bureau and USASOC will need to station and align units in locations where they will have the ability to recruit and retain soldiers that are a structural fit for SOF units. Using demographics and population shift strategies, the proposed structural change to National Guard forces still meets the command and control, DTA, and population base requirements needed for the National Guard to be a viable force into
the twenty-first century. Figure 6 gives an overview of the locations that could be suitable for National Guard units for DTA and recruiting and retention activities.

Figure 6. Proposed Army National Guard Special Forces Locations

*Source:* National Guard Bureau, Army Readiness Office, 2003, E-mail from First Lieutenant Mario Puccie, Washington, DC.

One of the parameters of this proposed solution was that it works within the general confines of the existing structure. The Army has been using two documents that give a good structure and outline that could be used by USSOCOM and USASOC to make the needed changes. The regulations are FORSCOM 11-30, which supports the Army’s Regulation 11-30, *The Army Wartrace Program*, and FORSCOM 350-4,
Training Active Component and Reserve Component Partnerships, which supports Army Regulation 10-87, Active Component and Reserve Component Association Program. Both of these documents can be used to assist in the building a SOF active component and reserve component alignment document regarding how to better utilize the force. FORSCOM regulations are a good model because. USASOC, like FORSCOM, is a force provider command.

The purpose of FORSCOM 11-30 as stated in paragraph 1-1, “The regulation outlines policies and procedures for the execution of the Army Wartrace Program in support of Army Regulation 11-30, Army Wartrace Program. Its purpose is for use by the program managers throughout the active component, Army National Guard, and the US Army Reserve. Describes the responsibilities of wartime and peacetime commanders; explains how to determine wartrace mission priority for units with multiple alignments.”

The multiple alignments would not be an issue unless a GCC plan to conduct his wartime mission required more than six battalions. There are no plans at this time that require greater than that number. The term “wartrace” is not an acronym, but represents the culmination of several evolutionary programs to organize the total Army into groupings to support the warfighting commands. The Army wartrace program is the deliberate alignment of Army forces under a specified wartime commanders in order to conduct wartime planning in support of US national military strategic strategy. This is all done through the JSCP via the Joint Staff that sets the goals of the various GCC. The JSCP is a top-secret document that establishes the deliberate planning process and apportions specific types of combat forces to each theater and then tasks the GCC to develop war plans for their specific AOR. Major wartime scenarios addressed under wartrace are the
Pacific (Korea), Southwest Asia, and Europe. The CONUS training and sustaining base is also directly related to the wartrace program (US Army Forces Command 2001, 3-5).

After the establishment of the wartrace, the alignment of forces that will work together in combat can begin training together. FORSCOM 350-4 covers the active component and reserve component partnership for training. USASOC and USASFC 350-1 both cover training, but this document gives specific direction on how units will be integrated and who has the responsibility. The responsibility for the training and execution of that training is the key element that USASOC and USASFC do not cover in their regulations. Presently, a risk-laden imbalance exists between essential sustainment requirements and immediately available capabilities. This is one of the critical active component and reserve component integration areas requiring resolution. A rapid response, reserve component capability is required if the reserve component is to provide a no-notice and or short notice support to contingency operations. This is especially true for those capabilities required during early entry operations. The alternative is to maintain an active component capability that may not best serve the needs of the Army as a whole.

There are three areas that require further study within SOF that have not been addressed here. First, the other SOF reserve forces, mainly the Civil Affairs and Pysop units, were not considered and would require completely different subject matter experts, than National Guard. How these forces should be aligned and demographically located would be a subject that could be researched extensively about each unit. Another area that was not reviewed was the need for reserve forces for some of the other forces in USASOC. Currently, the Rangers and TF 160 (SOF Aviation) do not have a reserve force that it can draw from during high operational tempo times and during times of high
conflicts such as now. The Rangers and TF 160 have been deployed non-stop since 11 September 2001 and do not have a bench to draw from for relief. Another issue that was not addressed is the lack of a reserve force for SF Detachment Delta. This force is a USSOCOM asset that has one of the highest operational tempos in the force and as demanding recruiting and retention process. Much like the National Guard, which is a unit that can keep soldiers that leave active duty prior to serving twenty years, SF ODA-D could establish reserve forces where operators could retain basic skills and be available during times of conflict. The British Military has done this with its Territorial Reserve Special Air Service and Special Boat Service in a very successful manner.

Summary

Regardless, through the joint mission analysis and OEF lessons learned, it is known that the need for SF unconventional forces will continue to increase and that the current numbers are insufficient. Traditional no growth strategies have caused persistent shortfalls in SF planners, trainers, and sustainers in the SF battalion and Special Forces Group headquarters. Current force structure is insufficient to plan, conduct, and sustain worldwide UW operations without significant augmentation. SF must transform to meet current and future mission requirements, so that it is ensured absolute superiority in combat operations; this is particularly important in the GWOT. This transformation requires significant and constant investment in manpower with specialized training and equipment.

Conclusion

To meet the demand, US SOF needs to look at the ways that, as a force, it can meet the operational and tactical goals. A strategic answer to the current shortcomings of
the SOF forces is not just a shift of reserve units from geographical locations and DTA. This shift is a new way to look at utilization and preparing the force that makes up one-third of the SF in the Army. Until the SF can work together as a force and grow together as young noncommissioned officers and officers, the reservations and prescribed notions of National Guard forces will remain throughout the force. In closing, the direction of this research bridges the current gaps and allows for a future force that is an integrated and cohesive across the spectrum.

In the short term, USASOC cannot make enough SF to put into the fight. USASOC has to optimize what as a force provider it has. It has done well with the active component, but has neglected the National Guard force. Even now, this shortcoming is being addressed. However, unless it shifts from a 20th Century Cold War model into the 21st century and streamline command and control, improve training alignment, and position units where there is a population to support them, USASOC will fail to maximize its forces. At a time when efficiency is measured by 11 September events, now is not the time to say the old way is “good enough.”


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