SOUTHEAST ASIA: AMERICA’S NEXT FRONTIER IN THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE
General Studies

by

LEROY R. BARKER, JR., MAJ, USA
B.S., United States Military Academy, West Point, New York, 1992

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
2004

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Name of Candidate: MAJ Leroy R. Barker Jr.

Thesis Title: Southeast Asia: America’s Next Frontier in the Global War on Terrorism

Approved by:

______________________________________________, Thesis Committee Chair
Stephen D. Coats, Ph.D.

______________________________________________, Member
LTC Marc A. Wagner, B.A.

______________________________________________, Member
William M. Johnson, M.A.

Accepted this 18th day of June 2004 by:

______________________________________________, Director, Graduate Degree Programs
Robert F. Baumann, Ph.D.

The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)
Southeast Asia: America’s next frontier in the global war on terrorism

America’s strategy to combat terrorism, resulting from Al-Qaeda’s 2001 attacks, falls short of its intent to defeat transnational terrorism. While the tenets of the current counterterrorism strategy were written broadly to enable global employment, this template approach proved ineffective. While focusing its efforts on dismantling terrorist organizations in Afghanistan and Iraq, America neglected parts in Southeast Asia that provided sanctuary to Islamic terrorists. Such sanctuaries facilitated the regrouping, recruiting, and training of Al-Qaeda operatives to conduct subsequent attacks against America and its allies throughout the world. The central research question is: What strategy can the US employ to eliminate Al-Qaeda’s influence throughout the Southeast Asian countries of Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines?

Recommended strategy changes were generated from applying a three-step analysis approach. First, analyzing the adversary established a foundation from which to develop recommendations to counter Al-Qaeda’s operations. Second, analyzing three Southeast Asian governments’ responses to terrorist threats within their country assisted in the formulation of a counterterror strategy for the region. Finally, the analysis of the current counterterror strategy resulted in recommended adjustments to each of America’s instruments of national power--diplomatic, informational, military, and economic--to facilitate elimination of Al-Qaeda’s influence in Southeast Asia.
ABSTRACT

SOUTHEAST ASIA: AMERICA’S NEXT FRONTIER IN THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM, by MAJ Leroy R. Barker, Jr., 88 pages.

America’s strategy to combat terrorism, resulting from Al-Qaeda’s 2001 attacks, falls short of its intent to defeat transnational terrorism. While the tenets of the current counterterrorism strategy were written broadly to enable global employment, this template approach proved ineffective. While focusing its efforts on dismantling terrorist organizations in Afghanistan and Iraq, America neglected parts in Southeast Asia that provided sanctuary to Islamic terrorists. Such sanctuaries facilitated the regrouping, recruiting, and training of Al-Qaeda operatives to conduct subsequent attacks against America and its allies throughout the world. The central research question is: What strategy can the US employ to eliminate Al-Qaeda’s influence throughout the Southeast Asian countries of Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines? Recommended strategy changes were generated from applying a three-step analysis approach. First, analyzing the adversary established a foundation from which to develop recommendations to counter Al-Qaeda’s operations. Second, analyzing three Southeast Asian governments’ responses to terrorist threats within their country assisted in the formulation of a counterterror strategy for the region. Finally, the analysis of the current counterterror strategy resulted in recommended adjustments to each of America’s instruments of national power--diplomatic, informational, military, and economic--to facilitate elimination of Al-Qaeda’s influence in Southeast Asia.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I wish to give special thanks to my thesis committee for their contributions and support throughout the development of this thesis. Their insight and guidance were instrumental in the completion of this thesis.

Most importantly, I wish to thank my family, Diane, Roderick, and Meghan for their tireless support throughout the development of this academic endeavor.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE THESIS APPROVAL PAGE</td>
<td>ii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABSTRACT</td>
<td>iii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACKNOWLEDGMENTS</td>
<td>iv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACRONYMS</td>
<td>vi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ILLUSTRATION</td>
<td>vii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Research Question</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Significance of the Study</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assumptions</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Definitions</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limitations</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delimitations</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summary</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Traditional Academic Works</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internet Research</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER 3 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER 4 ANALYSIS</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Adversary</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southeast Asia</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Obstacles</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Counterterrorism Strategy</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summary</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER 5 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusions</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recommendations</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REFERENCE LIST</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CERTIFICATION FOR MMAS DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACRONYMS</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFP</td>
<td>Armed Forces of the Philippines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AOR</td>
<td>Area of Responsibility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASEAN</td>
<td>Association of Southeast Asian Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASG</td>
<td>Abu Sayaf Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBRN</td>
<td>Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIA</td>
<td>Central Intelligence Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GWOT</td>
<td>Global War on Terrorism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JI</td>
<td>Jemmah Islamiyah</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JTF</td>
<td>Joint Task Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KGB</td>
<td>Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KMM</td>
<td>Kumpulan Mujahidin Malaysia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LJ</td>
<td>Lashkar Jihad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MILF</td>
<td>Moro Islamic Liberation Front</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MNLF</td>
<td>Moro National Liberation Front</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OEF-A</td>
<td>Operation Enduring Freedom-Afghanistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OEF-P</td>
<td>Operation Enduring Freedom-Philippines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OIF</td>
<td>Operation Iraqi Freedom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PACOM</td>
<td>Pacific Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEAL</td>
<td>Sea, Air, and Land</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOF</td>
<td>Special Operations Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USSF</td>
<td>United States Special Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WMD</td>
<td>Weapons of Mass Destruction</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

The use of terrorism as a form of warfare has existed since before recorded history. Using violence to coerce societies has been the primary tool terrorists employed in order to gain concessions or accomplish ideological goals. As a fundamental form of warfare, terrorism has affected practically every society on the planet at some point in history. In 2001 the United States (US) fell victim to the actions of the transnational terrorist organization, Al-Qaeda. Al-Qaeda had expanded its ideological focus of eradicating moderate Muslim governments to include targeting the US and its influence worldwide.

The ruling to kill the Americans and their allies--civilians and military--is an individual duty for every Muslim who can do it in any country in which it is possible to do it, in order to liberate the al-Aqsa Mosque and the holy mosque from their grip, and in order for their armies to move out of all the lands of Islam, defeated and unable to threaten any Muslim. (Bin Laden 1998, 1)

On 11 September 2001, the US suffered the worst act of domestic terrorism in its history. The Al-Qaeda terrorist group capitalized on America’s open society and committed the unthinkable. The terrorists brought the country to a virtual standstill by flying fuel laden commercial aircraft into the World Trade Center’s Twin Towers and the Pentagon, both significant symbols of American power. These horrendous acts caused the deaths of thousands of citizens, both American and foreign, and became the initial strike of a global war. Immediately, the US began a proactive hunt for those responsible and targeted nation-states that supported the terrorists. Thus began Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), the global hunt to eliminate Usama bin Laden and his Al-Qaeda terrorist organization.
While the proliferation of Al-Qaeda throughout the world is not a recent development, the realization of just how extensive its global reach has become is quite a noteworthy topic. It seems that every day law enforcement officials worldwide uncover new terror cells, identify new members, and reveal horrific plots. Many Americans are surprised at the revelation of just how prevalent and how active Al-Qaeda is in Asia. Though most Americans believed that this Islamic fundamentalist group originated and operated extensively in the Middle East, many did not realize how entrenched the group was in Asia (Prados 2002, 3).

While Islam is considered to be a religion practiced exclusively in the Middle East, the prevalence of Islam in Asia can be traced back to the time of the Crusades. During the struggles between Christianity and Islam to spread their form of worship throughout the known world, Muslims traveled east to Asia. From the eleventh to the sixteenth century Muslim traders and clerics brought their religious teachings from their desert holy lands in the Middle East to Southeast Asia, including the countries now known as Malaysia, the Philippines, and Indonesia (Holt 1970, 123).

The port city of Malacca in western Malaysia played an important role in the proliferation of the religion in Asia. A prominent trading city, Malacca became the hub for Islam in Southeast Asia. Often a stop for trade vessels during passage through the Straits of Malacca, this city hosted Asian and Arab traders, scholars, and diplomats. Here the social elite and entrepreneur would interact and return home with both trade goods and religious philosophies (Bunge 1985, 13-16). The practice of Islam spread throughout the numerous islands while prolific Chinese traders carried the teachings back with them to the Asian continent. The more advanced cultures of China and India, already
influenced by Hinduism, Buddhism, and Confucianism, did not support a large Muslim following. However, the outlying islands in Southeast Asia had no dominant organized religion and thus were more susceptible to Islamic influence. Spreading from western Malaysia to the numerous islands in the Pacific and Indian Oceans, Islam spread to Indonesia, the Philippines, Cambodia, Vietnam, Singapore, and Thailand (Quirino 1981, 9).

The histories of these cultures are intertwined with the emergence of Islam in the region. The teachings not only influenced religious beliefs, but also became immersed in politics. Islam impacted the political realm allowing leaders to curry favors from rival leaders while increasing their power base at home. For example, in Malaysia, tribal leaders converted to Islam to promote closer ties among trading partners and neighboring rulers. These conversions led to alliances that gave tribe leaders confidence to rebel against their Thai rulers and aggressively expand their empires (Bunge 1985, 16). Similarly in Indonesia, tribal leaders converted to Islam and took the title of “Sultan.” These leaders influenced their communities through Islamic teachings in school, the arts, and literature. This trend of conversion by the ruling elite lasted for several centuries until the arrival of European explorers (Frederick 1993, 13-15).

In the sixteenth century, European explorers began colonizing Asia with the intent of expanding their empires. The Europeans brought with them their brand of religion, Christianity, in the form of Catholicism. The introduction of Christianity led to a clash between cultures. Unfortunately, this clash of religious cultures was merely a continuation of the rivalry developed during the Crusades. For example, when Spain annexed the Philippines in the sixteenth century, the Spaniards attempted to convert the
indigenous population to Catholicism. While the conversion was successful in most parts of the country, the inhabitants on the southern island of Mindanao remained loyal to their Islamic faith. The religious intolerance of both sides resulted in holy wars among the islands. In the seventeenth century the indigenous leader Sultan Kudaradt succeeded in unifying the Muslims in Mindanao (commonly referred to as Moros) and led large armies to combat the Spanish. This rivalry would continue until, with the help of the US, the Spanish were finally expelled from the country in 1899 (Quirino 1981, 47).

Following America’s declaration of war against Spain in 1898, fighting between the two countries took place predominantly in the Spanish colonies of Cuba and the Philippines. This initial clash with the Spanish in Southeast Asia brought the US in contact with the Filipino Moros. While the US succeeded in ejecting the oppressive Spanish forces, it then had to contend with the rebellious Moro population. The Moros were an especially defiant group, seeking not only independence from colonial rule, but also recognition of an independent Islamic state in the southern portion of the country. As the occupying force, the US Army, like its Spanish predecessors, became the target of Moro aggression. The Army eventually defeated the Moro guerrilla forces through the employment of an effective counterinsurgency strategy. This strategy focused on the Army’s resources and efforts on the insurgency’s center of gravity, the population. Through confiscations, deportations, and imprisonment of the social elite that supported the insurgents, the Army managed to cut off the social and economic power of the insurgency. It also deterred future supporters out of fear that there were consequences for aligning with the insurgency. The social elite quickly changed their allegiance to the US, resulting in an end to the uprising (Linn 1989, 25). Despite their lack of success, the
Moros’ desire for an independent, autonomous Islamic state would be a recurring demand that continued to resurface, often violently, throughout the twentieth century.

Indonesia’s introduction to Islam occurred in the thirteenth century. Like Malaysia, Arab traders brought the religious teachings into the country’s ports. However, the religion’s influences did not quickly spread among the islands. Because the peoples living in the interior of the islands were reluctant to surrender their Hindu-Buddhist traditions, Islam proliferated mainly in the outer coastal regions.

In the sixteenth century, Portuguese explorers arrived in Indonesia with their quest to secure the rich natural resources found in the region. These explorers brought with them Christianity. Over a short period of time small pockets of the population, in such areas as Ambon, converted to the religion. The roots of Christianity had been firmly planted and would remain a source of continuous conflict with its Islamic counterpart until the end of the twentieth century (Frederick 1993, 12-15).

Throughout the twentieth century the Islamic minorities in Southeast Asia continued their tenuous coexistence among neighboring cultures. With the exception of Indonesia, the largest Muslim country in the world, these minorities had little to no governmental representation and received substantially less bureaucratic funding for their regions. This lack of political power coupled with the economically depressed culture made the conditions favorable for the rise of an organized militant Islamic movement (Dolan 1993, 291). The recurring demand for autonomous Islamic states throughout Southeast Asia gave rise to numerous militant Islamic groups throughout the 1960s and 1970s.
In the Philippines, the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) emerged in the early 1970s with the intent of establishing an independent Muslim state in Mindanao. Founded by Nur Misuari and Hashem Salamaat in 1972, the group sought to gain concessions by working with the Philippine government. However, this form of diplomacy sparked disputes between the organization’s leadership causing Salamaat to split from the MNLF and establish the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) in 1978. While sharing the MNLF’s core ideology of gaining an independent Muslim state, the MILF did not recognize the Philippine government or constitution and utilized more aggressive guerrilla tactics to combat government forces throughout the 1980s (Ressa 2003, 126). Again, organizational disagreements among leaders resulted in the formation of another splinter faction. In 1990 Abubakar Janjalani split from the MNLF to form the Abu Sayaf Group (ASG). Janjalani, a veteran of the Afghan War, recruited and organized MNLF members and former Afghan mujahidin to form an extremist group operating primarily throughout the southern Philippines. Like its predecessors, the ASG demanded an independent Muslim state. Unlike the MNLF and MILF, the ASG would not conduct any formal diplomatic negotiations with the country’s government (Niksch 2002, 50-52).

The Muslim struggle in the Philippines was mirrored in Indonesia. Elias Abu Bashir established the Jemmah Islamiyah (JI) organization in 1995. The goal of JI was to establish a Pan-Islamic state that included all Muslim communities throughout Southeast Asia (Schweitzer 2003, 89). Today, JI is the largest Al-Qaeda associate group working throughout the region. It has ties to groups in the Philippines, Malaysia, Thailand, and Singapore (Ressa 2003, 153).
Another significant Islamist group based in Indonesia is Lashkar Jihad (LJ). Founded in 2000 by Umar Jafar Thalib, LJ’s goal was to eradicate Christian influence in the outlying islands of Indonesia. Trained by members of the Indonesian military, Thalib organized the group to wage a jihad or holy war against Christians in Indonesia’s Maluku Islands. The effort to cleanse the region of Christians attracted mujahidin from all over the world. With over 10,000 Islamist fighters, LJ controlled the largest, most organized jihadi group in the region. The Maluku conflict succeeded in inciting confusion between the Indonesian military and the government in terms of their involvement with the crisis, as well as nearly severing diplomatic ties with the US. Indonesia remains an unreliable ally in the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) (Ressa 2003, 93).

Like Indonesia, Malaysia became home to several extremist groups, the most active being the Kumpulan Mujahidin Malaysia (KMM). Organized in 1998 by Zainon Ismail, a veteran mujahidin of the Afghan War, the group’s goal was to establish a Muslim state comprising of Malaysia, Indonesia, and the southern Philippines (US Department of State 2001, 123). Closely tied to JI, KMM members became JI’s foot soldiers within the country. KMM operatives executed JI planned operations, to include bombings and assassinations, in an effort to terrorize the population and usurp government control (Ressa 2003, 70).

These Southeast Asian extremist groups began insurgencies within their respective countries to delegitimize their governments and fight for autonomy. Because of the lack of financial support, sufficient training, and adequate equipment, most groups were relegated to basic guerrilla activities, such as bombings and kidnappings for ransom. This trend would continue from the late 1960s through the late 1990s.
While the Islamist groups have been prevalent in Southeast Asia for centuries, it would not be until late in the twentieth century that the often minority Muslims would be organized and united against a common enemy: the dominance of Western influence (Huntington 1997, 40-45). An influential Arab and devout Muslim by the name of Usama bin Laden would become the unifying force against the West, facilitated by his Al-Qaeda terrorist organization.

Bin Laden, a wealthy Saudi national, leveraged his inherited wealth and combat experience from the Afghan War against the Soviets throughout the 1980s to forge an Islamic fundamentalist organization dedicated to eliminating Western influence throughout the world. His exploits of fighting on the front lines with the mujahidin as well as funding Muslims worldwide to join the fight against the Soviet Army in Afghanistan elevated him to hero status in the eyes of the Muslim world (Bergen 2001, 48-59).

Along with fellow veterans of the Afghan War, bin Laden helped establish Al-Qaeda, or “The Base,” in 1988. The Al-Qaeda organization eventually based itself in Afghanistan and throughout the 1990s recruited and trained young Muslim men from all over the world to fight in a jihad against the West. Initially, the organization’s strategic objectives were to depose any moderate Muslim government that received support from the West and to set up Islamic states committed to the unequivocal observance of Sharia, or Islamic, law. The former Taliban regime in Afghanistan is an example of a Muslim society practicing strict adherence to the fundamentals of Sharia law. This objective evolved over the past several years to include removing all US military forces and Western influence from the Middle East (Ramakrishna 2002, 1). In 1998 bin Laden
further refined this by issuing a decree that all Muslims should take part in jihad to kill all Americans and their sympathizing allies anywhere in the world.

Several factors account for both bin Laden’s quest for a Sharia society and his deep hatred for America. First is bin Laden’s belief that moderate Islamic governments, like Saudi Arabia, are corrupt. He believes the Saud royal family is highly influenced by external non-Muslim states, like America, and has become too lenient in enforcing Muslim principles. The second factor stems from the long-standing hatred between Muslims and Jews. Like most Arabs bin Laden holds Israel accountable for the suffering by Palestinians in their quest for autonomy. America’s failure to resolve the Palestinian plight and its support of Israel has made it a prime target for Al-Qaeda. The group capitalizes on the Palestinian issue, using it as a point of contention to bring fellow Muslims disgruntled by the situation into the ranks of the extremists (Downing 2003, 148). The third factor came about as a result of America’s involvement in the Persian Gulf War in 1991. At the conclusion of the war, America maintained a large military presence in the Middle East. Bin Laden felt the occupation by non-Muslims violated the sanctity of the holy lands in the region. Coupled with the widespread suffering in Iraq that arose from the economic sanctions placed on it by the US, bin Laden focused his efforts on conquering the West (Robbins 2003, 85). Finally, his resentment of the West stems from the perception that it is the “fountain of all vice.” Bin Laden feels the coarseness, self-indulgence, and immorality from Western culture has permeated practically every society in the world (Burnham 2003, 104).

This desire to eliminate Western influence became Al-Qaeda’s rallying cry to every Muslim worldwide. Thus, throughout the 1990s Al-Qaeda developed a global
network of like-minded groups to combat the West on multiple fronts. Targeting Southeast Asia, with its large Muslim population, Al-Qaeda exploited the conditions that gave rise to an Islamist movement. High percentages of economically deprived populations, common to Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines, made attractive targets for exploitation by Islamic fundamentalist groups. The economic oppression coupled with the lack of formal education established a pool of disgruntled societies from which to recruit from (World Bank 1994, 158-159).

Throughout the 1990s Al-Qaeda infiltrated these countries to recruit followers by one of two methods. One method included using Islamic charities as cover organizations to gain access to a region. Operating under the covers of the International Islamic Relief Organization and Mercy International, Al-Qaeda operatives traveled to the Muslim communities of Southeast Asia and invested large sums of money in the local economy through social welfare programs in order to indirectly “buy” the peoples’ loyalty (Schweitzer 2003, 93).

A second method to gain followers and distribute the extremist views was through Islamic boarding schools throughout Southeast Asia. The schools provided youths from poor families the unique opportunity to gain an education with the possibility of attaining higher levels of education abroad at a university in the Middle East. The schools doubled as recruiting stations for such militant groups as JI and KMM. Within these schools the radical fundamentalist teachers would indoctrinate youths to join the jihad against the Soviets in Afghanistan and other jihads throughout the world (Murphy 2003, 2).

Al-Qaeda’s ability to operate discreetly through charitable organization and schools proved beneficial. Utilizing effective propaganda campaigns Al-Qaeda preyed on
peoples’ emotions by denouncing the governments that were supposed to protect and finance the regions. Eroding the governments’ legitimacy in the eyes of the people forged a bond between Al-Qaeda and the populace. In return, the local populations provided the groups with logistical support and able bodies to conduct terror campaigns worldwide.

Following the incidents of 11 September 2001, President George W. Bush initially targeted the country of Afghanistan to begin the GWOT. The US considered Afghanistan the primary breeding ground for Al-Qaeda. Throughout the 1990s the US monitored the Taliban regime’s support of the training, recruiting, and illicit activities of Al-Qaeda operatives. During this period bin Laden developed an extensive support network of associate groups throughout the world. Al-Qaeda has reportedly had ties with Chechen rebels in Eastern Europe and numerous Islamic groups throughout Southeast Asia including the Philippines’ ASG, Malaysia’s KMM, and Indonesia’s JI (Gunaratna 2002, 5).

Since 11 September 2001, the primary focus of the war on terrorism has been on Southwest and Central Asia. The media spotlight has been on military action in both Operation Enduring Freedom-Afghanistan (OEF-A) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). What gets less attention are the activities of Al-Qaeda and its associated factions in Southeast Asia that targets Western people, their property, and governments sympathetic to the West. Fleeing from the battlefields of Afghanistan via Pakistan, Al-Qaeda operatives have been able to reorganize and refit in the relative safety of Southeast Asia. Relying on support from its Southeast Asian network of associated cartels, Al-Qaeda is conducting training, planning, and waging terror campaigns throughout the region. The US needs to dislodge terrorists in Southeast Asia and eliminate Al-Qaeda’s influence
within the region if it is to be successful in its global campaign against terrorism. This 
begs the question of how can the US leverage its instruments of national power to find, 
fix, and finish Al-Qaeda terrorists operating throughout Southeast Asia?

The Research Question

The primary question to answer is, What strategy can the US employ to eliminate 
Al-Qaeda’s influence throughout Southeast Asia? While this is a broad subject, the thesis 
will refine this in the form of several secondary questions. This thesis will use the 
instruments of national power (diplomatic, information, military, and economic) as a 
framework to develop a recommended strategy to accomplish strategic aims.

The current counterterrorism strategy evolved in response to the incidents of 11 
September 2001. Departing from the traditional principles of previous administrations, 
the current strategy’s tenets are: (1) defeat terrorist organizations of global reach, (2) 
deny sponsorship, support, and sanctuary, (3) diminish the underlying conditions that 
perpetuate the recruiting of terrorists, and (4) defend US interests at home and abroad 
(Bush 2003, 11-12). The current strategy is significant in that it is a far more aggressive 
approach than past strategies. Today, the US no longer makes distinctions between 
terrorists and the countries that harbor them. Preemptive strikes, even unilaterally, 
provide American leaders with a formidable military option and may be exercised (Perl 
2002, 147).

Analyzing the current strategy using the instruments of national power reveals a 
generic template that is intended to be applicable worldwide. Through diplomacy, the US 
seeks an international coalition to apply pressure on terrorist organizations. America 
executes a “Rewards for Information” campaign offering large sums of money to
individuals who can provide appropriate information that leads to the arrest of known terrorists. The US relies on both civilian and military organizations that employ specialized skills and equipment to conduct covert actions globally. Economically, America requires the cooperation of this coalition to impose sanctions on countries that support terrorism as well as blocking financial assets of terrorist organizations (Perl 2002, 152).

Despite the fact that Al-Qaeda is a global organization, the current counterterrorism strategy employed in the Middle East cannot be simply applied to Southeast Asia. The political landscape of the region greatly differs from that of the Middle East. Unlike the Middle East, there are no Southeast Asian governments run by harsh Islamic fundamentalists that can be uprooted like the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. Neither are there any countries that overtly support or harbor terrorist groups with ties to Al-Qaeda. Therefore, the US must determine what is the most effective means of employing America’s instruments of diplomacy and the military throughout Southeast Asia?

America’s long-term involvement in the region also influences the strategy to employ. Over the past century American influence, from business to pop culture, has embedded itself in the cultures of Southeast Asia. Coupled with this is globalization, which is shrinking once distant societies through leaps in technological advances (Ramakrishna 2002, 2). The US must answer, how can if effectively leverage the instruments of information and economics to facilitate the defeat of Al-Qaeda? This thesis will answer these questions.
Significance of the Study

The intent of this study is to focus on America’s counterterror strategy as it applies to the current war on terrorism. Specifically, the focus is on the Islamic fundamentalist movement in Southeast Asia that nurtures Al-Qaeda and how eliminating it is crucial to America’s success. This thesis will limit the scope of the problem to the groups and activities operating in the Pacific Combatant Commander’s Area of Responsibility (PACOM AOR), specifically the Philippines, Malaysia, and Indonesia. Though not in the PACOM AOR, this thesis will mention Pakistan since it plays a key role in providing Al-Qaeda terrorists with access and refuge in Asia. This thesis will also touch on operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. It will only refer to OEF-Afghanistan and OIF as necessary to highlight a topic or to make a point.

Both the lack of daily American media coverage of terrorist related events in Southeast Asia and the absence of a large US troop presence in the region fail to reveal the global scope of Al-Qaeda operations to the American public. The significance of this topic is to make known the fact that the Al-Qaeda organization is operating liberally throughout Southeast Asia and perhaps, to convince political leaders that the US needs to adjust its focus and reapportion resources to the region if it is to eliminate the terrorist threat.

Assumptions

Several assumptions must be made in order to draw coherent conclusions at the end of this thesis. Assumptions for this thesis will be derived from the current operational environment and will take into account factors inherent within the US and abroad with Al-Qaeda operations.
An assumption this thesis makes is that the American public is willing to continue its support for a protracted war on terrorism, specifically in Southeast Asia. Recent history points to the will of the American public as the US’s center of gravity. Without public support, political leaders of the US will not commit the time and resources necessary to wage the campaign. Without strategic objectives from our leaders, America will have no focus and our victories in Southwest Asia may be temporary at best.

Another assumption is that the US has the means to execute this campaign in the region with existing technology and resources. While current capabilities may have to be adapted to ensure success, no significant leaps in technology will be required to defeat the terrorist threat. Adaptations should include properly allocating resources to the region as well as countering any tactical countermeasures employed by Al-Qaeda.

With regards to the adversary, this thesis assumes Al-Qaeda and its associates worldwide will continue to fight. Its deep hatred for and desire to conquer the West is the driving force that spawns new mujahidin to take up arms against the “Great Satan”, the US. Despite successful coalition efforts in the war on terrorism, Al-Qaeda has not been eliminated and still has the ability to execute substantial terrorist attacks.

Additionally, Al-Qaeda will employ any means necessary to cause catastrophic death and destruction. The group will not limit itself to conventional weapons, but will also incorporate unconventional weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Whether chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear, Al-Qaeda will continue its efforts to acquire and incorporate WMD into its deadly arsenal. It will focus attacks on American targets both within the US and abroad (Jenkins 2002, 137).
Finally, additional attacks will occur both within the borders of the US and abroad. Al-Qaeda retains the advantage of picking a time and targets of its choosing. Despite the success of intelligence sharing between departments and coalition partners, it will prove merely adequate at best in preventing any and all future attacks.

Definitions

Several terms need to be addressed in order to avoid confusion between everyday colloquialisms and military definitions. Terms in this thesis are based on definitions in the 2001 joint publications produced by the Department of Defense. Terrorism is defined as “the calculated use of unlawful violence or threat of unlawful violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological” (Department of Defense 2001, 531). The term “terrorist” is defined as “an individual who uses violence, terror, and intimidation to achieve a result” (Department of Defense 2001, 531). Terrorist groups are defined as “any element, regardless of size or espoused cause, that commits acts of violence or threatens violence in pursuit of its political, religious, or ideological objectives” (Department of Defense, 2001,531).

Several Islamic terms used throughout this thesis require explanation to provide a clearer understanding for the reader. Muslims are divided into two branches, the dominant Sunni and the minority Shia (or Shiite). Rivalry between the two groups date back to the seventh century. The Shias followed Ali, the fourth caliph after the prophet. When Ali was murdered in 661, the Shias considered him the last heir of the prophet. In contrast, Sunnis followed Muawiyya, the man who took power after Ali’s death. This
loyalty sparked a significant rivalry between the two branches and has been a source of contention ever since (Murphy 2002, 72).

“Sharia” is defined as strict Islamic law based on the teachings of the Koran and the sayings of the prophet. A “jihad” is a Muslim holy war against nonbelievers in the name of God. Usama bin Laden has been preaching of a jihad against Western countries and Israel. He has made several “fatwahs” or religious decrees against the West. Ironically, only Muslim holy men can declare both a jihad and fatwah, not an ordinary Muslim, like bin Laden (Murphy 2002, 365). The “mujahidin” are defined as “warriors of the faith.” The mujahidin was the label given to the Muslim fighters that came from all over the world to oppose the Soviet occupation in Afghanistan. Bin Laden recruited veteran mujahidin to become leaders of his various Al-Qaeda cells throughout the world (Murphy 2002, 350-351). “Mardrasah,” or “pesentren” as they are referred to in Asia, are the network of Islamic schools established to provide children with education. Many of these secular schools espouse extremist views and act as both recruiting and training centers for future jihad candidates. This extreme form of Islam taught in the schools is referred to as Wahhabism. It is a very strict and orthodox version of Islam, advocating a very literal interpretation of the Koran (Abuza 2002, 432). The term “Islamist” will be used throughout this thesis to identify radical Muslims or Islamic extremists that practice the Wahhabism form of Islam.

The colloquialism “11 September” refers to the attacks Al-Qaeda conducted against the US on 11 September 2001. The phrase constitutes all four aircraft-based attacks on the World Trade Center, the Pentagon, and rural Southwest Pennsylvania.
Finally, the premise of this thesis centers on developing a strategy to counter terrorism in Southeast Asia. For the purpose of this thesis, strategy will be defined as an objective or aim (ends) that is comprised of both a sequence of action (ways) and the application of resources (means). The ways are courses of action or policies the US develops and enacts. The resources, or means to accomplish the ends, will be through the four instruments of national power (diplomatic, information, military, and economic).

Limitations

An anticipated thesis problem involves the sensitive topic of classified information that surrounds this subject. The very nature of counterterrorism operations requires a level of operational security in order to facilitate success. The revelation of sources, tactics, techniques, or procedures could provide setbacks in the current campaign. The possibility of this outcome may compel officials to avoid discussion or, at best, be reluctant to express an opinion on the topic. Though the thesis intends to concentrate on the strategic level, the author will incorporate personal experience in the Southeast Asia region as background information to assist in the development of the thesis. Though the author has been privy to classified information involving the tactical aspects of the war on terrorism, this thesis will not discuss classified topics or expose sources. It will incorporate unclassified information discovered during research to guide conclusions to insure the thesis is not invalidated by current operational procedures.

For the purpose of this thesis only information from select countries within Southeast Asia will be analyzed. The countries focused on in this thesis are Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines.
Delimitations

For the purpose of this thesis Asia is defined by utilizing the Pacific combatant commander’s area of responsibility. This area spans the Pacific Ocean from the West Coast of the US to India. Countries from this region relevant to this thesis include Australia, Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore, China, India, Thailand, Burma, Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, and the Philippines.

While this thesis specifically focuses on the activities of Al-Qaeda and its associates in Southeast Asia, analysis of the group’s global tactics, techniques, and procedures will be incorporated.

Summary

Since 11 September 2001, the US has been engaged in the Global War on Terrorism. America’s focus has been on destroying the Al-Qaeda terrorist network and any government that harbors the organization’s operatives. Since 2001, America and its global coalition has succeeded in crippling Al-Qaeda by facilitating regime change in both Afghanistan and Iraq, two governments sympathetic to Al-Qaeda’s cause. However, in the flurry to dismantle the terrorist organization in the Middle East, America has neglected the fact that Al-Qaeda operates nearly unconstrained throughout Southeast Asia. How can the US employ a strategy to defeat this threat in Southeast Asia? This thesis will answer this question.
CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW

This chapter provides a review of the references used to develop this thesis. Because the global war on terrorism is relatively new, few academic works currently exist which focus primarily on Al-Qaeda’s operations and ties throughout Asia. However, this shortcoming is mitigated through the use of current information technology allowing for daily updates on the global war on terrorism via the Internet. As governments and law enforcement officials unravel the web of terrorism worldwide, they uncover more about the intricacies of the Al-Qaeda organization, its global reach, and its links in Southeast Asia. These daily revelations are captured on numerous websites, providing the latest information from around the world. The primary sources for material used throughout this thesis are both traditional academic works, such as the various forms of print media, and virtual archives of information found on the Internet.

**Traditional Academic Works**

Most of the traditional academic works used throughout this thesis were published after 11 September 2001. While resources on terrorism and related topics published prior to this date are plentiful, the incidents on that date caused a dramatic shift in America’s position on terrorism resulting in a new perspective on the topic. The United States cast aside its former counterterror policy of deterrence in favor of a preemptive strategy. The academic works used are broken down into two categories: those that provided background information on terrorism and those that provided information on the United States’ counterterrorism strategy.
The most comprehensive source on the Al-Qaeda terrorist organization is Dr. Rohan Gunaratna’s *Inside Al-Qaeda*. With five years of investigative research and numerous interviews with Al-Qaeda operatives, Gunaratna has compiled a detailed history of the organization. His work provided information on Al-Qaeda’s development from the front lines of the Afghan-Russian War to the attacks on September 11, 2001. This work is well researched and provided insight on such topics as Al-Qaeda’s ideology, strategy, training, and tactics. Perhaps Gunaratna’s greatest contribution is the information revealing the organization’s global network and international ties.

Peter Bergen’s *Holy War, Inc.* is another source that provided an in-depth look at Al-Qaeda. Being one of only a handful of Western journalists to have personally interviewed Usama bin Laden, Bergen offers an in-depth history of the organization. What distinguishes Bergen’s work from Gunaratna’s is Bergen writes from a Western perspective. He incorporates aspects from the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the United States Government on how they interpret the Al-Qaeda organization and its strategy. Using this Western perspective reveals the mindset of American leaders and how they developed the current counterterrorism strategy.

John Murphy’s *Sword of Islam* contains a thorough, well-researched history of Islamic terrorism. Starting from the seventh century through 11 September 2001, Murphy presents significant events and the root causes of today’s Islamic extremism. This work proved useful in understanding the culture of the militant Muslim.

American foreign policy and its current counterterrorism strategy are analyzed in Paul Pillar’s *Terrorism and US Foreign Policy*. Pillar does an excellent job dissecting American foreign policy and incorporating the impacts of terrorism. A former CIA
counterterrorism expert, Pillar describes the terrorists’ goals, the instruments a government has to defeat terrorists, and what obstacles must be overcome to establish an effective counterterrorist strategy.

John Prados provides a compilation of insightful essays in his book *America Confronts Terrorism*. Essays include writings from America’s intelligence agencies, Department of Defense, State Department, as well as reprints of terrorist documents. Through these essays, Prados provides a timeline of terrorist activities and the American government’s responses from the past several years. This work was an excellent source for understanding America’s top policymakers’ views on terrorism.

The changing national security environment is Colonel Russell Howard’s focus in his book *Terrorism and Counterterrorism*. Edited by Howard and Major Reid Sawyer, this book provides a compilation of informative essays by contemporary experts in the field of counterterrorism. The first half of the work defines the threat of terrorism and analyzes how it has evolved to its latest incarnation. The second half describes options for countering the threat. This work proved useful in illustrating the modern terrorist and how America must adapt its policies to protect itself from this threat.

Howard and Sawyer’s follow-up book, *Defeating Terrorism*, provides critiques and analyses regarding the war on terrorism. Again compiling works by contemporary counterterrorism experts, Howard and Sawyer provide a series of informative articles that describe the new form of terrorism Al-Qaeda has spawned. Articles also include innovative, and perhaps provocative, means to defeat the organization. This work proved useful in analyzing the adversary, drawing conclusions to develop an effective strategy, and making recommendations on defeating the new terrorist threat.
The State Department’s *Patterns of Global Terrorism 2001* bridges the aforementioned categories of background information and the United States’ counterterrorism strategy. It is an excellent source of information that provides the international communities’ reactions and responses to President Bush’s call for a global war on terrorism. Another useful instrument contained within this work is the State Department’s list of designated terrorist organizations worldwide. This list provides descriptions of the organizations, activities they have participated in, and external ties to other terrorist organizations. This all-encompassing source details America’s response and evolving strategy following the incidents of 11 September 2001.

Coupled with the aforementioned State Department manual, President Bush’s 2003 *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism* provides valuable information on America’s new counterterrorism policy. It describes how the former positions of deterrence and containment are no longer feasible in light of 11 September. The document states how the strategy now is to proactively defeat terrorists and their organizations, deny sanctuaries, diminish the underlying conditions that terrorists exploit, and defend the interests of the United States at home and abroad. This document established the foundation for chapter four, analysis of the current situation, and chapter five, conclusions and recommendations.

**Internet Research**

The Internet provided a wealth of information regarding the latest revelations on the global war on terrorism. It allowed for a search of archived materials, to include such resources as dissertations and newspaper articles, as well as access to information not readily available in the United States. Obscure information from overseas diplomatic
meetings, international conferences, and foreign academic works are examples of this type of limited information.

Especially important, the Internet enabled the researcher to discover obscure sources that reported using the Asian perspective. That is, imparting information based on a distinct set of values and cultural biases. Understanding this perspective is crucial for developing America’s counterterrorism policy for Southeast Asia. CNN-Asia provided an extensive on-line archive for subjects related to Al-Qaeda and its activities throughout the region. The CNN reports provided details, insights, and background information not forthcoming in the US version, allowing the researcher to draw conclusions to support this thesis.

The *Christian Science Monitor* has a comprehensive archive of stories related to the war on terrorism. This website’s articles differ in that, rather than merely listing the facts about an incident, the articles contain accounts of how Asians are personally affected by the global war on terrorism. The researcher found the articles very insightful because they gave perceptions about Islamic fundamentalism from the viewpoint of the common man who has to encounter these realities daily.

Several other major news sources, such as Time-Asia and ABC News, have large virtual archives of events centered in Asia. These archives contributed a wealth of information regarding Al-Qaeda and its links to Islamic fundamentalist groups in Southeast Asia. The reports from these news agencies helped to identify patterns or trends of these militant organizations and assisted in developing measures to counter them.
The Center for Defense Information (CDI) has a “Terrorism Project” website that focuses solely on the global war on terrorism. This site presents reports on the terrorist activities present in each Southeast Asian country, their government’s countermeasures, and American involvement to assist each country. The information from this site proved beneficial because it presented the unique circumstances each country faces with regards to fighting terrorism within its borders. Examples of these circumstances are corruption of law enforcement agencies, poverty, and political instability.

Several other sources that provided current, detailed information were the National Defense University (NDU) and the South Asia Terrorism Profile (SATP) websites. Both sites provided obscure information in the forms of reports and essays by leading counterterrorism scholars. Unlike SATP, articles from NDU focused on creating a strategy that incorporated the instruments of national power. These sites proved useful because they contributed different and distinct viewpoints on developing a successful counterterrorism strategy.

The recent transpiration of the global war on terrorism has exposed an information gap regarding Al-Qaeda and its global associates. However, daily revelations made by law enforcement agencies around the world are piecing together an intricate puzzle that ties Al-Qaeda with terrorist organizations worldwide. While scholars are incorporating these revelations and publishing informative works at a rapid pace, it will be several years before a thorough archive of information regarding Southeast Asian terrorist groups will be established. Despite this fact, the researcher of this thesis used a combination of traditional academic works along with virtual archives from the internet to investigate the Al-Qaeda terrorist organization, its links in Southeast Asia, and the
United States strategy to counter this threat. The information culled from these sources would then be incorporated into the research design.
The basis for the design of this thesis consisted of both historical research and the author’s personal experiences with regard to combating terrorism in Southeast Asia. The research methodology used to develop this thesis combined these two aspects, incorporating them into a three-phase approach to resolve the research question. The first phase consisted of researching the history of Islam and its prevalence in Southeast Asia. This phase laid the foundation upon which to build the subsequent phases. The research concluded that Islam established a foothold in Southeast Asia and would set the conditions by which Islamic fundamentalism could flourish. Research of the Al-Qaeda organization comprised the second phase. Investigating the background, modus operandi, and organizational requirements of the terrorist organization was instrumental to assessing its center of gravity in the region. In keeping with the traditional insurgency model, the population provides Al-Qaeda its center of gravity. With this analysis the recommended tenets of an effective counterterror policy were developed. The third phase incorporated research of the current US counterterrorism strategy. Research revealed that, despite the strategy’s evolution since 11 September 2001, it is currently ineffective in Southeast Asia. Adjustments are necessary if it is to effectively eliminate Al-Qaeda’s influence in the region. Fusing the analysis of the Muslim culture in Southeast Asia, the current terrorist threat, and America’s counterterror strategy ultimately resulted in developing recommended changes for the US counterterror policy as it applies to Southeast Asia.
The first phase of research focused on explaining the origins of Islam in Southeast Asia. The primary resources used were traditional academic works that ran the gamut of topics from the history of the Crusades to current events within the region. This background information framed the setting for the establishment and proliferation of Islam throughout the Southeast Asia. It is important to understand how factors, such as religion, politics, and society were instrumental in facilitating the spread of Islam throughout the region.

With the historical background established, the bulk of research then focused on the latter half of the twentieth century, specifically on the emergence and rise of Islamic militancy in Southeast Asia. The late 1960s to mid 1970s witnessed the upsurge of organized Islamic resistance movements throughout the region. Insurgent groups such as the Philippines’ MILF sought the establishment of an autonomous Islamic state in the southern portion of the country. Throughout the 80s and 90s the MILF and similar organizations within Southeast Asia employed traditional terror tactics aimed at destabilizing their respective governments. In attempts to coerce their governments to honor demands for independent states, these organizations targeted military, police, and innocent civilians to get extract concessions they could not otherwise obtain through less violent means. Research revealed that by the late 1990s, Al-Qaeda successfully united these Asian insurgent groups and established a global network of terrorism aimed at eliminating worldwide Western influences. Knowledge of how the governments handled these insurgencies in the past was critical to developing an effective strategy to counter the present day terrorist threat.
The second phase of research focused on the background of the Al-Qaeda organization. Understanding the organization’s base ideology was key to comprehending their extremist mindset. Sources used during this phase included traditional academic works as well as virtual archives found on the Internet. The academic works provided valuable insight into the history and organizational structure of the organization. The Internet sources provided current updates of Al-Qaeda’s operations, revealing new plans and ties to organizations throughout Southeast Asia.

Knowledge of Usama bin Laden and the origins of his Al-Qaeda organization, created by veteran Mujahidin fighting the Soviets during their 1979 occupation of Afghanistan, laid the groundwork for further research into the numerous supporting factions operating throughout Southeast Asia. Of note is the primary leader of each associate faction worldwide is held by Muslims that traveled to Afghanistan and fought along side bin Laden.

Research disclosed the global reach and strategic significance Al-Qaeda had developed following the ejection of the Soviets in 1989. With ties to cells operating in the Middle East, Europe, Asia, and the Americas, Al-Qaeda relied on the brotherhood of fellow Muslims, both government and individuals, to provide sanctuary and propagate its existence. The organization’s strategic significance lies in its fundamental goals of eliminating Western influence and establishing a global Islamic society.

Research on Al-Qaeda’s background and its involvement in Southeast Asia assisted in formulating a strategy to defeat its influence in the region. For the US to effectively influence the region it must develop a strategy to counter the methods used by Al-Qaeda to perpetuate its existence.
The third phase consisted of research on America’s counterterrorism policy. The primary sources for information came from current academic works. Research focused on how the US has changed its strategy to that of a more aggressive, preemptive policy since the attacks of 11 September 2001.

In citing examples from current operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, the US has stood by its demands of eliminating the global terrorist threat. Investigating the conditions that led to success in both Southwest Asia and the Middle East revealed that such conditions do not necessarily exist in Southeast Asia. The US will have to devise a different strategy if it is to be successful in eliminating Al-Qaeda’s influence in the region. Not only will it have to revise its strategy for the region, but it must also adjust its policies to insure effectiveness with each government it collaborates with.

Incorporating the four instruments of national power within the revised strategy is critical for the US to ultimately succeed in its global campaign. Understanding the political landscape of Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines will determine the diplomatic efforts necessary to facilitate elimination of the threat. The need for an intense, all encompassing information campaign to positively influence Muslim perceptions of the West is critical. Close and continuous interaction between the US and host nation military forces can help deter the spread of Islamic militancy. A well-structured, sound economic plan will diminish the underlying conditions that terrorists exploit and ultimately block Al-Qaeda’s influence within the region.

Incorporating both historical research and personal experience within a three-phase approach facilitated resolution of the research question. Merging the research of Islam’s history in Southeast Asia, Al-Qaeda’s organizational make-up, and America’s
current counterterrorism strategy ultimately resulted in developing recommended changes for the US counterterror policy as it applies to Southeast Asia. The analysis and conclusions derived from this research reflect the dynamic environment that exists with regards to the global war on terrorism.
CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS

The purpose of this chapter is to present, analyze, and interpret results of research related to this thesis. This chapter is divided into four sections. The first section contains analysis of the adversary, the Al-Qaeda organization. This analysis includes the organization’s ideology, strategy, structure, financing, tactical doctrine, techniques, and operational procedures. The second portion contains the analysis of the Southeast Asian countries of Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines. Specifically, this analysis focuses on the Islamic extremist groups operating in these countries and how the respective governments counter these threats. The third portion contains analysis of several obstacles the US must overcome in order to effectively combat terrorism in Southeast Asia. The fourth and final section incorporates the instruments of national power to analyze America’s current counterterrorism strategy. The outcome of the analyses will result in a set of recommendations to modify the current counterterror strategy in the following chapter.

The Adversary

Created by Abdullah Azzam to counter the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, Al-Qaeda has evolved to become the most dangerous terrorist organization in the world. It is an organization that is well financed, technologically savvy, and globally active (Downing 2003, 147). Like its predecessors, Al-Qaeda employs terrorism for its own satisfaction of power and status. It measures its achievements through the amount of death and destruction it can inflict (Jenkins 2002, 133). To truly understand Al-Qaeda, one must grasp why and how the organization operates.
Azzam originally developed the group’s ideology with the intent of restoring the world to a utopian Islamic empire (Jenkins 2002, 130). This could only be achieved as a result of a holy war or jihad between the believers, radical Islamists, and the non-believers, all others. Thus the centuries old war between Muslims and Jews would expand to include both progressive Muslim and Western societies. Following Azzam’s death in 1989, bin Laden established himself as head of the organization.

Prior to the 1991 Persian Gulf War, Al-Qaeda’s aim was to eliminate what it believed to be the false Muslim rulers and corrupt Muslim regimes of the Middle East in order to establish Islamic states ruled by Sharia law (Gunaratna 2003, 6). Once in control of the Holy Lands of the Middle East, Al-Qaeda would then conquer the rest of the world. But the results of the Gulf War would provoke a shift in the group’s ideology. The permanent presence of US troops stationed throughout the Middle East, in such places as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Qatar, infuriated bin Laden. He felt the West’s morally deficient influence was a leading cause for the decline of traditional Islamic piety. Coupled with the fact that the US staunchly supported Israel, bin Laden’s hatred for Jews would expand to include the US. Bin Laden then altered the group’s goal to not only include the destruction of Israel, but also the withdrawal of all US forces out of the Middle East (Robbins 2003, 75). Al-Qaeda then promoted this radical goal to attract Muslims worldwide to take up arms against the US. The result was a large number of young Muslim men willing to fight and die for the cause and wealthy Muslims willing to support and suffer incarceration (Gunaratna 2003, 20). In 1998, bin Laden issued his fatwah claiming Al-Qaeda would target all Westerners anywhere in the world. Now the
battlefield was elevated to a global scale and every US citizen, both military and civilian, a potential victim.

Al-Qaeda’s strategy is to oppose America’s counterterrorist initiatives throughout the world. It consists of four hallmarks: (1) conduct grandiose attacks to gain international attention, (2) encourage suicide bombings for their shock value, (3) target the heart, or center of gravity, of a nation, and (4) conduct coordinated simultaneous attacks to overwhelm scarce emergency response resources (Gunaratna 2003, 12). The Al-Qaeda leadership plans and executes attacks that maximize the psychological shock value on its intended victims. The 11 September strikes are the best examples of grandiose attacks Al-Qaeda strives to conduct. Employing young men willing to die for the cause makes it much harder for Western societies to counter. Al-Qaeda’s leadership thinks strategically, looking for vulnerabilities that will cause considerable disruption in the daily lives of its victims. For example, Al-Qaeda deems that America’s center of gravity is its economy (Robbins 2004, 84). It focuses all efforts on damaging or destroying America’s economic base to achieve its goal of conquering the West. Al-Qaeda will attempt to accomplish this by conducting multiple attacks simultaneously to stretch their opponents’ resources thin and inflict higher casualties.

The group’s strategy includes the use of asymmetrical means. An analysis of captured documents and interviews with former Al-Qaeda operatives indicates the group has experimented with and intends to use weapons of mass destruction. Al-Qaeda makes no distinction between weapons of mass destruction and other conventional weapons. No concrete evidence exists that the group has successfully obtained such a weapon, but it is
high on their list of priorities. The psychological shock value of attacking with such a
weapon far outweighs the group’s desire for casualties (Downing 2003, 150).

The post 11 September conflicts with the US and its allies forced Al-Qaeda to
modify its strategy. The heightened security posture of American infrastructure
worldwide has relegated the group to smaller, more conventional attacks outside the
country. With both increased vigilance by the populace and intelligence sharing between
departments and countries, strategic priorities shifted to softer targets abroad. Allied
foreign governments and their civilian populace became the new focus for attacks
(Gunaratna 2003, 9). With Al-Qaeda operatives constantly on the run, its associate
groups, such as Indonesia’s Jemmah Islamiyah and the Philippines’ Abu Sayaf Group,
bore the responsibility for planning and executing attacks. In October 2002, Jemmah
Islamiyah bombed several nightclubs at a tourist resort in Bali. The nightclubs were
known to be favorites among Western tourists. The blast killed 200 people and injured
300 more. That same month, the Abu Sayaf Group conducted similar operations,
bombing five nightclubs, killing twenty-two people (Gunaratna 2003, 10).

These attacks were most likely in retaliation for the losses Al-Qaeda suffered
since October 2001. To grow and continue to flourish, Al-Qaeda needed fresh recruits to
continue the fight. The media reports of these and other bombings worldwide acted as
recruiting posters for young Muslim men awaiting a reason to take up arms against the
US (Jenkins 2002, 130).

Al-Qaeda’s organizational structure is twofold (see figure 1). First, its internal
structure is made up of a very tight-knit group of individuals dedicated to the
organization’s ideology. Forged in the Afghan-Russian War, the top leaders are
exclusively veteran Arab mujahidin. Utilizing a pyramid-style organizational structure, Usama bin Laden is at its top. At the next level is a thirty-one member governing council (shura majils). This consultation council is responsible for discussing, considering, and approving policies and actions, which include the issuing of fattish and terrorist operations. Next, at the base of the internal organization, four committees report to the governing council. These committees and their responsibilities are as follows: (1) the military committee oversees, considers, and approves all military-related issues. It is responsible for such activities as recruiting, training, tactics development, agent-cell management, and the manufacturing of special weapons; (2) the finance and business committee oversees all financial matters and front businesses; (3) the fatwah and Islamic study committee deliberates religious rulings, and attempts to justify Al-Qaeda’s actions; and (4) a media and publicity committee is responsible for printing Al-Qaeda materials and the smooth day-to-day operations of Al-Qaeda (Gunaratna 2002, 58).
Second, its external structure is one of a loose, decentralized collection of individual cells located throughout the world. This flexible network of cells is able to shift people and resources to where jihads are taking place (Abuza 2002, 447). Like the internal leadership, the leaders of each of these international cells are also veteran mujahidin from the Afghan war. To avoid compromise of the organization, each cell is isolated from one another. This compartmentalization assures anonymity and acts as protection from outside detection. Communications between cells occur only when necessary, and then only by secure means. Al-Qaeda’s foot soldiers come from all walks of life, from all parts of the globe. From poor Chechen farmers to gifted Malaysian students to wealthy Arabs, these individuals answer Al-Qaeda’s call to train and fight against the West. With the exception of Afghanistan and Pakistan, Southeast Asia houses the largest concentration of active Al-Qaeda trained members in the world (Gunaratna 2003, 15). Al-Qaeda divides Southeast Asia into three primary cells: (1) Mantiqi 1, the leadership base in Malaysia (formerly led by Hambali); (2) Mantiqi 2, the Solo, Poso, and Ambon regions of Indonesia; and (3) Mantiqi 3, the MILF base camp located in the southern Philippines (Ressa 2002, 2).

Financing such a global, covert organization is conducted by several methods. Though many of the organization’s financial assets were confiscated following the 11 September attacks, it still has many investments and concealed accounts worldwide. One method employs middlemen to physically shift funds from place to place with few to no written records. Funds are usually in non-monetary forms, such as gold and diamonds (Robbins 2003, 79). Another method involves the ancient practice of hawala, an unregulated banking system. This arrangement involves the use of promissory notes in
exchange for cash and gold. In this system, the organization is able to transfer money globally with little fear of detection (Gunaratna 2002, 63).

Insights into Al-Qaeda’s tactics, techniques, and procedures have surfaced through interrogation of its operatives and translations of captured training manuals. In conjunction with the training detailed in the manuals, Al-Qaeda stresses strict adherence to the principles of operational security to ensure survival of the organization. For example, the various cells and their members throughout the world do not know one another. This is a safety measure to prevent compromise of the entire organization if a cell is captured (Gunaratna 2002, 76). Other operational security techniques include psychologically preparing individuals for self-sacrifice, methods of attacks, and the various forms of communications.

Al-Qaeda stresses that each member must be psychologically trained for war. The group believes this psychological hardening of the will produces fighters with the requisite mental resilience to sacrifice themselves. To accomplish this the group often dispatches instructors to training camps to impart religious indoctrination among the new recruits. This indoctrination is considered far more important than combat training. Because suicide is forbidden in Islam, Al-Qaeda indoctrinates its followers to conduct “martyrdom” operations. To gain entry into Al-Qaeda, a recruit must be willing to take part in such martyrdom attacks to achieve the goal of returning Allah’s rule on earth (Gunaratna 2002, 73).

Al-Qaeda trains its operators to conduct extensive planning prior to an attack. Attacks consist of three phases. The first phase involves a team conducting surveillance and reconnaissance of the intended target. Once complete, this information is relayed
back to a strike team that conducts extensive rehearsals, often on scale models of the
target. Next, a support team arrives in the target area and organizes the necessary
equipment and facilities for the follow-on strike team. The third and final phase consists
of the strike team carrying out its mission and withdrawing, unless it is a suicide attack.
As withdrawal becomes more difficult, given the increasingly hostile environments in
which Al-Qaeda finds itself operating, more operations will conclude with suicide attacks
(Gunaratna 2002, 77).

Communication is a key component to the effective execution and survival of Al-
Qaeda. As a global organization, Al-Qaeda relies on several means, both technical and
nontechnical, to communicate among members, between groups, and around the world.
Technical means include exploiting current technology via the mass media, cyberspace,
cellular technology, and texts. Al-Qaeda produces videotaped proclamations for viewing
by the millions over news agencies. The group exploits the anonymity of the Internet by
establishing temporary web sites in order to pass information or instructions to its
members worldwide. Web sites can be created from one place in the world and routed
through several different servers on the opposite side of the globe to conceal its place of
origin. The global proliferation of inexpensive cellular phones simplifies Al-Qaeda’s
communications capabilities. The preferred technique is a one-time-use phone for an
abbreviated amount of time using prearranged code words. Destroying the phone after
use helps to avoid detection or intercept by intelligence assets.

Nontechnical means provide the best security against Western technical
interception capabilities and are the preferred method of communication for the group.
Means range from the simplicity of a human courier to the more complex tradecraft
techniques developed by established espionage agencies such as the CIA and the KGB. Techniques include dead drops or prearranged signals to provide a relatively secure means of communications between individuals or groups with the minimum amount of exposure to surveillance and reconnaissance assets.

Finally, Al-Qaeda has produced several texts outlining the standard training for an operative. Derived from Western military manuals, government intelligence agencies, and time-tested terrorist experiences, these training manuals cover a wide range of topics to facilitate success for the terrorists. The eleven-volume Encyclopedia of the Afghan Jihad covers a wide spectrum of guerilla tactics and provides a baseline of knowledge for operatives. Along with the Encyclopedia is the Declaration of Jihad against the Country’s Tyrants (Military Series), dedicated exclusively for terrorist operations. This eighteen-chapter manual provides advanced instructions on the black art of terrorism. Topics covered include: counterfeiting money, forging documents, establishing safehouses, clandestine communications, transportation, weapons procurement, assassination, kidnapping, explosives, poisons, and interrogation (Gunaratna 2002, 72).

From Al-Qaeda’s perspective, the 11 September attacks dealt massive blows to America’s prominent economic and military might. Al-Qaeda’s leadership anticipated the attack would provoke a significant military response. Portraying this response as an assault on Islam, the intent was to incite the entire Islamic world to rise up and destroy the West (Jenkins 2002, 130). However, Al-Qaeda underestimated America’s reaction and overestimated the Islamic world’s response. Since 11 September Al-Qaeda’s primary focus has been on the survival of the organization. It suffered considerable losses to both infrastructure and personnel. The group must now operate in a less permissive
environment. Its members are constantly on the run in attempts to avoid law enforcement. Despite the setbacks, Al-Qaeda has sufficient capability worldwide to continue the planning and execution of attacks. The group is transforming into new cells and relying on associate groups worldwide, such as Jemmah Islamiyah, to continue the fight (Gunaratna 2003, 9).

**Southeast Asia**

In 1991, Al-Qaeda began penetrating Southeast Asia with the intent of expanding bin Laden’s terrorist network. Building on relationships forged during the Afghan-Russian War, Al-Qaeda co-opted individuals and groups, established independent cells, and found common cause with local militants. Taking advantage of this relationship, the leaders of Southeast Asian Islamic groups, also veteran mujahidin, were able to share resources, assist one another in weapons procurement, conduct joint training, and engage in financial transfers (Abuza 2002, 428). Though the Southeast Asian counterparts were not well trained initially, indoctrination and leadership from their Arab partners brought them up to a higher standard. In fact, those students that excelled in the training were sent to Afghanistan for advanced training. Upon returning to Southeast Asia, they acted as “sleeper” cells, waiting for the commands to strike, providing Al-Qaeda a strategic reserve for future employment (Gunaratna 2002, 168).

There are several reasons Al-Qaeda targeted Southeast Asia for expansion of its organization. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s the region inadvertently fostered the proper conditions to allow Islamic extremism to take root. The synergistic effects of the inequitable distribution of wealth, political oppression, poverty, and unemployment forced individuals to look for some form of relief. That relief, in terms of providing
one’s life with purpose and focus, came in the form of Islamic fundamentalism. Along with a receptive population and a large source of recruits the region is laden with corrupt governments, porous borders, and lack of governmental control in some parts (Abuza 2002, 434).

Once in Southeast Asia, Al-Qaeda quickly established its presence throughout the region. Within Indonesia and Malaysia clerics in the local pesentrens advocated extremist viewpoints, focusing on the strict Wahhabi brand of Islam. The result being thousands of young radical Muslims prepared to fight in the jihad against the West. In the Philippines, Al-Qaeda and its associated MILF stood up terrorist training camps on the southern island of Mindanao. During the 1990s, thousands of Malaysians, Indonesians and Middle Eastern radicals trained in the camps and went abroad to execute their craft. Training in these camps lasted from two weeks to upwards of three months. Subjects taught by Asian and Arab instructors included weapons training, development of sophisticated explosives, and fieldcraft (Bonner 2003, 1).

Since 11 September, the governments of the Philippines, Malaysia, and Indonesia have condemned the attacks on America as terrorist acts. The attacks on America brought the name of Al-Qaeda to the forefront of terrorism, threatening the security of every country worldwide. The 11 September attacks “connected the dots” for these three countries, revealing the magnitude of their inabilities to rid their regions of the entrenched terrorist threat. Backing America on its global war on terrorism has resulted in reprisals by Al-Qaeda and its associates for each of these countries. For example, in keeping with its doctrine of simultaneous wave attacks, Al-Qaeda’s associates conducted a series of bombings in October 2002 in each of these countries. In Indonesia, Jemmah
Islamiyah claimed responsibility for the bombing of a popular Bali tourist resort frequented by Westerners. A series of five bombings in the Philippines resulted in the death of 22 people, including one American Special Forces soldier (Gunaratna 2003, 10). Despite terrorist reprisals and political backlash, each of these three countries, in their own way, is supporting the US in its global campaign to counter terrorism.

The Philippines has provided the most vocal support for America’s war against terrorism. President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo’s tireless efforts and unflinching cooperation resulted in receiving special status as “Major Non-NATO Ally.” Labeled Operation Enduring Freedom-Philippines (OEF-P), President Arroyo utilized the annual bilateral “Balikatan” (Shoulder-to-Shoulder) training venue to initiate US counterterrorism policy. This combined endeavor became the model for America’s preemptive doctrine for the region. Under the guise of a training event associated with the PACOM Commander’s Theater Security Cooperation Plan, the preplanned Balikatan exercise facilitated the infiltration of some 600 US Special Operations Forces (SOF). Specifically targeting the Abu Sayaf Group, SOF advisors from a Joint Task Force (JTF) assisted the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) in capturing high ranking members of the ASG, killing the group’s leader (Abu Sabaya), and liberating one of two American hostages.

Unfortunately, the Balikatan exercise was only moderately successful. While the US military and AFP may have succeeded in routing the ASG, the country faced a bigger threat. Those ASG members that escaped melted into the ranks of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front. The MILF is the most prolific of the Islamic terrorist groups in the Philippines. With an estimated 10,000 guerrillas, the MILF is the best trained, best
equipped, insurgent group in the country. Fighting the government for several decades, the MILF has capitalized on its experience and ties with Al-Qaeda to threaten the stability within the archipelago. Through a combination of treacherous terrain, lack of governmental control in the area, and ease of buying arms from Southeast Asia’s black market, the MILF has established austere camps and trained numerous Islamists to fight in the jihad throughout the world.

The Balikatan model also hurt President Arroyo politically. Arroyo’s agreement with Washington to allow US troops to participate in combat operations without consent from her Senate violated the country’s constitution. This proposed violation was another in a long list of political grievances by the populace, cementing support for Arroyo’s removal. The media spin on the exercise convinced many Filipinos that the US attempted to strong-arm its way past their constitution and attempted to reestablish a permanent presence in the country (Dalpino 2003, 3).

Despite political obstructions, the US continues to provide support to the Philippines. Support comes in the form of economic assistance, advanced military technology, and supplies. The US has initially pledged $30 million in economic support to combat the conditions that contribute to Islamic extremism. In the area of military technology and supplies, America has provided a large aid package consisting of the latest generation of weapons and intelligence systems used by US forces.

The Philippine government is doing its share to counter terrorism within its borders. Focusing primarily on the MILF, Manila is attempting to negotiate with the group while conducting military strikes in retaliation for terrorist acts. The government is offering economic development in the Mindanao region to earn the trust of the Muslim
While progress is slow, the Catholic-based Philippine government has one less hurdle to overcome than the Islamic-based governments of Malaysia and Indonesia.

Malaysia’s relations with the US following the 11 September attacks have been tenuous at best. Home to the extremist group Kumpulan Mujahidin Malaysia (KMM), America charged that Malaysia served as a “springboard for Al-Qaeda operations, including the 11 September attacks” (Abuza, 2002, 443). Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad refuted the accusations, making anti-Western comments to publicly attack America. Despite his anti-American rhetoric, the Malaysian leader has aggressively tracked down suspected terrorists operating in the country (Lopez 2003, 1).

Malaysia’s crackdown resulted in the arrest of Nurjaman Riduan Isamuddin, also known as Hambali, leader of the KMM. Linked to the 11 September terrorists, Hambali represented a vital link between Al-Qaeda and the KMM. Hambali established an extensive terrorist network throughout Malaysia. This network would serve as an Al-Qaeda alternate base of operations, a transit point for operations throughout Southeast Asia, and as an underground transportation system moving fleeing terrorists throughout the region (Abuza, 2002, 443).

Malaysia is conducting its own counterterrorist campaign with little assistance from the US. Though the Malaysian government has provided a wealth of intelligence on Al-Qaeda operations in the Southeast Asian region, it feels that it must fight terrorism within its borders unilaterally. Unlike the Philippines, Malaysia must maintain a delicate balance among a nation of moderate Muslims to de-emphasize any perception to its people that it is a pawn of the US (Huang 2002, 4).
Indonesia’s President Megawati was the first Southeast Asian leader to travel to America and publicly announce her country’s support in the war against terrorism. While this symbolic gesture delighted American policymakers, it heightened animosity among her supporters back home. As the largest Muslim nation in the world, Megawati had to walk a fine line between rebuilding relations with the US while not alienating her supporters.

Indonesians distrust of their government and the US originates in the twentieth century. Under the dictatorship of President Mohamed Suharto, Indonesians suffered from the abusive military and security services. Following Suharto’s resignation in 1998, the country suffered large scale declines both economically and politically. The country’s economy bottomed out while numerous political movements threatened to fracture the nation. Indonesians’ misgivings of the US stem from distrust in its foreign policy. For example, on one hand the CIA attempted to undermine Suharto in the 1950s, yet America would not involve itself in the civil war in East Timor. This meddling and avoidance sent a mixed message to Indonesia implying the US would only intervene when it suited Western interests, but failed to act when Muslim interests were at stake (Smith 2003, 3).

The country’s downfall following Suharto’s resignation set the proper conditions to attract Al-Qaeda. Porous borders and lax laws facilitated Al-Qaeda’s influence in the country. Two Islamist groups with ties to Al-Qaeda, the Jemmah Islamiyah and Lashkar Jihad, emerged to operate freely in Indonesia. These groups are responsible for establishing and running training camps among the country’s many islands. Both groups provide safehouses and forged documents to facilitate covert travel for fellow terrorists throughout Southeast Asia. Finally, since 11 September, the groups are responsible for
numerous bombings throughout the country that targeted Western establishments and patrons (Abuza 2002, 447).

Another result of Suharto’s resignation was the widespread civil war in East Timor. Again, the age-old clash between Christians and Muslims bore numerous atrocities on both sides. The human rights violations prompted the Leahy Amendment, imposing sanctions intended to isolate and punish the Indonesian government from failing to control its Army (Sandretti, 1994, 1). The Leahy Amendment cut US military and many diplomatic ties between the two countries. The loss of contacts put Indonesia in relative seclusion. Despite this isolation from the US, Indonesia realized it must participate in a coalition to overcome the potential terrorism problem it faced within its own borders.

Support for America’s war on terrorism was further reinforced by the Philippines, Malaysia, and Indonesia in a February 2002 meeting of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). At the meeting, the three countries drafted an agreement for intelligence sharing, extradition, and synchronization of investigations (Christofferson 2002, 5). Despite such rhetoric, successful implementation of a counterterrorism policy is slow in these countries. In the Philippines, the JTF has pulled out of the southern region of the country, leaving behind only a small group of advisors at the embassy in Manila. No new Balikatan exercises have been negotiated between the two countries. Malaysia remains steadfast in its desire to tackle terrorism unilaterally, without external support from the US. Relations between the US and the fledgling democracy that is Indonesia is still hamstrung by the Leahy Amendment. President Megawati’s reluctance to act stems from her dilemma of implementation could prompt a backlash by conservative Islamists.
(Kaplan 2002, 2). Despite these setbacks, US Deputy Attorney General Larry Thompson stated, “We will work to track down and prosecute all those who would commit barbaric acts of terrorism against Americans, here at home and abroad” (Department of Justice 2003, 1).

Obstacles

While the US faces the obvious challenges of combating terrorism in Southeast Asia there are additional obstacles the US will encounter within the region. Though not all encompassing, the list of obstacles includes the culture, penetration of the adversary’s structure, and diplomacy.

The uniqueness of the Southeast Asian culture practically prevents the US from working unilaterally throughout the region. With the withdrawal of US forces from the Philippines in 1991 and the avoidance of Indonesia during its civil war in the late 1990s, America has not had a large diplomatic or military presence in the region for several years. Forced compliance of US counterterrorism strategy would encounter cultural biases against Western intervention in the region and would significantly hinder any type of progress America could hope to attain. Unilateral intervention could also trigger cultural resistance by portraying America as the common enemy to the people of the region. Nationalism, in the form of not allowing a fellow countryman to be incarcerated by Westerners, would trump any inclination towards cooperating with an outside power. This lack of cooperation would also make it very difficult for the US to distinguish Muslims from non-Muslims. For example, aside from a visual cue such as the wear of a particular article of religious clothing, it is very difficult to distinguish between a Moro from Mindanao from a Catholic Filipino from Manila. Americans have a hard enough
time determining the physical differences between an Indonesian, a Malaysian, or a Filipino, much less trying to identify an internal belief or ideology such as religion or group allegiance.

While hard to distinguish an individual’s allegiance, the Al-Qaeda organization is also very difficult to penetrate. Despite global reach and decentralization from its core in the Middle East, Al-Qaeda and its associates remain a close-knit organization of cells. Operational security is a primary concern for the organization. Compartmentalization and strict adherence to published guidelines are enforced to insure survival of the organization. Individuals targeted for entry into the organization undergo an intensive fourteen point screening process. Once selected, operatives undergo extensive training in cover development, covert operations, and secure communications techniques. Operatives are expected to blend into their surroundings and avoid any circumstances that can bring attention upon them. Married operatives are forbidden to inform their spouse of their ties to the organization. In some instances Al-Qaeda may enlist the support of outside organizations and organized crime groups to assist in the conduct of tactical operations. In addition, Al-Qaeda employs cutouts and intermediaries to prevent compromise of the organization in the event operatives are captured (Gunaratna 2002, 78-80).

Tenets of diplomacy have proven to be obstacles for the US. The combination of corruption, permissive laws, and lax security all contribute to the proliferation of Al-Qaeda throughout Southeast Asia. Corruption in various levels of governments, their militaries, and police forces has prevented the eradication of Al-Qaeda operatives in the region. For example, in June 2001, in the Philippine town of Lamitan, the ASG and its
hostages holed up in the local church. Several units of the Armed Forces of the Philippines that surrounded the church suddenly pulled out of their positions without explanation. This allowed the ASG, along with all its hostages, to escape and continue evading the AFP for another year. Local officials claimed the ASG bribed AFP commanders to withdraw from their positions and allow passage of the terrorists (Niksch 2002, 56).

Permissive laws and policies related to travel and immigration have facilitated Al-Qaeda’s ability to establish and operate from bases in Southeast Asia. Throughout the 1990s, Al-Qaeda funded and trained operatives in numerous camps throughout the region for employment in Islamic insurrections worldwide. The inability and lack of commitment by each country’s government to eradicate the threat resulted in well entrenched, highly effective terrorist cells committed to furthering Al-Qaeda’s cause (Niksch 2002, 53).

Coupled with this migratory permissiveness are the lax security measures present in the region. These lax measures exist because of the physical terrain as well as lack of sufficient capabilities. Consisting of several thousand islands interspersed throughout the South China Sea, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Indonesia make attractive safe havens for Al-Qaeda. The lack of available security forces and appropriate equipment to patrol the region encourage terrorists to take refuge in these isolated lands.

The combination of Southeast Asia’s human terrain, the covert structure of the adversary, and diplomatic barriers form a series of obstacles the US and its allies will have to overcome in order to be successful in its war on terrorism. Without cooperation from the region’s state actors, the US will fail to stem the tide of terrorism that runs
rampant throughout Southeast Asia. If the US is to be successful in its counterterrorism campaign it must persuade its Asian neighbors to aggressively identify and destroy Al-Qaeda’s influence in the region.

**Counterterrorism Strategy**

The primary mission of a counterterrorist strategy is to save lives. The prevention of malicious, lethal acts upon innocent and unsuspecting people is the overall objective. For several presidential administrations the tenets of the US’ Counterterrorist Policy consisted of the following: (1) make no concessions to terrorists and strike no deals, (2) bring terrorists to justice for their crimes, (3) isolate and apply pressure on states that sponsor terrorism to force them to change their behavior, and (4) bolster the counterterrorist capabilities of those countries that work with the US and require assistance (Pillar 2001, 8). The construct of this strategy focused on deterrence and containment of terrorism (Shultz 2002,423). Its intent was to counter the costs, both direct and indirect, of terrorism.

The direct costs of terrorism can be measured in the number of innocent lives lost to terrorist acts. Despite increased awareness and hardening of structures, America and its allies fall victim to acts of terrorism. The 1998 American embassy bombings in Africa, the 2000 attack on the USS *Cole* in Yemen, and the 2002 Bali bombings are examples of recent terrorist attacks that claimed American and allied lives.

The indirect costs have far reaching implications and are significantly greater than the direct costs. Indirect costs include the fear instilled in citizens. This fear causes individuals to act in certain ways, such as ostracizing a particular ethnic group associated with terrorism, not patronizing certain businesses, or avoiding certain destinations on
trips. Another indirect cost is the price of countermeasures taken to prevent terrorist acts. Airport security is an excellent example. Arriving at an airport several hours early to participate in the gauntlet of security screenings prior to departure cost both private citizens and security companies time and money. Politics also suffer from the indirect cost of terrorism by legislating laws that impact on the daily lives of its citizenry. Limiting and tracking the amount of ammonium nitrate an individual purchases, requiring licenses to purchase dynamite, and detaining individuals without due process are examples of the indirect costs politics shoulder while trying to maintain trust by its citizens. Finally, terrorism imposes several indirect costs on foreign relations and policies. First, maintaining an official US presence abroad requires some form of security to deter terrorist attacks. Whether a government employee or a businessman from the private sector, this deterrence always takes the form of distracting an individual from their primary job. Examples include varying routes to and from a job site, delays caused by repeated physical security screenings at designated checkpoints, and imposed restrictions or curfews for personal accountability. Second, another cost for foreign policy is the fact that terrorism undermines the peace process. For example, the possibility of progress for the enduring Arab-Israeli feud is always disrupted by fresh terrorist attacks. Third, terrorism can provoke other regional conflicts and push countries to the brink of war. A good example is the malicious acts by terrorist groups that rekindle hatred between Indians and Pakistanis fighting over the disputed Kashmir region. Fourth, there exists concern by friendly governments that they will become a target if they cooperates with the US. For example, as the leader of the largest Muslim country in the world, President Megawati Sukarnoputri of Indonesia maintains a delicate balance
between maintaining friendly, supportive relations with the US while not appearing to conduct Washington’s bidding in the eyes of her populace. Fifth, terrorism contributes to the destabilization of friendly governments. In the early 1990s, Egypt contended with terrorist attacks that crippled its tourism industry. These attacks impacted on the economic and social fabric of the country, testing the stamina of the government (Pillar 2001, 24).

While the defensive nature of the long standing counterterrorism strategy seemed politically and socially sound, it would prove insufficient in light of the increased numbers of organized attacks globally on American personnel and property by militant Islamic groups. It would not be until the US Embassy bombings in Tanzania and Kenya that America would see a shift in its policy on countering terrorism. On 20 August 1998, the Clinton administration launched retaliatory missile strikes against a Sudanese chemical plant, making a critical nerve gas component, as well as terrorist training bases and infrastructure in Afghanistan. Intelligence sources determined both sets of targets had some form of affiliation with bin Laden’s Al-Qaeda organization (Prados 2002, 305). While the strikes were considered retaliatory in response to the embassy bombings in Africa, this event marked the first preemptive strike by the US against an entire terrorist organization rather than merely an individual terrorist (Prados 2002, 307).

While the Clinton administration ushered in an evolved form of the country’s counterterrorism policy, it would prove ineffective because it did not have the global consensus from international coalitions required to defeat transnational terrorists. However, the attacks on 11 September 2001 considerably changed world opinion on terrorism. The Bush administration would depart from the traditional tenets of deterrence
and containment and transform America’s national security strategy to one more
offensive in nature.

“New threats also require new thinking. Deterrence, the promise of massive
retaliation against nations, means nothing against shadowy terrorist networks with
no nation or citizens to defend. Containment is not possible when unbalanced
dictators with weapons of mass destruction can deliver those weapons on missiles
or secretly provide them to terrorist allies. . . . If we wait for threats to fully
materialize, we will have waited to long. Yet the war on terror will not be won on
the defensive. We must take the battle to the enemy, disrupt his plans, and
confront the worst threats before they emerge . . . ready to strike at a moment's
notice in any dark corner of the world.” (Bush 2002, 3)

The Bush administration heralded a new preemptive strategy calling for America
to “strike first” (Howard 2003, 424). In February 2003, President Bush released his
National Strategy for Combating Terrorism. Within this unprecedented document he
described a five-part pyramid-like hierarchy that explained the structure of terrorism. The
hierarchy included the underlying conditions that promote terrorism, the international
environment, states that offer sanctuary, the expansion of the organization, and the
leadership that provides direction (Bush 2003, 6). In order to counter this well
entrenched, global terrorist threat, President Bush laid out his counterterrorism strategy.

His strategy, referred to as “4D” (Defeat, Deny, Diminish, Defend) consists of
four goals to eliminate the threat of terrorism. The goals are (1) defeat terrorists and their
organizations, (2) deny sponsorship, support, and sanctuary to terrorists, (3) diminish the
underlying conditions that terrorists seek to exploit, and (4) defend US citizens and
interests at home and abroad (Bush 2003, 11). Each of these goals has accompanying
objectives to facilitate accomplishment.

The first goal of “defeating terrorist organizations” has the objectives of
identifying, locating, and destroying terrorists and their organizations. The objectives for
the second goal of “denying support” include ending state sponsorship, establishing and maintaining an international standard of accountability with regard to combating terrorism, strengthening and sustaining the international effort to fight terrorism, interdict and disrupt material support for terrorists, and eliminate terrorist sanctuaries and havens. The two objectives for the third goal of “diminishing underlying conditions” consist of establishing partnerships with the international community to strengthen weak states to prevent the emergence of terrorism and winning the war of ideas. The fourth and final goal, “protecting US interests at home and abroad” incorporates the objectives of implementing the National Strategy for Homeland Security, attaining domain awareness, enhancing measures to ensure the integrity, reliability, and availability of critical physical and information-based infrastructures at home and abroad, integrating measures to protect US citizens abroad, and ensuring an incident management capability (Bush 2003, 15).

This strategy expounded upon Section III of the National Security Strategy further elaborating on the principles of the need to destroy terrorist organizations and protecting American interests at home and abroad. Working in tandem with the National Strategy for Homeland Security, which focuses on preventing terrorist attacks within the US, the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism focuses on identifying and defusing threats before they reach US borders (Bush 2003, 2). The intent of the national counterterrorism strategy is not only to stop terrorist attacks against the US, its citizens, its interests, and allies around the world, but also to create an international environment inhospitable to terrorists and all those who support them (Bush 2003, 11).
The 2003 counterterror strategy introduced broad and sweeping changes to America’s stance on terrorism. It was written in general terms to allow leaders to tailor responses in order to mitigate future terrorist acts. Analyzing this strategy using the four instruments of national power reveals some of its inadequacies when employed in Southeast Asia. Since the 11 September attacks the US has stepped up its efforts in the areas of diplomacy, information, military, and economics to convince Southeast Asia that eliminating the Al-Qaeda threat is in the best interests of the region.

Diplomatically, the US altered its previous stance on combating terrorism from deterrence and containment to that of preemption. Working with and through the governments of Malaysia, and Indonesia, and the Philippines the US intended to build a strong coalition in order to rid the region of Al-Qaeda terrorists. However, many Muslims in Southeast Asia distrust America’s intentions. There is a lingering fear that America’s power projection will impose a form of imperial rule over the Islamic world (Smith 2003, 10). While the Malaysian and Indonesian governments voice support of America’s counterterror campaign, both are reluctant to implement the necessary means for fear of political backlash. In the Philippines the US has been unable to find a suitable workaround with regards to the country’s constitution. Future bilateral training venues for the military and other governmental agencies have yet to be agreed upon. Given these examples America’s diplomatic efforts in the region are fair at best.

On the information front, President Bush repeatedly stated that the global counterterror campaign is not a war against Islam. However, the lack of an aggressive strategic information campaign has failed to counter the perceptions and propaganda of the Islamic world. Many Muslims in the region are either in denial of the 11 September
attacks or believe Israel’s Mossad was behind the attacks (Smith 2003, 2). Further widening the gap between America and Muslims was Operation Iraqi Freedom. The alleged invasion of Iraq sent the message that provided further proof to fence sitters that the operation was an attack on Islam. America’s inability to garner significant support from the United Nations, and subsequently world opinion, further increased distrust by Muslims. To this date, America has failed to win public opinion from the Muslim world in Southeast Asia.

While the US succeeded in overwhelming military victories in Afghanistan and Iraq, there is not a concerted effort in Southeast Asia to eliminate the Al-Qaeda threat. Retreating from the Afghan and Iraqi landscapes, Al-Qaeda operatives have regrouped in the relative safety of its sanctuaries in Pakistan and throughout Southeast Asia (Gunaratna 2003, 4). The lack of military emphasis in the region has empowered Al-Qaeda with the ability to plan and conduct further attacks against Western interests with little hindrance. US military forces that were once operating an aggressive counterterror campaign in the Philippines have withdrawn all but a handful of senior advisors. Though military relations with Malaysia has remained constant, it is merely several bilateral training venues annually that maintain contacts. The Leahy Amendment continues to bar the Pentagon from reestablishing significant military ties with Indonesia. Despite its importance, the military instrument of power is the weakest of America’s tools in the region.

Economically, the US has committed billions to rebuilding Afghanistan and Iraq. This leaves little for economic aid to Southeast Asia. The US pledged $20 million annually to the Philippines to bolster the country’s counterterror capabilities. Similar
economic packages have been earmarked for Malaysia and Indonesia. The US is monitoring the funds to insure they are being applied to developing those regions within these countries that spawn Islamic fundamentalists. While monetary incentives are the most powerful tool in America’s arsenal, the lack of economic attention in Southeast Asia is not enhancing the US’ counterterrorism policy.

America’s instruments of national power are the necessary tools the country must effectively employ in Southeast Asia if it is to succeed in its global war on terrorism. It must be a concerted effort between diplomacy, information sharing, military aid, and economic assistance. When refining the strategy to increase its effectiveness, one must also account for other variables pertinent to American influence.

Terrorism impacts a wide spectrum of variables to include economics, culture, and the military. Because these variables are tied to American influence abroad, the concept of a counterterrorism strategy has become an integral part of US foreign policy. To be an effective strategy it must take into account several elements. These elements include the root causes that give rise to terrorists, the ability of terrorist groups to conduct attacks, the groups’ intentions regarding whether to launch attacks, and the defenses to defeat such attacks. The factors that comprise each of these elements become competing demands in terms of resources and energies and requires a balanced counterterrorism strategy that addresses each element in order to be effective (Pillar 2001, 29).

Cutting the roots of terrorism did not become an official part of America’s counterterrorism strategy until 2003. The roots of terrorism comprise a wide spectrum of ideology--from religious beliefs, or self-fulfillment, to extreme views of society. These psychological underpinnings will always exist in a few individuals. There will always be
a bin Laden—a well-educated, wealthy individual who has a personal agenda. While cutting the roots of terrorism itself is nearly impossible, changing the underlying conditions that enable terrorist groups to recruit supporters falls into the realm of possibility. Underlying conditions include such factors as corruption, poverty, and ethnic strife (Bush 2003, 6). Incorporating the instruments of power into a counterterrorism strategy facilitates elimination of these underlying conditions. Examples include, employing diplomacy to resolve regional disputes, providing access to outside sources of information via media, bilateral military training venues, and fostering economic development. While these examples do not focus specifically on combating terrorism, they engage the problem by discretely targeting the underlying conditions terrorists often attempt to manipulate for their own advantage (Bush 2003, 23).

Reducing the ability of terrorist groups to conduct attacks is the primary goal of America’s counterterrorist strategy (Pillar 2001, 33). Bush’s strategy calls for executing offensive actions that attack terrorist capabilities before they can strike. Such offensive actions require a fusion of the multi-disciplines of intelligence to facilitate success. Offensive actions force terrorists to constantly stay on the move. Constant surveillance makes it difficult for terrorists to plan and organize. Constant pursuit makes it dangerous for them to rest. The result is an exhausted, inefficient group that can be eliminated as threats (Posen 2001, 434).

Understanding a terrorist organization’s intentions are just as important as degrading their capabilities. The intentions, or what the group chooses to do with the capabilities it possesses, can aid in developing a strategy to defeat the terrorist organization. For example, in their quest for an autonomous Islamic state in the
Philippines, the MILF curbed their terrorist activities once the government formally recognized the organization and was willing to discuss its grievances. MILF leaders then began negotiations at the diplomatic table rather than through assassinations and kidnappings (Gunaratna 2002, 185). Al-Qaeda’s intentions include removing US’ Armed forces out of the Middle East. In addition, it wants to rid the region of all Western influence, to include overthrowing those governments it feels supports the US and its allies. Al-Qaeda is willing to kill any American as well as any Muslim they feel is cooperating with the West. While the US has an understanding of Al-Qaeda’s intentions, it is unwilling to give in to the terrorists’ demands. Along with understanding intentions, there are several methods to affecting intentions through manipulation. Examples of manipulation include punishing terrorists either through retaliatory strikes or prosecution. Diplomacy, with regards to counterterrorism, can deny state sponsorship. Isolating the financial support that back terrorists can impact intentions. Capturing a group’s leader can deny a group its direction (Pillar 2001, 34).

Defensive measures used to deter terrorism include both physical and virtual means. Physical measures are those that employ natural and man-made structures in the attempt to dissuade a potential terrorist attack. Examples include hardening the physical structure of a building or compound, erecting barriers, and establishing security outposts in and around a facility. Virtual defensive measures are those anti-terrorism methods, both passive and active, individuals can employ to diminish the possibility of targeting by terrorists. Increasing the security posture of a site is an example of an active defensive measure. The wear or lack of wear of a particular type of clothing in a specific region can be considered an example of a passive defensive measure. The US military uses the term
“force protection” to describe such defensive measures. For service members, employing relaxed grooming standards to allow hair to grow beyond standard regulation length as well as the growth of facial hair is an example. Reliance on intelligence collection of terrorist activities, assessments to provide predictive analysis, and timely dissemination to units are force protection measures that the military employs to deter terrorism.

Another defensive measure that has emerged as a result of the explosion of technological advances we enjoy today is cyberterrorism. Protecting electronics and sensitive information from attacks has become a career field unto itself. Labeled by the US military as information operations, this field is both offensive and defensive in nature. Protecting sensitive information while simultaneously destroying an adversary’s information-based electronics infrastructure is a strategy the US relies on.

Al-Qaeda has become and will remain the primary threat to the US and its allies for years to come. The transnational threat this organization imposes on international societies is unprecedented. To counter such a threat, the US developed an unprecedented strategy to be applied globally. President Bush codified this preemptive approach in a speech on 6 November 2001, “No group or nation should mistake America’s intentions: We will not rest until terrorist groups of global reach have been found, have been stopped, and have been defeated.”

Summary

Despite America’s shortcomings, with regards to a timely, effective counterterrorism strategy, bin Laden and his Al-Qaeda organization failed to accomplish their initial goals of rallying Muslims worldwide to take up arms against America. In fact, the 11 September attacks managed to alienate some moderate Muslims while
strengthening a coalition to rid the world of Al-Qaeda’s brand of terrorism. The numerous attacks by Al-Qaeda operatives in the Middle East before, during, and after Operation Iraqi Freedom have had the opposite effect. Instead of dislodging the American armed forces out of the region, the US has established a larger presence. At home and abroad, the US has hardened itself from future attacks. Al-Qaeda’s miscalculations have them reeling, forcing the group to adapt new ways of fighting. Unfortunately for America, its current focus is on containing the situations in Afghanistan and Iraq. Its neglect of Southeast Asia will inevitably open a new front on the war against terrorism. The following chapter will provide conclusions on the effectiveness of America’s counterterror strategy in Southeast Asia and provide recommendations on what to alter to increase its effectiveness.
CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Conclusions

President Bush’s preemptive strategy provided a sound foundation upon which to
fight the global war on terrorism. Through its goals and objectives, the Bush
administration established a framework intended to dismantle the Al-Qaeda threat. An
example of this strategy properly executed is the destruction of the Taliban regime and
Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan. Operation Enduring Freedom-Afghanistan facilitated that
country’s regime change and dispersed Al-Qaeda terrorists to other parts of the globe.
However, the strategy has not had similar results worldwide. While successful in
Afghanistan, America’s counterterrorism strategy has fallen short in its efforts to
eliminate Al-Qaeda’s influence in Southeast Asia.

This shortcoming stems from America’s inability to emphasize to the
governments of Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines the benefits, such as public
safety, governmental legitimacy, and economic stability, which result from enforcing
proactive counterterrorism policies within their respective countries. Unlike its approach
to confronting challenges in Afghanistan, the US is required to work bilaterally with
these Southeast Asian governments to execute the policy. With the majority of its
emphasis on operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, the US has been unable to allocate the
appropriate amount of attention to properly utilize its diplomatic, informational, military,
and economic instruments of national power to influence these Southeast Asian leaders.

Diplomatically, the US failed to convince Megawati, Mahathir, and Arroyo to
sustain aggressive counterterrorism campaigns in their countries. America provided few
incentives that would cause these leaders to risk their political careers by arousing, in the case of Indonesia and Malaysia, their large vacillating Muslim constituencies. For example, the human atrocities committed by the Indonesian Army in East Timor discouraged the US from reestablishing considerable diplomatic ties with the country. Another example is Malaysia’s refusal to accept US assistance in the country’s counterterror campaign. Though Malaysia willingly shares intelligence information with the US, the absence of American advisors in-country prevents enforcement of the US global counterterrorism strategy. Finally, in the Philippines, the defeat of the ASG halted aggressive diplomacy between the Philippine government and the US. The assets employed to rid the southern islands of Islamists have been withdrawn from the region, relegating the once model counterterrorism element to back-burner status.

On the information front, the US did not develop and implement a robust strategic information campaign that sought to establish, among Southeast Asians, a positive perception of the US global counterterror campaign. This lack of a concentrated, focused campaign has hindered US cooperation with the governments of Indonesia and Malaysia. The large Muslim majorities of these countries believe the global war on terrorism veils the true intent of this conflict: a war against Islam (Ressa 2003, 192). Islamists point to the operations in Afghanistan and Iraq as evidence of such intent. This failure to win the hearts and minds of Southeast Asian Muslims has stonewalled America’s efforts to effectively employ its counterterror strategy in the region.

Militarily, the US has regressed from its preemptive policy to a traditional defensive posture within the region. With regard to America’s counterterror campaign, military-to-military relations are at an all-time low. In Indonesia, the Leahy Amendment
continues to prohibit conferences, assistance, and training between militaries. This severance disrupts the requisite information flow that could provide invaluable insight into the attitudes and beliefs of the country’s progressive Muslim population. While Malaysia participates in multinational exercises in the region, it only allows for a very small percentage of bilateral training exercises in-country. A limited number of US Special Forces (USSF) teams train with Malaysian forces annually. However, the purpose of this training is to benefit USSF in the areas of cultural immersion and area familiarization. The Joint Task Force that virtually eliminated the ASG from the southern islands of the Philippines has relinquished control of the region back to the Filipino armed forces. The only sign of US military presence in-country is the JTF’s handful of advisors that constantly rotate through the American Embassy in Manila. The inability of both countries to reach a mutual agreement for subsequent Balikatan exercises forced the withdrawal of the US troops and, with them, America’s commitment to its global counterterror campaign. The combination of both the diminished US presence and the lack of military pressure on Islamic fundamentalist groups resulted in increased insurgent activity by the MILF.

In the area of economics, the US failed to maintain a significant level of financial incentives and proper supervision of its distribution to the region’s most needy areas. Providing economic assistance to these governments did not ensure the funds trickled down to the poorest of neighborhoods. An example of this neglect is reflected in the Philippine island of Basilan. During Operation Enduring Freedom-Philippines the US invested large sums of money in the region to facilitate its economic rise. Paving roads, repairing churches, and building schools are examples of the fiscal assistance the US
provided to the communities on Basilan. At the conclusion of OEF-P, the US withdrew its forces from the region and, in turn, the economic support that came with it.

The preceding paragraphs illuminate America’s inability to effectively implement its counterterror strategy in Southeast Asia. In looking ahead to the future, the US must do better at implementing its counterterror policy at the strategic level. To be successful, America must take into account: (1) who its adversaries will be, (2) where they will operate, and (3) what means they will conduct terrorist campaigns.

Al-Qaeda will remain America’s primary threat for the foreseeable future. The US can expect to experience continued attacks against its interests at home and abroad. Though America’s vigilance and military successes against Al-Qaeda have diminished its capabilities, the group has not lost its will to attack. Subsequent attacks will exhibit Al-Qaeda’s adaptability and global reach. The difference in upcoming attacks on the US, as compared to what has already occurred, is they will be conducted at sites abroad, they will be carried out by associate groups, and they will tend to target friends and allies of the US (Gunaratna 2003, 7).

Southeast Asia will be the predominant theater in which Al-Qaeda will conduct its attacks against US interests. As mentioned in the previous chapter, the region’s porous borders, corruption, lax security, and large Muslim population facilitate terrorist operations throughout the region. Al-Qaeda will employ such associate groups as JI and the MILF, whose operators have unfettered access throughout the region, to conduct attacks against US interests and those of its allies.

Capital cities, as well as commercial and economic centers in Southeast Asia, make for attractive targets. The large civilian populous who inhabit, interact, and transit
these areas provide the fodder Al-Qaeda requires to inflict mass casualties. Air and maritime means are additional sets of targets that can provide devastating methods of delivery. An excellent example of the ravaging effects of air transportation is the failed Operation Bojinka in 1995. Prior to his capture in the Philippines, Ramzi Yousef developed a plan to bomb eleven US passenger aircraft flying throughout Southeast Asia within a forty-eight-hour period. If it had been successful, the plan would have killed as many as 4,000 Americans (Gunaratna 2002, 175). Maritime shipping, with its high volume of shipping containers and trafficability, guarantees an almost undetectable method of delivery for a “dirty bomb” device. The large numbers of the aforementioned targets stretched limited security resources, putting foreign governments at the mercy of terrorist plots.

In keeping with its modus operandi of conducting grandiose operations, Al-Qaeda will strike at softer targets overseas using a more devastating means from within its arsenal. Soft targets include population centers and non ground-based transportation means. Al-Qaeda’s most devastating weapon is the use of some form of WMD. The combination of Al-Qaeda’s desire to inflict maximum casualties and of Americans’ reliance on security predominantly in the hands of foreign governments abroad makes for a disastrous mix.

Al-Qaeda’s pursuit to develop a WMD is relentless. This fascination comes from the ease of its transportation, the difficulty in detecting a device (only a small amount is required), and the psychological effects it can generate once detonated. The group has co-opted renegade scientists to assist in the development of a WMD, either chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear (CBRN). Further supporting this effort, Sheikh Nasr
bin Hamid al Fahd issued a fatwah legitimizing the use of WMD (Gunaratna 2003, 5). It is only a matter of time before Al-Qaeda develops and implements a WMD. A letter confiscated during Ramzi Yousef’s arrest in the Philippines stated, “We also have the ability to make and use chemicals and poisonous gas for use against vital institutions and residential populations and drinking water sources and others. . . . These gases and poisons are made from the simplest ingredients. We could smuggle them from one country to another if needed” (Gunaratna 2002, 180).

President Bush’s 2003 counterterrorism strategy defines victory as “ending the ability of the global terrorist network to pursue attacks on the US, its interests and allies” (Bush 2003, 11). The current implementation of this strategy in Southeast Asia falls short of its anticipated goals as described in the aforementioned paragraphs. Al-Qaeda will continue to transform itself and take advantage of the relative safety of this region to launch subsequent attacks on the US and its allies. If it is to be successful in Southeast Asia, America needs to overhaul the implementation of its strategy to energize the governments of Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines to secure the results necessary to protect the international community from terrorism.

**Recommendations**

America’s goal is the destruction of a global terrorist infrastructure that threatens the security of the world (Jenkins 2003, 128). As such, America’s leaders must look at implementation of its counterterror strategy in two veins. First, America must understand the new environment in which Al-Qaeda is forced to operate since 11 September. Second, it must effectively implement its counterterror strategy to exploit the new operational environment.
Since its destruction after 11 September, Al-Qaeda has focused on its survival. The loss of significant members from its upper tiers of leadership and the safe sanctuaries of Afghanistan has put the terrorist group on the run. This dispersal has forced Al-Qaeda to rely on its associate groups in Southeast Asia to carry on its attacks against Western interests in the region. To succeed at rooting out Al-Qaeda’s influence in Southeast Asia, the US must employ its instruments of national power in a multi-pronged approach targeting safe havens, potential new members, support networks, and terrorist cells.

On the diplomatic front, the US must convince the governments of Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines of the importance of combating terrorism within their respective countries. In accordance with the objectives and goals of the 2003 strategy, diplomatic efforts at the strategic level must focus denying Al-Qaeda safe havens or sanctuaries within Southeast Asia. Working by, with, and through these Southeast Asian governments, American diplomats can develop a comprehensive strategy that maintains pressure on the Islamists and denies them governmental cooperation in order to counter the Al-Qaeda threat. To accomplish this the US must send its top-level State Department officials to foster better relations and develop effective means to enhance security countermeasures. Sending anyone of lesser status merely projects the perception that the US is not as serious or committed to its cause of fighting terrorism. The US must offer such incentives as increased friendly nation status to convince reluctant states, such as Indonesia and Malaysia, to meet their international obligations to combat terrorism. Simultaneously, it must enable willing but perhaps weak states, such as the Philippines, to develop comprehensive plans to counter the terrorist threat. In addition, the US, along with its Southeast Asian partners, must develop a set of international standards of
behavior, enforce these standards to eliminate safe havens, and continuously monitor each country’s progress. A strong coalition developed through diplomacy will not only deny terrorists safe havens, but also prevent recruitment of future terrorists.

A strategic level information campaign is essential to diminish the conditions that Al-Qaeda exploits in its quest to recruit new terrorists from the Muslim communities throughout Southeast Asia. That is, the US must counter the negative perception Al-Qaeda and its associate groups create and perpetuate to the masses of Southeast Asia. This information campaign must be both offensive, to win the war of ideas, and defensive, to expose established terrorist cells.

First, an offensive information campaign must “win the hearts and minds” of the Muslim communities within Southeast Asia. With assistance from its Southeast Asian partners, the US must promote a favorable perception of America’s global war on terrorism. It must project the idea the American ideals are not at odds with Islam; the global war is against a terrorist organization, not against Islam. It must also project the notion that the coalition will aggressively pursue Al-Qaeda and delegitimize its actions as a terrorist organization. This campaign must start at the top with each country’s government and trickle down into the schools and religious centers of the numerous Muslim communities. Informing the masses by highlighting American-Muslim cooperation will help cast a favorable light on the counterterror campaign and aid in diminishing the underlying conditions for terrorists to exploit.

Second, a defensive information campaign will require the sharing of intelligence between the US and its Southeast Asian partners to target those terrorists cells that seek to exploit these underlying conditions. Because the US must rely on the intelligence of its
coalition partners if it is to be successful, the American intelligence community must reduce self-imposed barriers to facilitate the free flow of information between countries. For example, US agencies must be willing to downgrade the classification and compartmentalization of its intelligence products to bring their partners into the fold. Also, American intelligence agencies must amend its rules to gather information from entities with questionable reputations or backgrounds. The reluctance to utilize sources with backgrounds that are inconsistent with US national policies severely hampers efforts to locate and capture terrorists. While developing a comprehensive, strategic level information campaign is beyond the scope of this thesis, the subject warrants further research and would make an excellent topic for future studies.

Tied with the information campaign is an economic strategy that will assist in the diminishment of the underlying conditions and the support networks that contribute to terrorism. Again, an offensive and defensive approach must be taken to achieve success.

An offensive economic campaign will target the support networks Al-Qaeda relies upon to execute its operations. Focusing efforts of the Southeast Asian governments to discover, expose, and eliminate the means by which Al-Qaeda funnels funds through the region is a priority for the US. America must also provide considerable financial aid packages that target the neediest of Muslim communities. Providing funds, as well as supervising its flow to the right areas, to develop much needed basic infrastructure in the poorest regions will aid in diminishing underlying conditions and dismantling the necessary support networks. Terrorists will no longer be able to exploit the economically oppressed Muslim masses to gain recruits.
The defensive economic campaign will act as a force protection measure to defend US interests at home and abroad. A technique includes providing large sums of cash for information leading to the capture of Al-Qaeda terrorists. In conjunction with an information campaign that advertises instant wealth, this economic tactic can sway moderate Muslims to circumvent long-standing ties and turn-in fellow Islamists. Applying the same tactic to individuals who provide information on impeding operations can also prevent attacks on Western interests and allies. Credible intelligence that results from these defensive economic techniques can be followed up with military force.

The military provides policy makers with an effective means by which to discharge its counterterrorism campaign and destroy terrorist cells. The US must enable its military to reengage with its Southeast Asian counterparts to conduct bilateral counterterror campaigns. The military instrument is considered the most decisive because, unlike the long-term processes developed by the diplomacy, information, and economic instruments, it provides immediate results. These immediate results can be produced by unconventional and covert actions.

Utilizing unconventional military units, such as special operations forces (SOF), governments have at their disposal a unique, precision instrument in which to root out terrorism. National level assets, Army Special Forces A-Teams, Navy SEAL platoons, as well as other SOF elements have special counterterrorism training that provides a surgical strike capability. In fact, the US combatant commander of the Pacific region has an entire Special Forces Group as well as a SEAL Team at his disposal to conduct counterterrorism operations. These SOF units consistently work with their Southeast Asian counterparts to produce a formidable force for terrorists to contend with. The
Pacific Command Combatant Commander, through his subordinate Special Operations Component Commander, can task these units to execute bilateral operations to find, fix, and finish Al-Qaeda operatives. Through a combination of specialized training and state-of-the-art equipment, these forces can deliver results through unconventional means or covert actions.

Covert actions provide leaders with the ability to conduct operations, either unilaterally or bilaterally, without public acknowledgement by a government. Utilizing military forces or governmental agencies with such unique capabilities ranging from intelligence gathering to direct action, a commander has an additional means to enforce the counterterrorism policy. Southeast Asian leaders could benefit by approving covert actions. They not only defuse potential crises that would test the governments’ resolve, but also clandestinely show support to America’s counterterrorism strategy resulting in favorable repercussions. To do otherwise puts these governments, their populace, and their nation at the mercy of terrorists.

President Bush’s 2003 counterterrorism strategy established a preemptive doctrine to fight the global war on terrorism. With this strategy, the Bush administration declared America’s commitment to a long-term policy leading to the defeat of global terrorism. While the strategy proved successful in Afghanistan and Iraq, it proved inadequate in Southeast Asia. With both an intelligent, adaptive adversary and reluctant governments in Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines, the US must aggressively implement all four instruments of national power within the region to facilitate success. The result will be an international community where shared values, such as human dignity, religious tolerance, and rule of law, will be the standard and not the exception (Bush 2003, 30).
REFERENCE LIST


INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST

Combined Arms Research Library
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
250 Gibbon Ave.
Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2314

Defense Technical Information Center/OCA
825 John J. Kingman Rd., Suite 944
Fort Belvoir, VA 22060-6218

Combating Terrorism Center
ATTN: Sheelagh Santoro
Department of Social Sciences
West Point, NY 10996

Dr. Stephen D. Coats
DJMO
USACGSC
1 Reynolds Ave.
Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-1352

Mr. William M. Johnson
DJMO
USACGSC
1 Reynolds Ave.
Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-1352

LTC Marc Wagner
DLRO
USACGSC
1 Reynolds Ave.
Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-1352
CERTIFICATION FOR MMAS DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT

1. Certification Date: 18 June 2004

2. Thesis Author: Major Leroy R. Barker, Jr.

3. Thesis Title: Southeast Asia: America’s Next Frontier In the Global War On Terrorism

4. Thesis Committee Members: ____________________________________________
   Signatures: ____________________________________________
   ____________________________________________
   ____________________________________________
   ____________________________________________
   ____________________________________________

5. Distribution Statement: See distribution statements A-X on reverse, then circle appropriate distribution statement letter code below:

A   B   C   D   E   F   X   SEE EXPLANATION OF CODES ON REVERSE

If your thesis does not fit into any of the above categories or is classified, you must coordinate with the classified section at CARL.

6. Justification: Justification is required for any distribution other than described in Distribution Statement A. All or part of a thesis may justify distribution limitation. See limitation justification statements 1-10 on reverse, then list, below, the statement(s) that applies (apply) to your thesis and corresponding chapters/sections and pages. Follow sample format shown below:

EXAMPLE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Limitation Justification Statement</th>
<th>/ Chapter/Section</th>
<th>/ Page(s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Direct Military Support (10)</td>
<td>/ Chapter 3</td>
<td>/ 12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Critical Technology (3)</td>
<td>/ Section 4</td>
<td>/ 31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrative Operational Use (7)</td>
<td>/ Chapter 2</td>
<td>/ 13-32</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Fill in limitation justification for your thesis below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Limitation Justification Statement</th>
<th>/ Chapter/Section</th>
<th>/ Page(s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7. MMAS Thesis Author's Signature: ____________________________________________

80
STATEMENT A: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. (Documents with this statement may be made available or sold to the general public and foreign nationals).

STATEMENT B: Distribution authorized to U.S. Government agencies only (insert reason and date ON REVERSE OF THIS FORM). Currently used reasons for imposing this statement include the following:


2. Proprietary Information. Protection of proprietary information not owned by the U.S. Government.

3. Critical Technology. Protection and control of critical technology including technical data with potential military application.

4. Test and Evaluation. Protection of test and evaluation of commercial production or military hardware.


6. Premature Dissemination. Protection of information involving systems or hardware from premature dissemination.

7. Administrative/Operational Use. Protection of information restricted to official use or for administrative or operational purposes.

8. Software Documentation. Protection of software documentation - release only in accordance with the provisions of DoD Instruction 7930.2.

9. Specific Authority. Protection of information required by a specific authority.

10. Direct Military Support. To protect export-controlled technical data of such military significance that release for purposes other than direct support of DoD-approved activities may jeopardize a U.S. military advantage.

STATEMENT C: Distribution authorized to U.S. Government agencies and their contractors: (REASON AND DATE). Currently most used reasons are 1, 3, 7, 8, and 9 above.

STATEMENT D: Distribution authorized to DoD and U.S. DoD contractors only; (REASON AND DATE). Currently most reasons are 1, 3, 7, 8, and 9 above.

STATEMENT E: Distribution authorized to DoD only; (REASON AND DATE). Currently most used reasons are 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10.

STATEMENT F: Further dissemination only as directed by (controlling DoD office and date), or higher DoD authority. Used when the DoD originator determines that information is subject to special dissemination limitation specified by paragraph 4-505, DoD 5200.1-R.

STATEMENT X: Distribution authorized to U.S. Government agencies and private individuals of enterprises eligible to obtain export-controlled technical data in accordance with DoD Directive 5230.25; (date). Controlling DoD office is (insert).