Germany's Geopolitical Maturation
Public Opinion and Security Policy in 1994

Deutschlands Geopolitische Reifung
Öffentliche Meinung und Sicherheitspolitik in 1994

Ronald D. Asmus

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This report analyzes the results of the most recent in a series of public opinion polls on national security issues in a unified Germany, conducted by Infratest Burke Berlin for RAND and the Friedrich Naumann Foundation. It draws on survey work conducted in previous years and builds on the analysis presented last year in Ronald D. Asmus, *German Strategy and Public Opinion After the Wall, 1990–1993* (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, MR-444-FNF/OSD/AF/A, 1994). It should be of interest to both German and American policymakers interested in the future U.S.-German relationship, the trans-Atlantic Alliance, and Germany's future security role in Europe and beyond.

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Public opinion polls come and go, yet every now and then one captures a society in transition. A recent poll conducted for RAND and the Friedrich Naumann Foundation by Infratest Burke Berlin in late 1994, the most recent in a series initiated in 1990 under the rubric of German Strategy and Public Opinion After the Wall, highlights just how far German public opinion has shifted since the end of the Cold War (as well as where it has not) on a range of foreign and security policy issues central to Germany's future role in Europe and the Atlantic Alliance.

To be sure, Germany remains a country focused first and foremost on its domestic problems. The top concerns of the German public remain unemployment, the economy, and crime. Foreign and security policy was hardly an issue during the 1994 German elections. However, a sizable portion of the German public also believes that the prospects for peace and stability in Europe have deteriorated. For example, four in ten (40 percent) Germans believe that the dangers to peace in Europe have increased in the last one or two years, and more than one in three (37 percent) also believe that European security is likely to become more endangered in the next one or two years. Only 31 percent believes that the danger to peace in Europe has decreased in recent years, and only 22 percent expects it to decrease in the future.

What are Germans most concerned about? There is no single overriding threat or concern as there was during the Cold War. Indeed, when asked to identify the most likely security challenge to Germany in the next decade, the leading candidate is "don't know," followed
by Russia and radical Islamic states. Instead, the German public's concern seems to encompass a much broader spectrum of possible threats. Asked to identify the critical threats facing Germany in the future, respondents pointed to such things as nuclear proliferation (64 percent), the spread of extreme nationalism (58 percent), Islamic fundamentalism (54 percent), ethnic conflicts in Europe (40 percent), and instability in Eastern Europe (36 percent).

This sense of diffuse threat is certainly one factor that has led the German public to reaffirm its support of both the United States and NATO on the one hand and European integration and the European Union (EU) on the other. This year's survey results again confirm that the essentials of the U.S.–German relationship remain intact. Overwhelming majorities of Germans (in consecutive years in which polls took place) consider themselves to be pro-American and expect the United States to remain a strong ally of a unified Germany. While Germans also support European integration, they see a stronger Europe as a stepping stone toward a new, strengthened U.S.–European relationship. For example, nine in ten Germans (90 percent) support the concept of a "partnership among equals" popularized by German Defense Minister Volker Rühe; and eight in ten (80 percent) approve of the notion of an expanded alliance between the United States and Europe. Germans also recognize the need for Washington to deal with domestic U.S. woes if the United States is to remain engaged in Europe. However, the initial enthusiasm toward President Bill Clinton documented in past RAND studies has waned. Whereas in 1993 nearly two in three (64 percent) Germans polled praised President Clinton's foreign policy performance, that support fell in 1994 to four in ten (39 percent).

German public support for the U.S. military presence increased in 1994, following the completion of the withdrawal of the troops of the former Soviet Union from German soil in August 1994. Asked specifically whether, following the departure of the troops of the former USSR, the U.S. military presence should remain or also be withdrawn, a majority of Germans (56 percent) opted for an ongoing presence. However, support for the U.S. troop presence remains largely centered in western Germany. In eastern Germany, overwhelming majorities continue to support the complete withdrawal of the U.S. military from German soil. Asked about the rationale for an ongoing U.S. military presence, respondents underscored the need
to ensure that the United States and Europe deal jointly with new conflicts in and around Europe (64 percent) and the need to provide insurance in case of new instability in the East (55 percent).

One of the most striking findings of the RAND surveys concerns German public attitudes toward NATO. Support for NATO has risen consistently in both western and eastern Germany in recent years. In 1994, three in four (75 percent) West Germans considered NATO essential for German security. In eastern Germany, support for NATO has risen to nearly six in ten (60 percent).

The core question, however, is not whether Germans support NATO but what they expect NATO to do. What is most striking here is that the German public has, in principle, made the conceptual leap to a vision of a new NATO assuming new missions in post–Cold War Europe. Asked whether they support NATO's assuming new missions after the collapse of the former USSR, clear majorities supported NATO's responding to new crises on Europe's periphery (80 percent) and containing conflicts in Eastern or Southeastern Europe, such as those in Bosnia (79 percent). Three in four (75 percent) Germans also supported maintaining NATO to counter a residual Russian threat, and 72 percent supported NATO's extending security guarantees to the countries of Eastern-Central Europe as they join the European Union. Nearly six in ten (58 percent) Germans supported expanding NATO membership to Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic independent of the European Union.

This year's study again finds the German public supportive of European integration in principle, but harboring doubts about key aspects of the integration process—above all political and monetary union. Asked whether they favor or oppose the deepening of European integration as foreseen in the Maastricht Treaty, seven in ten (70 percent) Germans favored deepening. Asked to identify the main tasks facing the EU, a majority singled out a common foreign and security policy (78 percent) as well as a common defense policy (64 percent), but less than a majority pointed to either political union (47 percent) or monetary union (41 percent). Asked whether they support the proposal last fall by the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) parliamentary group for a European Union led by a core group of countries to maintain the momentum of European in-
integration, nearly six in ten (59 percent) Germans polled were opposed.

The German public also supports Bonn’s assuming a more assertive stance in the European Union. Three in four (75 percent) Germans believe that Bonn should have more influence within the EU, and nearly seven in ten (69 percent) Germans believe that Germany should be more assertive in defending its own national interests in the EU and should not subordinate them in order to promote European integration. Germans see Germany as the country best equipped to play a leadership role in the EU in terms of monetary, economic, and foreign policy but believe France to be best suited to lead the EU in defense policy. Following the accession of Austria, Finland, and Sweden to the EU, the German public also supports EU expansion to East-Central Europe. Public support is highest for Hungary (74 percent), the Czech Republic (58 percent), Poland (54 percent), the Baltic states (54 percent), and Slovakia (50 percent).

Five years after German unification, Germans are also facing up to the need to define a new German defense role beyond the country’s borders. From the outset, the RAND studies have found majority support for a unified Germany to assume more international responsibility, but a clear reluctance to become involved militarily. Following the ruling of the German Constitutional Court on the future role of the Bundeswehr in July 1994, however, the issue of a new German military role beyond Germany’s and the Alliance’s current borders is no longer a question of whether but of when and how.

Following up on the Constitutional Court’s ruling, RAND posed two questions designed to test public support for future German military participation in new missions. The first question asked respondents whether they supported the Bundeswehr’s participating in certain kinds of missions. Strong majority support was expressed for the principle of Bundeswehr participation in humanitarian missions (86 percent), to prevent genocide (79 percent), in peacekeeping (78 percent), to defend threatened allies (76 percent), or to prevent proliferation (72 percent).

Respondents were then asked whether they would support Bundeswehr participation in a series of theoretical conflicts involving specified countries. Support fell dramatically. The greatest number
(54 percent) supported Bundeswehr participation in a preemptive NATO strike against Libya to prevent it from acquiring nuclear weapons. This majority was followed by defending Turkey against a theoretical Iraqi attack (41 percent), defending Saudi Arabia against a theoretical Iranian attack to secure oil supplies (37 percent), defending Poland against a theoretical Russian attack (25 percent), and defending Ukraine against a theoretical Russian attack (14 percent).

These numbers underscore that a unified Germany is still in the midst of redefining its future interests, roles, and attitudes toward the use of power in the post–Cold War period. These surveys present snapshots of a process that might be called Germany's geopolitical maturation. These numbers are likely to continue to change in the years ahead as the German public comes to terms with a changing security environment.

Looking back at the data in the RAND survey, we see several clear trends. Germany's strategic orientation remains unequivocally pro-Western. Public support for NATO is increasing. Germans support a strong EU, not as an alternative to the Atlantic Alliance but as a stepping stone to a new, more balanced partnership between the United States and Europe.

At the same time, Germans are realizing that the initial euphoria of the immediate post–Cold War era is over and that they face a new and broad spectrum of possible threats and challenges in and around Europe. The data presented here suggest that public appreciation for Germany's new vulnerabilities is far more pronounced than is often realized. The Germans' instinct is to turn to those institutions that worked so well for them during the Cold War—the EU and NATO—to address these new problems. As a result, support for NATO has not waned with the collapse of communism and the end of the Cold War but has actually increased.

Germans have also made the conceptual leap, at least in principle, to a new security role within NATO beyond national defense. Public support for NATO's assuming new missions such as peacekeeping and crisis management, or its expanding to Eastern Europe is strong—indeed, far stronger than many would have anticipated. To be sure, this year's results also show that Germany's "culture of reticence"—the reluctance to become involved in matters involving the
military and the use of force—still exists. Germans support more engagement in principle but seem to shy away when specific scenarios are involved. This is most marked in the huge gap between the German public’s willingness to support Bundeswehr participation in principle in a wide array of new missions and the dramatic fall in support when specific scenarios are mentioned.

Is the glass half-empty or half-full? Looking back over the data in the RAND surveys from the past four years, what is most striking to this author is just how far German public thinking has moved in a relatively short period and in spite of Germany's "culture of reticence." This move is especially striking when one realizes that the German political class has more often than not shied away from anything approaching a national debate on how to reorder Germany's foreign and security policy priorities and options. Despite the occasional voice calling for a national debate on these issues, the reality has been that such a debate has remained largely taboo. What the RAND surveys show, however, is a German public that is quite commonsensical on many of these issues and that, in some cases, may even be ahead of the political class in its thinking. Not all, but many, of the building blocks for a new consensus on security policy may already be in place. This new consensus, however, has not yet come together—perhaps in part because of the lack of leadership and consensus in the political class.

Das Bedrohungsszenario hat sich allerdings seit Ende des kalten Krieges völlig verändert. Es wird nicht mehr wie zu Zeiten des eisernen Vorhangs eine eindeutige und beherrschende Gefahr wahrgenommen, sondern eine diffuse und kaum identifizierbare Bedrohung. Auf die Frage, welches Land in den nächsten 10 Jahren die Sicherheit Deutschlands am meisten gefährden könnte, lautet die häufigste Antwort "weiß nicht" (28 Prozent), gefolgt von "Rußland" (18 Prozent), und "islamische Staaten" (13 Prozent). Eine Gefährdung wird insbesondere gesehen aufgrund der unkontrollierten Verbreitung von Atomwaffen (64 Prozent), der Ausweitung eines extremen Nationalismus (58 Prozent), des islamischen Fundamentalismus (54 Prozent) sowie ethnischer Konflikte in Europa (40 Prozent) und schließlich aufgrund der zunehmenden Instabilität in Osteuropa (36 Prozent).


Zugenommen hat dagegen die Unterstützung für eine amerikanische Truppenpräsenz in Deutschland. Gezielt danach gefragt, ob nach dem russischen Truppenabzug die Militärpräsenz der USA beibehalten oder beendet werden sollte, sprach sich eine Mehrheit (56 Prozent) für den Verbleib der US-Truppen in Deutschland aus. Noch im Vorjahr votierte eine Mehrheit (53 Prozent) für deren völli-
Zusammenfassung xvii

gen Abzug. Die Unterstützung für den Verbleib amerikanischer Truppen gründet sich allerdings im wesentlichen auf die westdeutsche Bevölkerung. In Ostdeutschland spricht sich weiterhin eine klare Mehrheit für einen völligen Abzug auch der US-Truppen aus. Befürworter einer amerikanischen Militärpräsenz in Deutschland meinen, daß nur die USA und Europa gemeinsam künftige Konflikte in und um Europa bewältigen können (64 Prozent) und daß amerikanische Truppen weiterhin als Rückversicherung gegen Instabilitäten in Osteuropa benötigt würden (55 Prozent).


Die europäische Integration ist in der deutschen Bevölkerung weitgehend unumstritten. Siebzig Prozent unterstützen grundsätzlich die im Maastricht-Vertrag festgeschriebene Vertiefung der europäischen Integration, wobei in erster Linie an eine gemeinsame Außenpolitik (78 Prozent) sowie eine gemeinsame Verteidigungspolitik (64 Prozent) gedacht wird. Zweifel werden aber hinsichtlich der politischen und der Währungsunion geäußert. Für eine

Fünf und siebzig Prozent der Deutschen plädieren dafür, daß Deutschland innerhalb der Europäischen Union mehr Einfluß ausüben sollte und 69 Prozent sind der Meinung, daß Deutschland seine nationalen Interessen innerhalb der EU stärker betonen und sie nicht der europäischen Integration unterordnen sollte. Von Deutschland erwarten sie eine Führungsrolle innerhalb der Europäischen Union im Bereich der Währungspolitik, der Wirtschafts-, Sozial- und Außenpolitik. Im Bereich der Verteidigungspolitik weisen die Deutschen allerdings mehrheitlich Frankreich die Führungsrolle zu.

Nach dem Beitritt von Österreich, Finnland und Schweden befürwortet eine Mehrheit der Deutschen eine Erweiterung der EU in Richtung Mittelost- bzw. Osteuropa. Am höchsten fällt die Unterstützung für Ungarn aus (74 Prozent) gefolgt von der Tschechischen Republik (58 Prozent), Polen (54 Prozent), den Baltischen Staaten (54 Prozent) und der Slowakei (50 Prozent).

zur Verteidigung bedrohter Verbündeter, oder wenn dadurch eine Verbreitung von Atomwaffen verhindert werden kann (72 Prozent).


Gleichzeitig ist der Deutsche aber auch bewußt, daß die anfängliche Euphorie der Ära nach dem kalten Krieg vorbei ist, daß sie mit neuen Gefahren konfrontiert werden, sie sich neuen Herausforderungen stellen müssen. Die vorliegenden Daten machen deutlich, daß die neue Verletzbarkeit Deutschlands von der Bevölkerung weit klarer erkannt wird, als häufig angenommen. Instinktiv wenden sich die Deutschen jenen Institutionen zu, die sich während des kalten Krieges bewährt haben, der EU und der NATO. Folgerichtig hat die Unterstützung für die NATO nach dem

The author would like to thank Fritz Fliszar and Barbara Goergen from the Friedrich Naumann Foundation, without whose support this survey series would never have been continued or have enjoyed the success and resonance these surveys have found. Richard Hilmer from Infratest Burke Berlin deserves special thanks for his key role in helping to conceptualize this survey and in overseeing the actual survey work.

Nancy Walker provided an especially helpful critique of an earlier draft of this report. Within RAND, a special word of thanks goes to Jerry Green, Charlie Kelley, and Bob Nurick for their support. A final word of appreciation goes to those friends and colleagues in both the United States and Germany who helped me think through these issues and spread the word on the results of these surveys and their implications. The conclusions are, of course, those of the author.
In fall 1990, RAND initiated a multiyear survey research effort exploring how trends in public opinion in a reunified Germany could reshape German strategic thinking over the next decade. Since 1993, this research has been supported by the Friedrich Naumann Foundation. The purpose of these studies was to address the issue of how a unified Germany would define its post–Cold War strategic interests and security role in Europe in the decade ahead. How would German public attitudes toward the United States, the Atlantic Alliance, and the European Union (EU) change under the influence of a radically altered strategic landscape in Europe? Would the German public support a new security role for Germany, including a more active role for the Bundeswehr beyond Germany’s borders?

To help answer such questions, RAND designed a set of questionnaires focusing on issues of special interest for the future U.S.–German relationship. A premium was placed on identifying underlying trends and “building-block” issues that would highlight how the German public viewed Germany’s future security role in a radically changed strategic environment. Questions were developed with an eye toward measuring how German public attitudes would respond over the next decade as Germans confronted a radically changed Europe in which many basic questions concerning German foreign and security policy were likely to be posed anew.

The RAND–Friedrich Naumann Foundation studies provide a series of snapshots into how Germany’s strategic mind-set has been reshaped by events taking place on and beyond its borders. They show how the Germans are redefining their roles and interests in, and atti-
tuclines toward, the use of power in the post–Cold War world, a process this author has termed *Germany’s geopolitical maturation*.

What is striking is just how much public attitudes have evolved since the end of the Cold War and German unification. Although "public opinion" is often cited as a factor preventing Germany from assuming a broader and more active foreign and security policy role, the results of the RAND studies suggest that the German public is quite commonsensical about many of the new security issues facing Germany today and more supportive of Germany’s assuming a significant new security role than is often realized.

This year’s study, conducted in November 1994, is of special interest because it was conducted against the background of several important events taking place both in and around Germany.¹ First, 1994 was an election year in Germany, culminating in the victory of the Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union–Free Democratic Party (CDU/CSU-FDP) coalition under Chancellor Helmut Kohl. Foreign and security policy issues were not major election campaign issues. Nonetheless, this year’s survey results suggest an undercurrent of concern about trends in Europe and their potential dangers to German security. While there is no sense of immediate threat, there is an amorphous sense of insecurity that has, in turn, translated into growing support for the Atlantic Alliance.

Second, in August 1994, Moscow completed the withdrawal of the military forces of the former Soviet Union from German soil. German public support for the U.S. military presence has been a focal point of the RAND studies from the outset. This year’s results show public support for the U.S. military presence increasing following the completion of Moscow’s withdrawal of the troops of the former USSR. They underscore that any political or psychological link between the U.S. military presence and that of the former USSR has been broken. Moreover, this year’s survey examined the question of why the German public still supports a U.S. military presence in Germany.

¹The fieldwork for this year’s survey was conducted from November 18 through December 9, 1994. The survey sample consists of 1,198 face-to-face interviews; 794 were conducted in western Germany and 404 in eastern Germany. The data have been weighted so that they are representative of Germany as a whole.
Third, 1994 witnessed a new phase in an unfolding debate over the future of the Atlantic Alliance. The Persian Gulf War, the failure of collective security to bring about the end of war in the former Yugoslavia, instability and uncertainty in Russia—all these factors have proven to be catalysts for a wide-ranging debate over NATO’s future on the following issues: Should the Alliance expand—or curtail—its involvement in peacekeeping efforts in light of the Bosnian experience? Should the Alliance extend a security guarantee to new democracies in Eastern Europe? Or should the Alliance focus on preparing for other crisis-management missions beyond the Alliance’s current borders, whether the missions be for counter-proliferation or in the Persian Gulf? The real issue is no longer whether the German public still supports NATO but, rather, what it actually expects NATO to do. This year’s study again shows that the German public is quite supportive of the principle of NATO’s assuming new missions beyond current borders, including NATO expansion to Eastern Europe.

Fourth, in July 1994 the German Constitutional Court ruled that there was no constitutional limit on the use of the German armed forces beyond Germany’s borders. The question of the future role of the Bundeswehr in new NATO missions is no longer one of whether but of when and how. Since the early 1990s, the RAND surveys have asked Germans about how they define German vital interests, their foreign and security policy priorities, and their attitudes toward the use of force. This year’s study goes the next step and explores German public attitudes toward possible Bundeswehr participation in a spectrum of new missions and specific scenarios.
Chapter Two

GERMANY'S GEOPOLITICAL MATURATION

Germany remains a country focused first and foremost on its internal problems. Foreign and security policy was largely absent as a major issue in the 1994 German electoral campaign, and this year's survey results also confirm that the German public is most concerned about domestic issues. As asked to identify the most important problems facing the country today, the German public points to unemployment (73 percent), the economy (18 percent), asylum-seekers (16 percent), and crime (16 percent). Perhaps most significant is the drop that has taken place in concern about asylum-seekers and right-wing extremism, concerns that two years ago were at the top of the list. Asked to identify the top foreign policy questions facing the country, respondents pointed to problems in European integration (22 percent), the war in ex-Yugoslavia (17 percent), concern about future peace and stability in Europe (15 percent), and possible instability in Eastern Europe (12 percent). (See Figure 2.1.)

To test the German public's sense of priorities, RAND also presented survey respondents with a list containing both domestic and foreign policy issues and asked them to identify which tasks they saw as the "most important and urgent" for the German government. The results are contained in Figure 2.2. The list is topped by the need to contain right-wing extremism and to rebuild the new eastern states and the desire to see the war in the former Yugoslavia ended. Also noteworthy is the fact that several current priorities of official German foreign policy are at the bottom of the list of public priorities—UN peacekeeping, strengthening the EU, and acquiring a seat in the UN Security Council (UNSC). What this figure contains is a list of the very real concerns facing Germany today.
What are the most important problems facing the country?

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<td>31</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6</td>
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SOURCE: RAND 11/94.

Figure 2.1—German Priorities

Asked whether the country is on the right track, respondents split down the middle, with 41 percent saying that Germany was on the right track and 42 percent replying that the country was not. This, however, represents an improvement over last year, when a 56 percent majority felt that the country was on the wrong track. At the same time, signs of unease about the overall situation in Europe are also evident: A sizable portion of the German public believes that the prospects for peace and stability in Europe have deteriorated. For example, four in ten (40 percent) Germans believe that the dangers to peace in Europe have increased in the past one or two years, and more than one in three (37 percent) believe that European security is likely to become more endangered in the next one or two years. (See Figure 2.3.)

What are Germans most concerned about? Where are German vital interests and what could threaten them? How should German security policy respond? These questions are, of course, at the heart of the debate over Germany’s new foreign and security policy. To get some measure of how the German public assesses such issues, RAND
adapted a series of questions that have been used by the Gallup poll in the United States in its own work for the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations in assessing American public attitudes. The series consists of three questions asking Germans to identify their vital interests, the possible threats to those vital interests, and what countries they see as potential challenges to German interests in the years ahead.

In 1994 Germans pointed to their closest allies in the West—France and the United States—as the country’s top vital interests. East-Central Europe and Russia, which topped the list in 1993, now
<table>
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<th>Has the danger to peace in Europe in the last two to three years . . .</th>
<th>And how do you assess the danger to peace in Europe in the future?</th>
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<td>Percent</td>
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<td>Remained same?</td>
<td>Won't change</td>
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<td>30</td>
<td>40</td>
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</table>

SOURCE: RAND.

Figure 2.3—Prospects for Peace in Europe

occupy third and fourth place among German priorities. In short, there clearly is a first tier of countries that Germans deem important as they look both East and West in defining their interests. (See Figure 2.4.)

What the Germans are most concerned about seems to encompass a broad spectrum of possible threats rather than a single overriding threat or concern as there was during the Cold War. Asked to identify the critical threats facing Germany in the future, respondents pointed to such things as the danger of a nuclear accident à la Chernobyl (77 percent), nuclear proliferation (64 percent), the spread of extreme nationalism (58 percent), Islamic fundamentalism (54 percent), emigration (47 percent), ethnic conflicts in Europe (40 percent), and instability in Eastern Europe (36 percent). Only one in four Germans (27 percent) currently sees Russia as a critical threat to German vital interests. (See Figure 2.5.)

Indeed, when asked to identify the country most likely to pose a major security challenge to Germany in the next decade, the leading candidate for the past three years has been “don’t know,” now followed by Russia and Islamic states. On the economic front, in contrast, a majority of Germans clearly see Japan as their main competitor. (See Figure 2.6.)
Figure 2.4—Germany’s Vital Interests

What is already clear from these figures is that the German public is starting to define a new set of interests and threats to those interests in the radically altered political landscape in Europe and beyond in which Germany must now operate. Although it is certainly too early to conclude that a new and solid consensus has already taken shape, Germans have nevertheless clearly moved beyond the old strategic mind-set of Bonn during the Cold War, when Germany’s strategic
focus was almost exclusively on Central Europe. Instead, Germans are broadening their strategic horizon and starting to come to grips with the new security challenges facing them. Their response, documented in the following two chapters, has been to turn to their traditional allies in the West to resolve those new challenges.
Figure 2.6—Germany’s Future Competitors

SOURCE: RAND.
In the aftermath of the collapse of communism and the end of the Cold War, many observers questioned the long-term viability of the close U.S.–German security partnership and of the Atlantic Alliance. Critics on both sides of the Atlantic openly wondered whether NATO could or should survive the end of the Cold War. Five years following the fall of the Berlin Wall, however, such critics have been proven wrong. One of the key success stories in recent years has been that the German public has sustained its support for a close U.S.–German relationship. Similarly, despite an initial slip following the collapse of communism, German public support for German membership in NATO has since steadily increased in both western and eastern Germany. Equally important, the German public has made the conceptual leap to support a new NATO no longer focused on a Soviet threat but increasingly embracing a new set of missions ranging from eastern expansion to crisis management.

Despite ongoing speculation about anti-Americanism in Germany, the RAND surveys have consistently shown a clear reservoir of public sympathy and support for the United States. The RAND surveys have asked Germans how much sympathy they have for different foreign countries. Survey respondents were presented with a scale ranging from +5 to –5 and asked to place different countries along this scale. Germans expressed the greatest sympathy for Sweden, Austria, and France, followed by the United States. Sympathy for the United States, however, has actually risen since unification, in part as East Germans gradually shed their critical views of the United States, which were shaped by four decades of anti-American communist propaganda. (See Figure 3.1.)
Three in four Germans (75 percent) consider themselves pro-American. Similarly, nine in ten (89 percent) expect the United States to continue as an important ally of a unified Germany. (See Figure 3.2.) A large majority, 74 percent of West Germans and 58 percent of East Germans, also continues to express considerable trust in the ability of the United States to deal with world problems.
The U.S. will be an important ally of a unified Germany in the future
The U.S. is the guarantor of peace and security in the world
The U.S. intervenes too much in world affairs
The U.S. only pursues its own interests in crisis interventions
The U.S. usually serves common international interests in crisis interventions

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SOURCE: RAND.

Figure 3.2—German Attitudes Toward U.S. World Role

(See Figure 3.3.) In short, the basics of the U.S.–German relationship remain solid and intact.

Germans also continue to recognize the United States' need to devote greater attention to resolving American domestic problems. For the past three years, the RAND studies have asked whether Germans feared the United States' turning inward and isolationist. As Figure 3.4 shows, the Germans understand that Washington must resolve its domestic problems if the United States is to remain engaged in international affairs. In 1994, only a handful (6 percent) feared the United States' turning inward and U.S.–European relations suffering as a result.

At the same time, President Clinton's personal star as a foreign policy leader has fallen in the eyes of the German public. For the past three years, RAND has also asked Germans whether the U.S. President has contributed to continuity in U.S. foreign policy or whether U.S. foreign policy has become less predictable under his stewardship. The percentage of Germans who believe that Clinton has made a positive contribution to international security dropped from 64 percent in 1992 to 39 percent in 1994. Moreover, the percentage of Germans who believe that Clinton's stewardship has led to a loss of predictability and continuity in U.S. foreign policy has risen from only 9
to 20 percent. The German public's uncertainty about how to judge the foreign policy performance of the U.S. president is reflected in the 41 percent of Germans who responded "don't know" to this question. (See Figure 3.5.)

Public support for NATO continues to increase in both western and eastern Germany. The proportion of Germans in 1994 who believed that NATO membership is essential for German security has risen to 75 percent in western Germany and 60 percent in eastern Germany. (See Figure 3.6.) This rise reflects a broader trend that has become evident since the inception of the RAND studies. In the immediate aftermath of the fall of communism and German unification, West German public support for NATO dropped, no doubt reflecting the initial euphoria of the time and a sense that the Alliance was perhaps no longer needed. Moreover, support for NATO was very low among East Germans, who had been exposed to nearly four decades of anti-NATO propaganda under the communist regime.
The U.S. and NATO

**Figure 3.4—German Attitudes Toward Clinton's Domestic Agenda**

**Figure 3.5—German Attitudes Toward Clinton's Foreign Policy**

Indeed, one of the most remarkable findings of these surveys is the degree to which German public support for NATO has since rebounded as Germans have started to come to terms with their new security environment and have increasingly seen NATO as crucial for addressing new security challenges on the horizon. Support for
NATO is so widespread that even 53 percent of Green voters and 48 percent of voters of the PDS (Party of Democratic Socialism) consider NATO essential for German security, despite the official anti-NATO stance these parties have adopted in public. (See Figure 3.7.)

In recent years, however, it has become increasingly clear that the core issue regarding the future of German public attitudes toward the Alliance is no longer whether the German public supports NATO in principle but what it expects NATO to do in the future. This question is especially important as the debate within the Alliance over its future moves to political center stage. Since the early 1990s the Alliance has increasingly debated whether it should assume new missions and, if so, which ones: Should the Alliance assume a major peacekeeping role and focus on other non–Article 5 missions, be they in the Balkans or the Persian Gulf? Should the Alliance extend security guarantees to the new democracies in East-Central Europe?

The RAND studies show that the German public has made the conceptual leap to supporting a NATO increasingly oriented toward such
new missions. Strong majorities (from consecutive years) of Germans support NATO's assuming new missions in and around Europe. In 1994, for example, eight in ten Germans (80 percent) supported the view that NATO should respond to new crises on Europe's periphery. Similarly, 79 percent supported NATO's becoming involved in conflicts in Eastern and Southeastern Europe. Three in four Germans (75 percent) supported NATO's role to counter a residual Russian threat. Nearly three in four (72 percent) supported NATO's extending security guarantees as the EU expands to include new members. Finally, nearly six in ten (58 percent) supported extending NATO membership to Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary before these countries join the EU. (See Figure 3.8.)

Again, support for these new missions extends across the political spectrum. Not only do large majorities among the mainstream parties support these new missions, but a narrow majority in support of most of these new missions can be found among the voters of the Greens as well as the PDS or the Republicans. For example, 62 percent of Green voters, 65 percent of PDS voters, and 79 percent of
Republican voters support NATO's responding to conflicts in Southern and Southeastern Europe, such as Bosnia. There is also majority support for NATO expansion to Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary across the political spectrum—CDU/CSU (61 percent), SPD (58 percent), FDP (57 percent), Greens (54 percent), PDS (56 percent), and Republicans (51 percent).

German public attitudes toward the U.S. military presence in Germany and Europe have been a special focus of the RAND studies. During the negotiations on German unification, the West emphasized ensuring that a unified Germany remain in the NATO alliance and that a reduced U.S. military presence remain in a unified Germany following Moscow's withdrawal of the troops of the former USSR. In short, both Bonn and Washington sought to officially delink the future U.S. and Russian troop presence to ensure that the Americans would remain and the Russians would leave.

Since 1990, RAND has asked a question specifically designed to test whether this linkage between the U.S. and Russian military presence
had been broken in the German public’s mind. Although German and allied diplomacy always insisted that such a linkage did not exist, in private many officials expressed concern about the possibility that the presence of American and Russian troops might be connected in the public’s mind and that support for the U.S. presence might start to slip as the troops of the former USSR were withdrawn. Every year respondents have been asked whether, following the completion of the Russian troop withdrawal, a limited U.S. military presence should remain or whether U.S. troops should also be withdrawn. Since 1990, divided and somewhat erratic support has been expressed for the U.S. military presence in western Germany, along with a solid majority in eastern Germany in favor of a U.S. withdrawal. As a result, in three of the five surveys conducted for RAND, a majority has favored a U.S. troop withdrawal. Such response had, in turn, led to some consternation about both the wording of the question used by RAND and how to interpret the result.

RAND’s question was explicitly designed to test whether the German public does or does not see a link between the U.S. and Russian military presence, and whether German public support for the U.S. presence might diminish following the completion of Moscow’s withdrawal of troops from eastern Germany. As a consequence of the actual completion of the Russian withdrawal in August 1994, this year’s results are quite interesting: In Germany as a whole, a 56 percent majority supports the U.S. military presence—a substantial increase over 1993. (See Figure 3.9.)

Nearly two in three (64 percent) West Germans support the U.S. military presence, but three in four (75 percent) East Germans favor a total U.S. military withdrawal. In short, a shift and consolidation in West German attitudes account for majority support for an ongoing U.S. troop presence. The growing support in eastern Germany for membership in NATO has not yet translated into support for the U.S. military presence. One wonders whether East German views may

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1The question reads as follows: “The Soviet Union/Russia is completely withdrawing its troops from a unified Germany. The United States, for its part, has announced that it is substantially reducing its presence. Are you of the opinion that the United States should retain a limited troop presence or should U.S. troops also be withdrawn?”
start to change now that Moscow has completed its troop withdrawal. The special status of eastern Germany under the 2+4 Treaty on German unification, which forbids the stationing or deployment of non-German NATO troops, means that East Germans have little opportunity to come into contact with the U.S. military presence. This noncontact may be one factor that, ironically, has helped preserve negative East German attitudes on this issue.

To be sure, questions concerning the future U.S. troop presence are sensitive to the precise wording of the question. RAND has therefore also asked a second question testing German public attitudes on the U.S. military presence. This question reminded interviewees that the United States was already reducing its presence in Europe to some 100,000 troops, of whom some two-thirds will remain in Germany. Respondents were asked whether they thought the United States should remain at that level, and whether the U.S. presence should be reduced further or be completely withdrawn. The results, contained in Figure 3.10, show that support for remaining at the current planned levels has grown and support for a complete withdrawal has
Whether the U.S. military should remain in Germany is, of course, tied to the question of why it is there. What is its rationale and can that rationale be sustained in German public opinion? Asked about the rationale for the U.S. military presence, nearly two in three Germans (64 percent) supported the view that the U.S. military presence was needed so that the United States and Europe could deal jointly with new conflicts in and around Europe. Overall, 55 percent viewed the U.S. military presence as insurance against new instability in the East. Similarly, 54 percent believed that the U.S. military presence helps keep the U.S. engaged in Europe. Only 37 percent believed that this presence is needed to prevent Europe from falling back into old conflicts. Three in ten Germans (30 percent) supported the view that the U.S. presence was needed to assure other Euro-
peans about a unified Germany again becoming too dominant in European affairs. This majority again underscores that the German public no longer sees the reason for the U.S. military presence being first and foremost to defend Germany but as part of a broader partnership whereby the United States and Germany face new security challenges together. (See Figure 3.12.)

Looking back over the past five years, the fact that German public attitudes toward the United States have remained so supportive suggests that, at least in the eyes of the German public, close U.S.—German relations were not just a product of the Cold War. Similarly, the increasing public support for NATO and for new NATO missions underscores the German public's desire that the Atlantic Alliance should be a permanent feature of the European political landscape. To appreciate the significance of these findings, one need only think
back to the period immediately following German unification and the predictions by some commentators that German public support for the United States and for NATO would inevitably atrophy.

However, the major gap between West and East German attitudes on some of these issues continues to pose a political challenge to German as well as to U.S. policy. East Germans' views toward the United States have clearly evolved. Sympathy for the United States has increased, and a majority of East Germans now support German membership in NATO. Especially noteworthy are the attitudes of young East Germans, which are often as pro-Western, pro-American, and pro-NATO as those of their West German counterparts.

Nevertheless this "East German factor," discussed at some length in earlier RAND reports, continues to make its presence felt—above all, on the issue of the U.S. military presence. Although East Germans increasingly like the United States and support NATO, these attitudes have not translated into support for the U.S. military presence. Whether such attitudes now start to change following the withdrawal
of the troops of the former USSR remains to be seen. The fact that the U.S. military has no presence in eastern Germany—and thus little opportunity to break down old prejudices—may inadvertently prolong an antiquated Cold War view of the U.S. military in the new eastern states.
Perhaps no German attitude has been more closely watched in recent years than that toward European integration. In the wake of unification, European integration was widely seen as the best means to resolve the “German Question” and to harness the influence and power of a unified Germany in a way that would not threaten Germany’s neighbors. To address lingering concerns about German hegemony on the Continent, German political leaders pledged to continue and even accelerate the integration and unification of Europe.

In recent years, a series of public opinion studies has examined in some detail German public attitudes toward Maastricht and the overall European integration process, especially German public skepticism and, at times, opposition to core elements of Maastricht, such as monetary union. Although RAND studies have not focused primarily on German public attitudes toward European integration, they have looked closely at several core issues relevant to the U.S.–German relationship and Germany’s broader role in Europe.

One special focus of the RAND surveys was the issue of whether Germans saw a more integrated and unified Europe as a complement or as an alternative to the United States and the trans-Atlantic relationship. Moreover, with the EU headed toward a crucial Inter-Governmental Conference (IGC) in 1996, German public attitudes on an array of issues ranging from possible internal EU reform to European monetary union, as well as the priority the EU should place on a deepening of integration among existing members versus broadening to include new members, are especially important.
This year's survey results again find the German public supportive of European integration in principle, but harboring doubts about key aspects of the integration process—above all, political and monetary union. Asked whether they thought the EU was "on the right track," 44 percent of those Germans polled responded that it was, whereas 32 percent responded that it was not. Asked whether they favor or oppose the deepening of European integration as foreseen in the Maastricht Treaty, seven in ten Germans (70 percent) favored the principle of deepening integration. (See Figure 4.1.)

As mentioned in Chapter Two, the German public singled out European integration as the most important foreign policy problem facing the country. Similarly, the percentage of the German public that sees EU integration as "an important and urgent task" for Bonn jumped from 28 percent in 1993 to 41 percent in 1994. At the same time, only 15 percent of the German public continues to believe that the EU members in general have common interests. Asked to prioritize the tasks facing the EU, a majority identified creating equal living standards (80 percent), creating a common foreign and security policy (78 percent), securing a close partnership with the United States (74 percent), creating a European defense community (64 percent), and integrating the new democracies of Eastern Europe (55 percent).

**Figure 4.1—German Attitudes Toward Maastricht**
Less than a majority pointed either to political union (47 percent) or to monetary union (41 percent). (See Figure 4.2.)

The Maastricht Treaty catalyzed a new wave of criticism and skepticism throughout many EU countries, including Germany. The EU has lost political momentum in recent years as it struggles to come to terms with the enormous challenges of deepening integration yet broadening to help stabilize the Continent’s eastern half. In an attempt to revive political momentum for European integration, in fall 1994 the CDU parliamentary group in the Bundestag under Wolfgang Schäuble issued a paper calling for the creation of a core group in the EU of those countries willing to proceed farther and faster in terms of deepening European integration while allowing others to move ahead at their own pace. The so-called Schäuble paper elicited considerable controversy both within Germany and more broadly among other EU members. The 1994 RAND survey picked up on this controversy and asked Germans whether they supported the forma-

![Figure 4.2—German Assessment of EU’s Priorities](image-url)

**SOURCE:** RAND.
tion of a core group within the EU. Nearly six in ten (59 percent) Germans polled opposed such a move. (See Figure 4.3.)

One clear trend, however, is that Germans believe that Bonn should have a greater say in the EU. Three in four (75 percent) Germans think that Bonn should have more influence within the EU. Nearly one in two (47 percent) is concerned that European unification could lead to a loss of German identity. (See Figure 4.4.) Almost seven in ten (69 percent) Germans believe that Germany should be more assertive in defending its own national interests in the EU and should not subordinate them in order to promote European integration. (See Figure 4.5.)

For several years now, the RAND studies have also asked Germans to assess which countries in the EU possess the greatest leadership capabilities in specific policy areas. Although Germany often shies away from playing a leadership role in public to avoid raising fears about German power, the German public sees Germany as the country best equipped to play a leadership role in the European Union in terms of monetary, economic, and foreign policy, but believes that

![Figure 4.3—Attitudes Toward “Core Group” Concept in EU](source: RAND 11/94)
Figure 4.4—German Desire for Greater Influence in EU

(source: RAND 11/94; Konrad Adenauer Stiftung (KAS) 6/93)

Figure 4.5—Defending German Interests in the EU

(source: RAND 11/94; KAS 6/93)
France is best suited to lead the EU in defense policy. (See Figure 4.6.) There are no significant differences on this issue between West and East Germans; the latter show just as much self-confidence as their western counterparts.

Finally, RAND has posed a number of questions over the past three years to test whether Germans view a strong EU as a future competitor with or as a partner of the United States. Alternative visions were presented to respondents in the form of brief statements summarizing quotes from various European leaders and politicians in an attempt to capture differing views of the EU's future and relationship with the United States. Most striking has been the clear German desire for an ongoing and more balanced partnership between the United States and the EU. Nine in ten Germans, for example, favor the notion of a "partnership among equals," and eight in ten (82 percent) favor an expanded alliance between the United States and Europe. (See Figure 4.7.)

The broadening of the EU to Eastern Europe has increasingly moved to center stage in the debate over the EU's future following the entry of Austria, Finland, and Sweden. Germany has been in the forefront

Figure 4.6—EU Leadership—1994

Which country is best equipped to play leadership role?

- Foreign policy
- Economic policy
- Defense/security policy
- Social policy
- Monetary policy

Source: RAND 11/94.
of those pushing for a rapid expansion of the EU to Eastern Europe. As Figure 4.8 shows, nearly six in ten Germans (58 percent) support the broadening of the EU to include Eastern Europe. Asked about their support for individual countries joining the EU, the German public’s list of preferences centers on East-Central Europe and the Baltic states. Public support is highest for Hungary (74 percent), the Czech Republic (58 percent), Poland (54 percent), the Baltic states (54 percent), and Slovakia (50 percent). Despite the lack of public sympathy for Poland, for example, there is majority support for Polish EU membership. Also noteworthy is the continued lack of enthusiasm for Turkish membership in the Union. More Germans, for example, support the idea of Russian or Ukrainian EU membership than Turkish membership. (See Figure 4.8.)

American and German policymakers can look at these data with a mixture of relief and apprehension. The RAND surveys have shown that the German public supports integration in principle and that it sees a strengthened EU as a partner and as a complement to the
trans-Atlantic relationship, not as an alternative. At the same time, what also comes through in these numbers is a clear public desire to see Bonn push German interests more directly and forcefully. How the public defines those interests and priorities can be seen in the soft support for monetary union and other aspects of deepening, as well as strong public support for the broadening of the EU to the East. In this as well as in other areas, one can document how Germans are coming to terms with their new position and role in the
Union. Although Chancellor Kohl and other German leaders continue to assert their commitment to the deepening of European integration, these results suggest that German support for European integration may be contingent upon future steps being more directly linked to specific German interests.
Five years after German unification, Germans are still facing the need to define a new German security role beyond the country’s borders. Since the early 1990s, a debate has taken place in Germany over both the scope and content of a new German foreign policy. The issue of what the German public will or will not support has been an important part of this debate. Especially controversial has been the future role of the Bundeswehr. This role has been at the heart of a major legal and political dispute over the German Basic Law, or constitution, which was only resolved in July 1994, when the German Constitutional Court ruled that the Basic Law did not prohibit the deployment of the Bundeswehr overseas. The issue is no longer whether but when and how the German armed forces will be used in the future in new missions other than German territorial defense.

The RAND surveys contain a number of questions that shed light on German public attitudes on these broader questions as well as on the specific issue of public support for a new role for the German Bundeswehr. This year’s study also went one step further, following the July 1994 German Constitutional Court’s decision on the Bundeswehr, and examined German attitudes toward the possible use of the German armed forces in potential scenarios.

The issue is, of course, more complicated than simply asking Germans whether they would support the use of military power to obtain a certain objective in a specific scenario. There is a much broader and more complex equation governing German attitudes that needs to be explored. Therefore, the RAND survey spanned this series of issues by asking Germans such questions as whether they
have national self-confidence and consider themselves capable of playing a leadership role in foreign and defense policy, how they define their vital interests, what institutions they prefer to use in defending those vital interests, whether they see the use of force as legitimate, and, if so, based on what principles and under what circumstances they would support the use of the German armed forces. The results of some of these questions have already been discussed in this report. One additional finding of the RAND surveys that deserves mention, however, pertains to German self-confidence.

Since the early 1990s, RAND has asked Germans to compare Germany with other countries in terms of whether it represents a good or bad model in an array of categories—economic performance, individual freedom, social justice, technology, culture, etc. The results are contained in Figures 5.1 and 5.2, which show what countries German respondents in 1993 and 1994 considered to be the best and worst models in these categories. What the figures show
is that Germans have a healthy sense of their own abilities, especially vis-à-vis their European allies and neighbors, in almost all categories. Recall the results shown in Figure 4.7, which show that majorities of Germans consider Germany the best-equipped country to play the leadership role in the European Union in every category other than defense policy. Again, both West and East Germans show similar levels of national self-confidence.

RAND has also asked the specific question: Should Germany’s past prevent it from playing a more active role internationally, or must a unified Germany assume more international responsibility? The RAND studies have consistently found a majority supporting a unified Germany’s assuming more international responsibility. In 1994, that majority was more than six in ten (62 percent). (See Figure 5.3.) That this remains a contentious issue in German politics is further emphasized by Figure 5.4, which shows the varying degrees of support for a more active role across the political spectrum.
Figure 5.3—A Majority of Germans Favor More Active International Role

Figure 5.4—German Attitudes Toward More Active International Role, by Party Affiliation
Note that the strongest support for Germany to assume more responsibility was indicated among the young: in western Germany, some 65 percent of 18–24-year-olds, a slightly higher percentage than in other generations. In eastern Germany, support among 18–24-year-olds was even higher, at 87 percent.

In response to the question of whether Germany should seek a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council, two in three (68 percent) Germans responded yes.

However, the RAND findings have also confirmed the existence of political and psychological hurdles in German public opinion when it comes to the use of force—hurdles that have often been called democratic postwar Germany's "culture of reticence" (i.e., the reluctance to become involved in military matters and the use of force) rooted in Germany's own past and its discredited legacy of power politics and militarism. When asked how Germany should assume new international responsibility, and presented with a spectrum of options ranging from "soft" to "hard" security tasks, Germans clearly showed greater public support for the former and less for the latter.

In 1994, for example, strong majorities supported German involvement in "soft" humanitarian missions (92 percent) and peacekeeping (57 percent), as well as financial support for UN-sanctioned interventions (53 percent). But only one in three (32 percent) supported German participation in "hard" out-of-area military interventions through NATO, and one in five (22 percent) supported German participation in UN military interventions such as the Gulf War. (See Figure 5.5.)

When asked whether the international community should, in principle, intervene in the internal affairs of another country, including using force when human rights and international law are being violated, the German public split, with 55 percent opposing the principle of intervention and 43 percent favoring it. In general, support for intervention and a more robust role for the Bundeswehr has been higher in western than in eastern Germany.

The issue of the future role of the German armed forces must, of course, be seen within the context of how Germany defines its vital interests and what it sees as its primary foreign policy goals. How
and where Germans define their vital interests and where they anticipate the threats and challenges to those interests are discussed earlier in this report. Figure 5.6 shows how Germans prioritize their foreign policy goals. Again, the German concern over nuclear weapons is reflected in the fact that the top priority for German foreign policy in the public’s eye is nonproliferation. A quick look at the list reinforces the fact that German public priorities are still primarily dominated by "soft" as opposed to "hard" security issues.

In July 1994, the German Constitutional Court ruled that the role of the German armed forces was limited neither geographically nor in terms of missions. In short, the Bundeswehr can be deployed beyond Germany's borders in the full range of combat and noncombat missions. The issue of a new German military role beyond Germany's and the Alliance's current borders is no longer a question of whether but, rather, when and how. Following up on the Constitutional Court's ruling, RAND posed two questions designed
to test public support for future German military participation in new missions. The first question asked respondents whether they supported the Bundeswehr’s participating in certain kinds of missions. Strong majorities supported the principle of Bundeswehr participation in national defense (93 percent), humanitarian missions (86 percent), to prevent genocide (79 percent), peacekeeping (78 percent), to defend threatened allies (76 percent), or to prevent proliferation (72 percent). (See Figure 5.7.)
Respondents were then asked whether they would support Bundeswehr participation in a series of theoretical conflicts involving specified countries. Support fell dramatically. The greatest amount of support existed for Bundeswehr participation in a preemptive NATO strike against Libya to prevent it from acquiring nuclear weapons (54 percent). This slim majority was followed by defending Turkey against a theoretical Iraqi attack (41 percent), defending Saudi Arabia against a theoretical Iranian attack to secure oil supplies (37 percent), defending Poland against a theoretical Russian attack (25 percent), and defending Ukraine against a theoretical Russian attack (14 percent). (See Figure 5.8.) When asked whether they supported the use of the Bundeswehr for these new missions in principle, both western and eastern Germany expressed strong support. However, when presented with specific scenarios, West Germans are more likely to support the use of German troops. (See Figure 5.9.)
Figure 5.8—... But Support Drops for Specific Scenarios
NATO preemptive strike against Libya to prevent proliferation
Defend Turkey against Iraqi attack
Prevent Serbian ethnic cleansing against Albanians in Kosovo
Defend Saudi Arabia against Iranian attack to secure oil supplies
Defend Hungary against Serbian attack
Defend Poland against Russian attack
Defend Israel against Arab attack
Contain a war between two African states
Defend Ukraine against Russian attack

Source: RAND 11/94.

Figure 5.9—West and East German Attitudes on Use of Bundeswehr
The results of the 1994 RAND–Friedrich Naumann Foundation study underscore that a unified Germany is still in the midst of a process of redefining its future role, interests, and attitudes toward the use of power in the post–Cold War period. These surveys present snapshots of the process of Germany's geopolitical maturation. The numbers are likely to continue to change in the years ahead as the German public comes to terms with a changing security environment.

The data in the RAND surveys reveal several clear trends. Germany's strategic orientation remains unequivocally pro-Western. At the same time, the initial euphoria of the immediate post–Cold War era is over and Germans realize that a new and broad spectrum of possible threats and security challenges may be emerging in and around Europe. Public appreciation for Germany's new vulnerabilities is far more pronounced than is often realized. The Germans' response is to turn to those institutions that worked so well for them during the Cold War—the EU and NATO—to address these new problems.

As a result, support for NATO has not waned with the collapse of communism and the end of the Cold War but has actually increased. Germans support a strong EU—not as an alternative to the Atlantic Alliance but, rather, as a stepping stone to a new, more balanced partnership between the United States and Europe. Germans have made at least the conceptual leap to a new security role beyond national defense. Public support for NATO's expanding to Eastern Europe or assuming new missions such as peacekeeping and crisis
management is strong—indeed stronger than many would have antici-
pipated.

To be sure, this year's results also show that Germany’s “culture of reticence” still exists. Germans often support more engagement in principle but seem to shy away when presented with involvement in specific scenarios. Such a gap is most marked between the German public’s willingness to support Bundeswehr participation in a wide array of hypothetical new missions and the dramatic fall in support when specific scenarios are mentioned.

Is the glass half-empty or half-full? What is most striking to this author is just how far German public thinking has moved in a relatively short period and in spite of all the psychological obstacles that had to be overcome. This move is especially remarkable when one realizes that the German political class has, with several notable exceptions, more often than not shied away from anything approaching a national debate on how to reorder Germany’s foreign and security policy priorities and options.

The occasional voice calls for a national debate on these issues, but, in reality, such a debate has remained largely taboo. One often hears that whether Germany assumes a new role, and at what pace, will depend on the threshold of public acceptance, which many commentators have repeatedly insisted is very low. What the RAND surveys show, however, is a German public that demonstrates common sense on many of these issues, and that, in some cases, may even be ahead of the political class in its thinking. Not all, but many, of the building blocks for a new consensus on security policy may already be in place. This new consensus, however, has not yet come together—perhaps in part because of the lack of leadership and consensus in the political class.
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