The History of the Unified Command Plan 1946–1999

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FOREWORD

Faced with the need to establish unified command of US military forces in peacetime, the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1946 created an organizational directive, the "Outline Command Plan," which was the first in a series of documents known as Unified Command Plans. Approved by the President, the Unified Command Plan prescribes high level command arrangements for operational forces on a global basis; its structure and the organizational philosophies that structure represents have had a major impact on US military operations in the post-World War II era. Thus the history of the Unified Command Plan is a useful guide for those engaged in the development of current military policy and strategy as well as an important reference for students of US policy and strategy during the Cold War.

The History of the Unified Command Plan, 1946–1999, covers the formulation of the plan, modifications, and periodic revisions. This volume includes three separate histories that were originally classified and an update covering the period from 1994 to 1999. The section describing the development of the Unified Command Plan between 1946 and 1977 was written by Dr. Robert J. Watson, Mr. James F. Schnabel, and Mr. Willard J. Webb and first published in declassified form in the late 1980s. The section covering the period from 1977 to 1983 was written by Dr. Ronald H. Cole and published in a classified version in 1985. The section covering 1983 through 1993, the update covering 1993–1999, and the overview were completed by Dr. Walter S. Poole. Ms. Penny Norman prepared the volume for publication.

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OVERVIEW

Following the experience of global warfare in World War II, the Services recognized the importance of unity of military effort achieved through the unified command of US forces. Generally, over the next 50 years, the Unified Command Plan did adapt to the changing strategic environment and to great advances in technology, particularly the growing global reach of US forces. But there were failures, notably the cumbersome command organization for the Vietnam War. The recurring difficulty lay in creating an organizational scheme that would centralize control without impinging upon what the Services saw as their basic roles and functions. Much of the history of the Unified Command Plan (UCP) involves debates over how commands should be organized. Such disputes usually pitted those who wanted commands organized by geographic areas against those who advocated forming commands according to functional groupings of forces. Command by forces or functions seemed to restrict Service prerogatives, while command by areas appeared to preserve them. The importance and intractability of this dispute is, perhaps, best demonstrated by tracing three particularly difficult sets of command arrangements, those for the Pacific Ocean and Far East, strategic nuclear forces, and general purpose forces based in the continental United States.

During 1945 and 1946, Pacific command organization became the main obstacle to completing an “Outline Campaign Plan,” the first version of the UCP. A line had to be drawn between a geographically organized Pacific Command (PACOM) and a Far East Command (FECOM) that was functionally organized for the occupation of Japan. The Army pushed for assigning command by forces or functions, a position based on its advocacy of a Department of Defense (DOD) under strong centralized direction. Behind the Navy’s insistence upon command by geographical area lay its desire for a loosely coordinated DOD organization that would preserve Service autonomy. Command arrangements, the Navy argued, had to reflect the reality that ships were not tied to functions but constantly steamed from one area of responsibility into another. Whether to place the Bonin and Mariana Islands under PACOM or FECOM became the bone of contention. The Navy saw all Pacific islands as one strategic entity, while the Army insisted that FECOM be able to draw upon military resources in the Bonin-Marianas during an emergency. Accordingly, the Commander in Chief, Far East (CINCFE), was given control over local forces and facilities in these islands, while naval administration and logistics there fell under Commander in Chief, Pacific (CINCPAC). In 1951, during the Korean War, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) shifted responsibility for the Bonin and Mariana Islands as well as the
Philippines and Taiwan from FECOM to PACOM. Five years later, with the Korean War over and the Japanese peace treaty concluded, FECOM was disestablished over Army protests and PACOM gained control over that area.

Command arrangements for the Vietnam War were complex and unsatisfactory. The Army failed to gain approval either for creating a Southeast Asia Command or for raising Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), to a unified command with PACOM in a supporting role. Instead, under CINCPAC, the Commander, US Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (COMUSMACV), largely controlled forces and operations within South Vietnam; CINCPAC delegated to its Service components, Pacific Air Forces (PACAF) and Pacific Fleet (PACFLT), responsibility for conducting air and naval operations against North Vietnam and Laos; PACFLT also retained control of Seventh Fleet forces providing gunfire support and air strikes on targets in South Vietnam. Control of B-52s remained under the Commander in Chief, Strategic Air Command (CINCSAC), but targets in South Vietnam were selected by COMUSMACV, refined by CINCPAC, and approved in Washington. CINCPAC’s domination of command arrangements created resentment among senior Army and Air Force officers. In 1972 the Army Chief of Staff was General William Westmoreland, a former COMUSMACV. He nominated and pressed for the current COMUSMACV, General Creighton Abrams, to become CINCPAC. Westmoreland's effort failed. But after Abrams became Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA), he argued for radical changes in the command structure in the Pacific. Joined by the Chief of Staff, Air Force (CSAF), General George Brown, who had commanded 7th Air Force in Vietnam, Abrams proposed disestablishing PACOM, making the Pacific Fleet a specified command, and creating four new unified commands: western Pacific, eastern Asia, northeast Asia, and southwest Pacific. Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger preserved PACOM, accepting the Navy’s arguments that since the Pacific area was a single geographic entity, four commands would interfere constantly with each other in a time of crisis. Indeed, Schlesinger expanded PACOM: CINCPAC was given responsibility for the Indian Ocean. During the 1980s the Army repeatedly pressed for creation of a northeast Asia command; even the end of the Cold War did not close the debate. The history of PACOM demonstrated both the viability and limitations of a large area command.

Control of strategic nuclear forces raised some of the same issues: jointness versus Service prerogatives, functional versus geographical command. In 1946 the Army Air Force (AAF) advocated a Strategic Air Command controlled by one commander and operating globally. The Navy insisted that SAC neither control forces normally based in other commands nor duplicate specialized search and rescue efforts. The Navy's desires were accommodated and SAC was designated the first specified command—an organization which controlled only the forces of a single Service. Then, in the late 1950s, the problem of fitting Polaris ballistic missile submarines into the nuclear
command structure provoked a heated debate. The Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), Admiral Arleigh Burke, argued that the operations of Polaris submarines had to be coordinated with other naval forces and, therefore, they must be allocated by area to the Atlantic Command (LANTCOM), European Command (EUCOM) and PACOM. The Chief of Staff of the Air Force, totally disagreeing, proposed putting all long-range missiles, their launch platforms and heavy bombers under one strategic command. In August 1960, the Secretary of Defense decided against making SAC a unified command and the Air Force failed to gain control over all strategic nuclear weapons systems. Instead, CINCSAC became the Director, Strategic Target Planning, supported by a Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff (JSTPS) with a Navy deputy. The JSTPS coordinated the process of identifying and prioritizing nuclear targets and then of matching weapons against them. Admiral Burke fought vigorously but vainly against the JSTPS, even carrying his case to the President. Subsequently, the Navy tacitly allowed the Air Force to dominate the JSTPS. This compromise integrated nuclear targeting while allowing each Service to protect its own prerogatives, the Air Force by controlling the bombers and intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) of SAC, the Navy by controlling its submarines through the naval components of LANTCOM, EUCOM, and PACOM.

During 1982 to 1983, a proposal was made to centralize the handling of all nuclear weapons within a strategic nuclear forces command. Here, and again in 1987, the JCS considered and rejected a unified strategic command on grounds that the SAC/JSTPS system worked satisfactorily. But arms control agreements and the end of the Cold War considerably reduced the size and importance of the strategic nuclear arsenal. Because the strategic nuclear mission mattered less, the Services’ basic interests were no longer at stake. Quickly, long-standing barriers to unified command of strategic nuclear forces fell away. The Chairman, General Colin L. Powell, USA, and the CINCSAC, General George Lee Butler, USAF, took the lead in pushing through reorganization. The US Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) began operations on 1 June 1992 and, simultaneously, SAC ceased to exist. In July 1993, mainly to conform to the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks II (START II) treaty, combatant command of heavy bombers and strategic reconnaissance aircraft was shifted from USSTRATCOM to the newly expanded Atlantic Command.

No issue connected with the UCP provoked more debate than unified command of deployable general-purpose forces based in the continental United States (CONUS). In 1961 these forces consisted of the Strategic Army Corps (STRAC), the composite air strike forces of Tactical Air Command (TAC), and Navy and Marine Corps units not assigned to unified commands. Secretary Robert S. McNamara asked the JCS to develop a plan for integrating STRAC and TAC under a unified command. The Army and Air Force readily concurred, provided that a new command eventually would include
Navy and Marine Corps units. The Navy, claiming that its flexibility would suffer in a command tailored to STRAC and TAC, suggested either organizing joint task forces or giving transport aircraft to the Army. The Marines favored doing nothing more than developing a joint doctrine for the employment of these forces. McNamara decided to activate Strike Command (STRICOM), under an Army general, with the missions of conducting joint training, developing joint doctrine, providing a general reserve, and planning contingency operations as directed by the JCS. The Navy and Marines wanted the UCP to state that STRICOM would consist only of Army and Air Force units. McNamara refused but did not integrate Navy and Marine units into the command.

It was not simply the absence of Navy and Marine units that denied STRICOM the ability to act as joint force integrator. In 1962, when the Army started organizing an air assault division, the Army and Air Force separately assessed its requirements for tactical mobility and air support; both Services sought more air mobility assets. Secretary McNamara ordered CINCSAR, General Paul D. Adams, USA, to test and evaluate the joint aspects of Army air mobility concepts. But the Army balked at using a standard “Reorganized Army Division” (ROAD) to support Air Force tests. Early in 1964 the JCS (less the Air Force) proposed and Secretary McNamara agreed that the Army would test its air mobility concepts unilaterally and then recommend for joint testing any concepts needing validation. When CINCSAR sought a larger role, the JCS limited him to “actively observing” Army tests, thereby abruptly ending joint evaluation of Army concepts.

Subsequently, CINCSAR planned to use a ROAD brigade to test the Air Force concept for air mobility during the autumn of 1964. McNamara ordered CINCSAR to evaluate an Army air assault exercise, to allow comparison of the ROAD and air assault divisions. The tests were scheduled concurrently. CINCSAR asked the Army to postpone its test for two weeks to allow his team to observe both; the Army refused. The JCS did allow CINCSAR to establish a joint observer group to monitor both exercises but would not let him use the existing Inter-Service Coordination Board for that purpose. Despite its support of STRICOM, Army attitudes had not advanced to the point of allowing joint evaluation of an important Army program. The JCS acquiesced in this approach.

In 1963 STRICOM was given regional responsibilities. At a time when intervention in the Congo seemed possible, the Army and Air Force proposed making STRICOM responsible for planning and operations in the Middle East, sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia (MEAFSA). Otherwise, they argued, existing unified commands would have to execute operations using forces they had not trained and plans they had not prepared. The Navy saw no need for major changes; the Marine Corps worried that adding area responsibilities would lead to a worldwide general purpose forces command. McNamara,
agreeing with the Army and Air Force, did expand CINCSTRIKE's responsibilities to include MEAFSA. Subsequently, though, events undermined this change. In 1964, EUCOM, not CINCSTRIKE/MEAFSA, coordinated a hostage rescue mission in the Congo because EUCOM provided the transports that carried Belgian paratroopers. In 1967, for the same reason, EUCOM conducted noncombatant evacuation operations from Middle East countries during the Arab-Israeli War. In both cases, the unified command with the nearest forces, not STRICOM, executed the mission.

In 1970 a Blue Ribbon Defense Panel recommended merging LANTCOM and STRICOM into a tactical or general purpose command, incorporating all CONUS-based general purpose forces assigned to organized combat units. This idea surfaced 20 years too early and nothing came of it. Instead, in 1971 STRICOM/MEAFSA was disestablished; its replacement, a new Readiness Command (REDCOM), was a version of the original STRICOM. The post-Vietnam climate, with public feeling running against further overseas involvements, militated against a “Strike” command with far-flung responsibilities. In 1974 the Navy and Marine Corps recommended replacing REDCOM with a joint training and exercise headquarters. Secretary James Schlesinger refused. He made REDCOM responsible for contingency planning and providing a Joint Task Force (JTF) headquarters staff for future operations but gave REDCOM neither additional assets nor area responsibilities. The 1970s witnessed a reaction in DOD against the centralization of the McNamara years, and the restrictions placed upon REDCOM reflected this trend.

When Southwest Asia became a top strategic priority in the late 1970s, the Army and Air Force pressed for assigning REDCOM all responsibility for major contingencies there. The Navy and Marine Corps repeated their long-standing preference: let a CONUS-based JTF headquarters carry out planning and exercising, but pass operational control of forces to EUCOM once their deployment took place. Secretary of Defense Harold Brown approved the Navy-Marine solution, but that proved to be only the first step. Spurred by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, what ultimately emerged was the US Central Command (USCENTCOM) as the combatant area command, with REDCOM as its force provider. USCINCPAC kept his role limited and did not accomplish major initiatives in joint doctrine and integration. When the US Special Operations Command (USASOC) was activated in 1987, budgetary constraints meant that a unified command had to disappear. REDCOM was the obvious choice.

Enactment of the Goldwater-Nichols DOD Reorganization Act in 1986, followed by the appointment of General Powell as Chairman, brought about a major change of course. Powell was determined to make full use of his powers in fostering changes in the organization of combatant commands. Early in 1986, a Blue Ribbon Panel had proposed creating three major functional commands
for strategic, logistical, and tactical or general-purpose forces. Pressure from
civilian leaders brought about the activation of the US Transportation
Command (USTRANSCOM) in 1987. But TRANSCOM's Service components
retained operational command over their forces, controlled procurement and
industrial funds, and bore responsibility for performing Service-unique mis-
sions. General Powell worked with Secretary of Defense Cheney to push through
a charter that gave the US Commander in Chief, Transportation Command
(USCINTRANS) a peacetime as well as a wartime mission, and made him the
single manager of transportation assets in place of the Service Secretaries.

Not only was creation of USSTRATCOM basically the work of Generals
Powell and Butler, but General Powell also took the initiative in creating a
CONUS-based command designed to deal with contingencies and perform
the function of joint force integrator. He believed that, while the unified com-
mand system worked well overseas, CONUS forces were Service-oriented.
Drawing upon the experiences of DESERT SHIELD/STORM, he rejected
Marine arguments that a CONUS-based command that was globally oriented
could not acquire regional expertise. Because it was CONUS-based and its
Cold War mission had been greatly reduced, Powell selected US Atlantic
Command (USACOM), in which all Services would be represented. As of 1
October 1993, an expanded USACOM had as its components Army Forces
Command (FORSCOM) (which lost its status as the last specified command),
Air Combat Command (ACC), Marine Forces Atlantic (MARLANT), and
Atlantic Fleet (LANTFLT). The Army wanted USACOM to control west coast
Navy and Marine forces but argued against giving it any area responsibili-
ties. Powell decided to do just the opposite. Thus USACOM uniquely melded
area and functional responsibilities. As the joint force integrator, it promised
to open a new chapter in the evolution of the joint system.

During the second half of the 1990s, the organization and focus of
USACOM continued to be a major issue facing joint planners. In late 1995, a
new UCP assigned the waters off the Central and South American coasts
including the Caribbean basin, the Gulf of Mexico and portions of the
Atlantic Ocean (all formerly part of the USCENTCOM AOR). While USACOM
at this point retained a geographic AOR, its future roles appeared linked to
joint training and doctrine. Satisfied with the direction taken in 1995, the
Chairman, General John M. Shalikashvili, oversaw evolutionary changes,
principally the assignment of former Soviet states to the geographic AORs of
USEUCOM and USCENTCOM, during the next UCP revision. The Western
Slavic and Caucasus states—Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia,
and Azerbaijan—were assigned to USEUCOM and the Central Asian states—
Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, and Krygyzstan—came
under USCENTCOM's aegis in the Unified Command Plan approved in
The next cycle of UCP revision took up more far-reaching change. In response to increasing threats from terrorism, the new Chairman, General Hugh H. Shelton, USA, commissioned a study of how the UCP should evolve as far forward as 2010. Chief among Shelton’s concerns were homeland defense and a further revision of USACOM’s role to address issues surrounding joint training and joint force integration. After considering CINC recommendations, Joint Staff proposals and a contractor study titled UCP 21, Shelton decided to give a redesigned USACOM the lead on a variety of joint issues including developing joint responses to emerging threats. Accordingly in the UCP approved on 29 September 1999, US Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) replaced USACOM. USJFCOM would serve as the lead joint force integrator, the lead agent for joint force training, and the DOD executive agent for joint force experimentation. Operating under USJFCOM, JTF-Civil Support would plan for and integrate DOD assistance to the federal agency leading the response to an attack using weapons of mass destruction within the United States.

For more than 50 years, the UCP’s provisions gradually became more joint and less protective of traditional Service prerogatives. Progress was not steady. Command arrangements in the Pacific during the Vietnam War did not promote unity of effort and worsened inter-Service tension. During the Cold War, Congress and the White House imposed changes that promoted unification. The Goldwater-Nichols Act gave the Chairman the authority to act as the instrument of change. General Powell used that authority to carry out major changes, making STRATCOM, TRANSCOM, and USACOM, later USJFCOM, into fully competent functional commands.
PART ONE

1946–1977
Origins in World War II

Unified command over US operational forces was adopted during World War II. It was a natural concomitant of the system of combined (US–British) command set up during that conflict by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. Unified command called for a single commander, responsible to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, assisted by a joint staff, and exercising command over all the units of his assigned force, regardless of Service. The system was generally applied during World War II in the conduct of individual operations and within geographic theater commands.

Even before the war ended, the Joint Chiefs of Staff envisioned retention of the unified command system in peacetime. They agreed that when General Eisenhower’s combined headquarters (Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force) was dissolved, he would then become the commander of all US forces in Europe. A directive appointing General Eisenhower as Commanding General, US Forces, European Theater (CG USFET), was issued by the JCS on 28 June 1945, soon after V–E Day.

In the Pacific, attempts to establish a unified command for the entire area proved impossible. Service interests precluded the subordination of either of the two major commanders in that area (General of the Army Douglas MacArthur and Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz). During the final campaigns in the Pacific, therefore, these two officers held separate commands, as Commander in Chief, US Army Forces, Pacific (CINCAFPAC), and Commander in Chief, US Pacific Fleet (CINCPAC), respectively.

The First Unified Command Plan, 1946

The impetus for the establishment of a postwar system of unified command over US military forces worldwide stemmed from the Navy’s dissatisfaction with this divided command in the Pacific. On 1 February 1946, the CNO characterized the existing arrangement, with Army and Navy forces under separate command, as “ambiguous” and “unsatisfactory.” He favored establishing a single command over the entire Pacific Theater (excluding Japan, Korea, and China), whose commander would have a joint staff and would exercise “unity of command” over all US forces in the theater.

This CNO proposal was discussed at some length. It was opposed by representatives of the Army and Army Air Forces, who favored unity of command on a basis of assignment of mission and forces, rather than of area of
responsibility. The Navy's plan, they feared, would deprive General MacArthur of control of ground and air forces that he might need for his mission.¹

After considerable discussion, a compromise emerged as part of a comprehensive worldwide system of unified command for US forces under JCS control. The resulting "Outline Command Plan," which was in effect the first Unified Command Plan, was approved by President Truman on 14 December 1946. It called for the eventual establishment, as an "interim measure for the immediate postwar period," of seven unified commands. These commands, their areas of responsibility, and their missions were as follows:

**Far East Command.** US forces in Japan, Korea, the Ryukyus, the Philippines, the Marianas, and the Bonins. Its commander, CINCPAC, would carry out occupation duties, maintain the security of his command, plan and prepare for a general emergency in his area, support CINCPAC, and command US forces in China in an emergency.

**Pacific Command.** Forces allocated by the JCS within the Pacific area. CINCPAC would defend the US against attack through the Pacific, conduct operations in the Pacific, and maintain security of US island positions and sea and air communications, support US military commitments in China, plan and prepare for general emergency, and support CINCPAC and CINCAL.

**Alaskan Command.** US forces in Alaska, including the Aleutians. CINCAL would protect Alaska, including sea and air communications, and protect the United States from attack through Alaska and the Arctic regions. He would plan and prepare for general emergency and support CINCPAC, CINCPAC, and CG SAC.

**Northeast Command.** US forces assigned to Newfoundland, Labrador, and Greenland. CINCNE would maintain the security of his area and defend the United States against attack through the Arctic regions within his command; protect sea and air communications in his area; control Arctic airways as appropriate; support CINCEUR, Commander in Chief, Atlantic Fleet (CINCLANTFLT) and SAC; and plan and prepare for a general emergency.

**Atlantic Fleet.** Comprising forces assigned to the Atlantic Fleet, US Navy. CINCLANTFLT would defend the United States against attack through the Atlantic; plan and prepare for general emergency; and support US forces in Europe, the Mediterranean, the Northeast, and the Caribbean.
**Caribbean Command.** US forces in Panama and the Antilles. CINCARIB would defend the United States against attack through his area; defend sea and air communications (with CNO coordinating between CINCARIB and CINCLANTFLT); secure the Panama Canal and US bases in Panama and the Caribbean; plan and prepare for general emergency; and support CINCLANTFLT.

**European Command.** All forces allocated to the European Theater by the JCS or other authority. CINCEUR would occupy Germany, support the national policy in Europe "within the scope of his command responsibility," and plan and prepare for general emergency.

The general principles established by the UCP were as follows:

Unified command in each command will be established in accordance, in so far as practicable, with Chapter 2, paragraph 12, of Joint Action of the Army and the Navy, [with] component forces consisting of Army, Army Air, and Naval forces. Forces assigned to a command will normally consist of two or more components and each will be commanded directly by an officer of that component. Each commander will have a joint staff with appropriate members from the various components of the Services under his command in key positions of responsibility. Commanders of component forces will communicate directly with appropriate headquarters on matters such as administration, training, and supply, expenditure of appropriate funds, and authorization of construction, which are not a responsibility of a unified command. The assignment of forces and the significant changes therein will be as determined by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The JCS would exercise strategic direction over all elements of the armed forces. They would assign forces to the unified commands and prescribe the missions and tasks of those commands. The Services would retain operational control of all forces not specifically assigned by the JCS. Each unified command would operate under a designated Service Chief acting as executive agent for the JCS: the Chief of Staff, US Army; the Chief of Naval Operations; or the Commanding General, Army Air Forces (CG, AAF) (later Chief of Staff, US Air Force).

By a separate provision of the UCP, the JCS recognized the existence of the Strategic Air Command (SAC), a command of the Army Air Forces (later USAF) which was not normally based overseas. It was made up of strategic air forces of the Army Air Forces not otherwise assigned. The commander of SAC was responsible to the JCS, but no specific mission was assigned to him by the JCS at that time. SAC became the first example of what was later designated a specific command though the term did not come into use until 1951.\(^2\)
Establishment of CINCFE, CINCPAC, CINCAL, CINCEUR

Approval of the UCP did not in itself establish the commands named in the plan; a separate implementing directive was required for each command. The first three to be created were the Far East Command (FECOM), Pacific Command (PACOM), and Alaskan Command (ALCOM). A JCS directive of 16 December 1946 established these commands effective 1 January 1947. The executive agents for these commands were the CSA, CNO, and CG, AAF, respectively.³

The next to be established was the European Command (EUCOM), established by directive of 24 February 1947, effective 15 March 1947, with the CSA as executive agent. In effect, CINCEUR was simply a new title for CG USFET. Since the latter had earlier been given direct command over US ground forces in Europe, no intermediate Army component headquarters was necessary.⁴

Establishment of CINCLANT

For the Atlantic, the original UCP would have set up a purely naval command under JCS direction (CINCLANTFLT). On 5 August 1947 the CNO recommended instead that CINCLANTFLT be established as a fully unified commander under the broader title of Commander in Chief, Atlantic (CINCLANT), and with its mission being “to conduct operations in the Atlantic,” instead of the narrower phraseology used in the UCP: “to control the sea and secure the airways through the Atlantic.” Also, the relations between the Atlantic and Caribbean Commands required clarification, in the CNO’s view. Finally, the CNO recommended that the JCS assume direction of US Naval Forces, Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean (NAVEASTLANTMED, formerly US Naval Forces Europe, or USNAVEUR).⁵

The Army and Army Air Forces members on the JCS considered it “neither necessary nor desirable” to broaden the status and mission of CINCLANTFLT as CNO desired or to give CINCLANTFLT command over ground and air forces. The JCS postponed action on this matter while they dealt with less controversial aspects of unified command. Effective 1 November 1947, CINCARIB and CINCLANTFLT were activated, and CINCAVFASTLANTMED (shortened in May 1948 to CINCNELM) was placed under JCS direction. The CSA became executive agent for CINCARIB and the CNO for the other two. CINCARIB assumed command of all US forces in the Caribbean Islands and the Panama area except for certain fleet units and facilities that were placed under operational control of CINCLANTFLT.⁶

A few days later, the CNO renewed his suggestion for the establishment of a unified Atlantic Command. This time his colleagues withdrew their
objections, and on 1 December 1947 the Atlantic Command (LANTCOM) was created under the Commander in Chief, Atlantic (CINCLANT).\(^7\)

Thus by the end of 1947, action had been taken on all of the seven commands envisioned in the original UCP except the Northeast Command (CINCNE). This presented political difficulties involving the Canadian Government, as described below. Meanwhile the National Security Act of 1947 had been passed by Congress and signed by the President; it gave the JCS a legal basis for existence and affirmed their responsibility for establishing unified commands in "strategic areas," "subject to the authority and direction of the President and the Secretary of Defense."\(^8\)

### Developments in 1948

As a result of continuing controversies over the roles and missions of the Services, the Secretary of Defense met with the Joint Chiefs of Staff at Key West, Florida, in March 1948 and worked out a detailed statement of the functions of each Service and of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This Key West Agreement, approved by the President and the Secretary of Defense and formally issued on 21 April 1948, recognized the JCS responsibility for unified commands and allowed them to authorize unified commanders "to establish such subordinate unified commands as may be necessary." It also sanctioned the practice, already well established, of designating a JCS member as executive agent for each command.\(^9\)

Several months later, mounting tensions in Europe led the Joint Chiefs of Staff to enlarge CINCEUR's mission somewhat. On 30 June 1948, they directed CINCEUR to supervise and coordinate all plans and actions of US forces under his command (and such other forces as might be made available in a general emergency) and to maintain reserve forces that could be employed elsewhere in an emergency.\(^10\)

Neither CINCEUR nor other unified commanders had been assigned logistic or administrative responsibilities under the original UCP. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recognized a need to grant them such responsibilities and did so in an amendment to the UCP on 7 September 1948. Commanders of unified commands were made responsible for "coordination of logistic and administrative support of the component forces of their unified command," subject to legislative limitations, departmental regulations, and budgetary considerations.\(^11\)

On 29 September 1948, the JCS assigned to CINCNELM responsibility for joint planning at the theater level for implementation within his area of joint plans directed by them. "This planning," they stated, "will be accomplished for all three U.S. Military Services, and will include plans for the employment of such other forces as may be available for meeting a general emergency."
CINCNELM's planning for employment of the Strategic Air Forces will be confined to logistic planning in support of such operations.\textsuperscript{12}

The status of SAC as a command under JCS direction was clarified by two directives issued by the JCS in 1949. On 4 January they designated the CSAF their executive agent for SAC. On 13 April the missions of CG, SAC (or CINCSAC, as he was later called) were set forth. He was charged with command over all forces allocated to him by the JCS or other authority and was assigned definite missions, including the conduct of strategic air operations or such other air operations as the JCS directed and with the support of other commanders under the JCS. He was also charged with planning for his assigned missions.\textsuperscript{13}

**Establishment of Northeast Command**

The question of activating the Northeast Command, to cover the approach route for enemy attack across Greenland, Labrador, and Newfoundland, was addressed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in November 1948. At that time, the CNO expressed opposition to the establishment of a unified command in that area. There were, in his view, too few US forces there to justify a unified command; moreover, its location in foreign territory would provide excellent propaganda for the communists and would generate misunderstanding and friction with Canada and the United Kingdom. The CNO favored instead an Air Force command in the area, under JCS operational control exercised through the CSAF (in effect, a specified command). The Chiefs of Staff of the Army and Air Force rejoined that the JCS would be “derelict if they did not provide a command structure for the efficient, integrated control of... forces” in the area in question. Thereupon, the CNO evidently withdrew his objection. In April 1949 the JCS approved the establishment of the Northeast Command and sought approval from the Secretary of Defense to issue a directive for the command. Recognizing the political sensitivity of the issue, they cautioned the Secretary against publicity and urged that the action be coordinated through the US/Canadian Permanent Joint Board on Defense (PJBD). This recommendation was adopted; the Secretary of Defense instructed the US section of the PJBD to inform their Canadian colleagues that the United States intended to establish the command.\textsuperscript{14}

The Canadian Government asked that the new command be titled “US Forces, Northeast.” As a compromise, the JCS suggested “US Northeast Command,” which Canada accepted. By a JCS decision on 29 August 1950, approved by the Secretary of Defense on 8 September, the US Northeast Command was established effective 1 October 1950, with the CSAF as executive agent.\textsuperscript{15}
Command Changes in the European Theater, 1949–1952

Important political developments occurring in Europe in 1949 were reflected in altered command arrangements. On 23 May 1949, the JCS removed US Forces in Austria from assignment to EUCOM, setting up these forces as an independent command responsible directly to the JCS. Several weeks later, when the President appointed a civilian High Commissioner for Germany, CINCEUR was relieved of his responsibilities as Military Governor of Germany. Changes in his mission affected by the JCS spelled out his relationship with the High Commissioner.16

The year 1949 also saw the establishment of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). In the ensuing months, NATO moved to shore up the defenses of Western Europe against a possible attack from the east. These developments showed a need for a stronger US air command in Europe. The JCS approved establishment of the Commander in Chief, US Air Forces in Europe (CINCUSAFE), on 20 November 1950 at the same level as CINCEUR and CINCELM. Since those two commands were in effect Army and Navy commands, the result was three separate Service commands for the European area. The CSAF was named the JCS executive agent for CINCUSAFE. Missions of CINCLANT, CINCEUR and CINCELM were modified as necessitated by creation of the new command.17

In 1951 the position of Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR), was established and to be held by a US officer. SACEUR was given "operational command, to the extent necessary for the accomplishment of your mission," of all US forces in Europe, regardless of Service: that is US [Army] Forces, Europe; US Air Forces, Europe; and US Naval Forces, Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean.

The precise relationship between SACEUR and US commands remained to be spelled out in detail. On 7 July 1952, the President approved recommendations by the JCS that effected fundamental changes in unified command in Europe. Those changes vested requisite command authority in one individual. With presidential concurrence, the JCS established a full-fledged unified command in Europe under the title US European Command (USEUCOM) under a Commander in Chief, US European Command (USCINCEUR), who was also SACEUR. USCINCEUR exercised unified command and authority (except to the extent that operational control was exercised by NATO commanders) over all US forces allocated him by the JCS or other competent authority. He was granted covert limited authority to operate in Berlin, Austria, Trieste and Yugoslavia when so directed by the JCS. USCINCEUR was instructed to establish a US headquarters with a deputy and joint US staff at the earliest practicable date. He was encouraged to delegate extensive authority to his deputy. The existing "JCS commands" in Europe—EUCOM, NELM and USAFE—were designated component commands under the new US European Command, although unilateral Service functions
would still be handled through single Service channels. EUCOM was to be
given a new title and would continue as a JCS specified command for
missions with respect to Berlin. Both NELM and USAFE would continue as
specified commands for currently assigned missions outside USCINCEUR's
area of responsibility. The CSA was designated executive agent for USEUCOM,
and for the old European Command, now redesignated US Army Forces
Europe (USAREUR). The CNO was named executive agent for NELM and the
CSAF for USAFE.\textsuperscript{18}

USCINCEUR assumed command in Europe effective 1 August 1952. In a
message approved by the Secretary of Defense, the JCS on 2 December 1952
spelled out for USCINCEUR his geographical area of responsibility: Norway,
Denmark, Western Germany, Berlin, Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands,
France, Italy, Greece, Turkey, Austria, Trieste, the Mediterranean Sea, the
Mediterranean Islands (exclusive of the Balearics), Algerian Departments of
France, and the United Kingdom, including the territorial waters of those
countries. His only authority for the rest of continental Europe was in the field
of covert military planning. His North African responsibilities were limited to
joint planning in French Morocco, Tunisia, and Libya and to military aspects of
negotiations for base rights. The Secretary of Defense delegated some of his
responsibilities concerning the Mutual Security Program (MSP) in Europe to
USCINCEUR on 15 July 1952. He directed that USCINCEUR administer the
military aspects of the MSP, including the control and administration of
military units engaged in military assistance. USCINCEUR would also
coordinate US military matters that were of joint logistical or administrative
nature, including military assistance activities, US military procurement, base
rights negotiations, and base construction.\textsuperscript{19}

Clarifying Responsibilities of Unified Commanders, 1950

Following a review of missions and deployments of US forces, the JCS
approved several changes to the basic UCP on 16 February 1950. They
removed South Korea from CINCFE's area of responsibility but added the
Volcano Islands, while also divesting CINCFE of some responsibilities for
China. CINCEUR was relieved of his requirement to maintain reserve forces,
and CINCAL and CINCNE were charged with coordinating Arctic airways.
Finally, the statement that the UCP was an "interim measure" was deleted.\textsuperscript{20}

The status of forces under one unified commander operating within
the general area assigned to another commander was the subject of a JCS
directive of 27 April 1950. The JCS did not intend to limit unified
commanders rigidly to fixed geographic boundaries but wished rather to
leave them free to operate where necessary to carry out their assigned
missions. Commanders were authorized to extend operations into areas
normally under cognizance of another commander if necessary for the
accomplishment of assigned tasks. In routine operational matters, commanders under the JCS were enjoined to coordinate closely with each other. Forces sent to reinforce a unified commander (or other commander operating under JCS direction) would be assigned to that commander’s operational control.21

Adjustments in areas of responsibilities affecting CINCARIB, CINCLANT and, to a lesser extent, CINCPAC, were ordered by the JCS in the early 1950s. In changes to the UCP suggested by the CNO and approved by the JCS on 18 July 1950, CINCLANT was given the missions of protecting Caribbean sea communications, to include antisubmarine warfare (ASW) operations and the control, routing, and protection of shipping. Commander, Caribbean Sea Frontier (COMCARIBSEAFRON), would perform these missions for CINCLANT. Additionally, CINCLANT was charged with furnishing CINCARIB with sealift in an emergency. CINCARIB’s mission was modified accordingly. He was also directed to coordinate with British, Venezuelan, and Dutch authorities in protecting oil fields in Venezuela, Trinidad, and Curacao. These changes brought questions from both CINCLANT and CINCARIB, which called forth clarifications on 21 August 1950. The JCS made CINCLANT responsible for protection of the Pacific Ocean approaches to the Panama Canal and made it clear that COMCARIBSEAFRON was directly responsible to CINCLANT for protection of sea communications in the Caribbean and the Pacific approaches. (In early 1951, protection of the Pacific approaches to the Panama Canal was reassigned from CINCLANT to CINCPAC.)22

Command in the Far East during the Korean War

The outbreak of the Korean War and subsequent developments in the Far East put US unified command there to a test, which it passed readily. Although General MacArthur, as CINCFE, had been relieved of responsibility for South Korea, early US reactions to the North Korean attack on 25 June 1950 were taken through his command, which was conveniently located for the purpose. These initial reactions, including logistic support to the Republic of Korea (ROK); protection of evacuation; air operations; and, eventually, ground operations were taken with presidential approval outside the authority of unified command under the UCP. On 10 July at the request of the United Nations, President Truman directed General MacArthur to establish the United Nations Command (UNC) for purposes of operations against the North Korean invaders. From that point General MacArthur, as CINCFE, supported the operations of the UNC, which he commanded as CINCUNC. His primary responsibility as CINCFE remained the defense of Japan, however. Over the strong objections of CINCFE, the JCS transferred the Marianas-Bonin and Volcano Islands from his responsibility and placed them under CINCPAC. The President concurred in this action on 9 April 1951. Further transfers of responsibility from CINCFE were
approved by the JCS in late 1951, when they made CINCPAC responsible for US security interests in the Philippines, the Pescadores, and Formosa.23

In seeking presidential approval of these actions, the JCS also noted a need for a change in the provisions in the UCP relating to the control of units designated for atomic operations. The existing UCP assigned these units to the control of SAC but provided that in case of “dire emergency” other commanders might request authority from the JCS to assume temporary operational control of such units. The JCS now recommended that when lack of communications prevented a commander from applying to the JCS for such authority in a “dire emergency,” he might assume temporary operational control without further authorization. On 22 January 1952, the Secretary of Defense approved this and the other amendments to the UCP recommended by the JCS.24

In the Far East Command as organized under General MacArthur, there were component commanders for the Air Force and Navy: Commanding General, Far East Air Forces (CG FEAF) and Commander, Naval Forces, Far East (COMNAVF). General MacArthur himself, however, retained direct command of Army components, wearing a second hat as Commanding General, Army Forces Far East (CG AFFE). His staff was essentially an Army staff, except for a Joint Strategic Plans and Operations Group (JSPOG), which had Air Force and Navy representation. In 1952, after General MacArthur had left FECOM, the headquarters of Army Forces Far East was fully staffed and placed on a par with the other two component commands, and the Far East Command was given a truly joint staff.25

Interim Revision of the UCP, 1952–1953

The establishment of USEUCOM in July 1952 with attendant changes in the command structure in Europe, as described earlier, pointed to a need for a new UCP. A draft revision submitted by the JCS to the Secretary of Defense on 24 December 1952 incorporated these changes and extended USCINCEUR’s responsibilities to include planning for military operations in Spain and Yugoslavia. At the same time the revision proposed to centralize ASW responsibilities under CINCLANT and CINCPAC in their respective areas, ending the existing situation whereby ASW responsibility in the Atlantic was divided among CINCLANT, CINCNELM, and CINCNE.26

The revised plan also listed those responsibilities given USCINCEUR for coordinating logistical and administrative matters, such as military assistance and base rights negotiation. Because the CSA was listed as the executive agent for USCINCEUR, the plan could be read as broadening the responsibilities of executive agents beyond the sphere of strategic direction
and operational control of forces. This aspect of the plan attracted unfavorable attention from the new administration that took office in January 1953, just after the JCS plan was completed. The new Secretary of Defense, Charles E. Wilson, at once began a review of DOD organization and functions, focusing particularly on the role of executive agents. On 13 February Secretary Wilson instructed the JCS to rewrite the plan to stipulate that USCINCEUR's logistic and administrative responsibilities were exercised on the authority of the Secretary of Defense. Thus revised, the plan was approved by the Secretary on 30 June 1953, purely for use in the preparation of emergency plans and without prejudice to later modifications. The JCS promulgated the plan, with this limitation, on 24 July 1953.\textsuperscript{27}

**DOD Reorganization, 1953: Change in the Executive Agent System**

The Eisenhower administration's review of DOD organization stemmed from a promise made by General Eisenhower during his successful campaign in 1952. The result was a reorganization plan sent to Congress in April 1953. This plan had several objectives, one of which was to strengthen civilian control of the military forces. With this end in view, the President directed that authority to appoint executive agents for unified and specified commands be transferred from the JCS to the Secretary of Defense, who would name the secretary of a military department to act in this capacity for each command (although the Secretaries would be authorized to delegate this responsibility to the military Chiefs of their Services). This change, according to the President, would strengthen civilian control by fixing responsibility along a definite channel of accountable civilian officials. It would also allow the JCS to concentrate on strategic planning and policy advice by freeing them from operational responsibilities.\textsuperscript{28}

The transfer of authority to name executive agents was accomplished by revising the Key West Agreement on 21 April 1948. The Secretary of Defense approved the revision on 1 October 1953 and circulated it on 16 March 1954. On 15 January 1954, he designated the following executive agencies for the unified and specified commands: the Department of the Army for the Far East Command, Caribbean Command, and US European Command; the Department of the Navy for the Atlantic Command, Pacific Command, and US Naval Forces, Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean; and the Department of the Air Force for the Alaskan Command, US Northeast Command, US Air Forces, Europe, and Strategic Air Command.\textsuperscript{29}
Establishment of Air Force Component for CINCPAC

At the beginning of 1954, the US Air Force component commander for CINCPAC also held the position of senior US Air Force officer of the Pacific Division, Military Air Transport Service. Since this officer had no staff as component commander, he could not adequately assist CINCPAC in performing his assigned missions. The Joint Chiefs of Staff on 2 April 1954, in connection with CINCPAC's planning for the defense of Taiwan, directed the CSAF to establish an Air Force component of Pacific Command, with a designated component commander and appropriate staff. To avoid duplication, the component commander was to act as a subordinate commander of CG FEAF on matters pertaining solely to the US Air Force. On 5 June 1954, the CSAF announced that the Pacific Air Force would be established effective 1 July 1954 as the Air Force component command under CINCPAC with headquarters in Hawaii.30

Establishment of Continental Air Defense Command

By 1954 the increasing threat of Soviet atomic air attack on the continental United States led the JCS to establish a command, including forces of all three Services, to defend against this new danger. In arriving at this decision, the JCS were responding, in part, to conclusions reached by the Eisenhower administration on the need to improve continental air defenses, including command arrangements.

The actual form of the new organization, arrived at after lengthy discussion, was a “joint,” rather than a “unified” or “specified” command. This terminology was adopted to allow issuance of terms of reference that might not fit exactly the definitions of these two forms of command organization.31

The JCS informed the Secretary of Defense of their intention to form the Continental Air Defense Command (CONAD) on 25 July 1954; he indicated his approval on 30 July and, in accordance, with a JCS recommendation, named the Secretary of the Air Force as his executive agent for the new command.32


The new command was to consist initially of the US Air Force Air Defense Command, the US Army Antiaircraft Command, and a naval command composed of the forces of the contiguous naval radar coverage
system. Forces of the seaward extensions of the early warning system (as
distinct from contiguous forces) were to continue under CINCLANT and
CINCPAC, and the early warning installations in Alaska and US Northeast
Command were to continue under CINCAL and CINCNE.33

The Unified Command Plan, 1955

Earlier, Secretary Wilson had directed the JCS to make recommendations
to him with respect to the unified command system areas and executive agent
responsibilities. In studying these matters the JCS came to the conclusion that
because of unsettled world conditions, no major revisions in the command
structure should be made at that time. They agreed instead to bring the limited
interim UCP of 24 July 1953 into line with the revised Key West Agreement and
the establishment of CONAD. After considerable review and personal
consultation with the Secretary of Defense, the JCS submitted a revised UCP for
his approval on 18 February 1955. The only substantive changes from the
earlier version involved those necessitated by the creation of CONAD and the
establishment of an early warning system. On 2 March 1955, the Secretary of
Defense approved this revision of the UCP and directed the JCS to keep the
unified command structure under continuing review, reporting to him on the
subject at least once each year. The plan was distributed on 9 March 1955.34

Changes in Terms of Reference for CONAD

After two years' experience with the command arrangements they had
established for CONAD, the JCS concluded that the "double hatted"
arrangement by which CINCONAD was also commander of the Air Force
Component (Air Defense Command) was not desirable. They accordingly
informed the Secretary of Defense on 5 June 1956 that CINCONAD should not
serve as the commander of the Air Defense Command but should establish a
separate and distinct headquarters (including a joint staff) for CONAD and
exercise operational control over all components and assigned forces. However,
the JCS could not agree on the meaning of "operational control." The CJCS,
supported by the CMC, CSAF, and CNO, wanted a clear and unequivocal
delegation of authority to CINCONAD to centralize control of all operations
down to the assignment of targets to individual antiaircraft batteries. The CSA,
who was particularly concerned that Army antiaircraft unit commanders would
lose the right to engage targets of opportunity, insisted that CINCONAD share
responsibility for operational control with his component commanders through
a requirement to "coordinate" with them. However, the JCS were all in
agreement that CINCONAD's responsibilities should be strengthened by
assigning him specific responsibility to submit estimates of force and weapons
requirements to the JCS. The Secretary of Defense resolved the split in favor of the JCS majority; the new terms of reference were issued to CINCONAD on 4 September 1956.35

Reorganization in 1956: Abolition of CINCFE

The first of the annual reviews of the UCP directed by the Secretary of Defense was carried out by the JCS in 1956. On 4 June of that year they submitted a revised UCP, in which they proposed some important changes. The responsibilities of CONAD would be enlarged to include air defense of Alaska and the Northeast. The US Northeast Command would be abolished. The Alaskan Command would continue but with sharply reduced responsibility, since it would also lose the mission of protecting sea communications in Alaskan waters, which would be assumed by CINCPAC. In Europe, USAFE would be abolished as a specified command but would continue as the Air Force component of USEUCOM. A Middle East Command (MECOM) would be established some time in the future, at which time the Navy specified command, CINCNEELM, would be abolished. (CINCNEELM had already been relieved of responsibility for preparing plans for the Middle East, which had been assigned to an OCJS committee, the Joint Middle East Planning Committee.) CINCARIB’s status would be considerably altered. His responsibility for defending the US against attack through the Caribbean and for security of bases and possessions in that sea would be transferred to CINCLANT. On the other hand, CINCARIB would become responsible for representing US interests and administering the Mutual Defense Assistance Program (MDAP) in Central and South America (less Mexico); he would also continue to administer the MDAP in the Caribbean Islands. The plan also provided that, unless specifically authorized, no unified commander was to exercise direct command of any of the Service components or of a subordinate force. This would mean that CINCPAC would no longer exercise direct command of the Pacific Fleet, as he had been doing.

The future of the Far East Command was the subject of a disagreement, which the JCS referred to the Secretary of Defense for decision. Four of the members recommended that CINCFE be abolished and his functions turned over to CINCPAC. They believed that the divided command in the Western Pacific-Far East area should be abolished, particularly in view of the dwindling US military strength in Japan and Korea, which cast doubt on the advisability of a separate command for that region. The lone dissenter was the CSA, who argued that an attempt to split up CINCFE’s multiple functions—as a US commander, as commander of the UNC in Korea, and as military governor of the Ryukyu Islands—would produce inefficiency and higher costs. He wanted the Far East Command to be expanded, with CINCFE given responsibility for Southeast Asia, Taiwan, Indonesia, and the Philippines, places where the CSA
perceived a growing communist threat. Especially, he wanted CINCFE to assume the supervision of military assistance in those regions.\textsuperscript{36}

The Secretary of Defense approved the proposed new UCP on 21 June 1956. In so doing, he approved the disestablishment of CINCFE, effective 1 July 1957. The President subsequently approved his decisions, and the revised plan was distributed on 3 July 1956. A JCS directive had already abolished USAFE as a specified command on 1 July. The US Northeast Command was disestablished effective 1 September 1956.\textsuperscript{37}

An outline plan for disestablishing CINCFE and redistributing his responsibilities was approved by the JCS and the Secretary of Defense and took effect on 1 July 1957. A subordinate unified command under CINCPAC was established in Japan: Commander, US Forces (COMUS) Japan. The senior US Army officer in Korea was designated Commander, US Forces, Korea (COMUSKOREA), directly subordinate to the Commanding General, US Army, Pacific (CG USARPAC); he was also named CINCUNC. CG, USARPAC became governor of the Ryukyu Islands.\textsuperscript{38}

CINCPAC, whose responsibilities were enlarged upon the disappearance of FECOM, gave up direct command of the Pacific Fleet, in accord with the UCP of 3 July 1956. He delegated this command to the Deputy CINCPAC. Later (13 January 1958), the Deputy position was abolished and replaced by Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet (CINCPACFLT), as the naval component command of PACOM.\textsuperscript{39}

The disestablishment of FECOM was reflected in a revised UCP drawn up by the JCS in 1957 following their annual review of the unified command system. During this review, at the direction of the Deputy Secretary of Defense, they examined the advisability of retaining ALCOM. They concluded that, despite ALCOM's reduced responsibilities, its strategic location and its responsibilities for ground defense of the Alaska area justified its retention.\textsuperscript{40}

**Establishment of CINCNORAD; Alteration of CINCONAD's Status**

In September 1957 a combined US–Canadian command, the North American Air Defense Command (NORAD), was established to defend the Continental United States, Canada, and Alaska against air attack. At that time CINCONAD was also designated CINCNORAD, and the establishment of this US–Canadian command made a new directive for CINCONAD necessary. The Joint Chiefs of Staff accordingly issued terms of reference to CINCONAD, effective 10 June 1958. CINCONAD was designated senior US officer in NORAD headquarters and given operational control over US forces assigned to him in carrying out the following missions: defending US installations in Greenland against air attack; assisting in the defense of Canada and Mexico;
and coordinating and implementing purely national matters pertaining to the air defense of the continental United States and Alaska.\textsuperscript{41}

\textbf{Department of Defense Reorganization, 1958}

By 1958 President Eisenhower had become convinced that rapidly developing military technology, as dramatized by the launching of the first Soviet satellite, Sputnik, demanded a more unified and streamlined chain of command to deploy combat forces. The days of separate land, sea and air warfare were over, the President believed; therefore complete unification of all military planning and combat forces and commands was essential. To this end, the President proposed and the Congress enacted the Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1958, amending the National Security Act of 1947.

The new law authorized the President, acting through the Secretary of Defense and with the advice of the JCS, to establish unified and specified commands, to assign missions to them, and to determine their force structure. This provision did not alter procedure or confer any new authorities, since under the 1947 law the JCS had taken these actions subject to the “authority and direction” of the President. The intent of the new law was to establish a clear line of command from the President through the Secretary, with the JCS as the Secretary’s operational staff. The commanders of unified and specified commands were made responsible to the President and Secretary of Defense for carrying out assigned missions and were delegated full “operational command” over forces assigned to them. Forces, once assigned, could only be transferred with presidential approval. However, responsibility for administration of these forces remained with the respective Military Departments.\textsuperscript{42}

By separate executive action, the President, through the Secretary of Defense, discontinued the designation of military departments as executive agents for unified and specified commands. Henceforth, the chain of command would run from the President to the Secretary of Defense to the unified and specified commanders. The Joint Chiefs of Staff were assigned to serve as the Secretary’s staff in performing this function. Orders issued by them to the commands would be in the name of, and under the authority of, the Secretary of Defense.\textsuperscript{43}

Necessary revisions of the UCP to bring it into conformity with the Defense Reorganization Act were approved by the President and issued by the Secretary of Defense, based on JCS recommendations, on 4 September 1958. They were issued to the commanders on 8 September. This revised plan redesignated CONAD a unified rather than a joint command. It also authorized component commanders to communicate directly with their Service Chiefs on administration, personnel, training, doctrine, logistics, communications, and other matters of uniservice interest.\textsuperscript{44}
The Secretary of Defense, again on JCS advice, took an additional step to implement the Reorganization Act on 2 February 1959, when he approved a definition for "operational command," as delegated by the Act to commanders of unified and specified commands. It contained the following elements: to direct the composition of subordinate forces, assign tasks, designate objectives, control overall assigned resources, and exercise full authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission. Operational command would be exercised through Service component commanders or commanders of subordinate commands, if established. This definition was included in the 1963 revision of the UCP and amended to state specifically that operational command did not include such matters as administration, discipline, internal organization, and unit training.46

The Revised Unified Command Plan, 1961

A revised UCP was approved by the President on 30 December 1960 and issued to commanders on 4 February 1961. It introduced only one significant substantive change in existing authorities of unified and specified commanders: deletion of the authority for a commander, in times of dire emergency, to assert operational command of forces scheduled for, or actually engaged in, operations under war plans approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This deletion was made on the recommendation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who feared the consequences to the orderly conduct of operations that might result from a diversion of forces by a unified or specified commander. Of particular concern was any diversion of SAC forces engaged in assigned general war missions, where centralized control over timing, penetration, and weight of effort were essential to a successful effort. Of lesser concern were the possible adverse effects of diversions of naval and ground forces transiting a unified command area en route to accomplish assigned missions in other areas. In addition, provisions of CINCONAD's terms of reference were incorporated in the UCP and his separate terms of reference rescinded.46

Refining Mediterranean and Middle Eastern Responsibilities

Political developments in the Middle East, Africa, and the Caribbean during the 1960s presented new challenges to the United States and called for adjustments in the military command structure. The first of these changes concerned the Middle East. Pending activation of a Middle East Command, CINCNELM was acting as specified commander responsible for the conduct of operations in countries east of Libya and south of Turkey, and in the Arabian
and Red Seas and the Bay of Bengal. In 1959, however, reconsideration of this temporary arrangement became necessary because the Department of State opposed creation of a military command in the Middle East. When queried by the JCS, USCINCEUR and CINCNELM each insisted that he was best qualified to assume Middle East planning responsibilities. The Army and Air Force Chiefs of Staff agreed with USCINCEUR, on grounds that assignment of these functions to CINCNELM might violate the 1958 Reorganization Act’s concept of unity of command and that it was “an anomaly” for CINCNELM, a subordinate of USCINCEUR, to exercise operational control over the forces of his superior. In fact, they favored disestablishment of CINCNELM as a specified command. But the CNO and the Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC) maintained that experiences in Suez and Lebanon demonstrated the necessity for retaining a specified commander (i.e., CINCNELM) unencumbered by NATO responsibilities.47

Concurrently, two additional problems arose. First, the CNO proposed that CINCNELM’s title, in his capacity as naval component commander to USCINCEUR, should be changed to USCINCNAVYEUR—an appellation more descriptive of his responsibilities in USEUCOM. Second, the CSAF complained about CINCNELM’s practice of identifying himself as Commander in Chief, Specified Command, Middle East (CINCSPECOMME), saying that the JCS had neither recognized nor authorized that title. The CNO, in rebuttal, defended the use of the title as “a very practical and customary means of facilitating the performance of CINCNELM’s Middle East mission.”48

In February 1960 the Secretary of Defense settled these questions on the basis of an “interim solution” suggested by the JCS Chairman. First, CINCNELM was renamed CINCNAVYEUR when acting in his component capacity. Second, CINCNELM was confirmed as a specified commander and authorized to carry out contingency and general war planning and to continue coordinated planning with the British. Third, CINCNELM would cease using the title CINCSPECOMME. If he conducted operations in the Middle East, he would do so as CINCNELM.49

CINCLANT’s Assumption of African Tasks

Communist penetration of the chaos-ridden Congo created another set of new command problems. In November 1960, the Secretary of Defense gave CINCLANT the responsibility for plans and operations pertaining to sub-Saharan Africa; he also instructed CINCLANT to establish a small Joint Task Force Headquarters (JTF-4) under an Army lieutenant general. Several months later, in response to a JCS request, Secretary Robert S. McNamara changed the UCP’s wording so that CINCLANT no longer bore responsibility for “routine” matters in sub-Saharan Africa but was, instead, responsible for contingency planning and for commanding any JCS-directed operations.50
A controversy arose over whether CINCLANT was now excluded from "routine" sub-Saharan operations. The CNO and the CMC recommended that he assume responsibilities similar to those assigned to all other unified commanders. The CSA and CSAF asked that the matter be deferred to allow further study. In July 1961 Secretary McNamara apportioned sub-Saharan responsibilities as follows: Military Assistance Program (MAP) to USCINCEUR and the Secretary of the Army, Congo air evacuation to USCINCEUR, and the Congo sea evacuation to CINCLANT.51

Command Changes for Cuban Operations

The emergence of a communist regime in Cuba added to CINCLANT's burdens. In April 1961 CINCLANT asked the JCS to activate Army and Air Force components (CINCARLANT and CINCAFLANT) already authorized under general provisions of the UCP. He cited, as justification, increased planning requirements for Cuba and the Congo. In July the CNO and the CMC recommended to their colleagues that CINCARLANT and CINCAFLANT be activated. The CSA and CSAF replied that Tactical Air Command (TAC) and Continental Army Command (CONARC) were already giving CINCLANT sufficient planning support. Secretary McNamara’s decision was as follows. First, CINCLANT should be provided with an adequate staff; the JCS Chairman would decide how many Army and Air Force officers should be so assigned and whether their billets would be permanent. Additionally, COMTAC and CG, CONARC, were told to designate interim Army and Air Force component commanders, who would assist in Cuban contingency planning. They chose CG, XVIII Airborne Corps, and Commander, 19th Air Force. The Secretary did not authorize any further steps at that time because CINCLANT possessed no significant Air Force and Army units and JTF-4 supplied adequate support for sub-Saharan planning.52

The Cuban missile crisis tested CINCLANT’s supporting organization. On 20 October 1962, when the quarantine of Cuba was being prepared, CINCLANT designated COMTAC and CG, CONARC, as interim Air Force and Army component commanders for contingency planning. (In September, on his own initiative, COMTAC had assumed the duties of CINCAFLANT). Also, CINCLANT changed the invasion plan by naming CG, CONARC, rather than CG, XVIII Airborne Corps, as Commander, Joint Task Force—Cuba. CINCLANT intended to exercise “operational command” of Service task forces through the component commanders. On 21 October, the JCS transferred from CINCSTRIKE to CINCLANT temporary operational control of all Army and Air Force units involved in Cuban operations. Next day, CINCLANT promulgated a new command structure. The CG, XVIII Airborne Corps was redesignated CJTF—Cuba; he would report directly to CINCLANT. Thus CG, CONARC, was effectively excluded from the operational chain of command.53
The CNO believed that the Cuban missile crisis clearly demonstrated CINCLANT's need for full-time Army and Air Force component commanders, which every other unified commander possessed. Accordingly, in December 1962, he recommended to the JCS that COMTAC and CG, CONARC, be so designated. No action was taken at the time, however. It was not until December 1966 that COMTAC and CG, CONARC, were designated component commanders for CINCLANT.54

During the 1965 Dominican intervention, CINCLANT again exercised operational control over Service task force commanders. A Navy vice admiral supervised evacuation of US citizens and Marine landings; an Army lieutenant general became US Commander, Dominican Republic.55

Establishment of Strike Command

In 1961 general purpose forces available in CONUS for fast overseas deployment consisted of the Strategic Army Corps (STRAC), containing the combat-ready units in Continental Army Command; the composite air strike forces of Tactical Air Command (TAC); and Navy and Marine Corps units not assigned to unified commands. In March 1961 Secretary of Defense McNamara ordered the JCS to develop a plan for integrating STRAC and TAC into a unified command.56

The JCS Chairman, the CSA, and the CSAF endorsed this idea, provided that the new command eventually included Navy and Marine Corps units. But the CNO objected that the inherent flexibility of naval forces would be sacrificed if assigned to a command tailored to STRAC and TAC. He suggested instead that troop carrier and ground-support aircraft be made organic to the Army or that a joint task force be organized that would train air-ground teams for augmentation of existing commands. Similarly, the CMC argued that development of a "doctrine" for joint Army-Air Force operations would suffice.57

Secretary McNamara ruled in favor of the proposed new command. United States Strike Command (USSTRICOM) was activated on 1 January 1962 under an Army general. USSTRICOM assumed operational control over the combat-ready forces of TAC and CONARC. Its missions were to provide a general reserve for reinforcement of other unified commands, train assigned forces, develop joint doctrine, and plan for and execute contingency operations if ordered by the JCS. It had no regional responsibilities.58

In the drafting of an amendment to the UCP incorporating the new command, a further JCS split occurred. The CNO and the CMC wished to include a statement that USSTRICOM would comprise only Army and Air Force units. Their colleagues considered such a statement unnecessary and, indeed, incompatible with the basic considerations appropriately included in the UCP. Secretary McNamara approved their view, and an amendment formally
incorporating USSTRICOM into the UCP, omitting the restrictive limitation on forces, was promulgated in October 1962.\textsuperscript{59}

**Altered Arrangements for the Middle East and Africa**

In December 1962 a US military commitment in the Congo seemed possible. Consequently, the Chairman requested a review of planning and operational responsibilities in sub-Saharan Africa. Under current arrangements, CINCLANT carried the responsibility for planning and conducting operations in this area. The JTF–4 acted as his executive agent; if necessary, it would also serve as the nucleus of a theater headquarters. Related responsibilities were USCINCEUR, for North Africa and for "cold war" and MAP matters in the Middle East; CINCNELM, for planning and operations in the Middle East.\textsuperscript{60}

A long inter-Service controversy, which had to be settled by Secretary McNamara, ensued. The Chairman, supported by the CSA and CSAF wanted CINCSTRIKE to be made responsible for planning and force employment in the Middle East, sub-Sahara Africa, and Southern Asia (MEAFSA). They justified this solution from the standpoint of speed and flexibility. Currently, they contended, "LANTCOM and NELM are required to execute operations with forces they do not have, using force employment plans developed by other commands, while USSTRICOM, with the organization and resources, is restricted to non-combatant functions and responsibilities." But the CMC feared that this extension of CINCSTRIKE's responsibilities would lead to creation of a "world-wide General Purpose Forces Command," which he opposed. He therefore advocated assigning all Middle East and Sub-Sahara responsibilities to CINCNELM. The CNO saw no need for major changes; CINCNELM was thoroughly familiar with Middle Eastern problems, and the likelihood of a major military confrontation in Africa struck him as remote.\textsuperscript{61}

Secretary McNamara decided that CINCSTRIKE's responsibilities should expand to include MEAFSA. Since the Department of State voiced concern about African reaction to the title "CINCSTRIKE," he assigned to the commander the concurrent title of "CINCMEAFSA." On 30 November 1963, CINCSTRIKE became responsible for planning and operations in the Middle East, sub-Sahara Africa, and Southern Asia. He also would continue coordinated Middle East planning with the British in London. MEAFSA included the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf; CINCLANT's area encompassed the western Indian Ocean, the Arabian Sea, and the Bay of Bengal. COMTAC and CG, CONARC, became CINCMEAFSA's Air Force and Army component commanders; in 1966, CINCLANT became his naval component. On 1 December 1963, NELM and JTF–4 were disestablished. USCINCEUR no longer faced the paradoxical situation of his naval component commander also being a specified commander responsible to the JCS. Further, the shearing of
USCINCEUR's MAP and Cold War duties in the Middle East reduced USEUCOM to NATO–Europe and North Africa west of Egypt, making it more accurately a European command.\textsuperscript{62}

The Joint Chiefs of Staff submitted to the Secretary of Defense the necessary changes in the UCP to reflect these decisions. He directed that they be incorporated, along with all other recent changes in the complete revision of the Plan. This revision was submitted to the Secretary of Defense on 15 October 1963 and was subsequently approved by the President, with effective date of 1 December 1963.\textsuperscript{63}

Nonetheless, implementing these new arrangements was not without practical difficulties. In 1964, when hostages in the Congo had to be rescued, USCINCEUR, rather than CINCMEAФSA, coordinated the operation because USEUCOM provided the transports that carried the Belgian paratroopers. For the same reason, during the 1967 Middle East war, USEUCOM arranged the evacuation of Americans from Jordan as well as Libya.\textsuperscript{64}

**Redesignation of CARIBCOM as USSOUTHCOM**

On 17 August 1962, the JCS recommended that the Caribbean Command be redesignated US Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM), a title that would more nearly reflect the actual geographical responsibilities of the command (Central America, less Mexico, and South America) and thereby facilitate the relations of CINCARIB with Latin American governments. In addition, the new title would emphasize the interest of the United States in promoting the Alliance for Progress, and in encouraging Latin American countries to tighten internal security against communist subversion. The Secretary of Defense, while not objecting to the change in title, withheld his approval until 1 May 1963 because of Congressional criticism of the Latin American Military Assistance Program. The change in title was announced on 11 June 1963 and was incorporated in the revised UCP of 1 December 1963.\textsuperscript{65}

**Assigning CONAD to Defend against Space Systems**

Political developments were not the only causes for changes in command responsibilities in the early 1960s. Rapidly developing technology also contributed. In June 1963 the Secretary of Defense, concerned that the Soviets might deploy space satellites capable of bombarding the United States, directed the Secretary of the Army to adapt an experimental Nike Zeus unit to attack such space vehicles. This unit was located on Kwajalein, a UN Trust Territory. On Army recommendation, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended that operational control of this Nike Zeus unit, when employed to shoot down satellites, be assigned to CINCONAD. They recommended this
assignment to CINCONAD rather than CINCNORAD (who, as commander responsible for the air defenses of North America, would seem to be the logical choice), because of delicate political and security considerations arising from employing nuclear weapons based on a UN Trust Territory to perform a mission that was, in itself, politically sensitive.66

The Secretary of Defense approved this command arrangement in principle on 29 July; appropriate changes were made in the UCP revision that went into effect on 1 December 1963.67

Command Relations in the Vietnam War

Command over US forces engaged in the war in Vietnam was exercised by CINCPAC, in whose command area the scene of operations lay, and by CINCSAC, who retained command of SAC forces employed in the war. CINCPAC's command authority was delegated to three subordinates: COMUSMACV; Commander in Chief, Pacific Air Forces (CINCPACAF); and, CINCPACFLT.

COMUSMACV, the first of the PACOM subordinate commanders to assume Vietnam responsibilities, was appointed on 8 February 1962 to take control of an expanding US program of advice to South Vietnamese military forces and of operations by US military forces (largely air transport or helicopters) being introduced to support South Vietnamese combat operations. When President Kennedy directed the establishment of a new US command in Vietnam, the Secretary of Defense called for the creation of a new unified command reporting to him through the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff and CINCPAC objected to this arrangement on the grounds that communist pressures throughout Southeast Asia dictated a unified military effort for the area as a whole. They proposed that this could best be accomplished by a subordinate unified command under CINCPAC. This was the solution adopted.68

As the war intensified and US forces entered combat in increasing numbers, USMACV acquired air and naval component commands. The Commanding General, 2d Air Division, became the commander of the air component in 1964 and Deputy COMUSMACV for Air in 1965. In 1966 the 2d Air Division became the 7th Air Force. The air component commander controlled the operations within South Vietnam of all units comprising the 2d Air Division (or 7th Air Force). At first, the Chief of Naval Advisory Group served as Naval Component Commander. When Marine units landed in South Vietnam in 1965, their commander assumed the responsibility of naval component commander for COMUSMACV, a post he held until 1966. At that time, problems inherent in the formation of Navy units for inshore patrol the previous year led to the appointment of a Navy flag officer to the post of Commander, US Naval Forces
Vietnam. He was responsible, under COMUSMACV, for coastal patrols and operations on South Vietnamese inland waters.69

Introduction of substantial US Army ground forces in Vietnam also required establishment of arrangements to assure the necessary command and control over them. After lengthy debate among authorities in Washington, South Vietnam and Pearl Harbor, the decision was made not to create an Army component command under COMUSMACV but to continue COMUSMACV in a double-hatted role as overall commander and commander of Army forces.70

COMUSMACV thus commanded all US forces and operations within South Vietnam and certain naval coastal patrol activities in contiguous waters extending out about 30–40 miles. There was one exception to his command authority, however. Air strikes and naval gunfire support on targets in South Vietnam were provided by the Seventh Fleet, operating under control of CINCPACFLT.71

Decisions to expand the war beyond the boundaries of South Vietnam and adjacent coastal waters gave rise to new command relationships. In general, command of these operations was exercised by CINCPAC’s air and naval component commanders. Responsibility for conducting air attacks on North Vietnam, designated ROLLING THUNDER, was delegated by CINCPAC to CINCPACAF and CINCPACFLT, who directed operations by the 2d Air Division (later 7th Air Force) and 7th Fleet respectively. COMUSMACV participated in ROLLING THUNDER by exercising an informal operational control over the Vietnamese Air Force, thereby avoiding the necessity for creating a combined command structure. The CG, 2d Air Division (7th Air Force), coordinated the efforts of all forces engaged in ROLLING THUNDER. Naval surface operations in North Vietnamese waters were the responsibility of CINCPACFLT.72

The decision, taken in 1965, to employ B-52s against targets in South Vietnam brought SAC units into the war in a program entitled ARC LIGHT. They remained under the command of CINCSAC, who, through his subordinate commanders and with assistance of PACOM, prepared the operations plans and conducted the operations. The targets attacked, however, were first selected by COMUSMACV, refined by CINCPAC, and approved for attack in Washington. In 1966 authority to execute ARC LIGHT strikes was delegated to CINCSAC and CINCPAC, with the proviso that any strike that risked a border violation would require Department of State concurrence.73

Developments in the Late 1960s

Only minor changes in the unified command structure took place in the late 1960s. On 17 June 1967, the JCS granted CINCONAD authority to designate his five regional commands as subordinate unified commands. The rationale was that these regional commands were command and control levels through which operational control was exercised over multi-service and
multipurpose weapon and environmental systems and that air defense required the coordinated contributions of more than a single Service.\textsuperscript{74}

Over two years later, in late 1969, the Joint Chiefs of Staff reviewed the mission, tasks, and organization of USSTRICOM/MEAFSA. They concluded that recent budget restrictions and strategic guidance had lowered the level of forces available for operations in the MEAFSA area. Accordingly, they directed USCINCSTRIKE/USCINCMEAFSA on 18 February 1970 to modify his headquarters to provide a capability to undertake only one contingency operation in the MEAFSA area at one time instead of two, as had previously been stipulated.\textsuperscript{75}

**Blue Ribbon Panel Consideration of the Unified Command System**

In July 1969, the President and the Secretary of Defense appointed a Blue Ribbon Defense Panel, a group of experts from outside the government, to study the organization and management of the Department of Defense. The panel included the “combatant commands” in its study and found the existing structure of eight unified and specified commands cumbersome, imposing “too broad a span of control for a single decision point in time of peace.” Moreover, the panel judged the organization of the commands “excessively layered, unwieldy and unworkable in crises, and too fragmented to provide the best potential for coordinated response to a general war situation.” The panel observed that the area commands did not receive adequate guidance for effective planning and that strategic offensive weapons were divided among several commands. Every crisis within the last decade, the panel said, had required both ad hoc planning and organizational rearrangements.\textsuperscript{76}

In its report to the President on 1 July 1970, the Blue Ribbon Panel recommended a broad reorganization of the Department of Defense that included provision for a Deputy Secretary of Defense for Operations who, among other things, would be responsible for the unified commands. The duties currently delegated to the Joint Chiefs of Staff to serve as the military staff in the operational chain of command for the unified commands would be reassigned to “a senior military officer.” This officer would supervise a separate staff to support military operations and serve as the channel of communication from the President and the Secretary of Defense to the unified commands. The panel also proposed the creation of three major functional commands: a strategic command, including the existing SAC and CONAD; a tactical or general purpose command, incorporating all combatant general purpose forces in the United States assigned to organized combat units; and a logistic command. The panel further proposed to consolidate existing area unified commands into the tactical command by
merging LANTCOM and USSTRICOM, and abolishing ALCOM and USSOUTHCOM. Finally, the panel recommended “unfragmented command authority” for the unified commanders and designation of the component commanders as deputies to the unified commander to make “unmistakably clear” that the combatant forces were in the chain of command that ran exclusively through the unified commander.\textsuperscript{77}

The Unified Command Plan, 1971

The Blue Ribbon Panel recommendations concerning the unified commands resulted in no action. But in the meantime, an extensive review of the commands had been undertaken within the Department of Defense. Deputy Secretary David A. Packard initiated this review in September 1969. He directed a study of the need for the US Southern Command. As part of a continuing effort to reduce the US presence overseas, the resulting study, dated 1 March 1970, found a unified combatant command in Latin America incompatible with a policy of low US visibility and with “military requirements.” It therefore recommended disestablishment of USSOUTHCOM and transfer of essential missions to other unified commands. The JCS, however, did not agree. They favored retention of SOUTHCOM, believing that the benefits of “an area-oriented senior US military command” in Latin America outweighed the advantage of the small reduction in US military presence accomplished by the command’s abolition.\textsuperscript{78}

After further review, Deputy Secretary Packard decided to recommend to the President the disestablishment of USSOUTHCOM but, at JCS request, deferred this action, pending an overall review of the unified command structure. Thereupon, the JCS conducted a review but could not reach agreement and forwarded divergent views to the Secretary of Defense on 17 November 1970.\textsuperscript{79}

The JCS remained united in opposing the disestablishment of USSOUTHCOM. Such an action, they believed, would not be in the best interests of the United States in light of the unsettled political conditions in Latin America and the continued evidence of Soviet political and military interest in the region. The JCS also agreed that SAC and CONAD should be retained without change. On other issues, however, they could not reach a consensus. Major questions were the redistribution of the USSOUTHCOM responsibilities should the President decide to abolish the command and the responsibility for the MEAFSA area. The CSA and CSAF would reassign the Middle East to USEUCOM, assign Latin America and the Caribbean Islands to USSTRICOM, and redesignate LANTCOM a specified command. The CNO, however, would abolish USSTRICOM/CINCMEDAFSA and USSOUTHCOM as well as ALCOM. The USCINCMEDAFSA area would be divided as follows: southern Asia to PACOM, the Middle East to USEUCOM, and Africa south of
the Sahara to LANTCOM. The USSTRICOM training and augmentation functions as well as the USSOUTHCOM area would go to LANTCOM and the ALCOM responsibilities would be divided between CONAD and PACOM. The CMC supported the CNO position except to propose that USSTRICOM be redesignated the US Readiness Command (USREDCOM), with unchanged responsibilities.\textsuperscript{80}

These differences were ultimately resolved between Deputy Secretary Packard and the JCS, and the following changes to the Unified Command Plan recommended to the President on 5 March 1971: (1) extension of USEUCOM to include “the Mediterranean littoral, the Red Sea, Persian Gulf, and Iran”; (2) adjustment of the PACOM area to join with USEUCOM east of Iran and with LANTCOM west of South America and east of Africa, in such a way that LANTCOM would have responsibility for the waters surrounding South America and Africa; (3) retention of ALCOM as a unified command, but with area responsibility altered to assign PACOM the Aleutian Islands; (4) disestablishment of USSOUTHCOM and USSTRICOM/USCINCMC/USAFSA, with area responsibility for Africa south of the Sahara and Latin America unassigned, except for the defense of the Canal Zone, which was assigned to LANTCOM, and with contingency planning for these areas (primarily evacuation and disaster relief) retained by the Joint Chiefs of Staff; (5) and establishment of a new unified command, US Readiness Command (USREDCOM), without area responsibility and consisting of CONUS-based forces to reinforce other unified commands. Both SAC and CONAD would be retained without change. These revisions in the command structure, the Deputy Secretary of Defense explained to the President, adjusted area responsibilities of the major unified commands in a more logical way, improved the responsiveness of the world-wide command structure, reduced manpower and costs, and were consistent with the recommendations of the Blue Ribbon Panel. Mr. Packard indicated, however, that the Army had reservations over the disestablishment of USSOUTHCOM and the proposed arrangement for the Canal Zone.\textsuperscript{81}

On 21 April 1971 President Nixon approved all the proposed changes to the Unified Command Plan except for the disestablishment of USSOUTHCOM. That action he deferred, pending “a clarification of the political and diplomatic implications of such a move.” Thereafter, Deputy Secretary Packard directed implementation of the President’s decisions, and on 30 June 1971 the Joint Chiefs of Staff issued a new Unified Command Plan to be effective 1 January 1972, superseding the version of 20 November 1963.\textsuperscript{82}

Accordingly, on 31 December 1971 USSTRICOM was disestablished and replaced the following day by USREDCOM. CINCSTRIKE became USCINCREDC; his headquarters remained at MacDill Air Force Base, Florida. The new command was tasked with providing a general reserve of combat-ready forces to reinforce other unified commands, conducting joint training and exercises with assigned forces, and developing recommendations to the Joint Chiefs of Staff regarding doctrine and “techniques for the joint employment of forces
assigned." In essence, USREDCOM was a redesignated USSTRICOM divested of its MEAFSA responsibilities.83

On 1 January 1972 the various adjustments in the command areas took place. USCINCEUR became responsible for the entire Mediterranean littoral, the Middle East, the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf, and Iran. CINCPAC assumed responsibility for the countries of southern Asia, much of the Indian Ocean, the Aleutian Islands, and part of the Arctic Ocean. CINCLANT's area in the Indian Ocean was reduced appropriately. In the previous Unified Command Plan, CINCLANT and CINCPAC were charged with planning for submarine, anti-submarine, and mining operations, together with the control and protection of shipping in the Atlantic, Pacific, and Indian Oceans. Now the new plan assigned this planning mission to CINCLANT, CINCPAC, and USCINCEUR, in coordination with CINCSAC, to cover not only the Atlantic, Pacific, and Indian Oceans, but the Arctic Ocean and the Mediterranean Sea as well.84

The President took no further action to eliminate USSOUTHCOM and it continued to be responsible for normal operations, other than air defense and protection of sea communications, in Central and South America (less Mexico). The new Unified Command Plan contained only one change for USSOUTHCOM. Except for the defense of the Panama Canal and the Canal Zone, USCINCSO was to orient contingency planning primarily to evacuation and disaster relief. ALCOM, now shorn of responsibility for the Aleutian Islands, also continued without change. Six months previously, however, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had approved the disestablishment of the ALCOM naval component, the Alaskan Sea Frontier, effective 30 June 1971. Thereafter, responsibility for sea areas contiguous to ALCOM was given to the Commander, Hawaiian Sea Frontier, and CINCPAC assigned a liaison officer to CINCAL's headquarters to provide necessary operational and planning information with regard to the sea approaches to Alaska.85

No changes were made in the Unified Command Plan between 1 January 1972 and 1 July 1975, but a number of related developments did occur. With the signature of the Vietnam Agreement in January 1973 and the subsequent withdrawal of US combat forces from South Vietnam, the US Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), the subordinate unified command under CINCPAC responsible for the conduct of combat operations in Vietnam, was disestablished on 29 March 1973. There now remained in PACOM four subordinate unified commands: US Forces, Korea; US Forces, Japan; US Taiwan Defense Command; and US Military Assistance Command, Thailand; and one multi-Service Headquarters, the US Support Activities Group (USSAG). The last named organization was activated in Thailand on 11 February 1973 in order to retain a capability for resumption of air and naval support to friendly forces in South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. The USSAG was subsequently disestablished on 30 June 1975 and the US Military Assistance Command, Thailand, on 1 October 1976. None of these subordinate organizations, however, were provided for in the Unified Command Plan.86
In the interest of streamlining a major command headquarters as well as saving nearly 900 military and civilian personnel spaces, the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved on 24 April 1973 the consolidation of the Headquarters, CONAD, with the headquarters of its Air Force component, the Aerospace Defense Command (ADC). Included in this action was provision for the Commander, ADC, to be raised to a four-star position, with CINCONAD now serving concurrently as Commander, ADC. Simultaneously, a new Deputy CINCONAD position was established and filled by the concurrent assignment of the Commanding General, US Army Air Defense Command (ARADCOM), the Army component of CONAD. This consolidation did not affect the structure of the US–Canadian North American Air Defense Command (NORAD); CINCONAD/Commander ADC continued as CINCNORAD. With Secretary of Defense and presidential sanction, the consolidation entered into effect on 1 July 1973. Subsequently the Joint Chiefs of Staff studied, but did not act on, the consolidation of the Headquarters, ARADCOM, with the Headquarters CONAD/ADC.87

On 5 October 1973 the Secretary of Defense directed a review of DOD headquarters with the goal of achieving substantial economies in manpower requirements. He specifically included the unified commands in the review and asked for the impact of 10, 20, and 30 percent reductions in the overall strengths of their headquarters. The JCS provided analyses of the impacts as requested but warned that such reductions would result in loss of flexibility and responsiveness. They pointed out that the unified command system had been restructured on 1 January 1972 and argued that this structure provided a sound basis of organization and should not be altered. Thereafter, the Secretary of Defense took no immediate action to reduce the headquarters of the unified commands.88

Responding to the same Secretary of Defense directive, the Army took various actions in 1974 to reduce headquarters, notably by disestablishing the Army component headquarters in PACOM, ALCOM, and USOUTHCOM. In USOUTHCOM the Army discontinued US Army Forces, Southern Command (USARSO), on 31 October 1974. The 193d Infantry Brigade (Canal Zone) assumed the Army component functions while retaining its mission for the defense of the Canal Zone. The US Army Pacific (USARPAC) was disestablished on 31 December 1974. It was replaced by the US Army CINCPAC Support Group, a field operating agency of the Army charged with providing liaison, advice, and assistance to and coordinating with the CINCPAC Headquarters and the PACOM Service components on Army matters; assisting CINCPAC Headquarters in preparation of plans; and preparing primary Army supporting plans for all areas of PACOM except Korea and Japan. In ALCOM, the 172d Infantry Brigade (Alaska) replaced the US Army Alaska (USARAL) as the Army component on 1 January 1975 and Headquarters, USARAL, was disestablished.89
1974–1975 Review

The CSA initiated a review of the UCP in 1974. In connection with reductions of Army headquarters, he also reappraised the structure of the unified and specified commands, in light of current political attitudes, manpower and budget realities. He also established strategic concepts for security of US interests. As a consequence, on 11 January 1974, the CSA recommended a JCS review of the UCP and the submission of appropriate revisions to the Secretary of Defense and the President.90

The Joint Chiefs of Staff did study the command structure and provided their recommendations to the Secretary of Defense on 19 March 1974. They favored retention of both USEUCOM and SAC without change and recommended disestablishment of USSOUTHCOM, ALCOM and CONAD. Whereas they had strenuously opposed abolition of USSOUTHCOM in 1969 to 1970, they had now changed their minds. In its place they proposed an austere Latin American Mutual Security Assistance Headquarters for security assistance and representational functions. With respect to planning for defense of the Canal Zone, emergency evacuation, and disaster relief, they did not agree. The CSA and CSAF wanted the mission to go to USREDCOM, while the CNO and CMC, supported by the Chairman, favored LANTCOM. To replace CONAD, the JCS proposed designation of the USAF Aerospace Defense Command (ADCOM) as a specified command to take over all the CONAD responsibilities, exercise operational command of Army air defense elements, and serve as CINC NORAD. The ALCOM air defense responsibilities would be assumed by CINC NORAD/CIN CAdCOM; other US forces remaining in Alaska would be administered by their respective Military Departments.

With regard to LANTCOM, PACOM, and USREDCOM, as well as command arrangements for the Middle East/Indian Ocean area, the Joint Chiefs of Staff could not agree. The CNO, the CMC, and the Chairman favored retention of LANTCOM as a unified command; the CSA and CSAF proposed that it be disestablished and the Atlantic Fleet be designated a specified command responsible for the sea areas currently assigned to LANTCOM. There was a similar split over PACOM, with CSA and CSAF proposing that the Pacific Fleet replace it as a specified command, while the other JCS members supported its retention. In addition, the CSA and CSAF proposed two new mission-oriented unified commands in the western Pacific and eastern Asia as well as a Northeast Asia Command for Korea, Japan, and Okinawa and a Southwest Pacific Command. The CSA and CSAF would keep USREDCOM as currently constituted and assign it responsibility to provide joint task forces for operations in the Caribbean and defense of the Canal Zone. The CNO, CMC, and Chairman recommended elimination of USREDCOM and its replacement with a joint training and exercise headquarters, under the Joint Chiefs of Staff, for planning and scheduling joint training. Deployment planning in support of other unified commands would be provided for by separate JCS directive.
The 1973 Middle East crisis had caused "increased awareness" of US and Free World interests both in that area and the Indian Ocean. The JCS Chairman recommended the establishment of a new mobile Joint Task Force Command for the entire area, responsible to the Secretary of Defense through the Joint Chiefs of Staff for security assistance, defense of the sea lines of communication (including planning), emergency evacuation, and disaster relief. The other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, however, wanted no change in the existing arrangements. The CSA, CSAF and CMC did propose a definition of US military interests and objectives in the area, to be followed by a reconsideration of command structure. In the meantime, the CNO and CMC wanted an immediate change in the PACOM area to include the entire Indian Ocean, but the CSA and CSAF opposed any changes, pending completion of the study of US military interests and objectives.91

Over five months later, on 3 September 1974, Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger announced his decision on the Unified Command Plan. He intended to recommend to the President retention of PACOM, USREDCOM, USEUCOM, and LANTCOM as unified commands and SAC as a specified command. He wanted both realignment of responsibilities and missions for the unified commands to improve organizational effectiveness and reductions in headquarters. He did not plan to recommend any changes in existing arrangements for the Middle East and Indian Ocean at that time, but he did ask the Joint Chiefs of Staff to study alternative command relations for the area. Finally, he accepted the JCS recommendations to disestablish CONAD (with ADCOM as a replacement) and to eliminate ALCOM and USSOUTHCOM. He instructed the JCS to be prepared to disestablish USSOUTHCOM as early as 30 June 1975, though the actual date would be timed to allow flexibility for the US delegation in the Panama Canal treaty negotiations.

The Secretary provided specific guidance for the realignment of missions and responsibilities for the unified commands. In PACOM, he wanted substantial reductions in all headquarters by means of consolidation or elimination of redundant activities. In the event of war, the Secretary would decide whether operational control of forces assigned to PACOM would continue under CINCPAC or be transferred for activation of a Northeast Asia Command, a Southwest Pacific Command, and other regional commands and task forces as necessary. In USEUCOM, US and NATO headquarters were to be consolidated as far as possible. Secretary Schlesinger also directed a 15 percent reduction in LANTCOM Headquarters. In addition to its existing tasks of reinforcing other commands and conducting joint training, he made USREDCOM responsible for contingency planning and provision of joint task force headquarters staff for the conduct of future joint operations. The Secretary did not intend, he added, to authorize additional assets or to assign any geographical responsibility for USREDCOM.92

To incorporate these decisions, the JCS drafted a revised UCP, which the Secretary submitted to the President on 17 December 1974. All the changes, he told the President, were in the "interests of management
effectiveness and the efficient use of resources" and were part of the overall
effort to reduce the layering of headquarters and to streamline command
relationships. On 24 February 1975 the President approved the changes as
submitted by the Secretary of Defense except for the disestablishment of
USSOUTHCOM. He held that action in abeyance pending receipt of plans for
the allocation of residual functions.93

Later, on 21 April 1975, the Secretary of Defense advised the President
that USSOUTHCOM should not be disestablished, pending the resolution of
the Panama Canal negotiations. Once they were concluded, the Secretary
intended to "move to a renamed and smaller unified command." In the interim,
he planned to reduce the size and grade structure of the USSOUTHCOM
Headquarters. As a result, the President took no action to eliminate
USSOUTHCOM, and on 6 June 1975 the Secretary of Defense directed that the
size and grade structure in the Canal Zone be reduced to the utmost.94

The Joint Chiefs of Staff issued a new Unified Command Plan on 27
June 1975, to enter into force on 1 July 1975. Changes in the general
guidance of the Plan were primarily editorial, but the Joint Chiefs of Staff did
add the statement that Service forces assigned to unified and specified
commands "will be organized by the Service to support accomplishment of
the unified or specified command mission."

The new plan deleted ALCOM and CONAD and established the Aerospace
Defense Command (ADCOM) as a specified command. CINCAD was responsible
for the aerospace defense of CONUS and Alaska under circumstances requiring
unilateral action by the United States. This was essentially the same mission
previously assigned to CONAD, with the additional responsibility for air
defenses of Alaska. CINCAD also served as CINCNORAD and in this latter
capacity had primary responsibility to defend CONUS, Alaska, and Canada
against air attack. As CINCAD, he would exercise operational command for
aerospace defense of CONUS and Alaska "only in the event of action by Canada
and the United States which makes it impossible for CINCNORAD to exercise
this assigned responsibility." In addition, CINCAD was charged with defense
against "space systems," air defense of bases in Greenland, and assistance in
the air defense of Mexico in accordance with approved plans and agreements.

In accord with the Secretary of Defense's decision, the new Unified
Command Plan assigned USREDCOM the additional task of conducting
planning and providing joint task force headquarters and forces for
contingency operations as well as planning for disaster relief and emergency
evacuation in areas not assigned to other unified commands. These areas
included Africa south of the Sahara, the Malagasy Republic, Canada,
Greenland, Mexico, Antarctica, Alaska, and CONUS. The new plan
continued LANTCOM, USEUCOM, PACOM, and SAC without change but
deleted the responsibility of CINCLANT, CINCPAC, and USCINCEUR, in
coordination with CINCSAC, to plan for submarine, anti-submarine, and
mining operations and for protection of shipping throughout the Atlantic, Pacific, Indian, and Arctic Oceans and the Mediterranean Sea.\textsuperscript{95}

The new command arrangements became effective on 1 July 1975. CONAD and its regional headquarters were disestablished on 30 June, with ADCOM activated the following day as a specified command. (The CONAD Army component, ARADCOM, had already been disestablished effective 4 January 1974.) ALCOM was disestablished on 1 July 1975 as well. USSOUTHCOM continued without change in mission, but, in accordance with the Secretary of Defense's directive, its size and structure were reduced (for example, the Commander's billet was downgraded from four to three stars). In addition, Headquarters, US Naval Forces Southern Command, and Headquarters, US Air Forces Southern Command, were disestablished on 31 December, the Navy and Air Force components of the Command becoming the US Naval Station, Panama Canal, and the USAF Southern Air Division. In a later action, on 8 October 1975, the Joint Chiefs of Staff gave USCINCPAC the additional responsibility for joint contingency planning, other than aerospace defense, for Alaska.\textsuperscript{96}

In the meantime, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had by separate actions directed reduction in the Headquarters, USEUCOM, as well as planning for the activation of regional commands in the PACOM area in compliance with the Secretary of Defense's earlier guidance on improved organizational effectiveness of the commands. They had, however, deferred action on reducing LANTCOM Headquarters by 15 percent as requested by Mr. Schlesinger.\textsuperscript{97} Then, on 22 October 1975, the Secretary asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff to review further the tasking of the unified commands to eliminate or reduce outdated tasks. He also directed the following manpower reductions in the headquarters of the commands: 20 percent in PACOM; 8 percent in LANTCOM; and 210 spaces in USEUCOM.\textsuperscript{98}

**Adjustment in the PACOM Boundary**

The new Unified Command Plan that became effective on 1 July 1975 made no change in the command arrangements for the Middle East and Indian Ocean area. In approving the plan, the Secretary of Defense had asked the JCS to study alternatives for the area, but they had been unable to agree. All except the CSA favored retention of the Middle East in the USEUCOM area as currently assigned. They believed any change unwise at that time in view of the "volatility" of the Middle East situation. However, they supported the inclusion of the entire Indian Ocean in PACOM to simplify command arrangements. The CSA wanted the Middle East assigned to USREDCOM, since that command was unhampered with geographical responsibilities elsewhere; he also recommended realignment of USEUCOM to coincide with the NATO boundaries.\textsuperscript{99}
The Secretary of Defense had made no decision on command arrangements for the Middle East and Indian Ocean when the new Unified Command Plan was issued in June 1975. But later, on 22 October 1975, he reached a decision, selecting the position of the JCS majority. He directed adjustment in the LANTCOM/PACOM boundary to give CINCPAC responsibility for the entire Indian Ocean to the east coast of Africa, including the Gulfs of Aden and Oman and the Indian Ocean Islands (Seychelles, Mauritius, and Maldives) but excluding the Malagasy Republic. The land areas of the Middle East and North Africa remained in the USEUCOM area; Africa south of the Sahara was still unassigned. The Joint Chiefs of Staff prepared and the President approved in March 1976 an amendment to the Unified Command Plan (which became effective on 1 May 1976) to implement this area adjustment.100

Designation of MAC as a Specified Command

In a program decision memorandum in July 1974, the Secretary of Defense directed the Air Force to consolidate all strategic and tactical airlifts under the Commander, Military Airlift Command (MAC), who became the specified commander for airlift. He took this action as part of a continuing effort toward greater reliance on Service mutual reinforcement.101

The Air Force, however, could see no advantage in such a move. It would, the Air Force believed, only introduce excessive headquarters layering in the approval and coordination process and could reduce the responsiveness of airlift service currently provided. Therefore, the Air Force prepared in March 1975 a plan to retain MAC as the single manager for airlift service under the Secretary of the Air Force. All the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff supported this plan except for the Chairman. He favored the original Secretary of Defense decision, since it would further the principle of unification and increase the stature of the Commander, MAC, in his relationship with other CINCs.102

The Deputy Secretary of Defense resolved the matter on 9 June 1976, reaffirming the original decision to make MAC a specified command and directing the Joint Chiefs of Staff to prepare the necessary change to the Unified Command Plan. They did so, and the President approved this change in December 1976. Thereupon, the Joint Chiefs of Staff amended the Unified Command Plan effective 1 February 1977. The Commander in Chief, Military Airlift Command (CINCMAC), was named “the commander of a specified command comprising all forces assigned for the accomplishment of his military airlift missions during wartime, periods of crisis, JCS exercises, and as necessary to ensure the operational support to other unified and specified commands.”103
Part One Notes

While the text of this study has been declassified, some of its sources remain classified.

1 [U] JCS 1259/7, 23 Mar 46, CCS 323.361 (2-26-45) sec 3.
3 [U] Msg, WARX 87793, JCS to CINCUSARPAC et al., 16 Dec 46, CCS 381 (1-24-42) sec 4.
8 National Security Act of 1947, PL 253, 80th Cong, 26 Jul 47.
9 "Functions of the Armed Forces and the Joint Chiefs of Staff," Att to JCS 1478/23, 26 Apr 48, CCS 380 (8-19-45) sec 8.
17 [U] SM-75-51 to LTG Lauris Norstad, 11 Jan 51; [U] SM-76-51 to CINCts et al., 11 Jan 51; CCS 381 (1-24-42) sec 22.
20 [U] Dec On JCS 521/49, 16 Feb 50, CCS 381 (2-8-43) sec 17.
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29 DOD Directive 5100.1, 16 Mar 54. [U] Memo, SecDef to SecArmy et al., 15 Jan 54, corrected and reissued on 5 Mar 54 in JCS 1259/317, 12 Mar 54, CCS 381 (1–24–42) sec 47.
32 [U] Memo, JCS to SecDef, 26 Jul 54 (derived from JCS 1899/135); N/H of JCS 1899/135, 4 Aug 54; CCS 381 (1–24–42) sec 50.
35 [U] Memo, JCS to SecDef, 5 Jun 56 (derived from JCS 1899/265 and JCS 1899/268); (C) Memo, SecDef to C/JCS, 19 Jun 56, Encl to JCS 1899/274, 26 Jun 56; CCS 381 (1–24–42) sec 61. [U] JCS 1899/281, 15 Aug 56; [U] N/H to JCS 1899/281, 5 Sep 56; same file, sec 62; [U] SM-716-56 to CINCONAD, 4 Sep 56, same file, sec 63.
36 [U] Memo, JCS to SecDef, 4 Jun 56 (derived from JCS 1259/348), CCS 381 (1–24–42) sec 61.
37 (C) Memo, SecDef to C/JCS, Encl to JCS 1259/357, 21 Jun 56; [C] N/H of JCS 1259/357, 23 Jul 56; [U] Msg, JCS 905628 to USCINCEUR, 28 Jun 56, Encl to JCS 1259/356, 28 Jun 56; [U] SM-551-56 to Chm, Canadian Chiefs of Staff, 3 Jul 56 (derived from JCS 1259/359); CCS 381 (1–24–42) sec 61.
38 (S) Memo, JCS to SecDef, 28 Dec 56, Encl to JCS 1259/378, 31 Dec 56; (S) Memo, DepSecDef to C/JCS, 16 Jan 57, Encl JCS 1259/390, 1 Feb 57; CCS 381 (1–24–42) sec 69.
40 (C) Memo, JCS to SecDef, 29 May 57 (derived from JCS 1259/394); [C] N/H to JCS 1259/394, 24 Oct 57; CCS 381 (1–24–42) sec 73. [C] Memo, JCS to SecDef, 11 Oct 57 (derived from JCS 1259/402); [C] SM-479-57 to CINCAL et al., 24 Oct 57; same file, sec 76.
41 [U] NORAD Historical Reference Paper No. 11, "Nineteen Years of Air Defense," 1 May 65, pp. 48–55. (TS) JCS 1541/132, 10 Jan 58; [C] Msg, JCS 943043 to CINCNORAD, 10 Jan 58; CCS 092 (9–10–45) sec 47.
43 DOD Directive 5100.1, 31 Dec 58.
44 [U] Memo, JCS to SecDef, 18 Aug 58 (derived from JCS 1977/55), CCS 040 (11–2–43) sec 25. (C) Memo, SecDef to C/JCS, 4 Sep 58, Encl to JCS 1259/421, 5 Sep 58, CCS 381 (1–24–42) sec 80. (C) SM-643–58 to CINCAL et al., 8 Sep 58; same file, sec 81.
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(C) JCSM–29–59 to SecDef, 26 Jan 59 (derived from JCS 1259/452); (U) Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 2 Feb 59, Encl to JCS 1259/455, 5 Feb 59; JMF 5160 (24 Jan 59).

(C) JCS 1259/490, 19 Aug 59; (C) JCS 1259/496, 20 Oct 59; JMF 5060 (17 Aug 59). (C) JCSM–407–60 to SecDef, 15 Sep 60 (derived from JCS 1259/516), JMF 5060 (15 Jul 60) sec 1. (C) Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 19 Jan 61, Encl to JCS 1259/524, 26 Jan 61; (C) SM–105–61 to CINCAL et al., 4 Feb 61; same file, sec 2.

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(C) Memo, CNO to JCS, 12 Aug 59, Att to JCS 1259/487, 12 Aug 59; (U) N/H of JCS 1259/487, 15 Sep 59; JMF 5167 (12 Aug 59). (C) CSAFM–528–59 to JCS, 19 Nov 59, Encl to JCS 1977/101, 23 Nov 59; (TS) Memo, CNO to JCS, 30 Nov 59, Encl to JCS 1977/102, 21 Dec 59; JMF 5020 (29 May 59).

(C) CJCS Paper, “Proposed Interim Solution on Middle East Command Arrangements,” 30 Jan 60; (C) Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS, 3 Feb 60, Encl to JCS 1259/500, 6 Feb 60; JMF 5167 (3 Feb 60) sec 1.

(C) Briefing Sheet for CJCS, “JCS 2262/63,” 3 Jan 61, JMF 5162 (30 Dec 60). (S) Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 13 Mar 61, Encl to JCS 1259/528, 16 Mar 61, JMF 5160 (16 Jul 60) sec 2.

(C) Briefing Sheet for CJCS, “JCS 1259/540,” 26 Jun 61; (C) Memo, CNO to JCS, 7 Jul 61, Att to JCS 1259/543, 7 Jul 61; (U) CSAFM–220–61 to JCS, 7 Jul 61, Encl to JCS 1259/544, 7 Jul 61; (S) Memo, BG Brown to JCS, 11 Jul 61, Encl to JCS 1259/545, 12 Jul 61; JMF 5162 (20 Jun 61).

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(C) JCSM–292–61 to SecDef, 1 May 61 (derived from JCS 1259/535), JMF 3140 (11 Apr 61) sec 1. (S) JCSM–549–61 to SecDef, 18 Aug 61 (derived from JCS 1259/547); (S) CM–335–61 to SecDef, 18 Aug 61; same file, sec 4.

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(S) JCSM–719–63 to SecDef, 17 Sep 63 (derived from JCS 1259/634–12), JMF 5160 (18 Dec 62) sec 6. (C) Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 10 Oct 63, same file, sec 7. (C) JCSM–800–63 to SecDef, 15 Oct 63 (derived from JCS 1259/634–18); (C) JCS 1259/645, 20 Nov 63; JMF 5160 (11 Oct 63).
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PART TWO

1977–1983
Requirement for a Biennial Review

One of the earliest administrative modifications of the UCP of 1975 involved the requirement for mandatory review and revision. In 1977 President Jimmy Carter directed a sweeping review of the National Military Command Structure System (NMCSS). Less than a year later, Richard C. Steadman, the study director for the Defense Department, submitted a report to the Secretary of Defense in which, among other recommendations, he urged that the CINCs, the Services, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff conduct a review of the UCP at “intervals not to exceed two years.” Mr. Steadman believed that a mandatory biennial review would permit the President and the Secretary of Defense to respond more efficiently and effectively to the increasingly rapid evolution of “political and military realities.”¹ The Joint Chiefs of Staff concurred in the recommendation for a biennial review of the UCP and issued Memorandum of Policy (MOP) 181 on 29 January 1979 to implement the new procedures.²

Air Defense of the Panama Canal, 1978

The issue of air defense of the Panama Canal surfaced in 1978. By a treaty ratified in April 1978, the United States agreed to relinquish to the Republic of Panama in the year 2000 all control over the canal and the Canal Zone. Meanwhile, USCINCSO was to defend that area with a modest force that included the 193d Infantry Brigade, the 450-man US Naval Station, and a handful of A-7 Corsair II close air support fighters from the USAF Southern Division. While such forces might suffice to protect the canal from sabotage or land attack by a neighboring state, USSOUTHCOM forces could not prevent a major air attack by Cuba.³

In 1978 the Soviet Union provided Cuba with several MiG 23 Floggers, fighter-bombers with an effective radius of 615 nautical miles. Alarmed, USCINCSO wrote the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 8 September requesting six F-4 Phantoms to provide his command with the capability to shoot down at sea any Floggers attempting to mount an attack on the canal. Under the UCP, air defense of the Caribbean air approaches to the canal were the responsibility of CINCLANT. In the event of air attack, the UCP specified that CINCLANT and USCINCSO were to coordinate their air assets in a joint defense: LANTCOM aircraft intercepting attackers at sea and USSOUTHCOM finishing off any attackers that managed to reach the Canal Zone. Arguing that shared command arrangements led to ambiguity and delay, USCINCSO requested that he alone be tasked with defending the Canal. In his opinion, augmentation or
replacement of A–7 Corsairs with the higher performance F–4 Phantoms would enable his command to assume such responsibility.4

While the Air Force supported USCINCSO recommendations, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (ASD/ISA) did not. He feared that placement of the Phantoms in USSOUTHCOM would convey the unintended impression that the United States was trying to intimidate Panama or other Caribbean states. The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) made a convincing case against the USCINCSO proposal. When fully armed with 500 kg. bombs and external fuel tanks, the Floggers, departing from the Cuban airfield nearest to Panama, Antonio Maceo, could only fly 615 nautical miles. Yet Antonio Maceo was 676 nautical miles away. Moreover, DIA concluded that neither the Soviet Union nor Cuba wished a confrontation with the United States in the Caribbean at that time. For the reasons cited by DIA, the Joint Chiefs of Staff decided by 15 December 1978 to reject USCINCSO’s proposal.5

Although USCINCSO lost his bid in late 1978 for full responsibility for air defense of the Panama Canal, he worked out a satisfactory compromise solution with CINCLANT in August 1979. At a conference the two men agreed that the commander with ground responsibility for the canal, USCINCSO, should also assume its air defense. Hence they reached an understanding that USCINCSO should have fulltime responsibility for air defense of the canal within a fifty-mile radius and temporary responsibility for the area outside the circle until relieved of the latter by a carrier battle group from LANTCOM.6


While the Soviets and the Cubans may have wished to avoid military confrontation with the United States in the Caribbean, both communist powers were already heavily committed in a region where the US presence was minimal, sub-Saharan Africa. Since World War II the North African states had been assigned to USCINCEUR for planning and normal operations, but sub-Saharan Africa had remained unassigned until 1960. At that time the Secretary of Defense had established within LANTCOM a small joint task force headquarters, under an Army lieutenant general, with the mission of planning for and conducting operations in the sub-Saharan region. A year later the Secretary of Defense reapportioned responsibility for the sub-Sahara giving security assistance and air evacuation to USCINCEUR but retaining seaward evacuation with CINCLANT. In 1963 the Joint Chiefs of Staff made USCINCSERIKE responsible for planning and operations in the Middle East, sub-Saharan Africa, and Southern Asia (MEAFSA). At that time USCINCSERIKE received the additional title of Commander in Chief, Middle East, Africa south of the Sahara, and South Asia (CINCSERIKA). Subsequently, in 1971, USSTRICOM was redesignated the US Readiness
Command (USREDCOM) and divested of all responsibility for the MEAFSA area. Thereafter sub-Saharan Africa was again unassigned.\(^7\)

By late 1976 the conspicuous growth of Soviet, Cuban, and Chinese influence in Africa south of the Sahara impelled planners on the Joint Staff to call for a reassessment of the area's importance to US strategic interests. Despite the withdrawal after World War II of colonial regimes from sub-Saharan Africa, the vast region remained important to the economy of Western Europe. At the crossroads of two oceans and three seas, Africa straddled air and sea-lanes linking North America and Europe to the Middle East, Asia, and the Pacific islands. The subcontinent also contained essential minerals. While US policy had been based on the principle that Africans should resolve African problems, the Joint Staff believed increasing Soviet, Chinese, and Cuban involvement in sub-Saharan Africa now posed a serious threat to US interests.\(^8\)

Since expanding communist influence might jeopardize US access to bases, ports, and raw materials in sub-Saharan Africa, and possibly threaten the lives of some 35,000 Americans living there, the Joint Staff foresaw a possibility of military involvement in that region. In December 1976 the Joint Staff recommended that the Joint Chiefs of Staff reconsider assigning the sub-Saharan region to one of the unified commands. On 6 December 1976 the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the Joint Staff's assessment of US military interests in the region and, at a conference of unified commanders convened in June 1977, broached the subject of assigning sub-Saharan Africa to one of them for contingency planning, if not for normal operations. In November 1977 the Army Operations Deputy proposed assigning the region to USCINCREDE for both contingency planning and normal operations.\(^9\)

Having heard the Army's views, the Joint Chiefs of Staff asked on 15 May 1978 for the views of the four unified commanders with some degree of interest in sub-Saharan Africa: CINCLANT, USCINCEUR, CINCPAC, and USCINCREDE. They responded in June 1978. CINCLANT recommended assigning the land area of sub-Saharan Africa to USEUCOM for planning and normal operations but pushing the LANTCOM/PACOM boundary eastward to make LANTCOM responsible for the ocean area surrounding Africa. USCINCEUR agreed with the assignment of the region to his command as the one with demonstrated ability to conduct planning and limited military operations for that area. CINCPAC thought that sub-Saharan Africa should be assigned either to USCINCREDE or USCINCEUR for normal operations but not to CINCLANT or CINCPAC. USCINCREDE volunteered to assume immediate responsibility for contingency planning and later on, perhaps, for normal operations as well.\(^10\)

In November 1978 the Joint Chiefs of Staff adopted a compromise position. While agreeing with the commanders and the Joint Staff that sub-Saharan Africa should be assigned to a unified command for contingency planning, the Joint Chiefs of Staff saw no pressing need to make a similar assignment for normal operations. By recommending assignment of the
region to a unified command for contingency planning only, the Joint Chiefs of Staff hoped to provide the National Command Authorities (NCA) with a broad range of options covering the deployment and employment of forces on the African continent. In passing on their conclusions to the Secretary of Defense on 28 November 1978, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended USCINCEUR for the assignment. The Secretary of Defense, however, took no action and sub-Saharan Africa continued to be unassigned.\(^\text{11}\)

**Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force, 1977–1979**

Beginning in 1977, the JCS again undertook to merge command arrangements for MEAFSA with efforts to create a rapid deployment force (RDF) for use in the area. After the Arab-Israeli war in October 1973, oil-producing states in the Persian Gulf region raised oil prices to punish the Western countries and Japan for Israeli occupation of former Arab lands. Further to the east, political and social unrest in Iran, Pakistan, and Afghanistan threatened to create a power vacuum along the southern border of the Soviet Union. Concerned that the Arab states might choke off the flow of oil to the West or that the Soviet Union might invade neighboring Islamic states, President Carter on 24 August 1977 directed that a study be made of creating a rapid deployment force of two or more light divisions for use in the Persian Gulf region.\(^\text{12}\)

From 1977 to 1979, the Joint Chiefs of Staff considered creating a multi-division rapid deployment force. By late 1979 they agreed that the bulk of ground forces for the RDF would have to come from CONUS-based USREDCOM. Since that command possessed only enough air- and sea-lift capability to deploy a single battalion to the Middle East, advanced bases for headquarters and logistics would be needed to field larger forces. Out of sympathy for Israel’s Arab neighbors, the Islamic nations refused to provide the facilities needed. To circumvent such obstacles, the Secretary of Defense on 22 June 1979 ordered the Joint Chiefs of Staff to review the entire system of command arrangements for the Middle East and look into the possibility of obtaining bases in the sub-Saharan region. It was at this juncture that US command arrangements for MEAFSA emerged as one of the most important UCP issues for the period 1977 to 1983.\(^\text{13}\)

Following a two-month review, the Joint Chiefs of Staff submitted a split decision to the Secretary of Defense on 29 August 1979. Made up of the Chairman, the Chief of Staff of the Army, and the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, the majority favored assignment of the MEAFSA countries to USREDCOM for most normal operations and to USEUCOM for security assistance and contingency operations. The Chief of Naval Operations and the Commandant of the Marine Corps preferred to assign responsibility for planning and contingency operations to a Rapid Deployment Joint Task
Force headquarters, administratively within USREDCOM but with operational autonomy to plan, exercise, and deploy forces to the Persian Gulf region. The JCS majority advanced several reasons for their recommendation. Under the UCP of 1975, USCINCEUR had satisfactorily demonstrated his capacity to plan security assistance, noncombatant evacuations, disaster relief, and minor contingency operations for the Middle East and sub-Saharan Africa. For executing such operations the Sixth Fleet and the Middle East Task Force appeared quite adequate. Recognizing, however, that USEUCOM could not provide enough manpower to protect NATO and handle a major contingency in the Persian Gulf area, the three generals recommended assigning all responsibility for major contingencies in that region to USREDCOM. That arrangement avoided embarrassing USCINCEUR by requiring him to perform operations in the Persian Gulf region likely to alienate NATO partners when their foreign policies diverged from the United States’ policies in the region.

In opposition, the CNO and the CMC regarded assignment of major contingencies directly to USREDCOM as unacceptable. Involvement of USREDCOM in a region vitally important to USEUCOM would probably evoke rivalry and problems of coordination that would delay the rapid execution of operations. Instead, they recommended the original presidential concept: a CONUS-based joint task force headquarters, under operational command of USREDCOM but with full responsibility for planning and conducting joint exercises and joint operations in the Persian Gulf area. Under the Navy-Marine Corps concept, once the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force Headquarters had actually deployed, operational control over it would pass completely to USCINCEUR.14

The Secretary of Defense agreed with the minority position and on 22 October 1979 ordered the Joint Chiefs of Staff to organize by 1 March 1980 a CONUS-based joint task force headquarters prepared to plan, train, deploy forces, and to conduct operations anywhere in the world but initially in the Middle East and Africa. On 29 November the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed establishment within USREDCOM headquarters of the RDJTF headquarters as a separate subordinate element under operational control of USCINCRE. As an initial task, the RDJTF would be responsible for all aspects of planning for rapid deployment force operations in the Middle East and Africa.15 The RDJTF would be responsible for planning and conducting rapid deployment operations in other regions of the world as directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Subsequently, in December 1979 the Joint Chiefs of Staff appointed Major General P. X. Kelley, USMC, as the first Commander of the RDJTF.16
The Middle East and the First Biennial Review, 1980

With a massive airlift of troops and equipment into Afghanistan on Christmas night 1979, the Soviet Union provided dramatic impetus for development of the RDJTF. In his State of the Union Address on 23 January 1980, President Carter announced what became known as the "Carter Doctrine":

"An attempt by any outside forces to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America, and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force... We are... improving our capability to deploy U.S. military forces rapidly to distant areas... We've increased and strengthened our naval presence in the Indian Ocean, and we are now making arrangements for key naval and air facilities to be used by our forces in the region of northeast Africa and the Persian Gulf. ... All these efforts combined emphasize our dedication to defend and preserve the vital interests of the region and of the nation which we represent..."\(^{17}\)

Afterward, the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs asked the Secretary of Defense on 25 January to review the UCP to determine what changes in the existing structures for command and control, intelligence collection, and military security assistance would be required to accommodate establishment of the RDJTF.\(^{18}\)

This request coincided with the first UCP biennial review required by the JCS MOP 181 of 29 January 1979. On 9 January 1980 the Joint Chiefs of Staff had directed the CINCs and the Services to submit proposed changes to the UCP by mid-February 1980. Their responses focused primarily on command arrangements for the Middle East, Africa south of the Sahara, South Asia, and the Indian Ocean (MEAFSAIO).

There was immediate disagreement. While spokesmen for the Marine Corps, the Army, and USREDCOM agreed on the necessity for demonstrating US determination to defend its vital interests in MEAFSAIO, they differed on the best command organization to achieve that goal. The Marine Corps' Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Policies saw no need to revise UCP command arrangements until the RDJTF had been given ample opportunity to become fully operational and demonstrate what it could do. The Army Operations Deputy, however, asserted that deterrence of Soviet aggression in the Middle East required a unified command with its headquarters located in the region. As for the RDJTF, he recommended keeping it but reemphasizing the worldwide mission given it under the original concept. USCINCREDED welcomed the RDJTF as a "significant step in providing rapid response to non-NATO contingencies" but doubted that it could handle more than limited
operations in the Middle East. In his view, only a single unified command would “demonstrate US resolve and properly focus on the strategic importance of the area.”

Adopting a modified version of the Marine Corps recommendation, the Joint Chiefs of Staff informed the Secretary of Defense on 1 March 1980 that, given the inherent flexibility of the UCP and the potential of the RDJTF under existing command arrangements, current area assignments for unified commanders should be retained. In the event of RDJTF deployment to the Persian Gulf area, however, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended that the Commander, RDJTF (COMRDJTF), be designated as a commander of a unified command for that region. Otherwise, problems of coordination between the RDJTF, USEUCOM, and PACOM would be handled by memorandums of understanding reviewed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and approved by the Secretary of Defense.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff also informed the Secretary that, as of 1 March 1980, the RDJTF headquarters had become fully operational. While the RDJTF headquarters would be under the operational command of USCINCREDCOM for planning, training, and deploying, the new headquarters would be a separate subordinate element of USREDCOM. Once deployed to the Persian Gulf region, the RDJTF headquarters and forces would come under the operational control of either USCINCEUR or CINCPAC. Whichever unified command was selected, that command would provide the COMRDJTF with logistical bases and personnel for operations, intelligence, civil affairs, communications, and medical care.

The debate over command arrangements for the RDJTF, USEUCOM, PACOM, and USREDCOM continued into December. The possibility of sharing responsibility for the Persian Gulf with a joint task force lacking resources or bases disturbed USCINCEUR and CINCPAC. Having recently prepositioned ships, secured access to bases in three East African countries, and participated in the RDJTF-sponsored Command Post Exercise (CPX) in Egypt (BRIGHT STAR), USCINCEUR professed ability to deploy forces anywhere in the Middle East or Africa. He therefore recommended that the RDJTF be made into a permanent subordinate unified command of USEUCOM, subject, however, to direct tasking by the NCA. For similar reasons, CINCPAC recommended that the RDJTF be made a subordinate command of USEUCOM or PACOM. USCINCREASED preferred, however, that the RDJTF should remain under his command but with status as a subordinate unified command for Southwest Asia. The Army Operations Deputy, repeating his earlier position, maintained that Soviet actions in Afghanistan must be answered boldly—by creation of a single unified command for all MEAFSAIO. No agreement was reached and controversy over command arrangements in the Middle East persisted throughout 1981.

The JCS call on 9 January 1980 for the first biennial review precipitated considerable discussion of optimum command arrangements for the Caribbean Basin. Neither CINCLANT nor USCINCSO were entirely satisfied with the division of functions in effect there since 1979. Following the discovery in 1979 of a Soviet combat brigade in Cuba, President Carter on 2 October 1979 had established the Caribbean Combined Joint Task Force (CCJTF) "to monitor and respond [by deployment of US forces] to any attempted military encroachment in the region." With headquarters at Key West, Florida, the CCJTF was a subordinate unified command of LANTCOM. While the CCJTF concentrated its efforts on Cuba and the northern Caribbean, LANTCOM's other subordinate organization, the Antilles Defense Command (ANTEDEFCOM), performed a similar mission in the southern Caribbean. Meanwhile, USSOUTHCOM continued to hold responsibility for security assistance activity in the Caribbean and for normal operations on the mainland of Central and South America, save for Mexico.

On 17 February 1980, CINCLANT recommended that the UCP be modified to give him responsibility vice USCINCSO for the military aspects of security assistance in the Caribbean. He advanced two arguments for the modification. First, the Caribbean fell within his geographic area of responsibility at a time when national policy called for increased operational planning to curtail Soviet and Cuban influence in the region. In CINCLANT's view, since operational planning and security assistance were closely linked, he should hold responsibility for both functions. His second argument was that the administration of military security assistance to Latin American navies would greatly enhance his ability to enlist their support for planning exercises and operations to protect the South Atlantic sea lines of communications (SLOCs).22

Conceding that CINCLANT had made some valid points for transferring security assistance to LANTCOM, USCINCSO on 16 April 1980 nevertheless concluded that he should retain management of all security assistance in Latin America, including the Caribbean, because "most of the nations in the Caribbean Basin are inseparable from Latin America due to historical, cultural, and political ties." Moreover, while LANTCOM was "oriented on an easterly axis" toward NATO, USSOUTHCOM focused entirely on the Western Hemisphere and already had programs and organizations in place to assist the Caribbean countries: military schools in the Panama Canal Zone served several of the Caribbean Basin countries; USSOUTHCOM had repeatedly shown its capacity to render speedy disaster relief throughout the area; and a directorate within USSOUTHCOM was already "dedicated exclusively to Latin American military affairs and security assistance matters." With regard to Mexico, however, USCINCSO argued that
responsibility for security assistance only would no longer suffice. That country's newfound oil wealth and potential for joint hemispheric leadership with the United States made it opportune that Mexico be assigned to USSOUTHCOM for normal operations as well as for security assistance.23

When no action resulted, USCINCSO restated his case in December 1980. While Cuba posed no present danger to Atlantic shipping or other LANTCOM interests, Soviet- and Cuban-sponsored military and political activities in the Caribbean had already overthrown the pro-US government in Nicaragua and threatened to topple another in El Salvador. With communist subversion and revolutionary activities spreading up the Central American isthmus toward Mexico, USCINCSO concluded that the USSOUTHCOM area of operations should be expanded to encompass not only Cuba and the Caribbean basin but Mexico as well. Not only would such assignments recognize the integral nature of Mexico, other Central American states, and the Caribbean, but the assignments would greatly streamline unity of command in a region where shared command arrangements weakened operational effectiveness.24

The Joint Chiefs of Staff took up the issue of command arrangements for Latin America and the Caribbean in June 1981. Meeting on 8 June, the Operations Deputies favored assignment of all normal operations in the Caribbean, including security assistance, to one unified commander. Under that one commander, they also favored consolidation of CCJTF and ANTEDEFCOM as a single subordinate unified command. On the assignment of Mexico, the Operations Deputies clearly disagreed with USCINCSO. Given the growing strategic importance of Mexico, they preferred to keep responsibility for that country with the Joint Chiefs of Staff.25

In meetings on 19 and 23 June, the Joint Chiefs of Staff accepted the preliminary recommendations of the Operations Deputies and concentrated on the choice of a single unified commander for the Caribbean basin. In reaching that determination they asked the question: In the event of a general war between the NATO powers and the Warsaw Pact what strategic US interests in the Caribbean would take priority? Once that question was answered, the choice of a single unified commander would be a foregone conclusion. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, less the Chief of Staff of the Army, agreed on 23 June that, during a general war, protecting sea lines of communication from the United States to Europe and from the oil fields of Venezuela to the Gulf Coast of the United States represented the nation's most vital interests. Hence they picked CINCLANT as the commander best equipped with the air, sea, and ground forces needed to prevent Soviet or Cuban efforts to interdict those sea lines of communication. The Joint Chiefs of Staff decided: (1) to retain assignment of area responsibility for the Caribbean with CINCLANT and Central and South America (less Mexico) with USCINCSO; (2) to assign responsibility for security assistance for the Caribbean to CINCLANT (vice USCINCSO), and (3) to consolidate the CCJTF and the Antilles Defense Command into a single subordinate unified command under CINCLANT.26
Dissenting from the majority, the Chief of Staff of the Army restated USCINCSO's argument that, like the Mediterranean and its littoral states, the Caribbean Basin and Central America formed an integral strategic whole. USCINCSO's traditional orientation toward that whole made him intimately acquainted with its leaders and its unique military requirements. In the event of a general war, while CINCLANT would necessarily concentrate on defense of the North Atlantic, USCINCSO would be a better choice to protect the Caribbean sea lines of communications and the Panama Canal. What USCINCSO required in air and sea assets to conduct that mission could be provided, in part, by assignment to him of the CCJTF and the ANTEDEFCOM—both combined into one subordinate unified command. The Chief of Staff of the Army also concurred with USCINCSO that while a general war was a possibility, communist revolutionary designs on Central America posed a clear and present danger to the security of Mexico and ultimately to the United States. That greater danger fell squarely within USCINCSO's area of responsibility, experience, and expertise.\textsuperscript{27}

Before authorizing the Joint Staff to prepare a final report for the Secretary of Defense, the Operations Deputies met on 26 June to discuss various minor modifications and amendments to the recommendations of the JCS majority. They also considered the Army view and rationale for supporting USCINCSO as the overall commander of the Caribbean Basin. The process of discussion, amendment, and revision continued until 17 July, when the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the report containing the majority recommendations, essentially as stated on 23 June. The Joint Chiefs of Staff annexed the CSA's dissent to the report.\textsuperscript{28}

The Joint Chiefs of Staff did not forward their split on Latin American and Caribbean command arrangements to the Secretary of Defense until 9 September. At that time the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff submitted a separate opinion. He recommended acceptance of the majority position as an interim measure to "clean up and consolidate" command arrangements in the Caribbean. He added, however, that USSOUTHCOM was too deficient in organic forces, command, control and communications (C\textsuperscript{3}) capability, and headquarters assets to remain viable as a unified command. He therefore proposed examination of a course of action whereby USSOUTHCOM eventually would be made into a second subordinate unified command of LANTCOM, with continued responsibility for political-military affairs, security assistance, and counterinsurgency on the Latin American mainland. Despite the Chairman's view, on 2 November 1981 the Secretary of Defense approved the majority position.\textsuperscript{29}

On 1 December 1981 CINCLANT combined his two subordinate commands into the United States Forces Caribbean (USFORCARIB), with headquarters at Puerto Rico. At JCS request, President Ronald Reagan on 12 April 1982 approved the necessary revision of the UCP to accommodate the changes. His approval carried with it the proviso that CINCLANT's new
responsibility for security assistance be limited exclusively to the islands of the Caribbean as distinguished from the countries on the mainland.  

The Transition from RDJTF to USCENTCOM, 1981–1982

The Joint Chiefs of Staff had not agreed in 1979 on the creation of a Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force, and command arrangements for the Middle East remained a controversial issue during 1980. Then, on 24 April 1981, the Secretary of Defense instructed the Joint Chiefs of Staff to submit a plan for transformation of the RDJTF within three to five years or less into a "separate unified command" for the countries bordering the Red Sea, the Persian Gulf, and the western part of the Indian Ocean. He also directed that the COMRDJTF plan to deploy assigned forces anywhere in the world but, especially, to Southwest Asia. In the event of imminent Soviet invasion of Iran, the COMRDJTF was to employ air, sea, and ground forces to deter the invasion or at least delay its progress.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff submitted an interim response to the Secretary of Defense on 18 May 1981. Assuming that the predominantly Moslem nations of Southwest Asia would oppose the sudden assignment of their region to a powerful new US military organization, the Joint Chiefs of Staff supported gradual establishment of a unified command over a period of a year and a half. The evolution from RDJTF to unified command was to take place in three stages. During the first stage, the RDJTF would remain under USCINCRED in Tampa. Placement of Army, Navy, and Air Force component headquarters under the operational control of the COMRDJTF would complete Stage I. Stage II would conclude in the fall of 1981 with designation of the RDJTF as a separate command reporting directly through the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the NCA. During Stage III the Joint Chiefs of Staff, at the direction of the Secretary of Defense, would assign forces and work out command arrangements with other unified commanders. For the date marking conclusion of Stage III and the birth of the new unified command, the Joint Chiefs of Staff chose New Year’s Day 1983.

To facilitate implementation of Stages II and III, the Joint Chiefs of Staff formulated several interim objectives—transition links—to be accomplished within the next few months. These included a direct command linkage from the Secretary of Defense through the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the COMRDJTF, definition of "terms of reference" (the mission, geographic boundaries, components and forces of the new command), placement of elements of the RDJTF headquarters at a forward base in the region, enlargement of the headquarters staff of the Service component headquarters at MacDill, and narrowing of RDJTF focus from a worldwide to a Southwest Asia perspective (USREDCOM would continue to be prepared to activate "a
separate JTF headquarters" for contingencies in other areas not assigned to another unified command).38

Expanding upon the recommendations of 18 May, the Joint Chiefs of Staff proposed to the Secretary of Defense on 6 July 1981 terms of reference and additional forces for the RDJTF. The terms of reference enumerated the countries for the RDJTF's area of operations and the missions and command arrangements for the transition through Stages II and III. The proposed RDJTF area of operations included Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Yemen, Democratic Yemen, Oman, United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Bahrain, Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Ethiopia, Djibouti, Somalia, and Kenya, and the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf. Once the RDJTF developed its capacity to perform all normal operations as a unified command, the Joint Chiefs of Staff proposed to expand the area of operations to include some or all of the following: Egypt, Israel, Syria, Jordan, India, and the Indian Ocean.

COMRDJTF would be under the operational command of USCINCREED until the conclusion of Stage II, sometime during the fall of 1981. His mission would include planning, joint training, preparation to deploy designated forces, and the management of the RDJTF's transition to Stage III. According to the same terms of reference, while the COMRDJTF exercised operational control of the RDJTF components' headquarters and designated forces, the Military Departments and Services would provide logistical and administrative support to those same headquarters and forces. Also, during Stage II, the JCS terms of reference called for the COMRDJTF to submit for approval all command arrangements involving the COMRDJTF and unified commanders through the USCINCREED to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Regarding employment of the RDJTF in the name of the National Command Authorities, the Joint Chiefs of Staff exercised direct command over the COMRDJTF.

Removal of the COMRDJTF from the operational command of USCINCREED would signal the end of Stage II. During Stage III, COMRDJTF would report directly to the NCA through the Joint Chiefs of Staff and carry out the same tasks as during the previous stage. In addition, the COMRDJTF would communicate directly with the Military Departments and Services for administrative and logistical support, with the unified and specified commands during joint exercises and operations, and with the Joint Chiefs of Staff on strategic and logistical planning, the operational direction of forces, and the conduct of combat operations. Any command arrangements concluded between the COMRDJTF and the unified or specified commanders would be submitted for review and approval directly to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff also proposed the following additional forces for the RDJTF: eleven tactical fighter squadrons under the operational control of COMRDJTF; Task Force 70 with one to three carrier battle groups with necessary logistic forces to support COMRDJTF; and Marine Corps forces consisting of Headquarters, I Marine Amphibious Force (HQ I MAF), with appropriate forces to operate in support of, or under the operational control of, COMRDJTF, as appropriate. The Secretary of Defense approved the terms
of reference and the additional force assignments on 6 August. Six days later, the Joint Chiefs of Staff ordered USCINCREDE to place the additional forces under the COMRDJTF. In the process of approving the terms of reference, however, the Secretary of Defense had asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the "ultimate" geographic area of the new command be more clearly defined and that the RDJTF be specifically designated as a separate joint task force on 1 October 1981.34

The Joint Chiefs of Staff complied with both of the Secretary’s requests. In a memorandum on 23 September 1981, they added Egypt and Sudan to the "ultimate" geographic area of RDJTF. The Joint Chiefs of Staff also agreed to designate the RDJTF as a separate joint task force, effective 1 October 1981. While at MacDill, it would continue to depend heavily upon USREDCOM for personnel, facilities, and logistical support. After deployment it would likewise depend upon the unified and specified commands, the Services, and the Joint Communications Support Element.35 Despite the JCS reservations about RDJTF dependence on USREDCOM, the RDJTF did become a separate joint task force on 1 October 1981, with all the privileges of direct communication spelled out for it in Stage III of the JCS terms of reference.

The problem of base facilities and logistical support for the RDJTF preoccupied JCS planners throughout late 1981 and early 1982. The Joint Chiefs of Staff planned to exercise direct oversight over the construction until the RDJTF could take over as the new unified command. Meanwhile, after requesting that the State Department negotiate with other Middle East states for similar base rights, the Joint Chiefs of Staff enhanced the RDJTF logistical base by expanding the Near Term Pre-Positioning Fleet stationed at Diego Garcia, an island in the Indian Ocean, south of Sri Lanka.36

In response to a JCS call for a biennial review, both CINCLANT and CINCPAC expressed dissatisfaction with the assigned area of the RDJTF. On 14 May CINCLANT recommended broadening the RDJTF area of Africa to include all the remaining states not already assigned to it or to USEUCOM, that is, all of Africa south of the Sahara and west of the Sudan and Kenya. Three days later, CINCPAC asserted that responsibility for naval operations in the Indian Ocean, the Persian Gulf, and the Red Sea should not be artificially divided between himself and COMRDJTF but should be assigned entirely to himself as the commander with the experience and naval resources to do the job.37

In May 1982 the Joint Chiefs of Staff reevaluated the RDJTF area of operations in light of a presidential query on 17 May about the desirability of including all Middle Eastern countries. In a memorandum to the Secretary of Defense on 26 May 1982, the Joint Chiefs of Staff firmly advised against expanding the new unified command’s area to include the so-called “confrontation states of Israel, Syria, and Lebanon.” In conclusion, the Secretary recommended that the President approve activation of the new unified command on 1 January 1983 and that the new command include all Middle Eastern nations except the confrontation states. When the President
finally approved the recommendation in December, the practical effect was the addition of one more country to the RDJTF list—Jordan.\textsuperscript{38}

In September and November 1982 the Navy and the Marine Corps both tried to divert the RDJTF from its transition to a unified command. On 13 September 1982 the Chief of Naval Operations made clear to his JCS colleagues his belief that the RDJTF should not be encumbered with the routine responsibilities of a unified command—security assistance, noncombatant evacuation operations, etc.—that had been satisfactorily performed by USEUCOM, nor should the new organization's mission be confined to the Middle East and East Africa. He resurrected the 1979 proposal that the rapid deployment force be prepared on short notice to conduct combat operations anywhere in the world to deter Soviet or Cuban aggression. On 10 November the Commandant of the Marine Corps recommended renaming the RDJTF the Rapid Deployment Force, giving it a worldwide mission and placing it directly under the NCA and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.\textsuperscript{39}

The Joint Chiefs of Staff did not accept the Navy and Marine Corps recommendations, and the RDJTF transition proceeded. On 12 November 1982 they named the future unified command the United States Central Command (USCENTCOM) and its commander, USCINCCENT. On 19 November a command center for USCINCCENT began operations at MacDill AFB. On 2 December the President formally approved the establishment of USCENTCOM on 1 January 1983 and requested that the Joint Chiefs of Staff inform his Assistant for National Security Affairs of proposed changes in the UCP pertaining to "major force allocation and precise geographic boundaries."\textsuperscript{40}

To reflect the new command arrangements, the Joint Chiefs of Staff revised the UCP of 1975 for the sixth and final time on 10 December 1982. Effective 1 January 1983, USCINCCENT would plan and conduct all normal operations, with one exception, for, the northeast African countries of Egypt, Sudan, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, and Somalia; the Arabian peninsular countries of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, the Yemen Arab Republic, the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, and Bahrain; the Middle East mainland countries of Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Jordan; and the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea. The exception, security assistance for Pakistan and Afghanistan, would continue as a CINCPAC responsibility until transferral to USCINCCENT on 1 October 1983. Also under the revised UCP, USCINCEUR would remain responsible for the three confrontation states of Israel, Syria, and Lebanon and for the North African states of Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, and Libya. All other African states south of the Sahara and west of Sudan and Kenya would continue to be unassigned.\textsuperscript{41}

In late December the Secretary of Defense announced intentions to augment USCENTCOM with the Middle East Force (MIDEASTFOR) then serving in the Persian Gulf and Red Sea areas.\textsuperscript{42} While promising the future USCINCCENT full support and cooperation, CINCPAC reiterated on 21
December his request that he retain operational command of the Middle East Force in the Arabian Sea. The Joint Chiefs of Staff denied that request on 30 December but directed USCINCCENT to coordinate with CINCPAC for contingency planning for rapid integration of MIDEASTFOR into PACOM’s Indian Ocean battle force, Task Force 70, whenever called upon to do so by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.43

The 1982 Biennial Review

The Joint Chiefs of Staff launched the second biennial review of the UCP on 15 April 1982. The Joint Staff advised the CINCs that their responses should anticipate two changes already underway in the UCP: transfer of security assistance in the Caribbean area to LANTCOM vice USSOUTHCOM and the establishment of the RDJTF as a new unified command. The CINCs’ replies raised several new issues. On 13 May 1982 CINCLANT recommended that Portugal be assigned to him because of its maritime orientation and its control over the Azores and the Madeira Islands, two strategically important island groups in the LANTCOM area. He also recommended that another strategically located island, Greenland, which guarded the northern gateway to the North Atlantic, be assigned to his area. The next day USCINCSO again urged that his command be expanded by inclusion of the Caribbean Basin and Mexico to reverse the growing Soviet/Cuban intrusion in Central America and to aid him in the task of building a pro-US Latin American coalition. On 17 May CINCPAC proposed that North Korea, the People’s Republic of China, and the eastern USSR be assigned to him for normal operations. He also requested responsibility for the Aleutian Islands.44

No immediate action resulted, and on 20 September the Army Operations Deputy categorized the changes in the UCP recommended during May as important but “easy to handle” secondary issues. In his view, they tended to divert consideration from fundamental geographic divisions and functional responsibilities necessary to “optimal command arrangements” for each unified command. He therefore proposed a “thorough overhaul of the UCP . . . to provide efficient command arrangements and structure to implement the national military strategy.” He recommended completion of “an extended review” in time for presentation of alternatives to the CINC’s Conference in March 1983, to be followed by revision of the UCP to incorporate the necessary changes.45

In light of the threats of revolutionary communism and state-sponsored terrorism, USCINCSO on 5 October 1982 urged revision of the UCP to allow unified commanders greater flexibility of action outside their traditional areas of responsibility (AORs). For areas immediately contiguous to the AORs, USCINCSO called for delineation within the UCP of “areas of influence,”
where two adjacent commanders, on their own initiative, could coordinate combined exercises or operations on an ad hoc basis. Beyond such areas of influence, he would have the UCP specify "areas of interest," where commanders would be allowed to monitor events that might eventually impact upon their areas of influence and ultimately upon their areas of responsibility. For his area of influence, USCINCSO would include all maritime waters up to twelve miles from the Latin American mainland. His area of interest, for example, might include sub-Saharan Africa, where several Latin American nations already enjoyed brisk commercial and political contacts.46

On 15 November the Army Operations Deputy submitted to the Joint Staff detailed recommendations for revising the UCP. If adopted, they would alter "the totality of US global command arrangements, unassigned areas, planning for rapid deployment of forces, and the structure and control of strategic nuclear forces." The recommendations began with a discussion of command arrangements for the Pacific and the Latin American-Caribbean areas. He sought to unify command arrangements in the northeast Pacific by combining US Forces, Korea, and US Forces, Japan, into one subordinate unified command under CINCPAC. He also recommended enhancing command arrangements in the Pacific by assigning the Aleutian Islands to CINCPAC and by creating within PACOM headquarters a joint planning cell for matters pertaining to the southwest Pacific. In the matter of Latin America and the Caribbean, the Army Operations Deputy borrowed the concept suggested by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 9 September 1981 of assigning all of the Caribbean and Latin America to USCINCSO but then making USOUTHCOM a subordinate unified command of LANTCOM.47

The Army Operations Deputy also addressed command arrangements for Southwest Asia and Africa south of the Sahara. First he recommended a study of what impact creation of a rapid deployment force under USCINCREDC might have on the mission of the new unified command in Southwest Asia. Next he noted that all African states south of the Sahara and west of Sudan and Kenya remained unassigned. Because of the area's strategic mineral wealth and location astride principal sea lines of communication, the Army Operations Deputy urged assigning the area to a unified command.

Command arrangements for strategic nuclear forces, joint special operations, and space also interested the Army Operations Deputy. Uncertain whether the present unified and specified command system provided the best vehicle for planning and execution of the Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP) by US strategic nuclear forces, he recommended scrutiny of the present system. The growing worldwide threat of insurgency and instability convinced him that the Joint Chiefs of Staff also needed to assess the Joint Special Operations Command's ability to coordinate the conduct of conventional and unconventional warfare and special operations. In light of the new space programs, the USAF Space Command, and the possibility of a new unified
command for space, the Army Operations Deputy proposed discussion of the impact of such developments upon national strategy, global planning, joint command arrangements, and global conflict.

In the matter of assigning the three major "adversary states"—the Soviet Union, China, and North Korea—and reassigning Greenland and Portugal, the Army Operations Deputy argued for no change. Because of the multi-faceted threat posed by both the Soviet Union and China, he contended that military relationships between the United States and the communist nations should continue to be supervised by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Deputy also concluded that assignment of North Korea to PACOM would only complicate the command structure in the Far East. Moreover, since the air threat to Greenland constituted an integral part of the air threat to all of CONUS, the Deputy opposed reassigning Greenland from ADCOM to LANTCOM, and he thought Portugal represented a vital outpost on NATO's southwestern flank that should remain in USEUCOM.48

On 26 November the Joint Staff invited CINCs and Service Chiefs to reevaluate and update their previous inputs for the biennial review. They were to consider the following proposals: (1) assignment of responsibility for rapid deployment planning and creation of a new joint task force for unassigned areas now that the RDJTF had become a geographic unified command; (2) revision of command arrangements in the North Pacific with regard to the Republic of Korea, Japan, Alaska, and the Aleutians; (3) determination of optimum command arrangements and structure for control of strategic nuclear forces; and (4) incorporation within the UCP of USCINCSO's recommendations for "areas of influence" and "areas of interest."49

The imminent transformation of the RDJTF into a unified command on 1 January 1983 revived the original need to plan for and execute rapid deployment outside the USCENTCOM area. Between 8 and 15 December 1982 USCINCREDE, USCINCEUR, and CINCLANT joined in recommending the assignment of planning for worldwide rapid deployment to one or more unified commanders. USCINCREDE concurred with USCINCEUR that such responsibility should be consolidated within USREDCOM and stipulated that a joint task force headquarters be set up within his headquarters solely for that mission. Upon its deployment, operational control of such a headquarters and its assigned forces would pass from USCINCREDE to the supported unified commander. CINCLANT opposed consolidation of RDF planning or establishment of a joint task force headquarters under a single commander; he preferred that rapid deployment become a function of each geographic unified commander.50

The question of optimum command arrangements and structure for control of strategic nuclear forces ultimately involved a proposal to centralize handling of all nuclear weapons within a strategic nuclear forces command. Both CINCLANT and USCINCEUR firmly opposed such centralization. On 10 December, USCINCEUR opposed establishment of a strategic nuclear command because it would deprive theater commanders of their "proper" role of controlling and targeting intermediate range nuclear forces. He added that
“some [nuclear] systems currently under development could have both strategic and tactical roles” and that the theater commander should always have a voice in the use of the latter. On 15 December CINCLANT declared that change in the existing structure was neither necessary nor desirable inasmuch as “planning and control...within the existing unified and specified command structure is efficient and responsive to national policy objectives.”

With regard to USCINCSO’s proposals for areas of influence and interest, both USCINCREDC and USCINCEUR agreed that commanders should be aware “of events and crisis situations relevant to their responsibilities, regardless of boundaries.” However, neither favored enactment within the UCP of formal “areas of influence” or “areas of interest.” USCINCREDC believed that cross boundary matters should be handled by close coordination and exchange of information between commanders. USCINCEUR suspected that inclusion of areas of influence and interest in the UCP would only add to the complexity and ambiguity of the document. CINCLANT seconded the opinions of USCINCREDC and USCINCEUR on the grounds that the UCP already provided for maximum flexibility for adjacent commanders to coordinate action on matters of mutual interest in its provision that: “In establishing commands, it is not intended to delineate restrictive geographic areas of responsibility for accomplishment of missions assigned. . . . To provide a basis for coordination by commanders, general geographic areas are delineated.”

On 23 December 1982, the Joint Chiefs of Staff asked USCINCSO and CINCLANT to address a new issue for the biennial review: Should USSOUTHCOM at last be made fully responsible for all of Latin America and the Caribbean Basin but only as a subordinate unified command of LANTCOM? In answer on 23 December, USCINCSO explained that at a time when Latin America’s importance to the United States was increasing, it would be folly to subordinate a command uniquely devoted to Latin American problems to a command whose interests focused eastward and northward toward NATO and the North Atlantic. Such subordination, he reasoned, would signal to Latin American governments and their military organizations that the United States did not deem them worthy of full-time concern. Such a view might demoralize them and encourage increased communist revolutionary activity in this hemisphere. Further, USCINCSO noted that placing his command under LANTCOM would impose a new layer of bureaucracy between his headquarters and the Joint Chiefs of Staff and could hinder prompt and effective communications during a crisis.

CINCLANT strongly supported the concept of revising command arrangements to promote regional integration of Latin America and the Caribbean Basin. He favored incorporating USSOUTHCOM into LANTCOM as a subordinate unified command with full responsibility for all Latin America. At the same time he wanted to reflect high national interest in the Caribbean by retaining USFORCARIB as a parallel subordinate unified command responsible for that area. But, by placing USSOUTHCOM under his command, CINCLANT recognized that Latin American army commanders
might take umbrage at having to deal with a maritime-oriented unified command. The obvious way around that obstacle, he believed, consisted of retaining USSOUTHCOM as an Army-oriented subordinate command to "interface" between LANTCOM and the Latin American military commanders. In any event, he insisted on retaining responsibility for the Caribbean Basin whether it was included under USFORCARIB or USSOUTHCOM.\textsuperscript{55}

The New Unified Command Plan of 1983

During the early part of 1983, the Joint Staff reviewed the comments and proposals of the CINCs and the Service Chiefs. On 2 May, rather than submit more revisions of the 1975 UCP, the Joint Chiefs of Staff sent to the Secretary of Defense the draft of a new unified command plan. It embodied several important changes affecting USEUCOM, PACOM, USCENTCOM, and USREDCOM. While retaining responsibility for the Soviet Union, the Joint Chiefs of Staff assigned to USCINCEUR responsibility for all other countries of Eastern Europe. The Joint Chiefs of Staff hoped to exploit the growing "potential for improvement in political-military linkage between this region and the West."

Seeking to use longstanding links between certain NATO nations and their former colonies, the Joint Chiefs of Staff also assigned to USCINCEUR responsibility for all states of Africa above and below the Sahara except those assigned to USCENTCOM (Egypt, Somalia, Kenya, Djibouti, and Ethiopia). By adding to the North African states already in USEUCOM those countries from the Sahara to South Africa, the Joint Chiefs of Staff wanted to signal to allies and adversaries the strategic importance the United States attached to this region.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff also expanded the number of countries assigned to CINCPAC. While labeling the Soviet Union a worldwide threat, they categorized China, North Korea, and Mongolia as strictly Asiatic problem areas and assigned them to PACOM. Moreover the Joint Chiefs of Staff foresaw increased political-military contacts between China and the United States that could best be handled at the unified command level. The decision to assign North Korea to PACOM stemmed from the belief that unifying responsibility for the entire Korean peninsula under CINCPAC would greatly enhance his ability to make the transition from peace to war.\textsuperscript{56}

The Joint Chiefs of Staff also recommended assignment of Alaska, the Aleutians, and Madagascar to CINCPAC. Growing Soviet air and naval activity in the north Pacific Ocean made it necessary to assign Alaska and the Aleutians to the only major command in the area with the ships and planes capable of protecting both places in the event of war. The Joint Chiefs of Staff assigned Madagascar to PACOM because that island impinged directly upon CINCPAC's mission of protecting US sea lines of communication in the Indian
Ocean. In a parallel move the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended assignment of Greenland to LANTCOM. Along with Iceland, Greenland formed an important island link in CINCLANT's wartime strategy for penning up Soviet missile-launching submarines in the Norwegian Sea. The proposed assignments of Madagascar and Greenland underlined the strategic concept that a large sea or ocean area and all the islands therein formed a continuous sea line of communication best handled by a single commander.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff could not agree on responsibility for the Indian Ocean. All except the Chief of Staff of the Army favored continued assignment of the entire Indian Ocean to CINCPAC. The Army member, however, wanted the northwest portion of the Indian Ocean to go to USCINCCENT. In the event of a major war on the Horn of Africa or in the Middle East, he argued, USCINCCENT would require "complete and effective operational control" over all naval and air forces in that portion of the Indian Ocean north of Madagascar and west of India. Such an assignment would "provide boundaries in war that circumscribe the likely and more coherent theater of operations and that move military command seams from strategically vital areas to open maritime areas."

In their memorandum submitting the new UCP to the Secretary, the Joint Chiefs of Staff also recommended that, in addition to being tasked with land defense of CONUS, USCINCRED be charged with responsibility both for establishing a new joint task force headquarters to plan for contingency operations worldwide and selecting forces from USREDCOM to make up the joint task force. Upon its deployment, however, operational control of such a joint task force would transfer to the nearest unified commander or remain with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the National Command Authorities.\textsuperscript{57}

The Secretary of Defense accepted the JCS majority recommendation on retention of the entire Indian Ocean by CINCPAC and approved all other JCS recommendations for the new UCP, save one. Rather than reassign Alaska to CINCPAC for normal operations, he retained it under ADCOM for air defense only. On 28 July the Secretary forwarded the UCP to the President for approval, and the President approved the UCP on 3 October 1983.\textsuperscript{58}

Before disseminating the UCP, the Joint Chiefs of Staff made one minor change to accommodate CINCPAC. He believed that his title, Commander in Chief, Pacific, suggested the inclusion of non-US forces, and he had asked that his title and command be redesignated USCINCPAC and USPACOM, respectively. The Joint Chiefs of Staff honored the request on 11 October and, in the interest of uniformity, renamed CINCLANT and LANTCOM respectively USCINCLANT and USLANTCOM.\textsuperscript{59}

On 28 October 1983, the Joint Chiefs of Staff published the new Unified Command Plan as SM-729-83. It was largely the product of the 1980 and 1982 mandatory biennial reviews. But the Joint Chiefs of Staff subsequently promulgated a new Memorandum of Policy 181 on 15 February 1984 that declared the biennial review unnecessary and replaced it with a requirement for periodic review at their discretion. The 1983 plan also greatly
enlarged the area of operation for three of the unified commands. It extended USEUCOM to include Eastern Europe and sub-Saharan Africa west of Sudan; it expanded USPACOM to include China, Mongolia, North Korea, Madagascar, and the Aleutians; and it enlarged USLANTCOM to include Greenland. These changes were significant, but the most dramatic alteration of command arrangements for the period 1977 through 1983 remained the establishment of USCENTCOM—a testimonial to the determination of two Presidents to defend US strategic interests in that turbulent region.60
Part Two Notes

While the text of this study has been declassified, some of its sources remain classified.


4 Ltr, USCINCSo to JCS, 8 Sep 78, JCS 1259/828, S–NOFORN, JMF 040 (8 Sep 78).

5 Ltr, USCINCSo to JCS, 8 Sep 78, JCS 1259/828, S–NOFORN, JMF 040 (8 Sep 78). Ltr, USAF DCSOPS to DJS, "Air Defense of the Panama Canal (U)," 25 Sep 78, S–NOFORN; Memo, ASD (ISA), to SecDef, "Air Defense of Panama Canal (U)," 28 Sep 78, S–NOFORN; Memo, Vice DepDir, I&R, DIA, to Dir J-5, "Air Defense of the Panama Canal (U)," 20 Oct 78, S; SM–1011–78 to USCINCSo, 15 Dec 78, JCS 1259/828, S; JMF 040 (8 Sep 78).

6 Msg, CINCLANT to JCS, 171806Z Feb 80, S, J-5/G&OP Files.


9 JCS 2121/232, 2 Dec 76, C, JMF 821 (2 Dec 76). CSAM 88–77 to JCS, 27 Nov 77, JCS 1259/800, 5 Dec 77, C, JMF 040 (5 Dec 77).

10 JCS 1259/800–2, 6 Nov 78, C, JMF 040 (5 Dec 77).

11 JCSM–331–78 to SecDef, 28 Nov 78, JCS 1259/800–2, S, JMF 040 (5 Dec 77).


15 Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 22 Oct 79, JCS 1887/849–1, C, JMF 370 (29 Aug 79).


18 Memo, Asst to Pres for NSA to SecDef, 25 Jan 80, JCS 1259/879, S, JMF 040 (25 Jan 80).

19 Memo, DCS Plans and Policies, USMC, to Dir, J-5, 15 Feb 80, S; Memo, Army OpsDep to DJS, 8 Feb 80, S; Msg, USCINCRED to Dir, J-5, 151512Z Feb 80, S; J-5/G&OP Files.


22 Msg, USCINCSo to JCS, 171806Z Feb 80, S, J-5/G&OP Files.
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23 Msg, USCINCSo to JCS, 152010Z Apr 80, JCS IN 67804, C, J-5/ G&OP Files.
27 Ann. to JCSM-274-81 to SecDef, 9 Sep 81, JCS 1976/648, S, JMF 922 (25 Jun 81).
31 Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 24 Apr 81, JCS 1259/920, S, JMF 915/040 (24 Apr 81).
32 Msg, JCS 091303Z Jul 81 to COMRDJTF, TS, cited in JCS 2513/33-1, 30 Oct 81, TS, JMF 865/470 (3 Sep 81).
33 JCSM-201-81 to SecDef, 18 May 81, JCS 1259/920-1, TS, JMF 915/040 (24 Apr 81).
34 JCSM-255-81 to SecDef, 6 Jul 81, JCS 2529/24, S, JMF 036 (18 Jun 81). Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 6 Aug 81, JCS 2529/24-1, S, same file, sec 2.
35 JCSM-331-81 to SecDef, 23 Sep 81, JCS 2529/24-2, S, JMF 036 (18 Jun 81) sec 2. That same date the Joint Chiefs of Staff distributed the approved terms of reference, including Egypt and Sudan in the AOR, to the Services and the CINCs. Also see SM-661-81 to CSA et al., 28 Sep 81, JCS 2529/24-2, S, JMF 036 (18 Jun 81) sec 2.
37 Msgs, JCS to CSA et al., 152130Z Apr 82, S; CINCLANT to JCS, 132000Z May 82, S; CINCPAC to JCS, 172130Z May 82, S; J-5/G&OP Files.
39 CNOM 57-82 to JCS, 13 Sep 82, JCS 2529/51, S; CMCM 06-82 to JCS, 10 Nov 82, JCS 2529/51, S; JMF 036 (13 Sep 82).
41 6th N/H of SM-356-75, 10 Dec 82, C, JMF 040 (11 Jan 74) sec 11.
44 Msgs, JCS to CSA et al., 152130Z Apr 82, S; CINCLANT to JCS, 132000Z May 82, S; USCINCSo to JCS, 151800Z May 82, S; CINCPAC to JCS, 172130Z May 82, S; J-5/G&OP Files.
45 Memo, Army OpsDep to DJS, 20 Sep 82, JCS 1259/970, U, JMF 040 (20 Sep 82).
46 Msg, USCINCSo to JCS, 050320Z Oct 82, S, J-5/G&OP Files.
47 Memo, Army OpsDep to DJS, 15 Nov 82, JCS 1259/982, S, JMF 040 (15 Nov 82). CM-1036-81 to SecDef, 9 Sep 81, JCS 1976/648, S, JMF 922 (25 Jun 81).
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48 Memo, Army OpsDep to DJS, 15 Nov 82, JCS 1259/982, S, JMF 040 (15 Nov 82).

49 Msg, JCS to CINCAD et al., 262309Z Nov 82, S, J–5/G&OP Files.

50 Msgs, USCINCRED to JCS, 081715Z Dec 82, S; USCINCEUR to JCS, 101728Z Dec 82, S; CINCLANT to JCS, 152330Z Dec 82, S; J–5/G&OP Files.

51 Msgs, USCINCEUR to JCS, 101728Z Dec 82, S; CINCLANT to JCS, 152330Z Dec 82, S; J–5/G&OP Files.

52 Msgs, USCINCRED to JCS, 081715Z Dec 82, S; USCINCEUR to JCS, 101728Z Dec 82, S; CINCLANT to JCS, 152330Z Dec 82, S; J–5/G&OP Files.

53 Msgs, JCS to USCINCSO and CINCLANT, 232313Z Dec 82, S; USCINCSO to JCS, 302330Z Dec 82, S; J–5/G&OP Files.

54 Msg, USCINCSO to JCS, 302330Z Dec 82, S, J–5/G&OP Files.


56 Although the UCP does not mention the Mongolian People’s Republic by name, the map clearly includes it in CINCPAC’s area. Interviews of J–5 officers verified that Mongolia had been assigned to USCINCPAC in the new UCP.

57 CSM–129–83 to SecDef, 2 May 83, JCS 1259/994, S, JMF 040 (8 Apr 83).

58 Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 28 Jul 83, JCS 1259/994–1, S; Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 3 Oct 83, JCS 1259/994–2, S; JMF 040 (8 Apr 83).


PART THREE

1983–1993
Two broad factors precipitated changes to the UCP between 1983 and 1993. First, great fluctuations occurred on the international scene. The early 1980s witnessed a sizeable US military buildup and a heightening of Soviet-American confrontation; the late 1980s saw a rapid waning of Cold War tensions. Second, the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 considerably expanded the powers of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as well as those of the commanders of unified and specified commands.

Between 1983 and 1987 new commands were created for Space, Special Operations, and Transportation. But the JCS as a corporate body still reviewed the UCP and showed themselves to be more comfortable with the status quo than with innovation. Service prerogatives often precluded sweeping reforms or what might seem efficient solutions. Consequently, outside agents were the instruments of change. Goldwater-Nichols did not immediately alter that situation. In 1989, General Colin L. Powell, Chairman of the JCS, became the catalyst for reform. He carried through measures—most notably, the expansion of Atlantic Command (USACOM)—that were designed to enhance a joint culture.

Setting Up US Space Command

President Ronald Reagan took actions that led to the creation of the US Space Command. On 4 July 1982 he announced a National Space Policy that, among other things, committed the United States to developing survivable and enduring space systems, an anti-satellite capability, and means for detecting and reacting to threats against US space systems. Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger then initiated a study of how DOD space assets could be integrated into the overall space structure. In March 1983 President Reagan unveiled a Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), popularly dubbed “Star Wars,” which aimed at creating an impenetrable shield against Soviet ballistic missiles. Already, by conducting exercises that involved operational control of space, the Joint Chiefs of Staff appreciated the need for improving coordination of space assets. The SDI highlighted space’s potential as a theater of operations.

In April 1983, General James V. Hartinger, who was CINC, Aerospace Defense Command, as well as Commander, US Air Force Space Command, proposed organizational moves toward a unified space command. These, he told the Joint Chiefs of Staff, would be logical steps to support SDI. On 7 June the Chief of Staff, Air Force, urged an immediate JCS recommendation to establish a unified space command that would “consolidate the mission areas of space control, space support, force application and force...
enhancement, and exercise operational control over all related systems developed for military application.\textsuperscript{22}

The Operations Deputies responded by commissioning a Service/Joint Staff study group to examine solutions. The Air Force advocated a single command, which of course it would dominate. The Army, Navy and Marine Corps reported no major problems with existing organizational mechanisms. On 11 October 1983 the group reported that while command arrangements for space appeared adequate during the near term, some deficiencies should be corrected. Clearer command and control over space defense ought to be established; a joint planning staff for space should be created; and the Joint Chiefs of Staff should assess what changes in command arrangements ought to be made by 1985.\textsuperscript{3}

Meanwhile, the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs, William P. Clark, had asked for JCS views about the Air Force proposal to establish a unified command and about how to exercise operational control over space systems. The Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed to recommend establishing a unified space command on 1 November 1985. They also created a Joint Planning Staff for Space that, among other things, would help develop a transition plan for the new command. The JCS recommendation for a space command went forward to Secretary Weinberger on 23 November 1983; Weinberger endorsed it and so advised the White House three days later. President Reagan, on 20 November 1984, formally approved establishing the new command.\textsuperscript{4}

In February 1984 the Joint Planning Staff for Space began reviewing the processes for establishing a command. The JCS, in December, started assigning missions and responsibilities; US Space Command would integrate tactical warning and space operations, including control of space, direction of space support activities, and planning for ballistic missile defense.

The JCS also began defining what should be the relationship between USSPACECOM and the US-Canadian North American Air Defense Command (NORAD). USSPACECOM would replace the soon-to-be-deactivated Aerospace Defense Command as a supporting command to NORAD, providing it with integrated warning and assessment information. The CINC NORAD, General Robert T. Herres, USAF, strongly favored having CINC NORAD serve also as USCIN CSPACE. The Chairman, along with the Army and Air Force Chiefs of Staff, agreed that, at least during USSPACECOM's first year, this should be the case. But the Chief of Naval Operations and the Commandant, Marine Corps, strongly supported separating the two positions. The duties of USCINCSPACE and CINC NORAD, they argued, were different and expanding. Also, by standing alone, USCINCSPACE would provide the proper military focus and singleness of purpose as well as send the political signals consistent with presidential guidance. Nonetheless, President Reagan decided that—at least for the first year—General Herres would be both USCIN CSPACE and CINC NORAD. The US Space Command was activated at Colorado Springs on 23 September 1985. In November 1986 the Joint Chiefs of Staff
recommended continuing General Herres in his dual role; Secretary Weinberger approved. After the final transfers of its principal missions to USSPACECOM had taken place, Aerospace Defense Command was inactivated on 19 December 1986.

The Strategic Defense Initiative had been a driving force behind USSPACECOM's creation. In June 1987, the Joint Chiefs of Staff endorsed the operational requirements proposed for Phase I of a ballistic missile defense system. With expectations of an operational system, they deemed the time right to place it within the traditional command framework. Accordingly, on 23 November they recommended assigning the ballistic missile defense mission to USSPACECOM. A single commander then would bear responsibility for both operational planning and force execution. Further, USCINCSPACE could influence the operational integration of systems being developed by the Services and the SDI Organization. USSPACECOM did acquire this mission in February 1988. Very soon, however, the ending of the Cold War made SDI seem outdated.

Readjusting for a Special Operations Command

The impetus to create a US Special Operations Command came largely from Capitol Hill. The staffs of Senator William Cohen (R, ME) and Rep. Dan Daniel (D, VA) included men who had served with Special Forces. These staffers, as well as some retired officers, convinced Senator Cohen and Congressman Daniel that the Services were deliberately and unwisely neglecting special operations, low-intensity conflict, and non-traditional threats. Early in 1986 Rep. Daniel introduced legislation to create a National Special Operations Agency, headed by an Assistant Secretary of Defense. Senator Cohen sponsored a bill creating the post of Assistant Secretary for Low Intensity Conflict and Special Operations as well as a unified command for special operations.

Two years earlier, on 1 January 1984, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had established a Joint Special Operations Agency (JSOA) under a two-star officer who reported to the Director, Joint Staff. In 1986, the Director, JSOA, Major General Thomas W. Kelly, USA, frankly described the agency's coordinating efforts as a “failure.” Faced with the Cohen and Daniel bills, the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 20 June 1986 decided to advocate establishing a special operations command under a three-star officer, on grounds that doing so would preserve the normal chain of command and keep the CINCs squarely in charge. They presented this proposal to President Reagan on 1 August, telling him that they opposed Rep. Daniel's bill on grounds that it really would create a fifth Service for Special Operations Forces. Senator Cohen's proposal, they argued, also was unacceptable because it confused low intensity warfare with special operations. The former encompassed much more and was a mission for all Services.
If the Joint Chiefs of Staff were trying to forestall anything resembling the Cohen and Daniel bills, they did not succeed. Public Law 99-661, signed by the President on 14 November 1986, mandated appointment of an Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict as well as creation of a unified combatant command for special operations forces.

The main issue now became whether to split special operations completely away from conventional forces. Early in January 1987 the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral William J. Crowe, Jr., raised this matter with Senator Cohen, Rep. Daniel, Senator Sam Nunn (D, GA; Chairman, Armed Services Committee), and Secretary Weinberger. Nunn and Weinberger thought that the new command should not retain any of USREDCOM's conventional missions. Weinberger, in fact, concluded that Congress would not accept an amalgamation. The USCINCRED, General James J. Lindsay, USA, advised Admiral Crowe that he looked upon a divorce of special operations from conventional forces as the worst possible solution, but Congress already had decided to do just that.

On 9 January General Kelly, the Director for Operations, J-3, briefed the Joint Chiefs of Staff on two alternatives. The first was to create a US Special Operations Command and disestablish USREDCOM, distributing its residual missions among USLANTCOM, USCENTCOM, and US Army Forces Command. The Army, Navy and Air Staffs favored this solution. The second was simply to establish USSOCCOM. Only the Marine Corps advocated this alternative. The first alternative won out because adding a new command meant that an existing one had to disappear.

General Lindsay wanted USREDCOM's major missions transferred to USCENTCOM. But the USCINCENT, General George B. Crist, Jr., USMC, argued that the Services should assume responsibility for maintaining strategic reserves. By 21 January USREDCOM's disestablishment was taken for granted. That step would free 250 billets, including flag slots, for reallocation. Also, PL 99-661's requirement to establish a special operations command by 15 April rendered urgent the need for identifying a suitable headquarters and supporting staff. General Kelly, the Army Staff, and the Marine Corps had come to favor having the Commander, Army Forces Command, act as the CINC, US Joint Forces Command (JFCOM). The Navy and Air Staffs advocated creating a new unified command by making USCINCENT also serve as US Commander in Chief Joint Forces Command (USCINCJFCOM) with responsibility for some of USREDCOM's missions.

During a JCS meeting on 23 January, Admiral Crowe defined the crux of the matter as convincing Secretary Weinberger that USREDCOM's residual missions should go to USCENTCOM. Evidently the Secretary could not be convinced; so a different course was chosen. On 20 February the Joint Chiefs of Staff decided to change US Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) into a specified command that would take over USREDCOM's Army-unique missions (land defense of CONUS and Alaska, a general
reserve of ground forces to support CINCs) as well as its joint training and exercise missions. Essentially, they overturned Secretary McNamara's 1961 decision to have USREDCOM's predecessor, USSTRICOM, control most of the strategic reserve. Some Army divisions in CONUS were not assigned to an overseas command but all USAF tactical fighter squadrons (TFS) were. Why, the Air Force argued, assign squadrons to a CINC who never would employ them? Also, the Air Force worried that making Tactical Air Command a component of FORSCOM would disrupt its own personnel programs by bringing field commanders under the criteria for joint duty assignment that had been imposed by Title IV of the Goldwater-Nichols Act. The JCS characterized the tasks remaining for USREDCOM's Air Force component as narrow, non-operational, and indistinguishable from Service-only responsibilities. Accordingly, squadrons now were to be distributed among warfighting CINCs in accordance with "base case" plans. Thus 32 of 41 were assigned to USEUCOM, even though some of them were based in the United States.

Subsequently, Secretary Weinberger voiced concern that CINCs might be able to direct deployments to their theaters without his approval. Therefore, he asked, why not either turn Tactical Air Command into a specified command or establish a unified US Forces Command? The Chairman replied that the Joint Operation Planning System prevented CINCs from acting on their own and that making FORSCOM a specified command represented the best and most economical way of complying with the Goldwater-Nichols Act.9

The formal JCS recommendation to create USSOCOM, disestablish USREDCOM, and turn Forces Command into a specified command was submitted on 18 March. Secretary Weinberger concurred, and on 13 April President Reagan approved it. Three days later, General Lindsay became USCINC; the disestablishment of USREDCOM occurred on 30 September 1987. General Joseph T. Palastra, Jr., USA, took up the post of CINCFOR on 1 July. USCENTCOM assumed responsibilities for Southwest Asia; responsibilities for strategic mobility planning went to the new USTRANSCOM. FORSCOM would provide a general reserve of combat-ready Army forces, carry out readiness and related deployment planning as well as joint training of assigned forces, and be responsible for the land defense of CONUS.

USCINC controlled all active and reserve special operations forces, except for two Naval Special Warfare Groups that stayed under USPACOM and USLANTCOM. General Lindsay wanted these Groups, and in October, despite Navy protests, Secretary Weinberger ordered them transferred. USCINC's responsibilities included providing a general reserve of combat-ready special operations forces, ensuring proper training, readiness exercises and deployment planning, validating requirements and establishing priorities for special operations forces, and commanding selected missions.10

USCINC possessed unique authority to oversee promotion, assignment, retention, and professional development of Special Forces personnel. He bore responsibility not only for developing and acquiring materiel, supplies, and services peculiar to special operations but also for submitting
program and budget proposals under Major Force Program (MFP) 11. Nevertheless, influential members of Congress remained frustrated by what they termed "malicious implementation" of the legislation by OSD. To reinforce congressional intent, PL 100-80, which became law on 4 December 1987, gave USCINCSOC head of agency authority that would enable him to facilitate the development and procurement of hardware. In 1988 Congress reiterated USCINCSOC's programming (MFP 11), budgeting, and execution authority and gave him acquisition authority as well. Thus, in these areas, USCINCSOC wields unique authority among the CINCs.

The Evolution of USTRANSCOM

Efforts at unifying transportation assets date back to World War II, and progress proved to be very slow. A JCS mobilization exercise in 1978, NIFTY NUGGET, revealed major shortcomings in transportation planning. In one case, airlift planners received 27 requests to move the same unit to 27 different locations. Consequently, the Joint Chiefs of Staff made USCINCREDS responsible for mobilization deployment planning. The Joint Deployment Agency (JDA), a distinct organization collocated with USREDCOM, was established on 1 May 1979 to coordinate and monitor intra-CONUS and inter-theater movements involving common user lift. USCINCREDS took the added responsibility of Director, JDA.

In 1981 Congress required the Defense Department to submit a plan for improving transportation and traffic management. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, on 24 July, recommended integrating the Army's Military Traffic Management Command (MTMC) and the Navy's Military Sealift Command (MSC) into a unified transportation command, reporting through the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense. But the Army and Navy lobbied against this solution on Capitol Hill so effectively that the FY 1982 DOD Authorization Act (PL 97-252) prohibited using any funds for such a purpose.¹¹

Secretary Weinberger rated a unified transportation command as the most needed improvement in readiness management. Accordingly, he sought remedial legislation. The chance came in February 1986, when a Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management (the Packard Commission) recommended setting up a single unified command to integrate global air, land, and sea transportation and repealing the legislation that prohibited such a command. President Reagan, on 1 April, directed Secretary Weinberger to take appropriate action.¹³

An interservice working group chaired by the Vice Director for Logistics, J-4, began deliberations on 7 April. Representatives from the Army Staff, the Air Staff and JDA favored a unified command. The Navy, backed by the Marine Corps, argued that consolidation would erode a Service's authority over its own operations. The group presented eleven proposals to a general officer steering
committee headed by the Director, J-4, Lieutenant General Alfred G. Hansen, USAF. The committee worked out two alternatives. It proposed either a unified headquarters functioning only as an integrating and coordinating entity, with the Services retaining command of their transportation operations and functions in peace and war or a typical unified command organization with Service components (MTMC, MSC, and Military Airlift Command (MAC)) under the CINC’s operational control. On 16 May the second alternative won the committee’s endorsement.

General Duane H. Cassidy, USAF, who was CINCMAC, briefed members of the Packard Commission on 18 June. Members reacted by stressing that a coordinating agency would not be enough. The CINC must have directive authority although in peacetime forces might be assigned for planning purposes only. On 7 October, after more study by the committee and the working group, General Hansen presented the Joint Chiefs of Staff with a three-tiered sequential approach:

1. Make a unified transportation command the peacetime focal point for planning and deployment exercises. In wartime, it would assess movement requirements, task Service components, and adjust plans and modes of transport.

2. In addition to 1, the unified command would develop and evaluate procedures for facilitating the flow of forces and re-supply.

3. In addition to 1 and 2, give the CINC operational command of forces but decentralize execution.

The Army and Air Force Chiefs of Staff favored moving directly to 3, bypassing 1 and 2. But the Chief of Naval Operations and the Commandant, Marine Corps, argued adamantly for starting with 1. They wanted the Service Secretaries to remain single managers of their respective components. At a JCS meeting on 28 October, Admiral Crowe decided to recommend moving immediately to 3, with General Cassidy becoming USCINCTRANS as well as CINCMAC. The Goldwater-Nichols DOD Reorganization Act, meantime, had lifted the legislative prohibition against a unified transportation command.

On 1 December the Chairman, supported by the Army and Air Force Chiefs of Staff, formally proposed phasing in USTRANSCOM over the next 12 months, having CINCMAC also serve as USCINCTRANS for the time being, and disestablishing the JDA. The Chief of Naval Operations dissented, arguing for the “evolutionary” approach on grounds that mechanisms that only recently had been put in place to correct problems should not be disrupted. He also voiced concern that USCINCTRANS’s functions would infringe upon single manager responsibilities that flowed from Congress to the Service Secretaries and then to the Service Chiefs. The Commandant, Marine Corps, recommended simply appointing a USCINCTRANS; separating him totally from
MTMC, MSC and MAC; and ordering him to conduct a comprehensive management analysis before proceeding any further.\textsuperscript{15} Secretary Weinberger accepted the Chairman's proposal.\textsuperscript{16} USTRANSCOM under General Cassidy was activated on 1 July 1987. Military Airlift Command lost its status as a specified command on 30 September 1988 and became a component of USTRANSCOM. But while the organizational charts now showed a superior-to-subordinate relationship, the reality was quite different. Service components retained operational command over their forces, control of industrial funds, and responsibility for performing Service-unique missions as well as procurement. Thus nearly all-essential headquarters functions associated with transportation management and control of transportation functions remained with the components. Headquarters, USTRANSCOM, was still so new that it played only a small role in Operation JUST CAUSE, the invasion of Panama. During Operation DESERT SHIELD, the deployment to Saudi Arabia in 1990, the vague nature of USTRANSCOM's responsibilities during situations short of war created confusion. The MTMC received taskings directly from FORSCOM, not through USCINTRANS, who had to spend two weeks establishing his full authority over components. Even during Operation DESERT STORM, the operation to liberate Kuwait during January to March 1991, the DOD Inspector General claimed later, USTRANSCOM primarily reiterated directions and information produced by higher levels as well as by the components. That may well have been an exaggeration, but it helped shape a perception that more centralized control was needed.

Before DESERT STORM began, General Powell (who became Chairman in October 1989) had started enhancing USCINTRANS's authority. On 30 November 1990, with the Service Chiefs' concurrence, General Powell approved proceeding with a reorganization that would give USCINTRANS a peacetime mission, assign all Service components to him, develop a charter establishing his responsibilities for common-user lift, and create a financial management office for the command. General Powell sent a draft charter to Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney in January. But Mr. David Addington, the Secretary's Special Assistant, then wrote a very different charter that would keep the Services as single managers of their specialties, restrict USCINTRANS's mission to "crises and war," and deny authority to analyze industrial funds. General Powell met with Mr. Addington on 21 October 1991 and convinced him that major revisions were necessary.

Late in December Mr. Addington circulated a proposal that the transportation mission, authority, and resources be transferred from the Service Secretaries to USCINTRANS. The Marine Corps voiced strong objections against such "fundamental changes to established DOD authorities and responsibilities." The Navy also argued against parts of the proposal. But General Powell recommended giving USCINTRANS even more authority. Mr. Addington's draft still allowed the Services to withhold "service-unique" transportation assets, defined in part as "organic parts of
Army, Navy, Air Force, or Marine Corps units assigned to the commander of a unified or specified combatant command other than CINTRANS.” General Powell wanted to delete that part of the definition. Assigning assets to another CINC, he maintained, did not necessarily remove them from common-user roles. The Addington draft also described afloat pre-positioning ships as being under Service control and assigned to a particular theater. General Powell claimed that these ships also served the Army and Air Force on a global strategic basis and therefore should be under combatant command of some CINC. Lastly, the draft did give USCINTRANS control over the transportation accounts of the Defense Business Operations Fund (DBOF). But a proposed National Defense Sealift Fund would not be part of the DBOF, so the draft would grant USCINTRANS wartime authority only. General Powell sought more latitude, so that USCINTRANS could deal directly with the civilian transportation industry.

On 14 February 1992 Secretary Cheney issued a directive making USCINTRANS the single manager for transportation in place of the Service Secretaries. During peace and war, the MTMC, MSC, and the new Air Mobility Command would come under his combatant command, except that the Services could withhold Service-unique or theater-assigned assets. Cheney dropped the portion of the “service-unique” definition that General Powell had found objectionable. Cheney also decided that afloat pre-positioning ships would be theater-assigned only prior to the initial discharge of cargo. He did not, however, extend USCINTRANS’s control beyond the DBOF.17 Although USCINTRANS had hoped for a detailed charter granting broader authority, he still believed that this directive brought about a great increase in his powers.

Debating Smaller Adjustments, 1983–1990

In 1982 the Joint Chiefs of Staff had inclined toward turning USSOUTHCOM into a sub-unified command under USLANTCOM when the time appeared right. But USSOUTHCOM’s strong objections led them to endorse the status quo. Just a year later, however, the Chairman reopened the issue. General John W. Vessey, Jr., USA, informed both CINCs early in 1983 that he believed the time for this change had come, and that USFORCARIB in Key West should be put under USSOUTHCOM as its naval component. Then USSOUTHCOM, as a sub-unified command, would have a pool of forces and a naval headquarters to carry out a wide variety of missions as well as a command dedicated to controlling the Caribbean and South Atlantic sea-lanes in the event of war with the USSR. Both CINCs balked, however, and the Chairman took no further action. In September 1987 the Joint Chiefs of Staff went on record as opposing USFORCARIB’s dissolution as long as Cuba threatened regional stability. Five months later, though, the DOD Inspector
General concluded that the USFORCARIB headquarters was "nice to have, but clearly not essential" because it would play no part in any contingency except a minor noncombatant evacuation during peacetime. He recommended abolishing it as part of a worldwide trimming of headquarters. The Joint Chiefs of Staff concurred, and USFORCARIB was disestablished on 30 June 1989.18

Another piece of unfinished business flowed from the fact that Alaska remained unassigned, except for air defense. In 1983 the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended creating a sub-unified Alaskan Command under USCINCPAC. That would have transformed the Alaskan Air Command into a numbered air force, subordinate to PACAF. Senator Ted Stevens (R, AK) pressed Secretary Weinberger into disapproving the change and later secured a series of legislative prohibitions against it. Lobbying by the Air Force finally ended his opposition. In February 1989, after getting assurances that Congress would remove legislative barriers at the first opportunity, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended assigning Alaska to USCINCPAC. Changes were made, and on 7 July 1989, the sub-unified Alaskan Command started functioning.19

Early in 1983 the Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed to move in the direction of a sub-unified command for Northeast Asia when it appeared politically feasible. In 1974 the Secretary of Defense had directed USCINCPAC to prepare contingency plans for activating Northeast Asia and Southwest Pacific commands. Such plans were incorporated into the Joint Operation Planning System edition for 1975 but not into the one for 1984. The Army Staff revived its argument that, without them, USCINCPAC would be overwhelmed by the distances involved as well as the diversity of nations and missions. Nonetheless, as part of a review required by the Goldwater-Nichols Act, the Joint Chiefs of Staff in September 1987 stated their opposition to a Northeast Asia command. As in the past, they worried that long-standing animosity between Japan and Korea would keep the CINC of such a command constantly walking a tightrope. By early 1990 the ending of the Cold War, plus USCINCPAC's continuing opposition, for the time being ended consideration of a new command.20

The Goldwater-Nichols Act also required an appraisal of whether USCENTCOM should become responsible for the ocean areas adjacent to Southwest Asia and for the "confrontation states" of Israel, Lebanon, and Syria. The Chief of Staff, Air Force, favored giving USCINCCENT the North Arabian Sea, the Gulf of Aden and the Gulf of Oman. Conversely, the Chief of Naval Operations proposed reassigning the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf from USCINCCENT to USCINCPAC. His rationale was that USCINCCENT could not carry out his mission without command of the seas stretching all the way back to the California coast, which was USCINCPAC's responsibility. Treating the Pacific and Indian Oceans as a single strategic entity would enhance efficiency and flexibility. Ultimately, in September 1987 the Joint Chiefs of Staff opted for the status quo. They concluded that current arrangements should remain intact and that keeping USCINCCENT separate from the "confrontation states"
would make him more effective and credible in dealing with other Arab and Muslim states.\textsuperscript{21}

In October 1988 the inactivation of MAC as a specified command, coupled with the start of a biennial UCP review mandated by the Goldwater-Nichols Act, created what the Director, Joint Staff, called a "window of opportunity" to reexamine several issues. He suggested expanding USCENTCOM's ocean area; giving the Caribbean, Mexico and the water around South America to USSOUTHCOM; and assigning CONUS to FORSCOM as its geographic area of responsibility. But these proposals raised some old and emotional issues. The Navy never had wanted land CINCs to control significant ocean areas; Mexico always had remained unassigned because of its "special relationship" with the United States; and a specified command never had been given a geographic area of responsibility. As in the past, Army and Air Force planners favored expanding USCENTCOM's ocean area and giving ocean area to USSOUTHCOM; Navy and Marine Corps planners opposed not only those steps but also assigning Mexico. The Joint Staff broached the possibility of establishing a CINC North America. Ultimately, on 9 February 1989 the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended only one significant change: adding the Gulf of Aden and Oman to USCENTCOM's area of responsibility. This modest shift meant that the new boundaries between PACOM and CENTCOM no longer would cut through the Bab el Mandeb/Strait of Hormuz and their approaches. The sensitive issue of USCENTCOM commanding fleets or controlling broad ocean areas was finessed. On 26 June Secretary Weinberger endorsed this change.\textsuperscript{22}

**Adapting to a New World Order**

The opening of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of communist regimes in Eastern Europe during late 1989 created a far wider "window of opportunity." The Cold War was over. In March 1990 an ad hoc working group started a UCP review based on the assumptions that there would be force reductions in PACOM and, especially, EUCOM and that Congress would mandate cutbacks in overseas headquarters. The group believed that options submitted to the Chairman should be as bold and as free of organizational bias as possible. They decided that several possibilities deserved consideration: disestablishing USCENTCOM and USSOUTHCOM, creating a North America command, and retaining those commands that served the most clearly identifiable US strategic interests (PACOM, LANTCOM, and EUCOM), letting joint task forces handle crises elsewhere.\textsuperscript{23}

The Director for Strategic Plans and Policy, J-5, believed that a radical approach should at least be presented to the JCS. The Director of J-5, Lieutenant General George Lee Butler, USAF, presided over a number of free-ranging sessions and kept General Powell informed. The outcome was a
proposal, given to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 21 November 1990, for reducing the ten commands to six:

1. Strategic Command, absorbing SAC, giving strategic direction to the Trident fleet, and taking responsibility for ballistic missile defense and the anti-satellite mission.

2. Contingency Command, in which USOCOM would be a sub-unified command; FORSCOM would be disestablished.

3. Transportation Command.


5. Atlantic Command, containing USEUCOM and USCENTCOM as sub-unified commands.

6. Pacific Command, with Northeast Asia as a new sub-unified command.

The Service Chiefs identified two problems with this proposal. The first was how to organize CONUS-based forces. The Army and Air Force favored placing all such forces under Americas Command and creating a National Contingency Force. The second problem was how to organize STRATCOM, SPACECOM and NORAD forces. The six-command proposal was intended to serve as a starting point and nothing more; J-5 believed from the outset that it would not be adopted. They felt certain, for instance, that General Powell would neither try to win JCS approval of an Americas Command nor, for political and diplomatic reasons, seek to abolish USSOUTHCOM. But the Chairman did worry that Congress might take the lead on UCP changes if the JCS failed to do so. The end of the Cold War meant shrinking budgets and switching from a global to a regionally based strategy, a smaller conventional capability, and a rationalization of strategic nuclear forces. The next UCP briefing, given by J-5 to the Chiefs on 22 May 1991, envisioned nine CINCs: STRATCOM would supersede SAC; Americas Command would replace SOUTHCOM and FORSCOM; all other commands would remain.

Strategic Command: An Easy Change

The 1960 compromise that created a specified SAC, a Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff (JSTPS), and a CINCSAC who was also Director, JSTPS, had weathered the Cold War unchanged. During the UCP review of 1982-1983, the Joint Chiefs of Staff considered and rejected a unified strategic command on grounds that “if it’s not broken, don’t fix it.” In September 1987, when the Goldwater-Nichols Act required reconsideration of the UCP, the JCS repeated that position. No Service or combatant command, they advised
Secretary Weinberger, advocated changing the current system. Diffusing responsibility for strategic nuclear forces among four CINCs (SAC, LANTCOM, PACOM, and EUCOM) enhanced force survivability by enforcing redundancy. Target planning was what required coordination, and that the JSTPS accomplished. Poseidon and Trident missile submarine patrols had to be coordinated with the movements of friendly and hostile forces, a task best handled by the associated maritime commander.26

When the Soviet Union ceased to be an adversary, the importance of the SIOP and the strategic nuclear arsenal declined. As the defense budget shrank, the institutional and inter-Service barriers that long had prevented a specified SAC from becoming a unified strategic command began to fall away. The J-5 began considering a possible structure of a new command. The CINCSAC, who was General John T. Chain, made a short presentation called "If I Were King" during the CINCs Conference in August 1990: A Strategic Command would include ICBMs, SLBMs, heavy bombers, SDI, and elements of USSPACECOM. Strategic warning, however, should become part of a command that also contained FORSCOM, TAC, and North American Air Defense. Two months later, drawing upon proposals passed from J-5 to SAC, General Chain recommended to General Powell that STRATCOM combine responsibilities assigned to CINCSAC, the Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff, and USCINCSPACE. But the attack warning and assessment mission, together with TAC and FORSCOM, should form part of another new unified command. General Chain suggested that STRATCOM's responsibilities include preparing and maintaining a national strategic target list and a SIOP; long-range nuclear and non-nuclear air strikes; ballistic missile combat and defense; strategic reconnaissance; management of USAF aerial refueling assets; and, finally, space surveillance, control, and support. The post of CINCSTRAT would rotate between the Navy and the Air Force. SAC would become the Air Force component of STRATCOM; USSPACECOM would be redesignated a sub-unified command under STRATCOM.27

Early in January 1991 General Powell broached the possibility of a smaller STRATCOM that incorporated strategic nuclear offensive forces, the JSTPS, anti-satellite and ballistic missile defense, and USCINCSPACE's defensive planning element. As an alternative, the Navy Staff proposed creating a STRATCOM headquarters with SAC, LANTFLT, and PACFLT as its Service components.28

One question raised by creating STRATCOM was whether to subordinate or fragment USSPACECOM. The USCINCSPACE, who was General Donald J. Kutyna, USAF, strongly opposed doing either. On 8 March 1991, at the end of DESERT STORM, he reminded General Powell that USSPACECOM's activities and emphases were changing. No longer was it merely a provider of strategic nuclear intelligence. DESERT STORM illustrated how USSPACECOM had become a major supplier of operational and tactical intelligence for the Army and Navy. Space, he said, had spent 30 years emerging from the umbrella of the intelligence community, then of research and development experimenters, and

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finally of an offensive-minded SAC headquarters. Today, Kutyna continued, an Army cook used a pocket-sized global positioning system to deliver meals to soldiers scattered across the sands of Saudi Arabia. Within two minutes of an Iraqi SCUD missile launch, PATRIOT missiles were alerted and primed while troops had time to don their protective gear and F-15s flew toward mobile SCUD launchers—all using target coordinates provided from space.29 His arguments were extremely effective.

In January 1991 General Butler succeeded General Chain as CINCSAC. By July Butler had become convinced that SAC suffered from an outdated mission focus that translated “strategic” as “nuclear,” which meant execution of the SIOP. He recommended not only merging SAC’s and TAC’s reconnaissance assets into a numbered air force but also integrating SAC’s bomber, tanker, and reconnaissance assets with TAC forces into a single operational command. Butler particularly wanted to make the B-1 bomber usable in conventional conflicts. The Chief of Staff, Air Force, endorsed creating new air combat and air mobility commands, which would replace SAC, MAC, and TAC.

During a JCS meeting in July 1991, General Powell promised that he would take no steps toward reorganization without first securing the Service Chiefs’ and the CINCS’ approval. The Army and Air Force Chiefs of Staff as well as the Commandant, Marine Corps, all said that they supported a unified STRATCOM. The Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Frank B. Kelso II, worried about finding the personnel to staff a new unified command. He told J-5 officers that STRATCOM was “a good concept but the devil’s in the details.”

Two more JCS meetings, followed by the CINCS’ Conference of August 1991, produced an agreement to establish USSTRATCOM. Admiral Kelso won consent that the Navy’s staff representation should increase to 35 percent and that USCINCSTRAT would become a rotational billet and not also be a Service component commander. On 27 September 1991 President George Bush publicly announced that he had approved dramatic cutbacks in nuclear weapons as well as creation of a unified strategic command.31

It was agreed at the 1991 CINCS’ Conference that General Butler, in his capacity as Director, Strategic Target Planning, would take the lead in developing an implementation plan to have USSTRATCOM start functioning by June 1992 and complete the transition six months later. On 27 September 1991 General Butler sent the Joint Staff a proposal that USCINCSTRAT be given geographical responsibility for the former USSR. That proposal was rejected. Two weeks later, he recommended giving USSTRATCOM responsibility for “strategic conventional forces.” The Navy and Air Staffs objected strenuously, claiming that such wording would cover aircraft carriers, airborne warning and control systems (AWACS), and conventional bombers. The Joint Staff agreed. General Butler said that he was looking toward possibly integrating conventional capability into the SIOP. But General Powell decided against him, on grounds that USSTRATCOM’s mission had been conceived by the CINCs as a strategic nuclear one and was so approved by the President.32
General Powell endorsed an implementation plan for USSTRATCOM on 6 April 1992. The next day President Bush approved a UCP revision establishing the new command. USSTRATCOM began functioning on 1 June, and, simultaneously, SAC ceased to exist. USSTRATCOM's components were elements from the new Air Combat Command (ICBMs, bombers, and battle management), CINCLANT/FLTLT, and CINCPACFLTLT (ballistic missile submarines and a strategic communications wing).

The START II Treaty required that a substantial number of US heavy bombers be reoriented to a primarily conventional role. Accordingly, Admiral Paul David Miller, who was CINC of the newly expanded Atlantic Command, proposed that combatant command of heavy bombers and strategic reconnaissance aircraft shift from USCINCSTRAT to him. On 27 December 1993 a transfer took place, and USSTRATCOM's command of forces was reduced to ICBMs, ballistic missile submarines and battle management aircraft, which had no role except in a strategic nuclear war.33

Meanwhile, in his February 1993 Report on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces, General Powell had recommended a review to determine whether USSPACECOM should be abolished and the space mission assigned to USSTRATCOM. Such a consolidation might occur if it could be shown to conserve resources and eliminate a substantial number of staff positions. On 15 April Secretary of Defense Les Aspin commissioned a 90-day study of such a merger. A working group led by J-5 but drawn from USSTRATCOM, USSPACECOM, NORAD, the Services, and all the Joint Staff directorates agreed that the space mission could be transferred to USSTRATCOM. The cost saving, however, would be limited to eliminating 100 to 300 staff support billets. But was this saving significant enough to justify a merger? And would the "value added"—that is, improving space support, operational effectiveness, efficiency, and interoperability while maintaining joint Service expertise and a joint operational focus—be enough to warrant a major change? Over this issue, members disagreed sharply. On 2 August, the Director, Joint Staff, informed OSD that streamlining already was under way and that the merger issue would be reexamined after the extent of saving became known. He added that merging USSTRATCOM into USSPACECOM might then be examined—a reversal of perception about the two commands' relative importance.34

Expanding the Atlantic Command

On 22 May 1991, when J-5 presented its plan for nine commands to the JCS, Americas Command attracted the most attention. FORSCOM, Tactical Air Command, and Atlantic Fleet would be its Service components. The Chief of Staff, Air Force, General Merrill A. McPeak, strongly supported this concept on grounds that having such a command would reduce ad hoc responses to crises. The Chief of Staff, Army, argued that tailoring force packages was the
key to meeting contingencies. The Commandant of the Marine Corps cautioned against presenting Americas Command as the only solution. The Director, J-5, noted that failure to reduce headquarters was a major weakness; the Joint National Contingency Force might even require an extra one. General Powell, observing that USEUCOM would lose at least half its personnel, suggested that a CINCAMERICAS might have his headquarters in Norfolk, Virginia, and control a sub-unified command in Europe. He had watched USREDCOM falter because the Navy was not part of it and favored an East Coast headquarters to be sure that the Navy was involved this time.  

The CINCs’ Conference on 13 August 1991 considered and rejected Americas Command, at least in the form presented by J-5: a command covering all of North and South America except Alaska, with USSOUTHCOM being disestablished. General Edwin H. Burba, Jr., strongly advocated retaining his FORSCOM as a specified command. During DESERT SHIELD/STORM, he had talked to and coordinated with many CINCs; going through a CINCAMERICAS would have made his task more cumbersome. He, CINCLANT, and the Commandant, Marine Corps, all opposed a Joint National Contingency Force. The Commandant argued that, since CONUS-based ground and air forces already were built into the CINCs’ operational plans (OPLANS), none of them wanted such a force. General Powell agreed on that point. He also favored retaining USSOUTHCOM and added that he had difficulty seeing how CINCAMERICAS could handle such a wide span of control. “None of the choices are pleasant,” he reminded conferees, “but we must get smaller.”

A new Air Combat Command (ACC), incorporating elements of TAC, SAC, and MAC, was scheduled to start operating in June 1992. Early in December 1991 a memorandum signed by the Vice Chief of Staff, Air Force, recommended designating ACC as a specified command that would parallel FORSCOM’s role in providing a general reserve, joint training, and readiness and deployment planning. J-5 opposed this solution as undercutting the practice of assigning forces to the CINCs. No action was taken.

At the CINCs’ Conference of August 1992, General Powell reopened the question of whether there should be a permanent CONUS-based command designed to deal with contingencies. The answers showed no consensus. General Burba argued again that going through another CINC would make FORSCOM’s task too complicated. General McPeak disagreed: the CINC simply would tell General Burba to make telephone calls and coordinate his requirements. McPeak said that he wanted ACC to be part of another command and not an independent force. General Powell defined the main issue as being whether a joint national contingency force was needed. The USCINCEUR, General John M. Shalikashvili, USA, gave his opinion that FORSCOM had rendered good service and he would not like to see it dissolved. The USCINCENT, General Joseph P. Hoar, USMC, argued that any war in CENTCOM would be a coalition war. A CONUS-based force that was globally oriented could acquire only limited regional expertise. The Commandant of the Marine Corps, General Carl E. Mundy, Jr., agreed. Not
so, General Powell replied. A joint task force was built for DESERT STORM, except that it was built in Saudi Arabia. But, the Commandant countered, USCENTCOM contained officers who knew the area and the personalities. General Powell had a rejoinder. When DESERT SHIELD started, he asked, did General Charles Horner know that he would be the Joint Forces Air Component Commander? General Horner, who was now the USCENTCOM, replied that he had not. As Commanding General, 9th Air Force, he could not have become a regional expert because he was reporting to both USCENTCOM and Tactical Air Command.38

The CINCs’ Conference crystallized three alternatives: First, keep the status quo. Second, establish ACC as a specified command. Third, assign all CONUS-based Army and Air Force units to USLANTCOM, making it the joint force integrator, and disestablish FORSCOM as a specified command. General Powell decided to take the initiative in pressing the third alternative. The Chairman’s rationale ran as follows: While the joint/unified system worked well overseas, CONUS forces still were Service-oriented. As the US presence overseas shrank, it became more important that CONUS-based forces “be trained to operate jointly as a way of life and not just for occasional exercises.” Growing acceptance of jointness opened the way toward this last step in unification. ACC as well as FORSCOM would become components in a unified command, and the term “specified” would be retired. A single combatant command would ensure the joint training and readiness of response forces. It also would support emerging missions, such as peacekeeping operations and humanitarian assistance; help cope with domestic disasters; and prepare and test joint doctrines. General Powell deemed USLANTCOM the most suitable choice for these tasks. The Cold War’s end freed it for a new mission, and it already enjoyed component relationships with FORSCOM, ACC, MArLANT, and LANTFLT. Since the USCINCLANT was also SACLANT, building joint capabilities would be as important as using the sea-lanes and so would enhance his position as a major NATO commander. Thus USLANTCOM would change from a principally naval headquarters into a more balanced one, and an officer from any Service could fill the CINC’s position.39

General Powell presented his concept to the Service Chiefs on 16 October 1992. After another meeting on 2 November, they approved its further development. Under Joint Staff leadership, a working group with USLANTCOM and Service officers set about refining the concept. On 18 November the Chairman authorized the preparation of a concept plan. The Joint Staff moved away from the term “Americas Command” because it carried too much emotional baggage from past debates. The Army still worried about declining Service authority, and the Marine Corps wanted to be sure of retaining Service-unique capabilities. General Burba several times visited the Director, J-5, Lieutenant General Edwin S. Leland, USA, to argue against disestablishing FORSCOM.40

In February 1993, in his Report on Roles, Missions, and Functions of the Armed Forces, General Powell expounded his concept for combining the
CONUS-based forces of FORSCOM, ACC, LANTFLT, and MARIANT into an expanded Atlantic Command. On 11 March the Chairman approved a final concept for USACOM—the acronym that would replace USLANTCOM.

Yet, to a far greater degree than with the creation of USSTRATCOM, the devil was in the details. The drafting of guidance for USACOM’s implementation plan sparked a number of controversies. The Army wanted USACOM to control west coast Navy and Marine forces but argued against giving the CINC geographic as well as functional responsibilities. USCENTCOM agreed about giving west coast forces to USACOM. The Navy, supported by USEUCOM and the Marine Corps, advocated having the component CINCLANTFLT also be SACLANT so that SACLANT would remain a naval officer. On 7 April General Powell resolved these issues. First, West Coast naval forces would stay under PACOM. Second, CINCLANT (soon to be USCINCACOM) would remain SACLANT; the Chairman had canvassed NATO Defense Chiefs and found that none insisted upon SACLANT always being a naval officer. Third, Atlantic Command would continue controlling a geographic area so that, among other things, Vieques in Puerto Rico would be available for joint exercises. General Powell remarked that transferring its geographic area to USEUCOM, for example, would make that command in turn too large. Fourth, the Chairman did agree that the Secretary of the Army would remain Executive Agent for domestic emergencies. But, since the Secretary would have to approach the Chairman about using a CINC’s forces, General Powell believed that his own role as principal military adviser was protected. The Secretary of the Army, moreover, did lose his role as Executive Agent for many “peacekeeping” operations; the UCP now assigned combatant command over peacekeeping forces to the appropriate CINC. General Powell wanted the whole implementation plan to reach a rapid completion and directed, “Make this happen before 30 September”—his own retirement date.41

On 15 April Secretary Aspin directed that USCINCACOM would assume command of FORSCOM, ACC, LANTFLT, and MARIANT as well as responsibility for joint training, force packaging, and facilitating deployments of designated CONUS forces. To facilitate USCINCACOM’s mission as the joint force integrator of most CONUS-based forces, key stateside USAF units that provided the conventional capabilities for joint force “packages” were brought under USCINCACOM’s command. Also, the Chairman’s Instruction that detailed the purpose and management of dual-based forces was revised to reflect USCINCACOM’s new role as the CINC who supported USCINCEUR. This revision did not fundamentally alter the political or military significance of the dual-based forces concept as stated in the NATO Defense Planning Guidance. A directive dated 20 September formalized all these changes.42

Meantime, on 27 August General Powell asked Secretary Aspin to approve UCP revisions reflecting USACOM’s new role. USCINCSOUTH proposed stripping USACOM of its geographic area of responsibility; USCINCEUR favored delay until both an implementation plan and an FY 1994 “Forces” document had been approved. The Chairman recommended rejecting both and making
the UCP changes take effect on 1 October. Secretary Aspin agreed and President Clinton gave his approval. Accordingly, on 1 October USLANTCOM became USACOM, and FORSCOM lost its specified command status.43

Conclusion

The end of the Cold War triggered dramatic changes in the US military establishment but not in the UCP, because the unified command structure was the product of different factors.44 A functional UCP reorganization would have cut deeply into what the Services saw as their traditional prerogatives. The debate over making USCINTRANST single manager of transportation assets would have been replicated many times. Instead, working within the old geographical framework, the UCP was reshaped to carry out General Powell’s regional approach set forth in the new National Military Strategy. Here other constraints worked against major cuts. First, reducing to only four or five CINCs could create one dominant figure who might undercut other CINCs and even the Chairman. Such a fear did exist about USCINCPACOM, and the UCP placed a unique limitation upon him: “In coordination with the other combatant commanders, identify and prepare for review by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, joint force packages for worldwide employment.” Second, eliminating unified command headquarters might not have generated the manpower savings sought by Congress. With a “super” CINC, controlling very large areas or forces, work simply would have shifted down to enlarged sub-unified commands and required bigger staffs there. Third, political and diplomatic factors helped keep commands in being. USSOUTHCOM survived in large part so that direct ties could be maintained with military officers who played dominant roles in many Latin American countries. Fourth, the Services acted as a powerful force for the status quo. Before Goldwater-Nichols, the corporate JCS usually shied away from major reforms and the President or Congress had to precipitate change.

After Goldwater-Nichols, the Chairman’s attitude became crucial. Admiral Crowe, having to work with some Service Chiefs who had taken office before Goldwater-Nichols, adopted an evolutionary approach in which consensus still played a significant part. General Powell took the lead in creating USACOM and turning USCINTRANST into the single manager. At a more mundane level, he cooperated with OSD in trimming the UCP from 28 pages in 1989 to 14 pages in 1992. Joint Staff officers characterized longer UCPs as “Christmas trees” in the sense that the Services hung on them qualifiers designed to protect their own prerogatives. In sum, General Powell used the powers given him by Goldwater-Nichols to work with CINCs like Admiral Miller in removing what he saw as barriers to jointness.
Part Three Notes

While the text of this study has been declassified, some of its sources remain classified.

1 Two Directors of the Joint Staff tried, in 1984 and again in 1988, to launch broad reexaminations of the UCP. Both times, little resulted beyond rearguements of old disputes. Memo, DJS to Dir, J-3, Dir, J-5, and DepDir, J-2, 3 Oct 84, U; DJSM-2166-88 to USCINCPLANT et al., 3 Oct 88, S; J-5 Organizational Policy Branch File. The Directors were LTG Jack N. Merritt, USA, in 1984 and LTG Robert W. RiCassell, USA, in 1988.

2 CSAFM-5–83 to JCS, 7 Jun 83, JCS 2542/8, S, JMF 040 (7 Jun 83).

3 JCS 2542/8–3, 26 Oct 83, S, JMF 040 (7 Jun 83).

4 JCSM-296-83 to SecDef, 23 Nov 83, S, JCS 2542/8–3, JMF 040 (7 Jun 83). Ltr, Pres to SecDef, 20 Nov 84, U, JCS 2542/76, JMF 043 (20 Nov 84).

5 JCSM-287-85 to SecDef, JCS 2542/101, S; Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 16 Sep 85, JCS 2542/101–2, C; JCSM-275–86 to SecDef, 26 Nov 86, JCS 2542/101–10, C; Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 18 Dec 86, 1st N/H of JCS 2542/101–10, 31 Dec 86, U; JMF 040.1 (6 Jun 85) sec. 1. In 1992 USCINCSPACE started filling another function as the Service component commander.


8 Partin, pp. P 50–53, U.

9 Partin, pp. P 56, 64–65, 68–73, 88–90, U. TelCon, W. S. Poole with Gen. Larry D. Welch, USAF (Ret.), 25 Jan 94, U. Gen. Welch also commented that Title IV’s burdens turned out to be much less onerous than the Air Force had expected. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 9 Nov 87, JCS 2542/ 136–3, S; CM-1043–87 to SecDef, 19 Nov 87, 1st N/H of JCS 2542/136–3, S, JMF 040 (15 Feb 86) sec. 2.

10 JCSM-26–87 to SecDef, 18 Mar 87, JCS 2542/181, U; Memo, SecDef to Pres, 6 Apr 87, JCS 2542/181–3, U; Memo, Pres to SecDef, 13 Apr 87, JCS 2542/181–3, S; JMF 047 (22 Jan 87). Tab E to App to JCSM-163–87 to SecDef, 24 Sep 87, JCS 2542/136–2, S, JMF 040 (15 Feb 87). Psychological warfare operations and civil affairs functions were assigned to USSOCOM on 15 October.

11 US Transportation Command History, 18 Apr–31 Dec 87, p. 1, U. Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS et al., 30 Jun 81, JCS 1672/404, U; JCSM-284–81 to SecDef, 24 Jul 81, JCS 1672/404–1, U; JMF 444 (30 Jun 81).

12 An Interim Report to the President by the Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management, 28 Feb 86, p. 12. NSDD 219, 1 Apr 86, U.


15 CM-457–86 to SecDef, 1 Dec 86, U, J-5 Org Pol Branch File.

16 Memo, LTC Higgins to DASSD (Admin), 8 Dec 86, U; Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS, “Recommendations for a UTC,” 31 Dec 86, U; Memo, Pres to SecDef, “Establishment of the UTC,” 18 Apr 87, U; J-5 Org Pol Br File.

17 DJSM-1419–90 to DepUSCINCTRANS, 27 Dec 90, U; IP by CAPT Brown, "USTRANSCOM Charter," n.d.; J-5 Org Pol Branch File. Memo, Mr Addington to SecDef, 27 Dec 91, JCS 1672/447, S; MCDV-41–91 to DJS, 31 Dec 91, JCS 1672/447–1, U; OP-423 NDV No. 9-92 to Dir, J-4, 7 Feb 92, U; Memo, Mr. Addington to SecDef, 5 Feb 92, JCS 1672/447–3, U; Memo, SecDef to Svc Secs et al., 14 Feb 92, JCS 1672/449, U, JMF 047.3 (CY 92). USCINCTRANS now also become Commander, Air Mobility Command.

18 P&IP, “Command Arrangements in Central/South America/Caribbean,” 19 Oct 84, S; “BG Schlossberg OSD Brief 22 Sep 87,” S; Msg, CJCS to USCINCSO and USCINCPLANT, 08245Z Jan 83, S; Msg,

32 CSAM-10-85 to JCS, 9 Sep 85, S, JMF 040 (15 Feb 86) sec. 4. JCSM-23-89 to SecDef, 9 Feb 89, JCS 2542/257, S; Memo, SecDef to Pres, "The UCP: Biennial Review and Revision," 26 Jun 89, U; J-5 Org Pol Br File.

33 MFR by Col. J. A. Smith, "Proposed Northeast Asia Command," 22 Feb 83, S; IP by LTC Crowell, 21 Dec 84, S; J-5 Org Pol Br File. JCSM-163-87 to SecDef, 24 Sep 87, JCS 2542/136-2, S, JMF 040 (15 Feb 86) sec. 1. DJSM-229-90 to OpsDeps, 8 Mar 90, JCS 2542/324, S. AFODM 8-90 to DJS, 8 Mar 90, JCS 2542/324, S; NODM 7-90 to DJS, 26 Mar 90, JCS 2542/324-1, S; Memo, Army Ops Dep to DJS, 10 Apr 90, JCS 2542/324-2, S; JMF 520 (CY 90).

34 AF Flimsy 9-87 to JCS, 26 Aug 87, S; CNOF-12-87 to JCS, 26 Aug 87, S; Notes to AMD, "JCS 2542/136-2," 28 Aug & 2 Sep 87, U; JCSM-163-87 to SecDef, 24 Sep 87, JCS 2542/136-2, S, JMF 040 (15 Feb 86) sec. 3.

35 DJSM-2166-88 to USCINCOSM et al., 3 Oct 88, S; J-5 PP 497-88, 7 Dec 88, U; Msg, USCINCSM to JCS, 261892Z Jan 89, S; PP, "USCINCOSM UCP Issues," n.d., C; Memo, Col. Conrad to Svc Planners, "Agenda for 19 Jan 89 Planners' Mtg," 19 Jan 89, S; Note to Actions Div by SJS, "UCP Revision," 3 Feb 89, S; Memo, Army Ops Dep to DJS, "Review of the UCP," n.d. (2 Feb 89), S; Memo, USMC OpsDep to Dir, J-5, same subj., 2 Feb 89, C; AF DepOpsDep 15-88 for DJS, 23 Dec 88, S; JCSM-23-89 to SecDef, 9 Feb 89, JCS 2542/257, S; Memo, SecDef to Pres, "The UCP: Biennial Review and Revision," 26 Jun 89, U; J-5 Org Pol Br File. The JCSC recommended that Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, and Tanzania be transferred from USEUCOM to USCENTCOM.


39 MFR by CAPT Schneider, "Goldwater-Nichols DOD Reorganization Bill . . . ," 15 Sep 86, U, J-5 Org Pol Br File. The Goldwater-Nichols Act mandated a biennial UCP review and specified ten issues that the first review must address. JCSM-163-87 to SecDef, 24 Sep 87, JCS 2542/136-2, S, JMF 040 (15 Feb 86) sec. 1.

40 CAPT Paul Brown interviewed by Walter S. Poole, 28 Feb 94. Ltr, CINCSAC to CJCS, 9 Oct 90, SJ 2542/364, S, 373 (CY 90).

41 "USCINCSM Organization (OP-65 Draft)," 8 Jan 91, U; J-5 Org Pol Br File.

42 Ltr, USCINCSM to CJCS, 8 Mar 91, S, J-5 Org Pol Br File.


45 Msg, CINCSAC to Jt Staff J-5, 272029Z Sep 91, S; UCP Update for DJ-5, 10 Oct 91, U, J-5 Org Pol Br File.

46 Ltr, USCINCSM to CJCS, "USACOM Implementation Plan," 16 Jun 93, U; CM-1757-93 to CJCS, 1 Jul 93, U; MCM-82-93 to USCINCSM, CH 1, 21 Jul 93, U, J-5 Org Pol Br File. On 27 December 1993 the Secretary of Defense approved the "Forces for Unified Commands" document as part of implementation of the revised UCP.

47 DJSM-816-93 to USD(F), 2 Aug 93, U, J-5 Org Pol Br File.

Bfg by LTG E. S. Leland. "Unified Command Plan," 13 Aug 91, J-5 Working Papers, J-5 Org Pol Br File, S; Memo, DJS to CSA et al., 19 Sep 91, S; J-5 Org Pol Br File. CAPT Paul Brown interview, 13 Jan 94. On 1 July LTG Leland had proposed either giving the whole hemisphere to CINCAMERICAS or assigning him only North and Central America, giving the Caribbean and South America to USCINCLANT. The Director, Joint Staff, preferred the former, on grounds that USCINCLANT was focused toward Europe and that Army officers dominated most Latin American military establishments. GEN Powell commented: "Good points. Another option is 'No change.'" Memo, DJS to CJCS, "The UCP and Latin America," 1 Jul 91, S, J-5 Org Pol Br File.

CSAFM-6–91 to CJCS, 2 Dec 91, SJS 2542/415, U; USAF Bfg. "Air Combat Command as a Specified Combatant Command," 13 Dec 91, U, J-5 Org Pol Br File. The Vice Chief who signed the CSAFM, Gen. Michael P. C. Carns, previously had been Director, Joint Staff.

J-5 Working Papers, S.


J-5A 5948–92 thru DJS to CJCS, 17 Nov 92, U; Bfg by RADM Gehman, USCINCLANT J–3, 13 Jan 93, with Handwritten Notes, "Debrief from J–7 Tank Brief ref LANTCOM," U; J-5 Org Pol Br File. CAPT Paul Brown interview, 13 Jan 94.


Msg. USCINCEUR to CJCS, 091200Z Jul 93, S; Msg, CJCS to USNMR SHAPE, 191432Z Jul 93, S; Msg. USCINCEUR to CJCS, 301200Z Jul 93, S; Form 136, SJS 2147/866, 5 Aug 93 with handwritten CJCS approval dated 14 Aug, S; J-5 Org Pol Br File.


Memo, USD(P) to SecDef, 13 Jan 93, SJS 2542/513, S; Memo, Pres to SecDef, 26 Feb 93, SJS 2542/513–1, U, 040 (12 Jan 93). The three Baltic states were deemed to have unique historical and cultural ties with Western Europe.
PART FOUR

1993–1999
Oiling the Machinery

In the 1995 review, Atlantic Command (ACOM) again emerged as the major topic of debate. Should ACOM continue combining functional with regional responsibilities? The Chairman, General John M. Shalikashvili, USA, began the biennial review in February by soliciting recommendations from the CINCs and the Services. The Chief of Naval Operations and the CINCUSACOM, General John M. Sheehan, USMC, proposed turning SOUTHCOM into a subunified command under ACOM. Sheehan also wanted to acquire either combatant command or training oversight of West Coast forces. Conversely, the Chief of Staff of the Army wanted to eliminate ACOM’s entire geographical AOR. The Chief of Staff, Air Force, and USCINCSOUTH recommended shifting the Caribbean area from ACOM to SOUTHCOM; USCINCSOUTH also sought to control the waters adjoining his command out to 200 nautical miles, on grounds that this would improve regional engagement, contingency planning, and counter-drug operations.¹

Concurrently, a Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces (CORM) was reviewing UCP issues. The Commission’s members leaned toward turning ACOM into a purely functional command. Talking to them in April, General Shalikashvili did not dismiss General Sheehan’s argument that having a geographic area of responsibility gave him credibility. The Chairman saw reasons for, ultimately, assigning West Coast forces to ACOM; deploying a brigade from the Hawaii-based 25th Infantry Division to Haiti had shown how units could be multi-tasked. Shalikashvili did agree that, because protecting the sea-lanes to Europe had lost importance, the Caribbean should be shifted to SOUTHCOM. Miami, where CINCSOUTH would be relocating his headquarters from Panama, impressed the Chairman as having become a major Latin American city. Broadening CINCSOUTH’s warfighting capabilities would give him credibility with Latin American counterparts who came to Miami.²

Some familiar issues were debated again. The USCINCENT, supported by the Army and Marine Corps, suggested adding India and a good part of the Indian Ocean to his AOR. Speaking with CORM members, General Shalikashvili defined the underlying issue as whether India and Pakistan saw a CINC as the officer who decided which country the United States would fight beside in a war or simply as the officer who conducted exercises. If the latter, he believed that large nations like India would prefer dealing directly with Washington when major issues arose. That being so, India and Pakistan could remain divided between USPACOM and USCENTCOM. A Commission member favored establishing a Northeast Asia Command. The Chairman replied that Korean unification had to come first; the Chinese would not talk to an officer who was also Commander in Chief, United Nations Command. Finally,
opinions differed over whether newly independent states created from the former Soviet Union should remain unassigned. USCINCPAC and USCINCCENT said yes; USCINCCOM recommended assigning countries as they joined the Partnership for Peace; CINCSTRAT wanted to assign Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan after they became non-nuclear states.5

During May and June 1995, the Chairman removed from consideration a number of controversial proposals: turning SOUTHCOM into a sub-unified command under ACOM; making CINCSOUTH responsible for all counter-drug operations in his AOR; giving geographic CINCs authority to budget and administer operations and maintenance funds for joint training; granting functional CINCs programming and budgeting authority similar to that possessed by USSOCOM; and creating a CINC for logistics. The Chairman also dropped, as premature, General Sheehan’s suggestion of designating a CINC for command, control, communications, computers and intelligence.4

Concurrently, the CORM recommended changing ACOM into a purely geographical command and creating a new functional command that would control CONUS-based general-purpose forces, reserve as well as active. That way, the Commission concluded, joint force integration would be better defined, understood and accepted by all the CINCs. But General Shalikashvili successfully urged the Secretary to postpone action, on grounds that the issue needed more study.5

At the CINCs’ conference, on 8 September 1995, the location of a redrawn boundary between ACOM and SOUTHCOM was the main point of contention. Discussion brought out some points that had not come to the Chairman’s attention (e.g., the extent of cooperation between PACOM and the Chilean navy, and the fact that every agency except the Department of Defense managed Caribbean and Latin American affairs through a single office). If SOUTHCOM did acquire a water area, the Navy preferred using lines of latitude and longitude for boundaries rather than following a two hundred mile limit as it curved along the coasts.6 However, the J–5 proposed giving SOUTHCOM water areas inside contour lines running three hundred nautical miles from the coasts. Expanding SOUTHCOM’s water area, the J–5 reasoned, would allow it to interact more effectively with Latin American navies and give it an area of responsibility with more space for joint operations and exercises. Phase I, proposed for 1 January 1996, would shift the waters adjoining Central and South America from ACOM to SOUTHCOM. Phase II, occurring no earlier than 1 June 1997, would transfer the Gulf of Mexico, the Caribbean, and portions of the Atlantic to SOUTHCOM.7

General Sheehan protested that losing so much water would return ACOM to the two-dimensional focus of the old Atlantic Command. Why not, instead, consider putting SOUTHCOM under ACOM to (1) firmly establish ACOM’s multi-dimensional joint focus and (2) provide an AOR that would be exceptionally conducive to joint training and integration? In October, nonetheless, the JCS agreed to the expansion of SOUTHCOM’s area of
responsibility outlined above. But the Navy prevailed to the extent that the
ew water boundaries would be drawn along lines of latitude and longitude.8

On 23 October 1995, General Shalikashvili asked Secretary of Defense
William J. Perry to endorse three UCP changes. First, revise STRATCOM's
mission to replace outdated wording that had encompassed peacetime missions
as well as wartime taskings. Second, shift from USPACOM to USCENTCOM the
Arabian Sea and portions of the Indian Ocean. This would move command
boundaries away from choke points and provide space to conduct joint
operations and training. Third, immediately enlarge USSOUTHCOM's area of
responsibility to include waters off the Central and South American coasts. Not
earlier than 1 June 1997, transfer to USSOUTHCOM the Caribbean basin, the
Gulf of Mexico and a portion of the Atlantic Ocean. As spokesman for the
combatant commanders, Shalikashvili pointed out that CINUSACOM and
USCINCPAC opposed enlarging USSOUTHCOM. The Chairman also concluded
that, contrary to the CORM's recommendation, USACOM should retain both
geographic and functional responsibilities for the time being. He favored
postponing, until the joint training system had time to mature, a decision about
putting West Coast forces under USACOM. Some in the Office of the Secretary
of Defense tried to accelerate transferring the Caribbean and Gulf of Mexico, but
Secretary Perry supported the Chairman. On 28 December 1995, President
William J. Clinton approved these changes.9

At the CINCs' conference in January 1997, General Shalikashvili
asserted that US armed forces had reached a new level of competence; he was
"not persuaded that we are doing anything wrong." The Director, J-5,
recommended tasking an evolutionary approach to the UCP in 1997, leaving
consideration of "revolutionary" changes for the next cycle—and the next
Chairman. Assignment of countries created from the former Soviet Union fell
into the category of evolutionary change. In the Defense Department's view, the
increased US presence in these countries showed the need for CINCs to
assume planning responsibilities. Accordingly, J-5 proposed assigning the
Western Slavic and Caucasus states—Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, Georgia,
Armenia, and Azerbaijan—to USEUCOM. USCENTCOM would get the Central
Asian states—Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, and
Kyrgyzstan. The State Department did not object, and these assignments were
incorporated into the next UCP.10

Should space be defined as a geographic AOR? The J-5 cautioned
against creating perceptions of intent to militarize space and saw no
compelling reason to define space as an AOR. But in June 1997 the
USCINCSPACE, General Howell M. Estes, III, USAF, advised the Chairman
that it was time to act. Having an AOR would allow USSPACECOM to develop
a cohesive regional strategy for space and to establish ties, through military-
to-military contacts, with other entities involved in space. State Department
representatives, however, voiced "serious concerns" about damaging Russian-
American relations, particularly, ABM negotiations and the ratification of
START II. The NSC Staff held a similar view. Accordingly, J-5 proposed

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expanding USSPACECOM’s mission only in modest ways: first, to serve as the single point of contact for space operational matters; second, to provide military representation to US national, commercial and international agencies for matters related to space operations; third, to plan and implement security assistance related to space operations; and fourth, to coordinate and conduct space campaign planning. These additions mostly codified what already was taking place.\textsuperscript{11} On January 1998, President Clinton approved a UCP that incorporated the revisions for USEUCOM, USCENTCOM and USSPACECOM described above. It also tasked each CINC with responsibility for the security and force protection of his command, and precisely spelled out USACOM’s responsibilities as the joint force integrator.\textsuperscript{12}

**Emerging Issues: Homeland Defense and Information Warfare**

The next UCP cycle took up “revolutionary” changes, and the focus of attention shifted sharply. The threats to US territory, particularly from terrorism, appeared to be large and growing. The bombing in Oklahoma City, the attempted destruction of the World Trade Center, and the release of sarin gas in the Tokyo subway dramatized the new dangers. A National Defense Panel, in December 1997, outlined a “transformation strategy” that accentuated homeland defense and control of cyberspace. The Panel proposed abolishing USACOM, giving USSPACECOM the mission of information support on a global scale, and creating three new commands. A Joint Forces Command would take responsibility for the readiness and training of all CONUS-based active and reserve forces, and provide combat-ready forces to all other commands. An Americas Command would have the mission of protecting the hemisphere, deterring the use of weapons of mass destruction, and building hemispheric cooperation. Homeland Defense and North American Aerospace Defense would be sub-unified commands under it. A Logistics Command would integrate the missions of USTRANSCOM and the Defense Logistics Agency.\textsuperscript{13}

In May 1998, Deputy Secretary of Defense John Hamre concluded that homeland defense ought to become a CINC’s responsibility. What, he asked the Vice Chairman, was the best way to proceed? As matters stood, the Secretary of the Army served as the executive agent for military support to civil authority. In certain situations, the Secretary could task service assets directly without CINC or Joint Staff coordination. The Army’s Director of Military Support (DOMS), who reported to the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, was executive agent for “weapons of mass destruction consequence management”—i.e., dealing with the aftermath of a manmade disaster. The current UCP made CINCUSACOM responsible for military support to civil authorities as well as military assistance for civil disturbances.\textsuperscript{14}
The January 1998 CINCs' conference decided to commission a study of how the UCP should evolve as far ahead as 2010. The new chairman, General Hugh H. Shelton, USA, cited review of ACOM's role and homeland defense as his top priorities. Should homeland defense remain decentralized among several DOD organizations or be centralized, either within the DOD or under a unified command?\textsuperscript{15} Shelton believed that the key to turning Joint Vision 2010 into operational reality lay in an aggressive experimentation program focused at the joint or "seam" areas where the Services by themselves fell short. ACOM struck him as the logical place to locate these experiments. The Chairman wanted to review the roles of ACOM and CONUS-based commands in the coming UCP cycle, then address 21st century issues in the next one. He also directed the Joint Staff to work upon defensive information operations and, after an organization had been created, deal with offensive information operations.\textsuperscript{16}

In September, the Chairman and the CINCs agreed upon important steps. First, replace ACOM in 1999 with a Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) that would be geographic as well as functional. Second, organize a Joint Task Force—Civil Support that would be subordinate to JFCOM; hold open the possibility of assigning it to a sub-unified command or another CINC. Third, continue organizing a JTF for computer network defense (CND). The CINCUSACOM observed that giving Information Support to SPACECOM would not leave enough duties to justify a homeland defense command. General Shelton replied that counter-terrorism, consequence management, DOMS, and national missile defense all could become larger tasks.\textsuperscript{17}

Concurrently, contractors submitted to the Joint Staff a study, UCP–21, that buttressed the Chairman's and CINC's conclusions. According to UCP 21, service component headquarters in geographic commands were inadequately prepared, trained, and equipped to head joint task forces. Therefore, Joint Forces Command should integrate service capabilities by training joint command and control elements. Also, JFCOM ought to design and manage the development of joint doctrine, and experiment with new operational concepts. Among other things, the study recommended creating, at some later time, an all-service Logistics Command as well as a US Defense Command. The latter would: control national missile and air defense; assume DOMS missions; support crisis and consequence management; and exercise oversight of efforts to protect DOD installations and computer networks.\textsuperscript{18}

In June 1999 General Shelton spelled out his UCP priorities for Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen. Joint Forces Command would receive the resources needed to get the most benefits from its experimentation program. A JTF—Civil Support, reporting through CINCJFCOM to the Chairman, would start functioning. But, he reported, there was disagreement within Defense and among agencies about the next step. Shelton's inclination was to build the JTF into a homeland defense command. As an interim step, he wanted JTF—Civil Support to acquire responsibility for all military support to civilian authorities within the United States. JTF—Computer Network Defense had reached full operational capability.\textsuperscript{19}
The J-5 had circulated a draft UCP for final coordination. In mid-June, unresolved issues were brought to General Shelton for resolution. The most important ones concerned JFCOM. First, the Air Force opposed giving JFCOM a mission to “support development and utilization of fully interoperable systems and capabilities,” including Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Surveillance and Reconnaissance. Since everyone else had approved this mission, however, Shelton retained it. Second, for the task of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) consequence management, the Army sought to insert “subject to Secretary of Defense approval and/or applicable DOD guidance.” But, J-5 noted, the Chairman’s intent was to require that orders come from the Secretary of Defense, not from the Secretary of the Army via DOMS. Consequently, Shelton deleted “and/or applicable DOD guidance.” Third, instead of simply serving as the joint force trainer, CINCUSACOM wanted the new CINCJFCOM to be “Executive Agent for Joint Training by implementing, managing, and assessing the CJCS exercise program.” Shelton comprised, designating him as “lead” rather than executive agent, and only for the CINC’s portion of the program. Fourth, CINCUSACOM asked that JFCOM acquire the following missions: conduct joint and interoperability training of assigned forces that were to operate as part of joint/combined task forces; and provide joint training of units not trained by other geographic commands. He wanted to have joint interoperability training recognized as being separate from component interoperability training. The basic difference lay in who would be the commander. General Shelton agreed to the first mission but not the second. Thus, he ensured that JFCOM would advance beyond ACOM in joint experimentation and training and WMD consequence management.\textsuperscript{20}

On 29 September 1999, upon the recommendations of General Shelton and Secretary Cohen, President Clinton approved the UCP. Effective 1 October, replacing USACOM, US Joint Forces Command would serve as the lead joint force integrator, the lead agent for joint force training, and the DOD executive agent for joint force experimentation. Its JTF–Civil Support would plan for and integrate DOD assistance to the lead federal agency managing the consequences of a domestic WMD event. The JTF would be commanded by a two-star officer, drawn from the Guard or Reserve component, with a small headquarters staff.

Appended to the Plan was a non-binding “Vision” statement, the first of its kind that described possible developments in the next century. USJFCOM might change into a purely functional command. Homeland defense either could be consolidated under a US Command or those tasks could remain distributed among combatant commanders. Missions related to information support might burgeon to such an extent that USSPACECOM would be reconfigured into a Space and Information Command. Finally, some areas long left unassigned, particularly Mexico, might be given to unified commands.\textsuperscript{21}
Part Four Notes

While the text of this study has been declassified, some of its sources remain classified.

1 J–5 Briefing Sheet, "1995 UCP Review," 3 May 95, U, Ltr, USCINCSOUTH to CJCJS, U, 040 (1 Mar 95).
3 Ibid.
4 J–5A 2502–95 to CJCJS, 1 Jun 95, FOOU, 040 (26 May 95); CM–885–95 to SecDef, 24 Jul 95, U, J–5 File.
5 CORM Rpt, Directions for Defense, 24 May 95, pp. 2–9 & 2–10; CM–885–95 to SecDef, 24 Jul 95, U; J–5 File.
6 The figure of three hundred nautical miles coincided with the definition of a littoral region approved by the Joint Warfare Capabilities Assessment for Ground Warfare.
7 J–5A 3746–95 to CJCJS, 11 Sep, S–OADR, J–5 File. The date of 1 June 1997 was chosen to mesh with the relocation of USSOUTHCOM's headquarters to Miami, the drawdown of US forces in Panama, and the projected completion of the UN mission in Haiti.
9 CM–1013–95 to SecDef, 23 Oct 95, S–X–4, 040 (26 May 95); J–5–A 4915–95 to DJS, 1 Dec 95, S; Memo, Pres to SecDef, "Unified Command Plan," 28 Sec 95, S; J–5 File.
10 J–5A 1016–95 to DJS, 12 Sep 97, S; DJSM–818–97 to Army Ops Dep et al., 23 Sep 97, S; 040 (12 Sep 97). Memo, ASD (Strategy and Threat Reduction) to SecDef, "Unified Command Revision," 24 Dec 97, U, 040 (9 Jan 98).
11 Ltr, USCINCSPACE to CJCJS, 26 Jun 97, U, SJS 97–2422/1; MFRs by CAPT Stavridis, "Space as an AOR Big to DOS,” 3 Sep 97, U and "NSC Discussion of Space as an AOR with Mr. Bob Bell," 4 Sep 97, U; J–5 File. Commercial organizations had been added to the second point at Gen. Estes' request. Estes also protested that directions to coordinate planning with other CINCs were unique, unnecessary and a bit demeaning. The wording remained, however, because it was part of a compromise that had been carefully worked out among J–5, the Army, and the Air Force. Ltr, USCINCSPACE to VCJCS, 2 Nov 97, U; J–5A 3263–97 to VCJCS, 2 Nov 97, U; 040/040.1 (2 Nov 97).
12 CM–38–97 to SecDef, 8 Dec 97, S, 040 (20 Nov); Memo, Pres to SecDef, "Unified Command Plan," 29 Jan 98, U; MCM 24–98 to CINCUSACOM et al., 9 Feb 98, S, 040 (31 Dec 97).
14 Memo, DepSecDef to VCJCS, 9 May 98, U; CM–212–98 to DepSecDef, 20 May 98, U, 040/320 (11 May 98); SJS 98–2447 to VCJCS, 14 May 98, U; J–5 IP, "Homeland Defense," 14 May 98, U; J–5 Pol Div File. In 1994, DOMS had tasked the 10th Division to fight forest fires while ACOM and the Joint Staff were tasking it to prepare for an invasion of Haiti. In 1995, the SecDef limited DOMS' tasking authority (1) when forces assigned to a CINC were involved, (2) for responses to terrorism, and (3) for the planned use of lethal force. Memo, SecDef to CJCJS et al., 12 Dec 95, U.


Memo, SecDef to Pres, "UCP," 13 Sep 99, S; Memo, Pres to SecDef, "UCP," 29 Sep 99, S, J-5 Pol Div File.
Appendices
# APPENDIX I

## Dates Unified and Specified Commands Established Under the Unified Command Plan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Command</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CINCSAC</td>
<td>Strategic Air Command (SAC)</td>
<td>14 Dec 1946</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A specified command. President Truman's approval of the</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>first Unified Command Plan on 14 Dec 1946 recognized</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>the already existing SAC and brought it under JCS</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>control. The JCS did not issue a directive to SAC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>until 13 Apr 1949.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Disestablished 1 Jun 1992; most functions assumed by</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>USSTRATCOM.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CINCPAC</td>
<td>Pacific Command (PACOM)</td>
<td>1 Jan 1947</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USCINCPAC</td>
<td>US Pacific Command (USPACOM)</td>
<td>11 Oct 1983</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CINCFE</td>
<td>Far East Command (FECOM)</td>
<td>1 Jan 1947</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Disestablished 1 Jul 1957; functions assumed by USPACOM.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CINCAL</td>
<td>Alaskan Command (ALCOM)</td>
<td>1 Jan 1947</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Disestablished 30 Jun 1975.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CINCEUR</td>
<td>European Command (EUCOM)</td>
<td>15 Mar 1947</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nominally a unified command, but almost wholly of Army</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>composition.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Succeeded by:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USCINCEUR</td>
<td>US European Command (EUCOM), a full-fledged unified</td>
<td>1 Aug 1952</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>command.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CINCNLM</td>
<td>US Naval Forces, Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean</td>
<td>1 Nov 1947</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(NELM)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A specified command. From 1 Aug 1952 to 19 Feb 1960,</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>also the Navy component of USEUCOM. Thereafter,</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CINCNLM had the concurrent title of CINCUSNAVEUR as</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>the Navy component of USEUCOM.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Disestablished 1 Dec 1963.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Command</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CINCARIB</td>
<td>Caribbean Command (CARIIBM) Redesignated:</td>
<td>1 Nov 1947</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USCINCSO</td>
<td>US Southern Command (USOUTHCOM)</td>
<td>6 Jun 1963</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CINCLANT</td>
<td>Atlantic Command (LANTCOM) Redesignated:</td>
<td>1 Dec 1947</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CINCUSACOM</td>
<td>US Atlantic Command (USACOM) with expanded responsibilities, including all CONUS-based Army and Air Force combat units. Redesignated:</td>
<td>1 Oct 1993</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CINCUSJFCOM</td>
<td>US Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) with focus as force provider, joint doctrine/training, interoperability, experimentation and transformation.</td>
<td>1 Oct 1999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CINCNE</td>
<td>US Northeast Command (USNEC) Disestablished 1 Sep 1956.</td>
<td>1 Oct 1950</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CINCUSAWE</td>
<td>US Air Forces, Europe (USAFE) A specified command. From 1 Aug 1952 onward, also the Air Force component of USEUCOM. Specified command status terminated 1 Jul 1956.</td>
<td>22 Jan 1951</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CINCONAD</td>
<td>Continental Air Defense Command (CONAD) Originally designated a joint command; made a unified command in Sep 1958. With Canada, the North American Air Defense Command (NORAD) was established 12 Sep 1957. CINCONAD also designated CINCNORAD. Disestablished 30 Jun 1975; functions assumed by ADCOM.</td>
<td>1 Sep 1954</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CINCSRIKE</td>
<td>US Strike Command (USSTRICOM) Assumed additional responsibilities, 1 Dec 1963, under added designation USCINCMEAFSA (Middle East, Africa south of the Sahara, and South Asia). Disestablished 31 Dec 1971; original functions passed to USREDCOM.</td>
<td>1 Jan 1962</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Command</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Date</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CINCAD</td>
<td>Aerospace Defense Command (ADCOM)</td>
<td>1 Jul 1975</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A specified command. NORAD continued, with CINCAD also designated CINCNORAD.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Disestablished 19 Dec 86; functions assumed by USSPACECOM.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CINMAC</td>
<td>Military Airlift Command (MAC)</td>
<td>1 Feb 1977</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Designated a specified command for airlift.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Terminated as a specified command 30 Sep 1988.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USCINCCENT</td>
<td>US Central Command (USCENTCOM)</td>
<td>1 Jan 1983</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Replaced the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force which was established 1 Mar 1980.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USSPACECOM</td>
<td>US Space Command (USSPACECOM)</td>
<td>23 Sep 1985</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USCINCSOC</td>
<td>US Special Operations Command (USSOCOM)</td>
<td>16 Apr 1987</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USCINTRANS</td>
<td>US Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM)</td>
<td>1 Jul 1987</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CINCFORSOM</td>
<td>Forces Command (FORSCOM) designated a specified command.</td>
<td>1 Jul 1987</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Specified command status terminated on 1 Oct 1993; FORSCOM then became the Army component of USACOM.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USCINSTRAT</td>
<td>US Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM)</td>
<td>1 Jun 1992</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
# APPENDIX II

## Unified Command Plans

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PLAN</th>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>SUPERSEDED BY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(U) Outline Command Plan</td>
<td>Approved by President Truman 14 Dec 1946</td>
<td>SM-180–55, 9 Mar 1955</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(C) SM–749–57</td>
<td>24 Oct 1957</td>
<td>SM–643–58, 8 Sep 1958</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(S) MCM–0016–03</td>
<td>4 Feb 2003</td>
<td>Current</td>
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</table>
## APPENDIX III

### Chronological Listing of Presidents of the United States, Secretaries of Defense, and Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PRESIDENT</th>
<th>SECRETARY</th>
<th>CHAIRMAN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Harry S. Truman</td>
<td>James V. Forrestal</td>
<td>General of the Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 Apr 45–20 Jan 53</td>
<td>17 Sep 47–27 Mar 49</td>
<td>Omar N. Bradley, USA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Louis A. Johnson</td>
<td>16 Aug 49–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>28 Mar 49–19 Sep 50</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>George C. Marshall</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>21 Sep 50–12 Sep 51</td>
<td>ADM Arthur W. Radford, USN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Robert A. Lovett</td>
<td>15 Aug 53–15 Aug 57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>17 Sep 51–20 Jan 53</td>
<td>GEN Nathan F. Twining, USAF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>15 Aug 57–30 Sep 60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>GEN Lyman L. Lemnitzer, USA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>01 Oct 60–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dwight D. Eisenhower</td>
<td>Charles E. Wilson</td>
<td>General of the Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 Jan 53–20 Jan 61</td>
<td>28 Jan 53–08 Oct 57</td>
<td>Omar N. Bradley, USA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Neil H. McElroy</td>
<td>15 Aug 53–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>09 Oct 57–01 Dec 59</td>
<td>ADM Arthur W. Radford, USN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Thomas S. Gates, Jr.</td>
<td>15 Aug 53–15 Aug 57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>02 Dec 59–20 Jan 61</td>
<td>GEN Nathan F. Twining, USAF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>15 Aug 57–30 Sep 60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>GEN Lyman L. Lemnitzer, USA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>01 Oct 60–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John F. Kennedy</td>
<td>Robert S. McNamara</td>
<td>GEN Lyman L. Lemnitzer, USA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 Jan 61–22 Nov 63</td>
<td>21 Jan 61–</td>
<td>30 Sep 62–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>GEN Maxwell D. Taylor, USA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>01 Oct 62–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lyndon B. Johnson</td>
<td>Robert S. McNamara</td>
<td>GEN Maxwell D. Taylor, USA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 Nov 63–20 Jan 69</td>
<td>29 Feb 68</td>
<td>01 Jul 64–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Clark M. Clifford</td>
<td>GEN Earle G. Wheeler, USA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>01 Mar 68–20 Jan 69</td>
<td>03 Jul 64–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Richard M. Nixon</td>
<td>Melvin R. Laird</td>
<td>GEN Earle G. Wheeler, USA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 Jan 69–09 Aug 74</td>
<td>22 Jan 69–29 Jan 73</td>
<td>02 Jul 70–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Elliot L. Richardson</td>
<td>ADM Thomas H. Moorer, USN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>30 Jan 73–24 May 73</td>
<td>02 Jul 70–01 Jul 74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>James R. Schlesinger</td>
<td>Gen George S. Brown, USAF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>02 Jul 73–</td>
<td>01 Jul 74–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gerald R. Ford</td>
<td>James R. Schlesinger</td>
<td>Gen George S. Brown, USAF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>09 Aug 74–20 Jan 77</td>
<td>19 Nov 75</td>
<td>02 Jun 78–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Donald H. Rumsfeld</td>
<td>Gen David C. Jones, USAF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>20 Nov 75–20 Jan 77</td>
<td>21 Jun 78–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jimmy Carter</td>
<td>Harold Brown</td>
<td>Gen George S. Brown, USAF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 Jan 77–20 Jan 81</td>
<td>21 Jan 77–20 Jan 81</td>
<td>02 Jun 78–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Gen David C. Jones, USAF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>21 Jun 78–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>President</td>
<td>Secretary of Defense</td>
<td>Deputy Secretary of Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------</td>
<td>----------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ronald W. Reagan</td>
<td>Caspar W. Weinberger</td>
<td>Frank C. Carlucci</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 Jan 81–20 Jan 89</td>
<td>21 Jan 81–23 Nov 87</td>
<td>23 Nov 87–20 Jan 89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>GEN John W. Vessey, Jr., USA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>18 Jun 82–30 Sep 85</td>
<td>ADM William J. Crowe, Jr., USN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>George H. W. Bush</td>
<td>Dick Cheney</td>
<td>21 Mar 89–20 Jan 93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 Jan 89–20 Jan 93</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>GEN Colin L. Powell, USA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>01 Oct 89–</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>William J. Clinton</td>
<td>Les Aspin</td>
<td>William J. Perry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 Jan 93–20 Jan 01</td>
<td>20 Jan 93–03 Feb 94</td>
<td>03 Feb 94–24 Jan 97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>GEN John M. Shalikashvili, USA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>25 Oct 93–30 Sep 97</td>
<td>GEN Henry H. Shelton, USA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>01 Oct 97–</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>George W. Bush</td>
<td>Donald H. Rumsfeld</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 Jan 01–</td>
<td>20 Jan 01–</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Gen Richard B. Myers, USAF</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>01 Oct 01–</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
# APPENDIX IV

Membership of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy</th>
<th>From</th>
<th>To</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fleet ADM William D. Leahy</td>
<td>20 Jul 42</td>
<td>21 Mar 49</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff</th>
<th>From</th>
<th>To</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>General of the Army</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Omar N. Bradley, USA</td>
<td>16 Aug 49</td>
<td>15 Aug 53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADM Arthur W. Radford, USN</td>
<td>15 Aug 53</td>
<td>15 Aug 57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GEN Nathan F. Twining, USAF</td>
<td>15 Aug 57(^4)</td>
<td>30 Sep 60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GEN Lyman L. Lemnitzer, USA</td>
<td>01 Oct 60</td>
<td>30 Sep 62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GEN Maxwell D. Taylor, USA</td>
<td>01 Oct 62</td>
<td>01 Jul 64(^6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GEN Earle G. Wheeler, USA</td>
<td>03 Jul 64</td>
<td>02 Jul 70(^6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADM Thomas H. Moorer, USN</td>
<td>02 Jul 70</td>
<td>01 Jul 74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GEN George S. Brown, USAF</td>
<td>01 Jul 74</td>
<td>20 Jun 78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GEN David C. Jones, USAF</td>
<td>21 Jun 78(^7)</td>
<td>18 Jun 82(^7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GEN John W. Vessey, Jr., USA</td>
<td>18 Jun 82(^8)</td>
<td>30 Sep 85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADM William J. Crowe, Jr., USN</td>
<td>01 Oct 85</td>
<td>30 Sep 89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GEN Colin L. Powell, USA</td>
<td>01 Oct 89</td>
<td>30 Sep 93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADM David E. Jeremiah, USA (acting)</td>
<td>01 Oct 93</td>
<td>24 Oct 93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GEN John M. Shalikashvili, USA</td>
<td>25 Oct 93</td>
<td>30 Sep 97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GEN Henry H. Shelton, USA</td>
<td>01 Oct 97</td>
<td>01 Oct 01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GEN Richard B. Myers, USAF</td>
<td>01 Oct 01</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

\(^1\) President Roosevelt established this position on 20 July 1942 to provide an officer to preside over JCS meetings and maintain liaison with the White House. The position lapsed in March 1949 when Admiral Leahy was detached.

\(^2\) Date detached. At the request of President Truman, General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower, while president of Columbia University, served as the principal military adviser to the President and the Secretary of Defense, and presiding officer of the Joint Chiefs of Staff from February to August 1949.

\(^3\) The position of Chairman was created by the 1949 Amendments to the National Security Act of 1947 approved 10 August 1949. The President, with the advice and consent of the Senate, appoints the Chairman. Originally, the Chairman served a two-year term with eligibility for a second two-year term, except in time of war when there would be no limit on the number of reappointments. Since 1 October 1986, the Chairman is appointed for a two-year term beginning on 1 October of odd-numbered years. He may be reappointed for an additional term, except in time of war when there is no limit on the number of reappointments. An officer may not serve as Chairman or Vice Chairman if his combined service in such positions exceeds six years.

\(^4\) Served as special assistant to Secretary of Defense Charles E. Wilson 1 July to 15 August 1957. He was sworn in as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 15 August 1957.

\(^5\) Retired 1 July 1959; recalled to active duty 1 July 1961; relieved from active duty 1 July 1964; reverted to retired status 2 July 1964.

\(^6\) Reappointed for a two-year term in 1966, for a one-year term in 1968, and an additional one-year term in 1969; retired 3 July 1970.

\(^7\) His Presidential commission was dated 20 June 1978. General Jones became Acting Chairman on 21 February 1978, when General Brown entered the hospital; he was sworn in as Chairman on 30 June 1978. He retired 1 July 1982.

\(^8\) Took oath of office privately on 18 June 1982; he was sworn in publicly on 21 June 1982.
### Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>From</th>
<th>To</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GEN Robert T. Herres, USAF</td>
<td>06 Feb 87</td>
<td>28 Feb 90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADM David E. Jeremiah, USN</td>
<td>01 Mar 90</td>
<td>28 Feb 94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADM William A. Owens, USN</td>
<td>01 Mar 94</td>
<td>28 Feb 96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GEN Joseph Ralston, USAF</td>
<td>01 Mar 96</td>
<td>01 Mar 00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GEN Richard B. Myers, USAF</td>
<td>01 Mar 00</td>
<td>01 Oct 01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GEN Peter Pace, USMC</td>
<td>03 Sep 01</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1The position of Vice Chairman was created by the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act (Public Law 99-433) of 1 October 1986. The Vice Chairman acts as Chairman when there is a vacancy in that office or in the absence or disability of the Chairman. Until October 1992, the Vice Chairman was a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff only when he was acting for the Chairman. Public Law 102-484 of 23 October 1992 made him a full member of the JCS. The Chairman and the Vice Chairman may not be members of the same military Service although the President may briefly waive that restriction in order to facilitate the orderly filling of the positions.

The President, with the advice and consent of the Senate, appoints the Vice Chairman for a term of two years, and may be reappointed for two additional terms, except in time of war when there is no limit on the number of reappointments.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chief of Staff, US Army</th>
<th>From</th>
<th>To</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>General of the Army</td>
<td>09 Feb 42²</td>
<td>18 Nov 45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>George C. Marshall</td>
<td>19 Nov 45</td>
<td>07 Feb 48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General of the Army</td>
<td>07 Feb 48</td>
<td>16 Aug 49</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dwight D. Eisenhower</td>
<td>16 Aug 49</td>
<td>15 Aug 53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GEN Matthew B. Ridgway</td>
<td>15 Aug 53</td>
<td>30 Jun 55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GEN Maxwell D. Taylor</td>
<td>30 Jun 55</td>
<td>01 Jul 59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GEN Lyman L. Lemnitzer</td>
<td>01 Jul 59</td>
<td>30 Sep 60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GEN George H. Decker</td>
<td>01 Oct 60</td>
<td>30 Sep 62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GEN Earle G. Wheeler</td>
<td>01 Oct 62</td>
<td>02 Jul 64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GEN Harold K. Johnson</td>
<td>03 Jul 64</td>
<td>02 Jul 68</td>
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<tr>
<td>GEN William C. Westmoreland</td>
<td>03 Jul 68</td>
<td>30 Jun 72</td>
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<tr>
<td>GEN Bruce Palmer, Jr. (acting)</td>
<td>01 Jul 72</td>
<td>11 Oct 72</td>
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<tr>
<td>GEN Creighton W. Abrams</td>
<td>12 Oct 72</td>
<td>04 Sep 74³</td>
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<tr>
<td>GEN Fred C. Weyand⁴</td>
<td>03 Oct 74</td>
<td>01 Oct 76</td>
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<tr>
<td>GEN Bernard W. Rogers</td>
<td>01 Oct 76</td>
<td>21 Jun 79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GEN Edward C. Meyer</td>
<td>22 Jun 79</td>
<td>22 Jun 83</td>
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<tr>
<td>GEN John A. Wickham, Jr.</td>
<td>23 Jun 83</td>
<td>22 Jun 87</td>
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<tr>
<td>GEN Carl E. Vuono</td>
<td>23 Jun 87</td>
<td>21 Jun 91</td>
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<td>GEN Gordon R. Sullivan</td>
<td>21 Jun 91</td>
<td>19 Jun 95</td>
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<tr>
<td>GEN Dennis A. Reimer</td>
<td>20 Jun 95</td>
<td>20 Jun 99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GEN Eric K. Shinseki</td>
<td>21 Jun 99</td>
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¹ Since 1 January 1969 (under Public Law 90-22 of 5 June 1967 which amended Section 3034(a) of Title 10, US Code), the Chief of Staff, US Army, is appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate for a four-year term and, in time of war, is eligible for reappointment for a term of not more than four years.

² Date of first formal JCS meeting.

³ Date of death.

⁴ Acting Chief of Staff, 4 September to 2 October 1974.
### Chief of Naval Operations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
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<th>To</th>
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<tr>
<td>ADM Harold R. Stark</td>
<td>09 Feb 42¹</td>
<td>12 Mar 42</td>
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<tr>
<td>Fleet ADM Ernest J. King²</td>
<td>09 Feb 42²</td>
<td>15 Dec 45</td>
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<tr>
<td>Fleet ADM Chester W. Nimitz</td>
<td>15 Dec 45</td>
<td>15 Dec 47</td>
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<tr>
<td>ADM Louis E. Denfeld</td>
<td>15 Dec 47</td>
<td>02 Nov 49</td>
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<tr>
<td>ADM Forrest P. Sherman</td>
<td>02 Nov 49</td>
<td>22 Jul 51¹</td>
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<tr>
<td>ADM William M. Fechteler</td>
<td>16 Aug 51</td>
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<tr>
<td>ADM Robert B. Carney</td>
<td>17 Aug 53</td>
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<tr>
<td>ADM Arleigh A. Burke</td>
<td>17 Aug 55</td>
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<tr>
<td>ADM George W. Anderson, Jr.</td>
<td>01 Aug 61</td>
<td>01 Aug 63</td>
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<tr>
<td>ADM David L. McDonald</td>
<td>01 Aug 63</td>
<td>01 Aug 67</td>
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<tr>
<td>ADM Thomas H. Moorer</td>
<td>01 Aug 67</td>
<td>01 Jul 70</td>
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<tr>
<td>ADM Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr.</td>
<td>01 Jul 70</td>
<td>01 Jul 74</td>
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<tr>
<td>ADM James L. Holloway III</td>
<td>01 Jul 74</td>
<td>01 Jul 78</td>
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<tr>
<td>ADM Thomas B. Hayward</td>
<td>01 Jul 78</td>
<td>01 Jul 82</td>
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<tr>
<td>ADM James D. Watkins</td>
<td>01 Jul 82</td>
<td>01 Jul 86</td>
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<tr>
<td>ADM Carlisle A. H. Trost</td>
<td>01 Jul 86</td>
<td>30 Jun 90</td>
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<tr>
<td>ADM Frank B. Kelso II</td>
<td>01 Jul 90</td>
<td>23 Apr 94</td>
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<tr>
<td>ADM Jeremy M. Boorda</td>
<td>23 Apr 94</td>
<td>16 May 96¹</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADM Jay L. Johnson (acting)</td>
<td>16 May 96</td>
<td>04 Aug 96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADM Jay L. Johnson</td>
<td>04 Aug 96</td>
<td>21 Jul 00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADM Vernon E. Clark</td>
<td>21 Jul 00</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

¹ Since 1 January 1969 (under Public Law 9-22 of 5 June 1967 which amended Section 5081(a) of Title 10, US Code), the Chief of Naval Operations is appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate for a four-year term and, in time of war, may be reappointed for a term of not more than four years.

² Date of first formal JCS meeting.

³ At the initial JCS meetings both the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Stark, and the Commander in Chief, US Fleet, Admiral King, represented the Navy. By Executive Order 9096, on 12 March 1942, the two positions were combined in one individual, Admiral King, who served as Commander in Chief, US Fleet, and Chief of Naval Operations. In accordance with Executive Order 9635, on 10 October 1945, Admiral King's title became simply Chief of Naval Operations, and the title of Commander in Chief, US Fleet, ceased to exist.

⁴ Date of death.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chief of Staff, US Air Force¹</th>
<th>From</th>
<th>To</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>General of the Army</td>
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<td>28 Feb 46</td>
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<td>Henry H. Arnold²</td>
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<td>30 Apr 48</td>
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<tr>
<td>GEN Carl Spaatz⁴</td>
<td>30 Apr 48</td>
<td>30 Jun 53</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gen Hoyt S. Vandenberg</td>
<td>30 Jun 53</td>
<td>30 Jun 57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gen Nathan F. Twining</td>
<td>01 Jul 57</td>
<td>30 Jun 61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gen Thomas D. White</td>
<td>30 Jun 61</td>
<td>31 Jan 65</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gen Curtis E. LeMay</td>
<td>01 Feb 65</td>
<td>01 Aug 69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gen John P. McConnell</td>
<td>01 Aug 69</td>
<td>31 Jul 73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gen John D. Ryan</td>
<td>01 Aug 73</td>
<td>30 Jun 74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gen George S. Brown</td>
<td>01 Jul 74</td>
<td>20 Jun 78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gen David C. Jones</td>
<td>01 Jul 78</td>
<td>30 Jun 82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gen Lew Allen, Jr.⁵</td>
<td>01 Jul 82</td>
<td>30 Jun 86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gen Charles A. Gabriel</td>
<td>01 Jul 86</td>
<td>30 Jun 90</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gen Larry D. Welch</td>
<td>01 Jul 90</td>
<td>17 Sep 90</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gen Michael J. Dugan</td>
<td>17 Sep 90</td>
<td>27 Oct 90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gen Merrill A. McPeak</td>
<td>26 Oct 94</td>
<td>02 Oct 97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gen Ronald R. Fogelman</td>
<td>02 Oct 97</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gen Michael E. Ryan</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

¹ Position created by the National Security Act of 1947. Since 1 January 1969 (under Public Law 90-22 of 5 June 1967 which amended Section 8034(A) of Title 10, US Code), the Chief of Staff, US Air Force, is appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate for a four-year term and, in time of war, may be reappointed for a term of not more than four years.

² Served as member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as Commanding General, Army Air Forces.

³ Date of first formal JCS meeting.

⁴ Commanding General, Army Air Forces, until sworn in as the first Chief of Staff, US Air Force, on 26 September 1947.

APPENDIX V

Glossary of Abbreviations

AAF
ACC
ACOM
ADCOM
ALCOM
ANTEDEFCOM
AOR
ARADCOM
ASD/ISA
ASW
AWACS

AAF
ACC
ACOM
ADCOM
ALCOM
ANTEDEFCOM
AOR
ARADCOM
ASD/ISA
ASW
AWACS

Army Air Force
Air Combat Command
Atlantic Command
Aerospace Defense Command
Alaskan Command
Antilles Defense Command
Area of Responsibility
Army Air Defense Command
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Affairs
Antisubmarine Warfare
Airborne Warning and Control System

CGJTF
CENTCOM
CG AAF
CG AFPE
CG CONARC
CG FEAR
CG SAC
CG USARPAC
CG USFET
CINCAD
CINCAFLANT
CINCAF PAC
CINCAL
CINCARIB
CINCARLANT
CINCEUR
CINCF E
CINCLANT
CINCLANTFL T
CINCMAC
CINCM EAF S
CINCM EAFLTMed
CINCNE
CINC NELM
CINCNOR AD
CINCON AD
CINCPAC
CINCPACAF
CINCPACFL T
CINCSAC
CINCSPEC COMME
CINCSKRI TE
CINCUN C
CINCSU AF E
CJCS
CJTF

Caribbean Combined Joint Task Force
Central Command
Commanding General, Army Air Forces
Commanding General, Army Forces, Far East
Commanding General, Continental Army Command
Commanding General, Far East Air Forces
Commanding General, Strategic Air Command
Commanding General, US Army Pacific
Commanding General, US Forces, European Theater
Commander in Chief, Aerospace Defense Command
Commander in Chief, Air Forces, Atlantic
Commander in Chief, US Army Forces, Pacific
Commander in Chief, Alaska
Commander in Chief, Caribbean
Commander in Chief, Army Atlantic
Commander in Chief, Europe
Commander in Chief, Far East
Commander in Chief, Atlantic
Commander in Chief, Atlantic Fleet
Commander in Chief, Military Airlift Command
Commander in Chief, Middle East, Africa south of the Sahara, and South Asia
Commander in Chief, US Naval Forces, Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean (shortened to CINCNELM in 1948)
Commander in Chief, Northeast
Commander in Chief, US Naval Forces, Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean
Commander in Chief, North American Air Defense Command
Commander in Chief, Continental Air Defense Command
Commander in Chief, Pacific
Commander in Chief, Pacific Air Forces
Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet
Commander in Chief, Strategic Air Command
Commander in Chief, Specified Command, Middle East
Commander in Chief, US Strike Command
Commander in Chief, United Nations Command
Commander in Chief, US Air Forces, Europe
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Commander, Joint Task Force
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CMC</td>
<td>Commandant, US Marine Corps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CND</td>
<td>Computer Network Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNO</td>
<td>Chief of Naval Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMCARIBSEAFRON</td>
<td>Commander, Caribbean Sea Frontier</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMNAVFE</td>
<td>Commander, Naval Forces, Far East</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMRDJTF</td>
<td>Commander, Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMTAC</td>
<td>Commander, Tactical Air Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMUS JAPAN</td>
<td>Commander, US Forces, Japan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMUS KOREA</td>
<td>Commander, US Forces, Korea</td>
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<tr>
<td>COMUSMACV</td>
<td>Commander, US Military Assistance Command, Vietnam</td>
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<tr>
<td>CONAD</td>
<td>Continental Air Defense Command</td>
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<td>CONARC</td>
<td>Continental Army Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>CONUS</td>
<td>Continental United States</td>
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<td>CORM</td>
<td>Commission on Roles and Missions</td>
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<td>CSA</td>
<td>Chief of Staff, US Army</td>
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<td>CSLF</td>
<td>Chief of Staff, US Air Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>DBOF</td>
<td>Defense Business Operations Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>DIA</td>
<td>Defense Intelligence Agency</td>
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<td>DOD</td>
<td>Department of Defense</td>
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<td>Director of Military Support</td>
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<td>FECOM</td>
<td>Far East Command</td>
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<td>Forces Command</td>
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<td>ICBM</td>
<td>Intercontinental Ballistic Missile</td>
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<td>JCS</td>
<td>Joint Chiefs of Staff</td>
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<tr>
<td>JDA</td>
<td>Joint Deployment Agency</td>
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<td>JFCOM</td>
<td>Joint Forces Command</td>
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<td>JSOA</td>
<td>Joint Special Operations Agency</td>
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<td>Joint Strategic Plans and Operations Group</td>
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<td>MAC</td>
<td>Military Airlift Command</td>
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<td>MACV</td>
<td>Military Assistance Command, Vietnam</td>
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<td>MAF</td>
<td>Marine Amphibious Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>MDAP</td>
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<td>MEAFSA</td>
<td>Middle East, Africa south of the Sahara, and South Asia</td>
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<td>MEAFSAIO</td>
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<td>MSP</td>
<td>Mutual Security Program</td>
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<td>Military Traffic Management Command</td>
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<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>NAVEASTLANTMED</td>
<td>US Naval Forces, Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>NCA</td>
<td>National Command Authorities</td>
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<td>NMCS5</td>
<td>National Military Command Structure System</td>
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<td>Pacific Air Forces</td>
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<td>PACFLT</td>
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<td>PJBS</td>
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<td>SAC</td>
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<td>SDI</td>
<td>Strategic Defense Initiative</td>
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<tr>
<td>SHAEF</td>
<td>Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>SIOP</td>
<td>Single Integrated Operational Plan</td>
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<td>SLOC</td>
<td>Sea Lines of Communication</td>
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<td>USCINCEUR</td>
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<td>US Readiness Command</td>
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USSTRICOM  US Strike Command
USTRANSCOM  US Transportation Command
WMD  Weapons of Mass Destruction
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