THE BATTLE OF KASSERINE PASS:
AN EXAMINATION OF ALLIED OPERATIONAL FAILINGS

by

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A Research Report Submitted to the Faculty
In Partial Fulfillment of the Graduation Requirements

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Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama
April 2003

Distribution A: Approved for public release; distribution unlimited.
### The Battle of Kasserine Pass: An Examination of Allied Operational Failings

**Title and Subtitle:** The Battle of Kasserine Pass: An Examination of Allied Operational Failings

**Performing Organization:** Air University Press

**Performing Organization Address:** Maxwell AFB, AL 36112-6615

**Distribution/Availability Statement:** Approved for public release, distribution unlimited

**Security Classification:**
- **Report:** Unclassified
- **Abstract:** Unclassified
- **This Page:** Unclassified

**Abstract:**

**Subject Terms:**

**Report Date:** APR 2003

**Report Type:** N/A

**Dates Covered:** -

**Contract Number:**

**Grant Number:**

**Program Element Number:**

**Project Number:**

**Task Number:**

**Work Unit Number:**

**Sponsor/Monitor's Acronym(s):**

**Sponsor/Monitor's Report Number:**

**Number of Pages:** 33

**Name of Responsible Person:**

**Limitation of Abstract:** UU

**Number of Pages:** 33
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Preface

This research grew out of recent efforts of my wife and my mother-in-law to retrace the steps of Captain Ernest C. “Bucky” Hatfield, my wife’s grandfather, in his World War II experience. I have always had a keen interest in studying the Second World War, but when I had an opportunity to read Bucky’s diaries, many of which have dirt stains from the North African desert imbedded in their pages, it put a very personal touch on what I had only read in secondary sources before. My intention in these pages is to use these first-hand accounts from the 1st Armored Division in North Africa along with other sources to build a picture of why the Americans failed at Kasserine Pass when they began their operations in that theater with such high expectations.

I would like to acknowledge the assistance of the Air University Library Staff for their expertise and desire to make resources as readily available as possible. In addition, I’d like to thank Chris Donororummo for providing me access to her father’s personal diaries, photos, and other personal mementos to aid in my research. Likewise, I appreciate the assistance of Dr. Richard Muller in reviewing the paper and providing timely and insightful feedback to improve the quality. Finally, I would also like to thank my wife, Michele, for her dogged determination to keep me on track with the project, as well as for giving me the idea of using her grandfather’s experiences to work on a unique research paper. I wish I’d had the opportunity to know Bucky and speak to him personally about his experiences, but unfortunately I never had that chance. It is to him and other veterans of the “greatest generation” that I dedicate this paper.
Abstract

The Battle of Kasserine Pass proved to be a shock both to American military forces in the field and to the American public at home. The defeat of the Allied forces in the battle put doubt into the minds of many – all of whom assumed the righteous democracies of the western Allies could not be defeated in the field by the armies of Fascism. The defeat suffered by the Allies had nothing to do with right versus wrong, however, but was very much a product of a number of operational shortcomings on the part of the Allies. Poor logistics, failures on the part of American leadership, lack of unity of effort on the part of the Allies, the lack of combat experience, and inferior equipment all combined to contribute to the failure at Kasserine. Despite the setback at Kasserine Pass, the Americans proved quick learners, and applied the lessons of the North African experience to the remainder of their campaign in the European theater.
The Battle of Kasserine Pass

The series of engagements in and around the Kasserine Pass in Tunisia marked the first time American forces engaged in full-scale combat against German forces in the Second World War. As they entered the campaign, the general feeling among the Americans was one of great confidence in their ability to rapidly defeat the Axis forces arrayed before them in the North African desert. A recent study argues, “the American military had been animated mostly by can-do zeal and a desire to win expeditiously; these traits eventually would help carry the day, but only when tempered with battle experience and strategic sensibility.” However, at Kasserine, “Axis troops … struck a blow and delivered a crushing defeat … on the Americans and the French.”

Introduction

In combat encounters comprising the Battle of Kasserine Pass, “German and Italian troops drove French and American soldiers from the Eastern Dorsale mountain range fifty miles across the Sbeitla Plain to the Western Dorsale, where the Allies stopped the attack and prevented the Axis from expanding a tactical triumph into a strategic success.” Following on the heels of the early success of Operation Torch and the Allied drive into Tunisia, the American military believed it had demonstrated its combat prowess, and the defeat at Kasserine proved to be a shock to both the US Army and the public at home. In his treatise on the Battle of Kasserine Pass, Martin Blumenson asserts, “to the American people, the event was incredible. It shook the
foundations of their faith, extinguished the glowing excitement that anticipated quick victory, and, worst of all, raised doubt that the righteous necessarily triumphed.\textsuperscript{4}

Using personal papers and reflections of Captain Ernest C. Hatfield, U.S. Army, as a primary source, this study will analyze the Battle of Kasserine Pass from an operational perspective to determine why the Allied forces were dealt such a defeat. Specifically, this essay will examine operational aspects of the battle and the North African campaign to include: logistics issues, failures on the part of the Allies to adhere to principles of war, problems with the use of intelligence information, and general failings on the part of various American and Allied military leaders throughout the theater of operations. Additionally, the essay will briefly discuss how this defeat, combined with experiences throughout the Tunisian campaign proved to be a great learning laboratory, providing invaluable lessons for prosecuting the war in Europe.

![Figure 1 Allied Landing Sites for Operation Torch](http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg/brochures/tunisia/tunisia.htm)

Figure 1 Allied Landing Sites for Operation Torch

Background

To justly analyze the Battle of Kasserine Pass, it is first necessary to place the battle in the larger context of the Allied campaign in North Africa. For the Americans, the war in North Africa began on November 8 1942 with the execution of the invasion plan for Operation Torch. On November 8, three Allied task forces, whose objectives were to seize Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia, invaded French North Africa. Allied forces for the operation consisted of three separate task forces: the Western Task Force which was to land on the coast of Morocco, near Casablanca; the Central Task Force landing in Algeria, had the seizure of Oran as its primary objective; and, the Eastern Task Force which was to land near Algiers. Meanwhile, as these Allied forces landed in northern and western Africa, the British Eighth Army was driving from Libya in the east, pushing Rommel’s Panzer Army before it. The Allies hoped to catch and destroy these forces between the two advancing armies.

From “Torch” to Tunisia

The objectives of Operation Torch were not simply military in nature, as planning for the operation had been rife with political gamesmanship among the leaders of the Allied nations. The decision to invade North Africa “reflected the triumph of British strategic arguments over those of the Americans” as the Americans were pushing for an invasion in northern France as early as 1942. American military leadership, however, was not sold on the logic or necessity of a North African campaign. General George C. Marshall, the architect of American military strategy, wanted no part of a US commitment to a Mediterranean campaign. The decision to commit American troops in North Africa came directly from President Roosevelt, who overruled the advice of Marshall and his military advisers on this point.
As the operation began, the Americans and British hoped the French would not resist the Allied landings, and further expected French forces in North Africa would rejoin the anti-Axis alliance. In order to facilitate these hopes, the Allies designated General Dwight D. Eisenhower to command the invasion forces. With an American general leading the forces, the Allies sought to restrict any resistance from Anglophobic French officials and officers in the areas around the invasion beaches and ports. Despite such measures, however, the French did put up some level of resistance at nearly every landing point. Nonetheless, dissension among the various French factions in North Africa limited the cohesiveness and effectiveness of the opposition. Ultimately, the magnitude and rapidity of the Allied invasion narrowly ensured the success of the invasion, though much was still required to bring together the warring French factions.

Figure 2 The Push into Tunisia

Once the beachheads had been established, however, most French forces fairly quickly switched alliance to the Allied effort. By November 13, a workable agreement had been achieved between the Americans and British, and the French. As a result, the Allies achieved their major objective—garnering the immediate assistance of French forces in North Africa to support American and British forces in liberating Tunisia. With their forces consolidated, the Allies turned to the east and began the race for Tunisia. After accomplishing the landings, the Allied plan called for Lieutenant-General Kenneth N. Anderson to assume command of British forces under the banner of the British First Army. Meanwhile American forces came under the control of Lloyd Fredendall’s II Corps. The Western Task Force, under George Patton, remained in Morocco, engaged in training. The initial drive into Tunisia was to fall to Anderson and the British First Army, assisted by American units, and coordinated with the French forces. In theory, Anderson represented British (and Allied) combat experience in the theater, as compared to the untested American leadership. However, the Allied march into Tunisia would not be uncontested, as Axis forces from Sicily and Italy began pouring into Tunisia and established a bridgehead of their own along the eastern seaboard.

**Allied Chain of Command**

Allied forces driving into Tunisia faced other difficulties beyond just Axis forces, one of which was the disjointed chain of command that existed among the coalition armies. Part of the problem stemmed from the recent addition of French forces into the Allied coalition. Harboring strong anti-British sentiments, “the French flatly refused to serve under the British” and “would take no orders from Anderson.” With the exception of Eisenhower, who was primarily engaged in political matters related to the transition of control of the French North African colonies, none of the American commanders in North Africa had the prestige or combat
experience to be placed over Anderson. As a result, “the enormous advantage of a unified direction supplied by a single commander was lost;” instead, “a hopeless intermingling of the three Allied forces would soon develop along the front, a thoroughly unsound military practice.”

Within one day of landing in North Africa, the British First Army along with various American elements began their move eastward into Tunisia. By November 14, Anderson had moved his forces into western Tunisia and planned to conduct attacks on Tunis and Bizerte within the week. Despite intelligence information gleaned from ULTRA intercepts the Allies had grossly underestimated the strength and capabilities of the German forces opposing them in northern Tunisia. Additionally, the Allies failed to heed information that Axis forces were expanding their bridgehead to the west. Having missed such evidence, Anderson pressed forward with an offensive plan to cut the Axis forces in half, isolating Bizerte, which was to be captured after Tunis had fallen. As a result, the Allies did not mass their forces into a more compact front and instead pushed their forces ahead on a broad, thin front. Consequently, on November 17, as Allied forces approached to within forty-five miles of Bizerte, several Allied elements ran into Axis troops. Some Allied contingents would get as close as fifteen miles from Tunis at the end of November, but the Allies had missed the opportunity to gain Tunisia without combat.

**To Kasserine Pass**

For the next month, the First Army as well as contingents of the American 1st Armored Division that had moved east from Oran, fought a number of small skirmishes against German forces in the mountains and desert of northern Tunisia. However, the Allied forces were unable to gain either Tunis or Bizerte, and also failed to split the German bridgehead. By Christmas
Eve 1942, Eisenhower realized the Allies had lost the race for Tunis. During the last several weeks of 1942 and the first six weeks of 1943, both the Allied and Axis armies sparred along the front in an attempt to improve their respective positions in central Tunisia.

In late December, the Allies were forced to indefinitely postpone offensive operations in Tunisia due to a combination of bad winter weather, poor logistics, and poorly integrated air and land operations, including the long distance of usable airfields from the Tunisian front. With operations halted in northern Tunisia, Eisenhower looked further south as an area to potentially continue an Allied offensive. In the area between Tebessa and Kasserine, Eisenhower sought to give the American forces a front of their own, while reinforcing French forces in the region and putting up a potential roadblock against anticipated offensive action by Rommel’s forces. By mid-January 1943, these moves by the Allies set the stage for what was to occur in the upcoming battles for Sidi Bou Zid and Kasserine Pass.

**Battles of Sidi Bou Zid and Kasserine.** Through much of the month of January, Axis attacks puzzled Allied commanders as Axis forces often abandoned key positions and tended to limit their own advances. At the end of January, German forces attacked the French, who were defending Faid Pass. This attack disrupted Allied plans for an offensive drive against Maknassy, as Allied commanders were torn on whether to continue their planned offensive or move armored forces to the Faid Pass region to mount a counterattack on the Germans.

The indecision and confusion of the Allies allowed the Germans to continue their attack. On February 14 1943, German forces attacked American and French positions in southern Tunisia. The German 21st Panzer Division struck westward against Combat Command A of the US 1st Armored Division at Sidi Bou Zid, ten miles west of Faid. With over 200 tanks on both sides, a protracted battle appeared in the making. However, American armor was thinly dispersed, and
the German and Italian armor drove through in only one day. American forces mounted an ineffective counterattack the next day, but the demoralizing capture of some 1,400 troops forced them to withdraw. Enemy pressure only eased as the 1st Armored Division fell back.  

Captain Ernest Hatfield, an aide to Major General Orlando Ward, commander of the 1st Armored Division, captures the events of 14 February in his diary.

Awakened at 0700 hrs by telephone call from CCA. Germans are attacking Lessouda in force with tanks and artillery. Stukas bombing their CP. Tanks (30 German) surrounded Lessouda hill and overran B Battery of 91st Field Artillery. Thirty tanks striking south from Lessouda toward Sidi Bou Zid – unknown number of tanks striking toward us at Sbeitla … Fighting is very hard and bombing is ongoing. Our air support isn’t too good. Hightower reported only five medium tanks left in one company, one company is unheard from and another is unheard from and there is no information about it. General [Ward] asked Corps for reinforcements … they got here about 1230 hours… I got a report from Dixon, II Corps G-2, that reconnaissance elements of the 21st Panzer were on the Sidi Bou Zid-Gafsa road … and that 34 enemy tanks were seen at 1300 hrs coming toward Sbeitla.  

The Allies could not initially contain the advancing panzer forces, nor could they get reinforcements into position in time. On February 16th Axis forces resumed push to the west, seizing Sbeitla, nearly twenty-five miles beyond Sidi Bou Zid. Again the Americans scrambled back to establish a new defensive position, this time at Kasserine Pass. However, partly because reinforcements did not arrive in time, the engagement at Sidi Bou Zid quickly turned into a rout as position after position was attacked and overrun. Captain Hatfield wrote: “Col Stack’s force, 1 BN INF, 2 TD companies, 1 btry FA, and 1 co medium tanks, plus Col Alger’s medium tank battalion are coming down around Lessouda … and made contact with the enemy … Alger contacted 40 enemy tanks south of Sidi Bou Zid. Stack withdrew to Kerns bivouac… Stack was to remain and help Drake get his 1500 men from Djebel Ksair… As for the men on Lessouda, a message was dropped to them by plane to withdraw to Kerns’ area at the crossroads.”
Rommel hoped to send his armored columns through the central Tunisian passes of Faid and Kasserine, then turn northwestward to the Allied supply depot at Tebessa before swinging north to the Algerian coast, with the intent of trapping the British First Army in northern Tunisia. Rommel, seeing an opportunity to keep the battered Allied forces reeling, continued his push for an even bigger prize: Kasserine Pass, gateway to Algeria. On 19 February, with the addition of the 10th and 21st Panzer Divisions to his Panzer Army, Rommel struck the II Corps. By the next
afternoon Axis forces had seized Kasserine Pass. Only the valiant stands of individual battalions and companies on isolated hilltops interrupted Rommel's progress.

In addition to the defeats in the field, American forces were suffering from falling morale, indicated by the huge stocks of equipment abandoned by American troops in their rush to fall back.32 The U.S. Army Center of Military History brochure on the Tunisian campaign asserts, “in a final insult, the disastrous series of defeats was ended not by stiffening American resolve but by a shift in Axis priorities.”33 Although the Germans were successful in the first week of their counteroffensive, Rommel’s forces did not have the fuel to continue the advance, and he was also forced to turn back to the east to defend against Montgomery’s Eighth Army as they advanced into southern Tunisia.34 The Americans had suffered humiliating defeats, with II Corps suffering nearly 6,000 casualties at Sidi Bou Zid and Kasserine before Rommel’s army had been forced to disengage and pull back from their advances.35

The Role of Logistics

As discussed at the opening of this essay, the initial defeat of the U.S. II Corps at Kasserine and Sidi Bou Zid was a shock to the U.S. Army and the general public. However, by examining some of the operational constraints as well as operational decisions made by the American and Allied leaders, one can begin to see how these issues contributed to the defeat at Kasserine. One such contributing factor to the Allied failure at Kasserine was logistics. One of the greatest challenges for the Allied forces in their operations across North Africa and in Tunisia proved to be logistics. As they moved into Tunisia, the original Allied aim was to seize lines of communication as well as to gain control of the port cities. Additionally, they intended to trap and destroy Rommel’s army. However, these operational and strategic objectives soon fell by the wayside, as Allied logistics problems came to a head. Eventually, Eisenhower realized his
most pressing task was not strategy but overseeing the complex logistical requirements that began with organizing a transportation system between Algeria and Tunisia.\textsuperscript{36}

**The Logistics Trail**

Much of the logistics problem stemmed from decisions made during the planning for Operation Torch. Eisenhower and his deputy, General Mark Clark, had assumed the Torch forces would act primarily as an occupying army rather than an offensive striking force. In planning for Torch, Eisenhower and Clark had ignored the recommendations of their logisticians, choosing to devote limited shipping space to tens of thousands of extra troops at the expense of vehicles and arms. Now, the forces they had planned to use as an army of occupation were now compelled to act as an offensive army. However, because of the acute shortage of vehicles, most units were immobile.\textsuperscript{37} In planning for the North African campaign, the overconfident Americans believed there would be little significant resistance and felt they would achieve their objectives of securing Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia by Christmas. This was not to be the case.

In addition to planning errors, Allied logistics were complicated by the distances that had to be traversed from port cities to the Tunisian front. During the Torch operation, Algiers was the easternmost port city captured by the Allies. However, it was nearly 500 miles from Algiers to the developing front in Tunisia. “The distance from Algiers to the Tunisian battlefront was vast, and the road net was extremely primitive…Along the Mediterranean ran the only railroad, originally built by the French and in uncertain condition…Resupply was to become the single most difficult problem facing the Allies during the Tunisian campaign.”\textsuperscript{38} Resupply problems were not limited to the Tunisian front however, but were afflicting Allied troop concentrations throughout the theater. Writing from Oran on 7 January 1943, Captain Ernest Hatfield states, “this city is so far in advance of main supply that everything is hard to get.”\textsuperscript{39} Again, on 8
January, Hatfield writes, “Went to II Corps Hq with General Ward to see how Combat Command B is being supplied. They aren’t…CCB are eating into reserve supplies.”

**“Wasted” Forces in Morocco and Algeria**

Logistics support problems were most hurtful to units conducting front line operations. Food, fuel, and ammunition were absolutely essential to the continuance of combat operations in Tunisia. Nonetheless, the Allies’ immature logistical system was unable to resupply any large force to the east. Accordingly, nearly two-thirds of the combat forces landed in Operation Torch were still in western Morocco and unavailable for combat commitment. The inability of the Allies to supply and support additional troops in Tunisia eventually resulted in further fragmentation of American forces along the Tunisian front. The fragmented forces of the US II Corps on the southern flank of the Allied front were “deployed across a large area … vulnerable to attack and defeat in detail by superior Axis forces.”

In an attempt to alleviate the poor disposition of Allied forces along the Tunisian front, both Anderson and General Giraud, commanding the French sector in the center of the Allied front, requested reinforcements. Giraud requested that General Eisenhower move the US 2nd Armored Division from Morocco to the front. However, Eisenhower was still at the mercy of the poor logistics, additional combat forces could not be supported in Tunisia at this juncture. As no reserve forces would be moving forward from rear echelons, Anderson ordered to have the French sector reinforced with elements of the American 1st and 34th Infantry Divisions and the British 1st Guards Brigade, with Combat Command B of the 1st Armored Division held in reserve. The inability of the Allies to bolster their front with reinforcements resulted in forces being deployed very thinly across the central and southern Tunisian front and allowed the
German and Italian panzer forces to execute rapid breakthroughs in capturing Faid Pass, Sidi Bou Zid, Sbeitla, and Kasserine Pass.

Violating the Principles of War

Logistics problems alone did not fashion the situation for failure of the Allied forces in Tunisia however. The operations of the Allies were also hampered because they violated several principles of warfare in this campaign. Specifically, the principles of mass, unity of command and security were not properly applied in this scenario, hindering the efforts of the Allies.

Mass

Current U.S. Army doctrine defines mass as concentrating the effects of combat power at the decisive place and time. Field Manual 3-0 states, “commanders mass the effects of combat power to overwhelm enemies or gain control of the situation.” Rather than being massed however, the U.S. II Corps was thinly deployed across a large area, increasing their vulnerability to attack and defeat by the superior Axis forces. Instead of establishing defense in depth, American infantry forces were spread across isolated djebels (hills) and both armored and infantry reserves were likewise scattered in small pockets along the front.

The penalty for these unsound dispositions was paid in February, when Axis units inflicted disastrous defeats at Sidi-Bou-Zid and Kasserine Pass. Two of von Arnim’s veteran panzer divisions surprise-attacked with vastly superior firepower and quickly chewed up units of the 1st Armored Division at Sidi-Bou-Zid. American units were deployed in so-called penny-packet formations (independent, self-contained, self-supporting, brigade-size forces) that the British had used with disastrous consequences in 1941-42 … Farther south a German-Italian battle group of Rommel’s Afrika Korps advanced with little opposition and attacked U.S. forces defending the Kasserine Pass, with equally grave consequences. There the American commander had not bothered to occupy the commanding terrain of the hillsides but instead had deployed his troops across the valley floor.
As previously mentioned, part of the problem with the disposition of forces stemmed from the Allies limited ability to resupply the forces and/or bring in reinforcements to shore up the lines along the Tunisian front. Regardless of such shortages however, General Fredendall as II Corps commander, should have better deployed the troops in the field. Instead, the penny-packet deployments resulted in pockets of troops being surrounded and cut-off during the battle, as was the case with American forces on Djebels Ksaira and Lessouda. Writing on 16 February, Captain Hatfield states, “we had a battalion of infantry trapped on Djebel Lessouda and Col Drake had 1500 men trapped on Djebel Ksaira. About 450 got off Lessouda, but we did not have the power to get Drake out.”

The penny-packet disposition of forces resulted in the capture or slaughter of various elements of the 1st Armored and/or II Corps. Rick Atkinson argues, “the folly of the Allied battle plan was clear: after losing Faid Pass in late January, the Americans should have either recaptured the Eastern Dorsal—at whatever cost—or retired to defensible terrain on the Grand Dorsal. Instead they had dispersed across a vulnerable open plain where the enemy could defeat them in detail.”

Unity of Command

The principle of mass was not the only principle of war that was misapplied by the Allies in the Tunisian campaign. Unity of command directs that “for every objective, ensure unity of effort under one responsible commander.” The purpose of unity of command is to direct and coordinate actions of forces toward a common objective. However, in a coalition environment, “unified action creates situations where the military commander does not directly control all elements in the area of operations. In the absence of command authority, commanders cooperate, negotiate, and build consensus to achieve unity of effort.” As has already been
mentioned, the Allies were having great difficulty in ensuring unity of effort let alone unity of command in North Africa.

**Coalition Warfare.** When engaged in coalition warfare, national interests as well as desires for publicity and prominence tend to dominate the relationship among allies.⁵³ Achieving unity of command is nearly impossible in coalition warfare as it “is circumscribed by a special kind of courtesy that inhibits unified, cohesive, and quick action.”⁵⁴ Despite Eisenhower’s attempts to create a truly Allied command structure in North Africa, all that he was able to achieve was a loose coalition.⁵⁵ Field commanders were confronted with often insoluble problems stemming both from differences in national interest and outlook as well as individual personality and character.⁵⁶ Discussing the role of leadership in coalition warfare, Martin Blumenson argues, “the exercise of command is not only a matter of organizational structure, doctrine, and authority; it is also a matter of personality—each commander commands in a personal manner. In times of tactical success, frictions among men tend to be overlooked or minimized; in times of operational adversity, annoyances develop into irritations and contribute their own influences on a deteriorating situation.”⁵⁷ The latter situation was very much the case in late January to mid-February of 1943 within the Allied structure.

Eisenhower was generally able to control such problems at Allied Forces Headquarters (AFHQ), but field commanders had greater difficulty controlling these problems. Part of the problem with unity of effort stemmed from the way in which combat troops had been employed. On several occasions, U.S. troops were employed in piecemeal fashion, with little regard for unit integrity, and merged with British elements. Additionally, American commanders and soldiers believed the British were being favored in the choice of missions, equipment, and supplies.⁵⁸ For example, Capt Ernest Hatfield wrote, “British 6th Armored Division, with the First Army, is
getting new M-4 tanks while we are receiving M-3s as replacements. Our boys get the short end of the deal.'

Such feelings went both ways however as the British felt they were being slighted in favor of the Americans. For example, Anderson and his chief of staff felt the eventual First Army drive to Tunis was the imperative mission for the Allies, any resources being shifted to Fredendall could potentially sidetrack this offensive.

Contempt and Distrust. Beyond piecemeal troop employment and the feelings of jealousy often felt among the national armies, various commanders often harbored feelings of contempt and distrust of their Allied counterparts. Anderson believed the French were extremely sensitive and felt compelled to act in a conciliatory manner toward them. At the same time, he lacked confidence in their combat ability primarily because of their inferior equipment. Additionally, there were problems with fitting the French forces into the overall Allied force structure. Due to the division of the Tunisian front into various sectors (British First Army in the north, and the U.S. II Corps in the south), there was consternation regarding command arrangements for the French XIX Corps in the center of the line, and also the French “Constantine” Division which was operating within II Corps’ area of responsibility.

Such feelings were not restricted to the British however, as several American commanders also did not disguise their feelings about their British allies. Fredendall in particular proved to be an impediment to resolving problems of interallied cooperation and command. Blumenson states, “he turned out to be an Anglophobe in general, and he disliked Anderson in particular. He had no confidence in and little patience with the French… Nor did he appreciate the frustration of men who were denied the weapons they needed to fight.” Although other American officers harbored feelings of ill-will toward their British counterparts, in many instances these feelings were held in check and did not come out till they published post-war memoirs. Overall, despite
the problems that occurred in the Anglo-American alliance during the Tunisian campaign, Martin Blumenson argues the alliance flourished. “It was the strongest coalition in the history of warfare. Despite grumbling on the part of disenchanted individuals, despite real and serious divergence of approach to strategy and policy, the partnership and the machinery that ran the military side functioned well and on every level.”

**Security**

In addition to contravening the principles of mass and unity of command, the Allies were guilty of ignoring aspects of the principle of security with regard to their actions in central Tunisia. Army Field Manual 3-0 defines security as protecting and preserving combat power by never permitting the enemy to acquire an unexpected advantage. In terms of the Battle of Kasserine Pass, one can regard the Allied failures to utilize various sources of intelligence to build a composite picture of the battlefield as a violation of the tenet of security.

The primary issue regarding the Allied use of intelligence data was their over-reliance on data from Ultra intercepts. The most glaring instance of this reliance occurred shortly before the Battle of Kasserine Pass commenced, when intelligence officers of Allied Force Headquarters misinterpreted Ultra information that ran counter to what was being reported by other sources of intelligence. Through Ultra intercepts, the AFHQ intelligence officer (G-2) learned of the large German buildup behind the Eastern Dorsale and expected an offensive soon, but believed Rommel would attack further to the north at Fondouk, with diversionary attacks at Faid and Gafsa. As a result, combat commands of the U.S. 1st Armored Division were shifted northward to Fondouk to meet the perceived threat.

Brigadier Eric Mockler-Ferryman was in charge of intelligence analysis at AFHQ. Intelligence information regarding the posturing of German forces along the Eastern Dorsale had
been decoded by Ultra in England and been relayed to Mockler-Ferryman in Algiers. However, there had been changes made at the Italian Comando Supremo in early February reducing the ability of AFHQ to acquire and access routine signal traffic of the enemy forces. As a result, Mockler-Ferryman and his staff were relying primarily on Ultra intercepts flowing from Bletchley Park to build their battlefield intelligence picture. Because of the muddled nature of data available, Mockler-Ferryman’s staff drew the wrong conclusions from the details provided from Ultra. They passed information to the front that Axis forces could be expected to organize a major assault at the Fondouk Pass in the Eastern Dorsal.

Based on the information received from AFHQ G-2, Anderson ordered the deployment of Allied forces along the front in an attempt to block the perceived threat at Fondouk. On 14 February, First Army Headquarters flashed a message along the Allied front warning of the impending German attack at Fondouk, with expected diversionary attacks elsewhere along the front. Anderson was unaware that the warnings of an attack at Fondouk were based on excessive reliance on Ultra. Thus he was surprised when Colonel Dickson, II Corps’ intelligence officer, provided an estimate, based on battlefield reconnaissance, that the attack would take place further south, at either Faid or Gafsa.

Eisenhower had also fallen victim to this reliance on Ultra intercepts to assess the battlefield situation. On the night of 13 and 14 February, Eisenhower visited the Tunisian front, stopping at the 1st Armored Division headquarters of Ward in the vicinity of Sbeitla. While there, General Robinett, commander of 1st Armored’s Combat Command B, reported “he had patrolled that [Fondouk] whole area and was convinced that the expected enemy attack would come further south, at Faid Pass.” Despite the reconnaissance strongly suggesting the Germans would attack elsewhere, an ambush was laid at Fondouk. But, as already discussed, the Axis armies struck
through Faid on the morning of 14 February, then split their forces to envelop and destroy a Combat Command of the 1st Armored Division at Sidi-Bou-Zid.  

Figure 4 Central Tunisia and Kasserine Pass

The Role of Leadership

In reviewing these various failings at the operational level of war, one must also assess the leadership of the Allies to determine why such errors could occur. This research will look specifically at the leadership of Dwight D. Eisenhower as the theater-level commander, and that of Lloyd Fredendall as the commander of the U.S. II Corps. In particular, with Fredendall, the focus will be on his relationship with Major General Orlando Ward who served under Fredendall as the 1st Armored Division commander.
Eisenhower

Several historians who have written about the Allied campaign in North Africa and the battle of Kasserine Pass argue the failures of American leadership begin with Eisenhower. Carlo D’Este asserts Eisenhower “continued to exhibit the uncertainties of inexperience of high command, manifested by a tendency to interfere on the battlefield and in his hesitation to address the growing problems within II Corps.” Others argue that “responsibility for the American disaster at Kasserine ultimately rests with Eisenhower for sanctioning, by default, the thinly spread deployment of the U.S. II Corps. After a personal visit before the German attack at Kasserine, he expressed dismay at the dispositions, but did nothing, possibly lacking the experience to correct the flaws in the layout, and the confidence to ‘grip’ and ‘sort out’ the commanders responsible.”

Perhaps the most cutting critique of Eisenhower’s leadership relates to his failure to address the command situation with the II Corps in the Tunisian campaign. George Marshall had identified Major General Lloyd Fredendall as a rising star and held him in high regard. Eisenhower, too, initially held Fredendall in high regard, but Fredendall proved to be an appallingly inept commander. Carlo D’Este attests, “Fredendall was utterly out of touch with his command, stonewalled any attempt at cooperation with Anderson, feuded constantly with his subordinate commanders, and generally broke every known principle of leadership in the employment of his corps.” Despite recognizing the problems with Fredendall, Eisenhower delayed in his responsibility to relieve him of command, a decision with dire consequences for the American forces under Fredendall at Kasserine Pass.

In addition to his hesitancy in resolving problems with subordinate commanders, Eisenhower tended to be rather tentative and risk-averse as the commander of the Allied North African campaign. Stephen Ambrose assessed Eisenhower in the following manner:
Eisenhower might have done better in his first command had he left behind him the emphasis on an orderly, systematic advance that he had imbibed at C&GS, and instead adopted the attitude Patton had expressed back in 1926, when he told Eisenhower always to remember that “victory in the next war will depend on EXECUTION not PLANS.” But Eisenhower had been a staff officer for twenty years and could not shake the patterns of thought that had become second nature to him. He concentrated on administrative matters and politics, and insisted on an orderly, rather than a bold and risky, advance, even when his superiors urged him to take more chances…In his first command experience, Eisenhower had shown both strengths and weaknesses. His greatest success had been in welding an Allied team together, especially at AFHQ…But at the point of attack, he had shown a lack of that ruthless, driving force that would lead him to take control of a tactical situation and, through the power of his personality, extract that extra measure of energy that might have carried the Allies into Tunis or Sardinia.  

Part of the problem confronting Eisenhower was he had become caught up in running AFHQ, shuffling paper, and coping with political consequences from Torch. Instead of focusing his attention on the duty of running the battle in Tunisia, which could not be accomplished from Algiers, four hundred miles away, Eisenhower was overly engaged in the political aspects of Allied command.  

Following the Battle of Kasserine Pass however, Eisenhower proved to be a quick study and showed his willingness to institute change and learn from his mistakes. The overall conduct of the Allied campaign in Tunisia in late 1942 and January-February 1943 forced Eisenhower to reexamine Allied organization and plans. General Eisenhower quickly restructured the Allied command and made key personnel changes among Allied leadership. For example, shortly after the Kasserine campaign, Eisenhower sent Major General Ernest Harmon to assess the situation at II Corps with respect to Fredendall’s ability to retain command. Additionally, Harmon was to evaluate whether the failures at Kasserine were the attributable to Fredendall or to Ward at the 1st Armored Division. After receiving Harmon’s assessment, Eisenhower relieved Fredendall, replacing him with George Patton as the new II Corps commander.
Fredendall

While it is certainly correct that Eisenhower, as the Allied commander for operations in Tunisia and North Africa, must bear a portion of the responsibility for the Allied failure, he was by no means the only American commander who was found lacking in this first engagement of the war. Lloyd Fredendall, commanding officer of the U.S. II Corps, is also culpable for a portion of the Allied failures at Kasserine and Sidi-Bou-Zid. Carlo D’Este argues Fredendall was one of the most inept senior officers to hold a high command in World War II. “He was completely out of touch with his command, had balked at cooperating with Anderson, and failed to make a positive impact on his troops or subordinate commanders with whom he feuded constantly, particularly Orlando Ward of the 1st Armored, who despised him.” Two primary aspects of his leadership that come into question were his relationship with Major General Orlando Ward, and his related tendency to centralize control and execution of combat activity.

Relationship with Ward. Martin Blumenson asserts Fredendall was often vague and imprecise in his orders, and continually usurped the authority and function of his subordinate commanders. This was particularly the case in his dealings with Ward at the 1st Armored Division. American military doctrine, espousing the virtues of centralized control and decentralized execution, maintains, when a commander assigns a mission, he gives subordinate commanders the initiative and authority to carry out the mission in his own way. However, Fredendall tended to violate this construct of leadership when giving direction to Ward. For example, Fredendall provided precise instructions to Ward on the deployment of troops to defend Djebels Ksaira and Lessouda, covering subjects such as proper employment of patrols, the importance of aerial photography, and the function of artillery, among other topics – all of which were subjects that junior officers were known to have mastered.
Capt Ernest Hatfield provides several other illustrations of such interventionist leadership on the part of Fredendall. Writing from the Sbeitla area on 9 February 1943, Hatfield states, “Fredendall ordered Col King of 701 to command CCD and Col Maraist to come back to our forward CP. Corps orders all our Division around and tells them what to do and how to do it, leaving Ward out of the picture.”89 Referring to the same incident several days later, he writes, “General [Ward] is low spirits because of Corps and I don’t blame him.”90

Hatfield’s diary also provides some insight regarding the results of Fredendall’s direction to Ward about the defense of Djebels Ksaira and Lessouda. “We were attacked on the 16th by 100 German tanks, infantry and plenty of AT guns. Combat A took the brunt of the attack and the one medium tank battalion with them was wiped out. Corps then said we could have back Col Alger’s Bn of medium tanks and ordered us to use Col Stack’s force with Alger and wipe out German tanks in vicinity of Side-Bou-Zid. General [Ward] protested but to no avail so we attacked next day and as a result Alger’s Bn was wiped out and we lost many other guns and vehicles. Meanwhile we had a Bn of infantry trapped on Djebel Lessouda and Col Drake had 1500 men trapped on Djebel Ksaira.”91 Hatfield’s growing contempt for orders from II Corps is evident in a later entry, as he wrote, “Corps then ordered down Combat B under Gen Robinett from Maktar to feed to the lions but Gen Ward refused to do it. Combat B was placed on the right flank and remnants of Combat A and C reorganized for a withdrawal the next day.”92

Centralized Control from Miles Away. Another aspect of Fredendall’s leadership style that had a negative impact on operations in the Kasserine area was his tendency to centralize his command while he was miles away from the front lines. To maintain contact with frontline forces, commanders typically try to establish their headquarters near existing lines of communication, with robust communications facilities and close enough to the combat units to
enable convenient visits. Fredendall’s headquarters was distant from the front and far up a
canyon, well removed from lines of communication. In constructing the headquarters bunker,
Fredendall had employed nearly two hundred engineers for more than three weeks on this
project, which was later abandoned, unfinished, under the German threat at Kasserine. The
common G.I. could not miss the fact that Fredendall was very far-removed from the activity.
“At the front, American vulnerability was obvious to the lowest-ranking private soldiers, even if
their senior commanders were too remote to grasp the situation. Soldiers possess a marvelous
ability to reduce events to their simplest common denominator. And so it was in Tunisia, with
an unnamed GI’s pithy observation that, ‘Never were so few commanded by so many from so far
away!’”

By the time of Kasserine, Fredendall’s corps headquarters was located nearly sixty-five
miles from the front in a huge underground bunker concealed in a gorge. Soldiers in the Corps
disparagingly referred to the headquarters as “Lloyd’s very last resort” or “Shangr-la, a million
miles from nowhere.” As discussed above, Harmon’s after-action report on Kasserine
identified Fredendall as unfit for command, and Eisenhower belatedly dismissed Fredendall of
his command of II Corps.

**Lessons Learned**

The failure at Kasserine Pass proved to be a temporary tactical setback for the American and
Allied forces. Despite the various operational failings on the part of the Allies, and particularly
the Americans, Axis forces were unable to make any strategic gains from their victories over the
period from 14-21 February. Ultimately, the Americans learned much from their failures in this
campaign – lessons that would be carried over to the ensuing campaigns in Sicily, Italy, and
northern France.
One such lesson was the importance of an efficient logistics and supply line. By March 1943, the Allies had drastically improved the logistics flow in North Africa. To remedy the problem with a shortage of transportation, more than 4,500 2-1/2-ton trucks were delivered from the United States. The influx of trucks for transportation improved the flow of food, fuel, ammunition, and weapons to the front. Several brief diary entries from Capt Hatfield reveal how improved logistics affected the troops at the front. Writing on 8 March 1943, Hatfield says, “after lunch, I drove a new M-5 tank, with twin engines. It runs very smoothly and quietly, and is very easy to shift.” Again referring to the flood of new weaponry he writes, “this will help us complete refitting the 2nd Bn of the 1st AD and allow the TD crews to become familiar with their 37 new 75-mm guns.” In addition to greater availability of transport, roads and railways were improved and repaired to facilitate the delivery of supplies and personnel to the front in Tunisia as Allied forces pressed their offensive to the east.

A second valuable lesson for the Americans was the importance of competent combat leadership. Throughout the Tunisian campaign, Eisenhower had been alarmed at the Americans’ inability to apply their training to the existing battle conditions and he was appalled by numerous examples of poor discipline. He realized the role of commanders to instill the necessary discipline among the troops and also the importance of ensuring combat forces received proper training and equipment. A commander such as Fredendall who spent his time some 65-miles away from his forces could not ensure the combat troops were battle-ready and disciplined.

As previously mentioned, Fredendall did not champion the ideals of centralized control and decentralized execution, as he failed to entrust subordinate commanders with the necessary initiative and authority to act on their own. In his many diary entries, Captain Hatfield captures several instances of the distrust between Fredendall and Ward. Writing on 25 February 1943,
Hatfield states, “Gen Fredendall asked for Gen Ward’s relief about 2 weeks ago, but Gen Eisenhower said no. Gen Ward is going to get out from under Fredendall and the sooner the better.” Despite Fredendall’s misgivings, however, “Gen Harmon, CG of 2nd AD, … came down to see Gen Ward this morning. He says Gen Ward is very solid with high command.” Eisenhower and AFHQ were well aware of the situation regarding Fredendall, and, although acting somewhat belatedly, worked to remedy the situation. Hatfield again provides a clear picture of these events. “There was quite a meeting of generals, including General Eisenhower, Gen Fredendall, Gen Bradley, Gen Eddie (9th Inf Div), Gen Allen (1st Inf Div), and Gen Ward. The meeting was successful for Gen Ward. He told me that he no longer has to worry about a knife in his back and is tops with high command…We now have a new Corps commander, Gen George S. Patton. Fredendall returns to the States.” Competent commanders were needed to lead American forces and instill an aggressive spirit in the force.

Although not discussed above, numerous other aspects of the Tunisian campaign as well as the experiences of the Battle of Kasserine Pass were also applied by U.S. military and political leaders to improve the conduct of the war. These included the need to improve equipment such as tanks, and anti-tank weapons to counter the German Wehrmacht’s forces. With respect to the improved equipment, Hatfield wrote, “we have a battalion of TD (776th) attached to us who are equipped with the new M-10 guns (75-mm on the M-3 tank chassis). The Germans will be quite surprised.” Beyond the need for improved equipment, Eisenhower recommended that training be improved for forces entering the military to better prepare units for the rigors of combat as they had experienced in North Africa. Additionally, the Americans realized the need to improve upon the coordination between air and ground forces in a combined-arms warfare concept. Again, Captain Hatfield’s diaries encapsulate these changes as they were occurring. On 5 March
1943, he wrote, “we had lunch with the Air Corps and then went to Bou Chekba to a meeting of our officers. Col Howze was conducting a tactical walk and discussion on the ground east of Bou Chekba. It was very interesting and instructive.” Hatfield wrote further on 7 March, “Gen Patton and Gen Bradley came down after lunch. We all went to the tactical walk on the combined arms, near Bou Chekba.” The coming offensive drive to the Tunisian seaboard would show greatly improved integration of ground and air forces. In due course, all these lessons and changes were incorporated and played a role in the eventual Allied victory in Europe.

**Summary**

The U.S. Army’s performance at the various engagements of the Battle of Kasserine Pass clearly illustrates the effect of operational level decisions on the conduct of tactical operations. At Kasserine, U.S. and Allied forces were plagued by a poor, slowly emerging logistics system. The shortcomings of the logistics system produced shortages of equipment and personnel, and ultimately had an effect on the deployment of forces on the front lines. In addition to logistics, the poor employment of forces on the Tunisian front resulted from decisions made by field commanders—decisions that resulted in forces being thinly dispersed and poorly massed for operations. Additionally, the Americans and Allies were guilty of ignoring the principles of unity of command or effort and security. Petty personal conflicts among leaders compounded the already difficult issue of unifying forces in a coalition environment. Likewise, over-reliance on a single source of intelligence impaired the Allies ability to apply the principle of security, as it allowed the Axis forces to gain an advantage over the Allied forces. Finally, failures of leadership at higher levels of command further complicated issues for the Allies in the engagements around Kasserine. Despite the problems however, the Allies and particularly the
Americans learned from the mistakes of the Tunisian campaign, and were able to apply these
lessons to the prosecution of the remainder of the war in the European theater.

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## Glossary

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<th>Abbreviation</th>
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<td>AFHQ</td>
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<td>tank destroyer</td>
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