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THESIS

THE TAO OF SPECIAL FORCES: AN ANALYSIS OF COUNTERINSURGENCY DOCTRINE

by

D. Todd Reed, Jr.
Adrian A. Donahoe

June 2004

Thesis Advisor: Kalev Sepp
Second Reader: John Arquilla

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The Tao of Special Forces: An Analysis of Counterinsurgency Doctrine

MAJ D. Todd Reed, Jr., MAJ Adrian A. Donahoe

The conflict in Afghanistan and Iraq is insurgent in nature, therefore requires a Counterinsurgent strategy. Current US Army Doctrine focuses entirely on the Counterguerrilla aspect of an insurgency, rather than viewing the insurgency in its entirety. Therefore, not only is the COIN doctrine inadequate, it also requires an overall governing strategy which must include the engagements of both the populace, and the infrastructure of the insurgency, as well as counterforce operations against the guerillas. The entire hierarchy of COIN Doctrine is skewed in favor of the conventional units who write it. Currently all COIN operations fall under Support and Stability Operations, as do Counterguerrilla Operations in doctrinal hierarchy that is written by the US Army Infantry Branch. However, US Army Special Forces Branch writes Insurgency and Foreign Internal Defense Doctrine (COIN falls under FID for all Internal Defense and Development [IDAD] Programs).

The unique qualifications of Special Forces units make them ideal for creating, developing, instituting, and command these operations. Special Forces soldiers are language and culturally trained to operate within these nations, and normally have habitual associations previously developed with the people and militaries of these nations.

Insurgency; Counterinsurgency; COIN; Unconventional Warfare

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D. Todd Reed, Jr.
Major, United States Army
B.A., Middle Tennessee University, 1992

Adrian A. Donahoe
Major, United States Army
B.S., University of South Dakota, 1993

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NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
June 2004

Authors: D. Todd Reed, Jr.

Adrian A. Donahoe

Approved by: Kalev Sepp
Thesis Advisor

John Arquilla
Second Reader

Gordon McCormick
Chairman, Department of Defense Analysis

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The unwillingness to correct deficiencies in current COIN doctrine or to adhere to the effective methods outlined by current doctrine will lead to continued instability and possible failure of counterinsurgency operations and governments in states with large Islamic populations. The conflict in Afghanistan and Iraq is insurgent in nature, requiring a counterinsurgent strategy. Current US Army Doctrine focuses entirely on the counterguerrilla aspect of an insurgency, rather than viewing the insurgency in its entirety. Existing COIN doctrine is inadequate, as it lacks an overall governing strategy, which must include engaging of both the populace, and the infrastructure of the insurgency, going well beyond just counterforce operations against the guerrillas. But the entire hierarchy of COIN doctrine is skewed in favor of the conventional units who write it. Currently all COIN operations fall under support and stability operations, as do counterguerrilla operations in a doctrinal hierarchy that is written by the US Army Infantry Branch. However, US Army Special Forces Branch writes insurgency and foreign internal defense doctrine (COIN falls under FID for all Internal Defense and Development [IDAD] Programs).

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I. INTRODUCTION AND NEW COUNTERINSURGENCY STRATEGIC MODEL

The purpose of this chapter is to review current U.S. military counterinsurgency doctrine critically and suggest changes and future applications. We will begin by examining definitions from doctrinal sources and conducting an overview and critique of current doctrine. Next, we will examine the academic literature on the subject. Finally, we will conclude with recommendations for reforming counterinsurgency doctrine.

A. DOCTRINAL OVERVIEW AND DEFINITIONS

To begin, the term counterinsurgency needs to be defined. Currently, several different doctrinal manuals provide guidance for conducting counterinsurgency operations, or COIN. We will begin with the joint publications, and then move to the Army-specific publications.

JP 3-07 paints a very broad picture of overall military operations and provides general guidance for military forces in the conduct of joint MOOTW. The term MOOTW (military operations other than war) is described as composing a large spectrum of operations, but is primarily concerned with operations focusing on deterring war, resolving conflict, promoting peace, and supporting civil authorities in response to domestic crises. Fortunately, this pub shows the initial link between the State Department and the regional commanders, as well as the location for an overall strategy (if there actually is one) for a particular insurgency. JP 3-07 describes nation assistance/support to counterinsurgency as a type of MOOTW. Nation assistance is civil or military assistance (other than HA) rendered to a nation by US forces within that nation’s territory during peacetime, crises or emergencies, or war, based on agreements mutually concluded between the United States and that nation. Nation assistance operations support an HN (Host Nation) by promoting sustainable development and growth of responsive institutions. The goal is to promote long-term regional stability. Nation assistance programs often include, but are not limited to, security assistance, FID, and HCA. All nation assistance actions are integrated through the US Ambassador’s Country Plan, loan, credit, or cash sales in furtherance of national policies and objectives(JP 3-07, p. III-9).
FID is described once again as being integrated into the HN’s internal defense and development programs (IDAD). FID is described as the “total political, economic, informational, and military support provided to another nation to assist its fight against subversion and insurgency” (JP 3-07, p. III-10). Further detail of FID is given in JP 3-07.1, Foreign Internal Defense, and FM 3-07, Stability Operations and Support Operations.

JP 3-07.1, *Foreign Internal Defense*, lays out the groundwork for planning FID operations, to include FID coordination (See Figure 1), command structures, and key points to ponder— including intelligence estimates. It discusses the three factors in determining whether or not the US will lend support to an HN: the existing or threatened internal disorder is such that US action supports US strategic goals; the threatened nation is capable of using US assistance; and the HN requests US support.

**Figure 1. Foreign Internal Defense Coordination (From JP 3-07.1)**
It is important to note that the regional combatant commanders can create a FID Advisory Committee to address the FID/COIN situation for a particular nation. This FIDAC closely resembles the Executive War Committee constructed by the British in Malaya. This pub provides an excellent overview of the general scheme of FID operations, and points out the leeway given to the combatant commander in the development of these programs, and their command structure. (See Figure 2).

Figure 2. Command Hierarchy for COIN
FM 3-07, *Stability and Support Operations* 2003, also gives guidance for addressing counterinsurgency. It defines counterinsurgency as “those military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat insurgency” (FM 3-07, p.3-3). The FM then states that “IDAD is the full range of measures taken by a nation to promote its growth and protect itself from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency, and counterinsurgency is part of the IDAD strategy that address the insurgent threat” (FM 3-07, p.3-4). Both definitions are very similar to FM 90-8. However, the doctrinal manual again uses virtually the same definition to define IDAD and counterinsurgency. When a nation conducts actions, programs or operations designed to protect it, the nation is eliminating the reasons for an insurgency. Therefore, the nation has conducted counterinsurgency operations.

FM 3-07 does little to change the meat of JP 3-07, but rather examines the Army’s role in the conduct of stability and support operations. It superseded FM 100-20, but still focuses on the use of infantry brigades as the primary unit of capability in the prosecution of COIN operations. The doctrine itself recognizes that “Success in counterinsurgency goes to the party that achieves the greater popular support”(FM 3-07, p. 3-4). However, it does not address how to achieve greater support, instead it simply defines success in terms of success. It examines the overall need for attacking all aspects of an insurgency, but focuses once again on force versus counterforce. It often comes extremely close to being on target but does not take the further step necessary in unconventional thinking. An example of this can be found in a theoretical vignette from the manual. (See Figure 3). The excerpt suggests splitting up and decontrolling forces, but does not add the necessary ingredient of involvement with and of the local populace. The manual does an excellent job of pointing out the need for accurate and timely intelligence but relies too heavily on supporting agencies and units to obtain the information. While no manual should be perceived as a “how-to” or checklist, there should be further encouragement for development beyond the growth of insurgencies.
An additional manual that provides guidance for conducting counterinsurgency is FM 7-98, *Operations In A Low Intensity Conflict* 1992. This FM states that the objective of counterinsurgency is for the host government to defeat an insurgency through military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological and civic action (FM 7-98, p.1-3). The FM does not define counterinsurgency. However, it does imply that the definition of a counterinsurgency is all military, paramilitary, economic, psychological and civic action operations designed to defeat an insurgency.

FM 7-98 then discusses low intensity conflict operations, and does a very good job of outlining insurgencies, as well as discussing their origins in section II. It discusses a multi-pronged strategy for attacking guerrillas, as well as finding ways to interrupt their
intelligence and decision processes. It recognizes some important initial truths about the nature of the forces that should be used in the conduct of COIN.

Soldiers must be prepared to operate in a variety of geographical conditions—from jungles and mountains to deserts and cities. These conditions, coupled with extremes in weather, can have a significant affect on operations. The language, religious, and cultural differences between our society and those that soldiers may come in contact with pose additional challenges. The basic values and beliefs that are common to US soldiers are not universally embraced” (FM 7-98, p.1-2).

However, it still focuses on conventional units as the COIN force and its commanders and sees SOF as an augmentation force (FIDAF). “Once committed, brigades and battalion task forces (both heavy and light) augmented by SOF serve as the "cutting edge” of the joint task force (JTF) in both insurgency and COIN operations”(FM7-98, p.2-1). The belief is that the common infantry soldier can handle any situation, “a disciplined unit, with soldiers proficient at individual skills who are operating under a clear expression of the commander's intent, can perform successfully at the tactical level in this environment”(FM 7-98, p. 1-2). It does not address COIN separate from FID as part of an HN’s IDAD program. Therefore, there is no reference to the US operating in a unilateral role such as Afghanistan or Iraq. ”(FM 7-98, p. 2-7).

FM 31-20-3, Foreign Internal Defense Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Special Forces, 1994, also provides guidance for conducting counterinsurgency. It defines IDAD with the exact same definition as FM 3-07. 31-20-3 goes on to state that IDAD is the overall strategy used to prevent an insurgency, while counterinsurgency activities are used once an insurgency has developed (FM 31-20-3, p.1-2). This explanation is the best for delineating the difference between IDAD and counterinsurgency; IDAD is preventive while counterinsurgency is reactive, it is the response to an ongoing insurgency.

FM 31-20-3 goes on to provide an excellent overview and explanation of IDAD, and our role in FID and where counterinsurgency fits in to the overall picture. The FM states that the US Military conducts FID is part of the overall IDAD strategy of a nation and that FID supports the nation’s counterinsurgency operations (FM 31-20-3, P.1-15-1-16). Throughout the first chapter, the FM provides good guidance on the numerous considerations, the different missions and operations, and the differing roles of the
military and Special Forces when conducting counterinsurgency within FID. The FM states the overall goal of FID is to help a nation protect its society from an existing or potential insurgent threat (FM 31-20-3, p.1-15). However, it does not provide any guidance on counterinsurgency strategies or the how of counterinsurgency, nor does it provide guidance on why or when to implement those strategies.

The FM also gives an explanation of the three phases of an insurgency and the insurgent strategies of foco, mass-oriented, and traditional insurgencies (FM 31-20-3, pp.1-10-1-13). These strategies are actually different models an insurgent organization can follow when conducting an insurgency. The organization must assess itself and decide on how it plans on conducting the insurgency. In other words, will the insurgent movement follow the foco model, or the mass-oriented model, or the traditional model to conduct the insurgency? The type of model an insurgency follows depends on several factors, external and internal support, insurgent leadership, and insurgent level of training to name a few. However, according to all four previously mentioned manuals, the overall goal of any insurgency will always be to replace or reform the established government. The strategy the insurgent movement uses to accomplish this goal is where the counterinsurgent must focus.

The remaining chapters of FM 31-20-3 provide excellent guidance on the phases of conducting FID. The manual details the planning and development of a training outline required for pre-mission activities in Chapter 2, the requirements for conducting training and advisory assistance during employment in Chapter 3, and post-mission activities in Chapter 4. However, part of Chapter 3 describes the process of tactical counterinsurgency operations. It provides good framework of some of the SFODA members’ abilities, and some capabilities of the SFODA along with some considerations for employment that can assist in conducting counterinsurgency operations. Again, the FM does not give any counterinsurgency strategies that these tactical operations can and should support.

FM 90-8, Counterguerrilla Operations 1986, defines counterinsurgency as “missions that include the full range of measures used by a government to free and protect its society from subversion, lawless, and insurgency” (FM 90-8, p.1-4). However, FM 90-8 also defines internal defense and development, IDAD, as programs geared to
counter a whole insurgency by alleviating the conditions, which may cause an insurgency (FM 90-8, p.1-5). The FM then states that the program that addresses both the insurgent and the populace is called counterinsurgency (FM 90-8, p.1-5). The FM defines both counterinsurgency and IDAD almost identically. The doctrinal manual does not provide a clear definition of counterinsurgency.

FM 90-8 provides some of the best doctrinal guidance for conducting counterguerrilla operations in a counterinsurgency. It is currently under revision incorporating the lessons learned in Afghanistan and will be republished as FM 3-07.11, but for now FM 90-8 is still in circulation. The manual begins with a good overview of insurgency and counterinsurgency as well as IDAD and FID in Chapter I. However, the definitions used for counterinsurgency and IDAD are seemingly interchangeable and confusing instead of clear and concise. Chapter II, The Threat, then gives an excellent explanation of an insurgency, an insurgent and the threats posed by both. Chapter III, Counterinsurgency Operations, continues with outstanding counterguerrilla procedures and techniques. Counterguerrilla operations in a conventional conflict are detailed in Chapter IV while Chapter V discusses the different combat units, their force compositions and considerations available for use in a counterinsurgency role. Chapters VI and VII give guidance on the use of and deployment of combat support and combat service support units during counterinsurgency.

Overall, this manual is one of the best doctrinal sources for conducting counterguerrilla, or counter-force, operations during counterinsurgency. It also describes the three stages or developmental phases of an insurgency. It briefly mentions that counterguerrilla operations are part of FID and a commander must understand how FID supports the host nation’s counterinsurgency plan (FM 90-8, p.3-1). However, it does not provide guidance on conducting counterinsurgency. The FM does not give any counterinsurgency strategies that these tactical operations support or fit into. Additionally, this FM is written for a conventional brigade sized unit. A conventional unit with no regional expertise, cultural understanding or language ability may not be the best unit to conduct counterinsurgency.
B. RELEVANT LITERATURE

In the book *Conflict of Myths*, Larry Cable argues that insurgencies can be broken into two types, partisan and insurgent, and that each type of insurgency will require a different approach to defeat it successfully (Cable, p.5). The partisan type of insurgency, which is characterized by external support and control, can be countered by interdiction of lines of supply and communication. Whereas, the insurgent type of insurgency, characterized by armed dissidents of a society seeking revolutionary change in absence of external support, must be countered by nonmilitary programs such as nation building and social reform as well as military operations such as intelligence gathering, psychological operations and police type activities (Cable, p.6). Therefore, he seems to imply that the definition for counterinsurgency depends on the type of insurgency with the only distinction being the external support or lack thereof.

Leites and Wolf’s report, *Rebellion and Authority*, does not give an actual definition for counterinsurgency. However, it does state that an insurgency can be countered in four different methods. Counterinsurgency can be conducted by interdiction of supplies through various means, reducing the effectiveness of the insurgent organization, traditional counterforce, or passive and active defense measures (Leites and Wolf, p.36-37). The authors also state that the best strategies for counterinsurgency are likely to vary depending on the stage of the insurgency (Leites and Wolf, p.51). Additionally, throughout the book, the authors describe the details of why to counter the insurgency in a specific method.

The above two approaches on insurgency and counterinsurgency are the most helpful in creating a new counterinsurgency definition. The authors of this thesis define insurgency as the spectrum of political, economic, psychological, paramilitary, military and civic actions conducted by a group with or without varying degrees of support to replace an existing government using the tactics of subversion, sabotage and intelligence collection. Therefore, taking into account the doctrinal definitions along with several books on the subject a definition can be compiled for counterinsurgency. Counterinsurgency should be defined as the broad spectrum of political, economic, psychological, paramilitary, military and civic actions conducted by a nation with or without varying degrees of external support to defeat an insurgency in any phase. This
definition seems to combine all the elements found in the manuals as well as points in several books.

C. DOCTRINAL HIERARCHY

Doctrine itself has its own hierarchy for which manuals govern which operations. At the highest level is the Joint Publications series. The Joint Pubs are meant to unify interservice operations using common doctrine that can be applied by all the using units.

Joint Doctrine can supersede service doctrine, but only in specific joint environments, and generally tends to incorporate it instead. All Joint Doctrine is intentionally broad in scope; in order to best allow the individual services freedom to develop their own tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP’s), yet still provides interoperability. JP 3-05, Joint Operations, governs all joint operations. JP 3-07, Joint Stability and Support Operations, falls under 3-05. JP 3-07.1, Foreign Internal Defense, is under 3-07. FM 3-07, Army Stability and Support Operations, is equal to JP 3-07, but under the grand scheme is one step below it. FM’s 7-98, Low Intensity Conflict, (soon to be FM 3-21.98), 90-8, Counterguerrilla Operations, (soon to be 3-07.11), and 31-20-3, Foreign Internal Defense TTP’s for Special Forces, all fall under FM 3-07, although JP 3-07.1 also governs FM 31-20-3.

Unfortunately, the difficulty in the development of doctrine is often not found at the upper levels. Joint Doctrine is derived almost entirely from the doctrine below it, and often uses a common sense approach to combine the lower elements. Much of the confusion is the result of conflicts in interpretation between the proponents of the branches that develop the doctrine for the service. In the case of 3-07, the proponent is the Combined Arms Center, Infantry Branch develops 7-98 as well as 90-8, and for 31-20-3, it’s SWCS. (See Figure 4).
Figure 4. Doctrinal Hierarchy
D. UNILATERAL VS BILATERAL COIN

One major dilemma that exists in current COIN operations lies in the available opportunities presented based on freedom of action versus organizational constraints imposed over time. Afghanistan and Iraq allow us the opportunity to prosecute a full-scale COIN operation without the limitations imposed by the necessity to work within the limits of an HN’s constraints, yet paradoxically, we have emplaced our own restrictions within our organization that prevent us from embracing the populace as an asset and resource. Sadly enough, we have more freedom of movement in countries where the HN’s constitution prevents us from conducting combat operations, but allows us to act in a true combat advisory role. Unilateral COIN offers more freedom of action initially, but quickly becomes constrained due to external pressures. Conversely, bilateral COIN has more initial restrictions that reduce as the relationship develops with the HN. Therefore, as our presence in a HN continues over time with forces designed specifically to assist in the conduct of COIN, our overall effectiveness may be greater than in a country where we develop our constraints for our own unilateral efforts. (See Figure 5).
Figure 5. Freedom of Action Graph
E. OTHER MODELS

To develop counterinsurgency strategies, we first must better understand the goals and strategies of an insurgency. According to each of the FM’s, by definition, the overall goal of an insurgency is to replace the established government, whether indigenous or external, with one of its own. How, then, does an insurgency replace an established government? The insurgency gains support, increases the population’s vulnerability, provides psychological victories, lessens government control, blocks government resources, and weakens government resolve (FM 90-8, pp. 2-1-2-2 & FM 7-98, pp. 2-1-2-2). Additionally, the insurgency over time grows its organization to contest for control over the population by de-legitimizing the established political government while legitimizing the insurgency’s shadow government through population and resource control, establishing organizational and political infrastructure and counter-force operations (McCormick, seminar notes, Aug 03). In other words, the insurgency gathers resources, develops experienced organizational leadership, builds infrastructure for control, and creates guerrilla units to wrest that control from the government.

Leites and Wolf provide further insight into the insurgent movement strategies by viewing an insurgency as a system. The authors’ model shows that an insurgency requires inputs, such as recruits, supplies, and information coupled with material, training cadre, and some financing converted by a mechanism, such as training bases, education centers and organization, into outputs, such as guerrilla operations and the exercise of administrative and governmental jurisdiction and control (Leites and Wolf, pp. 32-34). The model includes the following: inputs (internal-endogenous) recruits, supplies, information; inputs (external-exogenous) material, training cadre, finances; conversion mechanism- training bases, education centers, organizational operations; outputs- guerrilla operations, administrative control; which leads to overall authority. The entire system revolves within a neutral or permissive environment. (See Figure 6).
GREEN = ENVIRONMENT/STRUCTURE = OVERALL POSITIVE SYSTEM FROM THE INSURGENT’S PERSPECTIVE

Figure 6. Leites and Wolf Insurgent Model
Consequently, four counterinsurgency strategies emerge as a result of looking at an insurgency in this manner. They consist of input reduction or supply line interdiction, impediment of the conversion process or counter-organization techniques, destruction of the outputs or counter-force, and blunting the effects of the outputs or active and passive defense measures for the population and security forces (Leites and Wolf, p.36). This is the beginning of the development of a comprehensive counterinsurgency strategy.

Gordon McCormick additionally refines the counterinsurgency strategies with his insurgency/counterinsurgency mystic diamond model (McCormick, seminar notes, Aug 03). This model lists the actors in an insurgency as the insurgent organization or counter state, the population, the established government or state, and the international community and the relationship between each of those actors. The strategies of the insurgent and the established government are the result of these relationships. (See Figure 7).

The insurgent organization attempts to grow the organization by exercising control over the population to garner more resources. The insurgents also begin to establish an insurgent infrastructure capable of administrative and jurisdictional control that promotes the insurgency gaining support from the population as well as the gaining support and recognition from international community. The insurgents must also counter any government attempts to re-establish population control and an infrastructure. Meanwhile, the insurgents conduct counterforce operations against the government in order to decrease government control allowing for the continued development of insurgent infrastructure. This strategy is not a step-by-step process; it is circular in any direction. Counterforce operations loosen government control allowing the insurgent to build an infrastructure, which enables more population control, which generates more local and international support, which allows for more insurgent growth, which creates more guerrillas, which permits more counterforce operations. This circular strategy is iterative, and can be started at any point in the circle, depending on what is needed in a particular region of a country.
Figure 7. The Mystic Diamond Approach to Insurgency / COIN
Counterinsurgency strategies are the exact opposite of the insurgency strategies and are circular as well. The government must regain and maintain control over the population to deny the insurgent the ability to grow. The government agencies should establish/reestablish an infrastructure that exercises control over the population, which addresses concerns, which gains local and international support, which allows for government growth, which creates more security forces, which permits more counterguerrilla operations, which enables a reduction of insurgent control and infrastructure, which allows the government to build more infrastructure. Each of Leites and Wolf’s counterinsurgency strategies are expressed in this model; counter-resource, counter-organization, counter-infrastructure or blunt the effects with infrastructure development, counter-force. The degree to which one side executes this strategy is the degree to which it counters the other side’s strategy. The winner of this contest will be determined by the ability to exercise control over the population to extract resources to grow your side and eliminate the other side. This is exactly what the British did during the Malayan Emergency. They recognized the interdependent nature of the different elements of the counterinsurgency strategy and conducted operations that supported each strategy and did not limit themselves to conducting one type of operation, such as counterforce, to defeat all aspects of an insurgency (Komer, p.1-88).

The implications of these models are that all insurgencies are a battle for control of the political space of a nation. The established government has control over a certain proportion of the populace. The insurgent is attempting to establish its own control over other portions and in so doing, establish its legitimacy. Unless the government can keep the insurgents from continuously gaining more control in the remote areas, the insurgency will develop to the point of a zero sum gain. At this point the insurgent will have as much political control as the established government. If the insurgency continues to gain support beyond this point, it will develop until the government reaches a break point where the insurgents win. (See Figure 8).
CONTROL OF THE POLITICAL SPACE

Figure 8. Control of the Political Space Graph
F. CONCLUSION

The comprehensive counterinsurgency strategy advocated by the authors of this thesis requires four elements: counter-resource, or eliminate the inputs; counter-organization, or fracture or degrade the insurgent organization; counter-infrastructure, or build government infrastructure to provide stability and security; and counter-force, or kill guerrillas. All four elements of the strategy must be conducted for the strategy to be successful. They are also interdependent; success in one element reinforces success in the other elements. The counterinsurgency strategy requires long-term sustainment and habitual relationships between COIN forces and the local populace in order to develop trust and a thorough implementation of psychological and information warfare that compounds the result of every successful action.

Some basic problems with doctrine were discovered during our research. Point one; proponents for the development of counterinsurgency doctrine should be in the control of Special Forces. Point two; doctrine does not address unilateral US COIN operations, even though a precedent was set by the US during the Philippine Insurrection ending in 1904. Point three; command structures for COIN should reflect Special Operations as a supported command. Point four; doctrine does not address the full coverage (civil, infrastructure, and force on force) required for COIN.

Existing doctrine is limited; it provides good general guidance and considerations for tactical operations but does not have an overall counterinsurgency strategy. Doctrine can be amended with the above strategy giving a framework that tactical operations can fit into. Every tactical operation should support the counterinsurgency strategy in some way at some point along the counterinsurgency circular strategy. Doctrine should reflect that counterinsurgency is not a step-by-step process of defeat the military to gain control over the state to gain control over the population. Instead, the counterinsurgency process flows with each action having an effect on the other components of the strategic circle.

Currently, all doctrine is geared towards using conventional brigade-sized units as the counterinsurgency force. However, doctrine also states that a commander will face an enemy whose tactics, objectives and concepts differ from his own (FM 7-98, p.2-6). Additionally 90-8 states that neutralization of the guerrilla is only one-third of the counter
insurgency strategy, and that leaders must have the expertise to be able to operate independently at lower levels of command than is required in a conventional conflict (FM 90-8, pp. 1-6, 1-7). Therefore, the conventional military’s approach to conducting war in the step-by-step process of military, state, and population is a problem. It is locked into one way of doing business and does not have the flexibility to operate in the dynamic environment of a counterinsurgency. Additionally, the conventional military does not have the regional or cultural expertise or the language ability, which the British had as an occupying force in the Malaya Emergency, to be an effective counterinsurgency force.

Finally, Special Forces is mandated by law to be the primary executor of FID within DOD and as stated earlier according to doctrine, counterinsurgency is part of the FID plan (FM 31-20-3, p.1-17).

In our view, the conventional military is not the element best suited to conduct counterinsurgency. Doctrine should recognize then Special Forces as the leader in FID and consequently counterinsurgency with support from all other DOD assets. Thus, a hand over to conventional forces would not occur, allowing SF to remain the lead component with support as needed until the insurgency is completely defeated or the host nation can assume complete and effective control over the counterinsurgency operation. Lastly, according to doctrine, Special Forces train to support and foster an insurgency (FM 3-05.201). Therefore, because SF is familiar with insurgency and its strategies and operations and is the proponent for conducting an insurgency, SF is inherently familiar with what to expect in the way of counterinsurgency strategies and operations. Who better to defeat an insurgency than the force designed to foster an insurgency? Consequently, SF should have the lead on planning, executing and developing doctrine as well as being the supported unit for any and all counterinsurgency operations.
II. TRUST INFLUENCES EFFECTIVENESS: ELEMENTS OF TRUST, INFLUENCE, AND NETWORK DEVELOPMENT IN COUNTER INSURGENCIES

The purpose of this chapter is to identify the essential elements required for a government fighting an insurgency in the development of trust relationships, the capabilities to influence these relationships, and the evolution/devolution of networks required to increase the efficiency of counterinsurgent strategies or plans. The level of trust developed by the government and its counterinsurgent forces directly determines the level of effectiveness of the counterinsurgency strategies. Therefore, this chapter will analyze the trust relationships that exist between: the local populace and the insurgents; the local populace and the counterinsurgent government/assisting governments; and the insurgents and counterinsurgent government(s). This analysis may strengthen facets of existing US Army Counterinsurgency Doctrine. Therefore, the assumption is that any government following a counterinsurgency strategy, which is aided by US efforts, is a legitimate government in the eyes of the world community.

A. BACKGROUND

Following the theory set forth by Gordon McCormick that any insurgency is a struggle for the political space within a nation; there is essentially a zero-sum game at play. The government establishes initial control over a certain segment of the population. The insurgency starts off with little or no control, but will attempt to establish its own control over or compliance from other portions as it develops. There will always be some segments of the population that remain under no one’s control, but both sides will attempt to influence them. Unless the government develops its own networks and disrupts the networks and trust relationships developed by the insurgents, the insurgency will continue to grow in the remote areas until it reaches equilibrium of control with the government. If the insurgency develops beyond this point, it will force the government to a break-point where the insurgents win and take over. (See figure 8).

The trust model demonstrates the trust relationships and their potential for the interactive groups identified in the introduction. (See Figure 9).
Figure 9. Trust Relationship Model
B. INSURGENT-LOCAL POPULACE TRUST RELATIONSHIPS/
COUNTERINSURGENT-LOCAL POPULACE TRUST RELATIONSHIPS/
INSURGENT-COUNTERINSURGENT TRUST RELATIONSHIPS

The trust model explains how an insurgency engages the population to garner resources to grow the insurgent organization. The model says that A, the population, trusts B, the insurgents to do X, accomplish its goals, when Z, a specific timeframe. However, the examination of the factors that contribute to the population’s trust reveals an unstable trust relationship. The government can exploit an unstable trust to breakdown the insurgent networks in order to eliminate the insurgency.

The first set of factors that contributes to the population’s trust is the grounds or reasons for the population to trust the insurgents. The relationship the population has with the insurgents is the grounds for their trust. The population gives its trust based on its perception of the insurgents. The population considers several main factors: the reputation, the performance, the appearance, and the accountability of the insurgents on which to base its perception. During the early stages of an insurgency, the insurgents rely on the fear as much or more than the ideological acceptance by the population to gain the trust and support of the population. The insurgents may develop a cruel reputation based on their actions. They often use indiscriminate targeting to create terror in the population and to show what will happen if the population does not agree with or support the insurgents. Furthermore, the performance of the insurgents is sketchy at best. The insurgents conduct operations to gather resources, money, equipment, and supplies, by robbing the population or by using fear of reprisals if the population does not give its support willingly. The appearance of the insurgents is also taken into consideration. Insurgents often resemble fanatic, unprofessional, motley gangs using terrorist methods to achieve selfish goals. That image does not foster trustworthiness. Finally, insurgents are not accountable to the population. When the insurgents conduct operations that harm the population, the population has no means to hold the insurgents responsible and get restitution for the harmful action. Therefore, as the population realizes the grounds for trusting the insurgents are unacceptable, the population would rather not trust the insurgents.

Another set of factors that contribute to trust are the population’s expectations that the insurgency deserves the given trust. The population considers whether or not the
insurgents have the capability, the integrity and the benevolence to actually be considered worthy of the population’s trust. Since the population is giving the insurgency its trust, the insurgents must display the capability to meet that trust. An insurgency that relies more heavily on tactics that harm the population to garner resources and support has little capability to achieve population’s expectations of trustworthiness. Additionally, the population considers the integrity of the insurgents. An insurgency that hurts those it is professing to help loses all semblances of integrity and trustworthiness. Finally, the population considers the benevolence of the insurgency. Again, the more an insurgency hurts the population the less benevolent the population sees the insurgency. Therefore, with little capability, low integrity, and low benevolence, the population’s expectations for the given trust in the insurgency are low.

A third set of factors that add to the population’s trust concern the goals of the insurgents. In trusting the insurgents to accomplish its goals, the population considers weather or not the insurgents’ goals are worthy goals for the population. Therefore, the population considers the type of trust given to the insurgents. Piotr Sztompka defines three types of trust in his book *Trust: A Sociological Theory*. He defines anticipatory trust as the act of trust because someone believes that the actions carried out anyway by someone else are favorable to the population’s interests, needs, and expectations (Sztompka, p. 27). The population trusts the insurgency because the actions of the insurgents are in the best interests of the population anyway. An insurgency with goals only related to a small segment of the population or little willing support from the population will not act in the entire population’s best interests and does not receive anticipatory trust from the population. Sztompka then defines responsive trust as the act of entrusting a valuable object into someone else’s hands with their consent expecting responsible care (Sztompka, p.27). The population entrusts the leadership of their country to the insurgents expecting the insurgents to lead the country responsibly. An insurgency that harms the population as it seeks to accomplish its goals or has goals that only effect a small portion of the population is viewed by the population as merely self-serving and not as responsible leaders looking out for the best interests of the country. Lastly, Sztompka defines evocative trust as the act trusting someone else on the belief that the other party will reciprocate with trust towards the first party. The population trusts the insurgents on
the belief that the insurgents will in turn trust the population. A successful insurgency must have some secrecy and consequently cannot afford to completely trust the population. Therefore, the population cannot hope to gain the insurgents trust by trusting the insurgents. Consequently, when the goals of the insurgents are not in the best interests of the population, the population will not trust the insurgents.

The population also considers the degree of certainty that the insurgents will accomplish their goals, the risk associated to the population by the insurgency accomplishing its goals, and the controllability of that risk. An insurgency that appeals to a limited segment of the population or has gained only the support of a small segment of the population has a large degree of uncertainty both in achieving its goals and whether or not its goals are in the interests of the population. The greater the uncertainty the less trust the population has in the insurgency.

A final set of factors the population considers for trusting the insurgents is the use of the power gained by the insurgents due to the population’s trust. The population determines if the insurgents posses the knowledge, skills, resources and networks to accomplish its goals. The population decides whether or not the insurgents will abuse the power that the population’s trust has given to the insurgents.

Therefore, taking into account the low level of each factor effecting trust, the population’s trust in the insurgency is low and unstable. Consequently, the government’s counterinsurgency strategy should be to achieve a high level of stable trust with the population in every trust factor. The government forces must work to develop a superior reputation in each of the factors that effect trust as identified above. Developing that superior reputation takes time. The government and its counterinsurgency forces must acknowledge that trust is a commodity that is built on everyday activities and close personal interactions over a protracted period of time. The development of trust is not defined by a single, major engagement that the government forces can point to and say that is when the campaign tipped in our favor, instead that trust development is an accumulation of successful interactions between the population and government forces.
C. EXAMPLE CASE

1. The Moro National Liberation Front vs. the Government of the Philippines

In this case, the parameters for trust were decidedly different as a result of conflicting ideologies- Moro identity as opposed to distribution of wealth. The Moros (Islamic Philippinos from the southern islands of the Philippine Archipelago) had been fighting government rule since the time of the Spanish discovery and occupation in the 16th century. The Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) desired an autonomous Moro homeland independent of the GOP. The Moros fought Spanish occupation as well as US occupation. In both cases, the governments reached an accommodation, which allowed the Moros to govern themselves and maintain their customs and rule of law, with oversight by the occupying governments. Following GOP independence in 1946, the GOP occupied the Moro islands, and attempted to establish full government control. The islands within the Sulu Archipelago (Mindanao, Basilan, Sulu, Palawan, Jolo etc.) were agriculturally rich, and also provided ample mineral resources for the GOP. In the 1970’s the MNLF gained momentum with its ideal of establishing a separate Moro homeland. Its foundations rest on religious differences and traditional heritage. The GOP fought the MNLF Rebellion throughout the 1970’s and into the 1980’s. Despite repeated attempts by the GOP to establish trust relationships with the local populace and disrupt networks within the MNLF, they could not wholly accomplish their goals as a result of the strength of the religious based insurgency. The local populace (A) did not overwhelmingly trust the GOP (B) to offer full representation and security (X) when faced with the insurrection and the trust relationships established by close familial and religious ties over a much greater period of time (Z). The expectations of the locals with regard to the capabilities of its military, the integrity of the government to serve their best interest, and the perceived benevolence of the GOP were not high enough to outweigh those characteristics of the insurgents. They were great enough, however, to force the insurgents to the bargaining table. Following the influence model developed by Rosen and Smith, we see the optimal strategy for the MNLF (See Figure 10). Due to the willingness of the GOP to negotiate, combined with their existing reputation, the advantages (positive arrows) outweighed the possible negative activities. As a result, the government reached a peace agreement with the MNLF in 1976, and finalized in 1996.
The end result was the establishment of Autonomous Moro Regions on certain islands within the Sulu Archipelago. These regions allowed the Moros full administrative and judicial control, with GOP oversight -- very similar to US and Spanish occupation practices.

Figure 10. MNLF Influence Model
D. CONCLUSION

Government leaders must identify the nature of the insurgency and then create a flexible strategy to counter it. Government legitimacy must be ascertained and reinforced in the overall struggle. Furthermore, any counterinsurgency strategy must realize the intrinsic value of trust relationships. They must seek to engage the local populace at the small unit level and maintain close personal interaction with the populace. A government’s greatest opportunities for influencing or destroying an insurgency are at its outset. As the insurgency grows, the nature of its trust relationships, modes of influence, and networks change from unstable and tentative connections to stable and supported organizations. Therefore, in order to improve the effectiveness of any counterinsurgency strategy, governments and counterinsurgent agencies should attempt to strengthen ties with the local populace through PSYOPS, Civil Affairs, and Humanitarian Assistance programs. The government and its counterinsurgent forces should develop stronger HUMINT resources throughout any affected regions, and should conduct all operations with an understanding of the duration and sustainability required of such operations. Simultaneously, the government forces should be utilizing the opportunities presented by the operations listed above to destabilize and disrupt the insurgent’s trust relationships and networks. The government and assisting government agencies and allies have greater resources to strengthen trust connections than an emerging insurgency does, however, it will always require the immediate and sustainable attention of the government under insurgent attack.
III. SUCCESSFUL CASE STUDIES

A. THE PHILIPPINES INSURRECTION AND THE MOROLANDS

1. The Philippines Insurrection

   a. Background

      The Spanish-American War closed with the signing of the Treaty of Paris on December 10th, 1898. With the treaty came the purchase of the Philippines by the US for the price of twenty million dollars. Following the purchase, the US believed that the Filipinos could not protect their own independence. Although the US had originally brought Emilio Aguinaldo from Hong Kong to assist in fighting the Spanish in Manila, his claim as dictator of the provisional government of an Independent Philippine Republic was not recognized. Instead, the US decided to install an American governorship to oversee the conduct of civil administration until such time as the indigenous government was stable enough to run itself. The Americans original intent for the Philippines under President McKinley was one of “benevolent assimilation” whereby the US would assist them in their development, and shift control from the US Army to the governorship, and eventually grant full independence. Naturally, this did not sit well with Aguinaldo or his supporters, who attempted to wrest control of Manila and the rest of the Philippines from America in February 1899. From 1899 to 1902 the US Army conducted counterinsurgency operations in the Philippines against the indigenous guerilla forces of Aguinaldo, and fought repeated actions against Moro insurgents and pirates in the Southern Archipelago of the Philippines until 1914. The list of names of general officers to take part in these actions included Merritt, Otis, Kobbe, Chaffee, Arthur McArthur, Leonard Wood, Bliss, and Pershing. The tactics used by the Army during this period demonstrated a great measure of success for models of counterinsurgency, as well as possible hints for future operations in the Philippines against groups like the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), and the Abu Sayaf Group (ASG).

   b. Counter-Resource

      The Army discovered that there were certain keys to success in the conduct of counterinsurgency operations in an area with slow or no means of direct
communication between headquarters elements. Recognizing the agrarian base of the local economies, the US commanders began devoting their efforts to denying the guerillas their food supplies. They combined this with population concentrations. The US would force people in the outlying areas to move to the villages, taking their families, food and livestock. The US provided food, schools, and vaccinations in these villages, and identified anyone remaining in the outlying areas as partisans. The US also recognized the value in denying their enemy the use of rifles. The US had effectively imposed a blockade that prevented any foreign countries from supplying the guerrillas. Additionally, the US paid cash for anyone turning in a firearm, and would trade prisoners for firearms. This meant that the insurgents were constantly depleting their own arms in exchange for personnel, money, or food. This only continued to improve the reputation of the US.

c. **Counter-Organization**

Decentralization combined with familiarization was increasingly accepted. Local US commanders had to adjust their tactics to the local situation and could do so most effectively when they remained in the area for long periods of time. The intelligence gained from this close association with the local population allowed the US to conduct frequent patrols and rapidly respond to guerilla actions that began to exhaust the insurgents. However, there were some downsides to the autonomy of the individual commanders. The war in the Philippines was often compared to the taming of the American West, and the pacification of Native Americans. One of the most remembered, and unfortunate incidents of the war was the result of this mentality. Following the massacre of a US Army garrison at Balangiga on the island of Samar, the commander for the area, Brigadier General Jacob Smith, ordered that everyone over the age of ten should be captured or killed and that the interior of the island be turned into “a howling wilderness.” (Linn, 2000, p. 322).

d. **Counter-Infrastructure**

There is much controversy as to whether the United States won the war so much as the insurrectionists lost it. Aguinaldo had difficulty placing national interests above personal gain. He had excellent field commanders, but limited and untimely means of communication. Aguinaldo himself was more of a political leader than a
military commander, and the insurgents lacked what Professor Brian Linn described as an “equivalent to the American Revolution’s Nathaniel Greene, a general who could effectively combine partisans with regulars to achieve campaign or strategic goals.” (2000, p.324). The guerrillas did a fine job of conducting small unit tactics and raising local support, but could not sustain their successes. The guerrillas turned increasingly towards terrorist tactics that only alienated them from the local populace and caused increased retributions and harsher treatment by the US Army.

e. Counter-Force

The command of the Philippines Expedition passed hands from General Wesley Merritt in 1898 to his second in command, General Elwell Otis. Otis held forth the belief that his occupying force could merely act as a police force, while assisting in the development of civic projects. The positive effect of this policy was the generation of goodwill among the indigenous populace, and the recruitment of intelligence assets. Otis realized that the conflict was as much a political battle as it was military. He understood that “his task was not only to defeat the rebels, but also to set the stage for pacification and reconciliation.” (Joes, 2000, p. 114) However, General Otis realized his policies were proving largely ineffective in actually battling the military side of the insurgency. He relied on large-scale sweeps to crush the insurgent forces that stopped working when the insurgents no longer formed groups larger than company size. Otis’ plans also included having troops occupy an area in the interior for a short period of time, then pull out and move to a different area. This merely allowed the guerrillas to move back in and reoccupy the villages, and often provided them with greater resources. Otis realized he was not a jungle fighter, and in May 1900 turned control over to General Arthur MacArthur. MacArthur moved toward a more punitive policy towards guerrillas and their sympathizers, while still maintaining the civic action programs engaged by Otis. MacArthur believed that control of the island of Luzon would lead to the pacification of the remaining islands in the Archipelago, and therefore concentrated the majority of his troops and resources on Luzon. As a result of MacArthur’s strategies and the freedom of action he allowed his subordinate commanders, Aguinaldo was captured in March 1901. The Secretary of War determined that things were peaceful enough in the Philippines to begin the transition towards US civilian control, and replaced MacArthur with General
Adnee Chaffee. The Army quelled the majority of resistance on Luzon by the end of 1902. Credit must be given to both Otis and McArthur for creating a coherent pacification policy that balanced conciliation with repression, winning over the population while punishing those who resisted.

2. **The Lessons of the Kris**
   
   a. **Background**

   Actions in the northern portions of the Philippines originally involved a conventionally structured force switching to counterguerilla tactics, and hostile insurgent forces eventually moving to peaceful resolution and acceptance of American authority. Nearly the opposite was true in the Southern Philippines areas known as the Morolands. Relations between the US and the Moros were initially favorable, and only began to worsen following the declaration of the end of the War in 1902.

   McArthur had paid little attention to the islands of Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago, which he placed under the control of Brigadier General William A. Kobbe. Kobbe’s command was the largest in area and the smallest in terms of manpower. Kobbe realized quickly that to maintain order, he would need to divide his command into four districts, then subdivide these districts into autonomous sub-districts and post commands that allowed decentralization and flexibility. The only incidents of insurgency took place in areas of Northern Mindanao long contested by Spaniards, Filipinos, and Moros alike. These insurgents were gradually worn down, their cotts and supply caches destroyed. However, they gave an inkling of the tactics employed by the *juramentados* (individual warriors who were sworn to give their lives in exchange for the lives of several of their enemies) during the Moro Wars following 1903. In these incidents, the Moros would approach US outposts appearing as a group of innocent civilians; they would then attack in large numbers bearing their *Kris*’s (bolo knives). They developed a fearsome reputation for almost supernatural powers. Many reports cited instances of *juramentados* attacking sentries and outposts as individuals. They could move their blades so fast; they would often wound two or three men while sustaining several gunshot wounds. These berserkers formed the core of Moro insurgent forces, and it is believed that they helped convince the Army to switch to the Colt .45 and retire the Smith and Wesson .38 previously employed. The relations Kobbe had developed were to deteriorate
following the assumption of his command by General Leonard Wood. Wood took over as the first regional governor for the area in 1902, and had to deal with increasing unrest resulting from General Chaffee’s proclamation to the Moros of the Lake Lanao region. As Hurley describes, “When we consider the fact that the Moros not only had never heard of the Treaty of Paris but were in total ignorance that any such country as the United States existed, we can understand the prompt nature of their resistance. They were logically unable to understand how any nation [the Spanish] who had never subdued them had the right to cede their territory over to another power.” (Hurley, 1985, p. 85).

Furthermore, Wood immediately disliked the Moros whom he considered uncivilized, as they flagrantly disregarded the laws of the Insular Government of the Moro Province. Some of these laws included the abolition of the continued presence of slavery, as well as the prohibition against the continued practice of requiring monetary compensation as punishment for murder. Wood felt that the terms of the Bates Treaty had been completely violated, and therefore the Treaty should be abrogated. Wood had his forces begin to move into the interior of the islands of Jolo and Mindanao in an effort to destroy the *cottas* (Moro stone and wood forts) of the rebellious Moros. The Moros in turn struck back with assassinations of American sub-district governors, and ambushes of American troops, teachers, and businessmen. The provisional governorship would change hands twice more before 1913. Wood’s policies were carried out in a less strict manner by his successor, General Tasker Bliss, who relieved Wood in 1906.

**b. Counter-Resource**

Kobbe maximized the effectiveness of his few troops by creating close relations with the populace. He accomplished this by holding his soldiers to high standards of conduct and encouraging local civic action programs. Bliss’ command was known as the “era of peace” in Sulu, since he attempted to work closely with the Sultan and continued to support the Constabulary established by Wood.

**c. Counter-Organization**

The Moros did not develop guerrilla bands in the same manner as the Tagalogs in the North. Instead, they developed cellular organizations that moved to conduct operations in the malarial swamps and jungles, but would return to their homes and tended to brag about their actions. They generally remained loyal to their local *datu*
headsman) or sultan above him. They valued the bravery of a warrior above all, and would often try to go toe-to-toe against US forces bearing only their edged weapons. “America was discovering, as Spain had discovered, that the Moros would have to be reduced with hand-to-hand fighting in each barrio.” (Hurley, 1985, p.89). Wood responded by creating the Muslim Provisional Constabulary and the 53rd Philippine Scouts. The Constabulary was headed by US officers and composed of Muslim troops. Wood recognized that by giving the Moros the ability to enforce their own actions, he would be able to more effectively operate within the area and gather intelligence.

d. **Counter-Infrastructure**

Policies in the area were initially controlled by the Bates Agreement, named after the treaty developed by General John Bates under the direction of General Otis, and agreed to by the Sultan of Sulu. The Bates agreement gave the Sultan jurisdiction over intra-Moro affairs as a religious leader and the Army control over all external affairs. Kobbe also emphasized (as did his subordinate commanders) that the US would allow the Moros their religious freedoms. Initially, the Moros appreciated the US presence since it acted as a buffer between their lands and the incursions of Christian Filipinos.

e. **Counter-Force**

From 1902 to 1912, tensions were high in Mindanao as the Moros of the Lake regions began to fight US authority again. This time, it was the actions of a successful Army captain who was turning the tide of battle against the Moros. John J. Pershing was using small groups of well-trained jungle fighters combined with members of the Philippine Scouts to flush out Moro strongholds and gather intelligence on guerrilla activities. Pershing remained in the area for nearly two years. He saw the need for continued long-term small unit operations, combined with familiarity and an understanding of the enemy. He requested more troops from higher command, and as a result units were sent to him without their commanding officers, so that he could remain in command of the overall operation. By 1903, Pershing was in charge of an entire reinforced brigade’s worth of troops and resources, and had pacified the region. He returned to the US and was promoted from Captain directly to Brigadier General in 1906 by authority of President Theodore Roosevelt (Smith, p.92). This promotion was due to
his efforts in the Philippines, his efforts as an observer in the Russian-Japanese War in 1905, his personal relationship with President Roosevelt, the fact that his wife was the daughter of the Chairman of the Senate Military Affairs Committee as well as his record as the first Captain of the Corps of Cadets at West Point and his military experience in the Indian Wars. In 1909 he returned to Mindanao, where he assumed command from General Bliss and by 1913 had gained enough stability for the area for it to be incorporated into civilian governorship.

2. Conclusion

The US gained its first taste of conducting unilateral COIN operations while attempting to establish a legitimate and stable government. It saw the advent of new strategies based on lessons learned from the taming of the American West, and experienced the frustration of dealing with the stirrings of ethno-religiously based insurgencies. It employed unconventional tactics and granted wide authority to its subordinate commanders, and widened the scope of their responsibilities to the creation of infrastructure and the affirmation of the legitimacy of fledgling governments. The US military also had to take responsibility for the improper actions of its commanders in the face of burgeoning media coverage. The roots of the four elements of the counterinsurgency strategy for host nation development were present in the Philippines.

B. THE HUK REBELLION

1. Background

The roots of the Huk Rebellion can be traced to the peasant movements in the 1930’s in the central Luzon region of the Philippines. The peasants of central Luzon began to form unions in the 1930’s due to the deteriorating landlord/tenant relationships (Kerkvliet, pp.26-28). New landlords attempted to eliminate the old tenancy relationship in order to further maximize their profits. The old tenancy relationship was informal and had existed for decades. Basically, it was an agreement between the landlord and the tenant that allowed the tenant to clear and farm the landlord’s land keeping around 50% of the harvest. The landlord in return would pay for irrigation and give no interest loans, usually of rice, to the peasants as needed due to a small harvest. The landlords did other
things such as host fiestas, weddings and other special occasions and ensure the tenant farmers’ families were taken care of as well (Kerkvliet, pp.5-8).

With the deterioration of the relationship and landlords becoming more unresponsive and aloof to the peasants’ needs, the peasants realized that they must organize to effectively counter the power of the wealthy and often politically connected landlords. Two major socialist peasant unions, the Kalipunang Pambansa ng mga Magasaka sa Philipinas (National Society of Peasants in the Philippines), or KPMP, and the Aguman ding Malding Talapagobra (General Worker’s Union) or AMT, were formed and fought for agrarian reforms and peasant rights thru the legal system (Kerkvliet pp.31, 37). To counter the new unions, the landlords in turn became more repressive and used their political connections to either co-opt the Philippine constabulary as a personal army or hired their own armed bands to further oppress the peasants. The unions did win some battles and got limited government reforms, which the landlords arbitrarily implemented or ignored outright.

The Philippine Communist Party, PKP, was formed during the early 30’s and became active. It was promptly outlawed by the Supreme Court, which gave rise to the prestige of the socialist party as the legal focus for PKP supporters. Then in 1938 the PKP and socialist party merged and the new PKP organization professed communist doctrine and gained limited control over the peasant unions (Lachica, pp.100-102). Virtually the entire peasant unions’ leadership was indoctrinated and became officers in the communist organization. The PKP elected the peasant unions’ organizers and leadership to central committee positions as well as Luis Taruc, AMT officer, as the chairman of the military department (Lachica, p.106).

Then in 1942, the Japanese invaded and took control of the Philippines. As the Japanese swept across the islands, they committed numerous atrocities and began to sew the seeds of dissention. Filipinos soon realized that the Japanese and their puppet government were even more repressive than the previous government. The PKP then called for a unified front of all anti-Fascist organizations to oppose the Japanese (Kerkvliet p.79). The PKP military chairman and newly elected overall military commander of the guerrillas, Luis Taruc, began organizing the peasant guerrillas of central Luzon to resist the Japanese. The lessons learned by the central Luzon peasants in
creating and organizing the peasants’ unions served them well in this new environment. They organized and created the Hukbalahap, the *Hukbo ng Bayan Laban sa Hapon* (Peoples Anti-Japanese Army) (Kerkvliet, pp.79-80). The Hukbalahap organized itself into regional commands under Taruc and created shadow governments in virtually every barrio in central Luzon. The Hukbalahap was truly a mass organization. They continually fought and harassed the Japanese throughout the occupation exacting an impressive record. They also had numerous problems with United States Armed Forces Far East, or USAFFE, guerrillas over operations, operational areas, and overall command creating a high degree of animosity (Lachica, p112).

After the Philippines were liberated and the Japanese defeated, many Huk guerrillas expected conditions to improve and to return to farming. However, as soon as the US regained control, the military forcibly disarmed the Huks and imprisoned their leaders based on USAFFE guerrilla reports (Kerkvliet, p.112). The leaders, Taruc included, were released several days later due to mass protests (Lachica, p.116). The conditions did not improve and the landlords, many of whom were suspected of collaboration, returned to continue the repressive policies of the pre-war period (Kerkvliet, p.119). A new peasants union was formed, *Pambansang Kaisahan ng mga Magbubukid* (National Peasants Union), or PKM, which was an inheritor of AMT, KPMP, and Hukbalahap to again push for agrarian reforms and peasant rights (Kerkvliet, p.121). The government was unresponsive to the peasants’ demands for reform and made only superficial changes while also doggedly pursuing, harassing and imprisoning Huk veterans. Therefore, according to the peasants, their only alternative was to resist (Kerkvliet, p.143). Again, the lessons learned from the unions and the Hukbalahap were put to good use and the peasants organized and created the *Hukbong Mapagpalaya ng Bayan* (People’s Liberation Army), HMB or Huk for short, again under the leadership of Luis Taruc (Kerkvliet, pp.168-169). Most, but not all, of the Hukbalahap veterans who were also peasants in the unions became Huks. The Huks again set up their regional commands and shadow governments and began their insurgency (Kerkvliet, pp.168-169). The Huks were not supported by the PKP at first, due a seeming difference in communist philosophy. The PKP was more Marxist-Leninist focused while the Huk leadership was
more Maoist focused in their philosophy (Greenberg, p.65). However, by 1948 the Huks enjoyed direct support of the communist party (Kerkvliet, p.188).

a. Counterinsurgency

From 1946 till 1950, the Huks grew in numbers of guerrillas and active supporters. The new independent government was the Huks best recruiter. The new president, Manuel Roxas, decided to use the “mailed fist” approach to crush the insurgency (Lachica, pp.121). The Huks enjoyed such wide support from the peasants that the Constabulary and Army units in the area felt that they were in enemy territory and everyone was the enemy. Those units were so repressive and indiscriminately violent toward the local population that many peasants were literally driven to become Huks as supporters or guerrillas.

In 1948, President Elpidio Quirino (Roxas’ successor) offered the Huks accommodation instead of confrontation (Lachica, p.122). However, the negotiations broke down after two months and the fighting resumed in central Luzon. The Huks conducted raids on military and Constabulary outposts, ambushes on patrols, roadblocks, hijackings, looted banks, kidnapped local government officials and generally harassed government forces as well as dispensed “Huk justice” in the barrios. The support of the local people was the key to the Huks success and persistence during this time (Greenberg, p.46). The Huk insurgency had around 15,000 regulars and 100,000 active supporters at its peak (Greenberg, p.67).

Then in 1950 a congressman who had also been a guerrilla during the occupation was appointed as the Secretary of National Defense. Ramon Magsaysay took office with one condition: that he have a “free hand” in dealing with the insurgency, and began to implement a new strategy. He realized that the insurgency was a symptom of a bigger problem and combined political reforms with military operations to defeat the insurgency. He decided that whatever had hurt him as a guerrilla; he would use to attack the Huks (Greenberg, p.87). Without actually articulating it, Magsaysay conducted counter-resource operations to eliminate the Huks support, counter-infrastructure/infrastructure building to garner the support and legitimacy from the local population, counter-organization to split the leadership of the Huk and PKP organizations, and counter-force to eliminate the guerrillas.
b. Counter-Resource

Cutting off the supplies and support of an insurgency is an important part of the overall counterinsurgency strategy. These resources in terms of money, material, recruits and logistical support can come from the local sources as well as external sources. One of the most important resources of an insurgency is intelligence. Experts often describe the insurgent/counterinsurgent conflict as a battle of intelligence. An insurgency will always have the upper hand in terms of intelligence and the Huks were no exception. Due to widespread support, the Huks’ intelligence network was vast. The Huks knew when, where and approximate duration of government attacks. Consequently, Magsaysay’s first order of business was to gain intelligence on the Huks and discover their order of battle. Therefore, he stated that every military operation had to have three objectives, gain civilian cooperation, get guerrillas and get information (Valeriano, p.141).

The military gained intelligence on the Huks with several different methods. The Armed Forces of the Philippines, or AFP, often enlisted the help of local minorities, which were often victimized by the Huk bands creating animosity, to provide information about the Huks (Greenberg, p.117). The military also used spies with cleverly created cover stories. The military created one informant’s cover story by “arresting” his brother, “deporting” his parents and burning his house. The spy eventually was accepted by the Huk organization and made a collector on the Huk National Finance Committee, which was responsible for supplying the Huks with weapons, ammunition, money, medicine and equipment. He gathered intelligence on the Huk supply networks for two months and reported it to the government. As a result, the government was able to apprehend 1,175 members of the committee and destroy the main Huk supply line (Valeriano, p.177).

Another method for gaining intelligence was Force X and similar units. Force X was a unit that was made of hand-picked soldiers secretly trained for four weeks by “turned” Huks to appear as Huks and act as a Huk squadron from a distant area. Force X was then infiltrated into a Huk zone under cover of a staged mock battle with a military unit. Force X then linked up with two other Huk squadrons and for four days interacted with the Huks. The cover story of being from a different region allowed the “pseudo
“Huks” to question the real Huks on operations, supply systems, command structure, supporters, leaders and other intelligence requirements. Then after four days of intelligence gathering, Force X received military reinforcements and attacked and decimated the other Huk squadrons. Two real Huk squadrons were deactivated as a result of the attack (Valeriano, pp.143-147). An additional result was the distrust and confusion created among the Huk squadrons long afterward. Two Huk squadrons attacked each other three weeks after the Force X incident, each fearing the other was a Force X unit (Greenberg, p.73).

The military further countered the Huks’ intelligence system by overloading it. The military saturated Huk regional areas with numerous patrols resulting in the Huks’ inability to evade the government forces, which were seemingly everywhere (Valeriano, p.130-131). Another counter resource technique for gaining intelligence was to stage elaborate torture or execution scenarios for particularly hard-core Huk supporters. These fake scenarios generally caused Huk supports to give information about the guerrillas to the military out of shock and fear (Greenberg, p.127).

The military conducted other counter resource operations as well during the counterinsurgency. Disguised mobile checkpoints on lonely, rural routes were found to be very effective. Huk supply couriers did not know which route was safe and could not turn back until too late, which resulted in the arrest of several important Huk leaders and capture of supply shipments (Valeriano, p.169). The military also eliminated Huk production bases used to grow their own food. The military would identify these bases thru aerial surveillance and intelligence reports, wait until harvest time, and then destroy the bases. By waiting until harvest time, the military ensured Huk forces would be occupied guarding and tending the base then denying the Huk the needed food (Greenberg, pp.130-131). Additionally, the AFP planted altered ammunition in Huk supply channels and weapons caches. This altered ammunition destroyed the weapon when fired and caused distrust in the supply channels and armaments (Valeriano, p.136).

c. Counter-Organization

Fragmenting the organization of an insurgency is also an important part of the overall counterinsurgency strategy. The cohesiveness of the organization and its ability to operate effectively can be reduced dramatically. The link between the supporter
and the guerrilla can also be attacked and severed, which not only eliminates the
guerrilla’s resources but also destabilizes the entire insurgency organization. Counter
organization operations are any operations that degrade the organization by creating
distrust or enmity between the elements of the organization, such as between the rank and
file members and the leadership, or the guerrillas and their supporters or between the
actual fighting units from different areas. Psychological operations can be an extremely
effective technique in counter-organization.

Magsaysay was often his own best counter-organization agent. His
honesty, complete dedication and sincere desire to help all Filipinos and improve the
government actually turned several Huk leaders to the government’s side. On one
occasion, a Huk leader, Tarciano Rizal, arrived in Manila to assassinate Magsaysay.
After hearing reports of Magsaysay’s honesty, Rizal requested a meeting with the
Secretary and was convinced of Magsaysay’s sincerity. He then began helping
Magsaysay with PKP organizational information. Due to Rizal’s information, the army
and police conducted 22 simultaneous raids in Manila on 18 October 1950, capturing the
leaders of the communist party. This operation demoralized the entire insurgency and
also deprived the Huks of their urban apparatus and Manila support base (Lachica,
p.131).

Counter-organization operations can be aimed at the local officials and
political supporters of the insurgency by placing them a compromising position. A mayor
in one barrio was a notorious Huk supporter as well as an influential politician. For four
years, the AFP commander in that area tried to neutralize the mayor who made his town a
safe haven for the Huks. After one confrontation about Huk activity in the town, the
commander took the mayor to side and had a private conversation with him. Two days
later the commander returned to the town with dead Huks in the bed of a truck and
publicly thanked the mayor for his cooperation and information. Later that night, the
mayor and his family and belongings arrived at the commander’s location requesting
protection in exchange for all his information (Valeriano, p.51-52).

Other counter organization operations targeted the Huk leadership.
Rewards for information leading to the capture of Huk leaders were used throughout the
counterinsurgency campaign (Greenberg, p.120). Magsaysay authorized a $50,000
bounty for Luis Taruc and higher bounties for other Huk leaders creating dissention among the different Huk groups as to why their leader’s price was less than other leaders (Greenberg, p. 121). Additionally, the military publicly thanked several “informers” in Huk units creating distrust and apprehension as to whom else was an informer (Greenberg, p.122). Furthermore, some operations can serve more than one purpose. Force X is an excellent example of both a counter resource by gaining intelligence and counter force as well as a counter organization operation. Force X created distrust between Huk units from different areas and captured several Huk leaders degrading the organization.

d. Counter-Infrastructure

Building a social, political as well as physical infrastructure that provides for and protects the population is another important part of the overall counterinsurgency strategy. The degree to which the government builds the infrastructure is the degree to which the government counters the insurgents’ infrastructure. Therefore, the government should not conduct operations to specifically counter one element of the insurgents’ infrastructure, but rather the government should conduct operations that expand its influence, provide security and bind the population to the government.

Magsaysay realized that the government had to win the support of the population. To win that support, he had to build infrastructure to expand government influence and bind the population to the government. Therefore, he used the military to build schools and roads, defend civilians in civil courts, and sponsor resettlement projects (Valeriano, p.80). The Economic Development Corps, or EDCOR, was the most successful counter infrastructure operation conducted by the Philippine government. EDCOR took captured or surrendered guerrillas after an intelligence screening, along with a few retired soldiers, and resettled them onto government land in a different area in Mindinao or Luzon. The participants were given title to a section of land, re-educated about peaceful existence in society and advice and education on what to grow in the region. The participants raised homes, cleared the land (with army help) and received free transportation, schooling, medical care, electricity, clean water, and other basic needs. In exchange, the new tenants promised to farm the land, repay start-up costs, accept advice from the Department of Agriculture, and not institute insurgency (Greenberg, p. 89-90).
This operation bound the people to the government and legitimized the government in the guerrillas’ eyes. This operation also took away the main insurgent complaint and biggest rallying cry, “Land for the Landless” against the government.

Magsaysay also encouraged military commanders to form civilian commando units comprised of local volunteers, led by Army NCOs and used to protect their barrios from the Huks (Greenberg, p.134). These units allowed more government forces to available for anti-Huk operations by relieving them from stationary defense duties. Additionally, Magsaysay used the military to ensure that the 1951 elections were free and honest, another major Huk complaint. He even welcomed other outside agencies to be poll watchers and ensure the honesty of the elections. The result was reaffirmed faith in the democratic process and institutions from virtual every Filipino, which was the death toll for the Huk insurgency (Valeriano, p.239-240).

To continue furthering the government’s new promise to protect and assist the population, Magsaysay drastically changed the behavior and attitudes of the armed forces. Before his tenure as the Secretary of National Defense, soldiers viewed all civilians in the area as Huk supporters, treated them with contempt and took what was needed without repayment. However, through Magsaysay’s aggressive leadership and constant inspections, the soldier began to protect his fellow countrymen and became a symbol of good government (Greenberg, pp.107-108). Magsaysay also insisted that whenever possible troops should actually improve the living conditions of the population, and conduct civic action programs (Valeriano, p.216). The military also helped build schools and wells as well as improve and repair transportation and communication networks (Greenberg, p.147). Furthermore, the government began to invest in rural projects to benefit the population. These projects included agricultural extension services, agrarian courts to hear landlord/tenant disagreements, health clinics, bridges, irrigation canals, and cash credit for peasants (Kerkvliet, p.239). The Philippine government became a moral, legitimate government deserving Filipino support.

e. Counter-Force

Destroying the insurgent guerrilla forces is the final important part of the overall counterinsurgency strategy. In most cases, the hard-core guerrilla must be hunted down and eliminated to remove any lingering threat to the government. Government
forces must ruthlessly pursue the guerrilla by any means allowing him no safe havens and no time to regroup to plan future operations without losing track of the obligations to the population. The military must be able to act rapidly to intelligence reports on the guerrillas’ situation and exploit his weaknesses. They must force the guerrilla to fight at times and places he does not choose and beat him when he does fight (Valeriano p.28-29). However, government forces must realize that in every operation, either side can use propaganda and act accordingly.

The military conducted itself similar to an occupation army, rarely searching actively for the Huks until Magsaysay became the Secretary of National Defense. Army patrols returned to base before night stayed on or near roads and made contact at the discretion of the Huks (Greenberg, pp.82-83 & 116). Once Magsaysay was Secretary, he implemented changes in the military. He emphasized the use of small unit operations and tactics and patrolling as the way to maintain pressure and force on the Huks (Valeriano, p.129-130). He also began to pursue the Huks into areas nominally considered their safe havens. After the ambush and assassination of the former president Manuel Quezon’s wife, Dona, and her party, the military conducted a four-month campaign to eliminate those responsible for the attack. The operation was composed of three task forces that attacked Huk camps, ambushed retreating Huk units and cut off supplies to the Huks in an unexplored section of the Sierra Madres Mountains. Huk losses were 146 killed, 40 captured. The AFP destroyed the entire Huk Regional Command 1 by the end of the campaign (Valeriano pp.117-120).

Force X is also an excellent example of counter-force operations. Force X infiltrated a safe haven and eliminated two Huk squadrons. Additionally, the military concealed troops in covered trucks and made “deliveries” throughout the area. When the Huks attempted to rob the driver, he was happy to give the Huks what was in the back of the truck and left the dead insurgents by the road. Civilian vehicle hijackings came to a virtual stop after several similar incidents (Greenberg, p.121). Throughout the insurgency, the Army was successful because they doggedly pursued the Huks at every opportunity even into the centers their former bastions (Greenberg, p.136).

\[f. \quad \text{Trust}\]
Magsaysay realized that to maximize the effectiveness of his counterinsurgency strategy, he had to win the support and trust of the population. He did this by changing the soldier’s attitude and behavior towards the population. He fired corrupt officers on the spot to improve the military’s effectiveness and attitudes towards the population (Greenberg, p.81-83). He also went to the barrios on visits and talked to the people and informed them on the new policies of the government and to contact him with any complaints (Greenberg, p.86). Magsaysay then made sure that those with legitimate grievances could contact him by telegraph for five cents and he would respond within twenty-four hours and initiate an investigation, which he honored (Valeriano p.106). Magsaysay even conducted continual spot checks on all units in the field to ensure compliance with the new policies (Valeriano, p.207). All of these actions convinced the population that the government was improving and began to foster the population’s trust and support. He understood that the local populace was able to trust the government based on its improved reputation and the performance of its representatives, the AFP, as well as its overall appearance (Denning, Seminar Notes). He forced the government and its representatives to be more accountable to the people, and re-evaluated the overall situation. He was able to raise the expectations of the populace by increasing the military’s capability, integrity, and benevolent actions.

2. Conclusion

Magsaysay also realized that psychological and information warfare was extremely important in every aspect of a counterinsurgency. Every operation, every patrol, every enemy encounter and every civilian encounter was a psychological operation. His policy was that every mission must have three objectives: gain civilian cooperation, gain intelligence and get guerrillas (Valeriano, p.141). He further articulated this idea by stating that every soldier is a psychological warrior as well and has three missions: operations, intelligence, and public relations (Valeriano, p.220).

Counterinsurgency is a circular and iterative process. As the government establishes infrastructure, it gains the population’s support, which garners more resources for the government, which allows more operations to be conducted to fragment the organization and kill guerrillas. Some situations may require that one or another part of the strategy is used first. However, the parts of the strategy are interdependent and create
a compounded result. Magsaysay knew that a counterinsurgency strategy must be holistic in its approach and engage the population as well as kill the guerrilla. He followed a strategy that countered resources, countered the organization, built infrastructure and killed guerrillas. This resulted in the Huks’ defeat.

C. THE MALAYAN EMERGENCY

1. Background

The roots of the Malayan Emergency were in anti-colonial movements from the 1920’s that were slowly influenced by members of the Chinese Communist Party and Comintern agents. As most colonial historians note, the relative unfairness of imperialist systems allowed the breeding of anti-colonial movements that were inspired by the example of communism’s successful governmental usurpation in Russia. In Malaya, however, most of these movements were small scale in nature and largely unsuccessful due to the relative prosperity of the populations of Malaya and Singapore in comparison to that of neighboring South East Asian nations. O’Ballance notes that Comintern agents reported, “… the Malays in Malaya and Singapore under British rule were hopelessly contented with their lot. They therefore recommended that it would be more profitable to establish Communism amongst the resident Chinese population instead of bothering with the Malays” (O’Ballance, p.21). The majority of the Chinese population in Malaya saw themselves as transient workers from China whose original intention had been to gather wealth and return to their homeland. They felt disenfranchised by their subordinate position in Malayan society and were ripe for exploitation by the Comintern. The unassimilated ethnic Chinese made up about 38 percent of the Malayan population, but were not well represented in terms of government position. The Malayan Communist Party, or MCP, was organized in 1930, with the assistance of the Vietnamese communist leader Nguyen Ai Quoc (Ho Chi Minh). A parallel labor union was formed at the same time, known as the Malayan General Labor Union, or MGLU. The MCP/ MGLU “tested the waters” in the form of a large strike at the Batu Arang coal mine in 1935, but this strike was quickly put down, and the MCP was forced to proceed more cautiously. The organization became fractured over internal frictions, and the Comintern sent an agent by the name of Lai Tek to assist the organization. Lai Tek helped to restructure the MCP
into a strong cellular group and was eventually elected as the Secretary-General. The MCP remained a primarily ethnically Chinese organization that gained influence in the Chinese population as the Japanese expanded its reach throughout Asia in the late 30’s. As the threat of Japanese occupation increased, the MCP offered its cellular organization to the British government for potential stay-behind operations. The MCP recognized the opportunity to gain British support and resources while preparing for an eventual governmental overthrow. When the Japanese invaded in 1941, the British used the MCP as the core element in the creation of the Malayan People’s Anti-Japanese Army, or MPAJA. As the war progressed, the MCP began to hone its skills as guerillas and increased its methods of developing popular support. The MPAJA’s limited success against the Japanese led to harsher treatment towards the Chinese populace, causing many of them to move and create squatter sites. The US and UK recognized the MPAJA as the only effective subversive unit in occupied Malaya and in 1944, began supplying them with weapons and ammunition which the MCP promptly cached and reported as lost or having never landed on target. The MCP recognized that “… the issue of Japan’s defeat would be decided in other theaters of war, and that it could best serve its long-term interests by husbanding its strength for the power struggle which would inevitably follow the Japanese surrender” (Komer, p. 4). The British sought to avoid this conflict by absorbing the MPAJA into the regular units following Japanese capitulation, and then disbanding the MPAJA. The British bought back weapons and equipment from the MCP and officially recognized it as a legitimate political party. The MCP switched back to agitating labor unions to strike and eventually moved to terrorist tactics from 1945-1948, causing them to be outlawed again in 1948. The MCP had set up jungle bases, developed both a guerilla force and shadow government, and had created logistical support infrastructures amongst the displaced fringe dwelling squatters, as well as the Chinese merchants. The colonial government of Malaya was weak and unstable following WWII and was vulnerable to insurgency as it prepared for full independence from Britain.

a. Counterinsurgency

Initial British response to the emerging insurgency was confused and half-hearted, as they misunderstood the reasons behind the growing violence. As the MCP’s strength reached its peak in 1948, the government began creating a strategy based on its
own strengths, the realities of its available resources, and those of its enemy. The
government needed a long-term, low-cost, sustainable strategy involving the full
complement of national powers while utilizing small police, paramilitary, and military
forces that would need to grow larger and develop alternate methods of operation. In
1948, the guerrilla arm of the MCP known as the Malayan Races Liberation Army, or
MRLA, numbered 12,000, while the Malayan government could only field a combined
force of 16,000 police and regular combatants in Malaya. The MCP believed they could
create a mass uprising and take power. When this did not occur, they prepared for a
long-term insurgency. The government declared a state of emergency in June of 1948,
and made several initial mistakes, including underestimating the overall strength of their
enemy and its support base. However, in 1950 a new strategy known as the Briggs Plan
was instituted and led to the eventual defeat of the MCP/ MRLA. Lieutenant General Sir
Harold Briggs had successful counterinsurgency experience in Burma prior to his
retirement from military duty. He was considered a civilian, and therefore could be
placed in charge as Director of Operations in the Malaya Emergency. He directed a
series of programs aimed at countering all the insurgency’s aspects. There were four
tenets to the plan: Separate the guerrillas from the people; formalize and strengthen the
counter insurgency management system; strengthen intelligence as the key to anti-
guerilla operations; and deploy the security forces on a primarily territorial basis.

b. Counter-Resource

The MCP was already cut off from sources of external international
support. Under Briggs’ program of separating the guerillas from the people, nearly
500,000 Chinese squatters were resettled in new villages where they could be protected,
supervised, and better provided for. By doing this, the government took away the
remaining resource structure afforded to the insurgents. They could not turn to the ethnic
Malayan population for support, and ended up putting too much strain on the remaining
squatters. They had to resort to forceful means of gathering resources that only lessened
the willingness on the part of the squatters to continue to resource the MCP. One highly
successful tactic was food and medicine denial programs, which forced desperate
guerillas out of hiding as their resources dwindled.
c. Counter-Organization

The tenet of strengthening intelligence as the key to anti-guerilla operations proved vital in countering the organization. By gathering accurate intelligence on the insurgents through the Police Special Branch, the government was able to conduct psychological operations that fragmented the organization. Key leaders were identified and tracked or convinced to defect through the use of government-imposed registration, travel control, curfews, and ID card checks. Because the MRLA began suffering consistent defeats, and their available pool of potential recruits was diminished by the resettlement policy, they were forced to recruit from within the auxiliary. This forced the organization to shift and caused members to serve multiple functions or have gaps in the hierarchy. Additionally, the government was not as susceptible to corruption as most newly emerging post-colonial governments tended to be. This made it difficult for the shadow government to de-legitimize the existing government in the eyes of any community beyond the squatter camps, or project their own legitimacy and authority beyond them.

d. Counter-Infrastructure

One of Malaya’s greatest strengths lay in the capabilities of its colonial government to plan and enforce the development of its infrastructure. The degree to which the government builds the infrastructure is the degree to which the government counters the insurgents’ infrastructure. As stated earlier, the government itself was relatively strong in terms of its organization, and was already somewhat quasi-autonomous with regards to British oversight, and moved steadily toward self-government and independence. It was able resist attempts to destabilize government plans for economic and structural development because it possessed as Komer describes, “a well-organized territorial machinery with long tradition” (p.12). The requirement to formalize and strengthen the counter insurgency management system would have been a formidable task for any emerging government, particular one facing financial crises following WWII. However, the government was able to maintain continuity in its day-to-day administrative tasks and continue modernization practices. In fact, the counter insurgency campaign may have helped accelerate economic and social growth.
e. **Counter-Force**

Briggs’ plan to deploy the security forces on a primarily territorial basis was focused on the police and paramilitary actions as opposed to the military. Briggs understood the critical link between the populace and the government’s representatives, as well as their need for a sense of long-term sustainable and habitually associated force presence that was fair and even-handed in its dealings. The police, constabulary, village home guards, and militia were larger than the military, and military operations were always carried out in conjunction and coordination with police operations. All military operations were conducted by assigning a brigade to each state and a company for each district so that small-unit operations were executed instead of large-scale troop sweeps that would have required greater coordination and more complex modes of communication. Operations were initially defensive in nature until the police, paramilitary, and military forces could be grown to a size large enough to maintain local security and detach elements for other operations. Offensive operations began in 1952, and progressively increased to coincide with increased resettlement.

f. **Trust**

Information operations were designed to keep the public fully informed of the nature of the operations to be conducted, as well as the current activities of the government and the status of progression towards self-government. All information operations were conducted under a rule of law that spelled out what the security forces could and could not do. These operations combined with the sensitivity shown by the indigenous police forces that integrated greater numbers of ethnic Chinese with each recruiting iteration demonstrated a growth in the trust linkages between the government and the disaffected populace. As these linkages were strengthened, the populace in turn developed a greater sense of security and increased disillusionment with the insurgents, which led to further intelligence sources, and further effective fragmentation of the insurgent organizations.

2. **Conclusion**

Admittedly, the Malaya Emergency was conducted within a series of constraints upon the insurgents (lack of external support, ethnic minorities that could be isolated in a multiethnic society, etc.). However, the colonial government forces were also faced with
severe constraints in the form of near-financial bankruptcy following WWII, and an initial lack of realization as to the nature of the insurgency. Fortunately, the Malayan counter insurgency strategy involved government representation, police, military, psychological and information warfare in concert. The overall effect was not militarily driven, but instead developed an adaptive sustainment strategy with emphasis on habitual association with the populace and an adherence to a responsible rule of law.
IV. FAILED AND INCOMPLETE ATTEMPTS

A. THE US AND VIETNAM

1. Background

The American involvement in Vietnam became significant after the French withdrawal in the early 1950’s. In 1954 Colonel Edward Lansdale was assigned to the Vietnam country team to do for Vietnam what he did for the Philippines during the Huk insurgency (Lansdale, p.127). The head of state and former emperor, Boa Dai, appointed Ngo dinh Diem as the new Prime Minister in June 1954 (Lansdale, p.154). The government of South Vietnam had already taken some steps in creating a democratically elected government and Diem continued those steps. Diem even held an election between him and Boa Dai to determine the new head of state (Lansdale, pp.333-334). However, in 1956 he undid all the progressive steps by prohibiting the traditional village elections, and instead appointed village chiefs loyal to him (Cable, p.185).

The US Government constantly tried to find or create a strong leader to make reforms --a Magsaysay for Vietnam-- and put its faith in Diem. However, Diem continued to appoint government officials, ministers and promote officers loyal to him without any regard for the appointees’ capabilities. Diem’s favoritism created government corruption, inefficiency and fostered weak military leadership that was unable to deal with the insurgency or the overt threat of North Vietnam. Diem’s brother, Nhu, headed a secret intelligence organization that created a political party to support Diem and used midnight arrests and repression to suppress any political opposition group (Lansdale, pp.340-343). These practices led to a military coup supported by the US in 1963 that resulted in the death of Diem and his brother. The succeeding governments exacerbated the problems of corruption and inefficiency by appointing loyal followers to that government’s positions. Due to these recurring problems, several coups and new governments were launched throughout the war creating instability in the country (Shafer, p.270).

The US began providing military advice and assistance to the Vietnamese Army in 1955. American country team trained and organized the Vietnamese military along the American lines with the focus on big units that could resist aggression from North
Vietnam (Krepinevich, p. 23). US military advisors were introduced in 1959 with a buildup of American support and strength from 1961 to 1964. The communist insurgency also built up during this time with little help from the North. The Vietnamese Army continually failed in its efforts to combat the insurgency while the American military focused simply on destroying guerrilla units with large-scale operations (Krepinevich, p. 56). By 1965, The Vietnamese Army continued to deteriorate while the insurgents continued to grow and began getting more forces and supplies from North Vietnam (Krepinevich, p.131). The American military felt it was time to eliminate the imposed restrictions, and General William Westmoreland requested 44 battalions of ground troops for South Vietnam.

a. **Counterinsurgency**

The American military rejected a counterinsurgency strategy in favor of a strategy of more firepower and what it termed increased mobility by helicopters, an innovation that would not win the war, that fit within its organizational concept of war (Krepinevich, pp.170-171). With the exception of a few units, the military did not focus on actually countering the insurgency; instead it concentrated on defeating large Viet Cong units. However as Larry Cable noted, superior firepower and technology do not necessarily foster the capability to counter insurgents (Cable, p.282). As a consequence, the military fought in South Vietnam from 1965 till its departure in 1972 following a conventional, large-unit strategy of attrition against an enemy that followed a small-unit strategy of insurgency.

b. **Counter-Resource**

The US military attempted to conduct a semblance of counter-resource action according to its attrition strategy. The US military focused on the Viet Cong’s large units as the sources of supply for local guerrillas and conducted search and destroy missions to interdict the support (Krepinevich, p.168). Additionally, the US was convinced that North Vietnam was supplying the guerrillas and directed its counter resource efforts towards interdicting the supply lines from the North with air power (Cable, pp.216-218). The military mistakenly assumed that the insurgency was supplied externally. However, the entire insurgency received only twelve tons of supplies per day from external sources (Krepinevich, p. 168). Therefore, the guerrillas received the
majority of support from the local population. By ignoring that resource base and not countering the insurgents’ resource collection, the military not only gave the insurgents the ability to continually resupply their forces but also the ability to grow the organization to replace the government.

The strategic hamlet program was an attempt by the Saigon government to conduct counter resource operations. The program resettled peasants into villages constructed by the government in order to separate the population from the insurgents. The program failed for several reasons including government corruption and inefficiency, lack of an integrated national plan within governmental capabilities, lack of sustainment for constructed hamlets, inability to achieve security and lack of actual reforms (Shafer, pp.266-267). The Saigon government falsified data on the condition of the fortifications of the hamlets (Krepinevich, p.68). As a result, only a small number of hamlets were viable and the guerrillas were still able to maintain continuous contact with the population. The insurgents were never actually separated from their resource base.

Additionally, the military’s intelligence efforts were inadequate. The South Vietnamese Army intelligence apparatus was not only fractured by Nhu’s agents, but also did not fulfill the actual intelligence needs in a counterinsurgency (Cable, p.194-195). The Army also focused its intelligence efforts on the enemy’s big units and ignored the Viet Cong’s modus operandi (Krepinevich, p.229). The military failed to effectively counter the insurgents’ intelligence, probably the most important resource in a counterinsurgency, and ignored and alienated a vital source of intelligence, the population, with its attrition strategy.

**d. Counter-Organization**

The military only conducted one operation designed to fracture the insurgent organization, which was the controversial Phoenix program. The Phoenix program was intended to eliminate Viet Cong cadre, and saw limited success due to a weakened insurgent organization from the Tet Offensive (DeGroot, pp.216-218). However, the program was largely ineffective and plagued by government corruption, insurgent infiltration and ineffective leadership (Krepinevich, p.228). Furthermore, the RVN army made limited use of rewards for Viet Cong cadres. The RVN army was also plagued by corruption, and made only cursory attempts at using psychological operations
to create mistrust between the cadre and the guerrillas or between the guerrillas and the population. By not degrading or fracturing the insurgent organization, the military not only allowed the insurgent organization to grow stronger and more entrenched with the population, it also allowed the organization to grow an experienced leadership core.

e. Counter-Infrastructure

Two military units conducted pacification programs and other counter infrastructure operations in South Vietnam. These were the Special Forces A-Teams working with the CIA from 1961 till 1963, and the Marines’ Combined Action Platoons, or CAPs. The Special Forces A-Teams, or ODAs, worked with the tribal groups in the interior of the country. The ODAs worked side by side with the population and provided fortifications, shelters, medical care, population security and other forms of assistance and infrastructure development. The ODAs’ successful expansion eventually recovered and secured several hundred villages and the Darlac Province (Krepinevich, p.70-71). However, at their height, the ODAs were reverted to Army control, turning the camps over to the South Vietnamese and used as small mobile strike units behind enemy lines to support conventional operations (Krepinevich, p.74). The pacification program collapsed and an ineffective attempt at border surveillance and interdiction were the result (Krepinevich, p.75).

The Marine CAPs also enjoyed some success. The CAPs consisted of a 15-man Marine force and a 34-man Popular Force unit in each hamlet. This CAP concentrated on destruction of insurgent infrastructure and building government infrastructure, organizing intelligence nets and training the PF units. The units were so successful that their number grew to 79 units in the I Corps area (Krepinevich, p.173). However, the US Army disapproved of the CAP program, saying the program did not fit the Army’s concept; it was not offensive and did not go after the Viet Cong (Krepinevich, p.175). Consequently, the Army never adopted the program and repeatedly tried to persuade the Marines to fall in line with Army thinking.

Diem also contributed to the lack of infrastructure development by blocking all social and political reforms proposed to improve the government, degrading the military command and politicizing the bureaucracy (Shafer, p.249). The many coups over the years, which compounded the problem leading to government inefficiency and
instability, were the result of Diem’s mal-practices (Shafer, p.270). The unstable government was unable to have effective government agencies in the villages and hamlets, which allowed the Viet Cong to be the only government that existed operating its own agencies (Taber, p.92). Additionally, the corrupt and inefficient government failed to bind the population to the government with shared values (Shafer, p.259).

**f. Counter-Force**

The American military focused primarily on a strategy of large units fighting large units. The American military’s idea was to conduct offensive operations to destroy enemy units (Krepinevich, p.67). In the Army’s concept, these large units were used for search and destroy missions to kill the Viet Cong with massive amounts of firepower that alienated the population (Krepinevich, p.198). In fact, the military actually rejected the idea of small unit operations (Krepinevich, p.166). The US Army in favor of large unit operations rejected those operations that were deemed as essential by Magsaysay, Pershing and the British. The Army’s attempt at counter force was ineffective. The American concept of relying on technology and superior firepower failed to counter the guerrilla forces (Krepinevich, p.166). However, small unit patrols, easily reinforced by helicopters or close air support, saturating an area in order to harass the enemy are the most effective counter force operations.

**g. Trust**

Every action and operation conducted by the military created an environment of distrust and non-support among the population. Large unit conventional sweeps with massive amounts of firepower that created numerous refugees who were not taken care of by their government alienated the population (Krepinevich, p.225-226). The airmobile tactics used by the Army to arrive at and depart from the battle without actually engaging the population further contributed to the population’s distrust (Krepinevich, p.167). Additionally, the military made only half-hearted attempts at using psychological operations to win the population’s trust and support. Finally, the Army did not have a sustainment program for pacified areas. The military moved in, pacified an area for a few months and then left placing the population in the same predicament as before. The Viet Cong had a saying “the government is temporary, but we are here forever”. Consequently, the population did not and could not afford to trust the Army and offered
only limited support. A counterinsurgency strategy is effective only with the trust and support of the population.

2. Conclusion

The Army entered the Vietnam War with a preconceived concept on how to wage war. That concept was an outgrowth organizational learning fostered in other conflicts and lead to a strategy of attrition (Krepinevich, p.196). The Army conducted conventional, large unit operations with superior technology, massive amounts of firepower and airmobile assets to find, fix, fight, and finish Viet Cong units, supported by North Vietnam, that were viewed as the source of the problems in South Vietnam. The US Army never stopped to consider whether or not its strategy was the right strategy for this war. The Army rejected conducting a counterinsurgency strategy and instead attempted to fit its strategy to a counterinsurgency environment. The Army did make some attempts at conducting elements of a counterinsurgency strategy and two units in particular had notable success, but that was outside the US Army’s concept and therefore not acceptable. Furthermore, the US Army’s attempts at conducting elements of counterinsurgency lacked any sustainment commitment and alienated the population as well as providing the Viet Cong an excellent recruiting tool. The counterinsurgency strategy must comprehensively conduct counter-resource, counter-organization, counter-infrastructure and counter-force operations that are interdependent and create a compounded result while gaining the trust and support of the population.

B. 10th INFANTRY BATTALION, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES VERSUS THE ABU SAYYAF GROUP: AN ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGN PERSPECTIVE

1. Background

In this section, a current terrorist threat existing within the Philippines will be examined along with the COIN applications assigned to the threat. Organizational theory can help identify aspects relevant to COIN application and help determine whether the organization used in the conduct of COIN operations is the proper design for the nature of the threat. The organization to be studied is the 10th Infantry Battalion of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and its subordinate commands, which were involved in counterinsurgency operations against the Abu Sayyaf Group, or ASG, on the island of
Basilan in the southern Philippines during the time period of January 2002 through August 2002. The ASG is a radical group of Islamic extremists formed in the early 1990’s from members of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front, or MILF. When the Moro National Liberation Front, or MNLF, began peace negotiations with the Government of the Philippines, the ASG split off along with the MILF to continue their battle to form an independent Islamic free state in the southern islands of the Philippine Archipelago. In the late 1990’s, the MILF also began peace negotiations with the Government of the Philippines, leaving the ASG as the remaining major active Islamic insurgent group in the Southern Philippines. The ASG used the island of Basilan as their primary base of support. The ASG was responsible for numerous kidnappings, murders, and acts of terror against both Christian and Muslim communities. In June 2000, the 10th IB was deployed to Basilan in order to assist in the attempt to restore order to the province of Basilan. The 10th IB is a light (dismounted) infantry battalion, and has an authorized strength of 462 soldiers, but had only 243 soldiers on hand at any given day during their operations on Basilan. The 10th IB was 50 years old, and was originally assigned to protect southern areas of the main island of Luzon. The mission of 10th IB was to establish a forward military presence on Basilan and act as a base of operations in order to destroy ASG operations within the area of the Lantawan Sub-Province, and restore a sense of security to the local populace. The 10th IB has no published vision. However, the motto for the 10th IB is “Steady On.” The motto for their parent organization (the 1st Brigade) is “Even our best might not be good enough!” The Battalion Commander of the 10th IB in June 2000 directly affected the everyday actions of the unit. The 10th IB was his first battalion command, and all of his previous experience was as an officer in the AFP’s only armor brigade. The battalion commander was a Christian, but had received extensive training and education in Islam. He has extensive contacts within the military, business, and political realms. He received his military education from the Philippine Military Academy, as well as United States military training schools, such as the US Army Armor Officers Advanced Course. As of August 2002, the 10th IB had been operating on Basilan for 2 years. They had 3 separate incidents of fratricide with other Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) units.
a. Counterinsurgency

Stakeholders are loosely defined as anyone with an interest in the success or failure of an organization. Following this description, we see a large number of stakeholders for the 10th IB. They include everyone from the soldiers of the 10th IB themselves, to the governments of the US and Philippines. However, the critical stakeholders have been identified in the following paragraphs.

The local populace of the Lantawan area: without the continued military presence, the ASG is given free reign to conduct extortion and terror operations within the area. The Lantawan area provides numerous ports, harbors, and resources for resupply. It is also has the largest number of Christian barangays, or individual townships, on the island of Basilan.

The government of the Basilan Province: the provincial governor was a former member of the MILF, MNLF, and had links to the ASG. Funding from the Government of the Philippines was constantly given to the Province for infrastructure development. Further funding was dependent upon the curtailment of hostile activities on the island.

Members of the 10th IB: the soldiers of this organization and their families are directly affected by day-to-day operations within this organization. As more inductees are added to the force structure, the level of attachment to events on the island becomes greater.

Government of the Philippines: the federal government has a large stake in the success of the units stationed on and around Basilan. Increased global perceptions of the Philippines as unsafe for tourists (due to kidnappings and killings), as well as possessing an unstable government have led to increased destabilization of the economy. The US guarantees further financial and material support as long as cooperation continues in order to improve their military forces, as well as increase their counterterrorist efforts.

The United States: US military strategy seeks to continue engagement with Asian nations with large Muslim populations. The Philippines can be used as a model for support for other nations, as well as provide as staging base for other operations.
b. **Counter-Resource**

The island of Basilan lies very near the equator, and is part of a chain of islands formed by volcanic activity. The terrain consists of coastal swamps, hilly plateaus, with a mountainous interior. The vegetation is dense within the swamps (mangrove and reed), well cultivated on the plateaus (coconut, rubber, and fruit plantations), and extremely dense in the interior (triple-canopy jungle). Although the island has an established infrastructure, there are many portions that are inaccessible to vehicles. However, all *baranguays* within the Lantawan province are accessible by boat or ground vehicle. Most of the *baranguays* and outlying homes are constructed of bamboo, coconut, or teak wood, with palm frond roofs. Major administrative centers (schools, churches, mosques, etc.) are built of concrete. Generally, the geographical environment is somewhat simple and stable due to the relative predictability of the areas encountered. Planning for missions can easily predict locations of population centers, movement corridors, and possible resources. The technological environment is also relatively simple and stable, although the creation of running water sources, cell phone networks, and electrical power generation increased the environmental complexity; the area was still not completely dependent upon them. In relation to the weapons used, there was a significant increase in the number of serviceable and accurate weapons, as well as training with the weapons and tactics associated with them. However, this was merely an improvement upon an existing platform. 10th IB human resource issues were complex as people were constantly assigned to other places for schools, supporting missions, desertion, promotion, etc. But they were also stable since they could be easily predicted. Financial resources were complex due to the regulations governing how money was to be spent and from what source, yet once again it was easy to predict and therefore stable. Government strategies were complex in their desires to please all personnel concerned, yet they were clearly defined and easy to predict. Hostility towards these policies generally was directed at the government, and not at the 10th IB. There was a minimal amount of equivocality—confusion and lack of understanding (Burton & Obel, 1998, p. 175) associated with these environmental sectors since there was little to no confusion or lack of understanding over the geographical settings, technology in use, resources, or government.
c. **Counter-Organization**

As discussed earlier, the training for personnel within the ground units (the operational core) is based around an incremental model that develops abilities from individual skills to small unit tactics. The training includes new equipment familiarization and skill identification for special roles (radio operators, mechanics, etc.). This training also includes leadership training that encourages development of proactive NCOs and junior officers. This training is based on US military models, and is overseen by a “training cadre” recently developed by the battalion staff. The cadre evaluates training based on Periods of Instruction, or POI, given to them by US Special Forces in April 2002. Prior to the introduction of the POIs, there was no formalized training regimen for the subordinate ground units.

The middle-line managers fall in the positions of the platoon leaders and company commanders. All these officers receive basic officer training in Infantry tactics and leadership. Due to the current AFP structure, first lieutenants are normally company commanders, with second lieutenants serving as platoon leaders. The only specialized training they receive is in the AFP Commando Course. This course is voluntary and is equivalent to the US Army’s Ranger School.

The staff is populated with captains or senior first lieutenants, and fills the roles of support and strategic apex. They are not given any particular training if they switch roles to fill staff positions, with the exception of the S-2 position. Intelligence officers (the S-2 section) receive formalized training on Luzon, but the NCOs do not. Intelligence assets do not receive any formalized training or certification. They are paid on an information-provided basis, depending on the veracity of their information.

d. **Counter-Infrastructure**

Diversity refers to the different types of products or services that an organization provides. In the case of the 10th IB, it refers to the different missions and work to be accomplished. Mintzberg suggests that the diversity of the work “most strongly affects the choice of bases for grouping the units, as well as behavior formalization and the use of liaison devices” (1993, p.123). The 10th IB’s mission is twofold: to destroy ASG operations within the area of the Lantawan Sub-Province, and to restore a sense of security to the local populace. The mission is very limited in its
primary activity: to destroy ASG operations within the area of the Lantawan Sub-Province. In order for the unit to accomplish this mission, they must rely on accurate intelligence, and the ability to react quickly in a dynamic and hostile environment.

The mission is broad in scope in its secondary function: to restore a sense of security to the local populace. This is where the greatest level of diversity occurs. An entire subset of missions was created as a result of this intent. The unit was required to provide security for elections in the province, run patrols through highly populated areas, conduct medical operations within local baranguays without showing favoritism, create a psychological operations campaign for their region, and provide protection for local officials, civilian contractors, and non-government organizations, or NGO’s. This caused and still causes the unit to face a high and complex level of diversity. The level of synchronization of tasks and resource requirements for these tasks is very great, and often the cost of supporting the secondary mission causes the primary mission (to destroy ASG operations within the area of the Lantawan Sub-Provence) to be neglected.

e. **Counter-Force**

The 10th IB (See Figure 11) consists of three maneuver companies, one headquarters and headquarters command company, and twenty-six Civilian-Augmentee-Forces to Government Units, or CAFGU’s. (A fourth maneuver company was formed from selected members of the other companies, and was known as the Centurion Company. It was used as a Quick Reaction Force, or QRF, but was disbanded by order of the Brigade commander in April 2002). The AFP soldiers who are members of the 10th IB are generally recruited from the island of Luzon. They receive formalized Basic Training on Luzon, and are then sent to join the unit. However, with the advent of negotiations between the Government and the MNLF/ MILF, soldiers are recruited directly from the standing forces of the MNLF. These “inductees” are given no formalized training on Luzon, but are instead trained at the unit level. The CAFGU’s are equivalent to National Guard or militia in most nations. The CAFGU sections are geographically oriented, and located in and near the baranguays within the sub province. The CAFGU units are under the command of the 10th IB companies geographically located nearest them. The CAFGU members are recruited from the nearby communities, and serve for a period of two weeks each month. They are provided weapons, and are
paid a stipend, but receive little formal training. Each CAFGU section has a full-time 2-
man cadre of NCOs from their respective parent 10th IB Company. The S-2 section also
has paid intelligence assets who report directly to the S-2 or Battalion Commander.
These assets do not fall under any chain of command, and are not organized under any
formal structure.

Overall, this unit is structured with high vertical and horizontal
specialization, with greater levels of differentiation between the senior NCOs and
officers. The battalion commander oversees all staff functions personally. The battalion
commander oversees the recruiting, training, and pay of the assets as well. Although the
individual company commanders are geographically separated from the command
element, and can conduct day-to-day operations with little or no guidance, they defer to
the battalion commander for all tactical operations, and cannot conduct operations
without his approval and planning. The structure is divisional even though the individual
units are regionally distributed for reaction capabilities and a security presence. Work
processes are standardized (tactics, daily operations), as are some skills (marksmanship,
map reading, logistics). Although an attempt was made at adhocracy for one subordinate
unit (QRF), the organization is very mechanistic. Tactics and procedures used for
dealing with situations are based on a set of templates for conventional warfare.

As stated earlier, the environment in which it operates is complex,
dynamic, hostile, and contains equivocation. Mintzberg suggests that the proper
organizational structure for such an environment would be more decentralized and
organic (1993, p.145). The difficulty in decentralization lies in the need for reliable
means of communication and a greater level of trust / confidence in the operating core,
staff, and middle line. The core technology of an organization can be viewed in terms of
the task architecture of that organization. In the case of 10th IB, the task architecture rests
on training and operations. In Structure A (See Figure12) the 10th IB appears to follow a
series of sequential tasks designed to produce quality training and successful operations,
which are strictly controlled by the staff under the guidance of the Battalion Commander.

The training itself is focused on developing individual and small unit
capabilities. When a soldier enters the unit, some have received basic training on Luzon,
while others are integrees from the MNLF, and have no background training. The unit
then conducts training to standardize the levels of individual abilities (marksmanship, first aid, basic drill and ceremony, maintenance, etc.) for all the new members. The same is done for small unit tactics training. The process for conducting this training requires approval from higher headquarters, as well as deconfliction of missions and allocation of resources. There is little mutual adjustment since the chain of command coordinates all activities, and there is little leeway given in the direction of training or missions.

However, using the IDEF structure for task architecture in structure B (See Figure 13) 10th IB allows sequential and parallel tasks, particularly for day-to-day operations. Still, the greatest amount of mutual adjustment takes place at the subunit (below company command, among supporting units) level. There are inputs from the left (training of the subunits, mission preparation, and security operations throughout the region), outputs to the right (overall mission), command from the top, and resources from the bottom. 10th IB bases the majority of its results on the overall evaluation of the Battalion Commander. However, there are some reciprocal interdependencies at play in the second structure. Pooled interdependencies make up the core for the task architecture of the 10th IB. In order for missions to be accomplished while training is occurring, units will have to mutually support one another with troops, equipment, and information.
Figure 11. Command Structure for 10th IB
Figure 12. 10<sup>th</sup> IB Training and Operations Flow Chart
Figure 13. 10th IB Task Architecture Structure
Mintzberg (1993, pg. 54) provides an overview of the three interdependencies: sequential (where the work is fed from one task to the next), reciprocal (where the work is passed back and forth between the tasks), and pooled (involving only the sharing of resources). As suggested above, the 10th IB relies heavily on pooled interdependencies for their operations. However, there are instances of reciprocal and sequential interdependencies with regards to their training. The units receive a standard format to follow when conducting their training and are not to fall out of the established sequence. This becomes vital when making the transition from individual tasks to small unit tactics. Past training conducted out of sequence resulted in “friendly fire” incidents. Mintzberg suggests we view technology as the “instruments used in the operating core to transform the inputs into outputs, which we shall call the technical system of the organization” (1993, pg. 128). Therefore, the core technology or task architecture of an organization is dependent upon the technical systems in place. For the 10th IB, the technical systems included outdated radio systems using FM bandwidths, World War II and Vietnam era weapons, and vehicles based on 1960’s technology. With the infusion of money and equipment from the US in April 2002, the physical technology changed, by the systems remained intact. The communications procedures and reporting requirements did not change when the old FM radio sets and field antennas were replaced with Motorola FM transmitter/ receivers with repeater stations. However, redundant systems (sending a runner to the HQ Base every day with the daily status report) were relegated to contingency systems. In some instances, additional training was required to instill a level of trust with the new weapons, as well as maintenance procedures that had never been enforced. A final addition to the technical system was a reorganization of the camp structures for the entire battalion. New buildings were created (including classrooms and a single staff/ operations center) in order to centralize training and operational planning.

f. Trust

Daft suggests that culture is “the set of values, guiding beliefs, understandings, and ways of thinking that is shared by members of an organization and is taught to new members as correct” (1998, pp. 231-232). The culture within the 10th IB is
at odds with the values of many of its members. Members must have discipline and accustom themselves to the AFP’s norms, yet the 10\textsuperscript{th} IB is permeated by the influences of its composite organizations and their interactions. Within the military structure, there is an “understanding” that commanders and individuals will “look the other way” in certain situations if it means maintaining the status quo. Additionally, there is a “macho” undercurrent within the entire culture that is particularly strong in the military. The desire to be the one who “gets the bad guy” can cause friction between battalions, their leaders, and even their subordinate commands. This leads to a complex environment (greater knowledge required) that is dynamic (unpredictable since you can never be sure which value system is governing). There is a large amount of equivocation since many leaders will order operations, but plan ways for them to fail or succeed only for their own benefit; this leads to uncertainty and confusion for the subordinate leaders and soldiers. The level of hostility fluctuates from region to region, barangay to barangay and can deeply affect the actions of the soldiers. The battalion commander instituted a cross-cultural communications training program for all members of the battalion in April 2002. The purpose of the program is to make all members of the unit aware of the appropriate actions to take when dealing with different religious groups. As of August 2002, only 24 personnel received the training, and no more classes were scheduled.

Mintzberg suggests that the environment “comprises virtually everything outside the organization—its “technology” (the knowledge base it must draw upon); the nature of its products, customers, and competitors; its geographical setting; the economic, political, and even meteorological climate in which it must operate” (1993, p.4). Using this definition, as well as Daft’s examples of human resources, financial resources, economic conditions, government, external and internal culture, and industry (1983, p.43), we see the spectrum of possible influences on 10\textsuperscript{th} IB. However, the key sectors for the 10\textsuperscript{th} IB are the geographical setting, the human resources, the culture, financial resources, technology, and government. Examining these factors in terms of their complexity or level of accumulated knowledge of the area, stability and predictability, hostility or determination of level of threat, and equivocality; the sector that generates the greatest uncertainty is the external culture (Mintzberg, 1993, p.136). The majority of the population in Lantawan is Muslim. They are tribal and organize their population centers
around their mosques. On the periphery of the province are Roman Catholic barangays. Many view the Catholics as outsiders as they have only been on the island for 4 generations. It is not uncommon for neighbors to speak and barter with each other during the day, then attempt to burn down each other’s homes and places of worship at night.

The people of the Philippines disapprove of governmental corruption, but it is historically accepted, and to some degree expected within the culture of the islands. When new contracts were opened to deliver gravel to the US Naval Construction Units on Basilan, the local civilian contractors went to the military commanders for protection. Often, the first question they asked was, “how much will it cost for your unit to escort my gravel trucks along this piece of road?”

2. Conclusion

Standardization of skills, operating procedures, and rules is one of the most dominant modes of coordination for the 10th IB. The overall structure of the organization is a hybrid of a divisionalized form and a machine bureaucracy, which Mintzberg describes as a “carbon-copy bureaucracy…the structure that results when an organization sets up identical regional divisions and then concentrates certain critical functions at headquarters” (1993, pg. 227). This is not a good fit for the technology or environment.

The problem with this organization is the individual units’ inabilities to adapt or respond to changing situations. Examples of this are found in both the training and operational areas. When the battalion commander ordered the creation of the training cadre, he also ordered all training be conducted at the battalion headquarters area. This meant that the subordinate units had to send individual personnel to the area for training. If they were to send an entire platoon, they would not be able to man their regional bases, respond to hostile activities within the area, or fulfill taskings. This caused an inequality in the levels of training for personnel within the units when they returned to their regional bases. A simple fix would be to send resources (ammunition, equipment, weapons, rations, etc.) with the training cadre as they moved to the regional bases to conduct training. However, due to the amount of money and time spent improving the HQ training area, the battalion commander decided not to allow the cadre to use the fix. Company commanders could not plan or coordinate activities at their units, and were not given authority to act on information within their regions. All operational activities were
strictly regulated and planned by the Battalion Commander and his staff. Although the standardization of skills, operating procedures, and rules are important for the continued operation of this unit, a better fit might be an organization that is more decentralized and organic.

The unit has established reliable means of communication, and with the professionalization of its NCO core, will have units with proactive and competent leadership. The Armed Forces of the Philippines have attempted to follow policies similar to that of Otis in establishing civic action projects within Moro areas. They have also followed Kobbe’s example by maintaining units in the area for prolonged periods in order to gain the confidence and trust of the local populace. Unfortunately, they are unwilling to allow their subordinate commanders the leeway to act with autonomy within their sub districts. They continue to use local personnel as scouts and intermediaries, but do not try to seriously restrict or monitor the weapons in the area. The regular Filipinos still fear Moro Krismen, with stories of beheadings as recent as a year ago to bolster those fears. This thesis recommends to the AFP that they conduct rapid, random, and repeated patrols throughout their area in order to deny the ASG food, shelter, rest, or resupply. However, the tendency is to remain within their garrisons, and wait until a large-scale operation involving several battalions can be coordinated simultaneously.
V. OVERALL CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE APPLICATIONS

A. IS THERE A UNIVERSAL SOLUTION?

Currently, there is no universal set of prescriptive remedies that can be dusted off the shelf for immediate applications for every insurgency. The desire to apply a complete template for a nation’s growth curve and proper alignment can prove to be a destructive attempt to any government conducting COIN unless one approaches counterinsurgency in a comprehensive and committed manner. Insurgencies must be addressed separately with full understanding of the histories, cultures, ethnicities, religions, social and economic realities, as well as the overall political situations and their inherent instabilities. Although the authors disagree with Shafer’s belief that there is no “master key” to counterinsurgency, the following points are valid: “For policymakers contemplating involvement for whatever reason, the issue is not what threatened governments ought to do, but rather sober analysis of what they can do and what leverage the United States possesses to make them do it.” (Shafer, p.281).

The universals identified in this thesis as essential to successful counterinsurgency must include: counter-resource, counter-organization, counter-infrastructure, and counter-force operations. They are interdependent and when executed as such begin an iterative cycle that can capitalize on each success to reinforce future operations. These interdependent elements of the comprehensive strategy require the full application of political, civil, economic, and military cooperation. Their planning requires an understanding of long-term goals, sustainment, and close habitual association in order to develop the confidence and trust of the populace and to maintain and regain the legitimacy of the government. When examining the case studies presented, critics often point to the isolation of the locales and the distinctive ethnicities as enabling factors in limiting the spread of the insurgency and account for the successful cases. These same critics claim the lessons learned from the Malayan Emergency and Huk Rebellion cannot be applied to externally supported insurgencies with diverse ethnic groups and porous borders such as Vietnam as well as Iraq and Afghanistan. However, the British/Malayan government did not conduct counter-resource, counter-organization, counter-infrastructure, or counter-force the same way as the Philippine government or the US
government; but those governments did realize that to be successful they had to conduct all four elements of the comprehensive counterinsurgency strategy. The lack of a comprehensive counterinsurgency strategy is the central reason for the US defeat in Vietnam, and should be cause for current concern in Afghanistan and Iraq. How the government applies the elements of the comprehensive counterinsurgency strategy will definitely depend on the nuances of each insurgency as stated earlier; but the government must conduct all elements of the counterinsurgency strategy to effectively eliminate the insurgency.

B. NEW ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURES FOR HOST NATION AND US FORCES?

With the advent of the Revolution in Military Affairs, or RMA, (The Project on Defense Alternatives, The Commonwealth Institute homepage), the time for the adoption of a new COIN force structure is more than coincidental. IDAD and Counter Insurgency operations continue to occur more often than large-scale conventional conflicts on a global level. The nature of these insurgencies is no longer constrained to a communist-based ideology. The ideology of Islamic nationalism or regional caliphism may soon replace communism as the preferred ideology in the new “People’s War.” COIN requires a flexible design structure that can be applied to both unilateral as well as multi-lateral operations. As was noted earlier, current doctrine places the infantry brigade, a unit too large for the basic COIN unit of maneuver, as the central element to the COIN force, with augmentation from Special Forces. However, as Krepinevich has pointed out, “culturally astute soldiers are indispensable for counter insurgency” (Krepinevich, p.205). Other authors have agreed with this belief, “for maximum effectiveness as a counter-guerilla, the conventionally trained soldier needs additional training.” (Valeriano, p.188). Various counterinsurgency scholars have offered design proposals for the optimum counterinsurgency force. The majority of them see the Special Forces Group as being the core element of the COIN force. However, the essential flaw in each of these designs lies in the hierarchy of command/ control/ coordination structure. The unit making up the core should be the unit directing the nature of all operations. Special Forces needs to be supported by conventional as well as other Special Operations units in the conduct of
COIN. Examples of this force structure for one country would be the augmentation of a Special Forces Group with: three infantry brigades with their associated supporting units (minus the brigade headquarters), air lift and air mobile support, civil affairs and psyops detachments. The Group should have direct liaison authority with the individual units as well as host nation forces (to include police and civil service personnel). The Group should also have the ability to coordinate and direct all activities with the US ambassador as well as all other US and host nation governmental agencies required for countering the insurgency. This authority would also be extended to the coordination of operations in conjunction with NGOs. This structure would remain in place for the duration of the insurgency or until such time as its presence is no longer necessary.

C. FUTURE APPLICATIONS

1. Implementation
   
a. COIN Implementation

   As stated earlier, the methods for countering an insurgency depend on the type of insurgency and the local situation. The mystic diamond model for understanding insurgencies and the four elements of the counterinsurgency strategies that are the same for each insurgency; however, one must now develop a specific plan for the implementation of those strategies for the specific insurgency being countered. Arguably, the most important insurgencies to counter are in Afghanistan and Iraq. The conventional military has invented the term, “anti-coalition fighters”, to describe the guerrillas operating in Afghanistan. This term is an attempt by the military to conventionalize the insurgents and the insurgency thus allowing the military to rationalize a conventional response. However, a conventional response to an unconventional problem will not solve the problem. It may delay the final solution, but in the end, just as in Vietnam, unconventional tactics and techniques will trump conventional responses.

2. Afghanistan- Current Operations and COIN Considerations

   The problem facing the US forces in Afghanistan, as with any insurgency, is the lack of effective government control coupled with a disaffected population. The symptom of this problem is the insurgency and its growth.
a. **Current Situation**

The current situation in Afghanistan is static, which favors the insurgents. As long as the insurgency is allowed to grow even minimally or exist at all, then the US forces and Afghan Government are seen as weak and lose legitimacy in the eyes of the population. The US continues to attempt to apply conventional forces and doctrine to an unconventional conflict. Current US strategy is to hunt down and kill the insurgents or anti-coalition fighters and the leaders of those organizations, which is primarily a counter-force strategy with limited elements of counter-organization operations, while only attempting a cursory development of local government institutions. It lacks an infrastructure development element, and possesses no real counter-resource element (Bryant, Seminar, 2003). The US military seems to feel that by conducting only a counter-force strategy all other elements will result from the success of the counter-force strategy. However, to effectively counter the insurgency, one must implement all elements of the comprehensive strategy in a method that allows each element to reinforce the successes of the other elements. All elements must be implemented in conjunction with one another.

The result of the current US strategy is consolidation of US forces in the interest of force protection and the centralization of operations. The US has consolidated its forces into fewer bases of operations in order to reduce its "footprint" on the local area. In addition, the senior military leaders have restricted the movement and operations of military personnel to a ten-kilometer radius of the base with a 1-day length without prior written approval for any exceptions, which requires a two-day approval process (Bryant, Seminar 2003). Therefore, the US has limited contact with the surrounding area and local population, except for civic action programs, which are random acts of kindness with no planned sustainment or intelligence collection integration. Consequently, military personnel on the ground have no or limited experience with the local geography, culture, or language, which is essential, as proved by the British in Malaya, for conducting a counterinsurgency.

b. **Areas of COIN Implementation Specific to Afghanistan**

For counterinsurgency to be more effective in Afghanistan, the US must begin at the local level. The US can develop an effective local government with strong
ties to the national government promoting a national identity, reduce the insurgents and their threat and engage the population in order to create a sense of security. To accomplish this, the US military must first recognize that the nature of the conflict is unconventional and that only an unconventional response will work. Therefore, US Army Special Forces should be the supported command and subsequently assume command of all operations in Afghanistan. Next, SF teams should be decentralized and dispersed throughout the Pakistan and Afghanistan border region with each team completely responsible for the development of an area of operations. That team should then have complete freedom of movement and operational control in that area. One platoon of light infantry could be attached to the team as a multi-purpose reaction force. There would be times when additional units would be required to conduct an operation in that area, however, the team responsible for that area would have operational control.

The SF team should then begin to conduct the four counterinsurgency strategies, keeping in mind the mystic diamond model. First, the team should begin developing government institutions. The Afghan Military Force (AMF), which is similar to a national guard and disbanded in September of 2002, should be re-recruited from the local population. These local militia fighters are familiar with the local area, customs and culture and language. They can be a great intelligence source and an effective counter-force tool. Next, the team should help establish a local representative government known as a Shura. The Shura should be responsible for the domestic day-to-day governing of the local area. The team should support the Shura and eliminate any remaining warlord figure or mentality from the local area. In addition, the team must ensure that a police force is established and trained in accordance with some program of instruction with a police chief appointed by the government. The team should engage the population with civic action programs, such as a health clinic, engineer support, weapon collection, etc., with input from the Shura to gain the trust of the population and create a sense of security. Every program or action should also be used as a source of intelligence and potential intelligence development network. All of these actions are part of the infrastructure development strategy and are used to establish government control and control over the resources. The degree to which the government develops its infrastructure is the degree to which it counters the insurgent infrastructure development.
The team should also begin to counter the insurgents' resources with population and resource control techniques. The team should continue to engage the population and encourage the *Shura* to initiate a reasonable curfew in the local area for security. Anyone out after a certain time will be considered a suspect and detained for interrogation. In addition, any food aid confiscated from the warlords or insurgents should be distributed to the local population based on some form of registered identity card. This ID card can be used for several other purposes that reduce the insurgents' freedom of movement in the area such as food allotment, movement restrictions in the area, receiving health care from the clinic as well as being an aid to the AMF when conducting checkpoints and patrols in the area. Again, this reinforces confidence in the government and reduces the insurgents' ability to recruit guerrillas and gain resources in order to grow their organization.

Additionally, the team should begin to conduct the counter-force and counter-organization elements. The team should use the intelligence gathered from the AMF and the local population as well as use the AMF's intimate knowledge of the area to hunt down the insurgents. The AMF should conduct small-unit patrol operations to include cordon-and-search missions in suspected insurgent areas as well as checking the little-known footpaths used by the resistance fighters during the Soviet occupation. A priority can be placed on the leadership and cadres of the insurgency and special reward for confirmed capture or kill can be awarded. All of these operations depend on accurate and timely intelligence and the ability to respond immediately without a two-day approval process. The teams should also use the AMF to pursue the insurgents wherever they go eliminating their safe havens.

Each element must be seen as supportive of the other elements. One element will not work alone; it must support and be supported by the other elements. As more insurgents are killed and lawlessness is reduced, security is increased, which allows more civic action programs to be undertaken. This gives the government legitimacy, which enables the government to extract more resources and control, which allows more money for the AMF and police. This will help them kill the insurgents, thus providing more security. This continues in this circular pattern. As long as the insurgent organization is weak and unable to operate in the area and the government is seen as
responsive to the needs of the population then no one will want to join the insurgency in the first place.

The SF Company should be conducting the same elements of the strategy as the team at the next higher level of government, the provincial government. Additionally, the SF battalion should be at the next level, the national government agencies with the Group Commander serving as the CJSOTF Commander, advising the president.

c. Future Implications

Once the insurgency is defeated and the local governments are established, the US should continue with the development of the Afghan national government, and should ensure that the Afghan form of a representative government does not follow along the lines of tribal or ethnic divisions. Instead, the government must foster a national identity and develop states along a geographic division. The Afghan Government should continue to apply psychological and information operations to improve their credibility. The US must improve the economic development of Afghanistan and continue to pursue insurgents and terrorists along the nebulous border region. Finally, the Afghans must control their own country and continue to eliminate terrorists and their organizations with support from the US.

3. Iraq- Current Operations and COIN Considerations

The greatest problem facing US forces when they prepared for Iraq was not the conventional battle, but the plan for post war reconstruction. The possible rise of resistance groups within Iraq was not given enough consideration, and military leaders were left scrambling to react months after resistance began.

a. Current Situation

The US military identified three major resistance groups in Iraq, and labeled them as the following: former regime loyalists, extremists, and foreign fighters. They estimate the total strength to be around 5,000 and growing. The military believes that the Iraqi people are generally supportive of a democratic form of government, but most have adopted a “wait-and-see” attitude towards the coalition government. Resistance groups have focused in on key areas of disaffection among the populace. These areas are high unemployment, crime, distrust of a non-Muslim occupation force
(partly stemming from years of Hussein’s propaganda), residual fear of the Baath Party, resentment over restrictive military tactics, loss of power due to the regime change, and possible resentment due to the regime change which they themselves did not effect. Crime and unemployment are high, yet all is not worse than it was prior to US involvement. As pointed out by Caspar Weinberger, many areas have seen dramatic improvement.

Education—Nearly all of Iraq's schools are open, and data from 10 of the primary and secondary schools showed an encouraging increase in enrollment. All 22 universities and 43 technical institutes are also open. Public Health—All 240 hospitals and 1,200 primary health clinics are open. Spending for public health is more than 26 times what it was during Saddam's regime, and doctors' salaries are 8 times what they were. More than 22 million vaccine doses have been given to children, and more than two-thirds of drinking water supplies have been restored. Security—By Oct. 24 we had trained some 85,500 Iraqis: 55,000 police; 6,400 border guards; an 18,700-man Facilities Protection Corps; 700 new Iraqi Army graduates, with the goal of 27 battalions trained in a year; a 4,700-man Civil Defense Corps; and an additional 10,000 Iraqis in training for these forces. Public Services—Years of neglect wreaked major damage on Iraqi water, power and sewerage systems. All are being repaired and improved. Oil production, even from oilfields urgently in need of modernization following decades of calculated neglect, averaged 1.9 million barrels a day in October and is moving closer to the prewar level of 3 million. Power generation reached 4,518 megawatts of electricity in early October, compared with 300 megawatts, prewar. Three-fourths of the prewar level of telephone service has been restored. The courts are in session, and some 50,000 claims against the old government have been filed with the bar association. A new currency has been issued and the independent central bank opened two months after the war ended. It took three years for post-WWII occupied Germany to do this.

The recent walkouts conducted by the Iraqi security forces, followed by the subsequent raises in pay and continued negotiations can be viewed in both a negative and positive light. It does point to instability within the forces the US is attempting to create, but also shows an unprecedented willingness on the part of the populace to stand up for greater rights. The US military has recognized that military operations alone cannot defeat an insurgency, and that economic development and political action are required to address the sources of dissent. However, the overall US strategy restricts the US from identifying the major sources of resistance.
The current US strategy again involves attempting to apply conventional forces and doctrine to an unconventional conflict. The US consolidates its forces in the interest of force protection. The US allows minimal contact with the local populace except in the case of Civil Action programs, which are turned into large, centralized affairs with no longevity or sustained planning, and limited integration into intelligence collection. The US focuses the majority of our resources on catching former regime leaders (as in the case of the recent capture of Sadam Hussein). US personnel on the ground have limited area experience, cultural understanding, or language capability. The initial estimates as to the total number of personnel required to control Iraq’s 28 million people according to the Malayan Emergency Model is a 200,000 person security force. This number could have been reached by using initially existing and duly vetted Iraqi Army personnel in conjunction with one SF group, other SOF forces, and support from a US infantry division and its associated support structure.

b. Areas of COIN Implementation Specific to Iraq

It is understood that one of the keys to success in quelling an insurgency is to go deeper than conducting a mere force-on-force campaign and to prepare for a protracted operation. The US must not be blinded by its quick victory and automatically assume that US forces or the new government emplaced will be openly embraced. The US must address the populace, the insurgent infrastructure, as well as means of external support. In order to gain popular support, the US must conduct its operations with an understanding of local customs and still show respect to those captured as well as demonstrating fairness to those affected by the operation. The US must increasingly use the Iraqi forces instead of its own and oversee their actions, so as to help the government gain legitimacy and prepare for an overall transition. The greatest hurdle to overcome with the populace is in the area of economics and deteriorating attitudes towards the US. In the development of economic resources and employment, the US should insure that the populace understands that the money and opportunities come from their government rather than the US. US military presence should be lessened and become more dispersed. Small units with more autonomy, experience, cultural understanding, and language capability on smaller scale operations and involved in day-to-day activities within the outlying areas will provide greater contact and improve relations overall. These units can
more easily address grievances and gather intelligence, as well as address cultural nuances rather than taking a broad stroke approach, while allowing the command to coordinate their activities. The same should be done with civil action programs, as these are key to identifying points of discontent, and would be more effective if conducted consistently in more numerous locations. The US should continue to develop the police force, but should not use SF to train them. Instead we should develop a core curriculum, focused academies, and contracted instructors. The government should continue to increase border security to reduce the level of foreign support, as this will add to employment/intelligence capabilities.

c. Future Implications

One of the major areas of concern for the development of the newly emerging Iraqi government is the decision to have representation for the disparate groups (tribal, ethnic, and sectarian). Unfortunately, the US has chosen the Lebanese model, as opposed to the one-person, one-vote model (the result of fear of an Iranian supportive Sunni government). The US should continue to employ psychological and information operations in all aspects of its operations to help shore up the credibility of the new government. One of the major themes should be the realization of Iraq as a nation (development of a nationalistic spirit), which recognizes its differences, embraces them, and allows everyone their say, as opposed to the continued delineation of groups.

The development of Iraq’s infrastructure must not become solely dependent upon oil revenues, and the main source of employment should not be the military, police, or government. The US military in conjunction with the State Department must assist the new government in the development of a broader fiscal base that can utilize the large group of educated unemployed in areas that will give them a greater sense of satisfaction.

The focus of the US effort should be on the causes of popular dissent, the sources of insurgent support, the emerging insurgent infrastructure and organization (gained through greater human intelligence), as well as counter-force operations.

4. Conclusion

Terrorism is a tactic often employed by insurgent groups. Each act of terror is designed to spread fear, demonstrate capabilities, spread a message, and gain new
recruits. These actions are also an attempt to sway the opinions of the world community and promote their belief systems. Terrorist groups organize themselves along similar lines as insurgent organizations, with clandestine support, cellular structures, and hardcore militant arms. Like insurgents prior to entering the overt guerrilla action phase, terrorists would prefer to remain below the military horizon, allowing them to operate with a greater degree of freedom of action. Therefore, perhaps the US should view the war on terror, or WOT, as a global counterinsurgency, which would allow the combination of all elements of national power in the comprehensive counterinsurgency strategy. Currently, the US focus in the WOT is concerned primarily with the counter-force and portions of the counter-resource (deny sanctuary, shutting off financial sources, etc.) aspects of counterinsurgency. If the WOT was conducted as a global counterinsurgency effort, the approach would place greater emphasis on all aspects of the comprehensive COIN strategy, to include counter-infrastructure and counter-organization. The WOT’s decisive engagements would exist in the war of ideas and conduct the battle in a manner which addressed the ideology in order to eventually isolate the terrorists. Countering terrorism has become an issue requiring immediate results in the eyes of the terrorized. Just as a counterinsurgency requires long-term goals, sustainment, and trust development, so too does the war on terror.
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