THESIS

A QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS OF SELECTION TO FLAG RANK IN THE UNITED STATES NAVY

by

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June 2004

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This thesis is a qualitative analysis of selection to Rear Admiral (Lower Half) in the United States Navy. Specifically, this thesis examines the variables in the career of senior US Navy officers that can be considered as factors in determining advancement at the O-7 selection board. The researcher conducted 18 semi-structured interviews with active duty and retired flag officers, using a protocol based on an analysis of archival data from flag officers promoted from year groups 1972 to 1978, and relevant literature to determine what factors are considered during the selection board process. Overall, the data indicate that select background and performance variables are important factors in the promotion of flag officers. Examples include the importance of reputation and fitness report rankings and the lack of weight given to factors such as commissioning source and letters of recommendation.
A QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS OF SELECTION TO FLAG RANK
IN THE UNITED STATES NAVY

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ABSTRACT

This thesis is a qualitative analysis of selection to Rear Admiral (Lower Half) in the United States Navy. Specifically, this thesis examines the variables in the career of senior US Navy officers that can be considered as factors in determining advancement at the O-7 selection board. The researcher conducted 18 semi-structured interviews with active duty and retired flag officers, using a protocol based on an analysis of archival data from flag officers promoted from year groups 1972 to 1978, and relevant literature to determine what factors are considered during the selection board process. Overall, the data indicate that select background and performance variables are important factors in the promotion of flag officers. Examples include the importance of reputation and fitness report rankings and the lack of weight given to factors such as commissioning source and letters of recommendation.
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I. INTRODUCTION

A. BACKGROUND

Approximately six out of every 1000 newly commissioned naval officers will be promoted to flag rank during the span of their careers. Over 20-plus years of service, the other 994 officers will resign or retire at lesser hierarchical levels (called paygrades) along the way. Only a fraction of the officers who start a naval career will be promoted through the ranks to Captain (paygrade O-6). Of those officers, an average of only 2.2% will be selected for flag rank, which begins at paygrade O-7.

There are a considerable number of elements that can contribute to the continued promotion of a naval officer through the rank hierarchy. In the junior paygrades, these factors include warfare qualification and basic operational competency. In the more senior paygrades, graduate education, command at sea, joint and Washington DC duty, among others, become contributing dynamics. To be promoted to O-6, an officer must have the majority (if not all) of these requisite factors in his background, in addition to exhibiting an above-average level of competency in one’s warfare specialty. Considering the attributes requisite for promotion to paygrade O-6, what standards are used to select the 2.2% for flag rank?

Over time a significant number of hypotheses have developed, each attempting to explicate the criteria used in the determination of selection for flag rank. The integrity and soundness of these explanations vary widely,
from those based on casual observations (though often based on dated information) to those explanations that can be considered no more than mere conjecture.

B. PURPOSE

The purpose of this thesis is to identify salient aspects in the record of an O-6 upon which the O-7 selection board bases their selections. Specifically, this research examines in detail the elements in the naval career of an O-6 that distinguish him from the other members of his peer group as a potential candidate for selection to flag rank. Additionally, this study reviews the selection board process to ascertain dynamics within the process itself that can reveal additional elements in the factors contributing an officer’s selection to flag rank.

C. SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY

This thesis qualitatively examines the effect of career and background factors that determine the selection of officers to the rank of O-7.

1. Research Question

What variables and experiences in the backgrounds of officers in the O-6 paygrade distinguish them from their peers in selection to flag rank?

2. Scope

To fully examine the multitude of elements that are determinants in promotion to O-7, the selection process must be examined from several perspectives. First, theories and policies regarding promotion in both civilian and military contexts are reviewed in conjunction with
variables influencing the selection choices of the members of the selection board. Then, the career experiences and background variables of those Unrestricted Line (URL) flag officers belonging to Year Groups (YGs) 1972 through 1978 are evaluated to ascertain trends that may serve as indicators of an officer’s suitability and promotability to flag rank.

With the information from these two sources providing a foundation, semi-structured interviews are conducted with former members of 0-7 selection boards. It is through these interviews that the promotion hypotheses derived from the literature and archival data are tested. The results of these interviews are analyzed, and conclusions are made based on the findings.

That said, this thesis is not an attempt to fully analyze the Navy’s selection board process, nor is it an attempt to determine who the Navy should select as flag officers. The scope of this thesis is limited to the documentation of factors that influenced the selection of the current cohort of one to three-star flag officers in order to better understand the competencies and caliber of officers selected for flag rank.

3. Methodology

Interviews with flag officers and archival data from the records of URL flag officers from Year Groups 1972 through 1978 provide the foundation for this study.

This thesis analyzes data gained from interviews with retired and active duty flag officers, the majority of whom were members of 0-7 selection boards from Fiscal Year 1994

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1 Year Group (YG) is the classification of all officers commissioned during a Fiscal Year (FY). For example, officers commissioned between 1 October 1972 and 30 September 1973 are considered part of YG 1972.
through 1999. Other flag officers interviewed who did not participate on these selection boards were chosen for interviews based on their unique perspective of flag officer promotion, from a former Chief of Naval Operations to Chiefs and Deputy Chiefs of Naval Personnel.

A compilation of data taken from official biographies and personnel records from the Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC) in conjunction with relevant literature was used to formulate the protocol for the interviews. Additionally, these data provide this study with comprehensive statistical information to further illustrate those variables important in the selection of flag officers.

D. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY

This thesis is divided into five chapters. Chapter II concentrates on established theories of promotion and prior research on successful senior executives and officers. Chapter III outlines the research methods used in the collection of data for the thesis, from both official sources and interviews. Chapter IV is an analysis of the categories that emerged from the interview data and their relationships in the context of relevant literature. Finally, Chapter V outlines the conclusions drawn from the study and recommendations for future research.
II. PERSONNEL DEVELOPMENT AND PROMOTION

A. INTRODUCTION

Chapter II provides a summary of selected research on the dynamics contributing to the development and promotion of flag officers. The objective of this chapter is to provide a firm foundation in the theory and statutes relating to naval officer career development and promotion. This chapter begins with a broad, historical perspective on flag rank and career management, and concludes with the intrinsic personality factors and competencies that make an officer competitive for flag promotion.

The chapter opens with a brief history of the flag community and the policies regarding promotion to flag rank today. Part one continues with an overview of Navy officer commissioning sources and career progression for Unrestricted Line (URL) officers, specifically Pilots, Naval Flight Officers (NFO), Submariners and Surface Warfare Officers (SWO). This first portion of the chapter is intended to provide an understanding of the central variables in an officer’s career and how they relate to flag officer promotion, including history, commissioning source, career path and policy.

The second part of Chapter II details the career milestones that affect an officer’s probability of promotion to flag rank. These are opportunities in the career of an officer that they can elect to pursue during

---

2 The Navy’s URL officer corps encompasses eight officer communities: Pilot, Naval Flight Officer, Surface Warfare, Submarine Warfare, Special Warfare, Special Operations, Aviation Ground, and Fleet Support. In this study, because of the limited size of the other communities, only flag selection only within the first four is analyzed.
their own careers, allowing them to be more competitive for promotion to senior paygrades. At the same time, an officer can pursue other interests even though those decisions might be potentially detrimental to their chances of future promotion. An officer has considerable control over selecting such career milestones which include graduate education, joint experience, operational and staff experience.

Third, Chapter II describes the relevant concepts and theories elucidating those intangible assets that may have considerable impact in distinguishing between those who are promoted and those who remain at their terminal paygrade. In this section, the importance of successful career trends, visibility and competencies are discussed. These are the indispensable building blocks by which the most qualified officers are created, thus establishing the small core of officers competitive for flag selection.

It is important to note that although some of this research applies directly to the policy and career management of flag officers, there is a great void in published research concerning promotion to flag and general officer rank. Because of this, much of the literature reviewed here concentrates on the development and promotion of similarly qualified civilian personnel to the general manager and chief executive officer levels in major corporations. Many of the basic principles relating to the promotion of these senior civilians are relevant to the comparable experiences of senior and flag grade military officers.
B. NAVAL OFFICER PROGRESSION TO FLAG RANK

The first section of literature review begins with a historical overview of the flag officer rank. Subsequent sections detail the Navy’s officer commissioning sources and their impact on promotion and the career progression of URL naval officers. This section concludes with an overview of the statutory policy governing officer promotion.

The purpose of this section is to provide a deeper understanding of the career factors in the career of a naval officer, and how these components impact future selection and promotion.

1. Flag Officers

Throughout seafaring history, commanding officers of a squadron or fleet (consisting of any two or more vessels) have traditionally been known as “flag officers”. This title stems from the entitlement of flying a command pennant or flag atop a “flagship”, allowing other vessels in formation to identify their position within the force (Reynolds, 2002). By the 16th Century, the British Royal Navy had established stratification within the flag officer rank based on the seniority and physical positioning of flag officers within a fleet at sea (Oliver, 1983).

In America, the Continental Congress created policy on 15 November 1776 establishing naval ranks of Commodore, Rear Admiral, Vice Admiral, and Admiral, mirroring the contemporary rank structure of the British Royal Navy. However, because of their aristocratic overtones, these ranks were never filled by officers of the new republican nation (Cogar, 1991). With the establishment of the United
States Navy on 27 March 1794, flag ranks were abolished, and until the Civil War almost 70 years later, Captain was the highest rank in the Navy.

Throughout this time, the commander of a naval squadron, a senior Captain, maintained the title of Commodore. In 1857, Congress ruled that the honorary title of Commodore be replaced with the more significant title of Flag Officer. They further established that the pennant of these newly created Flag Officers would be emblazoned with the rank of Rear or Vice Admiral, based on their length of service. However, despite the notable titles, these officers still maintained the permanent rank of Captain (Reynolds, 2002).

Because of the rapid expansion of the Navy during the early days of the Civil War, Congress passed the Act of 16 July 1862, which established the ranks of Commodore and Rear Admiral. Nine senior Captains were selected to fill this latter rank, and before long, additional flag officer ranks were established. On 21 December 1864 Congress established the rank of Vice Admiral, and on 25 July 1866, the rank of Admiral was created.

With the standardization of the commissioned officer rank structure, ten hierarchical levels or “paygrades” were established. Officers in paygrades O-1 through O-4 are considered junior officer; officers in paygrades O-5 and O-6 are considered senior officers. Finally, officers in paygrades O-7 through O-10 bear the title of flag officer. Table 1 provides an overview of the Navy's officer rank structure.
In today’s Navy, there are 224 flag officers on active duty, constituting approximately .006% of the Navy’s total active duty force, and .4% of the active officer cadre. Approximately 50% of flag officers are O-7s, about 35% are O-8s, and approximately 15% make up the top two paygrades, O-9 and O-10.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Paygrade</th>
<th>Rank</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0-10</td>
<td>Admiral</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0-9</td>
<td>Vice Admiral</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0-8</td>
<td>Rear Admiral (Upper Half)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0-7</td>
<td>Rear Admiral (Lower Half)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0-6</td>
<td>Captain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0-5</td>
<td>Commander</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0-4</td>
<td>Lieutenant Commander</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0-3</td>
<td>Lieutenant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0-2</td>
<td>Lieutenant (Junior Grade)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0-1</td>
<td>Ensign</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Navy officer corps consists of two divisions: Restricted (RL) and Unrestricted Line (URL) officers. The RL officers are those who are ineligible for command at sea. This includes officers in the Medical Corps, Dental Corps, Civil Engineering Corps, Engineering Duty Only officers, among others. Approximately 2/3 of flag officers are URL. These officers are those who are eligible for command at sea, and include the officers that are the focus of this study: Surface Warfare Officers (SWO), Pilots, Naval Flight Officers (NFO), and Submariners.

Unlike much of the corporate world, the Navy promotes exclusively from within. Thus, every URL flag officer has served through all of the commissioned paygrades. All flag officers begin their career in the naval service through a commissioning source; a place that trains future officers
in the basics of naval theory, service, customs and traditions. These commissioning sources vary widely in the quality and amount of education and training an officer candidate or midshipman receives. This difference may have future consequences (both positive and negative) as officers proceed through the ranks.

2. Commissioning Sources

Nearly every officer begins their career in the naval service through one of the Navy’s commissioning sources. For URL officers, there are three primary commissioning sources: the United States Naval Academy (USNA), Naval Reserve Officer Training Corps (NROTC), and Officer Candidate School (OCS). Promotion rates to flag rank vary greatly between commissioning sources, with USNA graduates holding nearly 50% of URL flag positions. In order to better comprehend the depth of the variation between the three primary commissioning sources, a brief discussion of the background of these sources is required.

a. History

For the first 69 years of the United States Navy, officers in training, universally known by the title of Midshipman, were trained through hands-on experience in the fleet. This training, however, was often haphazard and lacking in basic academic and educational standards required for an officer’s service. As a result, the United States Naval Academy was founded in 1845 as a central school to standardize the education of future naval officers. From the founding of the Naval Academy through the end of the World War I, virtually all naval officers began their careers at the Academy.

3 A small percentage of officers enter the Navy after having been commissioned through the officer training pipelines of the other services, such as the Air Force and Military Academies.
In order to provide more officers for the fleet without overtaxing the Academy, Congress authorized the establishment of a Naval ROTC (NROTC) program shortly after World War I. NROTC closely paralleled the officer training system in use by the US Army at the time. From its beginnings in 6 universities, the NROTC program had spread to 27 campuses by the end of the World War II.

The massive naval buildup during World War II further necessitated the Navy to expedite its training process to create more officers for service in the fleet. New officer candidate programs were created. The largest of these, the V-12 program (predecessor to the Reserve Officer Candidate (ROC) program) was formed, creating a third major commissioning path for naval officers. In 1948, the ROC program was established by the Secretary of the Navy, allowing students of accredited colleges or universities to participate in officer training through organized Naval Reserve units. This paved the way for the creation of the third major commissioning source in today’s Navy, Officer Candidate School (OCS).

The Korean War saw the first graduates of this new type of training program. OCS was the Navy’s first accession program designed primarily for civilian college graduates. The benefits were twofold: Not only was the Navy not responsible for funding the college education of these future officers, but these officer candidates could be trained quickly in both large and small quantities, arriving in the fleet as needed.

b. Commissioning Source and Flag Rank

Traditionally, the senior ranks of the Navy have been filled by alumni of the Naval Academy. Even into the
early 1950s, 100% of the Navy’s Admirals and Vice Admirals were graduates of the Academy (Janowitz, 1971). Of the lower paygrades, 95.5% of Rear Admirals (one and two star) were Academy alumni, totaling 96.6% of all Navy flag-grade leadership. As late as 1987, Academy graduates filled the majority of the top paygrades in the Navy, with 81.8% of those in paygrade O-10, 67.7% in O-9, 46.6% in O-8 and 40.0% in O-7, an average of 47.3% across all flag ranks (Brown, Eitelberg & Laurence, 1992). This trend of Academy dominance within the flag officer community, albeit now at much lesser percentages than those reported by Janowitz (1971), has continued to the present day.

Part of the explanation for the seeming over-representation of Academy alumni in the flag officer ranks stems from the unofficial policy espoused prior to the Second World War in which the Academy was seen as the only source for career naval officers. Thus, prior to entry of the United States into World War II in 1941, all line flag officers had been commissioned through the Academy. With the exponential growth of the Navy during the period of 1941 through 1945, there became an increasing need for additional line flag officers. For the first time in modern Navy history, non-Academy graduates attained flag rank.

Despite the growing percentage of non-Academy graduate flag officers, their ranks are still dominated by Academy alumni, some 60 years after the first non-Academy graduates assumed flag rank in the line communities. This is especially surprising considering that the Academy commissions only one-third of new URL officers each year.
Moore and Trout (1978) attempt to answer this apparent over-representation of Academy graduates by explaining it in the context of visibility. The belief is held that four years at the Academy, in a Navy environment, gives Academy graduates a higher level of experience and adaptability to life in the fleet than another junior officer from a different commissioning source (Moore & Trout, 1978). Additionally, they state that: “...it should be noted that the academy association works to the advantage of academy graduates throughout their career...” by way of class reunions, social interaction with classmates after commissioning, and so forth. (Moore & Trout, 1978, p. 463).

Bowman (1991) notes several factors that could account for the higher percentage of Naval Academy graduates in senior ranks particularly in the Aviation and Surface Warfare communities. He explained that the propensity for Naval Academy graduates to promote to the higher grades in an amount disproportionate to other commissioning sources stemmed from two factors: the greater inclination for USNA graduates to voluntarily remain in the Navy, and the increased chances of graduates to be selected for promotion (Bowman, 1991). This latter factor is based on the higher probability of Academy graduates being early selected and their lower rate of failure to select (Bowman, 1991).

One additional contributing component to this dynamic of increased retention and promotion among Naval Academy alumni may stem from an Academy graduate’s expectation of a career in the Navy even before entering the Academy (Woelpner, 1998). While the NROTC program offers
similar benefits by way of scholarship, it is possible that a disproportionate percentage of NROTC midshipmen may not have the same career goals as do Academy midshipmen. Officers commissioned through OCS attend the three-month program after the completion of their college education in order to achieve their commission. For many OCS graduates however, the selection of this route may be an indication of an initial lack of interest or desire for a military lifestyle while in college, and the selection of a career in the Navy only because it was thought to be the best of a list of mediocre job prospects following graduation (Woelper, 1998).

Based on the survey of literature on commissioning source and eventual career success, it appears that being commissioned through the Naval Academy may have a significantly positive impact on the upward mobility of an officer. However, despite the conclusions of the research, the question still remains: Is it not reasonable to assume that officers eligible for flag promotion have overcome the differences in commissioning source over 20-plus years of distinguished naval service?

3. Naval Officer Career Paths

Officer promotion numbers at the O-7 selection board are based on their community representation of eligible O-6 paygrade officers being considered by the board. Thus, the larger the community, the more flag positions they can fill. Officer community career paths provide a framework by which naval officers can plan their careers; assisting in the determination of critical career milestones. It shows officers the jobs they can expect hold at certain periods in their career. By doing this, it allows for the
attainment of a range of “career enhancing” milestones, such as graduate school, joint education, and various staff positions in addition to the requisite sea tours.

a. Surface Warfare

The Surface Warfare Officer (SWO) community specializes in the operations of the Navy’s surface ship fleet. The SWO career path has four distinct levels of sea tours consisting of: division officer, department head, executive officer and commanding officer; interspersed with staff tours, joint service and education ashore. Figure 1 represents the “ideal” career path; select officers may have command at sea prior to an executive officer tour, and others may have a major command tour in the O-6 paygrade (commanding a guided missile cruiser, “large deck” amphibious ship, or destroyer squadron) following their initial O-5 command tour.

Prior to their eligibility for flag consideration, the SWO also has the opportunity to gain experience through four shore tours. Such shore tours can be used by officers to obtain graduate level education, or increase their level of experience by service on a Navy or joint staff.

With 24 to 25 years of commissioned service, a SWO traditionally receives their first consideration for flag promotion either in their major command sea tour or in the following shore tour.
### b. Aviation Warfare

The aviation warfare community is divided into two designators: Pilot and Naval Flight Officer (NFO). Pilots of both fixed wing (jets and propeller-driven aircraft) and rotary wing (helicopters) are responsible for flying the Navy’s aircraft, whereas Naval Flight Officers are responsible for radio operation, navigation and the operation of various aircraft weaponry. Both designators have a similar career path, leading ultimately to command at sea.

Aviators typically have four sea tours: three flying tours and one in a staff status, as detailed in Figure 2. The sea tours consist of one as a new pilot,
followed by an at-sea staff tour. The next sea tour is as a squadron department head, and the final squadron sea tour is as an executive officer; later “fleeting up”, becoming commanding officer of the unit during the same tour. At this point, the aviation career path splits. A select group of the fixed-wing post-Commander (O-5) command officers return to sea as a Deputy Commander, Air Group (DCAG) and later become a Commander, Air Group (CAG) as an O-6. Rotary wing officers traditionally proceed through the amphibious ship command process following their squadron command tours. Still other officers commence the nuclear training pipeline en route to aircraft carrier command. Upon successful completion of nuclear training, they are assigned an aircraft carrier executive officer billet, followed by a deep draft (large deck amphibious or logistics ship) command as an O-6. Finally, they serve in their carrier command tour, often following a second carrier executive officer tour.

As a result of the differences in later career tours, CAG-tour aviators typically receive their first serious consideration for flag promotion at the 24 to 25 year point; whereas their carrier commander counterparts wait an average of three to four years longer before their first significant consideration for flag selection because of their nuclear training pipeline. Carrier command aviators will typically have two shore tours, one as a Lieutenant (O-3), the other as a Lieutenant Commander (O-4), prior to their entry into the nuclear training pipeline. This creates difficulties for these officers later in their career with regard to attaining joint and important senior staff experience. In contrast, CAG-tour
Aviators will usually have both of these shore tours available, as well as one to two other shore tours at the paygrade O-5 and O-6 levels before consideration for flag promotion. During these shore tours, aviators are eligible for shore duty with the Navy staff, joint staff, service colleges and many other tours.

Figure 2. Aviation Officer Career Path (Mack, 1991)

c. Submarine Warfare
The submarine officer’s career path closely resembles the basic SWO career path in many ways with regard to the structured hierarchy of sea tour jobs. The submarine officer’s career path is outlined in Figure 3.
After the completion of nuclear training, they serve their first of four sea tours as a division officer. Their subsequent three sea tours include: department head, executive officer and commanding officer. As with the SWO career path, select officers may have a fourth sea tour as a submarine squadron commander. These sea tours are divided by three, possibly four (if selected for major command), shore tours. In contrast to other communities that allow considerable variance in the type of shore tour an officer selects, the submarine community has traditionally tended to place emphasis in the experience gained from nuclear-related shore tours over other types of shore tours. Additionally, the length of the training in preparation for each sea tour considerably shortens the amount of time available to obtain the requisite shore duty experiences to be competitive for flag selection.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CAPT</th>
<th>POST COMMAND SHORE</th>
<th>MAJOR COMMAND</th>
<th>SECOND MAJOR COMMAND</th>
<th>DC SHORE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>O-6</td>
<td>POST COMMAND SHORE</td>
<td>SERVICE COLLEGE</td>
<td>POST COMMAND SHORE</td>
<td>MAJOR COMMAND</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDR</td>
<td>COMMAND</td>
<td>PCD</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O-5</td>
<td>PCO</td>
<td>XO</td>
<td>POST XO SHORE</td>
<td>XO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LCDR</td>
<td>POST DH SHORE</td>
<td>XO</td>
<td>POST DH SHORE</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O-4</td>
<td>NAV</td>
<td>NAV</td>
<td>WEPS</td>
<td>SLO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LT</td>
<td>ENG</td>
<td>WEPS</td>
<td>ENG</td>
<td>ENG/NAV/WEPS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O-3</td>
<td>SOAC</td>
<td>POST JO SHORE TOUR/PG SCHOOL</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LTJG</td>
<td>FIRST SEA DUTY</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O-2</td>
<td>ENS</td>
<td>INITIAL TRAINING</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O-1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 3. Submarine Officer Career Path (Mack, 1991)
Submarine warfare officers normally receive their first consideration for flag promotion after 25 to 26 years of commissioned service, during their major command (O-6) or post-major command shore tour.

It should be noted that the career path models listed here merely provide a theoretical outline of what an officer’s career should include. As tours are extended, shortened, or as special duties or jobs are assumed, the actual career path of an officer may flex. Additionally, over time, tours vary in importance and relative weight. Thus, the “ideal” career path of an officer commissioned in the early 1970s is considerably different than the notional career path for an officer in the same community today.

What is important to be competitive for flag rank is that an officer takes advantage of experiences available within each tour. Thus, certain tours such as graduate education, joint service, certain senior staff jobs, and others can provide an officer with the competencies and experiential background requisite for flag promotion. These factors will be discussed further in Section C of this chapter.

4. Naval Officer Promotion

Another factor that determines the promotion of officers to flag rank is governmental policy. The legal basis for the promotion of officers in the United States Navy is contained in Title 10, United States Code. This law establishes guidelines for the operation of promotion boards, end strength and grade authorizations, and so on. Essentially, Title 10 forms the foundation upon which all military career management is based. With the approval of Congress, updates can be made to Title 10. Recent updates
have included the flexing of upper age retirement limits and strengthening joint service requirements, among others.

Table 2 provides the guidelines for promotion for all officer ranks up to O-7, along with average active duty strengths and percentages. When URL officers are commissioned, they start at paygrade O-1, where they remain for two years. At that point promotion to O-2 is automatic. After another two years an officer is promoted to O-3, which is also automatic unless an officer has demonstrated sufficiently poor performance to warrant a review of their suitability for naval service.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Promotion to:</th>
<th>Avg. Time in Service</th>
<th>Min. Time in Grade</th>
<th>Promotion % by Community</th>
<th>Active Duty Strength</th>
<th>Percent of Total Officers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>O-1</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>7015</td>
<td>13.19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O-2</td>
<td>2 Years</td>
<td>18 Months</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>7831</td>
<td>14.72%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O-3</td>
<td>4 Years</td>
<td>2 Years</td>
<td>95-100%</td>
<td>17190</td>
<td>32.32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O-4</td>
<td>9-11 Years</td>
<td>3 Years</td>
<td>70-90%</td>
<td>10396</td>
<td>19.55%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O-5</td>
<td>15-17 Years</td>
<td>3 Years</td>
<td>60-80%</td>
<td>7048</td>
<td>13.25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O-6</td>
<td>21-23 Years</td>
<td>3 Years</td>
<td>40-60%</td>
<td>3490</td>
<td>6.56%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O-7</td>
<td>23-29 Years</td>
<td>3 Years</td>
<td>2-8%</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>0.20%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For promotion to paygrades O-4 to O-6, officer records are reviewed by a statutory promotion board that selects officers for promotion based on performance and length of commissioned service. In these three paygrades, an officer has three promotion opportunities: Below Zone, In Zone and Above Zone. The number of vacancies within each grade forms the zone size, and the zone size sets the limits as to how many officers will be promoted in the three promotion opportunities. Officers who are promoted in the Below Zone
category are considered to have received “early promotions”, as they are promoted ahead of their other officers in their Year Group (YG). Those officers considered and not promoted in the Above Zone category will remain in their current grade (called a “terminal grade”) until either resignation or retirement. In contrast to the O-4 through O-6 selection boards, there is no Above Zone category for O-7 promotion. All officers in paygrade O-6 with sufficient time in grade are considered for promotion until they either depart the naval service or are selected for flag rank. Because of this lack of promotion zones, the O-7 board is traditionally considered a selection vice promotion board. Hence, those officers advanced by the O-7 board are traditionally considered to have been “selected” instead of “promoted”.

Table 3 lists the actual percentage of selection to O-7 for each URL community, based on the results of the FY 2004 selection board. The complete table can be reviewed in Appendix A.

Table 3. Eligible Officers Selected to O-7 by Community

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Community</th>
<th>Elig.</th>
<th>Sel.</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SWO</td>
<td>342</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2.05%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SUB</td>
<td>191</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2.09%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pilot</td>
<td>272</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2.21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NFO</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>947</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>2.01%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The factors that make an officer competitive for promotion to flag rank are varied. Some factors, such as joint education, are required by statutory law. Others, including graduate education and specific tours that build
an officer’s range of experience, are accomplished through the efforts and performance of an individual officer and can vary widely.

C. NAVAL OFFICER CAREER OPPORTUNITIES

This portion of Chapter II provides an overview of those “career-enhancing” opportunities that may provide an officer with many of the experiences and competencies necessary to compete for flag selection. Not every officer will secure all of these experiences. A considerable number of officers will be selected for flag rank without experiencing one or more of these career milestones. However, such flag officers are becoming more uncommon as officers are encouraged—even mandated—to gain the experiences provided by some of these opportunities.

Another factor to consider in the achievement of an officer’s career milestones is that the selection of an officer for one of these jobs (particularly in the senior paygrades) is greatly determined by prior experience and performance. This often creates a circuitous process by which “better” officers with more competitive records are detailed\(^4\) into more career enhancing assignments, allowing them to achieve further career milestones.

Very little research has been conducted with regard to which job choices are more beneficial to an officer in the realm of promotion and selection. The majority of this data has been passed to other officers by word-of-mouth, and an occasional professional article. An obvious question is: What jobs are more beneficial for gaining the requisite experiences necessary for promotion to flag rank?

\(^4\) Detailing is the process wherein officers are assigned to new jobs.
The first of the opportunities that many officers take advantage of is graduate education. An accredited undergraduate education is required for commissioning. Thus, the next step is to acquire learning from a masters-level educational program in order to further broaden the experiences of an officer.

1. Graduate Education

Recognizing the importance of a service college experience, each of our Unrestricted Line communities is reviewing their officer development career paths to ensure our officers have an opportunity for resident education as they progress through their careers. These efforts will result in more top quality officers better prepared for leadership roles that await them.\(^5\)

The graduate education experience, which is becoming ever more vital for today’s naval officers, can come in many different forms. An officer may attend a Navy-sponsored educational facility, such as the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) in Monterey, California for junior officers; for senior officers the Naval War College (NWC) in Newport, Rhode Island, or a combination of both. At the mid and senior paygrades, there are numerous government-sponsored educational options, ranging from the National War College (NWC) and Industrial College of the Armed Forces (ICAF) in Washington DC; to the Army and Air War Colleges; to a number of foreign military graduate education facilities.

Naval officers can also pursue graduate education at many civilian university campuses around the nation, as

\(^5\) VADM Gerald Hoewing, Chief of Naval Personnel. Testimony before Congress, 10 March 2004.
well as by distance education. These degree programs can be government-sponsored, or can be taken and personally paid for by the individual officer.

Despite the official encouragement of graduate education, the benefit of it to an officer’s career has been a subject of debate within the officer community (Buterbaugh, 1995). Although the Navy’s senior leadership has succinctly stated their desire for officers to obtain graduate education, some officers (and some officer communities) still believe that the one to two years away from the fleet requisite for earning a graduate degree will make them less competitive for future promotion (Buterbaugh, 1995).

Multiple studies have concluded that graduate education does have a limited positive effect on promotion at the O-3 through O-6 paygrades, depending on warfare specialty. Cymrot (1986), studying all officers (RL and URL) at the O-4 through O-7 promotion levels, found that graduate education does have a positive effect on promotion at the O-4 to O-6 paygrades, though not in selection to flag rank. Of course, the results of this study must be interpreted loosely, taking into account the very different culture that was pervasive in the Navy of 1986 when the study was conducted as compared to that of the Navy nearly 20 years later.

In a more recent study, Buterbaugh (1995) found that graduate education was a positive factor in promotions to the O-5 and O-6 paygrades in some warfare designators. Dividing his data by communities, he discovered that at the O-5 paygrade, graduate education had an overall significant effect on promotion, having a highly significant effect for
the Surface Warfare Officers, and slightly less for the Pilot community. In contrast, it had a negative effect on the Submarine and Naval Flight Officer communities. At the O-6 level, graduate education was significant only in the Surface Warfare community. It had a negative effect in the Submarine, Pilot and Naval Flight Officer communities.

In their 1998 study, Bowman and Mehay studied the effects of graduate education in the promotion of officers to the O-4 paygrade. They discovered that promotion probabilities were 10 to 15 points higher for those officers having any graduate degree. Further, they stated that those officers who completed their graduate education through one of the Navy’s fully-funded, full-time programs increased their chances of promotion to O-4 by 15 to 17 over an officer without a graduate degree. However, they noted one caveat to these findings: officers who participate in these graduate programs often have additional unobserved attributes that may make them more promotable, even without the added benefit of graduate education.

Unfortunately, research on the effects of graduate education at the flag officer levels is relatively sparse. Although there is a significant body of work on the effects of graduate education at the junior and senior officer paygrades, research into its effect at the flag officer level is considerably out-of-date, particularly considering the recent encouragement for officers to obtain graduate education.

One advantage of receiving graduate education through a military facility is the ability to simultaneously fulfill the requirements for joint education. Although it
was possible to waive the requirements for joint education in the past, qualification as a Joint Service Officer (JSO), part of which includes fulfilling the Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) requirements, is now mandatory to be considered for flag promotion.

2. Joint Education and Service

The Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 was created to improve the warfighting capability of the United States by ending service parochialism. The Act included provisions that required Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) in order to prepare officers for joint duty; joint duty tour lengths and requirements; the creation of a Joint Duty Assignment List (JDAL); and the conception of the Joint Specialty Officer (JSO). Additionally, the Act included that a joint duty assignment be a prerequisite for promotion to flag officer (Savage, 1992).

Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) is the foundation upon which all joint experience is built. JPME consists of five elements. The first step is the joint education received by an officer in their pre-commissioning education. Following that is JPME Phase I, which is taught by intermediate and senior level service schools. The next step is JPME Phase II, taught at the Armed Forces Staff College (AFSC). Phase II is then followed by the separate JPME programs conducted at the National War College (NWC) and the Industrial College of the Armed Forces (ICAF). The final level is the CAPSTONE course, which is reserved for flag and general officers. A framework for joint education as it complements service-specific training can be found in Appendix B.
To become a Joint Specialty Officer (JSO), an officer must first complete JPME Phase I and II, and then complete a qualifying Joint Duty Assignment (JDA) from the JDAL. With the approval of the FY 2002 National Defense Authorization Act, the JSO selection board was abolished. Instead, officers who completed the requisite education and tour experience are automatically nominated as a JSO.

Under the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986, joint duty has been a requirement for selection to flag rank. However, Good-of-the-Service waivers have been granted routinely to selected flag officers who did not have joint experience prior their actual promotion to flag rank. These officers have primarily been from the aviation (particularly aircraft carrier commanding officers) and submarine communities, as their career timelines often did not allow for a qualifying JDA. As with many military programs, the ability to grant waivers is changing. Beginning 30 September 2007, all flag officer selectees must have completed their JSO qualification. Very few, if any, waivers will be granted (Perspective, 2002).

What the acquisition of joint education and joint experience give a potential flag officer is a standardized level of expertise in working with, for and under the other entities of the Department of Defense, rather than just an officer’s parent service. The goal is to create senior military leaders capable of leading forces in a joint operating environment. As the Joint Operations Concept states: The Joint Force must develop joint operational level leaders capable of synergistically combining the emerging capabilities in time, space and purpose to accomplish the operational or strategic objectives. Joint
operational leaders must fully understand the operational strategy and be capable of designing an integrated approach in support of the other instruments of national power. The development of leaders grounded in both the art and science of joint operations must begin very early in the military education process. (Joint Operations Concepts, p. 25)

3. Operational and Staff Experience

While very little theoretical research has been conducted in the context of what experience is the most beneficial for flag promotion, Walsh (1997) provides a list of the “must have” assignments for a naval officer’s future promotability. These include:

a. Division Officer Tour
b. Postgraduate Education
c. Department Head Tour
d. Executive Officer Tour
e. Commanding Officer Tour
f. Joint/Professional Military Education
g. Joint Duty Assignment
h. Major Command Tour
i. Washington, DC Tour
j. Operational/Headquarters Staff Tour

This list covers all communities in this study: Surface, Aviation, and Submarine Warfare. Walsh also details a list of “nice to have” assignments:

a. Shore tour as a Junior Officer
b. Subspecialty Utilization Tour
c. More than one Washington Headquarters or Joint Tour
d. Longer Captain and Flag Careers

In the context of flag promotions, the first list of tours is vital. There are multiple reasons for this. First, the initial tours (a. through d.) are spent becoming an expert in an officer’s warfare specialty; providing a firm foundation for future assignments. These jobs can be considered as those that build functional skills, general organizational knowledge, and personal insight (Brancato,
Harrell, Schirmer & Thie, 2004) The later tours (e. through h.) are those which test the skills acquired by an officer by sending them into jobs that allow them to carry out more complex and often ambiguous assignments (Brancato, et al. 2004) as well as (in many cases) operate independently.

The skills and competencies developed in these jobs, the personal networks formed, and the reputation an officer establishes become the next step in the dynamics of an officer’s promotion to flag rank.

D. PROMOTION THEORY

By the time URL officers reach the rank of O-6, they have competently served in most, if not all, of the requisite career milestones discussed previously. Most have obtained graduate level education, and many have completed their joint education. They have had a successful command at sea, and many have served in a Washington or joint headquarters job. How then can a selection board determine who will be promoted to O-7? At this point, it is assumed that there must be more to selection to flag rank than simply accumulating the experiences of prescribed career milestones.

1. Successful Career Trends

There are several studies that have attempted to explain selection criteria, both in the military and in the corporate world. The first of these studies was conducted in 1982, and included 15 successful general managers over a broad cross-section of American businesses (Kotter, 1982).

During the course of the research, a trend appeared in the career histories of each of these successful executives. The trend included the following waypoints:
1. The future general manager did well in an early assignment.

2. That success then led either to a promotion or more challenging assignment.

3. That process served to increase (or reinforce) their self-esteem and motivation, leading to greater formal or informal power, and more opportunities to develop that power. These opportunities likewise served to stretch their abilities and build additional skills.

4. All of this led to an increase in relevant relationships (including the acquisition of a mentor in top management) and improved their interpersonal and intellectual skills.

5. Finally, these newly acquired skills and relationships then helped them to perform well in their next, more challenging job, which then led to similar experiences as before (Kotter, 1982, p. 47).

This trend identified several key areas of performance that lead to future promotions: reputation, work-related competencies and the building of interpersonal relationships, often with successful senior executives. These skills involve the personal attributes of an individual, and are above and beyond the other factors previously addressed for promotion to flag rank.

Reputation consists of many aspects, not the least of which is that of visibility, stemming from performance initially, and later, the ability to positively impact seniors, peers and subordinates.

2. Visibility Theory

Early in an officer’s career, performance is easily measurable, and it becomes the cornerstone of an officer’s professional reputation. However, as an officer moves upward through the ranks, performance becomes more difficult to measure as high levels of performance are expected from officers of the senior paygrades.
Additionally, by the time an officer reaches the senior levels, the promotion process has (normally) prevented substandard performers from attaining the same rank, and thus, all performance evaluations at this level are of “extremely high caliber” (Moore & Trout, 1978, p. 460). Other than the few senior officers who earn the rare poor performance evaluations at this level, the only distinguishing factor among these officers is their visibility in the form of their network of relationships and service reputation.

How does an officer achieve a high level of visibility? There are two aspects the visibility hypothesis. The first facet is the reputation an officer achieves by serving successfully in a high-visibility job. The second part is those contacts that are made while serving in that job (Moore & Trout, 1978). Thus, if an officer performs well in an initial job, particularly a high-visibility job, it has great potential to contribute to future career success.

What develops is a self-fulfilling prophecy, wherein officers who have proven themselves are not only expected to do well, but are often assigned future jobs based on this expectation. Visible officers transcend the performance reporting system, since their activities will be monitored relatively frequently by influential or potentially influential officers other than their immediate reporting seniors. Moreover, the criteria by which their activity is evaluated will be increasingly influenced by expectations about their future potential, rather than simply the outcomes of their currently assigned duties. (Moore & Trout, 1978, p. 456)
At the junior officer level, billets serve a vital role in the initial establishment of an officer’s visibility and commence a chain of superior fitness reports, with the latter holding the most importance (Moore & Trout, 1978). However, early high-visibility billets are still important at this point to an officer’s career as “early high-visibility billets lead to subsequent high-visibility billets” (Moore & Trout, 1978, p. 462).

Later, the actual impact of performance lessens as an officer rises in seniority and the visibility factor increases dramatically, largely determining the future assignment of an officer. By this point a pattern of superior performance has already formed, and the visible officer, based on his reputation, has been assigned to more elite and higher level jobs working for officers who are themselves outstanding (Moore & Trout, 1978).

By the time an officer reaches the senior paygrades, visibility becomes the greatest factor in promotion. At this point, the officer’s visibility plays a vital role in the selection of career enhancing billets (Moore & Trout, 1978), with the most visible officers claiming those few select billets from which flag officers are made.

That said, it is at this point that the theory combines several of the previously illustrated important components of an officer’s career, such as the importance of job selection and competencies as central elements in determining an officer’s selection to flag rank.

3. Competencies

The final ingredients crucial in the dynamics of those who are selected for flag rank are the officer’s competencies. Because flag officers are expected to be
able to capably operate outside their warfare specialty, other skills and competencies are valued.

a. Behavioral Competencies

In the civilian world, competencies that researchers have noted as being vital to executive success include four behaviorally defined competencies in the areas of Interpersonal Skills, Leadership Skills, Business Management Skills, and Personal Attributes (Byham, Paese and Smith, 2002). A further amplification of these traits includes:

1. Interpersonal Skills: This trait area includes communications, cultural and interpersonal effectiveness, customer orientation, developing strategic relationships and persuasiveness.
2. Leadership Skills: This includes the ability to build organizational talent, change leadership, coach and mentor, empower and delegate, influence others, selling the vision, and team development.
3. Business and Management Skills: This set of competencies includes business acumen, entrepreneurship, establishing strategic direction, global acumen, managing the job, mobilizing resources, and operational decision making.
4. Personal Attributes: These include accurate self-insight, adaptability, driving for results, energy, executive disposition, learning orientation, positive disposition, reading the environment and valuing diversity.

b. Skill Competencies

The Navy’s career framework is built upon the concept that work experience in various billet assignments prepares a person for more challenging and complex future jobs (Brancato, et al., 2004). Jobs held early in a career tend to build functional skills and general organizational knowledge. Later assignments tend to have more complex and ambiguous aspects, requiring the application of much of the
organizational knowledge, skills learned in the past, and the building of secondary skills or competencies (Brancato, et al., 2004).

Recent research of the competencies required for specific Navy flag jobs has created a list of desired secondary skills requisite for successful mission accomplishment in accordance with Sea Power 21\(^6\). These secondary skills are those competencies that flag officers are expected to have mastered in conjunction with their primary skills in the art of naval warfare. They are learned by serving in a job as a junior or senior officer using one or more of these skills on a routine basis (Hanser, 2004).

In order of importance, the key secondary skills include:

1. Joint/Combined Warfare
2. Resource Management
3. Financial Management
4. Strategic Plans/Policy
5. Information Warfare
6. Human Resource Management
7. Logistics and Readiness
8. Acquisition Management
9. Space Warfare
10. Installation Management

Although it is impossible for one officer to have all of these competencies, the “ideal” would be to create a pool of competent O-6 paygrade officers, eligible for flag selection, who have one or more of these skills. Thus, the intention is to identify those mid and senior paygrade officers who exhibit the potential to eventually become flag officers and “groom” them for future promotion by

\(^6\) Sea Power 21 is the Navy’s strategic policy for operations in the 21\(^{st}\) Century.
assigning them to jobs wherein they can master one or more of these secondary skills (Hanser, 2004).

E. SUMMARY

This chapter began with a review of those principles that are central to an officer’s career. The first section commenced with an overview of the history of flag rank, commissioning sources, URL career paths and policy determining the promotion of flag officers. Since these principles cannot determine the differences between those who do and do not promote to flag rank, Chapter II continued with several more variables.

These variables included the milestones in officers’ careers in which they can exercise control over their job assignments. These variables were graduate education, joint education and experience, as well as particular career operational and staff tours.

Finally, the chapter concluded with a section that discussed the unquantifiable personality traits that give an officer the “edge” among their high performing peers in selection to flag rank. These factors were successful career trends, visibility, and the behavioral and performance competencies requisite for being a successful flag officer.
III. DATA AND METHODOLOGY

A. INTRODUCTION

Chapter III presents the research methodology and data on which this thesis is based. Specifically, the chapter includes a description of (1) the archival data on flag officers from Year Groups (YGs) 1972 to 1978 and, (2) the preparation and collection of 18 semi-structured interviews conducted with a convenience sample of active duty and retired flag officers.

B. DATA COLLECTION METHODS

1. Archival Data

Data on the flag officers promoted from YGs 1972 through 1978 were compiled from three sources into a single database. First, using the official Navy biographies of the active-duty flag officers from the year groups in the sample as a foundation, a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet summarizing vital career information was created. Second, career information from the Navy’s Officer Master File (OMF) obtained through the Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC) was combined with the biographical spreadsheet to form a robust career information database. Finally, official Navy flag selection announcements were used to determine the final commands and billets of officers at their time of selection to O-7.

a. Biographical Database

Flag officer biographies were obtained through the Navy’s Flag Officer Biographies portion of the official Navy website. This resource provided 99 Unrestricted Line

http://www.chinfo.navy.mil/navpalib/people/flags/biographies/bios-top.html
Flag officer biographies. Flag officers who did not have their biographies accessible on the Navy website, or did not have complete information in their official biographies were contacted directly. Of six missing biographies, one biography was obtained. Four additional biographies had missing commissioning source data. When requested, all four of the flag officers provided that information. In total, the database included information from 100 complete biographies.

The biographies provided information for five primary factors: commissioning source, community, tours, graduate education, and command opportunities. Commissioning source was divided into three categories. This included the United States Naval Academy (USNA), the Naval Reserve Officer Training Corps (NROTC, which included both NROTC-C and NROTC-S) and Officer Candidate School (OCS, including both OCS and AOCS). Community identification consisted of four categories including Pilot, Naval Flight Officer (NFO), Surface Warfare Officer (SWO) and Submariner.

The tours listed in the database were those held by more than three flag officers and were billets held while in the paygrades of O-4 and above, with the exception of Flag Lieutenant. The graduate education portion of the database listed every university or course of instruction that a member of the cohort had attended and completed.

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8 The other flag officers missing biographies were believed to have recently retired from the Navy and did not respond to requests.

9 A Flag Lieutenant is an officer in paygrades 0-3 or 0-4 who serves on the staff of a flag officer. This billet was included due to the potential for an officer in this job gain visibility (thus increasing promotion potential) amongst senior officers.
successfully. Finally, the command opportunities section listed every sea command that was held by a member of the cohort during the course of their pre-flag career.

b. Officer Master File Database

Archival data on members from Year Groups (YG) 1972 through 1978 were obtained from DMDC. This information was taken from the OPINS (Officer Personnel Information System) in use by DMDC. This system extracts information from the Navy’s Officer Master File (OMF), which is updated quarterly at DMDC. For this study, the following data were extracted from OPINS: date of birth, undergraduate and graduate schools attended, degree(s) awarded, commissioning date, dates of rank from Ensign to current rank, unit identification codes (UIC) for each unit served, designator(s), and advanced qualification designators (AQD). Each entry was organized by officer name and social security number.

The file consisted of 3416 officers ranging in paygrade from Commander (O-5) to Vice Admiral (O-9), including Restricted and Unrestricted Line officers as well as Reserve and Active duty officers. In order to create a database of only URL, active duty flag and O-6 paygrade officers for the study, all officers below the paygrade of O-6 were removed from the database. Second, all Restricted Line (RL) officers (based on their designators\textsuperscript{10}) from all paygrades were removed from the database. Third, all Reserve (USNR) officers (based on their designators) were removed from the database.

\textsuperscript{10} Designator: A numerical indicator of community association. For example, Surface Warfare Officers are 1100, Submariners 1120, Pilots 1310 and Naval Flight Officers, 1320.
Fourth, all female officers were removed from the database. They were removed for two reasons: First, because of the relatively recent lifting of combat exclusion laws (1996), many of the senior female officers have profoundly different career backgrounds than their male counterparts, making it difficult to identify career trends. Second, their number (only one in the case of flag officers, and seven captains) allowed for their removal from the database without a significant change in percentages.

Fifth, all officers who belonged to the Acquisition Professional (AP) community were removed from the database. As AP officers maintain their line designator, these officers were removed based on their AQDs, which indicated that each was a qualified Acquisition Professional. Although an officer in the AP community may maintain a similar career path as a non-AP officer, the majority of officers within the database did not follow the prescribed career path of their parent community. The primary justification for their removal was that a non-AP officer must command a major sea or shore installation to be eligible for flag rank. An officer from the AP community may command such a unit; however, they may also work for, or serve as a project manager during the same period in their careers, thus creating a considerably divergent career compared to their non-AP peers.

With the removal of these five groups of officers, 681 O-6 grade and 108 flag ranked officers remained in the database. The data are complete, with the exception of the dates of promotion for the following ranks: 7 for O-1 and 12 for O-7. The 12 officers missing
their O-7 date of rank were verified as flag officers by their social security number and name. The only figure that this affected was the calculation of age at selection to flag rank. Because of this missing data, archival information regarding age at selection is \( n = 96 \).

Finally, 8 flag officers were removed from the database because their biographies were not available for the biographical database, either because of retirement or unavailability. After this final adjustment of the database, 100 archival entries remained.

c. ALNAV Rear Admiral Selection Messages

The third source of archival data was the Navy messages announcing the selection of new flag officers. These messages, entitled “FY[year] ACTIVE REAR ADMIRAL (LOWER HALF) LINE SELECTIONS” are released by the Secretary of the Navy, and are the Navy’s official announcement of who was promoted from paygrade O-6 to O-7. The messages used for this study date from FY99 through FY05. The primary information taken from these messages included the current duty station and billet for each officer selected to flag rank.

2. Qualitative Data

To ascertain the subtle differences between those who were and were not selected to flag rank, 18 semi-structured interviews with a convenience sample of retired and active-duty flag officers were conducted.

a. Sample Determination

To avoid the inclusion of speculation and/or hearsay into the study, the attempt was made to include only officers that had either been part of a flag officer selection board or had accumulated considerable experience
in flag and senior officer promotions. Lists of members from the O-7 promotion boards dating from FY 1994, 1996, 1998 and 1999 were obtained, as well as current addresses of the flag officers who were members of the boards. This list contained the names of 56 flag officers.

Because of the tremendous workload of active duty flag officers, letters requesting interviews\textsuperscript{11} were sent only to flag officers who had retired since serving on the selection board, with the exception of one active duty flag officer. Of the 56 flag officers on the list, 49 had retired. In order to conduct in-person interviews, a convenience sample was selected of only those flag officers residing within traveling distance.

Out of 49 retired flag officers, 23 resided within traveling distance. Letters detailing the aims of the research and requesting an interview were sent to all 23. Of the letters sent, 9 admirals were willing to be interviewed for the study. In order to bolster the amount of data for the study, 9 additional flag officers were contacted. Table 4 provides background information and contact methods for each of the flag officers interviewed.

\textit{b. Sample Demographics}

To ensure an equal representation of backgrounds, interviewees were selected based on their gender, commissioning source, and date of retirement. As there were very few female flag officers during the mid- to late-1990s when these selection boards took place. Because of this, 17 of the 18 flag officers interviewed were male, only one was female. Eleven of the 18 flag officers were Naval Academy

\textsuperscript{11} The text of the letter is contained in Appendix C.
graduates, slightly higher than the average representation of USNA alumni on the four flag officer promotion boards (Table 5).

Table 4. Biographical Information and Request Method for Flag Officer Sample Members

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Admiral</th>
<th>Warfare Specialty</th>
<th>O-7 Boards</th>
<th>Comm. Source</th>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Ret. Date</th>
<th>Request</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>Sub</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>USNA</td>
<td>O-8</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>Letter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>SWO</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>USNA</td>
<td>O-8</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>Letter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>Sub</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>USNA</td>
<td>O-10</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>In Person</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>Aviation</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>USNA</td>
<td>O-9</td>
<td>1986</td>
<td>Telephone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E</td>
<td>SWO</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>ROTC</td>
<td>O-8</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>E-mail</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>Aviation</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>USNA</td>
<td>O-8</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>Letter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G</td>
<td>SWO</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>ROTC</td>
<td>O-9</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>Letter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H</td>
<td>Aviation</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>USNA</td>
<td>O-10</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>Letter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>SWO</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>USNA</td>
<td>O-8</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>E-mail</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J</td>
<td>SWO</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>ROTC</td>
<td>O-9</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>E-mail</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K</td>
<td>Aviation</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>USNA</td>
<td>O-9</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>E-mail</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L</td>
<td>SWO</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>ROTC</td>
<td>O-8</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>E-mail</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M</td>
<td>Fleet Sup</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>OCS</td>
<td>O-8</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>Letter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>Sub</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>USNA</td>
<td>O-9</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>Letter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O</td>
<td>Sub</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>USNA</td>
<td>O-8</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>Letter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P</td>
<td>SWO</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>USNA</td>
<td>O-9</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>Memo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q</td>
<td>Aviation</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>OCS</td>
<td>O-7</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>Letter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R</td>
<td>Sub</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>ROTC</td>
<td>O-8</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>Letter</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5. Commissioning Sources of O-7 Board Members

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FY</th>
<th>% Academy</th>
<th>% Non-Academy</th>
<th>% Non-Academy</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>94</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>79%</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>96</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>98</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>99</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>59%</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

An attempt was made to interview an equal number of Academy versus non-Academy graduate flag officers, but it was not possible to do so (Table 6).
Table 6. Interviewees by O-7 Selection Board Service

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FY</th>
<th>Academy</th>
<th>% Academy</th>
<th>Non-Academy</th>
<th>% Non-Academy</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>94</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>2 (G,R)</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>96</td>
<td>2 (A,B)</td>
<td>66%</td>
<td>1 (O)</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>98</td>
<td>2 (A,F)</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>2 (M,Q)</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>99</td>
<td>2 (H,N)</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Other | 5 (C,D,I,K,P) | 63% | 3 (E,J,L) | 37% | 8

The flag officers interviewed differed in retirement dates considerably. The flag officer retired the longest was Admiral D, who retired in 1986. The most recently retired was Admiral I, who at the time of the interview, had been retired for five months. 14 of the 18 interviewees retired between 1997 and 2002. Only one of the flag officers interviewed was on active duty.

Although an attempt was made to interview only those flag officers who had taken part in O-7 selection boards, four of the 18 had not. Nevertheless, these officers all had either extensive amounts of personnel management experience or had taken part in selection boards for other senior ranks, or a combination of both. This allowed for the inclusion of data from varying viewpoints, from both inside the selection boards as well as from flag officers not directly involved in the O-7 selection process.

The most junior flag officer interviewed retired as an O-7. The most senior interviewee retired as an O-10. The majority (9 of 18) had retired at the rank of O-8. No O-7 promotion board presidents (who all retired at the rank of O-10) were interviewed for this study, although letters requesting an interview were sent to several.
c. Interviews

An initial set of questions was included in the request for each interview. This provided a general outline of the interview, and gave the interviewee time to formulate thorough responses to the questions. Prior to the commencement of the interview, the interviewees were informed that the interview would be conducted on a non-attribution basis.

The interviews were conducted in a semi-structured format, which allowed for focused, conversational and two-way communication. The majority of interviews took place in person either in the flag officer’s residence or place of work. Only one interview (Admiral M) was conducted over the phone due to scheduling conflicts in attempting to set up an in-person interview. The interviews lasted between 40 and 155 minutes, with an average of 90 minutes. Interview length was determined by the length of reply to each of the questions.

All but three interviews were recorded on audio cassettes. Recordings were made with the interviewee’s direct consent. The interviews that were not recorded were those with Admirals A, D and M. Following the interviews, content analysis was conducted on the recordings, and major categories were transcribed. Following the completion of the review of applicable literature the recordings and transcripts were reviewed to verify the correct identification of major categories.

d. Protocol

The protocol used for the interviews is included in Figure 4. The protocol was developed using information from three sources. The initial framework for the protocol
came from informal discussions with three officers (one in paygrade O-8, one O-6 and one O-4) who had previously served on flag selection boards. Through their guidance, the questions regarding “briefer” quality, the precept and board member knowledge were formed.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interview Protocol</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Please tell me what year you retired, and the number of O-7 selection boards you were a member of.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Is there any importance to the quality or role of the briefer on the selection board?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. What is the importance of having a &quot;well rounded&quot; career for making flag? Specifically, is graduate education or specific tours important for obtaining the experience necessary to be competitive for flag promotion?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. What is the importance of having tours such as Executive Assistant, Flag Aide, and so on? How do those tours factor into flag promotion?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. What is the importance of command tours in flag selection?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Do previous early promotions in an officer's career have any importance to the flag selection board?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. What are the importance of Fitness Report scores and comments in flag selection?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Are flag promotion recommendations important in the selection process? What was your criterion for giving flag promotion recommendations to your subordinates?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Does being known personally by a member of the board have any impact on selection?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Can age be a factor in selection?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. What is the importance of joint education and experience in selection?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. How closely is the precept for the board followed?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 4. Flag Officer Promotion Interview Protocol

The second source was the biographical database and archival data, which provided commissioning source, job history, age, command experience and education. The third source was pertinent research from the literature review.
This included research involving commissioning source, competencies, and the theory of visibility with regard to jobs held during a career and how these factors related to promotion.

Questions during the interview were asked in a sequential order as listed on the protocol. However, if required in the course of the interview, the structure of the questions allowed for flexibility in the order asked.

C. DATA ANALYSIS

Major categories were identified from the audio cassette recordings, or notes taken, and then transcribed. Once transcribed, the data consisted of over 84 single-spaced pages of text. Once the major categories of the interviews were transcribed, the researcher compiled the transcriptions, and conducted content analysis.

The content analysis involved coding the data into relevant categories and sub-categories. As the majority of responses followed the interview protocol, the data were coded by question response. This process involved the creation of categories for each question in the interview protocol. Once the data were coded by question response, the data were again analyzed to determine additional categories that arose from questions not asked by the protocol. A total of 2 categories, encompassing 14 sub-categories, emerged from the data. These categories are outlined in Table 7.
Table 7. Categories and Sub-categories

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category 1. Background Importance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. Commissioning Source</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Graduate Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Staff/Joint/Operation Experience</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. Fitness Reports</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e. Reputation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f. Career Timing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>g. Competencies and Personality</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category 2. The Selection Process</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. Board Fairness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Adherence to Precept</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Board Membership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. Record Briefing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e. Knowledge by Board Member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f. Letters to the Board</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>g. Selection</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Basic principles of grounded theory were used to further analyze the data from the interviews. Thus, a foundation of relevant literature and archival data guided the analysis of the primary data resulting from the interviews in order to best determine the factors influencing flag selection.

D. CHAPTER SUMMARY

This study was based on data drawn from three sources. First, it used data gleaned from the official Navy biographies of 100 flag officers, representing the URL flag officers from YGs 1972 through 1978. Data from the Navy’s OMF was used in conjunction with the database formed from the official biographies, in order to form a robust, single database. Second, the literature review provided substantial background information and a relevant theoretical backdrop to form a comprehensive interview protocol and later to analyze data from the primary data source.
The primary data source consisted of 18 systematic, semi-structured interviews that were conducted with a convenience sample of retired and active duty flag officers who had either served on O-7 selection boards, or had accumulated significant manpower management experience.

In Chapter IV, the data resulting from the analysis of the 18 interviews is presented in 2 categories and 14 sub-categories. Relevant literature and archival data are also presented where necessary to further illuminate the qualitative data.
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There’s always an exception to every single rule out there. That’s why there are no “rules”. You lay out a career path and you say: “Here’s the career path, do well in this career path and you’ll probably do well in the Navy”....There are no guarantees. (Admiral E)

A. INTRODUCTION

Chapter II provided an overview of the literature relevant to the careers and promotion of naval officers. Chapter III discussed the methods by which the data for the study were collected and edited. The chapter also outlined the 2 categories and 14 sub-categories drawn from the 18 flag officer interviews and archival data. Finally, it explained how the relevant literature, in conjunction with archival data formed a background to produce a comprehensive precept to conduct the interviews and later perform analysis on the primary data drawn from the interviews in order to determine the answer to the research question: What are the differences between those who are selected for O-7, and those who remain at O-6?

In this chapter, each of the 14 sub-categories is discussed. Then, specific quotes from the interviews, combined with literature references and tabular archival data are used to further illuminate each category. The chapter commences with the various factors affecting an officer’s selectability to flag rank, and continues through the selection board process. The chapter closes with a summary of those sub-categories important to the selection of officers to flag rank.
B. CATEGORY 1: BACKGROUND IMPORTANCE

The needs of the Navy dictate that our future leaders possess the qualities to excel as leaders and commanders, or in support of operational commanders. Proven excellence in leadership positions is the ultimate measure of the qualities required. Officers may have also demonstrated leadership, skill, integrity, and resourcefulness in other difficult and challenging joint and senior level staff assignments. It is important for the Board to consider the broad range of skills required in the Flag community. (Precept)

The majority of the qualities that will allow an officer to be competitive for promotion take place during the conduct of one’s career. These include graduate and joint education, experience in various tours and billets, Fitness Report scores and comments, and such factors as commissioning source, career timing, and job competencies.

This section begins with the start of a naval officer’s career: the commissioning source, to identify its potential impact on future selection to flag rank.

1. The Importance of an Officer’s Commissioning Source in Selection

   a. Theme

   An analysis of the three data sources, with particular weight given to the testimony of the interviewees, leads to the conclusion that commissioning source does not weigh heavily as a factor in selection to flag rank. Although the literature and archival data suggest an Academy bias, the interviewees all denied any propensity on the part of selection boards to select Naval Academy alumni.
b. Justification

As noted in the literature, it appears that Naval Academy alumni have a significantly higher chance of promotion to flag rank (Bowman, 1991; Brown, Eitelberg & Laurence, 1992; Janowitz, 1971; Moore & Trout 1978; Woelpner, 1998). Drawing from archival data, 56% of flag officers in the sample from Year Groups (YG) 1972 through 1978 graduated from the Naval Academy. The only other schools with more than one alumnus within the sample include: Holy Cross (MA), Georgia Tech, and the Universities of North Carolina and Virginia, each representing a respective 1.8% of the sample population (Appendix D).

Particularly interesting are the division of commissioning sources among the submarine flag officers in the sample. Out of 18 flag officers, only 4 were not Academy alumni (Table 8\textsuperscript{12}).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Community</th>
<th>Commissioning Source</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NFO (n=19)</td>
<td>USNA</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>42%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ROTC</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>OCS</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pilot (n=32)</td>
<td>USNA</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>56%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ROTC</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>OCS</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SUB (n=18)</td>
<td>USNA</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>78%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ROTC</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>OCS</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SWO (n=31)</td>
<td>USNA</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>48%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ROTC</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>OCS</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Whereas Table 8 offers a view of what percentage each commissioning source claims at the flag level in the

\textsuperscript{12} Table 8 is \(n=99\). One flag officer (NFO) in the study was commissioned by the US Air Force Academy, and is not included in the table.
sample, Table 9 further details the numbers of officers promoted to flag rank as contrasted to officers produced by each accession source for FY 1972 through 1975.

Table 9. Flag Officers by Commissioning Source, Year Groups 1972-1975

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year Group</th>
<th>Source</th>
<th>URL Flags</th>
<th>Officers Commissioned</th>
<th>% of Comm. Source</th>
<th>Year Group Total</th>
<th>% of YG Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>USNA</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>739</td>
<td>1.22%</td>
<td>3422</td>
<td>0.26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>OCS</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1692</td>
<td>0.35%</td>
<td>3422</td>
<td>0.18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ROTC</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>991</td>
<td>0.30%</td>
<td>3422</td>
<td>0.09%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>3422</td>
<td>0.53%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>USNA</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>725</td>
<td>1.52%</td>
<td>2868</td>
<td>0.38%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>OCS</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1291</td>
<td>0.15%</td>
<td>2868</td>
<td>0.07%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ROTC</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>852</td>
<td>0.59%</td>
<td>2868</td>
<td>0.17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>2868</td>
<td>0.63%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>USNA</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>822</td>
<td>1.46%</td>
<td>2794</td>
<td>0.43%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>OCS</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>915</td>
<td>0.55%</td>
<td>2794</td>
<td>0.18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ROTC</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1057</td>
<td>0.47%</td>
<td>2794</td>
<td>0.18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>2794</td>
<td>0.79%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>USNA</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>2.00%</td>
<td>2908</td>
<td>0.48%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>OCS</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1134</td>
<td>0.44%</td>
<td>2908</td>
<td>0.17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ROTC</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1074</td>
<td>0.37%</td>
<td>2908</td>
<td>0.14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>2908</td>
<td>0.79%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In contrast to the obvious conclusions from the literature and data, the interviewees noted without hesitation that there was no special consideration given to commissioning source during the flag selection process.

Although being an Academy alumnus may have assisted in an officer’s promotion during the time period of Janowitz’s (1971) study, the recent members of the O-7 selection board didn’t consider the commissioning source at all. Admiral I stated:

Where you went to school makes no difference on the flag board. They give it two seconds glance....The fact that you’re Naval Academy or University of Mississippi doesn’t mean squat.

---

13 Commissioned Number and Year Group Number entries reflect total number of URL and RL officers commissioned.
In the same category, Admiral J, a non-Academy graduate, stated:

I never heard a derogatory comment about a commissioning source, and I never heard the Naval Academy, for example, as a reason, at all, to support our selection.

Likewise, Admiral C bluntly discounted an officer’s commissioning source as a reason for selection:

Given equal qualifications, it doesn’t mean a damn where you graduated; the “ring-knocker” stuff is a bunch of crap. I have never seen that in selection boards.

And Admiral D made it a point of ensuring non-Academy graduates were selected without bias while he was CNP noted:

I never saw a bias with regard to commissioning source. In fact, I would rejoice anytime I saw an OCS or ROTC graduate promote into the higher ranks.

On the other hand, Admiral Q, a non-Academy graduate, did note that there had been a propensity to select Academy graduates in the past, but no longer:

Look at the CNO. Look at Boorda. The current CNO has broken that [propensity towards USNA graduates]. Boorda broke that. I wasn’t an Academy guy. A lot of my friends weren’t Academy guys.

In each of the interviews with a submariner flag officer, a question was asked about the propensity of the submarine force to promote Academy graduates given the high percentage of graduates within the data set. Considering that submarine warfare flag officers are selected by a selection board made up of members from various commissioning sources, the data appeared quite unusual.
Admiral R, one of the minority non-Academy submarine admirals, succinctly stated:

First of all...the submariners had the first cut in convincing [the midshipmen] to come into the submarine force. So you had to have the academic standing to be selected by Admiral Rickover.... So you’re getting...a high percentage of your very bright officers coming from the Naval Academy. That’s not to say that you’re not getting an equal amount out of some NROTC units, but you’re starting out with a uniquely intelligent group from the Naval Academy who are, fundamentally, going to make this a career. And you have a quota that you have to meet that Rickover established and was carried out, of officers and the Naval Academy putting the arm on guys who were qualified who could be accepted into the nuclear program. So you’re getting a higher cut of people [from the Academy] relative to the other branches; aviation or surface.

Beyond the commissioning source of an officer, the research leads to the next academic milestone, that of graduate education.

2. Graduate Education
   a. Theme

Graduate education is highly encouraged for all officers. However, pairing the literature (Buterbaugh, 1995) with the archival data, it appears that graduate education plays far less of a factor than expected in flag officer selection. In contrast to these two sources, the opinion among the interviewees was overwhelmingly positive towards graduate education. In conclusion, it appears that although graduate education is important, it is a variable that may be outweighed by other performance variables in selection to flag rank.
b. Justification

As was expected from the literature (Buterbaugh, 1995), the flag officers in the data sample had a surprisingly high number of members (29%) who did not have a graduate degree (Table 10).

Table 10. Number of Graduate Degrees Held by Flag Officers in the Sample

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>None</th>
<th></th>
<th>One</th>
<th></th>
<th>Two</th>
<th></th>
<th>Three</th>
<th></th>
<th>PhD</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| SWO   | 5    | 15%| 17  | 50%| 6   | 18%| 1     | 3%| 2   | 6%
| SUB   | 6    | 29%| 10  | 48%| 2   | 10%| 0     | 0%| 0   | 0%
| Pilot | 9    | 26%| 19  | 54%| 2   | 6% | 1     | 3%| 1   | 3%
| NFO   | 9    | 47%| 7   | 37%| 2   | 11%| 1     | 5%| 0   | 0%
| Total | 29   | 29%| 53  | 53%| 12  | 12%| 3     | 3%| 3   | 3%

In contrast to the conclusions drawn from the data and literature, the majority of interviewees noted the importance of graduate education. Admiral L viewed graduate education as having two benefits:

Graduate education is important along the way because one, it can put you into a subspecialty that is important to the Navy and two, it’s a discriminator. Without it, it’s easy for someone to say at some future board: “He doesn’t have a master’s degree.” Because having one is the norm, not having one means it’s unusual, and you don’t want to ever have something unusual in a negative sense about you.

Admiral H saw graduate education as a definitive need in today’s operational environment:

It is necessary and useful to have the education in order to do your job....In this world, it is a very rare circumstance for an individual whose undergraduate experience will carry him all the way through. I think it’s wrong to make it an on/off switch but it’s very important for the needs of the Navy to have individuals who are... educated beyond the undergraduate level.
Bringing the operational environment into the equation, Admiral Q stated:

I think it’s critical. The problem with the Navy is that we just don’t have enough time in the day. But, the guys that fit it all in, and are still good operators....I’d say it’s a strong factor.

The goal of education is to allow an officer to perform at a higher level while in their given duties. These duties, whether they be working in an at-sea or shore environment weigh heavily on the qualifications of an officer to select to flag rank.

3. The Importance of Staff/Joint/Operational Experience
   a. Theme

The tours officers serve throughout their career form the core of their background experiences and thus become one of the major predictors of future selection. Some of the jobs, such as Executive Assistant (EA), provide an officer with flag-level experiences, making it an ideal job for future promotion potential. Other jobs, such as joint tours, are mandated for selection to flag rank. Overall, while it was agreed that officers had to be exceptionally competent in their warfare community, they also must have the experiences of jobs offered by such commands as the Bureau of Personnel (BUPERS), Office of Legislative Affairs (OLA), OPNAV and the Joint Staff.

b. Justification

A review of the archival data revealed several job trends within the study group, which agrees with the “necessary” jobs noted by Walsh’s (1997) study, and the requisite experience gained from “complex” jobs in the senior ranks as noted by Thie (2004).
First, all of the flag officers in the study had attained their requisite warfare milestones, including command and major command. It is notable that there were very few trends among the units that the members of the sample commanded. The only exception was within the submarine community, where all but one flag officer commanded attack submarines (SSN) for their O-5 command tour. Although it could not be assessed through the data, the interviews gave a glimpse at the importance of command, and the weight given it in the selection for flag promotion. Admiral C stated:

Command, to me, is the epitome of the challenge a good naval officer faces and then enjoys. Performance in command proves professional competence; it proves leadership ability and competence, and the ability to take on various tasks often with very, very short notice and perform acceptably or better than acceptably.

Admiral H further detailed the benefits of command:

There’s no substitute for command experience.... My experience is that command, in all of the warfare specialties is absolutely essential and command at all levels is generally necessary and appropriate. Where there is an exception made... we would skew the leadership in an unhealthy way not to value highly those who have had command in line positions of authority and accountability.

In discussing the attributes of command, Admiral F said:

One of the things I looked for in promotions into the flag community: I was looking for somebody, quite frankly, that had been stress-tested. There are many paths to flag, and some of them are more stressful than others. Quite frankly, I think that for being a flag officer - not questioning the moral character or ethics that go along with
tough decision making - the next best attribute
or quality that one should look at is how they
handled the tremendous weight of responsibility.
Those who have been through these stress-laden
positions and have weathered them well and
excelled in that environment generally will do
well as a flag officer.

Continuing in the category of the “proving”
stress of command positions, Admiral J said the following:

[The flag boards] were looking for operational
experience in which the officer had the
opportunity to demonstrate his or her warfare
skill, leadership abilities, deal with real-world
contingencies....Those who did well in the
stressful circumstances understandably get some
extra credit for that. For captains who are being
looked at for flag, key operational assignments
are important. Major command, and again, the
more those people were stressed in those key
operational assignments, and lived up to their
tasking, fulfilled the mission, lead people well,
have good retention rates....All those things are
factored in.

Admiral O tied in an officer’s performance in
command as a predictor of potential for future flag
selection:

I think that at the end of command....I think you
can pick the guys that have the high probability
of making flag. The reason I say that, is that if
he has done well as a division officer, as a
department head, as an executive officer and as a
commanding officer, and when I say “done well”,
I’m not just talking about “okay”, I’m talking he
stands out amongst all the commanding officers in
the end, he’s 1 of 8, or whatever in his peer
group, I think that guy has a very high probability [of promotion].
However, doing well at sea isn’t always the best predictor of selection to flag rank. Too much time at sea, in fact, can actually become a detriment to an officer’s career:

...in my time, [we] had guys in the surface community, and the aviation community that made flag, that made three star, and they were known as “operators”. “I never want to go to that god-damned Pentagon, that’s for a bunch of weenies. I’m an operator; I’ll never leave the waterfront!” Those days are long gone. You may make it to Captain, but you’re not going to make it to flag officer as nothing but an operator.

Admiral E further elaborated about staying at sea too long:

We don’t need admirals who know how to drive ships. We need admirals who know how to plan battle groups, and know how to do other things. We don’t need admirals who just know how to drive ships. So, you’ve got to have something more to offer to the community.

And command at sea isn’t the only “proving” tour for an officer; it was the overall challenge of the job. Admiral B commented:

“Hard” within all of the communities, doesn’t necessarily relate to a particular type of ship or unit. For example, it was very well recognized that commanding a major shore station could be just as challenging, and often more challenging, than commanding a cruiser for a surface guy.... It’s the nature of the challenge and the issues that that person had to deal with.

In addition to command, board members look for officers with a broad background:

Flag boards look for broadening in the career. As a matter of fact...most flag board precepts said something...about the breadth of experience of
officers. When you come down to it, you can be the best combat pilot in the world, you can be the best shipdriver that ever lived, you can hold your submarine on depth absolutely perfectly... but we don’t ask flag officers to do any of those things. We ask flag officers to know a lot about ...every one of those realms. (Admiral J)

Admiral Q, however, cautioned about getting too much variety at the expense of knowledge depth:

Variety is a huge positive factor. The more exposure you get, joint, operational, education, the more positive....A lot of times [however], the guy who’s interested in punching the ticket has a lot of variety, but has no depth. The real key is to find a guy who has a lot of variety in positions with depth.

Interviewees cautioned about spending too much time at sea, and encouraged variety in a career background. In order to accomplish this, there are three areas in which an officer can gain invaluable, broadening experience. The first of these areas is joint service. Admiral K discussed the nature of becoming “Joint”:

...somebody that is...in the fleet their whole life and they are reported to be “the finest fleet operator”....They were CO of a ship, they were CO of a DESRON [Destroyer Squadron]...they worked on a cruiser destroyer group staff; they did all those things....They come up for flag officer and you’re looking at them....They’ve got no joint experience, and they have to get joint experience to even be eligible for flag. If they don’t have joint experience...people aren’t going to want them, except by de-facto pull.

Admiral F commented on the necessity of joint experience:

Joint tours are critical. The importance of being joint is manifold...the ability to integrate, collaborate and cooperate among the
services is an essential ingredient to success, and only those that have had the opportunity to experience that first hand can understand its importance.

A second invaluable experience for broadening an officer’s background is a Washington experience. Admiral K explained the value of having Washington experience early in a career:

You can’t bring...flag officers...to Washington for the first time and ask them to be the warfare specialist...if they’ve never served in Washington and don’t understand the budget cycle, the POM cycle, don’t understand The Hill. You’re looking for people that have these other qualifications because as you get more senior, it’s still important to be number one, a warrior, but you also have to...man those desks and serve the Navy.

Admiral N talked about Washington duty as an officer’s chance to make their record stand out during selection:

I was once told by Admiral [name deleted] that: “If your record doesn’t look different than the next guy’s, then you’ll be treated as one of the herd.” Somewhere in your career you need to have done something that stands out and you need to have done it successfully. [Name deleted], the last commander down here, spent a bunch of time on Capitol Hill as a young Lieutenant. He worked for a guy named Cohen....Over the years, he kept coming back to Legislative Affairs...that was his ticket to stardom. It was a little different than everyone else’s. There are other guys I know that were the best of ten guys in the financial department. They might not have made it otherwise. They just had that difference.

Several of the interviewees commented on the “right” jobs for flag selection. Admiral E pointed out:
You got to be in the right jobs. I mean, in the right jobs in the right place. It’s not the fact that you’re 1 of 10. Even if you’re 1 of 10 in Timbuktu, or out in the boonies somewhere, you’re not near the community leadership; it’s not going to matter....The real Washington tour though, is in OPNAV. That’s where the budgets are, that’s where the requirements process is, that’s where the decisions are made. Those are the people that are going to make big decisions about the Navy in the future. [Then] there are traditional flag making jobs: The CNO’s Strategic Studies Group, traditionally a lot of people make flag out of there. The Bureau, key jobs in Washington, EA [Executive Assistant] jobs...though some haven’t done well, the OLA [Office of Legislative Affairs] jobs tend to do very well... Type Commander Chief of Staffs, although again, no guarantee, EA to the Fleet Commanders, and Chief of Staff to the numbered fleets... For Submariners, there’re the Submarine Development Groups, those are key jobs for them; they tend to be flag-makers...

Admiral E also discussed how some officers are detailed into these jobs:

It’s been my experience that the communities know who the up-and-comers are, and they actually start detailing them, based on that. “Okay, we want this guy to go be Commandant of the Naval Academy”, because that’s a flag-making job. “We want this guy to be PERS-41, the head detailer,” because that’s a flag-making job. So you kind of pick guys to go to these jobs based on the fact that they are going to be your future flags in the community.

Table 11 is a listing of twelve common jobs that officers selected for flag rank from 1998 through 2004 held at the time of their selection.
Table 11. Common Jobs at Flag Selection, 1998-2004

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Job</th>
<th>Selected</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CVN Commanding Officer</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N8 Staff, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J3 Staff, Joint Chiefs of Staff</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Office of Legislative Affairs</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chief of Naval Operations Strategic Studies Group</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J8 Staff, Joint Chiefs of Staff</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COS to Commander, Naval Air Force, Pacific Fleet</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J5 Staff, Joint Chiefs of Staff</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COS to Commander, SEVENTH Fleet</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Executive Assistant to the Chief of Naval Operations</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Executive Assistant to the Vice Chief of Naval Operations</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Director, Naval Aviation Officer Distribution, PERS 43</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 11 can be viewed in its entirety in Appendix E.

Many of the interviewees placed a heavy emphasis on Executive Assistant (EA) jobs as those by which many officers gain both the experience, and the visibility for future flag selection, which coincides with the findings of Moore and Trout’s (1978) research. Table 12 outlines the number of flag officers in the sample that had served in EA tours.

Table 12. Number of Flag Officers in Sample Who Served in Executive Assistant and other Staff Positions.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Community</th>
<th>EA</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NFO</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pilot</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>41%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SUB</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>39%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SWO</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>48%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total in all communities who served in other staff billets:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EA (Multiple Tours)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEA (Deputy EA)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SA (Special Assistant)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DSA (Deputy Special Assistant)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NA (Naval Aide)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MA (Military Aide/Assistant)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flag Aide/Lieutenant</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Regarding the advantages and disadvantages of EA tours, Admiral C, noted:

The Executive Assistant has the advantage—or disadvantage—of being very visible and having a lot of interface with people more senior than he. There, clearly, you either have a chance to fall on your sword or be more widely known professionally. When I was selected for flag rank, there was no one on the flag board at the time I hadn’t interfaced with in the course of my professional assignments. Is that an advantage? I think so. You’re a known entity.

Admiral F continued:

It seems like, and it may be, in fact, viewed as the most important ticket to punch to flag. I mean, if you look at, and study...those O-7’s selected that did have an EA type tour, there’s no doubt about it that they had a competitive edge.

Whereas an EA tour may make an officer slightly more competitive for flag, officers selected for flag that held EA jobs are hand-picked for those positions based on their previous performance. Admiral O talked about high performing officers who are front-runners for flag selection:

...he’s completed the major command, and he’s going into a job that would set him up for flag. It’s not the job, it’s just the right condition of that...they include such jobs as EA to senior flags, like the CNO or Vice Chief or...something like that. Wherever he goes, you can look back historically and see that almost every person that had that job made flag. Does putting a guy in a job make him make flag? No. It’s that performance he had, going through the wickets, doing really, really well that somebody—-not just somebody, but Navy leadership—-says that this guy looks like he’s ready to go to flag.... He’s got the history.... He’s not in that job
because someone is going to push him to make flag. He’s in that job because he’s already proven that he could be a flag officer.

Admiral C talked about the officers he hand-picked to be his EAs while CNO:

...When you’ve got the key to the people locker, you get...the best people. My Executive Assistants--the number two guy in the office--were hand-selected for the job. They were always superstar performers in their professional life [and they] were generally people who had already been recognized as having probable flag capability. My Executive Assistants were both guys who were selected [for flag], while in the job as EAs, and would have been, even if they hadn’t come there.

If these jobs are the ones into which the best officers are placed, what benefit do they receive from the job? For one of the answers to this, Moore and Trout (1978) talked about the “visibility” of an officer and its role in future promotion in that it overcame the effects of pure performance as a promotion variable, with the knowledge and reputation of an officer weighing most heavily in the selection process.

Another valuable experience learned while serving as an EA is how the Navy works at the upper levels. Admiral O commented:

...he sits in on a lot of upper-level stuff with the CNO. So, no matter where he goes in the future, he can say “I know,” for a year or two years, or however long he was in that job, “I know how the top levels of the Navy think about the various things”...it really gives him a grounding in high-level decision making that he would not have had unless he had that job.
Admiral Q talked about the benefits that both his junior and senior aides had in the job:

I’d say my flag aides are better off as naval officers because they sat in the corner and said: “Whoa, I didn’t realize that” or “Whoa, politics do play” or “Wow, is that guy ever screwed up, I don’t want to be like him!” Not only is it interesting, but, it was a maturing factor.

In discussing the benefits of the EA experience in his own career, Admiral P stated:

Certainly an EA position gives you a perspective that you wouldn’t have if you were just an action officer working for a flag or staff officer working somewhere, because now you see the breadth of the issues that flag officers are dealing with...flag officers are working the “big Navy” perspective, and as a Commander/Captain you’re working in an area rather more narrow. So if you get the chance to be an EA, you learn a lot. I was Deputy EA to the Vice Chief [of Naval Operations] for 27 months....The Vice Chief is the XO, running all the details and how the Navy operates day to day, and I was his policy and admin person...all the policy things, all the decisions, all the flag orders came through me to the Vice Chief. So the education I got there on how the Navy operates was dramatic.

Is the EA job a mandatory experience in the making of a flag officer?—certainly not. The interviewees noted that it was simply a way to learn the top-level practices of the Navy. Admiral J commented:

...the EA job’s a good one. But, are there other good ones? You bet. Command of a major shore activity is a huge job, stressful in its own way, varying from one activity to another.... Leadership, in addition to the stressful nature of the job is another big qualifier for folks in the non-seagoing assignments.
Admiral H cautioned about “flag making” jobs:

Too much of a reliance upon a typical “pattern” is a pitfall and the system is not well served when it is required to recognize that getting an EA slot with a senior flag officer is an...essential check in the box to being promoted. There are too many examples of people never having such jobs that went on to success in their careers.

Admiral C talked about jobs that weren’t considered to be the “ideal” jobs a career:

You’ll hear complaints from people about “I got a lousy job”. Let me tell me that there aren’t too many lousy jobs. There are jobs in which people do a lousy job of performing.

Admiral J commented further:

Many of us who were detailers and placement officers were asked...what the “great” jobs were. We used to say: “There are no bad jobs; there are jobs in which people do badly and don’t get ahead.” Do the best damn job you can, wherever you find yourself situated, and generally, the system we have will do a pretty good job of recognizing it....People are picked for flag from some jobs that would be considered by the constituency to be “unusual”. Well, when that happens, it’s because they did an unusually fine job in it.

Admiral E also mentioned:

You talk about flag-making jobs; we talk about career enhancing jobs. My theory was we could make a job career enhancing by promoting the guys who got sent to them.

In the larger perspective, the exact job an officer has doesn’t matter to a great extent. What matters is the background an officer has developed and what role
they have assumed as future leadership of the Navy, according to Admiral P:

What matters is: What is your big-picture contribution to the Navy as a whole? What role are you playing in the top management of the Navy? So really, it doesn’t have as much to do with how well you’ve done. How well you’ve done gets you under consideration. These 110 [competitive] captains, I would say any one of them could be a successful flag officer, but what does the Navy need; what does “the company” need in expertise to continue doing what it’s trying to accomplish?

Whereas the jobs an officer has throughout their career can broaden their background and give them the requisite experiences for flag selection, it is how they perform in the job that really makes a difference in their chances for selection. Performance is documented by the Navy’s Fitness Report process.

4. Fitness Reports

FITREPs are important, extremely important. (Admiral C)

a. Theme

Fitness Reports (FITREPs) play a vital role in the selection process of an officer to flag rank. There are three portions of a FITREP: a numerical trait average on a 1 to 5 scale, a section for comments from the rating officer, and a section for ranking an officer against his peers. (See Appendix F for a FITREP outline.) This latter section, by far, carries the most weight in the selection process. The reason for this is that it’s an objective number regarding where an officer breaks out against his peers, in contrast to potentially inflated trait averages or comments. The section that holds secondary importance
is the comments section. Whereas this portion has the potential to be inflated, negative comments (either overt or “between the lines”) can have a significant effect on the selection of an officer for promotion. Finally, the trait averages are expected to be perfect for an officer competitive for flag selection because of grade inflation as well as the true stellar performance of the candidate. Any significant deviation from top marks as a senior officer would send a negative message to the board.

Two other factors that contribute toward the impact of a FITREP are: the person who wrote the FITREP and the presence (or lack) of a flag promotion recommendation. For the former, a glowing FITREP from an O-10 far outweighs a similarly stellar FITREP written by an O-4, simply because of the experience level and reputation of the writer. Flag promotion recommendations are a single line or two that recommend that the flag selection board promote the officer to flag. These lines begin to be present (though are uncommon) in officer’s FITREPs at the O-3 paygrade and become the norm at the O-6 paygrade for top performing officers. If these statements are not present in the FITREP of a senior officer before the flag selection board, it conveys an extremely negative message to the board.

b. Justification

Typically, only an officer’s latest FITREPs are thoroughly reviewed at the flag selection board. As Admiral E stated:

The thing is...when you look at a record...on a flag board you’re not looking at Ensign Fitness Reports; all you really care about are from command on.
Admiral I continued:

They spread these records out, and you read maybe 5, 10 of them....You start back with Ensign, but you don’t really tend to look at those things too much because, after all, the guy did make Captain. So you’re starting to home in maybe on the Commander command/Captain and major command certainly.

Although not holding as much importance as the rankings, the wording and the authorship of the FITREP are significant factors in the review of an officer’s record. As Admiral B put it:

The quality of comments is critically important. That’s part of the reason why your early record tends to be less looked at, or more discounted, in selection for flag than your later record...there’s a higher probability of being rated with your FITREPs being written by someone who doesn’t understand how the FITREP system works [early in a career].

Admiral N discussed the category of comment importance:

FITREP comments are very important. There are some guys that write flowery fitness reports and they come across so gushy that they get laughed at. It gets embarrassing sometimes. Other guys come across so quickly, so much to the point, it doesn’t even have to be really long.

Admiral C continued:

The wording is important to draw out a picture of the individual being graded. I have problems with people who feel that fitness reports are based on the volume of words included. I used to have one commanding officer who used to pride himself on very, very terse reports, but I will say they were about as incisive as any I have ever read. He just made a point. He was cryptic in his remarks, and yet he thoroughly evaluated the individual....I’ve seen fitness reports that have
two addendum sheets onto that, and frankly, they don’t say much more than the guy who does it all in one paragraph.

However, a member of the flag board reads hundreds of FITREPs during the course of a flag selection board. The wording becomes vital. Admiral E:

...how do you catch the guy who’s on his 100th record...and every record has had eight fitness reports; so 800 fitness reports? How do you get him to sit up and say: “I’m going to look at this one”....Most people read the first paragraph, and read the last paragraph. If they find something they were really interested in, they might go back and read: “Little Johnny was Electrical Officer for six months”. Fine, but what did you really think about Little Johnny? And you put that in the first paragraph, and the last paragraph. And that’s where it says: “Recommended for Flag” or...“If I had to go to war, this is the guy I’d want with me”. Lines like that stick. They get their attention....I can document what you’ve done...that’s immaterial. What I really want to document is your potential. Where are you going? What’s your future in the Navy? ...that’s what the board is looking for.

One of the things that makes a FITREP stand out, is a recommendation to promote the officer to flag rank. Although not policy, the recommendation is enough of a wide-spread tradition that it is expected on competitive FITREPs for senior officers. Admiral E stated:

If an admiral signs a fitness report on an officer...Commander and above, and doesn’t say that [recommended for flag promotion] then that’s sending the inverse message...you just have to say it. It just goes without saying....It’s hard to make flag without someone notice that you have flag potential at some point.

Admiral F also discussed the importance of the recommendation:
Without it, they wouldn’t be considered. That’s an important indication. It’s more of a signal, it’s a note to say: “Do look at this report more carefully because of that recommendation”.

Admiral K continued the category:

If you don’t have it, it’s a disaster. Some of that is just bad writing, particularly still by the reserves and some small communities maybe that just don’t get it. But the education process is that a flag officer...knows how to write a FITREP.

Admiral I discussed the impact of both a missing flag promotion recommendation as well as other wording:

If you don’t have that recommendation, that is a bad deal. That’s not good; especially if you don’t have it as a captain. If you’re not recommended for flag as a captain, the odds are there’s a message being sent to the board....Certainly bad words: “He’s not ready”, or faint praise: “I recommend him for positions of great responsibility”. What does that mean?

Admiral C described the reasons he would write a flag promotion recommendation for an officer, and reasons why he would consciously not write a recommendation:

When I saw an officer whom I thought demonstrated potential for flag rank I saw that it went into his Fitness Report....I think that’s the responsibility of a flag rank officer: To look very, very carefully...after all, they have the experience and the background to recognize what it takes to perform flag duties and they have the responsibility to designate those who they think can handle that job for future selection....I’d like to note [also] that on one occasion, as a flag officer, I recommended one of my senior subordinates, an O-6, not be selected for flag rank, despite the fact that he had made all the check-points in terms of command and major command. But, his demeanor was such that I didn’t
see him as capable of leading large groups of people.

The interviewees noted that the rare record with flag promotion recommendations continuing from the time an officer was an O-3 or O-4 was often a predictor of an officer who would promote to O-9 and O-10. Admiral C recalled:

...I saw this officer’s record when he was up for O-5 to O-6 selection. He had never been anything but number one in any rank in all his commands. He had had “flag material” comments from the time he was a Lieutenant. I might say that he retired as a four star.

As Admiral C noted, another major factor was the ranking of the officer against his peers. Admiral K commented:

The number one thing...that you can’t get away from is your ranking--particularly at the O-6 level. You know, it’s the law of numbers. If a guy recommends you for flag and four star and [ranks] you “3 of 6”, your chances are slim. You’ve got to be number one or number two at the worst....If you’re a shit hot guy, and everybody in that board says you’re shit hot, but that cruiser-destroyer group guy ranks you five of six CO’s in that battlegroup, it’s almost impossible to overcome.

Admiral C also noted the importance of rankings on the FITREPs, and the drawback of not having a large group to be rated against:

I put a lot more stock in the comparative markings than I did in the actual markings. I
think most people do. Somebody who stands out as one of the top 3 people in a group of 20 is more important in assessing his ability than the fact that he’s got perfect marks and he’s a 1 of 1.

Admiral E agreed:

If a guy is always one of one, and never gets competed with, that’s not good either. You can be the best in the world, but if you never compete with the other talent [it has a detrimental effect]...

Several interviewees discussed how the rankings played a large part in the determination of which records would be removed from further consideration on the flag board. Admiral I mentioned this scenario:

Let’s suppose that you’re...Captain Jones, and you rank one of four. That’s really good, that’s a good deal--for a significant amount of time. You’re on deployment and you rank one out of four. The briefer doesn’t even have to speak English; he doesn’t have to do anything, and [the board is] going to vote him into the 500 [cut]. Believe me. It’s going to go quick.

After removing more records from the selection process, Admiral B discussed the relative rankings of the officers that remained:

What you see in the [officers] prior to the top 200 [candidates] is that 20% – 30% of their rankings are “1 of”, 70% [of their rankings] would be “2” or “3 of”, maybe even “5” or “6 of”. Whereas the top 200 are ranked “1” or “2 of” all the time. So that is the difference....The really telling tale is where you get ranked, because you can’t cheat that.

The final major factor with FITREPs is the author. Admiral N said:

One of the big things that carries a lot of weight...is who wrote the fitness report. I know
it sounds...like nepotism, but very frankly, very few of us got to make admiral because we were so much better than the guy who didn’t....If you have a guy who’s coming up and all of a sudden the guy who wrote his fitness reports was the guy who was CNO, was CINCPACFLT\textsuperscript{14}, and this and that and all of them said the same thing over a period of years, that’s kind of important.

Just as the reputation of the FITREP signer is important, the reputation of the officer coming before the selection board is just as important.

5. Reputation

a. Theme

Of all the attributes of an officer that are weighed on a board, reputation may be one of the most important. The reputation of an officer, as an operator, planner, staffer, leader, and so forth, can overshadow nearly every other factor in the selection board. Some interviewees considered this the most important variable in selection, as it had a direct positive or negative effect on the career of an officer to that point.

b. Justification

Admiral I talked about the importance of reputation, which starts from the day an officer is commissioned:

\ldots from day one, when you’re an ensign, you’re going to get something called a service reputation. You’re going to be known by somebody. As you get more senior, you’re going to be known by a lot more “somebodies.” I’m not just talking about your peers....When you get to this league...your service reputation really starts to be a big deal, much more than your fitness reports.

\textsuperscript{14} Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, now Commander, Pacific Fleet (COMPACFLT), an O-10 position.
Admiral H detailed how the importance of reputation grows throughout the career of an officer:

As the pyramid gets more narrow, there is an additional factor, service reputation, which is beyond what’s just written on the paper, beyond the marks and beyond the comments...as the community, as the individuals about whom you’re talking gets smaller...you’re reputation among your subordinates your peers and your superiors is going to become more and more well known, and it counts as a factor in the selection process.

Although an officer’s reputation starts as a junior officer, the point at which it becomes well known is at the executive officer (XO) and commanding officer (CO) levels, which confirms the thesis of Moore and Trout’s (1978) visibility theory. Admiral E mentioned:

Commander command is the turning point....Your reputation is made as an XO and a CO, and where you break out as a CO is going to have a lot to do with it. I also think that what you do in between has a lot to do with it. I had six tours in Washington. I’d go to sea, come back to Washington, go to sea, come back to Washington. Other guys, stayed on the waterfront, did different things, work for the type commanders....Everybody has a different way of getting there, but [what’s important is]...what kind of reputation you have.

Admiral I brought up how a poor service reputation can work against an officer in the selection process:

We used to have a lot of screamers. That will come into play sometimes on the board. “He’s a screamer”. You can’t really say that. Does it say he’s a screamer in the Fitness Report? Your service reputation...there’s probably three or four guys that know you and know you’re a screamer, so the question is: Is his record so good, and the precept so much that we want
another jerk in the flag community? And the answer usually is no. So again, service reputation.

One of the last major variables determining flag selection is the career timing of an officer.

6. Career Timing
   a. Theme

Another vital factor in the selection of an officer to flag rank is career timing. This category is affected by three variables. First is the timeline by which officers are expected to achieve certain career milestones. The second variable is the potential harm, or conversely, benefit to an officer from receiving one (or more) early promotions. The final variable is the age of an officer, and whether or not the board considers the person too close to retirement to select for flag rank.

Officers are expected to achieve certain “milestones” in their career progression within a specific window of years in service. Sometimes, if an officer is too early, or conversely, too late, in their career timing, it may make them ineligible for certain jobs requisite for continued promotion. Another effect that career timing can have is in the competencies of an officer. The precept, issued by the Secretary of the Navy, sets guidelines for who the selection board chooses for flag rank based on the current and projected skill needs of the Navy. Some officers have skills that were in demand earlier in their careers, but as they moved into the more senior ranks, their skills became obsolete, such as skills in flying a decommissioned aircraft type, or specialization in a certain program that was later cancelled. A final factor in timing is in an officer’s creation of associations with
other officers, whether they are peers or superiors, who later are involved in assisting the officer attain various career milestones.

The chances for an officer to be promoted to flag can also be helped or hindered by early promotions. For a select few officers, early promotions in the junior ranks can speed them on a path to attaining flag rank at a younger age, thus allowing for more years of service as a flag officer before retirement becomes necessary. However, for many officers, early promotion thrusts them into positions of responsibility for which they were not yet fully prepared (or miss entirely) causing them to perform poorly, and thus hinder their chances at future promotion.

Finally, age plays a small factor in the selection board process. In years past, age had a significant role in the selection of flag officers because of the statutory retirement age of 62, or 35 years of service. With the recent increasing of retirement age, age is no longer as much of a consideration in the selection process. However, it still has a role in determining if an officer will, because of his age or health, remain on active duty past paygrade O-7 or O-8.

b. Justification

Admiral H delineated the factor of timing in the qualifications of an officer and how the needs of the Navy contribute to their importance:

...timing is an important factor that frankly, you can’t foresee ahead of time. If they go from sail to steam it’s going to change some particular issues for particular individuals. In a sense, that’s another side of the needs of the service issue, as looked at for a particular individual at a particular time at a particular
circumstance. His qualifications may have seemed to be the best last year, or the year before, but it may not necessarily be a static thing.

Working for relevant people is how Admiral K termed career timing:

For those typically relevant people, like me, either keep being relevant by working for people who are also relevant, and who are also going to be part of the Navy’s decision process on who is going to be the Navy’s future leaders, or you run out of relevant people and everybody says: “This guy’s good but, THIS guy, look what he got from a three star. This [first] guy’s working for a Captain now. We know two tours ago that he worked for Snuffy, but Snuffy’s not around here anymore, and I don’t even remember....Was he surface warfare or aviation?”

Admiral N noted how his eventual attainment of flag rank was dependant upon good timing:

There are a lot of guys who deserve to be admirals who didn’t make it. Classmates of mine--who taught me a lot of things--didn’t make it. And the reason they didn’t make it is because they weren’t at the right place at the right time with the right guy who wrote the right words. And I was. “Blind ass luck” is what it’s called.

The next factor, the effect of early promotions brought mixed opinions. However, the majority still felt that the potential for early promotions to harm a career was greater than their potential to help it. Admiral K noted:

Early promotions can be a tremendous thing for the person who got to the opportunity to see stuff. But, for the person it short-sheets of experience where they’re now going to compete with guys that have had a joint tour, or have worked on that staff and know how the boss is going to be thinking, versus this brilliant kid....I guess it can go either way. I’ve seen it
go wonderfully well for the Navy with folks like Admiral [name deleted] who didn’t need as much time as me to assimilate the lessons learned at that particular rank or in that particular job....But there are just as many who get thrown into that next job and all of a sudden are not as effective...because they missed out on a stepping stone or perhaps they stopped being a life-long learner....I’ve seen it go both ways.

Admiral N talked about the weight given to early promotions on the flag selection board:

I don’t think it’s weighted when it’s compared for promotion. It gets talked about; it’s usually one of those things that get briefed...“This guy has been deep selected to everything he’s ever done”. That being said, if there’s a stack of 30 guys and they’re going to pick 20, I think it’s your record that has to stand up against the other 30 rather than the fact that you’ve been deep selected all the way.

Admiral Q mentioned the potential harm it might have for a candidate before the selection board, by not allowing for the achievement of sufficient depth of experience:

Early promotions...[are] actually probably harmful [to promotion chances]. It’s a briefer. “Flag potential; flag potential; early selectee”....At the end of the day, you want range and depth, and if you keep being narrowed down and the only thing that’s important is a young guy who can serve longer, okay. But, ooh....He didn’t get to do this, and he didn’t get to do that.

The final factor in timing is the age of the officer. Since the statutory age has been lifted, the importance of younger officers is not what it once was, but
it still is important. Table 13 lists the ages at which the flag officers in the database \((n=96)\) were promoted to flag rank.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>%</th>
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<tr>
<td>45</td>
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<tr>
<td>51</td>
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<td>3.1%</td>
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<tr>
<td>52</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4.2%</td>
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Regarding the importance of age and promotion to flag, Admiral N said:

...there was a time, not to long ago, when that was a big deal. However, I don’t think that really matters that much anymore, now that we have some extensions on the laws on how long guys can stay on active duty and so on. I was worried about that myself. I had gone to two years of college before going to Annapolis, and while I had been deep selected for every rank, I was 50 years old when I made flag. I was concerned about that because there was a lot of talk...

Admiral K discussed age as a factor for how much longer an officer would remain in the Navy:

Age can be a factor because you wonder how much more time they have. Will this person be an automatic one star and then go home? And is it worth it to us, or are they healthy enough, are they young enough, or do we think they’ll want to stay on to accept the challenges of two, three or four stars?

Admiral C likewise noted the benefit to the Navy of possibly selecting a younger flag officer:
Sometimes you’ll see a guy who has really great performance, but he’s really too old to get through the wickets to do much more for the Navy, and here is a younger guy with similar or same qualifications who has the better potential age-wise. It’s not so much a question of age discrimination as much as it is a question of judgment as to whether or not that individual can serve...and perform as he’s expected to.

The final background variable is the competencies of the officer: what skill sets, knowledge, and demeanor a potential flag officer brings to the selection board.

7. Competencies and Personality
   a. Theme

The competencies and personality factors valuable for officers being considered for flag selection that were identified through the interviews were difficult to compile. Competencies valued by the interviewees ranged from people skills to political skills, to being able to thing “three to four” paygrades higher than one’s own. Although it would be impossible to identify these skills as actual predictors of promotion, they do become very valuable when paired with other predictors, such as the service reputation of an officer.

Behavioral competencies of personality include such things as: not continually looking for promotions, being able to interface well with both subordinates and superiors and others, the ability to speak well and articulate their thoughts and positions, among many others.

These variables are important to flag selection, particularly in the making of service reputation, FITREP writing, and so forth. However, these variables only have
an impact on the selection board if they are noted during the officer’s career, or are known by a member of the selection board, in contrast to more obvious categories, such as operational experience and graduate education.

b. Justification

Considering the diversity among the competencies identified, the quotes from interviewees have been inserted in no particular order. Many of these skills concur with the list of behavioral competencies created by Byham, Paese and Smith (2002) and the list of skill competencies identified by Brancato, Harrell, Schirmer and Thie (2004).

Admiral L discussed the importance of being able to think and perform three to four paygrades above one’s own, as well as understand how to operate within a bureaucracy:

So if top performance is a common denominator, if command at sea is a common denominator, you have to look for the discriminator....As I suggested to you, the ability to think three or four paygrades above your existing paygrade. To anticipate your boss’s needs, to anticipate how he should interact or think through how the most useful way to present information to him so that he can understand the issue and so that he can articulate the issue or defend the position or react to somebody....The other thing is understanding the bureaucracy. You have to serve in it to understand it....You have to have a sense of politics and how people react in a bureaucracy; where power lies, what you can do, and what you can’t do--how to get things done.

Admiral C discussed the value of having a broad background, with the ability to work with all warfare specialties:

I think the broader the background of an officer when he reaches the point of being promotable to
flag rank is very, very important. From that point on, his jobs are not going to be specialty, or warfare-specialty specific necessarily. He’ll have operational tours in his warfare specialty, but he’ll also...in those operational tours find himself responsible for other platforms as well, and it is incumbent upon him to be thoroughly conversant with warfare specialties of all types and capabilities, and of course, he has to know how to direct all of them.

Admiral C continued with personality factors valuable for flag rank:

We certainly prefer the outgoing personality to one who’s living in a shell, we certainly prefer the person who is self confident, with a basis for it, to one who is constantly looking over his shoulder, or wondering if this is the “right” thing to do. We certainly aren’t interested in the one who worries everyday in whether or not he’s promotable, who instead is paying attention to what his job requires. You want the person who’ll do what’s right, regardless of the consequences...you want a person who epitomizes what we are trying to teach midshipmen: integrity, honor, honesty, ethical practice....And when you find somebody who doesn’t abide by those characteristics, he’s not promotable, as far as I’m concerned.

Admiral N discussed the factors he looked for in an officer capable of performing at flag levels:

First of all, he had to be technically competent. He had to understand his job. Two, I looked very hard at how he handled his people. There are guys out there who get the job done but there are a lot of body bags along the way--just “peoplekillers”. Those are not the kind of guys who I would want to be flag. “Can do”, “Get it done”, “Show up on time and it will be done”....But you didn’t want to see them en route. So, technically competent, and did he get the most out of his people without killing them. I looked very hard at a guy who wasn’t always looking ahead. There are some guys out there who
look at the job they are in as just a stepping stone to the next job. I think that’s a mistake. I think anybody can come from behind and make admiral, as long as you keep doing every job right as you go along. You can know right away by looking them in the eye if they are looking for the next job. The next part may sound silly to some people: I looked for guys with a lot of stamina. And I don’t just mean physically stamina, but mental stamina. They could pursue things night and day and just didn’t give up. Not everybody has that. Some guys, their breakers trip after a while. And I didn’t like fat officers.

Admiral K identified two additional competencies. These include warfare expertise and the ability to manage complex problems:

I think that, first and foremost, the Navy will always say if you don’t know your warfare area for you warfighters, you might as well be a civilian. It starts at with those warfare fundamentals. But I see a continuing need for people who can manage a complex problem whether it’s at sea or ashore....Any kind of educational experience that gives you the ability to solve complex situations whether you’re at sea or shore, and gives you the ability to think is what’s going to make you somebody that the Navy needs in the future.

In a similar category to Admiral K, Admiral I identified another intellectual competency valued on flag selection boards:

That’s another thing that runs though the thread of the flag board, kind of in the background, intellectually, is the guy intellectually capable of retaining large amounts of information and making sense out of them.

Admiral P noted the need to develop an expertise in an area needed by the Navy:
You ought to find something you really like and become an expert in it. It could be personnel; you could do a couple of tours in Millington. It could be weapons acquisition...it could be that you want to be a test pilot. You’re going to help resolve an engineering issue with multi-blade propellers on a submarine. I don’t know what it is, but something where you become the Navy’s expert and it’s hopefully something where there’s a need for it in the future. If you’re an S-3 pilot, you’re a little in trouble if that’s where you’re expertise lies because there’s no more need for S-3 pilots...

In closing, Admiral P also underlined the need to be a good leader as the foundation of an officer’s core competencies:

Across all of this is to learn to be the best possible leader. How to motivate others to do more than they think they can. Because if you can do that, you will be successful.

8. Category 1 Summary

In this category, 7 sub-categories were discussed. The importance of each sub-category, the ability an officer has in controlling that variable, and its impact on flag officer selection, rated on a scale of Low – Medium – High – Mandatory, is outlined in Table 13.
Table 14. Summary of Sub-categories from Category 1 and Their Impact on Flag Selection

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<thead>
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<th>Sub-category</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Commissioning Source</td>
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<td>High</td>
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<tr>
<td>2 Graduate Education</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Staff/Joint/Operational Experience</td>
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<td>High</td>
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<tr>
<td>3a. Command</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>3b. Joint Experience</td>
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<tr>
<td>3c. Washington Experience</td>
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<tr>
<td>3d. Executive Assistant</td>
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<tr>
<td>4 Fitness Reports</td>
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<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4a. Trait Averages</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4b. Comments</td>
<td>High</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4c. Rankings</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>5 Reputation</td>
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<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Career Timing</td>
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<tr>
<td>6a. Timing</td>
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<tr>
<td>6b. Early Promotions</td>
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<tr>
<td>6c. Age</td>
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<tr>
<td>7 Competencies and Personality</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>High</td>
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C. CATEGORY 2: THE SELECTION PROCESS

The boards shall consider carefully, without prejudice or partiality, the record of every eligible officer. The boards shall recommend for promotion the officers who a majority of the members consider best qualified for promotion. (Precept)

There are two types of selection boards: Statutory and Administrative. The Administrative board, such as the Test Pilot and Lateral Transfer/Redesignation boards, is governed by instruction or policy, and is convened by the Chief of Naval Personnel (CNP) or Commander, Navy Personnel Command (CNPC). Administrative board results are approved by the CNP or CNPC. This study, however, concentrates on
the operation of the statutory selection board, particularly as it concerns O-7 selection.

Statutory boards are governed by Title 10 of the US Code, and are convened by the Secretary of the Navy. At the conclusion of a statutory board, the results are approved by the Secretary of the Navy, Secretary of Defense and finally, the President of the United States.

This second category drawn from the data involves the actual process of the selection board and its role in determining those officers who will be selected to O-7. This category encompasses seven sub-categories. These sub-categories include: selection board fairness; the adherence of the board membership to the Precept; the selection of the members of the selection board; the quality of the record briefing; the knowledge of a candidate by a board member; the impact of letters to the selection board; and finally, the difficulty in selection.

1. Fairness of the Selection Board Process

I am convinced that it is as good as humans can design a process (Admiral M)

   a. Theme

   Selection boards are as fair as can be designed. They strive to ensure that those officers who deserve to be promoted are promoted, as well as to winnow out officers of lesser quality. Although some officers who are not selected may incorrectly believe that they were unfairly treated, this is absolutely not the case.

   b. Justification

   Board fairness, as much as can be expected in a human-dependant system, was the first category discussed in detail by 14 of 18 interviewees. As Admiral N explained:
You can’t take personality out of it, but the board is a very, very good tool. Very few times have I ever seen it where it was a vindictive thing or anything like that. It was usually very professional. When you get to be an admiral, you want to take care of your Navy, and you want the best guys to be there. You’ve got to be fair.

Admiral I noted the amount of energy expended by the members of the board to ensure that the right officers were selected:

The flag board is a neat experience. You go away drained; sad for some of your friends that you couldn’t – it just wasn’t going to happen – guys that you’ve known for 30 years. It’s an awesome responsibility, but you’ve got to do it and the system’s fair. The right people rise to the top [with] very few exceptions.

As a control for the conduct of the selection board, the results of the board are briefed to the Chief of Naval Personnel (CNP) and the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO). Admiral O stated:

What keeps the boards honest, in my opinion, is the outbriefing process, where there’s a certain expectation of people and numbers, who has been selected and any unusual quirks about it. And that’s also where the president of the board will brief the minorities that have been selected, and the women that have been selected. Eventually, that particular outbrief will be set against the precept given to the board which is up to the president to carry out. There is some wiggle room in there, but basically, it should come out the way it should come out.

The board is highly regulated by statutory law, and the members of the board take their direction from the precept, that is promulgated by the Secretary of the Navy, giving guidance as to what skills the Navy needs in its future flag officers.
2. The Importance of the Precept and Its Role in the Selection Process

The flag boards run by the precept, they absolutely do. (Admiral J)

Their primary responsibility is to adhere to the precept. There’s usually not much to interpret. (Admiral K)

a. Theme

The precept for a statutory board is a document that is promulgated by the Secretary of the Navy, directed to the president of the selection board. Its main purpose is to give both general and specific guidance regarding the criteria upon which board selection should be made. Additional information included in the precept includes: the date, place and time the board will be convened; the list of personnel that are members or staff supporting the board; selection standards; board ethics; and number of flag officers to select per competitive category. Appendix G is a generic example of an O-7 selection board precept.

The intent of the precept is to guide the board members as to whom they should select for the present and future good of the Navy, as delineated by the Secretary of the Navy. Because the precept is a legal document, and because it carries the intent of the Secretary of the Navy, it is adhered to with great diligence and holds a significant amount of influence on the selection of future flag officers.

b. Justification

During the interviews, every one of the admirals noted the importance of the precept, and how the board ran by the letter of the precept. As Admiral J, a former Deputy Chief of Naval Personnel (DCNP) put it:
In my experience, the presidents of these boards, read, and re-read and re-read precepts. The Secretary of the Navy signs these things. It is “The Word”. And so the most important things about that selection board are determined by what the Secretary chose to say in the precept. If the Secretary says: “Read my lips: I want solid joint experience. I am looking for people that served on joint staffs, served in operational joint assignments, at the war fighting commands.” Whatever it is that the Secretary says the board really cues to that guidance. They realize their statutory responsibility.

Admiral K, a former CNP, stated:

I think the key fundamental driver for the selection of flag officers year in and year out is the precept. What does it say? Is there anything in there that differs from what it said the year before? Or anything where this CNO and this Secretary have said this or that of what this organization needs....What sticks in my mind is the leadership of the president, and how closely they charged and kept control of their board so that the board could promote those whom the organization needed, not who some individual may have preferred. And so to me, that is the crucial driver year in and year out that really sets the pace and sets the tone: the precept, the leadership of the president, and the members in adhering to that precept.

One of the items contained within the precept is the listing of all the members and support staff for the selection board. The creation of this list is not taken lightly. Only those officers who have the requisite experience, knowledge and qualities are chosen to select the next generation of flag officers.

3. Ensuring Proper Board Membership
   a. Theme

   The 0-7 URL selection board is composed of 15 to 18 flag officers. The majority of the board membership is
comprised of flag officers in paygrades O-7 and O-8, representing each URL community. Three flag officers in the paygrade O-9 are also included on the board to be the senior representatives of their respective communities. Finally, one O-10 will preside as board president, in charge of the conduct of the selection board and the fulfillment of the board precept.

The members of the board are selected by the CNP and his Flag Matters staff. Their goal is to find officers who represent their communities by fleet geographical location (e.g. West Coast, East Coast, and Washington D.C.) and who are most familiar with the current career milestones of their respective communities. The final approval of board membership rests with the CNO.

The CNP and his staff do their best to determine the slate of flag officers for the selection board. Once the slate is determined, it is further screened by the Vice Chief of Naval Operations (VCNO) and the CNO to ensure fair and equal representation of all warfare communities and major fleet geographical concentrations.

The list of the prospective board membership is kept secret. The officers selected for the board cannot publicize their impending duties so as to prevent any undue influence prior to the commencement of the board.

b. Justification

Admiral K, a former CNP, detailed the effort made to ensure fair and knowledgeable board members for the O-7 selection board:

The Chief of Naval Personnel, with the help of his staff in Flag Matters...comes up with a board that is representative of the Navy that has a
balance of all the different requirements you need in warfare specialties. You come up with a slate of people who have not been on the board the year before, who are in a position where they would know folks and know their community. You wouldn’t want to pick somebody, for example, who has been on remote duty for the last three years...somebody off at the CIA headquarters, or an astronaut, or at the White House. You try and pick people who are familiar with the communities...and the current career paths, the things that are going on in the community...that they are still relevant to the community so they can represent it.

Arguably the most influential member of the board is the board president, an O-10 paygrade flag officer. Admiral K, who as CNP had been closely involved with the selection process and final approval of selection board presidents, detailed their selection process:

When you get up to the president of the flag board, you need a four star. There aren’t that many of them and you look at: Okay, who served last year, who’s available this year, who’s running a war and can’t possibly do it and what community are they from? The CNO either signs off on it or he doesn’t and we adjust it....There usually isn’t a lot of choice because there usually aren’t a lot of four stars that are available....It’s all about balance and getting a perspective on the entire navy. Because you’re going to ask them to represent their community, kind of, but then also interpret this greater good called the precept and make sure everybody is the same ilk.

The president’s primary responsibility is to properly administer the selection board. The president is the one legally tasked with its supervision, and the one who must brief the CNO at the completion of the board. Recalling back to his time as CNO, Admiral C noted his criteria for a good board president:
A good board president is the “levener” of personality quirks. Personality traits do pop out. Generally, if the board is composed of flag officers, they’re going to know each other. (By flag rank you’ve certainly developed a service reputation. You might not be known by everyone, but you have a service reputation.) There’s more of a tendency that if someone comes up with something completely off-the-wall, you say: “Come on, you don’t really mean that, do you?” And it’s up to the board president to control that.

A president can set the direction and tone of the selection board. By doing that he can have a small, and indirect, influence on what officers the board selects for flag rank. Without a question directly regarding the influence of the board president, 6 out of 18 interviewees commented on the president’s role. Admiral I, who served on seven O-7 selection boards, mentioned:

The president of the board is very influential, but he’s got one vote. Every president of the boards I was on was great. They were all terrific. [Name deleted] for example; great guy; smart guy. You can tell why this guy’s a four star. He ran a tight board, he went over the rules, and said: “Hey guys, we’re all flag officers here, but I’m telling you, nobody leaks.” The good ones will make sure there’s no arguments, no pettiness, rarely do you see that but sometimes you do.

Contrary to the overall opinion of the interviewees, a minority thought that the board president had very little impact on board selections. Admiral N summed their feelings up well when he stated:

I don’t think [the board president] has much impact on who gets selected. It’s already been decided when you go in there how many [new flag officers] each community is going to get, so he doesn’t have any impact on that. The rules have already been determined about what they are
looking for; the Secretary has set that for him. Very frankly, during the deliberations, he only gets one vote.

In addition to the physical voting for or against each candidate, the members of the board have a direct impact on who is selected in two ways. First is having a personal knowledge of the candidate, which will be discussed later in the chapter. The other way they have a direct impact is in their skill in briefing the record to the other members of the selection board.

4. The Importance of the Record Briefing

a. Theme

All records that come up for consideration for promotion to O-7 are divided among the members of the selection board for review. The records contain personal information about each potential flag officer, including their Fitness Reports (FITREPs), records of tours experienced, graduate school information, any adverse documentation, and more. Each board member reads through all of the records assigned to him for review, page by page, with some records covering nearly 30 years of naval service.

The goal of the board member is to become the advocate for the officer whom the record represents. It is his job as a “briefer” to “sell” the officer, though remembering his responsibility to also note any adverse items. Most importantly, the briefer must frame the record in the context of the needs of the Navy, as delineated by the Precept.

Board members represent all URL communities, thus a member of one community may brief the record of an officer from another community, such as a submariner
briefing the record of a pilot. There is a possibility that in this process, vital community-specific job skills or milestones may be overlooked or downgraded in importance. Additionally, even though they are all flag officers, some board members may not be as skilled as others at briefing records and not give a record a sufficient briefing. Because of variations in briefing skills, records are briefed twice, by two different officers. This allows for a fair look at all officers by the selection board.

Despite this control however, there is still a possibility (albeit slight) that the chances of an officer may be harmed, or conversely, helped, by the skills of the flag officers briefing his record.

b. Justification

Although the interviewees all agreed that the briefer had little impact on the final outcome of the selection board, they did discuss the potential impact of a briefer. Admiral C outlined the overall responsibility of the briefer and his impact:

The briefer’s responsibility is to go through that record and determine all the factors that would lend either to the promotability or the non-promotability of the officer. He basically briefs the officer’s career, has the responsibility of highlighting the high points, such as early promotion, recommendations, commendatory comments, as well as highlighting any derogatory information in the folder. Since the briefer has the responsibly for a very honest presentation, I never really saw any indication that anyone ever did anything but that. That’s the individual’s presenter of him to the board, so it’s an extremely important job.
The job of the briefer is to not only represent the officer’s record, but to also tell the board how the officer being briefed can fulfill the mandates of the precept. Admiral F delineated this responsibility:

The best briefers, the quality that they have, as compared to those who might just be considered average, was that they knew why they were briefing. And they could draw...what we were trying to accomplish, in terms of what billet needed to be filled, what characteristics, what qualities of an individual fulfilled the Navy’s needs.

Admiral N also stated:

You have a very short period of time to get through a stack of records that you have to get through in a certain period of time. You have to be able to pull out of there what are the key things....When you go through the record, you have to review in your mind the piece of paper [the precept] that the Secretary of the Navy has given you. He gives you a piece of paper and says: “Here are the following things you should consider while selecting these folks.” The briefer has to pull all of that out, depending on what the guidance is. He’s got to, in a very short period of time.

For some of the board members, the O-7 board could be their first selection board. Thus, some members may have different briefing abilities than other members. Admiral K discussed how some flag officers are better briefers than others initially:

People go in there with different levels of readiness... I think by the time everybody’s done briefing one round, the slow learners understand they need to do better. So, I don’t think the briefers have a tremendous sway because they’re pretty well standardized. I never really saw, in my time, people being disadvantaged. You’d always have the board presidents report out that we had
some new people and it took time to get them up to speed on briefing, but you do a round, or you do a practice round, or you watch somebody else do it, and by the second time around, you’re briefing the same way they are.

Even though some briefers may be better than others, the interviewees agreed that, if the candidate had a good record, it would be noted, no matter what the quality of the briefer may be. Admiral H noted:

Although the skills varied between the briefers on the board, at that level, which is a board of all flag officers, the skill levels don’t differ so dramatically so as to submerge an otherwise good record if the briefer is not the best, and vice versa, the individuals have been around long enough that you can’t turn a sow’s ear into a silk purse.

Admiral I added:

Usually, the people in the room who look at your record look at the totality of your record and how you do as a Captain. Whether the briefer is a fumble-fingered-mumble-mouse or he is Abraham Lincoln, the record is the record. So, if you’ve got a bad record, I don’t care who you are, it’s just not going to make it.

One trend that was visible throughout the sub category of briefer importance was that the officers on the board did their best to bring all the attributes of an officer’s record to the board’s attention, even if the briefer did not mention the item. Admiral R said:

On occasion, I would notice something that was not highlighted enough on an individual I personally knew or knew of....That occurred, not frequently, but often enough. But, there was always someone in the room that knew the man, knew his record, and could speak to his reputation.
One institutional control to ensure fairness within the selection board is that all records are briefed a second time, by a member from a different warfare specialty. However, several interviewees mentioned that, on rare occasion, one or two candidates (“Probably 1 in 1000”, according to Admiral A) might only be briefed once and selected due to an outstanding record. Admiral J commented:

On the flag board, in my experience, there might be only one or two candidates that are “in” on the first time around, and maybe none, but there will be a lot who are out. You look at the Precept, and the Precept tells you that you got to have these kinds of people with these kinds of characteristics, and this group just doesn’t have these characteristics yet, or won’t. All the rest of the records are reviewed again, and briefed again, but by a different briefer. So, no one who is competitive at all gets just one shot at being briefed.

One of the potential variables with the briefer, however, was if they knew personally the officer whose record they were briefing. Admiral F noted:

The briefer is extremely important--perhaps more important than it should be. Only in the sense that, it was very obvious on the board that I was on you could immediately tell if the briefer knew the individual or did not, especially with the smaller groups.

In the more senior ranks, it is certainly possible that the person briefing a record personally knows, or at least knows of, the officer being briefed. This knowledge can be a significant help or hindrance to a candidate.

5. **Personal Knowledge by Board Members**

[Personal knowledge] can be the point that puts you over the edge. (Admiral B)
a. Theme

The overwhelming opinion of the interviewees was that if a member of the board held a potential selectee in high regard, and voiced that regard during the deliberations of the board, it had a great impact in the decision of the board members. Conversely, if a member of the board knew a candidate, and either did not discuss him in glowing terms or consciously refrained from discussing him, a negative message was conveyed to the other members of the board.\(^{15}\)

Knowledge, however, is just more than being “somebody’s guy”. It is the ability for a board member to articulate a candidate’s unquantifiable skills and attributes in a positive way to the board in order to show them how the person was, or was not, qualified for flag rank or fulfilled the statutes of the Precept.

In conclusion, the overwhelming majority of interviewees agreed that this variable could potentially become a singular select/not-select factor for a candidate before the selection board.

b. Justification

Like the majority of the interviewees, Admiral F agreed that being known by someone on the board was an important factor because it allows the board members to see more than just the black-and-white letters in the record.

It’s extremely important....You get a board...a mix of ten to twelve...and one of them stands up and says “I served with [name deleted] back in [place deleted], and let me give you a sense of what kind of person he is.” I can read what his job was, but what that board’s interested in is:

\(^{15}\) Members of the board cannot offer negative information about a candidate that is not included in their official record.
What is it that he can do? And if you can get somebody on that board to articulate what he can do, that carries a tremendous amount of weight....You know somebody on that board, and you know them well, and you have a record of high performance with that individual; that makes a big difference, absolutely. It’s one way of mitigating risk; you become a known quantity, made available to a broad audience.

Depending on the size of the community, one or more of the members on the board may know the officer personally. Coming from a small Restricted Line (RL) community, Admiral M said:

When I was selected for flag, both of my previous bosses, my new boss, and several others I knew were on the board. I would estimate I knew about half dozen of the board members personally. You can’t be in major command or in a senior staff position without knowing the people who will be sitting on the board.

Even from a URL community, there is still a good probability that a member of the board at least knows the candidate’s reputation. Admiral R, a submariner, talked about the candidates from his community:

The submarine community is small enough that when you’re a flag officer, you know the guys who are going to be in the running because of their history and the job they are in....Being from the submarine community, I’d say that I knew of or knew personally all the guys who were competitive....In the submarine community, some three or four of those guys have probably worked for you at some point...that’s going to influence you at some point. Personal knowledge is better than some written words which are usually not adequate to describe the performance....If you have personal knowledge, then that’s got to be a strong benefit for an individual before the board.
Even with the larger communities, there is still a chance that a board member will know a candidate at least by reputation. The rare case where a candidate is not known by someone on the board can be detrimental. Admiral B said:

If no one on that board knows you, your chances of selection go way down. When you start to get to this group of people though, almost everybody knows somebody but it is possible for a guy with a good record to get up in front of a board that just doesn’t know him....It’s going to be very hard [for him to be selected] unless his record is just phenomenal. Typically, what will happen is that that same guy, the following year, will probably get selected because on that board four guys will know him.

As a testament to the fairness of the board, having personal knowledge of a candidate didn’t guarantee their promotion, however. Admiral B stated:

If you have a mentor, and he is sitting on your board, that’s a good thing. [But] it doesn’t guarantee selection. I can’t tell you how many times I’ve heard “somebody’s guy” came to the board and didn’t get selected.

A caveat given by all of the interviewees was that knowledge could also be detrimental. Admiral N discussed how this might take place:

The good briefer will point out where he [the candidate] has worked, who his CO’s have been, and will point out that “George” [a fictitious board member] wrote the following things. Then “George” gets the opportunity to offer his inputs. That can be good, and that can be bad. He could have been one of those kids where he was the best you had on your ship, but not as good as other people. Sometimes I’ve heard guys say: “This guy is really good, but there’s about sixteen other guys we should look at as well as him”... I’ve seen it go good; I’ve seen it go bad.
Even though you may be known by a number of the board members, performance still outweighs personal knowledge. Admiral R observed:

...performance is key. You can have friends, you can have sponsors, and they will have some influence particularly if someone knows you and can speak personally about your attributes; that’s a benefit. But, if you’re performance has not been of flag caliber, you won’t get selected by the board.

In essence, personal knowledge by a board member can help (or hinder) because of human nature. Where all things are equal, people are more likely to select someone they know versus someone they don’t. Admiral Q put it bluntly:

Knowledge—that’s human nature. To discredit that means you’re stupid. “Hey, I know him. He’s proven. This guy I don’t know, he looks good, but if I have to make a choice, I’m picking my guy.”

One way that some officers attempt to ameliorate the impact of being known by a board member, or having been in positions of high visibility is to obtain letters, addressed to the board, recommending their selection from active and retired flag officers.

6. Letters to the Board
   a. Theme

The opinion of interviewees on the impact of letters to the board ranged from the stance that they had no impact on selection to the opinion that they were actually a detractor. The consensus was that, if an officer needed letters to recommend his selection, the message being sent to the board was that there was a problem in his
record. An officer with a good record will be promoted based on the quality of his record, and not by the volume of recommendation letters.

b. Justification

The common theme that ran through all of the statements regarding letters to the board was summed up by Admiral E:

Letters in general...don’t add or subtract from the board. And [they are there] normally because the guy’s in trouble. I mean, if you’ve got the record, and you’ve got the jobs, you don’t need the letters. The record stands on its own. If, however, you were [rated] “3 of 4” in your major command, then maybe you need the letters to point out clearly that the only reason you were “3 of 4” was that this guy was CO of the carrier, and this guy was that, and you were new on the job, and it wasn’t explained on the Fitness Report. Admiral A also noted:

All presidents treat letters to the board differently. Some read them when the officer’s file is being briefed. Some give them to the briefer. Some ignore them....The vote is still out as to if they help or not. If there are lots of letters, it seems that maybe there’s a reason that the officer might not be able to make it on his own record....If an officer is good, it will be reflected in his record.

Thus, a large number of letters is often seen as a sign to not select an officer. When it comes to the point of selecting the final officers to become the next flag officers, the decision is nothing short of “excruciating”, according to Admiral B.

7. Selecting the Best

One thing [being on the O-7 selection board] teaches you...when you’re a Commander or Lieutenant Commander and you are a recorder... like I was, I went home and said: “I’m not
worried about making flag, you should see the people who didn’t make flag; there’s no chance that I’m going to make it!” (Admiral I)

### a. Theme

All of the interviewees expressed the difficulty characterizing the final selections. While it was easy to eliminate the first 500 to 700 officers, it became progressively more difficult to remove officers as the numbers became fewer. Finally, when it came to selecting the officers who would become the selectees from the board, it was extremely difficult. Since being promoted to Captain isn’t easy in the first place, with the majority of officers having excellent records, it was difficult to sort out those officers who had exceptional records. The interviewees agreed that any candidate within the final 100 selectees would probably make a good flag officer; the ones that were finally selected were those who had the right mix of reputation, background experience, and fit the requirements set in the precept.

### b. Justification

The selection board makes several “cuts” of candidates as the board progresses. The first few cuts are of those officers clearly not destined for flag rank. Each successive cut, however, becomes more and more difficult as the officers being considered have more of the qualities requisite for flag rank. As Admiral C noted:

In that first go-round, you cut down a lot of people who clearly are not--either because of gaps in their performance, or gaps in their opportunities for different assignments--are not going to be qualified. For example, you’ll knock out immediately those who never had command or those who didn’t have major command....Then, it really gets to the crunch zone.
In the final few cuts, the selection board process becomes ever more difficult. Admiral B summed it up well when he stated:

That last bit, going from 100 to 25 is excruciating....The reason for this is that all these guys are all fully qualified and should be flag officers for the good of the Navy. They’ve all done something that the Navy needs.

At this point, community reputation weighs heavily, as the qualifications between officers are often similar, if not identical. Admiral F recalled:

The challenge of the board that I was on was that there were more candidates, any one of which could have made a great flag officer. The matter of choosing had little to do with their qualifications because they all were qualified. Once you get it down to all those who are qualified, sometimes that was two or three times the number of flags you could promote. The fact is that any one of them would have made a great flag officer.

During the final selection process, each community splits away from the general selection board to caucus about which officers they feel have the best reputation and the best qualities for flag. Upon returning to the board, their selections are reviewed for final selection by the entire board. Admiral R, commenting about this process, mentioned:

There are an awful lot of good guys there, and you can’t select them all. Hopefully you’ll get the best, and hopefully the other guys will get the best.

The members of the selection board take their responsibility very seriously, knowing the effect that their selections will have. As Admiral D said:
It was always truly heartbreaking when you see truly outstanding people who can’t be selected, simply because of the numbers.

One of the most difficult things about the final selection is that any of the remaining officers would be excellent flag officers. Admiral I noted:

The difficulty on the flag board is that every one of those guys has a great record; otherwise they wouldn’t have made Captain....Believe me, that group of people at the end...any one of them can be a flag officer. Take those first 20 guys, if they all fell down and died, the next 20 could replace them and you wouldn’t miss a beat; and the next 20 after that. That’s the good thing about this system. But you’ve got to make those hard choices. And it’s tough.

After the board selections are released, the majority of the interviewees concurred that they were humbled by their selection after considering those highly qualified officers who were not selected.

Admiral B summed it up well:

And at the end of [the] process...[the selectees] get notified. They have every right to be excited, happy and pleased, but they have no particular right to be on any kind of ego trip because there are three other guys for every one of them that are just as good....To some extent, it’s a bit of a dice roll. [Those who weren’t selected] are highly qualified people, and with a different board, different board membership, different day of the week, they might have been selected as opposed to some other guy.

8. Category 2 Summary

In this category, 7 sub-categories were discussed. The importance of each sub-category and its impact on flag officer selection, on a scale of Low – Medium – High, and
the control an officer before the selection board has of that variable, is outlined in Table 15.

Table 15. Summary of Sub-categories from Category 2 and Their Impact on Flag Selection

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sub-category</th>
<th>Impact</th>
<th>Control</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Selection Board Fairness</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Precept</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Board Membership</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Record Briefer</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Knowledge by Board Members</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Letters to the Board</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Selecting the Best</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

D. SUMMARY

The data for this study were compiled from two primary sources: Archival data, made up of the biographical database, OMF data, and data extracted from ALNAV messages. The second source of data was 18 semi-structured interviews with retired and active duty flag officers. While the archival data formed the data used in the tables, the interviews, directed by categories from relevant literature and subject matter experts, developed the 2 categories and 14 sub-categories.

In this chapter, the data were combined and analyzed to determine what variables had the greatest impact on an officer’s selection to flag rank. Of the 14 sub-categories, 5 had a high impact on the determination of those officers who are selected to flag rank. These were: Staff/Joint/Operational Experience, Fitness Reports, Reputation, Precept, and Knowledge by Board Members. There were also 4 sub-categories that had a Medium impact, and 5 sub-categories that had a low impact.
Chapter V will discuss the conclusions drawn from this analysis, its implications, and recommendations for further study.
V. CONCLUSIONS

A. INTRODUCTION

Chapter II reviewed the literature and theories relevant to officer promotion. Chapter III discussed how data were collected, edited, and how the literature would also be used as data within the guidelines of grounded theory. Chapter IV discussed the 2 categories and 14 sub-categories of factors influencing the selection decision that were developed as a result of data analysis and literature review.

Factors within five sub-categories: Staff/Joint/Operational Experience, Fitness Reports, Reputation, the Precept and Knowledge by Board Members, were noted as having a High level of impact on the decision to select an officer to flag rank. Of these five, two were rated Low for the amount of control an officer could have over the variable. There were two additional variables that had a board selection impact of Medium, with one having a control rating of Low (Table 16).

Table 16. Sub-categories with High Impact or Control Ratings

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category 1:</th>
<th>Sub-category</th>
<th>Impact</th>
<th>Control</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Graduate Education</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Staff/Joint/Operational Experience</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Fitness Reports</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Reputation</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Competencies and Personality</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Category 2:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Precept</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Knowledge by Board Members</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Letters to the Board</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The factors identified by these eight sub-categories that will be reviewed in this chapter, with a particular emphasis on the three variables that have both a High impact in the selection process and a High level of control by officers during their careers. These latter factors are the most telling indicators of an officer’s future probability for selection to flag rank.

B. FACTORS INFLUENCING SELECTION

This section reviews the sub-categories that make a substantial contribution to the selection probability for an officer. They are discussed in order of lowest to highest contribution.

1. Letters to the Board

The interviewees who elaborated on this sub-category were of the unanimous opinion that the letters had a very low, and possibly negative, impact on the ultimate decision of the selection board. Although there is a slight chance that they might help a very small minority of officers, they will generally have very little effect under the current system. Thus, this factor does not influence selection.

2. Graduate Education

Graduate education is an important aspect of the career development of an officer. However, the presence of a graduate degree, or lack thereof, currently does not seem to have a critical impact on selection to flag rank. It is probable that in the future, the attainment of a master’s (or equivalent) degree will be a deciding factor for an officer to be selected, but with this generation of senior officers, it does not hold as much weight. Because of this,
it had an impact rating of Medium, but had a control rating of High, as an officer has considerable latitude in the decision to achieve graduate education or not. In conclusion, this factor does not reliably influence selection.

3. The Precept

Although the precept is a deciding factor in who the board will select during the selection board process, the officers before the selection board have no ability to influence it, or even attempt to tailor their skills to the precept as it changes from year to year. Because of this, the precept cannot be said to be a predictable influence in determining the future promotability of an officer.

4. Knowledge by Board Members

This factor has tremendous impact if two conditions are met. First, an officer has to be fortunate enough to know one or more of the members of the selection board, the make up of which is kept secret until the conclusion of the board. Second, the board member knowing the candidate has to hold the candidate in high regard. If the member does not, or has a neutral opinion of the officer, it can be a determining factor in the non-selection of a candidate. Primarily for the first reason, the inability to know who the board members are before the selection board meets, this factor cannot serve to influence the probability of an officer’s selection.

5. Competencies and Personality

The two factors in this sub-category can have a critical impact on the selection of an officer to flag rank. However, this is dependent upon two elements: One, a member of the selection board can testify to the officer’s abilities, either through personal knowledge or an
officer’s reputation, and/or two, they are documented honestly in an officer’s Fitness Report (FITREP). If either, or both, of these conditions are met, this sub-category can influence the decision of the board. If neither is met, then it does not have a substantial impact. However, the chances of an exemplary officer having these variables documented in FITREPs, and being known at least by reputation are quite high. Thus these traits do factor in the ultimate decision of the selection board. Because of this, the factors in this sub-category can influence, at least to a limited extent, an officer’s selection to flag rank.

The next three sub-categories are sufficiently interrelated that it is difficult to place them in order of importance.

6. Staff/Joint/Operational Experience

This sub-category has a tremendous impact on the selection of an officer to flag rank. Two milestones are mandated: command at sea (specifically major command) and joint qualifications. Without these, an officer will not be considered a contender for flag selection. For the officers who have achieved these milestones, this is what sets them apart from their contemporaries whose records are removed from consideration in the first few reviews. An officer who has achieved the requisite experiences for flag selection can feel confident that his record will be seriously considered. Thus, this accomplishment is a major factor considered in determining an officer’s selection to flag rank.
7. **Fitness Reports**

This is the second of three variables that weigh heavily in an officer’s selection to flag. In addition to a thorough and honest documentation of their performance and assessment of future service, combined with stellar trait averages, there are two things that a FITREP must have for flag selection. The first is a specific recommendation for flag promotion. Although it is technically possible for an officer to be selected without this recommendation, his record will fall under close scrutiny to ensure that the reporting officers who omitted it are not sending a covert message to the members of the board regarding that officer’s selection potential.

The second requirement to make a competitive FITREP is the officer’s standing in peer rankings. If an officer has a majority of “1 of” and “2 of” rankings, particularly in the senior ranks with FITREPs written by relevant senior officers, he can feel confident that his record will be closely considered. Without those markings, his chances for selection decline considerably. As an influencing factor, FITREPs rank high on the list.

8. **Reputation**

The final consideration is an officer’s service reputation. This plays a critical role in an officer’s selection to flag rank. An officer with a stellar record, but poor reputation (given the level of knowledge of the candidate by board members) has little chance of selection. An officer with an excellent reputation will be given close scrutiny by the board, even if his record (albeit still outstanding) isn’t the best of the candidate pool. An officer’s service reputation is a function of competencies
and personality, and becomes known over the years by gaining staff/joint/operational experience. Because of this, reputation should be considered the greatest influencer in selection to flag rank.

A summary of the factors, within their respective sub-categories, which influence an officer’s selection to flag rank, are listed in order of rank and weight in Table 17.

Table 17. Rank of Sub-categories Influencing Flag Promotion

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sub-categories</th>
<th>Influence Rank</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Reputation</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fitness Reports</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Staff/Joint/Operational Experience</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Competencies and Personality</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Knowledge by Board Member</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Precept</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Graduate Education</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Letters to the Board</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

C. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

Because of the vast quantity of data available, nearly every sub-category in this study could be the subject of its own separate study. Three primary areas of potential follow-up include:

1. Further research into the seeming over-representation of Naval Academy graduates in the senior ranks of the Navy, particularly in the submarine community.

2. The identification of specific competencies and personality traits of flag officers.

3. The importance of the reputation of the Fitness Report author, and how it serves as a factor in future promotions.
D. SUMMARY

This thesis explores the research question: What are the fundamental differences between those officers who are promoted to flag rank, and those who remain at O-6? Through a review of relevant literature, the compilation of archival data from three sources, and 18 interviews, four influencing sub-categories were revealed. These factors were: Reputation, Fitness Reports, Staff/Joint/Operational Experience, and Competencies and Personality.

Throughout the research for this study, particularly during the interview process, the researcher specifically noted the way these factors were present within the context of each of the interviews. The flag officers interviewed significantly reflected each factor, notable within minutes of starting the interview. These flag officers had an indefinable mixture of all of the factors presented in this research, and many more. It is a fair and logical assumption to make that it was because of these factors, developed through their personal experiences and naval careers, that they had been promoted to flag rank.

In the research determining these factors influencing advancement, and observing these factors exemplified by the former and current leadership of our Navy, the researcher was instilled with confidence in the strength of the Navy’s senior leadership and the fairness, thoroughness and integrity of the process that selects them.
APPENDIX A. PERCENTAGES OF OFFICERS ELIGIBLE AND SELECTED AT THE FY 2004 O-7 SELECTION BOARD

Table A1. Listing of Eligible and Selected Officers at the FY 2004 O-7 Selection Board by Community. ¹⁶ (Source: Office of Flag Officer Management and Distribution, N00F)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Community</th>
<th>1st Board</th>
<th>2+ Boards</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Elig.</td>
<td>Sel.</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SWO</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SWO (Nuc)</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total SWO</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SUB (Non-Nuc)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SUB (Nuc)</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total SUB</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pilot (VF)</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pilot (VP)</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>14.29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pilot (VS)</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pilot (VAW/VRC)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pilot (VQ Prop)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pilot (VQ Jet)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pilot (VQ Tac)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pilot (VFA)</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pilot (VAQ)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pilot (VA Med)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pilot (HSL)</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pilot (HS)</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pilot (HM)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pilot (HC)</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Pilot</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.37%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NFO (VF)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NFO (VA Med)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NFO (VP)</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NFO (VS)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NFO (VAM)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NFO (VQ Prop)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NFO (VQ Jet)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NFO (VAQ Tac)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NFO (VAQ)</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total NFO</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Overall</td>
<td>260</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.30%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

¹⁶ This table divides officers by those considered for selection their first time (1st Board) and those being considered subsequent times.
### APPENDIX B. OFFICER MILITARY EDUCATION FRAMEWORK

Table B1. Naval Officer Professional Military Education Framework

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GRADE</th>
<th>MIDSHIPMAN/ OFFICER CANDIDATE</th>
<th>0-1/0-2/0-3</th>
<th>0-4</th>
<th>0-5/0-6</th>
<th>0-7 TO 0-10</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LEVEL OF MILITARY EDUCATION</td>
<td>PRE-COMMISSIONING</td>
<td>PRIMARY</td>
<td>INTERMEDIATE</td>
<td>SENIOR</td>
<td>FLAG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS AND COURSES</td>
<td>NAVAL ACADEMY, NROTC, OCS</td>
<td>-Basic and Advanced Warfare Specialty Schools -Primary Level JPME</td>
<td>-Naval Postgraduate School -Naval War College -Armed Forces Staff College</td>
<td>-Industrial College of the Armed Forces -National War College</td>
<td>-CAPSTONE -Joint Flag Officer Warfighting Course</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LEVEL OF WAR EMPHASIZED</td>
<td>CONCEPTUAL AWARENESS OF ALL LEVELS</td>
<td>TACTICAL</td>
<td>OPERATIONAL</td>
<td>STRATEGIC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FOCUS OF JPME PHASE II</td>
<td>Not Applicable</td>
<td>JPME Phase II</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Not Applicable</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: After Officer Professional Military Education Policy, CJCS 1996, as cited in Walsh, 1997)
APPENDIX C. INTERVIEW REQUEST LETTER

Dear Admiral [name deleted]:

My name is Lieutenant David Schwind, and I am working on my master's degree from the Naval Postgraduate School in their Leadership and Educational Development (Company Officer Master’s) Program at the Naval Academy. I am requesting a short interview with you to assist me in gathering data for my thesis.

My thesis topic is: Predictors of Flag Officer Promotion in the United States Navy. The goal of this study is to determine what specific career, education or background experiences in the service of a naval officer that could determine their future promotion to O-7.

Part of my research is quantitative, reviewing the records of 100 active-duty Rear Admirals, and observing trends in their careers which are different from those officers of the same year groups which have remained at the O-6 level.

The other portion of my research is from a qualitative standpoint. This part deals with the actual selection board process and the weights that selection board members place on certain aspects of a potential promotee's career and personality.

Specific areas that I am attempting to learn more about include:

- The importance of the officer who briefs the record before the board
- The "experience" level of the potential promotees
- Weight placed upon Command, Major Command, and Base Command tours
- Early promotions and their weight
- FITREP comments and scores
- Personal knowledge of candidate's performance by board members
- Flag promotion recommendations and their weight
- Joint tours/Goldwater-Nichols Act
- Postgraduate education

This interview will require approximately one hour of your time. If possible, I would like to conduct the interview prior to the end of January 2004.

I may be contacted by phone at: [removed], at the street address above, or at my e-mail address: [removed]. I would be greatly honored by having an interview with you, and I know you will bring valuable insight into my study.

Very Respectfully,
## APPENDIX D. UNDERGRADUATE SCHOOLS ATTENDED BY FLAG OFFICERS, YG 1972-1978

Table D1. Undergraduate Schools Attended by URL Flag Officers in Sample from YG 1972-1978.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Undergraduate Schools</th>
<th>n=100</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alabama A&amp;MT</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citadel</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Florida State</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia Tech</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Holy Cross</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Holy Cross (DC)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illinois State</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illinois Technical</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iona (NY)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jacksonville</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marquette</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Carolina Agricultural and Technical</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northeastern</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Notre Dame</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ohio University</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pan American</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pembroke</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rensselaer</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rutgers</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saint Francis (PA)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State University (NY)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southwest Missouri State</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tennessee Tech</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U. Florida</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U. Idaho</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U. Illinois</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U. Miami (FL)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U. Missouri</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U. Nebraska</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U. New Haven</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U. North Carolina</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U. Southern California</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U. South Carolina</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U. Tennessee</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U. Texas</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U. Utah</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U. Virginia</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U. Washington</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U. Wisconsin</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US Air Force Academy</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US Naval Academy</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>51.4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## APPENDIX E. JOBS HELD BY OFFICERS AT THEIR TIME OF SELECTION TO O-7, FY 1998-2004

Table E1. List of Jobs Held by Officers Selected to O-7, FY 1998-FY 2004 (n=142)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Job</th>
<th>Promoted</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CVN Commanding Officer</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N8 Staff, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fellow, Chief of Naval Operations Strategic Studies Group</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J3 Staff, Joint Chiefs of Staff</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J5 Staff, Joint Chiefs of Staff</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Office of Legislative Affairs</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COS to Commander, Naval Air Force, Pacific Fleet</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J8 Staff, Joint Chiefs of Staff</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COS to Commander, SEVENTH Fleet</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Director, Naval Aviation Officer Distribution, PERS 43</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Executive Assistant to Supreme Allied Commander, Europe</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Executive Assistant to the Chief of Naval Operations</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Executive Assistant to the Secretary of the Navy</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Executive Assistant to the Vice Chief of Naval Operations</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J6 Staff, Joint Chiefs of Staff</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commandant of Midshipmen, US Naval Academy</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commander, Amphibious Group THREE Special Operations</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commander, Surface Warfare Officer Schools Command</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COS to Commander, SECOND Fleet</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COS to Commander, Submarine Force Atlantic Fleet</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Director, Surface Officer Distribution, PERS 41</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Director, White House Military Office</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Director, White House Situation Room</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Executive Assistant to CINC Atlantic Fleet</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Executive Assistant to the Chief of Naval Personnel</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N5 Staff, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assistant COS, US Central Command</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CINC Atlantic Fleet Staff (TEMDU)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commander, Amphibious Squadron FIVE</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commander, Amphibious Squadron THREE</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commander, Destroyer Squadron FOURTEEN</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commander, Electronic Attack Wing, US Pacific Fleet</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commander, Naval Station Jacksonville</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commander, Naval Station San Diego</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commander, Submarine Squadron ONE</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COS to Commander, Amphibious Group TWO</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COS to Commander, Carrier Group FIVE</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COS to Commander, FIFTH Fleet</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COS to Commander, Naval Surface Force US Pacific Fleet</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COS to Commander, SIXTH Fleet</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COS to Commander, Submarine Allied Command, Atlantic</td>
<td>1</td>
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</table>
### Table E1. (con’t.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Deputy COS to N6/N8, Pacific Fleet</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Director, Submarine/Nuclear Programs Division, PERS 42</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Executive Assistant to CINC Joint Forces Command</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Executive Assistant to CINC Pacific Command</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Executive Assistant to CINC Pacific Fleet</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Executive Assistant to CINC US Central Command</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Executive Assistant to CINC US Strategic Command</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Executive Assistant to Commander, Fleet Forces Command</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Executive Assistant to Commander, NAF Pacific Fleet</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Executive Assistant to Commander, Naval Forces Europe</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Executive Assistant to Commander, SECOND Fleet</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Executive Assistant to COS to SAC Atlantic</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Executive Assistant to Deputy CINC US Transportation Cmd.</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Executive Assistant to the Chairman, JCS</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Executive Assistant to the Deputy CINC, Joint Forces Cmd.</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Executive Assistant to the Deputy CNO (Manpower and Resv)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Executive Assistant to the Deputy CNO (N3/N5)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Executive Assistant to the Deputy CNO (N7A)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Executive Assistant to the Vice Chairman, JCS</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J3 Staff, US Joint Forces Command</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J5 Staff, US Pacific Command</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J5 Staff, US Strategic Command</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Assistant, Headquarters Air Force South</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N4 Staff, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N7 Staff, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N8 to Commander, NAF Pacific Fleet</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Office of Budget, Assistant SECNAV (Financial Management)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Office of the Secretary Defense</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senior Mil. Assistant to Under SECDEF (Policy)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senior US Naval Officer, Supreme HQ Allied Powers Europe</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Assistant to Commander, Amphibious Group 3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Assistant to Commander, NAF Pacific Fleet</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Assistant to Commander, Navy Region Southeast</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Assistant to Commander, NSF Pacific Fleet</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Assistant, N8, Chief of Naval Operations</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table E2. Jobs Held by Selectees by Geographical Location and Joint/Navy Division.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location/Division</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Washington, D.C.</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>38.03%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>20.42%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>17.61%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern US/Atlantic/Middle East</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>40.14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(minus DC)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western US/Pacific</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>21.83%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint (Worldwide)</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>28.87%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## APPENDIX F. NAVY FITNESS REPORT EXAMPLE

### Figure F1. Navy Fitness Report, Obverse

#### FITNESS REPORT & COUNSELING RECORD (E7-06)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1. Name (Last, First M Suffix)</th>
<th>2. Grade/Rank</th>
<th>3. Desig</th>
<th>4. SSN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

5. ACT | TAR | INCP | AFASV | 6. UIC | 7. Ship Station | 8. Promotion Status | 9. Date Reported |

- **Decision for Rept:** 10. Periodic Detachment of Individual

- **29. Primary/Colleague/Watchstanding duties.** (Enter primary duty abbreviation in box.)

| 30. Date Censored | 31. Counselor | 32. Signature of Individual Counseled |

#### PERFORMANCE TRAITS: 1.0 - Below standard/knowledge progressing or UNSAT in any one standard; 20 - Does not meet all 3.0 standards; 3.0 - Meets all 3.0 standards; 4.0 - Exceeds most 3.0 standards; 5.0 - Meets overall criteria and most of the specific standards for 5.0. Standards are not all inclusive.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1.0 Below Standards</th>
<th>2.0 Progressing</th>
<th>3.0 Meets Standards</th>
<th>4.0 Above Standards</th>
<th>5.0 Greatly Exceeds Standards</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>33. PROFESSIONAL EXPERTISE:  Proven knowledge proficiency, and qualifications.</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Lacks basic professional knowledge to perform effectively.</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Cannot apply basic skills.</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Fails to develop professionally or achieve timely qualifications.</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| 34. COMMAND OR ORGANIZATIONAL CLIMATE/EQUAL OPPORTUNITY: Contributing to growth and development, human worth, and community. | - | - | - | - |
| - Actions counter to Navy's retirement/retention goals. | - | - | - | - |
| - Unrelated with mentoring or professional development of subordinates. | - | - | - | - |
| - Actions counter to good order and discipline and negatively affect Command/Organizational climate. | - | - | - | - |
| - Performance exclusive behavior, fair, in value differences from cultural diversity. | - | - | - | - |

| 35. MILITARY BEARING CHARACTER: Appearance, conduct, physical fitness, and adherence to Navy Core Values. | - | - | - | - |
| - Consistently unsatisfactory appearance. | - | - | - | - |
| - Unhealthy demeanor or conduct. | - | - | - | - |
| - Fails to live up to all of Navy Core Values: HONOR, COURAGE, COMMITMENT. | - | - | - | - |

| 36. TEAMWORK: Contributions towards team building and team results. | - | - | - | - |
| - Creates conflict, unwilling to work with others, pulls off of team. | - | - | - | - |
| - Fails to understand team goals or teamwork techniques. | - | - | - | - |
| - Does not take direction well. | - | - | - | - |

| 37. MINISTRY: ACCOMPLISHMENT AND INITIATIVE: Taking initiative, planning, organizing, achieving mission. | - | - | - | - |
| - Lacks initiative. | - | - | - | - |
| - Fails to plan or prioritize. | - | - | - | - |
| - Does not maintain readiness. | - | - | - | - |

- **38. PHYSICAL READINESS:** 20. Directs and maintains high standard of physical training. 
- **39. SIGNS OF DETERIORATION:** 21. Signs of physical deterioration.

**RDC RUPERS 1610-1**

NAVYER 1012 (01/07)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PERFORMANCE TRAITS</th>
<th>1.0* Below Standards</th>
<th>2.0 Progressing</th>
<th>3.0 Meets Standards</th>
<th>4.0 Almost Meets Standards</th>
<th>5.0 Exceeds Standards</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LEADERSHIP (Organizing, motivating and developing others to accomplish goals)</td>
<td>Neglects growth and development of subordinates.</td>
<td>Effectively stimulates growth and development of subordinates.</td>
<td>High above standard in this area.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NOB</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TACTICAL PERFORMANCE (Warfare qualified officers only) Basic and technical employment of weapons systems</td>
<td>Has difficulty attaining qualifications expected for the rank and experience.</td>
<td>Attains qualifications as required and expected.</td>
<td>Fully qualified at appropriate level for rank and experience.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NOB</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

40. I recommend screening this individual for next career milestone(s) as follows: (maximum of two) 

Recommendations may be for competitive schools or duty assignments such as: LCP0, DEPT CPO, STF, CMC, CWO, LSO, Dept Head, XO, OIC, CO, Major Command, War College, etc.

41. COMMENTS ON PERFORMANCE: * All 1.0 marks, three 2.0 marks, and 2.0 marks in Block M must be specifically substantiated in comments. Comments must be verifiable. Format must be 10 to 12 Points. (10 to 12 Point) only. Use upper and lower case.

| Promotion Recommendation | NOB | Significant Problems | Progressing Promotable Must Promote Early Promote |
|--------------------------|-----|----------------------|-------------|-----------------|-----------------|
| 42. INDIVIDUAL | X |   |   |   |   |
| 43. SUMMARY |   |   |   |   |   |

46. Signature of Reporting Officer: "I have seen this report, been approved of my performance, and understand my right to make a statement."

I intend to submit a statement. □ do not intend to submit a statement. □

Date

Member Trait Average: Summary Group Average

47. Typed name, grade, command, OIC, and signature of Regular Reporting Senior on Concurrent Report

Date
APPENDIX G. GENERIC O-7 SELECTION BOARD PRECEPT

(Source: Office of Flag Officer Management and Distribution, NOOF. Reproduced with permission.)

From: Secretary of the Navy
To: [President of Selection Board]

Subj: PRECEPT CONVENING SELECTION BOARDS TO CONSIDER OFFICERS OF THE NAVY ON THE ACTIVE-DUTY LIST IN THE LINE FOR PROMOTION TO THE PERMANENT GRADE OF REAR ADMIRAL (LOWER HALF)

Encl: (1) Board Membership [Not included]
(2) Supplemental Guidance

1. Membership, Date and Location. The selection boards, consisting of you as president and the officers listed in enclosure (1), are ordered to convene at the Navy Personnel Command, Millington, Tennessee, at 0800 on Monday, [Date], or as soon as practicable thereafter. The function of these boards is to consider active-duty list officers in the Line for promotion to the permanent grade of rear admiral (lower half). The names and records of all eligible officers, determined as of the date the boards convene, will be furnished to the boards. The names of those officers who are in the initial eligible zone and the eligible zone will be indicated as appropriate.

2. Selection Standard. The boards shall consider carefully, without prejudice or partiality, the record of every eligible officer. The boards shall recommend for promotion the officer whom a majority of the members consider best qualified for promotion, giving due consideration to the needs of the Navy for officers with particular skills. In addition to the standard of best qualified, all officers recommended for promotion must be fully qualified; that is, the officers must be capable of performing the duties of the next higher grade. The “best and fully qualified” standard shall be applied uniformly to all eligible officers whether in the initial eligible zone or eligible zone. It should be emphasized that there is no norm or preconceived career pattern that leads to promotion within the flag ranks.

3. Authorized Selections. From among those officers eligible for consideration, the boards may select the following number of officers for promotion in each competitive category. These numbers are the maximum that may be recommended for promotion. The boards need not select to the numbers provided.

---

This sample Precept is an edited version of an actual Precept used.
4. Show Cause Determination. In addition to determining which officers are best qualified for promotion, the boards shall review each record carefully to determine whether the officer’s performance is such that the individual is considered suitable for retention. The boards shall notify the Secretary of the Navy of the name of each officer whose record, in the opinion of a majority of the board members, indicates the officer should be required to show cause for retention due to:

a. Substandard performance of duty;

b. Moral or professional dereliction;

c. Misconduct; or

d. Because the officer’s retention is not clearly consistent with the interests of national security.

5. The boards shall proceed in accordance with the guidance provided at enclosure (2).

6. Unless expressly authorized or required by the President, Secretary of Defense, or myself, neither you nor any member of the board or administrative staff may disclose the proceedings, deliberations or recommendations of the promotion selection or continuation boards. All board members and administrative staff must comply fully with these requirements, and I expect you to emphasize the need for strict confidentiality.

Signed
Secretary of the Navy
This enclosure contains appendices that provide additional guidance, as indicated.

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Appendix</th>
<th>Subject</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>- Department of Defense policy on board proceedings</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Adverse Information</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Marital Status</td>
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<td></td>
<td>- Area Tours</td>
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<td>Skills Guidance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Unrestricted Line guidance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Navy policy guidance on application of the “best qualified” standard by grade and competitive category</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Joint Duty consideration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>- Innovation and Efficiency</td>
</tr>
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<td>- Integrated Joint Air Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Financial Managers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Shore Station Managers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Communications and Space and Electronic Warfare Specialists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Acquisition Professional guidance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Aerospace Engineering Duty Officer</td>
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<td></td>
<td>- Strategy and Policy</td>
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<tr>
<td>G4</td>
<td>Equal Opportunity Guidance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Address equitable consideration for all officers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G5</td>
<td>Board Reports</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Addresses content and routing of selection board reports</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G6</td>
<td>Oaths</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Provides oaths for board members and support personnel</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

18 In the standard Precept, these Appendices are labeled: “A”, “B”, etc.
APPENDIX G2

GENERAL GUIDANCE

1. **Duties of the Board President.** The president of the board has been appointed by me and shall perform prescribed administrative duties. The board president has no authority to constrain the board from recommending for promotion those fully qualified officer that the majority finds best qualified to meet the needs of the Navy.

2. **Board Proceedings.** Per DOD Instruction 1320.14 of 24 Sep 96, the following directions concerning communications and information apply to all board proceedings:

   a. Each of you (president, members, recorders, and administrative support personnel) is responsible to maintain the integrity and independence of this selection board, and to foster the careful consideration, without prejudice or partiality, of all eligible officers. DOD Instruction 1320.14 provides specific rules governing the conduct of officer selection boards and the actions of selection board personnel.

   b. You must pay particularly close attention to the rules governing communications with and among other board members, the information authorized to be furnished to you, and the procedures you should follow if you believe that the integrity of this selection board has been improperly affected.

   c. You may not receive, initiate, or participate in communications or discussions involving information that DOD Instruction 1320.14 precludes from consideration by a selection board. You are to base your recommendations on the material in each officer’s military record, any information I have provided to the board in accordance with DOD Instruction 1320.14, and any information communicated to you by the individual eligible officers under regulations I have issued. In your deliberations, you may discuss your own personal knowledge and evaluation of the professional qualifications of eligible officers to the extent that such matters are not precluded by law, DOD Instruction 1320.14, or Service regulation, from consideration by a selection board or inclusion in an officer’s military personnel record. You may not discuss or disclose the opinion of any person not a member of the board concerning an officer being considered, unless that opinion is contained in material provided to the board under the provisions of DOD Instruction 1320.14.

   d. When discussing your own personal knowledge concerning the professional qualifications of eligible officers, the board is reminded that if personal remarks, base on a member’s personal knowledge, could be considered adverse, the member cannot discuss his personal knowledge or evaluation unless such matter is contained in the officer’s official record or other material placed before
the board in compliance with the law and Service regulation. In addition, should an officer’s record reveal the removal of a fitness report, the member may not discuss any personal knowledge regarding the circumstances which resulted in the removal of the report from the officer’s record.

e. I am the only person who may appear in person to address you on other than administrative matters. All communications with this board, other than those that are clearly administrative, must be in writing, given to each of you, and made part of the board’s record. I have designated in writing those persons authorized to provide routine administrative information to you.

f. Before the report of the promotion selection board is signed, the recommendations may be disclosed only to the members of the board, recorders, and those administrative support personnel I have designated in writing. After you sign the board report, only the recommendations of the board may be disclosed. Except as authorized by DOD Instruction 1320.14 and sections 616(e), 618(f), 14104, or 14108(d) of title 10, U.S. Code, the proceedings of the may not be disclosed to any person not a board member or board recorder.

g. If at any time you believe you cannot in good conscience perform your duties as a member of this board without prejudice or partiality, you have a duty to request relief by me from this duty. I will honor any such request. If a member or recorder believe that the integrity of the board’s proceedings has been affected by improper influence of military or civilian authority, misconduct by the board president or a member, or any other reason, or believe someone is exerting or attempting to exert inappropriate influence over the board and it’s proceedings, he or she has a duty to request from me or the Secretary of Defense relief from the obligation not to disclose board proceedings and, upon receiving it, to report the basis for this belief.

3. **Adverse Information**

   a. Just as you must consider positive performance, you must consider documented incidents of misconduct and substandard performance, which are included in an officer’s official service record, in determining those officers who are best qualified for promotion. Members must give careful consideration to each such incident. For those eligible officers who are recommended for promotion and who have received disciplinary action, or whose privileged information record (Fiche Five/EMPRS Field Code 17) contains matters relating to conduct or performance of duty, every board member shall review the information contained therein personally prior to the final board decision.
b. Faced with many well-qualified officers, there may be a tendency to simplify your task by summarily putting aside the folders of officers whose past records are less than perfect. However, to do this is to fall short of your obligation. A judgment of the whole person and the whole record is required to determine whose future potential will serve the Navy best. You may conclude that particular adverse information undermines an officer’s ability to serve successfully in a position of increased responsibility, despite an otherwise outstanding record. On the other hand, you may find that an officer’s overall outstanding performance demonstrates such potential for future service that it outweighs deficiencies noted in the record. Some officer will have learned from their mistakes in ways that make them stronger; others will have strengths that outweigh relative weaknesses in their records.

c. Make the best, not simply the most obviously defensible, choices. By doing this you will not only fulfill your obligation, you will also better serve the Navy.

4. **Marital Status.** Promotion boards are prohibited from considering the marital status of a member or the employment, education, or volunteer service of a spouse.

5. **Area Tours.** Repeated tours in a particular geographic location should not be considered negatively, provided the officer has progressed in billet complexity, professional development, and leadership responsibility.
1. **Unrestricted Line.** The Navy’s ability to meet current and future mission requirements depends, in part, on a flag officer community reflecting a representational balance of skills and experience of warfare specialties. In determining who is best and fully qualified, you should strive to achieve a balance among officer recommended from various unrestricted line warfare communities that reflects the proportion of officers being considered by each community. This proportional number is a goal, not a quota, and is a factor for you to consider in determining which officers are best qualified for promotion.

2. **“Best Qualified” Standard.** Navy policy regarding application of the statutory “Best Qualified” standard is as follows:

   a. The needs of the Navy dictate that our future leaders possess the qualities to excel as leaders and commanders or in support of operational commanders. Proven excellence in leadership positions is the ultimate measure of the qualities required. Officers may have also demonstrated leadership, skill, integrity, and resourcefulness in other difficult and challenging joint and senior level staff assignments. It is important for the Board to consider the broad range of skills required in the Flag community. The “Best Qualified” standard must consider the institution-wide requirements.

   b. Because these boards are considering candidates to a very senior rank, particular emphasis should be given, within the “best and fully qualified” standard, to selection of those who have demonstrated imagination and breadth of vision. At the top of those qualities sought is a proven record of accomplishment in challenging circumstances, with a particular focus on executive level performance.

3. **Joint Duty Consideration**

   a. The Navy’s ability to operate effectively with the other Services is vital to our warfighting capability. To foster this ability, a number of officers are assigned to joint military training and education and to duties with other services and joint staffs. Board members shall give appropriate consideration to the performance of officers who are serving or have served in such assignments.

   (1) Title 10, United States Code, section 619a requires that an officer complete a full tour of duty in a joint duty assignment or be granted a waiver by the Secretary of Defense prior to appointment as a rear admiral (lower half). To meet statutory requirements and reduce our waiver dependency, as well as to ensure our ability to conduct joint operations, the Navy is firmly committed to
placing as many officers as possible in joint duty assignments. These assignments, critical for the future success of the Navy, may have resulted in a career pattern different from officers who have served exclusively in their primary or warfare specialty. In making your determination of those officers who are best and fully qualified for promotion, you must view joint duty assignments as having the same value as assignments within the primary or warfare specialty.

(2) Navy’s ability to meet future joint operations requirements depends, in part, on senior officers who have served or are serving in joint duty assignments. Experience in joint duty billets is a factor for you to consider in determining which officers are best qualified for promotion.

(3) The charter of the board is to recommend for promotion those officers who are “best and fully qualified” for promotion. Within that charter, Navy’s goals are to achieve:

(a) For officers who are serving, or have served since 1 October 1986, on the Joint Staff, selection rates at least equal to selection rates for officers of the relevant competitive categories who are serving, or have served, at Navy Headquarters;

(b) For officers designated as Joint Specialty Officers, selection rates at least equal to selection rates for officers of the relevant competitive categories; and

(c) For officers who are serving, or have served, in joint duty assignments other than the Joint Staff, such as the Office of the Secretary of Defense or Unified Command, and excluding officers designated Joint Specialty Officers, selection rates at least equal to the overall selection rates for officers in the relevant competitive categories.

These equivalent selection rates are goals, not quotas that you must select.

b. Officers recommended for promotion must be “best qualified for promotion, giving due consideration to the needs of the Navy for officers with particular skills.” You should be aware that officers who have not completed a full tour of duty in a joint duty assignment, or who are not currently serving in a joint duty assignment, or who do not qualify for: scientific or technical skill waivers; professional skill waivers granted excepted communities (medical, dental, medical service, nurse, chaplain or judge advocate); waivers based on service in a joint duty assignment commenced prior to 1 January 1987, will require a “good of service waiver” to permit their promotion to flag rank and must serve their initial flag officer assignments in joint positions. The Navy needs flag officers with joint experience skills who are immediately
eligible for appointment and able to serve in assignments other than joint duty assignments in their first flag tour. This is a factor for you to consider in determining which officers are best qualified for promotion.

4. **Innovation and Efficiency.** In your deliberations, give careful consideration to the fact that the needs of the Navy have changed over the years and will continue to change. Please be especially alert for officers who embrace innovation and efficiency to find new solutions to our most challenging problems. The Navy needs bold officers who are willing to think creatively, take well-calculated risks, develop new ideas, and to promote officers who have shown initiative in finding and pursuing the most effective ways of accomplishing our mission. In your consideration, recognize that the continued preeminence of the Navy in the future is inextricably linked to its ability to change and to manage for efficiency. I note also, in this regard, that officers with the greatest capacity for innovation and management efficiency may have had some billets different from the norm. In the context of a changing Navy, the best-qualified officers may reflect a variety of backgrounds and proven records of accomplishment.

5. **Integrated Joint Air Defense.** The Navy has a substantial investment in the future of our nation’s integrated joint air defense capability. The Navy requires senior officers with experience in theater air defense, theater ballistic missile defense, cruise missile defense, and integration of these disciplines.

6. **Financial Managers.** The present climate of tight budget constraints requires the Navy to have executive level leadership from officers with proven background and expertise in this field.

7. **Shore Station Managers.** Shore commanders are confronted with significant challenges of financial, personnel, facilities, and environmental management. These challenges have considerable impact on quality of life and quality of work and successfully meeting such challenges demonstrates an officer’s professional potential. Success as a shore station commander should, therefore, be given your special attention and consideration when determining those officers best qualified for promotion.

8. **Communications and Space and Electronic Warfare Specialists.** The Navy is dedicated to providing leadership in this area by those who have a highly qualified background in this field. This will ensure our continued excellence in communications and communication systems. Development, acquisition and exploitation of space systems have become integral to Navy’s Command, Control, Communications, Computers and Intelligence (C4I) support to the warfighter. The Navy needs senior leadership experienced in space management and acquisition.
9. **Acquisition Professionals.** Acquisition Professional (AP) community officers possess the requisite qualification to manage the development, acquisition, and life cycle management of the Navy’s current and future platforms and associated systems. Assignments given to these officers may have resulted in a career pattern different from officers who have served exclusively in their primary specialty. In making your determination of those officers who are best qualified for promotion, you must view the AP officer’s acquisition assignments as having the same value as assignments within their primary specialty. Officers enter the AP Community late in their careers. In the context of the best and fully qualified, the needs of the Navy require that you select officers with proven capacity for leadership as demonstrated in AP or other leadership positions. There is no strict career or assignment path to promotion in the AP community. In particular, direct association with a major acquisition program, while a significant factor, is not a prerequisite for promotion. If the board determines that an AP designated officer is among those “best qualified” for promotion, and the officer has a strong technical background and significant experience in acquisition through program sponsorship or previous assignment to positions in direct support of senior AP community leadership, then the board should view the officer’s unique assignment(s) as having the same value as traditional AP assignments. In view of the critical qualifications possessed by AP officers, and in accordance with title 10, United States Code, section 1731, it is expected that these officers, as a group, will be promoted at a rate not less than the rate for all line officers in the same grade. In considering AP officers for selection, the best qualified criteria is more important than balance among designators. The Acquisition Community is currently experiencing shortage of acquisition qualified flag officers to fill critical acquisition positions. The board should give careful consideration to this shortage.

10. **Aerospace Engineering Duty Officer.** In determining the best and fully qualified Aerospace Engineering Duty Officer, give consideration to the Navy’s requirement for a well-educated, highly trained, professional flag officer with proven leadership ability in a major aerospace acquisition professional command or program and experience in any combination of aerospace field activity assignments.

11. **Strategy and Policy.** Today’s pace of force transformation, combined with the acute instability of international forces and nations, requires that the Navy leadership be able to quickly and effectively develop strategy and policy. To achieve this, Navy requires leaders who have significant skill sets and experience in the development of strategy and policy at senior levels, from OSD to the State Department and White House. Navy leaders must possess the proven ability to think and plan strategically.
1. The Department of the Navy is dedicated to equality of treatment and opportunity for all personnel without regard to race, creed, color, gender, or national origin. The Navy strives to maintain a professional working environment in which an individual’s race, creed, color, gender, or national origin will not limit his or her professional opportunities. Accordingly, within this board’s charter to determine those officers who are “best and fully qualified”, you must ensure that officers are not disadvantaged because of their race, creed, color, gender or national origin.

2. Your evaluation of all officers, must afford them fair and equitable consideration. You should be particularly vigilant in your evaluation of records to take care that no officer’s promotion opportunity is disadvantaged by service utilization policies or practices. You should evaluate each officer’s potential to assume the responsibilities of the next higher grade, the overriding factor being performance of assigned duties.

3. The Navy has assigned some officer outside of traditional career development patterns, e.g., institutional instructors, recruiting and equal opportunity billets. In addition, other utilization policies or practices, such as those based on statutory restrictions on the assignment of women, may have had an effect on career opportunities. These assignments, though beneficial to the Navy, may have foreclosed to the officers so assigned opportunities available to other officers. Such assignment practices should not prejudice the selection of these officers for promotion. Successful performance of assigned duties is the key in measuring an officer’s potential for promotion. Accordingly, in determining the qualification for promotion of any officer who has been affected by such utilization policies or practices, duty performed well in such assignments should be given weight equal to duty performed well by an officer not affected by such policies or practices.

4. This guidance should not be interpreted as requiring or permitting preferential treatment of any officer or group of officers on the grounds of race, creed, color, gender or national origin.
APPENDIX G5

BOARD REPORTS

1. The record of the board’s proceedings shall be compiled by the recorders and administrative support staff. The written report of the board shall be signed by the board president, the board members, and board recorders. It shall contain a list of the officers recommended for promotion with appropriate selection statistics as required by DOD Instruction 1320.14, as well as the following items:

   a. Convening notice required by section 614 of title 10, United States Code;

   b. All instructions, information, and guidance that were provided to the board under section 615 of title 10, United States Code and DOD Instruction 1320.14, except information concerning particular officers, which must be retained and transferred to the Chief of Naval Personnel;

   c. Certification that:

      (1) To the best of your knowledge, the board complied with DOD Instruction 1320.14, all instructions contained in the precept, and as appropriate, other letters of guidance or instruction provided by me;

      (2) You were not subject to or aware of any censure, reprimand, or admonishment about the recommendations of the board or the exercise of any lawful function within the authorized discretion of the board;

      (3) You were not subject to or aware of any attempt to coerce or influence improperly any action in the formulation of the board’s recommendations;

      (4) You were not party to or aware of any attempt at unauthorized communications;

      (5) To the best of your knowledge, the board carefully considered the record of each officer whose name was furnished to the board;

      (6) The officers recommended for promotion are, in the opinion of the majority of the members of the board, fully qualified and best qualified to meet the needs of the Navy among those officers whose names were furnished to the board;

      (7) You are aware that the names of the selectees will be released to the public after the board report is approved, and you know that you may not disclose the recommended selectees until the names are released to the public; and

      (8) You understand that, except as authorized by DOD Instruction 1320.14 and sections 616(e), 618(f), 14104, or
14108(d) of title 10, United States Code, you may never disclose the proceedings and deliberations of the board to any person who is not a board member or board recorder;

d. A list of all officers eligible for consideration;

e. A sampling of records prepared by the board president under procedures prescribed by the Chief of Naval Operations for use in convening special selection boards;

f. Precept;

g. If applicable, the show-cause list shall contain the names of those officers whose records, in the opinion of a majority of the members of the board, indicate the officers should be required to show cause for his or her retention on active duty. It shall also contain a brief explanation of the basis for the board’s opinion. Negative reports shall state: “In the opinion of a majority of the members of the board, there were no officers recommended to show cause for their retention on active duty.”; and

h. A list of the names of all officers considered by the board who submitted letters for board consideration requesting that they not be selected for promotion or who have otherwise directly caused their nonselection through written communication to the board. Negative reports shall state: “No officers requested that they not be selected by the board or otherwise caused their nonselection through written communication to the board.”

2. The report shall be forwarded for approval to the Deputy Secretary of Defense via, first, the Chief of Naval Personnel; second, the Chief of Naval Operations; third, the Judge Advocate General of the Navy for legal review; and fourth, me. In addition, the report of a selection board that considered officers with service in joint duty assignments will be forwarded to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff for review.
APPENDIX G6

OATHS

1. The president of the board shall administer the following oath or affirmation to the recorder and assistant recorders:

   “You, and each of you, do solemnly swear (or affirm) that you will keep a true record of the proceedings of this board, and you will not divulge the proceedings of this board except as authorized or required by the Secretary of the Navy or higher authority, so help you God.”

The recorder shall then administer the following oath or affirmation to the members of the board:

   “You, and each of you, do solemnly swear (or affirm) that you will perform your duties as a member of this board without prejudice or partiality, having in view both the special fitness of officers and the efficiency of the Naval service, and you will not divulge the proceedings of this board except as authorized or required by the Secretary of the Navy or higher authority. So help you God.”

The recorder shall then administer the following oath or affirmation to other support personnel:

   “You, and each of you, do solemnly swear (or affirm) that you will not divulge the proceedings of this board except as authorized or required by the Secretary of the Navy or higher authority, so help you God.”
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