UN SANCTIONS AGAINST IRAQ
THEIR EFFECTS AND THEIR FUTURE

by

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A Research Report Submitted to the Faculty
In Partial Fulfillment of the Curriculum Requirements

Advisor: Dr. David S. Sorenson

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama
April 1997
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Preface

I want to extend my appreciation to my advisor, Dr. David Sorenson, for the insightful guidance he provided me during various phases of this research effort. His advice helped me better focus my research topic and chart an efficient plan of action.

I also commend Dr. Sorenson for the obvious passion and the enthusiasm he put into every lecture when he taught the “History of Warfare in the Middle East” elective I attended. His course convinced me to pursue more detailed studies of Middle East issues. Accordingly, I chose this research topic to better appreciate Iraq’s status and capabilities in the region in light of over six years of devastating sanctions. I also participated in the AWC regional studies trip to Egypt, Syria, Jordan, and Israel in March 1997. The report provided is a product of research I conducted via Internet on-line services, library services, and personal observations/discussions during my Middle East trip.

Finally, I wish to extend a very special and heartfelt thank you to my wife, Jo Ann, for her loving and unconditional support she gave me through this entire research effort. I think Jo Ann would agree that I am not the easiest person to live with when writing papers such as these. Nonetheless, whenever I became overly frustrated with the progress (or lack thereof) of my research efforts or my home computer system “crashed” at the worst times, Jo Ann always had sincere words of encouragement that somehow made everything better. I really appreciated her patience and support all the way to the end.
Abstract

The severe UN-imposed economic sanctions against Iraq are in their seventh year. Saddam seems content to let his people suffer extreme hardships from widespread disease and malnutrition, watch his state’s economy severely deteriorate, and see his once prosperous nation fall into despair. Why not? He is largely insulated from the harsh effects of the sanctions, and he and those close to him still maintain a very high standard of living. Also, today his armed forces are still the most formidable in the region. Moreover, Saddam remains firmly in power in Iraq, and he rules completely and unopposed.

The sanctions against Iraq have also had significant collateral impact on Jordan and Turkey, both major trading partners with Iraq prior to the Gulf crisis. Jordan’s trade volumes with Iraq plummeted from their levels in August 1990, especially as sanctions enforcement severely curtailed Iraq’s imports and exports. Nevertheless, Jordan and Iraq remain linked economically, as Iraq still provides the majority of oil used by Jordan. In the early years of the sanctions, Jordan’s enforcement was lax. Since 1995, however, Jordan has enforced the sanctions stringently, and Jordan has realigned itself away from Iraq and toward the West.

Turkey denounced Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, and immediately turned off its pipeline for Iraqi oil and severed all trade ties with Iraq. The embargo has cost Turkey $30 billion. Turkey must also contend with the de facto Kurdish state that has emerged in northern Iraq, threatening Turkish territorial integrity and political unity.
The US is adamant that the Security Council will maintain the full sanctions as long as is required to force Iraq’s full compliance with relevant Security Council resolutions. If sanctions are removed prematurely, Saddam Hussein’s cooperation to date, though lacking, would surely cease. And, when Iraq’s oil again flows freely on the world market, it will be very hard to shut it off.
Chapter 1

Introduction

*Getting Iraq to comply (with UN orders) is like pulling teeth from somebody who doesn’t want to open his mouth.*

—US Ambassador Bill Richardson, 1997

On 2 August 1990, Iraq surprised the world by invading the basically defenseless, oil rich country of Kuwait. Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait created a shock wave felt by the nearby Middle Eastern states and the entire Western world. Immediately after the invasion, the United Nations (UN) denounced Iraq’s aggression and placed severe sanctions on Iraq. The UN Security Council hoped the sanctions would cause Iraq’s withdrawal from Kuwait. The sanctions did not work. Saddam Hussein’s forces remained in Kuwait, and the Gulf War resulted.¹

Saddam suffered a crushing defeat in the Gulf War, and the UN-imposed sanctions against Iraq are still in place today. These are the toughest sanctions ever imposed by the UN. The sanctions, now in their seventh year, persist because Saddam has not complied fully with relevant UN resolutions since 2 August 1990, and there is no end in sight. The sanctions have devastated Iraq’s economy and resulted in widespread hunger and disease among Iraq’s people. Despite the sanctions’ harsh effects, Saddam remains in power, unopposed and largely personally unaffected by the sanctions.²
The UN sanctions against Iraq have also had significant collateral impact on other nations in the region, particularly Jordan and Turkey. Jordan supported Iraq during the Gulf War (but did not fight in the war). Prior to the Gulf crisis, Iraq was Jordan’s primary trade partner. After the Gulf War, Jordan still remained Iraq’s main trade partner. Due to Jordan’s dependence on Iraq’s oil, the UN allowed Iraq to continue exporting oil to Jordan. Iraq and Jordan also continue to remain economically linked through Jordan’s exports of domestic products (especially foodstuffs) to Iraq. However, the volume of trade between Jordan and Iraq in the era of sanctions is drastically reduced compared to pre-Gulf War levels.\(^3\)

Prior to the Gulf crisis, Iraq was also a major trading partner with Turkey. However, Turkey was the first country in the region to enforce the UN sanctions against Iraq. It severed trade ties and cut off the oil pipeline that Iraq depended upon to transport its crude oil through Turkey to the Mediterranean for export. As a result, Turkey suffered severe economic losses since the imposition of sanctions against Iraq. Also, the continued sanctions and the Iraqi repression of its Kurdish peoples in northern Iraq present both political and security problems for Turkey.\(^4\)

This paper will briefly trace the early history of significant UN Security Council resolutions regarding Iraq’s aggression against Kuwait and the UN-imposed sanctions against Iraq. It will also discuss the direct effects of those sanctions on Iraq, and their collateral effects on two key US allies in the region, Jordan and Turkey. Finally, this paper will offer a prognosis for continued UN sanctions against Iraq.
Notes

3 Ibid.
Chapter 2

UN Sanctions Against Iraq

The sanctions as imposed on Iraq are unprecedented—they are the most comprehensive economic sanctions imposed on any country by a post cold-war Security Council. This of course, was in conjunction with the decimation of the country’s military and civil infrastructure during ‘Operation Desert Storm’ in 1991.

—Abdullah Mutawi
A member of the Centre for Economic and Social Rights mission to Iraq in 1996

Saddam Hussein invaded and began occupation of Kuwait on 2 August 1990, with only minimal resistance from the Kuwaiti armed forces.¹ He thus gained control of a huge portion of the world’s oil supply. The international community was both surprised and appalled at Iraq’s brutal aggression against Kuwait. On that same day of the invasion, the United Nations (UN) Security Council issued its first of many resolutions pertaining to Saddam’s unlawful act of aggression. The UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 660 denounced Iraq’s invasion and occupation of Kuwait.²
UNSCR 660 required Iraq immediately withdraw its forces from Kuwait to their positions on 1 August 1990. Saddam Hussein disregarded UNSCR 660 and continued Iraq’s occupation of Kuwait, and the human suffering that it brought. He effectively usurped the authority of the legitimate Government of Kuwait and purported a “comprehensive and eternal merger”\(^3\) of Kuwait with Iraq. His proclaimed annexation of Kuwait as the “nineteenth province” of Iraq announced to the world that he had no intentions of retreating from Kuwait.\(^4\) In fact, Hussein gave up all the territory Iraq gained
from its war with Iran to concentrate his forces against Western military forces assembling in Saudi Arabia. However, in response to Hussein’s military threat, within a few weeks tens of thousands of foreign troops deployed to defend Saudi Arabia and its oil fields from possible Iraqi military incursion into that area. Iraq’s continued occupation of Kuwait and demonstrated military aggressiveness convinced the Security Council that Saddam Hussein would not willingly retreat from Kuwait.

On 6 August 1990 the Security Council adopted UNSCR 661, which levied severe economic sanctions against Iraq (Table 1). The Security Council imposed the sanctions to compel Saddam Hussein to withdraw his forces from Kuwait and impede the Iraqi army’s readiness for war. These were the “most universal, comprehensive sanctions in modern history.” The sanctions focused significantly on Iraq’s export of oil (its largest money-generating commodity). However, the sanctions were so broad as to target the entire economy of Iraq and its extensive weapons maintenance, development, production, and delivery systems and capabilities.

As the Member States of the United Nations undertook efforts to enforce the sanctions imposed upon Iraq, Saddam Hussein made no effort to comply with the UN resolutions. The Security Council adopted UNSCR 662 on 9 August 1990, once again demanding Iraq’s immediate and unconditional withdrawal from Kuwait. UNSCR 662 proclaimed Iraq’s annexation of Kuwait was illegal and, thus, null and void. The Security Council further demanded Iraq revoke any claim to Kuwait and cease any and all annexation actions.
Table 1. UN Security Council Resolution 661 (6 August 1990)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reason</th>
<th>Key Requirements/Statements</th>
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<tr>
<td>• Invasion by Iraq of Kuwait still continues with further loss of human life and material destruction</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>• Iraq usurped the authority of the legitimate Government of Kuwait</td>
<td>• All states shall prevent:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(a) the import into their territories all commodities and products originating in Iraq and Kuwait exported therefrom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(b) any activities by their nationals or in their territories which would promote or would be calculated to promote the export or trans-shipment of any commodities or products from Iraq or Kuwait</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(c) the sale or supply by their nationals or from their territories or using their flag vessels of any commodities or products, including weapons or any other military equipment, whether or not originating in their territories to any person or body in Iraq or Kuwait or to any person or body for the purposes of any business carried on in or operated from Iraq or Kuwait (not including supplies intended strictly for medical purposes, and, in humanitarian circumstances, foodstuffs)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• All states shall not make available to the Government of Iraq or Kuwait any funds or other financial or economic resources and shall prevent their nationals and any persons within their territories from removing from their territories or otherwise making available to the Government or to any such undertaking any such funds or resources, and from remitting any other funds to person or bodies within Iraq or Kuwait (except for payments exclusively for strictly medical or humanitarian purposes, and, in humanitarian circumstances, foodstuffs)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Establishes a Committee of the Security Council of all the members of the Council, to undertake the following tasks:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(a) examine reports on progress/implementation of the present resolution</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>(b) seek from all States further information regarding the action taken by them concerning the effective implementation of the present resolution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Nothing in the present resolution shall prohibit assistance to the legitimate Government of Kuwait, and all States should:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(a) take appropriate measures to protect assets of the legitimate Government of Kuwait, and its agencies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(b) not recognize any regime set up by the occupying power (Iraq)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** United Nations, “Resolution 661,” adopted by the Security Council at its 2933rd meeting, on 9 August 1990.

Undaunted, Saddam persisted in his efforts regarding Kuwait. The Security Council grew increasingly concerned for the nationals of other countries residing in Iraq and Kuwait. They then adopted UNSCR 664 on 18 August 1990 demanding “that Iraq permit and facilitate the immediate departure from Kuwait and Iraq of the nations of third countries and grant immediate and continuing access of consular officials to such nationals.”10
Table 2. UN Security Council Resolution 665 (25 August 1990)

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Reason</th>
<th>Key Requirements/Statements</th>
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</thead>
</table>
| • Iraq continues to refuse to comply with resolutions 660, 661, 662, and 664  
• Government of Iraq using Iraqi flag vessels to export oil | • Calls upon Member States cooperating with the government of Kuwait which are deploying maritime forces to the area to use such measures commensurate to the specific circumstances as may be necessary under the authority of the Security Council to halt all inward and outward maritime shipping in order to inspect and verify their cargoes and destinations and to ensure strict implementation of the provisions relating to such shipping laid down in resolution 661  
• Invites Member States accordingly to cooperate as may be necessary to ensure compliance with the provisions of resolution 661 with maximum use of political and diplomatic measures |


Iraq continued its refusal to comply with the UN resolutions. Saddam flaunted this disregard by using Iraqi flag vessels to export oil, a direct violation of the sanctions levied by UNSCR 661. The Security Council issued UNSCR 665 (Table 2) on 25 August 1990, calling upon all Member States to strictly enforce the economic sanctions against Iraq, especially regarding inward and outward shipping from Iraq and Kuwait.11

With the continued embargo against Iraq and Saddam Hussein’s non-yielding position, human suffering continued in both Iraq and Kuwait. The Security Council adopted UNSCR 666 (Table 3) on 13 September 1990 to ensure provision to provide foodstuffs to the civilian population in Iraq or Kuwait, if required to relieve human suffering. UNSCR 666 also specifies that the Security Council must determine when humanitarian circumstances exist that warrant such implementation.12

The vigorous international enforcement of the comprehensive sanctions against Iraq did not persuade Saddam Hussein to withdraw from Kuwait or comply fully with the UN resolutions. The sanctions against Iraq continued, and, as 1990 ended, the military option to force Iraq’s withdrawal from Kuwait became viable. The Gulf War began on 17 January 1991 and ended with the liberation of Kuwait on 27 February 1991. The Allied
coalition achieved their goal to oust Iraq from Kuwait and restore Kuwait’s legitimate Government. Iraq signed cease-fire agreements to abide by UN Security Council resolutions establishing requirements for Iraq’s postwar conduct. The international economic embargo against Iraq remained in force, and despite the military disaster he brought upon his country, Saddam Hussein survived in power in Iraq.\(^{13}\)

### Table 3. UN Security Council Resolution 666 (13 September 1990)

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<th>Reason</th>
<th>Key Requirements/Statements</th>
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| • Recognizes that circumstances may arise in which it will be necessary for foodstuffs to be supplied to the civilian population in Iraq or Kuwait to relieve human suffering (it is for the Security Council, acting alone or through the Committee, to determine whether such conditions have arisen) | • The Committee shall keep the situation regarding foodstuffs in Iraq and Kuwait under constant review  
• Requires the Secretary-General seek urgently, and on a continuing basis, information from relevant United Nations and other appropriate humanitarian agencies and all other sources on the availability of food in Iraq and Kuwait, and communicate such information to the Committee regularly  
• If urgent humanitarian need exists, foodstuffs should be provided through the United Nations in cooperation with the International Committee of the Red Cross or other appropriate humanitarian agencies and distributed by them or under their supervision in order to ensure that they reach the intended beneficiaries  
• Requests the Secretary-General facilitate the delivery and distribution of foodstuffs to Iraq and Kuwait in accordance with provisions of this and other relevant resolutions  
• Because resolution 661 does not apply to supplies intended strictly for medical purposes, recommends that medical supplies should be exported under the strict supervision of the Government of the exporting State or by appropriate humanitarian agencies |
| • Iraq failed to meet its obligations under resolution 664 in respect to the safety and well-being of third State nationals; reaffirms that Iraq must comply with resolution 664 |                                                                                                                                                                                                                         |

**Source:** United Nations, “Resolution 666,” adopted by the Security Council at its 2939th meeting, on 13 September 1990.

Shortly after the Gulf War cease-fire, the Security Council adopted UNSCR 686 (Table 4). This resolution reaffirmed Iraq’s obligation to comply with previous relevant resolutions. It also demanded Iraq immediately returns prisoners of war and remains of deceased personnel of Kuwaiti and Member States military forces.\(^{14}\)
Table 4. UN Security Council Resolution 686 (2 March 1991)

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Reason</th>
<th>Key Requirements/Statements</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Affirms that all Member States are committed to the independence, and the sovereignty, and the territorial integrity of Iraq and Kuwait.</td>
<td>• Iraq rescind immediately its actions purporting to annex Kuwait.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Kuwait decided to provide access to and commence immediately the release of Iraqi prisoners of war as required by the terms of the Third Geneva Convention of 1949, under the auspices of the Red Cross.</td>
<td>• Iraq accept in principle its liability for any loss, damage, or injury arising in regard to Kuwait and third States, and their nations and corporations, as a result of the invasion and illegal occupation of Kuwait by Iraq.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Iraq immediately release under the auspices of the International Committee of the Red Cross, Red Cross Societies, or Red Crescent Societies, all Kuwait and third country nationals detained by Iraq and return remains of any deceased Kuwaiti and third country nationals so detained.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Iraq immediately begin to return all Kuwaiti property seized by Iraq, to be completed in the shortest possible period.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Iraq arrange for immediate access to and release of all prisoners of war under the auspices of the International Committee of the red Cross and return the remains of any deceased personnel of the forces of Kuwait.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Requests all Member States, as well as the United Nations, the specialized agencies, and other international organizations in the United Nations system to take all appropriate action to cooperate with the Government and people of Kuwait in reconstruction of their country.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>


To specify the Gulf War cease-fire requirements and obligations of Iraq, the Security Council adopted UNSCR 687 (Table 5) on 3 April 1991. UNSCR is referred to as the “cease-fire” resolution. It welcomed the restoration of Kuwait’s sovereignty and the return of Kuwait’s legitimate Government. Further, UNSCR 687 dictated demands on Iraq to ensure its weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and delivery systems are identified and verified destroyed. This resolution also reaffirmed Iraq’s liability for damages and injuries to foreign Governments’ nationals and corporations as a result of Iraq’s invasion and occupation of Kuwait.¹⁵
Table 5. UN Security Council Resolution 687 (3 April 1991)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reason</th>
<th>Key Requirements/Statements</th>
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<tr>
<td>• Kuwait sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity restored, and return of Kuwait’s legitimate Government</td>
<td>• Iraq and Kuwait respect the inviolability of the international boundary and the allocation of islands set out in the in the “Agreed Minutes Between the State of Kuwait and the Republic of Iraq Regarding the Restoration of Friendly Relations, Recognition, and Related Matters,” signed by them in the exercise of their sovereignty at Baghdad on 4 October 1963 and registered with the United Nations and published by the United Nations in document 7063, United nations, treaty series, 1964</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Reaffirms the need to be assured of Iraq’s peaceful intentions in the light of its unlawful invasion and occupation of Kuwait</td>
<td>• Security Council guarantees the inviolability of the Iraq/Kuwait boundary and will take as appropriate all necessary measures to that end in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Reaffirms that Iraq is liable under international law for any direct loss, damage, including environmental damage and depletion of natural resources, or injury to foreign Governments, foreign nationals, and foreign corporations, as a result of Iraq’s unlawful invasion and its occupation of Kuwait</td>
<td>• Iraq shall unconditionally accept the destruction, removal, or rendering harmless, under international supervision, of:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>(a) all chemical and biological weapons and all stocks of agents and all related subsystems and components and all research, development, support, and manufacturing facilities</td>
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<td>(b) all ballistic missiles with a range greater than 150 kilometers and related major parts, and repair and production facilities</td>
</tr>
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<td>• Iraq shall unconditionally agree not to acquire/develop nuclear weapons or nuclear-weapons-usable material or any subsystems or components or any related research, development, support, or manufacturing facilities</td>
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<td>• Creates a fund to pay compensation for claims against Iraq and establishes a Commission that will administer the fund</td>
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<td>• Iraq must adhere scrupulously to all its obligations concerning servicing and repayment of its foreign debt (all Iraqi statements made since 2 August 1990 repudiating its foreign debt are null and void)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Iraq must inform the Security Council that it will not commit or support any act of international terrorism or harbor terrorists within Iraq: Iraq must unequivocally condemn and renounce all practices of terrorism</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Because of the swift and overwhelming defeat of Iraq’s military in the Gulf War, the Kurdish minority in northern Iraq and the Shi’ites in the south rebelled against Saddam Hussein. At first it appeared these rebellions might pose a danger to his regime, but, ultimately, that did not happen. Despite Saddam’s military equipment and manpower losses during the Gulf War, he still was able to mobilize his available forces (smaller in number, but well equipped to fight for a short duration) and crush the rebellions. Thus, Saddam’s repression of these groups of Iraqi civilians continued.
Gravely concerned about the repression of Iraqi civilian populations, particularly in the Kurdish areas, the Security Council adopted UNSCR 688 on 5 April 1991. The situation with the Kurds in the north was especially significant because the resultant massive flow of refugees across international frontiers and cross-border incursions threatened international peace and security in the region. The Security Council condemned the repression of Iraqi civilian populations and demanded Iraq stop the repression. UNSCR 688 also required that Saddam allow immediate humanitarian assistance in all areas of Iraq.\(^{17}\)

The UN sanctions against Iraq are now six years old. Since April 1991, the UN adopted numerous other resolutions directed toward Iraq and Saddam’s post-war activities. Many of these resolutions denounced Saddam’s continued repression of Iraqi minorities and strongly reaffirmed Saddam’s obligations to destroy his WMD weaponry and production capabilities. To remain legally effective, the Security Council must formally renew the sanctions against Iraq every two months. The Security Council has consistently done just that, and all sanctions remain in effect today. Iraq’s only relief has come in the implementation of UNSCR 986 in December 1996. UNSCR 986 (referred to as the “oil-for-food” resolution) allows Iraq to sell $2 billion worth of oil (under very strict UN oversight) over a 180-day period to purchase humanitarian supplies (food, medicines, etc.) for its very much impoverished population.\(^{18}\) Among the five permanent members of the Security Council, France, and Russia, and China voice growing opposition to continued comprehensive sanctions against Iraq, and “all three stand to win lucrative contracts to repair Iraq’s infrastructure.”\(^{19}\) Only the US and United Kingdom (UK)
remain steadfast in their determination to fully maintain the sanctions against Iraq until Saddam complies with all relevant UN resolutions.\textsuperscript{20}

\textbf{Notes}


\textsuperscript{2} United Nations, “Resolution 660,” adopted by the Security Council at its 2932nd meeting, on 2 August 1990.


\textsuperscript{12} United Nations, “Resolution 666,” adopted by the Security Council at its 2939th meeting, on 13 September 1990.

\textsuperscript{13} Daniel C. Diller, ed., \textit{The Middle East} (Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Inc., 1996), 236.


\textsuperscript{17} United Nations, “Resolution 688,” adopted by the Security Council at its 2982nd meeting, on 5 April 1991.
Notes

Chapter 3

Sanctions’ Effects on Iraq

Without oil revenue, the Iraqi government can’t subsidize the cost of food and medicine, which it did before 1990. At that time, even the poorest Iraqis had enough to eat. But today Iraq is a land of hunger, thanks to the sanctions.

—John Catalinotto, 1996

Despite the overwhelming international and domestic issues he faces, Saddam Hussein continues to play alternating roles of defiance and conciliation regarding UN demands. The sanctions against Iraq are very harsh, and the Iraqi populace has endured over six years of the fully implemented international embargo against Iraq. The UN Security Council adopted and continues to adopt resolutions placing demands upon Iraq and condemning Iraq’s failure to comply with its pre- and post-Gulf War obligations. Iraq is virtually isolated economically and politically from the international community. The living conditions of Iraq have severely deteriorated, leading to very serious nutritional and health situations for the Iraqi people, especially children. Nevertheless, even in the face of internationally enforced sanctions and widespread domestic human suffering, Saddam still lives in the opulence he enjoyed prior to the sanctions. He also shows no real inclination to fully comply with relevant UN resolutions so that the sanctions against Iraq may be lifted. Finally, Saddam Hussein remains in power in Iraq, and there appears to be no leadership change in sight.¹
Iraq’s Economy Crippled

The UN sanctions against Iraq crippled the Iraqi economy. Also, a large portion of the middle class has been wiped out as tens of thousands of Iraqis have fled abroad in search of a better life. Iraq’s oil exports are prohibited, its foreign assets are seized, and Iraq’s war debt is $70 billion (about seven years of oil revenues). After more than six years of economic devastation, inflation runs in the thousands of percent. In early January 1996, the Iraqi government stopped printing money to try to contain runaway inflation and a plummeting dinar. “The steepest fall in living standards came soon after the war and the decline now is a more steady, if still painful, process.”

Iraqi Population Paying a High Price

Since August 1990, Iraq has not imported foodstuffs and medical supplies in sufficient quantities to provide for its 20 million people. Because Iraq could not sell its oil, the revenue available to purchase such items did not exceed one billion dollars (compared to
the $3-4 billion spent annually prior to 1990). Even though the UN Security Council resolutions specifically exempted appropriate humanitarian goods (i.e., food and medical supplies) from the embargo, the ban on Iraqi oil exports essentially imposed severe restrictions on Iraq’s capability to purchase these items. Prior to 1990, Iraq relied on the oil revenues to purchase required food and medical supplies. To avert wholesale starvation, in 1990 the Iraqi government implemented a program that provided a basic monthly food ration to all Iraqis. The program cost the government about one billion dollars a year, funded primarily from Iraq’s hidden monetary reserves. As Iraq’s hidden reserves dwindled, though, it economized by cutting the rations by one-third. In 1994, the government rations provided less than half a person’s nutritional requirements. In late 1996, “many Iraqis are simply unable to afford basic foodstuffs, with inflation soaring and the dinar losing yet more value.” Hyperinflation caused the average public-sector wage to fall to about 3500 dinars (approximately $3-$4 at February 1997 exchange rates) per month. This is barely enough to buy a single meal for a family of six.

Malnutrition was only one effect of the sanctions on the populace of Iraq. Disease levels also rose, due to shortages of critical medical supplies and basic infrastructure deterioration. Many cases of disease could have been treated, but the drug shortage in Iraq makes successful treatment nearly impossible. A UN investigative mission found that “in 1994, 2380 children died of diarrhea as compared with 121 in 1989 and 1789 of pneumonia, as compared with 139 in 1989, and the mortality rate for people over fifty suffering from hypertension, diabetes, and cancer was 10 times higher in each category than the 1989 rate.” In 1996, aid agencies “estimate that 4500 children are dying of hunger and disease every week and say the situation is likely to get worse.”
The drug shortage and the resultant medical problems that arose in Iraq weren’t just caused by a lack of funds. When Iraq tried to purchase drugs, some foreign producers simply refused to fill the Iraqi orders. “About $10 million out of $17 million worth of orders placed and paid for before the embargo was imposed have yet to be delivered.”

Iraq’s medical crisis became acute in 1991. It then arranged with Great Britain, Spain, Italy, Canada, and Sweden to deliver foodstuffs and drugs to Iraq and credit the costs against frozen Iraqi assets held in each country. However, the Iraqi efforts reaped a discouraging return. “By the end of 1994, Britain had only sent $22 million out of an agreed $70 million in drugs and food, Spain $1 million, Italy a quarter of the specified amount, and Canada and Sweden were still negotiating deals.”

All Iraqis are not suffering equally. Saddam’s regime concentrates rations and reconstruction efforts on the center of Iraq, to the detriment of the south. The medical problems endured by the general population in Iraq are exasperated by Iraq’s failing infrastructure. For example, Iraq’s sewage treatment and water purification systems and facilities (especially in the south) were largely destroyed during the Gulf War. Under the current sanctions, Iraq cannot import chlorine for water purification, nor can it import parts to repair damaged purification plants and related facilities. As such, “some 800,000 people in Southern Iraq are at risk from water borne diseases.” Some of the diseases that the people of Iraq must contend with today were unknown in Iraq before the Gulf crisis. “Typhoid, Dysentery, and Cholera are all examples.”
UN Security Council Resolution 986 Promises Relief

In May 1996, the UN Security Council and the Government of Iraq reached agreement on the implementation of the UNSCR 986 (the “oil-for-food” resolution). The US sponsored UNSCR 986 (Table 6), allowing Iraq to export up to $2 billion worth of oil in a 180 day period. UNSCR 986 is a humanitarian exception to the existing sanctions so Iraq may purchase food and medicine to ease the suffering of its people. The Security Council will review the continuation of oil sales at the end of the 180-day period.¹⁴

The limited allowance to export oil came with strict requirements of UN supervision and management to prevent manipulation of the program. Also, UNSCR 986 does not allow all proceeds to go to relieve suffering in Iraq. The allocation of proceeds from the oil sales is as follows: (1) 30% to go on Gulf War reparations; (2) about 66% to go on medical supplies and foodstuffs for civilian needs (about 15% of the 66% must be given to the UN Inter-Agency Humanitarian Program operating in Iraq’s Kurdish north); and (3) the remaining percentage to cover the cost of the UN operation and supervision of the oil sale and repair to the pipeline.¹⁵
Table 6. UN Security Council Resolution 986 (14 April 95)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reason</th>
<th>Key Requirements/Authorizations/Requests</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Concern over the serious nutritional and health situation of the Iraqi population, and the risk of further deterioration of this situation</td>
<td>• Authorizes States to permit the import of petroleum and petroleum products originating in Iraq, including financial and other essential transactions directly relating thereto, sufficient to produce a sum not exceeding a total of one billion United States dollars every 90 days; this authorization will remain in force for an initial period of 180 days unless the Security Council takes other relevant action with regard to the provisions of resolution 661</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Convinced of need as a temporary measure to provide for the humanitarian needs of the Iraqi people until the fulfillment by Iraq of the relevant Security Council resolutions</td>
<td>• Authorizes Turkey to permit the import of petroleum and petroleum products originating in Iraq sufficient, after the deduction of the required percentage for the Compensation Fund, to meet the pipeline tariff charges, verified as reasonable by the independent inspection agents appointed by the Secretary-General, for the transport of Iraqi petroleum and petroleum products through the Kirkuk-Yumurtalik pipeline in Turkey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Convinced of the need for equitable distribution of humanitarian relief to all segments of the Iraqi population throughout the country</td>
<td>• Directs the UN Special Committee established by resolution 661 to monitor the sale of petroleum and petroleum products to be exported by Iraq via the Kirkuk-Yumurtalik pipeline from Iraq to Turkey and from the Mina al-Bahr oil terminal, with the assistance of independent inspection agents; the agents will verify the purchase price of the petroleum and petroleum products is reasonable and that the larger share of the petroleum and petroleum products is shipped via the Kirkuk-Yumurtalik pipeline and the remainder is exported from the Mina al-Bahr oil terminal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Requests the Secretary-General establish an escrow account for the purposes of this resolution, and appoint independent and certified public accountants to audit it</td>
<td>• Requests the Secretary-General establish an escrow account for the purposes of this resolution, and appoint independent and certified public accountants to audit it</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• The funds in the escrow account shall be used to meet the humanitarian needs of the Iraqi population and for the following other purposes:</td>
<td>• The funds in the escrow account shall be used to meet the humanitarian needs of the Iraqi population and for the following other purposes:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(a) to finance the export to Iraq of medicine, health supplies, foodstuffs, and materials and supplies for essential civilian needs (in accordance with resolution 661)</td>
<td>(a) to finance the export to Iraq of medicine, health supplies, foodstuffs, and materials and supplies for essential civilian needs (in accordance with resolution 661)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b) Help ensure equitable distribution of humanitarian relief to all segments of the Iraqi population throughout the country by providing between 130 million and 150 million United States dollars to the United Nations Inter-Agency Humanitarian Program operating within the sovereign territory of Iraq</td>
<td>(b) Help ensure equitable distribution of humanitarian relief to all segments of the Iraqi population throughout the country by providing between 130 million and 150 million United States dollars to the United Nations Inter-Agency Humanitarian Program operating within the sovereign territory of Iraq</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Authorizes States to permit:</td>
<td>• Authorizes States to permit:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(a) the export to Iraq of the parts and equipment which are essential for the safe operation of the Kirkuk-Yumurtalik pipeline system in Iraq</td>
<td>(a) the export to Iraq of the parts and equipment which are essential for the safe operation of the Kirkuk-Yumurtalik pipeline system in Iraq</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b) activities directly necessary for the exports authorized by this resolution, including related financial transactions</td>
<td>(b) activities directly necessary for the exports authorized by this resolution, including related financial transactions</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The implementation of UNSCR 986 should relieve some of the human suffering in Iraq. It should not, however, be construed as a lifting of the sanctions against Iraq. Then US Ambassador to the United Nations, Madeline Albright, emphasized that “the sanctions regime is fully in place and there is business as usual on that until Saddam Hussein lives up to all the obligations that are required of him under the resolutions of the Security Council.”

Figure 3. Iraqi Workman at Oil Pipeline Station at Kirkuk
Iraqi Leadership Largely Unaffected by Sanctions

The internationally-enforced UN sanctions against Iraq have exacted a significant toll on the health and well-being of the Iraqi civilian population. They have not, though, prodded Saddam Hussein into full compliance with relevant UN Security Council resolutions. Essentially Saddam seems essentially unaffected by the sanctions imposed. He continues his lavish lifestyle (at the expense of his people’s well being). He also ensures sectors of the Iraqi society loyal to him remain relatively well off and substantially insulated from the ill effects of the sanctions. These groups are “the Ba’th party elite, the military in general, and some divisions in particular.”

Saddam’s and his chosen elite’s dignity is clearly unaffronted, even as the general Iraqi populace suffers in the extreme misery caused by the UN sanctions. In blatant disregard for his people’s plight, Saddam Hussein imported $25 million worth of Italian marble to build ‘the largest Mosque in the world.’ He also continued building palaces for himself and his family. In 1995, thirty-nine such palaces were under construction or renovation at a cost of $1.2 billion over a two-year period. Saddam’s palace at Basra is larger than the palace at Versailles. Further, despite Jordan’s enforcement of the sanctions, luxury goods for Saddam’s “inner circle” arrive from Jordan on command within a few days. In Baghdad, too, the shops open only to government employees sell food (clearly bearing the name of the UN World Food Program) at preferential prices. Saddam also pays his Republican Guard in dollars rather than with increasingly devalued Iraqi dinars.

In government circles within Iraq, Saddam Hussein makes appointments based on one prime quality—loyalty. Most of his appointees, especially senior government and military
officials, are “family,” linked to him by birth, marriage, or common political history. Even in the era of stringent sanctions, being “close” to Saddam pays off in power and wealth. An international team of investigators identified at least 48 firms (domestic and international) owned by Iraqi officials. “Among those listed as owners were six members of Saddam’s family who control key ministries and, acting for their patron, rule Iraq like a feudal kingdom.” Compared to the living conditions of the average Baghdad resident constantly trying to cope with widespread hunger and skyrocketing food prices, Saddam and his elite appear insulated from the disastrous effects of the UN sanctions.

Though largely insulated from their effects, the sanctions may yet be taking a toll on Saddam’s beleaguered regime, as serious fissures are increasingly evident. Saddam was humiliated by the defection to Jordan of two of his sons-in-law, Lieutenant General Hussein Kamel al-Majid and his brother, with his daughters in 1995. Kamel was Saddam’s trusted aide in charge of Iraq’s extensive secret weapons programs in the 1980s. His disclosures alerted the world to the fact that Iraq’s WMD programs were far more advanced and extensive than Western intelligence agencies had suspected. Because of Kamel’s defection, Saddam had to admit to both the existence and extent of his WMD programs through 1995. For reasons not readily obvious, Kamel, his brother and their wives returned to Baghdad. Their wives quickly divorced them, and only days afterwards the two men were murdered.

Along with Kamel’s defection and subsequent assassination, the Iraqi opposition point to other examples of problems within the Baghdad regime. Saddam’s thuggish eldest son Uday frequently openly terrorized and murdered individuals and groups within Iraq. His excesses likely spurred several of the feuds that have occurred within Saddam’s dwindling
inner circle, particularly his extended family. Further, senior figures in the regime and the military are still defecting, although not in large numbers, and executions and mass arrests continue in Iraq. These activities underlay “the nervousness of the regime as it scrambles to ensure its own survival as its military, political, and economic problems mount.”

Through all of these maneuverings, Iraq’s 20 million people continue to suffer the extreme hardships the sanctions’ have brought. Even so, there is no indication of an organized effort to rise against Saddam. “Saddam Hussein is likely to remain in power over the short to medium term at least.” He brutally crushed all conspiracies detected in the military, and his opposition within the country is fragmented and unable (and unwilling) to act against him. So, “Saddam remains in place through a combination of savage brutality, political manipulation and the lack of a credible opposition capable of replacing him and introducing democratic rule.”

**Iraq’s Military Weakened, But Capable**

Despite increasingly scarce resources, Saddam Hussein continues his efforts to reconstitute his armed forces and maintain a credible military capability. From the beginning of the sanctions, Iraq focused reconstruction efforts not on the civilian economy, but towards its military-industrial infrastructure. Under the terms of the imposed embargo, Iraq cannot import arms. Iraq has, however, made repeated attempts to import arms-related materials and components, in direct violation of the embargo. Iraq is not dependent, though, on external sources for military armament, as it has some indigenous arms manufacturing capability. Since the embargo, Iraq manufactured some parts for its older Russian aircraft, refurbished armored equipment damaged during the
Gulf War, and produced ammunition, small caliber weapons, and mortars. Iraq also successfully incorporated captured Kuwaiti equipment into its operational inventory (a violation of UN resolutions requiring return of captured Kuwaiti equipment).²⁷

Figure 4. Saddam Hussein Greets Iraqi Troops

Saddam’s army is less than half its size during the Gulf War, but it is still the most formidable in the region.²⁸ Iraq demonstrated some impressive military capability in October 1994. Saddam deployed two Republican Guard divisions to the Kuwaiti border. He showed that using heavy lift assets and Iraq’s national transportation infrastructure, Iraqi military units could rapidly move from one section of the country to another. In 1996, Saddam also sent his army into Kurdish territory in northern Iraq and expelled the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) from the city of Irbil. This again demonstrated that Saddam’s army is not impotent, but rather, a presentable fighting force. “Analysts believe
the army retains a qualitative superiority over the armies of Iran and the southern Gulf states, and this is likely to remain the case for the next few years.”

The consoling thought for Iraq’s neighbors who fear revived Iraqi military aggression beyond Iraq’s borders is that Iraq is not well postured to fight an extended campaign. An extended fight would overstretch its forces and use up the limited stores of spare parts so vital to the army’s operational capability. Further, the Iraqi army suffers from a poor logistics and support system. Analysts also doubt that the army can effectively operate in large formations necessary to conduct an extended military campaign beyond Iraq’s borders. With an estimated strength of up to 350,000, the quality and morale of the personnel within the armed forces may also be lacking. This is especially true in light of the large and bloody August 1996 purge in the military, occurring as the army prepared to go into Kurdistan.30

So far Saddam has succeeded in keeping the military operationally capable with a certain level of equipment. In the longer term, however, if sanctions continue, then the military will face serious problems as equipment can no longer be repaired. The operational capability of the military then will suffer dramatically. In the short term, though, the army can deal with Iraq’s domestic challenges and is certainly a respectable power within the Gulf region.31 Despite the UN sanctions, “Iraq has the military capability to conduct short-term, limited objective, multi-division offensive operations against Kuwait and northeastern Saudi Arabia which would require a coalition response.”32

Notes

Notes


5 Kate Clark, “Disaster Looms,” Middle East International, 22 November 1996, 10.


8 Ibid.

9 Kate Clark, “Disaster Looms,” Middle East International, Number 538, 22 November 1996, 10.


11 Ibid.

12 Ibid.


Notes


21 Ibid.

22 Ibid.


24 Ibid.


30 Ibid.

31 Ibid.

Chapter 4

Sanctions’ Collateral Effects on Jordan and Turkey

Sanctions also cause hardship outside the target country, in what is known (borrowing from military terminology) as “collateral damage.” Sanctions invariably hurt countries that are neighbors or major trading partners, who lose export markets, government revenues, and employment opportunities.

—James Paul

Of the countries in the region, Jordan and Turkey are the two perhaps most affected by collateral effects of the UN sanctions against Iraq. These two US allies both were major trading partners with Iraq prior to the Gulf crisis. Both countries also enforce the sanctions against Iraq, at great loss of income and economic opportunities. Further, Jordan and Turkey must both deal with respective political and security-related issues associated with the sanctions against their unpredictable and still powerful neighbor, Iraq.

Jordan

Iraq markets are vital to Jordan’s economy. Iraq and Jordan have conducted economic and trade relations since the early 1950s. Modest at first, the mutual trade grew rapidly during the 1980s. However, trade dropped sharply after Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait and drew the wrath of the Western powers. Because of the UN-imposed sanctions, Jordan suffered a negative trade balance with Iraq. In spite of the sanctions, the
UN allowed Jordan to maintain “special” trading ties with Iraq.\(^1\) As such, Iraq remained Jordan’s main source of oil supply, but other Arab countries, especially the Gulf states, substantially reduced their trade with Jordan. As this trade volume sharply fell, Jordan’s trade deficit increased, and Iraq continued to be the main market for Jordan’s exports.\(^2\)

The Gulf crisis and the post-war reaction from the Gulf states against Jordan made it increasingly dependent upon Iraq for crude oil and oil products. In 1989, Jordan imported 2.5 million tons of crude oil at a cost of 190.3 million Jordanian dinars (JD). In 1995, Jordan imported nearly 5.5 million tons of crude oil, valued at JD 235.2 million; Iraq supplied 95% of this crude oil. Jordan’s import of oil products showed a similar rise since 1989. In 1989, Jordan imported about 596,000 tons of oil products worth JD 37 million. In 1995, Jordan imported 1.1 million tons of oil products worth JD 66 million. In 1989, Iraq provided 39% of the volume and earned 46% of the total value of the oil products Jordan imported. By 1995, Iraq’s share grew to 82% of the volume and 93% of the value.\(^3\)

**Port of Aqaba Operations Hit Hard**

Jordan’s shipping industry is still feeling the negative effects of the Gulf War and the UN sanctions against Iraq. Iraq is not only a chief market for Jordanian goods, it is also a principal source of shipping business for Jordan. The UN sanctions against Iraq, and their international enforcement, “have jeopardized the continued prosperity of the once thriving Port of Aqaba.”\(^4\)
The port of Aqaba is Jordan’s only port. Aqaba is located at the south of Jordan and along the northeastern shore of the Gulf of Aqaba, which connects Jordan to the Red Sea. During its over 57 year history, the Port of Aqaba prospered largely due to Jordan’s strategic location as a crossroads between the Middle east, Africa, the Mediterranean Sea, and the European continent. The port activity peaked in 1988, when Aqaba serviced 2500 ships and handled about 20 million tons of cargo (Table 7). However, the eruption of the Gulf crisis in 1990, the subsequent UN sanctions against Iraq, and the blockade of the port of Aqaba sent port activity into a sharp decline, largely because the port activity is so largely linked to Iraq. In 1989, prior to the Gulf crisis, the port handled about 10 million tons of exports, 71% of those goods were for Iraq. Since the sanctions, cargo destined
for Iraq is less than 20% of the 1989 amounts, and foodstuff makes up the majority of those products shipped.⁵

The proportion of transit traffic to total traffic through the port of Aqaba in 1988 versus 1994 further illustrates the effects of the Gulf War and the sanctions on Iraq. That ratio was 55% in 1988 and dwindled to about 10% in 1994. Aqaba is increasingly counting on Southbound trade from the Far East. The Far East trade activity now amounts to about 61% of the total trade operated by the port.⁶

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>No. Of Ships</th>
<th>Imports (Tons)</th>
<th>Exports (Tons)</th>
<th>Total Tons</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>2382</td>
<td>5,077,045</td>
<td>6,679,115</td>
<td>11,756,160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>2495</td>
<td>3,923,903</td>
<td>6,648,377</td>
<td>10,572,280</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>2491</td>
<td>5,252,689</td>
<td>6,381,181</td>
<td>11,633,870</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>2430</td>
<td>6,021,703</td>
<td>7,361,798</td>
<td>13,383,501</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>2075</td>
<td>5,547,998</td>
<td>7,677,470</td>
<td>13,225,468</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>2222</td>
<td>6,164,599</td>
<td>8,871,857</td>
<td>15,036,456</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>2446</td>
<td>8,694,675</td>
<td>9,985,974</td>
<td>18,680,649</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>2583</td>
<td>9,143,165</td>
<td>10,952,973</td>
<td>20,096,138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>2555</td>
<td>8,743,749</td>
<td>11,271,622</td>
<td>20,015,371</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>2677</td>
<td>7,153,420</td>
<td>9,697,388</td>
<td>16,850,628</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Although revenues fell in 1990 and 1991 because of the Gulf War, the port has shown steady recovery ever since. When the United Nations Security Council fully lifts the embargo against Iraq, Jordan expects large increases in port activity (including movement of cargo and passengers). In the meantime, Jordan’s strategic plan is “to position Aqaba as a key port for all cruise ships, and transit and trans-shipment cargoes.”⁷
“Oil-for-Food” Agreement Gets Mixed Reviews

In May 1996, the Iraq agreed to the provisions of UNSCR 986. The so-called “oil-for-food” agreement allows Iraq to sell $2 billion over a six-month period, under strict UN supervision. Iraq actually started pumping its oil to international customers in accordance with UNSCR 986 in December 1996. Jordan’s King Hussein views UNSCR 986 with calculated skepticism. He sees UNSCR 986 as a softening of US resolve against Iraq and Saddam. Jordan wants a “tough stand” against Saddam, as King Hussein is concerned about reprisals against Jordan if Iraq again becomes a dominant military power in the region.

Figure 6. Jordan’s King Hussein

Nevertheless, the implementation of UNSCR 986 is certainly good news for Jordan, too. Jordan’s economy stands to benefit greatly from the “oil-for-food” deal between the
UN and Iraq. Jordan anticipates more trade activity between Iraq and Jordan due to the renewed Iraqi oil exports. The UN gave official approval for Jordan “to provide Iraq with basic foodstuffs and pharmaceuticals as stipulated in the deal.” Jordan also expects Iraq will import about 250,000 tons of these supplies through the port of Aqaba during the first quarter of 1997. “The transport sector of Jordan is highly equipped to replenish the Iraqi market with much needed basic commodities from local production and by transit cargo from regional and international markets.” The “oil-for-food” deal may also provide Jordanian manufacturers many opportunities to export their high quality, competitively priced products to Iraq. Increases in Jordanian exports to Iraq will, at the very least, help strengthen Jordan-Iraq economic ties.

**Jordan Realigning with the West**

Jordan’s King Hussein sided with Iraq during the Gulf War. At least this was the perception of the Arab coalition states that fought the Gulf War, since Jordan did not overtly oppose Iraq. King Hussein contends Jordan has always sought to promote reconciliation and understanding among Arabs, and opposes the use of force against fellow Arabs. He further asserts that “this policy was misinterpreted by some during the Gulf crisis when we [Jordan] called for a peaceful settlement guaranteeing Iraq’s withdrawal from Kuwait.” Whatever the perceptions or realities of Jordan’s alignment with, or sympathetic posture toward, Iraq during the Gulf War, relations since deteriorated as Jordan also began enforcing the UN sanctions against Iraq (with limited exceptions as mentioned above).

Since 1995 (when Kamel defected to Jordan from Iraq), Jordan has distanced itself from Iraq and publicly realigned itself with the West and those Arab coalition states that
defeated Iraq in the Gulf War. Jordan apparently decided alignment with Iraq was no longer beneficial. Until 1995, Jordan had only loosely enforced the UN sanctions against Iraq. During 1995, Jordan’s policy regarding Iraq and sanctions enforcement became more focused. King Hussein ordered more rigorous monitoring of goods shipped to Iraq in transit through Jordan. This dramatically reduced the Iraqi elite’s use of connections within Jordan to avoid the worst effects of the sanctions. Also, the increase monitoring efforts showed that Iraq repeatedly attempted to use Jordan as a transit point for importing technology and components required to maintain and develop its weapons programs. Jordan successfully thwarted some of these attempts. In December 1995, Jordanian authorities seized a shipment of gyroscopes suitable for long-range missiles bound for Iraq. Jordanian authorities also seized a “hidden consignment of chemicals in transit through Jordan in January 1996.” Jordan also recently allowed US Air Force air power expeditionary force operations from within its country for three months. From Jordan’s Shaheed Mwaffaq Air Base, US planes flew missions to enforce the no-fly zone over southern Iraq, and US and Royal Jordan Air Force fighter pilots practice dogfighting and other wartime skills together.

Jordan’s realignment with the West carries with it both risks and benefits for Jordan. One significant risk is manifested in the sizable Palestinian population in Jordan. This group remains pro-Iraq. The Jordan government continues to enforce the UN sanctions against Iraq. Also, Jordan’s King Hussein openly supports the Israeli-Arab peace process, and Jordan signed a peace accord with Israel in 1994. However, from its peace efforts Jordan has seen little or no resultant economic benefits in the form of alternative markets for Jordanian goods. The government’s policies regarding peace with Israel and the
enforcement of sanctions against Iraq are very unpopular with the Jordanian people (especially the businessmen). Further, given Jordan’s dependence on Iraqi oil, if Iraq stopped or curtailed that crude oil flow to Jordan, the latter could experience significant domestic problems.\textsuperscript{18} If Iraq should choose this course of action against Jordan, Saudi Arabia offered to provide oil to meet Jordan’s needs.\textsuperscript{19} Unfortunately, in the near-term, crude oil from Saudi Arabia is not a practical option. The pipeline from Saudi Arabia into Jordan is severely degraded from lack of use and upkeep, and would require significant repairs/upgrades. Finally, the Saudi’s would likely charge Jordan market price for the crude oil provided, and Jordan can ill afford this cost.\textsuperscript{20}

The overwhelming benefit of Jordan’s new realignment politics is growing support from the US. A timely example of US support came when Jordan provided sanctuary to Saddam Hussein’s two sons-in-law, including Kamel (Saddam’s former director of military procurement). To warn against any Iraqi government retaliation against Jordan, the US sent an aircraft carrier to the waters near Jordan and conducted marine amphibious exercises near Jordan’s port of Aqaba. The Clinton administration also promised more US-Jordanian military exercises, including naval, special-operations, and combined service exercises.\textsuperscript{21} Also, after lengthy and often bitter negotiations over many years, the US recently agreed to sell Jordan 16 early-models US F-16 fighter aircraft. The first of these planes, along with a USAF instructor pilot and F-16 support personnel, should arrive in Jordan in mid- to late-1997.\textsuperscript{22} For Jordan, then, the benefits derived from continued realignment with the West and pro-western Arab states apparently outweigh the regional and domestic risks involved.
Turkey

Besides Jordan, Turkey also suffered political and economic hardships resulting from the UN sanctions against Iraq. During the 1990-1991 Gulf crisis, Turkey supported the US-led coalition efforts to accomplish the UN limited objective to restore Kuwaiti sovereignty, so clearly violated by the overt military invasion and occupation by Iraq. Turkey could not remain neutral in this crisis since neutrality would be construed as siding with Iraq. Also, Turkey’s regional security policy was consistent with its participation in a multilateral action in response to Iraq’s aggression against Kuwait. Further, Turkey had no disagreement with the legality of the sanctions imposed Iraq and the Gulf War in terms of international law.23

Circumstances changed, however, after the Gulf War. Kuwaiti sovereignty was restored, the Iraqi war machine was severely crippled, and permanent members of the UN Security Council disagreed over the extent and continuation of economic and military sanctions against Iraq. For Turkey, the legality of continued sanctions against Iraq seemed suspect, especially since the UN objective of the Gulf War was achieved. Also, the continued sanctions are contrary to Turkey’s foreign policy objectives in the region. Turkey’s policy in the region is a conservative, balance-of-power approach, significantly different from the US-led reform-oriented policy regarding Iraq. Turkey seeks to manage the situation in the Gulf through coexistence based on diplomatic damage control, as opposed to the US attempt to eliminate regional sources of hostility through economic and political warfare. “This US policy has negatively affected Turkey’s political, economic, and security interests in the region.”24
Substantial Economic Losses

Turkey was the first country in the region to denounce Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait. In response to Iraq’s unlawful aggression against its neighbor, Turkey turned off the oil pipeline which runs from Iraq’s borders to Turkey’s Mediterranean port of Yumurtalik. This effectively shut off Iraq’s access to the Mediterranean for exporting its crude oil. Also, even though Iraq was a major trading partner with Turkey prior to the Gulf crisis, Turkey ended all trade with Iraq after the invasion of Kuwait.25

In late 1996, Turkey’s government declared that the embargo against Iraq has cost its country $30 billion.26 Turkey also suffered significant job losses among its population and experienced decreased availability of hard currency due to the UN sanctions imposed on Iraq. Economically, Turkey would fare much better if the UN Security Council lifted the sanctions against Iraq. Turkey could then restore its trade with one of its former main trading partners, Iraq. Only in this scenario could Turkey hope to recoup its economic losses since the Security Council imposed the sanctions against Iraq. Turkish officials certainly look forward to the day when the embargo against is lifted fully. Until then, however, Turkey continues its enforcement of the embargo against Iraq.27
Iraqi Oil Flowing Again through Turkey

Figure 7. Major Oil Pipelines in the Middle East

With the implementation of UNSCR 986, in December 1996 Iraq started exporting limited amounts of crude oil to international customers. Much of this oil will flow through the Kirkuk-Yumurtalik pipeline between Iraq and Turkey. “Turkish officials celebrated as a tanker loaded with Iraqi crude departed an oil terminal on the Mediterranean Sea. It was the first shipment of Iraqi oil from the port of Yumurtalik in more than six years, an event Turkey hailed as the beginning of a relaxation of a UN-imposed economic embargo against Baghdad.”28 This is certainly a boost, albeit a small one, for Turkey’s economy
and trade relations with Iraq. Under this limited resumption of Iraqi oil sales, Turkey expects to receive an estimated $200 million annually in fees for Iraq’s use of the oil pipeline through Turkey. Turkey also hopes to provide 20 to 40 percent of the approximately $1.3 billion in food and medicine Iraq will import over a six month period per UNSCR 986.29

**Political and Security Problems**

Aside from the economic losses, Turkey has political and security problems that stem from the continuing UN embargo against Iraq and the survival of the Saddam Hussein regime. In the wake of territorial and political divisions domestically, a *de facto* Kurdish state has emerged in northern Iraq. Turkey perceives this development negatively as it may have a domino effect on Turkey’s and other regional state’s territorial integrity and political unity. Also, PKK (Kurdistan Workers Party) militants have established bases in northern Iraq and threaten Turkey’s security. Turkey conducted retaliatory military interventions against the PKK. These actions proved financially costly and militarily risky for Turkey, and Turkey’s security concerns regarding Kurds and PKK militants are far from resolved.30

**Notes**


3 Ibid.

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5 Ibid.
7 Ibid.
8 Personal notes from discussion with US State Department officials.
10 Ibid.
18 Personal notes from discussion with US State Department officials.
20 Personal notes from discussion with US State Department officials.
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Notes


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Chapter 5

How Long Will the Sanctions Persist?

There are lingering worries about these special warheads associated with chemical weapons and biological weapons and Iraqis’ efforts to acquire large quantities of chemical weapons nerve agents. We clearly have quite a long way to go before the council will lift the sanctions.

—British Ambassador John Weston, March 1997

Today many countries throughout the Western world and the Middle East are asking when the sanctions against Iraq will be fully lifted. Arguably, the most direct answer to the question is that the sanctions will remain in place as long as the US wishes it be so. Legally, of course, the UN Security Council will decide when, or if, the sanctions should be lifted. Within the group of Security Council permanent members, the US, strongly supported by the UK, is leading the charge for continued sanctions against Iraq.

The members of the Gulf Cooperation Council, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, and Oman, also oppose lifting the sanctions because Iraq has not fulfilled all Gulf War cease-fire conditions. They are deeply suspicious of Iraq and the still defiant Saddam Hussein.¹ On 10 November 1994, Iraq formally recognized Kuwaiti sovereignty and the UN demarcated borders between the two countries. This recognition of Kuwait satisfied significant requirements of UNSRC 687 (the “cease-fire” resolution), but it also came only days before a UN Security Council meeting to review the sanctions.
against Iraq. Many states in the region saw this action by Iraq as a ploy to gain relief from the sanctions. If so, Saddam’s subterfuge did not work.  

Despite Iraq’s recognition of Kuwait and its borders, other issues still remain as obstacles to a lifting of the sanctions. “Among these is Iraq’s failure to return Kuwaiti military equipment that it seized during its occupation of Kuwait.” In direct violation of UN resolutions, Iraq integrated much of this captured equipment into its military. The equipment Iraq did return was badly damaged.  

Another significant issue is that of Kuwaiti prisoners of war (POW). Kuwait insists that Iraq is holding approximately 600 Kuwaiti POWs. Iraq has made no effort to return POWs it may still hold. Kuwait’s prime minister and crown prince, Shaikh Saad al-Abdullah al-Sabah, is adamant that the Kuwaiti POWs must be returned to Kuwaiti. He said: “The prisoners issue is not a slogan we raise to impress the world. This is our prime problem and our prisoners of war are our brothers and sons.”  

Perhaps the foremost impediment to fully lifting the sanctions against Iraq is Saddam Hussein’s continued attempts to acquire weapons of mass destruction, and his obvious efforts to preserve as much of his WMD programs as possible. Despite UN monitoring and destruction efforts, certain aspects of Baghdad’s WMD programs may never be detected and destroyed. Even if Iraq’s WMD program is totally destroyed, Iraq still retains the scientific and technical infrastructure and trained personnel to eventually restart these programs. In an effort to guard against any future such resurrections in Iraq, in October 1994, both the United Nations Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) began UN-directed long term monitoring of
Baghdad’s arms potential. This monitoring effort is not directly linked to the lifting of sanctions, as the UN envisions this program to continue indefinitely.7

Rolf Ekeus, UNSCOM chairman, is charged with the responsibility of disarming Iraq. In February 1997, after many months and hundreds of inspections, he “accused Iraqi officials of still pursuing a policy full of contradiction, misstatements and understatements.”8 Ekeus said for the first time he believes Iraq has more operational missiles than the 16 he first suspected. He did not specify numbers, but stated that Iraq could have enough missiles to “constitute a complete operational force.”9

In early March 1997, Ekeus briefed the Security Council on his team’s efforts to verify the destruction of Iraq’s high-tech weapons programs in accordance with UN resolutions. The Iraqis claim that after the Gulf War they secretly destroyed 1700 pounds of the VX nerve agent (considered far deadlier than sarin) they admittedly produced in 1990. However, “Ekeus said UN inspectors could not verify Baghdad’s claims when they were taken to sites in the desert where the destruction was said to have taken place.”10 Based on the information Ekeus presented, the council agreed to extend the sanctions against Iraq another 60 days.11

The issues and concerns discussed above are substantial and seemingly lasting roadblocks to fully lifting the UN sanctions against Iraq. The sanctions will at least persist through April 1997. Also, barring some dramatic change in character or cooperation by Saddam Hussein, the Security Council may well maintain the comprehensive sanctions against Iraq through 1997, and perhaps through 1998, too. Moreover, the Security Council will likely extend the limited oil sales authorized by UNSCR 986 for the duration of the sanctions. The oil sales currently allowed under UNSCR 986, and any extensions
thereof, should help Iraq avoid total economic collapse and widespread starvation, and make the comprehensive sanctions against Iraq sustainable well into the future.\textsuperscript{12} Iraq cannot fully recover from the devastating sanctions through such limited oil sales. Iraq can embark upon the road to complete recovery from the sanctions’ effects only when the UN lifts the full sanctions. Given Saddam Hussein’s consistently defiant posture toward compliance with relevant UN resolutions and the US resolve in maintaining the sanctions, “Saddam has little hope of getting the full sanctions lifted soon.”\textsuperscript{13}

Notes

\begin{enumerate}
\item Ibid.
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Chapter 6

Conclusion

*Each time we review Iraq’s compliance, we find new reasons not to trust Iraq. A sobering reality is that Iraq has never met voluntarily any of the demands of the (UN Security) Council... Sanctions must be maintained until Iraq is in overall compliance with all of its obligations to the Council.*

—Madeline Albright, 1996

Since its unlawful invasion of Kuwait on 2 August 1990 and its subsequent defeat in the Gulf War, Iraq has existed under the specter of broad internationally enforced sanctions. The UN Security Council adopted numerous resolutions over the past six years denouncing Iraq’s aggression against Kuwait and Saddam’s continued repression of the Kurds and Shi’ites in Iraq. Security Council resolutions also levied demands upon Iraq that must be satisfied completely before the UN will fully lift the sanctions against Iraq. To date, however, Saddam has only partially complied with relevant UN Security Council resolutions. He doesn’t yet appear motivated to fully comply. Until he does, the sanctions will continue.1

The effect of the sanctions on Iraq are chiefly felt by the civilian population. Saddam seems content to let his people suffer great hardships from disease and malnutrition, watch his state’s economy severely deteriorate, and see his once extremely prosperous nation fall into despair. Why not? His standard of living remains very high, and he has similarly
insulated his family and his close followers from the harsh realities of the sanctions. More importantly, though he may have little direct influence internationally due to the sanctions, Saddam remains in power in Iraq, and he rules completely and unopposed.²

Saddam has also managed to maintain a credible military capability despite the sanctions imposed upon Iraq. The Iraqi armed forces are still the most formidable in the region, and they present a respectable threat to neighboring countries in a short-term conflict. Iraq’s army is not well prepared, however, to conduct multi-division, long-term campaigns against its neighbors. Continued sanctions will also likely degrade the army’s operational capabilities further, but for at least the next few years, the Iraqi army will remain a powerful force.³

The UN-imposed sanctions against Iraq have also had significant collateral impact on US allies in the region, particularly Jordan and Turkey. Prior to the Gulf crisis, both countries enjoyed Iraq as a major trading partner. But the Gulf crisis brought drastic changes to that relationship for both Jordan and Turkey. Although the UN allowed Jordan limited trade (primarily oil imports) with Iraq post Gulf War, Jordan’s trade volumes with Iraq plummeted from their levels in August 1990. Jordan’s shipping industry, especially activity through the port of Aqaba, was greatly affected as sanctions enforcement severely curtailed Iraq’s imports and exports. Nonetheless, Jordan and Iraq remain linked economically, as Iraq still provides the majority of oil used by Jordan. Too, the UNSCR 986 (the “oil-for-food” resolution) should provide a much needed boost to trade between Jordan and Iraq, but on a very small scale compared to the era of Jordan-Iraq unrestricted trade.⁴
Even though still linked economically, since 1995, Jordan has taken a harder line in enforcement of sanctions against Iraq, and has realigned itself away from Iraq and toward the West. Jordan felt it much more beneficial to distance itself from Iraq, and its leader Saddam Hussein. As such, Jordan has received increased US support and a lucrative foreign military sales package of 16 US F-16 fighter aircraft. Also, the US promised more military exercises with Jordan in the future.\(^5\)

Like Jordan, Turkey, too, felt collateral effects from the sanctions against Iraq. Turkey was the first country in the region to denounce Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait. Turkey immediately turned off its pipeline from the Iraqi border to Turkey’s Mediterranean port and severed all trade ties with Iraq. The embargo against Iraq has cost Turkey $30 billion and significant job losses and decreased availability of hard currency.\(^6\) However, with the implementation of UNSCR 986, Turkey’s economy benefits from Iraqi oil again flowing through Turkey’s pipeline. Turkey will receive over $200 million annually in fees for the Iraq’s use of the pipeline. Turkey also expects to sell Iraq about $500 million worth of food and medicine in accordance with UNSCR 986.\(^7\)

Turkey must also contend with political and security issues resulting in part from the sanctions against Iraq. A de facto Kurdish state has emerged in northern Iraq, threatening Turkish territorial integrity and political unity. The situation is worsened by the fact that PKK militants are also based in northern Iraq and directly threaten Turkey’s security. Turkey is addressing these problems to the extent it can, and it remains vigilant in its enforcement of the sanctions against Iraq.\(^8\)

Thus, the UN-imposed sanctions against Iraq have had significant negative impact on Iraq’s country and its population. The collateral effects of the comprehensive sanctions are
also felt beyond Iraq’s borders, especially in Jordan and Turkey. The sanctions are now in
their seventh year, but Saddam Hussein remains in power in Iraq, unopposed and largely
insulated from the sanctions’ harsh effects. He also has shown no willingness to fully
comply with relevant UN resolutions, especially with respect to complete destruction of
his WMD programs. Given Saddam’s only limited acquiescence to Security Council
requirements to date, the Security Council will not likely lift the full sanctions soon. The
US is leading the Security Council charge to maintain all sanctions until Saddam fully
satisfies his post-Gulf War obligations. President Clinton is adamant in this regard. In a
January 1997 letter to Congress, he said: “I remain determined to see Iraq comply fully
with all of the obligations under UN Security Council resolutions. My Administration will
continue to oppose any relaxation of sanctions until Iraq demonstrates its peaceful
intentions through such compliance.”

The Security Council must ensure it maintains sanctions against Iraq as long as is
required to force Iraq’s compliance with relevant UN resolutions. If sanctions are
removed prematurely, Saddam Hussein’s cooperation to date, though lacking, would
surely cease. And, when Iraq’s oil again flows freely on the world market, it will be very
hard to shut it off.

Notes

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