EXPANDING THE EUROPEAN UNION’S PETERSBERG TASKS: REQUIREMENTS AND CAPABILITIES

by

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June 2004

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This thesis analyzes the “updated Petersberg tasks” included in the draft treaty establishing a Constitution for the European Union. The original Petersberg tasks called for forces capable of humanitarian and rescue missions, peacekeeping operations and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking. The updated tasks add conflict prevention, joint disarmament, military advice and assistance, post-conflict stabilization, and support to third countries in combating terrorism. The thesis focuses on the requirements of these tasks and the capabilities of the European Union’s civilian agencies and military forces to execute them. It explores the meaning of the new missions, their specific capability requirements, and the prospects for the European Union to meet these requirements. It concludes that the European Union is currently capable of undertaking the missions that require mostly civilian tools or medium-level military forces for their conduct. The European Union does not at present have the relevant capabilities for the missions that demand more advanced military forces.
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ABSTRACT

This thesis analyzes the “updated Petersberg tasks” included in the draft treaty establishing a Constitution for the European Union. The original Petersberg tasks called for forces capable of humanitarian and rescue missions, peacekeeping operations and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking. The updated tasks add conflict prevention, joint disarmament, military advice and assistance, post-conflict stabilization, and support to third countries in combating terrorism. The thesis focuses on the requirements of these tasks and the capabilities of the European Union’s civilian agencies and military forces to execute them. It explores the meaning of the new missions, their specific capability requirements, and the prospects for the European Union to meet these requirements. It concludes that the European Union is currently capable of undertaking the missions that require mostly civilian tools or medium-level military forces for their conduct. The European Union does not at present have the relevant capabilities for the missions that demand more advanced military forces.
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I. INTRODUCTION

A. STATEMENT OF PURPOSE

The “Petersberg tasks”\(^1\) were initially adopted by the Western European Union (WEU) in June 1992. The WEU Council of Ministers declared that, in addition to the continuing collective defense obligations of the WEU member states under the 1948 Brussels Treaty and the 1949 North Atlantic Treaty, “military units of WEU member States, acting under the authority of WEU, could be employed for: humanitarian and rescue tasks; peacekeeping tasks; [and] tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking.”\(^2\) The Petersberg tasks were adopted as the military missions of the European Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) in the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty and the 2000 Nice Treaty. However, the member states of the European Union (EU) have for years, particularly since the terrorist attacks on the United States in September 2001, been considering a redefinition of those missions.

On 18 July 2003, the European Convention published the final version of the draft treaty establishing a Constitution for the European Union. This draft treaty recommended that the missions in which the European Union could use its civilian and military means be expanded to include the following:

- conflict prevention,
- joint disarmament operations,
- military advice and assistance,
- post-conflict stabilization, and
- support to third countries in combating terrorism in their territories.\(^3\)

With the European Convention’s recommendation, two critical questions have emerged: To what extent can the operations in the updated Petersberg tasks be defined with greater precision? What capabilities requirements have to be met to conduct these

\(^1\) The tasks were named after the location outside Bonn, Germany, where the WEU Council of Ministers made the declaration.


operations? These questions are addressed in this thesis. With the updated Petersberg tasks proposal the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) has received a new dynamic with several implications at the global level. However, the most important issue is whether the European Union’s effort to acquire credible tools capable of intervening effectively in international security affairs has gone one step further. Therefore, the purpose of this thesis is to examine to what extent that step is of practical value. The analysis concentrates on the European Union’s actual and prospective capabilities to meet the requirements of the updated Petersberg tasks.

B. IMPORTANCE

The ESDP project has been a thorny issue in the trans-Atlantic arena since its beginning in late 1998. However, the European Union’s critical military shortfalls have hampered its development. The European Convention’s recommendation constitutes another step in the developmental process of the ESDP, and a new chapter in the long-standing debate. If the EU has the political will and the operational capabilities to undertake the “updated Petersberg Tasks,” it may gain a more influential position in international politics since it could play a larger role in relation to international organizations such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and the United Nations (UN). Therefore, potential ESDP developments in light of the Convention’s recommendation regarding updated Petersberg tasks should be carefully considered by specialists in international security affairs, particularly strategic planners.

C. MAJOR QUESTIONS AND ARGUMENT

The proposed updated list of the Petersberg tasks has given birth to some uncertainties, since the European Convention’s proposal does not specifically define what should be expected from each mission. For example, what is meant by conflict prevention? Is the European Union’s definition the same as that of the United Nations? If not, how does it differ? Moreover, will the missions included in the updated list be carried out by the same forces identified in 1999 as the “Headline Goal?” Or will additional or different forces be required? Furthermore, what form should the support to a third country, in case of a terrorist attack, take? The thesis attempts to resolve some of these uncertainties by employing the methodology described below.
As noted earlier, the thesis focuses on the following research question: Is the European Union capable of performing the updated Petersberg tasks that have been recommended by the European Convention? This question is answered by examining the following closely related questions:

- What are the origins of the ESDP concept? What significant steps led to the European Convention’s recommendation?
- What is the precise definition of the “updated missions” and what requirements have to be met to successfully accomplish them?
- What is the European Union’s current military posture, and what are its future prospects? What improvements must be made to perform the “updated Petersberg tasks”?
- What is the importance of the European Convention’s recommendation?

The thesis concludes that the European Union is currently capable of undertaking the missions that require mostly civilian tools or medium-level military forces for their conduct. The European Union does not at present have the relevant capabilities for the missions that demand more advanced military forces.

D. METHODOLOGY AND SOURCES

The thesis primarily employs a comparative approach. In particular, it examines past activities similar to those included in the updated list of Petersberg tasks and compares the capabilities required with those of the European Union. The time framework for this comparative study focuses on the post-Cold War era for the civilian or military undertakings and the period since the Saint Malo meeting for the assessment of the European Union’s military capabilities. This method is expected to lead to reasonably accurate conclusions since it is based on the examination of concrete technical requirements in a similar political framework.

Since the European Convention made its recommendation regarding an updated list of Petersberg Tasks in July 2003, the quantity of relevant primary sources is comparatively limited. However, UN documents on peace operations, EU and NATO documents concerning the ESDP, statements by national leaders and other officials, agreements and treaties, and the literature dedicated to European defence affairs and peace operations provide valuable material for analysis. In addition, official defence
ministries’ publications and unofficial studies of military forces help identify the capabilities of the ESDP contributors. The secondary sources include informational reports and analytical studies.

E. CHAPTER-BY-CHAPTER SUMMARY

The thesis is organized as follows. Chapter II reviews the historical background of the ESDP developmental process and especially the factors that have contributed to its progress. The examination of events follows a chronological order. It commences with the Maastricht Treaty and the first steps of the European Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy and provides a brief account of the successive European Councils and related events affecting the evolution of its security and defense aspect.

Chapter III explores the meaning of the updated missions and attempts to identify their capabilities requirements. In doing so, it considers how other organizations have defined and conducted such missions, including the personnel and equipment requirements.

Chapter IV examines the overall operational capabilities of the European Union’s civilian agencies and military forces with special attention to the proposed missions. It briefly discusses the evident lack of commitment by the EU countries to meeting the requirements of the original Petersberg tasks. It then compares the requirements of the newly proposed missions to the actual operational capabilities of the European Union’s forces, furnishing a basis for conclusions about the extent to which proposed missions could be carried out. It also reviews the efforts the EU member states have undertaken to address their recognized shortfalls.

Chapter V summarizes the thesis findings and focuses on the importance of the European Union’s ability to carry out the updated Petersberg tasks.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

A. INTRODUCTION

The “updated Petersberg tasks” represent only one of the latest steps in the developmental process of the ESDP. Diverse considerations about the future role of the European Union, trans-Atlantic debates, financial constraints, political alliances, operational concerns, and the intervention of the great powers are only some of the factors, which have thus far influenced the ESDP’s progress. The decision-making procedure of ESDP development has not always run smoothly. The outcomes were mainly the product of compromises among the EU member states, which many times found themselves in a difficult position. Consequently, a close look at that process would be helpful to identify its critical points and extract lessons to ascertain what was done well and what went wrong.

Therefore, the purpose of this chapter is to examine the evolution of the ESDP, mainly from a historical point of view, clarifying the necessary political assumptions whenever possible. In doing so, the analysis follows a chronological order. The first section deals with the actual events that took place in the European security arena, primarily in the last decade of the 20th century. The second analyzes two of the primary factors in the context of the Union’s gradual maturation and attempts to determine where the ESDP efforts are more likely to succeed.

B. A DECADE OF RAPID PACE

Since 1949, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has been the major political-military force in Western Europe. In contrast, the European Community (EC), initially developed as an economic association, only began to take an interest in external security affairs in 1970, with the policy consultation mechanism known as European Political Cooperation. Not until the Maastricht Treaty entered into force in November 1993, did the EC member states give a new character to their organization with the creation of the European Union (EU). The Maastricht Treaty, also known as the Treaty on European Union (TEU), set the objective of a Common Foreign and Security Policy.
(CFSP) as the necessary step for the European Union to make its voice heard on the
global stage and referred to the development of the Western European Union (WEU) as
its defense arm.

The provisions concerning the CFSP were revised by the Amsterdam Treaty, which entered into force in May 1999 and also gave birth to the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP). The ESDP, as an integral part of the CFSP, covers all matters relating to the Union’s security, including the eventual formulation of a common defense if the European Council so decides. That development embodied the EU members’ aspirations to promote their security and defense activities in a common policy in cooperation with NATO and not within it. In addition, the European Council decided to establish the position of the Secretary General of the Council and High Representative for the CFSP (SG/HR) for coordinating the Union’s efforts and effectively promoting the Council’s decisions regarding international security affairs. Finally, the “Petersberg tasks” were placed at the core of the ESDP process.

However, the vital impetus for the creation of the ESDP had been given six months earlier at the St. Malo meeting on 4 December 1998 between the leaders of Britain and France. The St. Malo declaration resulted from a significant shift in British foreign policy concerning the European Union’s defense affairs. Britain reversed its long-standing position of opposing EU involvement in military security affairs and became a leading proponent of European integration through ESDP by agreeing that “the Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international


6 The different perceptions in the EU and NATO on what form a common European security and defense policy should take were reflected on the different terms that those organizations used to address it. In NATO, it was called ESDI and in the EU it was called ESDP. In particular, the “I” for NATO stood for “Identity,” which should be developed within the Alliance. By contrast, “P” for the EU, stood for “Policy,” which should be developed within the EU, in cooperation with NATO.

crises.” The St. Malo declaration was so well received by the rest of the EU member states that all of them, with the exception of Denmark, decided to embark on the ESDP project. Moreover, at the Cologne European Council meeting on 3 and 4 June 1999, the governments of the European Union expressed the intention “to give the European Union the necessary means and capabilities to assume its responsibilities regarding a common European policy on security and defence…in order to respond to international crises without prejudice to actions by NATO.”

Afterwards, the Helsinki European Council on 10 and 11 December 1999 sketched the operational framework for the European Union’s potential interventions in international crises. In specific terms, the EU leaders concluded that:

- Cooperating voluntarily in EU-led operations, Member States must be able, by 2003, to deploy within 60 days and sustain for at least 1 year military forces of up to 50,000-60,000 persons capable of the full range of Petersberg Tasks;

- New political and military bodies and structures will be established within the Council to enable the Union to ensure the necessary political guidance and strategic direction to such operations, while respecting the single institutional framework;

- Modalities will be developed for full consultation, cooperation and transparency between the EU and NATO, taking into account the needs of all EU Member States;

- Appropriate arrangements will be defined that would allow, while respecting the Union’s decision-making autonomy, non-EU European NATO members and other interested states to contribute to EU military crisis management;

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9 According to the Protocol 5 annexed to the Amsterdam Treaty, “Denmark does not participate in the elaboration and the implementation of decisions and actions of the Union which have defence implications, but it will not prevent the development of closer cooperation between Member States in this area.” For more details in the Treaty of Amsterdam, Protocol on the Position of Denmark, Part II, Article 6, 102, Available at [http://www.europarl.eu.int/topics/treaty/pdf/amst-en.pdf], Accessed 16 November 2003.

a non-military crisis management mechanism will be established to coordinate and make more effective the various civilian means and resources, in parallel with the military ones, at the disposal of the Union and the Member States.\textsuperscript{11}

Taking advantage of the momentum gained at Helsinki, the General Affairs Council met in Brussels, on 14-15 February 2000, and proceeded to make decisions regarding the establishment of the following three interim bodies responsible for handling all ESDP issues:

The interim Political and Security Committee (PSC)...will be composed of national representatives at the senior/ambassador level, placed within the framework of Member States’ Permanent Representations. Its task, in close cooperation with the Secretary General/High Representative, will be to prepare recommendations on the future functioning of the CESDP and to deal with CFSP affairs on a day to day basis.

The interim Military Body [later known as the EU Military Committee] will be composed of representatives of the Member States’ Chief[s] of Defence [Staff] and will have to give military advice as required to the Political and Security Committee and to the Secretary General/High Representative. It is assisted by the military experts seconded from Member States to the Council Secretariat.

The national military experts [later known as the EU Military Staff] on secondment will be part of the General Secretariat of the Council. They will provide military expertise to the interim Military body and the SG/HR to support CFSP.\textsuperscript{12}

Subsequently, the Nice European Council, on 7, 8 and 9 December 2000, recognizing those bodies’ significant contribution to the Union’s policy and military planning, gave them a permanent character by approving their official adoption.

In between these events, the Feira European Council on 19 and 20 June 2000 proceeded to define the necessary arrangements that would allow the non-EU European NATO members and the candidate countries for accession to the EU to participate in EU-led military crisis management. Furthermore, the last WEU Ministerial Council, which was held in Marseille on 13 November 2000, marked the official end of the WEU’s operational functions and their transfer to the European Union. However, the WEU was

\textsuperscript{11} European Council Presidency Conclusions, Helsinki, par. 28, 10-11 December 1999 in Rutten, Chaillot Paper 47, 82.

not entirely abolished. Since 1 July 2001, it has obtained a new restructured mode and its residual functions have mainly related to (a) safeguarding the mutual defense commitment of the modified Brussels Treaty; (b) providing administrative, financial and linguistic support to the organization’s armaments bodies, the Western European Armaments Group (WEAG) and Western European Armaments Organization (WEAO); (c) reorganizing and opening the archives to the public; and (d) the management of pensions.13

Subsequently, the Laeken European Council (14-15 December 2001), taking into account the progress that had been made at that time, declared that

[T]hrough the continuing development of the ESDP, the strengthening of its capabilities, both civil and military, and the creation of appropriate structures within it … the Union is now capable of conducting some crisis-management operations… Development of the means and capabilities at its disposal will enable the Union progressively to take on more demanding operations.14

However, it was only after another year that the European Union managed to complete its negotiations with NATO and open the door for the undertaking of its first operations. The Copenhagen European Council on 12-13 December 2002 approved the necessary accommodations that would allow the Union to have access to NATO’s infrastructure for operations in which the Alliance does not wish to be more directly involved.15 In addition, the ensuing EU-NATO Declaration on ESDP, published on 16

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December 2002, finalized the strategic partnership between the two organizations by authorizing the implementation of the “Berlin-plus”\textsuperscript{16} agreement and “ensuring the fullest possible involvement of non-EU European members of NATO within ESDP.”\textsuperscript{17}

Since that declaration, the European Union launched its first policing mission on 1 January 2003 in Bosnia-Herzegovina, succeeding the United Nations in that role. From 31 March to 15 December 2003 it conducted its first military operation, succeeding NATO’s “Allied Harmony” in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), and from 12 June to 1 September 2003, its second one, which was an effort to stabilize the security conditions and improve the humanitarian situation in Bunia, in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Operation Concordia in FYROM and Operation Artemis in DRC involved approximately 350 and 1,800 EU troops, respectively.\textsuperscript{18} Finally, on 15 December 2003 the European Union launched its second policing mission, this time in FYROM, to help the country’s police forces fight organized crime and develop to international standards.

Despite the significant progress of the European Union’s transformation efforts, the member states have realized that additional measures need to come into practice, especially with regard to the modernization of EU institutions and the establishment of a more effective mechanism to speak to the world with a single voice. To that end, the European Convention was created with the mission to propose new ideas and introduce fresh approaches for the future of the European Union.

On 18 July 2003, in Rome, the Chairman of the European Convention, Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, handed over the full draft treaty intended to serve as a Constitution for the European Union to the President of the European Council, Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi. That constitution is expected to replace all existing EU treaties and crucially influence the European Union’s development in the coming decades.

\textsuperscript{16} The first decision allowing the EU to have access to NATO assets was reached at the Berlin Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council on 3 June 1996. A more detailed agreement was reached at the 1999 NATO Washington Summit, which gained the “Berlin-Plus” title. That agreement, however, initiated a series of negotiations among the NATO allies and the EU member states; and these negotiations were completed in December 2002.

\textsuperscript{17} EU-NATO, Brussels, 16 December 2002, European Union-NATO Declaration on ESDP, in Haine, Chaillot Paper 57, 179.

Consequently, it has already become the object of extensive discussions among EU member states in the Intergovernmental Conference context. It is hoped that these discussions will be concluded before the European Parliament’s elections in June 2004.

The European Union’s aspirations to exert influence on world affairs and acquire international credibility contributed to the creation of the ESDP. “The aim in framing that policy is not to transform the European Union into a military alliance but to provide it with the instruments it needs to defend its objectives and its values.”19 Remarkably, though, that process took approximately a decade to gestate and become a reality. One may date its beginning from the drafting of the CFSP provisions of the Maastricht Treaty in 1991, and its first concrete results were the operations undertaken in 2003. Therefore, it is important to analyze the fundamental reasons behind the progress achieved.

C. THE DRIVING FACTORS

West European efforts to create a common security and defense policy have a complex history in the post-World War II period. The 1947 Treaty of Dunkirk between Britain and France, and the 1948 Brussels Treaty among Britain, Belgium, France, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands are considered the first post-1945 attempts to organize a unified West European defense posture.20 However, the failed attempt to set up the European Defense Community (EDC) in 1950-1954 postponed the pursuit of further ambitions of that nature. After the EDC’s failure, the Western European Union (WEU) was established on the basis of the 1954 Brussels Treaty. In the event, the strong United States commitment to European security through NATO rendered the operational importance of the WEU almost irrelevant. It took until the 1990s for the European Union to see the dreams of some of its founding fathers come true. Apart from the completely different international conditions, there were two major factors in these recent successes.

The first major factor concerns the United Kingdom’s attitude towards European security and defense arrangements. As the most powerful member state of the European Union in military terms, Britain plays a decisive role influencing all potential developments. France and Germany cannot effectively push things forward in this


domain without Britain. France’s usual anti-American rhetoric makes other countries suspect that Paris might have ulterior motives. Germany has had difficulties with carrying out its defense reforms\textsuperscript{21} and does not seem capable of undertaking another significant project. The most characteristic expression of the United Kingdom’s key role was, as already noted, the St. Malo declaration, which provided new impetus to the entire ESDP project. Moreover, it is noteworthy that the staunchest United States ally, British Prime Minister Tony Blair, accepted the draft Constitution’s provision for a ‘‘structured co-operation within the Union framework,’ and that means outside NATO.’’\textsuperscript{22} This proposal, already backed by France and Germany, worried the Americans and ignited a new debate among trans-Atlantic circles.

British support for the ESDP serves four purposes. First, it gives Britain a more pro-European Union profile ‘‘to compensate for the United Kingdom’s self-chosen exclusion from other European projects, most notably the European Monetary Union (EMU),’’\textsuperscript{23} or to regain the support of the British people who favored ‘‘Old Europe’s’’\textsuperscript{24} position and opposed the recent war in Iraq. Second, it gives Britain an opportunity to play a leading role in European affairs. The United Kingdom, ‘‘which is the highest European spender on defense and fields Europe’s most capable armed forces that are well suited to far-flung international deployments,’’\textsuperscript{25} cannot simply ignore its historic destiny and not get involved in EU military affairs. Third, the British participation augments multipolarity among European Union member states and allows the representation of

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{22} Paul Reynolds, ‘‘Defence: Atlantic or European?!’’, \textit{BBC News-Europe}, Available at [\texttt{http://newsvote.bbc.co.uk/mpapps/pagetools/print/news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/3210418.stm}], Accessed 21 October 2003. The phrase ‘‘structured co-operation within the Union framework’’ appears in the draft Constitution.
\item \textsuperscript{23} Peter Van Ham, \textit{Europe’s New Defense Ambitions: Implications for NATO, the US, and Russia}, The Marshall Center Papers No. 1 (Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany: George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, April 2000), 4-5.
\item \textsuperscript{24} This term was initially used by the U.S. Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, to refer to Belgium, France, Germany, and Luxembourg, which initiated an independent defense effort in April 2003. However, the same term has been employed to include the European Union member states that opposed the American policy on the Iraq issue.
\end{itemize}
divergent approaches within the EU. That, in turn, would lead to the easing of potential tensions and facilitate the decision-making process. Finally, Britain’s leadership role in the ESDP makes the likelihood of an anti-American position remote, and therefore reassures US policy-makers.26

As for the second major factor, some governments have demonstrated an increased sensitivity since the end of the Cold War to incidents of human rights violations, especially by repressive regimes against their own populations. Many states argued that respect for a state’s sovereignty, which has nominally been a significant pillar of international order since the seventeenth century, can no longer justify inaction in the face of genocide.27 The decisive reaction of some states in those cases gave birth to a new type of intervention, one based on humanitarian grounds, which may become more prominent in the 21st century.

Examples of humanitarian intervention operations in the early 1990s include the following: the intervention by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in Liberia’s civil war in August 1990; the evacuation of 716 nationals by Belgian and French troops in Kinshasa, Zaïre, in October 1991; and Operation Provide Comfort in northern Iraq in April 1991. These operations, whether authorized by an explicit UN Security Council mandate or not, were considered legitimate actions by the overwhelming majority of governments.28

The undertaking of these missions seemed to influence the formulation of the WEU’s military tasks, also known as the Petersberg tasks, in 1992.29 Its humanitarian and rescue missions referred to operations such as the aforementioned ones in Zaire and northern Iraq, and the peacekeeping tasks to the usual UN missions, which have been conducted for a long time. The last category, as Willem van Eekelen stated, consisted of “coercive measures.”

26 Ibid.
28 Ibid., 105.
29 Ibid.
The inclusion of the word “peacemaking” was interpreted as peace-enforcement, in line with the jargon used at the time. It was used because Germany found it difficult to accept an earlier version: “tasks of combat forces in crisis management, limited armed conflict and armed conflict.”

An additional incentive, however, was provided by the embarrassing situation in which the EU member states found themselves during the Bosnian crisis in 1992-1995. That is, the EU lacked the military means to intervene effectively in this conflict. The NATO European armed forces’ limited contribution to Operation Allied Force in the 1999 Kosovo war, compared to that of the United States, demonstrated that the European Union would have to accelerate its security and defense efforts if it wanted to play a larger role on the international stage. This could also prove that the EU’s pledge to comply with the provisions of the UN Charter, the Helsinki Final Act, and the Paris Charter is not empty but in fact consistent with the European Union’s overall efforts to assist in the promotion of international peace and security.

In sum, the driving factors behind the relatively fast development of the ESDP in the last decade were the British initiatives, which stirred the stagnant waters, and the necessity of addressing current challenges, which provided the guidelines for the formulation of the European Union’s military missions. However, although the Petersberg tasks were seen as appropriate for 1990s-style crisis management obligations, the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, and the ensuing Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan, made clear that they are not designed to deal with the new threats. Keeping that in mind, the European Convention proposed a new list of updated tasks for the European Constitution, and its requirements are analyzed in the next chapter.

III. ANALYSIS OF PROPOSED MISSIONS AND CORRESPONDING CAPABILITY REQUIREMENTS

A. INTRODUCTION

Precise terminology is absolutely necessary to understand what is expected from the new missions included in the European Constitution. Potential ambiguities and unclarified issues may lead to major misperceptions among European Union nations, making the conduct of the corresponding operations an extremely difficult endeavor. The lack of clarity had already been noticed in the original list of the “Petersberg tasks,” which recognized peacemaking as a combat forces’ mission, in contrast to other organizations such as the United Nations and NATO, which saw it as “a strictly diplomatic undertaking.” Similar problems were observed during the 1990s with the evolution of peacekeeping and the emergence of peace enforcement operations. For the U.S. Armed Forces, those missions fell under the category of “peace operations,” whereas NATO and the UK Armed Forces used to call them “peace support operations” and “wider peacekeeping” respectively.

Therefore, this chapter attempts to define the “updated Petersberg tasks” as accurately as possible and identify their capability requirements. The first section explores the various current perceptions of the missions’ meaning and comes up with the most widely accepted definitions, while the second reviews the kinds of tasks the EU civilian agencies and military forces are likely to perform in undertaking those missions.

B. ANALYSIS OF THE “UPDATED PETERSBERG TASKS”

According to Working Group VIII of the European Convention, the term conflict prevention refers to “a peace support operation employing complementary diplomatic, civil and, when necessary, military means, to identify the causes of conflict, support monitoring, and take timely action to prevent the occurrence, escalation, or resumption of

31 Charles L. Barry, “NATO’s Bold New Concept-CJTF,” Joint Force Quarterly, Number 5, Summer 1994, 54. It must be noted that many of the EU member states were not fully aware of the real reason behind the use of the term “peacemaking,” which has already been analyzed in Chapter II. This led to misunderstandings and miscalculations among EU nations.

hostilities.”\textsuperscript{33} Michael Lund has offered a more comprehensive definition of conflict prevention as the sum of “governmental or nongovernmental actions, policies, and institutions that are taken deliberately to keep particular states or organized groups within them from threatening or using organized violence, armed force, or related forms of coercion such as repression as the means to settle interstate or national political disputes, especially in situations where the existing means cannot peacefully manage the destabilizing effects of economic, social, political, and international change.”\textsuperscript{34} The UN Security Council has reportedly identified five key component elements of every conflict prevention strategy: early warning, preventive diplomacy, preventive deployment, preventive disarmament and post-conflict peace-building.\textsuperscript{35} All of these elements are closely interlinked, because the primary goal is to deal with potential conflicts at an early stage and prevent them from escalating into armed confrontations. Prevention is better for everybody than involvement in a conflict. On the one hand, it protects people from suffering the devastating repercussions of a war. On the other, it saves external powers the significant amount of effort and resources that would otherwise be required to end the bloodshed.\textsuperscript{36} Precautionary intervention in various hot spots around the world, however, is a complex issue. It is usually hindered by the tendency to show indifference in the incubation stage of a conflict before the actual violence erupts, and by uncertainty about the legitimacy of interference in a state’s domestic affairs. Therefore, it requires a high level of political will and a culture of “preventive statecraft”\textsuperscript{37} to have any chance of succeeding.


The United Nations Staff College has defined the first of the constituent parts of conflict prevention, early warning, as “the process of collecting and analyzing information for the purpose of identifying and recommending strategic options for preventive measures prior to the outbreak of violent conflict.” Therefore, it represents the most significant step in the whole prevention process, since without timely information, the whole process cannot be appropriately set into motion. Its main purpose is to continuously examine potentially unstable areas and identify the crucial indicators for a violent conflict, such as ethnic or religious hostilities, social upheavals, human rights violations, media suppression, etc. The United Nations recognized the significance of early warning and set up a mechanism to monitor potential sources of instability, in cooperation with other organizations. As a result, the number of cases that external powers have failed to address effectively due to a lack of warning has decreased significantly in recent years.

Moreover, preventive diplomacy, according to the UN definition, is “the use of diplomatic measures to prevent disputes from arising between parties, to prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflicts and to limit the latter when they occur.” Critics of that definition have pointed out that it is too inclusive as it lays emphasis on actions during the whole conflict’s escalatory cycle. Indeed, the third part of it cannot actually be considered preventive action. The term “preventive” should properly refer to diplomatic action undertaken before the eruption of hostilities. Any subsequent effort, as will be noted later, falls under the category of “peacemaking.” The initiation of confidence-building measures among belligerents such as the “formation of regional or subregional risk reduction centres, [and] arrangements for the free flow of information, including the monitoring of regional arms agreements,” is the best method of defusing potential crises which can be promoted through diplomatic efforts. Those efforts,

38 United Nations Staff College, Early Warning, 2.


42 United Nations Secretary General, An Agenda for Peace, Par. 24, 5.
however, presuppose both adversaries’ consent to any kind of mediation; otherwise the prospects for a peaceful resolution will be doubtful. The main strength of preventive diplomacy often lies in its virtually clandestine functioning. According to UN Secretary General Kofi A. Annan,

> Whether it takes the form of mediation, conciliation or negotiation, preventive diplomacy is normally non-coercive, low-key and confidential in its approach. Its quiet achievements are mostly unheralded; indeed it suffers from the irony that when it does succeed, nothing happens. Sometimes, the need for confidentiality means that success stories can never be told...It is not surprising, therefore, that preventive diplomacy is so often unappreciated by the public at large.43

Preventive deployment refers to the early positioning of military or police forces or even political observers to stop rising tensions from escalating.44 In particular, the use of military personnel serves the twofold purpose of effectively monitoring the situation and deterring any would-be extremists. Moreover, “Like peacekeeping, preventive deployment is intended to provide a ‘thin blue line’ to help contain conflicts by building confidence in areas of tension or between highly polarized communities.”45 Preventive deployment missions should be undertaken: (a) in intra-state conflicts with the consent of all parties involved, (b) in cases in which a country feels threatened and asks the United Nations for help, and finally (c) in inter-state confrontations when both states agree that an international military presence could avert hostilities.

In addition, preventive disarmament “relates to action intended to reduce the number of small arms and limit weapons in conflict-prone regions. Activities include curtailing the trafficking in small arms and light weapons and demobilizing combat forces as well as collecting and destroying weapons as part of the implementation of a peace agreement in order to prevent their future use.”46

The destabilizing accumulation and uncontrolled spread of small arms may impede conflict prevention, and in some cases, may contribute to criminal violence, fuel terrorism and/or lead to a breakdown in order. Since approximately 40 to 60% of the

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44 United Nations Staff College, Preventive Deployment, 4.
46 United Nations Staff College, Preventive Disarmament, 4.
world’s trade in small arms is illicit, the prevention of illegal arms trafficking is considered to be the first step towards the non-proliferation of small arms. Therefore, the collection and destruction of small weapons might in some cases discourage potential adversaries from resorting to hostilities. According to the United Nations, two categories of weapons and munitions deserve significant attention: automatic assault weapons and anti-personnel mines. Automatic assault weapons have been widely used in all intra-state conflicts since the end of the Cold War. They are difficult to control because many countries acquired them before the end of the Cold War or because criminal groups engaged in their illegal distribution have employed sophisticated methods to avoid detection. Anti-personnel mines constitute one of the most insidious killing machines that mankind ever devised and the main cause of numerous deaths among civilians after the termination of hostilities. For this reason, a movement for the prohibition of their use mobilized many non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and humanitarian groups and led to the 1999 Mine Ban Convention (MBC), in Ottawa, Canada.

Finally, post-conflict peace-building is preventive action taken to inhibit the recurrence of conflict comprised of activities and programs which are aimed at creating conditions necessary for a sustainable peace in war-torn societies. It is a holistic process involving broad-based interagency cooperation across a wide range of issues such as demobilization, reconciliation, and institution-building.

In addition, according to Nicole Ball,

The peacebuilding stage also consists of two phases: transition and consolidation. Priorities during these two phases center on strengthening political institutions, consolidating internal and external security, and revitalizing the economy and society. The major objectives during the transition phase are to establish a government with a sufficient degree of


49 United Nations Staff College, Post-Conflict Peace-Building, 3.
legitimacy to operate effectively and to implement key reforms mandated by the peace accords. The first major objective during the consolidation phase is to continue the reform process.⁵⁰

In short, post-conflict peace-building is intended to increase cooperation among the parties to a conflict and deepen their relationship. The protection of human rights, the holding of fair elections, the restoration of law and order, the promotion of various economic projects, and the provision of basic utilities for all citizens are only some of the measures that could contribute to the social and economic development of the war-torn region and render the resumption of hostilities an undesirable option for all parties. Moreover, setting up the necessary educational programs could narrow peoples’ ethnic or religious differences and promote a shared sense of national identity. In practice, however, the implementation of all the above measures has proved to be difficult. The involvement of numerous organizations, international (IO), regional (RO), nongovernmental (NGO), and private voluntary (PVO), as well as the military makes the establishment of an effective coordinating system among them an absolute necessity.⁵¹ In addition, since post-conflict peace-building represents the final stage of the life cycle of any conflict,⁵² the timing of the termination of its transition phase and the complete disengagement of all non-local actors should be determined carefully. Some war-mongers may wait for that moment to resume their violent activities and throw the region back to chaos. It is noteworthy, for example, that in Bosnia, some influential officials have declared that “We have waited five hundred years for this moment and we will wait a few more years for you to leave.”⁵³


Second, joint disarmament operations, as defined by the Defense Working Group of the European Convention, consist of weapons destruction and arms control efforts. It must be noted that ideologically these two processes differ in their end state. Weapons destruction is closer to the idea of disarmament since it advocates the general or limited elimination of weapons systems as the main source of instability, whereas arms control accepts that weapons have a role to play in international politics and prefers to exercise restraint in their acquisition. Many observers, however, agree that despite their differences, these two programs interact and their common contribution would be to reduce the likelihood of war by putting constraints on arms race activities between contending sides in various hotspots of the world. The systematic efforts to control the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and the restraints in missile development for military purposes could reduce the prospects of a holocaust, and become the basis for the initiation of further disarmament negotiations, “including the prevention of an arms race in outer space.” In addition, arms control and disarmament measures could lead to the savings of considerable resources for use in support of other priorities, including the improvement of a society’s living conditions. In any case, if disarmament operations lead to the signing of a treaty, special attention should be given to the establishment of effective verification procedures and the imposition of strict sanctions on non-compliant states. It is noteworthy, however, that the benefits of disarmament successes cannot be reaped unless there is a sincere political willingness for further development of bilateral or multilateral relations. As Michael Krepon and Lawrence Scheinman point out, “[C]onsensual arms control and disarmament regimes are therefore predicated on an already existing political will to transform and consolidate relationships, to establish rules and standards to regulate activity in certain defined spheres, and to provide mechanisms and processes for dealing with conflict.”

Third, the rubric of military advice and assistance refers, in general, to the establishment of military relations between the European Union and other countries or organizations. The European Convention also used the term “defence outreach” to describe the kinds of activities this mission could entail: “cooperation with the military forces of a third country or of a regional/subregional organization on developing democratically accountable armed forces, by the exchange of good practices, e.g., through training measures.”\(^5\) The EU member states could transfer their common “Western” military culture to new democracies, thus helping them to create healthy relations between their civilian authorities and armed forces. That cooperation could take various forms, such as common training, common large-scale exercises, officers’ and NCOs’ exchanges in various schools, information exchanges on military issues, advice on defense budgeting, technical and financial assistance in building sophisticated training facilities, etc. The development of such relations (apart from its apparent benefits for both sides) could also create close ties at the political level, thus extending cooperation to other issues and making the democratic transition’s efforts easier to achieve. The ultimate goal for those efforts could be the promotion of regional and international stability through mutual understanding.

Fourth, post-conflict stabilization, according to a view expressed in the working documents of the Working Group VIII-Defense of the European Convention, refers to “an operation, focused on training, public security and democratic and military reform activities, that seeks to move from a ‘conflict prevention’ phase to return to civilian rule with minimal dependence on external military or political support.”\(^6\) NATO’s Operation Amber Fox in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) was presented as an example of this mission.\(^6\) Except for the European Convention, however, the term post-conflict stabilization has apparently not been adopted by any other organization. Furthermore, the activities specified for missions such as these are almost the same as those already noted in post-conflict peace-building. After all, as noted above, the ultimate

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5. The European Convention, Final Report of Working Group VIII-Defence, Par. 51, 16.


goal of the latter is to “stabilize” the situation in war-torn regions. Therefore, the
difference between the two missions is more one of terminology than of real substance.
So, unless the European Union or another organization makes a clear distinction between
them, this thesis uses the two terms interchangeably, referring to the same actions.

The final task refers to the support that could be given to a “third country” if it
faced a terrorist threat. Considering the diverging perceptions between the United States
and several EU nations over the Iraq war, it is assumed that this help could not take the
form of a preemptive attack. However, the December 2003 European Security Strategy
(ESS) does not exclude a preventive action, observing that “With the new threats, the first
line of defence will often be abroad. The new threats are dynamic…This implies that we
should be ready to act before a crisis occurs.” In general, the terrorist issue is of utmost
importance for all European countries. In the past, some Europeans believed that their
soil would never be a terrorist target and that the United States would always have the
lead. This is a false and even dangerous argument since it ignores the fact that Europe
shares the same ideas and values with the United States and represents a prominent
proportion of the so-called Western world. Therefore, it is as much at risk as the United
States. Unfortunately, the terrorist bombings that shook Madrid, Spain, on 11 March
2004 have already proved the validity of that argument. The terrorist threat primarily
requires solidarity and cooperation among states all over the world if it is to be addressed
adequately. That is also one of the messages of the European Security Strategy (ESS),
which recognizes that “no single country is able to tackle today’s complex problems on
its own." However, what kind of support the European Union should and could provide
remains to be clarified. Is the discussion about the undertaking of some measures similar
to those that NATO adopted after the September 2001 attacks (with the exception of the

61. This term is assumed to refer to states that are not members of either NATO or the EU.
63. Théresè Delpech, International Terrorism and Europe, Chaillot Paper 56 (Paris: Institute for
Article 5 invocation), or does it mean full engagement in combat missions, as in Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan? The requirements for each of those missions are quite different and establish the need for very diverse capabilities.

After having explored the meaning of the new missions, an examination of past experience would be helpful to identify more specifically the requirements they set for the European Union.

C. REQUIREMENTS OF THE NEW MISSIONS

To begin with, the components of conflict prevention, the demands of the early warning tasks are not extremely high in personnel and resources. In the information era, almost everybody in NATO and the European Union has easy access to databases and information-sharing networks, and conflict signposts can be found on-line worldwide. However, an institutionalized body is required with the capability to gather all information and analyze it. The United Nations first made an effort in 1987 to create an Early Warning Unit after failing to predict the 1982 Falklands War between Britain and Argentina. Although that unit did not meet with wide support, it became the predecessor of a new political branch within the UN Secretariat responsible for global monitoring and response in coordination with the United Nations humanitarian and peacekeeping agencies. Since 1992, many of the functions of the Secretariat, including the early warning activities, have been transferred to a new agency, the Department of Political Affairs that is “now organized to follow political developments worldwide, so that it can provide early warning of impending conflicts and analyze possibilities for preventive action by the United Nations.”

Its permanent station is at the UN headquarters in New York, but it works in close cooperation with UN offices throughout the world. It must also be noted that the United Nations exchanges information with various regional organizations such as the OSCE, which has been active in that field and has created an early warning mechanism within its Conflict Prevention Centre (CPC). Military inputs could be also useful in monitoring conflict-prone regions. In particular, air and space assets such as unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), reconnaissance aircraft, airborne

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65 United Nations Secretary General, *Supplement to an Agenda for Peace*, Par. 26, 6.
sensors, and satellites could cover wide areas and gather timely information.\(^67\) In addition, land and naval patrolling could identify suspect activities before the eruption of hostilities.

Moreover, preventive diplomacy is mostly exercised by professional diplomats of international or regional multilateral organizations (RMO) who are sent as heads of delegations to various hotspots to act as mediators between confronting parties.\(^68\) Examples of preventive diplomacy successes include the 1993 negotiations between Ukraine and Russia for nuclear arms dismantlement as a result of a joint effort involving the United States, the UN, and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE); the accommodations between Estonia and Russia under UN and CSCE auspices; the resolution of internal tensions in Congo/Brazzaville due to the Organization of African Unity’s (OAU) intervention;\(^69\) and “the guarding against the rolling back of the rights of [ethnic] Hungarians in Slovakia during the Meciar era,”\(^70\) thanks to the active involvement of the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM). In general, the OSCE, with the establishment of its preventive diplomacy mechanisms such as the HCNM, the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), and the Long-Term Preventive Diplomacy Mission (LPDM), sets the best model for the role of regional organizations in preventive diplomacy activities.\(^71\) Those efforts, however, need not be limited to officials but could be undertaken by individuals as well. According to the 1999 *Report of the Secretary General on the Work of the [United Nations] Organization,*

So-called “citizen diplomacy” sometimes paves the way for subsequent official agreements. For example, former United States President Jimmy Carter’s visit to Pyongyang in June 1994 helped to resolve a crisis over the nuclear weapons programme of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and set in motion a process that led directly to an agreement in October that year between that country and the United States of America.


\(^68\) United Nations Secretary General, *Supplement to an Agenda for Peace,* Par. 31, 7.

\(^69\) Lund, “Early Warning and Preventive Diplomacy,” 394.


\(^71\) Ibid., 582.
In the Middle East process, it was a small Norwegian research institute that played the critical initial role in paving the way for the 1993 Oslo Agreement.72

Furthermore, preventive deployment constitutes military support to preventive diplomacy’s efforts to deter conflict.73 The first and only UN preventive deployment operation to date took place from 31 March 1995 to 28 February 1999, in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM).74 The so-called UNPREDEP (United Nations Preventive Deployment) Force’s mandate was to monitor and report any developments on FYROM’s borders with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (to the north) and Albania (to the west), which could undermine confidence and stability in FYROM and threaten its territorial integrity and, in addition, to offer ad hoc community services and humanitarian assistance to the local population.75 To that end, 1,049 army troops (two battalions) were deployed by February 1999 in FYROM’s territory manning 24 permanent and 33 temporary observation posts along a 420 km borderline.76 UNPREDEP contributed significantly to hindering the spread of conflicts from neighboring areas to FYROM. Besides its general stabilizing contribution, UNPREDEP’s presence inspired confidence in that small country’s leaders and population and allowed them to make progressive steps towards political and economic development. The eruption of hostilities between FYROM’s National Army and ethnic Albanian forces in 2000 suggested that the decision to withdraw was a mistake.

In addition, preventive disarmament requires tight control of border areas and other points of entries where unlawful arms transfers usually take place, as well as extensive search capabilities. Consequently, it is a demanding task to be assigned to a few observers or police personnel, and only military forces are efficient in playing that role. Those forces are usually assigned to a broader peace operation, and the range of their

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76 UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), UNPREDEP Mission Profile, 2.
responsibilities is not limited solely to disarmament issues. “The assembly, control and disposal of weapons has been a central feature of most of the comprehensive peace settlements in which the United Nations has played a peace-keeping role.”

For example, UNPREDEP’s obligation to detect illicit arms flows in FYROM’s borders was part of its overall mission to monitor and report all kinds of conflict-prone developments in the country. Moreover, the NATO Stabilization Force (SFOR) undertook Project Harvest in 1998 in an effort “to collect and destroy unregistered weapons and ordnance in private hands” as part of its overall mandate to provide a stable and secure environment in Bosnia-Herzegovina. A similar operation was launched by the NATO Kosovo Force (KFOR) with noteworthy success.

Continuing with joint disarmament, its arms control portion mostly requires diplomatic efforts carried out by a limited number of delegations. Those attempts usually lead to long-lasting negotiations. The Interim Agreement on Strategic Offensive Arms, better known as the first Strategic Arms Limitation Talks treaty (SALT I), and the first Strategic Arms Reductions Talks treaty (START I), both concluded between the United States and the Soviet Union, placed limits on certain weapons delivery systems. The 2002 Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT), also known as the Moscow Treaty, between the United States and Russia represents a commitment to make significant reductions in both countries’ operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads by the end of 2012. In addition, the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) has effectively reduced the acquisition efforts of its signatory states concerning certain categories of weaponry.

According to the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, military forces could also contribute to arms control activities by “verifying an arms control treaty; seizing WMD (nuclear, biological, and chemical or conventional); escorting authorized deliveries of weapons and other materials (such as enriched uranium) to preclude loss or unauthorized use of these assets; or dismantling, destroying, or disposing of weapons and hazardous materials.”

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77 United Nations Secretary General, *Supplement to an Agenda for Peace*, Par. 62, 12.


material...[and] conducting and hosting site inspections, participating in military data exchanges, and implementing armament reductions.”80 As for weapons destruction, the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) represent the best examples of that kind of agreement.81 Military forces could also be deployed to organize and conduct the collection and destruction of weapons. For example, Operation Essential Harvest, undertaken by 3,500 NATO troops in FYROM from 22 August to 23 September 2001, led to the destruction of a total of 3,800 weapons.82

Moreover, the activities of military advice and assistance are similar to those of NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP) project. After all, that was clearly stated by the members of the European Convention’s Working Group VIII-Defense who mentioned that “Such a programme would therefore encompass a number of the activities and objectives undertaken within NATO’s Partnership for Peace programme.”83 That plan would require the creation of some coordinating bodies, such as the PfP’s Political-Military Steering Committee, the Partnership Coordination Cell, and the Partnership Staff Elements,84 to organize the various activities and guarantee that they meet their objectives. Those bodies’ demands, in personnel and resources, are not prohibitive and can be easily met by the EU budget. In addition, the conduct of exercises or other military activities would take place at the existing EU member states’ national facilities and would not place a significant burden on the participating countries. It must be noted that NATO has already granted PfP training status to the facilities of three EU countries (Austria, Greece, and Sweden), two of which are not NATO members (Austria and

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81 Krepon and Scheinman, 619.


Sweden). Furthermore, many EU member states have been engaged in military assistance projects during the past decade, launching bilateral projects with former communist countries. For example, Greece has signed separate military agreements with Albania, FYROM, and Bulgaria.

Furthermore, the United Nations has been active in the field of post-conflict peace-building or stabilization; and, taking advantage of this experience, it has assigned those specific responsibilities to its Department of Political Affairs. In addition, local political offices have been organized in each area of interest to ensure better coordination between the various types of assistance. The strength of those political offices may vary from a few persons to much larger staffs. For example, in 2002, the total number of personnel in the UN Peace-Building Support Office in Liberia (UNOL) was 25 people, whereas the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) included up to 440 people. It must be noted, though, that the extensive amount of work in those missions requires their close coordination with the corresponding peacekeeping operations. In that case, the military forces, apart from their primary role in maintaining security and stability in the area, are also assigned other tasks such as providing armed escorts and medical care; rebuilding schools and hospitals; restoring electrical power, water systems, telecommunications, and the transportation infrastructure; clearing mines; carrying out demobilization and weapons destruction programs; and distributing humanitarian aid. All these efforts depart from the traditional sense of peacekeeping missions and have thus earned the title “third generation peacekeeping.” According to Tom Woodhouse and Oliver Ramsbotham, “This has become necessary...as stability operations contingents are often the only entities capable of providing critical services in non-war/non-peace

environments at decisive moments in post-war transitions.” The strength of the personnel required to perform these tasks depends on a variety of factors, the most important of which are the size of the country, the magnitude of residual tensions, and the amount of damage inflicted to the country’s infrastructure. In general, compared to other missions, post-conflict stabilization efforts appear to be more demanding in the amount of troops and resources required. For example, the strength of the Implementation Force (IFOR) in Bosnia in 1995 was about 60,000 troops, whereas the Kosovo Force (KFOR), at the beginning of the mission in 1999, amounted to approximately 50,000 people.

As for support in combating terrorism, the European Union could provide states attacked by terrorists with assistance to expand their options in fighting against them and in consequence management. To that end, it could learn from NATO’s action, taken after the September 2001 attacks, at the U.S. government’s request. In particular, as a result of the invocation of Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, the Allies agreed to take the following eight measures on 4 and 8 October 2001: enhance intelligence sharing and cooperation relating to terrorism; assist Allies and others subject to increased terrorist threats; increase security for U.S. and allied facilities; backfill Allied assets in NATO’s area of responsibility required for operations against terrorism; grant blanket overflight clearances for US and Allied aircraft; provide access to ports and airfields; deploy Standing Naval Forces (STANAVFORMED) elements to the Eastern Mediterranean; and deploy NATO AWACS aircraft to the US. However, as already noted, if the assistance implies the undertaking of combat missions such as Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan, robust military capabilities will be required. For instance, fully equipped combat and combat support units, advanced information systems, strategic and operational air and sea lift capabilities, precision guided munitions, interoperable


communications, effective command and control assets, all weather aircraft, cruise missiles, navigation systems, and air-refueling capabilities will be required. Apart from the necessary resources, the intensive training of all participating forces and headquarters would be of equal importance, to promote a common understanding of the operational strategy and maximize their combined effects.

To summarize, the updated list of the “Petersberg tasks” includes a mixture of peacetime activities, post-conflict stabilization, and support to third countries in combating terrorism. It remains to be seen in the following chapter whether the European Union is capable of accomplishing these tasks.
IV. THE EUROPEAN UNION’S CAPABILITIES: AN OVERALL ASSESSMENT

A. INTRODUCTION

As noted earlier, the 1999 “Helsinki Headline Goal” identified the number of forces required for the European Union to undertake the most demanding of its Petersberg tasks. Some scholars, however, raised questions about the purpose of that objective and what the Helsinki Headline Goal capabilities could really accomplish. For example, according to David Yost, the Headline Goal seemed to suggest “that the EU’s current aspirations extend to being able to undertake only peacekeeping missions, not a combat action like Operation Allied Force.”93 The serious deficiencies in various critical military capabilities had also been recognized by the EU officials who launched the European Capabilities Action Plan (ECAP), in March 2002, with the aim of proposing potential solutions.94 The ECAP process is still in progress. As a result, the General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC), held in Brussels on 19-20 May 2003, declared that “the EU now has operational capability across the full range of the Petersberg tasks, limited and constrained by recognized shortfalls.”95

The purpose of this chapter is to examine the current and future prospects of the European Union to undertake the updated Petersberg tasks and acquire credible military forces. The first section deals with the EU capabilities, based on the new missions’ requirements analyzed in the previous chapter, while the second section offers a brief account of the efforts made by the European Union to address its most significant shortfalls and enhance its military potential. It must be noted that, since the “Helsinki Force Catalogue”96 has not been officially published and the draft treaty of the

96 The “Helsinki Force Catalogue” includes the contribution of each of EU member states for the achievement of the “Helsinki Headline Goal.”
Constitution for the European Union does not identify specific forces for carrying out the new missions, the examination of the EU capabilities will be based on the member states’ national inventories before the May 2004 enlargement.

B. ARE THE EU FORCES CAPABLE OF PERFORMING THE NEW TASKS?

1. Peacetime Activities

Conflict prevention has been one of the main objectives of the European Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) since its very beginning. In order to improve the EU member states’ preventive capabilities, the European Council, held in Göteborg, Sweden, on 15-16 June 2001, approved the Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflicts, which set the basic guidelines for the European Union’s efforts and called on future presidencies to present reports on the progress made.97 As for conflict prevention’s constituent parts, early warning capabilities were given special attention, with the creation of the Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit (PPEWU), under the responsibility of the Secretary General/High Representative (SG/HR)98. The mission of that unit is to monitor and analyze CFSP-relevant developments, and provide timely assessments and early warning of significant events for the European Union’s security interests.99 Its staff consists of 20 specialists from the General Secretariat of the European Council (3), the member states (15), the European Commission (1) and the WEU (1).100 The important work in the early warning area was recognized by the Greek Presidency’s third annual report on conflict prevention, submitted to the Thessaloniki European Council, on 20 June 2003:

In support of this work, the flow of information and intelligence from Member States has been improved. Steps are being taken to ensure that account is taken of early warning reports in agenda planning. Frequent staff to staff meetings between the EU and international organizations such as the UN, OSCE and NATO contribute to gather information for early warning purposes. In early 2003, the Commission updated its


98 Details about the role of the SG/HR were given in the second chapter. Currently, the Spanish politician and former NATO Secretary General Javier Solana holds that position.

99 Treaty of Amsterdam, Final Act-Declaration on the Establishment of a Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit, 132.

country conflict assessments covering more than 120 countries. These assessments formed the basis for the Commission’s contribution on early warning and provided analytical input to ensure a systematic treatment of conflict issues in Country Strategy Papers and mid-term reviews.101

The European Union’s military forces engaged in peacekeeping tasks could also constitute a significant early warning asset. The EU reconnaissance aircraft and imagery satellites could extend the area of monitoring to neighboring regions or countries during an SFOR or KFOR-type operation.102 In addition, EU troops in Bosnia and Kosovo have organized numerous foot and vehicular patrols as well as traffic control points (TCP) to observe any suspicious activities, and have used utility and attack helicopters extensively to support intelligence collectors at the tactical level. Moreover, naval units from various EU member states have continuously participated in naval patrolling activities undertaken by NATO, e.g. in the Standing Naval Force Mediterranean (STANAVFORMED).

As for preventive diplomacy, preventive deployment and preventive disarmament, they are all interrelated EU activities, which could take place in parallel or sequentially during the conflict avoidance cycle. Preventive diplomacy has always been the strong area of the EU civilian sector, which has coupled the EU officials’ diplomatic expertise with significant humanitarian and economic aid to resolve potential crises. The European Commission is the leading EU agency in this domain, and it relies on the Rapid Reaction Mechanism to act quickly in pre-crisis situations.103

In addition, EU Special Representatives (EUSRs) are appointed to areas of special attention, such as Afghanistan, the Balkans (three EUSRs, one for Bosnia-Herzegovina, FYROM and the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe, respectively), the Great Lakes region in Africa, the Middle East, and the South Caucasus.104 The role of those representatives is to follow developments closely in their assigned areas and promote the implementation of established EU policies. For example, the mandate of the EUSR for

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102 Further details on those assets will be given later, in the examination of combat-essential capabilities.
the Middle East region is based on the EU policy objectives of a two-state solution in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, a goal also promoted by the quartet (the European Union, Russia, the United Nations and the United States) Middle East Road Map.

Moreover, the European Council has undertaken various diplomatic initiatives to address EU and international challenges. For example, EU foreign ministers have been engaged in negotiations with countries suspected of promoting WMD proliferation and assisting terrorist groups, such as Syria, and they required a non-proliferation clause in the text of a trade and aid agreement with Damascus. Furthermore, the EU Troika (composed of representatives from the previous, the current, and the next presidency) is another diplomatic tool, which the European Union uses to resolve long-standing deadlocks. For example, it was the mediation of the Foreign Ministers of Britain, France and Germany that managed to resolve the impasse over the Iranian nuclear program by convincing the country’s authorities to accept the UN International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) inspections. Finally, the EU presidency and the SG/HR are also the sources of many diplomatic initiatives in various hot spots around the world.

Moreover, preventive deployment missions give a more coercive tone to preventive diplomacy’s efforts and are to be conducted in more polarized situations. In any case, the required capabilities include armed forces capable of carrying out patrolling and monitoring activities, working in accordance with the traditional lines of UN peacekeeping, and therefore “authorized to use force [only] in self-defence.” Small combat support elements should be also deployed to add deterrent value to the mission and contribute to the observation tasks. When, however, the onset of hostilities is imminent, a more “muscular” force is required both in numbers and equipment, deployed

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105 Ibid.


under the UN Charter’s Chapter VII provisions. The EU countries maintain a significant number of troops (the 15 EU countries’ total forces amount approximately to 1,500,000 people) that could meet all plausible preventive deployment mission requirements. In addition, the EU inventory of armored personnel carriers (APCs), tanks, self-propelled artillery pieces, ground monitoring stations, general utility and attack helicopters, and intra-theater cargo aircraft could prove to be sufficient for these kinds of missions. Furthermore, the EU forces could take advantage of the experience gained by the six EU nations which participated in UNPREDEP (Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Portugal, and Sweden).

The preventive disarmament mission could be part of an overall preventive deployment operation that would not call for any extra personnel or capabilities to guarantee the necessary security conditions. In addition, the whole process of disarmament (including the collection, inventory, dismantlement, and destruction of weapons such as pistols, rifles, and other guns) does not require any rare expertise that is not available among the EU military forces’ services. Logistical needs, for setting up and running melting down facilities, might be increased, but this should not be considered a problem for the European Union’s financial resources. Troops from EU nations have been actively involved in these kinds of activities undertaken by SFOR and KFOR and by the NATO units in FYROM. For example, the SFOR German-Italian Battle Group collected and destroyed, in the period from May to July 2003, 743 small arms and accessories.

Almost all EU countries have participated in joint disarmament operations. EU member states’ diplomats participated in the negotiations between NATO and Warsaw Pact countries which resulted in the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE), signed in Paris on 19 November 1990. Military officials also took part in

110 Ibid., 39.
112 Ibid.
113 UNDPKO, UNPREDEP Mission Profile, 2.
115 Larsen, 376.
consultations providing their respective delegations with the necessary technical expertise on the five types of equipment under limitation: armored personnel carriers, tanks, artillery pieces, attack helicopters and combat aircraft. The most important contribution that the EU military forces have been making since then, however, is to the verification process. Most of the EU countries have organized effective systems of conducting and hosting on-site inspections, either scheduled or unexpected, in accordance with the treaty’s provisions. The challenge of bringing various skills together, such as inspection team leaders, deputies, linguists and weapons specialists as well as the establishment of a rigorous curriculum for those teams’ training,116 has not been difficult for the EU national armed forces. Moreover, along with the inspection teams, specific escort groups have been created, responsible for providing the visiting inspectors with the necessary support and any extra information they might require. As for the weapons destruction mission, the EU military agencies have, as already noted, the necessary capabilities and experience. In addition, they could take stock of their successful participation in NATO’s Operation Essential Harvest in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. Task Force Harvest was composed primarily of troops from EU nations, with 9 of the 14 ESDP participant states contributing troops and equipment. Specifically, the brigade-level task force consisted of 4 battalions provided by Britain, France, Greece, and Italy, whereas Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Spain assigned approximately 1,100 troops.117 These troops collected, in only 30 days, 3,875 weapon systems (3,210 assault rifles, 483 machine guns, 162 mortars/anti-tank launchers, 17 air-defense weapon systems and 4 tanks/APCs) and 397,625 miscellaneous items, including mines, explosives and ammunition.118

Furthermore, EU member states would face no problem in launching military advice and assistance programs with other countries. All EU partners participate in NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP) project and have the knowledge and the resources


required for undertaking a similar effort at the EU level. The establishment, however, of the necessary organizing bodies within the current ESDP institutional framework should receive the EU military authorities’ special attention. Additionally, the defense assistance endeavor should be consistent with the provisions of the European Security Strategy (ESS) and promote effective cooperative action against the threats posed by terrorism and WMD proliferation.

2. Post-Conflict Stabilization

As for post-conflict stabilization, since EU member states have participated in various reconstruction efforts under United Nations and OSCE auspices, the European Union has the knowledge to set up its own mechanisms and further improve its capabilities in this field. As for the EU military forces, their primary role in post-conflict stabilization operations to maintain security, public safety and order, distinguishes their relevant capabilities into two categories, depending on the permissiveness of the environment.

On the one hand, in non-permissive situations, the European Union should be able to deploy combat-ready forces to deter potential aggressors and respond, if necessary, to any provocation. The 60,000-strong IFOR could serve as a model for the size of the EU combat forces, which could undertake a mission of equivalent magnitude with an additional pool of 120,000 military personnel for combat support and logistical activities. As noted earlier, the European Union should be able to meet that goal, despite the fact that approximately 20% of the EU countries’ armed forces are still conscripts. Moreover, most EU countries are likely to reserve a significant number of troops for national, NATO or EU contingencies. In qualitative terms, however, the forces of European Union nations do not possess the state-of-the-art capabilities that would be required to undertake major operations without the assistance of the United States.

On the other hand, in permissive environments, the troops of the European Union nations are not expected to face any serious difficulties. Although security should always be the main consideration, the reduction of tensions and the gradual transition to a more

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119 Heisbourg et al., 80.
121 More details about the military hardware of the EU countries’ armed forces are provided in a later section of this chapter.
peaceful situation could allow the EU forces to assume a larger role. That has already been proven in Bosnia and Kosovo, where the EU forces constitute 53% and 69% respectively of the total international input.\textsuperscript{122} It must be also noted that in both permissive and non-permissive cases the EU armed forces are able to contribute to the reconstruction efforts. More specifically, the EU engineers could help in rebuilding schools and hospitals; restoring electrical power, water systems and telecommunications; repairing the transportation infrastructure; and constructing camps for displaced civilians or refugees.\textsuperscript{123} EU ordnance disposal teams could execute the necessary de-mining operations, and EU medical personnel could provide medical assistance to the local population.\textsuperscript{124} The ability of the European Union to undertake medium-intensity post-conflict stabilization operations has already been acknowledged by NATO, which may hand SFOR command responsibility over to the European Union by the end of 2004.\textsuperscript{125} In executing the SFOR mission, the EU forces could benefit from the experience gained in their two low-intensity military missions conducted in 2003, Operation Concordia in FYROM and Operation Artemis in DRC.

3. **Combating Terrorism**

   a. **Capabilities Analysis**

   The EU assistance that could be given to a third country in combating terrorism in its territory depends, as previously noted, on the overall situation. First, it could be limited to intelligence efforts comparable to those undertaken after the September 2001 terrorist attacks. Many EU countries fighting against their own domestic terrorist groups (IRA in the United Kingdom, ETA in Spain, Red Brigades in Italy, Corsican terrorists in France, and 17 November in Greece) have gained useful knowledge to employ in the struggle against international terrorism.\textsuperscript{126} Information exchange channels had been established between European Union states and the United States even

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\textsuperscript{123} Allied Joint Publication (AJP)-3.4.1, Par. 0525, 5-7.

\textsuperscript{124} Ibid., Par. 0528.


\textsuperscript{126} Delpech, 9.
before September 2001. For example, French intelligence provided U.S. authorities with enough information to arrest an Algerian national named Ahmed Rezam, whose goal was to detonate explosives in Los Angeles during the millennium celebrations.\textsuperscript{127}

Moreover, after September 2001, most of the EU member states, whether as members of NATO or individually, took actions similar to those decided by the Atlantic Alliance on 4 and 8 October 2001, described in the previous chapter. For example, they have undertaken thorough investigations in the Balkans to eradicate terrorist groups with possible Al Qaeda links, tightened security measures affecting U.S. military and civilian potential targets, and offered their airspace and other facilities to U.S. military forces.\textsuperscript{128} In addition, the participation of some EU members in NATO’s Standing Naval Force Mediterranean (STANAVFORMED)\textsuperscript{129} anti-terrorism assignment in the Eastern Mediterranean has added value to the European Union’s capacity to execute such operations. However, if the third country requested the provision of some critical military equipment, like the AWACS units that the United States asked NATO to provide, the EU authorities could find themselves in an embarrassing position. Among all the EU member states, Britain possesses 6 E-3Ds and France operates 4 E-3Fs, a total of 10 of this kind of aircraft.\textsuperscript{130} That number could prove to be insufficient even in the case of a limited request, since the European Union lacks the necessary backup units to respond to other contingencies. By contrast, when NATO sent the requested five AWACS aircraft to the United States, it still had a significant pool of reserve assets.\textsuperscript{131} Finally, NATO and EU countries have participated since November 2002 in various measures under the Partnership Action Plan Against Terrorism, one of the main objectives of which is “Upon request, provide assistance to EAPC [Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council] States in dealing with the risks and consequences of terrorist

\textsuperscript{127} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{128} Bennett, 6-7.

\textsuperscript{129} STANAVFORMED consists of one ship from each of the following states: Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States. More information available at [http://www.afsouth.nato.int], Accessed 20 January 2004.

\textsuperscript{130} The Military Balance 2003-2004, 41 and 62.

\textsuperscript{131} Those were 12 E-3As in Germany and 7 E-3Ds in the United Kingdom. More details available at [http://www.e3a.nato.int], Accessed 20 August 2003.
attacks, including on their economic and other critical infrastructure.”

Non-NATO EU states, including Austria, Finland, Ireland, and Sweden, might also be willing to become involved in these activities.

Second, if the support against terrorism took the form of a scenario comparable to Operation Enduring Freedom, the European Union would probably face significant problems, at least in the immediate future. Operation Enduring Freedom, which was launched in October 2001 to overthrow the Taliban regime and eradicate the backbone of the Al Qaeda terrorist network, presented some distinct characteristics, such as the extensive use of special operations forces (SOF) and precision guided munitions (PGMs) as well as relying on indigenous troops of the Northern Alliance as the main ground force. The synergistic effects of SOF, PGMs and Northern Alliance forces gained the title of the “Afghan Model” and led U.S. President George W. Bush to say that

This combination -- real-time intelligence, local allied forces, special forces, and precision air power-- has really never been used before. The conflict in Afghanistan has taught us more about the future of our military than a decade of blue-ribbon panels and think tank symposiums.

Critics of the Afghan Model, however, did not share President Bush’s ideas and argued that, despite the innovations this conflict introduced, traditional elements of the Western way of war remained intact. Small numbers of commandos and PGMs proved to be less effective as the war progressed and the Taliban and Al Qaeda

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135 Ibid., vii.

forces adopted better techniques of dispersion, cover and concealment. In response, coalition forces had to employ the fundamental methods of modern joint warfare based on the utilization of fires and maneuver. As Stephen Biddle pointed out, what Afghanistan really shows is that the wars of tomorrow—like those of yesterday—will require tight integration of fires and ground maneuver at close quarters to exploit technology’s effects. Precision weapons make this combination more powerful, but against resolute opponents, neither air power nor conventional ground forces alone will suffice any time soon.\footnote{137 Biddle, 7.}

The conditions that prevailed in Afghanistan may have been unique, and more allied dismounted infantry might be needed in future cases.

Operation Enduring Freedom made clear once again (after Operation Deliberate Force in Bosnia and Operation Allied Force in Kosovo) the significant deficiencies of the EU nations’ military forces. Among all EU members only Britain, France, Germany and Italy showed a willingness to participate in combat missions, but their contributions were much smaller than those of the United States.\footnote{138 It should be recalled that this chapter focuses on the capabilities of the 15 EU members prior to the May 2004 enlargement of the European Union. It therefore does not discuss the contributions of Poland and other new members to Operation Enduring Freedom.}

Britain deployed some of its airborne early warning, air-refueling, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets and also made some \textit{Tomahawk} cruise missile strikes against terrorist training camps from its two nuclear-powered submarines assigned to the Gulf area, the \textit{HMS Trafalgar} and the \textit{HMS Triumph}.\footnote{139 Global Security Organization, \textit{Operation Enduring Freedom-Deployments-Coalition Forces}, 6, Available at [http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/enduring-freedom_deploy.htm], Accessed 26 April 2004.} In addition, “as of early November 2001, marines from the 3 Commando Brigade, the army’s mountain and winter warfare specialists,”\footnote{140 Ibid.} were attached to the coalition forces.

France assigned its only carrier battle group to support operations in the North Arabian Sea, and the 16 \textit{Super Étendards}, 2 \textit{Rafales} and 2 \textit{Hawkeyes} embarked on the \textit{Charles de Gaulle} aircraft carrier\footnote{141 Ibid.} had flown more than 2,000 hours by the end of June 2002, supporting the coalition with air reconnaissance, strikes and early warning.
missions. France also deployed 6 *Mirage-2000* fighter aircraft for close air support (CAS) missions and 2 *KC-135* tanker aircraft for air refueling to Kyrgyzstan, a number of *C-160* and *C-130* aircraft to Tajikistan, to provide airlift support, and some *Atlantique* aircraft to Djibouti, to participate in intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) missions.

Germany, according to Thérèse Delpech, made a less publicized–for its own political reasons–contribution to that operation by sending hundreds of Special Forces but no combat aircraft. It deployed only 3 *C-160* transport aircraft, to Incirlik, Turkey, to assist U.S. Air Force operations and some support naval units, to the Gulf of Aden, beginning in January 2002.

Italy deployed its only carrier battle group in the North Arabian Sea on 18 November 2001, with 8 *Harrier* aircraft, 4 *Sea King* helicopters, and 1,400 troops embarked.

The operational data available demonstrate that U.S. forces executed the overwhelming majority of the combat missions. U.S. aircraft in the first three-month period of the war (October-December 2001) flew 92% of the total sorties and the rest of the coalition forces (EU and non-EU participants) 8%. In addition, of the approximately 10,000 precision guided weapons that had been dropped by February 2002, 99% were delivered by the United States.

144 Cordesman, 87.
145 Ibid.
146 Delpech, 23.
148 Cordesman, 88.
150 Cordesman, 4.
151 Ibid., 11.
b. **The EU Military Deficiencies**

In general, the Afghan conflict showed that the European Union is not able to undertake operations of that type and magnitude without U.S. participation, because it lacks the necessary capabilities in several areas.

In strategic airlift, the United States possesses 126 C-5 Galaxy, 101 C-17 Globemaster III, and 77 C-141 Starlifter aircraft with unparalleled troop and cargo capacities, as well as with in-flight refueling capabilities, whereas most of the EU countries operate the far smaller C-130 and C-160 aircraft, appropriate solely for intra-theater flights. Britain and France are the only EU countries which have acquired a limited number of larger transport aircraft. Britain has leased 4 C-17 aircraft from Boeing whereas France owns 3 A-310-300 and 2 DC-8F aircraft.

In strategic sealift, the United States possesses, in total, 12 LHAs-LHDs, 26 LSDs-LPDs, and approximately 200 landing craft, whereas the top five EU military powers (EU-5: Britain, France, Germany, Italy, and Spain) have not acquired any LHA-LHD ships and could draw together 22 LSDs-LPDs and 83 landing craft.

In power projection capabilities, Britain, France, Italy and Spain are the only EU countries with aircraft carriers. Except for the French Charles de Gaulle, however, which is a nuclear-powered and large-deck carrier with a capacity of about 40 aircraft, these carriers (the three British Invincible-type, the Italian Garibaldi and the Spanish Principe de Asturias) are diesel-powered and accommodate a much smaller number of aircraft ranging from 6 to 16 vertical/short take-off and landing (V/STOL)
These aircraft carriers cannot be compared with the 12 U.S. carriers (nine nuclear-powered and three conventional ones), each of which is able to carry 50 fighters and 24 support aircraft.

In the C4 ISTAR spectrum, Britain and France are the only countries which have acquired airborne early warning and command and control systems such as the E-3 Sentry aircraft, whereas no EU country possesses battle management and ground surveillance aircraft like the U.S. E-8C JSTARS. In addition, most of the EU member states still depend on limited-range reconnaissance aircraft and have not yet procured more sophisticated information-gathering systems. With the exception of Spain, the rest of the EU forces can employ only tactical unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) with a limited range of 200-300 km.

In space activities, except for the Galileo civilian navigation program, which is a full EU undertaking scheduled to materialize in 2008, EU member states have opted for either their own national programs or limited joint initiatives. More specifically, in observation satellites, France operates the Helios-I (Italy has a 14% share of participation and Spain a 7% share), whereas Britain, Germany and Italy have opted

158 Ibid., 48, 56 and 60.
160 The acronym C4 ISTAR stands for Command, Control, Communications, Computers and Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance.
163 Within the EU-5 circle, France still uses 43 Mirage-F1s and 5 MIVPs, Germany employs 41 Tornados, Italy makes use of 13 Atlantics, Spain operates 6 C-212s, and the United Kingdom depends on 53 Tornados GR4A, 39 Jaguars GR3/3A and 4 Canberras PR-9. Source: *The Military Balance 2003-2004*.
164 Britain possesses the Phoenix-type UAVs, France employs the CL-289s and the Hunters, Germany uses the CL-289s too, and Italy operates the Mirach. Source: *The Military Balance 2003-2004*.
for their *Topsat*, *SAR Lupe* and *Cosmo Skymed* satellites, respectively.\(^{168}\) Additionally, in communication satellites, four of the EU-5 countries have followed their own way with the British *Skynet*, the French *Syracuse*, the Italian *Sical*, and the Spanish *Hispasat* already in orbit.\(^{169}\)

In combat aircraft, the EU forces should face fewer problems, but some worrisome indicators still exist. Specifically, although the 15 EU member states together maintain about 2,500 fighters, a significant number of these aircraft cannot make precision strikes at night or under adverse weather conditions. In addition, the EU fighters include some 15 different types,\(^{170}\) many of which have incompatible communication systems and other interoperability problems. It must be noted, however, that the European Union could muster 500 aircraft with modern radar systems and missiles as well as 400 all-weather air defense aircraft,\(^{171}\) which would constitute a sufficient force package for the required 25 to 200 sorties per day of an Enduring Freedom-type air operation.\(^{172}\)

The EU’s options to conduct successful air operations away from the European mainland are further reduced by its member states’ limited air-to-air refueling (AAR) capabilities, since only Britain and France maintain such aircraft. Britain has nine *Tristars* and 19 *VC-10*s,\(^{173}\) which are somewhat outdated and need to be replaced or modernized, whereas France has only 3 *KC-135*s and 11 *C-135FR*s,\(^{174}\) an insufficient number for large-scale operations.


\(^{172}\) Cordesman, 11.


\(^{174}\) Ibid., 41.
The European Union is far behind the United States in combat search and rescue (CSAR) capabilities with only France,\textsuperscript{175} Greece and Italy trying to make some remedial efforts.\textsuperscript{176}

Finally, another area of unease for the EU military authorities is the lack of sufficient self-protection capabilities for their aircraft, which limits their operational effectiveness in high-intensity environments. The EU member states have limited themselves to tactical jamming capabilities, supplying their aircraft with U.S. \textit{HARM} and U.K. \textit{ALARM} weapons for Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses (SEAD) missions. EU nations lack offensive electronic warfare aircraft, such as the U.S. \textit{EA-6B Prowlers}, able to shut down enemy radars.

In sum, the armed forces of European Union nations could undertake the peacetime activities and the peace operations included in the updated “Petersberg tasks” list, with some reservations about post-conflict stabilization in non-permissive environments. As for combating terrorism, the military forces of European Union countries could respond effectively to any request which did not require advanced war-fighting capabilities. What efforts, however, is the European Union making to address its shortfalls and improve its military posture?

C. THE WAY AHEAD

The European Convention, recognizing the need for the improvement of the European Union’s capabilities, has included in the draft treaty of the Constitution for the European Union the creation of a new mechanism, the European Armaments, Research and Military Capabilities Agency, with the aim to:

- contribute to identifying the Member States’ military capability objectives and evaluating observance of the capability commitments given by the Member States;

- promote harmonisation of operational needs and adoption of effective, compatible procurement methods;

\textsuperscript{175} France possesses \textit{Puma} and \textit{Super Puma} CSAR helicopters and it is scheduled to acquire new \textit{EC 725} ones. Source: [http://www4.janes.com/emeta/Denial?url=/subscribe/jwaf/doc_view.jsp?K2DocKey=/content1/janesdata/binder/jwaf/jwafa092.htm@current&Prod_Name=JWAF&QueryText=], Accessed 12 April 2004.

\textsuperscript{176} Greece and Italy either possess or they will soon acquire the \textit{AS-332 Super Puma} and the \textit{HH-3F} helicopters, respectively.
• propose multilateral projects to fulfil the objectives in terms of military capabilities, ensure coordination of the programmes implemented by the Member States and management of specific cooperation programmes;

• support defense technology research, and coordinate and plan joint research activities and the study of technical solutions meeting future operational needs; [and]

• contribute to identifying and, if necessary, implementing any useful measure for strengthening the industrial and technological base of the defence sector and for improving the effectiveness of military expenditure.177

This agency, which will be open to all member states, could promote the EU industrial integration process and oversee the readiness of forces available to the European Union. Cooperation on armaments issues, however, will not be a new endeavor for many of the European Union nations. Some of its member states have created, since the end of the Cold War, specific organizations, such as the Western European Armaments Group (WEAG), the Organization for Joint Armaments Cooperation (OCCAR-Organisme Conjoint de Coopération en matière d’Armement), and the Letter of Intent (LoI), for the promotion of multilateral or bilateral defense projects. The main purpose of these initiatives was to find more cost-effective solutions for the development of complex defense equipment, which has become extremely expensive, even for the biggest economic powers of the European Union.178 Either within these mechanisms or independently, some of the European Union countries, including Britain, France, Germany, Italy and Spain, have launched important projects; and this suggests that the EU efforts could slowly but steadily make progress.


Britain has focused on the procurement of: 25 A400M strategic transport aircraft, by 2011; two new aircraft carriers called the Future Aircraft Carriers (CVF), expected to enter into service in 2012 and 2015; the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) aircraft (the exact number has not yet been determined), by 2012, to replace the aging Harriers; five Airborne Stand Off Radar (ASTOR) aircraft (with functions similar to the U.S. E-8C JSTARS) scheduled to achieve operational capability by 2008; and the Future Strategic Tanker Aircraft (FSTA) to replace the current Tristar and VC 10 aircraft (the project is still in a preliminary phase).

France has directed its efforts to the acquisition of 50 A400M transport aircraft by October 2009, the deployment of a new Helios-II satellite by 2005, and the procurement of 57 and 19 Rafale fighters for the Air Force and Navy, respectively.

Germany has focused on the acquisition of 60 A400M transport aircraft and the completion of the 180 Eurofighter aircraft deliveries.

Italy, despite its procurement budget cuts, seems determined to continue as scheduled with the acquisition of a second aircraft carrier, the Andrea Doria, by 2007, and the first deliveries of a new Boeing 767 transport/tanker aircraft from 2005.

186 Military Balance 2003-2004, 244.
Finally, Spain has become the pioneer country in amphibious capabilities programs by pursuing the acquisition of an LHD ship by 2008. In addition, it participates in the multinational A400M project and plans to procure a total of 36 aircraft by 2008.

Furthermore, the lessons learned in Operation Artemis in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) influenced the decision taken by the EU defense ministers in Brussels on 17 May 2004 to proceed to the creation of nine battlegroups of 1,500 troops each, ready to deploy within 15 days, by 2007. These units, trained to fight in any kind of warfare (e.g., urban, mountain, jungle, desert, and amphibious operations) would include the “appropriate supporting elements (Combat Support (CS) and Combat Service Support (CSS)) together with [the] necessary strategic lift, sustainability, and debarkation…capability.” In addition, they could undertake operations within the whole spectrum of the existing and updated Petersberg tasks, either alone or as the initial-entry forces of larger packages, depending on the requirements of the contingency.

Moreover, the General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC) decided on 17 November 2003 to develop a new Headline Goal for 2010 and directed the Political and Security Committee (PSC) to initiate proposals in this regard. The new operational objective will have to take stock of the December 2003 European Security Strategy (ESS), of the enlargement of the European Union, of the outcome of the


188 Ibid., 2.

189 Ibid., 262.

190 Ibid., 261.


193 Ibid., 3.

Intergovernmental Conference (IGC), and the experience gained from the first EU-led operations. The European Council held in Brussels on 12 December 2003 adopted the idea for the 2010 Headline Goal, and declared that “the EU needs now to look beyond 2003, in addition to the outstanding capability shortfalls against the Helsinki Headline Goal that still are to be addressed, and set new goals for the further development of European capabilities for crisis management with a horizon of 2010, thus defining the EU level of ambition in terms of achieving qualitative and quantitative capability goals.”\(^{195}\)

Finally, the informal meeting of the EU defense ministers, held in Brussels on 17 May 2004, decided that the qualitative requirements of the new goal would include “An aircraft carrier with associated air and naval escort; An EU airlift command to deploy troops in hotspots; A revamped communications network including space-based systems; [and] A planning cell in Brussels for EU military operations.”\(^{196}\)

In conclusion, the EU member states seem willing to take some promising steps to improve their overall military posture and create a credible organization, able to confront the 21st century’s threats. The coming years will show whether these efforts will bear fruit or remain unfulfilled aspirations.

\(^{195}\) European Council, Brussels, 12 December 2003, ESDP Presidency Report, in Misiroli, Ch. II, Par. 7, 301.

V. CONCLUSION

Since the December 1998 Franco-British initiative at St. Malo, many steps have been taken by the EU member states, focusing mainly on structural and institutional modifications, in an effort to accelerate the ESDP process and enable the European Union to play a more active and influential role in international affairs. The European Constitution’s proposed additions to the Petersberg tasks represent a new chapter in the endeavor.

The specific reference in the draft treaty of the Constitution for the European Union to peacetime activities, post-conflict stabilization, and support to third countries in combating terrorism reveals the willingness of the European Union to address the 21st century’s challenges. With conflict prevention capabilities, joint disarmament assets and military advice and assistance, the European Union would be able to play a more active role in international disputes, coupling its diplomatic efforts and economic prowess with the necessary military capabilities. The EU’s further involvement in post-conflict stabilization missions has been necessitated by the evolution of traditional peacekeeping and the further development of peace operations during the 1990s, which call for long-term approaches rather than short-term engagements in post-conflict environments. Finally, the support in combating terrorism aims to confront the post-11 September 2001 threats, which extend beyond the original crisis management provisions of the Petersberg tasks.

The European Union has already undertaken various initiatives within the scope of most of the proposed new missions, and it has proved that it will not face significant problems in the employment of civilian or medium-level military personnel and hardware. If, however, operations require more advanced military forces and equipment, the European Union’s capabilities are still in an embryonic stage. Despite the progress achieved in recent years, the EU’s current aspirations would be limited to the conduct of low-risk missions. Some of the EU member states evidently regard this as an embarrassing situation and seem determined to change it. If it intends to gain international credibility, the European Union will have to acquire military assets capable of responding to global insecurity risks.
The provision for a European Armaments, Research and Military Capabilities Agency is the first proof of the European Union’s unwillingness to remain a “soft” power, in the post-11 September 2001 era, limited to low-end peacekeeping missions. In addition, the recent decisions about the creation by 2007 of nine combat-ready and rapidly deployable joint battle groups, as well as the various EU member states’ individual or joint procurement efforts are regarded as promising steps. Moreover, the establishment of a new Headline Goal for 2010, focused on specific quantitative and qualitative requirements, may help to provide the EU countries with the necessary instruments to promote the goals of the European Security Strategy.

The suggestions for updating the Petersberg Tasks comprise only one aspect of the proposed Constitution’s provisions about the future development of ESDP; and it has been received fairly positively by all member states. Two related proposals, however, the prospective “structured cooperation” among some EU member states and a “mutual defense” clause calling for solidarity in case of an external attack, have become the sources of deep disagreements among EU partners and have exacerbated the discord in the EU-U.S. relationship caused by the divisions over the Iraq issue. In addition, a proposal for the establishment of a purely EU operational headquarters, at Tervuren, a suburb of Brussels, was also seen as a challenge to the cohesion of the transatlantic relationship. Despite the fact that some of these issues await the completion of the Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) deliberations to be officially resolved, the compromises achieved among EU and NATO officials show that inter-allied unity has been restored.

Facing the challenges of the third millennium, the European Union has a moral and political obligation to intervene in international security affairs and become a serious partner for NATO, the OSCE and the United Nations. The European Security Strategy (ESS) has placed cooperation between the European Union and these organizations at the heart of efforts to counter international threats. To that end, the pursuit of the updated

198 Ibid., Article III-214, 164.
199 European Defence Meeting-‘Tervuren,’ Brussels, 29 April 2003, Meeting of the Heads of State and Government of Germany, France, Luxembourg and Belgium on European Defence, in Misiroli, Par. 6, 80.
Petersberg tasks would promote multinational cooperation for the maintenance of global peace and prosperity and help the European Union realize some of its political aspirations, to the benefit of humanity as a whole.
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