

USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

DEVELOPING A PARTNERSHIP WITH BRAZIL – AN EMERGING POWER

by

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ABSTRACT

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The intention of this paper is to analyze relations between Brazil and the United States of America from a Brazilian perspective as well as the possible future improvement of those relations to a point where the countries can again be considered partners. It is also the intent to provide an accessible text that will help explain Brazil to those policy makers and military leaders who find themselves baffled by their vast and surprisingly little-known Southern neighbor. As a way to set the pace, it commences with a brief historical background of the cooperation between both countries since the beginning of the Republican regime in Brazil. Subsequently, it discusses the importance for the U.S of a partnership with Brazil with particular focus on the advantages for the Western Hemisphere of such a partnership. At this point, three major purposes for a partnership are listed and discussed, taking into account the current behavior of both societies and their governments' policies towards hemispheric economic development, hemispheric security and global peace. Then, using the lessons learned during the history of past relations to suggest a model for the core elements of a new partnership from a Brazilian perspective, it highlights some of Brazil's most important interests that could strongly affect future relations. In conclusion, the manuscript provides a brief assessment of the perspectives of establishing a partnership and some suggestions as to how the U.S. should deal with this traditionally friendly country in South America.

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DEVELOPING A PARTNERSHIP WITH BRAZIL, AN EMERGING POWER

United States-Brazilian bilateral relationship has a long history, characterized by some moments of remarkable convergence of interests but also by sporadic and critical divergences on sensitive international issues. In the past, this dichotomy has demonstrated that the differences did not superimpose on the affinities between the two countries. Both nations share democratic principles and basic objectives that have provided, so far, numerous promising opportunities for closer cooperation between the two countries.

Existing differences make the future of the bilateral relationship uncertain and can even cause concern if U.S. and Brazilian foreign policies do not change their current approaches to work with their common interests in spite of their differences. The objective of this project is to briefly examine some of the historical, political, military and socio-economic differences that have conditioned the U.S.–Brazil relationship to date. The once intended “special relationship” between the two countries will be examined. From a Brazilian viewpoint, the suitability of current U.S. policy towards Brazil needs improvement in order to bring relations to a point where they can become a partnership. In this context, social, economic and military aspects foreseen as dictating future of the U.S.–Brazil relations will be analyzed.

BACKGROUND – HISTORICAL TIES BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES

Since its early years as a republic, Brazil has looked forward to establishing close relations with the United States. This was a clear, and to a certain extent unexpected contrast with the trend in many nations in South America where strong feelings existed against perceived U.S. growing imperialism in the hemisphere.

THE BEGINNING OF THE SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP¹

From the time of the Republican movement that ended the monarchy of *Dom Pedro II*, in 1889, the United States of America, a relatively young and already a successful country, was viewed as a natural inspiration for the new Brazilian Republic.² This belief was so powerful that the first Brazilian Republican Constitution – promulgated in 1891 – was strongly influenced by the provisions of the U.S. Constitution.³ Although facing many more complex internal issues than its North American neighbor in the development of a democratic republic, Brazil felt that there were strong similarities between the two countries that would reinforce the common sense of the country’s “*grandeza*” (greatness),⁴ and therefore, lead to the conclusion that both countries were predestined to share the leadership of the Western Hemisphere as only very good friends could accomplish.⁵

The importance given to an alliance with the United States shaped Brazilian foreign policy strategy from the very beginning of the Republic. At the start of the twentieth century, the Baron of Rio Branco, Brazil's Foreign Minister and legendary diplomat, made this point clear by expressing that "there is no friendship more coveted in the world," referring to Brazilian - U.S ties.⁶ Later in 1906, following the rising uneasiness in many Latin American countries with regard to the United States' rising hegemony in the Americas, Rio Branco emphatically stressed both his support of the Monroe Doctrine and of the Roosevelt Corollary⁷ – the two major contested U.S. "rules" for the region – and his criticism of the lack of a "sense of community" among South American countries.⁸

In his book *Talons of the Eagle*, Peter Smith sets forth an interesting analysis of the reasons that led Brazil to adopt such a strategy.⁹ However, he misses an important point that must be taken into account: Different from the neighboring Spanish-speaking countries, Brazilian independence did not result in fragmentation of the former Portuguese colony in America.¹⁰ Brazilians have always been very proud of this distinct way their country began compared to the ex-Spanish colonies.

As was evidenced later in the twentieth century, Brazil experienced two major negative results from the above policy. First, Brazil concluded that the United States never really wished to make any special concessions to Brazil in its South American policy. Secondly, this Brazilian pursuit of its "grandeza" through an approach to the already perceived imperialist United States generated suspicion of Brazil's intentions among some of its neighbors on the continent. This would later negatively affect the integration of the region.

THE "BROTHERHOOD IN ARMS"

Although Brazil demonstrated the will to have close relations with the United States, U.S.-Brazilian ties remained tenuous. The United States' pursuit of a "multilateral approach" in its policy towards Latin American countries placed Brazil on the same level as that of the smallest of the Spanish-speaking countries of Central America in the eyes of U.S. policymakers. This lack of recognition and priority given to the second largest country of the Western Hemisphere was highlighted by Washington's dual approach regarding military aid in the 1930's to both regional rivals Brazil and Argentina.¹¹ This slowly changed in the first years of World War II. U.S. President Franklin Delano Roosevelt's Good Neighbor Policy¹² introduced a major change in the U.S. approach to Latin America. As described by Sonny Davis:

Adhering to the intent of "Good Neighborism," the policy eschewed direct intervention but kept the objectives of obtaining markets for U.S. goods and securing the hemisphere through trade and military agreements...U.S. security

plans assigned the Latin American militaries the roles of protecting U.S. access to natural resources and rights of transit or allowing permanently based military personnel if that could be achieved.¹³

This policy shift was a major factor in achieving the overwhelming and immediate support for the Allies by Brazil during WW II and several other military arrangements, which included the Airport Development Program (ADP),¹⁴ the political-military accord signed in May 1942¹⁵ and – most important for Brazil – the Brazilian Expeditionary Force dispatched to join allied troops on the Italian front in Europe.¹⁶ Nevertheless, Brazil remained cooperative but never accepted a subordinate status in the U.S. idealized relationship. As an example, the permanent presence of U.S troops in Brazilian territory was – since the very beginning of the relations – a non-negotiable issue. For Brazilians, it has always been a matter of sovereignty.¹⁷

The success of the wartime bonds between the two countries was incontestably the highest point in the history of U.S.-Brazilian relations. The Brazilians, proud of their fruitful and active participation in the war side-by-side with the U.S. and looking forward to placing their country among the great nations of the post-war era, began to call for a “*Special Relationship*” or a “*Brotherhood in Arms*”¹⁸ between the two giants of the Americas. A real partnership was achieved at that point in history. Unfortunately, this good relationship was based more on close personal friendships¹⁹ between officers of both countries rather than in the perception of the importance of the momentum gained in U.S.-Brazilian affairs.²⁰ U.S. policymakers, considering this closeness as episodic, decided to return the relationship to its pre-war status quo.

The geopolitical exigencies of the cold war led the U.S. to focus its efforts on Europe and Asia rather than Latin America. Brazilian diplomacy however, pursuing its overall plan to position the country among the great nations of the world, insisted on retaining U.S. military assistance. Even with a less than fully committed U.S. governmental policy, active cooperation with Brazil occurred in several fields during the post war period.²¹ However, as a result of a perception of not having benefited from a real partnership with the U.S. and, at the same time, being subject to the same collateral effects of the United States Cold War policy on the Continent,²² the future of the Brazilian approach to bilateral relations with the United States started to suffer a slow but constant reshaping process and the changes would deeply influence relations between the two countries in subsequent years.

ONLY GOOD FRIENDS

The Communist attempt to take power in Brazil in 1964 and the counter-revolution led by the military and supported by the middle class and other segments of Brazilian society²³ changed the bi-lateral relations between the two countries into a closer alliance. U.S. interests

on the Continent were perceived to be seriously menaced by a possible communist coup in Brazil. Therefore, an anti-communist movement such as that led by the Brazilian military, was the only acceptable outcome for U.S. President Lyndon Johnson, as described by Lincoln Gordon, a former U.S. Ambassador to Brazil in the early 1960's.²⁴

Washington's reaction was facilitated by its confidence in a "100%" Brazilian solution, due to the fact that many of the military leaders during the revolution were former officers on the staff of the Brazilian Expeditionary Force during WW II, which once again brought the aura of "personal relationships" to the scene.²⁵ The most remarkable example of this new era of cooperation was Brazilian participation in the Inter-American Peace Force (IAPF) sent to the Dominican Republic to counter the communist menace and end the civil war in that country.²⁶ However the lack of continuity of policies between the two countries would again cause deterioration in relations and give reason for oppositionist voices to rise against perceived U.S. interference in the country's development and self-determination. Examples are the episodes of the Brazilian nuclear power plant and also President Carter's attacks against the military government because of their human rights record,²⁷ which conditioned a country's receipt of U.S. military assistance on the state of human rights as determined by a Department of State annual report.

Experiencing increasing U.S. administration opposition to the provision of military equipment to Brazil, the nation's leadership realized the extent of its dependence on U.S. policy and decided on changes. This perception was later reinforced by post-Cold War U.S. policy, despite some isolated initiatives of the U.S. to re-approach Latin America. Bi-lateral relations remained cordial, but the close relationship was damaged and never returned to the level of the late 1940's and early 1950's.

The end of the Cold War created great expectations in Brazil over the future of the hemisphere's integration. But unfortunately the pace of the negotiations²⁸ did not achieve results before the tragic events of September 11, 2001 when U.S. priority once again shifted away from South America. As in the past, there is still a significant convergence of points of view between the two countries. Democracy, economic integration, human rights, the environment, non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and repudiation of terrorism are common issues in the political agendas of both countries and support broader cooperation between them.

WHY A PARTNERSHIP?

THE RELEVANCY OF A PARTNERSHIP WITH BRAZIL

In the last two decades, a rising number of U.S. institutions and other experts have seen Brazil as a key partner for the United States in its pursuit of a fully integrated and prosperous community of the Western Hemisphere. In 1996, Robert Chase, Emily Hill and Paul Kennedy wrote about the pivotal role of Brazil along with other developing nations in the four corners of the world. Their conclusions on the country are quite clear: Should Brazil fail, “the Americans would feel the consequences.”²⁹

Brazil in Numbers

Inattentive observers often misunderstand the size and importance of Brazil. It is the fifth largest country in the world both in size and population, with more than 170 million people and around 8.5 million square kilometers (slightly smaller than the U.S.). Brazil's economy and population are larger than Russia's. While great disparities of income among social classes still exist, Brazil has a powerful entrepreneurial class, substantial industrial base, vigorous middle class, vibrant culture and a boisterous mass media.³⁰ Its economy has been oscillating between the eighth and tenth largest in the world in the last decade. Out of its more than 170 million inhabitants, around 120 million are considered middle or emerging class (35 million families).³¹ This number almost equals the entire population of Japan. The persons considered rich total around 16 million – equivalent to the entire population of Chile. Such impressive figures of Brazilian assets place Brazil as one of the major markets in today's world.³² Brazil is already among the three largest markets in the world for a variety of significant products, ranging from cell phones and microwaves to helicopters and executive jets.


The New Republic magazine wrote that Brazil is a “globally competitive farming engine.”³³ According to the same magazine, the last U.S. Department of Agriculture report concluded that Brazilian farming potential had been “grossly underestimated.” The report also mentioned that Brazil can easily become “the agricultural powerhouse of this century” due to its potential for future expansion, which can reach up to 170 million hectares – a region that roughly equals the entire area currently used in the U.S. for crop production.³⁴ Not surprisingly, the last report of the United Nations' Conference on Trade and Development ranked Brazil as eighth in the attraction of foreign direct investments at the end of 2002 (US\$ 236 billion).³⁵

An Unknown Partner

Some of the Brazilian economy's impressive numbers and strategic importance in the continent seems not enough to attract the attention of U.S. decision makers and certainly are not realized by the majority of the population of North America. It can be said that throughout the long relationship between the two countries, the U.S. decision-makers' view of Brazil was distorted by some stereotyped vision of Latin America as a whole. Although sporadic, a distorted view of Brazil by some important personages in U.S. history has had a remarkable influence in the path of the bi-lateral relations between the two countries.³⁶

Unfortunately for both nations, this situation was built on a foundation of lack of full knowledge – or interest – about the peculiarities of the Brazilian culture, quite different from that of the United States, and to a lesser extent, from those of the Spanish speaking countries in Latin America. In this regard, generalizations with negative connotation like the expression “backyard of the United States” had always had devastating consequences for the bilateral relationship.³⁷

In 1996, Peter Smith displayed his skepticism over U.S. will to invest resources in the development of the Western Hemisphere. He wrote, “The public accords relatively low priority to South America...in general, there is little desire to commit substantial U.S. resources, economic or otherwise, to the Latin American region.”³⁸ In the last decade U.S. *think tanks* – and more recently, some leaders – are increasingly giving more importance to Brazil, such as the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) in New York, or the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations.³⁹ Table 1 below provides a complete view of the recent evolution of the public and the U.S. leader's perception towards Brazil.⁴⁰



* Data not available for the leaders

TABLE 1 - PERCEPTION OF U.S. VITAL INTERESTS IN BRAZIL

Actually, the poll shows that the U.S. leaders' perception towards Brazil is the one that increased the most from 1994 to 1998 (26 points), which can be confirmed in Table 2. The U.S. leaders are no doubt more aware than the general public of the critical role of Brazil in the world environment.⁴¹ After a detailed analysis of the country in the book *The Pivotal States*,⁴² Jean Krasno reaches the unavoidable conclusion that "a successful and sustainable economy and social structure are clearly in the best interests of the United States."⁴³




TABLE 2 - U.S. VITAL INTERESTS ACCORDING TO LEADERS

Other independent U.S. institutions have come to the same conclusion regarding Brazil. In a special report produced by an "Independent Task Force on Brazil," the Council of Foreign Relations (CFR) urged U.S. decision makers to take immediate action to improve relations with the "third biggest democratic country of the world," reflecting the perceived importance given by this independent commission to a U.S.-Brazil partnership.⁴⁴

HEMISPHERE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

The Pan-American Community

The idea of a free trade area that would incorporate all the nations in the Americas is not new. The United States proposed Pan-Americanism in the late nineteenth century as part of its efforts to institutionalize its aspirations in the Western Hemisphere, among other reasons, to

open the markets of South America for exchange of goods and to expand U.S trade.⁴⁵ It planted the seed for the future creation of the Organization of American States (OAS).⁴⁶

The Brazilian Option - MERCOSUR

Viewed by some as a natural result of the vagueness and ever changing U.S. policy in South America,⁴⁷ MERCOSUR is actually the Brazilian option for regional integration. This envisioned future for the region is a result of the ultimate understanding that the countries of South America will be more effective in the international arena of the twenty-first century by building up a synergetic effect with their economies and cultures without direct and paternalist assistance from any world power. For its members, MERCOSUR is more than a commercial integration. It represents the ending of years of distrust and the beginning of a new era of trust, synergetic work and integration. This understanding is so important for Brazilians that the Latin American community of nations was included in the Fundamental Principles of the 1988 Brazilian Constitution.⁴⁸

Brazil and Argentina, ending years of suspicion,⁴⁹ became the first two nations to bring this vision to reality. MERCOSUR – “*Mercado Comum do Sul*” (also *Mercado Común del Sur*, in Spanish - Common Market of the South) has its roots in 1986 when Brazilian President José Sarney and Argentine President Raúl Alfonsín, inspired by the European Union, started talks about the formation of a regional bloc, which later that year was formalized in a twelve-point protocol. In 1990, Paraguay and Uruguay joined the agreement. Later in the same decade, Chile and Bolivia became “associated countries.”

MERCOSUR’s overall strategy is to build a more attractive partner for future trade negotiations with other regional blocks and at the same time gather more leverage for negotiations under better conditions. It is the goal of MERCOSUR to collect all of the South American nations into a common market, which will bring improvement of the overall economic and social conditions of the people in the region.⁵⁰

This economic integration, implemented in accordance with the members’ limitations, is planned to later become a real community of nations with no hegemonic country or preferential treatment, but rather a union of efforts to strengthen and develop Latin America.⁵¹ The results are already auspicious: Despite the difficulties it has recently faced,⁵² MERCOSUR has become the world’s second-largest customs union and the world’s third largest regional bloc. The trade among the four members has tripled to its current US\$15 billion a year.⁵³

MERCOSUR’s most important objectives are already being achieved. The growth of among state-members is a reality. An example of this is the radical change in priorities of both

Brazil and Argentina in their military strategy towards each other. Consistently, Brazilian foreign policy has been largely directed towards the countries in the region, respecting their realities and their sovereign will to join the Common market. Both former President Cardoso and President Lula da Silva have worked in the same strategic direction.⁵⁴

The U.S. Option - The Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA)

The concept of a free trade area within the entire American continent – with the exception of Cuba – originated during President George Bush’s administration in 1990, but only turned into reality under President Bill Clinton, who effectively started negotiations to implement it in late 1994. Victor Bulmer-Thomas explains this unusual “bi-partisan” support as the fact that the United States sees FTAA as an opportunity to implement its own trade agenda – prioritizing its own interests – with less risk of losing control compared to what happened in the “Uruguay” round of the World Trade Organization (WTO).⁵⁵ If U.S. interests are preserved over sensitive trade issues within the FTAA it will be easier to negotiate with other rich countries in the WTO arena.

The United States also favors negotiating on a country-by-country basis as it enjoys a strong bargaining position over many issues, particularly given the powerful U.S. economy.⁵⁶ This can lead to undesirable competition for preferential trade with the United States among the weaker economies in the Hemisphere that could eventually backfire against the FTAA. Some believe that, with bilateral agreements guaranteed, there will be no further interest in broader agreements.⁵⁷

U.S. protectionism over several products, in particular over agricultural ones, is another major concern within Brazil, as it represents one of MERCOSUR’s most important trade commodities.⁵⁸ In the words of the Brazilian Foreign Minister, Celso Amorin, debating international criticism over the Brazilian position in Cancún, Brazil is not “interested in North-South confrontation.” It is a real legitimate aspiration of developing countries, which represent 69 percent of the world’s farmers.

[No] other area of trade is subject to such blatant discrimination as agriculture. Domestic and export subsidies...does not contribute to productivity gains or the creation of wealth. They only generate dependence, on one side, and deprivation on the other.⁵⁹

Geoff Dyer, in a New Republic article, defended the Brazilian position because it was “merely trying to open markets for its bountiful agricultural exports, much as the United States has done” in the past.⁶⁰

In the words of the former U.S. Ambassador to Brazil, Lincoln Gordon,

Even in the best of prospects, full implementation of Western Hemisphere free trade would surely be spread over a multiyear transition period. FTAA would open vast new perspectives for Brazil but would require at least a decade to become a major contributor to economic and technological progress.⁶¹

Considering such a perspective and having prioritized MERCOSUR, Brazilian diplomacy is convinced that the best option for the country is to honor its commitment to regional development. It is therefore consistently seeking international arrangements for a broader participation of MERCOSUR products in the international market. This option does not mean that FTAA will be discarded. Instead, it offers an extremely valuable formula designed to speed up Latin American development, which is in the interest of every nation in the region. But with MERCOSUR's legitimate claims apparently not recognized by U.S. negotiators, it will probably double the time frame needed to accomplish its objectives – or even divide the countries in the region instead of integrating them.⁶²

Although a little “dramatic,” Robert Chase predicts the consequences of the protectionism of rich economies on countries like India and Brazil:

If major actors agree to establish rules for openness and transparency, all can reap the benefits and minimize the cost of interdependence. However, if rising economic powers continue to feel marginalized by the current international regime, they may choose to establish separate economic or financial standards.⁶³

Both Brazil and the United States – the two largest economies of each subcontinent – have much to benefit from each other. Unless they can establish a really meaningful and frank agenda, both will miss the most evident opportunity currently existing to strengthen cooperation within the hemisphere.

HEMISPHERE SECURITY

Defining Regional Security

Even though agreeing about several important issues related to the security of the democratic world, Brazil and the United States do not have the same perception of the existence of a single threat to the South American region that would be capable of provoking a solid collective security arrangement. Even though Latin American reaction to September 11 was the immediate repudiation of the terrorist attacks and the surprising evocation of the Rio Treaty⁶⁴ under the spearhead of Brazil, the perception of a real terrorist threat to the hemisphere as a whole is not shared by all of the countries.

Brazil has lived in peace with all its neighbors for more than a hundred years, with no boundary disputes or other serious international difficulties. The Brazilian people, aware of the long-lasting internal and endemic social problems yet to be solved, have a mature and clear understanding that only with regional economic development and full cooperation will it be possible to “fight” poverty and social exclusion – the real enemy of the populace in South America – and reduce the existing large economic and social gap between the rich and the poor strata of societies. This is also perceived to be valid when talking about democracies.

It is important to note that Brazil, like other countries in Latin America, does not recognize an extra-hemispheric military threat against the region. Internal and inter-regional problems such as international organized crime, drug trafficking and poverty are enough to direct the attention of the policymakers and to national efforts to combat them. Besides, internal instabilities and regional conflicts in other regions of the world require intensive assistance of United Nations peacekeeping missions, to which Brazil has been a willing participant.⁶⁵

The Organization of American States (OAS) and the Defense Ministerials are forums to discuss regional security, but to date no important decisions have been made. This can be attributed to several different reasons, even to cultural differences, as Luis Bitencourt points out when he mentions the question as to what does the term “security” really mean. It is not only a result of a conceptual question over the generic term “security” as posed by Bitencourt,⁶⁶ but is reminiscent of the historically negative perception within South America about U.S. intentions for the continent. Different from other regions of the world, where the U.S. presence is perceived as a factor of stability, in South America the presence of U.S. troops has always generated concerns and even created some inquietude among the populace and governments.⁶⁷

When President Bush’s National Security Strategy (NSS) recognizes the U.S. right of pre-emptive action, the foregoing perception tends to be exacerbated in the region, possibly with the results recently predicted by George Soros.⁶⁸ In this context, the only possible concrete actions to develop a regional security framework must be addressed within the OAS forum, in the way Max Manwaring proposes.⁶⁹ U.S. exclusive led initiatives – from the simplest to the more complex ones – are unlikely to truly flourish without real multi-national endorsement and joint control by the governments of the Latin American countries.⁷⁰

Different Approaches to Colombian Crisis

When Plan Colombia was announced in 2000, the Brazilian Government displayed a certain discomfort with the presence of U.S. military personnel in the region. This position was

not exclusively Brazilian: Venezuela, Peru, Ecuador and Panama also expressed their concerns about the Plan.⁷¹

Since he took office in January 2003, President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva is taking direct action towards a more substantial foreign policy on the sub-continent. His administration is pursuing a larger role in helping to solve the conflict, while maintaining the traditional Brazilian historical posture, which prioritizes a peaceful solution for any conflict and non-intervention in internal affairs of other countries.⁷² The recent evidence collected by the Colombian Army definitively tying the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) with drug dealing⁷³ is convincing Brazilian policymakers that what is happening in Colombia is not only a problem of the Colombians but also a serious threat that affects South American security. The Brazilian Ministry of Defense has recently signed an agreement with its counterpart in Colombia, now called "Plan Colombia II."⁷⁴ This agreement formalizes the already existing help in terms of military intelligence in the region with the use of the recently installed apparatus of the Amazon Surveillance System (Sistema de Vigilância da Amazônia – SIVAM),⁷⁵ which is said to be also helping Peru against the resurgent leftist movement "Sendero Luminoso."⁷⁶

These attitudes positively demonstrate Brazilian commitment to South America and do not interfere in any way with U.S. initiatives in Colombia.⁷⁷ Following an "independent" path, they are consistent with the understanding that the countries in the region are the most capable of finding adequate solutions to their common problems, working as partners. "Brazil has all the interest in the region's stability, so we can concentrate on economic growth and social inclusion, which is what really interests us," confirmed José Viegas, Brazil's Minister of Defense.⁷⁸

GLOBAL PEACE

As already mentioned, the recent U.S. foreign policy "tendency" for unilateralism is probably the most important question discussed nowadays in the international arena.⁷⁹ Even within the United States this is causing strong concern among international relations experts, scholars and politicians like U.S. Senator Chuck Hagel.⁸⁰ For Brazil, as well, it represents a fundamental divergent point regarding the perceived role of their respective nations in today's world.

In the name of defending American sovereignty and inspired by its nationalism, the "shining city on the hill" (as former U.S. president Ronald Reagan used to say) is balancing between its political discourse about a more democratic world and its unilateral actions. The skepticism about international forums led the U.S. administration to distrust international institutions, a process in which Brazil cannot agree. The Kyoto Climate Change Protocol, the

Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, the International Criminal Court, the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and more recently, the decision to attack Iraq without a corresponding U.N. Security Council resolution, are examples on how the most powerful country in the world is establishing some dangerous precedents in the international arena, which certainly undermines its credibility and legitimacy.⁸¹

Regarding the use of force to solve conflict, the U.S. rationale will never coincide with the Brazilian perception. War as the last resort – one of the criteria that Martin Cook suggests to analyze the justification a country has to go on war – is a good example.⁸² The reason is that normally the cost of a war in terms of money and lives is often very high and that alone justifies an attempt at first trying a diplomatic solution. However, judging by the recent U.S. involvements in armed conflicts and its pre-emptive doctrine (exemplified by the Iraq incursion), the conclusion can be made that the *ultima ratio* is becoming less a factor to be considered in this country than it was in the past.⁸³

For Brazil – as for many other societies – the cost of war is far less acceptable. This was evident in the months preceding the war in Iraq when even though not agreeing with the dictatorship in that country, the Brazilian government opposed the early end of talks and the decision of the United States led coalition to wage war. Brazilian society, struggling against many social ills, strongly believes that social exclusion and poverty is a challenge heavy enough for humanity to concentrate its efforts, rather than devoting those efforts towards war.

Prioritization of U.S. interests to the detriment of a more responsive attitude to other nations' priorities gives rise to what Moisés Naím called "Lite anti-Americanism."⁸⁴ This may or may not jeopardize immediate U.S. objectives but certainly will affect the position of the United States in the long run. A U.S.-Brazil partnership to ensure world peace will only be possible if effected in a context of multinational agreement under the auspices of the U.N.

SHAPING U.S. – BRAZILIAN RELATIONS FOR THE FUTURE

Divergences of opinion like those regarding FTAA should not be seen as abnormal in relations between two strong democratic countries. Nevertheless, in this particular situation the current U.S. Administration is demonstrating its will, less to discuss and more to undermine the Brazilian position among the nations of the region. The U.S. option has been to show its "muscle" to impose its interests over the Brazilian proposal. After the failure of the World Trade Organization summit in Cancun,⁸⁵ for instance, U.S. officials used increasingly stern language to either blame or threaten Brazil with being left behind.⁸⁶ This "hard diplomacy" apparently seems

to confirm Soros' view of "a crude form of Social Darwinism."⁸⁷ The above is not all that may or can jeopardize long-term relations between the two nations.

BRAZIL IN ITS PLACE

When several Central and South American countries, under strong U.S. pressure, decided to withdraw from the Brazilian led G-22 Alliance formed in Cancún, unofficial press conferences rushed to call this as "Lula being put in his place" – a bare insult and a degrading comment.⁸⁸ What is Lula's – or Brazil's – place in the context of recent international events? Does it mean that Brasilia is not supposed to articulate or form alliances or partnerships in the same way as Washington does? Or is there any implicit understanding that Brazil should subordinate its interests to those of the United States?




FIGURE 1 – MINDING THE BACKYARD⁸⁹

For a long time Brazil has been dedicated to making its international insertion a reality. The aspiration is not to be mistaken. It does not mean that the country is going to dispute positions with any other country but rather that Brazil is willing to be an active participant in the

global scenario where there are still many steps to be taken towards making a better world for future generations.⁹⁰ In the words of Brazilian President Lula da Silva, while addressing recent graduates of Brazil's Diplomatic Academy:

We no longer accept participation in international politics as if we were Latin American wretches; a Third World country of no account; a worthless country with homeless children; a minor country whose people only know how to play soccer and dance the samba [...] There is no interlocutor anywhere in the world who respects another who bows his head and acts as an inferior.⁹¹

President Lula da Silva is attempting to overcome old prejudiced views directed towards the so-called "Third World" countries. Different cultures produce different histories and diverse problems in nations around the globe. Therefore, the tendency of some world policymakers to compare the various behaviors of countries in the global arena to their own standards only results in a narrow view of such behaviors and adversely affects proposed solutions to largely dissimilar problems. This narrow view is responsible for some of the misunderstandings and prejudices found in international relations. Brazil's place – as is that of any other country - is certainly not in anybody else's backyard or in a subservient role. Rather, Brazil's place is "shoulder-to-shoulder" with other nations interested in improving human development and global peace.

A POSSIBLE PARTNERSHIP

The word *partnership* has different connotations. The classical meaning is linked to business as "*an organization of persons having common interests, purposes, etc., engaged in the same business enterprise and sharing its profits and risks.*"⁹² But an association among countries involves more than simple business-like profits and risks. This paper considers a broader concept of partnership among nations such as "*it is an association between two or more countries with shared interests, values and principles, with a clear common purpose and the willingness to share both benefits and risks that can result from this association.*"

Using the basic model presented by William Parry to describe successful alliances and coalitions,⁹³ and considering the particularity of Brazilian historical behavior, a model of the essential elements of any future partnership can be suggested (Figure 2). It is important to note that although internal public support does not appear in the model, without the bond it provides the partnership will quickly and easily erode, with few or no results. The perceived gain for these societies as the finest representation of the populace's will is therefore at the top of the pyramid.⁹⁴




FIGURE 2 - ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF A BILATERAL/MULTILATERAL PARTNERSHIP

By analyzing the above model, it is possible to say that the current U.S.-Brazilian relationship in almost all levels of the pyramid has suffered “erosion,” mostly in the recent years.⁹⁵ International partnerships are built with the understanding that the desired goals must meet the national interests of both partners. If there are perceptions that the intended partnership will not be able to fulfill the interests of one of the partners or that one of the partners is not willing to accept the other’s interests, the partnership will never materialize. This is clearly what is happening today. Fortunately, in all the necessary elements – especially those at the base of the pyramid – the two countries still have ample common ground to explore. A partnership for the security of the Americas must be built with a socio-economic commitment of the future partners and vice-versa. Brazilians view these issues as interdependent and inseparable, one to the other.

Brazil has adopted its own course of action, prioritizing the socio-economic integration of South America as a way to foster the long-pursued improvement in the quality of life of its populace. This will be achieved with its neighbors-partners, who live in the same *espace de sens* (space of meaning) and are more likely to build a community of nations tied together by cultural identity rather than for purely economical reasons.⁹⁶ Based on the Buenos-Aires

Consensus launched by both the Brazilian and Argentine Presidents in October 2003,⁹⁷ MERCOSUR partners are acting motivated by a mix of "inside-out" and "outside-in" stimuli.⁹⁸

FINAL CONSIDERATIONS

Democracy is the most important value for the world's most powerful nations. This is true for Brazil as well. If democracy is believed to be the best way for mankind to live in society it should also be accepted as the best way to govern relations among countries. Accordingly, the United States through its actions should consistently demonstrate to its partners and friends that democratic behavior within the community of nations is highly desired. This by itself would send a powerful message to the entire world that those nations who live under a democracy would achieve better results for their people, regardless of the country's size or relative power.

There is a perceived increasing gap between the democratic discourse of the United States and its behavior in the international arena. Most important are the devastating consequences for the future of global peace that are not yet fully realized by U.S. policymakers. This "dual" behavior of the United States, not only when dealing with the issues of the Western Hemisphere but also with other international matters, as clearly put by Bulmer-Thomas, "is at the very least an uncomfortable state of affairs for the other states of the hemisphere: multilateralism when it is important and unilateralism in other cases."⁹⁹

Brazil, having developed its democracy throughout a "turbulent path," is aware of the reality of the new world order and has made its decision. It is actually applying continuity to a very consistent diplomacy developed over decades and focused on the prosperity of the country as well as that of South America as a whole.¹⁰⁰ The nation will continue to pursue both the development of South America through the enlargement of MERCOSUR and increased cooperation with different regions of the world. It will always apply its tradition of respect for the diversity of people and cultures that it has developed in its own territory throughout history.

This paper has not attempted to cover the complexity of the negotiations surrounding Western Hemispheric economic integration. But the conclusion that the success of MERCOSUR should be desired and encouraged by the U.S. is a natural conclusion after what was discussed. As consistently put by the CFR report, "a realistic and sustained dialogue with Brazil is central to any successful U.S. policy in the Western Hemisphere," but the report adds that Brazil will not "react favorably if it believes that the United States aims only to co-opt Brazil for exclusively American purposes."¹⁰¹

If the United States chooses to offer to South America – through an expanded MERCOSUR – an open-ended option to develop a free system of trade, finance, security

cooperation and technological and cultural interchange, a Brazilian partnership could make a major contribution to this real revolution in the affairs of the Western Hemisphere. For Brazil and its partners, MERCOSUR has created much more than economic results; it has created real conditions for a new era of cooperation in several different – and in the past forgotten – areas. This, of course, helps Brazil to meet its national objective of “establishing a ring of peace around the country” and certainly benefits other nations in the Southern Hemisphere. What is more important, this new environment is being created by the will of the people in the region, rather than being imposed by others. That is why the United States should encourage this understanding among its neighbors in South America. Democracy, economic development and peace in the region are also U.S. interests for the region. The most likely alternative is a much longer period of time necessary to overcome the socio-cultural differences needed to integrate the countries in the area and to consolidate, once and for all, the most peaceful region in the world.¹⁰²

Paraphrasing Jorge Castañeda, “to turn hope into reality, the entire region needs leadership, vision, and the will to achieve.”¹⁰³ These are times when only great leaders – real statesmen – will be able to concentrate on lessons from the past in order to overcome old international relations’ paradigms and construct a better future. As recently stated in a New York Times editorial, “so long as Washington moves beyond outdated notions that Latin America must march behind us [the United States] in lock-step unity on every issue, there is reason to believe that a more constructive relationship can be cultivated with Brazil.”¹⁰⁴ In the history of bilateral relations with the United States, Brazil has learned its lessons and hopefully so has the United States of America.

WORD COUNT= 6711

ENDNOTES

¹ “Special relationship” is used here by the author to describe the close friendly feeling that the country once had with the U.S. The original expression however was first used by the Brazilian Ambassador Oswaldo Aranha when urging the United States to abandon the multilateral military approach to the Latin American countries in favor of a closer bilateral relationship with Brazil. Sonny B. Davis, *A Brotherhood of Arms: Brazil – United States Military Relations, 1945 – 1977* (Niwot, CO: University Press of Colorado, 1996), 4.

² The breaking with the monarchy that had direct links with the Portuguese crown made it almost impossible to approach any of the European Powers for support of the new government. Even France, the traditional socio-cultural inspiration of Brazilian urban society was not suitable to fulfill this need. Therefore, Brazil had forcibly to look for inspiration and support in a model for democracy other than those available in Europe at the end of the nineteenth century.

³ The Brazilian Senator Prudente de Moraes (1841-1902), President of the 1891 Constituent Assembly, stated that the Brazilian Constitution “*was to correspond in South America to its model in North America,*” referring to the U.S. Constitution. Even the name of the young republic followed the inspiration given by the North American neighbor: “United States of Brazil.” This official designation remained until the 1967 constitution, when it was changed to the actual name of “Federative Republic of Brazil.”

⁴ Even during the colonial period, Brazilian authors and intellectuals have expressed their feelings that Brazil was predestined to be a world power in the future. André João Antonil with “*Cultura e Opulência do Brasil*” (1711) was one of those who set the path of national pride, emphasizing the nation’s natural majesty and greatness. After independence from the Portuguese Crown (1822) and more emphatically after the Proclamation of the Republic (1889), this feeling became strongly influential for Brazilian policymakers. Among others, Golbery do Couto e Silva and Carlos de Meira Mattos – authors in geopolitics during the late 1960’s and 1970’s – had strong influence in shaping Brazilian foreign policy in the late twentieth century. Peter H. Smith, *Talons of the Eagle – Dynamics of U.S.-Latin American Relations* (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1996), 99.

⁵ The perception at the time was that both countries shared common geographical characteristics that made them similar one to another: the two biggest countries of the Americas had vast and yet-to-be explored natural wealth and they both contained unusual extended costal lines, with potential control of the sea lines of communication and of commercial maritime routes.

⁶ Smith, 100.

⁷ The Monroe Doctrine, first stated by President James Monroe in a message to Congress in 1823, essentially stressed that the U.S. would regard as an unfriendly act any attempt by a European nation to interfere in the affairs of the American countries or increase its possessions on the American continent. In 1904, Theodore Roosevelt added his corollary to the doctrine that proclaimed that the United States had not only the right to intervene, but it was their moral obligation to act as an international police power in case of any American country’s “impotence” or “wrongdoing.”

⁸ Smith, 100. In his speech, Rio Branco stated that “[n]othing, absolutely nothing, in the policies of the United States would be able to cause uneasiness to the national sensitivity of the

other American countries. Just the opposite, these nations find in the preponderance of the first nation of the continent's support for their causes and aspirations.”

⁹ Smith, 23. In his considerations regarding the Brazilian perceived empathy with the United States, Smith mentions that Brazil like the U.S. was an expansionist power, engaged in territorial expansion, and for that reason looked for support for its aspirations from the northern neighbor. This shows some disconnection with the reality. Brazil was never an expansionist country. Most of the Brazilian territorial expansion occurred during the Portuguese-Spanish disputes of the colonial period. The territorial gains after independence amounted to less than 3 percent of actual Brazilian territory and were all set by international mediation, except the purchase of the state of Acre from Bolivia proposed by Rio Branco as a solution to pacify the region. In any case, these situations cannot be compared to the way the U.S. annexed Mexican territories after the Mexican war in the early nineteenth century. It is also important to remember that in 1828 the Brazilian Empire accepted the British mediation that gave independence to Uruguay, after an armed conflict initiated by the Argentines, what is, by itself, another proof of a non-expansionist Brazilian mentality.

¹⁰ Unlike the former Spanish colonies, which divided themselves into different countries with some rivalry among them, the entire Portuguese-speaking population of the continent remained unified in a single large country – an empire – after a generally peaceful achievement of independence from Portugal.

¹¹ Davis, 2. Argentina had an extensive re-armament program that was taking place in the same decade, with weapons and equipment being provided by European countries, mainly by England. Although a common practice for the U.S. foreign policy and other world powers, this policy certainly was not welcomed by Brazilians. The Brazilian government considered the United States insensitive to its concerns about the intentions of its neighbor in the Southern Cone.

¹² As a result of increasing U.S. policymakers concern with the Axis menace in the Western Hemisphere, Roosevelt adopted a “revived version of the Monroe Doctrine” by adopting a new policy designed to increase U.S. influence in Latin America and focused on security and economic issues, with Brazil as the key country. See Davis, 5.

¹³ Davis, 5.

¹⁴ Davis, 10. The ADP followed the significant change in the U.S. Congress attitude towards Brazil. Fearing the Axis influence in South America, the Congress quickly passed the Pittman Resolution, which authorized U.S. military equipment sales to Brazil. Subsequently, the United States and Brazil had agreed to a plan permitting U.S. use of airfields to be constructed in the northeast Brazilian territory. The ADP can be used as an example of a good bilateral agreement on military cooperation between the U.S. and Brazil. President Getúlio Vargas rapidly approved the program because it met the interests of both countries in protecting the country and the special Administration interest in developing the necessary infrastructure in one of the less assisted regions of Brazil.

¹⁵ Among other arrangements, the agreement established Joint Commissions for assistance in training and equipment. The Joint Brazil-United States Defense Commission (JBUSDC) in Washington and the Joint Brazil-United States Military Commission (JBUSMC) located in Rio de Janeiro were integrated by officers of the armed forces of both countries. The

JBUSDC was responsible for undertaking studies and making recommendations on mutual defense matters while the JBUSMC mission was to implement the recommendations and plans of its counterpart in Washington. The Military Accord ended in 1977 as a result of President Carter's change of policy towards Brazil, which led Brazilian President Ernesto Geisel to announce his intention to cancel it, unilaterally.

¹⁶ Although initial plans were to send three to four Brazilian divisions to the war, one expeditionary division and aircrews composed the final force that fought in Europe. Some scholars mention that problems associated with the great challenge posed to the Brazilian Army in adopting new methods, ideology and organization impacted in the decision of sending only one Division. The most important fact that led to this decision, however, was the U.S. commitment to the cross-channel invasion of France, which left less shipping available for the Italian front.

¹⁷ When the U.S. Army insisted on sending troops to occupy the northeast of Brazil, following the ADP, as a protection against the possibility of a German invasion, the Brazilian Government's vehement denial "embarrassed" U.S. officials responsible for negotiations. Brazilian military were convinced that their own troops (when provided with adequate arms) could repulse any German attempt to invade the country.

¹⁸ The expression "Brotherhood of Arms" was first mentioned by Brazilian General Estevão Leitão de Carvalho, in September 1944, referring to his perception of a shared responsibility of the two countries for the defense of the western hemisphere. See Davis's *A Brotherhood of Arms*, xviii, no.10.

¹⁹ A good example of this kind of personal influence in U.S.-Brazil relations is U.S. Admiral Jonas H. Ingram, former commander of the South Atlantic Force, who became a personal adviser to President Vargas during the War. Several other strong friendship ties developed as a result of the interaction of staff officers of both armies in the joint commissions and during the Italian front campaign. These friendships influenced important decisions in the future relations of the two countries.

²⁰ Davis, 50. The fragility of the post-war relations – from the United States side – can be exemplified by the U.S. Navy proposal to dismantle the Joint Commissions established by the 1942 accord on the same day President Truman announced Japan's surrender. The Joint Commissions resisted this proposal.

²¹ Among other initiatives, the establishment of the "*Escola Superior de Guerra*," the provision of training for military personnel in both U.S. and Brazilian installations and sales of military materiel under the Surplus Property Act are good examples of this post-war cooperation. Even the divergence on the war in Korea ("Peace Action") was not able to break the 1942 political-military accord, which was renewed in 1952. The accord received some minor adaptations in order to better fulfill the overall cold war U.S. strategy of containment.

²² Some scholars argue that, as it had happened earlier in many other countries in Latin America, the U.S. Cold War era policy gradually "consolidated" the paradigm of U.S. political domination and the threat of military intervention among Brazilian policymakers. Brazilian society was obviously not immune to this perception and would be strongly influenced by these perceptions until the beginning of the military regime in 1964. For additional information on this subject, see chapter IV of Davis' "*A Brotherhood of Arms*" (1996).

²³ Scholars frequently refer to the 1964 military-lead movement that overthrew the leftist Brazilian President Goulart as a military *coup d'état*. However, from the point of view of those who had been involved in the movement, what happened was a counter-coup because the Goulart administration sought absolute power in the communist style, governing the country without accepting any constitutional constraints. Several authors wrote about the internal instability that left the Brazilian society with no option other than the counter-revolution. A good independent testimony of the situation can be found in the book *Brazil's Second Chance*, written by the former U.S. ambassador in Brazil, Lincoln Gordon.

²⁴ Lincoln Gordon, *Brazil's Second Chance: En Route toward the First World* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2001), 66. Although Gordon categorically states that the U.S. did not take part in any phase of the revolution, he provides testimony about the U.S. prompt intention to act in support of the military, or those who he called the "anti-Goulart" side. Washington, endorsing Gordon's proposal, prepared two contingency plans to support the movement: The first – whose existence the Brazilian military leadership was not aware of – consisted of sending a naval task force with the suggestive code-name of Brother Sam, and the second plan prepared a supply of small arms and ammunition to be sent by air to the Brazilian revolutionary leadership. Gordon emphasizes that the task force was not intended to be used in a direct military involvement but rather was planned to exert physiological pressure against the leftist Goulart government and evacuate U.S. citizens in case of necessity.

²⁵ Davis, 180. These personal and close relationships included the future President under the new regime, Humberto de Alencar Castelo Branco. President Castelo Branco enjoyed a strong and personal friendship with the U.S. Military Attaché in Brazil, Colonel Vernon Walters, who had previously worked as a liaison officer with the FEB.

²⁶ It is worthy of mention that the Organization of American States (OAS) sanctioned the intervention. The "*Latin Brigade*" of the inter-American force was composed of one Brazilian infantry battalion and a "*fraternity*" battalion made up of a Brazilian Marine company and units from other Latin Countries. The commanders of the IAPF were subsequently Brazilian Generals Hugo Panasco Alvin and Álvaro Alves da Silva Braga. See Davis, 190.

²⁷ The U.S. government efforts to undermine – and later on to block – the Brazilian Government's long desired plans to build a nuclear power plant caused the relations to reach their lowest point since WW II. The control of nuclear power technology was considered as a necessary and inescapable step toward the country's insertion in the developed world. Max Manwaring gives his view on that in Max G. Manwaring, "Brazilian Security in the New World Disorder: Implications for Civil-Military Relations," in *Beyond Praetorianism: The Latin America Military in Transition*, eds. Richard L. Millett and Michael Gold-Biss (Coral Gables: North-South Center Press, University of Miami, 1996), 230. The Carter administration's direct attack on human rights records in Brazil using the Harkin Amendment, which was passed in the U.S. Congress during the Gerald Ford administration, but was never before used in the case of Brazil. The Amendment conditioned a country's receipt of U.S. military assistance to the state of human rights as determined by a Department of State annual report. During the Carter administration, the Report on Brazil strongly criticized the human rights' records of the country, leading the political and military leadership to react with indignation. Even some members of the political opposition considered it offensive to the nation. See Davis, 201. For different perspectives on this issue, see Smith 154 –161.

²⁸ The Clinton administration showed particular interest in fostering this integration but, as expected, any adopted “formula” will require a long time to be implemented, particularly when facing all sort of internal obstacles within the countries in this complex region. Internal politics and pressures of all kinds proved to be quite effective to slow down the negotiations: the Clinton administration faced the loss of the *fast track* – now Trade Promotion Authority – which resulted in a reinforced perception of the U.S. low priority to economic integration in the hemisphere.

²⁹ Robert Chase, Emily Hill, and Paul Kennedy. “Pivotal States and U.S. Strategy,” *Foreign Affairs* 75, no. 1 (January/February 1996): 44. Although justifying their list of pivotal countries by the negative consequences that these nations could spread in their regions in case of their collapse, their choice of Brazil among other countries, directs the attention of the readers to the importance of this nation in the world scenario.

³⁰ This potential of the Brazilian economy did not go unnoticed by some of the biggest multinational corporations in the last few decades. The French owned “*Carrefour*,” a company of supermarkets operating in many countries around the world, is one of the major private employers in Brazil, with more than forty-seven thousand employees. Its annual profits in the country are believe to be around US\$ 7.5 billion, which makes Brazil the most attractive market for the company in the world. Other important European multinationals, mainly from the Netherlands, Spain and Germany, also appreciate the value of the Brazilian market and have heavily invested in the country.

³¹ Derived from Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística (IBGE), *Census 2000*. Available from <<http://www.ibge.gov.br/censo/default.php>>. Internet. Accessed 24 October 2003. “Emerging class” is an expression commonly used in Brazil to describe those families in the low-middle class. It represents part of the population with some purchasing power, capable to influence in internal trade and economy.

³² Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), *Independent Task Force Report 2001* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 12 February 2001). Also available from <<http://www.cfr.org/publication.php?id=3900>>; Internet; accessed 22 October 2003. Brazil has *purchasing power parity* (PPP) equivalent to 1.34 trillion U.S. dollars, the ninth largest in the world. The first eight countries in PPP in 2001 were: U.S., China, Japan, Germany, India, France, England, and Italy. According to the CFR estimate, by 2005 Brazil will have the fifth largest PPP, behind Germany.

³³ Geoff Dyer, “Rondonopolis Dispatch – Role Reversal,” *The New Republic*, 10 November 2003, 16. Brazil is already one of the world’s biggest producers of soy, cotton, orange juice, beef, poultry, sugar, coffee, corn and cellulose.

³⁴ *Ibid.* Contrary to general belief, the Brazilian Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is not essentially based in agriculture, even though its incredible potential and great importance to the economy – as one of the major exports sectors – is substantial: 6.1 percent of the GDP is sustained by agriculture, 21 percent by industry/manufacturing, and 72.9 by services. The World Bank report presents the 2002 Brazilian GDP equivalent to 452.4 US\$ billions with an average annual growth rate estimated for the period 2002/2006 equivalent to 3.4 percent.

³⁵ “The Attractions of China and Brazil,” *Latin American Economy & Business* August 2003 [journal on-line]; available from <http://www.latinnews.com/leb/LEB2370.asp?instance=3&mode=a>; Internet; accessed 7 October 2003. Historically, the United States has been a major investor in Brazil. Direct US investments in Brazil rose from US\$ 18.9 billion in 1994 to

roughly US\$ 38 billion in 1998. Brazil occupies the fifth position among those countries receiving direct US investments, following Germany and before Japan. According to statistics from the Department of Commerce of the United States, the increase of US investments in Brazil during 1996-97 was two times greater than its average global growth (11%) and surpassed by 50% the increase recorded in the rest of South America (16%). Spain, The Netherlands, France and Germany follow the U.S. in the rank of Direct Foreign Investments (DFI) in Brazil.

³⁶ Lars Schoultz, *Beneath the United States – A History of U.S. Policy toward Latin America* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998), 329 – 382. Unfortunately, throughout history there was always at least one influential voice among the U.S. leadership to keep this stereotyped view in place. Among others, some of the most influential men on this list are the sixth U.S. President, John Quincy Adams, the U.S. Consul to Paraguay in 1851, Edward A. Hopkins, the former undersecretary of State Dean Acheson (when mentioning Brazilian President Getulio Vargas in his 1969 autobiography), and the famous intellectual father of “containment” during the Cold War, George Kennan. Kennan, a U.S. diplomat in the late 1940’s and early 1950’s, after a rapid tour through the continent, offered his peculiar explanation of Latin American behavior. In his view, full of prejudice and generalizations, he categorically stressed that: “[It] seems unlikely that there could be any other region of the earth in which nature and human behavior could have combined to produce a more unhappy and hopeless background for the conduct of human life than Latin America. A more recent example is the undiplomatic reference of the U.S. trade representative Robert Zoellick, which reflects some prejudice against the Brazilian political leadership. See Robert B. Zoellick, “America will not wait for the won’t-do countries,” *Financial Times*, 22 September 2003, sec. Comment, p.23.

³⁷ The expression “Backyard of the United States” was first used to refer to Mexico, and soon became a way for some U.S. politicians and particularly the media to refer to all of Latin America. For many Latin American countries, this unfortunate expression represented both the perceived “U.S. imperialism” and the low priority given to the region, because it embodies the sense of ownership and, at the same time, the secondary importance the backyard of a house enjoys.

³⁸ Smith, 23. Although a little outdated, Smith’s observations proved still valid, according to results of the last Chicago Council of Foreign Relations poll, of 2002 (See endnote 40).

³⁹ Among other reasons, the strategic importance for the development of the Western Hemisphere in the new World order, the political stability and a sound Brazilian economy are believed to have become more relevant aspects considered by these *think tanks*.

⁴⁰ John E. Rielly, ed., *American Public Opinion and U.S. Foreign Policy 1999* (Chicago: The Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, 1999), 34. Noticeably, while the general public’s perception in U.S. remained constant in the previous four years, the poll showed that in 1998 three quarters of the U.S. leadership perceived Brazil as of vital interest for the United States against less than half of them in the previous 1994 poll.

⁴¹ In the 1999 poll, sixty-four percent of the leaders believed that Brazil would have a greater role – or power – in the beginning of the 21st century. Although the same questions were not available for leaders in the 2002 poll, by observing the answers of the general public and considering that the general circumstances involving the U.S.-Brazil relationship did not

significantly change in the 1998-2002 period, it is reasonable to assume that the tendency shown in the 1999 poll was maintained.

⁴² Jean Krasno, "Brazil," in *The Pivotal States*, eds. Robert Chase, Emily Hill, and Paul Kennedy (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1999), 165-194. Although very detailed, Krasno's analysis of the Brazilian case makes some unrealistic consideration when discussing possible scenarios for the future of the country. The pessimistic projection considering the possible return of the Brazilian military to power in the years to come is, at least, unsustainable, due to the fact that it fails to consider the actual stage of the Brazilian society – including the military - who would never accept such return to the past.

⁴³ Ibid. According to the definition presented by Chase to be a pivotal state a country must be considered a key country whose future development may not only determine the success or failure of its region but also affect international stability as a whole.

⁴⁴ Council on Foreign Relations. The Independent Task Force Report was sent to U.S. President George W. Bush, U.S. Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, U.S. Secretary of State, Collin Powell, and the Chairmen of the Foreign Relations Committees of both Houses of the U.S. Congress, among others.

⁴⁵ Smith, 29. In 1881 the U.S. Secretary of States James G. Blaine envisioned an international conference of the American States that later came to be know as the Pan-American conference. One of his goals for this conference was "*to cultivate such friendly commercial relations with all American countries as would lead to a large increase in the export trade of the United States.*" The agenda of the conference, held years later was very ambitious for that time. It aimed at the preservation of peace in the continent and included topics ranging from construction of a Pan-American railway to the adoption of a common monetary standard and a possible formation of a customs union.

⁴⁶ This Union would become much later the OAS, as we know it today. It is believed that the results of the Conference were insignificant for the real integration of the Hemisphere, due to the growing feeling against U.S. expansionism among the Latin America countries. This feeling persisted even after the creation of the OAS, which can explain the lack of further talks in the direction of the dreamed Pan American community of Nations.

⁴⁷ Several North American authors described the inconstancy of U.S. policy towards Latin America and particularly Brazil. Although written with the American perspective focused on military matters, Sonny Davis's *A Brotherhood of Arms* gives a good view in this subject. Peter Smith's *Talons of the Eagle* is another reference on this subject.

⁴⁸ *Constitution of the Federative Republic of Brazil*, 1997 Revised ed. Brasília: Senado Federal, (1997). The Sole paragraph of Article 4 states that "The Federative Republic of Brazil shall seek the economic, political, social and cultural integration of the peoples of Latin America, viewing the formation of a Latin-American community of nations."

⁴⁹ In reading South American history, a natural conclusion can be reached that this situation of distrust among countries in the region is not a product of irrational hatred. Rather, it was in partly inherited from territorial disputes between Portugal and Spain since the very beginning of the colonization of the continent.

⁵⁰ MERCOSUR is a process of integration among the members. It is basically a customs union, but its final goal is to become a Common Market or, in broader terms "a community of nations." Although first conceived as an economic accord, it represents a political project for the countries involved. MERCOSUR represents 70% of South American territory, 64% of its population and 60% of its GDP. The regional bloc has 210 million people and a GDP of US\$ 1.1 trillion. A customs union represents one step further than a Free Trade Area, that is, besides the elimination of barriers for commerce, the goal is to work as a single economic body with free circulation of capital and work force among the members. For additional information on MERCOSUR see *Mercosur – The Common Market of the South*. Available from <<http://www.mre.gov.br/cdbrasil/itamaraty/web/ingles/relex/mre/orgreg/mercom/index.htm>>. Internet. Accessed 1 December 2003 or <<http://www.mercosul.org.br>> (the least web site is in Portuguese).

⁵¹ Although there is a perception in some sectors of South America – as well as in the United States – that Brazil is trying to become a hegemonic power in the region, the actions taken by the current and the last Brazilian administrations are proving this perception to be wrong. The Brazilian initiative in inviting representatives from other MERCOSUR countries on the last Presidential trip to discuss a free trade area with India is a good example. The decision of both Brazil and Argentina to share their two-year terms as member of the U.N. Security Council with each other has no historical precedent. See Jorge Elías, "La Argentina se incorporará en la misión brasileña en la ONU," *La Nación*, 18 December 2003; available from <http://www.lanacion.com.ar/Archivo/Nota.asp?nota_id=556419>; Internet; accessed 18 December 2003. See also Andres Cisneros, "Un paso adelante con la relacion con Brasil," *La Nación*, 29 December 2003; available from <http://www.lanacion.com.ar/03/12/29/dp_559335.asp>; Internet; accessed 10 January 2004.

⁵² Scholars and journalists have for some time admired MERCOSUR's ability to withstand several crises. Among the latest problems that affected MERCOSUR as a bloc, Brazil's currency devaluation of 1999 and Argentina's crisis in 2001 are the most significant ones. These problems have challenged but so far have not undermined MERCOSUR's stability. For those readers interested in deepening the study on this subject, there is a vast bibliography available about the challenges MERCOSUR's four members have faced in the past and the problems still to be solved. For a balanced view on the subject, including the most significant divergences between the two major members Argentina and Brazil, see Riordan Roett, ed., *MERCOSUR: Regional Integration, World Markets* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1999) and Víctor Bulmer-Thomas and Sheila Page, "Trade Relations in Americas: MERCOSUR, The Free Trade Area of the Americas and the European Union" in *The United States and Latin America: The New Agenda*, eds Víctor Bulmer-Thomas and James Dunkerley (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999).

⁵³ Mario E. Carranza, "Neighbors or Partners? NAFTA and the Politics of Regional Economic Integration in North America," *Latin American Politics and Society* 44, no.3 (Fall 2002): 145.

⁵⁴ President Cardoso's initiative to gather South American Presidents for a summit in August 2001 was a remarkable step towards regional integration. In his first year in office, President Lula da Silva has either hosted or visited all heads of government of South America in a clear attempt to accelerate the tightening of links with both the Andean and Amazonian blocks of countries, prior to 2005, when FTAA will be effective. The plans include, among other forms

of integration, enhancing physical liaisons by exploiting border opportunities in furtherance of the movement of goods and people.

⁵⁵ Victor Bulmer-Thomas and Sheila Page, "Trade Relations in Americas: MERCOSUR, The Free Trade Area of the Americas and the European Union" in *The United States and Latin America: The New Agenda*, eds. Victor Bulmer-Thomas and James Dunkerley (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999), 89-91. The Uruguay round produced a deep frustration for the United States, due to the fact that the agenda of the WTO was less subject to its control and actually produced some arbitration contrary to its interests.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 91.

⁵⁷ "Comercio I: Miami Produce un ALCA "Flexible," *Informe Latinoamericano* 25 November 2003 [journal on-line]; available from <<http://www.latinnews.com/lil/LIL2836.asp?instance=2&mode=a>>; Internet; accessed 5 December 2003.

⁵⁸ An "agricultural reform" in international trade was also sought by Brazil at the WTO Summit in Cancún and resulted in an impasse between the E.U. and the U.S. on one side and the so-called G-21, a group of agricultural countries headed by Brazil, on the other. It is important to note that Brazil also has some "protected" areas such as services, investments, governmental purchases and intellectual property. These areas, however, do not negatively affect (proportionally) the United States in the same manner as the agricultural subsidies do for MERCOSUR members.

⁵⁹ Celso Amorin, "The Real Cancun," *The Wall Street Journal*, 25 September 2003, sec A, p. 18. Amorin refuses the idea of a rich-poor confrontation lead by Brazil, as posed by many critics after the disappointing results of the WTO Summit in Cancún.

⁶⁰ Dyer, 18.

⁶¹ Gordon, 227.

⁶² Assessing his perception on the effects of FTAA in many countries in South America, the 2001 Economics Nobel Prize Winner Joseph Stiglitz mentioned that the agreement, in the way that it is now being proposed – not including anti-dumping and agricultural issues - has almost no advantage for the countries in the region. During an interview with a Brazilian newspaper, he said that "Brazil is doing right in (in resisting), since the United States is totally unreasonable in the negotiations." See "Para economista, Brasil acerta em resistir aos Estados Unidos na ALCA," *O Estado de São Paulo*, 2 November 2003; available from <<http://txt.estado.com.br/editorias/2003/11/03/eco008.html>>; Internet; accessed 15 January 2004. For a comparative view of all the different stages of regional economic integration and for another perspective on FTAA/MERCOSUR problematique see Theodore H. Cohn, *Global Political Economy: Theory and Practice* (New York: Addison Wesley Longman, Inc., 2003), 35-37 and 297-303.

⁶³ Robert Chase, "International Finance, Trade, and the Pivotal States," in *The Pivotal States*, eds. Robert Chase, Emily Hill, and Paul Kennedy (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1999), 378.

⁶⁴ The so-called Rio Treaty, officially the *Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance*, was signed in 1947 under the Cold War framework and was considered moribund by many

observers. The Treaty essentially states that an attack against one country should be considered an attack against all countries in the Americas. There are some critics stating that Brazil's evocation of the Rio Treaty does not mean much because it did not send troops to join the war in Afghanistan. It is important to note that if several different factors – the economic aspect the most important – impeded Brazil to join the coalition, the will to help in the war against terrorism showed a very positive and important commitment to the Western Hemisphere security.

⁶⁵ MERCOSUR members are extensively involved in peacekeeping missions around the world. Brazil, Argentina and Uruguay are currently executing joint exercises and exchange of expertise in this area with the purpose of better preparing their troops for this type of operation. The *Centro Argentino de Entrenamiento Conjunto para Fuerza de Paz - CAECOPAZ* – an Argentine joint peacekeeping training center, is a good example. These are auspicious signs of the new environment created by the broad project of integration of the nations in the Southern cone called MERCOSUR.

⁶⁶ Luis Bitencourt, "Security Issues and Challenges to Regional Security Cooperation: A Brazilian Perspective," in *Perspectives from Argentina, Brazil, and Colombia* (Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, July 2003), 14.

⁶⁷ Although the last U.S. unilateral intervention in the Americas occurred fifteen years ago in Panama, this perception can be explained as a reminiscence of the "imperialist legacy" left by both the Monroe Doctrine and the Roosevelt Corollary, as explained earlier in this paper. The U.S. approach to regional security is a natural extension of its global policy, which is exemplified by the Clinton Administration's National Security Strategy, and now confirmed by the actions taken by the Bush Administration in Iraq. It is based on the belief that although many security objectives are best achieved by alliances or other formal security arrangements; the U.S. must be prepared to act alone whenever it is the most advantageous course to do so.

⁶⁸ George Soros, "The Bubble of American Supremacy." *The Atlantic Monthly* 292, no.5 (December 2003): 64. Soros mentioned that the actual U.S. NSS established two kinds of sovereignty: "...the sovereignty of the United States, which takes precedence over international treaties and obligations; and the sovereignty of all other states, which is subject to the will of the United States. This is reminiscent of George Orwell's *Animal Farm*: all animals are equal, but some animals are more equal than others." It is interesting to note that the book cited by Soros – is now used to criticize the most powerful capitalist democracy of the world – was originally written by Orwell as a sharp criticism of the Communist system.

⁶⁹ Max G. Manwaring, *Strategic Effects of the Conflict with Iraq: Latin America* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, March 2003). Manwaring states that the organization "provides a moral position and structural framework to which member states can transfer the responsibility of the promulgation of binding international agreements" that can provide "harmony, accountability, transparency and means to impose effective sanctions on non accomplishing members." It is also important to note that one of MERCOSUR's future steps is to integrate South American security. In this sense, the U.S. Army Colonel Joseph R. Nuñez proposal for the creation of what he called "First Special Service" Force (FSSP) formed by troops from the Southern Cone countries appears to be a natural result of MERCOSUR in the year to come. For further information on this subject, see Joseph R. Nuñez, *A 21st Century Security Architecture for the Americas: Multilateral*

Cooperation, Liberal Peace and Soft Power (Carlisle Barracks: Strategic Studies Institute, 2002), 32.

⁷⁰ As an example, in 1980 President Jimmy Carter attempted to form a South Atlantic Treaty Organization based on NATO, by sending Vernon Walters to Brazil as a negotiator, but he did not succeed. President Ronald Reagan tried a kind of new military accord, even offering arms technology transfers, but again the offer was refused.

⁷¹ "Plano Aprovado Sob Desconfiança," *Jornal do Commercio On Line*, 2 September 2000; available from <http://www2.uol.com.br/JC/_2000/0209/br0209c.htm>; Internet; accessed 23 September 2003. These concerns were presented by Former Brazilian President Fernando Henrique Cardoso along with other South American leaders during the Summit of South American Heads-of-State in Brasília in September 2000. Here it is important to note that the major concern about Plan Colombia was derived from the fear of the "spill-over" effect of military operations against the FARC inside Colombian territory. But, as previously mentioned, the presence of U.S. military personnel in the region is always seen as a cause of concern by the political leadership of South America.

⁷² Non-intervention and peaceful settlement of conflicts are among the ten principles governing the international relations of Brazil included in the 1988 Constitution. Article 4 lists national independence, prevalence of human rights, self-determination of peoples, equality among states, defense of peace, repudiation of terrorism and racism, cooperation among peoples for the progress of mankind and granting of political asylum as basic principles, as well.

⁷³ The arrest of the Brazilian most wanted drug lord – Luis Fernando da Costa – in 2001 by the Colombian Army during the operation "Gato Negro" in southeastern Colombia, is considered to be the most evident proof of the involvement of FARC with international drug-trafficking. Fernando da Costa is the leader of the Brazilian based criminal organization called Red Command (Comando Vermelho) and according to Colombia officials he crossed the border for a drugs-for-arms business with the logistic support of the guerrillas.

⁷⁴ Márcia Carmos, "Vizinhos aprovam Lula, mas temem sua liderança," *Jornaldamídia.com* 1 July 2003 [journal on-line]; available from <http://www.jornaldamidia.com.br/noticias/2003/07/Vizinhos_aprovam_Lula_mas_teme.shtml>; Internet; accessed 23 September 2003.

⁷⁵ The SIVAM is a complex and broad system of surveillance with several ground radar stations installed in the Amazon Region and a fleet of Aircraft specially equipped for surveillance and interception. They include the Embraer 145 (FAB R-99B) with sophisticated electronic gear, including heat sensors, SAR radar and radio-monitoring gear. The system is currently being implemented.

⁷⁶ Mário Simas Filho, "Missão Secreta no Peru," *IstoÉ*, 24 September 2003; also available from <http://www.terra.com.br/istoe/1773/brasil/1773_missao_secreta_peru_01.htm>; Internet; accessed 15 October 2003. According to *Isto É* a Brazilian aircraft was sent into Peruvian airspace to pinpoint the exact location of the whereabouts of senderistas who had kidnapped 71 pipeline workers. This information has not been publicly acknowledged by either Peru or Brazil.

⁷⁷ It is essential to consider the broader scenario in which Colombian paramilitaries and insurgent groups are immersed in – which includes transnational crime and its branches in Brazil – and integrate it into the complex equation that results in a considerable threat to the

country's interests. Unfortunately, Brazilian policy makers have not systematically considered this when dealing with the Colombian crisis. There was a general tendency among politicians and diplomats to viewing the insurgents in Colombia only as a result of social clash, related to regional disparities in the neighbor country. This view is naturally linked to the existence of similar problems in some Brazilian regions in the past and tends to block the correct perception of the intrinsic danger in the criminal actions to which they are related.

⁷⁸ Raymond Collit, "Brazil Spells out Quest for Regional Stability," *The New York Times*, *FT.com* [journal on-line]; available from <<http://www.nytimes.com/financialtimes/international/FT1059479849475>>; Internet; accessed 16 September 2003.

⁷⁹ "Unilateralist" is not an adjective well accepted by the U.S. government in spite of their recent acts in the international arena. There are extensive and passionate debates on what the term Unilateralism really means and whether it can be applied to the United States nowadays. Some preeminent U.S. intellectuals have written about the subject. For a fair-minded analysis of how this subject is related to the current U.S. policy, see Henry Kissinger, *Does America Need a Foreign Policy? Toward a Diplomacy for the 21st Century* (New York, NY: Simon & Schuster, 2001), 17-31; John M. Owen, IV, "Transnational Liberalism and U.S. Primacy," *International Security* 26, no. 3 (Winter 2001/2002): 117-127, 149-152; and John Ikenberry, *After Victory: Institutions, Strategy Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order in After Major Wars* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001).

⁸⁰ Chuck Hagel. *Defining a Foreign Policy for the 21st Century*, Posture Statement presented at the Conference on New American Strategies for Security and Peace (Washington, D.C.: 29 October 2003). Expressing his concerns about the direction taken by U.S. foreign policy Senator Hagel strongly stated that "developing effective and sustainable alliances and partnerships requires give and take...Other countries have their own interests, and those interests need to be acknowledged and heard. Too often American insensitivity toward other nations' interests is perceived as American arrogance".

⁸¹ Minxim Pei, "The Paradoxes of American Nationalism." *Foreign Policy*, no.136 (May/June 2003): 36.

⁸² Martin L. Cook, "Ethical Issues in War: An Overview," in *U.S. Army War College Guide to Strategy*, eds. Joseph R. Cerami and James F. Holcomb Jr. (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2001), 24-26. Cook lists seven essential elements used to analyze the reasons for going to war, or *jus ad bellum*: 1) The need of a just cause; 2) The existence of a legitimate authority to declare war; 3) A public declaration; 4) The just intent of the country waging war; 5) The proportionality in the use of force; 6) The reasonable hope of success; and 7) The requirement for the war to be the last resort.

⁸³ This is certainly due to major factors: the capacity of the powerful U.S economy to absorb the costs of a war with almost no detriment to its own population; and the perceived possibility of the country to wage war with low cost in American lives, as a result of the unparalleled technological advances in weapon systems reached by the U.S. in the last two decades.

⁸⁴ Moisés Naím, "The Perils of Lite Anti-Americanism." *Foreign Policy*, no.136 (May/June 2003): 96.

⁸⁵ The WTO summit in Cancun ended with no conclusion over the agricultural subsidies and other protectionism barriers against free trade. Some observers blamed Brazil although the impasse resulted from reluctance of the U.S. and the European Union to discuss agricultural subsidies, which was expected to happen by many of the agricultural countries since the Doha summit.

⁸⁶ U.S. trade Representative Robert Zoellick writing in the *Financial Times*, explicitly blamed "Brazil and its colleagues" for scuppering the talks with a position stemming from "a culture of protest that defined victory in terms of political acts rather than economic results." See Zoellick, "America will not wait for the won't-do countries," *Financial Times*, 22 September 2003, sec. Comment, p.23. Roger Noriega, Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs echoed Zoellick's opinion ("Brazil: Cancun & Colombia illustrate new style." *Latin American Weekly Report* 23 September 2003 [journal on-line]; available from <<http://www.latinnews.com/lwr/LWR2494.asp?instance=5&mode=a>>; Internet; accessed 7 October 2003). Peter Algiers, deputy to Mr. Zoellick, threatened Brazil by saying, in other words, that if Brazil is not willing to advance the talks on FTAA, the U.S. will do it by itself, leaving Brazil behind ("Brazil: US and Brazil on collision course over FTAA," *Latinnews Daily* 29 September 2003 [journal on-line]; available from <<http://www.latinnews.com/ldb/LDB2522.asp?instance=4&mode=a>>; Internet; accessed 7 October 2003). Those remarks are definitely non-diplomatic language and do not contribute to attempts to find a solution. There is a real threat for Brazil to be left behind. However this outcome should be carefully considered by the U.S. administration because of the damaging long-term consequences it could produce in the regional – if not global – context. See also Zoellick's article "The route from Miami to economic freedom," *Financial Times*, 9 December 2003, sec. Comment, p.15; for an example of the softening of language used by the U.S. trade representative after the outcome of the FTAA meeting in Miami.

⁸⁷ Soros, 63. Soros justified his definition by stating that the actual U.S. foreign policy ignores the role of cooperation in the survival of the fittest, and puts all the emphasis on competition, which will, under the current world order, lead to the assertion of United States supremacy.

⁸⁸ "Brazil's Strategic Outlook: 'Assertive' bid to Change Power Balance," *Latin American Security & Strategic Review* October 2003 [journal on-line]; available from <<http://www.latinnews.com/lss/LSS2655.asp?instance=2&mode=a>>; Internet; accessed 24 October 2003.

⁸⁹ El Fisgón, cover drawing of the *Nacla Report on the Americas* 34, no.3 (November/December 2000). The author of the drawing depicts a criticism to the expression "backyard" used in the U.S. to refer to Central and South American countries. NACLA is seemed by many as a "100% anti-U.S. policy in America" entity. However, sound discussions and good argumentation can be found in their publications and always bring a different and important point of view about this complex relationship.

⁹⁰ To understand the distance between the perceptions of the two countries regarding National Security and foreign policy it is necessary to remember that the two main streams of international relations theory are at the core of this discussion: realism versus idealism. While Brazilian diplomacy is essentially and traditionally idealist, the United States foreign policy in new world order is purely realist. Due to the limited size of this paper, the author intentionally avoided deepening the discussion over this subject. For a good understanding, see John J. Mearsheimer's *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (New York, NY: W.W. Norton & Company,

2001), 1-28. Measheimer offers a good explanation of both theories and what he calls the “rhetoric versus practice” of the U.S. foreign policy. For additional information on how the U.S. *Grand Strategy* is shaped within this framework, see Barry R. Posen and Andrew L. Ross, “Competing Vision for U.S. Grand Strategy,” *International Security* 21, no.3 (Winter 1996/1997): 5-53.

⁹¹ Luiz Inácio Lula Da Silva, *Presidential Address to the graduates of the Brazilian Instituto Rio Branco* (Brasília, DF: 9 September 2003).

⁹² Michael Agnes, ed., *Webster’s New World College Dictionary*, 4th ed. (Cleveland, OH: Wiley Publishing, Inc., 2002). Both definitions of the terms “association” and “partnership” were considered.

⁹³ William H. Parry III, *Multinational Operations and the National Security Strategy: The Modern Melian Dialogue*, Strategy Research Project (Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College, 19 March 2000), 12.

⁹⁴ The model proposed in this work fits some South American countries, as well. It certainly helps explain several cases when multinational initiatives in Latin America did not produce concrete results despite the existence of good proposal on the table.

⁹⁵ As an example, the decision to cancel military aid to Brazil (as well as for other non-NATO countries or major allies) over article 98 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) issue has backfired against U.S. efforts to improve cooperation between the two countries. Basically, the United States – which is not a signatory of the Rome Statute – is conditioning this aid to an agreement exempting U.S. citizens from ICC trials. Article 98 of the ICC refers to the Court’s observance of international agreements when requesting surrender of persons. The Rome Statute is available at <<http://www.un.org/law/icc/statute/rome.htm>>.

⁹⁶ Zaki Ladi, *Les Espaces de Sens*, (Paris: Gallimard, 1995); quoted in R. Craig Nation, “Regional Studies and Global Strategy,” in *U.S. Army War College Guide to Strategy*, eds. Joseph R. Cerami and James F. Holcomb Jr. (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2001), 80. Zaki Ladi defends that meaningful civilizational projects can only be constructed on regional basis – an *espaces de sens* – because of a mix of historical, social, cultural, political, and economical associations among the people involved.

⁹⁷ “Brazil-Argentina: Lula & Kirchner launch ‘BA Consensus,’” *Latin American Weekly Report* 21 October 2003. [Journal on-line]; available from <<http://www.latinnews.com/lwr/LWR2641.asp?instance=8>>; Internet, accessed 24 October 2003. Besides the existing commitment for economic development within the common market of the Southern Cone, the “consensus” defined some important strategic points which include, among others, the reaffirmation of both countries’ responsibilities in strengthening regional integration to become a future “South American nation” to be constructed as a model of development “in which growth, social justice and the dignity of its citizens are linked together.”

⁹⁸ R. Craig Nation, “Regional Studies and Global Strategy,” in *U.S. Army War College Guide to Strategy*, eds. Joseph R. Cerami and James F. Holcomb Jr. (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2001), 80. Nation defines *inside-out* dynamics in regional association as those driven by social and cultural trends and *outside-in* dynamics as those

occurring as a response to external challenges, such as economic competition or misdistribution of power.

⁹⁹ Bulmer-Thomas, 320.

¹⁰⁰ The idea of continuity is emphasized here in opposition of those – particularly in the international media – who believe that the country is now shifting towards a more independent and “aggressive” foreign policy. It is worthy of mention that these are National Objectives derived from Articles 3 and 4 of the Brazilian Constitution. See *Constitution of the Federative Republic of Brazil*, 1997 Revised ed. (Brasília: Senado Federal, 1997), 3.

¹⁰¹ Council on Foreign Relations.

¹⁰² Ibid. Concluding the Independent Task Force Report, the CFR urges the U.S. administration to consider a partnership with Brazil to promote the development of the Hemisphere because it categorically states that “South America cannot be reshaped from Washington.”

¹⁰³ Jorge G. Castañeda, “The Forgotten Relationship,” *Foreign Affairs* (May/June 2003): 81.

¹⁰⁴ “Brazil’s Moment,” *The New York Times*, 24 January 2004; available from <[http://www.nytimes.com/2004/01/24/opinion/24SAT1.html? th](http://www.nytimes.com/2004/01/24/opinion/24SAT1.html?th)>; Internet; accessed 21 February 2004.

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