

USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

**REBUILDING IRAQ'S INFRASTRUCTURE
THROUGH IRAQI NATIONALS**

by

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This SRP is submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the Master of Strategic Studies Degree. The views expressed in this student academic research paper are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

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ABSTRACT

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Today's geo-political environment is filled with unrest, violence and unstable regimes that threaten region stability throughout the globe. It represents a challenge for the United States as it determines which conflict to intervene with respect to its national interests and those of its affected allies. Once peace and stability are achieved, the United States faces an equally daunting challenge, effectively rebuilding a nation's infrastructure. Effective infrastructure rebuilding begins at the National level with a modification of the National Security Strategy that includes engagement with the same importance as preemption. Engagement includes sufficient coalition support and reaching out to the affected nation. The affected nation, ravaged by war, is included early in the Stability Operations planning phase and is included as a vital participant in the country's reconstruction. The realignment of the Coalition Provision Authority under the Department of Defense along with active participation by the Department of State will set the right conditions for the affected nation's involvement, from the level of governing council to the individual on the street. Overcoming this challenge is not new to the United States. It can apply its lessons from Germany's reconstruction in World War II.

This paper articulates that present day Iraq's infrastructure can be effectively rebuilt using its local nationals. It takes their participation a step further by explaining that Iraqis can take over the rebuilding process sooner than what the United States is accustomed to. With proper training, they are more than capable of rebuilding their country. However, the United States must break from its contract labor practices that have their roots in the Civil War and Reconstruction period.

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REBUILDING IRAQ'S INFRASTRUCTURE THROUGH IRAQI NATIONALS

While insisting upon the firm adherence to the course delineated by existing Allied policy and directive, it is my purpose to continue to advance the transition just as rapidly as you are able to assume the attending autonomous responsibility.

—General Douglas MacArthur, message to the people of Japan, 1949

Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) accomplished one its major objectives, the removal of the Sadaam Hussein regime. However, in Phase IV, Stability Operations, it is still in pursuit of winning and securing the peace. Grasping this objective is proving to be a far more daunting challenge as attacks on U.S. and coalition forces occur almost daily. The enemy, now termed an insurgent, has laid many obstacles along the path of the country's efforts, from shoulder launched missiles to the infinite number of explosive devices and mines strewn throughout the countryside. Subsequently, the U.S. led coalition is engaged in a relentless battle to root out and eliminate stubborn enemy forces opposed to a peaceful Iraq.

When peace has been attained it must be maintained. A key component to maintaining peace will be the use and employment of Iraqi nationals instead of contractors from outside the country to rebuild Iraqi infrastructure. The U.S. must take the lead in this effort, breaking from its traditional relationship with contractors such as Halliburton and Bechtel and, equally important, garnering sufficient coalition support to maintain this endeavor.

This paper contends that organizational changes are needed at the Department of Defense (DoD) and the Department of State (DOS) in conjunction with Non-Governmental Agencies (NGOs) that will accelerate and expand the involvement of Iraqi nationals in the rebuilding of their country. Additionally, the Iraqi people will be closely examined in the context of their history, culture and religion. Parallels will be drawn between the Iraqi and African American labor during the U.S. Civil War and Reconstruction periods.

THE IRAQI PEOPLE, RELIGION AND HISTORY

The Iraqis are proud, hard working people forged by their history. Their survivability, perseverance and endurance make them more than capable of rebuilding their nation. They have a rich, diverse culture and background made up of equally diverse peoples living in different regions of the country. For the Iraqi, religion is far more than a casual observance. They are deeply committed to their religion and to such an extent, their faith regulates daily life.

The Islamic religion is based on submitting to the will of God or "Allah" and it governs everything from government, social life, crime, punishment to mortality

and the after life. The Qur'an / Koran and Sunnah are the two main sources of Islamic teachings. The Koran is the basic religious book for Muslims; it is the spoken word of Allah. The Sunnah is complementary to the Koran and comprises the sayings of the Prophet Muhammad and his way of life. Muslims accept and admire all major Judeo-Christian prophets from Old Testament Adam to New Testament Jesus, however they proclaim Muhammad to be the last and greatest. Although Iraq is a secular country, the traditional Islamic culture predominates with Koranic Law playing a vital role in the daily, routine life in the country.

Islam is the state religion of Iraq and approximately 97% of the population belongs to either the Shi'a (60%) or the Sunni (37%) sect. The higher educated Sunni have traditionally dominated the government; since 1958, the majority of the government has been Sunni. The Kurds are also Sunni but their religious practices differ from the Arabs.

75% of Iraqis are Arab. 20% of Iraq's population is Kurdish and the remaining 5% is made up of Turkoman, Assyrian and others. The Kurds form a majority in the north and northwest portions of Iraq where they were forced to settle due to economic constraints and border crossing limitations. Most Kurds are agrarian herdsmen, though many have moved to the cities, particularly Mosul, Kirkuk and Sulaymoniyah. The Kurds are divided into three separate groups. These groups' inability to overcome their differences has hamstrung them and hindered their ability to present a united front to Sadaam Hussein and the international community.

The Arab population is divided between the Shi'a majority in the south, and the Sunni, who live mainly in the central part of the country near Baghdad. Two Arab groups that have not been assimilated into the population are the "Marsh Arabs" who occupied the lower Tigris and Euphrates River delta until the Iraq government drained 90% of the marsh area. Most Marsh Arabs fled to Iran. The second group is a small Bedouin population who move about the desert regions. 75% of the people live in the flood plains that make up only 25% of the total land area. Almost 70% of the population lives in urban areas, with Baghdad being the largest city. ¹

Arabs, Iraq's predominant population group, share common beliefs and values that cut across all social classes. The family unit, like in the U.S., is a critical societal unit for most Iraqis. It is an institution of great honor. Arabs gain status by being born in the right family. ² The actions of each family member impacts significantly, particularly on the family's reputation. The father is the head of the family. He usually brings home the most money and the wife rarely works. An Arab's first loyalty is to the family. Many families are large and close-knit. Maintenance of the family honor is one of the highest values among the Arabic Iraqi people.

It is this honor that is revered and cherished above anything else, occasionally even survival itself. ³ Criticism, no matter how constructive, is usually as damaging to the Arab's honor and it is seen as a personal insult. The Arab must, above all else, shield himself and his honor from this critical onslaught. ⁴

Iraqi diversity helped them become a strong and resilient people who overcame numerous adversities throughout their history. Most notably is the succession of plagues, famines and floods that date back to the seventeenth, eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.⁵ The slaughtering of Sunnis, Persians and civil wars in Bagdad throughout this same period, further punctuate the trials the Iraqi people endured and overcame.⁶ In spite of the setbacks, the Iraqis forged ahead, welcoming ideas, innovation and any technological breakthroughs that would improve their personal lives and nation as a whole.

In the second half of the nineteenth century, the Iraqi people successfully exploited the advances in communications and established their first links to the capitalist world. This led to a significant recovery of towns and the demise of tribal power.⁷ Breaking with tradition and thoroughly committed to a new state, the Iraqis opened their borders, even to the West to enhance and accelerate the reconstruction of their country. In the early twentieth century, Iraq embraced the English invasion of 1914 – 1918.⁸ England brought to Iraq its ideas and skills in the field of administration, irrigation, agriculture and other areas of life, though incidental to their pursuit of basic imperial interests, no doubt helped the progress of the Iraqis toward a viable state.⁹ This openness is a significant point of departure from latter twentieth century to present day Iraq with all of its uncertainty and turbulence.

The grasping of ideas and technology shaped Iraq's ability to rebuild itself; an ability it has done well throughout history.

In the early twentieth century, Iraq greatly added to its existing educational facilities, subsequently adding to the ranks of the new middle class, the natural carrier of national sentiment. In the years that followed, Iraq's ruling class focused on nurturing in the schools patriotism and active sympathy for Arab ideals. However, in the time of King Faisal I, 1921 – 1933, the focus of the ruling class was the difficult task of cultivating a common purpose and feeling among Iraq's diverse populations. King Faisal maintained in a confidential memorandum, "there is still and I say this with a heart full of sorrow, no Iraqi people but unimaginable masses of human beings devoid of any patriotic idea, imbued with religious traditions and absurdities connected by no common tie, giving ear to evil, prone to anarchy and perpetually ready to rise against any government whatsoever. Out of these masses we want to fashion a people which we would train, educate and refine. The circumstances, being what they are, the immenseness of the efforts needed for this can be imagined". King Faisal went out of his way to associate with the Shi'is by easing their admission into government service and putting promising young Shi'is through an accelerated training program and affording them opportunities to rise rapidly in positions of responsibility.¹⁰

Iraq, like much of the Western Hemisphere, enhanced its pool of skilled workers through labor unions. Labor unions helped the worker progress through King Faisal's accelerated

training programs but more importantly, gave the Iraqi worker a voice to express concerns over working conditions and wages. Many workers were abused as Iraqi growth and technological development continued on a rapid pace, particularly in the twentieth century. The Artisans, Association founded in 1929, catered to handicraft workers and petty tradesmen.¹¹ It was sensitive to the working conditions and their grievances but gave priority to the national worker in general.¹² Iraq's labor unions were fairly successful. Worker skill improved and abuse abated. Like their Western counterparts, worker rights were at least heard and attempts were made to improve conditions. The Iraqi worker forged ahead and did so with pride. Handwritten proclamations written long hand appeared in eighteen locations in the town of Nasiriyyah on 13 December 1932.¹³ The proclamation bore the watchwords, "workers of the world unite!" "Long live the union of workers and peasants republic of the Arab Countries!" The proclamation captured the spirit and essence of the Iraqi worker.

RECONSTRUCTION STRATEGY

Iraq reconstruction has been frustrating for U.S. and Iraq officials. The United States perceives that the Iraqi Governing Council, a key player in Iraq's reconstruction and political future, is slow and indecisive.¹⁴ Defeating the daily asymmetric obstacles and frustrations requires mental and physical agility at every level.

Modifications to the reconstruction strategy should be made in four areas. First, realign the U.S. Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) within the DoD under the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). Second, invite the participation of Iraq's Governing Council early in the post-conflict, rebuilding process and invite the State Department participation. Third, enhance the planning process by including OSD's Under Secretary of Defense Policy and Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics. Fourth, expand the local national vetting process to include Baathist party members and Sunni and Shi'ite Tribal leaders.

These modifications will echo the National Security Strategy (NSS) that treats global engagement and post-conflict operations with the same importance as preemption strategy. Keeping and securing the peace is thus just as critical as going to war for it. The National Military Strategy which derives its overall security policy guidance from the NSS will adjust accordingly, as it defines the national military objectives and establishes the strategy to accomplish the military objectives to meet the engagement strategy. For example, to meet the the renewed engagement strategy, adjustments to the U.S. Army, active duty and reserves, should be made to bring the majority of the Civil Affairs soldiers back on active duty. The pool of linguists and related specialties will have to increase to meet the demands of an engagement

strategy. Although the CPA is currently not aligned under OSD, it is a new organization that works directly for the Secretary of Defense. It is in charge of Iraq's reconstruction efforts. However, it underwent two leadership changes within 12 months and has experienced some personnel instability. Contractors in Iraq complain that the CPA's staff consists primarily of political appointees who do not understand the process.¹⁵ Privately, some CPA officials acknowledge the staff is less than the best the U.S. has to offer. One official admits to working with the C-team or third string players.¹⁶ Aligning the CPA under the OSD gives it a stable foothold in the DoD where it can draw on valuable advice, experience and credibility – ingredients that are pivotal to the CPA as it reaches out to Iraq's Governing Council.

The U.S. should carefully hand pick a Governing Council for the reconstruction planning process during Phase I of the campaign planning process. The Governing Council's main focus must be on reconstruction. Thus, they should be in place long before decisive operations begin. Unlike during OIF when they were not included in the planning process, members of the Governing Council must be invited to be active participants in the planning effort led by the Secretary of Defense, Deputy Secretary of Defense and head of the CPA. Early involvement by the Governing Council gives the Council a broad and appropriate platform to voice concerns and recommendations and lay the foundation for a new constitution.

The Governing Council provides a critical link to vital leadership outposts throughout Iraq. The Council, by ethnicity alone, would have easier access to vetted Baathist Party members, Sunni and Shi'ite Tribal leaders. Vetted or cleared Baathists, Sunni and Shi'ite leaders would be confirmed by the CPA to have no association with or support for the Hussein regime. Baathists, Iraq's only legal political party, and of considerable prestige and influence during the Hussein regime, would know the country's key infrastructure points of contact.¹⁷

After the first Gulf War, there was no access to foreign workers, no access to spare parts, but bridges were rebuilt and telephones and electricity were restored quicker than Kuwait rebuilt after the Gulf War.¹⁸ Many Tribal leaders are familiar with the pulse of the Iraqi people and can provide insight on the population's mood and attitudes. Tribal leaders can also help identify regional hot spots or areas of potential insurgency and sabotage. Controlling hot spots and keeping them chilled will enable reconstruction efforts to take root and flourish. Smartly applied, reconstruction would soon bring jobs to the Iraqi landscape ravaged by war. Fair and appropriate wages would also be addressed. The current Governing Council estimates unemployment is as high as 75%.¹⁹

Lastly, Governing Council, Baathist and Tribal leader involvement early in the planning process sends the right signal to the Iraq people. It greatly helps in distinguishing between what

Iraqis can and should do and where they need help. It also demonstrates that the United States is aware of their cultural sensitivities and controls expectations that the U.S. military can fix all of Iraq's reconstruction problems, thus preventing great disappointment among Iraqis in the future. Subsequently, the Iraqis will sense they are part of their country's reconstruction. More importantly, this becomes a shared solution rather than a made in America one.

The planning effort will also specifically include key members of the State Department and OSD's Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics and Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. It is just as critical to involve these agencies early. The State Department can assess the global impact of Iraq's reconstruction and identify any issues that could impede progress. Early planning will afford the State Department ample opportunity to sway any skeptical Coalition partners. Maintaining contact with the United Nations (U.N.) may be necessary as well. It is vital that the U.S. garner as much coalition support as possible. Multinational support validates the rebuilding mission and commits nations to resource sharing. The State Department can also inject lessons learned from previous contingencies. The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics provides key information on any logistic, procurement and contractor activities. The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy provides input on the review and preparation of contingency plans, tying them to post conflict operations. These agencies together bring an immense amount of expertise, experience and synergy that the Iraqi reconstruction cannot afford to do without.

RECONSTRUCTION IMPLEMENTATION

Iraqi nationals must be introduced to the rebuilding process relatively quickly. The timeline needs to be shorter than the typical peace keeping operations in places such as the Balkans, Bosnia or Haiti. Eighteen months after the signing of the agreement between North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Yugoslav Army over Kosovo, U.S. Army soldiers there were still engaged in "peacekeeping with an iron fist".²⁰ A large, international military presence has been engaged in Bosnia since 1995 and the U.S. Army seems resigned to a long term commitment in the region with rotational schedules prepared through 2005.²¹ The military occupation in Haiti lasted two years, Fall 1994 to Spring 1996. The shortened timeline will get the Iraqi people thoroughly involved with rebuilding their country's infrastructure. Early introduction enhances Iraqi responsibility and ownership. It will signal to Iraq that the U.S. and the coalition are committed to quickly turning over the country, its operations and sovereignty to the free Iraqi people. It may also be a less expensive rebuilding approach than a lengthy contract operation.

The first step in getting Iraqis to rebuild their country's infrastructure is choosing labor from the right pool. This is a daunting challenge. Shi'ite Muslims make up most of the Iraqi population and a large majority of the Arab population.²² Despite Shi'ite numerical dominance, all Iraqi governments, since it became a state, have been Sunni dominated. This has been a source of Shi'ite resentment. Splintering exists within the Iraq's Sunni community.²³ Some Sunni tribes are ardent supporters of the Hussein regime, others that remained outside of his circle of power are not.²⁴

Tension between pro-Sadaam Sunnis and the other Sunnis who were victims of Sadaam, could be contributing to the country's ongoing instability and violence. Furthermore, the Sunni, Shi'ite and Kurdish populations of Iraq are further subdivided by association with hundreds of tribes throughout the country.²⁵ A smaller but important Iraqi minority group, the Turkomans, are located predominately in the north, near the Kurds. The Turkomans and Kurds have overlapping and conflicting claims to areas in northern Iraq including the key city of Kirkuk, which is located near some of Iraq's key oil fields. The Turkomans would resist any drive for Kurdish independence and any broad mistreatment of them by the Kurds could provoke Turkish intervention. All of these tribes are viewed as suspicious alternative sources of authority and form critical, political fault lines.²⁶ Thus, finding the right composition and mix of Iraqi nationals to rebuild their infrastructure is a complex proposition.

The Civilian Military Implementation Staff model (CMIS), authored by retired General George A. Joulwan and Mr. Christopher C. Shoemaker, is a civil military organization that would be up to this challenge.²⁷ The CMIS forged and sharpened from U.S. experiences in Rwanda and Somalia would operate at the strategic and operational level. The U.N. and U.S. led coalition should co-lead the CMIS in the transition from conflict to post conflict operations. Once peace is maintained, command and control should be passed to the head of the CPA. These levels of supervision provide the appropriate civilian and military authority mix and structure to get the rebuilding effort off the ground. However, it is essential that the U.S., its military and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) understand each other's role and collaborate effectively.

The CMIS consists of many diverse organizations, skills, capabilities and ideas. Unlike military organizations, it is not as rigidly organized with a supporting hierarchy. Moreover, this diversity makes it difficult to manage rebuilding efforts, particularly right after crises situations. But it is this very diversity that is fundamental to the capability of what the CMIS can leverage. To overcome this challenge, the transition of command and control should not be too sudden or sweeping. An appropriate mix of military and civilian should remain so that any unforeseen

crises that might arise are handled swiftly by the military. Coordination between the CMIS' civilian organizations can begin with little delay. Thus at this juncture, the CPA head should not assign leadership positions automatically, nor should leaders be appointed according to which organization provides the most resources. Instead, the leadership role may shift over time, as preventive actions pass from one phase to another, with leaders appointed on the basis of the main thrust of activities during each phase.²⁸

The CMIS should be comprised of representatives from the following governmental, NGOs and international agencies: U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), U.N. Assistance Mission, U.N. Children's Fund, the U.N. Development Program, a U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, a U.N. Emergency Office, and the World Food Program.²⁹ The USAID organization in particular, is best suited to undertake the challenge of finding the appropriate Iraqis to rebuild their country. This is vital in supporting USAID's capabilities of restoring essential services such as telephone, water and electricity. Involving Iraqis in the rebuilding of their infrastructure is critical to the country's recovery. Here, progress could be seen, daily. USAID proved to be a successful lead agency in Haiti's Uphold Democracy in which it effectively led all major interagency functional areas.³⁰ Uphold Democracy was a crucial test bed for the DoD because it applied lessons learned from Panama and Somalia that improved USAID.³¹ Other similar agencies mentioned above have come together and proven successful in humanitarian operations in Rwanda and Somalia.³²

The CMIS should begin full operations at the start of post conflict operations. It should focus on integrating functions associated to a series of key events, i.e., linking the start of post conflict operations to the start of infrastructure rebuilding. This and other key events, such as major economic initiatives, withdrawal of peacekeepers and elections should then be integrated into a unifying vision of the overall shape of the operation.³³

Detailed, time-phased matrices assigning actions and responsibilities are vital. They should occur in three phases: stabilization, build institutions and handover - redeploy. In stabilization, the CMIS hits the ground running, factions are controlled and the U.S. and coalition partners have seized the initiative. The stabilization phase should take approximately 8 -12 months.³⁴ In the build institutions phase, Iraqi nationals with lessening assistance from CMIS begin to rebuild their country. Job programs and investment programs will be started to facilitate the reconstruction efforts, laying a foundation for a new Iraq.³⁵ This phase should last 12 - 24 months.³⁶ In the handover - redeploy phase, the handover of CPA authority of CMIS functions to a free, Iraq government occurs. Additionally, transition to Iraqi's national security, police forces and civil defense corps occurs. All coalition forces redeploy and the U.S. Embassy

monitors the country's governance and operations. The last phase lasts 1-2 years.³⁷ Phasing will ensure coordination across all organizations occurs and that no critical function is overlooked. This process will also alert organization representatives of any major shortfalls ahead of time.

A comprehensive vetting process will identify reliable, trustworthy Iraqis. However, before the vetting of the Iraqi population by the USAID, the Iraqi Governing Council must be vetted first. The CPA, augmented by the OSD and State Department would lead this vetting. Vetting should be an exclusive responsibility for the CPA. It is the first and most important step in the rebuilding process and should not be delegated to any other agency or organization. Specifically, it starts from the Governing Council down through the Baathist and Tribal leaders. Its purpose is to further dismantle remnants of the Hussein regime while retaining the skills of many Iraqis.

The vetting procedure would require adult, anti-Hussein groups to fill out a detailed questionnaire about their affiliations. Penalties could be imposed by U.S. Military and Iraqi police for lying or failing to answer questions. The procedure is modeled after the Allied forces overthrow of Nazi Germany in World War II. Every adult German filled out the Fragebogen (German for questionnaire) to determine which people held leadership positions and deserved to have their political and economic activities curtailed for the occupation.³⁸ After Baathist and Tribal leaders are cleared, they multiply the effectiveness of the vetting process by identifying Iraqi supporters and non-supporters of the U.S. coalition led reconstruction effort.

The Kurds could also be a likely pool to choose from. They have a track record of searching for their freedom from the Hussein regime over the years. Recently, Kurdish leaders stressed reconciliation and unity as a way of demonstrating that they can be reliable allies with the U.S. in helping shape a post-Sadaam Iraq.³⁹

Anti-Sadaam Sunnis could be another source to tap. They can help the CPA further locate key infrastructure points of contact, such as ministers or heads of transportation, water, electricity or power grids and national monuments. They can also assist in locating groups of disbanded Iraqi Army members who are willing and able to team with the U.S. and coalition forces. Once trained, the Iraqis will significantly reduce the U.S. and coalition footprint. In a post conflict environment, vetted Iraq Army members can augment police or guard duties, further securing the peace. They can also intervene and prevent regional hot spots from growing out of control. A careful, methodical vetting process is vital to a successful and sustained reconstruction effort. It is less intrusive when done early and it sets the conditions for lasting cooperation.

Once vetted, a capable contractor such as Kellogg, Brown and Root, a subsidiary of Halliburton, would take the lead and conduct training. Training will focus, as much as possible, on Iraq's indigenous capacities and center on a hands-on methodology. The training program will not need to start from scratch. For decades, Iraq's large professional classes have furnished Bagdad with relatively efficient and skilled bureaucrats and technicians and, while many have been forced to drive taxis, they are waiting to return to their prior occupations.⁴⁰ When sufficient Iraqis are trained and can demonstrate skilled and sustained proficiency over a limited period of time, the contractor mission will be complete. However, contracting representatives should check on and assess the progress of major projects. Progress would be tied to measurable standards that are understood by contracting representatives and Iraqi nationals in the second phase of CMIS' three phase operation, build institutions.

Initially, the training program would target quick impact projects such as, housing and public facilities at the community level and then move to larger ones such as, major roads, highways, water treatment, public works and the electrical grid system. Progress will be important and energies will be focused on highly visible projects. Smaller, community projects could average \$25,000 - \$50,000 and these funds could be channeled directly into communities once local citizens have been organized to prioritize their reconstruction requests.⁴¹ The hands-on methodology will help lay the foundation of local elections and civil society development and ultimately could point the country to a free democracy. In Kosovo and Afghanistan such projects were useful in developing a new political class and renewed sense of citizen responsibility.⁴²

Early divestiture of contracting organizations like Halliburton is necessary for two reasons. One, it fosters Iraqi independence, self governance and stability without the sense of too much Western involvement. Two, it is arguably less expensive in the long term to train local nationals than depending on an external source of labor. Although Brown and Root's support in the Balkans is an efficient operation, since December 1995, the Army has spent \$546.6 million for services supporting peacekeeping operations.⁴³ The cost savings from using Iraqi nationals could significantly contribute to the country's reconstruction or the U.S. led Global War on Terrorism. Their labor would also help prevent the conditions of overcharging or waste by contractors. The U.S. construction giant Bechtel has the prime contract worth about \$1 billion for restoring Iraq's infrastructure.⁴⁴ The employment of some Iraqis by Bechtel does very little in off-setting the cost. However, the CPA's capability of exclusively hiring Iraqis through its CMIS organization, can significantly off-set the costs. The cost savings would be realized in phase two, build institutions.

HISTORICAL SIMILARITIES BETWEEN IRAQIS AND AFRICAN AMERICANS

Historical parallels can be drawn to the use of Iraqi workers and the use of African American labor in the U.S. Civil War and post War Reconstruction. Like the Iraqi, African American laborers persevered and displayed unique resiliency. These periods offer vivid examples of labor inefficiencies and abuses where price gouging contractors took advantages where they could, at the expense of the African American laborer and even the U.S. soldier.

In light of these unfair practices by the capitalists, much of the U.S., particularly the south, turned to cheaper, more efficient black labor. Black labor was not only efficient but offered the employer a broad range of skills. John Mercer Langston, a black lawyer and general inspector of black schools in the south for the Freedmen's' Bureau, reported to the Bureau in 1872 that one third of the blacks of North Carolina were craftsmen and artisans.⁴⁵ Blacks working as wheelwrights, gunsmiths, blacksmiths, millwrights, machinists, carpenters, painters, ship builders, stonemasons, pilots and engineers outnumbered their white counterparts six to one.⁴⁶ In many areas, blacks throughout the south were as skilled and capable of assuming the responsibilities of everyday living as those they served.

Those in power in the South and in other regions of the country realized how efficient, dedicated and industrious the black worker was when given the opportunity. As time moved on, more black Virginians were pulled into the Confederate war effort in occupations formerly held by white males in mining, salt works, ironworks, military fortifications, ordnance, shipyards and similar industries.⁴⁷ Nearly 180,000 black Virginians toiled as logistical support for Confederate Virginia.⁴⁸ These and other efforts helped to prevent the South from falling too quickly to the North. Blacks filled white labor shortages during the Civil War and their toil also played a significant role in the Reconstruction.

In many cases the black laborer in some cases outworked their white counterparts. A Confederate soldier stationed at Gloucester Point in May 1861 marveled at the sight of one white engineer officer supervising sixty blacks and commented that "they had already accomplished a good deal" and could easily put up breastworks faster than any number of whites.⁴⁹ Southern free blacks proved to be so industrious they posed serious labor competition for whites in the Summer 1861.⁵⁰ However, Representatives never allowed black labor to compete with white labor. Representative William Richardson from Ohio insisted that "God made the white man superior to the black and legislation will undo or change the decrees of Heaven."⁵¹ Moreover, southern legislators accustomed to inexpensive black labor and fearful of autonomous migration, passed laws to restrict black movement. Enticement laws, enacted in

most states before 1890, prohibited one employer from hiring an employee or sharecropper under contract to or in the employment of another.⁵²

Adverse and austere working conditions tested the black laborer further. They were frequently afforded minimal shade from the hot sun in the Summer and cold wind in the Winter. Technology had not developed central heating or air, which exasperated the problem. Exposure to these conditions contributed to many illnesses and diseases that black laborers and their families had to endure and overcome.

The black laborer, like the Iraqi, was steeped in his faith and religion. Many blacks, not too far removed from slavery, found escape, emotional release and solace from the injustices of everyday life. However, religion believed and practiced by slaves was paradoxical. Christianity urged resistance to oppression in the Old Testament but taught acceptance of fate and obedience in the New Testament.⁵³ Faith provided the surreptitious development of black intelligentsia (preachers, ministers, deacons) and a sense of community in a hostile society.⁵⁴ Their faith provided spiritual nourishment, which evolved into songs. In these spirituals blacks sang about the end of injustices and a better working environments.

The Iraqi people are proud, reliable and resilient. They share a uniquely common linkage with the African American laborer and his struggles. The Iraqi and the African American grew from unimaginable masses of human beings devoid any patriotic idea or loyalty to their country, whether to Iraq or the U.S. Both were refined, honed and strengthened by history, culture and religion. Both know how to overcome near insurmountable challenges and injustices. Both also know how to work and what they are capable of producing. Given the opportunity, they can achieve unmatched work efficiencies and quality that rival external sources and the counterparts they serve. If given the opportunity, just like African Americans were given to help rebuild the U.S. following the Civil War, Iraqis will demonstrate that they are more than capable for the tasks, thereby minimizing needs for profit seeking, capitalistic contractors.

CONTRACTING PITFALLS

In the Civil War, equipment, uniforms and weapons were often cheaply made for profit by hungry government contractors and of substandard quality, which contributed more to the suffering of soldiers in the field.⁵⁵ Unfair practices of contractors and business continued throughout the post-Civil War period. In the late nineteenth century, the preoccupation with the grosser inequities of American life, freedom seemed to many reformers tainted by the freedom of predatory capitalists to exploit their fellow citizens.⁵⁶

The Civil War practice of denying the labor competition equal access, could be repeating itself in the Iraqi reconstruction with the swift awarding of contracts to Halliburton and Bechtel. There is no evidence to suggest that these contracting giants conducted any early training or transitioning with local nationals upon their arrival in the country that could have set the conditions for large employment of Iraqi laborers. Quite the opposite appears to be occurring.

There is a lucrative temptation for some contracting companies in Iraq to overcharge for their services. The lawless conditions in Iraq make this practice a fairly easy temptation to slip into. Usually, companies are barred from excessive payments and kickbacks by law. Halliburton a chief U.S. contractor, under intense scrutiny for its connections to Vice President Cheney, is accused of gouging prices on imported fuel – charging \$1.59 a gallon to import nearly \$200 million gallons of gasoline.⁵⁷ SOMO, the Iraqi national oil company, stated it can purchase the same fuel at no higher than 98 cents a gallon.⁵⁸ Others question why Iraqis are not allowed to bring in their own fuel rather than external companies like Halliburton. A Halliburton spokesperson indicates that a Halliburton subsidiary had to settle for higher prices because it could only negotiate on a 30 – day basis. An oil economist counters that the constraint should amount to only a penny or so a gallon difference for fuel. The Iraqi Minister of Transportation told Newsweek that another American contractor, Stevedoring Services of America was overcharging in its administration of Um Qasr. “They are loading cargo at \$12 a ton. That is a lot. Ports in Dubai and Kuwait do it for \$3 a ton”, he said. “A lot of ships are not coming because it costs too much.”⁵⁹

CONCLUSION

Just as the U.S. boldly changed its NSS to preemption, it must also make radical changes to its Iraqi post war strategy. It begins at the national level with an inclusion of an engagement strategy with the same fervor as preemption. Thus, a balanced approach of engagement and when necessary preemption, are the hallmarks of the NSS. Correspondingly, the DoD organizational structure must adjust as well. The Coalition Provision Authority needs to be under the OSD and State Department in the reconstruction efforts. The U.S. only has to look back to post World War II Europe. There she will be reminded of the requisite detailed and careful planning that Europe’s reconstruction mandated. By the time Germany surrendered in May 1945, U.S. and Allied planning for the occupation of Europe had been ongoing for two years.⁶⁰ Balance is critical to successful reconstruction particularly for Iraq that experienced 30 years of totalitarian rule.⁶¹

Post war Iraq mandates the same, if not more careful planning and execution in order for the U.S. to win and maintain the peace. Adjusting a strategy that fosters greater involvement by the local nationals to rebuild their own country has the potential to lead it quicker to a free, self governing democracy. Particularly if the affected country perceives outside assistance as comprehensive, result oriented and relatively short in duration. Evidence in this paper leads to this conclusion.

The U.S. needs to resist the immediate urge to turn to its contract giants exclusively. Instead, leverage their capabilities to accelerate the rebuilding efforts of Iraqi industries such as SOMO, the country's national oil company. When Iraq starts to get back on its feet, the U.S. and coalition forces need to pull out to give Iraq the space it will need to try its new wings of freedom. The Iraqi people are very resilient, competent and capable. Subsequently, the coalition and its partners cannot give Iraq the impression that its space is being micromanaged or crowded. Thus, the U.S. peacekeeping strategy must continue to train rebuilding nations, but now must stress an early redeployment or departure and leave behind a minimum footprint, such as a U.S. Embassy. Most importantly, the U.S. must thoroughly articulate its new peacekeeping strategy to the world. Allied or coalition support must be accomplished upfront, well before the start of any U.S. led operations or regime change. Although it is probably not as expensive rebuilding Iraq with its own population in the long term, considerable resources will be required at the onset - costs that U.S. cannot bear alone.

The revised strategy will ultimately pave the way to a smooth reconstruction that includes active participation by all parties and ultimately, self governance.

WORD COUNT=6,190

ENDNOTES

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³ Ibid.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Hanna Batatu, *The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1978), 15.

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Ibid., p. 24.

⁸ Ibid., p. 23.

⁹ Ibid., p. 24.

¹⁰ Ibid., p. 26.

¹¹ Ibid., p. 295.

¹² Ibid.

¹³ Ibid., p. 428.

¹⁴ Robin Wright, "U.S. Ponders Alternatives to Iraq Governing Council," *The Washington Post*, 9 November 2003, sec IA, p.1.

¹⁵ Rod Nordland, "The \$87 Billion Money Pit," *Newsweek*, 3 November 2003, 33.

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ Conrad C. Crane and W. Andrew Terrill, *Reconstructing Iraq: Insights, Challenges and Missions for Military Forces in a Post-Conflict Scenario*, (Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute 2003), 24.

¹⁸ Nordland, p. 38.

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ Crane and Terrill, p.9.

²¹ Ibid., p.8.

²² Ibid., p. 26.

²³ Ibid., p. 26.

²⁴ Ibid., p. 27.

²⁵ Ibid., p. 28.

²⁶ Ibid., p. 29.

²⁷ George A. Joulwan and Christopher C. Shoemaker, *Civil-Military Cooperation in the Prevention of Deadly Conflict, Implementing Agreements in Bosnia and Beyond*, A Report to the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict (Carnegie Corporation of New York 1998),6.

²⁸ Joulwan and Shoemaker, p. 22.

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³⁰ Ibid., p. 6.

³¹ Ibid.

³² Joulwan and Shoemaker, p. 23.

³³ Ibid., p. 21.

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³⁵ Ray S. Jennings, *The Road Ahead, Lessons in Nation Building from Japan, Germany, and Afghanistan for Postwar Iraq*, (Washington, D.C. : United States Institute of Peace, 2003), 32.

³⁶ Crane and Terrill, p.44.

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³⁸ Ibid., p. 15.

³⁹ Ibid., p. 29.

⁴⁰ Daniel Byman, "Constructing a Democratic Iraq: Challenges and Opportunities," *International Security* (Summer 2003): 72.

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⁴² Ibid., p. 33.

⁴³ Donald T. Wynn, "Managing the Logistics – Support Contract in the Balkans Theater", *Engineer* (July 2000): 36.

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⁴⁵ Ibid., p. 621.

⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁷ Ervin L. Jordan, Jr., *Black Confederates and Afro-Yankees in Civil War Virginia*, (Charlottesville, Virginia: University Press of Virginia, 1995), 49.

⁴⁸ Ibid., p. 67.

⁴⁹ Ibid., p. 57.

⁵⁰ Ibid., p. 203

⁵¹ Avery Craven, *Reconstruction: The Ending of the Civil War*, (San Francisco, California: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1969), 263.

⁵² Steven J. Diner, *A Very Different Age, Americans of the Progressive Era*, (New York, New York: Hill and Wang, 1998), 133.

⁵³ Jordan, p. 107

⁵⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁵ Michael J. Verhola, *Everyday Life in the Civil War* (Cincinnati, Ohio: Writer's Digest Books, 1999), 185 .

⁵⁶ Page Smith, *The Rise of Industrial America, A People's History of the Post-Reconstruction Era*,(St. Louis, Missouri: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1984), 927.

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⁵⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁰ Crane and Terrill, p. 1.

⁶¹ Nordland, p. 38.

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