ALLIED COMMAND STRUCTURES IN THE NEW NATO
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1. Progress on NATO's Internal Adaptation has slowed. After extremely promising efforts to strengthen NATO's military structure, progress has been slowed by demands to convert the AFSOUTH command at Naples from a U.S.-led to a European-led position.

2. Theater commands are key. The role of NATO's regional commanders has been enhanced significantly since the end of the Cold War. As NATO broadens its focus, adding crisis management operations to its core mission of collective defense, it is the theater commander who has been called upon to deal with conflict at the regional level. The United States has but one major subordinate commander in Europe, at AFSOUTH. Therefore the proposal to make AFSOUTH a European-led command would weaken the Alliance by weakening the U.S. leadership role in regional affairs at a time when that command is becoming increasingly important.

3. Negotiations have been difficult. The AFSOUTH issue has become difficult to manage for at least three reasons. As a result, a high level effort may be required to break the deadlock. The reasons are:

   - The United States believes the changes it accepted in strengthening the role of SACEUR's European Deputy, adding other Europeans in command positions, and empowering the Western European Union (WEU) were important enough by themselves to warrant French reintegration into the unified command.

   - Some Europeans interpreted articles 5, 7, and 8 of the June 1996 Berlin Communique, which call on the parties to identify Headquarters to support the European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI), as a de facto pledge to transform AFSOUTH
into a European Command. The United States considers that interpretation a misreading of those articles.

- The issue was elevated in the autumn of 1996 by an exchange of correspondence between Presidents Clinton and Chirac, with Chirac calling for two regional NATO commands that would be “entrusted to Europeans” and Clinton responding that the United States should retain command of AFSOUTH. The exchange of Presidential correspondence has made subsequent lower level negotiations very difficult.

4. Progress in adaptation. Setting aside the AFSOUTH issue, there has been significant progress in the area of NATO adaptation—that is, in strengthening of ESDI in NATO. For example:

- Three-quarters of the most senior NATO general officer positions in Europe are now held by Europeans.
- NATO-designated positions at all NATO Headquarters in Europe were reduced from 18,354 in 1990 to 12,919 in 1996. This has resulted in a corresponding budget reduction from U.S. $621.6M (1990) to U.S. $482M (1996).
- The WEU has been empowered to lead Combined Joint Task Forces in cases when the North Atlantic Council so decides.
- The European Deputy SACEUR could command such WEU-led operations.
- Mechanisms have been established to strengthen political control over military operations, something long sought by the French.

5. U.S. military strength remains crucial. The military assets and capabilities that the United States makes available to AFSOUTH warrant a U.S.-led command.

- The Sixth Fleet—which includes a Carrier Battle Group, an Amphibious Ready Group, and several submarines, all backed by the U.S. Atlantic Fleet—is the single most important asset of AFSOUTH. The seamless connections created by dual hatting the U.S. commander of Naval Forces Europe and CINCSOUTH can be critical in time of crisis.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

- U.S. air assets in Italy and Turkey have been critical to operations such as *Deny Flight*, during which in a typical week the United States flew 43% of the air missions.
- The importance of U.S. leadership and expertise in managing modern C4I systems was demonstrated in the Bosnia operation.
- The growing need for advanced systems to counter ballistic missile proliferation targeted primarily at the AFSOUTH region will require continued American leadership and capabilities.

AFSOUTH, given its strategic importance, will remain a strong symbol of trans-Atlantic resolve. U.S. leadership will be essential at least until there is evidence that European leadership would be backed by European capabilities and resources commensurate with the importance of the region. Given the recent and projected trends in European defense investments, it cannot be foreseen when adequate capabilities and commitment of resources would become a reality.

6. **U.S. leadership is indispensable.** A review of recent history in the Balkans, the Aegean area, the Persian Gulf and the Middle East indicates the indispensable nature of both U.S. diplomacy and U.S. military engagement in the key regions surrounding the AFSOUTH area of operation. In the case of the Implementation Force (IFOR) in Bosnia, for example, European powers in NATO were unwilling to undertake the follow-on Stabilization Force (SFOR) operation without significant U.S. participation. In the case of *Desert Storm*, AFSOUTH played a critical supporting role which was enhanced by the American command.

7. **The region is vital and volatile.** An assessment of future prospects for these same areas suggests that they are both highly unstable and vital to both U.S. and European interests. In command of AFSOUTH, the United States is positioned to strengthen its diplomacy with military capability, and a U.S. commander at AFSOUTH will be one demonstration of that military capability. It will be in NATO's interest for the United States to have this
combination of diplomatic and military clout. The U.S. command at AFSOUTH enhances NATO’s ability to stabilize crises in the Mediterranean basin.

Because of the volatility of the region and the historical importance of AFSOUTH, there is a strong convergence of interests in maintaining an effective U.S.-led command. By its nature, the NATO command structure is intended to respond to risks that threaten the shared interests of all NATO members.

8. **U.S. public is concerned.** There remains considerable support for NATO among the U.S. public, the Congress and the academic community. There is also support for a U.S. leadership role and for increased burden-sharing. Given the increasingly operational nature of AFSOUTH, and the military and political requirement to have American forces engaged as a key part of future operations, loss of the command would probably be seen by the U.S. public as loss of U.S. leadership. As a result, U.S. public support for operations in this critical region would decline, along with support for NATO in general.

9. **Simple command arrangements are best.** The U.N. operation in Bosnia reinforces the lesson that complex command arrangements can contribute to failed operations. The thrust of NATO’s command structure review has been to simplify lines of command. The solution to the AFSOUTH political problem should not result in complex command arrangements that could fail in time of crisis.

10. **Summation of arguments.** The key arguments for retaining a U.S. commander at AFSOUTH are:

    • AFSOUTH has emerged as a very important region in NATO and must remain a strong symbol of trans-Atlantic resolve and capabilities.
    • By its nature, the NATO command structure is intended to respond to risks that threaten the shared interests of all NATO members.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

- This is the only U.S.-led regional command in Europe and losing it will weaken U.S. operational and political support for NATO.
- Significant measures have already been taken to enhance ESDI within NATO.
- Removing the command link between AFSOUTH and the Sixth Fleet will increase reaction time in crises.
- IFOR/SFOR demonstrates the continued need for U.S. leadership in the area.
- Successful U.S. diplomacy in this vital region has been strengthened by the U.S. command at AFSOUTH.
- U.S. command at AFSOUTH can help stabilize tensions throughout the Mediterranean area.
- NATO responses to new ballistic missile proliferation threats against the AFSOUTH area will benefit from a U.S. command.
- U.S. command facilitates participation by Partner countries, including the Russians.
- U.S. command maximizes the effectiveness of modern C^4I assets.
- Complicated command arrangements, such as a bifurcated regional and functional command at AFSOUTH, can harm NATO's responsiveness in crisis.
TRANSFORMATION OF
THE ALLIANCE

U.S. SUPPORT FOR ESDI

The concept of a European Security and Defense Identity as it emerged at the end of the Cold War offered to American policy makers both a challenge and an opportunity. On the one hand, it was necessary to maintain a strong trans-Atlantic link even in the absence of a Soviet threat by ensuring that a European-only command structure would not separate the European military from the United States and lead to America's alienation from NATO. This undesirable development could also happen on a political level if European nations would caucus in the WEU and bring unified positions to the NATO North Atlantic Council without compromise or negotiation opportunities to embrace North American positions. These concerns were presented to the European governments in what became known as the Bartholomew demarche, which left the impression that the United States was unsupportive towards ESDI.

In reality, there was growing recognition in U.S. circles that ESDI was an idea whose time had come. ESDI provided an opportunity for Europe to take a stronger and more effective role in the new security environment of Europe. ESDI permitted more equal burden sharing especially in participating in new Alliance missions encompassing non-Article V operations. However, the experience in Bosnia demonstrated the limitations of Europeans acting on their own and the need for continued American leadership. The WEU remained incapable of undertaking any significant military activities without NATO support. ESDI became firmly imbedded within NATO as part of the "separable but not separate" policy promoted in the Clinton Administration. A stronger European defense capability within the Alliance allowed the United States to continue to invest in NATO. Political changes
in France underscored the possibility that a new alliance structure would emerge that could incorporate the French, an enhanced ESDI

ESDI in NATO: General John M. Shalikashvili, USA, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, participates with senior European and American officers in a working lunch about the upcoming national election in Bosnia.

and NATO’s new missions while allowing the effective exercise of U.S. leadership.

During the first 4 years of the Clinton administration, significant efforts were made to strengthen ESDI and to fulfill the requirements for NATO adaptation. The key elements already agreed for NATO adaptation include:

- Increased European participation in the NATO command structure
- Actions taken to increase political oversight of NATO’s military structure
- Actions taken to empower the WEU
- Measures to strengthen the European Deputy SACEUR.
TRANSFORMATION OF THE ALLIANCE

It was, therefore, surprising to U.S. officials when France insisted on transforming AFSOUTH into a European-led command.

EUROPEANIZING THE NATO COMMAND STRUCTURE

Since 1966, with the French absent from the integrated military command, NATO's command structure has become progressively multinational. By the end of the Cold War, the integrated command had already developed to the point that senior working-level military could be expected to operate in almost any command regardless of nationality. Rank made the difference, not country of origin. NATO planning, for example, has become totally multinational and fully incorporated in the command structure. The Schaefer Plan introduced in 1993 made specific cuts and changes in a number of senior-level positions. The most significant change at SHAPE was the transfer of the four-star Chief of Staff billet to the Germans and the organization of a straight line of command from the U.S. SACEUR through the UK Deputy SACEUR to the German Chief of Staff. The Intelligence Division formerly headed by a two-star Canadian was transferred to a Dutch two-star. Other key positions like the three-star head of the Allied Command Europe (ACE) Reaction Force Planning Staff and the Chief of Public Information went to Europeans. Of the five Assistant Chief of Staff positions at SHAPE, only one is held by an American. He is, after the SACEUR, the most senior American officer in the entire SHAPE command. The newly important offices of Military Cooperation and Partnership Coordination were also designated for European officers. Of the dozen Principal Subordinate Commands in ACE, only four are headed by American officers. Further Europeanizing NATO command structure in Europe could, in fact, endanger NATO's trans-Atlantic character and military effectiveness.

ACTIONS TO INCREASE NATO OVERSIGHT OF ALLIANCE MILITARY

NATO has been adapting its military structures and procedures since July 1990, when the allies declared, "The Alliance’s
integrated force structure . . . will change fundamentally." A major facet of change has been the increased European representation on higher staffs and in senior billets, and the increased structures—both political and military—at NATO headquarters for oversight of the Major NATO Commanders (MNCs). In addition to the Chairman of the Military Committee (CMC), the Director of the Integrated Military Staff (DIMS) and seven Assistant Directors are Europeans, including the newly established Cooperation and Regional Security (C&RS) Directorate headed by a French two-star general. In 1996, France joined the Military Committee (MC) as a full member, and the protocol governing French participation on the MC and its subordinate bodies has been revised.

Directly addressing long-standing French desires for greater political oversight of the military structure in which the United States plays a major role, NATO has agreed to several initiatives since France declared its intention to move closer to full participation in the Alliance military structure. In June, 1996, the full North Atlantic Council (NAC) met for the first time in 30 years at the level of Defense Minister (the so-called “NAC-D”); this forum reconvened in December 1996, indicating the establishment of a precedent. In addition, the Policy Coordination Group (PCG) was established in June 1996 to provide politico-military advice to the Council in managing and ensuring timely overall direction of Alliance military operations, particularly in a crisis.

Also agreed to in June 1996, as a new feature of the MC, is the Capabilities Coordination Cell (CCC), which is to provide staff support to the MC on contingency-related matters, and to develop planning guidance for approval by the MC and transmission to the Major NATO Commanders. The CCC became operational on 1 October 1996. Finally, the Combined Joint Planning Staff (CJPS) was also established. The CJPS will plan for Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) operations as a bi-MNC staff managed by an executive board comprised of the Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic, DSACEUR, and the CJPS Chief of Staff, all of whom are Europeans. The CJPS is being constituted by dual-hatting SACEUR’s ACE Reaction Force Planning Staff and Reaction Force Air Staff and making them available to plan
TRANSFORMATION OF THE ALLIANCE

Alliance-wide missions, thus eroding SACEUR's exclusive planning capability for non-Article V contingencies.

**ACTIONS BY NATO TO EMPOWER THE WEU**

Since the WEU moved to Brussels in January 1993 to undertake its new roles of strengthening the European pillar of NATO and simultaneously providing an independent European defense capability, the Alliance has taken significant steps to empower the fledgling WEU with real assets to accomplish its tasks. While the process of developing NATO links to and support for the WEU proceeded slowly even after the 1994 Summit due to political factors, it has accelerated noticeably since the French decision to abandon pursuit of ESDI in the WEU and seek it instead inside NATO. Following the June 1996 NATO ministerials, NATO support for the WEU gained substance and continues to grow.

The WEU and NATO meet quarterly in joint Council sessions, the two organizations' secretaries general meet often to discuss matters of common interest, and the WEU secretary general is invited to NAC ministerial meetings. Other ties exist between the WEU’s Politico-Military Working Group (PMWG) and NATO’s Executive Working Group (EWG) and Policy Coordination Group (PCG). Links are growing between the WEU Planning Cell and MC and SHAPE staffs. Recent agreements have been concluded on the sharing of NATO intelligence with the WEU, and the WEU now has access to secure NATO communications. It is likely that in the near future Planning Cell staff members will become permanent members of NATO’s CJPS for the purpose of planning WEU CJTF missions and exercises.

At Berlin, NATO agreed to a CJTF concept that includes the provision of CJTF headquarters, as well as NATO assets and capabilities, to the WEU on a case-by-case basis. NATO also agreed to assume the planning responsibility for illustrative mission scenarios submitted to NATO by the WEU. The communique stipulates that the Alliance "will prepare... for WEU-led operations (including planning and exercising of command elements and forces)... and work toward... elaboration of multinational command arrangements within NATO."
... able to prepare, support, command and conduct the WEU-led operations.”

**STRENGTHENING THE EUROPEAN DEPUTY SACEUR**

By relinquishing the U.S. four-star Chief of Staff, to European officers, the United States facilitated a command relationship for the deputy SACEUR which had not previously existed. Now NATO has a direct chain to the deputy SACEUR. When the Chief of Staff was a U.S. four star, the two deputy SACEURs (UK and German) were not in the chain of command. In other words, they did not have command authority in the absence of SACEUR and the United States would have named a new SACEUR. Now the UK four star has direct command authority—a major U.S. concession.

Also, soon after the UK was authorized to fill the deputy SACEUR position, new terms of reference were adopted to include liaison with the WEU. The liaison activity of the deputy SACEUR with the WEU, leading to an expected strategic command position as commander of WEU forces, is a dramatic departure from previous command arrangements within Allied Command Europe. It strengthens the European pillar and gives meaning to the “separable but not separate” concept. The United States considers this to be a major contribution for ESDI.
AFSOUTH AND COMMAND
STRUCTURE REFORM

HOW AFSOUTH FITS IN
Under current NATO organization, the AFSOUTH command is
one of three major subordinate commands (MSCs) in Allied
Command Europe (ACE). The other ACE MSCs are in High
Wycombe, England (AFNORTHWEST) and Brunsum, The
Netherlands (AFCENT). The staffing of the MSCs at present
follow a plan drafted by retired German General Schaefer and put
into effect in phases beginning in 1993. The genesis of the
Schaefer Plan was NATO’s first effort to streamline its Cold-War
structure to match the anticipated decline in resources and changes
in force strength. Personnel reductions already in train since 1990
coupled with the execution of the Schaefer Plan have resulted in a
30% reduction in NATO manpower at European
Headquarters—from 18,354 in 1990 to 12,919 in 1996. This has
resulted in a corresponding budget reduction from U.S. $621.6M

The authorized size and funding of the ACE MSCs and
nationality and service of the MSC four-star commanders are:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NATO-Authorized</th>
<th>Commander</th>
<th>Personnel</th>
<th>Funding ($ millions)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AFNORTHWEST</td>
<td>U.K. RAF</td>
<td>290</td>
<td>7.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFCENT</td>
<td>German Army</td>
<td>2,144</td>
<td>26.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFSOUTH</td>
<td>U.S. Navy</td>
<td>823</td>
<td>36.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Each MSC commander has a senior-ranked European deputy.
None of the MSCs has any standing forces under direct command.
However, the AFSOUTH commander has significant dual-hatted
responsibilities. Using an independent U.S.-staffed liaison office
headed by a two-star U.S. admiral in London, he directly
commands the U.S. Sixth Fleet, consisting of a carrier strike force
ALLIED COMMAND GROUP AT SHAPE
usually deployed in the Mediterranean and all other U.S. Navy forces in the ACE area of responsibility. He also directly commands the Standing Naval Forces Mediterranean through his principal subordinate command (NAVSOUTH) headed by an Italian admiral.

The AFSOUTH command reports to the ACE headquarters (SHAPE) at Mons, which, since the Schaefer Plan was adopted, has been configured at the four-star level as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Command</th>
<th>Nation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Supreme Allied Commander Europe</td>
<td>SACEUR</td>
<td>U.S. Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deputy Supreme Allied Commander</td>
<td>DSACEUR</td>
<td>U.K. Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHAPE Chief of Staff</td>
<td>COS</td>
<td>German Army</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Because the Mediterranean is a significant part of AFSOUTH’s area of responsibility as well as NATO’s southern frontier, military practicality dictates that the AFSOUTH Commander be a four-star navy officer. The AFSOUTH Commander serves simultaneously as the most senior operational navy officer in ACE and as SACEUR’s senior naval advisor in addition to being, at present, the most senior U.S. Navy officer in Europe.

ACE FLAG OFFICER COMMANDS BY NATION

The number of flag and general officer positions currently held by nations within Allied Command Europe shows clearly the predominance of European positions in accordance with an historical trend set by the Schaefer Plan. Of the 56 total positions (including to the level of deputy commanders), 41, or 73%, are held by European officers. The United States holds only 15, or 27%. The majority of the U.S. positions are found in AFSOUTH. Despite the preponderance of U.S. force structure located in the Central Region, U.S. officers fill only 25% of the command billets.

- AFSOUTH. Of the 23 command flag/general officer positions within AFSOUTH, eight are held by American officers (see chart). The rest are or will be held by Europeans.
At the level of Commander, excluding deputies, the United States holds five, or 33% of the positions. Ten of the positions are held by Europeans: four Italian, three Turkish, two Greek, and one British.

- **AFNORWEST.** Allied Forces Northwest has a total of 11 flag/general officers in command billets. There are no U.S. command positions in this subordinate command; six are British and five are Norwegian.

- **AFCENT.** Allied Forces Central Europe has a total of 12 flag/general officers in command billets. Three, or 25%, are Americans. The remaining nine positions are held by Europeans: five Germans, two Danes, one Dutchman, and one British.

- **HQ SHAPE.** From a total of 11 flag/general officers on the headquarters staff, of whom three, or 27%, are Americans. European officers hold eight, or 73%, of these positions: four British, two German, one Italian, and one Dutch.

**THE VALUE OF DUAL HATTING**

There are three NATO command positions in ACE which carry with them significant dual-hatted responsibilities for U.S. assets: the AFSOUTH Major Subordinate Command in Naples and the Principal Subordinate Commands of AIRCENT at Ramstein and LANDCENT in Heidelberg, both of which report to AFCENT.

Dual-hatting affords both a flexibility and a capability unavailable to single-hatted commanders. The dual-hatted commander enters the position with the knowledge of the entire range of U.S. assets available in the command. These assets can be called upon directly if circumstances warrant.

Communication, logistics and lift, and intelligence are three areas where U.S. assets are paramount in the Alliance. All three are crucial components of Article V and certain non-Article V activities, particularly peacekeeping operations. In some circumstances, the success or failure of the operation will be dependent on use of these assets. For example, reconnaissance and intelligence systems have played a significant role in military
operations in Bosnia; some of the most modern U.S. assets have been utilized, including Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), Joint Stars aircraft and the Airborne Reconnaissance (AR) systems. Moreover, in some instances, these assets can be used without adding to NATO's cost of the operation. Whether or not the assets are used, having the capability to call on these assets quickly and directly enhances the credibility of the commander. These are all assets of extreme sensitivity available only to American forces without special authorization. The U.S. Congress would have major difficulties approving the deployment of such special technology if the commander was not an American.

The U.S. assets of AFSOUTH are extensive. It is important that the AFSOUTH commander (CINCSOUTH) has the ability to employ them utilizing a single chain of military command. Most importantly a U.S. CINCSOUTH makes it more likely that NATO can get ready access, with a minimum of contentious debate, to the specialized capabilities the United States can provide through its regional assets.

THE NATO COMMAND STRUCTURE REVIEW

Decisions regarding the current NATO command configuration were endorsed by NATO's Military Committee (MC) at a time when France was outside the military structure with no NATO-designated forces and was an observer without a vote in the MC. It satisfied the British and Germans to jointly serve at the four-star level in SHAPE, subordinate to the U.S. SACEUR, and share equal billets at the MSC regional command level.

In April 1994, the NATO Chiefs of Defense (CHODs), minus the French, commissioned the Long-Term Study to review NATO command structures even while the Schaefer Plan was being implemented. National defense budgets in almost all NATO countries were already in steep decline, and the CHODs were concerned that the current structure could not be sustained. Terms of reference for the study were approved in November 1994.
NATO's New Military Structure in Europe
2-Region Option
Key 4 Star Posts (U.S. and European)

At Regional Command Level and Above:
U.S. — Two 4-Star Posts
Europeans — Six 4-Star Posts
As illustrated in the chart, left, in a future two-regional command option for ACE, U.S. 4-stars would command ACE, as the SACEUR, and AFSOUTH, one of the two Regional Commands (RC). The second RC, AFNORTH, would be unique in having European 4-stars at both the commander and deputy commander positions. However, the SACEUR will be supported by two European 4-stars (one of which has been converted from a U.S. to a European post since the Cold War), and the U.S. CINCSOUTH will be supported by a European 4-star as his deputy. In the two-RC option, the ratio of U.S. to European 4-stars in key NATO posts (RC level and above) would be 1:3. This arrangement ensures strong European representation through the structure. It also provides for U.S. presence at every echelon, as called for by the Allies at Berlin (June 1996) as essential to preserving strong trans-Atlantic cohesion throughout the new structure. Finally, the increased responsibilities, both in guidance to and oversight of the military structure, that have accrued to the Military Committee as a result of internal adaptations, strengthen the role of the Chairman of the Military Committee (CMC), which is yet another rotational European post.

It was anticipated that generic models would be available for elaboration and review by the spring of 1996 and a status report on the one or more preferred model(s) be ready for the June 1996 Berlin ministerial of the North Atlantic Council. The range of models under discussion by various countries then included:

- One Major NATO Command (MNC) with four regional commands, one of which would be designated for West European Union (WEU) activities.
- Two MNCs with four regional commands, one of which would be designated for WEU activities.
- One MNC with a deputy MNC for European-led operations and several regional commands, any one of which could be tasked by the deputy MNC.
NATO's New Military Structure in Europe
3-Region Option
Key 4 Star Posts (U.S. and European)

At Regional Command Level and Above:
U.S. — Two 4-Star Posts
Europeans — Eight 4-Star Posts
AFSOUTH AND COMMAND STRUCTURE REFORM

The chart at left illustrates a future three-regional command option for ACE, which would provide all of the adaptation and Europeanization advantages of the two-RC option, and also provide for another European 4-star command. In the three-RC option, the ratio of U.S. to European 4-stars at the RC level and above increases marginally in the European favor to 1:4.

- Two MNCs with a deputy MNC for European-led operations.
- Two MNCs with an additional supporting command.
- Three MNCs and a supporting command with several deputy MNCs for European-led contingencies.

EVOLUTION OF THE U.S. AND EUROPEAN POSITIONS

The allies turned their attention to command structure options in December 1995, after NATO's Long-Term Study concluded Phase 1B (the review of MC 400) and the CHODs directed the MC to begin work on Phase 2B, the study of future command structure models. As the allies considered various generic models, the two-Regional-Command (RC) and three-RC models for Europe survived the culling process. In April 1996, the CHODs selected two generic options for further study, and in September, as Phase 2C of the study was concluded, one option was selected for further development in Phase 3. Under the selected option, there are alternatives for either two or three RCs in ACE, while agreement has been reached on three RCs under ACLANT. Phase 3 should conclude by the spring 1997 ministerials, having determined (among other factors) the number of RCs in ACE.

The United States initially leaned toward the two-RC option as a matter of streamlining, efficiency and creating a smaller, markedly different structure. For these and additional reasons, Europeans readily supported the early (albeit not strongly stated) U.S. slant toward two RCs. One perspective was that the natural division of Europe was the Alps, so the two-RC (AFNORTH and
AFSOUTH) model follows historic precedent and logic. Another sentiment was that two RCs fostered European cohesion and avoided a situation where Germany was cast in a central region with new partners, while France and the United Kingdom focused on separate RCs to the south and northwest. The United Kingdom took the unexpected position of supporting the two-RC position because it foresaw that its own RC, AFNORTHWEST, would be marginalized anyway and the only alternative was to become fully engaged in the other two commands.

Supporting the three-RC option were those, notably SACEUR, who saw that NATO's military missions (and soon, territory) were expanding, not diminishing, and that the retention of three-RC level commands in ACE was both prudent and defensible. In September 1996, after the French proposal for a European CINCSOUTH and with strong arguments by SACEUR, the United States supported the position for three RCs in ACE, although indicating that two RCs would be acceptable. That position was reflected at the November 1996 Military Committee Chiefs of Staff Session. All European allies continue to support the two-RC option. Although France, Spain, and Turkey see the three-RC option as acceptable, there is no preference for splitting the current AFSOUTH into two RCs. These positions, most recently described in the Chairman of the Military Committee’s report to ministers in December 1996, appear to remain unchanged. It is clear, however, that the two-RC option creates nationality-of-command problems that would be solved with the three-RC option.

It is important to reach consensus on the right model. There is general agreement that this latest adaptation will be the final form of NATO adopted to meet both the challenges of enlargement and NATO's post-Cold War mission and doctrine, including its new tasks in non-Article V operations like peacekeeping, search and rescue, and humanitarian activities.

A number of broad goals have shaped the U.S. approach to the NATO command structure review: adapting NATO to the changing security environment in Europe, strengthening the European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI), maintaining U.S. leadership, and promoting the integration of France and Spain into the Alliance’s military activities.
Specifically, the new command structure would have to be capable of translating guidance from higher authority into effective military action at all levels while ensuring collective defense as NATO's core mission. It must include a force projection capability, support a strong transatlantic link and permit the contribution and participation of all Alliance members. It should avoid ad hoc arrangements and support non-NATO operations through separable but not separate capabilities. Finally, the new command structure must be financially supportable.

THE BERLIN COMMUNIQUE

The Berlin Communique of 3 June 1996 was issued at the conclusion of the 1996 NATO spring NAC ministerial. It is a seminal document in that it was approved with French participation at the ministerial level in the expectation that France was rejoining NATO's military command. Several communique articles directly relate to the ongoing discussion of NATO adaptation and new command structure:

5. Much has been achieved, but now is the moment to take a decisive step forward in making the Alliance increasingly flexible and effective to meet new challenges. Therefore we are determined to adapt Alliance structures. An essential part of this adaptation is to build a European Security and Defence Identity within NATO, which will enable all European Allies to make a more coherent and effective contribution to the missions and activities of the Alliance as an expression of our shared responsibilities; to act themselves as required; and to reinforce the transatlantic partnership...

7. In our adaptation efforts to improve the Alliance's capability to fulfill its roles and missions, with the participation of all Allies, we will be guided by three fundamental objectives:

The first objective is to ensure the Alliance's military effectiveness... The CJTF [Combined Joint Task Force] concept is central to our approach for assembling forces for
contingency operations and organizing their command within the Alliance. Consistent with the goal of building the European Security and Defence Identity within NATO, these arrangements should permit all European Allies to play a larger role in NATO's military and command structures and, as appropriate, in contingency operations undertaken by the Alliance...

The second objective is to preserve the transatlantic link... The third objective is the development of the European Security and Defence Identity within the Alliance. Taking full advantage of the approved CJTF concept, this identity will be grounded on sound military principles and supported by appropriate military planning and permit the creation of militarily coherent and effective forces capable of operating under the political control and strategic direction of the WEU.

As an essential element of the development of the identity, we will prepare, with the involvement of NATO and the WEU, for WEU-led operations (including planning and exercising of command elements and forces). Such preparations within the Alliance should take into account the participation, including in European command arrangements, of all European Allies if they were so to choose. It will be based on:

- Identification, within the Alliance, of the types of separable but not separate capabilities, assets and support assets, as well as, in order to prepare for WEU-led operations, separable but not separate Headquarters, Headquarters elements and command positions, that would be required to command and conduct WEU-led operations and which could be made available, subject to decisions by the NAC;

- Elaboration of appropriate multinational European command arrangements within NATO, consistent with and taking full advantage of the CJTF concept, able to prepare, support, command and conduct the WEU-led operations. This implies double-hatting appropriate personnel within the NATO command structure to
perform these functions. Such European command arrangements should be identifiable and the arrangements should be sufficiently well articulated to permit the rapid constitution of a militarily coherent and effective operational force.

8. On the basis of the guidelines agreed today, we have tasked the Council in Permanent Session, with the advice of NATO's Military Authorities:
   - To provide guidance and develop specific proposals for further adapting the Alliance's structures and procedures;
   - To develop, with regard to the European Security and Defence Identity with the Alliance, appropriate measures and arrangements for implementing the provisions of paragraph 7. Among the arrangements which require detailed elaboration will be provisions for the identification and release for use by the WEU of NATO capabilities, assets, and Headquarters and Headquarters elements for missions to be performed by the WEU; any necessary supplement to existing information-sharing arrangements for the conduct of WEU operations; and how consultations will be conducted with the NAC on the use of NATO assets and capabilities, including the NATO monitoring of the use of these assets; and to report to our December meeting with recommendations for decisions.

9. As part of this work, we have tasked the Council in Permanent Session to review the ongoing work on NATO's military command structure and to report to us at our next meeting with recommendations.

Some Europeans believe that the Berlin Communique supports their contention that Europeans should be offered more senior positions in NATO's command than they currently occupy. They note that the first of three steps the Alliance was expected to take under the communique's article 5 was to adapt Alliance structures to enable all European Allies (that is, including the French) to make a more coherent contribution. Article 7 sets as part of
NATO's guiding fundamental objectives a renovated command structure which reflects the strategic situation in Europe and enables all Allies to participate fully. The article also states that there should be arrangements permitting all European Allies to play a larger role in NATO's military and command structures. Finally, the taskings in articles 8 and 9 refer to further adapting the Alliance's structure and to reviewing NATO's military command structure.

The Berlin Communique also affirmed the enduring principles on which NATO is built: the trans-Atlantic partnership, the Alliance's military effectiveness, and the continued involvement of the North American Allies across the command and force structure. Nowhere in the communique is there any specific mention of nationality of command at any level. But the French believe the inference is clear and that the timing for the change is now.

EXCHANGE OF PRESIDENTIAL LETTERS

In the period leading up to the June 1996 Berlin ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic Council, the French had already begun unofficially discussing the possibility of naming French military officers to senior level NATO positions in the command structure. The AFSOUTH command was one such position. The French began promoting their case first with other European Allies. The French intimated that the Americans might be willing to relinquish AFSOUTH.

These informal exchanges together with the broadly written Berlin Communique form the backdrop to the unexpected letter from President Chirac to President Clinton, elevating the discussion without first holding senior bilateral policy negotiations. President Chirac recommended that NATO's top command be organized around a U.S.-designated super-SACEUR at the head of a single strategic command, with two sub-strategic commands correlating to the current MNCs except that the MNC command position in Europe would be filled by a European.

On 14 August 1996, and again on 26 September, President Clinton wrote Chirac discussing in general terms the need for
progress on NATO adaptation but ruling out any change in the nationality of the AFSOUTH Commander. According to press reports, Chirac’s response on 10 October was specific and almost entirely devoted to the issue of NATO’s command structure. According to press reports, Chirac stated that political and strategic concerns necessitate assigning AFSOUTH to a European. Since the two NATO Strategic Commands were remaining for the foreseeable future in American hands, then it was only legitimate for the two Regional Commands to be delegated to Europeans. According to Chirac, developments in the Mediterranean basin held new importance for Europe, and it was essential that Europeans shoulder their responsibilities in this crucial region. Chirac recognized that there were important operational issues for the Americans but was convinced that innovative solutions should be found to address the different concerns. To underscore the significance of AFSOUTH, Chirac reportedly added a handwritten postscript that described the Southern Command as being of capital importance.

There is no doubt that Chirac wants to engage his personal authority in the debate over the further adaptation of NATO’s command structure. His letters echo what he earlier said in his 1 February 1996 speech before the U.S. Congress when describing the changing Euro-Atlantic security architecture:

*In this new situation France is ready to assume its full share of this renovation process. This was demonstrated a few weeks ago when France announced its attention to move closer to the military structures of the Organization. I wish to confirm today the open-mindedness and availability with which France approaches this adaptation of NATO, including the military side, as long as the European identity can assert itself fully.*

*For the Alliance to be strong, Europe must be strong, capable of bearing a larger share of the common burden.*

Throughout the discussion, the French have made very clear the linkage between rejoining the military command and a fuller expression of ESDI within the Alliance. For them, a fuller
expression could be demonstrated only by their occupying senior military positions.

**VIEWS OF OTHER EUROPEAN ALLIES**

Germany supported the French position on AF-SOUTH from the beginning, but, according to the *Economist* of 30 November 1996, without much zeal. German Defense Minister Volker Ruehe reiterated his government's support for the French position in a 17 December press conference. It is not a French demand but a European demand, he said, stressing that France did not want to have a French admiral but a European one in command at Naples. Subsequently, there have been reports that Germany would accept a command rotating between an American and a European. Under the Schaefer Plan drafted by their own senior officers, the Germans have already attained an unprecedented senior level of command positions in NATO. Obviously Bonn would prefer the French take over a previously held American position rather than one of their own. Germany has signaled increasing flexibility in their position on AF-SOUTH. Indeed, the *International Herald Tribune* of 14 March 1997 quoted Ruhe as saying, "Germany no longer supports the French position" calling for an immediate change at AF-SOUTH. The German position would allow for a delay of the discussion of AF-SOUTH while moving ahead with other key elements of NATO restructuring.

British views are more circumscribed, although, of all the European allies, a British naval officer would be best qualified to fill in behind an American in AF-SOUTH. What is clear is that London is prepared to lose a four-star Air Force position and close the Major Subordinate Command at High Wycombe, providing other nations are prepared to be similarly flexible. Their only other comparable positions are the deputies at SHAPE and SACLANT and the EASTLANT MSC in Northwood.
Spain and Belgium have been reported to support the French position to varying degrees. While several other NATO allies would seem to be supportive of the United States on one or another issue of self-interest, their support might waiver. Alternatively they might make their support dependent on the resolution of some other matters. Turkey, for example, wants to link its status in the WEU to the AFSOUTH issue.

In sum, most Europeans seek a compromise on the AFSOUTH issue and would be comfortable with any arrangement that defuses this contentious issue and maintains military effectiveness.
ALLIED COMMAND STRUCTURES IN THE NEW NATO

U.S. SUPPORT FOR NATO'S FUTURE
Contrary to concerns about a new isolationism, surveys show that Americans remain committed to a global U.S. leadership role in concert with other major countries. Recent U.S. polls also show a solid majority of Americans continue to support NATO and see it as vital to U.S. security (In an October 1994 Chicago Council on Foreign Relations poll—64%; in a September 1996 Program on International Policy Attitudes poll—67%).

At the same time, public opinion data suggests that the American public rejects playing a dominant role in world affairs. Consistent with polls since 1993, a 1995 Times Mirror poll shows Americans want to share leadership with other major countries more or less equally (47%), rather than regularly taking the most active leading role (25%). Only a small proportion of the public believes the United States should exert itself unilaterally as the single world leader (13%), or at the other extreme, eschew a world leadership role (9%).

The attitude that the United States should do its fair share in efforts to solve international problems together with other countries (74%) continued to be in evidence in September 1996 polling conducted by the University of Maryland Program on International Policy Attitudes. Here, too, only 13% supported the United States being the preeminent world leader in solving international problems and only 12% supported withdrawing from most efforts to solve international problems.

So, U.S. public opinion support for NATO continues unabated. However, there is an occasional contradiction that is often reflected in congressional attitudes toward international engagement. On the one hand, Americans want increased burdensharing among their allies. However, more importantly, Americans insist that when solemn international commitments of U.S. forces are undertaken, as in NATO, Americans serve under an American command.

U.S. think-tank attitudes toward NATO mirror the broad array of attitudes seen in public opinion, ranging from the views of the CATO Institute to those of the Heritage Foundation. The broad array of opinion between these extremes will likely reflect and guide the general debate on NATO's future. Institutions more
closely associated with such discourse include the Brookings Institution, American Enterprise Institute, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Carnegie Endowment, RAND, Institute for Defense Analysis, Center for Naval Analyses, Congressional Budget Office, and Congressional Research Service.

In sum, public opinion is not focused, and at times is contradictory. Despite the best efforts of government officials and respected commentators, the transfer of AFSOUTH to European command could appear to the American people as a loss of influence comparable to that after the transfer of authority for the Panama Canal. Any claim that volunteering to assume high-level command positions is “burdensharing” would not be taken seriously by the American public unless accompanied by commensurate commitment of resources.
The Southern Region of NATO is primarily a maritime area of military operations in that the Mediterranean Sea is the dominant geographical feature of the area. Unlike the Central Region, the member nations do not all have contiguous borders. Therefore, the one common means of joining the nations together both militarily and economically is via the sea.

Prior to the end of the Cold War, the southern flank of NATO, as the region was often called, held secondary importance in Alliance military planning to that of the Central Region. The dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and NATO's willingness to address threats to its security by engaging in out-of-area operations in Bosnia shifted the locus of military attention to the Southern Region. Additionally, the most pressing threats to the security of the members are now seen as originating in or being associated with the Southern Region.

While various NATO nations maintain significant military capability in the Southern Region, it is the United States Sixth Fleet with its associated Carrier Battle Group and Amphibious Ready Group backed up by the U.S. Atlantic Fleet and Fleet Marine Forces, Atlantic, that provides the primary military capability to AFSOUTH.

Operating under U.S. national command during peacetime, the fleet includes a flagship, a Carrier Battle Group comprised of one nuclear-powered aircraft carrier and the embarked air wing of 80+ aircraft, six cruisers/destroyers and frigates with the AEGIS combat system and Tomahawk cruise missiles, and three or more nuclear-powered attack submarines with Tomahawk cruise missiles and maritime patrol aircraft. Additionally, an Amphibious Ready Group of 1,500 Marines (special operations capable) embarked on three or more amphibious ships is part of the fleet. If NATO were
to go to Reinforced Alert, the number of U.S. naval units available to AFSOUTH would increase significantly in all categories of naval forces.

The Sixth Fleet in conjunction with U.S. Army and Air Force units in the region represents the U.S. intention and ability to help friends and allies ensure stability and security in the region. Additionally, these forces possess the military capability to unilaterally or as a part of a NATO operation bring decisive military force quickly to bear on any threat. Having the U.S. naval forces chain of command parallel to the NATO command structure ensures that actions taken by the Alliance include U.S. involvement and in particular that of U.S. naval forces. The seamless connection of U.S. Sixth Fleet and NATO’s Strike Force South is effected by dual hatting the Commander, as is ensuring that the Commander in Chief U.S. Naval Forces Europe and NATO’s Commander in Chief South are the same individual.

### Typical U.S. Peacetime Naval Presence

| Aircraft Carriers | 1 |
| Other Surface Combatants* | 6 |
| Attack Submarines | 2 |
| Amphibious Ready Groups | 1 |
| Command Ship | 1 |
| Mobile Logistics Support** | 2 |
| Sub Tender | 1 |
| Maritime Patrol Aircraft | 4 |

* includes cruisers, destroyers, and frigates.

** sufficient MLS ships will be provided to support the naval forces.

Increasingly, military capability in the Southern Region is characterized by joint combinations of Army and Air Force units with naval forces. This is best illustrated in Bosnia, where the ground, sea and air forces of member nations work together to restore stability to the area. As part of the multinational force, U.S. forces bring unique capabilities in the areas of logistics, command and control and intelligence gathering. Additionally, the massive sustainment infrastructure of the U.S. forces also supports allied
forces, thereby allowing them to remain on station and operate effectively for a much longer period than otherwise possible.

The United States is the only nation possessing the military capability in the Southern Region necessary to carry out the full spectrum of military operations required by a complex long-term military mission such as Bosnia. The involvement of U.S. forces enables the other allied forces to achieve their full military

**ALLIED NAVAL FORCES HOME PORTED**

**IN THE MEDITERRANEAN SEA**

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potential. The key combat capabilities, especially offensive strike assets, provided by U.S. forces included:

- The majority of C4ISR assets
- 80% of the precision guided munitions used by NATO (and PGMs accounted for 77% of the 1100+ air-to-ground weapons employed)
- Tomahawk land attack missiles
- 90% of the air defense suppression sorties (by EA-6B, EF-111, F/A-18 and F-16 aircraft).

**U.S. AIR ASSETS**

Allied Forces Southern Europe is the largest of Allied Command Europe’s major subordinate commands. It has no geographic contiguity with Allied Forces Central Europe, covering the NATO area from Gibraltar to Eastern Turkey. U.S. air assets available for immediate use within the region would be stationed within Italy and Turkey. The majority of U.S. combat aircraft would launch from
the embarked air wing aboard the USN aircraft carrier deployed
within Sixth Fleet, and the squadrons based at Aviano AB, Italy.

In comparison to USAF assets in AFCENT, there are few
squadrons stationed permanently in the Southern Region, although
the region has two of the six Main Operating Bases in Allied
Command Europe. The largest permanent basing at a U.S. airbase
in the region is Italy, where there are 4,020 personnel. They are
primarily at Aviano AB, which has 1 AF HQ, 1 fighter wing, and 2
squadrons with 36 F-16C/D. In Turkey, there are 2,640 personnel,
primarily at Incirlik AB, Turkey. While aircraft numbers vary, a
representative situation would be 6 F-15, 18 F-16, 5 KC-135, 3 E-
3B/C, 2 C-12, 2 HC-130. Air Force assets stationed in Spain
would be assigned to U.S. European Command versus AFSOUTH.
Air Forces assigned to Portugal come under the command of U.S.
Atlantic Command.

As for financial infrastructure considerations, there are 17
NATO projects prefined by the U.S. in this region, totaling
$62.3 million, $37.9 million of which are in support of Aviano Air
Base, Italy. Prefinancing of NATO capabilities projects by the
United States provides to NATO and the Southern Region assets
which could not otherwise be easily provided by other allies.

Recent AFSOUTH region air activity includes:

* Operation Joint Guard: Aircraft of 13 NATO nations are
participating as part of the air component. NATO aircraft are
both carrier and land based. Of the 211 national aircraft
participating, 110 (52%) are American, 27 are French, and 21
are German.

* Deny Flight: During the 983 days and 100,420 sorties of
Deny Flight operations, 12 NATO nations participated with
aircraft. During the last week of operations, of the total 239
aircraft participating, including 8 NATO AWACS aircraft, the
United States flew 100 aircraft or 43% of national
contributions.

* Provide Promise: Following 4 years of operations, this
Joint Task Force deactivated in March 1996. Over 4,500
USAF airlift sorties were flown, providing at times up to 95% of
Sarajevo's sustenance.
Operation Joint Endeavor: Most of the Joint Endeavor aircraft were American. In December 1996, there were 124 U.S. aircraft—53% of the national contributions—and a total of 109 aircraft from 10 European nations.

U.S. GROUND ASSETS

While there are few U.S. Army forces permanently stationed in the Southern Region, the United States considers its forward-stationed army forces a visible affirmation of its commitment to fulfill a significant role in NATO. Within Allied Command Europe (ACE), the U.S. Army maintains a corps headquarters with two divisions as the foundation of its Europe-based forces. They fulfill the roles of main defense and reaction forces. The third brigade for each of these two divisions is located at Fort Riley, Kansas.

U.S. European command could assign additional dual-based units from the Continental United States within the Southern Region. These dual-based units are forces that were previously stationed in Europe and remain available to NATO, at a high degree of readiness, in the event of a crisis in Europe. On an as-needed basis, Army forces stationed in any region of Allied Command Europe can be placed under command in the Southern Region.

Army forces as of October 1996 were:

- Italy - 2550 personnel, HQ at Vicenza, Southern European Task Force (SETAF), 325 Airborne BN Combat Team, 1 infantry battalion group, 1 artillery brigade.
- Greece - 9 personnel
- Turkey - 310 personnel.

For the IFOR operations, the U.S. Army's First Armored Division deployed over 17,500 personnel to implement the peace agreement. Another 5000 operated from Hungary and Croatia—the Multinational Division (SouthWest). The United States contributed a psychological operations company.

Multinational Division North (MND/N), in the U.S. division HQ at Tuzla, controls:

- Brigade at Dubrave - 5 battalions, including mechanized infantry, armored reconnaissance, artillery, engineer, and military police
  Brigade at Vlasenica - same 5 battalions as above
  Aviation Brigade at Tuzla - 1 aviation attack battalion, 1 aviation general support battalion
  Divisional troops - 2 engineer brigades, 1 MP brigade, 1 signal brigade, 2 logistic brigades, 1 air defense artillery battalion, 1 psychological operations unit.
- IFOR support to Combined Joint Civil Military Cooperation: Three civil affairs brigades—the 352nd Civil Affairs Command (Maryland) and the 360th and 354th brigades deployed to Sarajevo.
U.S. LOGISTICS ASSETS

Logistics remains a national responsibility within NATO, despite efforts to create a true multinational logistics organization capable of facilitating international operations. There are no standing air force logistic assets in the Southern Region. Nor are there logistics ships assigned to Standing Naval Forces Mediterranean. The current U.S. surface combatant—a fast frigate with a helicopter embarked—is often used for logistics tasks due to its vertical replenishment capability.

The United States used massive airlift, rail, and wheeled assets to support operations in the Former Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) and Hungary IFOR deployment. In the initial deployment of December 1995 - February 1996, the United States deployed approximately 35K passengers and 230K short tons. The United States flew 1,893 airlift sorties, accounting for 73% of the airlift sorties. The United States organized 368 trains consisting of 7,432 rail cars, amounting to 97% of the trains. It also organized 53 truck convoys, comprised of 2,508 trucks. For the current Stabilization Force operations, there is a standing pool of 23 passenger and cargo airlift assigned to AFSOUTH (under AIRSOUTH) which supports SFOR, of which 4, or 17%, are from the United States.

The United States made major manpower contributions to key IFOR movement agencies. The United States provided 26% of the officers and 29% of the enlisted personnel for the ACE Mobility Coordination Center (SHAPE). From the Regional Air Movement Coordination Center in Vicenza, Italy, the United States coordinated all traffic in and from FRY; the United States provided 83% of total action officers. U.S. manpower contributions to Commander for Support, Zagreb (responsible for all logistic support to COMIFOR/ SFOR) initially included providing 135 positions out of 379, or 36%. The United States initially provided the commander (a major general) and the Chief of Staff. The United States currently fills 94 of 356 positions, or 26%.

Another U.S. role in the Southern Region is its security assistance programs for Greece and Turkey.
U.S. MILITARY ASSETS IN AF SOUTH

- Greece - High priority programs are the F-16 aircraft, and the Multiple Launch Rocket System. Greece has identified more requirements than will be met by the proposed FY 1997 U.S. security assistance budget, which is $122.5 million of market rate loans.
- Turkey - High priority programs are the F-16 co-assembly, upgrade of frigate weapons suites, engines, and combat information centers. The proposed FY 1997 budget is $175 million plus $60 million in Economic Support Funds; all aid would be market rate loans. Current assistance levels fall short of the resources needed to meet Turkish requirements for NATO standards.

C4I: THE BOSNIA EXPERIENCE

IFOR demonstrated that a particular challenge to combined military operations is C4I. Effectively extending integrated C4I services and capabilities to provide timely distribution of information is particularly difficult in the case of politically sensitive operations with ad hoc members and command arrangements.

The task was made more difficult in Bosnia-Herzegovina by the circumstances under which NATO forces deployed under AFSOUTH command. The region lacked such critical infrastructure as communications and power. The terrain and weather conditions were extremely challenging. Minefields were everywhere. The forces had to plan with a minimum of guidance and a lack of established requirements for the C4I capabilities.

Furthermore, NATO lacked the C4I infrastructure to deploy out of area and the organization structure and staff to plan, implement and manage the deployed C4I systems. As a result, they had to turn to the member nations to provide leadership, staff and capabilities. The timely and effective response of the United States in particular, enabled AFSOUTH to quickly react to the signing of the Dayton General Framework Agreement and rapidly deploy enough C4I systems to take command and control of the operation at the strategic, operational and tactical levels, thereby leading the coalition into Bosnia.
In order to plan, implement and manage the IFOR C4I systems, it was necessary for AFSOUTH to put a new organization structure in place. AFSOUTH created the Combined Joint Communications Control Center (based on U.S. JTF concepts) and staffed it with augmeetees from the Southern Region Signal Support Regiment, U.S. Army Europe, SHAPE and AFCENT. Liaisons were also provided to the Combined Joint Communications Coordination Center (CJCCC) by EUCOM, Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA), the ACE Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC) and the French. The CJCCC was initially heavily staffed with U.S. personnel, whose job was to integrate the C4I planning activities of NATO and participating national elements and monitor and coordinate the implementation including interfaces with both the NATO Integrated Communications and Information Systems, the AFSOUTH Communications and Information System, the ARRC Communication and Information System and the national Strategic and Tactical systems. It was also necessary for the CJCCC to take on the responsibilities of frequency management for IFOR and the C4I theater network management and system control, including the appropriate integration of the management and control elements of the supporting national and IFOR strategic, operational and tactical level systems.

U.S. leadership, expertise, experience, and systems were the keys to success. Without this support, AFSOUTH would not have been able to take timely action to meet its C4I support requirements for the coalition operation. U.S. tactical systems (like the TRI-TAC joint command control system) were deployed quickly and provided the strategic-level infrastructure in country, and MSE provided the Tactical-level infrastructure for Multinational Division North. The TRI-TAC system also played a key integration role because of its ability to interoperate with NATO members’ tactical systems such as PTARMIGAN, RITA, SOTRIN and AUTOKO and commercial systems such as the UN VSAT and local Postal Telegraph and Telephone (PTT) networks. Hence, TRI-TAC facilitated the ad hoc interconnection and integration of the disparate systems deployed in country. The U.S. MILSATCOM system was the major provider of both Ultra High Frequency and Super High Frequency capabilities. Without these...
capabilities, it would not have been possible to establish timely and effective military communications connectivity into Bosnia. Intelligence dissemination for coalition partners was provided by the U.S. Limited Operation Capability Europe (LOCE) system, which was extended into the AOR to support IFOR operations. U.S. STU-IIBs (secure voice telephones) were provided to facilitate secure communications with the PIP nations and the High Representative in Bosnia for civil matters.

U.S. ability to bring off-the-shelf technologies to bear to improve operational capabilities was also evident. Data network technology such as the Integrated Digital Network Exchange (IDNX) was used to provide both U.S. and NATO strategic theater communications backbone connectivity. U.S. video teleconferencing technology was employed to facilitate collaboration and coordination within the command structures of SHAPE, AFSOUTH, IFOR, ARRC and MNDs and within the U.S. command structures supporting the operation. The U.S.-Bosnia C2 Augmentation and Joint Broadcast Systems were provided to IFOR HQs, the ARRC, the MND HQs and the Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC) to facilitate intelligence dissemination, support collaborative planning, and provide direct broadcast services for imagery, weather and other information services. The United States also introduced new capabilities such as the UAV Predator, which used the BC2A/JBS for distribution to the commands. The CAOC also served as an advanced technology testbed to introduce enhanced air command and control capabilities. In fact, without the U.S. participation, the air campaign would have been much more risky for all the allies than it was during the early portions of the Bosnia operation.

COUNTERPROLIFERATION AND AFSOUTH
The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and missiles as a means of delivery provides another powerful argument for retaining an American commander at AFSOUTH. A number of states in the region appear to regard these weapons as valuable instruments for pursuing their political and military ambitions and
for overcoming the conventional superiority the United States and its NATO partners can command in the area.

Libya is actively pursuing chemical and biological weapons, as demonstrated by their construction of chemical weapons production plants at Rabta and Tarhunah. It is currently assessed to possess at least 100 tons of chemical agents. While its biological program is today assessed to be in the R&D phase, Tripoli is seeking to transform this program to produce weaponized agents. Regarding ballistic missiles, in addition to its 300km-range SCUDs, Libya has reportedly arranged to buy extended-range SCUD-Cs and, perhaps, NODONG missiles from North Korea. If deployed in Libya, the 1,000km-plus NODONG could strike Italy proper, possibly including Naples. Iran is embarked on a significant arms buildup across the board, including nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) and missile programs. Although Tehran signed the Chemical Warfare Convention, it has subsequently expanded its CW program and is capable of producing hundreds of tons of agents annually. Its biological warfare program has advanced to the point that it probably has produced and weaponized at least a small quantity of agents. Iran is also actively pursuing nuclear weapons, and could have them in as few as 5 years with external assistance or 8 to 10 years on its own. Iran has already acquired the extended range SCUD-C from North Korea and is expected to receive the NODONG, which could threaten the southernmost mainland of Europe as well as critical assets in the Mediterranean and Gulf. Although Iraq’s NBC and missile programs suffered a major setback with Desert Storm, Baghdad remains a proliferation threat and is likely to be able to resume its chemical and biological programs soon after UN inspectors leave.

NATO members have recognized that proliferation can undermine the Alliance’s ability to conduct essential defense missions, both in protecting NATO territory and in out-of-area regional conflicts. Under U.S. leadership in the Defense Group on Proliferation and in the Military Committee, allies have agreed on an assessment of the risks, and on the security implications of, and
Proliferation of weapons requires U.S. political and military engagement.
the military requirements to meet, the growing threat. Allies have also identified a set of capabilities—intelligence, active and passive defense, and command and control—needed to give NATO the ability to project power and to conduct operations in an NBC environment. Yet, the success of the NATO initiative to counter the proliferation threat will only be assured when allies make national and collective commitments to field the necessary military capabilities and embed the threat in the Alliance planning process. In this context, continued U.S. leadership is essential.

Despite the Alliance's progress to date in moving to counter the threat, European allies will continue to lag behind the United States for the foreseeable future in a number of areas that will be key to deterring and defending against the proliferation threat. These range from intelligence and hardware to doctrine and training. In the near term, NBC and missiles have the potential for disrupting coalition presence and operations, particularly in areas outside of the traditional area of operations, such as the Gulf. In this context, at the operational level, U.S. command will be the best means of overcoming recognized shortfalls in joint and combined operations. U.S. command will be a vital ingredient to bring to bear the full spectrum of counterproliferation capabilities to include counterforce, as well as the full range of active and passive defenses. There is a high degree of shared interest in countering the NBC challenge. Until NATO can overcome existing deficiencies, U.S. command will remain the best guarantor of effective alliance capability to respond to those threats.

U.S. command will also best facilitate the integration of new capabilities, such as ballistic missile defenses, into NATO defenses whether as a national U.S. asset or as an Alliance asset such as AWACS. A U.S. commander is best placed to make counterproliferation a command priority and integrate NBC training and operational concepts into Alliance defense planning. Moreover, for those operations which may carry substantial political consequences for our European allies, such as the potential requirement to ensure that the Libyan chemical warfare facility at Tarhunah does not go into production, an American in command may well be essential.
THE U.S. ROLE IN AFSOUTH

THE U.S. COMMAND TRADITION

Prior to the November 1942 Allied landings in North Africa, the Combined Chiefs of Staff appointed General Dwight Eisenhower commander of all Allied forces in the Mediterranean Theater. Command of all Allied naval forces in the Mediterranean was assigned to Admiral Sir Andrew Cunningham, commander of the British Mediterranean Fleet. This arrangement continued until Eisenhower's departure for England in January 1944 to assume command of Allied forces in the Normandy invasion. General Sir Henry Maitland Wilson became Supreme Allied Commander in the Mediterranean, with General Sir Harold Alexander as commander of Allied forces in Italy and with Cunningham remaining as Allied naval commander.

At the end of the war, the Americans and British agreed that the Royal Navy would serve as guarantor of Western interests in the Mediterranean. However, British economic difficulties soon made it impossible for the Mediterranean Fleet to sustain such responsibilities. Meanwhile, Soviet pressure on Greece and Turkey had begun to mount. By early 1946, it was obvious the U.S. Navy would have to send forces to the Mediterranean. In late September, the U.S. Navy formed the Sixth Task Group and assigned it permanently to the Central and Eastern Mediterranean. Over the next 16 months, as Soviet threats and Communist subversion menaced Italy, as well as Greece and Turkey, the Sixth Task Force was reinforced. In January 1948, it was redesignated the Sixth Fleet.

The creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in April 1949 and the start of the Korean War in the summer of 1950 prompted the United States and its NATO allies to create larger military forces to defend Western Europe. In 1952,
Greece and Turkey entered NATO, when a more powerful Mediterranean force was assembled to defend those countries. NATO established the Allied Forces Southern Europe Command at Naples, placing it under the command of the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR). However, the commander of U.S. naval forces in Europe remained in London and the U.S. Sixth Fleet was not assigned to Allied Forces South. Instead, the fleet remained entirely under American control, merely being earmarked for NATO in case of necessity.

The command relationships established in 1952 dissatisfied the British. They wanted one of their admirals designated NATO Atlantic commander. But the U.S. Government held firm that this post, as well as SACEUR and commander of Allied Forces South, be held by Americans. The United States did agree that NATO Mediterranean naval forces would be assigned to the commander of the British Mediterranean Fleet, based in Malta. He would assume command of the Sixth Fleet only in the event of war.

French President Charles De Gaulle disliked NATO command arrangements. Of the thirteen subordinate NATO commands under SACEUR, Americans held seven, the British five and the French one. As a sign of unhappiness, De Gaulle removed the French Mediterranean Fleet from NATO in February 1959. At the time, the French naval forces in the Mediterranean already surpassed those of the Royal Navy. As further signs of his displeasure, De Gaulle removed the French Atlantic Fleet from NATO in June 1963 and withdrew French naval staff from NATO headquarters in April 1964. Finally, in March 1966, De Gaulle announced total French military disengagement from NATO and ordered the expulsion of all NATO forces from French soil.

Meanwhile, British naval forces continued to erode. By the mid-1960s, the Royal Navy in the Mediterranean had shrunk to four frigates and six mine sweepers. In consequence, the Mediterranean Fleet was abolished in June 1967 and the British lost the post of NATO Commander in Chief, Mediterranean. All NATO naval forces in the Mediterranean fell under American command, though these consisted of only Italian, Greek, Turkish and the small British naval forces. As before, the U.S. Sixth Fleet
remained separate from NATO in peacetime. This arrangement has continued to the present.

GREEK-TURKISH DISPUTES
Greek-Turkish disputes have centered on both Cyprus and the Aegean. The United States has been the key to preventing war between Greece and Turkey since NATO's inception in 1949.

CYPRUS
Since 1964, U.S. intervention in the Greek-Turkish disputes has proved to be the only way to avoid open conflict between these two historic rivals. The Greeks and the Turks are likely to remain at odds. Washington will likely remain the closest thing there is to a totally honest broker.

The 1964 Cyprus crisis was precipitated by the quiet buildup by the Greek Government in Athens of more than 10,000 combat troops on Cyprus, in direct violation of the London and Zurich agreements. U.S. involvement in this crisis was high-level from the beginning. President Johnson brought former Secretary of State Dean Acheson out of retirement to manage the negotiations, which resulted in the Acheson Plan. Although never adopted (having been condemned by Greece), it would have created security zones on Cyprus, which mainland Turkey would have controlled, while essentially allowing Greece to annex large portions of the island. In short, the plan would have dissolved Cyprus as a unitary state. The goal of the plan was to meet Greek demands for Greek union with the island (enosis) and Turkish desires for partition (taksim).

Some senior Turkish military officers and politicians remain upset about the U.S. position first articulated in 1964 in a letter from President Johnson to Turkish Prime Minister Inonu. The letter, which all Turks are schooled in recounting, threatened that if Turkey decided to invade Cyprus, the NATO Article V guarantee protecting Turkey against other threats (i.e., the Soviet Union) might not hold.

The 1974 Turkish invasion of Cyprus again directly engaged the good offices of U.S. diplomacy to limit the damage.
U.S. command at AFSOUTH ameliorates complex Greek-Turkish territorial disputes.
congressional concern over the use of U.S.-supplied arms and equipment in the operation resulted in an arms embargo against Turkey which lasted several years, substantially delaying the country's military modernization program. While the Turks were unhappy with the U.S. action, to the Greeks, it restored a balance to a U.S. regional policy, seen by successive Greek governments as pro-Turkish. During the time in which the embargo was in effect, Turkey closed most of the U.S. military facilities on its soil. The damage to the relationship from that episode has largely faded, but as with the Johnson letter, Turkish memories are durable.

In 1983, Turkey declared the northern part of Cyprus the independent Turkish Republic of North Cyprus (TRNC). To date, only Turkey has formally recognized the TRNC. About 30,000 Turkish soldiers remain on the island.

Although the UN has the institutional lead on the Cyprus issue (due to the UN force along the Green line), efforts to resuscitate negotiations over Cyprus have generally come from the United States, including the latest effort by the U.S. mediator, Carey Cavanaugh. Until the summer of 1996, when a series of shootings along the Green Line (the UN line of demarcation dividing the island) escalated tensions significantly, the Cyprus situation has been relatively quiescent. The recent decision by the Greek Cypriot administration to acquire Russian-made anti-aircraft missiles (probably SA-12s) is the only example of either side introducing a new variable into the military balance. Here, too, the United States has played a leading role in defusing a potential military crisis.

AEGEAN ISSUES
Over the last decade, the most serious Greek-Turkish crises have involved maritime and air jurisdiction and boundary issues in the Aegean Sea. These disputes over territorial sea and airspace boundaries have on occasion severely constrained NATO operations in the area, restricting the scope of (and sometimes forcing cancellation of) Alliance naval and air exercises. Periodically, the AFSOUTH Commander in Chief has become directly involved in resolving these issues, since they could affect his operational readiness and certainly his force planning.
The January/February 1996 dispute over a small, uninhabited pair of islets, known to the Greeks as Imia and to the Turks as Kardak, illustrates the potential for a seemingly insignificant issue to quickly escalate into a crisis. The consensus of observers is that the Imia/Kardak episode, which highlighted the sensitivity of territorial sovereignty, brought the Greeks and Turks closer to hostilities than any incident since the late 1980s. Were it not for the quiet but effective intervention of senior U.S. officials, conflict would likely have occurred in January over these small off-shore islands. The Imia/Kardak episode was precipitated by a Greek attempt to enforce its decision to extend its territorial sea from six nautical miles to twelve. In 1994, Turkey publicly warned Greece that attempting to enforce this unilateral extension of the sea boundary (which Greece claims it may do under the Law of the Sea Treaty) would be regarded by Ankara as a casus belli. While Turkey understands the legal justification for the Greek action, Turkey argues that such an extension would transform the Aegean into a Greek lake, and could cut off several high seas corridors to Turkish ports and access to the Turkish Straits. Should the Greeks seek to enforce this extension, NATO and U.S. naval forces could find themselves operationally constrained.

The history of direct U.S. diplomatic involvement in Greek-Turkish disputes, however uneven, is still unparalleled in terms of the ability to exert positive pressure for peaceful resolution of complex and politically contentious issues. In addition, the list of candidates to replace the United States in this role (nations which both Greece and Turkey would find acceptable mediators) is quite short, as there is essentially no way to please both sides on any of the issues in dispute and therefore volunteering for mediation is politically risky. Put simply, only the United States can perform the function of regional mediator. Allowing the AFSOUTH Commander in Chief to revolve to non-U.S. officers, therefore, would deny the Alliance an important mediating tool. It would also send a signal to both Greece and Turkey that a significant brake had been removed on their tendency to escalate seemingly insignificant issues to the level of political crisis.
DEsert SHIeld/DESERT STorm

During Desert Shield/Desert Storm, at the direction of NATO headquarters, Allied Forces South created a multinational destroyer and mine sweeper flotilla under a Greek vice admiral. This group of warships deployed in the Eastern Mediterranean. Its major tasks were to deter Libya from mining operations that could disrupt the sea lanes to the Gulf and to protect the Mediterranean coasts of Turkey, Cyprus, Syria, Israel and Egypt. The flotilla also was used to escort Coalition naval vessels and merchant ships to and from the Suez Canal, which were bound for or returning from the Persian Gulf. As a secondary mission, the destroyers carried out surveillance of shipping sailing toward the Suez Canal to prevent any freighters from bringing supplies or equipment to the Iraqis. The admiral commanding the flotilla later expressed complete satisfaction at the outstanding cooperation he had received from all his captains during this 8-month NATO operation.

An F/A-18C Hornet from the "Wildcats" of Strike Force, attached to the U.S. Navy's nuclear-powered aircraft carrier USS George Washington, enforces the "no-fly" zone in the skies over Iraq.
U.S. assets in the AFSOUTH region contributed to the allied war effort in a variety of other ways:

- The carrier battle group from the Sixth Fleet in the Eastern Mediterranean launched a number of Tomahawk missiles.
- Over 10,000 U.S. flights passed through staging areas in Italy, supported and staffed at AFSOUTH facilities, carrying men and materiel to the Gulf under Desert Shield.
- A carrier battle group was stationed off the coast of Turkey during the early stages of Operation Provide Comfort I (OPC I) to support that operation and protect Turkey.
- Bases in Turkey, a NATO member, were used for U.S. bombing operations in northern Iraq during Desert Storm.
- Incirlik was and still is used as a staging area for OPC I and Operation Provide Comfort II. Turkey has participated in both operations.
- The Sixth Fleet presence in the Eastern Mediterranean provided protection for Israel and constituted a symbol of U.S. resolve, contributing to its willingness to stay out of the war, despite SCUD attacks from Iraq.
- The Sixth Fleet provided similar protection for Turkey as a participant in Desert Storm.
- The Sixth Fleet protected massive flows of men and material as it traversed the Mediterranean through Cairo West and the Suez Canal during Desert Shield.
- Assets from AFSOUTH member states were used in monitoring the UN embargo on Iraq both in the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf.

The fact that AFSOUTH (and SHAPE) were commanded by a dual-hatted U.S. commander had significant political (rather than operational) impact on this support to Desert Shield, Desert Storm, OPC I, and OPC II. These contributions include:

- The ability to designate forces from AFSOUTH (most of which are under U.S. command) to out-of-area operations quickly and efficiently without political wrangling. The United
States was able to get Congressional support for these operations and their costs more easily than if the operations had been under European command. U.S. command and leadership was also significant in securing European cooperation in these operations which might not have been otherwise so readily forthcoming. Above all, the ability of the coalition to work together and the interoperability of the forces contributed to the success of *Desert Storm* and *Provide Comfort*, factors which relate to AFSOUTH training and experience. Allied participants could regroup quickly in the Gulf and in Northern Iraq to conduct joint and combined operations that would have been impossible had this experience not been present.

- U.S. leadership of the command played an important role in securing the cooperation of regional allies, which was essential to the operations. In particular, Turkey, as a NATO ally with strong ties to the United States but with more difficult relations with Europe, was willing to play an extremely
important role in Desert Storm—and in OPC I, OPC II—at considerable economic cost to itself in part because of U.S. leadership. Israel's relinquishment of a retaliatory role in Desert Storm, essential to keeping Gulf and other Arab allies on board, was related to the presence of the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean under U.S. leadership. Egypt, whose territory was essential to the flow of materiel to the region, also felt more comfortable with the U.S. leadership role.

- The United States has a broad sphere of operations outside NATO and the network and infrastructure that goes with it. The United States was able to bring these assets to bear in Desert Storm and Provide Comfort. Europeans do not have such a sphere of operations, and they lack the assets.
- In replacing assets delegated to Desert Storm and OPC II, U.S. leadership is better able to draw on wider sources. For example, when EUCOM assets for PC I were stretched, air assets were used from the U.S. National Guard and from the Pacific Command. Only a U.S. command can undertake this kind of back filling.
- The United States is considered an impartial manager, one that does not bring extraneous baggage with it, such as previous colonial ties or involvement in internecine European squabbles. This factor encourages others to participate in out-of-area operations.

INITIAL OPERATIONS IN THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA

In 1992, after Yugoslavia had dissolved in ethnic bloodshed, Allied Forces South directed Operations Sharp Guard and Deny Flight. The former operation was for the purpose of carrying out a naval embargo in the Adriatic, in order to prevent the import of arms into Serbia-Montenegro, Bosnia and Croatia. Deny Flight was an air operation to impose a no-fly zone over Bosnia primarily to stop air attacks by the Serbian Air Force.
Advanced U.S. technology employed under U.S. Command contributes to such operations as Desert Storm.

As the fighting in Bosnia continued, civilians faced mounting deprivations and casualties. The members of NATO acted to alleviate such misery. In response to orders from SHAPE, Allied Forces South was placed in charge of Operation Provide Promise. In 1993-94, Provide Promise brought large-scale humanitarian relief to Bosnians of all religions through a regular series of air drops of food, clothing and medicine.

In summer 1995, the NATO Alliance agreed that the Bosnian-Serb armed forces had engaged in widespread atrocities and unwarranted attacks on civilians. The Alliance members decided to prevent further Bosnian-Serb crimes. They agreed to launch Operation Deliberate Force. Allied Forces South was directed to carry out the operation, a series of air strikes by American, British, French and other NATO air forces against Bosnian-Serb artillery and mortar emplacements, radar sites and other targets endangering civilians or allied aircraft. This operation helped to end the war in Bosnia and to bring the warring parties to the negotiation table in Dayton, Ohio.
U.S. command maximizes effectiveness of modern intelligence assets.

After difficult negotiations, the Croats, Bosnians and Bosnian-Serbs agreed to end their war. Operation *Joint Endeavor* was the name given to the IFOR operation that was initiated in December 1995, following the signing of the Dayton peace accords. Allied Forces South was directed by NATO to supply the air and naval forces component of this peace operation.

In December 1996, NATO initiated Operation *Joint Guard* to ensure the continuation of the cease fire and the advancement of the peace process. While *Joint Guard* is directed by SHAPE headquarters, it is directly supported by the Allied Forces South command. The operation is continuing as of February 1997.
The political and military utility of U.S. command of AFSOUTH was demonstrated in events leading up to the U.S. decision to join the IFOR intervention.

From a pragmatic military perspective, there were few senior European commanders with the requisite experience at leading combined, joint and coalition operations at the theater level. Additionally, it would have been a daunting task to achieve agreement within the alliance about the nationality of the single European to whom all other forces would have been subordinated. Since the AFSOUTH commander was a U.S. officer, no European nation had to be singled out for special treatment. The selection of Admiral Leighton Smith was especially apt, since as AFSOUTH Commander, he had extensive experience with Bosnian operations providing air support under Deny Flight and naval patrolling under Sharp Guard. Moreover, the U.S. military commands special respect within NATO. This is also the case with PIP and other NATO troop contributors as well as the Russians. They were ready to participate under a U.S. commander but many would probably have decided not to do so had any other country been in command.

The other enduring value of this command arrangement, however, is in terms of the U.S. political climate. Public and congressional support for dispatching 20,000 U.S. troops potentially into harm’s way in Bosnia was tenuous, at best. Indeed, Congress merely acquiesced in rather than approved the IFOR deployment. If the issue had been clouded with additional controversy, such as a non-U.S. commander of AFSOUTH, it is quite conceivable the outcome would have been much less acceptable for Administration policy.

Bosnia illustrates the need for U.S. engagement in serious disruptions of European security. To quell the fighting and obtain a peace accord, U.S. leadership was eventually necessary, especially as pertains to palliating the Russians and bringing them inside the proverbial tent. U.S. leadership alone was certainly not sufficient, and the Europeans also made vital contributions to creating the conditions for negotiations and IFOR’s successful
deployment. The lesson of this phase of the Bosnian experience is not that the Europeans are incapable of resolving their own security problems and must, therefore, look to America for intervention (and, thus, the need to keep the United States engaged via command of AFSOUTH). Rather, the lesson is that the United States continues to have vital security interests in Europe and that to address these adequately, both the United States and European allies must be collaboratively engaged. Sustaining U.S. support for such collaboration depends on preserving the opportunity for the United States to exercise command.
POTENTIAL MISSIONS FOR AFSOUTH

THE FUTURE OF THEATER COMMANDS

There has been a significant shift in the role of the SACEUR vis-à-vis the immediate theater commanders in the post-Cold War. This trend has devolved greater responsibility and autonomy to the Major Subordinate Commands. Reducing the three existing MSCs in Europe to two would only accelerate the trend by increasing the geographic span of control. In an East-West nuclear confrontation, the SACEUR's role is preeminent, but for low intensity warfare, operational responsibility shifts to the theater commander. If there is no American serving as a theater commander, the United States is distanced from the daily business of NATO, creating conditions for further reduction of American support.

The MSCs have been delegated additional responsibilities in carrying out NATO's new mission in non-Article V operations and cooperation with new PfP Partners. It has been the specific intent to decentralize to the extent possible the work dealing with the Partners from the Major NATO Commands to the MSCs and Principal Subordinate Commands (PSCs). This development has increased the operational duties of the regional commander.

In Europe, SHAPE and the SACEUR have had to be increasingly responsive to NATO's political headquarters in Brussels and serve as a point of coordination. The Bosnia operations beginning with Maritime Guard/Sharp Guard, Deny Flight and Joint Endeavor demonstrated that the regional commander at the MSC level will most logically be selected as the most senior operational theater commander. Based on anticipated areas of responsibilities, the AFCENT (or AFNORTH) commander would be tasked with overall direction of any major peacekeeping or humanitarian operations north and east in the Balkans region and south in Central/Eastern Europe to Hungary. Below Hungary, extending through the Balkans, including the
Black Sea and facing south, responsibility would be delegated to the AFSOUTH commander.

Key to the success of any future CJTF non-Article V NATO mission will be the training and exercise of multinational joint forces. The regional commander at the MSC or PSC level will have had the working experience to lead potential participants in geographic regions which are already familiar. The SACEUR’s role will be one of a force provider and interface with the organizations under whose political mandate a theoretical operation would be carried on. Should the operation be essentially one delegated under WEU auspices, the Deputy SACEUR could serve the same role.

THE BALKANS
Currently, the U.S. objective for SFOR is to accomplish the necessary tasks during its 18-month mandate, then depart. If, as is possible, the mission is not totally accomplished and another Follow-on Force (FOFOR) is required, the current European position is that they will not remain unless U.S. forces continue to be engaged. One option would be to perpetuate the basic command arrangements with a reduced force. Since this may not serve U.S. interests in disengaging its forces from Bosnia, other options might be desirable. One would be to place a U.S. Quick Reaction Force (QRF), stationed in Hungary, under the operational control of a European commander in Bosnia. Another would be for a reduced U.S. force to be part of a lesser, primarily European force with a European commander. The chain of command would run from a U.S. commander at SACEUR, to a notional European FOFOR commander, to the U.S. QRF commander. This would not differ dramatically from the IFOR chain of command, which went from SACEUR (U.S.), to AFSOUTH (U.S.), to the ARRC (UK), to MND-N (U.S.). The essential point is that there may be circumstances in the foreseeable future where placing U.S. forces under the operational command of a European commander would be the most desirable arrangement, so long as ultimate command and control remains with the United States.
Macedonia is a current case in point. A U.S. battalion (Task Force Able Sentry) has been placed under the operational control of the United Nations and assigned to the U.N. Preventive Deployment Force, which is commanded by a Swedish General. Should problems in Macedonia escalate, however, NATO would probably need to engage directly. Under those circumstances, a U.S. commander at AF SOUTH would be best positioned to both draw on America’s experience there and to limit the risks of a wider Balkan war.

TURKEY

Turkish security concerns have shifted dramatically as a result of the Cold War’s demise. One perception among Turkish officials, academics, and security specialists is that the promised security dividend has not materialized. This is in stark contrast to an earlier Turkish attitude, characterized by Turkish pride in their military’s involvement in or support for the Korean conflict, Somalia, the
Gulf War, and the Bosnian operations. Turkey's key role in the AFSOUTH chain of command and order of battle is regarded as a fundamental commitment to Western security. A strong factor contributing to Turkey's security anxiety is a weakening of its NATO tie.

A decision either to remove the U.S. four-star command billet at AFSOUTH to reduce significantly the profile of U.S. flag officers at AFSOUTH would send an unwelcome signal to the Turks. It would confirm their fear that Washington has accepted the general European view that Southern Europe is simply too complicated and peripheral for NATO to expend much energy there and that Turkey is really not a European ally.

The timing of any decision to cede the AFSOUTH CINC slot to a European could not be worse from a Turkish point of view. It would come as the major NATO European powers have made clear their discomfort at welcoming Turkey into the European Union. Although the interim step of agreeing to Turkish membership in the EU Customs Union has occurred, the process was politically difficult for the Turks, many of whom have resigned themselves to the likelihood that no further integration of Turkey into the European membership structures will be permitted.

THE PERSIAN GULF
The United States and Europe share a vital interest in maintaining access to Persian Gulf oil at reasonable prices and in preventing Iran and Iraq from acquiring weapons of mass destruction. These shared vital interests face serious threats: Saddam Hussein is down but not out; Iran could adopt a confrontational stance towards the West (e.g., on the Arab-Israeli peace process, on terrorism threatening American forces, and on its nuclear plans); and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states remain vulnerable to Islamist extremists (foreign-instigated as well as home-grown). Given the inability of the GCC states to defend themselves, it is quite possible that Western forces could be called upon to protect the common vital interests in the Gulf.

NATO members can play a crucial role in the defense of Western interests in the Gulf. Part of that role would be
POTENTIAL MISSIONS FOR AFSOUTH

political—European support would greatly ease the political acceptability, both in the United States and in the Gulf, of large-scale U.S. deployment to the region. But another part would be military. European countries could provide forces that would complement what the United States can bring to the theater. Because of the common experience in NATO, those European militaries could be fully and seamlessly integrated with U.S. forces. The contribution of European militaries would permit the United States to retain a sufficient margin of forces, other than those involved in a Gulf crisis, to allow the United States to deter aggression elsewhere, such as on the Korean peninsula; without the European role, the United States might have to commit such a large portion of its forces to the Gulf that its ability to respond elsewhere would be degraded.

By far the most practical route into the Gulf from the United States is via the Mediterranean and its air space. That route faces potential threats from Libya, which could, even with a small force, seriously complicate the free flow of men and material to the Gulf. That flow could also be threatened by terrorists, e.g., in the approaches to the Suez Canal. The assets in the AFSOUTH area could provide the protection needed for timely arrival in the Gulf of sufficient forces to deter or defeat aggression.

Furthermore, the assets in the AFSOUTH area could contribute directly to a war effort. From the eastern Mediterranean, Tomahawk Land Attack Missiles and carrier-based aircraft could be launched, directed at targets in the Gulf littoral states.

U.S. leadership of AFSOUTH is indispensable for a task vital to defense of the Gulf, namely, reassuring Israel that the West will come to its defense if it is threatened by a Gulf rogue regime. Given the sometimes uneven character of European-Israeli relations, Israel would not have confidence that a European-led command would provide an assured and robust defense. Were AFSOUTH under European command, Israel might well be sufficiently nervous about threats from a Gulf conflict (especially about the threat of weapons of mass destruction) that it would intervene directly in the Gulf, with potentially disastrous political effects on Arab coalition partners.
In light of the importance of the threats to Western interests in the Gulf, a recent RAND study recommended restructuring NATO to respond to the new threat environment. According to that report:

The only penetrating justification for the continuation of NATO is its direct relevance to the commonly perceived security problems facing the United States and its European allies. That elemental redefinition of NATO’s missions and of the alliance’s current practices would have the following indispensable elements:

- The United States would commit itself to engage deeply in securing the newly emerging Europe, including Eastern Europe.
- In turn, the allies would share with the United States through NATO the military burdens and risks in defending common vital interests and meeting mutual security threats outside Europe, especially in the Persian Gulf and with respect to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.¹

Should U.S. and alliance policy move in that direction, having a U.S. commander at AFSOUTH would be more critical than ever.

THE MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS
While there is no direct connection between the Middle East peace process and a change in AFSOUTH command leadership from an American to a European, the perception of U.S. hesitation or re-examination of the U.S.-European balance of responsibilities in the Mediterranean could weaken the commitment of the parties to the process itself.

Successful U.S. diplomacy in the region is strengthened by U.S. command at AFSOUTH.

The Sixth Fleet represented an important symbol of U.S. presence and commitment during virtually every crisis in the Middle East, beginning with Israel's independence and the earliest Arab-Israeli conflicts. In this regard, it is useful to recall both Israeli and Arab expressions of concern when the strength of the Sixth Fleet has been reduced to meet challenges in other regions.

As the peace process progresses, Israeli security concerns (and possibly Egyptian as well) are likely to grow. Therefore, continued U.S. military leadership in the region and in adjacent theaters would grow more important politically to Israel and Egypt as their militaries sought to reassure themselves that—should the process fail or suffer a major setback—U.S. power would not have retreated permanently from the Mediterranean.

In sum, the United States and its European allies have deeply shared historical and contemporary interests in the AFSOUTH region. Given the breadth of these shared interests and the indispensable contribution the United States makes to defend them,
it will be fundamentally important for AFSOUTH to remain a U.S.-led command.