Community

Promising Strategies

To Reduce Gun Violence

Education

OJJDP Report
Officce of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention

The Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP) was established by the President and Congress through the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (JJDPA) Act of 1974, Public Law 93–415, as amended. Located within the Office of Justice Programs of the U.S. Department of Justice, OJJDP's goal is to provide national leadership in addressing the issues of juvenile delinquency and improving juvenile justice.

OJJDP sponsors a broad array of research, program, and training initiatives to improve the juvenile justice system as a whole, as well as to benefit individual youth-serving agencies. These initiatives are carried out by seven components within OJJDP, described below.

**Research and Program Development Division** develops knowledge on national trends in juvenile delinquency; supports a program for data collection and information sharing that incorporates elements of statistical and systems development; identifies how delinquency develops and the best methods for its prevention, intervention, and treatment; and analyzes practices and trends in the juvenile justice system.

**Training and Technical Assistance Division** provides juvenile justice training and technical assistance to Federal, State, and local governments; law enforcement, judiciary, and corrections personnel; and private agencies, educational institutions, and community organizations.

**Special Emphasis Division** provides discretionary funds to public and private agencies, organizations, and individuals to replicate tested approaches to delinquency prevention, treatment, and control in such pertinent areas as chronic juvenile offenders, community-based sanctions, and the disproportionate representation of minorities in the juvenile justice system.

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**Concentration of Federal Efforts Program** promotes interagency cooperation and coordination among Federal agencies with responsibilities in the area of juvenile justice. The program primarily carries out this responsibility through the Coordinating Council on Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, an independent body within the executive branch that was established by Congress through the JJDPA Act.

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The mission of OJJDP is to provide national leadership, coordination, and resources to prevent juvenile victimization and respond appropriately to juvenile delinquency. This is accomplished through developing and implementing prevention programs and a juvenile justice system that protects the public safety, holds juvenile offenders accountable, and provides treatment and rehabilitative services based on the needs of each individual juvenile.
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Shay Bilchik, Administrator
Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention

February 1999
Foreword

All of us should be able to feel safe and secure on streets, in our schools, at work, and in our homes. Yet too many Americans are threatened by violence every day.

Gun-related violence, in particular, represents a major threat to the health and safety of all Americans. Every day in America, 93 people die from gunshot wounds, and approximately 240 sustain gunshot injuries. In addition to the human suffering caused by these injuries and fatalities, gunshot wounds cost approximately $40 billion in medical care, public service, and work-loss costs each year.

Reducing the number of gun-related injuries and deaths must become a national priority. At the Federal level, and especially at the State and local level, we must implement comprehensive strategies that address not just the consequences of violence, but also its underlying causes.

Since 1993, as I have traveled the country as Attorney General, I have had the privilege of observing many innovative, local responses to gun violence that have been developed by police, prosecutors, judges, probation officers, mayors, school officials, and other leaders who recognized a problem, devised a solution in collaboration with other members of their community, and worked to see it implemented.

At the same time, many other communities are still looking for effective solutions to their own gun violence problems. It is my hope that this Report, *Promising Strategies To Reduce Gun Violence*, will provide useful answers and solutions for these communities by profiling the successful approaches that some cities and towns have already implemented.

*Promising Strategies To Reduce Gun Violence* is designed as a “toolbox” to provide law enforcement, State and local elected officials, prosecutors, judges, community organizations, and other policymakers with practical information about a range of strategies to reduce gun violence. Although particular programs and strategies will need to be tailored to suit local needs, I hope that the programs profiled here will provide inspiration and guidance as communities take action to create safe and healthy neighborhoods.

Ending the tragedy of gun violence will require a sustained effort at all levels of our government and society. Together, however, we will make a difference, and bring greater security and peace to America's communities.

Janet Reno
Attorney General
U.S. Department of Justice
Acknowledgments

In the spring of 1998, Attorney General Reno asked that a U.S. Department of Justice Work Group review existing efforts to reduce gun violence to identify key programs and strategies. This Work Group—consisting of representatives of the Offices of the Attorney General, Deputy Attorney General, and Associate Attorney General; the Executive Office of United States Attorneys; the Criminal Division; the Office of Policy Development; the Office of Intergovernmental Affairs; the Office of Community Oriented Policing Services; the Office of Justice Programs; the Bureau of Justice Assistance; the National Institute of Justice; and the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP)—has worked with COSMOS Corporation to identify, review, and describe promising and demonstrated strategies to reduce gun violence.

Under a grant from OJJDP, COSMOS Corporation, a research firm specializing in criminal justice policy issues, was tasked with building on an initial assessment of youth gun programs OJJDP published in 1996 and surveying the country to identify additional promising practices and strategies to reduce gun violence. This Report is the culmination of this survey and followup site visits to several communities. It could not have been completed without the dedication of COSMOS Corporation staff who worked tirelessly on this Report. A special thanks to David Sheppard, the primary author and project director at COSMOS. Others at COSMOS assisting Dr. Sheppard include Darci Terrell, the Project Coordinator, Michael Cannon, Elizabeth Earl, Heath Grant, Patricia Kelly, Joe Randolph, Ann Reese, Wendy Rowe, Pamela Schaal, Pat Thibeaux, Emily Warner, Alicia Williams, and Patricia Zangrillo.

A special note of appreciation is offered to Paul Kingery and Lisa Murphy from Hamilton Fish National Institute on School and Community Violence, The George Washington University; Glenn Pierce from the Center of Criminal Justice Policy, Northeastern University; Jeffrey Roth from The Urban Institute; Edmund McGarrell from the Hudson Institute, Indiana University; and Arthur Kellermann from the Center for Injury Control, Emory University; all of whom contributed to the writing and editing of this Report.

Gratitude must also be expressed to the many communities that have cooperated with us throughout this process and greeted our site visit teams with enthusiasm. Many sites completed extensive telephone surveys, and several hosted site visit teams for several days. Although more than 400 programs and strategies were identified, we have selected only 60 promising programs and strategies for inclusion in this Report. Without a doubt, there are many others throughout the country that are attacking the gun violence problem. The fact that they are not listed here should not be considered a negative reflection on these programs.

Finally, I must acknowledge the invaluable input from national experts who came to Washington, D.C., in July 1998 to participate in a Focus Group on Gun Violence Reduction Strategies. More than 40 criminologists, public health experts, law enforcement officers, prosecutors, judges, mayors, and foundation representatives came together to review the first drafts of the Report and to discuss a variety of strategies to reduce gun violence. Their thoughtful discussions and recommendations were vital to the success of this Report.

Shay Bilchik
Administrator
Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention
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Introduction

Gun violence represents a major threat to the health and safety of all Americans. Every day in the United States, 93 people die from gunshot wounds,1 and an additional 240 sustain gunshot injuries.2 The fatality rate is roughly equivalent to that associated with HIV infection—a disease that the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention has recognized as an epidemic. In addition to the human suffering caused by these injuries and fatalities, gunshot wounds account for approximately $40 billion in medical, public service, and work-loss costs each year.3 In short, gun violence is a significant criminal justice problem and a public health problem.

In recent years, communities across the country have struggled to develop effective solutions to the problem of gun violence. Many have approached the U.S. Department of Justice for help in identifying such solutions. The Department has developed this publication, Promising Strategies To Reduce Gun Violence, in response to those requests.

As its name suggests, Promising Strategies To Reduce Gun Violence is designed to provide law enforcement, State and local elected officials, prosecutors, judges, school administrators, community organizations, and other local stakeholders with the tools for fighting firearm violence in their communities. It includes a blueprint for communities to develop their own comprehensive, strategic violence reduction plan and a wealth of practical information on demonstrated and promising gun violence reduction strategies and programs.

This “toolbox” approach is intended to provide inspiration and guidance as communities take action against violent crime and, in particular, gun violence. It also is intended to help communities learn from each other’s successes. To promote and facilitate this exchange of ideas, contact information is provided for each of the programs profiled.

Development of This Report

To develop this Report, the U.S. Department of Justice first identified more than 400 gun violence programs from around the country (see appendix D) by soliciting input from a wide variety of sources (see appendix E).

Having cast a wide net to identify candidate programs, the Department then conducted a two-phase telephone survey. The preliminary survey (see appendix F) allowed the Department to classify each candidate program according to its level of development and to select 89 programs for further study.

These 89 programs were the topic of a July 1998 focus group on gun violence reduction strategies, attended by more than 40 national experts representing a range of disciplines from criminology to public health. These programs were then subjected to further study in the form of a followup telephone screening and document review. This second-phase review yielded the 60 individual programs and comprehensive strategies included in this Report, each of which was designated as “promising” or “demonstrated”; the 10 most promising programs and strategies were also identified (see appendix F). Finally, site visits were made to eight communities that have implemented comprehensive plans to reduce gun violence.
Each of the gun violence reduction strategies (profiles) presented in this Report is designated as either “demonstrated” or “promising” as follows:

- **Demonstrated.** Identifies those strategies that have been formally evaluated using either internal resources or external evaluators. These evaluations have shown positive impacts on one or more aspects of gun violence: reducing the sources of illegal guns, reducing the possession and carrying of illegal guns, and reducing the illegal use of guns. Demonstrated also designates those strategies where, although a final evaluation report has not been published, preliminary results have shown positive impacts on gun violence outcomes.

- **Promising.** Identifies those strategies that have not been evaluated formally, but where outcomes are being captured as part of effective program management. Promising also includes those strategies employing innovative gun violence reduction models based on prior research findings, and where problem-solving technologies were employed to design the strategy. Promising strategies require further testing with stronger evaluation designs before they can demonstrate their effectiveness.

Notwithstanding the Department’s best efforts to conduct a comprehensive and thorough inventory of gun violence reduction programs, it is possible that some programs that would have met the criteria for designation as “promising” or “demonstrated” have been inadvertently overlooked.

**Organization of This Report**

Gun violence can be considered as a three-phase continuum comprising (1) the illegal acquisition of firearms, (2) the illegal possession and carrying of firearms, and (3) the illegal, improper, or careless use of firearms. This continuum is illustrated in figure 1. To be effective, any strategy to reduce gun violence must focus on one or more of these three points of intervention; however, a comprehensive plan will incorporate strategies and programs that focus on each of the three points of intervention.

**Figure 1. The Chain of Causation for Gun Violence**
Sections I and II provide current data on the nature of gun violence and a blueprint for addressing the problem at the community level. Section III profiles several successful examples of comprehensive gun violence reduction plans. Sections IV through VII describe programs that are grouped according to the point of intervention along the three-phase continuum that each seeks to address. Section VIII provides a range of program resources and contacts for communities seeking to reduce gun violence. Sections IX and X consist of references and appendixes. Summaries of the contents of sections I through VIII follow.

I. Gun Violence in the United States

To provide the critical context for thinking about solutions to this problem, section I presents key data on the nature of gun violence from a national perspective, together with current trends. This section examines the problem of gun violence as an element of violence more broadly defined: Gun ownership, possession, and carrying; gun violence in schools; guns and drugs; and guns and gangs.

II. Solving the Problem of Gun Violence

Section II describes a blueprint for communities to develop a comprehensive solution to gun violence. A meaningful response to gun violence requires a strategy that takes into account the specific elements of the problem as experienced by an individual community and then identifies an appropriate solution. This problem-solving approach is most effective if the various stakeholders in a community collaborate to develop and implement a comprehensive violence reduction plan. Such a plan reflects the needs and resources of the community and employs the best programs and strategies to meet those needs.

III. Comprehensive Gun Violence Reduction Strategies

Section III profiles the comprehensive gun violence reduction plans that have been successfully implemented in eight different communities. To develop their comprehensive plans, these communities employed variations of the problem-solving process described in section II, including a process of forming partnerships, measuring problems, setting goals, evaluating strategies, and implementing, evaluating, and revising the plan. Their comprehensive plans address each of the three phases in the continuum of gun violence—access to, possession of, and use of firearms—and draw on many of the programs presented in sections IV through VII.

IV. Strategies To Interrupt Sources of Illegal Guns

The first phase of the gun violence continuum—the illegal acquisition of firearms—is addressed in section IV, which describes programs that seek to limit access to sources of illegal guns and thereby to reduce the number of illegally acquired guns in communities. These programs include law enforcement initiatives that disrupt the illegal flow of firearms by using intelligence gathered through crime gun tracing and regulatory inspections or undercover operations involving suspected illegal gun dealers. Comprehensive crime gun tracing facilitates both the reconstruction of the sales history of firearms associated with crime and the identification of patterns of illegal gun trafficking. Similarly, focusing criminal and regulatory enforcement on suspect dealers allows law enforcement to:

Each institution in a community brings a unique perspective, expertise, and sphere of influence to a crime prevention partnership. Partners may include the U.S. Attorney, chief of police, sheriff, Federal law enforcement agencies (FBI, ATF, DEA, and others as applicable), district attorney, State attorney general, mayor/city manager, probation and parole officers, juvenile corrections officials, judges, public defenders, school superintendents, social services officials, leaders in the faith community, and business leaders.
enforcement to efficiently focus limited resources. Suspect dealers include, for example, those at the highest risk of selling firearms to “straw purchasers”—purchasers fronting for people linked to illegal gun trafficking and firearm violence.

V. Strategies To Deter Illegal Gun Possession and Carrying

The illegal possession and carrying of firearms—the second phase in the continuum—is the unifying theme for section V. This section describes a range of innovative approaches to deter illegal gun possession and carrying, such as municipal gun ordinances, weapons hotlines, directed police patrols, and the specific deterrence approach known as “pulling levers.” It also describes programs that focus on individuals who are most likely to possess and carry firearms illegally, including gang members and probationers. School-based enforcement programs also are highlighted in section V.

VI. Strategies To Respond To Illegal Gun Use

The programs profiled in section VI target illegal gun use—the third phase in the continuum—through identification, prosecution, and aggressive punishment of people who have committed multiple violent crimes, are armed drug traffickers, or have used a firearm in a crime (or possessed an illegally acquired gun); intensive education; and strict monitoring of offenders. For example, U.S. Attorneys in several States have used focused prosecution and enhanced Federal sanctions in cases against certain gun offenders. Among the court-based programs included in this section are “fast-tracking” (forwarding all gun cases to a single docket and disposing of them in a limited timeframe) and juvenile diversion programs.

VII. Education Initiatives and Alternative Prevention Strategies

Section VII profiles programs that cut across the three phases of gun violence. In recent years, many communities have recognized that gun violence is a public health and criminal justice problem. Accordingly, these communities have developed education programs that address the underlying reasons that individuals carry and use guns. These programs promote gun safety, inform youth and adults about the dangers of gun use, and seek to reduce gang membership (because gang members are so much more likely than nonmembers to carry guns). These programs also seek to prevent at-risk youth from becoming involved in criminal activity by providing them with specialized education, training, and alternative prevention programs.

VIII. Research, Technical Assistance, and Education Programs

Section VIII presents programs that provide research, technical assistance, and educational resources to communities that are seeking to address gun violence. These resources include Federal, university, and private programs that support the development and implementation of effective firearm violence reduction strategies. The programs include law enforcement strategies to reduce the sources of illegal guns and intervention strategies to prevent the possession, carrying, and use of illegal firearms.

For ease of reference, the programs profiled in sections III through VII are indexed geographically (appendix A), alphabetically (appendix B), and according to key collaborating agencies (appendix C).
Notes


Section I

Gun Violence in the United States
The Nature of the Problem and Current Trends

In 1996 (the most recent year for which data are available), 34,040 people died from gunfire in the United States. Of these deaths, approximately 54 percent resulted from suicide, 41 percent resulted from homicide, and 5 percent were unintentional (see figure 2). Firearm injuries are the eighth leading cause of death in the United States. In addition, for every fatal shooting, there are roughly three nonfatal shootings.\(^1\)

Gun-related crime peaked in the late 1980’s and early 1990’s. Since that time, the United States has made steady improvement in reducing gun-related violence (see figure 3). Gun-related homicides have declined by 33 percent since 1993, including a 35-percent drop in handgun homicides. Meanwhile, from 1992 to 1996, murder rates declined by 20 percent, aggravated assaults by 12 percent, and the overall violent crime rate by 16 percent.\(^2\) The Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI’s) Uniform Crime Report data for 1997 show that these trends are continuing, with murder and robbery totals declining by 7 percent over the previous year and the total of all violent crimes declining by 3 percent.\(^3\) Nonetheless, gun violence remains a serious national problem.

The impact of gun violence is especially pronounced among juveniles and adolescents. The firearm homicide rate for children under 15 years of age is 16 times higher in the United States than in 25 other industrialized countries combined. Among those ages 15 to 24, the U.S. firearm homicide rate is 5 times higher than in neighboring Canada and 30 times higher than in Japan, and the firearm homicide rate for the 15- to 24-year-old age group increased 158 percent during the 10-year period from 1984 to 1993 (see figure 4). This contrasts with a 19-percent decline in gun-related homicides for those 25 and older. A teenager in the United States today is more likely to die of a gunshot wound than from all the “natural” causes of death combined.\(^4\)

Young African-American males have the most elevated homicide victimization rate of any race or gender group. Homicides involving firearms have been the leading cause of death for African-American males ages 15 to 19 since 1969.\(^5\)

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*Figure 2. 1996 Firearm Deaths by Intent*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Total Deaths for All Ages</th>
<th>Total Deaths Ages 14 and Under</th>
<th>Total Deaths Ages 15–19</th>
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<td>N=34,040</td>
<td>N=693</td>
<td>N=3,950</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>62%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2%</td>
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<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>54%</td>
<td></td>
<td>29%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Legend:
- **Suicide**
- **Unintentional**
- **Homicide**
- **Other**

---

Section 1: Gun Violence in the United States
Gun ownership, possession, and carrying

There are approximately 44 million gun owners in the United States. This means that 25 percent of all adults, and 40 percent of American households, own at least one firearm. These owners possess 192 million firearms, of which 65 million are handguns. Among legal gun owners, the reasons given for owning or carrying a weapon include hunting, sports-related activities, and home protection. Among those who own handguns, 75 percent reported in a national survey that self-protection is the primary reason for owning a firearm.

Approximately 37,500 gun sales, including 17,800 handgun sales, are completed every day in the United States. The increasing number of gun owners has elevated the danger of guns being acquired illegally through robberies and burglaries. In 1994, more than a quarter-million households experienced the theft of one or more firearms; nearly 600,000 guns were stolen during these burglaries.

The number of youth who report that they carry weapons is significant. In 1997, 14 percent, or 1 in 7 male juveniles, reported carrying a gun outside the home in the previous 30-day period. In the inner city, the problem is more severe. One study involving 800 inner-city high school students reported that 22 percent said they carried weapons. An even greater number of convicted juvenile offenders reported carrying guns—88 percent, according to another study.

Firearms are readily available on the illegal gun market, and those who are most likely to possess guns are drug sellers and gang members—overwhelmingly young and male. More than two-thirds of the respondents in one study of urban arrestees stated that the primary reason for owning and carrying a weapon is self-protection—a small number also reported using the weapon for drug trafficking or other...
illegal activities. Among arrestees overall, 25 percent of those who owned a gun said they had used one to commit a crime. Among juvenile drug sellers who owned a firearm, 42 percent reported using a gun in a crime; among gang members, 50 percent reported using a gun.

Although no national data base contains detailed information about all the guns used in crimes, police records and surveys of offenders provide some insights on the types of firearms used in criminal offenses. In 1994, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms received more than 85,000 requests from police departments for traces of guns used in crime. More than three-fourths of the guns traced were handguns, and almost one-third were less than 3 years old. In 1994, the most frequent types of guns used in homicides were large caliber revolvers, but the number of large caliber semiautomatic guns is increasing.

In an early survey of incarcerated felons, 32 percent reported that they had acquired their most recent handgun by theft. A more recent survey reported that guns had been stolen by 13 percent of all arrestees, 25 percent of all juvenile arrestees, 29 percent of the gang members, and 30 percent of the drug sellers.
Gun violence in schools

During the 1997–98 school year, the public was riveted by extensive media coverage of school shootings in Jonesboro, AR; West Paducah, KY; Pearl, MS; Springfield, OR; and Edinboro, PA. This spate of multiple shootings increased parental concerns about school safety. However, the 40 school shooting deaths in the 1997–98 school year fall within the midrange of total annual incidents since 1992.\textsuperscript{17} According to the National School Safety Center, violent deaths in school settings (suicides and homicides) declined 27.3 percent between the 1992–93 school year and the 1997–98 school year.

The high-profile multiple shootings also have fueled public perceptions that children are in danger while attending school. In fact, youth (in particular those who live in high-crime neighborhoods) are safest while in school. A 2-year study by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention found that the incidence of school-associated violent death was less than one in a million.\textsuperscript{18}

Even if actual shootings at school are rare, the presence of guns in schools is not. One leading survey reveals that between 1994 and 1996, the percentage of 12th grade males that reported carrying a gun to school in the previous 4 weeks increased from 4.8 to 6.3, or roughly 1 in 17.\textsuperscript{19} Another survey tells us that 12.7 percent of students ages 12 to 19 reported knowing a student who brought a gun to school.\textsuperscript{20}

Guns and drugs

The drug market is a major contributor to the Nation's homicide rate. Indeed, the peak in homicides during the mid-1980's was directly related to the saturation of urban areas with the crack cocaine drug trade. Methamphetamine — more powerful, more addictive, and easier to produce than crack cocaine — is becoming a major drug of choice in urban, suburban, and rural communities. If the methamphetamine trade results in drug wars on the same scale as those of the 1980's, it is possible that homicide rates will begin to climb once more, as drug dealers are among those most likely to carry weapons.\textsuperscript{21}

Guns and gangs

Gangs have proliferated rapidly since 1980, when there were about 2,000 gangs with 100,000 members in 286 cities.\textsuperscript{22} By 1996, there were 31,000 gangs with 846,000 members in 4,800 cities and towns.\textsuperscript{23}

Gangs are more likely to recruit adolescents who own firearms, and gang members (who are twice as likely to own guns for protection than nongang members) are more likely to carry guns outside their homes.\textsuperscript{24} The risk of being killed is 60 times greater among young gang members than in the general population\textsuperscript{25} and in some cities, far higher. For example, the St. Louis youth gang homicide rate is 1,000 times higher than the U.S. homicide rate.\textsuperscript{26}

Although not all gangs are drug organizations, gang membership appears to increase individual participation in drug use and trafficking, gun carrying, violence, and prolonged involvement in drug sales.\textsuperscript{27} Furthermore, gang activity is no longer a problem that is unique to urban communities. From 1989 to 1995, the percentage of students who reported that street gangs were present at school increased by 186 percent in suburban schools and 250 percent in rural schools. Gangs reportedly operate in 41 percent of urban schools, 26 percent of suburban schools, and 20 percent of rural schools. Long-term solutions to address the problem of gun violence must include a comprehensive approach to reducing the number of youth involved in gangs.
Section 1: Gun Violence in the United States
Section II

Solving the Problem of Gun Violence
Developing a Comprehensive Strategy

To protect their citizens' health and safety, and to address fear of gun violence, many communities are successfully combating such violence by adopting a strategy that takes into account the specific gun violence problem experienced by their community and then identifies an appropriate solution. This problem-solving approach requires that stakeholders in the community collaborate to develop and implement a comprehensive gun violence reduction plan. Although one stakeholder (e.g., law enforcement, a public official, or a community group) may initiate the process and the same stakeholder (or another) may spearhead it, consultation and collaboration are essential.

This section outlines the steps for developing and implementing a comprehensive gun violence reduction plan. These are: (1) establish appropriate stakeholder partnerships, (2) identify and measure the problem, (3) set measurable goals and objectives, (4) identify appropriate programs and strategies, (5) implement the comprehensive plan, (6) evaluate the plan, and (7) revise the plan on the basis of the evaluation.

Establish stakeholder partnerships

Gun violence does not discriminate. It strikes purposefully and randomly, in inner cities and rural towns, wounding rich and poor, blind to differences in skin color and religion. In short, gun violence operates throughout the community. As a result, participation from Federal, State, and local law enforcement; juvenile justice authorities; businesses; families; faith communities; civic organizations; and health and social service agencies is necessary to successfully prevent gun violence. Harnessing the resources of these stakeholders and creating a successful partnership frequently requires strong leadership from law enforcement. However, a successful partnership invites multiple perspectives and allows for the sharing of responsibilities and accomplishments.

Identify and measure the problem

Different stakeholders have different perceptions of gun violence. These different perceptions may make it difficult to agree on the primary gun violence issues that need to be addressed. Because perceptions of problems are not always accurate, it is important to know which problems are real and to act on them. In developing a comprehensive gun violence reduction plan, communities should seek consensus on the primary issues. Consensus is possible when stakeholders examine information from several sources and share it widely. As has been proven in New York City and elsewhere, local crime analysis—including thorough crime mapping—to identify and predict emerging crime patterns is an effective tool in designing crime reduction interventions.

Set measurable goals and objectives

Goals describe broad purposes of anticipated measurable accomplishments. Objectives are the sequential, measurable steps needed to achieve each goal. Setting an unrealistic goal, such as eliminating violence, increases the likelihood of failure and invites criticism. A goal is more useful when it is reasonably specific and is supported by a fairly short list of objectives. Goals and objectives are based on accurate data and the identification of community-specific problems. Realistic and attainable goals lead to greater commitment and, ultimately, long-term success.

Objectives describe "who will do how much of what by when." Often the objectives are written in sequential order, but multiple objectives are generally addressed in overlapping periods of time. Measurable objectives allow for determinations of when, and whether, they have been achieved. However, they do not need to be so specific that every minor action is included. Stating the primary objectives is sufficient to allow accountability and to monitor progress. Goals and objectives need to be revised over time as an affected community gains wisdom and experience. Communicating the goals to all stakeholders throughout the course of an intervention is vital.

Section II: Solving the Problem of Gun Violence
Identify appropriate programs and strategies

Although some programs and strategies are more effective than others, no single program or strategy is effective in combating all three phases of the continuum of gun violence. The best approach for a community seeking a comprehensive response to gun violence typically calls for a mix of programs and strategies based on the goals, objectives, needs, and resources identified in the community’s comprehensive plan.

When selecting programs and strategies, communities should consider these factors:

- The availability of personnel and administrative, technological, and other resources.
- Any evidence of past effectiveness.
- The match between the program or strategy and the goals and objectives of the comprehensive plan.
- The appropriateness of the techniques and images employed by the program or strategy to the racial, ethnic, and religious makeup of the community.

Section III describes model programs that have proven effective or appear promising. A community may choose to implement several programs and strategies simultaneously or sequentially. Communities should bear in mind that many innovative strategies and programs (including those listed in section III) work because they were designed to solve a problem driven by specific local dynamics and will not necessarily be effective in other circumstances. Communities should consider carefully whether selected strategies and programs need to be adapted to meet local conditions. In considering different programs and strategies, communities will want to consider existing local and Federal gun laws that govern how guns are legally possessed, who may possess them, and what the comparative penalties are for criminal possession and use of guns.

Finally, it makes sense to balance programs and strategies that impact all three phases of the gun violence continuum and emphasize prevention in addition to punishment. Having selected a mix of programs and strategies, a community should carefully develop a plan to assess the effectiveness of their particular combination as applied.

Implement the comprehensive plan

Communities differ in the way they implement their comprehensive plans. All communities should, however, take certain basic steps. Gearing up for implementation, stakeholders will likely want to seek broad community support through a public awareness campaign. Participants also will need to be trained in implementation of the program or strategy.

Continuous monitoring and assessment are critical steps in the actual implementation of the plan. The following questions should be asked before and during implementation in order to determine the efficacy of the implementation:

- Have you developed procedures for monitoring the implementation of the plan?
- Is there consistency between actual implementation events and the plan?
- Do budgeted costs match actual costs?
- What is the response of community members to the plan?
- Are there unforeseen barriers to implementation?
Are there unintended negative consequences of the selected programs or strategies?

What adjustments need to be made?

Communities should anticipate problems (barriers, unintended consequences, unforeseen changes, need for adjustments) and view them as opportunities for collaborative resolution.

Evaluate the plan

Evaluation is a critical component of a comprehensive gun violence reduction plan. It serves several purposes:

- Increases the effectiveness of management and administration of the plan.
- Documents that objectives have or have not been met.
- Determines the overall efficacy of the plan and its component programs and strategies.

Conducting an evaluation or a series of evaluations helps to ensure accountability, establishes whether the plan is making a difference, and provides important feedback for improving the plan.

Revise the plan on the basis of the evaluation

A well-designed evaluation yields vital information. Evaluation results may suggest that changes should be made in the selection or implementation of programs and strategies, that additional training is warranted, or that other stakeholders need to be involved. Recommendations for improvement may come from the original partnership of stakeholders or from individual stakeholder groups. Assessments by the stakeholder partnership and by individual stakeholders will reveal which activities were most and least effective, which materials worked best and worst, and how barriers were overcome or proved insurmountable. If a community administers a comprehensive gun violence reduction plan for a substantial period of time with little or no progress toward identified objectives, an entirely new plan may need to be implemented.

The U.S. Department of Justice's Anti-Violent Crime Initiative (AVCI)—introduced in 1994—serves as one valuable model of the strategic planning process. To implement the AVCI, every U.S. Attorney met with all pertinent Federal, State, and local law enforcement agencies and formed a new, or newly strengthened, violent crime working group. These working groups identified and prioritized the critical violent crime problems that are susceptible to a coordinated Federal/State/local approach. They also developed short- and long-range objectives and implemented programs and strategies to address the relevant local crime problems. More information is available from your local U.S. Attorney's office.

Section II: Solving the Problem of Gun Violence
Section III

Comprehensive Gun Violence Reduction Strategies
Overview

During the past decade, the epidemic of gun violence has led residents and law enforcement agencies in each of the communities profiled in this section to form a collaborative to find new solutions to this problem. In some cases, these efforts have been driven by neighborhood residents determined to address the problem of gun violence and to take back their streets. In other communities, crime reduction efforts have been spearheaded by police, prosecutors, the courts, schools, health departments, public and private social service organizations, or members of the faith and business communities.

Regardless of who initiated the various crime prevention efforts, however, these communities have learned that each of these institutions contributes to the collaborative's ability to mobilize resources and implement strategies that produce desired outcomes.1 In particular, citizen participation in crime prevention efforts has been critical to their success and sustainability. Police can do their job more effectively when the community's priorities shape their actions. The subsequent development of trust enhances this partnership and results in greater police-community cooperation and mutual support. These communities have also learned that their efforts must be long-term in order to be effective, and that capacity building in different sectors of the community is needed.

The communities profiled in this section have also successfully engaged in the process of forming partnerships; measuring problems; setting goals; evaluating strategies; and implementing, evaluating, and revising plans described in section II. As such, these successful communities share the following characteristics:

- The community recognizes its gun violence problems. Support for a collaborative increases if a broad range of community residents and law enforcement representatives recognizes the prevalence and incidence of the gun violence problem and participates in planning and implementing appropriate suppression, intervention, and prevention strategies. A fundamental challenge that many partnerships face in reducing illegal firearm possession, carrying, and use is to convince those who carry guns that they can survive in their neighborhoods without being armed. Programs in these communities must work to dispel the perception of many residents that the authorities can neither protect them nor maintain order in their neighborhoods.2

- Law enforcement and other key institutional administrators are enlisted as key partners. The active participation of administrators of key agencies that have primary responsibility for the program's participants—the victims, offenders, and families associated with gun violence—is instrumental for accessing agency staff resources and identifying other agencies that can provide services to the targeted participants.

- The collaborative has access to resources. Developing a community partnership requires access to certain resources, including professional staff who are experienced and knowledgeable about delivery of social services to the target populations, volunteers who can maintain the prevention and intervention strategies, and funding from sources within and outside the community.

- The collaborative develops a comprehensive vision and plan. The partnership must have a core group of members who engage in strategic planning that will produce a comprehensive plan of action. A shared community vision can provide the foundation for engaging in a process that links the vision with measurable goals and strategies. A comprehensive plan requires a series of strategies that are grounded in an understanding of the risk and protective factors associated with gun violence.3 The plan needs to be comprehensive and integrated, using a number of strategies to address gun violence from both a supply and a demand perspective.

- The collaborative mobilizes and sustains gun violence reduction activities. Productive capacity includes the energy of a core group of partnership members to plan and implement effective strategies. It is important to involve those persons who have a direct stake in the well-being of the community prior to mobilizing residents who live in the affected neighborhoods.

- The collaborative develops a leadership structure. A productive partnership does not depend on
personal charisma but relies on quality leadership and management to build a productive team. This team is the vision-setting, standard-setting core of the partnership and combines talents to help the partnership meet the challenges of structure, strategy, growth, and innovation.

The comprehensive gun violence reduction programs described in this section incorporate multiple suppression and prevention strategies to address risk factors that are associated with violent criminal behavior, including aggressive behaviors at an early age, conflicts with authority, gun possession and carrying, gang membership, substance abuse, depression, exposure to violence, poor parental supervision, low academic achievement, truancy, delinquent peers, drug trafficking, and unemployment. Rather than targeting one or two risk factors associated with gun violence, these collaboratives recognize that their efforts are likely to be more successful if they incorporate strategies that address both the supply and demand side of the illegal firearm market. They have therefore developed comprehensive, multiple-component programs that address the identified risk factors in multiple ways. Such program strategies include targeted police responses, surveillance of probationers, situational crime prevention using problem-solving strategies, parental supervision, peer mediation and conflict resolution, school-based interventions, community mobilization, legislation restricting youth access to guns, and tough sentences for crimes involving firearms. Because gang membership is associated with violent behaviors, many of these comprehensive programs also include intervention strategies to reduce gang-related violence, including the development of geographically coded information systems to track gang violence, restricting gang members’ access to firearms, enhancing prosecution of gang crimes, and punishing and monitoring offenders.

Lastly, the communities profiled here have incorporated most of the productive capacity characteristics in their collaborative structures. They have involved community residents, law enforcement, and other public and private agencies in developing a comprehensive plan and have created a strong collaborative structure to mobilize and sustain their gun violence reduction strategies. While these programs may vary in the degree to which the community is an integral part of their collaboratives, each of them has involved the community in assessing its gun violence problems or in implementing effective violence reduction strategies.

Notes


Baltimore Comprehensive Communities Program—
Baltimore, MD

Program Type or Federal Program Source:
A program of comprehensive gun violence reduction strategies; Bureau of Justice Assistance.

Program Goal:
To reduce violent crime by building the community’s capacity to implement a comprehensive strategy to address the factors that contribute to violent crime—guns and drugs.

Specific Groups Targeted by the Strategy:
None.

Geographical Area Targeted by the Strategy:
High-crime areas of Baltimore, MD.

Evaluated by:
Urban Institute, Washington, DC; BOTEC, Cambridge, MA.

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Years of Operation:
1995–present.

In 1991, the problem of gun violence, drugs, and crime had reached crisis levels in many Baltimore neighborhoods. The Boyd Booth area, for example, had one of the largest open-air drug markets and accounted for many of the city’s homicides. The residential population was dwindling, and entire blocks of homes had been abandoned by their owners, had fallen into disrepair, and had been appropriated by drug dealers and addicts.

Two local nonprofit organizations, the Community Law Center (CLC) and the Citizens Planning and Housing Association (CPHA), began working with local residents to address neighborhood problems and help restore safety and a sense of community. CLC helped neighborhood associations and other community groups file civil litigation based on the Drug Nuisance Abatement Law, the Community Bill of Rights, vacant house receivership law, and the Self-Help Abatement of Nuisances Law (a common law dating back to the 16th century) to address drug and crime problems.

At the same time that CLC was providing representation, technical assistance, and legal education to community groups, CPHA was helping community residents organize to address drug, crime, and housing problems. CPHA showed residents how to gradually reclaim their neighborhoods using a variety of tactics, such as holding vigils on drug corners, hosting community fairs on abandoned lots, painting murals on newly boarded houses, and launching other “street actions.”
Profile No. 1 (continued)

Comprehensive Communities Program

By the spring of 1995, the Mayor’s Coordinating Council on Criminal Justice had received a grant from the Bureau of Justice Assistance to become 1 of 16 national sites participating in the Comprehensive Communities Program (CCP). The work being done by CLC and CPHA was well known, and the mayor’s office asked the groups to expand and implement Baltimore’s CCP initiative in several core communities: Boyd Booth, Carrollton Ridge, Fayette Street, Franklin Square, Harlem Park, and New Southwest. Dozens of other areas were identified as apprentice sites that would receive more limited assistance (e.g., training and the services of a pro bono attorney) to develop their own comprehensive crime prevention strategies.

Building community capacity is absolutely key. You have to begin by identifying the people and institutions in the local neighborhoods who have a stake in the community and really want to address the neighborhood’s problems. And then you have to give them the resources that they need to be successful—and that’s where the Mayor’s Coordinating Council on Criminal Justice comes in. We are able to bring together all the key agencies—law enforcement, housing, community organizers, youth, legal advisers—and marshall their resources in a focused way to have the biggest impact on solving the neighborhood’s problems. We then build the relationships between these groups to sustain the effort over the long haul.

—Betsi Griffith
Baltimore, MD, Mayor’s Coordinating Council on Criminal Justice

The first-year planning grant allowed the partners to establish a solid foundation for the initiative by recruiting and training local leadership, working with residents to identify priority problems, mapping out strategies, and establishing relationships with key groups such as law enforcement and nearby schools. The nonprofit Neighborhood Design Center was brought on as a partner to help residents reduce drug dealing and other criminal activities by changing the physical environment. The center’s approach, entitled Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED), encourages residents to reclaim public spaces such as parks and playgrounds that have been taken over by drug dealers, prostitutes, and others because they are poorly maintained or are not used by law-abiding citizens. Typical CPTED activities include the establishment of community gardens on vacant lots or staking “ownership” of street corners by having vigils.

Full implementation of Baltimore’s CCP initiative began in 1995. Implementation funding was provided not only through a Bureau of Justice Assistance discretionary grant, but also through grants from the Merck Foundation, the Abell Foundation, two Federal block grant programs (Byrne Memorial Block Grant Funds and Local Law Enforcement Block Grants), and in-kind contributions from the city’s Department of Public Works and the police. The CCP initiative has a number of critical program elements, which follow.

Community-based anticrime strategies

CCP sites use six strategies to reduce crime in target areas:

- Denying the drug trade and other criminal activities the space in which to operate by using CPTED and other measures to turn these spaces into viable community assets.
Profile No. 1 (continued)

- Maximizing the accountability and participation of all stakeholders in the community by building public support for crime reduction and increasing stakeholder responsibility for and participation in efforts to reduce crime.

- Removing the sense of impunity by working with the criminal justice system to increase the likelihood of arrest, prosecution, and sanctions and providing for community input at all stages of the criminal justice process.

- Expressing community intolerance for drug dealing and reclaiming public spaces, establishing citizen patrol groups, and holding street actions such as marches or vigils.

- Providing positive alternatives for children and adults (particularly recovering addicts) through youth programs, employment, and other alternatives to drug-related activities and developing support systems for recovering addicts.

- Developing community capacity to sustain the effort by organizing the community, developing local leaders, and strengthening community organizations. Community capacity includes the following:

  - A committed core of residents. Community change and improvement efforts can be successful only if there is resident involvement and leadership. Indeed, one of the criteria for selecting CCP sites was the existence of local organizations whose members were willing to play an active role in identifying problems and implementing solutions.

  - Community organizing. Neighborhoods in crisis face enormous obstacles and need high levels of support, especially during the early stages, to launch and sustain effective community campaigns. A paid community organizer is crucial in order to maximize the effectiveness of community efforts.

  - Community policing. In the CCP sites, full-time community foot patrol officers were freed from responding to calls for service and were assigned to work closely with residents to solve local problems. These officers attended meetings, became acquainted with residents, and targeted their law enforcement to resident-identified problems.

  - Legal assistance. CLC gave residents access to a number of civil legal remedies in their battles against crime, drugs, and social decay. Laws regarding drug nuisances, house receivership, self-help nuisance abatement, and housing and building code violations became part of the community’s legal
Profile No. 1 (continued)

arsenal. CLC also provided legal assistance with organizational development issues such as drafting bylaws and articles of incorporation.

- Capacity to address physical problems and to provide community-based alternatives to incarceration. Small-scale, physical improvements to a neighborhood—for example, turning a local dumping ground into a community garden in the course of a weekend—are enormously important to communities in crisis. In addition to adding to the area’s visible community assets, these incremental neighborhood improvements increase community spirit and build support for future residential action. Recovering addicts and other nonviolent ex-offenders can become important resources for this effort, performing community service as members of work crews that build communities ravaged by the kinds of activities in which they were once engaged.

- Other support services. Each CCP site has developed additional programs and services that are considered necessary to the success of the initiative. For example, four sites have worked with the Alternative Sentencing Unit to establish formal and informal systems to support recovering addicts. Other CCP sites have tried to secure additional resources for youth and have either established links with existing agencies or developed afterschool and summer programs of their own. Faith organizations like the Union Methodist Memorial Church also have been active in some CCP areas, providing meeting space, transportation, and support services for recovering substance abusers.

By the end of 1996, dramatic decreases in crime were being reported in CCP areas. In Boyd Booth, the pilot site, violent crimes were reduced by more than 50 percent between 1993 and 1996. There also was evidence of increased law enforcement activity: the number of arrests doubled or tripled in many core communities during that same period.

HotSpot Communities

In March 1997, in large part because of the success of the CCP effort, the Governor of Maryland launched the HotSpot Communities (HSC) Initiative as the next generation of community-based crime prevention. HSC incorporated all the main features of CCP and added several others. HSC sites had to include the following core elements:

- Community mobilization.
- Community policing.
- Community probation (including intensive supervision of adult and juvenile probationers and parolees through Operation Spotlight).
- Community maintenance (use of city code enforcement, offender work crews, civil legal remedies, and rapid response to “broken windows”).
- Youth prevention (afterschool programs, truancy and curfew enforcement, partnerships with schools and law-enforcement agencies).
- Local coordination of the Baltimore CCP/HSC program by The Mayor’s Coordinating Council on Criminal Justice.

In addition, HSC areas could adopt six enhancing elements: community prosecution, juvenile intervention, CPTED measures, victim outreach and assistance, community support for addiction recovery, or housing and business revitalization.
The Governor’s Office on Crime Control and Prevention, which partially funds the CCP/HSC program, invited every county and municipality in the State to apply for HSC funding. Two criteria were used to select the 56 communities that are now part of HSC: a concentration of fear and crime, based on police statistics for the targeted areas, and a community with a core group of committed residents and the capacity to launch and sustain the effort. Six hotspot communities were designated in the city of Baltimore, including several CCP sites.

The six hotspot communities in Baltimore are coordinated by The Mayor’s Coordinating Council on Criminal Justice. An Oversight Committee comprising agency heads and high-level representatives of all the institutions involved in HSC (i.e., the Department of Public Works, the Police Commissioner, and the Department of Parole and Probation) is responsible for overall program monitoring. A Sustainment/Evaluation Committee, composed of all the members of the Supervisory Teams discussed below, assesses the effectiveness of CCP/HSC programs and continually reviews and modifies goals and objectives.

A Supervisory Team, including senior staff from each of the agencies directly involved in HSC activities, meets quarterly and “creates a forum where the policies and goals of each agency, nonprofit, and service provider are integrated with the strategy in each area targeted for programming.” The Supervisory Team is composed of work groups that focus on the core HSC elements: community policing/community probation, community organizing, legal issues, community maintenance, and youth.

Finally, Neighborhood Safety Teams established in each of the HSC areas meet at least monthly to make specific decisions affecting communities. For example, Neighborhood Safety Teams decide which corners or streets will be targeted by community policing patrols, which houses should be the focus of a Drug Nuisance Abatement case, and what kinds of programs should be developed for youth to keep them free of drugs and crime. Each Neighborhood Safety Team has a community organizer, a police officer, a parole/probation agent, a community attorney, one or more community residents, and other representatives as needed.

The progression from the Comprehensive Communities Program to HotSpots represents the realization that long-term community change requires a systemwide approach. The work of separate agencies—arresting lawbreakers, prosecuting criminals, cleaning up neighborhoods, monitoring probationers—should coalesce under the single goal of creating a safe community. The police department must work with parole and probation officers to target career criminals, the housing department must work with the State’s Attorney to prosecute absentee slumlords, and all agencies must work with the community residents—who know best what their problems are and how to solve them.

The philosophy of comprehensiveness has influenced the way CCP/HSC is funded and managed. The $10.5 million that funds the statewide, 3-year initiative comes from many sources, including the Bureau of Justice Assistance’s Byrne Memorial Block Grants and the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention. However, HSC sites do not submit separate applications for each part of the funding mosaic that is relevant to their work, nor do they have to prepare separate progress and evaluation reports to meet the varying requirements of the funding agencies. Instead, The Governor’s Office on Crime
Control and Prevention has developed a unified reporting form for HSC sites, which disaggregates the information provided by the target communities and presents relevant data to the array of funders. The Governor’s Office on Crime Control and Prevention also has changed its own internal operations in response to this initiative.

**CCP/HSC coordination**

The goal of CCP/HSC is institutionalization of its work. The group has established partnerships with 24 Federal, State, and local agencies, and it is hoped that the activities initiated under this special funding project will become part of the core functions of the participating groups. There is some evidence that this has begun to take place. For example, the Baltimore Police Department has implemented a system for the exchange of intelligence between the community foot patrol officers and members of other specialized units, and each now supports the work of the other. The State’s Attorney’s Office established the Firearms Investigation/Violence Division in 1997 to allow for vertical prosecution of cases involving nonfatal shootings where the defendant had a history of firearm violence and handgun violations. Individuals from HSC’s are one of the offender groups being targeted through this division. In addition, the division targets individuals who are eligible for DISARM, a project of the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the District of Maryland (see profile 36).

Law enforcement activities in CCP/HSC sites also are coordinated through Baltimore’s Violent Crimes Division and its Youth Violence Strike Force (see profile 18). The two law enforcement programs work to reduce firearm-related offenses and may target specific individuals (such as gang members), geographic areas (high-crime corners and other hotspots), crimes (drug-related shootings), or weapons. Representatives from probation and parole departments, the courts, school police forces, and each of HSC’s Neighborhood Safety Teams serve as liaisons to the Violent Crimes Division and the Youth Violence Strike Force, helping them to determine enforcement priorities.

Another CCP/HSC partner is the Department of Housing and Community Development (HCD), which has supported the work of CCP/HSC by tripling the number of code violations issued by housing inspectors to close down buildings suspected of drug or gang activity. The Mayor also has established nine Neighborhood Service Centers (one in each police district) as a way to bring city services to the local level and make them more responsive to neighborhood needs. The Neighborhood Service Centers contain branch offices of all city government agencies—from housing and health inspectors, to human service workers, to business assistance coordinators. Two public elementary schools and a local recreation center also are CCP/HSC partners, providing youth programs in some of the targeted neighborhoods.

Maryland’s Department of Parole and Probation and the Department of Juvenile Justice have hired several parole and probation officers to target medium- and high-risk offenders in CCP/HSC neighborhoods, and the Federal Probation Office also has assigned one agent to each site. Among the initiative’s 10 nonprofit partners is Bon Secours Hospital, the largest employer in one of the CCP/HSC communities. The hospital has played an important role in economic and housing development—first building a multimillion-dollar Community
Support Center for local families and then launching a housing development initiative to renovate many vacant homes in the area.

**CCP evaluation**

Evaluation data on CCP/HSC is being collected in several ways. The Mayor's Coordinating Council for Criminal Justice is conducting an internal evaluation, which will provide process and outcome data on improvements in physical conditions, youth programs and services, community attitudes, and changes in community capacity. In addition, BOTEC is conducting a process evaluation for the Bureau of Justice Assistance, and the University of Maryland and the Urban Institute are collecting and analyzing data on crime, violence, and drug dealing in the targeted areas, to include analysis of displacement of crime. These evaluation reports will be available in 1999.
Profile No. 2

Boston Strategy To Prevent Youth Violence—Boston, MA

Program Type or Federal Program Source:
A research and action project of comprehensive gun violence reduction strategies;
National Institute of Justice.

Program Goal:
To reduce serious youth violence in Boston.

Specific Groups Targeted by the Strategy:
Youth 8-18 years old.

Geographical Area Targeted by the Strategy:
Boston, MA.

Evaluated by:
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Years of Operation:
1995–present.

Starting in the early to mid-1990’s, Boston embarked on a series of innovative public safety strategies that focused on violent youth and illicit gun markets. Using a problem-solving approach, a broad coalition of Federal, State, and local governmental agencies, nonprofit community service organizations, businesses, religious leaders, parents, and resident stakeholders developed several programs to address the escalating number of juvenile homicides. Its enforcement strategy largely consisted of Operation Ceasefire (a gang violence abatement strategy; see profile 21), the Boston Gun Project (a gun suppression and interdiction strategy; see profile 10), and Operation Night Light (a police-probation partnership; see profile 33), each of which is described in detail below. In addition to enforcement efforts, and in keeping with its new neighborhood policing strategy, Boston also employed numerous prevention and intervention initiatives. Working with community partners, the city built on existing services in the communities to create a more extensive and effective continuum of services.

It took approximately 2 years (from 1994 to 1996) for Boston to develop its strategic plan, with hundreds of neighborhoods, community-based programs, and neighborhood groups mobilized and brought into the process. During this same period, the Boston Police Department was undergoing great change in its neighborhood policing initiatives. More than 400 participants in 16 teams (roughly half police and half other stakeholders) worked on the planning phases.

In July 1996, at about the same time that Operation Ceasefire began to be implemented,
Profile No. 2 (continued)

the police department published a Citywide Strategic Plan, which examined neighborhood policing goals across districts, identified players, and provided the standards and principles to guide the strategic effort. The strategic plan laid out several key components of neighborhood policing, including increasing ownership and accountability among command and patrol staff, incorporating prevention and problem-solving approaches at every level of operation, and building partnerships with stakeholders on planning and tactical issues. To accomplish these objectives, the police commissioner decentralized the department and instituted a “Same Cop, Same Neighborhood” patrol organization strategy, which assigned officers to certain blocks in neighborhoods so that they would become familiar with local issues and take a problem-solving approach in cooperation with the residents.

Also in 1996, the State enacted two laws to address violent juvenile offenders. First, the Youthful Offender statute, passed in October 1996, allowed prosecutors to indict violent youthful offenders between the ages of 14 and 17 on felony charges. Upon conviction, these juveniles can receive increased penalties in the form of adult sentences or Department of Youth Services (DYS) commitments until the age of 21, with or without a suspended adult sentence. Second, the Brett-Martin law, passed in early 1996, required that juveniles convicted of firearm possession be committed to DYS for a minimum of 6 months. In addition, the Suffolk County District Attorney’s Office began to prosecute certain juveniles on a priority basis. These juveniles were considered threats to community safety yet could not be prosecuted under the Youthful Offender statute because of their age, lack of a previous record, or because they were charged with misdemeanors rather than felonies.

Problem-solving research for Operation Ceasefire and the Boston Gun Project

Researchers from the John F. Kennedy School of Government (KSG) at Harvard University received funding from the National Institute of Justice to apply problemsolving techniques to youth gun violence in Boston and to evaluate the effort. The research was divided into demand-side (focus on youth) and supply-side (focus on guns) components. In the demand-side research, KSG researchers looked at youth homicide data from 1990 to 1994 in Boston and found that crime was confined almost entirely to Boston’s poor, African-American neighborhoods and was committed primarily by 15- to 21-year-old African-American males. Researchers also found that firearms were overwhelmingly the weapons of choice. KSG also looked at youth emergency room visits for nonfatal gunshot and sharp instrument wounds. Researchers then studied data on 155 youth murder victims and 125 known youth offenders who committed gun or knife homicides. They found that both victims and offenders had a high degree of prior criminal involvement that included court actions ranging from arraignments to sentences of probation.

From the outset, researchers worked closely with a team of police officers from the department’s Youth Violence Strike Force (YVSF), with probation officers covering high-risk youth gun violence neighborhoods (especially those engaged in the Night Light program), and with city-employed youth gang outreach workers, known as “street-workers.” Practitioners believed that the youth violence problem was mainly a problem of gangs and that only a handful of dangerous gang offenders—maybe no more than one-tenth of all gang members—were driving the cycle of fear and gun crimes in
neighborhoods. Probation officers introduced researchers to a sample of young probationers who were interviewed in focus groups or individually in winter 1994 and summer 1995. Many of the juveniles said they had guns for self-defense and joined gangs for protection.

The main thrust of the KSG analysis consisted of geographical mapping over the summer of 1995. The working group of practitioners pooled their knowledge and provided the researchers with information on gang size, turf, alliances, and conflicts. They also classified 5 years of youth homicide victimization data and tied it to gangs. Boston had 61 gangs with about 1,300 members from 4 neighborhoods; these groups committed 60 percent or more of the youth homicides in the city. Based on this information, researchers constructed a territorial map of the identified gangs, containing practitioners’ estimates of membership size and sociograms of alliances and antagonisms. This territorial map identified which gangs should be targeted in order to disrupt key sources of conflict. Network analysis also led to strategies to communicate a deterrence message to targeted gangs by identifying cliques that would, in turn, be most efficient at getting that message out to the largest number of gang members.

The researchers were fortunate in having access to a very rich gun data set from the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF). Every gun that had been used in a crime and which had come into police hands since 1991 had been traced and included in the ATF data set. Out of 1,550 records of guns from youth ages 21 and under, 809 were traceable to Federal firearm licensees, first retail purchases, or both. ATF analyzed the type, caliber, make, geographic origin, and “time-to-crime” age for each gun; the proportion of guns with obliterated serial numbers; the number of guns that had been used in substantive crimes versus those seized by police on possession charges; and adult versus youth gun patterns. In addition, ATF determined that at least half of the guns came from very small and infrequent purchases by straw purchasers and that these purchasers rarely received law enforcement attention. Interviews with youth confirmed the belief that guns were readily available to them—through illegal purchase or borrowing. A gang might have only a few guns, but they were available to all members. Contrary to common belief, youth shunned guns that had been used in burglaries because they knew that the weapons had been used in other crimes and did not want to be held responsible.

The supply-side research dispelled the generally held belief that Boston youth gangs obtained their guns from southern States with lax gun laws. Contrarily to expectations, 34 percent of traceable guns were first sold at retail in Massachusetts and close to 15 percent were from nearby New England States. Most of the guns recovered were handguns and semiautomatic pistols. Semiautomatic weapons had the shortest “time-to-crime”: more than 40 percent were less than 2 years old. Serious crimes typically involved more shotguns, more in-State guns, and fewer obliterated serial numbers than guns associated with the possession charges of less serious youth offenders. In summary, the supply-side analyses indicated that new guns were coming into the youth illicit market at close to first retail sale.

**Law enforcement strategies**

**Operation Ceasefire**

Operation Ceasefire is a coordinated citywide strategy established in May 1996 to deter youth firearm violence. Ceasefire operates as a system, focusing interventions...
Profile No. 2 (continued)

through the coordination and knowledge of all of the city's law enforcement and criminal justice agencies. The working group devised an overall strategy based on the problem-solving research of KSG and ATF, described above, and the success of tactics that had worked against gangs in the past. The goal was to communicate warnings to gangs that, if violence occurred, there would be a swift, predictable response with weighty consequences. Ceasefire has the leadership and support of the current mayor and police commissioner.

YVSF led the development of the strategy working with the U.S. Attorney, State probation, ATF, the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), the Federal Bureau of Investigation, DYS, the county district attorney, the clergy, streetworkers (see profile 58), and at times local community-based service providers. Prior to Operation Ceasefire, law enforcement and criminal justice agencies operated not as a system but as a disparate group of agencies, each following its own mandate and mission except when necessity dictated otherwise.

The strategy began with focused communications. Probation and gang unit police officers who knew the youth, streetworkers, clergy (see profile 46), and community-based organizations met informally and formally with gang youth in schools, homes, neighborhoods, courthouses, and other locations. Probationers were required to attend these meetings. The message was emphatically delivered to them that violence would no longer be tolerated in Boston—it had to stop or the full weight of the law enforcement and criminal justice systems would be brought to bear on the perpetrators. The working group wanted youth to realize that this zero tolerance message was not a bluff, but a serious interagency effort. True to its word, when its message was ignored and gang violence erupted, YVSF used intensive order maintenance and enforcement tactics to quickly suppress flareups of firearm violence in emerging gang hotspots. YVSF targeted noncomplying gangs with aggressive enforcement of public drinking and motor vehicle violations, outstanding warrants, and probation surrenders and made numerous arrests. Street enforcement resulted in two dozen Federal indictments and arrests in August 1996. News of these activities quickly spread to other gangs in Boston whose members saw what could happen if they did not comply.

Boston Gun Project

Based on the analysis conducted on the ATF tracing data set, the working group decided to flag for investigation every trace that showed guns with a time-to-crime of less than 30 months, more popular gun types, guns with restored serial numbers, those in high-risk neighborhoods, and those associated with gang members or territories. Another tactic was to link the trace data set with the gang membership and turf data, which allowed for identification of gun owners who also were gang members.

Disruption of gun markets, swift Federal prosecution for gun possession or dealing, and the zero tolerance message and enforcement measures of Operation Ceasefire were all used to reduce gun violence. The major partners in gun trafficking interdiction efforts were the ATF Field Office in Boston, the Boston Police Department, the Suffolk County District Attorney's Office, and the U.S. Attorney's Office, all of whom worked together to direct the investigations of firearm trafficking and armed career criminals in the city of Boston. The Boston ATF supervisor claims the key to their success has been the close working relationship and genuine cooperation between ATF and local police.
Profile No. 2 (continued)

Cooperation between ATF and the police department took many forms. A seasoned Violent Crime Coordinator was assigned by ATF to investigate Federal firearm arrests. ATF attempted to trace every gun recovered by the Boston Police Department through ATF’s National Tracing Center in order to discover sources of illegal weapons and gun-trafficking patterns. For their part, YVSF officers tried to extract gun market information from offenders charged with serious nongun charges. The Boston Police Department and ATF also conducted joint inspections of all Federal firearms licensees (FFLs) in Boston. As a result of these inspections, 65 license holders (80 percent) decided either not to renew their licenses or to surrender them.

Swift Federal prosecution for gun trafficking also took some traffickers off the streets and resulted in the investigation and prosecution of several interstate gun trafficking rings. These actions were thought to have a deterrent effect because Federal crimes carry longer sentences than most State gun crimes, and gang members fear being in a Federal correctional facility—away from home and visitors and without the security of knowing other prisoners.

Operation Night Light

Operation Night Light began in November 1992 as a partnership between probation officers in the Dorchester District Court and Boston police officers in the Anti-Gang Violence Unit, which later became YVSF. Operation Night Light pairs one probation officer with two police officers to make unannounced visits to the homes, schools, and workplaces of high-risk youth probationers during the nontraditional hours of 7 p.m. to midnight rather than between 8:30 a.m. and 4:30 p.m., which was previously the norm.

The probation officer decides which of 10 to 15 probationers to visit each evening based on which youth were defaulting on compliance. The team wears plain clothes and uses an unmarked car. The terms of probation—which commonly include curfews, geographic restrictions, and other constraints designed to keep youth from reoffending—are strictly enforced. Probation officers also have been instrumental in convincing judges to impose expanded conditions.

This teaming has enhanced the safety of the probation officers and given police an opportunity to meet people in the community in a nonconfrontational manner in accordance with their community policing role. Officers are expected to conduct themselves during these home visits in a courteous and professional manner, encouraging parents to keep their children out of trouble. The officers discuss substance abuse prevention and treatment options with the probationers and their families. Some parents welcome these interactions, as they want to protect their children from becoming victims of violence. These unannounced home visits also give borderline juveniles an excuse for staying in at night and putting off their gang leaders or associates with the argument that they would face sanctions for violating curfew.

The best intervention and enforcement efforts are also preventive. In the same way, the best prevention programs produce intervention effects. While the prevention/intervention/enforcement strategy is seen as providing a continuum of services, effects overlap. The strategy has evolved in this way because of the complexity of the overall problem.

—Commissioner Paul F. Evans
Boston, MA, Police Commissioner
Profile No. 2 (continued)

Intervention and prevention programs and initiatives in Boston

Below are some examples of intervention and prevention programs aimed at adjudicated and at-risk youth that were implemented simultaneously with Operation Ceasefire.

Boston Community Centers’ Streetworkers Program

Boston has Community Centers located throughout the city, including facilities in middle and high schools. The Streetworkers Program operates from these centers with 30 college-educated staff members available 24 hours a day to conduct gang and youth outreach. The streetworkers are ages 25 to 55 and work closely with gang members to mediate disputes (student/student, student/teacher, gang/gang) and gang truces in schools and throughout the community. The streetworkers also help gang members and their families gain access to much-needed social services. Each streetworker is assigned to 5 to 10 gangs, with a caseload of roughly 25 active and 25 less active cases. They work closely with the police department, probation, clergy, courts, and schools.

When the city’s homicide rate skyrocketed in 1990, the mayor sought the help of the streetworkers in the hope that their non-traditional outreach approaches could help reduce crime. For example, the streetworkers played an important role in Operation Ceasefire, personally inviting gang members to meetings with Federal, State, and local law enforcement agencies. The streetworkers informed gang members of the consequences of continued violence. They also referred youth to agencies that could provide social services, job training, and employment opportunities. Finally, streetworkers provided training for the police on how to develop relationships with youth and gangs.

Youth Services Providers Network (YSPN)

To achieve the comprehensive services, partnerships, coalition building, and resource sharing required of youth programs under the Comprehensive Communities Program grant, a network of services was formed in three of Boston’s most troubled neighborhoods. The network is a partnership of many of Boston’s youth service organizations and city agencies to address teenage runaways, dropout prevention, mentoring, job training and placement, tutoring, and building leadership skills. A police officer who comes across a youth in need of services calls the social worker or a District Community Service Officer, who then makes the appropriate referral to the network provider agency. From YSPN’s implementation in June 1996 until September 1998, more than 500 youth had been referred by officers.

Alternatives to Incarceration Network (ATIN)

The network links various State and local criminal justice agencies, including the district courts, to Boston service providers. This network is supported by the Comprehensive Communities Program grant. Individuals enter ATIN as a condition for their sentence deferment or as a condition for parole or probation. Youth offenders receive counseling, substance abuse treatment, job skills training, and monitoring services.

Safe Neighborhood Initiative (SNI)

This initiative offers community residents the opportunity to work with law enforcement
and government officials to identify and address neighborhood issues using SNI advisory councils and subcontracted programs. The Office of the Attorney General administers the program, which began in 1995, in cooperation with the Suffolk County District Attorney’s Office, the mayor’s office, and the police department. SNI targets four high-crime, low-income neighborhoods. Its revitalization efforts include the organization and education of local merchants, job training programs, expedited city services, and a municipal priority to rehabilitate abandoned property. SNI also supports expanded hours for community-based youth centers, counseling services for children in domestic violence situations, a Child Witness to Violence Project, a Vietnamese police liaison who mediates gang disputes and conducts school presentations, gang dispute mediation by the Dorchester Youth Collaborative, small business training, an SNI prosecution team, voluntary business closures to avoid late-night crowds, a drug education program for youth, and a law student project that recommends ways to reduce drugs, prostitution, and crime. Funding comes from the Bureau of Justice Assistance, which recently approved a new 4-year grant.

**Summer of Opportunity**

In 1994, the Boston-based John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Company began providing financial support to an 8-week summer program that pays urban youth a weekly stipend while providing them with classes, field trips, and a real-world internship at Northeastern University or John Hancock. The internships teach youth leadership and life skills, including conflict resolution and time management, and also assign mentors. Youth are referred by the antiviolence unit of the police department. Many program graduates complete high school and go on to college or obtain employment.

**Outcomes**

Since Operation Ceasefire, the Boston Gun Project, Operation Night Light, neighborhood policing, tougher youth offender laws, and expanded prevention and intervention programs went into effect, there has been a dramatic decrease in the number of homicides in the city of Boston. The table presented below illustrates these results. This reduction in homicides and youth homicides cannot directly be attributed to any one of these programs but more likely is due to the

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>24 and Younger</th>
<th>16 and Younger (Firearm-Related)</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>152</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998*</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*(first 8 months)
cumulative impact of this comprehensive, multipronged approach.

Other outcomes also resulted from these programs. First, citywide collaboration has now been institutionalized. For example, in reaction to the threat of recruitment of young Bostonians by the Crips and Bloods gangs, a group of police, probation officers, religious leaders, and streetworkers visited middle school students in their schools and homes before school ended in June 1998. Second, as a result of these efforts, communities are now regularly consulted by public agencies in setting agendas for their neighborhoods. Finally, Boston has become a national model for youth gun violence reduction, and the Boston Police Department won an Innovations in American Government award from the Ford Foundation and KSG in 1997. Operation Ceasefire recently won the Herman Goldstein award for best program employing problem-solving strategies.
Profile No. 3

Buffalo Weed and Seed Initiative—Buffalo, NY

Program Type or Federal Program Source:
A program of comprehensive gun violence reduction strategies; Executive Office for Weed and Seed.

Program Goal:
To reduce crime, to improve economic and housing development.

Specific Groups Targeted by the Strategy:
Violent perpetrators.

Geographical Area Targeted by the Strategy:
Weed and Seed area in Buffalo, NY.

Evaluated by:
Internal data collection.

Contact Information:
Oswaldo Mestre
Director of Weed and Seed
Department of Community Development
City Hall, Room 920
Buffalo, NY 14202
Phone: 716–851–4281

Years of Operation:
1997–present.

By 1994, the dramatically increasing violent crime rate that took place throughout the late 1980's and early 1990's had earned the city of Buffalo, NY, a reputation as one of the highest homicide centers in the country for a population base of its size. A declining infrastructure and subsequent rise in drug- and gang-related violence contributed to the city's significant crime problems. Since 1954, Buffalo has witnessed a population decrease from approximately 600,000 to 328,000 residents, leaving many communities with a proliferation of abandoned houses that would eventually become "drug dens" supporting the storage, trafficking, and marketing of illegal narcotics. Similar to many other urban centers, gun- and gang-related violence in the city are intricately tied to the drug trade. The rise in the number of these drug dens not only brought drugs and criminal elements into many Buffalo neighborhoods, but also created a downward spiral in the quality of life for residents, paralyzing many in fear.

Violent crimes reached their peak in Buffalo in 1994. Between 1993 and 1994, homicides in the city increased 19 percent (from 79 to 94). Since 1994, Buffalo has followed the national trend of steadily decreasing violent crime. Violent crime decreased 38 percent between 1993 and 1997 (from 6,041 to 4,052). Between 1994 and 1997, Part II weapons offenses witnessed a 12-percent decrease (from 430 to 384). Similarly, a review of gun-related calls for service demonstrates an overall decline in gun activity in Buffalo: calls about assault with a deadly weapon declined 33 percent between 1994 and 1997 (from 1,146 to 892), reports of a subject with a gun declined 38 percent (from 3,149 to 1,972), and reports of shots fired declined 26 percent (from 2,515 to 1,860). One of the major factors contributing to this decrease in Buffalo was the targeting of key gangs in the high-crime areas of the city, resulting in the removal of four of the most violent groups.

Recognizing that its declining crime rates could not be sustained without a coordinated approach that targets serious offenders in its neighborhoods while the areas are...
Profile No. 3 (continued)

being revitalized and restored through economic and housing development activities, the city applied for and received a U.S. Department of Justice Weed and Seed grant, which was initiated in April 1997. Underlying Buffalo’s Weed and Seed strategies are two assumptions:

- Neighborhood residents must directly participate in recommending solutions to reduce and prevent crime and to redevelop their neighborhoods.
- The Buffalo Police Department will work with the City of Buffalo Community Development Department, schools, business associations, block clubs, social service agencies, and other community-based organizations in the targeted areas to implement a coordinated Weed and Seed program.

The Buffalo Weed and Seed program targets the core of the inner city, encompassing portions of four councilmatic districts in one of the city’s most socioeconomically distressed areas. The target area comprises 36,231 residents, representing 11 percent of the city population, of whom 95 percent are African-American. In addition to consistently being a major source of the city’s homicides and other violent crimes (in 1995, there were 17 homicides in the area—more than 25 percent of the citywide total of 62), the target area also has the city’s highest rates of teenage pregnancy, unemployment, and infant mortality.

Comprehensiveness and integration of the strategies

The Buffalo Weed and Seed program represents a comprehensive strategy covering enforcement-based prevention and intervention strategies. The Buffalo Police Department and Community Development Office have sought ways to involve community feedback and partnership at all levels of the program, although it was primarily driven by law enforcement in its first year.

The underlying philosophy of the program is that while law enforcement activities are necessary to rid communities of criminal aspects, sustainable change will occur only if a stable community infrastructure is built at the same time. To this end, the seeding activities involve a strong community capacity-building element that provides residents with the necessary skills to be informed participants in both law enforcement and community restoration activities.

Although there is a formal structure to the program consisting of a Steering Committee, a Weed Subcommittee, and a Seed Subcommittee, overall coordination remains informal but effective. Collaboration occurs across all levels of government with each agency/organization knowing whom to contact to accomplish the Weed and Seed objectives.

Enforcement-based strategies:
The Weed component

The Buffalo Police Department developed a coordinated approach to gun suppression that involves collaboration across Federal, State, and local levels. In addition to a gun detail that engages in targeted activities against gun-involved offenders and locations, the U.S. Attorney’s Office works with local prosecutors to ensure that a zero tolerance policy is carried through all levels of the criminal justice system.

Gun Abatement Program

At the core of the Weed component is the Gun Abatement Program, which is designed to reduce the availability of guns on the streets by targeting drug and weapon
dealers and high-crime locations. A gun hotline was developed for citizens to report gun locations or offenders, but it had fewer calls than expected. Officers of the precinct went door-to-door to area residents, businesses, and churches to hand out material related to the program including magnetized cards and coffee mugs with the hotline number on them. Although the hotline itself did not produce many tips, a surprising benefit of the door-to-door interviewing was the confiscation of 30 weapons by the officers canvassing the neighborhood. These guns were retrieved by parental consent to search children’s bedrooms and attics or basements where the children hang out with their friends. Because the police department’s focus is on both arrests and removing guns from circulation, informants whom the officers met on the streets also relinquished several guns. These activities also served as a public relations tool by promoting the efforts of the department and sending a message to potential violators.

The identification and targeting of drug dealers also is a central strategy of the gun abatement strategy. Operating on the assumption that wherever gangs or drug dealers congregate, a gun is nearby, gun abatement officers searched abandoned houses in these locations and confiscated 47 weapons, more than 3,300 rounds of ammunition, and 2 bulletproof vests. Drug dealers were stopped, and on several occasions this tactic resulted in arrests for gun possession. Once any individual is arrested for weapons possession, his or her mug shot is put on display in the precinct to allow other officers to become familiar with him or her. Coordinated drug raids with several Federal, State, and local law enforcement agencies resulted in the seizure of 30 additional weapons. To date, a total of 262 weapons have been confiscated as a result of these gun abatement program activities.

Every gun seized by officers is subjected to a point-of-origin trace by an ATF special agent, who works closely with both the gun abatement officers and Federal prosecutors. These traces have resulted in 15 criminal investigations and identification of 2 major gun traffickers. Gun abatement officers refer trace data to ATF for further investigation and to the lieutenant in charge of the Gun Abatement Program to enhance the development of targeted strategies.

Collaboration with the district attorney’s office

The appointment of a special prosecutor to work specifically with the gun abatement officers is an important complement to the street-based enforcement strategies. Having one prosecutor concentrate on gun-related offenses develops a skill base and resources in the manner that is common for many other crimes (e.g., sexual assault prosecutor and domestic violence prosecutor). Six convictions have been achieved in the last year. Collaboration with the district attorney’s office also has included training gun abatement officers on gun frisks, profiling gun carriers on the streets, teaching witnesses to articulate suspicions in court, and promoting safety on the street.

Operation Save Our Streets

Save Our Streets, a program initiated in 1995, recently has been revitalized and incorporated into the Weed and Seed Program through the hiring of a coordinator. Fifteen agencies are a part of the Save Our Streets Task Force, including members from the Narcotics Division of the Buffalo Police Department, City Hall’s Department of Community Development, the Mayor’s Task Force on Housing, the District Attorney’s Office, Erie County Probation Department, Erie County Department of Social Services,
Profile No. 3 (continued)

New York State Division of Parole, United States Marshals Service, and the U.S. Attorney's Office. The task force targets houses in the Weed and Seed area suspected of involvement in drug use and facilitating criminal activity. Using Federal asset forfeiture laws to gain access to a property, each agency or department on the task force is responsible for a particular problem facing the individual property. A response team is set up for each agency to enforce its respective ordinances and to ensure that the owner and tenants of the property are properly held accountable for violations. Where problems persist, the city chooses from a wide range of program-oriented missions to reclaim the property and to place it back into productive use in the community. Many properties have been demolished and turned into community gardens and parks.

**Flex Unit: Zero tolerance enforcement**

The Buffalo Police Department also has hired 20 officers under the COPS Distressed Neighborhood Program and has initiated a “Flex Unit” in an economically distressed, high-crime community close to the Weed and Seed target area. The Flex Unit ultimately will be deployed in target areas throughout the city. Based on traditional crime analysis techniques (e.g., mapping data of robberies, murders, and gangs) and a review of the availability of community assets (e.g., community leadership and community block clubs), the target area was selected and broken down into low-, medium-, and high-risk areas. An essential ingredient of target area selection was the presence of a hub area, such as a park or community house, which could serve as the physical, community locus for the project. The Flex Unit seeks to saturate the area with a zero tolerance policy that targets habitual offenders, eliminates crack and vacant houses, and works with the community to improve the quality of life. The Unit focuses its efforts in the low-risk area, before gradually moving into the designated medium- and high-risk areas. Activities are continued in the target area until both council members and the community indicate that enough of an infrastructure has been established to sustain outcomes in the absence of the Unit. Within the first 2 months of the program, the Flex Unit had made a total of 105 arrests, enforced 43 city ordinances, and served 19 warrants.

**Community mobilization and restoration: The link between the Weed and Seed components**

A central focus of the Weed and Seed program involves the mobilization of community input and support to develop specific strategies and activities. Although the first-year Weed efforts were primarily driven by law enforcement, planning is well underway to make community residents a key ingredient in both the Weed and Seed components of the program. Plans include working with existing block clubs, working to establish community groups where none currently exist, and building on the Buffalo Police Department's community policing stations located throughout the city.

The Weed and Seed coordinator works directly with a coalition of block clubs that involves community leaders from the target area. By collaborating with this group, the Weed and Seed program receives tips and information that contribute to enforcement activities. Year 2 objectives include collaborating with the coalition in the development of an overall strategic plan to enhance the quality of life in the target area, including the identification of new Seed strategies.
Profile No. 3 (continued)

Training will be provided to police officers and community groups within the target area in group facilitation methods, resource identification, and problem solving using the Scanning, Analysis, Response, and Assessment model. To complement its work with the block clubs, the Weed and Seed program also has developed junior block clubs in the target area, which may ultimately be linked to the Youth Police Academy offered by the BPD’s Citizen Advisory Group.

Community police stations

Weed and Seed community mobilization activities are integrated with the Buffalo Police Department’s efforts to implement community policing throughout the city. Community policing stations have been or will be established in each of the city’s districts, staffed by a combination of VISTA volunteer workers and citizens committed to improving the quality of life in their neighborhoods. The Buffalo Police Department developed the V.I.A.B.L.E. (Volunteers Assisting in Buffalo Law Enforcement) program to train residents in community policing and develop the necessary skills to volunteer at the community policing stations. The stations enable residents to bring their quality-of-life concerns to community police officers and to provide tips and other information to the police department. The stations also serve as meeting places for community groups and block clubs throughout the city. The Weed and Seed coordinator uses these resources to enhance community input into Weed and Seed.

Neighborhood improvement

Through the formation of the Mayor’s Impact Team (MIT), the city has created a coordinated force involving all city departments to clean up Buffalo’s neglected neighborhoods and to encourage residents to take an active role in maintaining the integrity of their neighborhoods by expanding existing block clubs or forming new clubs where none exist. In response to input received from block club and council members, the MIT goes into neighborhoods and takes care of a variety of quality-of-life issues by removing debris produced by illegal dumping, boarding up abandoned properties, carrying out building inspections, enforcing codes, landscaping, and addressing any other necessary issues. Of particular interest, much of the work carried out by the MIT is done by people required to perform community service (e.g., probationers and people cited for DWI). Members of the MIT work closely with the Operation Save Our Streets program to combat the existence of abandoned houses throughout the city.

Resident street patrols

Weed and Seed also collaborates with a local chapter of the national organization MAD DADS (Men Against Destruction—Defending Against Drugs and Social Disorder). MAD DADS is currently training volunteers to participate effectively in street patrols within the Weed and Seed target area. The street patrols are viewed as an instrument for providing a positive presence of community residents on the street as a complement to the Weed and Seed program. In addition to the street patrols, MAD DADS offers mentoring and surrogate father support programs to those youth they contact on the street. The Masten Block Club Coalition also has developed a Neighborhood Crime Watch program to develop street patrols on particular blocks within the target area.

Buffalo has witnessed a positive change in police-community relations, through both the above strategies and other police-community partnerships across the city, such as the Neighborhood Initiatives (police-community
partnerships) that the department has initiated in four neighborhoods in addition to the Weed and Seed target area.

High-risk youth intervention and prevention activities: The Seed component

The Seed Subcommittee of the Weed and Seed program works through block clubs to organize and support the efforts of each block club in the target area, offer training programs for the block clubs within the target area, and regularly meet with the three Safe Haven sites to develop integrated strategies.

Safe Haven

The focal point of the Seed component is its Safe Haven program, with three Safe Haven sites now operating in the three corners of the target area boundaries. Each Safe Haven offers a range of services to the target area including job skills training, family services referrals, adult literacy programs, tutoring, firearm prevention education, and recreational programming. At all three Safe Haven sites, parents are encouraged to participate in the children’s educational and recreational activities.

One of the Safe Haven sites is located in a former church that was scheduled for demolition, but was renovated to become the King Urban Life Center. As a part of the Buffalo Board of Education, the site offers state-of-the-art distance learning and multimedia portfolios that not only enhance the parent and child’s learning experience, but also expose them to the new advances in technology. In addition to educational programs for youth within the target area, the King Urban Life Center offers adult literacy programs to develop the skills of area parents.

Another Safe Haven site, located in a community school in the heart of the target area, offers extended hours and provides a meeting area for youth, adult residents, block clubs, and local community groups. A wide variety of educational and recreational programming is offered at the site. In addition, it offers a Family Support Center designed to link comprehensive community-based services to the student population and their families. Providers linked to the Center through referrals include Child and Family Services, Child and Adolescent Treatment Services, the Erie County Department of Social Services, a community health care center, and the Greater Buffalo Council on Alcoholism and Substance Abuse. Although the school once suffered from the violence and drug problems characteristic of many urban centers, it has become a truly safe space for community youth and adults. The community school reports no significant problems with weapons violations or drug and gang activity.

Alternatives for youthful offenders

The Buffalo Police Department also works with the First Time/Last Time program, an alternative to incarceration for first-time youth offenders throughout Erie County. All youth entering the program receive intake counseling and are then referred to one of numerous resource agencies in the area participating in the program. Throughout its first year of operation, the program served 493 youth, with 96 drug/alcohol referrals, 220 education referrals, 79 employment referrals, 13 residential referrals, 25 mental health referrals, 94 community service placements, and 18 other referrals.

Truancy abatement

The attendance improvement model (AIM) involves a collaboration between Buffalo
police officers and the schools to bring truant youth back into the school system. Officers work with parents and educators to deal with individuals who are not reporting to school. AIM officers also work with students who have been identified as at risk in areas such as conflict management, peer disputes, anti-violence training, and trouble-spot monitoring near city schools. To date, 78 truants have been returned to school, 44 home investigations have taken place, 19 adults and 17 juveniles have been arrested, and 64 presentations have been given by AIM officers.

Curfew enforcement

A Curfew Ordinance Enforcement project also has been implemented by the Buffalo Police Department in collaboration with the Erie County Department of Social Services/Child and Family Services and Compass Houses. In its first 50 nights of operation, 471 citations were issued, 1,626 noncurfew violations contacts with youth older than 17 were made, and 22 arrests were made. Rather than simply returning youth to problem environments, the Buffalo Police Department referred cases to the Department of Social Services for case management where necessary.

The Weed and Seed program has recently received funding from AmeriCorps to hire 32 youth and young adults to engage in designated seeding projects throughout the target area.

In addition to the above program highlights, a wide variety of seeding activities were implemented in year 1, including those listed below:

♦ A book drive benefiting the Erie County Youth Detention Center.

♦ The establishment of a community garden on the site of a former drug house across from one of the Safe Havens.

♦ The hiring of 30 youth (ages 13 to 17) through the Mayor’s Summer Youth Opportunities and Internship program, who were placed with various community-based organizations and area businesses in the target area.


Impacts of the Buffalo Weed and Seed Initiative

Part I crimes within the target area have decreased 31 percent since 1996, comparing the 9-month period of January to September. Within this total, homicides have decreased 38 percent, rapes have decreased 14 percent, and aggravated assaults have decreased 36 percent. While the target area used to average 15 to 20 shooting deaths per year, only 1 such death has occurred within the first 12 months. The dramatic drop in homicides and aggravated assaults cannot be directly attributed to any of these strategies in isolation, but more likely is the result of the cumulative impact of all these strategies.

In the first 9 months of 1997, Part I crimes within the target area decreased 31 percent compared with the same timeframe in 1996.

Weed and Seed has provided the City of Buffalo an opportunity to show the power of police and the community working together and focusing our efforts toward common problems, and to once again prove the maxim that the whole is greater than the sum of its parts.

— Rocco J. Diina
Commissioner of Police, Buffalo, NY
Comprehensive Homicide Initiative—Richmond, CA

Program Type or Federal Program Source:
A program of comprehensive gun violence reduction strategies; Bureau of Justice Assistance.

Program Goal:
To provide a coordinated focus for all programs and practices designed to address homicide in Richmond through community-based intervention strategies and targeted enforcement strategies.

Specific Groups Targeted by the Strategy:
Youth and adults who commit violent crime.

Geographical Area Targeted by the Strategy:
Richmond, CA, and western Contra Costa County.

Evaluated by:
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Years of Operation:
1995–present.

One of the communities of the East Bay Public Safety Corridor Partnership (EBPSCP), Richmond, CA, has implemented a comprehensive approach to reducing violent crime both in collaboration with the other EBPSCP communities and on its own (see profile 5). The results of its efforts dramatically illustrate the impact that a comprehensive, multijurisdiction strategy can make on crime reduction.

Drug- and gang-related violence in Richmond, CA, increased markedly throughout the 1980's. By 1991, the city's all-time high of 62 homicides, among a population of 98,000, was 7 times the national average. The portion of these homicides that were drug- or gang-related increased from 5 percent to 55 percent between 1989 and 1991. Shots fired increased 51 percent, from 1,687 calls in 1990 to 2,640 calls by 1992. In 1992, Richmond Police responded to a 911 emergency call every 7 minutes.

To combat the problem, Richmond implemented a communitywide murder reduction strategy, based on the recommendations of the 1992 International Association of Chiefs of Police Murder in America Summit Study. Elements of this strategy included (1) intervening against all forms of violence as early as possible; (2) using technology to improve clearances; (3) intensifying community policing and murder-specific problem-solving strategies; (4) creating an advisory committee to assist with murder reduction; (5) involving all segments of the community in violence prevention and control; (6) intensifying alcohol consumption reduction programs; (7) providing cash and other incentives to citizens for information on violent crimes and crimes involving guns; (8) providing safe havens for youth after normal school hours; (9) training police officers to recognize and respond to different
Profile No. 4 (continued)

kinds of violence, including domestic violence; and (10) becoming involved in schools to reduce violence and violent behaviors.

Richmond received support in implementing these strategies from EBPSCP (see profile 5). Financial support for Richmond’s initiatives came from a State of California police-hiring supplement, a Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA) grant to implement the Comprehensive Homicide Initiative Project, an Office of Community Oriented Policing (COPS) grant, and a number of other smaller grants. Over the 5-year period 1993–98, the grants totaled $1.7 million.

Enforcement-based strategies

The Richmond Police Department adopted the following investigative and enforcement strategies: (1) developed an intensified team approach to obtain information on high-profile homicides; (2) obtained FBI assistance in reviewing old and unsolved (“cold”) homicide cases; (3) obtained DEA, FBI, and California Bureau of Narcotics Enforcement assistance in targeting violence-prone members of the drug culture; (4) assigned an evidence specialist to the Richmond Police Department’s detective bureau; and (5) improved information sharing and technology within the department.

Homicide cases that can be closed through quick and intensive information-gathering efforts are systematically identified. However, different protocols are used to gather intelligence in cases involving “set-on-set” gang or turf-related murders (in which retaliatory violence is likely and possibly preventable) and in cases that have drawn extraordinary public attention. To investigate gang-related homicides and prevent or interrupt reciprocal violence, the department maintains extensive up-to-date inform-

ation on gang members, their activities, and their disputes. Increased surveillance of gang members can lead to seizures of guns and drugs and to arrests prior to outbreaks of firearm violence. Seizures of vehicles on traffic or license violations also have been useful in preventing retaliatory drive-by shootings, because vehicle seizures decrease the mobility of gang members.

In its efforts to respond faster and more proactively to homicides and other gang- and drug-related crime in the city, police also have participated in a number of interagency task forces. The Metro DEA Team is a combined force of uniformed police officers and DEA agents who target drug dealers in hotspot areas. Using its information resources, the U.S. Marshals Task Force helps the Richmond police to identify fugitives. WestNet (the West Contra Costa Narcotics Enforcement Team), which is headed by the State’s Bureau of Narcotics Enforcement, also assists Richmond police in targeting drug trafficking in the city.

Public housing initiative

In cooperation with the Richmond Housing Authority, a model lease agreement was created requiring tenants to avoid involvement with drugs and crime or risk eviction. Housing code enforcement and restraining orders have been used to prevent drug dealers and gang members from frequenting various housing developments. Renovations of buildings, removal of abandoned vehicles, and tenant evictions also are used. As of December 1997, Richmond Police Department drug elimination officers had issued 139 citations, made 74 arrests, towed 35 vehicles, written 71 reports, and evicted 1 drug dealer from a notorious public housing development.
Profile No. 4 (continued)

Community-based collaboration and mobilization strategies

The police department sought to develop new relationships with the community through use of the 30 neighborhood councils that have been in existence since the 1960’s. Not only have police taken steps to keep community citizens better informed, they have turned to the community to find innovative solutions to crime and violence. Activities include a communitywide survey of residents living in an area targeted for violence-reduction efforts. Seventy-two percent of residents in the area said that they, or someone they knew, had been a victim of violent crime. When working with adults and juveniles in collaborative efforts to reduce violence, these residents called for a higher police presence.

High-risk youth intervention and prevention strategies

A major focus of Richmond’s efforts is to target high-risk youth through several prevention and intervention programs. Twenty-three police officers have been assigned to the Richmond Police Department’s Adopt-a-School Program. Officers meet with children, faculty, and parents on a monthly basis to discuss school safety issues and to plan solutions and strategies. Police have worked closely with school officials to change school classroom environments that exacerbate the formation of racially based gangs. In addition, officers have provided mentoring and tutoring to high-risk youth identified in the school.

Through the Probation Officers-On-Campus Program, the Contra Costa County Probation Department assigns resident juvenile probation officers to two Richmond high schools. Richmond police work with these probation officers on a regular basis to address crimes that may occur on school property. The probation officers check daily on probationers’ school attendance and monitor their activities to keep them in school. Probation/parole officers also go out on patrol with police officers to provide closer surveillance of identified offenders.

Truancy reduction

Operation “Stay in School” Truancy Recovery Program, is a cooperative effort with the Contra Costa Unified School District. In 1995, more than 16 percent of the school population was recorded as chronically truant. A truancy study in 1997 revealed that much of the crime being committed in the neighborhoods surrounding schools was being caused by chronic truants. To combat the problem, officers conduct truancy roundups, returning youth to school or to a specialized SWAT (School Welfare and Attendance Team) office. Between 1996 and 1998, more than 1,000 youth were returned to school or referred to other specialized services. For a more detailed description of this program, see profile 57.

Summer youth academy

In October 1996, the Richmond Police Department joined with the San Pablo Police Department and the El Cerrito Police Department to establish and operate a youth academy. The youth academy provides a constructive, educational experience for local youth, teaching them alternatives to life on the street while increasing their interest in police and community service careers. Among the issues covered during the academy’s 12-week program are community oriented policing, criminal law, firearm safety, defensive tactics, crime scene investigations, hostage situations, and drug and alcohol awareness.
Impact of the comprehensive homicide initiative

The city of Richmond has experienced spectacular reductions in serious crime as a result of their comprehensive homicide reduction initiatives. Aggravated assaults dropped 40 percent from 1,763 incidences in 1993 to 1,056 incidences in 1997 and robberies dropped from 990 incidences in 1993 to 735 in 1994 and continue to decline. There were 525 incidences in 1997, a drop of 47 percent from 1993. The number of homicides also dropped from a high of 62 in 1992 and 52 in 1993 to 26 in 1995, a drop of 58 percent. This dramatic decrease in violent crime cannot be directly attributed to any single strategy; it is likely the cumulative result of Richmond's comprehensive approach to crime.
Profile No. 5

East Bay Public Safety Corridor Partnership—Oakland, CA

Program Type or Federal Program Source:
A program of comprehensive gun violence reduction strategies.

Program Goal:
To reduce crime and violence in order to create a safer, healthier, and more economically viable community.

Specific Groups Targeted by the Strategy:
Residents and youth.

Geographical Area Targeted by the Strategy:
26 communities in Alameda and Contra Costa counties, along the East Bay Corridor.

Evaluuated by:
Resource Development Associates, Oakland, CA; COSMOS Corporation, Bethesda, MD.

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Phone: 510–832–7071

Years of Operation:
1993–present.

Serious violence among youth gangs in Richmond, CA, during the summer of 1993 precipitated the formation of what was initially a three-city collaborative involving the mayors, administration, and police of Richmond, Oakland, and Berkeley—the East Bay Public Safety Corridor Partnership (EBPSCP). These three cities were experiencing high rates of homicides (214 murders in 1993 and 200 in 1994). Initial funding for this collaborative effort came from the National Funding Collaborative on Violence Prevention, which awarded planning grants to community foundations to develop local collaboratives for violence prevention.

During 1994, as crime and violence continued to escalate, the collaborative grew as new cities were added within Alameda and Contra Costa Counties. By the end of 1995, the collaborative included 16 jurisdictions. An independent nonprofit organization, the East Bay Community Foundation, was selected as the facilitator and fiscal agent. The governing board, the Corridor Council, includes three city mayors, three police chiefs, three school superintendents, three city managers, two elected supervisors, two county administrators, two county school superintendents, youth members, and several members of the community at large. A comprehensive needs assessment was completed in 1996, detailing patterns of crime, social conditions, and resources across the corridor’s cities.

Youth Violence Prevention Work Plan

A 12-point Youth Violence Prevention Work Plan was finalized in October 1996, although many of the strategies were initiated earlier. Strategy areas identified in the work plan follow.

Section III: Comprehensive Gun Violence Reduction Strategies 45
Municipal gun ordinances

Participating jurisdictions have worked to enact community-friendly gun ordinances that ban the sale and manufacture of junk guns, require triggerlocks at the point of sale, limit the number of gun dealers (particularly those in home-based businesses), require background checks on gun dealers, and impose a gross receipts tax on retailers that sell guns. To date, junk gun bans have been passed by all 16 towns within the EBPSCP, plus 5 neighboring jurisdictions and the 2 counties. In all, 48 local gun ordinances have been adopted by partnership members and other localities.

EBPSCP has provided considerable resources to localities trying to pass these gun laws, including free legal assistance and representation. In addition to retaining a lawyer, the partnership has access to pro bono legal services to help any jurisdiction respond to lawsuits against proposed gun legislation. EBPSCP also provides sample legislation on request and has hosted workshops on the issue. Additional information on EBPSCP’s efforts to pass local ordinances restricting firearm sales can be found in profile 16.

Gun abatement

The gun abatement strategy aims to reduce the illegal accessibility of guns through gun suppression efforts in corridor cities. Activities include technical support for police departments to fully adopt community policing practices, gun buyback programs, and a domestic violence protocol for law enforcement (adopted by 23 law enforcement agencies in the corridor).

In addition, in 1996 the Richmond Police Department implemented the Neighborhood Gun Suppression Program. This program was designed to encourage citizens to report anonymously on illegal gun activity and provide information about illegal guns by calling a Silent Witness Hotline. If the information results in an arrest and seizure of weapons, the citizen providing the information is eligible for a $100 reward. A total of $4,000 has been paid as of September 1998. In one celebrated case, citizen information led to the arrest of suspects lying on the roof of a school with high-powered weapons. Brochures and public service announcements help publicize the hotline number. Because of the success of this program, a similar hotline recently was established in Oakland as part of the East Oakland Partnership to Reduce Juvenile Gun Violence. EBPSCP is working with this OJJDP-funded program to reduce youth’s access to guns, address the reasons why youth possess and carry guns, and reduce the level of juvenile gun-related violence in the community.

This is about building new connections across cultures and institutions—exposing children to the full range of learning opportunities. It’s about saving lives, not just enriching them. Extended Day is not rocket science. It’s simple and logical. The first step is establishing teacher exchanges and coordination of curricula within the school, then in-school performance and afterschool classes. From there, you take art and focus it on all of life, with involvement in events like holidays. There’s a spiraling effect of meaning and fun. Then you can connect with other agencies for counseling, tutoring, mentoring, growth. The purpose as it relates to stemming violence is to expand the understanding of the quality and content of the human potential, and to mobilize the family, school, and community-based organizations into a committed partnership that encourages alternatives.

— Jordan Simons
East Bay Center for Performing Arts, Lead Agency for Extended Day School Program, East Bay Public Safety Corridor Partnership
Profile No. 5 (continued)

EBPSCP also is developing a computerized information system that will centralize law enforcement data from police departments throughout the Corridor. Known as CopNET, this system will provide timely and accurate information about perpetrators, vehicles, and crimes to officers in the field from multiple jurisdictions. This system is expected to be online in 1999.

Truancy abatement

Through crime data analysis, Richmond police learned that truant youth were responsible for much of the crime that occurred during school hours. Accordingly, in 1997, the West Contra Costa County Unified School District and the Richmond Police Department developed a Truancy Enforcement Program in which law enforcement officers pick up truants and take them to a specialized school program that identifies problems interfering with school attendance and implements remedial actions (see profile 57). Because of this program’s success in reducing truancy, addressing the needs of chronic truants, and reducing crime during school hours, EBPSCP coordinated a truancy assessment in other school districts and negotiated funding sources to implement a comprehensive truancy reduction program across all school districts in the Corridor.

Safe Passage Program

Richmond police also learned that children and youth were frequently threatened or victimized on their way to and from school. In response, a Safe Passage Program was implemented in 1996 in selected neighborhoods in Richmond. The program coordinated the efforts of police and community residents to establish “safe havens,” houses where children can go if they feel threatened; to train community residents and community centers on how to help children seek refuge from the streets; and to deploy more police on foot, on bicycles, and in squad cars around schools in the morning and afterschool hours. This program is being replicated in Oakland in coordination with the East Oakland juvenile gun violence reduction partnership. As a member of the partnership’s Steering Committee, EBPSCP participates in the development and implementation of strategies that focus on suppression, intervention, and prevention of firearm violence among high-risk juveniles in East Oakland.

Conflict resolution

EBPSCP has supported two programs to develop and implement model programs for conflict resolution: the Youth Together Program and the Communities and Schools
Profile No. 5 (continued)

Program. Youth Together seeks to reduce and prevent racially related violence among students in five high schools by developing multicultural teams to prevent cross-cultural conflicts. Teams engage in several structured activities together, including classroom activities to educate peers about conflict resolution, ethnic studies, and violence prevention; mentoring junior high students; and field trips to places that demonstrate the consequences of violence. The Communities and Schools Program provides a comprehensive case management and conflict resolution training program for students involved in conflict. The program is housed at Richmond High School and involves many interagency partners.

Aftercare education/employment/mentorship for juveniles leaving the justice system

EBPSCP also has coordinated the development of aftercare programs in Contra Costa and Alameda Counties for youth who are released from juvenile correctional centers. These programs provide education, employment, and mentorship. An evaluation of the Alameda County Camp Sweeney aftercare program, for juvenile males 14–18 years of age with less than 8 weeks left in their residential phase, demonstrated that compared with a control group aftercare participants retained their jobs for 3 months longer and were less likely to be arrested and convicted for felonies.

Domestic violence protocol

A domestic violence protocol has been developed based on research showing that the cycle of domestic violence is perpetuated when children see violence as an acceptable means of resolving family conflicts. In addition, domestic violence creates high-risk conditions for gun violence. Under California State law, police called to the scene of a domestic altercation are authorized to seize any firearm for up to 72 hours if they believe that its presence in the household represents a threat to safety; this protocol assists police in making that determination. The guns are stored at the police station and may be retrieved by the owner once the domestic situation has been stabilized. Police may also destroy the gun under the auspices of a State gun nuisance law. In addition, police at the scene of a domestic dispute can use digital mobile units to determine whether a restraining order is on file and, if one is, take the individual into custody for the protection of both parties.

Transferability and sustainability

EBPSCP seeks to strategically coordinate the human and fiscal resources within the Corridor to sustain those efforts that have proven effective in curbing crime and drug abuse, especially among families and youth. To accomplish this goal, EBPSCP takes on new initiatives using a problem-solving approach; once these initiatives prove effective, it then engages in a process of transferability and sustainability. Strategies and intervention actions undertaken by EBPSCP are developed only after there has been a thorough analysis of the crime, social issues, and resources present in a targeted jurisdiction. A work plan is then developed and implemented by EBPSCP partners through a memorandum of understanding and service agreements. An interagency technical staff team is created to implement the work plan, and a lead agency is designated. Federal or State demonstration funds
Profile No. 5 (continued)

are often drawn down through grants to pilot test the program work plan.

The Corridor Partnership’s gun violence victories were not a pinnacle we have to come down from; they were a starting point for progress on other issues like truancy.

—Shirley Dean
Mayor of Berkeley, CA
Chair of East Bay Public Safety Corridor Partnership

Once an initiative has been demonstrated to be effective, the program model is shared with other jurisdictions. Local or State long-term sources of funding are sought to sustain the initiative as a permanent institutionalized program. In many cases, existing resources allocated to local or State agencies can be redistributed or new laws enacted with accompanying funds for implementation. This process was used with the Truancy Enforcement Program, which now receives funding through local school districts in the East Bay Corridor. Reducing truancy and unexcused absences has led to increased enrollment, which in turn has increased the enrollment revenues available to the school districts—funds that can now be used to help these youth stay in school.

Critical to this process of research and development, followed by transfer to other jurisdictions and building sustainability, is the formulation of interagency agreements and the sharing of resources among the public and private agencies in the jurisdiction. A Joint Powers Agreement provides legal authority for the partner agencies to share common resources dedicated to the purposes outlined in the agreement. EBPSCP remains involved in providing coordination, support, and technical assistance to the local partnership initiatives while simultaneously maintaining regional and cross-jurisdictional communication and linkages.

Gun violence impacts

Gun violence has decreased dramatically throughout the Corridor. From 1993 to 1997, homicides fell by 28.9 percent across all jurisdictions in the Corridor. As shown in the following table, Oakland experienced a 35.7-percent drop in homicide rates and Richmond saw a 36.5-percent decline.

The dramatic reduction in the number of homicides cannot be attributed directly to any one of the programs described above, but is more likely due to the cumulative effect of a comprehensive, multipronged approach involving intensified law enforcement efforts, the development of many community-based prevention and intervention activities, and the coordinating efforts of EBPSCP.

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<td>Oakland Homicides</td>
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<td>Richmond Homicides</td>
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<td>Total Homicides Across 17 Jurisdictions</td>
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Indianapolis Weed and Seed Initiative—Indianapolis, IN

Program Type or Federal Program Source:
A program of comprehensive gun violence reduction strategies; Office of Weed and Seed.

Program Goal:
To reduce gun trafficking, gang-related violence, and gun crimes, and to improve the quality of life and the socioeconomies of targeted communities.

Specific Groups Targeted by the Strategy:
Drug traffickers, gangs, straw gun purchasers, violent criminals.

Geographical Area Targeted by the Strategy:
West District with expansion to North District and East District in Indianapolis.

Indianapolis, IN, has received Federal Weed and Seed grants since 1995 to target three neighborhoods in the West District of the city: Haughville, a predominantly African-American area that was plagued by drug trafficking and associated violence and Hawthorne and Stringtown, predominantly white areas with high levels of property crime, prostitution, and domestic violence. The neighborhoods were selected because of high crime rates but also because there was a community organization, the Westside Cooperative Organization (WESCO), that was able to bring together these disparate groups. WESCO is a nonprofit umbrella organization for civic associations and other community groups. It serves as a conduit for Federal, State, and local funding for community-based programming and coordinates much of the social, political, and economic activity in the western area of the city.

In 1998, Weed and Seed was expanded to include an area contiguous to the WESCO community and two neighborhoods in the North and East Districts of the city. Officers assigned to the WESCO initiative are serving as trainers in the new target areas. Each site has a steering committee that oversees committees on law enforcement, social services, and economic development. Requests for action can move from the steering committee directly to the mayor, chief of police, or a government agency. The current goals of the Weed and Seed effort are elimination of open-air drug trafficking (drug-related firearm incidents drive Indianapolis' homicide rate), reduction of alcohol-related incidents, reduction of nuisance properties through code enforcement, elimination of street prostitution, reduction of gang-related violence (particularly incidents involving firearms), and reduction of crimes committed with guns.

Effective leadership, both in the community and in the police department, has been critical to the success of this law enforcement
Profile No. 6 (continued)

effort. Many of those involved feel that the achievements of Weed and Seed in the West District are due in large part to the skills of the community leader who managed the project. He was able to get the community’s racially diverse groups to agree that what they had in common—a desire for safe communities, better schools, economic development—was more important than what made them different (e.g., race, politics, and religion). The community became a public ally of the police department—if there was police misconduct or other problems, residents agreed to resolve the issues privately rather than airing their grievances on the front page of the newspaper. In return, the police became more open about sharing information and explaining the rationale for some of their actions. Over time, mutual trust began to develop between the two groups, which allowed for effective community policing. As residents began to provide more tips, the number of arrests increased and crime decreased. As crime decreased, residents became ever more willing to report criminal activity, resulting in more arrests—a self-reinforcing cycle of police-community cooperation.

Community policing

A change in leadership at the police department has also been key to the success of Weed and Seed in the West District. A retired Indianapolis Police Department (IPD) deputy chief, who had been working in the private sector, was hired in 1997 as the new chief of police. Empowered by a 3-year contract that would give him the freedom to experiment, he set two priorities: a "return to basics" that concentrated on quality-of-life issues, which were a major concern of citizens, and the setting of high standards of professionalism and productivity for police officers. The new comprehensive strategy targets violent criminal activity and less pressing but nonetheless important issues such as graffiti, loitering, abandoned vehicles and properties, and prostitution. "Professionalization" of the force means that officers treat citizens as customers and are judged on how well citizens are served. Only officers who exhibit model behaviors (e.g., officers who receive few citizen complaints) and high productivity (e.g., officers who make a large number of arrests) are assigned to Weed and Seed activities and are eligible for overtime. Furthermore, command officers are encouraged to apply problem-solving and crime-analysis principles in developing new approaches for combating crime. The police chief encourages innovation and strives to create an atmosphere where new approaches can be tried and then modified or discarded, if necessary, without fear of negative repercussions.

Weed and Seed has become the impetus for building relationships with residents, and it allows for true community policing—with residents telling police which crimes should be the focus of law enforcement activities and which techniques should be used (e.g., bike patrols and directed patrols). Improved communication has even caused a change in IPD investigative policy. In response to citizen concerns about retaliation, the police chief has directed officers to knock on "200 doors" after a shooting or other crime, to make it more difficult for the perpetrators to trace the information back to any single individual. The new procedure makes it possible for officers to build better cases and to collect information on other issues from residents, share information on police activities, and further build community support and trust.

Community residents and law enforcement officers believe that the early and sustained investment in community relations has begun to pay off. In 1997, the clearance rate for homicide cases was 79 percent, which is 10 percentage points higher than the national
average, although the Indianapolis police force is about one-half the size of departments in comparable cities. Perhaps the strongest evidence of the change in police-community relations came in September 1998, when a drug dealer under surveillance emerged from his residence firing an AK-47 at police officers and was wounded by return fire. Almost immediately, rumors spread among those at the crime scene that white police officers had shot a young black man in the back five times. A local minister who was a community leader arrived at the scene, was recognized by the IPD officers because they had been working together on other issues, and was invited behind the police crime-scene tape for an explanation of what happened and a visual examination of the bullet-riddled patrol car. He shared these facts with the crowd, which then dispersed without incident. Building on this positive experience, the chief plans to implement an IPD/WESCO chaplaincy program proposed by the community that would train a pool of ministers from each neighborhood to interact with police at crime scenes. The ministers would be identifiable by a special badge, would assist IPD in communicating with local residents about sensitive and high-visibility incidents, and would encourage those with any information to come forward.

Law enforcement strategies

Most project resources during the early years were devoted to “seeding” activities that helped build the community’s capacity and infrastructure. This included coordinating the social services provided in the target neighborhood, putting together a strong staff, and strengthening police-community relations. Over time, the city began to put more resources into “weeding” activities, largely by cotargeting the Weed and Seed areas with officers and resources from other Federal programs. For example, the additional officers assigned to the area through grants from COPS were freed from having to respond to 911 calls and other “runs” from central dispatch. The Weed and Seed area also benefited from Federal Asset Sharing of Forfeiture (FASF) funds.

Crime data analysis

Collection and analysis of data drive decisions about which policing tactics should be used and which crimes and areas will be targeted. IPD has several evaluation contracts with a research firm affiliated with Indiana University. In March 1998, a researcher there completed a review of every 1997 homicide in the city of Indianapolis and discovered that most murders were committed by chronic offenders, most of these offenders were in some way linked to the city’s drug trade, and in three-fourths of the cases victims and perpetrators knew each other. The researcher also noted that both victims and suspects had come in contact with the juvenile justice system at an early age and had been abused as children. Such information is important in helping communities to determine the kinds of early intervention and treatment services that are needed by children and families during the early stages of contact with the criminal justice system.

The Indianapolis Violence Reduction partnership uses the Indianapolis Management Accountability Program (IMAP) data as the basis for a multiagency project that develops strategies based on crime patterns tracked by officer reports and displayed bimonthly on Geographic Information System maps by IPD district. The partnership includes representatives from police, prosecution, probation and parole, ATF, DEA, and other agencies. Partnership members meet every 2 weeks to analyze crime data and to develop
Profile No. 6 (continued)

joint crime reduction strategies. Monthly community meetings provide an opportunity for community input.

In IPD's Violence Impact Program for Enhanced Response (VIPER), police identify the youth with the highest arrest rates and target them for enhanced surveillance, probationary supervision, and State or Federal prosecution. In 1997, for example, three-quarters of the homicide suspects had adult records as juveniles and averaged 3.7 arrests; almost 49 percent had prior felony convictions.

Crime data also helped IPD identify areas with the highest level of narcotics trafficking, which led to the creation of the Highway Interdiction Program. Signs that announce a fictitious “Narcotics Checkpoint” ahead are strategically placed on an interstate highway. Cars that attempt to avoid the checkpoint by exiting at the next off-ramp are searched. Protocols provide for a routine of stopping five consecutive vehicles, then passing the subsequent five. The procedure has withstood a recent court challenge for discrimination. A command van or undercover vehicle is positioned to observe drivers who attempt to dispose of contraband. Since the strategy was first employed in August 1998, there have been six operations resulting in 1,161 vehicles stopped and 109 arrests (55 for narcotics violations).

**Multijurisdictional task forces**

In addition to the Indianapolis Violence Reduction Partnership mentioned above, several multijurisdictional task forces have been created to address violent crime. The Metro Gang Task Force (MGTF) began quietly as a speakers bureau but has since evolved into a unit of highly trained officers who target gang-related drug trafficking. The task force members (all cross-designated as U.S. Marshals) include six IPD investigators, an officer from the Sheriff's office, and two FBI agents. The U.S. Department of Agriculture is a task force member because of extensive use of food stamps as currency in the drug trade, and INS provides leverage in cases where immigrants or nonnaturalized citizens are involved in criminal activity. State law enforcement personnel, IPD homicide and tactical units, and prosecutors also sit on the task force.

IPD participates in ATF's Project LEAD, which analyzes information gathered by the ATF National Tracking Center in order to identify straw gun purchases. IPD also works with the FBI's Drugfire program, through which all seized weapons are tested and the ballistics data entered into a computerized data base. In the last 5 years, there have been 19 “hits” on the Drugfire data base that have tied together 43 open cases in the State of Indiana. Analysis of gun-related arrests showed a need for collaboration between the police, prosecutors, and courts to ensure that individuals caught with weapons are not simply released, but receive appropriately swift and certain consequences. As a result, in February 1998, a Firearms Unit was created within the police department, with one sergeant put in charge of all gun cases. The unit also designated a specific State prosecutor who would have responsibility for getting the case on the docket and ensuring that it was not pleaded out.

**Directed patrols**

Indianapolis has used directed patrols, a replication of the Kansas City Gun Experiment, in different neighborhoods with mixed success. In some areas, there were no attempts to educate the public about the initiative, and consequently, there was little community involvement or support. The impact was further muted because directed
Profile No. 6 (continued)

...patrols were not fully integrated into a comprehensive law enforcement strategy. In 1997, IPD tested different protocols within the directed patrol strategy. In the East District, the police stopped vehicles for any infraction, but then typically issued warnings rather than citations. In the North District, which was more faithful to the Kansas City model, the police targeted suspicious vehicles and operators.

Results in the two areas differed markedly. In the East District, where 3,836 vehicles were stopped, for every 100 stops there were 60.7 warning tickets, 24.5 citations, 14.5 arrests, 1.1 felony arrests, and 0.34 seizures of illegal guns. In the North District, where there were many fewer stops (1,417), for every 100 stops there were higher rates for most police actions: 36 warning tickets, 49.2 citations, 30.6 arrests, 2.9 felony arrests, and 0.085 seizures of illegal guns. Crime in the North District also was significantly lower: homicides dropped from 11 to 1, while the city was experiencing a 53-percent increase. Aggravated assaults and armed robberies declined by 40 percent in the North District, and total gun crime reduction was 29 percent.

By comparison, violent and property crimes increased in the East District, where directed patrols had been in use since late 1995 as part of a Safe Streets project.

Better performance in the North may have been influenced by several factors. First, police in the North District were more selective about which vehicles were stopped, while officers in the East District cast a much wider net that included many people who were unlikely to be lawbreakers. Second, by issuing citations rather than warnings, the North District may have more effectively communicated a zero tolerance approach that ultimately influenced criminal behavior and reduced crime. Finally, part of the reason for the poor performance in the East District may have been that the strategy had been in use there for 2 years, and a “decay effect” (i.e., reduced effectiveness, again because of adaptive criminal behavior) may have occurred. K-9 patrols and probation sweeps for guns also were employed in the North District and may have affected criminal behavior.

The police department concluded that these directed patrols were an important factor in reducing homicides from 11 to 1 in the target areas, even though the homicide rate increased citywide during the same period. Drawing on lessons learned from the Kansas City Gun Experiment and from the city’s North and East Districts, directed patrols are now part of an ongoing strategy in the West District Weed and Seed area, where they are coordinated with the Metro Gang Task Force.

Police/probation collaboration

Probation sweeps in conjunction with Marion County Probation Adult Services (Operation Probationer Accountability) are considered a cost-effective method of identifying and seizing illegal guns and have led to Federal triggerlock prosecutions of drug dealers in the target area. The sweeps found 34 percent of 245 probationers visited were in violation (two-thirds for reporting incorrect addresses), and 19 firearms were confiscated. The sweeps initially targeted the North District but are now being used in other areas. Police officers believe these unannounced visits are effective because parole and probation officers have sanctions available to them and authority that is not vested with IPD. For example, providing a bogus address is a violation of probation that can lead to reincarceration. In addition, while probation officers may enter a probationer’s home, a police officer needs a search warrant. With multiple visits done on
1 or 2 nights, the program is extremely cost-effective. (Both police and probation officers are paid overtime through various grants.) Probation officers also are more willing to make visits into dangerous neighborhoods when they are accompanied by police officers.

Home detention checks with the cooperation of juvenile probation officers are credited with significantly reducing the number of daytime crimes (particularly burglaries), and curfew enforcement has significantly decreased evening crime rates. A recent home detention project targeted 72 juveniles who received 816 checks for compliance over 3 months. This resulted in 101 affidavits filed on 26 juveniles, 17 of which were subsequently found in violation by the juvenile court. Curfew violators are processed at Weed and Seed "safe houses," their parents are called to pick them up, and social service interventions are arranged as necessary. IPD believes the sweeps would be even more effective if local truancy laws were revised, and if a better network of social services existed for troubled juveniles. (At present, students who are picked up and returned to school may be expelled—which sends them back onto the streets.)

Program outcomes

Since 1995, crimes in Weed and Seed neighborhoods have dropped significantly. For example, total crime has fallen by 18 percent, property crime by 35 percent, burglary by 32 percent, and larceny by 27 percent. IPD case reports suggest that violence, weapons offenses, and gang- and narcotics-related activity decreased 8 percent, while arrests in these categories increased 12 percent. Citywide, total crime decreased 6 percent from 1996 to 1997. Homicides in the West District have decreased more than 50 percent, from 33 to 16, while homicides in the rest of the city have increased by 19 percent, from 85 to 117 through October 1998.

Although Weed and Seed clearly has played an important role in crime reduction in Indianapolis, it is difficult to show a causal relationship between crime reduction and any single Federal or local program, because each strategy is made more effective by the presence of the others. The reduction in Indianapolis' gun-related crimes is likely the cumulative product of the city's comprehensive multipronged program rather than the direct result of any single strategy.
Minnesota HEALS (Hope, Education, and Law and Safety)—Minneapolis and St. Paul, MN

Program Type or Federal Program Source:
A program of comprehensive gun violence reduction strategies.

Program Goal:
To decrease violent crime in the Twin Cities metropolitan area through the active involvement of a committed group of business, government, and community leaders.

Specific Groups Targeted by the Strategy:
Gangs, homicide suspects, and victims.

Geographical Area Targeted by the Strategy:
Minneapolis and St. Paul, MN; statewide.

Evaluayed by:
Internal data collection.

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Years of Operation:
1997–present.

Minnesota HEALS (Hope, Education, and Law and Safety) is a unique public-private partnership that has developed a comprehensive violence reduction strategy. The program is characterized by corporate commitments and public agency collaborations to reduce violent crime. The catalyst for HEALS was Honeywell, Inc., which has a long history of active involvement in philanthropic activities. Honeywell reacted to a New York Times article that dubbed Minneapolis "Murderapolis," reflecting a sharp rise in homicides—a jump from approximately 60 per year in 1994 to 97 in 1995 and 86 in 1996. With its world headquarters in one of the most crime-ridden neighborhoods in Minneapolis, Honeywell was concerned for the safety of its employees and property and for the quality of life in the surrounding neighborhood. Honeywell decided that in order to remain in the inner city, it had to do something about violent crime.

Honeywell's chief executive officer enlisted fellow CEO's from other socially responsible private corporations—Allina Health Systems, 3M, General Mills, and the staff of the Minnesota Business Partnership—to meet with the Governor to share their concerns about the escalating local and statewide crime rates. After the Governor pledged his support, Honeywell arranged a series of planning meetings. The business community, including a core group of local corporations and the Minnesota Business
Profile No. 7 (continued)

Partnership, contributed financial support, influence, and human resources to implement the program. Honeywell then sought an independent consultant to bring all the needed partners to the planning table. The executive director of the Police Executive Research Forum (PERF) in Washington, D.C., was selected to provide knowledge about criminal justice innovations and to facilitate collaboration among the Federal, State, and local criminal justice agencies. Having an outside consultant proved to be very helpful, as he was familiar with successful crime reduction strategies and had no vested interest in the project or the community. Therefore, the consultant could make unbiased assessments and hold local stakeholders accountable. Furthermore, he was known and supported by both the Republican Commissioner of the Minnesota Department of Public Safety and the Democrat-appointed Minneapolis Chief of Police.

Minnesota HEALS is a collaboration of government, community, law enforcement, and business, all of whom are working toward the goal of reducing crime and violence. Through a two-track system of law enforcement strategies and community long-term initiatives, Minnesota HEALS has achieved long-term results.

— Pat Hoven
Vice President for Social Responsibility
Honeywell, Inc.

In an initial brainstorming meeting held in December 1996, the Minneapolis Chief of Police, the State’s Commissioner of Public Safety, the PERF consultant, and representatives from Honeywell and General Mills hammered out a list of initial objectives focusing both on law enforcement and on community prevention efforts.

Organizational structure of Minnesota HEALS

Minnesota HEALS members first met as a group in early 1997. Soon after, two task forces were created. The Law Enforcement Task Force consisted of the key criminal justice agencies in the city and State. Its purpose was to analyze and develop a strategic response to the recent rash of homicides and shootings, and the current gang activities. The Community Task Force, chaired by the director of a local business association, also was to develop long-range, local crime prevention activities funded wholly or in part by corporations.

In addition to these two groups, Forum and Support committees were created. The Forum Committee is open to all members and shares information through presentations and discussions. This committee also makes recommendations to the other committees. The Support Committee approves final actions and makes decisions on matters such as fundraising and key objectives. It consists of 19 members, including key corporate, community, and criminal justice agency representatives. The Forum and Support Committee meetings are held monthly, usually at Honeywell, while the Law Enforcement and Community Task Forces meet as often as necessary. The Vice President for Social Responsibility at Honeywell serves as the primary resource to coordinate discussion topics and share information among members. A newsletter for members has recently been published to facilitate communication.

Today, Minnesota HEALS has 61 member organizations. Corporate members include Honeywell, General Mills, 3M, Allina Health Systems, and Medtronic. Local government agencies include the chiefs of police and mayors’ offices of Minneapolis and St.
Profile No. 7 (continued)

Paul; the Minneapolis City Council; the sheriff’s offices, attorney’s offices, and commissioners from Hennepin and Ramsey Counties; Metro Transit Police; Minneapolis Department of Health and Family Support; and the public schools. State-level participants include the Minnesota Department of Public Safety, the Minnesota Department of Corrections, the University of Minnesota, and the Attorney General’s Office. The Law Enforcement Task Force currently consists of 25–30 law enforcement representatives from the Minneapolis and St. Paul police departments’ gang, homicide, and narcotics units; the sheriff’s office; the probation department; and Federal agencies such as the FBI, DEA, ATF, and the U.S. Attorney’s Office. The Community Task Force consists of nonprofit members that represent various neighborhood coalitions and service providers and private business partnerships.

The law enforcement strategy

The Law Enforcement Task Force commissioned researchers from Harvard’s KSG to conduct a study of homicide patterns in Minneapolis. The homicide study analyzed data from January 1994 through May 1997 and revealed an important link between gangs and violent crime. Nearly 45 percent of all homicides appeared to be gang related. African-American youth tended to be disproportionately represented as both homicide suspects and victims. More than 40 percent of gang members who were homicide victims or suspects had been on probation and 76.8 percent had arrest histories prior to the homicide incidents, with an average of 9.5 arrests. Significantly, the similarity between perpetrator and victim profiles influenced subsequent police strategies; it was learned that suspects and arrestees had 7.4 prior arrests and victims had 7.5 prior arrests. Firearms were used in two-thirds of homicides. The task force used these data to focus their 1997 strategies on gangs and guns. The gang unit of the Minneapolis Police Department then used its data base to identify gangs and to target specific youth. It first charted and linked all homicide suspects, victims, and witnesses for 1994 and 1995 and found that certain individuals showed up repeatedly. Looking further, the unit surmised that certain shootings and murders were probably retaliatory. Based on this analysis, it decided to concentrate on 50 multiple offenders within the gangs. The gang unit was doubled in size with emphasis on including more racially and ethnically diverse officers.

Rapid response team

One important strategic intervention initiated in summer 1997 was to respond quickly and decisively to those shootings that had the potential of provoking gang retaliations. This response was based on Boston’s Operation Ceasefire model, which was adopted by the Law Enforcement Task Force (see profile 21). Immediately after a shooting, a rapid response team consisting of police, probation officers, Federal and local prosecutors, and Federal law enforcement personnel met and located not only suspects, but also the victims’ associates. The message sent to all involved was that any hint of retaliation would evoke an aggressive response from law enforcement. Probation officers also checked to see if these associates were under the authority of the Department of Probation and could be targeted for special attention to discourage violent acts. In one instance in June 1997, a retaliation occurred after a victim’s associates were warned against this by the response team. As a result, the associates’ car was searched and four guns and two Molotov cocktails were found. These individuals were referred for Federal...
Profile No. 7 (continued)

prosecution. This incident was covered extensively by the media, thereby reinforcing the warning to gang members of the consequences of their retaliatory actions. The coordinated action of the response team and the subsequent swift action of prosecutors was a major turning point in stemming the violence in Minneapolis in summer 1997.

Until recently, Federal prosecutions were rare for non-Federal crimes, but the U.S. Attorney promised the police that under certain circumstances those crimes would be prosecuted under Federal statutes. A similar commitment was made by the county attorney’s office, which established a gang prosecution unit with vertical prosecutions. A number of tough, new State laws also helped. In August 1996, a new law went into effect that mandated a minimum 18-month disposition of incarceration for juveniles who commit delinquent offenses that, if committed by an adult, would be considered felonies; prior to this date, these juveniles could be sentenced for only 15 to 25 days.

Minneapolis Anti-Violence Initiative (MAVI)

MAVI, which is modeled after Boston’s Operation Night Light program (see profile 33), pairs Minneapolis police officers (including all officers in the gang unit) and Hennepin County sheriff’s deputies with probation officers from the Hennepin County Department of Community Corrections. Police officers and deputies co-train with probation officers for 2 days. These police and probation officer teams make regular, unannounced visits to the homes of probationers during the evening hours to monitor their adherence to the terms of their probation. From June 1997 through September 1998, MAVI teams visited 331 juveniles and 398 adults in Minneapolis, including the 50 violent gang members who were previously identified and warned not to cause trouble. The commander of the gang unit believes MAVI has had a deterrent effect because probationers do not like being personally known by probation and police officers. Another benefit of the program was to bring together two agencies that had not previously worked together. Further, MAVI participants worked with the courts to place more stringent conditions on pretrial release, such as curfews, restrictions on visiting certain geographic areas, and associating with undesirable persons (see profile 31).

A number of strategies relating specifically to guns also were initiated or expanded. Beginning in August 1996, ATF agents were partnered with members of the Minneapolis police department gang unit and homicide unit to immediately investigate every gun homicide. ATF traced every firearm recovered by police within 1 day after it was confiscated. If a suspicious trace resulted, an ATF special agent accompanied police on an investigation. As a result of these joint investigations, police were able to develop cases for illegal firearm use and trafficking for prosecution.

Saturation patrols

Patrol and gang unit police officers, together with ATF agents, also conducted saturation patrols 2 nights per week in small, targeted areas. These areas were identified by the police crime analysis unit focusing on locations with the highest number of shots fired and shooting calls. The goal was to remove as many firearms from the streets as possible through aggressive inspection and consent searches. The program also targeted residential gun dealers. Drivers involved in traffic violations were asked if they would consent to a search of their vehicles. If permission was granted,
Profile No. 7 (continued)

these vehicles were searched for guns. Police also teamed with ATF agents in investigating residential firearm dealers and gun shops as part of their criminal investigations.

The presence of ATF agents riding along with police, and being seen on the streets, seemed to have had an impact on gang members. Police and ATF agents noticed that gang members stopped carrying their weapons in their waistbands. Instead they had acquaintances carry them or had them hidden somewhere nearby. Police and ATF believe that creating this distance between gang members and their guns probably cut down on spontaneous shootings, such as those that had occurred in summer 1996.

State gang task force

In response to the increasing mobility of gangs, and the infiltration of gangs into suburban and rural communities, a statewide gang task force was created. This task force, which has 40 members from local, county, and State police agencies, has enabled law enforcement to collaborate across jurisdictions and respond more efficiently to statewide gang activities. Members are deputized and have power statewide, and they conduct long-term investigations using a gang database.

As a means of gaining public support for their law enforcement strategies, key Minnesota HEALS partners—notably the Law Enforcement Task Force consultant from PERF, the U.S. Attorney, the Minneapolis Chief of Police and coordinator, and the probation supervisor—spoke to community groups in the targeted neighborhoods about the new tactics to reduce violent crimes and the rationale behind them. HEALS representatives were sometimes met with small but vocal criticism at these meetings. However, recent community surveys show that residents have accepted HEALS tactics and are pleased to have safer neighborhoods.

Outcomes and new directions for law enforcement strategies

Since the Minnesota HEALS initiatives began, homicides declined 30 percent in Minneapolis (from 83 in 1996 to 58 in 1997) and the number of murders dropped from 40 in summer 1996 to 8 in summer 1997—the lowest number of summer homicides in 12 years. Gang-related homicides dropped from 52 percent of all homicides to 23 percent from May 1997 to March 1998. Part 1 crimes also have fallen; in the first 8 months of 1998 versus 1997, Part 1 crimes declined 14 percent. This reduction in homicides and other Part 1 crimes cannot be directly attributed to any one of these enforcement strategies but more likely is the result of a cumulative impact of a comprehensive approach.

With such success, many of the 1997 strategies implemented by Minnesota HEALS have been institutionalized, such as the interagency collaborations, M A V I, saturation patrols, rapid response teams to prevent retaliation, total gun tracing, and Federal gun prosecutions. Minnesota HEALS also has led to many new and useful criminal justice collaborations—among police, ATF, probation, and Federal partners; between the Minneapolis and St. Paul police departments; and between prosecutors and police.

As an evolution of the HEALS program, CODEFOR has been initiated by the Minneapolis Police Department, fashioned after the New York City Police Department's COMPSTAT program (see profile 19). CODEFOR has provided the police with rapidly available crime pattern information and the ability to deploy personnel accordingly. This has led to greater commander
accountability for police operations linked to crime outcomes. In addition, a second study, *Violent Crime in the Twin Cities: An Analysis of Violent Crime and Illegal Drugs in Minneapolis and St. Paul,* conducted by PERF, concluded that narcotics and its relationship with violent crime should be Minnesota HEALS’ next focus. Another of Minnesota HEALS’ goals for 1999 is to improve and make more compatible the area’s criminal justice information systems.

**The community prevention and intervention strategies**

Many of the corporations involved in Minnesota HEALS have long helped communities through their philanthropic foundations and employee volunteers. For instance, part of Honeywell’s mission is “to strengthen communities where we operate and trade so that our neighbors, our employees, our shareholders and our company can grow, prosper and experience an enhanced quality of life.” Honeywell provided not only financial resources, but also hands-on assistance and expertise to nearby Minneapolis communities with high crime, poverty, and social problems.

In addition to Honeywell, General Mills, and Allina Foundation, other companies consulted and partnered with existing community organizations on a regular basis by attending community meetings, by working hand-in-hand with community members on revitalization and community development programs, and by inviting community organizations to HEALS meetings. These corporations believe that working with communities is as important as giving them financial support.

Below are some brief examples of the many forms of community prevention and inter-

vention programs and initiatives credited to the members of Minnesota HEALS.

Trust can get things done that money can never get done. Trust is absolutely essential for effective work in inner-city communities. While the philanthropic dollars help do small projects and help to catalyze change, sustaining good results happens as people are willing to trust us and are willing to become involved in solving the problems. The more they can trust the people they work with, the more they are willing to share their ideas and persist in solving the problems.

—Reatha C. King
President and Executive Director
General Mills Foundation

- Honeywell Corporation is developing two square blocks (52 residential units) from substandard rental housing to mixed-income, owner-occupied, single-family homes. Some of the demolished housing had previously been the scenes of prostitution and drug dealing and use.

- With underwriting from corporations, the city’s Park Board extended summer hours for neighborhood park programs.

- The Health Care Coalition on Violence, led by the Allina Foundation, is asking healthcare organizations throughout the State to voluntarily maintain “E-Codes,” or data on external causes of injury. These data will be useful in identifying patterns of injuries (including intentional injuries such as homicides or firearm injuries purposely inflicted). An ultimate goal is to share these data with law enforcement agencies and to develop prevention programs.

- The Minneapolis Public Schools partnered with Honeywell and others to sponsor the New Vistas School for pregnant and parenting teens and their children. The
Profile No. 7 (continued)

school, housed in Honeywell’s corporate headquarters, provides academic instruction leading to a high school diploma, employment training, parenting classes, early childhood care, and onsite health and social services. Honeywell provides volunteer mentors and opportunities for internships and summer jobs.

◆ General Mills Corporation, in partnership with two minority-owned food-processing companies, helped launch a North Minneapolis frozen soul-food company, Siyeza, meaning “We’re coming,” opened its doors in January and will provide an estimated 175 local jobs.

◆ The president of the General Mills Foundation formed the “Hawthorne Huddle,” a monthly gathering of residents, neighborhood leaders, business people, church members, and public agencies in the low-income, high-crime Hawthorne neighborhood of North Minneapolis. Participants discuss community problems and devise solutions, such as planning for the area’s first elementary school, creating a neighborhood safe house for children, undertaking neighborhood cleanups and crime reduction initiatives, and closing down crack houses.

◆ Minnesota HEALS is starting a program whereby a select group of law enforcement personnel will go to classrooms to talk to children about guns. In the pilot stage, the supervising ATF agent and a police inspector will visit two middle schools and one high school.

◆ Abbott Northwestern Hospital has developed a paid employment training program, Train to Work, funded by Allina Foundation, Honeywell, and others. The program gives welfare recipients 120 hours of entry-level and life skills training and 18 months of mentoring to obtain jobs at Abbott or Children’s Hospital, with average starting wages of $8.75 per hour plus full benefits. In its first 8 months of operation, Train to Work placed 50 of 59 graduates, 33 of whom retained their jobs at the end of the 8-month period. Similarly, 3M Corporation created a jobs program in which low-income participants are matched with “coaches” to help them make the transition to the workforce.
Profile No. 8

Partnership for the Prevention of Juvenile Gun Violence—Baton Rouge, LA

Program Type or Federal Program Source: A program of comprehensive gun violence reduction strategies; Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention.

Program Goal: To reduce gun violence among youth and increase community safety.

Specific Groups Targeted by the Strategy: Youth ages 12 to 24.

Geographical Area Targeted by the Strategy: Two ZIP code areas in Baton Rouge, LA.

Evaluated by: COSMOS Corporation, Bethesda, MD.

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Years of Operation: 1997–present.

In recent years, Baton Rouge experienced dramatic increases in the number of youth involved in violent crimes. Between 1992 and 1996, the number of juveniles (under 16 years of age) arrested annually in East Baton Rouge Parish increased 61 percent, from 2,931 to 4,716. In 1996, one-fourth of the 1,179 juveniles arrested were multiple offenders. Sixteen percent of these juveniles had committed a total of 940 violent crimes, including 14 homicides, 51 armed robberies, and 132 aggravated assaults; and 122 juveniles committed 192 weapons violations. Of the 71 homicides in Baton Rouge in 1996, 13 were committed by youth under the age of 21, and 18 involved a young victim. More than two-thirds of the city’s homicides occurred in two ZIP code areas.

Because the effects of juvenile violence are felt by the entire community, the partnership felt that solutions to the problem must involve a communitywide effort by a collaboration of agency and community stakeholders. No single organization or agency could address all the risk factors associated with juvenile violence. The partnership thus designed a comprehensive strategy with four specific goals:

- Implement a multiagency law enforcement (suppression) strategy to reduce gun-related and other violent crimes by juveniles and older youth (ages 17–20).

- Implement an intensive intervention program to reduce the risk factors for the highest risk youth, their families, and the community.

Section III: Comprehensive Gun Violence Reduction Strategies
Profile No. 8 (continued)

- Mobilize the community at the grassroots level to address the problems of hard-to-reach families and the highest risk youth.

- Implement a long-range prevention program that identifies, links, and strengthens existing resources to serve youth who may be at risk.

The organizational structure of the Baton Rouge partnership emerged from the project strategies that were developed during several program development workshops involving law enforcement, the courts, the juvenile justice system, community service providers, and the faith community. The structure of the partnership is simple and informal, consisting of two standing committees with specified decisionmaking responsibilities: the Executive Committee (program policy or planning) and the Judicial Advisory Committee (legal advice and planning). The program also has several task forces—Enforcement, Intervention, and Prevention—which are responsible for operational decisions in carrying out the comprehensive plan. A fourth community mobilization task force, ACT NOW, is a new grassroots organization chaired by a pastor who represents the African-American Baptist churches in the target areas. The Baton Rouge Chief of Police chairs the partnership.

The gun violence suppression strategies

The partnership seeks to reduce juvenile gun-related and other violent crimes through a three-pronged suppression strategy: (1) identify and monitor, through intensive probation and law enforcement surveillance, the small group of serious, violent, and chronic young offenders who have committed multiple felony offenses; (2) reduce access to illegal guns and the incidence of juveniles carrying illegal guns by identifying and closing gun distribution sources; and (3) expedite the judicial response to those offenders involved in gun-related offenses, including expedited prosecution in Federal court when possible. The partnership has implemented the following suppression activities.

Operation Eiger

The Eiger strategy is a high-intensity probation and parole effort that targets an identified group of chronic young violent offenders identified as Eigers. (Eiger is a reference to a mountain of the same name, which is one of the most difficult mountains in the world to climb.) Three-member police/probation pilot teams make regular and intensive contacts with the Eigers and their parents. Additionally, Operation Eiger teams contact an identified group of non-Eiger youth who are at risk of becoming serious, habitual offenders. The strategy facilitates an immediate response to delinquent behavior when it occurs. As of September 1998, 311 Eigers have been identified, 198 juveniles and 113 young adults. A total of 9,570 home visits were made by Operation Eiger teams during their first year with the monthly average number of contacts per Eiger ranging from 3.3 in the first month of implementation to more than 6 during the last 3 months of the reporting period. The percentage of Eiger contacts in which no violations were reported increased from 56 percent in September 1997 to 71 percent in September 1998.

Although Operation Eiger does not aggregate data by type of violation, it is estimated that 80 percent of violations were for curfew violation, disobeying parents, failure to notify a parent of whereabouts, and truancy. The remaining 20 percent were for more serious infractions such as failing a drug screening, associating with prohibited persons, and committing a new offense.
Profile No. 8 (continued)

Through the first quarter of 1998, 14 Eigers (9.5 percent) have been incarcerated on new adult offenses—a figure considerably less than the expected recidivism for this group of repeat violent offenders.

Gun Tracing Initiative

Every gun acquired at the scene of a crime or otherwise seized is submitted to ATF, which—in partnership with the Baton Rouge Police Department (BRPD)—ascertains where the gun came from and who purchased it. BRPD completes the tracing forms and submits them to ATF. During the first year of the partnership, from July 1, 1997, to June 30, 1998, 1,291 guns were seized. All of the gun seizures were mapped by street location, showing that 620 (54.5 percent) came from within the target areas. Guns were linked to 790 known offenders in Baton Rouge. The gun seizure data also revealed the following information:

♦ Seventy-one of these offenders were convicted felons.
♦ Thirty-eight (53.5 percent of the convicted felons) resided within the partnership’s target areas.
♦ Seventeen (43.6 percent of those from the target areas) were referred to the U.S. Attorney for prosecution, and four were convicted.
♦ Sixty-one juvenile offenders were identified through the gun seizures; 42 (68.9 percent) resided within the target areas.
♦ Fifty-four (6.8 percent of known offenders) were from outside Baton Rouge.
♦ Seventy-six percent of the offenders had their guns recovered within the ZIP code areas where they reside, and the remaining had guns recovered outside their neighborhood.

Gun Permits Application Initiative

Partnership staff and the Sheriff’s Office review all applications for gun permits, providing information to Federal, State, and local agencies on persons known to have felony records or known to be associating with felons. Between January 1 and September 1, 1998, the partnership collected data on the 329 denied applications for gun permits and found that 34.2 percent of these denied applications were for residents in the target areas. These data were correlated with ATF offender indices to provide additional profiles on violent offenders.

Like many American cities, Baton Rouge has seen an increase in violent crimes among juveniles in recent years. Though law enforcement has had some success in dealing with the problem, we know that the police alone cannot address all the underlying issues and causes. To do that, we need to involve a broad coalition of intervention and prevention services, grassroots groups, residents, and the youth themselves. These interests came together with local, State, and Federal law enforcement in 1997 as equal partners in shaping a plan of action. The result was a multifaceted approach that already is showing some positive results in addressing juvenile gun violence in our city. Though our Partnership continues to grow in strength and number, our goals and our comprehensive approach to achieving them remain the same. Our comprehensive approach—and our ability to stay focused on it—is one reason, I think, for our success.

—Greg Phares
Chief of Police and Partnership Chair
Baton Rouge, LA

School Drug Task Force

This special unit of the Police Department implements the school system’s newly enacted zero tolerance policy in 99 public
schools with a 1997–98 enrollment of nearly 56,000 students. During that school year, the task force arrested 202 students for weapons, drugs, or violent offenses on school grounds and conducted 16 school-based, antidrug, antiviolence prevention programs. About 30 percent of the 202 students arrested were girls. The increasing number of female delinquents (24.7 percent of all juveniles arrested by city police in 1997) is the focus of several planned intervention and prevention strategies.

Operation Takedown

Operation Takedown's primary focus is on street-level narcotic sales in the target areas, thereby reducing the incidence of drug-related gun violence. Forty-three Baton Rouge police officers were assigned to the program starting August 15, 1997. Eight of these officers also were assigned to Operation Eiger to work with adult and juvenile probation officers in the target area. During the 13-month period from April 1, 1997, through April 30, 1998, 1,158 arrests were made under Operation Takedown; 796 (68.7 percent) were from the partnership's target areas. During this period, 117 guns were confiscated, with 61.5 percent of them from the target areas. In addition, $26,329 in cash was seized during the period along with drugs with a street value of $120,411.

Judicial advisory committee

The partnership has formed a judicial advisory committee, including the District Attorney and three judges, to collaborate with the law enforcement, intervention, and prevention task forces, and to advise on issues relating to firearm and drug offenses. The committee also advises on issues related to jail space, increased workload, and justice system reform. The committee has prepared draft reformed juvenile court procedures and a position paper on a court-based mentoring program called Reclaiming Our Youth. The committee also has prepared a grant application to establish a juvenile drug court in Baton Rouge. More important, the juvenile judges have instituted a practice of writing probation orders using suspended jail sentences so that any violation of the terms of probation can result in a rearrest and immediate incarceration. While this zero tolerance policy is creating an overcrowding problem in the 55-bed juvenile detention facility and in the adult jail, talks are under way to contract with the private sector for additional detention and jail facilities. A committee established by the metro council is developing plans for more specialized group homes.

Intervention and prevention strategies

The partnership's gun violence intervention strategies seek to address risk factors that contribute to the violent behaviors of the identified Eigers through a three-pronged approach: (1) provide intensive intervention services for the Eigers to address their alienation and rebelliousness, propensity for violence, association with peers who engage in high-risk behaviors, academic failure, unemployment, and lack of social and interpersonal skills; (2) strengthen the Eiger families to instill moral values and support their children by intervening in family conflicts and dysfunctional relationships and alcohol and drug abuse; and (3) build resiliency in the community by intervening to address risk factors that include attitudes and conditions favorable to drug use, gun violence, community disorganization, low neighborhood attachment, and economic deprivation. The following specific strategies have been implemented.

Case management and intervention services

Case management services were initially designed to facilitate the reintegration of Eigers
Profile No. 8 (continued)

into the community. However, during the first year only a small number of Eigers were targeted for prerelease strategies because so few of them were incarcerated in local facilities. (Most were incarcerated elsewhere in the State.) A decision was made to shift the focus from prerelease/aftercare to intervention services for the entire Eiger population. The partnership thus sought to identify specific risk factors for all of the 205 Eigers. A case management specialist developed individual service plans (ISP’s) that address factors identified in the risk and needs assessments. Individual needs assessments were completed for 138 juvenile Eigers and 106 young adult Eigers ages 17 to 21. Seventy-two ISP’s have been completed to date. In addition, interviews and periodic meetings were held with 51 Eigers and their parents. Intervention services in the first year included substance abuse evaluations and treatment, a chemical awareness clinic, an anger management clinic, a crime prevention clinic, psychological evaluations and counseling, family counseling, preemployment job skills training, and job training and placement. These programs included the following:

- **Mentoring program.** Seeks to provide at-risk youth with positive messages on how they can turn their lives around. Mentors are largely drawn from the faith community and the 100 Black Men organization. Twenty Eigers have been paired with neighborhood-based spiritual mentors.

- **Job training/placement program.** Identifies existing employment training and job skills programs suitable for the Eigers and formalizes a strategy for involving neighborhood businesses to provide jobs.

- **Family education program.** Enables family members to deal more effectively with the Eigers and other central family issues. The initiative also identifies specific needs and gaps in family services. There is a minimum of one contact per week by probation officers with 58 Eiger parents.

- **I-CARE: School-based services.** As part of the prevention initiative, the partnership identified younger siblings of Eiger youth to be referred to school-based services and other relevant service programs. By the end of the first year, 87 siblings had been identified and referred to the I-CARE program for coordination of access to school-based services.

- **Juvenile diversion program.** A 40-week program, run by the Boy Scouts of America, one of the partnership’s member agencies, provides an alternative to incarceration for first-time offenders to facilitate positive character development and prevent recidivism. Two groups of about 20 youth participated in the first cycle of the program, which began in January 1998.

- **Youth Services Resource Directory.** A comprehensive directory has been created listing programs, organizations, and services throughout the city for targeted youth, their siblings, and other at-risk youth. This compilation includes 1,578 businesses, 183 churches, 67 schools, family service agencies in 69 categories, health services groups in 74 categories, and more than 400 other programs and services.

**The community mobilization strategy**

The partnership seeks to mobilize the community at the grassroots level as part of an overall strategy to address the problems of hard-to-reach families and highest risk youth by (1) involving youth and families in identifying and helping resolve gun violence
Profile No. 8 (continued)

issues in their neighborhoods and encouraging accountability at the street level; (2) identifying organizations and resources that individuals and families in the target area can turn to for help in dealing with their respective risk factors; (3) addressing residents' negative attitudes about what they perceive as law enforcement's lack of interest and involvement in solving neighborhood crime; and (4) implementing a public information strategy that will garner community support and publicize positive outcomes of grassroots initiatives. Activities include community forums, community surveys, community help/hotspot identification phone line, media coverage on program activities, and school presentations.

The partnership members have increased their visibility in the target communities and have collaborated with local civic groups to sponsor community forums and respond to community-defined problems. The Baton Rouge Chief of Police has attended many community forums, and several police officers maintain a presence in the targeted communities. In addition, community members have been encouraged to identify hotspots and individuals engaged in criminal activities as part of the suppression efforts.

ACT NOW

The partnership has established a relationship with ACT NOW, whose principal leaders also are members in the partnership. Fifty-four grassroots leaders and more than 400 residents from the community and faith groups have joined together to form ACT NOW, following the January 1998 Rev. Dr. Martin Luther King Day parade shootings at which an 8-year-old girl died and several others were injured. This is a significant organizational outcome for the partnership. Several members of the partnership are chairs of or active participants in the ACT NOW committees. Although ACT NOW is broader and reaches out to more neighborhoods and families than the partnership's target areas, they have agreed to focus their primary attention on the Eiger youth, their families, and siblings.

Anti-gun violence public information campaign

As part of an overall public awareness program, the partnership has established strong relationships with local newspaper and radio stations and has cooperated to provide information for a number of articles and announcements about violence-related issues.

Outcomes

The number of homicides in Baton Rouge dropped 17 percent from 1996 to 1997, from 71 murders in 1996 to 59 in 1997. Of these, 10 (17 percent) involved a suspect under the age of 21, and 14 (24 percent) involved a victim under the age of 21. The number of aggravated assaults dropped 43 percent (to 1,135 incidents), with 995 involving firearms. One hundred sixty-nine youth (under 21) were involved in these firearm-related aggravated assaults, down 30 percent from the previous year. Preliminary data for 1998 suggest significant reduction in firearm-related crimes. There were 34 homicides and 399 firearm-involved aggravated assaults through September 1998. Only 50 youth (under 21) were involved in these firearm-related assaults. These reductions in homicides, aggravated assaults, and other firearm-related crimes cannot be directly attributed to any one of these programs, but are more likely related to the cumulative impact of a comprehensive, multipronged approach.
Section IV

Strategies To Interrupt Sources of Illegal Guns
Section IV. Strategies To Interrupt Sources of Illegal Guns

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Overview

Through analysis of their gun violence problems, communities have found that limiting the sources of both illegal and legal guns enables them to reduce the number of illegal guns in their neighborhoods, thereby reducing criminal access to weapons and the related assaults, injuries, and deaths. Important to their efforts is comprehensive tracing of the guns through the U.S. Department of the Treasury's Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF) National Tracing Center (NTC). Crime gun tracing and trace analysis can link crime gun sellers, purchasers, and possessors across jurisdictions, including identifying suspects who may be serving as "straw purchasers" for those who are linked to gun trafficking and firearm violence. Purchasers and dealers of large numbers of crime guns over extended periods of time can be tracked through gun crime data bases.

Gun Tracing

ATF established NTC to trace firearms used in crimes and recovered at crime scenes. Crime gun tracing is the "systematic tracking of firearms from manufacturer to purchaser for the purpose of aiding law enforcement officials in identifying suspects involved in criminal violations, establishing stolen status, and proving ownership." The volume and efficiency of NTC trace operations have significantly increased since 1993, when it responded to 55,000 requests for traces with a response time of 13 days. During 1996, NTC responded to 133,000 trace requests in an average response time of 9 days. In 1997, NTC traced 194,000 crime guns.

To initiate a trace on a gun used in a crime, the requesting agency, typically a local police department, furnishes firearm, possession, and incident description information to NTC. Firearms without at least a partial serial number cannot be traced, although ATF and many police laboratories have the capacity to restore obliterated serial numbers. NTC communicates the trace request to the gun manufacturer, who is required to provide the name of the wholesale/retail distributor and the date of transfer. The chain of wholesale/retail transactions is then followed to the extent possible from point of sale to the first retail purchaser. Further investigative tracing of crime guns is at the discretion of NTC and dependent on the significance of the individual investigation and the availability of special agent resources.

Two functions of gun tracing

Firearm tracing serves two primary functions. First, tracing enables law enforcement officials to reconstruct the history of a firearm associated with a crime. This traditional, incident-driven trace may lead to the apprehension of suspects, the identification of potential witnesses, and the discovery of other persons who may be associated with the crime under investigation. The trace may also reveal evidence for other cases and disclose crimes that previously had been undetected.

The second emerging function of firearm tracing is the identification of patterns of illegal gun trafficking. Gun tracing can facilitate development of predictive indicators for trafficking schemes at an early stage in their life cycles. For example, patterns of partially or completely obliterated serial numbers of firearms, multiple sales of firearms to purchasers and subsequent short time to crime, patterns of thefts from Federal firearm licensees (FFLs), and multiple traces to the same FFLs or purchaser are highly significant predictors of gun-related crime. By examining patterns in aggregates of traces, gun tracing can help identify opportunities for intervention on the supply side of illegal firearm markets. Such intervention can then reduce further trafficking and associated violent crime. Already, ATF's Project LEAD, an automated data system that tracks illegal firearms, is identifying recurring patterns of illegal firearm

[quote]
A 1998 amendment to 18 U.S.C. § 923(d)(1) requires Federal firearms licensees to make triggerlocks or lockboxes available for sale on their premises. Failure to comply can result in revocation of the dealer's license (see 144 Cong. Rec. H11044-03; 1998 WL732765).
[/quote]
suppliers both in the United States and across international borders and providing evidence for prosecution.

Integrated Ballistics Identification System

The Integrated Ballistics Identification System (IBIS) has also been implemented by NTC. IBIS is the first computer identification system that correlates and matches projectile and shell casing ballistic evidence in a national data base. Now local law enforcement can fire recovered weapons and enter digitized information from the bullet that will provide "fingerprint" evidence for all other bullets fired from it. When a suspect is linked to a gun, IBIS can quickly determine if bullets fired from that gun can be linked to other crimes. With every recovered gun, projectile, or shell casing, the data base—and the potential for individual criminal prosecution—grows.

The programs described in this section incorporate crime gun tracing as a valuable weapons-fighting tool, whether as the primary violence suppression activity or as part of a broader strategy. In some of these efforts, ATF agents take the lead in increasing local crime gun-tracing initiatives; in others, they provide technology and resources as part of a team that is spearheaded by State, county, or local enforcement agencies.

Inspection and Investigation of Federal Firearms Licensees

Because only a few high-risk licensed firearms dealers and pawnbrokers are associated with multiple crime guns, law enforcement has an opportunity to allocate its resources most efficiently and fairly by focusing on the few suspects who may be involved with the systematic illegal transfer of guns to felons and minors.

A major obstacle to these "firm and fair" enforcement strategies lies in obtaining and analyzing the information needed to distinguish the lawbreakers from law-abiding dealers who happen to turn up frequently in purchase histories of crime guns. Federal, State, and local law enforcement agencies have found that, by sharing information with one another, they can more effectively distinguish the unlucky from the unlawful, and target unlawful activity at the point of retail sale.

One information-sharing strategy, reflected in profile 10, occurs when local agencies ask ATF to trace the purchase history of every crime gun they recover and then use Project LEAD output to target problem areas. Project LEAD is a national gun-tracing initiative to identify straw purchasers. Sometimes, however, the missing puzzle piece lies in a State or local data base, not in ATF trace results. Therefore, potentially high-risk dealers who show up frequently in ATF crime gun trace records but are absent from their States' and localities' records of sales tax receipts or business licenses may warrant a preliminary check by local law enforcement authorities. Active dealers' addresses that lie in residentially zoned neighborhoods may signal an illegal business. Federal licensees who turn up in the trace of a crime handgun but are missing from a State data base of licensed handgun dealers may signal promising leads.

Joint Federal and local task forces may find other strategies helpful in locating people who channel guns to criminals or use them in crimes. In more and more localities, local police are using geographic
information systems to locate drug markets, places where "shots fired" 911 calls cluster, and other hotspots for gun crime. Under appropriate safeguards, the task forces can then use a variety of interdiction tactics in identified areas to confiscate illegally carried guns, make arrests, or deter future violence by direct contact with gang leaders, drug dealers, and other participants in violent social networks.

To date, the successes of these information-sharing strategies have largely been measured in terms of licenses confiscated from FFLs involved with criminal activity, prosecutions referred, or convictions obtained—they have not been evaluated by gun crimes prevented. Measuring prevention effects presents a difficult challenge in evaluation, but a necessary one because of the risk that the dealers, straw purchasers, and guns removed are simply replaced by others. Recognizing this limitation, the following profiles describe some promising, current programs.

**Notes**


Profile No. 9

Baltimore County Police Gun Squad—Baltimore, MD

Program Type or Federal Program Source:
Program to monitor Federal firearms licensees.

Program Goal:
To reduce the number of illegal guns in homes and on the streets.

Specific Groups Targeted by the Strategy:
Illegal FFL's.

Geographical Area Targeted by the Strategy:
Baltimore County, MD.

Evaluated by:
Internal data collection.

Contact Information:
Sergeant Mark Cowley
Baltimore County Police Department
700 East Joppa Road
Towson, MD 21286
Phone: 410–887–6287

Years of Operation:
1995–present.

The chief of the Baltimore County Police Department established the department's Gun Squad as a pilot project in 1995 to respond to an increase in the number of crimes involving firearms. Members of the Gun Squad completed 6 months of training with ATF to learn firearm investigation techniques.

The Gun Squad began by focusing on residential FFL's because home burglaries were a major source of illegal guns. The 1994 Omnibus Crime Bill included a provision that if a person holding an FFL was in violation of any local laws, the Federal license would not be renewed. Gun Squad officers, therefore, reviewed local laws and discovered a county ordinance prohibiting the operation of a business from the home. The Gun Squad asked county zoning officials to prepare a list of all FFL's operating in areas that were not zoned for business use; letters were sent to these individuals informing them that they were in violation of a county law and that their FFL's would not be renewed. Because of the group's work, the number of FFL's has been reduced from 404 in 1995 to about 75 dealers and 50 collectors in 1998.

The Gun Squad also has developed rapid response procedures to investigate suspected straw purchasers, many of whom have been identified from information given to police by gun dealers. The Gun Squad has spent years building a strong rapport with dealers. When a tip is received, the officers are able to conduct a background check and execute a search warrant within hours, making it more likely that the suspect will still have the weapons in his or her possession at the time of arrest.

Finally, when uniformed officers respond to a domestic violence call, they contact the Gun Squad if one of the parties has been threatened with a gun (even if the weapon is not visible at the time). The Gun Squad will run a profile on the suspect to determine whether there are legal reasons why the person may not own a gun (a prior felony conviction, for example) and, if there are, will come to the premises and seize the gun.

In 1996, the Gun Squad seized more than 300 weapons—25 percent of all weapons seized by county law enforcement; 260 weapons were seized in 1997.
Profile No. 10

Boston Gun Project—Boston, MA

Program Type or Federal Program Source:
Project to target violent crime and criminals; ATF; U.S. Attorney's Office.

Program Goal:
To investigate firearm trafficking and armed career criminals.

Specific Groups Targeted by the Strategy:
Illegal gun traffickers and violent perpetrators who use guns.

Geographical Area Targeted by the Strategy:
Boston, MA.

Evaluates by:
Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA.

Contact Information:
Phil Tortorella, Group Supervisor
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms
Boston Field Office
O'Neal Federal Building
10 Causeway Street, Room 701
Boston, MA 02222
Phone: 617–565–7054

Years of Operation:
1994–present.

Gun trafficking interdiction is one component of a broad strategy implemented by law enforcement officials to stop gun violence in Boston, described more fully in profile 2. Major partners in the city's efforts are ATF, the Boston Police Department (BPD), the Suffolk County District Attorney's Office, and the U.S. Attorney's Office. These partners have worked together to direct the investigations of firearm trafficking and armed career criminals. The Boston ATF supervisor finds that the key to the program's success has been the close working relationship and genuine cooperation between ATF and local police.

This cooperation has taken many forms. Within both BPD and ATF, organizational resources were made available exclusively to investigate firearm-trafficking cases. A seasoned violent crime coordinator was assigned by ATF to pursue Federal firearm arrests. ATF also assigned six agents to collaborate with the ballistics and crime laboratories at BPD to trace recovered handguns and match them to other crimes. The police and ATF followed a protocol that guided this process. ATF attempted to trace every gun recovered by BPD through ATF's National Tracing Center to discover sources of illegal weapons and gun-trafficking patterns. For their part, the Youth Violence Strike Force officers extracted gun market information from offenders charged with serious, nongun charges. BPD and ATF also conducted joint inspections of all federally licensed firearm dealers in Boston, checking to ensure that they were in compliance with Federal, State, and local laws and regulations. As a result of these inspections, 65 license holders (80 percent) decided not to renew their licences or to surrender them, leaving only 17 licensed dealers in Boston.

ATF also developed a local tracing data set, consisting of police information and trace data, that was helpful in the development of Boston's Operation Ceasefire strategies (see profile 21) and Boston's strategy to prevent youth violence (see profile 2).
Profile No. 10 (continued)

Based on the ATF tracing data set, members in the working group established priorities for disrupting the illegal gun market, realizing that they would never totally eliminate it. First, the working group prioritized investigating every trace that showed a gun with a time-to-crime of less than 30 months. Investigative priority also was given to certain types of guns popular with youth (e.g., semiautomatic handguns), those with restored obliterated serial numbers, those found in high-risk neighborhoods, and those associated with gang members or territories. Investigations of illegal traffickers focused on guns involved in multiple crimes and for which specific FFLs or first purchasers could be identified. Another tactic was to link the trace data set with gang membership data to identify gun possessors who also were gang members.

The working group also prioritized, through the U.S. Attorney’s Office, swift Federal prosecution for gun trafficking. Federal prosecution is believed to deter gun usage by gangs because it carries longer sentences than those for most State gun crimes, and because gang members fear being in a Federal correctional facility away from home and family and without the security of knowing other prisoners. The joint efforts of ATF, BPD, and the U.S. Attorney’s Office also resulted in the investigation and prosecution of several interstate gun-trafficking rings in Alabama, Connecticut, Georgia, Massachusetts, and Mississippi.

Based on the success of the Boston Gun Project, ATF launched the Youth Crime Gun Interdiction Initiative in 17 demonstration cities in 1996. (See section VIII for more details.)
Profile No. 11

Chicago Anti-Gun Enforcement (CAGE) Program—Chicago, IL

Program Type or Federal Program Source: Program to target violent criminals.

Program Goal: To investigate the illegal purchase and transfer of firearms.

Specific Groups Targeted by the Strategy: Illegal handgun purchasers.

Geographical Area Targeted by the Strategy: Chicago, IL.

Evaluated by: Internal data collection.

Contact Information: Sergeant Ken Barnas Chicago Police Department 3340 West Fillmore Street Chicago, IL 60624 Phone: 312-746-5884

Years of Operation: Mid-1990's-present.

The Chicago Anti-Gun Enforcement (CAGE) team was established in the mid-1990's in response to an increase in the number of gun-related crimes. The Chicago Police Department believed that a more proactive approach was needed: Instead of focusing exclusively on the crime itself, gun violence could be reduced by investigating individuals who purchased guns that were used in crimes and arresting and prosecuting the straw purchasers who were the sources of many of these illegal weapons. At the start of the program, only two officers were assigned to the CAGE team; by 1998, when police data suggested that additional resources could cause significant reductions in illegal gun purchases, the team was increased to eight Chicago police gang specialists and two special agents from ATF who are detailed to the unit.

Any firearm recovered at the scene of the crime is investigated by this special unit. First, investigators obtain the serial number of the gun and forward it to the ATF’s National Tracing Center, which will reveal information about the manufacturer, the FFL that sold the firearm, the purchaser, and the purchaser’s State-mandated Firearms Owner Identification (FOID) card, if any. The CAGE team then contacts the Illinois

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State Police and requests information on how many times that person has been “queried”—that is, how many times a gun dealer has informed the State police that a FOID holder has tried to purchase firearms or ammunition. Not only does State law require that the FFL report each transaction, but the FFL is not even allowed to show weapons or ammunition to anyone who does not have a FOID card. (FFLs are also required to notify ATF when someone is buying more than two guns in 1 week.) The law also requires that the purchaser retain records on the gun for 10 years. In the event that the weapon is sold to someone else, the original purchaser must ensure that the new purchaser has a FOID card and meets the same State and Federal requirements for firearm purchases.

Using information obtained from the State police, the CAGE team initiates an investigation, beginning with the weapon that was recovered from the crime scene. The unit also works with its two ATF agents to obtain information on all the guns that have ever been purchased by a particular individual, based on information from ATF. When sufficient evidence is obtained, an arrest is made; if the case warrants Federal prosecution, the CAGE team works with the U.S. Attorney’s Office to have the case prosecuted in Federal court (where penalties are more severe) rather than in State court.

One of the strengths of the CAGE team is its ability to complete a weapons trace quickly—in about 24 hours, compared with the 2 weeks that are normally required. There has been no independent evaluation of the program, although the unit has collected evidence suggesting that the CAGE team has been successful in identifying straw purchasers and preventing guns from being transferred to the illegal market. During the period January 1–October 8, 1998, for example, the CAGE team made a total of 61 arrests, both felony (e.g., gun running and unlawful sales) and misdemeanor (e.g., failure to maintain records).

During the period January 1–September 30, 1998, CAGE team requests for ATF tracing documented 874 firearms. Of that number, 154 weapons were recovered from crime scenes by the Chicago Police Department or other local law enforcement agencies, and 131 were recovered by the CAGE team during its investigations of suspected straw purchasers or gun runners. The remaining weapons were reported missing, stolen, or otherwise unaccounted for. The CAGE team launched 123 investigations during that same period, resulting in the 61 arrests noted above. So far, 27 case dispositions have resulted in 23 convictions with jail time or probation; approximately 30 cases are still pending.
Profile No. 12

Oakland Firearms Licensee Compliance Program—Oakland, CA

Program Type or Federal Program Source: Program to monitor Federal firearms licensees; Bureau of Justice Assistance.

Program Goal: To reduce violent crime by decreasing the availability of illegal firearms.

Specific Groups Targeted by the Strategy: Federal firearm licensees.

Geographical Area Targeted by the Strategy: Oakland, CA.

Evaluated by: Internal data collection; Police Executive Research Forum, Washington, DC.

Contact Information: Sergeant Gary Tollifson Oakland Police Department 455 Seventh Street Oakland, CA 94607 Phone: 510-238-3728

Years of Operation: 1994–present.

The use of firearms in violent crime in Oakland, CA, increased steadily during the period from the late 1980’s through the early 1990’s. City officials were concerned about the increase in the proportion of aggravated assaults involving firearms (from 40 percent in 1992 to 44 percent in 1993) and in homicides (from 60 percent to 80 percent during the same period). The city also had a large number of Federal firearms licensees, many of whom were selling out of their cars and homes.

To respond to these concerns, the Oakland Police Department (OPD) joined with ATF to create the Firearms Licensee Compliance Program. This program aims to enhance the ability of OPD to conduct more complete and comprehensive background investigations on applicants for new or renewed Federal firearms licenses and to ensure that gun dealers comply with Federal, State, and local laws. Oakland also initiated a Firearms Trafficking Program to reduce the number of illegally purchased firearms and illicit dealers. Both initiatives were implemented in the department’s Weapons Unit with funding from the Bureau of Justice Assistance.

The goals of the initiatives are to reduce violent crime by reducing the availability of firearms, reducing the number of illegally purchased firearms, eliminating firearms businesses that operate in residential neighborhoods, and reducing the number of firearm dealers. These goals are achieved by conducting comprehensive background investigations of applicants for FFLs and by ensuring that all licensees have OPD permits. The Weapons Unit also maintains a data base to identify multiple gun sales and determines if certain individuals are operating as independent dealers or completing questionable sales (straw purchases). The Weapons Unit also traces all guns confiscated by a police officer. Patrol officers bring between 20 and 25 gun cases a month to the unit’s attention. The investigators in the unit conduct all work on each firearm violation case—from initial interview of the arrestee to preparation of the case for the
Profile No. 12 (continued)

district attorney. Investigators also work with the U.S. Attorney’s Office to prepare cases for Federal prosecution under Operation Triggerlock, an ATF initiative.

Oakland’s firearm licensee compliance initiatives, together with the new municipal ordinances governing firearm sales (see profile 16), reduced the number of FFL’s from 57 to 6 during the 2-year period from 1994 to 1996. The unit completed more than 3,000 firearm traces and investigated 28 straw purchasers—leading to prosecution of suspects in 5 of these straw purchase cases. Because of its recognized success, this initiative is continuing with ATF staff support and OPD officers.
Profile No. 13

Violent Crime Task Force—Charlotte, NC

Program Type or Federal Program Source:
Task force to target violent crime and criminals.

Program Goal:
To investigate crimes involving guns, violent career criminals, and violent organizations or gangs.

Specific Groups Targeted by the Strategy:
Violent career criminals, including both adults and juveniles.

Geographical Area Targeted by the Strategy:
Charlotte, NC.

Evaluated by:
Internal data collection.

Contact Information:
Jack Davis
North Carolina State Bureau of Investigation
P.O. Box 1042
Huntersville, NC 28078
Phone: 704-522-1491

Years of Operation:
1990–present.

The Violent Crime Task Force in Charlotte, NC, comprises 25 Federal, State, and local agents. The task force’s goal is to investigate crimes involving violent organizations or gangs, guns, and violent career criminals. The member agencies of the task force include ATF, the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Department (CMPD), the North Carolina State Bureau of Investigation (SBI), the U.S. Secret Service, the Immigration and Naturalization Service, and the U.S. Attorney’s Office.

A set of standard operating procedures details the roles and responsibilities of the task force members and establishes the screening criteria by which the task force reviews cases and decides whether to assume lead investigative responsibility, thereby making use of its limited assets. Two criteria are applied for gun cases: first, the target organization must be using or stockpiling guns or weapons of mass destruction (i.e., explosives); and second, there must be a pattern of violent crimes, including shootings. These cases may be referred by any law enforcement agency within the task force’s corresponding Federal judicial district.

CMPD, ATF, and SBI contribute supervisory personnel to coordinate activities and assignment of cases. The special agents in charge of ATF and SBI and the Deputy Chief for CMPD retain overall command of the task force and serve as an advisory board with other participating agencies.

Because we have limited resources, we have learned to be strategic about how to use them. By creating the Violent Crime Task Force, we have been able to combine the resources from 25 local, State, and Federal agents to investigate crimes involving violent organizations, gangs, and violent career criminals. The task force has developed two criteria for deciding which crimes will be targeted: first, we target organizations that are using or stockpiling guns or weapons of mass destruction (like explosives); second, we target individuals and groups that show a pattern of violent crimes.

—Jack Davis
North Carolina State Bureau of Investigation
Profile No. 13 (continued)

From early 1990 through July 1996, the task force initiated 220 firearm-related investigations, targeting 1,290 individuals, which resulted in 650 Federal indictments and 170 State indictments. As a result of the task force's efforts, 29 life sentences were issued; 385 weapons were seized (195 semi-automatic pistols, 80 revolvers, 49 shotguns, 44 rifles, 10 machine guns, and 7 fire bombs); 23 vehicles and 9 properties were seized; large quantities of crack cocaine, cocaine, heroin, marijuana, and methamphetamine were confiscated; and $712 in U.S. currency was recovered. Additionally, the task force has identified 122 gang-related organizations.
Profile No. 14

West Virginia Firearms Violations Task Force—Charleston, WV

Program Type or Federal Program Source: Task force to monitor Federal firearms licensees; Bureau of Justice Assistance.

Program Goal: To reduce the number of illegal weapons and gun violence.

Specific Groups Targeted by the Strategy: Illegal gun traffickers.

Geographical Area Targeted by the Strategy: West Virginia.

Evaluated by: Internal data collection; Police Executive Research Forum, Washington, DC.

Contact Information: Trooper Barrington Gore West Virginia State Police 900 One Valley Square Charleston, WV 25301 Phone: 304-558-2600

Years of Operation: 1994–present.

In South Charleston, WV, the West Virginia State Police formed the Firearms Violations Task Force (FVTF) in response to a significant rise in violent crime and illegal firearm trafficking in West Virginia. FVTF is made up of personnel from ATF and full-time investigators from the West Virginia State Police Bureau of Criminal Investigation.

The mission of the task force is to reduce firearm trafficking and firearm-related violent crime. FVTF collects, analyzes, and disseminates criminal intelligence information relating to firearm violations in West Virginia and other jurisdictions and investigates individuals who traffic illegally in firearms and who commit violent crimes with firearms. In addition, the task force conducts comprehensive background investigations on applicants for new or renewal FFL's to ensure dealer compliance with Federal, State, and local laws. The investigations help screen out applicants with a prior criminal record, ethical breaches, or history of mental illness. Onsite inspections are conducted to ensure that the building where the dealer operates meets security requirements. The task force also educates applicants and licensees regarding the illegal sale or purchase of firearms.

From April 1994 through December 1996, FVTF made 55 arrests for firearm-related offenses and obtained the convictions of 34 individuals, 23 of whom were incarcerated for their crimes. Prior to the creation of the task force, these offenders likely would not have been prosecuted because of staffing shortages, ignorance of Federal statutes, and other factors.
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Deterring Illegal Gun Possession

Data from recent criminal justice research tell a straightforward but daunting story: Across the country, more and more youth are acquiring and carrying guns illegally. They are doing so to protect themselves, to engage in gang- and drug-related criminal activity, and to gain respect. Research also shows that gaining access to a gun—from home, family members, or friends, or by theft or street purchase—is easy.

The programs profiled in this chapter seek to reduce firearm possession and carrying by juveniles and others who are not legally entitled to own or carry guns. These programs focus largely on making it harder for youth to gain access to guns, including reducing the number of guns in a community.

To accomplish this goal, some communities have limited the number of Federal firearms licensees (FFLs) that are allowed to sell firearms. Zoning and other municipal ordinances that restrict permissible gun sale locations (e.g., in residential and school zones) and impose conditions on gun sales are effective strategies used by many jurisdictions to reduce the degree to which communities are saturated with guns.

Another approach to restricting juveniles’ access to guns has been the development of “silent witness” or “weapons hotline” initiatives. In many cities, people are encouraged, through the promise of anonymity and a cash reward, to call a special toll-free telephone number to report persons in possession of guns. A related approach is the “Consent to Search and Seize” initiative of the St. Louis Police Department, which has enabled police to remove guns from the homes of many youth in that city.

Other strategies profiled in this section make effective use of scarce law enforcement and community resources by focusing on crime “hotspots” where disproportionate amounts of crime and violence are occurring. Still others monitor probationers and parolees (groups likely to be involved in gun crimes) through unannounced home visits and searches. Finally, this section includes a description of several programs that combine prevention education, searches, and sanctions to keep guns out of schools.

Intentionally not included in this section, but worthy of discussion, are the gun buyback programs that were implemented in many communities in the early 1990’s. Evaluations of these programs suggested that they did not meaningfully reduce juvenile access to guns since many of the guns turned in were either old or defective and individuals sometimes used their buyback payments to buy better guns. Nevertheless, when implemented in concert with a public media campaign about safe gun storage, gun buyback programs may serve to mobilize the community and alert parents to the dangers of their children’s access to guns.

Note

Consent to Search and Seize Firearms—St. Louis, MO

Program Type or Federal Program Source:
Program to deter illegal gun possession.

Program Goal:
To reduce juvenile possession and carrying of guns.

Specific Groups Targeted by the Strategy:
Juveniles engaged in gun violence.

Geographical Area Targeted by the Strategy:
St. Louis, MO.

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Years of Operation:
1994–present.

Through the late 1980’s and early 1990’s, St. Louis experienced a greater increase in homicides and other violent crimes than most other U.S. cities of comparable demographics. Homicides increased dramatically (68 percent) from 1988 to 1989, rising from 130 murders to 219. The percentage of homicide suspects who were juveniles also increased from 4.9 percent in the early 1980’s to 15.1 percent in the early 1990’s. A profile of victims and suspects revealed that the vast majority of both offenders and victims were young black males and, in nearly all cases, homicides involved the use of a handgun.

Firearm Suppression Program (FSP)

The St. Louis Police Department implemented FSP in 1994 in an effort to reduce the level of gun violence in the community. The overall goal of this initiative was to develop a community-based, problem-solving approach that would encourage greater community input and assistance in address-
criminal prosecution. Residents are informed that they will not be charged with the illegal possession of a firearm if they sign the consent form. By agreeing not to file criminal charges, the police can focus their attention on getting guns out of the hands of juveniles and send a clear message that juvenile firearm possession is not tolerated by police or the community.

The program has been criticized as depriving citizens of the right to protect themselves against crime. Furthermore, some senior police officers have stated that they prefer to use legal search warrants as they allow them both to arrest juvenile suspects and other persons engaged in criminal activity and to seize the guns.

Despite this criticism, however, evaluation of the program indicated a favorable response by families of juveniles who had guns confiscated and by the broader community. According to anecdotal reports, one parent even wanted to presign consent forms so that the officers could return any time. Another parent wanted to give officers a key to her house so that they could come in while she was at work.

According to the officers of the Mobile Reserve Unit, the program’s success depended on their scrupulous adherence to the promise not to arrest the consenting adult. Several officers reported that they were willing to ignore evidence of all but the most serious crimes in return for access to homes of juveniles with firearms. This reflected the officers’ view that the community was better served by removing guns from juvenile hands than by using evidence discovered in the search as a basis for making an arrest.

Over the 3-year demonstration period from 1994 to 1997, a total of more than 1,300 guns were seized. FSP officers reported that they conducted approximately 260 searches per year, finding guns in about half the houses. An outcome evaluation of the program is being considered.

Cease Fire program

In 1997, FSP was incorporated into a broader law enforcement initiative called Cease Fire (modeled after Operation Ceasefire in Boston—see profile 21), which is a coordinated effort across several law enforcement agencies to reduce youth violence. This program is being spearheaded by the U.S. Attorney’s Offices in the Eastern District of Missouri and the Southern District of Illinois, but includes partners from the FBI; DEA; ATF; St. Louis Metropolitan Police Department; St. Louis City Sheriff’s Department; St. Louis County Police Department; Missouri Highway Patrol; St. Louis County Prosecutor’s Office; Illinois State Police; U.S. Marshals’ Office; Jefferson County Sheriff’s Office; Regional Anti-Violence Initiative; OJJDP SafeFutures program; St. Louis Family Court; Missouri Probation and Parole; St. Louis Public Schools; University of Missouri, St. Louis; and St. Louis City Neighborhood Stabilization Team.

Cease Fire’s three-part strategy includes a crackdown on illicit gun trafficking through ATF’s gun-tracing program; a swift response to acts of gang violence through intensive surveillance, youth outreach streetworkers, and social service interventions (a Ten-Point Coalition of religious leaders is taking a key role in gang intervention efforts—see profile 46); and Operation Night Light which sends police and probation teams out together on nightly visits to the homes of youth on probation to ensure compliance with the terms of their probation.
Profile No. 15 (continued)

Gang Outreach

One Cease Fire component, the Gang Outreach program, was launched in 1998 by the St. Louis Metropolitan Police Department and targets youth from neighborhoods that have either a high level of gang violence or few social service resources. When a gang-involved youth is shot, police contact a team of counseling professionals from Central Baptist Family Services, who meet with the youth. The goal of this counseling is to prevent victims or their friends from retaliating and to encourage them to leave gangs. While the counselor is working with the victim, police make contact with the parent and, using the “consent to search and seize” protocols, obtain permission to search the youth’s home for weapons and other contraband.

These initiatives have resulted in youth moving their weapons from their family homes to abandoned buildings in the neighborhood. In response, police initiated the Demolition Project. Under this program, when police identify high-profile houses that are linked to gang activity, they have the authority to secure them (board them up) or raze them. Police now find that 40 percent of the abandoned buildings they search contain firearms or other contraband.
Municipal Firearms Ordinances, East Bay Public Safety Corridor Partnership—Oakland, CA

Program Type or Federal Program Source:
Program to deter illegal gun possession.

Program Goal:
To pass municipal ordinances that reduce the availability of and access to illegal and unsafe guns.

Specific Groups Targeted by the Strategy:
Federal firearm dealers.

Geographical Area Targeted by the Strategy:
16 communities in Alameda and Contra Costa Counties.

Evaluated by:
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Years of Operation:
1994–present.

The East Bay Gun Violence Prevention Project was initiated by the East Bay Public Safety Corridor Partnership (EBPSCP), a regional coordinating body formed to reduce crime and violence in response to an alarming level of gun violence among cities in the East Bay Corridor. Among the 16 communities of the East Bay Corridor, there had been 252 homicides in 1993, 258 in 1994, and 215 in 1995. There was a general belief that Federal and State legislators were not doing enough to control the flow of guns into the area. In 1994, faced with the presence of more than 400 gun dealers in Alameda County and 700 in Contra Costa County, the Corridor cities of Oakland, Richmond, and San Pablo began working to pass municipal ordinances to better regulate gun sales and eliminate residential gun dealers (i.e., dealers who sell guns out of their homes or cars) as part of a public health approach to violence prevention.

Participating municipalities attempted to implement the following policies: banning the manufacture and sale of "junk guns"; requiring triggerlocks at the point of sale; restricting the number of licensed gun dealers and the areas in which they can operate; and placing a gross receipts tax on merchandise sold by gun dealers. To date, 16 Corridor communities, including the cities of Oakland, Richmond, and Berkeley, have banned junk guns; triggerlock ordinances were passed in 11 communities; restrictions on gun dealers were passed in 8 other Corridor communities; and the gross receipts sales tax proposal went on the ballot in 3 communities in 1998. It is still too early to measure the impact of these new ordinances. However, as a result of the gun dealer ordinances passed in Oakland, the number of gun dealers in the city dropped from 115 to 7 within 1 year. Similarly, the number of gun dealers in Richmond declined from 15 to 2.
Moreover, as a result of these ordinances, ATF and local police were able to increase monitoring of the smaller number of remaining dealers to ensure their compliance with applicable laws and regulations.

The passage of municipal firearm ordinances is one element of a collaborative, comprehensive strategy that was implemented in the East Bay Corridor to address escalating violent crime rates. For a more detailed description of this effort and a discussion of how the program fits into the Corridor's overall crime-reduction strategy, see profile 5 (East Bay Public Safety Corridor Partnership) and profile 4 (Comprehensive Homicide Initiative, Richmond, CA).
Profile No. 17

Weapon Watch—Memphis, TN

Program Type or Federal Program Source:
Program to change attitudes about guns and violence.

Program Goal:
To reduce weapons in the schools through the use of a weapons hotline.

Specific Groups Targeted by the Strategy:
All students in the city and county schools.

Geographical Area Targeted by the Strategy:
Memphis City Schools and Shelby County Schools.

Evaluated by:
Internal data collection.

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Years of Operation:
1993–present.

Weapon Watch is a hotline program that was created to address the growing number of weapons in the Memphis City and Shelby County School Districts. The goals of the program are to create a safe learning environment by removing guns and other weapons from the schools and to serve as a deterrent to children who consider bringing weapons to school. The program is a joint venture involving Memphis City Schools, Shelby County Schools, Memphis Police Department, Shelby County Sheriff’s Department, and Crime Stoppers of Memphis.

The Weapon Watch hotline allows students to anonymously report fellow students who have guns or other weapons on school property. If a student sees an individual with a gun or other weapon, or knows about a crime that occurred on or around school property, he or she can contact the confidential hotline (which is operated by Crime Stoppers). The Memphis Police Department or the Shelby County Sheriff’s Department is then contacted by Crime Stoppers, and a police officer is dispatched to the school. Cash rewards of $50 to $1,000 are given to the caller, depending on whether an arrest is made and the type of weapon or the severity of the crime.

The program is advertised to the student population through fliers that are distributed to every student and by signs posted in the schools. Due to extensive advertising about the program, many reports of weapons also have been received from adults outside the school system.

This hotline is unique in that it is operated by a confidential third party; the students actually speak to Crime Stoppers, rather than to a school official or a police officer. The students’ desire for safety and the
Profile No. 17 (continued)

Anonymity of the program are believed to be more important factors in its success than the offer of a cash reward. This is evidenced by the fact that only 50 percent of award funds have been collected.

Since the inception of the program, more than 400 weapons, including several hand-made bombs, have been seized. In 1993, during the first 100 days of the program, police removed 100 guns from the schools. During the 1994-95 school year, 60 arrests resulted in the recovery of 24 firearms. During the 1995-96 school year, the hotline received 117 calls; 44 calls were related to firearms and 15 firearms were confiscated from school grounds. During the 1996-97 school year, 12 guns and 27 other weapons were reported to the hotline and seized. During the first 2 months of the 1997-98 school year, six guns were reported to the hotline. Crime Stoppers officials believe the program places students at a high level of risk for bringing weapons onto school property or committing crimes at school; students do not know who is going to turn them in, and, thus, the potential for being caught has increased dramatically.
Deterring Gun Carrying in High-Crime Hotspot Areas

One of the key research findings of the last 10 to 15 years has been the discovery of the importance of hotspots of crime. Researchers have recently discovered that even within high-crime areas there are specific locales that generate the majority of calls for police service and response to crime.\(^1\) This discovery informs important theoretical work on problem-oriented policing,\(^2\) the community policing movement,\(^3\) and situational crime prevention.\(^4\) Hotspot analyses also have become increasingly important for police departments as they seek to move from a reactive to a proactive model of policing.\(^6\) Perhaps most reflective of this orientation is the New York City Police Department's COMPSTAT program, which systematically utilizes hotspot analyses in regular crime analysis meetings involving strategic planning and managerial benchmarking.\(^6\)

Applying a hotspot perspective to firearm crime suggests a focus on both places and people. Research in Indianapolis found that only 3 percent of the city's addresses accounted for 100 percent of the gun crimes.\(^7\) Further, a small number of the city's blocks accounted for a disproportionate number of firearm calls for service. Another study in Washington, D.C., found that a small and select group of youth were arrested repeatedly on gun charges. This is consistent with research in Boston, which showed that approximately 1,300 gang members, representing less than 1 percent of the city's youth, were responsible for at least 60 percent of the city's youth homicides.\(^8\) Youth involved in homicides in Boston, both as victims and suspects, had long histories of involvement in the justice system, leading to the conclusion that "youth homicide was concentrated among a small number of serially offending, gang-involved youths."\(^9\)

The fact that firearm-related violence is concentrated in select locations within a city also provides opportunities for prevention. As indicated in the program summaries described in this chapter, these opportunities may be based on interventions at specific locales, among certain groups of potential offenders, or may involve a combination of place and person. Two promising approaches that rest on these principles involve directed police patrol and the specific deterrence approach developed in Boston referred to as "pulling levers."

Directed police patrol

In 1992, the Kansas City Police Department, as part of its Weed and Seed program, implemented a directed patrol initiative in a police beat with very high levels of homicide and firearm-related violent crime.\(^10\) This was a beat that included a number of gun crime hotspots. For 6 months, a group of officers patrolled the beat, free from the responsibility of responding to calls for service. The directed patrol officers provided more than 1,200 additional hours of police presence in this beat, issued nearly 1,100 traffic warrants, and made approximately 600 arrests. Primarily relying upon vehicle stops, the police increased the number of firearm seizures by 65 percent during the project period. This activity, in turn, was associated with a 49-percent decrease in gun crimes.

Given the success of the Kansas City Gun Experiment and facing an escalating homicide problem, the Indianapolis Police Department implemented a similar directed patrol project in the summer of 1997. The Indianapolis project focused on two areas for a 3-month period. The areas chosen in Indianapolis were two police beats selected for their high levels of violent crime. Two slightly different strategies were employed in each area. The officers working in the east target area utilized a "general deterrence strategy" maximizing the number of police vehicle stops to create a sense of significantly increased police presence. The North District used a "specific deterrence strategy" in which officers focused on stopping individuals suspected of being involved in criminal activity. Essentially, in the East District any type of traffic violation resulted in a stop, whereas in the North District officers were looking for additional bases for suspicion.

Examination of officer activity and output data suggested that the two strategies were implemented in a serious fashion.\(^11\) More than 4,800 officer hours resulted in more than 5,200 vehicle stops and just under 1,000 arrests. Homicides in the target areas dropped from 11 in the same 90-day period in 1996 to 1 during...
the project period. Upon closer inspection, the project appeared to have an effect in the north target area (total gun crimes dropped 29 percent; aggravated assaults with a gun and armed robbery each declined 40 percent) but not in the east target area (these offenses actually increased there). Surprisingly, given the Kansas City findings, it was the east target area that witnessed the largest increase in gun seizures. The east target area showed a 50-percent increase and the north target area only an 8-percent increase. Thus, the Indianapolis findings raise the question of whether the Kansas City and the Indianapolis north target area effects on firearm crime were due to seizing and removing illegal weapons from hotspot areas or from the increased police attention given to high-risk individuals within these areas.

Pulling levers

The notion that increased law enforcement attention to high-risk individuals may be effective in reducing crime receives additional support from the Boston “pulling levers” approach. Having found that in particular neighborhoods a small group of youth with extensive involvement in the justice system accounted for a majority of youth homicides, Boston officials sought to deliver a specific deterrence message to these youth. The result was the two-pronged “pulling levers” program. A multiagency law enforcement team convened a series of meetings with chronic gang offenders in which law enforcement communicated new standards for behavior (violence will no longer be tolerated). When the standards were violated, the multiagency law enforcement team responded by imposing all available sanctions (pulling levers). The initial examples of pulling levers with gang members then became the source of discussion in continued meetings with potential offenders. Since Boston implemented the strategy in 1996, youth homicides have fallen by two-thirds.

Firearm-related violence has often been considered largely impervious to law enforcement intervention. The Kansas City, Indianapolis, and Boston projects, and those implemented in other jurisdictions reported in this Report, suggest that this assumption may simply be erroneous. Certain questions do, however, remain. For example, is it the removal of guns from the streets or the direct communication of a deterrence message that has had an impact? Are youth no longer carrying weapons or have they temporarily ceased using them? Although these and related issues must be addressed, these studies indicate that significant reductions in violent crime may be possible. It appears that interventions based on a more precise understanding of the problem, as in those targeting high-risk individuals in high-risk areas, offer important prevention opportunities.

The following initiatives, including directed patrols, community policing, and other “hotspot” programs, use a common set of strategies to target individuals most likely to carry weapons. Several involve the creation of task forces or other steering committees to coordinate law enforcement efforts and some were funded through national initiatives such as the U.S. Department of Justice Weed and Seed initiative.

Notes


Baltimore Police Violent Crimes Division and Youth Violence Strike Force—Baltimore, MD

**Program Type or Federal Program Source:**
Program to deter gun carrying in high crime hotspot areas.

**Program Goal:**
To target gang members and violent offenders under age 24.

**Specific Groups Targeted by the Strategy:**
Violent gang members.

**Geographical Area Targeted by the Strategy:**
Areas of Baltimore where violent gangs operate.

In 1991, in response to unacceptably high levels of violence, the Baltimore City Police Department created a Violent Crime Task Force. The Task Force, now called the Violent Crimes Division, has several units: the Handgun Recovery Squad; the Operations Unit; the Shooting Squad; the Cold-Case Squad (which works closely with the Shooting Squad); and the newest addition to the group, the Youth Violence Strike Force (which now oversees the Intelligence Unit).

**Handgun Recovery Squad**

During the early 1990’s, Baltimore police believed that most of the area’s violent and criminal activity centered on the drug trade. Police therefore concentrated their efforts on buy-bust operations, search-and-seizure activities, and undercover drug buys. This approach was effective for a time and the violent crime rate decreased. However, in 1995, the number of shootings again began to climb, so the Handgun Recovery Squad was created as a special program of the Violent Crime Task Force. At first, the Squad spent most of its time simply seizing guns all over the city—four to five handguns each night. This proved ineffective, however, since seizing large numbers of guns had no noticeable impact on crime. The Department therefore decided that the Squad would limit its activities to the highest crime areas: posts 326 and 333 in Baltimore’s Eastern Police District (two of the city’s hotspot areas). After targeting gangs in these two posts, there was a marked decrease in handgun-related violence.

Firearms seizures by the Handgun Recovery Squad again began to dwindle, for two primary reasons. First, criminals realized that guns were being targeted in Baltimore and stopped carrying weapons. Second, every tactical unit in the Baltimore Police Department began to target guns in their investigations, so more arrests were being made by nonsquad units. The Handgun Recovery
Profile No. 18 (continued)

Squad therefore changed its focus to undercover surveillance, working closely with ATF on Project LEAD, a national gun-tracing initiative to identify straw purchasers. The Handgun Recovery Squad also coordinated its efforts with the U.S. Attorney’s Office DISARM program, the Baltimore County Gun Squad, and the State Attorney’s FIVE program (the Firearms Investigation/Violence Division), which allows vertical prosecution of nonfatal shooting cases. These city and county agencies share intelligence and serve warrants together when one agency seeks a suspect in the other’s jurisdiction.

During September and October 1998, the Handgun Recovery Squad seized almost 40 guns. Although squad members are “aggressive,” they are trained to be respectful toward all members of the public, including arrestees. As a result, they have been able to maintain a positive relationship with community members and have not generated significant resident complaints.

Youth Violence Strike Force

In 1997, when the Baltimore City Police Department analyzed internal data on shootings, it found that more than 50 percent of victims and suspects were age 24 and younger. It also found that most violence was caused by violent drug “crews” that were using handguns to settle disputes. This led to the creation of the Youth Violence Task Force (now called the Strike Force), whose mission is to identify and target gang members and violent offenders and aggressively seek their apprehension and incarceration. Once the Youth Violence Strike Force has linked a particular gang to homicides, shootings, and other violent activities, the gang is targeted for investigation and, if possible, Federal prosecution. In the Cherry Hill section of the city, for example, police found that one gang was responsible for seven shootings, all of which involved youthful offenders. The Strike Force worked with the U.S. Attorney’s Office in that case to identify defendants for prosecution in Federal court.

The Strike Force has strong partnerships with other criminal justice agencies, including the U.S. Attorney, ATF, FBI, school police, and State Department of Juvenile Justice. The Task Force also works closely with parole officers, probation officers, and judges, holding “Gang Call-In” meetings with youth who are on parole and probation. Police officers also accompany parole and probation staff during home visits.

Although the Violent Crimes Division and Youth Violence Strike Force are not formally linked with Baltimore’s Comprehensive Communities Program (see profile 1), many of their enforcement activities are focused in the same hotspot neighborhoods identified by that program.
Getting Guns Off the Streets, New York City Police Department—New York, NY

Program Type or Federal Program Source: Program to deter gun carrying in high-crime hotspot areas.

Program Goal:
To get guns off the streets through targeted law enforcement activities and FFL enforcement monitoring.

Specific Groups Targeted by the Strategy:
Illegal firearm dealers and at-risk youth, adults, and juveniles in possession of illegal guns.

Geographical Area Targeted by the Strategy:
New York, NY.

Evaluated by:
Internal data collection.

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Years of Operation:
1994–present.

It is estimated that as many as 2 million illegal guns were in circulation in New York City in 1993. During that year, there were roughly 1,500 gun deaths (20 times the number in 1960) and 5,000 people were wounded in shootings. Ninety percent of the guns seized in New York City that year were originally purchased in other States. In an effort to combat the serious crime plaguing the city, the New York City Police Department (NYPD) developed several crime-fighting strategies. The strategies are based on aggressive policing tactics, with a tough new managerial style that emphasizes both empowerment and accountability at the precinct level.

The NYPD gun strategy uses felony arrests and summonses to target gun trafficking and gun-related crime in the city. NYPD pursues all perpetrators and accomplices in gun crimes cases and interrogates them about how their guns were acquired. In a proactive effort to get guns off the streets, the NYPD’s Street Crime Units aggressively enforce all gun laws. In 1996, the Street Crime Units made up one-half of 1 percent of the NYPD, but made 20 percent of all gun arrests. In 1997, their ability to enforce gun laws and make firearm arrests was enhanced by a quadrupling of the number of officers assigned to the program.

COMPSTAT

The collection and analysis of crime statistics, and the conducting of weekly crime control strategy meetings to disseminate crime data to top-level management and unit commanders are major components of NYPD’s gun strategy. These briefings are referred to as COMPSTAT (Computerized Statistics) meetings. The meetings are a central element
of a comprehensive management strategy that emphasizes accountability, proper allocation of resources, and evaluation of crime reduction tactics. Data are collected by officers and entered into an automated system, which includes information about the crime, victim, time of day, weapons involved, and location. The result is a computer-generated map illustrating where and when crime is occurring in the city. This approach allows police to identify hotspots and strategically target resources. The power of the crime data is evident during NYPD’s weekly meetings, each of which focuses on a particular borough. Commanders from each precinct are required to attend one meeting per month. They are held accountable for the activities in their precincts and must report on specific steps their precincts are taking to prevent and solve crimes. The questioning is tough and excuses are not tolerated; from 1994 to 1997, 80 percent of NYPD precinct commanders were reassigned.

FFL enforcement

New York City has some of the most restrictive local licensing requirements for Federal firearm dealers in the country. NYPD works with ATF to monitor federally licensed gun dealers in the city and to combat interstate gun trafficking. Thorough background investigations are conducted on all applicants seeking new or renewed Federal firearms licenses (FFLs) to ensure that individuals who obtain licenses have a legitimate reason for doing so and that individuals with a history of criminal involvement be denied FFLs. If applicants do not meet the licensing requirements, officers meet with them to explain the policy, sometimes while conducting unannounced inspections. Applicants are then given 30 days within which to comply with the requirements. This regulatory function of the police department was originally funded under the Bureau of Justice Assistance’s Firearms Trafficking Program and has been continued by NYPD’s licensing division.

School crime and truancy

Schools in New York City also have become a locus of crime, with frequent reports of armed students. Moreover, 15 percent of the student body (150,000 students) were absent from school each day in 1993. These students are as likely to be victims as perpetrators of gun violence. In response to the high absentee rate, the department has increased the number of youth officers in the precinct commands, providing much more followup ability in individual cases and better program oversight. School security plans have been prepared for every school, and typically include safe corridor posts that protect kids on their way to and from school. The Transit Bureau has established safe passage cars on more than 100 subway trains, serving 80 key schools and allowing children to ride home free from harassment and fear. In the 1994–95 school year, truant squads active throughout the city returned nearly 42,000 truants to the school system, made more than 5,000 arrests, and confiscated 97 firearms.

In 1997, there were 3,600 fewer nonfatal shootings than in 1995, the year before implementation of NYPD’s strategy for getting guns off the streets (a reduction of 62 percent). From 1994 to 1997, 46,198 gun arrests were made and 56,081 guns were taken off the streets. For the first time since 1968, the annual number of murders in the city dropped below 1,000.

FFL enforcement also has been effective in discouraging unqualified applicants from applying for gun licenses and in denying licenses to unqualified dealers. Since the
Profile No. 19 (continued)

Inception of the program, more than 92 percent of the applicants for new or renewed gun licenses have been denied or have withdrawn their applications. More than 200 gun dealers have been arrested and their weapons caches confiscated. The number of FFLs in the city dropped from 952 in 1991 to 259 in 1996, a 73-percent reduction.

Police departments from across the country and around the world have begun to apply some of the crime-fighting strategies used by NYPD, including its gun strategy and data collection and analysis techniques.
Profile No. 20

Kansas City Gun Experiment—Kansas City, MO

Program Type or Federal Program Source:
Program to deter gun carrying in high crime hotspot areas; Office of Weed and Seed.

Program Goal:
To reduce crime by seizures of illegal guns.

Specific Groups Targeted by the Strategy:
Violent perpetrators carrying guns.

Geographical Area Targeted by the Strategy:
80-block area of Kansas City, MO.

Evaluated by:
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Years of Operation:

The Kansas City Gun Experiment used intensive police patrols directed to an 80-block hotspot area where the homicide rate was 20 times the national average. Patrol officers seized guns by frisking individuals who were arrested and by making plain view sightings of firearms during routine traffic violation or safety stops. Traffic stops were most effective in locating illegal guns, with 1 gun found per 28 stops. Gun crimes, including drive-by shootings and homicides, declined significantly during the 29-week experimental period between July 1992 and January 1993. Drive-by shootings dropped from 7 to 1 in the target area, while increasing from 6 to 12 in a comparison area. Overall gun crimes dropped 49 percent (169 to 86) and criminal homicide declined 67 percent (30 to 10) from the 29 weeks before the patrols to the 29-week experiment period. However, there was no effect on other crime indicators, including calls for police service, calls about violence, property or disorder crimes, and total offense reports within the target area. Significantly, there did not appear to be a displacement effect (i.e., gun crimes did not increase in any of the seven surrounding patrol beats).

Based on a statistical comparison with a control area, directed patrols were three times more cost effective than traditional patrols in removing firearms from the streets in hotspot areas. Active involvement of community and religious leaders in developing the program resulted in broad community support, even among those who had objected to previous police crackdowns on guns. However, the program was not institutionalized within the city budget after Federal funding ended. The program was replicated in Indianapolis between April 1995 and September 1997. Directed patrols are now used in Indianapolis as the front end of a more comprehensive Weed and Seed effort directed at reducing crime and stabilizing the community (see profile 6).
Operation Ceasefire—Boston, MA

Program Type or Federal Program Source:
Program to deter gun carrying in high-crime hotspot areas; National Institute of Justice.

Program Goal:
To reduce serious juvenile and gang violence in Boston.

Specific Groups Targeted by the Strategy:
Youth ages 8 to 18.

Geographical Area Targeted by the Strategy:
Boston, MA.

Evaluated by:
Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA.

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Harvard University
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Cambridge, MA 02138
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Years of Operation:
1995–present.

Operation Ceasefire was first implemented in May 1996 as a coordinated, citywide strategy aimed at deterring juvenile and gang firearm violence. Ceasefire operates as a system that implements interventions that include the knowledge and coordination of all of the city's law enforcement and criminal justice agencies. The strategy was developed by the Boston Police Department's Youth Violence Strike Force (YVSF), a multiagency task force composed of approximately 62 sworn officers, in collaboration with the Attorney for the Commonwealth of Massachusetts and representatives from numerous agencies and institutions, including Federal, State, and local law enforcement; parole and probation officers; the mayor's office; city agencies; clergy; and several universities.

YVSF devised a core strategy based on previous research and successful antigang tactics: Law enforcement would communicate to gangs that there would be swift, sure, and severe consequences for violence.

Operation Ceasefire is being evaluated by a research team from Harvard University's Kennedy School of Government. Preliminary data suggest that this strategy has had a dramatic impact on reducing gang violence. After two focused interagency interventions with violent gangs, matched with the communications strategy, violent gang offending dropped markedly, sometimes appearing almost to have stopped. For the second full year of operation, through May 31, 1998, there was a 71-percent decrease in
Profile No. 21 (continued)

homicides by persons ages 24 and under and a 70-percent reduction in gun assaults (for all ages).

Operation Ceasefire is one element of a collaborative, comprehensive strategy implemented in Boston to address the community's escalating violent crime rates. For a more detailed description of Operation Ceasefire, and a discussion of how this program fits into Boston's overall crime reduction strategy, see profile 2.
Operation Safe Streets Gang Prevention Initiative—Phoenix, AZ

Program Type or Federal Program Source:
Program to deter gun carrying in high-crime hotspot areas.

Program Goal:
To apply a proactive, community-based policing approach to suppress criminal street gang violence and youth-related crimes during the summer months.

Specific Groups Targeted by the Strategy:
Gang members.

Geographical Area Targeted by the Strategy:
Phoenix, AZ.

Evaluated by:
Internal data collection.

Contact Information:
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Phoenix Police Department
620 West Washington Street
Phoenix, AZ 85003
Phone: 602-262-7311

Years of Operation:
1990–present.

Operation Safe Streets (OSS) was launched in 1990, a year when there were 580 gang-related violent incidents in the city of Phoenix. Of these, 377 were gang-related aggravated assaults; 171 were drive-by shootings; and 3 were homicides directly linked to gangs. In response, the Phoenix Police Department established OSS to suppress criminal street gang violence and youth-related crimes during the summer months. From the outset, community participation in the initiative has been critical; police rely on local residents to help them identify gang members through a gang hotline; and OSS attends public meetings to inform residents of police activities and build community support.

OSS’s four main objectives are to: (1) reduce gang-related violent offenses by 5 percent during the summer months; (2) investigate 95 percent of the violent crimes involving criminal street gangs; (3) respond within 5 days to 100 percent of citizens’ complaints of criminal street gang activity within their neighborhoods; and (4) maximize the enforcement of weapons violations through the use of appropriate Federal and State prosecutorial venues.

In the summer of 1998, a budget of $150,000 was set aside to cover overtime pay for more than 70 law enforcement officers assigned to OSS. Officers included personnel from the Organized Crime Bureau’s Gang Enforcement Unit, the Patrol Division, the Traffic Enforcement Unit, and the statewide Gang Intelligence Team Enforcement Mission (a special task force of the Department of Public Safety). An ATF agent also is assigned to OSS and is responsible for reviewing weapons violations cases to see if they qualify for Federal prosecution and then sending letters to the county prosecutor when cases have been transferred to Federal court.

Crime statistics on the achievement of the program’s four objectives are tallied each week. In 1997, OSS seized 213 guns; made
Profile No. 22 (continued)

2,647 arrests; identified 439 gang members; interrogated 1,511 people; processed 681 curfew violations; attended 28 block watch meetings; received 13 citizen referrals and 15 precinct referrals for gang problems; and issued 10,177 traffic citations.

Police statistics for OSS in 1998 (OSS98) indicate that gang-related violent crimes were reduced by one-third compared to the previous summer (there were 57 violent incidents in the summer of 1998, compared with 86 in the summer of 1997). Other data from OSS98 show that: (1) officers logged close to 19,000 overtime hours; (2) there were a total 1,501 arrests (424 adult felonies, 723 adult misdemeanors, 125 juvenile felonies, and 229 juvenile misdemeanors); (3) 6,745 traffic citations were issued; (4) OSS officers conducted 575 interrogations; (5) 992 new gang members were identified; (6) updated information was collected on 959 existing gang members; and (7) 110 weapons were seized.

Representatives from the unit also attended 9 block watch or community meetings, and the 24 residents who filed gang complaints were contacted within 5 days of their complaints.

The public continues to perceive a high rate of gang violence despite data showing that the problem has considerably abated. In 1997, there were 357 violent incidents (compared with 918 cases in the peak year of 1992), 226 aggravated assaults, 86 drive-by shootings, and 11 homicides attributable to gangs.
Targeted Enforcement Program, Indianapolis Weed and Seed Initiative—Indianapolis, IN

Program Type or Federal Program Source:
Program to deter gun carrying in high-crime hotspot areas; Office of Weed and Seed.

Program Goal:
To reduce drug trafficking and property crime, seize illegal guns, and show strong police presence.

Specific Groups Targeted by the Strategy:
All motor vehicle operators (East Side); suspicious profile vehicle operators (North Side).

Geographical Area Targeted by the Strategy:
High-crime areas in North and East Indianapolis, IN.

Evaluated by:
The Hudson Institute, Indiana University.

Contact Information:
Liz Allison
Indianapolis Police Department
50 North Alabama Street
Indianapolis, IN 46204
Phone: 317-327-3452

Years of Operation:
1995–present.

The Targeted Enforcement Program uses “directed patrols” to identify firearm offenders. First implemented in 1994 as a modified replication of the Kansas City Gun Experiment, Indianapolis police stop vehicles for traffic violations and, when probable cause exists, search the vehicles for weapons or other contraband. In 1997, the Indianapolis Police Department tested different protocols within the directed patrols strategy. On the East side, officers stopped vehicles for any infraction and issued warnings rather than citations in the majority of instances. On the North Side, the police department replicated the Kansas City model with more fidelity, stopping only those vehicles that were “suspicious” based on a profile and issuing a greater number of citations per 100 stops.

There were 3,836 stops on the East Side resulting on average in 60.7 warning tickets, 24.5 citations, 14.5 arrests, 1.1 felony arrests, and 0.34 illegal gun seizures per 100 stops.
Profile No. 23 (continued)

stops. With only 1,417 stops, the North Side produced a lower rate of warning tickets (36.0 per 100 stops) but notably higher rates for citations (49.2); arrests (30.6); felony arrests (2.9); and illegal gun seizures (.85). Gun-related assaults and robberies declined by 40 percent on the North Side while both violent crimes and property crimes increased on the East Side. Because directed patrols had been used for 2 years on the East Side, adaptive behavior by violators may explain this increase. On the North Side, probation sweeps and K-9 patrols also were active during the study period for directed patrols.

The Targeted Enforcement Program is one element of a collaborative, comprehensive strategy implemented in Indianapolis to address escalating violent crime rates. For a more detailed description of targeted patrols and a discussion of how this program fits into the city’s overall crime reduction strategy, please see profile 6.
Profile No. 24

Youth, Firearms, and Violence—Atlanta, GA

Program Type or Federal Program Source:
Program to deter gun carrying in targeted police hotspot areas.

Program Goal:
To reduce the level of juvenile gun violence in Atlanta.

Specific Groups Targeted by the Strategy:
Juveniles and young adults.

Geographical Area Targeted by the Strategy:
Atlanta, GA.

Evaluated by:
Emory University Center for Injury Control, Atlanta, GA.

Contact Information:
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Atlanta Police Department
675 Ponce de Leon Avenue
Atlanta, GA 30308
Phone: 404–817–6900

Dr. Arthur Kellermann
Emory University
1518 Clifton Road NE.
Atlanta, GA 30322
Phone: 404–727–9977

Years of Operation:
1994–present.

In Fulton County, GA (which includes most of the city of Atlanta), firearm-related homicide rates for 15- to 24-year-olds increased dramatically from the early 1980's to the early 1990's. Nonfirearm-related homicides, on the other hand, remained relatively stable. Firearm-related homicides during this time period accounted for nearly all of the murders in the city. Guns are readily available to juveniles in Atlanta, where it is reported that handguns can be purchased on the street for as little as $5.

In 1994, Atlanta's Project PACT (Pulling America's Communities Together) was funded by the U.S. Department of Justice. Project PACT is a consortium of Federal, State, and local agencies, and community groups designed to organize diverse community institutions and to empower them, individually and collectively, to use problem-solving strategies and tactics to create safer communities. Juvenile gun violence emerged as the top priority of this consortium. With funding from the National Institute of Justice, Emory University Center for Injury Control initiated a formal evaluation of PACT's efforts by obtaining baseline measures of the magnitude of juvenile gun violence in metropolitan Atlanta. In addition to the collection of quantitative data showing juvenile and adult firearm-related morbidity and mortality, a telephone survey of adults was conducted, and focus groups with high-risk and incarcerated youth were held to collect information about weapon-carrying behavior. Baseline data were shared with community groups, law enforcement officials, and juvenile justice officials and were used to develop the targeted interventions.
Profile No. 24 (continued)

As a result of Project PACT, several Federal, State, and local agencies joined forces in a coordinated effort to reduce overall gun violence, with a particular emphasis on juveniles and young adults. The agencies involved in this initiative include the Atlanta Police Department (APD), ATF, the U.S. Attorney’s Office, the Georgia State Board of Pardons and Paroles, the Fulton County Juvenile Court, the Fulton County District Attorney, the Georgia State Department of Corrections (Fulton County Probation), the Georgia Bureau of Investigation, and Emory University Center for Injury Control.

I can ask an adult to put a gun down, and 75 percent of them will do it, but a juvenile will not. The juvenile will fire it at me, or in the air, or flee with the weapon. His actions are much more fearless.

—Thay Humes
Atlanta, GA, Police Officer

The strategies for preventing gun violence among Atlanta’s youth are centered on addressing each point of intervention in the “chain of events” that begins with the demand for a firearm and ends with commission of a violent crime. Three strategies were proposed to address the chain of events that lead to gun violence: (1) a reduction in the demand for guns through community education and enforcement of laws prohibiting gun-carrying by youth; (2) a reduction in the supply of guns through aggressive enforcement of laws that prohibit sale or transfer of firearms to youth and systematic tracing of guns used by juvenile offenders; and (3) effective rehabilitation to decrease recidivism by juveniles caught with weapons.

Identification of high crime hotspots

To identify the city’s gun violence hotspots, researchers at the Center for Injury Control developed the Georgia Firearm Injury Notification System. This system, known as “Cops and Docs,” collects data on firearm-related morbidity and mortality in specific police patrol beats and census tracts within the Atlanta metropolitan area. Firearm assault data are reported by 54 law enforcement agencies, 21 metro emergency medical centers, and 5 medical examiners in the Atlanta area and forwarded to the Georgia Bureau of Investigation (GBI). GBI organizes the data, which include fatal and non-fatal injuries by age, race, sex, weapon type, location, and circumstance. The data are then forwarded to the Center for Injury Control where they are linked with firearm-related data from the Atlanta 911 System.

All of this information is then analyzed using a Geographic Information System. The Center identifies hotspots of gun violence activity at the street-block level and shares these data with Federal, State, and local law enforcement officials. These officials then use these data to allocate resources, target intervention neighborhoods, and evaluate results.

The researchers note that obtaining dual reporting of firearm assault data from emergency medical centers and law enforcement to the Cops and Docs system is a challenging task. For example, although Georgia State law requires healthcare providers to notify local authorities when they treat a gunshot injury, incomplete reporting of such injuries to Cops and Docs remains a problem. Only 60 percent of medically documented shootings have been matched by Cops and Docs to corresponding police reports. Efforts are made to relate and match records to create a complete picture of firearm injury and violence throughout the city. To meet the needs of law enforcement, the firearm assault data are collected, analyzed, and disseminated in a very short timeframe. Data are updated for weekly meetings and compiled in reports that are disseminated monthly.
Directed police patrol

APD’s Guns and Violent Crime Suppression Unit (Gun Unit) was deployed in the fall of 1997 to take guns off the streets. The Gun Unit is a group of 12 officers that utilizes a nontraditional, problem-solving approach of locating and seizing illegal guns before they are used. The Gun Unit targets illegal gun carrying in the city’s hotspot neighborhoods that have been identified by the Cops and Docs data base. The Gun Unit has focused its operations on three hotspot areas, one of which has shown a decline in firearm-related 911 calls. The Unit recently expanded to four additional hotspot areas. The officers in the Gun Unit watch for persons who appear to be carrying firearms. Although the officers perform investigative functions, they also confiscate guns in routine traffic stops, roadblocks, and other proactive interactions within the hotspot neighborhoods. Approximately one in seven traffic stops results in the confiscation of a firearm. APD is also partnering with Atlanta’s schools to locate truants and bring them back to school and implementing a probation-police partnership to conduct probation sweeps in crime hotspot neighborhoods.

A small minority of people are responsible for a disproportionate amount of crime. We want to put an end to that, or at least raise the stakes for those who want to continue on the violent path. Were it not for the quality of doctors and emergency personnel, we would have a lot more deaths in this city.

—Carter B. Jackson
Atlanta, GA, Deputy Police Chief

ATF’s participation

The Atlanta office of ATF receives data compiled by the Center for Injury Control and the Cops and Docs notification system and works in partnership with APD and GBI to identify illegal gun traffickers. State and local law enforcement agencies recover the majority of crime guns and arrest the majority of juveniles and violent criminals in possession of firearms. The initiation of Federal investigations is based on the information obtained from debriefing the suspects and subsequently tracing firearms.

ATF’s Regulatory Enforcement Unit is responsible for investigating and regulating firearm dealers and developing cases against illegal firearm traffickers involved in the transfer or sale of firearms to juveniles. This unit conducts investigations and surveillance of gun shows, which are a common source of illegal firearms for juveniles and criminals. The Pawn Desk Detail conducts surveillance and investigation of all pawned weapons. Convicted felons attempting to pawn weapons are apprehended, their weapons are seized, and they are prosecuted under Federal statutes. Unintended byproducts of requiring background checks for handgun purchases have been an increase in robberies and “smash and grab” thefts from gun stores and an increase in theft from shippers. ATF is actively involved in educating gun dealers and shippers about how to increase store and employee security.

The Center for Injury Control, as the academic partner for Atlanta’s program, provides monthly reports on firearm crime and injury to the Gun Unit, all project partners, and law enforcement leadership. Researchers at the Center are conducting an impact evaluation of the program.
Youth Firearms Violence Initiative—Birmingham, AL

Profile No. 25

Program Type or Federal Program Source:
Program to deter gun carrying in hotspot areas; Office of Community Oriented Policing Services.

Program Goal:
To reduce youth firearm violence.

Specific Groups Targeted by the Strategy:
Juveniles in all middle and high schools.

Geographical Area Targeted by the Strategy:
Birmingham, AL.

Evaluuated by:
Internal data collection; Abt Associates Inc., Cambridge, MA.

Contact Information:
Barbara Eaddy
Birmingham Police Department
1710 First Avenue North
Birmingham, AL 35203
Phone: 205–254–1710

Years of Operation:
1996–present.

The Birmingham Police Department set two important goals for this COPS office-funded initiative: to establish school-based community policing, crime prevention education, and training for police officers, students, and teachers; and to develop a computer system to collect, monitor, and analyze crime statistics regarding youth firearm violence. To meet these goals, the police department implemented several strategies.

School resource officers

The police department assigned 18 officers to serve as School Resource Officers (SRO's) whose primary focus was to reduce occurrences of youth firearm crime in the Birmingham Public School System through education and intervention. Special programs such as Drug Abuse Resistance Education (D.A.R.E.®), Gang Resistance Education and Training (G.R.E.A.T.), Problem Oriented Policing (POP), and the Scanning, Analysis, Response, and Assessment (SARA) model were introduced into the school system curriculum. School officials and officers worked collaboratively to detect firearms in schools by conducting searches of lockers and vehicles and by using handheld metal detectors during random checks of students. The officers also worked to prevent trespassing on school grounds and to take control of other disruptive quality-of-life problems to maintain a secure and safe environment for the students and teachers within the schools. Additionally, SRO's assigned to schools were trained to teach and counsel students, teachers, and parents on gun violence prevention using the STAR (Straight Talk About Risk) Program (see profile 54).

Computerized crime tracking system

In order to monitor encounters with juveniles and develop statistical trends, the police department developed a computer tracking system.

Part I offenses involving juveniles declined 28 percent from 1997–98, falling from 1,045 to 752. During the same period, firearm charges declined 69 percent (from 108 to
Profile No. 25 (continued)

33). The total number of firearm-related incidents involving one or more juveniles fell 39 percent (from 266 to 162).

As a result of the programs implemented in the Birmingham Public School System, officers have become positive role models for students, introduced effective school-based antiviolence programs, taught handgun safety, and served as a liaison between the school and the police department.
Profile No. 26

Youth Firearms Violence Initiative—Bridgeport, CT

Program Type or Federal Program Source: Initiative to deter gun carrying in crime hotspot areas; Office of Community Oriented Policing Services.

Program Goal: To reduce youth firearm violence.

Specific Groups Targeted by the Strategy: Juveniles and youth under age 25.

Geographical Area Targeted by the Strategy: High-crime areas in Bridgeport, CT.

Evaluated by: John Jay College of Criminal Justice, New York, NY; Abt Associates Inc., Cambridge, MA.

Contact Information: Thomas Sweeney, Chief of Police Bridgeport Police Department 300 Congress Street Bridgeport, CT 06604 Phone: 203-576-7611

Years of Operation: 1995–present

The Bridgeport Police Department (BPD) used support from COPS to develop a multifaceted gun violence reduction initiative that incorporated five distinct but interrelated components: warrant enforcement; ballistics identification; crime mapping; gun suppression; and prevention. The initiative received DOJ COPS' Youth Firearms Violence Initiative support for 18 months (through June 1997) and much of the demonstration effort is now institutionalized.

An enhanced warrant enforcement program provided for employment of two warrant administrative aides who were assigned to review all outstanding warrants with a priority for identifying firearm-related charges. Of 3,138 warrants researched during the program period, 833 were for narcotics offenses, 696 for probation violations, 652 for assaults, 260 for larcenies, and 172 for firearm charges.

Ballistics identification capacity was created internally through enhancements that included acquisition of a comparison microscope for ballistics examinations. Firearm evidence had previously been sent to an outside laboratory, delaying investigations by days; inhouse ballistics examinations permitted a 24-hour turnaround. The BPD is now part of the Drugfire Program, the FBI's automated computer technology that links firearm evidence across jurisdictions.

A crime-mapping system was developed to provide rapid identification of crime hotspots, with an emphasis on targeting gun incidents throughout the city. That system has been upgraded to provide immediate tracking of crime trends and appropriate deployment.

Gun Suppression Details were developed by training a special pool of officers that could be made available during all of their shifts for assignment to gun violence hotspots. During the program's operation, 174 details were deployed resulting in 45 gun seizures (22 of which were from juveniles).

Prevention education also was integrated into the initiative. "Character Counts," a national initiative developed through the
Josephson Institute of Ethics, was brought in by BPD to train a pool of educators and counselors to present a curriculum to students of all grade levels on the concepts of trustworthiness, respect, fairness, caring, responsibility, and citizenship. The extent of the curriculum's infusion into the school system or community social programs has not been evaluated; however, BPD has become the first local law enforcement agency to be part of the Character Counts Coalition, a national organization of more than 60 community-related groups.
Profile No. 27

Youth Firearms Violence Initiative—Inglewood, CA

Program Type or Federal Program Source:
Initiative to deter gun carrying in high crime hotspot areas; Office of Community Oriented Policing Services.

Program Goal:
To reduce handgun violence through disruption of gang activities.

Specific Groups Targeted by the Strategy:
Crenshaw Mafia Gang and Family Gangster Bloods.

Geographical Area Targeted by the Strategy:
Darby-Dixon public housing area of Inglewood known as “the Bottoms.”

Evaluating by:
Abt Associates Inc., Cambridge, MA.

Contact Information:
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Fax: 510-412-8798

Years of Operation:

Through the Inglewood Community Oriented Policing and Problem Solving (ICOPPS) unit, the Inglewood Police Department implemented handgun violence enforcement and prevention programs that targeted major youth gangs in West Central Los Angeles. Unique to the initiative was enforcement through civil injunction and restraining orders against the Crenshaw Mafia Gang and the Family Gangster Bloods that operated in and around the Darby-Dixon section of Inglewood, particularly in a drug-driven, crime-infested six block area of public housing known as “the Bottoms.” The primary prevention component was a Rights of Passage (ROP) mentoring program designed to fill a gap in afterschool activities from 3 p.m. to 6 p.m.

Inglewood, previously a predominantly low-income, African-American community, was rapidly becoming a majority Hispanic population, thereby creating a fertile environment for gang affinity, turf conflict, and violence. One building containing Morningside High, Monroe Junior High, and Woodworth Elementary serves one-half of the Darby-Dixon student population and was a focal point for juvenile gang recruitment and criminal activity. Also in Inglewood are Centinella Park and a large cemetery that attracts spillover gang and criminal activity from Los Angeles. The unemployment rate for the target area is 42 percent.

Enforcement activities were directed through Strategies Against Gang Environments (SAGE)—a unit funded by the Youth Firearms Violence Initiative (YFVI)—which comprises one full-time and six overtime officers that worked closely with a deputy district attorney and a deputy probation officer dedicated to the initiative. Through saturation patrols in the target area, SAGE officers gathered evidence that would establish specific gangs and gang members as a public nuisance. The deputy district attorney then requested a restraining order that would
allow the Inglewood Police Department to take gang members into custody for violation of a civil court injunction (e.g., loitering) rather than waiting until the police observed criminal activity by gang members. Part of the strategy also included "knock and talk" investigations conducted by the deputy probation officer who visited probationers at their residences and searched for guns. Initially the deputy probation officer, a lifelong Inglewood resident, rode with SAGE officers; however, as the role became institutionalized, and with the support of the police department, he was issued his own car, granted an exemption to allow carrying a gun, and empowered to work alone. Initial fears that the civil injunction strategy might not stand judicial scrutiny were diminished when the California Supreme Court ruled favorably in a related case (People ex re. Gallo v. Carlos Acuna, 97 Cal. Daily op. Service 724).

The prevention component used volunteer police officers, firefighters, and community leaders as role models and mentors in curriculum that included components on civic values, self-esteem, conflict mediation, aesthetic art, martial arts, violence prevention, academic support, and healthy male/female relationships. The school district referred the youth and provided facilities for the ROP program, which graduated 87 of the first class of 120 students in the 3-month program. The ROP program has been continued beyond the federally funded project by business and community donations.

The SAGE unit was disbanded after YFVI funding was exhausted; however, the injunction against the Crenshaw Mafia Gang remains in place with enforcement through routine patrols and the police department's gang component. The department reports that the Crenshaw Mafia Gang has ceased to exist as an organized entity as a direct result of the civil action. As 1998 ended, public defenders were positioning to represent individual gang members in challenging the strategy that the Inglewood Police Department regards as one of its most effective weapons for combating juvenile gang violence.
Profile No. 28

Youth Firearms Violence Initiative—Milwaukee, WI

Program Type or Federal Program Source:
Initiative to deter gun carrying in high-crime hotspot areas; Office of Community Oriented Policing Services.

Evaluating by:
Department of Emergency Medicine, Medical College of Wisconsin; Abt Associates Inc., Cambridge, MA.

Program Goal:
To break the connection between youth and guns through a combination of enforcement and prevention strategies.

Contact Information:
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Milwaukee Police Department
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Milwaukee, WI 53233
Phone: 414–935–7825

Specific Groups Targeted by the Strategy:
Youth involved in less serious offenses involving firearms and gangs.

Years of Operation:

Geographical Area Targeted by the Strategy:
Milwaukee, WI.

The Milwaukee Police Department’s (MPD’s) Youth Firearms Violence Initiative focused enforcement and prevention efforts, supported by enhanced technology, on reducing the number of violent firearm-related crimes committed by youth. Components included the addition of officers to the Gang Crimes/Intelligence Unit, enhancement of curfew activities, and deployment of saturation patrols in high-crime areas. Prevention activities were linked to a youth survey administered by the health department regarding gun-related attitudes and behaviors and to a “Hang Tough” program that combined peer persuasion, public messages, and direct contact with youth and was designed to stigmatize firearm violence. Target areas were determined by Geographic Information System data that indicated a high incidence of juvenile handgun violence. Community-MPD coalitions that included health department and public school collaboration were key elements for both the prevention and intervention strategies.

An earlier survey of 694 youth ages 15 to 24 years old in the same target area revealed that 71 percent resided with their mothers in single-parent households. During the preceding year, 27 percent had been threatened and/or attacked by someone with a gun; 83 percent had heard gunshots in their neighborhood; 86 percent knew someone who had been shot with a handgun; 42 percent had been suspended from school; 35 percent had used drugs; 35 percent had been drunk before; and 20 percent had carried a concealed handgun (54 percent of those had first carried when they were younger than 15 years old). School was the site of the handgun threat in 14 percent of responses and the site of attack in 10 percent. In the survey, “on the street” was the most frequently identified site of both threats (49 percent) and attacks (54 percent). Although 48 percent of youth had friends who carried concealed handguns and 51 percent thought there were times when it was necessary to carry, only 34 percent had ever fired a handgun for any reason.
Profile No. 28 (continued)

(including target practice). Twenty-two percent, however, indicated that they had fired in anger.

From January to September 1996, MPD recovered 2,550 firearms, 70 percent of which were from people under 25 years old. Of those recovered from youth, 30 percent were .22 or .25 caliber, and 32 percent were manufactured by “Ring of Fire” manufacturers, a small group of gun manufacturers in southern California that produces the majority of Saturday night specials.

During the project, the number of firearms recovered increased 58 percent and curfew violation citations increased 64 percent. Firearm-related offenses, however, decreased 7 percent and violent firearm offenses decreased 15 percent. Firearm injuries for those under age 25 decreased 27 percent. From 1995 to 1996, death rates for those 20–24 years old decreased by 11.4 percent; however, death rates for those 15–19 years old increased 11.8 percent.
Profile No. 29

Youth Firearms Violence Initiative—Salinas, CA

Program Type or Federal Program Source:
Initiative to deter gun carrying in high-crime hotspot areas; Office of Community Oriented Policing Services.

Program Goal:
To reduce youth firearm violence through proactive enforcement.

Specific Groups Targeted by the Strategy:
Youth gang members under age 25.

Geographical Area Targeted by the Strategy:
Salinas, CA.

Evaluuated by:
Criminal Justice Department,
Sacramento State University,
Sacramento, CA.; Abt Associates Inc.,
Cambridge, MA.

Contact Information:
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Salinas Police Department
222 Lincoln Avenue
Salinas, CA 93901–2639
Phone: 831–758–7348

Years of Operation:
1995–present.

Between 1984 and 1994, the Salinas community witnessed a dramatic increase in the number of gangs and the amount of gang-related violence. The Salinas Police Department identified 14 street gangs with more than 400 certified and active gang members. Moreover, during this time period, the annual number of homicides in Salinas tripled (75 percent of these were gang related). Notably, 90 percent of the gun-related violent offenses that occurred in the community involved perpetrators under the age of 25 years.

YFVI sought to respond to these problems by addressing the community conditions associated with gang violence and gang-related activities through proactive enforcement strategies. Prior to the development of this initiative, the Salinas Police Department had been involved in several antigang efforts, created a Gang Task Force, and had participated in several community partnerships including a violent injury prevention program. YFVI, however, was an independent venture of the Salinas Police Department.

The primary component of the YFVI strategy was the creation of a Violence Suppression Unit (VSU)—which is an expansion of the previous Gang Task Force. The VSU consists of 15 police officers and utilizes a series of aggressive patrol strategies. These strategies include periodic surveillance, probation/parole searches, traffic stops, the use of raids and search warrants to recover illegal firearms and firearms used in crimes, the use of informants, and the development of criteria for determining gang membership. In addition, YFVI developed a Geographic Information System database that geographically tracks gang-related activity and firearm use. This system allows Salinas police officers to respond to inquiries regarding the location of firearm seizures, violent crimes, and gang incidents near school zones.

This initiative has had several successful outcomes. Data show that there has been an increase in the number of violent crime arrests in the Salinas area since the initiative began. Gun-related crimes and violent
Profile No. 29 (continued)

offenses committed by youth under the age of 25 years dropped considerably during the first 2 years of the initiative (34 percent and 21 percent, respectively). Similar decreases were found for all gun crimes and violent offenses (regardless of the perpetrator's age) occurring in the community, resulting in a communitywide reduction in gun-related and violent crimes. There also is consensus among VSU officers that gang members no longer hang out on the streets. Moreover, anecdotal evidence suggests that the sense of fear among community members has decreased.
Profile No. 30

Youth Firearms Violence Initiative—Seattle, WA

Program Type or Federal Program Source:
Initiative to deter gun carrying in high-crime hotspot areas; Office of Community Oriented Policing Services.

Program Goal:
To reduce youth firearm violence through targeted and focused enforcement efforts.

Specific Groups Targeted by the Strategy:
Chronic youth weapons offenders.

Geographical Area Targeted by the Strategy:
Seattle, WA.

Evaluated by:
University of Washington; Abt Associates Inc., Cambridge, MA.

Contact Information:
Julie Baker, Grant Coordinator
Community Information and Services Bureau
Seattle Police Department
610 Third Avenue
Seattle, WA 98104
Phone: 206-233-5133

Years of Operation:

Seattle experienced an increase in juvenile violence through the late 1980’s and early 1990’s. In 1994, there were a total of 77 juvenile firearm-related crime incidents, and the total jumped to 151 incidents by 1995. As in most cities, a small number of serious and chronic juvenile offenders in Seattle were responsible for the majority of serious juvenile crimes. In response to this increase in violence, the Seattle Police Department (SPD) instituted departmentwide community policing and launched the Youth Firearms Violence Initiative which was funded by the Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) and awarded to SPD in October 1995.

Violence prevention and intervention strategies

Prior to 1996, SPD had initiated a variety of intervention and prevention initiatives, including the Seattle Team for Youth (STFY), which provides intensive services for youth who are in gangs or are otherwise “at risk.” The program emphasizes family involvement and linking youth and families to social services, counseling, and other support services. SPD also began developing the Options, Choices and Consequences program which involved a 2-day presentation to eighth and ninth grade students by police officers and medical and legal professionals on the consequences of gun use. In schools, COPS office-funded community policing officers worked full time as School Emphasis Patrol Officers in various prevention, intervention, and school safety projects. The Community Safety Workgroup was formed to integrate the city’s efforts to support youth, control firearms, change negative community attitudes that foster violence, and raise community awareness of and involvement in violence prevention.

Enforcement strategies

The Seattle Police Department focused its enforcement efforts in schools by establishing School Enforcement Teams (SET’s) in each
of Seattle’s four precincts. SET’s were made up of officers working in the schools. Each SET was headed by an STFY detective and augmented by patrol officers who provided an additional police presence. These teams coordinated with school administrators on various enforcement and problem-solving projects and worked closely with crime analysts assigned to precinct stations. Monthly team meetings were critical in identifying special problems related to incidences of violence in particular schools and improving the level of communication and problem solving among police, schools, and other agencies.

A new computer-mapping crime analysis system was created with the long-term goal of providing precinct officers access to a database that would help them identify problems occurring in their neighborhoods or around their area schools. Information from this system was deemed essential to full implementation of the problem-solving or identification and response model.

To target chronic juvenile gun offenders, a system was established for tracking violent offenders and disseminating information through the department and other social service agencies to reduce the anonymity of the juveniles and refer the offenders to intervention services. A list of the 50 most violent juveniles was developed, and a notebook index system was created containing information on the juveniles’ characteristics, offense histories, gang affiliations, and probation orders and conditions. In addition, conditions of probation imposed by the courts for the 50 targeted juveniles were added to the SPD information system. This information, in turn, could be accessed through Mobile Data Terminals in patrol cars.

Increased communication between police and probation resulted in police and probation teams being able to increase surveillance on the most serious violent offenders and enforce conditions of probation. A pilot program was implemented pairing probation officers with police officers.

Enhanced prosecution for serious violent juvenile offenders was instituted through the addition of a new full-time position in the King County Prosecutor’s Office, which resulted in changes to procedures for filing and handling cases (to speed up processing) and increases in conviction rates. The prosecutor also provided training to police officers on how to successfully prepare firearm reports on juveniles by identifying essential elements of offenses that need to be in police reports (such as age of offender, weapon operability, and issues related to establishing possession) (see profile 42).

During the 1995 to 1997 period, when efforts of the Youth Firearms Violence Initiative were most intensive, SPD reported 139 weapons violations and 77 arrests made specifically through the program. In a comparison of the first 4 months of the 1997 school year with the same 4-month period of the previous year, it was reported that weapons violations in the Seattle schools had declined by 23 percent (falling from 47 to 36).
Surveillance of Probationers

Individuals on probation are responsible for a significant portion of all violent crime. In fact, probationers commit 30 percent of all homicides. Yet, probation agencies traditionally have not collaborated with police departments. This lack of coordination has evolved over the years, reflecting the apparently divergent missions of the two organizations—the police “lock them up,” and probation officers “let them go.” However, the differences between probation and policing are being addressed as new forms of cooperation are explored. Police and probation officers alike recognize that both groups play important roles in reducing the explosion of violent and firearm-related crime. They see their collaboration as a logical outgrowth of the community policing models influencing today’s law enforcement practices. Moreover, probation officers are increasingly at risk of more violence-prone probationers, and they recognize that probationer surveillance can be greatly enhanced by working with police.

Nationally, 60 percent of all offenders under corrections supervision are on probation. Offenders placed on probation have conditional rights to remain in the community provided they comply with the terms of probation set by the sentencing judge, such as avoiding additional arrests, reporting to a probation officer, paying restitution, and obtaining substance abuse treatment. Juvenile probationers are often subject to curfews.

Joint surveillance model

In November 1992, Operation Night Light began operations in Boston, MA, as a demonstration of the joint surveillance of probationers. Police and probation officers in the Dorchester area of the city began to leave their desks and approach probationers on the streets, after hours, and on their home turf. District judges were encouraged to impose new probation restrictions on their most violent, gang-involved defendants. In this manner, the police and probation teams could intensify probation supervision and keep the high-risk offenders, who were likely to take any advantage of perceived laxity, on a “short leash.” Police and probation officers expected that this escalation in the intensity of supervision would lower the number of violations for new arrests as compliance with curfews and other restrictive conditions increased.

Joint probationer surveillance programs generally involve establishing two- or three-person police and probation officer teams to identify active probationers who may not have been complying with court-imposed conditions. During visits with probationers, the police officers take responsibility for safety issues and the probation officers meet with the probationer and family members to reinforce the importance of meeting all court requirements, and to determine if the probationer or family needs other social services that can help the offender successfully complete his or her sentence. The police-probation officer team also meets with groups of juveniles and young adults on the streets to send a message to other probationers that both agencies are cooperating to monitor their activities.

Initial outcomes

Although these joint surveillance programs have not been formally evaluated, the use of these police-probation officer teams in the Dorchester area of Boston, MA, resulted in a 9-percent decline in the number of violations for new arrests as compliance with curfews and other conditions of probation increased during the first 3 years of the program. Moreover, with more than 6,000 probationer contacts during the 5-year period from 1992 to 1997, the number of all firearm-related homicides declined more than 50 percent. The program administrators in Boston recognize that the reduction of the homicide rate cannot be attributed exclusively to the Operation Night Light program; however, they suggest that probation sentences have gained a new and enhanced credibility due to stricter enforcement of key conditions, and that people on probation must take their requirements seriously or endure the consequences. Probationers came to realize that their actions were known to either probation officers or the police, who were pooling their intelligence. This deterrence strategy made many more probationers amenable to “going straight” than was typical under previous conditions.
Operation Night Light has served as the model for the other probation surveillance strategies described in this chapter, and for a number of similar programs in other cities.

Notes


Minnesota Anti-Violence Initiative (MAVI), Minnesota HEALS—Minneapolis, MN

Program Type or Federal Program Source: Program for surveillance of probationers.

Program Goal: To monitor probationers' adherence to the terms of their probation and reduce violent crimes.

Specific Groups Targeted by the Strategy: Adults and juveniles in pretrial and sentence status, on parole, or on probation.

Geographical Area Targeted by the Strategy: Hennepin County, MN.

Evaluated by: Internal data collection.

Contact Information:
Jim Robertson, Corrections Unit Supervisor
Hennepin County Department of Community Corrections
Adult Field Services—Investigation Division
A–302 Government Center
300 South Sixth Street
Minneapolis, MN 55487
Phone: 612–548–9215

Years of Operation: 1997–present.

The Minneapolis Anti-Violence Initiative (MAVI) is a collaborative of the Hennepin County Department of Community Corrections, the Hennepin County Sheriff’s Office, and the Minneapolis Police Department, and is modeled after Boston’s Operation Night Light program. For the first time, probation and police officers work together to monitor both adults and juveniles who are in pretrial or sentencing status. The MAVI teams also respond to referrals from judges, probation officers, and pretrial and posttrial sources. Priority is given to cases involving violence, weapons possession, and gang affiliation.

MAVI teams make unannounced “soft entry” visits (where consent is obtained) to the homes of selected probationers during the evening hours to monitor adherence to the terms of their probation. The most common violations found during these visits are possession of drugs or weapons and probationers under the influence of drugs. About 40 such visits are made each week by 50 probation and police officers. Police and deputies train with probation officers for 2 days to learn about their respective roles in this operation.

The Minneapolis police chief believes the MAVI program is largely responsible for the drop in the city’s homicides during the summer of 1997, which fell to 8 from 40 the previous summer. The former commander of the gang unit also believes MAVI has had a deterrent effect because probationers do not like being known on a personal level by probation officers and the police. In addition, as a result of MAVI the courts now place more stringent conditions on pretrial release, such as curfews and restrictions on visiting certain neighborhoods and associates. From
Profile No. 31 (continued)

June 1997 through September 1998, 1,644 MAVI visits were conducted, and from January through September 1998, 49 arrests were made as a result of the surveillance activities.

MAVI is one element of a collaborative, comprehensive strategy that was implemented in Hennepin County to address escalating crime rates. For more information and a discussion of how MAVI fits into the county's overall crime reduction strategy, please see profile 7, Minnesota HEALS.
Operation Eiger, Baton Rouge Partnership for the Prevention of Juvenile Gun Violence—Baton Rouge, LA

Program Type or Federal Program Source: Initiative for surveillance of probationers.

Program Goal: To reduce gun violence among youth and increase community safety.

Specific Groups Targeted by the Strategy: Juveniles and youth ages 12 to 24.

Geographical Area Targeted by the Strategy: Two ZIP code areas in the city.

Evaluated by: COSMOS Corporation, Bethesda, MD.

Contact Information: Yvonne Day Baton Rouge Partnership to Reduce Juvenile Gun Violence 222 St. Louis Street, Ninth Floor, Room 936 Baton Rouge, LA 70802 Phone: 504–389–7871

Years of Operation: 1997–present.

Operation Eiger is a high-intensity, police-probation partnership, operating in Baton Rouge, LA. This initiative targets a group of repeat violent youth offenders identified by the Partnership as “Eigers.” Eiger is a metaphorical reference to the Swiss mountain of the same name. Though not the world’s highest mountain, it is known as one of the most difficult to climb. Three-member, police-probation teams have implemented intensive and regular home visits with the Eiggers, their parents, and their siblings to monitor probation compliance, record information for intervention services, and establish an ongoing dialog with the families. In addition, Operation Eiger teams monitor identified youth (non-Eigers) who are at risk of becoming serious habitual offenders. The strategy facilitates an immediate response to delinquent behavior when it occurs.

In the initiative’s first 13 months, a total of 311 Eigers had been identified—198 juveniles and 113 young adults (17–21 years of age). These probationers reside in two target ZIP code areas in North Baton Rouge. In addition, the teams monitor 247 other high-risk youth. Intensive case management and intervention services are provided to the Eiger population. Need and risk assessments have been completed for 205 Eigers, individual service plans have been developed for 72 juvenile Eigers, and case management intervention services (using program partners and other community resources) have been delivered to 51 youth. These intervention services included substance abuse treatment, mentoring, job training/placement, and many other forms of counseling and support to both youth and families.

Over the past year, Eiger teams have made 9,570 home visits, with the average number of monthly contacts per juvenile Eiger (ages 16 and under) ranging from 3.5 during the first month of implementation to 6.2 during the last 3 months of the reporting period. The average number of monthly contacts for older youth (ages 17 to 21) remained constant at 3.4 contacts per month throughout the period, largely because the number of...
violations for individuals in this group remained consistently low (at less than 2 percent). The most dramatic difference was found in the juvenile Eiger population. In this group, the percentage of contacts for whom no violations were reported increased from 56 percent in September 1997 to 71 percent in September 1998.

Operation Eiger is one element of a collaborative, comprehensive strategy, funded by the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, that was implemented in Baton Rouge to address escalating violent crime rates. For a more detailed description, and discussion of how the program fits into the city’s overall crime reduction strategy, please see profile 8.
Profile No. 33

Operation Night Light—Boston, MA

Program Type or Federal Program Source:
Program for surveillance of probationers.

Program Goal:
To effectively enforce the terms and conditions of probation with an eye on public safety, protecting the safety and rehabilitation of the offender.

Specific Groups Targeted by the Strategy:
Juveniles and youth on probation.

Geographical Area Targeted by the Strategy:
Boston, MA.

Evaluating by:
Internal data collection.

Contact Information:
Bernard Fitzgerald, Chief Probation Officer
Dorchester District Court
510 Washington Street
Dorchester, MA 02124
Phone: 617-288-9500

Years of Operation:

Operation Night Light began in November 1992 as a partnership between probation officers in the Dorchester, MA, District Court and Boston, MA, police officers in the Anti-Gang Violence Unit (which later became the Youth Violence Strike Force). This alliance was created at a time when Boston was experiencing heightened gang violence, a rise in homicide victims under the age of 17, public alarm, increasingly bold behavior of gang members in courthouses, and criticism by minority community leaders and judges of police “stop and search” tactics. Probation officers worked independently of police, and curfews were not commonly imposed by the court and were difficult to enforce. In response to those problems, a few probation officers met informally with a few police officers to develop the Operation Night Light model as a more effective way of deterring juvenile violence.

Operation Night Light pairs one probation officer with two police officers to make surprise visits to the homes, schools, and worksites of high-risk youth probationers during the nontraditional hours of 7 p.m. to midnight, rather than from 8:30 a.m. to 4:30 p.m., which was previously the norm.

In Dorchester, where Operation Night Light started, probationer surrenders based on new arrests declined 9.2 percent between January 1994 and June 1996, compared with a statewide increase of 14 percent during the same period.

Operation Night Light is one element of a collaborative, comprehensive strategy that was implemented in Boston to address escalating violent crime rates. For a more detailed description and a discussion of how this program fits into Boston’s overall crime reduction strategy, please see profile 2.
School-Based Enforcement Programs

Several recent high-profile cases of school shootings have led schools and communities to increase the security of students and staff while on campus. Deterring gun carrying in schools is essential for both safety and education. Even if actual shootings at school are rare, the presence of guns in schools is not rare and the threatening environment guns create makes teaching and learning difficult. Between 1994 and 1996, the percentage of 12th grade males reporting carrying a gun to school in the past 4 weeks increased from 4.8 percent to 6.3 percent or approximately 1 in 16. In addition, 12.7 percent of students ages 12 to 19 reported knowing a student who brought a gun to school. When the sample is restricted to students who reported street gangs in their schools, 24.8 percent reported knowing a student who brought a gun to school.

Having learned that no school is immune to serious and sudden violence, administrators are choosing quickly to adopt new policies, discipline codes, technologies, and security strategies. Many of these approaches are expensive in terms of startup costs, external technical assistance expertise, and maintenance, and are more effective when updated periodically. The investment appears warranted where schools have carefully considered their actual or potential local gun violence problems and based their approaches on these analyses. Rigorously selected security approaches can deter gun carrying and reduce school violence. Even if school administrators believe gun violence is unlikely, they may want to examine their approach to creating a safe school.

When dealing with students who bring firearms to school, the local chief educational officer should refer to the Gun Free Schools Act (GFSA) of 1994. Under GFSA, every State receiving funds under the Elementary and Secondary Education Act must have a law that requires any student who brings a firearm to school to be expelled for not less than 1 year, and allows the expulsion requirement to be modified on a case-by-case basis by the local chief administering officer. Many States and communities have expanded on GFSA and created policies of zero tolerance for all weapons, including toys. The U.S. Department of Education reports that more than 6,000 students were expelled for bringing firearms to public schools during the 1996–97 school year. Approximately 58 percent of these firearms were handguns.

There are several key points to consider in deterring gun carrying in schools:

- Treating staff and students with dignity and respect, principals can create an environment conducive to learning, school attachment, and nonviolent behavior. Providing engaging academic programs that recognize multiple forms of student achievement channels students’ energy into constructive learning activities. Students’ respect for authority can be increased by ensuring that punishments are appropriate to the severity of infractions, the disciplinary code is consistently and impartially enforced, due process is followed (using witnesses, gathering evidence, involving multiple staff members in deciding how to react), and positive behavior is rewarded as vigorously as negative behavior is punished.

- Assigning an appropriate level of responsibility to every person in the school for maintaining a secure environment increases the likelihood that the presence of guns will be reported. Students can be prepared to take responsibility through social skills training and education about the dangers of carrying guns. Staff can learn the early warning signs for violence, visual screening techniques for spotting concealed weapons, and appropriate procedures for responding to a student with a gun. Gun carrying also can be deterred by providing an anonymous hotline and making everyone responsible for reporting weapons and other offenses.

- Keeping the school facility clean, in good repair, and attractive to students increases student respect for the school and for school officials, and may decrease gun carrying, vandalism, and violent behavior. Immediately painting over graffiti (after taking photographs for investigators) decreases the recognition received by the vandal and may deter gun carrying by minimizing gangs’ opportunities to demonstrate their presence.
Monitoring all areas of the school building and grounds increases the opportunities for detecting students carrying weapons and increases their fear of being caught. Monitoring can be enhanced by ensuring that entrances and administrative offices are visible from the street; drop tile ceilings where weapons can be hidden are eliminated; exterior lights are break-resistant; areas where students congregate are supervised; playground equipment is located where school staff, neighbors, and police patrols have good visual surveillance; blind spots are limited by the use of low-level landscaping; and the facility and grounds have sufficient lighting.

Restricting access to the building makes it more difficult for students to bring guns into the school. Methods of restricting access may include enforcing a policy against loitering on campus by non-students, requiring identification cards for all students and staff, limiting handles on exterior doors with the exception of major entry doors and places where firefighters must be able to enter, and requiring that visitors sign in and be escorted.

Involving professional security personnel, security devices, and police effectively can help prevent guns from entering the school and make students feel safer, so that they no longer feel a need to bring weapons to school. Security personnel provide both environmental protection and extra staff who can build relationships with the students. Metal detectors are not entirely effective, but they can be used to limit the presence of guns at school. Alarm systems, surveillance cameras, and student uniforms draw attention to unauthorized entries. Police patrols increase the risk of being arrested for behaving violently and for carrying concealed weapons.

Students who have carried weapons to school pose a grave threat to other students and are likely to repeat their offenses. To be in compliance with the GFSA, the local chief educational officer must consider expulsion. However, gun-carrying students can, and should, continue to receive educational services. Alternative education programs for weapon-carrying students are likely to succeed if they contain the following elements: administrators with vision and commitment, extensive contact with motivated and specially trained school staff, needs-based individualized instruction, focused classes with low student-to-staff ratios, innovative presentations of materials related to real life, caring and supportive environments, intensive counseling for students and their families, and frequent student progress reports.

The strategies profiled on the following pages were developed by communities in response to increasing concern about the safety of children in school settings and to research indicating that a large number of children report that they either carry guns or other weapons to school, or know that their peers are doing so. Some of the strategies focus on youth education; others include a system of warnings, parent notification, and sanctions to create a safer educational environment. Police and probation officers in these communities are now working together for the first time, each bringing special skills and resources to keep probationers from reoffending.

Notes
Bibb County, GA, Department of Education, Violence and Weapons Prevention and Intervention Program—Macon, GA

Program Type or Federal Program Source: School-based enforcement program.

Program Goal: To reduce violence and weapons in schools.

Specific Groups Targeted by the Strategy: School-age youth and gang members.

Geographical Area Targeted by the Strategy: Bibb County, GA, school campuses and surrounding areas.

Evaluated by: Internal data collection.

Contact Information:
Michael Dorn
Bibb County Campus Police
2444 Ross Avenue
Macon, GA 31204
Phone: 912-752-5236


The Bibb County, GA, Department of Education has adopted a comprehensive prevention and intervention initiative to reduce the number of weapons in schools. The initiative’s five components are: (1) a policy that defines, prohibits students from carrying, and establishes consequences for being caught with an impermissible weapon at school; (2) constant education of students to reinforce the policy; (3) policies designed to make it difficult to bring weapons to school; (4) weapon-screening programs; and (5) consistent sanctions for violations.

In addition to firearms and explosives, two dozen other types of weapons are prohibited, including switchblades, pocket knives, box cutters, razors, ice picks, blackjacks, and chains. Students sign a behavioral contract pledging not to bring weapons to school or to handle another student’s weapon, and parents and school administrators sign in support of the students. The contract specifies that violators will be arrested and disciplined and explains that random searches of lockers, cars, and students will occur. A male and female police team participates in random searches of entire classrooms, and a “gun dog” assists in searching lockers. All public areas where weapons might be hidden are routinely checked. Zero tolerance for weapons violations mandates prosecution by the schools for every incident. Students are removed from the classroom, examined by a psychologist, and may complete the year in an alternative school. Other intervention
methods include strictly enforced policies against fighting, gang paraphernalia, gang signs, and graffiti.

Community policing techniques such as high-visibility officers on dirt bikes on school campuses, analysis of overall crime reports to identify schools at risk, and zero tolerance of motor vehicle violations in school areas contribute to a communitywide effort. Stopping cars in school areas for suspicious behavior, minor violations, and searches is believed to reduce gang drive-by incidents and keep nonstudents out of the area. Gun suppression strategies target gang members and students at random.

Campus police speak regularly at community organizations and churches as part of Bibb County's violence prevention and education strategy. They also teach an American Bar Association law and individual responsibility curriculum to eighth graders and a National Rifle Association gun accident prevention curriculum to third graders. Teachers are now being trained to recognize body movements that are indicative of gun possession.

Bibb County is reported to be the only urban school system in Georgia that has not had a student shot while at school. The relationship between students and law enforcement is said to be very good. Students are even said to have applauded when the police arrived to search their class for weapons.
Profile No. 35

Suffolk County Community-Based Juvenile Justice Program—Boston, MA

Program Type or Federal Program Source: School-based enforcement program.

Program Goal:
To identify and provide services for juveniles who commit acts of violence or are at risk of gun violence.

Specific Groups Targeted by the Strategy:
At-risk and offending juveniles in middle and high schools.

Geographical Area Targeted by the Strategy:
Suffolk County, MA.

Evaluated by:
Internal data collection.

Contact Information:
Jim Borghesani
External Affairs and Communications
Director
Suffolk County District Attorney’s Office
One Bulfinch Place
Boston, MA 02114
Phone: 617–619–4189

Years of Operation:
1995–present.

The Community-Based Juvenile Justice (CBJJ) Program was established in 1995. Its goal is to reduce juvenile crime and violence in the schools and the community through increased communication and better sharing of information and resources. The program is operated out of the Suffolk County District Attorney’s (D.A.’s) Office. In 1997, more than half of the middle schools and one-third of the high schools in Boston, MA, hosted CBJJ roundtable meetings, which were led by representatives from the D.A.’s office, Boston Police Department, Boston Schools, Metropolitan Boston Transit Authority, juvenile probation services, Department of Youth Services, and Department of Social Services.

The CBJJ Program takes advantage of three Federal grants from the U.S. Department of Justice (SafeFutures provides funding for services to youth in a geographical corridor where many court-involved and at-risk youth live), the U.S. Department of Labor (the Youth Opportunity Area Grant funds educational and job opportunities for youth), and the U.S. Department of Education, which supports the truancy initiative.

The team meets twice each month to prescribe interventions for juveniles at risk and those involved in violence. The roundtable meeting is a forum for school principals to brief police about students who bring weapons to school, to refer troubled kids to social services, or to inform counselors of youth situations in legal proceedings. At the meeting, one agency is designated as responsible for followup planning on a particular juvenile. Interventions may include indictment as a youthful offender; recommitment to the Department of Youth Services based on a juvenile’s violation of his or her terms of release; revocation of probation based on a juvenile’s noncompliance with court-imposed conditions; requests for the court to impose specific conditions both before trial and at disposition; prosecution on a priority basis; filing a Child in Need of Supervision (CHINS) petition; or referral of a
Profile No. 35 (continued)

juvenile for services in one of the involved
grants or in school- or community-based
agencies.

The roundtable meetings are said to result in
more efficient prosecution of violent juve-
niles, more coordinated response among
agencies dealing with court-involved youth,
and more coordinated intervention initiatives
for at-risk youth. They also create greater
accountability and more predictable conse-
quences for delinquent behavior. During the
period from September 1996 to December
1997, 552 cases were discussed at CBJJ
roundtables; of these, 44 percent were court
involved. The three major reasons for referr-
als were negative behavior, truancy, and
recent arrests. The roundtables also have
helped draw attention to other important
issues—the lack of alternative education
placements, the need for more tutorial ser-
dices, the lack of appropriate placements for
juveniles over the age of 18 who have few
academic credits due to past incarcerations,
and a lack of coordination between schools
and probation officers for CHINS cases.

Other initiatives of the program have
included expanded truancy sweeps by
Metropolitan Boston Transit Authority
(MBTA) police, local police, and school
attendance officers; interventions by the
CBJJ staff and Boston Police Department
in a rapid and coordinated manner when
violent episodes occur at schools; and col-
laboration with the MBTA to reduce youth
violence on the transit system after school.
The county district attorney believes that
effective truancy intervention and preven-
tion measures at the middle school level will
reduce the heavy court involvement of juve-
niles at the high school level.

For cases completed in 1997, 32.9 percent
of students exhibited an increase in positive
behavior, 15.6 percent of the students were
transferred to other schools, and 8.0 percent
were brought into custody. Although the
Community-Based Juvenile Justice Pro-
gram is not formally linked to other gun
violence reduction strategies in Boston,
many of the schools involved in the program
are in neighborhoods targeted by the city’s
Operation Ceasefire (see profile 21), and the
Police Department’s Strategy to Prevent
Youth Violence (see profile 2).
Section VI

Strategies To Respond To Illegal Gun Use
## Section VI. Strategies To Respond To Illegal Gun Use

### Overview

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Overview

This section addresses the third phase of the gun violence continuum—gun use—and describes the ways in which the criminal justice system has responded to those who are charged with possessing and using firearms.

Focused Prosecution Strategies

Both prosecutors and the courts have developed new strategies to target illegal use of firearms by adults. U.S. Attorneys in several States have used enhanced Federal sanctions in cases against certain groups of gun offenders. In addition, U.S. Attorneys and local prosecutors have joined forces to find the best prosecutorial forum for gun offenders. In many cases, special task forces have been created that include representatives from Federal, State, county, and local law enforcement agencies.

Although recent crime data show that juvenile arrests for murder and other violent crimes have been declining, public perceptions to the contrary have led to new legislation targeting juvenile offenders.


The courts have also developed programs to deter gun use with swift, sure, and severe penalties. The Nation’s first adult gun court was established in the Providence, RI, Superior Court in 1994 by a State statute that created a separate gun court calendar with concurrent jurisdiction with all other Superior Court calendars. It is anticipated that increasing the likelihood of imprisonment and lengthening its duration will have a deterrent effect on those who engage in gun violence.

Federal and State prosecutors have not only acquired increased discretion in juvenile cases, but also, in many jurisdictions, initiated their own programs to target violent juveniles.
DISARM, U.S. Attorney’s Office—Baltimore, MD

Program Type or Federal Program Source: Program of focused prosecution strategies; High-Intensity Drug Trafficking Area; and U.S. Attorney’s Office.

Program Goal: To identify repeat felons with UCR Part 1 offenses who are arrested while in possession of a gun and target them for Federal prosecution.

Specific Groups Targeted by the Strategy: Repeat violent offenders.

Geographical Area Targeted by the Strategy: Baltimore City, Baltimore County, Montgomery County, Prince Georges County.

DISARM targets gun-related violence in Maryland by seeking Federal prosecution for individuals arrested while in possession of a gun who have a substantial record of convictions for violent crime or drug trafficking. In Federal court, these felons face up to life imprisonment and mandatory minimums for gun possession, including a minimum sentence of 15 years for gun possession associated with three prior felonies.

The program began as a cooperative effort of the U.S. Attorney’s Office; the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF); the Baltimore City Police; and the State’s Attorney’s Office. It has been expanded to include Baltimore, Montgomery, and Prince Georges Counties and all parts of the High-Intensity Drug Trafficking Area (HIDTA) program, which now funds it. The program also is available to any jurisdiction in Maryland that contacts the U.S. Attorney’s Office. While the DISARM initiative is not linked to Baltimore’s Comprehensive Communities Program (CCP) (see profile 1), some of the individuals targeted reside in CCP neighborhoods.

The procedure for authorizing DISARM cases is as follows. Any individual with at least one prior violent crime or narcotics felony conviction who is arrested with a firearm in his or her possession will be considered a DISARM target, although normally a defendant must have two prior qualifying felonies before a Federal prosecution will be authorized. Federal prosecution of a defendant with one prior qualifying felony can be authorized if the police department or State’s Attorney’s Office believes that special circumstances justify a Federal prosecution. The cases are initially screened by personnel assigned to the ATF’s HIDTA program and then referred to the U.S. Attorney’s Office and the State’s Attorney’s Office for review.
Profile No. 36 (continued)

Between May 1994 and June 1998, 173 locally arrested defendants were referred to the U.S. Attorney’s Office for Federal prosecution. Those convicted received an average sentence of 8.3 years without the possibility of parole. In contrast, a defendant prosecuted in State court for handgun possession faces a maximum of 3 years’ incarceration, subject to parole, and defendants often simply receive probation. The cumulative criminal histories of the convicted DISARM defendants include 1,158 prior arrests and 395 prior convictions.
Gun Court—Providence, RI

Program Type or Federal Program Source: Court-related program.

Program Goal: To prosecute and sentence violent adults who use guns.

Specific Groups Targeted by the Strategy: Persons charged with gun offenses.

Geographical Area Targeted by the Strategy: City of Providence, RI, and surrounding counties.

Evaluates by: Internal data collection/legislative review.

Contact Information:
Susan Revens
Superior Court
250 Benefit Street
Providence, RI 02903
Phone: 401–222–3288

Years of Operation: 1994–present.

The Nation’s first Gun Court was established in the Providence, RI, Superior Court in September 1994. After gaining the support of both the National Rifle Association (NRA) and gun control groups, enabling legislation passed with only one negative vote. A 1989 law had provided for minimum sentencing for carrying a gun in committing a crime of violence: first offense, 3–10 years; second offense, 10–20 years; and third offense, 15 years to life. Nevertheless, gun crimes continued to escalate. Before the Gun Court, sentences were imposed in only 67 percent of cases (sentences include terms of probation). The average time to disposition was 518 days.

The new legislation created a separate Gun Court calendar concurrent with all other Superior Court calendars and required that any case involving a gun be scheduled for trial within 60 days of completion of discovery. Automatic referral of such cases to the Gun Court calendar is part of an administrative routine and does not require a hearing. No evaluation has been conducted to assess the effect on reducing gun-related crime or charges; however, the speed of disposition and level and certainty of punishment have been enhanced.

Of 866 cases assigned to the Gun Court calendar between September 1994 and October 1998, 794 have been concluded, 82 percent of which have resulted in sentences. Of those cases that resulted in sentences, 19 percent have completed their sentences, 25 percent have less than 2 years left to serve, 11 percent have 2 to 5 years left to serve, 4 percent have 5 to 10 years left to serve, and 6 percent have more than 10 years left to serve. Thirty-five percent received a suspended or deferred sentence or probation. Only 3 percent were found not guilty; 10 percent were dismissed. Case disposition time has been reduced by 311 percent to 126 days.

Officials believe the Gun Court sends the message that, if you use a gun in Providence, you are going to jail. NRA augmented this message by paying for billboards that stated, “Gun Court is now in session.”
Profile No. 38

Project Exile, U.S. Attorney’s Office—Eastern District of Virginia

Program Type or Federal Program Source:
Collaborative initiative of the U.S. Attorney’s Office; Richmond Commonwealth Attorney’s Office; Richmond Police Department; Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms; Federal Bureau of Investigation; and Virginia State Police.

Program Goal:
To reduce Richmond’s homicide rate by detaining dangerous armed felons prior to trial and prosecuting them in Federal court.

Specific Groups Targeted by the Strategy:
Previously convicted felons who possess guns and/or armed persons involved in drug or violent crimes.

Geographical Area Targeted by the Strategy:
Richmond, VA, metropolitan area, including the City of Richmond and Chesterfield and Henrico Counties.

Evaluated by:
No formal evaluation is being conducted.

Contact Information:
David Schiller
Assistant U.S. Attorney
U.S. Attorney’s Office
600 East Main Street, Suite 1800
Richmond, VA 23219
Phone: 804-771-2186

Years of Operation:
1997–present.

Project Exile is a coordinated approach to gun violence in the Richmond metropolitan area led by the Richmond U.S. Attorney’s Office in coordination with the Richmond Commonwealth’s Attorney; Richmond Police Department; Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF); Federal Bureau of Investigation; and Virginia State Police.

During the 1990’s, Richmond’s homicide rate—which is driven primarily by gun violence—has been among the highest in the Nation for cities with populations exceeding 100,000. In the past few years, Virginia has enacted new State laws (one-gun-a-month and truth-in-sentencing), while implementing several Federal, State, and local law enforcement initiatives to address violent crime in Richmond. Project Exile specifically targets previously convicted felons carrying guns and armed persons involved in drug or violent crimes. Approximately 85 percent of Richmond’s homicides in 1997 were committed with guns, more than 40 percent were drug-related, and more than 60 percent involved offenders with prior criminal records. During the first 10 months of 1998, compared with the same period of the previous year, the total number of homicides committed in Richmond was down 36 percent and the number of firearm homicides was down 41 percent.
Project Exile was formally initiated in February 1997 when indictments of the first group of Project Exile defendants for Federal firearm offenses were announced. Project Exile is based on the principle that, if police catch a criminal in Richmond with a gun, the criminal has forfeited his or her right to remain in the community and, as such, will face immediate Federal prosecution and stiff mandatory Federal prison sentences.

The U.S. Attorney's Office, along with a Richmond Assistant Commonwealth's Attorney who is cross-designated as a special Assistant U.S. Attorney, reviews cases involving felons with guns, drug users with guns, guns used in drug trafficking, and gun/domestic violence referrals and prosecutes these cases in Federal court when a Federal nexus exists and State prison sentences or pretrial detention is insufficient. When a police officer finds a gun while on duty, the officer can page an ATF agent, who is available 24 hours a day. ATF and the Richmond Police, in consultation with the U.S. Attorney's Office, review the circumstances and determine if a Federal statute applies and whether Federal prosecution would provide the most effective incapacitation for the offender. Typically, Federal prison sentences are longer than Virginia sentences for offenses involving previously convicted felons possessing firearms and armed drug traffickers, whereas State sentences may equal or exceed Federal sentences for repeat violent offenders.

As of November 1998, Project Exile had achieved the following results:

- 372 persons indicted for Federal gun violations.
- 440 guns seized.
- 300 persons arrested or held in State custody.
- 222 arrestees (more than 74 percent) held without bond.
- 247 persons convicted.
- 196 persons sentenced to an average of 55 months of imprisonment.

An extensive public outreach and media campaign to educate citizens about lengthy Federal prison sentences for gun crimes and to maximize deterrence also is a critical component of Project Exile. The Project Exile Citizen Support Foundation was formed in July 1997. The Foundation raised more than $40,000 in 1997 and more than $100,000 in financial and in-kind contributions in 1998 for advertising and for dissemination of Project Exile's media message. The message, "An illegal gun will get you 5 years in Federal prison," asks citizens to report guns to the Metro Richmond Crime Stoppers anonymous telephone number. The media message was advertised on 15 billboards throughout the city, a fully painted city bus (which changes routes daily so that it covers the entire city each week), 15,000 business cards, a series of radio and television promotional spots, traffic reports aired by 24 local radio stations, and print advertising.

The Richmond Police Department, ATF, and the U.S. Attorney's Office also have worked with numerous public and/or private entities, such as the Richmond Boys & Girls Club, Richmond Public Schools, Richmond Metro Crime Stoppers, Fox Television's Black Achievers program, and the Richmond Times-Dispatch newspaper, among others, to publicize Project Exile and to enlist citizen support and participation.
Profile No. 38 (continued)

In response to Project Exile, Virginia’s Governor has announced specific proposals to be introduced in the 1999 legislative session that would enhance State penalties for gun offenders. The Virginia plan would establish 3-year mandatory minimum sentences for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, possession of an illegal firearm in a school building, or possession of both an illegal firearm and an illegal drug such as cocaine or heroin.
Profile No. 39

U.S. Attorney’s Office Anti-Violence Crime Task Force—Memphis, TN

Program Type or Federal Program Source:
Program of Prevention Education—changing attitudes toward guns and violence.

Program Goal:
To prosecute adults who provide guns to juveniles.

Specific Groups Targeted by the Strategy:
Adults who are illegally transferring guns to youth.

Geographical Area Targeted by the Strategy:
Western District of Tennessee.

Evaluated by:
Internal data collection.

Contact Information:
Tony Arvin
Assistant U.S. Attorney
U.S. Attorney’s Office
800 Federal Building
Memphis, TN 38103
Phone: 901-544-4231

Years of Operation:
1995—present.

In 1995, Memphis and Shelby County experienced a 39-percent increase in weapons possession on school campuses; a 50-percent increase in the number of youth charged with reckless endangerment with a weapon; a 5.5-percent increase in misdemeanor gun possession by juveniles; and a 9-percent increase in felony possession. Forty juveniles were charged with some form of homicide.

In response, the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Western District of Tennessee applied for and received an Anti-Violent Crime Initiative grant, which began in August 1995. This grant formed the basis for the expansion of the Violent Crimes Task Force (VCTF) to target juvenile offenders and to enforce the Youth Handgun Safety Act. The language of this Act states that it is unlawful for a person to sell, deliver, or otherwise transfer a handgun and/or handgun ammunition to a person whom the transferor knows is a juvenile. The goals of the task force were to discover how juveniles were obtaining guns, develop appropriate prevention policies, and develop prosecutable cases against adults responsible for the illegal supply of guns to children and other juveniles.

VCTF operates under a memorandum of understanding (MOU) involving eight agencies: the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF), Memphis Police Department, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Shelby County Sheriff’s Department, in addition to the U.S. Attorney’s Office, Juvenile Court of Memphis and Shelby County, Memphis City Schools, and District Attorney’s Office for the 30th District of Tennessee. Under the terms of the MOU, the task force has maintained a presence within the juvenile court to compile statistics on firearm possession by juveniles and within the school system to collect information on student violence. With the assistance of ATF, the task force also traces all confiscated guns and interviews all juveniles arrested for firearm possession in an attempt to locate the sources of firearms. In addition, the task force has developed a method of organizing and
Profile No. 39 (continued)

classifying all statistical information gathered at the Juvenile Court to maximize intelligence. These data are reported to a Violent Crimes Coordinator on a monthly basis. The task force also has developed a method for identifying related juvenile cases. The participation of the arresting officers has greatly increased the task force's effectiveness in and awareness of potential cases.

The task force also has been involved in analyzing all weapon-related information obtained from the school system.

Interim findings, covering the period from June 1995 to May 1996, reveal that 82 percent of arrested children (ages 11 to 17) were interviewed by VCTF. VCTF traced 319 weapons. The most popular guns recovered were the .38 caliber revolver and the .38 caliber pistol. Charges for these arrests included aggravated robbery, property crimes, and drug and firearm violations. Most of the juveniles denied having a weapon or refused to talk to VCTF, although they were told it would have no bearing on their cases. On average, the youth's first gun experience was at age 13, although the incidence of gang involvement, mentioned in the interviews, was believed to be underestimated. The first prosecution in the country under the Youth Handgun Safety Act was attributed to this task force.
U.S. Attorney's Office Initiatives—Rochester, NY

Program Type or Federal Program Source: Focused prosecution strategies.

Program Goal: To reduce the illegal possession, use, sale, and trade of firearms by juveniles and adults.

Specific Groups Targeted by the Strategy: High-risk youth, gang members, and criminals who use guns.

Geographical Area Targeted by the Strategy: Rochester, NY.

Evaluatd by: Internal data collection.

Contact Information:
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U.S. Attorney's Office
620 Keating Federal Building
Rochester, NY 14614
Phone: 716–263–5717

Chief Robert Duffy
Rochester Police Department
150 Plymouth Avenue
South Rochester, NY 14614
Phone: 716–428–7033

Years of Operation: 1996–present.

In 1993, the Attorney General requested that all U.S. Attorneys in each district prepare a crime plan that would address gun violence and related crimes in their local areas. As a result of this mandate, the U.S. Attorney for the Western District of New York teamed up with several Federal, State, and local law enforcement and criminal justice agencies to form the Violent Crimes Task Force (VCTF). The local office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) is the lead agency for VCTF. The mission of the task force is to respond to and investigate violent crimes. The group sets its priorities in response to current crime trends.

VCTF endeavors to reduce crime by current and former youth offenders through a carrot-and-stick approach. Youth are encouraged to take advantage of social services so they can avoid criminal behavior, they are warned of the consequences of further criminal behavior, and they are closely monitored by parole and probation officers in the postincarceration period.

In 1997, VCTF created an Illegal Firearms Suppression Unit (sometimes referred to as the Gun Squad), under the leadership of the Rochester Police Department. The unit's mission is to reduce the illegal sale and trade of firearms, using prosecutorial discretion to try cases through either the U.S. Attorney's Office (which has mandatory jail terms with no parole and uses out-of-State prisons) or the District Attorney's Office. This initiative is funded by grants from the Carnegie Mellon Foundation and the U.S. Department of Justice in partnership with the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Western District of New York; Monroe County District Attorney; FBI; Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms; Monroe County Sheriff's Department; New York State Police; and Rochester Police Department. Although there is no formal governing board, these agencies have
Profile No. 40 (continued)

established a collegial working relationship over the years, and launch multiagency initiatives when needed.

The U.S. Attorney's Office is the lead agency for both VCTF and the Suppression Unit, and works closely with a local prosecutor to find the judicial forum that will have the biggest impact. There are three prosecutorial options available in New York. First, a case may be kept in a State court because the penalties available are at least equal to those that would apply in a Federal case. Second, the U.S. Attorney and the District Attorney may agree to forward the case to Federal court for prosecution. Third, the U.S. Attorney may request a waiver that would allow a defendant to be tried in both Federal and State courts. The U.S. Attorney's Office may prosecute crimes by juveniles as young as 13 years old in Federal court.

The program has not been formally evaluated, but inhouse data show that the Illegal Firearms Suppression Unit has been involved in three major prosecutions of cross-State gun-purchasing activities and currently has 30 to 40 open single-defendant felony gun cases.
Court-Related Programs

A 1996 OJJDP report by the National Center for Juvenile Justice, *State Responses to Serious and Violent Juvenile Crime*, documented a "trend toward redefining the purpose of the juvenile justice system" so that cases are increasingly handled "with the goal of punishment as opposed to rehabilitation." The report described statutory changes making it easier for juveniles to be tried as adults; the imposition of longer sentences; and the incarceration of juveniles with adults. Notwithstanding this trend toward tougher prosecution and incarceration of juvenile offenders, many juvenile courts also have begun to focus on rehabilitating offenders who are believed may benefit from such treatment. Leading this movement have been juvenile and family drug courts patterned after the adult drug court pioneered in Dade County, FL, in 1989. Since juvenile cases represent a mixture of complex social issues and criminal behavior, the juvenile drug courts were designed to offer intensive, continuous judicial supervision of participants and coordination of treatment and rehabilitation services. Such courts are now active in more than 300 jurisdictions in the country. In these programs the judge plays a pivotal role, ensuring that youth, parents, and sometimes the entire family are properly assessed and receive necessary social services, especially since parental involvement greatly increases the likelihood of successful intervention.

A similar philosophy underlies the development of juvenile gun courts. Selected youth (typically first-time, nonviolent offenders) are eligible for these special court programs, which usually mandate parent education. Several jurisdictions have established diversion programs for youth charged with weapons offenses. These initiatives may include firearm education courses and presentations by experts or people who have been affected by firearm violence (coroners, gunshot victims, police officers, parents of those who died from firearm violence). Social services for youth and their families are also a key component in many of these programs.

Notes


Handgun Intervention Program—Detroit, MI

Program Type or Federal Program Source: Court-related programs.

Program Goal: To prevent young offenders from carrying and using guns.

Specific Groups Targeted by the Strategy: Juveniles charged with first or second gun offenses in Michigan’s 36th District Court.

Geographical Area Targeted by the Strategy: Detroit, MI.

Evaluated by:
The Urban Institute, Washington, DC.

Contact Information:
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Handgun Intervention Program
36th District Court, Madison Center
421 Madison Avenue, Suite 3017
Detroit, MI 48226
Phone: 313-965-3724

Jeffrey Roth
The Urban Institute
2100 M Street NW.
Washington, DC 20037
Phone: 202–833–7200

Years of Operation:
1993–present.

After a teenager whom he knew personally died from a gunshot injury, Judge Willie Lipscomb, Jr., launched a program to stop the tide of gun-toting youth who pass through his court. The Handgun Intervention Program (HIP) was developed as a court-based education program for defendants, whose attendance at one 4-hour session is ordered as a condition of their bond. At sentencing, the judge also can order defendants to attend additional sessions if he feels that it would be beneficial to them. The program targets young African-American men ages 12 to 28 who are first- or second-time offenders charged with carrying a concealed weapon and who currently have no other serious charges pending. The goal of the program is to prevent these defendants from committing gun violence or from becoming homicide victims. The program stresses the importance of consequences, choices, responsibility, and nonviolence.

HIP is coordinated by the probation office and staffed by volunteers from the court and community. Community volunteers include the clergy, police officers, probation officers, ex-offenders, doctors, lawyers, and victims. Judge Lipscomb and the other volunteers implement the 4-hour gun education class, which is held on Saturday mornings. The program has five components: (1) images of gun-murder victims are presented to remind the offenders that they share much in common with victims and to appeal to their sense of humanity; (2) information about guns and gun-related violence is distributed, leading to a discussion of these topics; (3) presentations are given by other youth about avoiding and neutralizing violent street conflicts; (4) participants discuss their responsibilities and heritage as African-American men (this segment includes a presentation about historic figures and civil
Profile No. 41 (continued)

either a control or an intervention group, and attitude measures were taken at initial lockup and after participation in the program. Attitudes about situational avoidance, status motivation, the inevitability of gun violence, ethical considerations about gun violence, personal responsibility, and knowledge about gun risks were measured. After participating in the program, participants’ attitudes shifted favorably for 19 of 21 variables in the instrument. The researchers also held focus groups to gather feedback. Participants emphasized that the government failed to understand the problems of inner-city neighborhoods and that the program should be offered to a much younger audience through the schools. Researchers indicated that the long-term effects of the program are unknown at this time. They intend to examine the defendants’ rearrest and revocation data and to analyze characteristics of program participants and their neighborhoods.
Profile No. 42

Juvenile Firearms Prosecution—Seattle, WA

Program Type or Federal Program Source:
Court-related programs; the Office of Community Oriented Policing Services.

Program Goal:
To prosecute juvenile firearm cases and coordinate efforts between the prosecutor's office and the Seattle Police Department.

Specific Groups Targeted by the Strategy:
Juvenile weapons offenders.

Geographical Area Targeted by the Strategy:
Seattle, WA.

Evaluated by:
Internal data collection.

Contact Information:
Julie Baker
Grant Coordinator
Seattle Police Department
610 Third Avenue
Seattle, WA 98104
Phone: 206-233-5133

Years of Operation:

Between January 1994 and May 1997, the King County prosecutor's office received 820 cases involving a juvenile charged with a firearm-related crime. The number of firearm cases filed in juvenile court increased by 27 percent between 1995 and 1996. This increase was primarily made up of felony gun possession cases. Filings were expected to increase by 24 percent in 1997, because of more aggressive enforcement efforts.

The prosecutor's response to each case is dictated by whether it is an "in-custody" case (i.e., the juvenile is in detention) or an "out-of-custody" case. In-custody cases require a 48-hour probable cause hearing, a detention review, and a case review. Each in-custody case must be filed within 72 hours of arrest to detain the juvenile. Once a case is filed, there are a number of further actions, including the arraignment, case-setting hearing, trial, disposition, and modification hearing.

Filings and actions taken on out-of-custody cases are not prescribed, and thus normally take much longer. In the 3 years preceding the Juvenile Firearms Prosecution project, it took an average of 50 days to file an out-of-custody firearm case. Long delays in filing a case often would occur when cases needed to be returned to police for more information. Up to three Deputy Prosecuting Attorneys (DPA's) normally handled a juvenile case from filing to trial because they did not specialize in any one type of crime. Thus, juvenile firearm cases were handled by a number of different DPA's, which hampered communication with police and other departments, contributing to the slowness of the filing and court processes.

The Juvenile Firearms Prosecution project was initiated in September 1996, under a grant from the Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) to the Seattle Police Department, to facilitate the processing of juvenile firearm offenses as part of an overall law enforcement strategy to crack down on firearm offenders. A new full-time DPA position was created (for 1 year) to coordinate enforcement and prosecution efforts in juvenile firearm offenses between the prosecutor's office and the
Profile No. 42 (continued)

Seattle Police Department's Gang Unit. The duties of the juvenile firearm DPA were to: (1) develop a computerized tracking system for pending juvenile firearm cases; (2) review and file out-of-custody juvenile firearm cases and in-custody cases and assist and advise other DPAs in filing these cases; (3) handle hearings on the most serious firearm offenders; (4) manage case-setting negotiations and advise other DPAs on pretrial hearings; (5) handle trials involving firearm offenses; (6) handle the disposition hearings on chronic or serious offenders; (7) become knowledgeable about legal issues arising in juvenile firearm cases and analyze the effects of new legislation; (8) conduct periodic training with other DPAs and provide updates on new laws and legal briefs; and (9) coordinate efforts with the Seattle Police Department and other police agencies by conducting training sessions for detectives and patrol officers, assisting in initial police investigations, and ensuring that cases are filed in a timely manner.

The Juvenile Firearms Prosecution project thus provided for a number of changes in the handling of juvenile firearm cases. A vertical prosecution process also was adopted in which one DPA became a specialist in firearm prosecution, handling all juvenile firearm offenses from the time the case was received by the prosecutor's office until juvenile sentencing.

As a result of these efforts, juvenile firearm cases were filed faster (in 17 days rather than 53) and filing backlogs were eliminated; conviction rates increased (from 65.4 percent to 78.4 percent); the number of cases going to trial increased (monthly trials doubled to 5 on average); the adjudications rate (i.e., pleaded guilty or found guilty) increased (from 83.1 percent to 85.5 percent); the pretrial dismissal rate was reduced (from 9.6 percent to 5.5 percent); more cases were successfully rushed to trial (from 86 percent to 91.4 percent); more juveniles were detained at first appearance (from 82.7 percent to 93.8 percent); more exceptional sentences were imposed (from 10 percent to 18 percent); more juveniles were declined for adult prosecution (from 1 to 5); and police investigation and incident reports were improved. Information provided in this profile was obtained from an upcoming Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Bulletin. The juvenile firearm DPA position ended in September 1997 when the grant ended.
Profile No. 43

Juvenile Gun Court—Birmingham, AL

Program Type or Federal Program Source: Court-related programs.

Program Goal:
To deliver swift, sure, and appropriate consequences to juveniles found in possession of a gun.

Specific Groups Targeted by the Strategy:
Juvenile gun offenders.

Geographical Area Targeted by the Strategy:
Birmingham, AL.

Evaluated by:
Internal data collection.

Contact Information:
Judge Sandra Storm
Family Court of Jefferson County
120 Second Court North
Birmingham, AL 35204
Phone: 205–325–5538

Years of Operation:
1995–present.

Birmingham's Juvenile Gun Court was established in April 1995 by Sandra H. Storm, a Circuit Court Judge in the Family Court of Jefferson County. Juvenile deaths had reached a peak in 1994 when there were 34 deaths of individuals ages 18 and younger, of which 25 were murders or other acts resulting in the death of another person. After reading an article in the Birmingham News about an adult gun court in Rhode Island, Judge Storm began planning for the development of a court to handle juvenile gun cases, in the hope that early intervention could reduce the number of homicides and other serious gun crimes involving youth.

The judicial infrastructure for establishing a juvenile gun court was already in place. Family Court judges had the authority for mandatory detention of juvenile offenders; discretion as to whether juvenile cases were eligible for diversion; a mandate to review incoming cases within 72 hours of arrest; a mandate to hold trials within 10 days; and access to 30-day boot camps. In addition, the judge had reviewed several research articles (including studies from the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention) that concluded that the most effective boot camps were those that included intensive followup and the involvement of parents. It was decided that Birmingham's initiative would include these critical elements and would be designed to ensure swift, sure, and fair consequences for juvenile gun offenders.

In January 1995, the Family Court of Jefferson County hosted a "town meeting" to discuss the formation of the new Gun Court. Among those represented were social service providers; the Alabama Department of Youth Services (DYS), which provides a range of services to troubled and court-involved youth.
and runs juvenile detention facilities; law enforcement; criminal defense attorneys; and many other public and private organizations. Impact, Inc., a local nonprofit organization providing services for children, adults, and families involved in the criminal justice system, also attended these early meetings and became a key partner. The organization was already under contract to the Family Court to conduct a 9-week family counseling program, and the "family communication" curriculum used in that program was adapted for use with Gun Court parents. By April 1, 1995, the core components of the Gun Court had been developed, linkages with key agencies had been established, Family Court had reallocated funds and other resources to support the program, and the first docketed cases were heard by a judge. In mid-May 1995, the Parent Education Program (PEP) was implemented, and the court recently started juvenile education classes for youth whose parents are in the PEP sessions.

The Family Court of Jefferson County is located on a campus-like setting and is a centralized venue for handling all juvenile crime and delinquency cases—from violent offenses such as murder to truancy, abuse, and neglect cases. The Family Court oversees 20 programs (13 of them located on the premises), and a detention center abutting the court building has the capacity to hold 80 youth. The average length of stay for detainees, who range in age from 10 through 19, is 30 days. Legal Aid, an Assistant District Attorney, drug-testing services, a probation office, child support personnel, and a family therapist also are located in the complex.

This centralization of services is considered one of the keys to the success of the Juvenile Gun Court. Having most juvenile government agencies colocated in the Family Court complex eliminates many of the logistical barriers to obtaining services for youth with ongoing needs. For example, a judge or probation officer can request on-the-spot assessment or mental health placement through the onsite court liaison officer. If a youth tells a probation officer that his or her recent urine screen was negative, it is easy to verify the results in person. Strong networks and relationships with external agencies also facilitate case management. With a mental health liaison who is fully knowledgeable about State and local agencies, a call to the head of a private substance abuse treatment center can be placed, and an opening for a treatment bed can be quickly secured. However, mere physical proximity and strong personal networks would be insufficient were it not for the fact that staff caseloads, though not ideal, are lower than in most localities.

The Department of Probation is a key partner and has two full-time staff and one part-time staff member assigned to the Gun Court. Juvenile probation officers are responsible for the intensive monitoring of high-risk youth once they complete the 30-day boot camp. The officers have a caseload of approximately 40 youth (the goal is a ratio of 1 staff member to 15 probationers). Other law enforcement agencies also have extensive involvement with the Gun Court. The County Sheriff’s Office and the Birmingham Police Department accompany probation officers on home visits as part of the Operation Nighttime Crime Eradicators (ONCE) program, which is modeled on Boston’s Operation Night Light program (see profile 33). Since May 1996, ATF has devoted resources from its Project LEAD program (a national gun-tracing initiative) to interview youth and to obtain information on weapons recovered through Gun Court. Between July 1, 1996, and April 30, 1997, ATF has collected data from 695 gun traces.

Although the Gun Court prosecutes cases from throughout Jefferson County, a large proportion of gun cases are from the western part of the city, which has therefore
become a target area for the ONCE pro-
gram. The area is a designated Enterprise
Zone and also has communities being tar-
geted through the U.S. Department of Justi-
tice Weed and Seed program. Birmingham
is one of the sites participating in ATF’s
Youth Crime Gun Interdiction Initiative,
and it has received two grants from the
Office of Community Oriented Policing
Services and Local Law Enforcement Block
Grants that were used primarily for map-
ning technology.

Cases are processed through the Juvenile
Gun Court as follows:

♦ Arrest. There are a number of gun of-
fenses with which juveniles may be
charged:

♦ **Gun found:** A weapon is seized by
police officers as part of another pri-
mary charge (e.g., shoplifting).

♦ **Gun possession:** Having a gun is the
primary or only charge. The majority
of cases fall into this category
(59 percent of all cases in 1997). Most
of the weapons are recovered during
traffic stops by the police.

♦ **Menacing:** A gun was used to frighten
or harass someone.

♦ **Gun used in a crime:** A gun was used
in the commission of an armed robbery,
burglary, assault, or other serious
crime.

♦ **Gun fired:** A gun was fired near people
or into a home, building, or vehicle.

♦ **Murder:** A gun was fired at a person
(this category includes murder and
attempted murder).

In 1997 there were 398 gun complaints
filed on 302 individuals. Among those
individuals, 48 (16 percent) had prior gun
charges, and 7 (2 percent) were charged
with murder or attempted murder. The
data also show that 235 (77 percent) of
the arrestees had prior contact with Fam-
ily Court, and 175 (58 percent) had prior
delinquency complaints filed against
them. Only first-time gun offenders are
eligible for Gun Court; youth with mul-
tiple gun charges or with violent or other
serious offenses are transferred to adult
court or DYS. Alabama State law allows
juveniles as young as 14 to be tried as
adults.

♦ **Court intake.** All juveniles arrested for
gun offenses are retained; there is no dis-
cretion to transfer cases from formal pros-
ecution to diversion programs.

♦ **Detention hearing.** All Gun Court hear-
ings are held within 72 hours. Youth may
request a trial or may plead “true” at this
point.

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We developed our program based on what
we learned from the research literature about
what was effective in changing juvenile
behavior. First, we knew that there had to
be swift, sure, and fair consequences so that
it was clear that if you committed a gun
offense it was going to be treated seriously.
Second, we knew that boot camps were
more likely to be effective if they included
services and intensive followup. We knew
that any intervention with a juvenile was
going to be much more effective if you
involved the parent. And finally, we knew
that you would have to deal with the
problem comprehensively, by linking the
juvenile and his or her family to other social
services and resources. We designed our
Juvenile Gun Court so that it included all of
these elements.

—Hon. Sandra H. Storm
Birmingham, AL, Juvenile Gun Court
Profile No. 43 (continued)

- **Trial.** Trials must be held within 10 working days for all who request it.

- **Boot camp.** Male youth who plead "true" are immediately dispatched to the High Intensive Training (HIT) program at the Autauga facility, a DYS boot camp in Prattville, AL. (There are separate boot camps for boys and girls with a long waiting list for the latter since girls commit so few gun offenses. In 1997, for example, only 6 percent of juvenile gun offenders were female.) With a 78-bed capacity, the boot camp includes other DYS-referred youth, but the majority of the residents are Gun Court referrals. HIT is designed to instill self-discipline, respect for authority, problem-solving skills, and other appropriate social skills. The highly regimented day begins at 5 a.m. with physical exercise, and throughout the day youth participate in group counseling, team-building exercises, academic remediation, journal-writing, and other activities that reinforce desired skills, attitudes, and behaviors. Youth are judged daily against a list of desired traits and behaviors, and infractions can result in extending the amount of time in the boot camp by days or weeks. Autauga is one of more than 50 facilities run or supported by DYS. Referrals also can be made to another 25 private providers (group homes, treatment centers, hospitals, alternative schools, and other facilities).

- **Parent education program.** Parents are party to their children's cases and are mandated to attend a 7-week workshop series; failure to comply can result in their incarceration. The sessions, which are held Tuesday evenings, use volunteers and staff from Impact, Inc., to try to impress upon parents that a gun offense is a serious matter, but that it is an opportu-

- **Probation.** After release from the HIT program at Autauga, all youth are placed on maximum supervision probation, which may last from 30 days to 6 months. Maximum supervision requires twice-daily telephone check-in with a probation officer or unannounced visits from the probation officer at least twice each week. Limited resources affect the length of time a youth remains under maximum supervision. During the initial period of probation, youth are under house arrest except for school attendance or work. After compliance during the initial probation period, participants are allowed out of the house from 6 to 8:30 p.m. Violations of probation can result in a probationer being placed on an electronic monitoring system or being monitored by a telephone voice recognition system. During probation, youth must complete the Alabama Substance Abuse Program, a prevention-based program.

Probation officers team up with law enforcement officials to make home visits through the ONCE program. ONCE targets juveniles age 17 and younger, making visits on 2 randomly selected nights per week, at random times during the night. All probation officers are trained by police before they take part in ONCE visits and are required to wear bulletproof vests. Between July 1997 and August 1998, the ONCE team made more than 1,152 curfew visits, executed 245 pickup orders, and served 67 summonses (these data include all juvenile probation cases, not just those from the Gun Court).
Profile No. 43 (continued)

The final component of the Gun Court is community outreach: staff make presentations to local schools and community groups and distribute brochures that explain the consequences for gun offenses. This is the least developed court component, primarily because of a lack of resources. From the outset, the Juvenile Gun Court has had few sources of outside support and has relied on existing Family Court resources, agency networks, and service providers to meet the needs of youthful offenders. This may make institutionalization of program elements more likely since the work is considered part of core work assignments, but it can become problematic if the court’s caseload continues to rise.

During the first year of operation, there was an increase in the number of gun offenses reported and handled by the new court: 323 offenses in 1995 compared with 273 offenses in 1994 (pre-Gun Court). This paradoxical outcome is believed to be the result of increased awareness among law enforcement officers that there were now credible sanctions for juvenile gun charges. Since the court was established in 1995, juvenile gun offenses in general, and gun-related deaths in particular, have been decreasing. Juvenile gun offenses dropped from 323 cases in 1995 to 302 in 1997; gun-related deaths were almost cut in half, from 30 in 1995 to 18 in 1997. However, court data also show that offenders are getting younger; in 1995, only 9 offenders were age 13 or younger, but by 1997 there were 24 Gun Court cases involving youth in this age range—including one 9-year-old and two 10-year-olds.

Based on police data, during the past 2 years, gun-related juvenile offenses have declined 38.7 percent in Birmingham—from 266 offenses during the period from September 1996 through August 1997 to 170 offenses from September 1997 through August 1998. An inhouse review of recidivism rates compared the first 100 Juvenile Gun Court cases with the first 100 cases from 1994, the year before the court was established. Gun Court youth had an overall reoffense rate of 41 percent, compared with 73 percent among pre-Gun Court youth. In addition, those adjudicated in the Gun Court were less likely to reoffend on gun charges—11 percent had new gun offenses, compared with a 32-percent gun reoffense rate among juveniles whose cases were adjudicated prior to the Gun Court.
Profile No. 44

Juvenile Gun Program—Minneapolis, MN

Program Type or Federal Program Source: Court-related programs.

Program Goal: To reduce the number of juveniles committing gun offenses through education about gun violence and its consequences.

Specific Groups Targeted by the Strategy: Juveniles adjudicated on gun offenses.

Geographical Area Targeted by the Strategy: Hennepin County, MN.

Evaluated by: Internal data collection.

Contact Information: Michael Sandin, Coordinator/Probation Officer Hennepin County Juvenile Probation 626 South Sixth Street Minneapolis, MN 55415 Phone: 612-348-2407


Hennepin County initiated a Juvenile Gun Program in November 1995 in response to the rising number of juveniles coming into the juvenile justice system on gun offenses. Prior to the program’s inception, all juveniles adjudicated on gun offenses were required to complete 100 hours of community service. However, these orders were not consistently enforced and had little impact on recidivism.

The Juvenile Gun Program was designed by a Hennepin County Juvenile Court judge in conjunction with the juvenile probation staff. The program, which is operated by the juvenile probation office, combines education and community service requirements. Juveniles adjudicated on charges involving a gun are given a stayed commitment to an out-of-home placement and referral to a work program. If the juvenile fails to follow the expectations of the program, his stay is revoked immediately.

Juveniles meet for 40 hours over a 16-week period for the educational component of the gun program. Random urine testing is conducted at some meetings, and indicators of drug use lead to referrals for treatment. Juveniles are exposed to a variety of speakers, presentations, and experiences designed to show them the negative consequences of gun violence. They attend the Calling the Shots program, where they witness a reenactment of a hospital emergency room scene depicting the aftermath of a serious gunshot incident. Speakers have included prisoners convicted of gun charges, the judge who founded the program, the mayor, a minister who was on probation in his youth, investigators, a woman whose child was murdered, a juvenile on death row, and a probation staff member whose brother was convicted of murder.

The goal of the Juvenile Gun Program is to encourage youth to think about the effects of gun violence on themselves, their families, and their communities, as well as personal responsibility, victimization, and community responsibility. In addition, trained professionals discuss anger management alternatives with the youth and help them develop plans to manage stressful situations. They are given a tour of the workhouse, an old and ominous short-term lockup run by the
Profile No. 44 (continued)

county. They are asked to read and clip newspaper articles on gun violence in the Twin Cities area and bring them in for discussion. To satisfy their 60-hour community service requirement, they perform park maintenance and beautification, neighborhood clean sweeps, one-time activities like planting a “victim’s garden,” and other jobs that benefit the community.

The program continually adapts to the changing needs of its clients. Evaluations administered at the end of each presentation have given program administrators insights into how the program is affecting participants, and the program has been modified accordingly. For example, the time of commitment has been lengthened from 3 to 6 weeks, and more aggressive substance abuse referrals and treatment have been implemented.

From its inception in 1995 through July 1998, the program served more than 300 clients. In quarterly progress reports, the probation department compares results for program “completers” with “noncompleters.” Seven-month outcomes for the first 7 groups (51 completers and 56 noncompleters), which included juveniles out of the program for at least 6 months, showed that the completers had slightly lower rates for new charges than noncompleters (49 percent versus 55 percent). However, the new charges for completers tended to be misdemeanors or status offenses (88 percent) rather than felonies (12 percent), whereas for noncompleters 35 percent of new charges were misdemeanors and 65 percent were felonies. There was one new weapons charge for the completers group, which was subsequently dismissed, while the noncompleter group had six new weapons offenses.

In the latest report, revocations had declined and a formal aftercare component for those in need of probation supervision had been added to the program. The Minneapolis Anti-Violence Initiative (see profile 31) also will be used as an additional resource to supervise probationers. Of the 26 clients who completed the program between December 1997 and March 1998, none had committed a new offense by June 30, while four noncompleters had reoffended with one new weapons charge each.
Profile No. 45

Promising

Project LIFE—Indianapolis, IN

Program Type or Federal Program Source: Court-related program.

Program Goal: To educate juveniles about the impact that guns have on human life.

Specific Groups Targeted by the Strategy: Juvenile and youth gun offenders.

Geographical Area Targeted by the Strategy: Marion County, IN.

Evaluating by:
Internal data collection.

Contact Information:
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Marion Superior Court, Juvenile Division
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Indianapolis, IN 46218
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Years of Operation:
1991—present.

Project LIFE (Lasting Intense Firearms Education) was initiated in 1991 by the Marion Superior Court, Juvenile Division, in response to an alarming increase in the number of youth carrying guns. In 1995, amended criminal justice statutes stipulated that 16- and 17-year-olds would enter the adult system when charged with handgun violations. The criteria also were expanded to include youth who possess other dangerous weapons (e.g., knives, box cutters, and blackjacks).

Project LIFE delivers directed messages intended to disrupt the apathetic attitudes of youth regarding gun experimentation. This mandatory program targets youth who are also on probation for committing a weapons crime. The educational sessions are held every 6 weeks, lasting 2 to 3 hours per meeting, and are limited to 10 youth offenders and their parents. The objectives of Project LIFE are to: (1) educate youth regarding the impact of guns and other weapons, (2) portray guns and other weapons as instruments that kill and injure people and demonstrate that there is always a potential victim when someone is armed with a weapon, and (3) include parents and guardians in the learning process. As part of the educational process, participants view graphic police videos from homicide scenes and other visual media. Throughout the process, Project LIFE staff encourage each juvenile to recount the circumstances that led to his or her arrest, to accept responsibility for the crime, and to examine what he or she might have done differently. The parents of gun victims also recount the tragedy of their children’s involvement with guns. To date, 474 offenders have participated in this program.

In 1998, 94 percent of the participants rated the program good or excellent. In 1997 and 1998, 89 percent of the participants agreed that the program provided substantial information on the dangers of gun use. Participants who felt that Project LIFE helped them set positive goals and refrain from experimenting with guns increased from 72 percent in 1997 to 80 percent in 1998.
Section VII

Education Initiatives and Alternative Prevention Strategies
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Overview

The programs that are described in this chapter use a variety of strategies to promote smart and responsible choices—about guns, about gangs, and about violence. They employ a variety of methods to get their message across, including eye-catching graphics, peer involvement, mentoring by caring adults, and broad-based community involvement. Some of these programs are being formally evaluated; others are not. All show promise for reducing gun violence.

Prevention Education—Changing Attitudes Toward Guns and Violence

Gun violence is not only a criminal justice problem but also a public health problem. Firearm incidents of all kinds (suicides, homicides, and unintentional gunshot injuries) claim the lives of approximately 34,000 Americans each year. In fact, firearm injuries are the eighth leading cause of death in the United States and the fourth leading cause of years of potential life lost before age 65.

The impact of gun violence is even more pronounced among teenagers and young adults. A teenager in the United States today is more likely to die of a gunshot wound than from all “natural” causes of disease combined. More than one-half of all deaths of African-American males 15 to 19 years of age are homicides. More than 80 percent of these killings involve firearms. White teens face a lower risk of firearm-related homicide than their African-American peers, but they have a higher risk of committing suicide with a gun.

Firearms also are a major cause of nonfatal injuries. For every firearm fatality, there are 2.6 nonfatal gunshot injuries. The case-fatality ratio for shootings varies widely by manner—approximately 1 in 5 victims of a firearm assault dies, but only 1 unintentional shooting out of every 16 results in death. Suicide attempts with a firearm, on the other hand, are completed approximately 85 to 90 percent of the time.

Some nonfatal firearm injuries are minor, but others are devastating. Violence is the second leading cause of spinal cord injuries, behind motor vehicle crashes. The vast majority of these injuries are the result of gunshot wounds. It has been estimated that the annual direct and indirect costs of fatal and nonfatal firearm injuries exceed $20 billion per year.

Health care professionals have traditionally used reactive approaches to control death and disability from gunshot wounds. Improvements in the provision of prehospital care (an ambulance), trauma center care, postoperative critical care, and rehabilitation have greatly increased the chances that a gunshot victim will survive his or her injury. There is a limit, however, to the power of medicine and surgical techniques. Recently, researchers conducted a population-based study of firearm injuries in three cities served by sophisticated emergency services and level 1 trauma centers. They found that 80 percent of fatalities were pronounced dead on the scene or immediately following arrival in an emergency department. Ninety-seven percent of deaths occurred within 24 hours of injury. In short, greater emphasis must be placed on prevention to reduce the morbidity, mortality, and costs of gunshot wounds.

The public health approach to reducing violence includes: (1) emphasizing the prevention of violence before it occurs; (2) making science integral to identifying effective policies and programs; and (3) integrating the efforts of diverse organizations, communities, and disciplines. By bringing a fresh viewpoint, new allies, and different analytical methodologies to violence control, this public health approach can complement that of the criminal justice community.

Education is a mainstay of public health. Education to prevent gun violence can take many forms, including promotion of safe storage and other strategies to reduce access to firearms by children, youth, and other unauthorized persons; teaching safe behavior around firearms; and a variety of programs that are designed to prevent or reduce youth violence.

Safe storage of firearms

Approximately 40 percent of American households contain one or more firearms; the average gun-owning
household contains several. The total number of firearms in private hands in America is estimated to exceed 190 million, of which one-third (65 million) are handguns. In general, firearm ownership is more common in rural areas and small towns, and less common in urban areas, but urban gun owners are more likely to own handguns.

In up to 50 percent of gun-owning households, firearms are kept loaded at least part of the time. Roughly 30 percent of all handguns are kept loaded and unlocked, and therefore easily accessible. This violates a central tenet of gun safety. The National Rifle Association’s (NRA’s) A Parent’s Guide to Gun Safety advises owners to “Store guns so that they are inaccessible to children and other unauthorized users.” There is consensus on these points across the political and professional spectrums.

Safe storage of firearms has multiple benefits. It reduces the risk that firearms will be lost due to burglary or theft, an event that occurs more than 350,000 times each year. Safe storage also reduces the chances that a loaded gun will be reached by a child. A home where guns are kept securely stored is less likely to be the scene of a suicide than a home where one or more guns are kept loaded and unlocked.

A number of devices are available that are capable of rendering a firearm inoperative. These include various types of triggerlocks, cable locks, lockboxes, and gun safes. The price, performance, quality, and reliability of these devices vary widely.

Placing a gun in a safe or lockbox or rendering it inoperative with an add-on safety device is an “active” countermeasure that requires the conscious cooperation of the user each and every time he or she handles the gun. Gun owners who are fatigued, distracted, or inattentive may forget to follow the routine from time to time. In addition, some flatly reject the idea of “safe storage.” This is especially true of individuals who keep a gun primarily for protection. However, the idea of keeping a gun loaded and readily available for protection is misguided. Evidence suggests that the odds that a gun in the home will kill or injure a member of the household are substantially greater than the odds that it will be used to injure or kill in self-defense.

Potential avenues to promote safe storage of firearms include mass media and public education campaigns, distribution of brochures or pamphlets at the point of sale, incorporation of information about safe storage in gun safety training programs, and counseling by physician and other health care providers. At present, little is known about the relative effectiveness of these options. One study suggests that child access-prevention laws that require adults to store their firearms safely reduce unintentional shooting deaths of children.

**Educational programs**

Education is a fundamental element of many injury prevention programs. The educational programs described below seek to encourage kids to behave responsibly around guns.

Traditional firearm safety instruction is based on sound advice such as, “always keep the gun pointed in a safe direction” and “always keep your finger off the trigger until ready to shoot.” Firearm instructors also teach shooters to assume that every firearm is loaded unless they personally verify that it is not by inspecting the firing chamber. For many, promoting gun safety education is a matter of common sense. Some believe that gun safety education, like driver’s education, should be included in the curriculum of public schools.

Unfortunately, there is little evidence that safety training alters behavior around guns. One team of researchers found that when young children are unsupervised, they frequently touch and play with real guns, even after receiving clear and specific instructions not to do so. Another survey found that gun owners who reported taking a gun safety class were no more likely to store their firearms safely than those who had not. On the other hand, gun owners who received instruction from the National Safety Council were more likely to store their guns unloaded and locked than individuals who took other types of gun safety training programs.

Whether this finding reflects differences in the design of these courses or differences in the temperament of those who took them is unknown.

The optimal role of gun safety education in community-based programs to reduce gun violence has not yet...
been defined. Carefully controlled evaluations that examine both the content and the impact of various curriculums and public education programs are needed. When these evaluations are conducted, it will be important to assess not only the proximate outcome of the intervention (e.g., safer behavior around firearms), but any unintended consequences as well.

Notes


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22. M.S. Hardy, F.D. Armstrong, B.L. Martin, and K.N. Strawn, “A firearm safety program for children:

They just can’t say no,” Developmental and Behavioral Pediatrics 17(4):216–221, 1996.


Profile No. 46

Boston Ten-Point Coalition—Operation 2006—Boston, MA

Program Type or Federal Program Source:
Program to change attitudes about guns and violence.

Program Goal:
To reach out to at-risk youth and gang members; to reduce violence in the community.

Specific Groups Targeted by the Strategy:
At-risk youth, gang members.

Geographical Area Targeted by the Strategy:
Boston, MA.

Evaluuated by:
Internal data collection.

Contact Information:
Mark Scott, Executive Director
National Ten-Point Leadership Foundation
411 Washington Street
Boston, MA 02124
Phone: 617–282–6704

Years of Operation:

Prior to the development of a coordinated effort to reduce gun violence in Boston, MA, a few African-American churches in the city had been working independently with at-risk youth in their neighborhoods. In 1992, when violence escalated, some church clergy and laity formed the Boston Ten-Point Coalition—Operation 2006, which then developed a collaboration with Boston police. This collaboration was based on the belief that for every nine youngsters who could be saved from violence by the clergy or community-based organizations, there was one who could not and would be better off in the hands of the police.

In light of Boston’s long history of racial tensions, this type of collaboration between the police department and the coalition was a milestone. The clergy supported selective, aggressive enforcement and helped to “deracialize” policing in the African-American community.

Clergy members of the coalition have gone into crack houses and gang-infested areas at night to reclaim youth. Under the Adopt-a-Gang program, city churches have agreed to keep their doors open and serve as drop-in centers to provide sanctuary for troubled youth. The Boston Ten-Point Coalition—Operation 2006 participated in Boston’s Operation Ceasefire neighborhood forums (see profile 21), at which youth were given zero tolerance messages and offered services. The Coalition also is linked to Boston’s strategy to prevent youth violence (see profile 2).

The Boston Ten-Point Coalition—Operation 2006 launched the National Ten-Point Coalition to develop similar programs in other cities, including Chester, PA; Gary, IN; Los Angeles, CA; Louisville, KY; Plainfield, NJ; and Tampa, FL.
Region's Hospital in St. Paul, MN, developed an antiviolence education program for at-risk youth and youth already involved in the criminal justice system. Participants are referred through St. Paul's juvenile probation and corrections departments, schools, and mentoring organizations. The Juvenile Gun Program in Minneapolis, which is operated by the Juvenile Probation Department (see profile 44), regularly refers youth adjudicated on gun charges to this program.

The hospital uses actors and actual trauma unit personnel to dramatize, in a 4-hour program, a realistic emergency room situation involving a gunshot victim in a level 1 trauma center. Participants receive an introductory lecture on trauma resuscitation for all types of trauma victims. While the group is receiving training in trauma resuscitation equipment, a gunshot victim (a teenage actor) is suddenly brought into the emergency room by an ambulance and four paramedics from the city of St. Paul Fire Emergency Medical Services division. The youth are recruited to work on the "patient" with a real team of doctors. The team cuts his clothing off and clears his airway, but the victim dies because a second wound to the back of the head is overlooked. The hospital chaplain then announces that the victim's family is waiting in the family room, and the participants have to accompany him to tell the family the news. The youth then meet with a counselor to discuss what they have seen. They talk about their feelings and are told that what they just witnessed was not real, but a realistic portrayal of daily emergency room occurrences.

An internal evaluation of the program was conducted by Health Partners Research Foundation in September 1997. It used a randomized, prospective study design with a control group. The Attitudes Toward Guns and Violence Questionnaire (AGVQ), developed by Applewood Centers, Inc., was administered 2 weeks prior to and after the program intervention. A total of 212 youth were recruited for the study, but through attrition and invalidations due to inconsistencies in subject answers, only 73 test pairs were available for analysis. Of the four factors measured by the AGVQ (excitement,
Profile No. 47 (continued)

power/safety, comfort with aggression, and aggressive response to shame), one factor (comfort with aggression) showed a marked decrease, indicating the subjects became more disturbed about violence in the environment, had less respect for violent individuals, and had more confidence in the effectiveness of nonviolent problem-solving behaviors. The researchers believe that with a larger number of subjects, statistical significance would have been achieved. According to the program, counselors and staff from referring agencies have observed positive effects on the youth. The hospital is planning to expand the program to other major cities.
Profile No. 48

Child Development-Community Policing (CD-CP)
Program—New Haven, CT

Program Type or Federal Program Source:
Program to reduce the impact of violence on children.

Program Goal:
To coordinate the efforts of the New Haven Police Department and mental health clinicians by providing interdisciplinary intervention to children and families who are victims, witnesses, or perpetrators of violent crimes.

Specific Groups Targeted by the Strategy:
Children and families who are victims, witnesses, or perpetrators of violent crimes.

Geographical Area Targeted by the Strategy:
New Haven, CT.

Evaluating by:
Child Study Center, Yale University, New Haven, CT.

Contact Information:
Colleen Vadala
Child Development-Community Policing Program
Yale Child Study Center
47 College Street
Suite 212
New Haven, CT 06510
Phone: 203-785-7047

Years of Operation:

The Child Development-Community Policing (CD-CP) Program—a collaborative effort of the New Haven Department of Police Services and the Child Study Center at the Yale University School of Medicine—was developed to address the tragic psychological impact of exposure to violence on children. The CD-CP Program brings together police officers and mental health professionals for mutual training, consultation, and support so that they may effectively provide direct interdisciplinary intervention to children and families who are victims, witnesses, or perpetrators of violent crimes.

The CD-CP Program consists of interrelated training and consultation components that focus on sharing knowledge and developing ongoing collegial relationships between police officers and mental health professionals. Toward this end, CD-CP sponsors fellowships for police supervisors and clinicians to establish interdisciplinary relationships. In the Child Development Fellowship for Police Supervisors, fellows spend 5 full days in training activities and observations to become familiar with developmental concepts, patterns of psychological disturbance, methods of clinical intervention, and settings for treatment and care. Supervisors also provide basic knowledge about police practices to their mental health colleagues. In the Police Fellowship for Clinicians, clinicians are given opportunities to spend time with police participants in squad cars, at police stations, and on the streets learning directly from officers about their day-to-day activities. This helps clinicians understand the roles that officers play in the lives of children and families and prepares clinicians to intervene collaboratively with police partners. Police officers and
Profile No. 48 (continued)

clinical staff are either recruited into the program via announcement of openings, or those with especially needed skills are specifically targeted by organization administrators for inclusion in the program.

The CD–CP Program also includes a seminar course on child development, human functioning, and policing strategies for police officers, mental health clinicians, and related professionals. The seminar, which meets for 1 1/2 hours for 10 weeks, is led by a team of clinical faculty and a police supervisor experienced in the CD–CP approach. The program also has established a 24-hour consultation service. This service allows police officers to make referrals and obtain immediate clinical guidance, especially in the aftermath of children's traumatic experiences. In addition, once per week, police officers and clinicians who staff the CD–CP Program meet to discuss difficult cases that they encounter in their direct experiences in neighborhoods and from their consultations.

The CD–CP collaboration also has expanded to include juvenile probation officers and juvenile detention center representatives. These participants work with children and adolescents who may have experienced chronic exposure to violence and are becoming involved in delinquent activities. Through the CD–CP Gateway Offenders Program, CD–CP staff provide coordinated, comprehensive, and structured assessment and intervention for juvenile offenders who are considered to be at high risk of escalating criminal activities.

Since the CD–CP Program began formal operation in January 1992, 260 officers have completed the 10-week CD–CP seminar; 50 police supervisors have completed the Child Development Fellowship and continue to attend the weekly program conference, and 19 Child Study Center faculty members have completed the Police Fellowship. Moreover, since its inception, the CD–CP consultation service has received more than 700 referrals regarding more than 1,000 children. These consultations concerned children of all ages who have been involved in a variety of violent incidents as victims, witnesses, or perpetrators. Numerous incidents demonstrate the impact that the program has had on children referred to consultation services. In one case, a woman was stabbed to death in the presence of her eight children. CD–CP clinicians responded to the scene, provided acute clinical assessments of the children, and consulted with relatives and police. Intensive followup care was conducted and continues for several family members. All of the children are currently attending school, and symptoms of depression, anxiety, and aggression have subsided.

The CD–CP Program serves as a national model for police-mental health partnerships and is being replicated in several cities. Similar programs have been established in Baltimore, MD; Buffalo, NY; Charlotte, NC; Framingham, MA; Nashville, TN; Newark, NJ; Portland, OR; and Italy. The Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention is providing training and technical assistance to these new sites.
Eddie Eagle Elementary Gun Safety Education Program—Fairfax, VA

Program Type or Federal Program Source:
Program to educate children about gun safety.

Program Goal:
To prevent firearm accidents.

Specific Groups Targeted by the Strategy:
Children in kindergarten through grade 6.

Geographical Area Targeted by the Strategy:
United States, Canada, and Puerto Rico.

Evaluat ed by:
Internal data collection.

Contact Information:
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National Rifle Association
11250 Waples Mill Road
Fairfax, VA 22030
Phones: 703–267–1574
800–251–0752

Years of Operation:
1988–present.

The Eddie Eagle Elementary Gun Safety Education Program was designed for use by schools, law enforcement agencies, and youth service organizations by Friends of the National Rifle Association. The program makes no value judgments about whether guns are good or bad, but teaches children that guns are not toys.

Children in preschool through grade 6 are taught to remember the mantra “Stop! Don’t Touch. Leave the Area. Tell an Adult.” whenever they see a gun. The program has been taught to more than 12 million children in 10,000 schools by more than 6,000 law enforcement agencies in every State, Canada, and Puerto Rico. It is recognized by the National Safety Council, Police Athletic League, American Legion, and National School Public Relations Association. Fourteen State legislatures have passed resolutions encouraging the program’s use. Local law enforcement provides officers who speak in the schools. Coordination with the faith community and United Way organizations is encouraged.

An educational video and music component teaching the “Eddie Eagle Shuffle” targets children. An inservice video and instructor guides for grades K–1, 2–3, and 4–6 are supported by a parent’s guide, comic books, coloring books, stickers, and posters. All printed materials are available in English and Spanish.
Profile No. 50

Hands Without Guns—Washington, DC

Program Type or Federal Program Source:
Program to change attitudes about guns and violence.

Program Goal:
To promote a public health and education campaign to change attitudes about gun violence and gun possession by highlighting positive youth programs.

Specific Groups Targeted by the Strategy:
12- to 18-year-old youth.

Geographical Area Targeted by the Strategy:
Nationwide.

Evaluated by:
Internal data collection.

Contact Information:
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Educational Fund to End Handgun Violence
1000 16th Street NW, Suite 603
Washington, DC 20036
Phone: 202-530-5888, ext. 28

Years of Operation:
1995—present.

Over the past three decades, gun-related injuries and deaths have risen among youth. Hands Without Guns, a public health and education campaign, was developed by the Educational Fund to End Handgun Violence, in partnership with a creative communications firm, to address this growing problem. The goal of the initiative is to change the attitudes of 12- to 18-year-old youth about gun possession. To accomplish this, the initiative seeks to reduce the public acceptability of firearms by promoting and stimulating positive grassroots initiatives and by encouraging youth activism in the fight against gun violence. These activities include youth antiviolence programs and a variety of after-school projects not typically associated with violence prevention, such as theater groups, arts centers, and video clubs.

Hands Without Guns has three components. One is an extensive media campaign using television, radio, transportation advertisements, and music. Through this effort, youth see that other youth are involved in positive activities and that their efforts are supported and praised by adults. A second component is youth outreach through a series of workshops and activities. In the workshops, youth are encouraged to develop their own responses to gun violence. For example, in the Boston program, the youth developed a buyback program for toy guns. The third component is an evaluation of program outcomes. A youth survey available in long or short forms, developed by the Harvard University School of Public Health, is administered before the campaign starts and at various times throughout the campaign to determine its impact on youth. Specifically, one of the questions asks youth whether they have ever carried a handgun for protection. The results of the survey appear to demonstrate a beneficial effect of the program. Youth who had never carried a gun before were more likely to know about the program (40 percent) than those who had carried a gun before (10 percent).
Profile No. 50 (continued)

Over the past 3 years, the Hands Without Guns program has been implemented in four cities: Boston, MA; Chicago, IL; Holland, MI; and Washington, DC. In 1999, the campaign will be implemented in Milwaukee, WI; Norfolk/Virginia Beach, VA; Pittsburgh, PA; and Richmond, VA.
Profile No. 51

The Living Classroom Foundation—Baltimore, MD

Program Type or Federal Program Source: Program to change attitudes about violence.

Program Goal:
To provide adjudicated youth with GED classes and employment training to improve future employment opportunities; to provide students with a safe haven during after-school hours.

Specific Groups Targeted by the Strategy:
Juvenile offenders, middle school students.

Geographical Area Targeted by the Strategy:
Baltimore City Empowerment Zone and southeastern neighborhoods.

Evaluuated by:
Internal data collection.

Contact Information:
John Dillow, Director of the Maritime Institute
The Living Classrooms Foundation
802 South Caroline Street
Baltimore, MD 21231
Phone: 410–685–0295

Years of Operation:
1989–present.

Since 1989, the Living Classroom Foundation’s Fresh Start Program has provided juveniles (ages 16 through 21) with employment training and academic remediation. These juveniles are typically referred through the juvenile court system or their probation or parole officers. One-half of the participants have been convicted of a crime and are serving a sentence at a juvenile lock-down facility. Most of the remainder are living in group homes, halfway houses, or residential juvenile treatment facilities, and a few are living with their families. Typical students include juveniles charged with drug- or gun-related offenses.

Through a rolling admissions process, students enter the program continuously; a graduation ceremony is held every 8 weeks. Twenty-five juveniles attend every day for 9 months and are divided into groups of five (a 1:5 staff-to-student ratio). Students learn carpentry, boat building, and construction skills, and many earn their GED’s. The chairs, sheds, and even custom-built canoes that the students build are sold, and the profits are shared by all the youth in the program according to a point system. This money is put into a savings account for the student, which is given to him or her on graduation day; those who fail to graduate forfeit their money. Following graduation, students also may participate in an inhouse internship (e.g., restoring and maintaining historic wooden ships or serving as an office assistant) or an offsite internship (e.g., working for a local development contractor restoring a historic office building). These internships are typically unpaid and are designed to provide real-world work experiences for the youth.

Though the main purpose of this program is employment training and GED preparation, the program also focuses on improving the students’ social, conflict resolution, and individual problem-solving skills. There are frequent planned and unplanned lessons in conflict and stress management because “teachable moments” occur naturally in this
hands-on environment in which teamwork is necessary. The program also practices zero tolerance for alcohol, drugs, or violence. Students engaging in any of these behaviors are asked to leave. The movie “First Time Felon” is shown to the students; it portrays a violent scene of a juvenile shot in a drug dispute. The film is then discussed, personal experiences with violence are shared, and students discuss how to prevent violent outcomes.

The juveniles are assessed at the outset of the program on their academic abilities. The daily curriculum may be remedial, including GED preparation, computer training, and, when appropriate, vocational training. To prepare students for graduation and release from the residential facility, placement staff and counselors work with youth from the beginning of the program to teach them job-seeking skills (interviewing, writing a resume, etc.) and budgeting. When graduation nears, placement staff assist the students in finding jobs and housing. A job bank of employers willing to hire motivated workers is maintained for this purpose. Graduates can receive guidance and help from the program after graduation as well.

Graduates are tracked for 3 years after completion of the program. Approximately 50 percent of the juveniles who enter the program graduate. Juveniles are contacted and asked about their current status and, when possible, this information is verified against data from the Maryland Department of Juvenile Justice for youth 18 years of age and under. As of the latest reporting period (July 1998), 57 percent of graduates were employed and 90 percent of these were earning more than the minimum wage; 45 percent of graduates have earned their GED’s; 41 percent live independently; 38 percent have been rearrested; and 11 percent are incarcerated. This incarceration rate compares favorably with the 32-percent recommitment or reincarceration rate of two other State juvenile detention programs, as reported by the Maryland Department of Juvenile Justice. The program was awarded a Promising and Effective Practices for Youth award as one of the U.S. Department of Labor’s and National Youth Employment Coalition’s top 32 youth programs across the country.

The program is supported in part by the Maryland Department of Juvenile Justice, the Governor’s Office on Crime Control and Prevention, the Baltimore County Office of Employment and Training, and private donations. Private businesses and corporations in the area also contribute to the program through internships, donated materials, Chief Executive Office orders for products, and their willingness to hire motivated graduates. The Living Classroom Program is not formally linked with the Baltimore Comprehensive Communities Program (CCP) (see profile 1); however, the program targets the same population of juvenile offenders that is identified in the CCP.
Profile No. 52

Safe Gun Storage Campaign—Seattle, WA

Program Type or Federal Program Source:
Program to promote safe gun storage.

Program Goal:
To reduce unintentional gun injuries among children and suicides among adults and adolescents by promoting the sale and use of handgun lockboxes.

Specific Groups Targeted by the Strategy:
Families with children and teens or homes where children are frequent visitors.

Geographical Area Targeted by the Strategy:
King County, WA (includes Seattle).

Evaluated by:
Internal data collection.

Contact Information:
Evan Simpson
Harborview Injury Prevention & Research Center
325 Ninth Avenue, P.O. Box 359960
Seattle, WA 98104
Phone: 206–521–1520

Years of Operation:
1997–present.

From 1991 to 1995, there were 534 firearm-related suicides, 278 firearm-related homicides, and 9 unintentional shooting deaths in King County, WA. Twenty-six percent of the suicides involved adolescents and youth under 30 years of age. In addition, there were 63 nonfatal, self-inflicted injuries, 500 assault-related injuries, and 191 injuries caused by unintentional firearm discharges. A total of 797 deaths and injuries in King County (1991 to 1995) were due to suicide or unintentional firearm discharges. A 1997 telephone survey of Seattle households revealed that more than 40 percent possessed guns. The National Survey of Private Ownership of Firearms (1994) indicates that 30 percent of handguns are stored loaded and unlocked.

The Safe Gun Storage Campaign was developed to reduce the rate of nonhomicide gun-related deaths and injuries in King County. Harborview Injury Prevention & Research Center, affiliated with the University of Washington, collaborated with primary care doctors, the police department, and schools to promote the use of handgun lockboxes to prevent access to firearms by children and adolescents, and thereby
reduce unintentional shootings and suicides among this population. Harborview negotiated an arrangement with a major retailer, which had several department stores in the State, to sell a special lockbox for handguns and offer it at a substantially reduced cost to customers bearing coupons. The program was publicized through public service announcements and presentations to groups by the Safe Storage Coalition, which included participating primary care physicians, health care organizations, law enforcement, and schools. By calling a hotline, the public could receive coupons and a fact sheet on safe gun storage practices.

While the first 6 months of the safe storage campaign, January through June 1998, were very successful—with more than 1,700 lockboxes sold—program organizers discovered considerable reluctance on the part of homeowners to acknowledge the real risk of adolescent suicide. Consequently, the second phase of the Safe Gun Storage Campaign, beginning in September 1998, emphasized the need to properly store firearms to reduce the risk of any kind of firearm injury, including the unintentional discharge of guns by children, and to prevent guns from being stolen and used in crimes that caused injury or death.

The Seattle Safe Gun Storage Campaign is part of a study in five western cities, coordinated by Harborview, which is investigating gun storage attitudes and behaviors in a cross-sectional, population-based sample of households with children. Harborview will soon release a report based on this study.
Profile No. 53

Shock Mentor Program—Prince George’s County, MD

Program Type or Federal Program Source:
Program to change attitudes about guns and violence.

Program Goal:
To reduce violence and high-risk behavior through experiential learning and effective mentoring.

Specific Groups Targeted by the Strategy:
African-American and other minority youth ages 13 to 24.

Geographical Area Targeted by the Strategy:
Prince George’s County, MD.

Evaluated by:
Internal data collection.

Contact Information:
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Prince George’s Hospital Center
3001 Hospital Drive
Cheverly, MD 20785
Phone: 301–618–3858

Willis Mitchell, Chairperson
Washington, D.C., Chapter of Concerned Black Men, Inc.
604 15th Street NE.
Washington, DC 20002
Phone: 202–783–5414

Years of Operation:
1994–present.

In response to the high numbers of young African-American males being brought to local hospitals with gunshot wounds and other severe weapon-related injuries, the Prince George’s Hospital Center, in collaboration with the Washington, D.C., Chapter of Concerned Black Men, Inc. (a volunteer mentoring group of professional African-American males), and the Prince George’s County School Board, developed the Shock Mentor Program. The program incorporates a proactive approach to preventing youth violence by showing at-risk high school students the aftermath of gun violence and other high-risk behaviors. A student is typically identified as at-risk by a teacher based on the neighborhood environment in which the student lives, past experiences of violence in the student’s family or community, or his or her association with peers in acts of violence. Some youth are placed in the program by the court system or at their parents’ request.

The students are brought to the shock trauma center and emergency rooms of the Prince George’s Hospital Center to witness the efforts of doctors and nurses to treat gunshot injuries and save lives. They also have opportunities to ride along with police
officers and ambulance drivers in Prince George's County to witness the effects that violence has on the community. Each student is matched with and accompanied by a member of Concerned Black Men. When the students return to school, they have an opportunity to share their experiences and impressions with their peers. These activities are complemented by a larger conflict resolution program taught in the county's high schools. Participant roundtables at the schools and a youth-developed conference on violence culminate in youth recommendations to police, health departments, and hospital officials about strategies for preventing or reducing gun violence.

More than 600 students from 19 of the 20 high schools in the public school system have participated in the program over the past 5 years. The majority of the students who have participated indicate that they have found the program to be of great value and they have shared information about their visits to the hospital's emergency room with their peers. Mentors also report that the youth are visibly affected by their experiences in the program.
Profile No. 54

Straight Talk About Risks (STAR), Center to Prevent Handgun Violence—Washington, DC

Program Type or Federal Program Source: Program to teach gun safety.

Program Goal: To reduce unintentional childhood gun traumas, injuries, and deaths.

Specific Groups Targeted by the Strategy: Children and youth in prekindergarten through grade 12.

Geographical Area Targeted by the Strategy: Nationwide.

Evaluating by:
Education Development Center, Inc., Newton, MA.

Contact Information:
Alicia Horton
Center to Prevent Handgun Violence
Education Division
1225 Eye Street NW
Washington, DC 20005
Phone: 202-289-7319

Years of Operation:
1992-present.

The Center to Prevent Handgun Violence developed the STAR curriculum in response to the escalating number of gun-related deaths of children and teens. STAR is a prekindergarten through grade 12 curriculum that educates students about the risks of handling guns and enables them to recognize situations that may lead to gun-related injuries, identify trusted adults, make safe choices, combat negative peer pressure, and resolve conflicts nonviolently. The goal of the program is to reduce childhood gun trauma and fatalities by providing the curriculum to schools, youth agencies, and community-based organizations. The curriculum is based on focus group research conducted by the Center to Prevent Handgun Violence, and on a joint pilot program with the Dade County, FL, public schools. The Center worked closely with teachers, guidance counselors, students, and parents to develop the curriculum. A team of national experts in child development, injury prevention, curriculum design, crime prevention, and law enforce-
Profile No. 54 (continued)

children about the dangers of guns and consequences of gun violence. Currently, STAR is being used in more than 90 school districts nationwide as part of police-led crime prevention efforts and in conjunction with recreation and health education programs.

An independent research firm, Education Development Center, Inc., conducted a formative and preliminary impact evaluation of STAR. The evaluation was designed to examine STAR implementation and student outcomes and included participant self-reports, direct observation, teacher interviews, and student group interviews. Educators found STAR to be developmentally and culturally sensitive, and the program has been well received and generally rated positively by younger students. However, student enthusiasm for the program declined with grade level. The evaluators believe that this is not unique to STAR and indicates only that innovative methods for engaging older students need to be incorporated. Additionally, educators indicated a need to enhance the program through practice and reinforcement throughout the school day and for all subject areas. Student impacts were assessed using an evaluation design involving pretesting and posttesting of treatment and comparison groups. STAR was found to be most effective for increasing gun safety knowledge, attitudes, and behavior of students in grades 3 to 5.
Teens on Target—Oakland, CA

Program Type or Federal Program Source:
Initiative to change attitudes about guns and violence.

Program Goal:
To reduce violent injuries to and deaths of youth through peer education, peer intervention, leadership development, and peer counseling.

Specific Groups Targeted by the Strategy:
At-risk urban youth in East Oakland junior and senior high schools.

Geographical Area Targeted by the Strategy:
East Oakland, CA.

Evaluated by:
Internal data collection.

Contact Information:
Deane Calhoun
YouthAlive!
3300 Elm Street
Oakland, CA 94609
Phone: 510-594-2588

Years of Operation:
1989–present.

The Teens on Target (TNT) teen advocacy initiative is operated by YouthAlive!, a non-profit youth development agency whose mission is to reduce youth injuries and deaths through peer education, peer intervention, mentoring, and leadership development. The goal of TNT is to train urban youth who are at risk of violence, including gun violence, to become advocates for violence prevention. TNT began operating in Oakland, CA, in 1989 at a time when gun violence in the city was on the rise. Homicides continued to rise through the mid-1990’s, reaching an all-time high of 154 murders in 1993. Juveniles were involved in gun violence through gang activity, through drug running, or as victims of gang-based or racial conflicts in the schools and on the streets.

In junior and senior high schools in East Oakland, TNT members, many themselves victims of violence, were enlisted and trained to become leaders and advocates of violence prevention. The teenagers developed a training curriculum to address issues of family violence, street and gang violence, guns, and drugs and alcohol; the causes and effects of this violence; and the advocacy skills necessary to stop it. The program provides positive roles for youth to portray in schools, at conferences, at public hearings, and in the media that show low-income urban youth as leaders and spokespersons in preventing violence. The program seeks to demonstrate that violence is not an inevitable part of urban youth’s lives.

TNT leaders conduct weekly workshops on finding alternatives to violence with students suspended from school for carrying weapons or engaging in destructive behavior. TNT youth make about five presentations per week on violence prevention to students in high schools, junior high schools, and some of the feeder elementary schools, and also become involved as mentors and peer counselors to youth involved in conflict. It is estimated that TNT peer presenters reach more than 2,000 youth each year. In 1998, 50 TNT
members were trained, bringing the current active membership to 185 youth. In the same year, these youth reached more than 3,000 people directly through their four-part workshop in schools (each series was presented to a classroom of about 30 students) and their presentations at public hearings, press conferences, and community workshops.

In the past 2 years, TNT members have become more proactively involved in mediating conflict situations between rival racial groups (Asian/Pacific Islanders and Latinos) on school campuses, in addition to responding to other conflict situations that occur on school grounds. An internal pretest and posttest survey among students who attended presentations determined there was an increase in knowledge about gun violence facts, including who gets victimized and the role of alcohol in violence.

In a peer visitation program in Alameda County, known as Caught in the Crossfire, TNT provides adolescents recovering from violent injuries in a county hospital trauma center with information on homicide statistics, recidivism rates, and personal experiences to try to dissuade them and their friends from retaliation. After patients are discharged, a buddy system is set up to help the injured youth develop and maintain positive alternatives to violence when they return to the community. Each year, TNT members visit an average of 50 injured youth and their families and friends.

In their advocacy role, TNT members become involved in making presentations and giving expert testimonials before city councils, school boards, members of county boards of supervisors, and the California State Legislature. They advocated for the Oakland City Council’s passage of a municipal ordinance banning residential gun dealers in 1998 and for additional youth services.

The TNT initiative has a sister program in Los Angeles. Together, these community-based programs have won many awards for their work, including recognition by the U.S. Department of Justice, the California Peace Prize, and a Community Fellow Award from the California Wellness Foundation.
Profile No. 56

Weapons Are Removed Now (W.A.R.N.) Program—Los Angeles, CA

Program Type or Federal Program Source: School-based intervention program.

Program Goal:
To reduce the number of weapons on school campuses and encourage students to report when they see a weapon on campus.

Specific Groups Targeted by the Strategy:
Elementary and middle school students (grades 5 to 8).

Geographical Area Targeted by the Strategy:
Los Angeles, CA.

Evaluating by:
Internal data collection.

Contact Information:
Jay Schaffer, Director
18230 Kittredge Street
Reseda, CA 91355
Phone: 818-342-6186, ext. 355

Years of Operation:
1993—present.

In 1993, Reseda High School, which was considered one of the county’s safest schools, was shocked when a student was murdered on campus by a fellow student. It was later discovered that several students knew beforehand that the perpetrator was carrying a handgun, but did not alert school officials. In response, the W.A.R.N. program was created to break the code of silence among students and keep weapons of all kinds off school campuses.

The program trains high school student volunteers to visit area elementary and middle schools and make presentations on the dangers of weapons and violence on campus. The students present the message that violence is an improper method for settling disputes; weapons on campus are life-threatening; and breaking the code of silence about those who bring weapons on campus is the right and necessary thing to do. The student volunteers visit the schools alone or in groups. The method by which the message is presented is left to the students’ discretion. Students have used several creative methods of presentation, including performing skits, reading poetry, and singing rap songs. School administrators assist the students by reviewing and approving their presentations beforehand, confirming contacts with local feeder schools, and providing transportation for the students, if needed.

The W.A.R.N. program has received positive feedback from elementary and middle school students. Evaluation forms given to these students show that the message is being heard. Moreover, the number of recovered weapons in Los Angeles County schools has decreased since 1993, when the W.A.R.N. program was initiated. While it is difficult to directly link all of this reduction to the W.A.R.N. program, the findings are encouraging. In 1995, the W.A.R.N. program was recognized by the International Association of Chiefs of Police as 1 of 15 promising programs for reducing gun and other violence in the schools.
Profile No. 57

West Contra Costa Unified School District Truancy Enforcement Program—Richmond, CA

Program Type or Federal Program Source:
Program to change attitudes about guns and violence.

Program Goal:
To decrease the truancy rate within the student population of the West Contra Costa Unified School District and enhance the role of the law enforcement community in the overall battle against truancy.

Specific Groups Targeted by the Strategy:
At-risk and truant youth ages 6 to 18.

Geographical Area Targeted by the Strategy:
West Contra Costa Unified School District, CA.

Evaluating by:
East Bay Public Safety Corridor Partnership, Oakland, CA.

Contact Information:
Officer Larry Lewis
Richmond Police Department
401 27th Street
Richmond, CA 94804
Phone: 510-620-6642

Years of Operation:
1996–present.

The West Contra Costa Unified School District (W.C.C.U.S.D.) has long experienced problems of chronic school truancy and high rates of juvenile delinquency. The district encompasses 6 cities (the largest being Richmond, north of San Francisco) and serves 31,548 students, of whom 51 percent are from low-income families (qualifying for free or reduced-price lunches) and more than 75 percent are African-American, Latino, or other minorities.

In 1995, more than 16 percent of the total student body was designated chronically truant as a result of three or more consecutive unexcused absences. Using crime-mapping techniques, police identified a strong relationship between truancy and juvenile crime activities. Juvenile burglary rates were particularly high during school hours, a problem attributed to large numbers of youth being out of school. However, in 1996, only 41 percent of youth on probation were enrolled in school, 44 percent had dropped out of the school district entirely, and there were no school records on the remaining 15 percent.

The Truancy Enforcement Program is a cooperative effort of six county law enforcement agencies, the County Probation Department, and W.C.C.U.S.D. and is coordinated by the Richmond Police Department. Police officers conduct intensive sweeps throughout the school district and deliver truant youth to the School Welfare and Attendance Team (SWAT) office, where probation staff and district school staff assess the level of truancy of each youth based on school records and determine a course of action. Parents are called and must pick up their children to return them to school. Youth who have not been enrolled in school are either enrolled in school at that time or placed in one of

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the alternative school programs. Parents and youth are counseled regarding the State Education Code's compulsory attendance requirements and are provided with recommendations for remediating truancy and nonenrollment problems. Youth with a history of chronic truancy are referred to the Student Attendance Review Board (SARB), which is made up of nine representatives from social service agencies and youth-serving organizations. Parents and students are required to attend a hearing before SARB to discuss factors contributing to the student's poor attendance (e.g., fear of violence, illiteracy, substance abuse) and to institute a contracted plan of action.

In a recent study of factors contributing to school truancy, 80 percent of youth surveyed said they feared the trip to and from school. The students said that going to school forced them to cross the 'turf' of hostile gangs and that they often skipped school rather than risk violence. Half of the respondents said they knew a close friend or family member who had died violently, had overdosed on drugs, or had been harmed as a result of gang conflict.


In addition to the intensive sweeps to pick up truant youth, local police officers are encouraged to make contact with all youth on the street during school hours. Students without a written excuse for being out of school are transported to the SWAT office.

The multiagency truancy enforcement efforts were immediately productive. In the first 4-day intensive sweep, March 11–14, 1996, 175 youth were picked up, of whom 118 were taken to the SWAT office, 26 were taken directly to school, 25 were taken home, and 6 were arrested. Two months later (May 13–17), another 4-day sweep netted 176 youth: 84 were taken to the SWAT office, 42 were taken back to school, 46 were taken home, and 4 were arrested. A third sweep, November 19–21, 1996, resulted in 110 youth being taken to the SWAT office, taken back to school, or returned home. More than 460 youth were picked up in the 1996 sweeps; 669 youth were picked up in three sweeps conducted in 1997; and in 1998, three intensive sweeps resulted in 840 youth being returned to school. In addition to the intensive truancy sweeps, officers of all six enforcement agencies have stepped up regular beat activity (by 35 percent since the previous year) by identifying and picking up truant youth whom they see or who are reported to be on the streets.

Student enrollment figures increased by 1,561 students (a 5-percent increase) from 1994–95 to 1997–98 (an increase attributed partly to the truancy enforcement program and population growth), and the rate of truancy dropped dramatically. The program is reported to have evoked a positive response from the entire school community. Police appreciate the program because it helps keep youth off the streets and reduces juvenile crime. Responses from parents of truant students have been overwhelmingly positive. In addition, community residents regularly call the SWAT office to report that youth are on the streets during school hours. The program is not punitive, and even the youth have acknowledged that they prefer to be in school.

The Richmond Police Department's role in the Truancy Enforcement Program is one component of the city's initiative to reduce gun violence. The W.C.C.U.S.D. Truancy Enforcement Program is also being replicated by other cities in the East Bay Corridor.
Finally, the East Bay Public Safety Corridor Partnership (see profile 5) is assisting W.C.C.U.S.D. in developing a comprehensive Truancy Reduction Program that includes the Truancy Enforcement Program, SafeFutures Probation Aftercare, Family/Schools Community Partnership, Girls Mentoring, and Family Preservation Services.
Youth Violence and Gang Prevention Programs

Interventions to reduce youth violence must address a variety of individual and social factors. Violent behavior is not purely a matter of individual temperament; it also is influenced by a variety of family, peer, neighborhood, and societal factors. Two lines of thought about the development of violent and delinquent behavior are prevalent in the literature. One is that youth who engage in violence have failed to develop appropriate social skills. They engage in violence because they are unable to solve problems and satisfy their needs in a more socially constructive way. The second viewpoint is that delinquent youth are very good at analyzing and interpreting behavior, but they employ this skill in a socially unsanctioned way. According to this view, many delinquent youth live in violent and unforgiving environments and have adopted a violent pattern of response to survive. From the perspective of these youth, violence is justified if it helps them achieve a goal or command respect. Sociologist Elijah Anderson has called this the code of the streets.1

Early violence prevention programs targeted older adolescents age 15 and above.2 Newer programs target younger children as well. Most of these programs are designed to improve social skills, problem solving, and anger management, while promoting beliefs that are favorable to nonviolence. Many encourage youth to consider the long-term consequences of their actions, both for themselves and for others.3

Few violence prevention programs have been subjected to carefully controlled evaluation. Those that have been evaluated produced mixed results.4 Most produced only modest effects on self-reported rates of aggressive or violent behavior and did not change the underlying views of youth or measured rates of serious violence. It is important to note, however, that evaluated programs generally targeted older adolescents, and younger children may be more affected by intervention efforts.

Changing long-established patterns of behavior may require a more sustained commitment to education and followup than was previously appreciated. There is growing appreciation of the enormous influence that peer groups exercise over the behavior of adolescents; therefore, programs that ignore group dynamics by focusing entirely on individual behavior diminish their chances for success.

Notes


Profile No. 58

Boston Community Centers' Streetworkers Program—
Boston, MA

Program Type or Federal Program Source:  
Gang intervention and prevention program.

Program Goal:  
To reach out to gang members, at-risk youth, and their families.

Specific Groups Targeted by the Strategy:  
Gang members, youth, and their families.

Geographical Area Targeted by the Strategy:  
Boston, MA.

Evaluated by:  
Internal data collection.

Contact Information:  
Tracy Lithcut, Unit Manager of Youth Services  
Boston Community Centers  
1010 Massachusetts Avenue  
Boston, MA 02118  
Phone: 617–635–4920

Years of Operation:  
1990–present.

The Streetworkers Program operates 24 hours a day through Boston Community Centers, city-funded agencies located throughout Boston (including in many middle and high schools). Thirty college-educated staff, ages 25 to 55, conduct gang and youth outreach activities engaging gang members in the streets and through home visits. The streetworkers advocate for gang members in the courts (when appropriate), help the probation department with supervision, mediate disputes and gang truces, and refer gang members and their families to existing government and community programs. Streetworkers also have played a critical role in Operation Ceasefire (see profile 21), personally inviting gang members to meetings with Federal, State, and local law enforcement agencies to communicate a message of zero tolerance for firearm homicides.

The Streetworkers Program is one element of a collaborative, comprehensive strategy implemented in Boston to address escalating violent crime rates. For more detailed information on the Streetworkers Program, and a discussion of how it fits into Boston's overall crime reduction strategy, see profile 2, Boston Strategy to Prevent Youth Violence.
Profile No. 59

Mayor's Anti-Gang Office and Gang Task Force—Houston, TX

Program Type or Federal Program Source: Gang intervention and prevention programs.

Program Goal: To reduce juvenile and gang-related crime and violence through partnerships with law enforcement, criminal justice agencies, schools, and youth service providers.

Specific Groups Targeted by the Strategy: Criminal street gangs and at-risk juveniles.

Geographical Area Targeted by the Strategy: Houston, TX.

Evaluating by: Internal data collection.

Contact Information:
Kim Ogg, Director
Mayor's Anti-Gang Office, City of Houston
P.O. Box 1562
Houston, TX 77251
Phone: 713-247-1576

Years of Operation: 1994–present.

In response to the rise in gang-related crime in the early 1990’s, Houston’s mayor instituted an Anti-Gang Office and Gang Task Force. The office’s mission is to develop a comprehensive mechanism to reduce gang-related violence and crime. To meet this goal, the office has implemented prevention, intervention, and suppression program partnerships with law enforcement, criminal justice agencies, schools, youth service providers, and the public. No additional costs are incurred by taxpayers because the office utilizes existing resources. The office coordinates citywide antigang efforts, including gathering and sharing information on gang activity, crime prevention, and gang abatement. Many programs involve innovative collaborations that include the following:

- The Anti-Gang Office developed a computerized gang geomapping and tracking system to identify the location of gangs and gang gun violence in the city, and to locate existing youth program resources. This system helps identify hotspots of gang-related crime and necessary youth services.

- The Gang Offender Probation Program was developed to improve judicial oversight of gang members on probation by partnering probation and law enforcement officers for increased supervision. More intensive probation requirements were imposed on gang members, including participation in gang offender treatment programs. Through close monitoring of the activities of gang members under supervision, the courts are able to provide more assistance to first-time offenders.

- The Anti-Gang Office initiated a community service program whereby juvenile probationers clean up graffiti-vandalized sites and maintain city facilities and vehicles. Since its implementation in 1994, 6,482 graffiti-vandalized sites have been cleaned. In 1997, 2,833 hours of community service, including rectifying graffiti-vandalized sites, were served by adult and
Profile No. 59 (continued)

juvenile probationers. The Anti-Gang Office and the Houston Paint and Coatings Association have donated more than 10,000 gallons of recycled paint for graffiti abatement.

* The Gang Education Awareness Resistance (GEAR) program is a partnership between the Anti-Gang Office, the school district, and two police departments. GEAR trains school personnel, including school administrators, to recognize gang activity on school campuses and provides a model for notifying parents and police when criminal activity is identified.

* The Gang-Related Information Tracking System is a regional gang intelligence data base serving more than 50 Houston area law enforcement agencies. This program identifies Houston area gangs and provides information on gang members and gang vehicles. Mobile Data Terminals also are used, supplying an added security measure for patrol officers participating in inquiries related to a suspect's criminal background.

Several local youth service providers have received funding from the Mayor's Anti-Gang Office to engage in suppression, intervention, and prevention activities related to gang violence. The Association for the Advancement of Mexican Americans' Gang Prevention Program, for example, provides legal education and individual counseling to troubled youth, facilitates program participation and alternative activities, sustains intervention planning, and provides student services ranging from tutoring and drug abuse counseling to HIV testing and financial aid. In 1997, roughly 62 youth between the ages of 13 and 17 completed this program and reported that the experience had significantly affected them.

In 1997, the percentage of juveniles accused of murder declined 23.1 percent from 1996, rape convictions declined by 5.7 percent, robbery convictions declined by 10 percent, aggravated assault convictions declined by 14.2 percent, and overall violent crimes declined by 11.6 percent.
Profile No. 60

Se Puede—San Juan, TX

Program Type or Federal Program Source: Gang intervention and prevention program.

Program Goal:
To prevent at-risk youth from becoming involved with gun violence, gangs, and drugs; to improve their academic performance.

Specific Groups Targeted by the Strategy:
At-risk middle school students and their parents.

Geographical Area Targeted by the Strategy:
Tricity area (Pharr, Alamo, and San Juan), TX.

Evaluating by:
OZ White Associates, San Antonio, TX.

Contact Information:
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527 Kings Court
San Antonio, TX 78212
Phone: 210-736-1712

Years of Operation:
1996–present.

The tricity area of Pharr-Alamo-San Juan, TX, has 5,000 gang members (about one-fourth of the student body) attending the district’s schools. It is an area of high drug use and drug trafficking within 44 neighborhoods (“colonias”) characterized by high unemployment, few job opportunities, and substandard housing that is often without indoor plumbing. Children who are most at risk often come from families involved in drug use and/or trafficking and frequently have been sexually abused.

The Se Puede (“You Can”) program brings together teachers, counselors, and school security personnel to provide positive alternatives and role models to counter daily exposure to violence, gangs, and drugs while helping to improve the student’s academic performance. Students participate in the program for 1 year. Each participating school campus designates a trained and appropriately licensed program staff member to provide both individual and group counseling. A curriculum component, Project Heart, combines substance abuse and violence prevention principles and techniques through culturally sensitive lessons that are taught weekly in every school.

To improve behavior and academic skills in school, Se Puede offers students, many of whom have never been out of their colonia, weekend camping experiences. Groups of 10–15 students from each of the nine schools participate each month in modified survival skills outings in which they learn to camp, fish, cook, canoe, and complete rope challenge courses. High school students who have exhibited leadership potential are trained in mentoring and given responsibility for assisting younger participants during the outings. According to evaluators, “rival gang members who began trips by flashing gang signs and exhibiting hostility returned from the experience asleep on the shoulder of their former enemy.” Some of the former gang members even went on to become mentors on subsequent trips.
In the communities in which the nine schools in the tricity school district are located, the number of gangs increased from 9 to 22 during the 12 months of Se Puede’s implementation. Arrests of juveniles increased by 32 percent from 699 to 923.

However, of the 826 participants in Se Puede (99 percent Hispanic and 124 speaking only Spanish), 20 percent stopped participating in gangs after 6 months; another 10 percent dropped gang status after 12 months. During the same period, “wannabes” dropped from 13 percent to 3 percent. Arrest rates among Se Puede participants dropped from 13 to 10 percent, adjudicated participants from 12 to 6 percent, and repeat offenders from 15 to 3 percent. The number of participants having no contact with law enforcement increased from 34 to 65 percent. After 6 months, 18 percent of Se Puede participants reported they had stopped using drugs, and another 19 percent reported that they had stopped using drugs after 12 months.

Participants also demonstrated improved school behavior; absenteeism was reduced by 10 percent and disciplinary incidents decreased by 20 percent. Teachers reported better classroom behavior for 50 percent of participants, and results of tests administered before and after the program indicated improvement in decisionmaking skills, communication, and healthy behaviors such as drug avoidance.

Violent behavior among participants also declined significantly. During the year prior to Se Puede (1995–96), 395 aggravated assaults were reported among 6,750 students in all grades, a rate of 5.9 percent. During the program’s first year, Se Puede participants committed only eight aggravated assaults, representing less than 1 percent of the program’s participants.
Section VIII

Research, Technical Assistance, and Education Programs
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Overview

This section presents programs that provide research, technical assistance, and educational resources for those communities seeking to reduce gun violence. These resources include Federal and private programs that support the development and implementation of effective firearm violence reduction strategies. They focus on law enforcement and other intervention initiatives to reduce the sources of illegal guns, the possession and carrying of illegal firearms, and the illegal use of guns.

Brief descriptions of the program or agency are given followed by contact information. Although a variety of violence reduction programs are included in this section, the listed agencies and organizations do not represent all of the available technical assistance and educational resources that can be accessed by interested jurisdictions. Appendix E lists the many organizations and sources contacted for the development of this Report. Several of these agencies and groups also provide research, technical assistance, and educational support to reduce firearm violence.

Federal Programs

Comprehensive Communities Program—U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Assistance

The Comprehensive Communities Program (CCP) is a Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA) initiative that implements a community-based comprehensive approach to crime control and prevention. CCP, which was initiated in 1994, receives technical assistance from the National Crime Prevention Council and operates in 16 demonstration sites across the country, including Atlanta, GA; Baltimore, MD; Boston, MA; Columbia, SC; Denver, CO; East Bay, CA; Fort Worth, TX; Gary, IN; Hartford, CT; Omaha, NE; Phoenix, AZ; Salt Lake City, UT; Seattle, WA; Washington, DC; Wichita, KS; and Wilmington, DE. CCP promotes the engagement of Federal, State, and local governments; the private sector; and the community in combating violent crime and drug use and abuse in our communities. The objectives of the program are to: (1) suppress violence and restore the sense of community in the target neighborhoods; (2) focus on community problems by implementing comprehensive planning and improved intergovernmental and community relationships; (3) develop a comprehensive, multiagency strategy to identify the causes of violence in the target community, and to control and prevent violent crime; (4) implement community policing and other efforts that encourage citizens to take an active role in problem solving; and (5) coordinate and concentrate Federal, State, and local, government organizations and private resources to maximize their impact on reducing violent crime.

The 16 demonstration sites have implemented a wide range of crime prevention and control activities that integrate criminal and juvenile justice systems with social service systems. In addition to promoting community policing and other community mobilization efforts, these jurisdictions are attempting to implement innovative approaches to combat crime including drug courts, community prosecution and diversion, conflict resolution training, and alternatives to incarceration.

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Comprehensive Strategy for Serious, Violent, and Chronic Juvenile Offenders—U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention

The Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP) published its Comprehensive Strategy for Serious, Violent and Chronic Juvenile Offenders in 1995. After developing and testing both the prevention and graduated sanctions components of the program over the next 2 years, OJJDP launched a national training and technical
assistance initiative in 1995 with the publication of a guide for implementing the Comprehensive Strategy. The guide provides a framework for developing and implementing the program, and is based on the creation of a continuum of juvenile delinquency prevention, early intervention, and graduated sanctions strategies. The continuum starts with prenatal prevention and includes community-based prevention services based on risk and resource assessment, immediate interventions, and a range of graduated sanctions that include institutional care and aftercare services. These strategies are key points along the continuum and are designed to reduce the risk factors that contribute to delinquent behaviors.

OJJDP has provided intensive training and technical assistance to three pilot sites (San Diego County, CA; and Jacksonville and Ft. Myers, FL) to develop strategic plans for implementing the Comprehensive Strategy. In addition, eight States (Florida, Iowa, Maryland, Ohio, Oregon, Rhode Island, Texas, and Wisconsin) were selected to test the program by receiving onsite technical assistance or by field testing a community planning manual. OJJDP also has provided strategic planning assistance for implementing the Comprehensive Strategy for the six SafeFutures jurisdictions (Boston, MA; Contra Costa, CA; Seattle, WA; St. Louis, MO; Imperial County, CA; and Ft. Belknap Indian Community, Harlem, MT). SafeFutures is designed to test the implementation of a continuum of care for at-risk and delinquent youth and their families to prevent and control juvenile crime and victimization. SafeFutures is conceptually consistent with the Comprehensive Strategy initiative.

The three pilot sites are participating in the training and technical assistance component of the program, and are in the process of publishing their strategic plans for implementing the Comprehensive Strategy. Valuable lessons learned in these pilot sites have helped to develop additional implementation tools that have been used to help expand strategic planning efforts in the other sites.

At this time OJJDP’s Comprehensive Strategy intensive training and technical assistance is available only in the competitively selected Comprehensive Strategy States, the San Diego County pilot site, and the SafeFutures sites.

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Crime Gun Interdiction Initiative—International Association of Chiefs of Police and U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Assistance

The International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP), in conjunction with the Bureau of Justice Assistance, provides 15 law enforcement agencies with technical assistance on crime gun interdiction and investigation. The program, developed in cooperation with State, local, and Federal law enforcement agencies, addresses the following aspects of crime gun interdiction and investigation: (1) tracing crime guns, identifying patterns, and focusing enforcement efforts; (2) developing policy and implementing standard operating procedures regarding firearm tracing; (3) understanding the connections among firearms, gangs, and youth violence; (4) developing effective strategies for the interdiction of illegally trafficking firearms; (5) creating a multijurisdictional firearm interdiction and investigation task force; (6) developing and implementing a memorandum of understanding with other agencies; (7) working with firearm dealers to reduce illegal firearm and ammunition sales; and (8) working with the courts to prosecute cases effectively.

Technical assistance is provided by IACP and ATF experts on crime gun interdiction and investigation issues, and during visits to the National Tracing Center. In addition, IACP and ATF assist law enforcement agencies in developing local policies, strategies, and protocols to reduce the illegal flow and availability of crime guns to violent criminals, gang offenders, and juveniles.
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Hamilton Fish National Institute on School and Community Violence—U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, The George Washington University

During the early 1990's, the National Academy of Sciences and the U.S. General Accounting Office noted that most prior efforts to develop school violence prevention strategies had been hastily prepared, implemented for only short periods, and not rigorously evaluated. They urged that investments be made in rigorous research, development, and evaluation of programs to reduce violence in and around schools.

Their recommendations inspired the creation of the Hamilton Fish National Institute on School and Community Violence, which was founded in 1997 to serve as a national resource to test the effectiveness of school violence prevention methods and to develop more effective strategies. The Institute's goal is to determine what works, what does not work, and what can be replicated to reduce violence in schools and their immediate communities across the Nation.

Drawing from previous research on school violence and from the experience and knowledge of leading violence prevention experts, teachers, school administrators, and others, the Institute identifies the most promising violence prevention strategies and tests them in local schools. After strategies are identified, tested, and refined, the Institute disseminates this information to the public.

The Institute services include: (1) providing the most current information and analysis about the levels and trends of school violence in the Nation; (2) providing comprehensive literature reviews, research papers, and a searchable data base for resources on violence prevention topics; (3) consulting on effective strategies for school violence prevention; (4) assisting schools in conducting needs assessments for violence prevention and evaluating school violence interventions; and (5) providing assistance to practitioners and policymakers on the national, State, and local levels.

The Institute is funded by the U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, and is administered by George Washington University.

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National Weed and Seed Program—U.S. Department of Justice, Executive Office for Weed and Seed

The U.S. Department of Justice's Weed and Seed program was developed to demonstrate an innovative and comprehensive approach to law enforcement and community revitalization, and to prevent and control violent crime, drug abuse, and gang activity in target areas. The program, initiated in 1991, attempts to weed out violent crime, gang activity, and drug use and trafficking in target areas, and then seed the target area by restoring the neighborhood through social and economic revitalization. Weed and Seed has three objectives: (1) develop a comprehensive, multiagency strategy to control and prevent violent crime, drug trafficking, and drug-related crime in target neighborhoods; (2) coordinate and integrate existing and new initiatives to concentrate resources and maximize their impact on reducing and preventing violent crime, drug trafficking, and gang activity; and (3) mobilize community residents in the target areas to assist law enforcement in identifying and removing violent offenders and drug traffickers from the community.
and to assist other human service agencies in identifying and responding to service needs of the target area. To achieve these goals, Weed and Seed integrates law enforcement, community policing, prevention, intervention, treatment, and neighborhood restoration efforts. The Weed and Seed program is being implemented in more than 150 communities across the country.

The Executive Office for Weed and Seed (EOWS) within the Office of Justice Programs is responsible for overall program policy, coordination, and development. EOWS also serves to enhance the law enforcement and prosecution coordination among Federal, State, and local agencies, and coordinates with other cooperating programs and agencies such as AmeriCorps, Empowerment Zones/Enterprise Communities, and the Comprehensive Communities Program.

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**National Youth Gang Center—U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention**

In response to escalating gang membership and violence in the last two decades, the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention established the National Youth Gang Center (NYGC). The Center’s goals follow:

- Collect the most current gang literature, which OJJDP makes available through the Juvenile Justice Clearinghouse (800–638–8756).
- Identify promising gang intervention and prevention strategies across the country, develop documentation, and prepare summary reports.
- Participate in and serve as the coordinator for the OJJDP-sponsored Youth Gang Consortium, which coordinates gang program development and information exchange among Federal, State, and local agencies. The Consortium conducts regular meetings and produces reports to disseminate gang-related data and information.
- NYGC also supports and implements GANGINFO, an online forum on youth gangs. Subscribers can exchange information about effective strategies for identifying and combating youth gangs. GANGINFO regularly posts announcements of relevant conferences and new literature.

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In recent years, law-abiding residents of public and assisted housing have been terrorized by gun, gang, and drug activity that destroys the quality of life for residents and the surrounding community. The Operation Safe Home initiative was based on analysis by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), Office of the Inspector General (OIG), that violent crime was seriously undermining the efficiency of the country’s low-income housing programs. The rising tide of violence was due, in part, to poor communication and cooperation
between housing authorities and local law enforcement; inadequate emphasis on crime prevention (as opposed to law enforcement); and fragmented Federal, State, and local law enforcement efforts.

Operation Safe Home seeks to address these problems by creating: (1) a collaboration of Federal, State, and local law enforcement focused on reducing the level of violent crime within public and assisted housing; (2) a collaboration between law enforcement agencies and public housing managers and residents to devise methods to prevent violent crime; and (3) the introduction of HUD and other Federal initiatives specifically geared to preventing crime.

In response to a request from a crime-plagued public or assisted housing community, a task force is assembled to identify persons who are engaged in illegal activity involving weapons or drugs within the publicly funded housing area and the housing units where the illegal activity is taking place. Evidence is then developed through the use of informants, cooperating witnesses, surveillance, and covert drug or gun purchases, and presented to Federal or State courts to secure arrest and/or search warrants. This traditional law enforcement phase may take several months from inception to prosecution. However, HUD/OIG’s responsibility to the HUD-funded community does not end with arrests, but includes efforts to further the community’s recovery, improve the quality of life for residents, and prevent the criminal element from reasserting control. The postenforcement strategies include: (1) formation of neighborhood watch groups; (2) institution of drug education, gun safety, and life skills programs; (3) implementation of efforts to rid housing complexes of trash and graffiti; and (4) institution of job training programs and reading programs for children.

**Partnerships To Reduce Juvenile Gun Violence—U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention**

In 1997, as part of its commitment to address the escalating problem of youth violence, the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention awarded grants to demonstration sites to implement partnerships to reduce juvenile gun violence. The purpose of these partnerships is to increase the effectiveness of existing youth gun violence reduction strategies by enhancing and coordinating prevention, intervention, and suppression strategies and strengthening linkages between community residents, law enforcement, and the juvenile justice system. The program is based on research showing that a community assessment of the local youth gun violence problems should guide program development and that program implementation should use suppression intervention and multiple prevention strategies. The sites seek to: (1) reduce illegal gun availability to juveniles, (2) reduce the incidence of juveniles illegally carrying guns, (3) reduce juvenile gun-related crime, (4) increase youth awareness of the personal and legal consequences of gun violence, (5) increase participation of community residents and organizations in public safety efforts, (6) improve community residents’ attitudes toward law enforcement and alleviate their concerns about safety, and (7) increase and coordinate services and resources for at-risk juveniles, especially juveniles involved in the justice system. Seven strategies are being implemented to achieve these goals:

- Institute a suppression strategy that reduces juvenile access to illegal guns and illegal gun trafficking by developing special gun units, using community allies to report illegal gun trafficking, targeting gang members and illegal guns, targeting for prosecution those who possess, and imposing sanctions on those who are involved in gun violence.
- Develop a juvenile justice strategy that applies appropriate interventions to respond to the needs of juvenile gun offenders. These interventions may include family counseling, victim impact

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counseling, drug abuse treatment, probation, and community supervision.

- Implement a law enforcement strategy that expands neighborhood communication, includes community policing, and initiates community supervision to educate at-risk and court-involved juveniles on the legal consequences of gun violence.

- Provide positive opportunities for youth, such as mentoring, job-readiness training, and afterschool programs.

- Institute an educational strategy in which students learn how to resolve conflicts, resist peer pressure to carry or possess guns, and distinguish between real life and television violence.

- Implement a public information strategy that uses radio, local television, and print outlets to communicate the dangers and consequences of gun violence to juveniles and youth and to present information about positive youth activities in the community.

- Implement a community mobilization strategy that engages neighborhood residents, including youth, in improving the community.

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**Safe and Drug-Free Schools and Communities Act—U.S. Department of Education**

The Safe and Drug-Free Schools and Communities Act (SDFSCA) State and Local Grants Program, authorized by the 1994 Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) (Title IV, §§ 4111–4116, 20 U.S.C. 7111–7116), is a central part of the Federal Government’s effort to encourage the creation of safe, disciplined, and drug-free learning environments that will help all children meet challenging academic standards. The program provides support for school- and community-based programs to prevent youth violence and alcohol and other drug use.

SDFSCA primarily supports prevention programs and activities. Its program provides funding for formula grants to States to support local educational agencies and community-based organizations in developing and implementing programs to prevent drug use and violence among children and youth. The program also provides funding for national leadership activities that directly support classroom teaching. The following list highlights some of these activities.

- Developing comprehensive drug and violence prevention programs for all students from preschool through grade 12 that include health education, early intervention, pupil services, mentoring, rehabilitation referral, and related activities.

- Devising strategies to integrate family services from a variety of providers to enhance school performance and boost attachment to school and family.

- Providing professional training and development for school personnel, parents, law enforcement officials, and other community members.

- Supporting “safe zones of passage” for students between home and school through enhanced law enforcement, neighborhood patrols, and similar measures.
Offering direct services to schools and school systems afflicted with especially severe drug and violence problems.

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U.S. Department of the Treasury,
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms

The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF) is a law enforcement agency within the U.S. Department of the Treasury that enforces Federal laws and regulations relating to alcohol, tobacco, firearms, explosives, and arson. ATF works directly and in cooperation with other agencies to suppress and prevent crime and violence; provide fair and effective industry regulation and revenue collection; support and assist Federal, State, local, and international law enforcement; and provide innovative training programs in support of its functions.

To curb the illegal use of firearms and enforce Federal firearm laws, ATF issues firearms dealers' licenses and conducts firearms licensee qualification and compliance inspections. In addition to aiding the enforcement of Federal requirements for gun purchases, compliance inspections of existing licensees focus on assisting law enforcement to identify and apprehend criminals who illegally purchase firearms. The inspections also help improve the likelihood that crime gun traces will be successful, because inspectors educate licensees in proper recordkeeping and business practices. Compliance inspections target licensees likely to divert firearms from legitimate trade to criminal use and dealers with a history of poor compliance. Investigative priorities focus on armed violent offenders and career criminals, narcotics traffickers, narcotics traffickers, violent gang members, and domestic and international arms traffickers. ATF also works with Federal, State, and local law enforce-

ment to target, investigate, and recommend prosecution of armed career criminals and narcotics traffickers; to reduce the level of violent crime; and to enhance public safety.

National Tracing Center

ATF established the National Tracing Center (NTC) as the sole agency responsible for tracing firearms used in crimes and recovered at crime scenes. Firearm tracing is the systematic tracking of firearms from manufacturer to purchaser for the purpose of aiding law enforcement officials in identifying suspects involved in criminal violations, establishing stolen status, and proving ownership. The volume and efficiency of NTC trace operations has increased significantly. In 1997, NTC traced 199,000 crime guns. NTC currently houses more than 100 million firearm records as part of a reference library that identifies firearms, manufacturers, and importers. NTC communicates trace requests to the gun manufacturer, which is required to provide the name of the wholesale/retail distributor and the date of transfer. The chain of wholesale/retail transactions is then followed from the point of sale to an individual citizen. Further tracing is then at the discretion of ATF and dependent on the significance of the individual investigation and the availability of special agent resources.

Project LEAD

Project LEAD is an automated data system that tracks illegal firearms. It provides investigative leads to law enforcement by analyzing crime gun trace data and multiple sales information to identify indicators of illegal firearm trafficking.

An illegal firearm trafficking indicator is a factor or circumstance, most often revealed by recurring trends and patterns, that is associated with illegal firearm diversion or sales. Project LEAD allows investigators to identify such indicators, which can then help law enforcement to identify and investigate the most active and prolific illegal firearm traffickers. One such indicator is the “time-to-crime” rate of a firearm. Time-to-crime is the period of time (measured in days) between a firearm's retail sale and law enforcement's recovery of the firearm in
connection with a crime. A short time-to-crime rate usually means the firearm will be easier to trace, and when several short time-to-crime traces involve the same individual/Federal firearm licensee, illegal trafficking activity is highly probable.

The comprehensive tracing of all recovered crime-related firearms in an area experiencing high rates of armed crimes can identify individuals who are illegally trafficking firearms to violent criminals, gang offenders, and in particular, to juveniles and youth.

**Integrated Ballistics Identification System**

The Integrated Ballistics Identification System (IBIS) has been implemented by NTC. IBIS is a computer identification system that correlates and matches projectile and shell casing ballistic evidence. A unique comparison system allows firearm technicians to digitize and sort bullet and shell casings at a greatly accelerated rate, and to maintain a national database that quickly assimilates local law enforcement evidence. Now, local law enforcement can fire a recovered weapon and enter digitized information from the bullet that will provide “fingerprint” evidence for all other bullets fired from it. When a suspect is linked to a gun, IBIS can quickly determine if bullets fired from that gun can be linked to other crimes. With every recovered gun, projectile, or shell casing, the database and the potential for individual criminal prosecution grow.

**Youth Crime Gun Interdiction Initiative**

The Youth Crime Gun Interdiction Initiative (YCGII) is a component of ATF’s illegal gun trafficking enforcement program. Begun in July 1996 in 17 cities, YCGII seeks to reduce the illegal supply of firearms to juveniles, youth, and adult criminals. Police departments participating in the program agree to trace all recovered crime guns and to collaborate with ATF in investigations of trafficking. ATF assists the departments in developing electronic tracking capability and provides training in tracing and trafficking interdiction. ATF’s Crime Gun Analysis Branch also provides each participating community with a standardized analysis of the crime guns recovered and traced from that jurisdiction. Twenty-seven communities participate in YCGII, and ATF expects to expand the program in the next few years. ATF and local law enforcement are investigating and arresting illegal gun traffickers by using comprehensive trace information and traditional investigative methods.

**Gang Resistance Education and Training**

ATF’s Gang Resistance Education and Training (G.R.E.A.T.) program is designed to help children set goals for themselves, resist negative peer pressure, learn how to resolve conflicts without violence, and understand how gangs and youth violence affect the quality of their lives. G.R.E.A.T. students discover for themselves the ramifications of gang and youth violence through structured exercises and interactive approaches to learning.

G.R.E.A.T. curriculums reach third/fourth-grade and fifth/sixth-grade students. To date, thousands of law enforcement officers from hundreds of agencies throughout the United States, Canada, Guam, and Puerto Rico, and military personnel from overseas bases in Japan and Germany have been trained to present the core curriculum in elementary, middle, and junior high school classrooms. The estimated cumulative number of students who have received the G.R.E.A.T. program exceeds 1.5 million.

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Non-Federal Programs

Gang Prevention Through Targeted Outreach—Boys & Girls Clubs of America

The Gang Prevention Through Targeted Outreach program was initiated in 1991 to help local Boys & Girls Clubs build a network of local community representatives (including community agencies, schools, social service organizations, courts, and police and other law enforcement officials) to assess their local gang problem, recruit youth (ages 6 to 18) who are at risk of gang membership, and focus efforts and resources on the reduction of gang involvement by providing these at-risk youth with alternative activities. According to Frank Sanchez, Jr., Director of Delinquency Prevention for the Boys & Girls Clubs of America, the major goal of the program is to satisfy youth interests and their social and physical needs by providing prosocial activities. These activities center around five target areas: character and leadership development; health and life skills; the arts; sports, fitness, and recreation; and education. In addition to the activities provided in the program, the youth are provided with counselors and are tracked for the first year of their participation while being mainstreamed into normal club activities. Since the program’s inception, more than 120 clubs nationwide have been funded, serving more than 6,850 youth.

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gun violence by providing information on firearm injuries and gun policy; by developing, analyzing, and evaluating strategies to prevent firearm injuries; and by conducting public health and legal research to identify gun policy needs. Recently, the Center published an annotated bibliography on firearm violence, and a model State law on “personalized” handguns. Personalized handguns, or “smart” guns, are handguns that, through various technologies, can be fired only by authorized users; smart guns can reduce the incidence of teenage suicide, unintentional shootings, and the use of stolen firearms.

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National School Safety Center

The National School Safety Center (NSSC) was created by Presidential directive in 1984. The Center was formed by a partnership between the
U.S. Department of Justice, the U.S. Department of Education, and Pepperdine University. The Center’s national headquarters are in Westlake Village, CA. NSSC’s mandate is to focus national attention on cooperative solutions to problems that disrupt the educational process. Special emphasis is placed on efforts to rid schools of crime, violence, and drugs, and on programs to improve student discipline, attendance, and achievement, and school climate. NSSC provides technical assistance, offers legal and legislative aid, and produces publications and films. The Center also serves as a clearinghouse for information on school safety issues.

NSSC’s communications section conducts a comprehensive national public relations program that includes producing public service announcements, films, publications, resource papers, articles, conferences, and other promotional activities. NSSC’s School Safety News Service is published nine times annually. Considered one of America’s leading school crime prevention news journals, it features topical articles by prominent authors and communicates trends and exemplary programs for delinquency prevention and school safety. These materials promote NSSC’s underlying theme: the need for partnerships between schools, other public and private institutions, and the community.

NSSC maintains a resource center with more than 50,000 articles, publications, and films on victim’s rights, school security, student discipline, bullying, character development, law-related education, drug trafficking and abuse, school/law enforcement partnerships, public/community relations, and attendance issues.

The NSSC field services section coordinates a national network of education, law enforcement, business, legal, and other civic and professional leaders who are working cooperatively to create and maintain safe schools. The field services section provides online training and technical assistance programs worldwide.

Youth Violence Project

The Youth Violence Project (YVP) is supported by the Curry School of Education at the University of Virginia. YVP has three primary goals: (1) to identify effective methods and policies for preventing and responding to youth violence, especially in school settings; (2) to provide education and training on youth violence and aggression for educators, psychologists, and other colleagues in the social, legal, and human services professions; and (3) to conduct and disseminate research on the understanding and reduction of violent behavior in youth. YVP does not work with youth directly but funds several projects that work with youth.

For example, YVP is collaborating with Virginia Commonwealth University on the Youth Gang Project, which works with Virginia communities with identified gang problems. The project trains community members in violence prevention, conducts needs assessments, assists in program development, and funds local community grants to nonprofit organizations focusing on gang prevention. One program is the United Neighborhoods Project, which brings rival gang members from Arlington and Fairfax, VA, together in an effort to reduce intergang conflict, graffiti, and violence, and to encourage community service. Another is the Gang Prevention Through Targeted Outreach program of the Newport News Boys & Girls Club, which offers club membership to youth referred by the courts, schools, or police, or identified through targeted outreach efforts.

Contact information:
Dewey Cornell
University of Virginia
405 Emmet Street
Charlottesville, VA 22903
804-924-0793
Section IX

References
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## Appendix B: Alphabetical Index of Promising Gun Violence Reduction Strategies

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Appendix C: Matrix of Key Participating Agencies and Organizations

A matrix of key participating agencies has been developed to identify the variety of criminal justice, law enforcement, government, social service, and community organizations that are involved in each of the listed gun violence reduction strategy profiles. These agencies and organizations make up the key components of each strategy.

In many instances, the profiled strategies include the participation of researchers from universities or consulting firms. These experts often provide valuable assistance for the collaborating group as they attempt to identify the gun violence problems in their communities. These researchers also help the participants develop measurable goals and data collection mechanisms for assessing program outcomes.

The involvement of the media and newspapers also is a valuable component in several programs. The media can assist in getting the gun violence reduction message out to the public. Local newspapers and broadcast media can target specific high-risk populations and help create a culture of change.

However, the matrix does not include every agency that may be involved in implementing gun violence reduction programs. A variety of public and private agencies are needed to develop effective gun violence reduction strategies. The following matrix is limited to those organizations that have key collaborative roles.
## Appendix C: Matrix of Key Participating Agencies and Organizations

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### Gun Violence Reduction Strategy

1. Baltimore Comprehensive Communities Program—Baltimore, MD
2. Boston Strategy to Prevent Youth Violence—Bosston, MA
3. Buffalo Ward and Seed Initiative—Buffalo, NY
4. Comprehensive Homicide Initiative—Richmond, CA
5. East Bay Public Safety Corridor Partnership—Oakland, CA
6. Indianapolis Ward and Seed Initiative—Indianapolis, IN
7. Minnesota HEALS—Minneapolis, MN
9. Baltimore County Police Gun Squad—Baltimore, MD
10. Boston Gun Project—Boston, MA
## Appendix C: Matrix of Key Participating Agencies and Organizations

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### Media/Outreach
- Universities/Research Organizations
- Community Partnerships
- Other Civic Organizations
- Neighborhood Crime Prevention
- Faith Community

### Social Services
- Child Service Providers
- Prevention Education
- Mentoring Programs
- Job Training/Employment
- Substance Abuse/Mental Health

### Other Federal Agencies
- Other Federal Agencies

### Government
- Other Federal Agencies
- School Districts
- Hospitals/Health Centers
- Mayors/County Manager

### Other Criminal Justice System
- Juvenile Delinquency
- Juvenile Delinquency Prevention
- Juvenile Detention
- Juvenile Family Courts
- Juvenile Justice

### State and Local Agencies
- State and Local Resources
- State Law Enforcement
- Federal Law Enforcement

### Local Law Enforcement
- Police Special Units
- Multifunctional Task Forces
- Community Policing
- Gang Units
- Weapons Units
- Prescription Drugs
- Planning/Crime Mapping

### Gun Violence Reduction Strategy
- Chicago Anti-Gun Enforcement Program (CAGE)—Chicago, IL
- Oakland Firearms License Compliance Program—Oakland, CA
- Violent Crime Task Force—Charleston, NC
- West Virginia Firearms—Charleston, WV
- Consent To Search and Seize Firearms—St. Louis, MO
- Municipal Firearms Ordinance—East Bay Public Safety Community Partnership—Oakland, CA
- Weapon Watch—Memphis, TN
- Baltimore Police/Violent Crimes Division and Youth Violence Strike Force—Baltimore, MD
- Getting Guns Off the Streets—New York City Police Department—New York, NY
- Kansas City Gun Experiment—Kansas City, MO

Section X: Appendixes
## Appendix C: Matrix of Key Participating Agencies and Organizations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Community/Other</th>
<th>Media/Newspapers</th>
<th>University/Research Organizations</th>
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### Gun Violence Reduction Strategy

21. Operation Ceasefire-Boston, MA
22. Operation Safe Streets Gang Prevention Initiative—Phoenix, AZ
23. Targeted Enforcement Program—Indianapolis-Indianapolis, IN
24. Youth Firearms Violence Initiative—Atlanta, GA
25. Youth Firearms Violence Initiative—Birmingham, AL
26. Youth Firearms Violence Initiative—Bridgewater, CT
27. Youth Firearms Violence Initiative—Indianapolis, IN
28. Youth Firearms Violence Initiative—Milwaukee, WI
29. Youth Firearms Violence Initiative—Seattle, WA
30. Youth Firearms Violence Initiative—Basking Ridge, NJ

Promising Strategies To Reduce Gun Violence
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<td>51. The Living Classroom Foundation–Baltimore, MD</td>
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**Appendix C: Matrix of Key Participating Agencies and Organizations**

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Section X: Appendixes
## Appendix D: Candidate Programs Identified for the Inventory

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Promising Strategies To Reduce Gun Violence
### Appendix D: Candidate Programs Identified for the Inventory

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<th>Program Name, by Type of Program</th>
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## Appendix D: Candidate Programs Identified for the Inventory

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<th>Program Name, by Type of Program</th>
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Promising Strategies To Reduce Gun Violence
### Appendix D: Candidate Programs Identified for the Inventory

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Promising Strategies To Reduce Gun Violence
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<th>Program Name, by Type of Program</th>
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<td>Firearms and Violence: Juveniles, Illicit Markets, and Fear</td>
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<td>Words Not Weapons</td>
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<td>Dorchester Youth Collaborative</td>
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<td>Stop Handgun Violence</td>
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<td>Safety First—Lowell</td>
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<td>National Ten-Point Leadership Foundation</td>
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<td>Community-Based Juvenile Justice</td>
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<td>Community Policing and the Truancy Patrol</td>
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<td>Initiative for Violence-Free Families and Communities</td>
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<td>Calling the Shots</td>
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Section X: Appendixes
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<td>ENOUGH</td>
<td>Kansas City</td>
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<tr>
<td>Missourians Against Handgun Violence</td>
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<td>Ceasefire—St. Louis</td>
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<td>Jackson County Jail Violence Prevention Program</td>
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<td>Project LISA (Locate, Identify, Seize, and Apprehend)</td>
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<td>LENA</td>
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Promising Strategies To Reduce Gun Violence
### Appendix D: Candidate Programs Identified for the Inventory

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<th>Program Name, by Type of Program</th>
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<td>Weapon Watch</td>
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<td>Alternatives to Violence Project/USA Inc.</td>
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<td>Southwest Key Program, Inc.</td>
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<td>University of Virginia Youth Violence Project</td>
<td>Virginia Beach</td>
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<td>Crime Control in Public Housing</td>
<td>Richmond</td>
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<td>Northern Virginians Against Handgun Violence</td>
<td>Fairfax</td>
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<td>Virginians Against Handgun Violence</td>
<td>Norfolk</td>
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<tr>
<td>Virginians Against Handgun Violence—Richmond Chapter</td>
<td>Richmond</td>
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<td>Juvenile Justice Prosecution Unit</td>
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<td>Seattle Campaign Against Violence</td>
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<td>Mothers Against Violence in America</td>
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<tr>
<td>Seattle Community-Oriented Problem-Solving Police Program</td>
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<td>Washington Ceasefire</td>
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<td>Charlestown</td>
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<td>School-Based Initiative on Assaults</td>
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<td>Menominee Law Enforcement Community Organization Project</td>
<td>Keshena</td>
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<td>Wisconsin Anti-Violence Effort (WAVE)</td>
<td>Milwaukee</td>
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### Appendix E: Organizations and Sources Contacted for the Inventory

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<td>Abt Associates Inc.</td>
<td>Cambridge, MA</td>
<td>617–492–7100</td>
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<tr>
<td>Adolescent Violence Prevention Resource Center</td>
<td>Newton, MA</td>
<td>617–969–7100</td>
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<tr>
<td>American Bar Association, Coordinating Committee on Gun Violence</td>
<td>Washington, DC</td>
<td>202–662–1769</td>
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<tr>
<td>American Medical Association</td>
<td>Chicago, IL</td>
<td>312–464–5000</td>
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<tr>
<td>American Prosecutors Research Institute (APRI)</td>
<td>Alexandria, VA</td>
<td>703–549–4253</td>
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<tr>
<td>American Trauma Society</td>
<td>Upper Marlboro, MD</td>
<td>800–556–7890</td>
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<td>301–420–4189</td>
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<tr>
<td>Annie E. Casey Foundation</td>
<td>Baltimore, MD</td>
<td>410–547–6600</td>
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<tr>
<td>Boys &amp; Girls Clubs of America, Office of Government Relations</td>
<td>Rockville, MD</td>
<td>301–251–6676</td>
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<tr>
<td>California Wellness Foundation</td>
<td>Woodland Hills, CA</td>
<td>818–593–6600</td>
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<tr>
<td>Center for Criminal Justice Policy Research,</td>
<td>Boston, MA</td>
<td>617–373–3702</td>
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<tr>
<td>Northeastern University</td>
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<tr>
<td>Center for Gun Policy and Research, Johns Hopkins University</td>
<td>Baltimore, MD</td>
<td>410–614–3243</td>
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<tr>
<td>Center for Injury Control, Emory University</td>
<td>Atlanta, GA</td>
<td>404–727–9977</td>
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<tr>
<td>Center for the Prevention of School Violence</td>
<td>Raleigh, NC</td>
<td>800–299–6054</td>
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<td>919–515–9397</td>
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<tr>
<td>Center for the Study and Prevention of Violence, University of Colorado</td>
<td>Boulder, CO</td>
<td>303–492–8465</td>
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<tr>
<td>Center on Crime, Community, and Culture</td>
<td>New York, NY</td>
<td>212–548–0135</td>
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<tr>
<td>Center to Prevent Handgun Violence</td>
<td>Washington, DC</td>
<td>202–289–7319</td>
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<tr>
<td>Charles Stewart Mott Foundation</td>
<td>Flint, MI</td>
<td>810–238–5651</td>
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Appendix E: Organizations and Sources Contacted for the Inventory

Children’s Safety Network  
Newton, MA  
617–969–7101

George Gund Foundation  
Cleveland, OH  
216–241–3114

Hamilton Fish National Institute on School and Community Violence,  
The George Washington University  
Rosslyn, VA  
703–527–4217

Handgun Control, Inc.  
Washington, DC  
202–898–0792

The Hudson Institute,  
Indiana University  
Bloomington, IN  
317–545–1000

International Association of Chiefs of Police  
Alexandria, VA  
703–836–6767

Joyce Foundation  
Chicago, IL  
312–782–2464

Kennedy School of Government,  
Harvard University  
Cambridge, MA  
617–495–1402

Mothers Against Violence in America  
Seattle, WA  
206–323–2503

National Association of Attorney Generals  
Washington, DC  
202–326–6000

National Association of Counties  
Washington, DC  
202–393–6226

National Association of Police Athletic Leagues  
North Palm Beach, FL  
561–844–1823

National Center for Juvenile Justice  
Pittsburgh, PA  
412–227–6950

National Collaboration for Youth  
Washington, DC  
202–347–2080

National Council on Crime and Delinquency  
San Francisco, CA  
415–896–6223

National Crime Prevention Council  
Washington, DC  
202–466–6272

National District Attorneys Association  
Alexandria, VA  
703–549–9222

National Rifle Association  
Fairfax, VA  
703–267–1000

National School Safety Center  
Westlake Village, CA  
805–373–9977
Appendix E: Organizations and Sources Contacted for the Inventory

National Youth Gang Center
Tallahassee, FL
850–385–0600

Not Even One,
The Carter Center
Atlanta, GA
404–420–5100

Pacific Center for Violence Prevention
San Francisco, CA
415–285–1793

Police Executive Research Forum (PERF)
Washington, DC
202–466–7820

Police Foundation
Washington, DC
202–833–1460

The RAND Corporation
Santa Monica, CA
310–393–0411

Robert Wood Johnson Foundation
Princeton, NJ
609–452–8701

Rural Law Enforcement Center,
University of Arkansas
Little Rock, AR
800–635–6310
501–570–8000

Stop Handgun Violence
Newton, MA
617–243–8174

Urban Institute
Washington, DC
202–261–5592

U.S. Conference of Mayors
Washington, DC
202–293–7330

Violence Policy Center
Washington, DC
202–822–8200

YWCA of the U.S.A
New York, NY
212–273–7800
Overview of Approach

The range and focus of strategies currently employed by communities attempting to implement effective gun violence reduction programs were examined by conducting a two-wave national telephone inventory of promising strategies to reduce firearms violence. To facilitate selection of these programs, the project team developed a taxonomy of strategies based on a review of available program information and research findings (see table 1). The taxonomy's gun violence focus areas include reducing illegal access to guns, reducing use of guns by violent perpetrators, and reducing accidents related to gun violence. Strategies for reducing gun violence include legislative and regulatory approaches, gun supply initiatives (suppression and interdiction), and demand reduction programs (prevention and intervention).

An inventory of promising programs and strategies was conducted during May and June 1998. The inventory covered gun supply initiatives by Federal, State, and local law enforcement agencies to remove illegal weapons from the community and demand reduction strategies focusing on preventing possession, carrying, and use of illegal guns by adults and youth. Strategies involving legislation and regulation were limited to State and local laws and regulations perceived as having an impact on the development of supply-and-demand programs. A comprehensive review of the impact of Federal gun control laws, such as the Brady Bill, was not included in this inventory.

Based on the results of the inventory, an indepth screening of selected strategies was conducted during August and September 1998. Comprehensive gun violence reduction programs incorporating both gun supply and gun demand strategies were selected for followup case studies. The project team conducted site visits to these selected comprehensive programs during October 1998.

Wave 1

Telephone Inventory

During May and June 1998, the project team identified 425 candidate gun violence reduction programs by contacting agencies and organizations that had been funding or supporting innovative and effective programs (appendix B lists these programs). The U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) funded or partly funded many of the programs and strategies in the inventory. In addition, the project team contacted other Federal agencies, individuals, and private organizations involved in programs that reduce gun violence (appendix C presents a list of contact sources). The project team then developed a telephone interview protocol to gather relevant program data. The protocol included questions on program goals, targeted populations, development of measurable goals and objectives, and other pertinent information (this protocol is located at the end of this appendix). The project team's ability to conduct effective telephone surveys was contingent on identifying and contacting a project director or other key stakeholder who was knowledgeable about the strategy.

Selection Criteria

The inventory was used to identify initiatives that had the following characteristics:

◆ A program structure with active participation by a variety of public and community organizations, including Federal, State, and local law enforcement agencies; prosecutors; courts; probation and parole; county and State corrections institutions; substance abuse treatment programs; job-readiness programs; schools; health services; youth-serving agencies; community grassroots organizations; parents; the faith community; local businesses; and the media.
Appendix F: Inventory of Promising Gun Violence Reduction Strategies

Table 1. Taxonomy of Gun Violence Reduction Strategies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Focus of Gun Violence Reduction Strategies</th>
<th>Regulating and Reducing</th>
<th>Reduction of Supply</th>
<th>Reduction of Demand</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Reduce Illegal Access to Guns</td>
<td>• Brady Bill.</td>
<td>• Federal and local law enforcement initiatives to reduce illegal gun trafficking.</td>
<td>• Public education programs, media campaigns, and rallies focusing on the problems of gun violence and the availability and access to illegal guns in the community.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Restrictions on manufacture and sales of automatic weapons and bullet clips.</td>
<td>• Gun tracing leading to prosecution of illegal gun dealers.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Local ordinances restricting sales and distribution of guns.</td>
<td>• Local police and community initiatives to identify and remove illegal guns from the community.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reduce Use of Guns by Violent Perpetrators</td>
<td>• Criminal laws specifying use of guns while committing crimes.</td>
<td>• ATF and local police gun tracing programs.</td>
<td>• Criminal justice and social service programs to address the reasons violent offenders use guns, and initiatives to prevent subsequent gun violence by juvenile offenders.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Laws restricting concealed weapons.</td>
<td>• Prosecution of violent perpetrators using guns.</td>
<td>• School- and community-based mentoring and conflict resolution programs, gang and drug prevention initiatives, parenting-skills programs, and job-readiness training for high-risk youth.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Sentencing guidelines for offenders convicted of using guns.</td>
<td>• Intensive probation and parole supervision of violent offenders.</td>
<td>• Gun violence prevention strategies including classroom training programs, afterschool alternatives strategies, and trauma centers' counseling initiatives.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reduce Gun Violence Related Accidents</td>
<td>• Trigger/lock laws.</td>
<td>• Gun safety education programs.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Safe storage ordinances.</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- A plan for reducing gun violence based on a needs assessment of the gun violence problems in the community and baseline data that identified specific high-risk target populations. The plan also was to include effective strategies with measurable goals and outcomes.

- Gun violence reduction strategies that addressed supply and access issues (e.g., police suppression and enforcement, gun tracing, and community mobilization) and demand and prevention issues (e.g., justice system programs, intensive supervision, aftercare placements, mentoring, school tutoring, gun violence educational programs, parenting support, crisis counseling, and public media campaigns).

Analysis of the Telephone Inventory

Strategies identified during the telephone inventory were assessed by assigning them to one of three levels of program development (see table 2). The criteria for these assessments included completion of a comprehensive needs (problem) assessment, availability of baseline data, identification of target groups, development of well-planned strategies based on an analysis of a problem assessment, a written plan linking the strategies, and identification of measurable goals and objectives.

Limitations of the Inventory Process

While comprehensive and thorough, this inventory did not attempt to sample programs scientifically from a known universe of gun violence reduction strategies. Known program sources were targeted because of the limited timeframe in which the inventory had to be completed. Another significant limitation was the lack of consistent evaluation outcome information. Many of the programs contacted were not engaged in formal
evaluations. These included initiatives not funded by Federal, State or local governments. However, many locally supported programs have extensive evaluation results, and in other instances, government-funded initiatives were not engaged in impact evaluations.

**Report of Initial Findings to a Focus Group**

The telephone inventory data were analyzed and drafted into a “Summary of the National Survey of Promising Violence Reduction Strategies.” The program profiles included in this report documented those strategies and initiatives that met the criteria for effective programs described above. They contained descriptions of 89 strategies that demonstrated promise in reducing gun violence. On July 30, 1998, the Attorney General’s Working Group held a focus group meeting to discuss the Summary Report and provide feedback on its contents. The focus group was composed of mayors, government representatives, law enforcement officials, prosecutors, judges, researchers, and community representatives. Comments from the focus group were assembled by the project team and used to revise the structure of the final Report.

**Wave 2**

**Followup Screening and Data Collection**

To identify the most promising of those strategies presented in the Summary Report, a followup telephone screening was conducted. The screening included an intensive review of the promising firearms violence reduction strategies based on data documenting the strength of these interventions. This included evaluation reports or other documentation on third-party assessments or outcomes. Data sources used to assess those outcomes also were reviewed by the project team. Candidate strategies for intensive case study were selected from among those reviewed during this second screening process.
Appendix F: Inventory of Promising Gun Violence Reduction Strategies

Site Visits to Promising Programs
The project team, in collaboration with members of the Attorney General’s Working Group, selected a small group of promising programs for intensive case study site visits. The following criteria were used to select these sites:

♦ Had a comprehensive implementation plan for reducing gun violence.
♦ Included active participation by a variety of agencies, including law enforcement and community-based organizations.
♦ Used strategies that included a range of both gun supply and demand reduction components.
♦ Identified specific short- and long-term outcomes, and had data for measuring specified outcomes.
♦ Expressed an interest and willingness to participate in the case study process.

The sites selected for the intensive case studies included the following:
♦ Operation Ceasefire—Boston, MA.
♦ Minnesota HEALS—Minneapolis and St. Paul, MN.
♦ East Bay Public Safety Corridor—Oakland, CA.
♦ Comprehensive Homicide Initiative—Richmond, CA.
♦ Youth, Firearms, and Violence in Atlanta—Atlanta, GA.
♦ Partnership to Reduce Juvenile Gun Violence—Baton Rouge, LA.
♦ Comprehensive Communities Program—Baltimore, MD.
♦ Weed and Seed Program—Indianapolis, IN.
♦ Weed and Seed Program—Buffalo, NY.
♦ Juvenile Gun Court—Birmingham, AL.

During site visits, the project team and members of the Working Group reviewed program documentation and available records from the implementing agencies. The team also examined implementation procedures, investigated causal links between services and outcomes, identified and examined rival hypotheses that may have accounted for the cited outcomes, and, where possible, collected community contextual data. During the site visit, team members interviewed key program administrators, stakeholders, program staff, service providers, and other community and public agency officials, using a semistructured protocol.

During the Wave 1 telephone inventory, many jurisdictions were found to have several candidate strategies focusing on both supply and demand gun violence reduction issues. In most cases, the project team was unable to determine if these strategies were linked into a comprehensive gun violence reduction program. During the Wave 2 followup screening and subsequent site visits, the project team identified those jurisdictions where comprehensive gun violence reduction programs had been implemented. Information was collected to assess how these multiple strategies were linked and whether the programs had an organizational structure to monitor program outcomes.
Appendix F: Inventory of Promising Gun Violence Reduction Strategies

Development of This Report
The project team identified promising strategies for reducing gun violence for inclusion in the Report by conducting programmatic reviews of strategies with documented outcomes. For inclusion in the Report, the strategies must have implemented innovative strategies based on well-developed and recognizably effective program development procedures. The project team also collected formal evaluation data, when available, and data compiled by the programs themselves. In many instances, programs are included even if they have not been formally evaluated. Each profile in the Report contains the following information:

- Preexisting community problems related to gun violence.
- Goals of the gun violence reduction strategy.
- Populations targeted by the strategy.
- The organization and structure of the strategy, including lead agency, key stakeholders, and coordinating structures.
- The gun violence reduction strategy(s), including roles, procedures employed, and so on.
- Quantifiable outcomes and impact measures, where possible.