NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

THESIS


By

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March 2004

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**Title:** Creation of a Higher Military Educational System in Ukraine as a Part of Civil-Military Relations (1992-1998)  

**Author:** Taras Katyrenchuk  

**Abstract:** This thesis provides a critical analysis of the development of the military staff officer education and training system in Ukraine. The chronological scope of research includes a period from January 1992 to December 1998. The research examines the status of officer training after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the reasons for the creation of a national higher military school in Ukraine. The research also covers the evolution of ideas and opinions on Ukraine's creation of its modern system of officer personnel training from 1992-1998. This thesis traces the process of the creation of the national system of the officer personnel training and its influence on the organization of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. It examines the roles of influential bodies of State power and military authorities in solving the conceptual questions of reforming the system of higher military education. The author describes and provides his own interpretation of the events, facts and phenomena related to the creation of the officer personnel training system and its influence on the creation of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

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ABSTRACT

This thesis provides a critical analysis of the development of the military staff officer education and training system in Ukraine. The chronological scope of research includes a period from January 1992 to December 1998, i.e. the interval of time when the fundamentals of the new system of military education was laid, its organizational structure was established and its integration into the general educational system took place.

The research examines the status of officer training after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the reasons for the creation of a national higher military school in Ukraine. The research also covers the evolution of ideas and opinions on Ukraine's creation of its modern system of officer personnel training from 1992-1998. This thesis traces the process of the creation of the national system of the officer personnel training and its influence on the organization of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. It examines the roles of influential bodies of State power and military authorities in solving the conceptual questions of reforming the system of higher military education. The author describes and provides his own interpretation of the events, facts and phenomena related to the creation of the officer personnel training system and its influence on the creation of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HMAS</td>
<td>The Higher Military Aviation School</td>
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<tr>
<td>HMES</td>
<td>The Higher Military Engineering School</td>
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<td>HMCS</td>
<td>The Higher Military Command School</td>
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<td>HNS</td>
<td>The Higher Naval School</td>
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<td>HMEI</td>
<td>The Higher Military Educational Institution</td>
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<tr>
<td>HMPS</td>
<td>The Higher Military Political School</td>
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<td>HMACS</td>
<td>The Higher Military Army Command School</td>
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<tr>
<td>MDME</td>
<td>Main Department of the Military Education</td>
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<tr>
<td>AF RF</td>
<td>The Armed Forces of the Russian Federation</td>
</tr>
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<td>AFU</td>
<td>The Armed Forces of Ukraine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MoD</td>
<td>The Ministry of Defense</td>
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<tr>
<td>SPS</td>
<td>Scientific and Pedagogical Cadre</td>
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<tr>
<td>AD</td>
<td>Air Defense</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIS</td>
<td>The Commonwealth of the Independent States</td>
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In particular, I want to express my thanks and appreciation to Ukrainian Ministry of Defense for the opportunity to study and learn during the past 21 months.

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I owe special thanks to my wife, Diana, and my children, Katerina and Anton, for their love, support and patience during the completion of this thesis.
Since 1991, Ukraine has undergone unprecedented transition from communism to democracy, which impacts every aspect of the life of its citizens. Having many specific features, the transformations in a separate country are shaped by its political, cultural, and technological characteristics and the potential of its people. However, there is a prevalent endeavor to join democratic Europe. As a part of this process, the country seeks security guarantees in full-fledged integration within the North Atlantic Alliance (NATO).

However, members of the Alliance are not ready to invite our country to join NATO in the near future. Among the reasons are the serious problems Ukraine has with establishing effective democratic control over the armed forces.

The principle of civil control over the military is one of the basic principles of democracy. In their attempt for democratization, all post-communist countries confronted the problem of transforming one model of civilian control – the communist party control – with another –democratic control over the armed forces. As a whole, the need for this transformation was accepted positively. However, its implementation encountered a number of obstacles created by a lack of traditions, the impossibility of directly implementing models of civil-military relations, functioning successfully in the United States (U.S.) and Western Europe, and the lack of people prepared to guide and lead the armed forces under conditions of political pluralism.

The establishment of effective civil control is crucial for the democratic development of Ukraine, both in the sense of preventing excessive military involvement in politics and as a guarantee that no more than the necessary resources for the military security of the state will be allocated, and that these resources will be spent effectively. At the same time, achieving effective democratic control over the military became a requirement for the integration of countries from Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) in
international political, economic, and security organizations. For example, although NATO has not officially announced criteria for accession to the Alliance, the Study on NATO Enlargement postulates that

Prospective members will have to have:

- Demonstrate a commitment to and respect for OSCE norms and principles, including the resolution of ethnic disputes, external territorial disputes …;
- Show a commitment to promoting stability and well-being by economic liberty, social justice and environmental responsibility;
- Establish appropriate democratic and civilian control of their defense forces; … ¹

New members must fulfill certain criteria such as encouraging harmonization of their security and defense policy with those of the Alliance and achievement of effective democratic civil-military relations.² Illustrative in this respect is the conclusion made by Chris Donnelly that “no post-communist country has yet achieved a totally satisfactory degree of democratic control and good civil-military relations. In all cases, as societies transform, their armies lag behind.”³

The democratic future of Ukraine anticipates effective democratic control of the military, especially on its integration way to NATO. Although there are flaws in the current legislature, the problem is not in the lack of laws or organizations. Practically all “players” in Ukrainian civil-military relations lack the relevant knowledge.

The very notion of civil control is generally not understood, both by political elites and the military. Reflecting societal culture, changes in their perceptions, attitudes, and behavior are slow and painful.

Solutions to these problems are not readily available. Moreover, it is not easy to structure the efforts to change societal culture. However, clearly, military education may contribute in important ways to the establishment of effective democratic control over the

¹ Study on NATO Enlargement, NATO, September 1995, Chapter 5B, Article 72.
armed forces. Educating officers, NCOs and conscripts, civilians, journalists and the public at large, has the potential of turning into a major factor for harmonization of civil-military relations in Ukraine.

Civil-military relations play a crucial role in every society. Ignorance and inattention to such important issues can lead to mistrust between military and civilian sectors of society and alienation of the military from society. This dangerous tendency can result in a civil-military crisis that turns the Armed Forces into a destabilizing factor in the society. On the other hand, with proper attention and careful construction to civil-military relations, “The military could conceivably play a proactive role in accelerating reform building, national unity, and imparting a sense of discipline in the state organization” (Samuel P. Huntington “Political Order in Changing Societies”, p. 203).

The concepts, principles, and practice of civil-military relations in Ukraine were inherited from the Soviet and Communist systems. During Soviet times, civilian control over the military consisted of the Communist Party controlling every level of the Armed Forces. That control was neither democratic, nor truly civilian, but it was effective within the overall structure of the totalitarian state.

The end of the old system brought forth the new task of rebuilding civil-military relations from scratch. Ukraine managed to create a framework for civilian control over the Armed Forces, as the necessary constitutional provisions are now in place and a set of principal defense-related laws have been adopted.

Today, it can be said that a system of military education has been created in Ukraine as an integral part of the overall system of democratic civil-military relations that takes into account the characteristics of the professional military training of specialists. Its functioning and further development are taking place in the legislative field which is based on the Constitution of Ukraine, and is regulated by the Decrees of the President of Ukraine, Government resolutions, ministerial normative acts, international agreements and treaties.

Modern problems in education, including military education, constantly attract the attention of the public. The educational level has increased and continues to increase endlessly. As concerns the practical business of training, and also, the improvement of
professional skills, the overwhelming majority of the population is involved in these or other reforms. These problems concern practically everybody. Some sources testify that the increase in part of the state national income due to an investment in the non-productive area of education is estimated at 35-45 percent. The social role of education also is somewhat valued.

The understanding of the major role of education in the development of a society that has resulted since the years following the Second World War worldwide concerns accepted laws, acts, and other documents mentioning education, more than at any time in the history of mankind. Also, during the last 20 years, many countries have begun to reform general educational systems. Thus, an educational system is one of the most dynamic components of the modern world.

The process of creating the modern Ukrainian state is accompanied by the development of education and science on par with requirements worldwide as well as according to its national interests. The basic strategic tasks and methods for the path to follow to realize the development of both a complete educational system, and its separate components, are determined in the State National Program called “Education” (“Ukraine of the 21st Century”).

Despite the need for changes, educational reforms realized by a newly emerging society with conservative tendencies towards reducing educational expenses make these reforms politically and financially unsound, which leads to their inconsistency and incompleteness, and sometimes, to failures.

The study and generalization of the world leading countries experience such as the USA, Great Britain France and Italy which have been known for years for their high level of educational system organization gives us all grounds to state that educational level of these countries is being maintained on the level of high modern demands. The practice, experience of improvement and reformation of the system of education have demonstrated certain regularities:

4 Nikandrov, N. D., Modern Higher School of Capitalist Countries: The Main Questions of Dialectic, Moscow, Higher School, 1978.

• Educational reforms which bring significant improvements within the framework of existing education systems;

• Reforms of education systems, which serve as a reason for transforming the purposes and educational tasks connected to social and political changes, which are on the fringes of an educational system.⁶

New problems of social, economic, and political development of Ukraine began to demand the extreme transformation of an education system to solve modern societal tasks of our country. Therefore, for Ukraine, the reform of an educational system of the second type is characteristic.

Widely discussed education reforms, which occurred in different countries at international seminars and conferences, have revealed many problems and barriers preventing the realization of reforms. The latter were demonstrated in different degrees of intensity in the different countries. However, they were rather typical. The lack of various characteristics were exposed, such as the absence of an operational strategy to execute reform, insufficient clarity as to the direction of the tasks of reform, and uneducated personnel responsible for various aspects of executing reforms, such as teachers, managers and others. The disparity between the political will concerning the execution of reforms and the professional competence of those implementing the reforms and the unsuitability of the separate structures of social institutions are also troublesome.

It was also highlighted that the realization of reforms is connected to minor results and paradoxes, which demand flexible, skilful and constant modifications in the Department of Education.

Ukraine possesses a wide range of experience in the training of specialists who have a higher education. This fact is well known worldwide. At the same time, the dynamism of growth of a modern civilization, the increase in the role of the person, the intellectualization of work, the rapid development of techniques and technologies, the cultural and spiritual revival of the Ukrainian people, and national development should

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cause the Armed Forces to reflect on educational activity which is called upon to provide the state with a cadre of people from all levels, from workers to the heads of state and the military.7

The important component of the reform process of the national education system is the problem of the military educational system reforming with the aim of becoming integrated with the state educational system, and also, the establishment and maintenance of state educational standards in the teaching and educational process of military specialists.

The military education system represents national laws and departmental normative-legal documents and materials, a network of military educational institutions, military training branches, faculties and chairs of military training, military Lyceums, as well as the structure of the controlling bodies.8

The content of military education and its system are a reflection of the public and nature of the state system, the assignments of the Armed Forces, characteristics of their acquisition, national traditions, requirements of the state standards of higher education and specific qualifying requirements for officers.

Military education has a wide spectrum of educational and scientific tasks which cover important directions of educational activity of teaching and educational establishments of different levels and types.9

The training of military specialists is based on a field of knowledge which is called “Military Studies.” It is a field of knowledge about laws and the character of war, construction and training of the Armed Forces and the countries going to war, as well as the manner in which armed struggle is conducted. Military Sciences include the common theory and the theory of military art, the theory of the Department of the Armed Forces, the theory of military economy, and military history. Military Sciences are closely connected to special areas of scientific knowledge, such as social, humanitarian, natural, technical and other sciences on which they are based and with which they cooperate.

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The specific training of a military specialist is aimed at executing the duties either in the areas of administrative activity, or operation of technical equipment in combat conditions and rapidly changing circumstances.

The Armed Forces in countries throughout the world attach great importance to the training of military specialists. In the leading countries, powerful national systems of military education were created for this purpose.

Their differences are determined by:

- The current legislation and military doctrine;
- Assignment, number and organizational-cadre structures of the Armed Forces;
- Principles of army acquisition and terms of military service;
- Needs for military specialists in different parts and levels of the management;
- Financial and economic opportunities;
- National-historical characteristics, etc.\(^\text{10}\)

One of the major questions concerning the creation and development of the Ukrainian Armed Forces is the formation of military national training structures and defining their basic functions, based on a system of civil-military relations within the framework of a lawful democratic state. That foundation, in the military education system, is specifically created according to the principles on which the Armed Forces are based, as well as who is capable of protecting independence and the inviolability of the borders of the sovereign country of Ukraine.

The current situation of the military sector of the state specifies, that the further neglect of the mistakes made in the creation of the state can lead to pernicious consequences. As history has demonstrated, the disintegration of the state begins with the weakening and discrediting of the military organizations.

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In order to make the Ukrainian Armed Forces a disciplined and efficient organism capable of successfully executing state tasks and not being too much of a strain on the budget, the state has implemented a number of organizational, legal, military-technical, financial-economic and other actions directed at their reformation.\textsuperscript{11}

The analysis of these actions makes it possible to draw the conclusion that the most important action is the reformation of the military educational system, which, in turn, is directed at:

- The optimization of the number of military-training establishments,
- Reforming their organizational-cadre structures in view of the real needs of the Armed Forces within the framework of the civil-military relations system
- The maximum integration of the common state education system with the goal of training improvement in the officer cadre.

According to current points of view of Ukrainian military specialists, military education represents a step system of training of the military cadre under different organizational forms on the basis of common normative-legal foundations and contains the following components:

- Initial military training of youths;
- Professional military training;
- Higher education of military specialists (tactical, operative-tactical, operative-strategic level);
- Postgraduate education of military specialists;
- Training of reserve officers;
- Improvement of professional skills and retraining of the officer cadre.\textsuperscript{12}


Thus, military education is a component of national education, directed at the education of military science specialists, and improving it is always executed as a component of reform of the Armed Forces. Due to the professionalism of the military cadre, as well as their loyalty to their native country, readiness to execute military duty depends on the combat readiness and fighting capability of the army and the fleet.

The creation and development of the Ukrainian higher military education system began simultaneously with the creation of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, when independence was declared. The country received only a part of the advanced system of the military cadre training from the former USSR, which was unable to satisfy completely the requirements of troops and neither qualitatively nor quantitatively in all the necessary specialties.

The reformation of the military education system occurred under complicated conditions. It was also influenced by the country’s economic crisis, political instability, and conservatism of the separate heads of the Armed Forces. The latter were characterized by haste and brazenness in the decision-making process concerning the reformation of a network of military-training establishments, and by the Department’s inexperience in this important area of military creation called military education. The prolonged lack of military doctrine in Ukraine also did not aid the normal creation of a military educational system, a program of perspective reformation of the Armed Forces and state development.

A thorough and complete study of the problem in this area has important public and scientific value. It will assist in an unbiased interpretation of a period of Ukrainian history connected to the revival of national military traditions and the creation of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. It is especially important now when Ukraine is undergoing a complicated period as a sovereign state. An objective scientific research of the history of the creation of the country, and the military in particular, will make it possible to use historical lessons learned creatively in decisions concerning sensitive problems relating to military development, and will supplement scientific efforts to produce military-historic facts.
Thorough research of the problem is also necessary as it concerns such an important aspect in the creation of the Ukrainian Armed Forces as defined by timeliness and legitimacy in executing the reforms in the military arena. This process infringes on the interests of many thousands of people and essentially influences a state political and economic condition. Thus, the need not only for concentrated economic calculations and sociological research surfaces, but an analysis of past events is also required. Domestic and world experience convincingly proves that the position of the army during turning points in the development of a society can affect its destiny radically.

Furthermore, there is actually an aspect of the problem that has not even been addressed, which is determining the factors that influenced the development of the military education system, and the role of a political, state and military during the creation of a national system for training military specialists.

Thus, the problem presented in this thesis is existent and must be thoroughly investigated. The scientific analysis of the associated materials is described to demonstrate the complex process involved in the formation and development of a national training system of military specialists during the creation of the Ukrainian Armed Forces.

The subject of this research is the system of training the officer cadre of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. Also researched is the process for creating the higher military education system in Ukraine during the formation of statehood and development of the Armed Forces as a component of the civil-military relations system.

A chronological framework of the research covers the period from January 1992 to December 1998, which is the time interval during which the foundation for the creation of the higher military education system was actually wrought, its organizational structure was formed, and an examination of the optimization of the functioning and integration in a national educational system was sought.

The purpose of this research is a comprehensive study of the events concerning the creation of a national higher military educational system, as well as a realization of the complete picture of creating an advanced military school in Ukraine.
The research consists of:

- studying the state of training of the officer cadre following the disintegration of the USSR military education system
- studying the objective reasons which resulted in the creation of a national higher military school in Ukraine,
- the analysis of the formation of a training system of the officer cadre during the creation of the Ukrainian Armed Forces
- the research of the internal processes of the training system of military specialists
- the definition of miscalculations, mistakes and achievements as a method to reform the higher military school
- discovering the progression of opinions regarding the creation of a modern officer cadre training system, the experience and lessons learned about the creation of higher military education in Ukraine during 1992-1998.

The methodological approach of this research creates historical tenets, as well as a study of the observable facts in their development, and the systematic processing of a significant volume of materials based on a comparative analysis.

The practical value of this research will be the conclusions reached that can be taken into account concerning the decisions about problems in the creation of a modern military in Ukraine, as well as about the system of training the officer cadre, in particular. The thesis also can be used to detail the generalization of popular scientific works, educational and help materials, from an historical viewpoint of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and its national military education.
II. HISTORICAL REQUIREMENTS FOR THE TRANSFORMATION OF
THE HIGHER MILITARY EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM IN UKRAINE

A. GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE MILITARY EDUCATION
INSTITUTIONS IN UKRAINE BEFORE THE COLLAPSE OF THE
SOVIET UNION

The military educational system of the Ukrainian Armed Forces was created based on military-training institutions of the USSR when independence was declared. Ukraine inherited 34 military educational institutions, including two military academies, 30 higher and two middle military schools and 73 military faculties of higher educational institutions.13

The aforementioned fragment of military education was led by the Military Engineering Radio-Technique Air Defense Academy (AD) located in Kharkiv, and the Military Academy of Air Defense of Land Forces with a contingent in Kiev.

The Military Engineering Radio-Technique AD Academy was intended for the training of military engineers in radio engineering and radio-electronic specialties for the armies of the country’s AD, and the Military AD Academy of Land Forces trained the military command and engineering cadre in the same specialties for the needs of the Land Forces.

The higher military schools were the primary section of the officer cadre training system of the USSR Armed Forces. They shared the higher military command schools (HMCS), the higher military engineering schools (HMES), the higher military aviation schools (HMAS), the higher naval schools (HNS) and the higher military-political schools (HMPS).14

The higher military command schools were intended for the training of command structure officers. They represented military-training establishments in which the primary training of officers was performed. The Land Forces included the army, tanks, artillery, anti-aircraft-rockets, military-engineering, a military-chemical school, a communications school, automobiles, as well as airborne, military-topographical and railway troops and


military communications. The training of command structure officers from the other branches of the Armed Forces was conducted in the corresponding schools of the branches of the Armed Forces of the USSR. HMCS trained officers for the organization unit’s actions and their control, as well as for the effective use and technically competent operation of weapon and military techniques. Such officers would completely possess command qualities and the most important practices of personnel training and education. This education lasted four years. After graduating from HMCS, the military rank of “lieutenant” was bestowed on the graduates and the diploma for higher military-special education, recognized by any institutions of the former USSR, was given.

There were nine military schools among the command schools of Land Forces in Ukraine, as well as one school, which trained the command cadre for the Air Defense armies.

The Kiev higher army command school was the only single school in Ukraine which trained the commanders of the motor-shooting divisions and which was the main school. It was unique in the former USSR in that it trained specialists in front line reconnaissance.

The Kharkiv Higher Tank Command School trained commanders of tank units. Three command schools trained specialists in artillery. These schools were the Khmelnitskiy Higher Artillery Command School (tow artillery), the Sumy Higher Artillery Command School, which was unique in Ukraine for training commanders in self-propelled artillery, and the Odessa Higher Artillery Command School for training specialists in the field of airborne and stationary artillery.

The Poltava Higher Antiaircraft-Rocket Command School, the Poltava higher Military Command School of Communication, and the Kamenets-Podolsk Higher Military Engineering Command School, trained the corresponding specialists for the services of Land forces. Lastly, in the USSR, there were only three such schools, which trained specialists in fortification and camouflage, creating minefields and clearing mines, diving, and so forth.
There were two more command schools which were engaged in the training of the officer cadre for the corresponding branches of the Armed Forces of the USSR: the Dnepropetrovsk higher antiaircraft rocket AD command school and the Kharkiv higher military command-engineering school of rocket troops.

The higher military engineering schools were intended to train the officer cadre in engineering in higher military-special education. They existed in all branches of the Armed Forces of the USSR, in almost all troop services, and special troops and services. The length of training in such schools was five years. The military rank of “lieutenant-engineer” was given to these graduates and the diploma in the higher engineering education, recognized by any institutions of the former USSR, was also given. The main subjects in these schools were military-technical. The future engineers received training on questions concerning their operations, storage and military repair, which closely resembled the knowledge on a structure of weapon and military techniques. During training, except for those cadets who were in a military probationary period, the cadets had to undergo industrial practice, and at the end of their training, had to do degree projects.

There were several engineering schools which trained the cadre of Land Forces: the Kiev Higher Tank Engineering School which trained the assistants of tank unit commanders on armaments; the Kiev Higher Military Engineering School and the Kiev Higher Antiaircraft Rocket Engineering School which trained the corresponding engineering cadre.

In turn, the Kiev Higher Engineering Radio Technique AD School and the Zhitomir Higher AD School of Radio Electronics trained specialists for the armies of the country’s AD. By the way, the Zhitomir School was the only single school in the former USSR which trained specialists in space activities.

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The higher military aviation schools were intended to train officers with a higher military-special education for the Air Force and the aviation section of the other branches of the Armed Forces of the USSR. There were separate schools for pilots, navigators and engineers. The length of training for pilots and navigators was 4 years, and five years for engineering.16

In Ukraine, after the disintegration of the USSR, only the Air Force had six higher military schools for training air specialists. Of them, two were for training pilots: the Kharkiv Higher Military Aviation School of Pilots and the Chernigov Higher Military Aviation School of Pilots. Navigators were trained at the Lugansk Higher Military Aviation School of Navigators. Specialists in communication and radio engineering maintenance of aircraft were trained in the Kharkiv Higher Military Aviation School of Radio Electronics. Two schools trained aviation engineers: the Kharkiv Higher Military Aviation-Engineering School and the Kiev Higher Military Aviation-Engineering School.

The higher naval schools trained the Navy fleet officers of the USSR. They trained officers of different organizations, such as for command, navigator specialties, rocket, artillery, antiship, and other kinds of weapons, engineering specialists on power, electro-technical, radio-electronic and other specialties. Training was for five years.17

The Black Sea Higher Naval School trained specialists in the field of armaments, including questions of the use of cruise missiles. The Sevastopol Higher Naval Engineering School specialized in training specialists in anti-chemical protection for all fleets in the USSR and on the operation of building nuclear ships.

Even though all military-training establishments of the USSR paid great attention to the brain washing military specialists, in the Armed Forces, a network of specialized educational institutions existed which trained “fighters of the ideological front”. These were the higher military-political schools. In Ukraine, four such educational institutions existed: the Donetsk Higher Military-Political School of Engineering Troops and


Communication Troops, the Kiev Higher Naval Political School, the Lviv Higher Military-Political School and the Simferopol Higher Military-Political Construction School.

Although practically all military-training establishments of the USSR Armed Forces trained military specialists for satellites countries, there were specialized military educational institutions in which only foreigners studied.

The Odessa Higher Military Unified Command-Engineering AD School was one such school, which has remained in Ukraine.

According to the common Order of the Minister of Defense of the USSR and the Chairman of the State Committee of the USSR on National Education No. 458/712, the military training of students under the program of reserve officers for the Armed Forces of the USSR was conducted at 73 military faculties of higher civil educational institutions in Ukraine. Military training was also conducted for students of both sexes in medicine at higher schools.

At the beginning of 1992, more than 39,000 people worked in military educational institutions, including 4,500 officers. Approximately 3,000 people continuously worked at military faculties, and the number of teachers and officers was 1,439.

Thus, after the disintegration of the Soviet Union, a large part of the higher military education system of the Armed Forces of the USSR was in Ukraine. Despite this diversity and large number of schools, the qualitative needs of the Armed Forces of Ukraine for specialists trained in all the necessary military-registration specialties could not be satisfied. In addition, it was a very heavy burden for the economy of the young Ukrainian state.

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18 Order of the Minister of Defense of the USSR and the Chairman of the State Committee of the USSR on National Education N 458/712 from 25 of November 1990, No. 458/712 “About Military Training of Students (Cadets) in Higher Military Educational Institutions According to the Reserve Officers Program”.

B. CONDITION OF THE OFFICER CADRE TRAINING BEFORE THE CREATION OF THE UKRAINIAN NATIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION SYSTEM

When the Soviet Army ceased to exist, its military educational system was suffering from numerous problems. The reasons for this uncommon situation were observed economically and socially during the last years of the Soviet era, and negatively affected the teaching and educational process in military educational institutions.

Radical political and economic changes, a change in the ideological reference points, a new political way of thinking, and a new approved defensive doctrine, led to the start of military reform which demanded the development of new principles for creating a military whose priority would be guided by qualitative parameters.

During this period, the need for a new kind of a specialist began to materialize. They were to have a broad outlook, extensive military, military-technical and military-economic knowledge. They were supposed to possess an insightful ability to think creatively, and to be the conduits for culture and education.

The higher military education system which was historically developed in the Armed Forces of the USSR, covered a large number of various military-training establishments and consisted of three basic stages:

- Training of qualified specialists in military schools (4-5 years);
- Receiving higher military education in the academies of the branches of the Armed Forces (3 years),
- Military Academy of the General Staff (2 years).

At first, the two stages the cadets and students trained for were the performance of concrete official duties with the prospect of obtaining 2-3 higher positions. Thus, only certain areas of armaments and military techniques were studied. Training for specialists of an operative, operative-strategic and strategic nature was conducted towards the end of the training at the Military Academy of the General Staff. Continuous current training in the system of command training was conducted together with fundamental general training as well as courses geared towards improving qualifications.

Military specialists stated that in such a system of military education, the quality of training never met the requirements of that time. The reason was that the mass approach to training the officer cadre was widely adopted. It harmed the development of
analytical thinking and creativity of those who studied. Attempts were made to compensate for all these deficiencies, mainly by redistributing the kinds of training conducted and the time spent in such training and increasing the amount of material taught. This has led to the students and cadets being completely overloaded. The physiological recommendations concerning the amount of teaching materials mastered by the students were also ignored.

The study of the training system for specialists possessing a higher military education has demonstrated that within the framework of existing programs, there exists increasing discrepancy between the volume of knowledge necessary for students and the constant number of school hours, which is impossible to exceed. Thus, the average level at which the information reached a saturation point concerning the lecture material exceeded the capability of a person to process the information two-fold. Therefore, to fix this problem of receiving information during the first 24 hours after absorbing it, the student should obtain 75 percent of the new material from a literature review. However, this process did not occur at once, and consequently, up to one quarter of the information was simply lost.

The fundamental theoretical training of students was included in all educational periods but did not always occur regularly. The reason posited was that each discipline had one or several sections, which only provided its requirements due to the lack of a congruous system of links between the subject that reduced the quality of obtaining knowledge and skills. Opportunities to employ pedagogical innovations and intensive pedagogical technologies by then were used insufficiently. The quality of training of the officer cadre was negatively affected by the dominant theory in the military of the pedagogical “subject-by-subject” approach to training. The students formed habits and skills for future professional work based on a disconnected system of learning different subjects. Each professor was responsible only for ensuring that the graduates received

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cumulative knowledge, which was provided by the program in a given discipline, and not the skills needed to solve a problem, which they would eventually encounter when performing their functional duties.22

In the advanced schools, an environment was not created to search for new innovative methods to improve the educational process. Non-traditional forms and methods of organizing classes were not employed, nor were the most gifted students and cadets provided any individual focused, challenging work. The use of new information technologies and computerized training was not possible because of the lack of diverse computer facilities built locally, which could not help in the training of modern specialists. As a result, since investments in education were not always evaluated and scientifically proven, the material resources of many military-training establishments seriously lagged behind current requirements while other HMEIs were inundated with technical training methods that did not remedy the training objectives.

According to official assignments to resolve actual situations, the training of officers was basically done by reinforcing the same thing over and over. Such an approach adversely affected the future work of the graduates of schools and academies. As a rule, they were appointed to different positions, and were basically taught only to operate within “a narrow circle” of specialties.

Practical training in advanced schools was achieved due to a decrease in the amount of study in fundamental disciplines that resulted in a sharp reduction in efficiency, in particular, the training of graduates in the operation of particular kinds of technical equipment and armaments. The additional expenses were required for the prolonged reeducation and training of military specialists after a transition to new kinds of training. Since they did not have the basic fundamental training, the specialists, as a rule, were not sufficiently flexible in their thinking and did not possess the necessary theoretical knowledge as well, and were disoriented in non-standard situations. They were not always able to provide assistance in, nor predict the failure of, nor the need to repair armaments and military technical equipment in disrepair.

The structure and the contents of the educational process did not allow for the development of the student’s creative thought processes because the training was too complicated, and the manner in which the classes were organized had not been changed in tens years. Formalism and simplicity in the assessment and control of training occurred. This was explained by a lack of precise criteria for an objective assessment of the knowledge of cadets and students, due to liberalism and not insisting strongly enough for an efficient teaching structure.

In the majority of the military schools, training was organized so that in the beginning of the educational process, the cadets did not feel a connection between the received knowledge and any future activity. It not only slows the pace of cognitive motivation development, but also negatively influences the specialist’s training as a whole. In particular, a similar damaging situation also occurred in the common command training of cadets at the command-engineering school, where corresponding disciplines were studied during the first quarters. This knowledge was subsequently lost when it was not applied after graduation.23

Military specialists complained of an insufficient level of integration of education with fundamental and applied sciences, modern technologies and technical methods, that meet the standards of the examples set worldwide.

The professional standard of some of the teachers was low. In a number of the advanced schools, the results of an investigation of the difficult verification and certification process revealed that 20 and more percent of the professors only received a grade of a “C” in personal training. Despite actions taken, which were implemented, the increase in the scientific and teaching potential of military schools has practically decreased. The full potential of many of the scientists did not exceed 20-30 percent. Some of the scientists ceased scientific activity, but an improvement in the educational process did not occur.24

It is important to note that the overwhelming majority of the faculty hired at military-training establishments came from the officer ranks. A special system of selection did not exist. Only personnel institutions performed this process. Military

23 Ibid.
24 Ibid.
educational institutions received cadre from time to time who did not specialize in pedagogical work, and did not show any inclination towards it. Many were not ready for such intense overloaded schedules and the daily hard work required for training cadets and self-education. It was hard to expect that this person would be successful, due to the negligible lack of culture, language difficulties, bad diction, and a lack of skill in giving truly methodical classes. This essential deficiency also existed in the military education system of the former USSR.

For example, in each branch of the Armed Forces of the USSR, a branch of the service defined its own requirements for future graduates, directed an activity at the subordinated advanced schools, supervised and estimated the quality of the training needed for the specialists. As has been demonstrated over time, this sometimes resulted in the requests for specialists from restricted department positions, and required work on improving the training and the quality of officer’s training.

Between the controlling institutions, no concrete distribution of tasks and areas of responsibility were delineated. The scientific approach at all stages was not completely provided for planning at the organizational or departmental level, and to manage HMEI.25

Research in military education has demonstrated that the majority of the organizational documents did not correspond to their assignments. Thus, they did not allow for taking into account the specificity of HMEI and the opportunities to provide the necessary changes in the educational process.26

The requirements of the Minister of Defense of the USSR concerning the replacement of administrative posts at military educational institutions by the skilled scientific and pedagogical cadre were not implemented. Thus, in 1991, approximately 90 percent of the HMEI chiefs and a certain number of the heads of faculties at the time they were assigned the positions did not possess any operational experience in military-training establishments.27

27 Ibid.
The system of selecting candidates for training in military educational institutions such as academies and military schools was essentially lacking. For example, the Military Academy of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR has practically been deprived of the right to select officers and generals for training. Military districts, departmental branches of the Armed Forces, and the Ministry of Defense and the General Staff determined who entered these institutions. The widely held view was that these institutions, having incontestable authority, were more qualified to select the cadre’s training. Other officers at other military academies were also selected for training in a similar manner, the only difference being that the influential institutions determining who was to be trained were considered of a lower caliber.

This manner of acquiring candidates severely harmed the training of the military cadre. Very often talented and creative candidates were denied an opportunity to receive an advanced military education solely by virtue of the character of the key officers. On the other hand, the extensive use of protectionism and personal connections emerged.

The quality of the cadets selected for military schools was poor. Military schools admitted young cadets who were not ready to master the program at a higher military school. As a result of this practice, the progress of the cadets deteriorated and the number of cadets discharged increased. From the graduation of 1991, for the period of training at the military schools, the number of cadets discharged was over 11,000 equaling more than 22 percent of those who had signed up for training. The number discharged for poor progress has increased more than two-fold.

Thus, all the above-stated deficiencies as well as the insufficiencies of the higher military educational system of the Armed Forces of the USSR were the main reasons for the extensive development of the higher military school. As a result, a significant number of graduates were poorly trained in what was needed for regular service. They neither possessed the necessary skills to operate the new systems of armaments nor received adequate training or education. Since the very moment the officers started to perform their daily duties they faced with the problems of their performance.

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29 Ibid.
III. THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF THE FIRST STAGES OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF HIGHER MILITARY EDUCATION SYSTEMS IN UKRAINE


Three periods characterize the creation of the higher military education system. The first was 1992-1993, the second 1994 – 1995, and the third 1996 - 1998.\textsuperscript{30}

The analysis of the events occurring at the beginning of the reform of military education indicates that the creation of the officer cadre training system outpaced the development of the Ukrainian Armed Forces of as a whole. Both issues are probably related in both achievements and significant miscalculations. What is unfortunate is the subjectiveness of these issues, which caused the lack of a state approach.

The need to reform the higher military education system was not limited to its excessiveness or economic complexity. Almost all the controls for this system have remained outside Ukraine. The military educational institutions that remained in Ukraine did not provide the necessary training of specialists in all the military-registration specialties for the Armed Forces. Those who were not trained, for example, included pilots of military-transport and bombing aircraft, helicopter pilots, commandoes, medical workers, support personnel, motorists, chemists, financiers, lawyers, railway men, and so forth. In addition, the military educational system could not be excluded from the reorganization of the entire Ukrainian state educational system.

The creators of the higher military education system were faced with the task of developing a normative-legal basis. In addition, it was necessary to resolve the daily issues relevant to maintaining the continuous process of training military specialists, the realization of the administrative and control functions and the decisions concerning some social questions.

In the process of the creation of independent system of higher military education in Ukraine its creators were faced with a series of complicated problems:

- insufficient information concerning the higher military education systems of the leading countries of the world;

- imperfection of a normative-legal basis of the State, the Military doctrine in particular;

- instability of an economic and sociopolitical situation in the country;

- need for a fundamental reorganization of the networking structure of military educational institutions and the military specialists training organizations of all the specialties;

- need for a rational definition of a role, place, tasks and amalgam of the higher military education system in the common structure of the Armed Forces of Ukraine;

- necessity of the complex approach to the creation of the higher military education system;

- necessity of the creation and introduction of a military specialists training basis which would respond to the tendencies and national interests of the modern world.31

The analysis of accessible information sources, including departmental documents, confirms that the development of the reform of the higher military education began publicly by a group of military education specialists, headed by the chief of an Educational Department of the Kiev Higher Tank Engineering School, Colonel U. M. Prokofjev. The first official mention of the reform of military education occurs in the directive of the Minister of Defense No D-5 of January 22, 1992 on “About Development of Military Education during the Reform Process of the Armed Forces of Ukraine”

It was evident in the Directive: “At the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine the Commission Works on the Reform of Military Education and Science”. The commission has been developed and coordinated with the Ukrainian State educational system based on a scientifically proved concept of military educational reform. The department of military education was added to the structure of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, to which is assigned the Department of military schools, training centers of the branches of

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31 Ibid.
the Armed Forces, pre-conscription, draftee training of younger specialists, pre-high school and higher school training of specialists and the scientific and pedagogical cadre in doctoral studies.”32

The directive demanded from the newly created department of military education created deadlines, until April 1, 1992, to develop a package of normative documents to include projects on the resolution of the higher military-training establishments and the military faculties of the higher civil educational institutions as well as military lyceums. It was also necessary to develop the project of the Resolution of the Cabinet of Ministers concerning the pre-conscript training of youths and the manual on specialists training for the Armed Forces in the educational organizations of the Society of Assistance to Defense of Ukraine. By September 1, 1992, the development of the project on the regulations of student’s military training at higher civil educational institutions under the program of reserve officers was to occur. The recommendation to the head of the department of military education was to develop the program by March 1, the reform plan by August 1, and the project of “Resolution about Certification of Constant Personnel of the Higher Military Educational Institutions,” and then begin certification as of September 1, 1992.

Long before the existence of the Directive No. D-5 and the Department of Military Education, documents about reform have been considered by the Commission of the Verkhovna Rada concerning issues of defense and state security, authorized without a collective vote, and was only signed by the Vice-President V. P. Lemeha and33 Verkhovna Rada did not approve this decision made by the Commission. The package of documents also has been considered by the Commission of national education and science, has met with approval in the conceptual plan, and the execution of reform in the higher military educational institutions has been recommended by the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine.34

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32 Ibid.
34 Ibid.
In October 1991, once again long before the creation of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine and its divisions, the “Regulations about the Commission Concerning Reform of Military Education,” authorized by the Chairman of the Commission of the Verkhovna Rada concerning questions of defense and state security appeared.35

“The Regulations about of the Commission” were issued before the Directive of Minister of Defense of Ukraine No. D-5 appeared. In May 1992, the Minister of Defense settled the status of the Commission.

Although the No.D-5 Directive demanded the development of the project of Resolution concerning the certification of the constant structure of the higher military educational institutions by August 1, 1992, only on April, 2, 1992 did a signed document by General-Major U.M.Prokofjev materialize called the “Temporary Resolution on the Organization and Carrying Out of Certifications (Verifications) of the Higher Military-Training Institutions of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine.”

The document concerning the decisions and regulations of reform appear in the Order of Minister of Defense of Ukraine No. 133 on July 25, 1992 entitled “About Reforming Military Education System in Ukraine.” The Decision of Defense Council of Ukraine on June 4, 1992, recommended that the Head of Department of Military Education from July 1992 to August 1996 execute step-by-step reform of all types of training of Ukrainian citizens for military service. This training included pre-conscription and draftee training, training in military lyceums, trainings of the cadre officers and reserves in military training sections (faculties) and military chairs of higher educational institutions of the Ministry of Education, training of cadets and students in military educational institutions. Also, it was recommended that the establishment of the Academy of the Ukrainian Armed Forces begin, and included, three interdepartmental and five departmental military educational institutions, nine military lyceums, three sections, two faculties of military training, two military faculties and 39 military faculties in 48 higher educational institutions of the Ministry of Education.

35 Ibid.
The Order required that cadets and students not be enrolled since 1992 in 17 military-training establishments. After the training of cadets and students concluded their studies at these establishments, including those who had been enlisted before 1991, these educational institutions were to be completely closed. In time, the agreement with the Ministry of Education was cancelled as specified in the Order, military training was ended and 30 military chairs at the higher civil educational institutions were eliminated.

The above mentioned facts demonstrate that the Minister of Defense of Ukraine exceeded his powers, and Order No. 133 could not be recognized as a legislative act, because according to article 8 of the Law of Ukraine “About the Defense of Ukraine,” the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine can only develop and submit for consideration to the President of Ukraine projects concerning state programs on the construction and development of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. However, the Minister of Defense cannot perform any actions without coordinating them directly with the President according to the hierarchy of Ukrainian Armed Forces. The reference to the Minister of Defense concerning the decision of the Defense Council of Ukraine also appears to be unlawful, because the Defense Council of Ukraine does not possess legislative powers and its decision cannot be referred to.

Only in August 1992 did the Resolution of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine No. 490 “About Reform of Military Education” appear with the aim of perfecting the training of specialists in the Ukrainian Armed Forces. The Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine decides:

To create higher educational institutions, and a list of these establishments exists. The Ministry of Defense should carry out the necessary organizational job to create the specified educational institutions to begin training cadets and students by September 1, 1993. Again, the created higher schools can conduct the training of master degree students until 1999 without accreditation.

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38 Ibid.
Furthermore, the resolution also discusses the nine lyceums and contains a list of military educational institutions in which the enrollment of students and cadets ended because they were eliminated, and this list coincides with the list in Order No. 133.


According to the Law “About Defense of Ukraine,” article 7, the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine creates and eliminates military educational institutions, research organizations of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and military chairs of higher civil educational institutions.

The practical actions concerning the reform of advanced military education were developed as follows.

In the beginning of January 1992 the meeting on questions of military development occurred. The Minister of Defense of Ukraine General-Major K. Morozov and the head of Department of Military Education Colonel J. Prokofjev responded with command speeches. In the speech, Colonel J. Prokofjev emphasized the large backlog in the military education system and began some aspects of the reform of the training system for the officer cadre for the Ukrainian Armed Forces.

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At the end of January, the aforementioned directive of the Minister of Defense of Ukraine No. D-5 appeared. Colonel J. Prokofjev presented the idea of the creation of the document in “The Concept of the Military Education Reform”.43

The authorized aforementioned concept, or its project, was not found in the information sources which I was able to access. This position, to some extent, explains the documentation to which Colonel J. Prokofjev adheres. His assistant at the Department of Military Education, General-Major V. Pilipchuk stated that:

The fact is that the Concept is practically absent. There is a general idea of the direction of reform and the plan to decrease the number of higher schools. This document has not passed through scientific examination and practical approbation within the precincts of a military educational institution. It has not been substantiated economically nor does it have a legal basis, and in addition, is not connected to reforming the branches and sections of the Armed Services.44

Despite the above statement, the Colonel, by the time General-Major, J. Prokofjev emphasized the existence of the concept in numerous statements, concerning what the jobs of the large collective of leading scientists of Ukraine are, discussions on such documents never occurred publicly in any form. No legal, comprehensive documents were ever provided.45

In the opinion of U. Prokofjev’s supporters, the reform of the higher military education system should be begun by merging the scientific and pedagogical potential and training-material resources of existing military educational institutions and creating nine new establishments for officer cadre training. They expected that this would allow for the creation of educational institutions to function effectively, reduce administrative structures, and lower the costs of training military specialists.46 In addition, they wanted


to execute the requirements of the Law of Ukraine “About Education”\textsuperscript{47} and the Resolution of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine No. 303 dated June 1, 1992\textsuperscript{48} concerning the conditions about the accreditation of higher educational institutions in Ukraine. According to this Resolution, the higher school had the right to exist and provide the opportunity to be accredited as a center for bachelor’s degree level training only if the number of scientists in each specialty was fifty percent. Therefore, reformers wanted to create such military educational institutions, which would provide not only bachelor level degrees, but also master level training. It was then necessary for seventy percent of the faculty to have a doctoral degree.

The latter played a very large role in the fate of many existent higher military educational institutions in 1992, and for some, this was a fatal blow.

An example is the fate of the Kiev Higher Army School, the Kharkiv Higher Tank Command School, the Zhitomir Higher School of AD Radio Electronics, the Sumy Higher Artillery Command School and others. In the opinion of General-Major J. Prokofjev and his colleagues, these establishments were certified due to the very low scientific potential of 15-20 percent.\textsuperscript{49} At times, a certain level of irrationality seems to prevail. Thus, the Kharkiv and Chernigov higher military schools of pilots were blamed for the fact that among the pilot-instructor structure, the basic educational link, did not include a teacher possessing a scientific degree,\textsuperscript{50} although even the advanced countries of the world do not require that the specialists have a scientific degree in a particular field. As to the requirements for certification of the higher military educational institutions, the Regulations concerning the organization and execution of certification, developed three months before the requirements of No. D-5 directive and authorized by


the chief of the Department of military education, General-Major J. Prokofjev, did not provide an exact number for teachers possessing a scientific degree. Thus, according to the afore-stated position, the military school received its certification:

If it is ready to perform the tasks on the applicability for the mobilization period and during wartime, the educational and methodical job, qualifications of the faculty, scientific positions, the training-material resources and the Department of the higher school according to its officials are certificated, individual training of not less than 95 percent of the students (cadets) in the last year is certified positively.51

By the way, the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine in Resolution No. 490,52 permitted newly created military educational institutions to conduct training at a Master’s level until 1999 without being accredited, that, probably, was caused by the lack of the necessary scientific potential even after the merger of the earlier existent military educational institutions into new organizations.

The head of the Department of Military Education, General-Major U. Prokofjev declared, that, upon approving the creation of the officer cadre training centers and the Department together with defining the scientific potential of the existing military educational institutions, he studied the training-material resources of HMEI and took into consideration the necessary number of specialists needed for the Ukrainian Armed Forces.53 The question was raised on how the supporters of reform determined the number of necessary specialists for the Ukrainian Armed Forces but finally on October 19, 1993, the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine determined the final number of the Ukrainian army which was up to 450,000 men.54


At the beginning of military educational reform, the customers, the Armed Forces, branches and army services, and main departments, could not determine the list of their necessary specialties, could not train the number of specialists required or requested, and could not take part in personnel and material support of the higher military educational institutions. The reason was a lack of military doctrine and uncertainty in the final number of Armed Forces and the corresponding normative-legal basis. To offer any structure to the higher military education systems, they had to determine the guiding principles needed during the creation of such a system.

By the time reform began, the principles were as follows:

- First, it is necessary to fulfill the terms of the officer training which should provide the quantity and level of training of graduates from the military educational institutions. The contingent must be enrolled as based on a need following the end of the training instead of the year enrolled. The terms for the specialist should coincide with military doctrine, quantitative structure and structure of the Armed forces;

- Second, the occupation of the specialists should be unequivocally determined, which are subject to replacement by graduates with the necessary level of training. In other words, the education level needed for those or other positions that have to be replaced should be determined.55

Thus, during this aforementioned phase, it was necessary for the Department of Military Education to determine the necessary military specialties needed for the Ukrainian Armed Forces, and to add them to the Order. Expediently, it was better to do this after completing the general reform of the Ukrainian Armed Forces.

Accordingly, the reorganization of the army was considered the top priority instead of HMEI. The number of specialists required and requested would also create the necessary military education system.

Therefore, the statements of General-Major U. Prokofyev that the supporters of military education reform based their conclusions on the calculations of the number of specialists necessary for the Armed Forces because of the uncertainty in the number of Armed Forces and absence of the military doctrine seem uncertain and vague.

According to the concept of the military education system reforming all command schools in Ukraine which trained officers for the troops capable of conducting operations directly, reductions were bound to occur. Workers at the Kharkiv tank-building factory were fired from the Kharkiv Tank Command School, where students were taught science. At the same time, in Kiev, the distance between the Tank Engineering School and the nearest training ground was 75 kilometers, and was designed for the training of the assistants for the commanders of sections, instead of commanders of tank platoons. The Kiev Army School was disbanded. It was the only school in the USSR specializing in front line reconnaiss ance.56

Command officers of the Kiev army school tried to convince military education reformers of the need to keep them as they were unique military educational institutions in the former USSR. The Kiev army school was known for exclusive training-material resources, and educational and scientific expertise of a certain number of professors which allowed the Kiev HMACS to be counted among the advanced schools of the Soviet Army. However, the school has been disbanded, and its cadets moved to the new school created at the Odessa Institute of Land Forces. Further events have demonstrated that moving cadets to Odessa, did affect the professional training of future commanders of motor-shooting platoons in a negative manner. The former unified Odessa higher army schools were designated for a certain number of foreign students. It was also created for them, as was the current methodology of teaching them. The 3rd year Kiev cadets who had already stayed at the Institute of Infantry never completed exercises for training in shooting in the armaments of the personnel vehicle carriers (PVC). Practical training in automobile driving took place in classes (indoors). The lack of practical skills in operating modern armaments and technical equipment was substituted by drills.57

According to the concept of reformation, the Kharkiv Higher Tank Command School ceased to exist, but in 1994, based on the decision of the Military Collegium of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense, the school was provided with a full number of cadets.

The 2nd and 3rd year cadets from the Kiev and Odessa Military Institutes of Land Forces were moved to the Kharkiv Higher Tank Command School, and cadets were once again enrolled in this school.

Reform provided that the two military institutes would train officers for the Land forces. This decision resulted from an analysis of the structure of military education in other countries although the same foreign experience demonstrated, that together with large military-training establishments, conditionally it is possible to call them departmental, schools in sections of service branches exist. The official idea of the Department of military education concerning what kind of specialists to train in the Kiev and Odessa Institutes of Land Forces was not accepted by some military specialists. Thus, the Department of Military Education expected to charge the Kiev Military Institute with the training of officers-commanders, engineers, and technique specialist for tank and automobile armies and specialists of the logistics. The Odessa Military Institute was to train officers-commanders for motor-shooting armies, officers and commanders, engineers, technique specialist and other specialists for artillery. The reasons for such a decision were absolutely unclear to the specialists of military education and their stated remarks can be condensed as follows:

- the Kiev tank school, on the basis of which the Institute of Land Forces was created, had no teaching structure which could provide qualitative training to officers of the logistics, and in the near future, could not have, because it takes approximately 3 years to train such a teacher;
- Errors existed in the use of training-material resources. In both newly created institutes, it was fundamentally necessary in the shortest time possible, of 2-8 months, to reconstruct and construct anew the subject matter in the classroom-laboratory, field and experiments. The foundation of the existing educational institutions, which were to be used, could facilitate the resolution of this task, but not as completely as had been envisioned for the training of younger specialists. As I already mentioned, the events related to the training of commanders for motor-shooting divisions in the Odessa Institute of Land Forces have completely confirmed the predictions of military specialists.

The military press expressed the ideas concerning some of the deficiencies in of the creation of the Kiev Institute of the Department and Communication based on the on the basis of dismantlement of the Kiev Higher Military Engineering School Of

Communication, The Kiev Higher Engineering AD Radio Technical School and the Kiev Higher Naval Political School. As it was stated in January 1994, it was not possible to unify the chairs and faculties into one unit.\(^{59}\) Only on the surface did these HMEI seem related. Communication and air defense are absolutely two different things. One of the arguments for more closely aligning these military educational institutions was a reduction of administrative personnel. In January 1994, the number of cadets in the new institute decreased by one fifth, but the number of administrative personnel increased by 70 percent.\(^{60}\)

According to plans of the Department of Military Education, the higher military aviation schools of pilots and navigators were consolidated into the Kharkiv Institute of Air Forces pilots.

The commander of the 17th Air Army, General-Major V. Kolody, to whom at that time the HMEI was subordinated, expressed his own point of view on this matter. He considered that a basic change in the existing system of pilot’s training, which was refined over several decades, is extremely ineffectual, and resulted in arguments against the creation of the Kharkiv Institute\(^{61}\) as follows:

- The formation will be very costly. Specialists have determined that only an expansion of a communication center at a new base in Kharkiv would require approximately 330 million rubles (at 1992 prices). Also, a completed institute necessitated new buildings, departments and laboratories that did not exist.

- It was supposed to teach cadets on Jak-52 planes and Mi-2 helicopters, which were not produced in Ukraine. Therefore, it was necessary to buy them. A total purchase price of only the aviation technical equipment was 4.5 billion rubles. Thus, taking into account all the additional equipment needed, this amount increased to 6 billion.

The idea to create an institute, in the opinion of General-Major V. Kolody, had not been given enough time to be completely considered. Also, the system of applications, distribution of air space, aviation training grounds and the organization of flights had also not been thoroughly considered. The system of organizing the control, planning and management of pilot training was uncertain. The questions concerning the


\(^{60}\) Ibid.

structure of the Department of Combat Support, armaments, and communication systems have not been solved. The radio engineering service of flights was also not accomplished. In other words, the structures necessary for maintaining the Chernigov and Lugansk branches of the Kharkiv Institute of pilots were nonexistent.

As time has demonstrated, the unification of the five aviation schools into one Kharkiv Institute of the Air Forces pilots led to that optimization of its organizational-staff structure prior to 1998. The great costs related to its creation has forced the command of the institute to inform the Ministry of Defense that it is not able to execute the Order of Minister of Defense No. 133 and the Order of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine No. 490 for the training to begin in 1994.

However, despite disparaging remarks of specialists concerning the reform process, the Department of Military Education gradually introduced the ideas over time. This was aided by the fact that, according to the Order of Minister of Defense of Ukraine No. 133, the Department of Military Education had subordinated to itself to all military educational institutions and military faculties, received the rights to their financing and consequently, could dictate what was to be reformed.

The tendency towards monopolism in the area of military education was also demonstrated by the 1993 events in which the Department of military education issued and signed the Order No. 96 on May 13, 1993 at the Ministry of Defense “About personnel in military education system”. According to the Order, the list of officers’ occupations within the military educational system was selected from the enlisted record of positions in the Ukrainian Armed Forces and official military ranks were unreasonably and intentionally misused. The Order of Minister of Defense No. 185/1206 of December 20, 1995 cancelled the previous Order.

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The opportunity to accept individual decisions made by the Department of Military Education confirms the words of General-Major D. Umanets, the head of Management and Development of the Ukrainian Armed Forces:

We shall recollect the first steps in the development of our army. This time, the military administration, as a matter of fact, did not have a plan and program for the development of the Armed Forces with a clear understanding of the current and urgent tasks, and future tasks. Therefore, it was not strange at all, that, when based on that or other decisions, the chief who was in a higher service position, could insist, press, impose his own desires on others, who as a rule, did not share his point of view. Afterwards, these orders and directives appeared. And their fulfillment stopped halfway through, or worst case scenario, ended completely. As a result, considerable sums of money and material means were thrown out the drain, and present and future destinies of the people involved were shattered.65

The aforementioned shows that on June 12, 1992, the head of the Department of Military Education signed directive No. 4 “About the Creation of Faculties of Ukrainian Studies in Military-Training Establishments of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine.”66 Although the reform of military education of the Ukrainian Armed Forces has also stated the new principles concerning the approach of military chairs to the training of the military specialists, in many respects, the previous mechanisms of resolving the most complicated tasks have been left undecided. The Department of Military Education vociferously declared the creation of new chairs, without considering the costs of the necessary means and coordinating the financing for this process. Therefore, military educational institutions, which had to execute the order, had started to create chairs in Ukraine on their own, somehow.

Events, which developed around the HMEI, to some extent, overshadowed questions of military education at higher educational institutions of the Ministry of Education and newly created educational institutions for pre-conscripted youth - military lyceums.


According to the Order of Minister of Defense of Ukraine No. 133 and the Resolution of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine No. 490 at higher educational institutions of the Ministry of Public Education, the following were created: three sections of military training at the Kiev State University, the Kiev Medical Institute and the Lviv Polytechnic Institute, two faculties of military training at the Kiev Institute Of Engineers of Civil Aviation and the Kiev Polytechnic Institute, two military faculties: the military-engineering faculty at the Kamenets-Podolsk Agricultural Institute, and the military-building faculty at the Crimean Institute of Environment Protection and Resort Construction, and 39 military chairs.

The list of higher educational institutions of the Ministry of Education, in which military faculties were disbanded, contained 30 educational institutions.67

By the way, seven educational institutions on this list were located in the western region of the country. And the fact that thirty of them were disbanded and many military higher schools were reduced generated a lack of trust towards the reform among the people of this region and the feeling of negligence of state interests on behalf of the reformers as the possibility of regular military service of young people of western regions were drastically reduced. Also, people suspected that reformers did not respect state interests because the opportunities for youth from the western areas for cadre military service were severely limited.68 At the same time, when, for example, in Kharkiv, two powerful military higher schools were created, the Kharkiv Military University and the Kharkiv Institute of the Air Force pilots, six additional military chairs69 remained in the city.

As events of that time have demonstrated, the Department of Military Education, unreasonable, individual decisions were made concerning the motivation of the process of reducing the Ukrainian Armed Forces and a decrease in mobilization tasks, without coordination with the Ministry of State Resources70

It is necessary to note that the creation of the military training system in the higher civil educational institutions was progressive. This made it possible to train military specialists in specialties not available at military educational institutions of the Ministry of Defense. Thus, for example, the faculty of military training at the Kiev Institute of Engineers of Civil Aviation started to train specialists in the following specialties: military communications in air transport, construction and operation of air stations and supply of combustive-lubricating materials.\(^71\) The faculty of military training at the Dnepropetrovsk Institute of Engineers of Railway Transportation started training officers for service in railway troops and in commandant's offices of military communications.\(^72\) The section of military training at the Lviv Polytechnic Institute started training military journalists, translators, cultural workers, motorists, lawyers, financiers, topographers, conductors and officers for airmobile troops.\(^73\)

According to the Order of the Minister of Defense of Ukraine No. 133, the Department of military education had to develop as well as create projects of normative documents for the training organization and by February 1993 as stated in the “Statement about Military Educational Institutions of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine.”

In April 1992, the Department of military education created the aforementioned Statement - the basic normative document that would regulate the activities of military educational institutions.\(^74\)

Analysis of the document clearly demonstrates that the newly created document almost completely duplicates the Order of Minister of Defense of the USSR. It is unclear why the proclamation of new principles concerning military education and the rejection of previously learned experience from predecessors and reform supporters have relegated recommendations concerning Soviet military education to the back burner when it concerns the higher military school of Ukraine.

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By the end of 1993, such educational institutions as the following were created: the Academy of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, three interdepartmental and five departmental military-training establishments, two sections and three faculties of military training, two military faculties and 41 military chairs in 48 educational institutions of the Ministry of Education.\(^75\)

According to the joint Order of the Minister of Defense and the Minister of Education of Ukraine No. 039/1 of May 4, 1993, for the first time, in the higher civil educational institutions of Ukraine, the training of the cadre officers began in their own divisions of military training in the sections of military training of the Kiev State University and the Lviv Polytechnic Institute, at the faculty of military training of the Kiev Institute of Engineers of Civil Aviation, at the military chairs of the Dnepropetrovsk Institute of Engineers of Railway Transportation, at the Ivano-Frankovsk Institute of Oil and Gas, at the Kiev Institute of Light Industry Technology, at the Odessa Hydrometeorological Institute, at the Odessa Institute of the Food-Processing Industry Technology and at the Ukrainian State Agrarian University.\(^76\)

Events of 1993 have demonstrated that the reform of military education was the most sensitive area in the creation of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. Anyhow, this process infringed upon the interests of many thousands of people who worked in the area of military education. In this area, the most inconsistent and most irreconcilable views were expressed, both on the part of adherents to the concept of reform, and on the part of their opponents.

The first attributes introduced about the accepted concept of military education reformation appeared in the beginning of 1993. The Minister of Defense of Ukraine, General-Colonel K. Morozov, in an interview on April 17, 1993, stated:

Unfortunately, meanwhile not all this is investigated thoroughly, not all is understandable, meanwhile, and not everything is determined. And today the common definition of known conceptual approaches to the reform of military education, even for me as a Minister of Defense, in general is

\(^75\) “What Do We Have and What Should We Have: The Data of National Institute of Strategic Studies,” Shliak Peremogy, 1994, 30 April (No. 18-19), p. 5.

uncertain concerning the question of subordination of educational institutions as well as the order for using their scientific potential by commanders and cadres of branches of the Armed Forces, and in particular, the order concerning their maintenance, regulation of educational process, etc. Issues which concern questions of special training, were not resolved completely as well. In fact, each military profession contains many such features. Therefore, decisions about additional study of these questions were accepted. The order was signed, which created the authoritative commission led by the Deputy of the Minister of Defense.77

The Order of Minister of Defense of Ukraine No. 244 was issued in October 1993. It stated that the reform of military-training establishments and the creation of a military education system was to be executed. A large number of jobs concerning the development and embodiment of the concept, plans to reform, the creation of a system of higher educational institutions, centers of science, integration of military education and science with the state education system have been executed. The officer cadre is in transition with training according to the new educational plans and programs. At the same time, the Order stated that if the terms of performance of the plans for reform to occur fail, then the terms for approving the organizational structures of military educational institutions are null and void. Delays have resulted in the approval of the Statements “About Military Education in Ukraine”, “About the Department of Military Education of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine”, “About Military Training of Students”, “About Centers of Science of Military Educational Institutions”, and so forth, due to the lack of experience which hamper the reform of military education.

At a briefing in April 1994, in which the Chief of the Main Department of Military Education, General-Major V. Gudym participated, journalists were informed that during the hasty reform by the end of 1993 the unique military educational institutions had been eliminated and that the teaching staff was lost and many teachers left the army forever. According to the data of the Main Department of Personnel of the Ukrainian Armed Forces since the beginning of 1992 by the end of 1993, 1,000 teachers left military schools, among them, more than 250 with scientific degrees.78 In those higher


schools that survived the reform, there is the lack of teachers, textbooks and technologies. There is not enough space for all the cadets and students to live and to study. The invaluable educational-material basis of many military educational institutions was destroyed. The decision to dismantle the valuable stationary equipment and move it to other locations was made without sufficient grounds. Not all this equipment arrived at the appropriate destinations, and what did arrive, was as a rule, incomplete and in non-working condition.79

General-Major V. Gudym also has noted, that schools that were really needed were closed as well. Thus, due to this dismantlement, the only Army school in Ukraine, the Kiev Army School, and in Odessa, the training of specialists for Land Forces, has begun the basis of a non-adapted training-material without sufficient support of the corresponding teaching structure. The decision to eliminate the Zhitomir Higher School of AD Radio Electronics, the only school in the former USSR which trained specialists for space activities, and conducted their training, as well as the elimination of the Kharkiv Command Tank School is not stipulated anywhere. Training has been redirected to the Kiev Tank-Technical School, which in the past, trained assistants to commanders in arms, instead of commanders of platoons. There was neither corresponding field educational basis nor special educational equipment in this school. The Kharkiv educational basis was subordinated to the National Guard and divisions of the Border Troops.80

Today, the armies have begun to feel the acute need for tank commanders of motor-shooting divisions. The transition training lasting six years, in the opinion of General-Major V. Gudyma, the chief of the Main Department of Military Education, in 1997 and 1998, could lead to a lack of officers graduating in some specialties for which training was not previously conducted in the Ukrainian Armed Forces.81 As time has demonstrated, these forecasts have proven to be true.

80 Ibid.
81 Ibid.
The position of General-Major V. Gudyma was supported by the Chief of the Main Department of Personnel of the Armed Forces General-Lieutenant G. Djachuk who at a meeting of the chiefs of personnel organizations noticed:

Reform of military education has caused great damage. We shall feel the consequences for a long time, let us say gently, not an absolutely well thought out and considered course concerning the destruction of the military schools with the most well-known traditions and tremendous scientific potential. And, as a result, certain failures in this very necessary training of our army specialists will most undoubtedly occur.82

Further analysis of various documentary sources indicates that originators and supporters of the reform of the higher military education system according to western examples, have unreasonably unified various military educational institutions in a structure of training with widely different scientific potential. This has led to the creation of cumbersome educational conglomerates. The confusion and despondency among the faculty, cadets and students that resulted in their dismissal from the army took place in the military educational institutions. The quality of the educational process has significantly decreased, which has led to the beginnings of the plundering of training-material resources and military technical equipment.83

At the end of 1993, General-Major J. Prokofjev, the initiator of military educational reform, left the post of the Chief of the Department of military education. This structure was headed by General-Major V. Gudym. Thus, the first stage of reformation of the higher military educational system, which allowed certain mistakes and miscalculations to occur, has come to an end.

The former chief of the Main Department of Military Education, General-Major V. Gudym in 1996 recognized, that

In the business of the reform of the military educational system, essential miscalculations and mistakes took place which should be corrected.84

General-Lieutenant M. Neshchadim, who subsequently headed the Main

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Department of Military Education, considers, that: “...The concept had a number of deficiencies concerning the definition of the direction of the activity, their substantiation and methods for practical realization. All specified stimulated a search for new ideas and approaches to help in correcting the situation.85

As a result of the aforementioned, according to the words of the President of Ukraine, Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine L. Kuchma, at a meeting in the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine that took place December 1-2 in 1994:

the military education system is practically destroyed. Owing to unreasonable reforms, we are experiencing a brain drain of skilled teachers and science officers. For example, in the Kiev Institute of the Air Forces, only one or two teachers in complex technical posts decided to remain.86

Thus, as the analysis demonstrated, the first attempt to create a higher military education system by copying western examples without taking into account the economic abilities of Ukraine has not resulted in the desired outcome.


On October 14, 1993, the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine eventually accepted the precise and exact directed program of the interests of the Ukrainian national security and policy, the Military doctrine.87 On October 19, 1993, the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine determined the final number of the Ukrainian army which was 450,000 men.88

The social and economic situation that occurred in Ukraine at the end of 1993 - 1994, was reflected in the Armed Forces and negatively influenced the level of their combat readiness and state security. The state reached the upper limit of resource opportunities to create a defense against enemies at the specified level. Suffice it to say,


the approved budget of the Ukrainian Armed Forces for 1994 was only a quarter of that suggested by the Ministry of Defense, and thus, it was only possible to provide for the current needs of the troop’s retention.89

The creation and reformation of the Ukrainian Armed Forces actually ceased. In October 1994, by decree of the President of Ukraine, a civilian, V. Shmarov, was appointed to the post of the Minister of Defense.

In the speech at the Verkhovna Rada of the Ukraine session on October 4, 1994, V. Shmarov, stated that among the priorities for the Administration of the Ministry of Defense in the near future, was professional training and military education. He said that “Two reforms in three years were executed with the first attempt made during the era of the Soviet Army. Unfortunately, they have not led to the necessary level of military education.”90

The session of the Military Collegium of the Ministry of Defense devoted to the problems of military education took place on April 29, 1994. A speech was given about the corrections to some state decisions concerning military education. The decision to create the Kiev Humanitarian Institute that would train psychologists, sociologists and the professorial cadre was approved. It was an attempt to resolve the question of how to unload the Odessa and Kiev Institutes of Land Forces.91

With the purpose of executing the requirements of the decisions of the Collegium of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine dated April 29, 1994, by the Directive of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine No. D-35 dated August 4, 1994 “About the Organizational Actions on Reorganizing Training and the Completion of some Military-Training Establishments of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine by Varied Cadre,” a number of decisions have been made affecting more than 600 people who have been moved from one military-training establishment to another. Practically all military

89 Shmarov, V., “The Defensibility Have to be Sufficient, the Army - Modern,” Uriadovyj Kurjer, 1994, 8 October (No. 156), p. 5.
90 Ibid.
schools of the Ministry of Defense were involved in this process. In addition, the reorganization of specialties to some HMEI and the internal movement of specialties has also occurred.\footnote{Ibid.}


As regards these complex events, which affected the destiny of many people, some observers of military education reform have now characterized: 1994-1995 as the development and improvement of a departmental normative-legal basis. This was also distinguished by educational-methodical documents and materials, structural changes in the military education system, a deepening of the integration with civil education, the development of educational standards, and the transition to a centralized control system.\footnote{Neshchadim, М. І., “Methodological Base of Creation of Military Education System in Ukraine,” \textit{Science and Defense}, 1998, No. 2, pp. 33 – 40.}

The beginning of 1994 raised a great variety of problems and placed them at the feet of the Main Department of Military Education. The needs of the Ukrainian Armed Forces for some specialties were not completely taken into account. The working system of higher military education did not provide for full coverage of the shortage of the cadre that would arise in 1997-1998.\footnote{Dmitrijev, V., “Care of Cadre is Care of the Future of Ukrainian Armed Forces,” \textit{Narodna Armija}, 1994, 16 December (No. 225), pp. 1 - 2.} Also, the opportunities of some HMEI to accommodate the cadre was not been taken into account as well. Therefore, for example, the Kiev and Odessa Institutes of Land Forces appeared “overloaded” by cadets and students, and the Sevastopol Naval Institute lacked cadets and students. Funds for military schools,
training centers and small military towns, were thoughtlessly distributed to other ministries and departments. It was necessary to return, if not everything, the most needed funds.96

In 1995, the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine accepted two resolutions, which directly concerned the higher military educational system in Ukraine.97

According to the Resolution of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine dated July 25, 1995 No. 547, “About Actions on the Improvement of Officer Cadre Training for the Armed Forces,” the Cabinet decided to transform the Sumy Higher Military Artillery Command School into a Military Institute of Artillery at the Sumy State University with housing based on the specified school. The Poltava Higher Command School of Communication has been transformed into a branch of the Kiev Military Institute of Management and Communication. According to the resolution, the Kharkiv Higher Tank Command School and the Chair of Military Training at the Kharkiv State Polytechnic University were unified into the Military Faculty of Tank Troops at the Kharkiv State University.98

Due to the acceptance of the national space program and the creation of space activities, specialists in this area became extremely necessary. Therefore, on the basis of the Zhitomir Higher School of Radio Electronics, which owned powerful and unique training-material resources in the former USSR, the training of specialists on processing information and the management of space vehicles flights has been slated to begin. Thus, the Zhitomir Higher School of AD Radio Electronics turned to the Military Faculty of Radio Electronics at the Zhitomir Engineering Institute of Technology which had housing based on the specified school. To fill vacancies during the 2nd and 3rd years of education, moving cadets from other HMEI related directions to the military-space


section of the school was planned. By the way, Russia refused the offer to train such specialists in Ukraine and began to create its own institute near Moscow, and have encountered major problems.99

Henceforth, the training of railway troops and military communications specialists was attributed to the Chair of Military Training of the Dnepropetrovsk State Technical University of Railway Transportation to execute by using its base and a portion of funds of the Dnepropetrovsk Higher AD Antiaircraft Rocket Command School.100

It was recommended to the Ministry of Education, to the Ministry of Health, to the Ministry of Culture, to the Ministry in Affairs of Youth and Sports, to the Ministry of Agriculture and Foodstuffs, and to the Ministry of Transport to provide training to cadets and students in all the aforementioned educational institutions and military divisions of higher educational institutions of the Ministry of Education.

The second Resolution of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine dated July 25, 1995 No. 548 “About the Modification of the List of Higher Educational Institutions in which the Military Training of Students is Executed,” cancelled the military training of students in nine higher educational institutions, implemented it in ten new institutions and determined to whom they would be subordinated.101

The Minister of Defense of Ukraine issued Order No. 243 “About the Actions on the Improvement of the Officer Cadre Training for the Armed Forces” dated October 1, 1995 with the purpose of defining the appropriate performance of the specified Resolutions of the Cabinet. Certain terms and necessary organizational actions concerning the transformation and creation of the military educational institutions specified in the aforementioned resolutions were determined.102


A year before the creation of the aforementioned Resolutions of the Cabinet, the military-engineering faculty at the Agricultural Institute was created based on the Kamenets-Podolsk Engineering Command School.103

In Simferopol, on the basis of the Military Construction School, the Military-Construction Faculty at the Crimean Institute of Wildlife and Resort Building was organized. The faculty started to train officers in three construction specialties, and the deputy to the commander of a military constructing platoon was required to have educational experience for all specializations.104

The corresponding Department of the General Staff offered some solutions presenting this question to the Military Collegium. It has been proven that it is economically infeasible to train specialists for the troops in radiating, chemical and bacteriological protection at the Sevastopol Naval Institute. At the same time, the Sea HMEI was not capable of conducting such training. Therefore, the decision was taken to create the faculty for radiating, chemical and bacteriological protection at the Kharkiv Military University.105 The Sevastopol Naval Institute continued to train specialists in chemical protection for Ukrainian Navy. By the way, the command of the Sevastopol Naval Institute considered that this decision was not well grounded.106

The problem is that specialists in chemical protection for all the Navy of the former USSR were previously trained there. The necessity arose to add some courses, to create a corresponding faculty, and to create a training basis for studies. Nevertheless, the decision was adopted not for the benefit of the Institute and the Armed Forces.

The essential changes have taken place in the structure of the higher military educational institutions that are already functioning. Thus, the faculty of airmobile troops was created in the structure of the Odessa Institute of Land Forces. The faculty conducting the training for the tank commanders at the Kiev Institute of Land Forces was

moved to Kharkiv, and the training of officers-motorists of this Institute were assigned to The Section of Military Training of the State University “Lviv Polytechnics.”

Since September 1, 1994, the training of officers for the Ukrainian Armed Forces at operational-strategic and operational-tactic levels began for the first time. The Academy of the Ukrainian Armed Forces has trained the first set of students. In addition to the Kharkiv Military University, the Kiev Institute of Management and Communication, the Kiev Institute of the Air Force, the Odessa Institute of Land Forces, and the Section of Military Training at the Kiev University have started to train specialists at an operational and tactical level. Thus, the training of the officers was restored. It was similar to the training in the departmental academies and the Academy of the General Staff of the former USSR.

In 1995, the joint Order of the Minister of Defense and the Minister of Education of Ukraine No. 131/145 dated May 20, 1995 “About Changes of Training Terms of Cadets in Military-Training Establishments of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine” appeared. According to the Order, the terms of the cadet’s training of 4 and 5 years was established. The Order gave the scientific-methodical commission at the Main Department of Military Education of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine the right to form independently a cycle of professionally-guided disciplines which is a normative part of the contents of education according to the training program of military specialists with higher education in corresponding professional guidelines.

The Directive of the Minister of Defense of Ukraine No. D-7 of June 7, 1995 explained which categories would require four or five years of study for the cadets. Thus, the training terms of four years were established for cadets studying military specialties of command structure, and five years for cadets studying military specialties engineering

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or command-engineering, and for cadets studying under programs of an officer’s cadre training in military training sections, faculties and chairs, of civil higher Ukrainian educational institutions.\(^{110}\)

Thus, the training system of the officer cadre for the Ukrainian Armed Forces in 1994 - 1995 basically was determined. It significantly differed from the traditional military education system of the former USSR, and from the systems accepted in other countries. In particular, almost all higher military educational institutions were versatile, and were interdepartmental. All of them followed the structure of postgraduate educations - command-staff faculties or faculties of a managerial engineering cadre.

Since 1994, the military education system has changed to a new system of management.

As is known, any organized system, be it social, technical or political, is not capable of effectively realizing opportunities without an optimal organized management. Also, it is very important concerning the military education system.

In the opinion of the originators of military educational reform in Ukraine, the principles of the organization and management of military education of the former USSR were not optimal, which led to the search for new approaches.\(^{111}\)

For example, in the existing management system, each branch of the Armed Forces of the USSR, a section of the service itself, determined the requirements of the future graduates, directed the activity of the subordinated educational institutions, and supervised and estimated the quality of the specialist’s training. As the practice of that time has demonstrated, it sometimes resulted in situations in which it was often customary for specialists to be formed from restricted departmental positions, and thus, the unjustified division of specialties was allowed. That appreciably restricted the work done for the improvement of the quality of the officer’s training. The problems of


pedagogical, personnel and material support of HMEI, the development of new training in technologies, and the maintenance of connections with the higher civil school of the USSR were resolved similarly.

As specialists of the Soviet military education remarked, the management of the military education system was imperfect. It included different administrative structures for command, staff, personnel, combat training of the troops and educational positions. These bodies supervised the higher schools concerning everything, or only in separate areas of their activity. Between the management bodies no concrete distribution of tasks and areas of responsibility existed. The scientific approach at all stages of management: planning, organization, management and control of the higher military educational institutions activity were not completely provided.

In the opinion of the authors of the higher military education system reforms in Ukraine, it is possible to avoid all the aforementioned deficiencies in management, if all authority were completely undertaken by the Department of Military Education of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine. Therefore, the Order of the Minister of Defense of Ukraine No. 133 dated July 25, 1992 was to manage the higher military educational institution’s activity system, military training sections and faculties, and military faculties of the higher civil educational institutions in all areas. It was only necessary to keep the pilot training management in the Kharkiv Institute of Pilots of the Air Force for the commander of the Air Force of Ukraine.

Thus, according to Order No. 133, the Main Department of Military Education acted as a customer and executor at the same time. It determined the list of the necessary specialties for The Ukrainian Armed Forces, created estimates of the requirements for specialists and their qualifications, took part in personnel and material support of HMEI, and estimated the quality of training of specialists during graduation from HMEI. Simultaneously, it provided training for students and cadets in military educational institutions and the training of reserve officers, and executed a unified policy of military cadre training.
The state of military education, and the activity of the Main Department of Military Education of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine in 1992-1994 did not satisfy the requirements of the military specialist’s training. On June 21, 1994, the Order of the Minister of Defense of Ukraine No. 164, “About the Distribution of Functions and Responsibility of the Managing Bodies in the Process of Management and Maintenance of Activity of the Military Education System of the Ukrainian Armed Forces,” was created. The Order recommended the subordination of the military-training establishments directly to the commanders of the branches of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, to the commanders of the Armies of Military Districts, to the chiefs of the Departments of the Central Apparatus of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine and make them completely responsible for the organization of the activities of the subordinated HMEI. According to the Order, the departments of military education were created in the commands and staffs of the branches of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. Groups of military education were created in the Departments of the central apparatus of the Ministry of Defense to whom the HMEI were submitted.\footnote{112 The Order of the Minister of Defense of Ukraine from 21 June 1994, No. 164, Kiev, Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, 1994, p. 3.}

Thus, all commanders of the branches of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, of the Armies of Military Districts and chiefs of the Departments of the Central Apparatus of the Ministry of Defense, Chiefs of Staffs of Armaments and combat support of the Ukrainian Armed Forces have received corresponding military educational institutions subordinate to them.

According to Order No. 164, the Main Department of Military Education of the Ministry of Defense had the following tasks:

- provide general management of the military education system
- participate in the decision and implementation of a state policy in the field of education, in defining prospects and direction of education development, content requirements, level and quantity
- coordinating activity during the process of management and maintenance of the military-training establishments
- organizing interaction between the management bodies of the Armed Forces and the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine

\footnote{112 The Order of the Minister of Defense of Ukraine from 21 June 1994, No. 164, Kiev, Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, 1994, p. 3.}
control over adherence to state policy and execution of requirements of the Minister of Defense in the field of military education and science in the Armed Forces

control over status and activity of military-training establishments, and the selection of personnel in the military education system

maintenance of interactions with the Ministry of Education of Ukraine, other ministries and departments

organization and support of international cooperation in the field of military education and science.\textsuperscript{113}

In 1994, military educational institutions started to demonstrate the opportunity to carry out activities at a level that corresponded to state requirements and standards of education. The Ukrainian law “About Education” of 1991 and the Resolution of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine from June 1992, No. 303 “About Accreditation of Higher Educational Institutions” stated the execution of the accreditation of all the higher educational institutions, irrespective of ownership and to whom they were subordinated. This allowed the state to officially recognize their right to conduct activities and to provide the graduates with documents about education, qualifications and a scientific degree recognized by all organizations in the country.\textsuperscript{114} Military educational institutions of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine also had to undergo the process of accreditation.

The Minister of Defense of Ukraine issued Order No. 122 dated May 4, 1994 “About Accreditation of Military-Training Establishments of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine,” in which was stipulated the creation of a center of accreditation and implementation of the Statute concerning the center of accreditation of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine. Also recommended was the development of a schedule of licensing and certification of military-training establishments.\textsuperscript{115} The purpose of accreditation was to define the opportunities of a tangible military educational institution to conduct the professional training of certain educational and qualifying levels and the granting of appropriate status.

\textsuperscript{113} Ibid.


The state body of accreditation, the Ministry of Education of Ukraine, provides the accreditation of all educational institutions. The Collegium of the Ministry of Education of Ukraine, on the basis of the decision of the Inter Branch Accreditation Commission of the Collegium of the Ministry of Education of Ukraine provides the right to establish what is to be recognized as accredited, to execute educational activities and to present the graduates with corresponding documents on education and qualifications. The right of the organization and execution of the accreditation examinations of military-training establishments has been delegated to the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, which is verified in the Order of the Minister of Defense of Ukraine No. 122.

The leading specialists of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, scientists of military-training establishments, representatives of the central body of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine were included in the structure of the created center of accreditation of the Ministry of Defense.

Actually, accreditation consists of three stages: licensing, attestation and certification.116

The first stage, the licensing of military-training establishments, was passed in 1994. This staged resulted in HMEI receiving their license for the right to provide educational activity under the declared status and they were entered into the State registry of Ukraine. Corresponding materials were prepared for the licensing of military educational institutions: the concept of HMEI activity, its statute and programs of educational activity, and the program for the creation of faculty and the supply of materials.

Military education underwent a complex examination. Very rigid requirements concerning the qualitative structure of faculties were put forward as the necessary conditions for the successful accreditation of specialties.

In the opinion of the Department of Military Education, the basis for licensing practically existed in all military educational institutions in 1994, and in such, as the

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Kharkiv Military University and the Kiev Institute of the Air Forces, all had the opportunity to pass successfully not only the licensing, but certification at the highest level, the fourth level of accreditation.\textsuperscript{117}

By January 1995, the following were accredited at the 3rd level: the Kiev Institute of Land Forces and the Military-Engineering faculty at the Kamenets-Podolsk Agricultural Institute. The Academy of the Ukrainian Armed Forces was working hard to obtain accreditation. Next, the Kiev Institute of the Air Forces, the Kharkiv Military University, and the Kiev Military Institute of the Department and Communication were slated to receive accreditation.\textsuperscript{118}

During this period, the Main Department of Military Education concentrated their attention on the creation of a normative base of military education. New regulations concerning the higher military educational institutions and regulations about enrollments in the higher military-training establishments of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine were developed. The last regulation was commissioned by the Order of Minister of Defense of Ukraine No. 130 dated May 20, 1995.\textsuperscript{119}

According to the Order of the Minister of Defense of Ukraine No. 268 dated October 3, 1995, the Educational-Methodical Council of Military Educational Institutions\textsuperscript{120} was created. At the first Council session, the status and prospects for the development of a military education system of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine was considered.

The Council suggested that statements be added to the Decree of the President of Ukraine No. 832 dated September 12, 1995 “About the Basic Directions of Reforming Higher Education in Ukraine “on the basis of the further reform of the military


educational system. As a result of this statement, the higher military educational institutions were tasked to establish research jobs in the field of optimization of the structure of the military education system. It is necessary to note, that in the military education system, by that time, 160 doctors and 1,782 science candidates were working in the military educational system representing significant scientific potential which could carry out the requested tasks.

According to the decision of the educational-methodical council, further improvements in the quality of training of military specialists was were planned. It was necessary to develop new variants of qualifying characteristics, educational-professional programs of training military specialists and the common requirements concerning the maintenance of an appropriate level of special training for this purpose. It was necessary to specify the list of military specialties and needs of the Ukrainian Armed Forces for military specialists of different skill levels.

Order No. 225 dated September 20, 1995, “About the Results of the Officer Cadre Training in the Military Education System of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine in the Educational Year of 1994-1995 and New Tasks for 1995-1996”, the Minister of Defense of Ukraine has noted that military-training establishments basically have carried out the tasks assigned to them. It is necessary to note, that in 1995, military educational institutions trained 5,652 officers, 4,940 for Ukraine and 712 for the CIS countries.

The Minister of Defense of Ukraine has noticed that jobs concerning the improvement of the higher military education system continue. Combined with this, the results of the complex and particular verifications, which were conducted in the educational area in 1994-1995, have verified that some of the questions were still present concerning the resolution of the essential deficiencies in the officer cadre training, such as the normative-legal base of military education being developed slowly as well as the tendency to decrease the common level of training of military specialists. In the Order it


was also stated that the problem of HMEI acquiring a skilled scientific and pedagogical cadre was still complicated. In 1995, more than 60% of the professors had teaching experience of up to three years. The system of professional training of permanent cadre and improvements in the professional skill level of the faculty of the military-training establishments actually did not work. All this has led to the deterioration of the status of the methodical maintenance of the educational process, and a decrease in faculty activity in the writing and editing of tutorials, manuals and other educational-methodical materials.\footnote{The Order of the Minister of Defense of Ukraine from 20 August 1995, No. 225, Kiev, Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, 1995.}

The practice of dismissing cadets from military educational institutions for different reasons was extended. Thus, in 1994-1995, 2,475 cadets\footnote{“Thoroughly Considered Cadre Policy-Effective Lever in Ukrainian Army Creation,” \textit{Narodna Armija}, 1995, 19 December (No. 203), p. 1.} were dismissed.

The Minister of Defense of Ukraine demanded that the quality of training of the officer cadre be improved as well as the normative-legal base, and concrete measures taken concerning the primary maintenance of the educational process with the necessary material means and property.

Thus, at the second stage of its development, the higher military education system basically was determined. The contents of the curricula were considerably updated, the list of specialties for training military specialists and structure of the higher military education system determined. The training of the scientific and pedagogical cadre was improved; the process of developing management bodies of the military education also occurred. The training of the officers of operational-tactical and operational-strategic levels that started the first stage of accreditation of military educational institutions was completed.

In order to prevent divergences in the treatment of the Order, the functions of management of the organizations as regards management and maintenance of the activities of the military-training establishments have been determined. For example, the responsibility for the quality of the specialist’s training, the organization and status of the
daily activity of the military-training establishments, military discipline of the cadres and others was delegated to the people to whom the military-training establishments are directly subordinated.
IV. THE THIRD STAGE OF REFORMING THE HIGHER MILITARY EDUCATION SYSTEM

A. THE ARMED FORCES OF UKRAINE AND TRAINING OF THE OFFICER CADRE IN THE BEGINNING OF THE NEW STAGE OF REFORMATION

The third stage of creating the higher military education system of Ukraine has been underway since 1996. The search for new ideas and approaches in the development of military education and in particular, a justification for the realization of these new approaches began at this time.

In March 1996, General-Lieutenant V. Gorshkolepov was appointed by the Order of Minister of Defense of Ukraine as the Head of the Main Department of Military Education of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine.

From V. Gorshkolepov's point of view, it was necessary to determine the final number of military-training establishments, their structure, and eliminate duplication in the training of specialists when initiating a new stage of military education reformation. The second important direction provided for the further integration of the military education system with a nationwide system. Resolving the aforementioned questions would require improvements in the management system of the military educational institutions.

In spite of the fact that the Ukrainian military-training establishments trained 5,652 officers in 1995, of them, 4,940 belonged to their Ukrainian Armed Forces, the Ukrainian Army felt that the greatest need was for officers in the platoon chain. When calculated, this shortage amounted to almost 50 percent.

In addition, during the verification processes conducted by the principal military inspectors, it was discovered that the graduates of military-training establishments had

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not always been well trained to perform functional duties. By the way, for the 1997 graduates, low results were also seen for some officers in physical and tactical training, driving combat machines and other areas as well.\textsuperscript{129}

As a result, improvement in the quality of the training of military specialists was considered essential, but this is very difficult to do in times of difficult economic conditions. Owing to the shortage of fuel and poor financing in the higher military educational institutions, the quantity of the practical classes steadily decreased, and in particular, those in driving, shooting and/or working on technical equipment that could result in worthless qualifications for the graduate. At the same time, verifications in other disciplines not requiring special material investments, such as the Temporary Statutes of the Armed Forces, physical training, and so forth, have demonstrated that this direction is still not at an adequate level. In the opinion of military specialists, one of the reasons is the deficiency in educational plans, which were constantly corrected in connection with the reduction in training. The continuous change of state requirements for the training of specialists with a higher education, with the terms and list of specialties being updated in 1995, was also aggravated due to the lack of a state position concerning higher educational institutions in Ukraine. In this regard, the implementation of regulating documents was delayed, and especially for military-training establishments. Therefore, the institutions have been compelled to change their own programs almost every year.

Some specialists of military education were certain, that, despite the presence of organizational changes, a reduction of HMEI, and radical and essential changes in the educational process of military educational institutions had not taken place, as curricula had remained unchanged, as well technological approaches to training. Exceptions were curricula in the humanitarian disciplines, but this, in the opinion of specialists, was not connected to educational reform, but to changes in state ideology.\textsuperscript{130}


The training of the military cadre in top skills, or postgraduate education, at command-staff faculties of military-training establishments providing higher education, except in some specialties and training conducted at the Academy of the Armed Forces, has been organized to a lesser degree.\textsuperscript{131}

The central failures in the organization of training officers at command-staff faculties were generated by curricula and programs, incomplete subject plans, and the lack of computers, and all of this occurring during the second year of training for these students!

The creation of a national Ukrainian military education system resulted in the creation of a subsystem of training of the scientific, pedagogical and scientific cadre of the Armed Forces.

In 1996, the situation with the military scientific and pedagogical cadre, in many respects, was similar to that of the general population across Ukraine. The severe economic and financial situation in the country and the Armed Forces demonstrated that the reformation of military education outpaced the general development of the Armed Forces definitely was reflected in the quality and quantity of the teaching structure of the military-training establishments. Previous mistakes also impacted the situation.

The first official evidence concerning the situation in the field of training the scientific and pedagogical cadre can be found in the Order of Minister of Defense of Ukraine No. 225 dated August 20, 1995.\textsuperscript{132} The Order ascertained that the problem of cramming military-training establishments with skilled scientific and pedagogical cadre is very complex. More than 60 percent of the HMEI teachers received any kind of teaching experience only during the last three years. The system of vocational training in the constant structure of HMEI and improving the professional skills of the faculty actually did not work. All this led to a decline in the methodical maintenance of the educational process and self-study done by the cadets to decrease faculty activity in the writing and editing of tutorials, manuals and other education-methodical materials.


Upon assembling the heads of personnel organizations of the Ukrainian Armed Forces in December 1995, the chief of the Main Department of Personnel of the Ministry of Defense, General-Lieutenant G. Djachuk, noted that the educational level of fully staffed military-training establishments with skilled teachers declined dramatically. In December 1995, this was about 70 percent of the total number of teachers. The figure of 1,000 men was mentioned. As many teachers had left HMEI during 1993 - 1995. More than 250 men possessing scientific degrees were among them.133

At the same time, the chief of the Main Department of Military Education, V. Gudym, emphasized that competition for replacing faculty positions with military men was not realized because of a lack of applicants. The worse situation occurred with the enrollment for doctoral studies where, during the last year, there was no competition. The situation led to the enrollment of doctoral studies graduates at military-training establishments who had no military experience.134

The main causes of such situations were the lack of interest of the officers in scientific and pedagogical work, the diminishing prestige of being a military teacher, low salary and the lack of housing. Also, the tendency of the faculty to leave and go work for research centers was also observed.

Thus, this order has proven to be true for the situation which has developed at the Kiev Institute of Land Forces. There was no opportunity to add skilled specialists to the teaching structure because of the lack of housing. Consequently, these posts were filled by some officers having teaching experience, but did have a place to live in Kiev.135

As a result of the aforementioned issues, the President of Ukraine, Commander in Chief of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, L. Kuchma, stated at the expanded session of the Collegium of the Ministry of Defense on December, 13, 1996:

In our Armed Forces there is no system for training, selection and promotion of the officer cadre. I consider inadequate performance by the

Ministry of Defense instructions concerning improvement of the military education system and science to be the cause. It is hard to imagine, what harm occurs, both morally and materially, when there is a continuous and fruitless turnover in staff. We again deal with this situation, which camouflages inability and nonprofessionalism in the management of the military education system, absence of vision of future prospect in this area. The structure and activity of this system even when it was first being developed, was not balanced against the real requirements of the Armed Forces.\textsuperscript{136}

In the opinion of military specialists during this period, military education was organized, guided and carried out subjectively, without scientific substantiation of the decisions related to military education. There was a lack of attention paid to the questions concerning military education from the point of view of the commanders of the branches of the Armed Forces, chiefs of the Departments of the central body of the Ministry of Defense, and so forth.\textsuperscript{137}

The resolution of the primary goal, the coordination of actions and efforts, with the purpose of creating the necessary conditions for qualitative training of the officer cadre, and the control of the military education system, was not executed in a sufficient nor effective manner.

The requirements of that time were not met as regards the organization of control over the activity of educational institutions and the fulfillment by military-training establishments of managerial documents on training the officer cadre.

In April 1996, changes once again occurred in the Department of Military Education of the Armed Forces.

The Minister of Defense of Ukraine signed Order No. 98, “About Improvement of the Management of the Military Education System of the Ukrainian Armed Forces”. The


purpose was to centralize the Department of Military Education, increase the responsibility of officials to provide quality training of specialists in military-training establishments and improve the method for their year-round support.\textsuperscript{138}

The Order asserted that the powers of the Ministry of Defense stipulated by the current legislation as a state body of military education management be conducted through the Main Department of Military Education of the Ministry of Defense.

The Department began to execute the educational system directly and through corresponding controls, deputies of the Minister of Defense, commanders of the branches of the Armed Forces, military district commanders, chiefs of the departments of the central body of the Ministry of Defense, according to the functions determined by the Order.

Military-training establishments, sections, faculties, faculties of military training of civil higher educational institutions, military lyceums and lyceums with strengthened military-physical training, except the Academy of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, the military-medical Institute of the Ukrainian Army Medical College, and the Kharkiv Institute of Pilots of the Air Forces, were subordinated to the chief of the Main Department of Military Education.

The academy of the Armed Forces has been subordinated to the chief of General Staff of Ukraine, the Military-Medical Institute to the chief of the Main Military-Medical Department, and the Kharkiv Institute of Pilots of the Air Force to the Commander of the Air Forces. However, questions on education-methodical work, financial and technical support of the specified military-training establishments were also submitted to the Chief of the Main Department of Military Education.

Thus, according to the Order, the idea was to centralize the management through the Ministry of Defense, to use the abilities of all the other commands and departments, which also executed the management of the HMEI. However, the basic distinction henceforth was, that concerning major questions, in particular, financing, the material support was to be resolved at the centralized level.

The Main Department of Military Education, carrying out the centralized management of the educational system, began to be responsible for a mainstream of HMEI activities, such as professional training, education-methodical and scientific work, in order to be the coordinating role in the work of the entire central body of the Ministry of Defense.

The Minister of Defense issued Order No. 99, “About Implementation of the Regulation about the Main Department of Military Education of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine” whose purpose was to define the functions and powers of the Main Department of Military Education regarding the management of the military educational system.\textsuperscript{139}

The regulation determined the placement of the MDME in the system of the Ministry of Defense and its subordinates, the primary goals of the Department in forecasting and planning the development of military education and the organizational development as well as the legal mechanism needed for it to function. In addition to these tasks directed at the teaching and educational process, the management of the military education system, work with the supervising and scientific-pedagogical cadre, scientific activity, cooperation with other departments, financial and economic activity, development of a material basis of education, and the daily activity of the military education system was explained in extreme detail.

Thus, for the first time in the existence of the Ukrainian military educational system, the activities of the MDME and the tasks of this structure of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine were solidified in the fourth year.

However, after appointing the new Minister of Defense, O. Kuzmuk, Order No. 99 was no longer in effect 10 months after being issued.

According to the new Order of Minister of Defense No. 47 “About Improvement of the Management of the Military Education System of the Armed Forces of Ukraine”, the MDME was removed from the general management of the HMEI, and new proposals

for military-training establishments submitted to the deputies of the Minister of Defense, the commanders of branches of the Armed Forces, to military districts commanders, to chiefs of the Departments of central body of the Ministry of Defense\textsuperscript{140}, were authorized.

The Main Department of Military Education became responsible for the status of military education and was given certain powers for participating in the creation and development of a state policy in the field of education, for the control over its governance, as well as for continuing interactions with the Ministry of Education of Ukraine, and other ministries and departments.

The new Order completely repeated the Order of the Minister of Defense of Ukraine No. 164 in 1994,\textsuperscript{141} as concerns the subordination of the HMEI, but with some improvements.

In order to prevent divergences in the treatment of the Order, the functions of management of the organizations as regards management and maintenance of the activities of the military-training establishments have been determined. For example, the responsibility for the quality of the specialist’s training, the organization and status of the daily activity of the military-training establishments, military discipline of the cadres and others was delegated to the people to whom the military-training establishments are directly subordinated.


It is necessary to note that during 1996, improvements in the national higher education system were vigorously requested. The Decrees of the President of Ukraine, issued at the end of 1995, were a big step in this direction: “About the Basic Directions of Reforming the Higher Education of Ukraine” and “About Actions for the Improvement of the Activity of the Educational Institutions.”\textsuperscript{142}


The State Accreditation Commission was approved, and the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine was tasked with developing a number of normative-legal documents to enable the optimization and creation of an educational system.

Concerning the Decrees of the President of Ukraine, the Cabinet of the Ministers with Resolution No. 200 ratified the Statement about the State Accreditation Commission and its Cadre, the Regulations about licensing educational institutions and the Statement concerning accreditation of higher educational institutions. According to Article 12 of the Law of Ukraine “About Education”, the Cabinet of the Ministers ratified the Resolution about the state higher educational institution.143

The aforementioned documents became the basis for the development of the normative-legal base of the Ukrainian higher military education system.

Since military education is a component of a national education system, all tasks determined by the Decrees of the President of Ukraine of 1995 concerning the basic directions of the reform of higher education in Ukraine are also completely concentrated on military education.

The severe criticism resulting from the speech given by the President of Ukraine, L. Kuchma at the expanded session of the Collegium of the Ministry of Defense, concerning the results of 1996 about the serious deficiencies in the reform of the military educational system demanded that corrective action be taken.

The State program on the creation and development of the Armed Forces until 2005, approved on December 28, 1996, finally made it possible to address this painful question.144 The question regarding the improvement of the military educational system was included in this program as a component. The solutions to the tasks set forth by the program have been connected to a number of actions concerning the improvement and

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increase in the quality of the training of military specialists, the creation of a military
educational system which would take into account the needs of the Armed Forces and
other military formations, would reduce the number of HMEI to an optimal level, and
would assist in the further integration of military and civilian education.

On April 8, 1997 the common expanded session of the Collegium of the Ministry
of Defense and the Ministry of Education of Ukraine was held. Representatives of the
government, the General Military Inspection of the President of Ukraine, commanders of
military districts, representatives of powerful ministries and departments, chiefs of central
administrative boards of the central body of military departments, and chiefs and rectors
of the higher military and civil educational institutions were present.145

During this session, the direction of the further reform of the military education
system and its integration into a national system were discussed. The time had come to
finish these tasks as well as a number of other tasks concerning the training of military
specialists and the conceptual questions concerning the officer cadre training system. As
a matter of fact, it was necessary to specify to a large extent the concept of a military
educational system, the training direction and specialties, the structure of a military
education system, and the staff needed at military educational institutions.

The expanded session has accepted the resolution, which has determined the tasks
connected with the list of specialties from which it is necessary to train military
specialists and the tasks on which the training can be based in civilian educational
institutions according to the traditional state systems for training the officer cadre. It was
necessary to take into account plans concerning the structure and number of Armed
Forces and other state military organizations as well as the optimization of the subject
matter of the military education on all levels.

In May 1997, the government of the country authorized the new state list of
specialties for training according to which the Ministry of Defense should create its own

145 “The System of the Military Education is Under Reform According to the State Program of the
(No. 64), p. 1. and Vachaev, O., “The System of the Military Education: Next Directions of Reforming and
Integration to the State System: By Summaries after Common Extended Meeting of the Collegium of the
list. The field “Military Sciences” has been created for the state list. New names of military specialties based on which the military educational institutions will be training specialists were also to be created. This represented an attempt to move towards state standards for training specialists at different levels, and who would also receive diplomas recognized by any Ukrainian educational institutions, but would be trained based on those requirements necessary for the Armed Forces.

The approval of the State list required a transition to new curricula and programs.

The principal event occurring in the creation of a normative-legal base of the higher military education system in 1997 was the Resolution of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine No. 1410 “About Creation of the Joint Military Education System.”

With the aim of improving the training system of the military cadre in light of the needs of the Armed Forces and other military organizations, the Cabinet of the Ministers ratified “The Concept of Military Education in Ukraine and Actions on its Realization,” “The List of the Higher Military Educational Institutions which are Included in the Joint Military Education System,” and the “Regulation about the Training of Military Specialists in Higher Educational Institutions of Joint Military Education System.” In addition, the Resolution created the Coordination Council on questions of military education at the Ministry of Education ratified its structure and the corresponding Regulation.

The concept of military education in Ukraine was developed according to the Constitution of Ukraine, acts of Ukraine on questions of defense and national security, the Law of Ukraine “About Education,” and the State program on the creation and development of the Armed Forces, in light of the experience of military specialists training in Ukraine and foreign countries.


The concept determined a set of actions for accomplishing the following primary goals: creation of a joint military education system taking into account the interests of all the power structures of Ukraine; optimization of the network of military educational institutions and their organizational-staff structures with the goal of avoiding duplication; optimization of the subject matter of the military education at all levels according to state and departmental requirements, military-technical politics, current training needs and the experience of the troops; integration of military and civilian education; creation of the system for improving professional skills and technical retraining of the officer cadre; and improvement of the system of officer vocational training.

According to the Concept, the higher education of military specialists is a step education based on a complete general secondary education. It is carried out at the higher military educational institutions according to the licensing for the training of military specialists of all education-qualifying levels, such as for younger specialists, a Bachelor’s degree, a specialist degree and a Master’s degree, with education-professional programs which meet the requirements of state standards of education and provide the state certification for graduates and the state certificate in education that is recognized by all Ukrainian institutions.

The Concept determined certain levels of training of military specialists in tactical, operative-tactical, operative-strategic areas and levels of higher military education to include military education under the program for younger specialists, advanced military special education, advanced military operative-tactical education, and advanced higher military operative-strategic education.

The overall objective of this document was the preservation of the achievements of the Higher Military School of Ukraine, its scientific and pedagogical potential, reduction in expenses for the training of specialists and its conformity to current requirements, formation and development of higher moral qualities of the citizens and the defenders of the Fatherland.

During 1997-1998, the optimization of the guidelines and specialties of the training of military specialists was executed, the subject matter of training at different education-qualifying levels was specified, the qualifying characteristics of the current
level, education-professional programs, curricula and education programs were
developed, and the techniques for controlling degree conformity to the level of training of
military specialists consistent with the requirements of state standards and qualifying
characteristics were established.\footnote{149 “The Resolution of the Cabinet of the Ministries of Ukraine from 20 January 1998. No. 65,”
\textit{Uriadovyj Kurjer}, 1998, 26 February (No. 38–39).}

It is necessary to note that this laborious work was to some extent halted because of a lack of a national normative base. The “Regulation about Education-Qualifying Levels” was authorized by the Order of the Cabinet of the Ministers in the beginning of 1998, but the state standards of higher education was only authorized by the Order of the Cabinet No. 1247 on August 7, 1998.

With the goal of making the military specialists training system conform to state requirements and the organizations working on the standardization of the normative and scientific-methodical maintenance for the training of the military specialists, the first deputy of the Minister of Defense of Ukraine issued Order No. 11 “About Standardization of Normative and Scientific-Methodical Support of Training of Military Specialists with Higher Education.”\footnote{150 The Order of the First Deputy of the Minister of Defense of Ukraine from 29 October 1998, No. 11, Kiev, Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, 1998.}

The present Order determined a list of executors responsible for the execution of the complex standards projects of higher education of military specialists in corresponding specialties.

Also important was the creation of a unified system of military education, authorized by the Resolution of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine No. 1410.\footnote{151 The Legislative Collection of Ukraine: The Resolutions and the Orders of the Cabinet of the Ministries of Ukraine, \textit{The Resolution of the Cabinet of the Ministries of Ukraine from 15 December 1997, No. 1410}, 1998, No. 3, pp. 104 - 137.}

Before this Resolution, practically all ‘power’ (Armed Forces, Border Troops, Security Services, Internal Troops, Ministry of Emergency Situations and Civilian Defense Troops), ministries and departments possessed the educational institutions in which the training of specialists in the necessary specialties for corresponding ministries and departments was carried out. At the same time, the training of specialists for the
specified ‘power’ structures was carried out also in the military educational institutions of the Ministry of Defense. Despite certain divergences in the direction and specialties of military specialists of ‘power’ ministries, their training, according to the specific performance of duties, was able to be executed at unified educational institutions. In addition, in 1997, the amount of money owed by the ‘power’ organizations to the Ministry of Defense for training military specialists reached 47 million grivnas.\textsuperscript{152}

Resolution No. 1410 determined the unified military education system as a part of the state education of Ukraine. The system was designed for the training of specialists at all education-qualifying levels for sub-units, units, formations and other structures of the Armed Forces, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the National Guard, the Security Service of Ukraine, the State Committee on State Borders, the Ministry of Emergencies and National Space Agency of Ukraine. “The Regulation about Military Specialists Training in Higher Educational Institutions of Unified Military Education System” regulates the functioning of the unified system based on the HMEI list, which are included in the unified military education system. The Coordination Council on Questions of Military Education was created at the Ministry of Education. This is a joint body which provides the support for the military specialist’s training in a unified military educational system, which executes the instructions of the Ministry of Education and other central enforcement authorities. The higher educational institutions of the unified military educational system are subordinated to them.

In addition, such a system provides for the creation of an agency, the regular sub-unit in the structure of the Ministry of Education at the expense of the staff of the Ministry of Defense. Also, and not less importantly, the system provides target financing of the military specialist’s training for the Armed Forces and all ‘power’ structures, which is a separate line item in the State budget.

In order to execute paragraph 4 of Article 11 of the Law of Ukraine “About General Military Duty and Military Service,” with the goal of implementing the agreement at the organization, and the planning and a technique for the completion of the

training officers at civilian higher educational institutions, the Minister of Defense and the Minister of Education of Ukraine signed the joint Order No. 360/342. It ratified the temporary Statement about the organization of training officers in civilian higher educational institutions of Ukraine.\footnote{153 The Order of the Minister of Defense of Ukraine and the Minister of Education of Ukraine from 28 December 1995, No. 360/342, Kiev, Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, 1995.}

The Statement determined, that for the training of officers in civilian higher educational institutions, the following are created:

- military institutes, military sections, military faculties at civil higher educational institutions
- chairs of military training, faculties of military training, sections of military training, as structural sub-units of civil higher educational institutions

The Statement further defines the organization of the training of officers in civilian higher educational institutions, the authorities of the state bodies of education management concerning the training of officers, and regulates the activity of the aforementioned higher military educational institutions and military educational sub-units.

In October 1998, the Order of Minister of Defense of Ukraine No. 399 authorizes the Instruction concerning the organization of educational activity in the higher educational institutions of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine.\footnote{154 The Order of the Minister of Defense of Ukraine from 30 October 1998, No. 399, Official Ukrainian Bulletin, 1998, No. 50, pp. 166 - 207.} Its purpose was:

- to conform the current legislation of Ukraine to a normative base which provides for the functioning of the higher military educational institutions of the Ministry of Defense
- improve the process of the organization of educational activity in the military educational system

Of great significance for the higher military educational system of Ukraine is the Order of the Minister of Defense No. 313 in which the Concept of the personnel selection policy in the Ukrainian Armed Forces was authorized until 2005.\footnote{155 The Order of the Minister of Defense of Ukraine from 17 August 1998, No. 313, Kiev, Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, 1998, p. 3.} The specified Concept is the brief, systematized statement concerning the main, most essential and
fundamental questions regarding the selection of personnel in the Armed Forces, as a component of the state personnel selection policy in Ukraine.

The main points of the personnel selection policy are as follows:

- improvement of the officer’s professional training system
- creation of the system for retraining the officer cadre before assignment to higher posts
- attracting the best commanders to the military education system and other specialists with experience in operative-tactical, combat and moral-psychological training and capable of scientific and pedagogical activity
- improving the training system of the scientific and scientific-pedagogical cadre

It is necessary to note, that by the beginning of 1990s in military-training establishments of the Ministry of Defense of the USSR, the precise system of psychological-pedagogical support of the educational process, which possessed a wide range of experience and significant statistical material that confirmed its needs and efficiency, was developed and operated. The groups of professional psychological selections within the structure of educational departments were the main elements of the system of the professional selection of the Soviet Army in military educational institutions. The main workers of the groups were specialists in questions concerning the organization and the selections of professionals such as psychologists and psychological-physiologists. The training of these specialists was purposefully conducted by the Military-Medical and Military-Political Academies.

The Order of the Minister of Defense of the USSR No. 162 of 1986 determined the implementation of the groups concerning professional psychological selection. The methodical materials concerning the professional selection in branches and sections of services in each military-training establishment were developed on the basis of this order.

During the creation of the Ukrainian Armed Forces in 1992, the groups of professional selection were withdrawn from educational departments and subordinated to chiefs of military-training establishments, as a component of social-psychological
services. In their work, they were guided by the “Instruction Concerning Psychological Selection and a Rating of Physical Training Acting in Military-Training Establishments of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine.”

Before long, sub-units of the social-psychological services, in 1994, turned to structures of educational work, and the results of professional selection, psychological tests, psychological-pedagogical support of the educational process appeared practically unnecessary for this structure. During the selection of candidates, the importance of psychological tests decreased from 30-35% to 8-10%. The psychological-pedagogical support of the educational process was not working. Educational departments, teachers and commanders have lost this source of information concerning the specific educational level of the students who had undergone these psychological tests.

In 1996, the decision was accepted concerning the restoration of psychological services, creation of a normative-legal base of groups for professional selection, and their return to educational departments. In the structure of the scientific-methodical center of military education, the laboratories for the development and introduction of techniques concerning professional selection on training in HMEI appeared. The chief of the Main Department of Military Education was authorized temporary regulations concerning the selection of groups of professional psychological personnel at a military educational institution. During this period, this preliminary selection had to be passed not only by candidates in training at the higher military educational institutions, but also by students wanting to undergo military training under programs for reserve officers.

By that time it became obvious that improvements in the military-professional orientation of youth required close attention from the military registration offices,

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enlistment offices, and military educational institutions. As the result of the decline in this activity, the enrollment of cadets from civilian youths reached only 60 percent of the entire plan that year.\textsuperscript{159}

In 1998, the “Instruction about the Sequence of Carrying Out the Military-Professional Orientation of the Youth and Professional Entrance Examinations in the HMEI of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine” was developed and implemented.”\textsuperscript{160}

It is necessary to note that it was already a fourth resolution which determined the sequence of conducting the selection of candidates for training at the higher military educational institutions. The first was implemented by the Directive of the Chief of the Main Staff in the March, 1993, the second by Order of the Minister of Defense No. 130 in May 1995, and the third by Order of Minister of Defense of Ukraine No. 140 in May 1996.\textsuperscript{161}

Thus, between 1996 – 1998, the corresponding normative-legal and methodical base of the military education system of Ukraine was created and the interaction between military educational sub-units and base higher educational institutions organized. The work on the development and introduction of state standards of education also began. They include such components as education-qualifying characteristics, education-professional programs, and the funds for control qualifying tasks.

In the beginning of 1998, the higher military education system of the Ukrainian Armed Forces consisted of the Academy of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, the Ukrainian Military-Medical College, the Kharkiv Military University, nine military institutes, four


Professional military training amounted to approximately one fifth of the total Ukrainian Armed Forces. Almost a third of the military department budget was spent on retention. Real expenses for 1997 needed 50 percent from the necessary sum to be able to provide just social needs. Thus, the lack of financial means resulted in the decision of the Minister of Defense concerning the publication of tutorials in Ukrainian has not been executed.\footnote{Vachajev, O., \textit{The Military Education System: the Perspectives Look Fine}, Sich, 1998, 13 January, p. 5 and Melnichuk, I., “Past Glory for the Military education,” \textit{Golos Ukrainy}, 1998, 1 April (No. 61), p. 4.}


In the higher military schools of the country, the training of specialists in 30 new specialties was implemented.

Despite the fact that the state tradition of training military specialists in 1998 compared with the years 1993 - 1994 was reduced by half, and by 25-30 percent when compared to 1997, the number of first-year students in the HMEI totaled approximately 4,000. Of them, 3,300 trained based on the needs of the Ministry of Defense, and 700 were slated to train based on the needs of other ‘power’ departments.\footnote{Vachajev, O., “Military Specialists Will be Trained According to a New Standards,” \textit{Narodna Armija}, 1998, 4 March (No. 41), p. 1.}
Since 1997, General-Major M. Neshchadim headed the Main Department of Military Education. According to Order of the Minister of Defense No. 47 in 1997, the transition to a more perfect management system of the higher military education institutions was executed. The MDME became responsible for the general management of military education, control over its status of certain powers, and participation in the development and implementation of the state policy in the field of education.\textsuperscript{167}

The main role in the support of the effective functioning of the HMEI is carried out by the military teacher who was and remains the main figure in resolving the complex tasks of the teaching-educational process. The Main Department of Military Education has developed a number of normative documents, which have been directed at improving the educational process in the HMEI and the operating conditions of military teachers.

Thus, in March 1997, the Order of Minister of Defense No. 90 was issued. It noted that the training of the scientific and scientific-pedagogical cadre for the Armed Forces was conducted by 37 scientific specialties of which 20 were related to the “Military Science” field.\textsuperscript{168} During 1993 – 1996, in the higher military educational institutions, over 330 scientists have been trained. Changes were made in the structure of the training of the scientific and pedagogical cadre. Also, certain progress has been achieved in the structure of enrollment in doctoral studies in military-theoretical and military-special sciences. The network of the specialized academic councils concerning the defense of a doctoral degree was developed. Seven doctoral and 11 candidate specialized Academic councils operated in the beginning of 1997 in the HMEI and research establishments.

The Order noticed, together with the above, that during 1994-1995, the doctoral studies were overloaded with graduates from military educational institutions in the current year, and in 1995, it decreased to 40% from the year before. Opportunities for postgraduate courses at civil higher educational institutions were not fully utilized. These

\textsuperscript{167} The Order of the Minister of Defense of Ukraine from 11 February 1997 No. 47, Kiev, Minister of Defense of Ukraine, 1997.

\textsuperscript{168} The Order of the Minister of Defense of Ukraine from 14 March 1997 No. 90, Kiev, Minister of Defense of Ukraine, 1997, p. 5.
graduates were not able to go on experience tours to work on completing their dissertations. The Order demanded the removal of deficiencies in the training of the scientific and pedagogical cadre.

In May of the same year, the Order of Minister of Defense No. 154 was authorized, “The Concept of Scientific Work in the Ukrainian Armed Forces and Primary Actions on its Realization”. The Concept determined in great detail the purpose, tasks and principles of scientific work in the Armed Forces, its forms, organization and support organizations.\footnote{The Order of the Minister of Defense of Ukraine from 7 May 1997 No. 154, Kiev, Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, 1997, p. 19.}

As a result of this painstaking work in the creation of a normative base of development of scientific work in the Armed Forces, the Order of Minister of Defense No. 384 appeared. It ratified the Regulations of scientific work in the Ukrainian Armed Forces. The authorized resolution finally determined the forms and methods for scientific work, management, planning and the organization of research and development. It was developed for legal, financial, material, personnel and information support.\footnote{The Order of the Minister of Defense of Ukraine from 20 October 1998 No. 384, Kiev, Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, 1998.}

On September 3, 1997, the briefing in the press-service of the Ministry of Defense took place. There, the chief of the Main Department of Military Education, General-Major M. Neshchadim specified that 12 military educational institutions had doctoral studies in which about 680 men had been trained. A third of them graduate every year. In comparison to 1994-1996, certain shifts have taken place, although, the problem of employing teachers is still complicated, first of all, because of the lack of housing in the big cities.\footnote{Vachajev O., “The System of the Military Education is Continue,” \textit{Narodna Armija}, 1997, 3 September (No. 155), p. 1.}

As to a level of training, in the opinion of M. Neshchadim, candidates of military science educational institutions as a whole met the requirements for state accreditation. For doctors of science, and in particular military sciences, the level was a little bit lower. This problem was planned to be resolved, in particular, at the expense of attracting civil teachers to the military posts from the officer’s reserves.
At the meeting with the Administrative Board of the Military Education System, which was devoted to the results of work of the HMEI in 1996-1997 and to problems of training of military specialists in 1997 – 1998, which took place in January 1996, and the meeting on December 22, 1998, devoted to the results of work of the HMEI in 1997-1998, the prospects for the development of the military education system and tasks in 1998-1999, the first deputy of the Minister of Defense of Ukraine General-Colonel I. Bizhan paid attention to the system of training the scientific and pedagogical cadre.172

By then, more then 2,000 doctors and candidates of sciences worked in the military educational system and military sciences. It shows that considerable potential was involved. In addition, almost 80 percent of the teachers had less than 5 years of teaching experience. This was the reason for improving the methods of training of the scientific and pedagogical cadre, and the implementation of a probationary period in the troops.

In 1997-1998, the dismissal of military science officers was observed for the first time. For 1998, the aggregate number of scientists in the military educational system reached approximately 40 percent from a total number of faculties.

Based on what was just previously discussed, the general status of the system of training of the scientific-pedagogical cadre and the potential of the faculty was at an appropriate level. However, by taking into account that 80 percent of the teachers had less than five years of teaching experience, it was hard to expect that the qualitative training of the military specialists would be successful. Among pedagogical specialists, the general idea was that it is necessary to have approximately 5-7 years experience in order to become a teacher.173


The overwhelming majority of information sources of that time demonstrated that the quality of the faculty’s potential at the higher military educational institutions essentially depended on the financial-economic situation in the HMEI. The significant amount of money paid for salaries, which was lower in comparison to civilian teachers, the decline in the prestige of being a military teacher, and the resulting displeasure with the job essentially influenced the fruitfulness of the work of the faculty. As a consequence, the scientific potential of teachers decreased, and the methodical job of supervising personnel and the faculty worsened. That, as a whole, was negatively reflected in the quality of training of military specialists.

As the first deputy of the Minister of Defense, General-Colonel I. Bizhan noted, the analysis of the results of the verification of the higher military educational institutions by the General Military Inspection of the President of Ukraine, by the Main Military Inspection of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, by the State Inspection of Educational Institutions, by the Main Department of Military Education of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine and analyses of reports of the state examination commissions showed that the deficiencies in education-methodical work of many higher establishments essentially influenced the quality of training of military specialists, which were:

- the budget for school hours was used irrationally, the calculations for these hours were made erroneously resulting in intrusions in the scheduling of classes and the sequence in which educational disciplines were studied. There was the practice of removing cadets from classes for work not related to the curriculum. This comprised more than 20-25 % of school hours
- structural-logic plans for training military specialists in a number of specialties demanded more precise development directed at the support of close disciplinary connections
- the subject matter of the training of students and cadets partially met the requirements of the main documents and the current state of military preparation. A number of classes were created according to the simplified plan, without using combat techniques and practical training.

The Minister of Defense of Ukraine, summing up 1998 concerning the creation, development and training of the Armed Forces, specified that one of the main problems

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of military education is the rather long transition to training students and cadets in modern techniques and technologies. The experience of the HMEI graduates during their first years of service convincingly testifies to their lack of knowledge and complete disconnect concerning the situation in which troops live, and the tasks and conditions of their duties. A significant number of young officers did not even possess minimal practical knowledge and skills in the work with cadre on questions of the support of units and sub-units in higher combat and mobilization readiness, had no elementary methodical practice, and actually were not capable of executing economic-financial duties in modern economic conditions. Officers-graduates did not have progressive ideas nor views concerning the combat application of military units using the automated control system. They had unsatisfactory skills in modeling processes of military activity and working with personal computers.175

It was also noticed that many graduates of the HMEI did not have advanced operational-tactical and tactical thinking. Their decisions and actions, as a rule, were based on pre-determined standards, and do not take into account the specificity of the present stage of development of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. They master posts slowly and certainly cannot resolve tasks concerning the management of units.

A significant number of graduates were poorly informed of the system of regular arms and military technical equipment, were insufficiently trained in its practical application, the organization of operation and restoration, and their features in field conditions.

Often young officers did not have the necessary methodical training, were badly uninformed about questions for strengthening military discipline and supporting the standards of conduct.

Many problems resulted from the number of cadets dismissed during training in the HMEI. Thus, the annual decrease of cadets from military educational institutions increased three to four times in 1998, compared to 1991-1992. During 1995-1997, 2,256

cadets dismissed from military educational institutions for different reasons, such as low level of discipline, a lack of desire for further study, or the cadets decided to pursue other activities.\textsuperscript{176}

The unsatisfactory condition of the material base of some educational institutions, the halt in publishing at the HMEI, the low level of providing new computers to the higher military education institutions, attracted the constant attention of military leaders. In spite of the fact that for the last few years, considerable work on supporting the military educational institutions of Ukraine has been carried out, the level of computer support at HMEI in 1998 only reached 45\% of the general need.\textsuperscript{177}

There were problems with the acquisition of units with officers linked to a platoon-company. Military educational institutions covered all personnel needs but not completely. To resolve this situation, military leaders of the country decided to restore correspondence courses and short-term courses to improve the qualifications and retraining of officers.\textsuperscript{178}

During the third period of the reform great attention was devoted to the economic sphere of training military specialists, which resulted in the increase of the value of training the higher skilled cadre in military institutes, departments, and faculties at civilian higher educational institutions. Professors and senior lecturers of corresponding civil faculties teach non-military disciplines.

In this case, there is no need to open corresponding faculties with the necessary personnel and material support for training concerning the small number of specialists in rare specialties at military educational institutions, especially in those specialties not taught in Ukraine. Thus, in the Military Institute of the State University “Lviv


Polytechnics” in 1996, cadets studied 11 staff military-registration specialities, and reserve officers were trained in 25 specialities. The scientific potential consisted of 10 doctors and 106 candidates of sciences (Associate Professors) engaged in teaching.179

Despite the fact that the already existent system allowed for significant economic benefits in training in such establishments of military education, since 1997, questions concerning the transition to new types of training of military specialists in civilian higher educational institutions began to be studied. The following was decided: the students-cadets were to have four years of training plus one year in the same establishment following state certification and obtaining a bachelor's degree. Civilian students were to have five years of training and obtain the diploma of a specialist, and afterwards, two to four months of additional training in the educational centers of the branches of the Armed Forces and sections of service was required. According to a plan for such a training system, in the first case, the graduates are appointed to primary positions at the tactical level of command-engineering structures with the qualification of “specialist”, and in the second, in primary positions with the qualification of “specialist of an administrative-humanitarian structure.”

According to the calculations of the Main Department of Military Education of the Ministry of Defense, the number of those who can study in civil educational institutions account for 10-12 percent of the general enrollment. The cost of this training is approximately 1.5 times less than the current costs.180

By the way, in the United States, the number of officers who graduated from civilian advanced schools totals 80%, in Great Britain and France 30%, and in Ukraine in 1997, approximately 6%.181


The full strength of the Armed Forces with a reserve cadre defines the ability of any state to achieve their transformation from peacetime to a military status in many respects.

As specialists in military sciences state, financial difficulties in Ukraine result in the curtailment of training systems of trained military resources. In this respect, the lack of specialists defining the fighting capacity of units becomes serious.182

At the same time, the interests of the state defensibility support depend on the support of the training system and the accumulation of the trained military resources at an appropriate level.

As mobilization requirements of Ukraine are objectively reduced, decisions to disband about 10 faculties of military training during the period from 1999 to 2001 have been accepted, while in 1998, the number was 30.183

Several sources for updating the mobilization resources by reserve officers were foreseen by the legislation and normative acts of Ukraine. The first, and the more fundamental, is the training of students by civilian higher educational institutions, assigning them an officer’s rank and transferring them to a reserve unit. From the point of view of the military leaders of Ukraine, this manner of training last year accounted for 73% of the enlisted ranks and remains, a reliable source for maintaining military readiness of the reserve units. It is necessary to note the economic feasibility of such a form of training of the officer cadre. In fact, the expense portion of the Ministry of Defense on training reserve officers accounts for approximately 1.5-2% of the total amount of expenses of the entire military education system. For the creation of a reserve unit, the existing system of training reserve officers restricts almost all areas of the necessary military-registration specialties.184


In 1998, the military educational sub-units of the training for reserve officers existed at the most powerful civil educational institutions, such as the Kiev National University, State University “Lviv Polytechnics”, National Technical University of Ukraine “the Kiev Polytechnic Institute,” the Kiev International University of Civil Aviation, the Dnepropetrovsk State University, the Kharkiv State Polytechnic University, the Chernovtsy State University and others.

As the expenses related to training of reserve officers are charged to the budget of the Ministry of Defense, the quality of training and sources for maintaining this link to the officer cadre has been analyzed.

It appeared that their training requires the essential review of the contents, volume and techniques for training. Such statistics also lead to interesting conclusions: the cost of training one reserve officer from among the students was, for September 1, 1996, 1588 grivnas for one year. The expenses for the same training by conducting educational periodical training with the military personnel in conscript service who has a higher education level, before leaving the military when the tour of duty was completed, was 1039 grivnas for one year. The same situation, but with the person subject to call-up in a rare specialty, costs 2521 grivnas for one year. The certification of a person subject to call-up, who has a higher civilian education in a related civil military specialty, does not require expenses.185

However, the last variant as the most expedient from the point of view of financial expenses can be applied to the limited quantity of military-registration specialties.

Calculations concerning the economic benefit of training officers of the cadre and a reserve using the opportunities of civil higher educational institutions, demonstrate that the cost of one year for the military training of a student at the Kiev International University of Civil Aviation for the first and second year, and the cadet at the same

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faculty in the third, fourth and fifth years, cost $1,200 and $1,400 US dollars accordingly in 1996 prices, whereas only one month of training of the cadet at the military educational institution cost the state $200 dollars.\textsuperscript{186}

Research which has been directed at studying the level of training of reserve officers through the military training of students in comparison with a level of training of officers of the cadre, have found, that by the beginning of service, except for the training of common engineers, graduates of civilian higher schools lagged behind graduates of similar specialties of a military educational institution in all areas. Poor command skills and a minimal knowledge of managerial documents appeared to be the greatest cause. Further, in the second year of service, this distinction disappeared, and in some areas, the level of training of graduates from civilian establishments was even higher. This manner of training officers, further, did not differ from graduates of military educational institutions. At the same time, the cost of training of officers in faculties appeared to be 5 times less than at military educational institutions.\textsuperscript{187}

All actions of the state and military leaders concerning the training of officers of the cadre also fully concern reserve officers. The corresponding normative-legal and methodical base of military training was created, interaction between military educational divisions and base higher educational institutions organized, and work on the development and introduction of state standards of education fulfilled.

As the first deputy of the Minister of Defense of Ukraine, General-Colonel I. Bizhan has noted, the lack of training of reserve officers is related to a crisis situation in the state. This essentially influences the support of training with the necessary material means, technical equipment, and also, is related to an organization, internal order and discipline, methodical readiness of teachers, visiting classes by students, and the insistence in the rating of knowledge and skills, and so forth.\textsuperscript{188}


During the last 12 years, reserve officers have not had educational periodical training, nor improvements in professional skills. Gradually, their professional level declines. There is no educational periodical training of students in troops conducted before final examinations. Some years it is necessary to organize these periodical trainings directly at the educational institutions. Therefore, it is necessary to find opportunities to restore the practical training of students in these units, since if this is not done, much of their training is lost.

Thus, at the third stage of reform of the higher military education system, the network of military educational institutions has been optimized. Also, their organizational staff structure was changed according to the number of future officers necessary for the Armed Forces.

The study and analysis of the practice of the normative-legal regulation of the military education system led to its radical transformation and improvement with the goal of complete support of military education under modern conditions. However, despite the plethora of legal acts that were created, which were adjusted based on the questions concerning military education, this normative-legal base continued to have many disagreements and outdated norms.

Military education has been integrated with state education and began to realize a step system of training specialists for the Ukrainian Armed Forces, from initial training to operative-strategic situations. At the same time, there was a need for additional research and a definition of a normative basis, principles and bases for further integration with civilian education as the military education system should be guided by European professional standards, uniform in all European countries.

As a whole, the higher military education system carried out the tasks assigned to it and trained higher skilled military specialists for the Armed Forces and other military organizations in Ukraine. The system of training reserve officers, from the position of reducing the expenses of training conducted at the military institution, the support of the integration of military and civilian education, and optimization, has been essentially reconsidered according to mobilization needs.
The process of creating state standards of education based on the new list of specialties for training military specialists at all levels of training within the framework of the unified military education system has begun. The list of specialties in the field of "Military Sciences" has been developed. The analysis of the structure of the future professional activity of the officer, in light of remarks and suggestions from all customers and the higher military educational institutions, has led to a considerable reduction in the nomenclature of specialties in the training of officers, and the exclusion of the duplication of training of military specialists in rare specialties at different higher educational institutions.

The extremely limited and delayed financing of the Ministry of Defense has led to a decline in the material base of the higher military educational institutions, as well as a decline in publishing, and insufficient support of computer equipment.

Further, accomplishing the tasks facing the higher military educational system requires a consolidation of efforts in all interlinked areas of the system, appropriate financing, display of professionalism, discipline and organization.

The Transition of the Armed Forces into a professional organization can further complicate the reorganization of the higher military education and require enormous efforts and new approaches concerning the training of military specialists for the Ukrainian Armed Forces.
V. CONCLUSION AND PROPOSALS

A. SUMMARY

Ukraine is still on the path to democracy. The future of a military-political situation in Europe and prospects for relations between the East and the West will depend on its internal political developments.

Conflicts in the Persian Gulf, complex developments in the Balkans, in Afghanistan and on the territory of Russia demonstrate that combat operations have become a component of world policy in all global areas. They are closely intertwined through economics, food, power, ethnicity and many other problems which resist one another not only in conflicts with states, but also in global conflicts as a whole.

The protection of the national interests of Ukraine predetermines the necessity of the existence of the Armed Forces, which are capable of providing military security and defense effectively, and to provide complete counteraction to possible external pressures both political and otherwise.

Military development defines the priorities in the structure of the Ukrainian Armed Forces as well as in questions of management, combat maintenance and the training of cadres. Therefore, questions concerning the basic concepts of development of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and reform of the officer cadre training system and military education as a whole are a priority.

Historical experience demonstrates that any position in the world community, and the viability of any state depends, first of all, on an educational and military education, in particular. Facing Ukraine since the first days of the creation of the national army has been the urgent need for the creation of an officer cadre training system, which the Ukrainian Armed Forces is developing.

The course of events concerning the creation of a Ukrainian higher military education system is of particular interest as it is still insufficiently explained and analyzed. The processes, which occurred inside the higher military school, progress of views concerning the creation of the modern officer cadre training system and actions taken for its improvement have still not be revealed.
The process of creating and developing the advanced military educational system in Ukraine began at the same time the Ukrainian Armed Forces were created when independence was declared. The country received only part of the advanced system of training of the military cadre from the former Soviet Union, which was not unable to satisfy completely all the needs of the troops neither qualitatively nor quantitatively in all the necessary specialties.

When the Soviet Army ceased to exist, the higher military education system still encountered many problems, with the principle problems stated below:

- psychological-pedagogical science was saturated with Marxist-Leninist ideology and theory
- this aforementioned science was completely unlike any real teaching and educational process
- insufficient integration of military education with the fundamental and applied sciences, modern technologies and the means with which to respond appropriately to the leading world examples
- certain discrepancies between the structure and contents of training as concerns the requirements of real practical activities for specialists and uncertainty in the qualifying requirements
- An overload in the contents of training, as well as the psychological-physiological recommendations being ignored as concerns the amount of material to be learned by the students
- ignoring the personalities of the cadets
- lack of precise criteria on the objective rating of the knowledge and skills possessed by the cadets and students
- certain discrepancies in the structural construction of educational institutions to meet the requirements of training
- inadequate material-technical and educational-methodical support of the teaching-educational process

Radical transformations in the course of Ukrainian politics, a crisis in the country’s economy, a change in ideological reference points, new political thinking and the beginning of military reform demanded that new principles of military development, and higher military education, in particular, be formulated.
The process of creating and developing the higher military education system occurred under complex political and economic conditions. Among them are the following:

- lack of experience in managing this area of military development
- lack of documents concerning military politics and national security
- lack of a normative-legal basis for military education

The policy of the military leaders did not assist in the normal creation of the officer cadre training system. During the first steps, it was not evaluated and did not take into account the actual conditions and opportunities facing the state.

Despite the inconsistent, error-ridden process of creating the higher military education system during 1992 – 1998, it is possible to ascertain that the political and military leaders of the state managed to create an educational system of military specialists. It is integrated with the state educational system and follows a step system of continuous training of the officer cadre for the Ukrainian Armed Forces with a full list of specialties ranging from an operational-tactical level to an operative-strategic level. It also provides for the improvement of professional skills or the retraining of officers of different levels and under different chains of commands.

The creation of the system of training of the officer cadre in Ukraine has passed through a number of stages.

The first stage, which occurred between January 1992 and December 1993, was the first attempt to create a higher military education system by copying Western examples without taking into account the economic opportunities of Ukraine which has resulted in undesirable consequences. Reform of the higher military education was executed without Military doctrine, basic state normative-legal documents, and the incomplete creation of a central body of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine. Critical decisions were accepted individually, without scientific substantiation or any method to execute them. The harmonious system of the higher military education has dissolved and great harm was caused to the scientific-pedagogical potential and material base of
military educational institutions. At the same time, the further management of the process of reforming the higher military education system has become more scientific in nature, and many mistakes have been corrected.

The second stage occurred between January 1994 and December 1995 when the structure of the higher military education system and the list of specialties of training of military specialists was specified and the contents of the curricula updated. The management bodies of military education have been developed, and the training of the officers of operational-tactical and operative-strategic levels begun. Military educational institutions began research in the field of searching to optimize the structure of higher military education. The normative-legal base of training the officer cadre was improved. The first stage of accreditation of the higher military-training establishment has been completed.

At the same time, a complex problem existed in which higher military educational institutions were overloaded with scientific and pedagogical cadre, as a consequence of the destructive processes which occurred during the first stage of reforming the higher military education system of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. The system of professional training of the permanent cadre and improvement of the professional skills of the faculty actually did not function properly. The state of methodical maintenance of the educational process has worsened. The development of the higher military education system was basically determined during the second stage.

The third stage occurred between January 1996 to 1998 and a network of military educational institutions has been optimized, and their organizational-staff changes, according to the convention for training military specialists, were also completed.

The study and analysis of the practice of the normative-legal regulation of the military educational system at this stage led to its radical transformation and improvement whose goal was to maintain the complete functioning of the higher military education under current conditions. However, despite the fact that many legal acts, regulating the question of military education have appeared, this normative-legal base continued to contain many disagreements and outdated norms.
Military education has been integrated with state education and a step system of training specialists for the Ukrainian Armed Forces has begun. At the same time, there was a need for additional research and for the normative base, principles and bases of further integration with civilian education to be defined. The higher military education system should be guided by European professional standards, and be uniform with all European countries, and in particular, NATO countries.

New ideas concerning the development of military education are a result of the State Program of Reform and Development of the Ukrainian Armed Forces Until 2005 being accepted in Ukraine. This important state document emphasized that during the past few years in Ukraine, the military educational system, which appeared to be too cumbersome, has been essentially reformed and did not respond to the new structure and tasks of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. Concerning the performance of the Resolutions of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine of December 15, 1997, No. 1410 “About Creation of Uniform Military Education System” the concept of military education in Ukraine has been authorized. The creation of its stances assisted, first of all, in eliminating duplication in the areas and structures in the training of military specialists, the optimization of a network of military educational institutions, and the organization of the training of specialists who earlier, were not trained in Ukraine. The structural reorganization of the military education system was executed according to changes in the structure and total number of personnel of the Ukrainian Armed Forces.

In the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, the system for training the officer cadre, which generally meets the needs of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and other military formations, was created. Educational-qualifying characteristics and educational-professional programs for graduates of the higher military educational institutions, curricula and working educational programs, which have been implemented since September 1, 1998, have been developed.
It can be remarked that the creation of the leading educational institution of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, the National Academy of Defense of Ukraine, is almost completed. Its graduates occupy the majority of supervisory posts in the Ukrainian Armed Forces. Together with the citizens of Ukraine, many military men from a number of other countries study there and in other educational institutions.

The process of integration of the military education system with a national educational system is more demanding. It has made it possible, together with significant funds and budgetary appropriations, to achieve the maximum use of the scientific-pedagogical potential of the civil educational institutions to train military specialists. Only during 1997 to 2000 was a national educational system of seven military educational institutions integrated. The experience of the Lviv Military Institute demonstrates the extremely successful created methods at associating the efforts of the military and leading civil higher educational institutions to train advanced skilled specialists for the Ukrainian Armed Forces.

The leaders of Ukraine emphasize that the country initiated the previous steps regarding joining the military and political structures of NATO. The modern Armed Forces of democratic Ukraine require the creation of a new generation of officer cadre. Also, this process requires the further corresponding reorganization of the military educational system.

Under the present conditions, military professionals should have not only a higher level of training in special military sciences, but also, precise training in other fields of activity. The maximum integration of the military and civil education systems is a result of this higher level of training.

In addition to the interests of state defense, uniform approaches to professional training for all military formations of Ukraine are required, and as well as, accordingly, the creation of a unified military educational system for them. Together with the optimization of a network of military educational institutions, budgetary resources are also eased.
Thus, by accepting the State Program for the Creation and Development of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, and by approving the concept of military education qualitatively, a new period of development in the military educational system began in Ukraine. This development of complex actions concerning the performance of such primary goals are as follows:

- the creation of a uniform military educational system including all the military institutions of Ukraine
- optimization of the network of military educational institutions and their organizational-staff structures with the goal of eliminating duplication
- the creation of a unified state system for training the officer cadre
- defining the list of specialties in which the military specialists are to be trained
- the optimization of the subject matter of military education at all levels according to state and departmental requirements, military-technical politics, the current needs and experience for training troops
- further integration of military and civil education
- expansion of the training of foreign military specialists
- the creation of a professional skill improvement system and retraining of the officer cadre before being assigned to corresponding positions
- improvement in the system of the professional training of officers

It is significant to emphasize, as regards the goal of improving the quality of the military-professional practical training of cadets at the higher military educational institutions, the importance for them to obtain the practical skills of working directly with the cadre, arms and military technical equipment as well as the creation of an approximate basis for military-professional work of the future officers during the first six months the cadets receive training at the educational centers of the branches and sections of services of the Ukrainian Armed Forces.

The minimal necessary requirements were established for the knowledge and skills required by the military specialists, for the contents of training and the number of school hours required for studying tactical, tactic-special and army educational subjects for military-professional and practical training.

It is very important that the physical training of future officers of the AFU be stipulated.
The ultimate goal of the reform of the military education system was the creation of an essentially new economically beneficial and unified system of military education that is adequate for the structure and tasks of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and other military organizations, and also, capable of training the higher skilled officers and scientific-pedagogical cadre.

The Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, proceeding from current normative documents concerning the further development of the military education system has stated the following tasks as being a priority:

- to expand further the integration of military and civilian education as a strategic goal for the development of the military educational system with the goal of improving the training quality of the military specialists
- further structural optimization of the network of the HMEI to reduce the number of cadets enrolled by unifying the small HMEI and the creation of educational complexes, military institutes, military colleges, military lyceum, and educational centers, and integrate the specialties and specializations.

Educational work is to include:

- providing a higher quality of training of military specialists by improving the selection of military-professional training
- strengthening the military-professional orientation of general higher education and to provide appropriate practical training by taking into account future assignments
- strengthening the discipline of the organization and performing the educational process
- adhering to the strict requirements concerning the licensing and accreditation of specialties and the HMEI as a whole
- increasing control over the educational process, and those responsible for the administrative board concerning the quality of the graduate’s training
- introducing the module-rating system of a training quality rating of the military specialists in the educational process

The methodological positions are to include:

- directing efforts at the scientific-methodical maintenance of the educational process with manuals, methodical development, other didactic materials in Ukrainian with the contents meeting current requirements, to use professional printing equipment and computer technologies to issue educational literature more effectively
• restoring the practice of competitive reviews of the best faculty, “the best teacher” in a specialty, of faculty training and of an educational subject

• restoring the system of competition-contract replacement of the basic supervisory positions as well as faculty at HMEI

• adjusting the training of students at civilian higher schools under the program of reserve officers and the organization of the civilian youth training based on a structure of specialties of the HMEI with income from donated funds

• increasing the discipline of the educational process, including reducing the number of cadets removed from the educational process for reasons not related to the curricula

• involving foreign military in training in HMEI specialties

• using the available training-material resources of the HMEI effectively, creating a network connection for the local computing systems of HMEI and regional networks to access the Internet, as a source for receiving educational information

Ukraine aspires to create a military specialist of the Armed Forces who is a multitalented, educated person who thinks in a non-traditional manner, possesses a wide ranging nature-scientific and humanitarian outlook, is a socially active patriot, as well as being spiritually, morally and professionally trained for military service in a certain specialty. He should be ready, psychologically and pedagogically, to skillfully create interpersonal mutual relations with senior and younger service members, to respect the ideas of others, to be tolerant, to be able to adapt quickly and successfully to new conditions and to make correct decisions in any non-ordinary situations as well as extricating oneself from complicated military and domestic situations.

The main assets of the military specialist should be the complex feeling of responsibility towards the state, society, collective and, certainly, towards professional readiness in the performance of official duties and the protection of national interests.

Some people are extremely confident that by 2005 a unified, modern, mobile, and economically expedient military education system with the correct number of personnel will be created in Ukraine. It would capable of training higher skilled military specialists at all educational-qualifying levels according to the needs of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and other military formations.
The military security of our state, and national security and efficiency in the performance of actions will depend on the status of the officer cadre training. It should be emphasized that the development of the military educational system in Ukraine, as part of the civil-military relations of the democratic society, will make our country on par with the standards of the countries-members of the North Atlantic Alliance in this important area.

B. PROPOSALS

The current requirements in military education are shaped by the new world political order, economic, technological, and legal factors, and the development of Ukrainian democratic institutions. Some of these factors are similar to military educators worldwide, while others are specific to the present situation in Ukraine. Of particular importance is the role of military education in the development of democratic civil-military relations in Ukraine. The most important single factor demanding change, however, is the information technology revolution and the corresponding changes in Military Affairs. More than ever, the military must be educated to anticipate change, cope with ambiguity, question traditional boundaries, and take the lead in organizational transformation. To be effective, the Ukrainian military needs to transform rapidly. The Ukrainian system of military education, and the people responsible for it, have the unique opportunity to direct this transformation. They will either lead it, or military colleges and academies will become anachronisms.

The environment in which the Ukrainian system of military education functions, can be characterized by several main factors. Some of them are typical of any society at the end of the last century, and others are specific to the transition in Ukraine. The first group encompasses the changing international political situation, the corresponding changes in doctrine and mission, and the impact of the information revolution. The second group stems from the specifics of the Ukrainian transition towards democracy, the severe financial constraints, and the abrupt change of the legal framework.

Changes in international politics brought the end of the ‘simple and stable’ opposition of the Cold War. Answers to questions concerning players, capabilities, intentions, and perceptions are no longer readily available. Military students neither may nor presume whom their opponent or coalition partner would be and how they would act.
New threats appeared and the threat perception is changing. Terrorism, and especially international terrorism, international drug trafficking and organized crime are becoming targets of the military worldwide.

Respective doctrinal changes are taking place. New missions appear, i.e., international peacekeeping missions under the United Nations or the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, and the emphasis is shifting towards participation in international missions, coalition warfare, peacekeeping and peacemaking missions, subsequently, requiring the military student to possess a qualitatively new level of ethnic, religious, cultural, ecological, and human rights awareness.

The influence of technology, and information technology in particular, is overwhelming. It impacts the process of planning and conducting military operations, organization, communication, command and control, intelligence, procurement, education and training. A new kind of warfare emerged - Information Warfare.

The domestic political situation influences the military in two main directions: orientation of Ukraine toward integration in European and Euroatlantic security structures and building democratic institutions. The first requires education and training of the military for cooperation with new partners through participation in the Partnership for Peace program, leading the way to future interoperability of military forces. The latter is primarily concerned with building democratic civil-military relations in Ukraine. Both demand a stronger emphasis on leadership and cultural awareness of the military.

Preparation for such missions is taking place in a declining economic situation, financial limitations, and force reduction. Furthermore, democratic transformations are paralleled by changes in the attitudes of the population. The Armed Forces are faced by changing patterns of behavior and changing motivations of a society at large. Changes in the value system of the Ukrainian society are reflected in an emphasis on ‘occupational’ versus ‘institutional’ trends in attitudes toward the military profession.

Below I will examine the potential roles of military education for building effective democratic control over the Armed Forces. In the adopted conceptual framework, the major impact of the system of military education is on the second—cultural—layer of civil-military interactions. First, through adequate reform and
substantial changes in curricula, the Ukrainian system of military education may contribute to the professionalization of the military. As a part of this professionalization, it should teach the military to understand and function effectively under democratic civilian leadership and oversight. Secondly, given the lack of traditions in educating civilian experts in defense and security in Ukraine, it may serve as a basis for the institutionalization of their education and training. Thirdly, the system of military education has a great, and largely unused, potential to ‘educate’ the Ukrainian society. All three areas may benefit from the implementation of modern information and communication technologies.

1. Preparing Military Professionals for the 21st Century: A Shifting Focus of Military Education

The military of the 21st, more than ever, will need leaders able to anticipate change, to deal with uncertainty, to present ideas, to communicate vision, and to lead organizational change. There are no ready solutions. Some changes in the emphasis of the curriculum of military academies and colleges, however, cannot be postponed.

a. Ambiguity and Unpredictability

In the security environment of the Information Age, the first requirement for the curricula is to ensure that military students do not presume to know who their future opponents or coalition partners will be. This appreciation for uncertainty is the beginning of wisdom in the post-Cold War era. Students must understand more than their predecessors about economics, technologies, and diverse cultures to make sound judgments.

The emphasis of military curricula is shifting from preparing managers to preparing leaders. While managers function in the lower cognitive domain of knowledge, comprehension, and application, leaders function in the higher cognitive domain of analysis, synthesis, and evaluation. Managers are people who do things right and leaders are people who do the right thing. The difference may be summarized as activities of vision and judgment – effectiveness versus activities of mastering routines – efficiency.189

A new balance between academic and specialized education, as well as between humanitarian and technical education is needed. The dilemma is not new. In the Information Age, however, the initial educational phase for the preparation of a specialist is quickly rendered obsolete by the rate of progress. It is not only special skills and knowledge we should be seeking, but a higher level of abstract thinking which can be acquired from a higher academic education and a system of life-long learning. Further insight into the problem is provided by Herold and Radbruch:

Leadership curricula for the military profession have to stipulate specific learning objectives as precisely as possible, but they also have to state interdisciplinary, general learning objectives. Whereas specific objectives may vary, the general objectives will ensure that the corporate unity of the military profession remains intact irrespective of changes in modern society, modern warfare and modern defense policy. These objectives are: participation; creativity; flexibility; critical reasoning; the ability to obtain information and organize it; the ability to communicate and exchange information; social awareness; endurance in conflicts; readiness to accept responsibility and criticism, and the ability to inspire corporate unity.190

b. Cultural Awareness and Human Rights

The transition of Ukrainian society toward democracy, the new international realities, and the cultural changes of the Information Age require a military well versed in human rights issues. Officers should be aware of problems concerning the rights of individual military members, rules of engagement and respective international legislation, and rights of the civilian population, especially in peacekeeping and humanitarian missions. According to McCaffrey “A great challenge for those of us who serve in uniform is addressing human rights training without suggesting that respect for an enemy, its soldiers, and civilians detracts from the central objective of winning the war. … such respect actually contributes to military effectiveness.”191 Furthermore, disrespect for human rights may lead to the case of winning the war and losing the peace.

The respective shift of military curricula should also address the importance of culture in conflict, in peacekeeping, in everyday military life. We should remember that the main failure of culture is imagination. As Alvin Toffler put it, it's very hard to think

outside the boxes—cultural box, institutional box, political box, religious box—that we are all, everyone of us, imprisoned in. Cultural unawareness will keep us imprisoned in our own traditional attitudes and will prevent the adaptation of the military to demands of the time.

c. Information Revolution

Advances in technology are hardly new phenomena. Recently, however, breakthroughs related to warfare have occurred with greater frequency, more substantial impact on quality versus quantity tradeoffs, and increased organizational implications. The information explosion and the changing way in which military organizations function, both during peace and war, must be reflected in military curricula.

The military of the future must be able to acquire, process and transmit unprecedented amounts of information quickly and precisely. Information navigation (searching) skills will be critical for all who expect to navigate the rapidly increasing sea of information. The ability of the military student to ‘navigate’ the Internet is becoming a prerequisite for the effective use of information resources.

The military student needs an understanding and appreciation of the blurred boundaries among military, diplomatic, economics, media, and psychological tools for influencing an opponent, as well as the specific requirements of interagency and international cooperation. New dimensions of information and knowledge impact all aspects of defense and security.

2. Effective Military Under Democratic Control

One of the principle requirements for military education is to prepare officers, and understand and accept civilian control in all its aspects. It cannot be fulfilled without relevant changes in curricula. Three considerations influence the development of new curricula in this respect.

First, in the process of education and training, the service academies build qualities such as courage, audacity, determination, comradeship, honesty, physical and psychological endurance, critical thinking, readiness for self-sacrifice, loyalty, etc. The last two deserve special attention. The military prepare themselves to sacrifice their lives not for material reasons, but for the defense of symbols and ideas. Western experts point
out that after more than 45 years of the successful development of NATO, no military of a member country prepares themselves for sacrifice in the name of NATO or European security. The readiness for sacrifice is in the name of national ideals and in defense of a value system.

Second, although the military is subordinated to the democratically elected political authority, its loyalty is to more stable institutions and symbols. Ukrainian soldiers, airmen, and sailors take an oath “in the name of Ukraine” to serve honestly to their people, courageously to defend the integrity and the independence of Ukraine, and, if that is necessary, to sacrifice their lives for their Motherland. Understandable from the point of view of their preparation to accomplish an extremely complex and important assignment for the military defense of the Motherland, the build-up of these qualities creates in the military the sense of a special mission. In many cases, they tend to examine themselves as the last bulwark of the state, statehood, and the national ideals, and often look on the politicians as persons corrupt, following individual narrow partisan interests. Unfortunately, the Ukrainian experience in the first years of democratization, to a certain degree validated, this attitude.

Third, it is necessary to prepare the military for new missions, some of which require increased interaction with civilians, as well as foreign military and civilians. Some of the new tasks, i.e., participation in peacekeeping and humanitarian operations, lead to an increase in the political role of the military.

To answer these requirements, the military educational system has to prepare officers who understand their place in the complex democratic transformation, as well as in the intricate civil-military relations with vague boundaries and changing responsibilities. When developing new curricula, it is important to remember that, although the principle of civilian control over the armed forces is accepted by the Ukrainian military, problems arise because of the military's understanding of the concept of boundaries between the rights and responsibilities of the political and military authority.
Furthermore, the main objective of education, and military education in particular, in societies where the military is subordinate to political power, is “to harmonize professional efficiency and democratic values which are the determining factor in the civil-military interrelationship.”192

Traditionally, professional men and women tend to stress their special technical expertise which in many cases may lead to alienation from society. To provide professional efficiency without such an alienation, the education of officers, as well as future officers, should never be confined purely to the technical aspects. The general academic aspects, and humanitarian education in particular, are equally as vital.

Finally, an important effect on Ukrainian civil-military relations is the continuing compartmentalization of military education. It feeds on and supports the compartmentalization of the military profession, goes against the corporateness of the officer corps, and creates conditions for subjective civilian control. Therefore, a main objective of the reform of the Ukrainian military education should be the elimination of the restricted specialization, especially in the early stages of military education at the service academies.

3. Education of Civilian Defense and Security Experts

It is not important how good theoretically the democratic mechanisms are for civilian control if there are no competent parliamentarians and civilians to fill governmental positions, if there are no civilians who might speak on an equal footing with the military and do not understand the justifiable needs of the army.193 The lack of civilian experts turned out to be the main obstacle in the establishment of effective civilian control in Ukraine. Practically all defense experts in Parliament and Government are military or recently retired officers. As a rule, the politicians do not understand the real world of the military. Their incompetent intrusion creates negative reactions among the military, generates animosity, and prevents the attainment of adequate solutions to delicate problems.


Furthermore, Ukraine needs not only civilian experts but institutional guarantees that the civilians in Government, and in the Ministry of Defense in particular, will be adequately qualified. Currently, there are no such guarantees, and the potential of existing educational structures is not fully utilized.

The study of the foreign experience in the education of civilian defense and security experts showed that there is no standard “Western system.” Every country approaches the problem in its unique way. However, there are some prevailing features. Civilians should finish courses lasting two to 11 months. They are not awarded an educational degree and in some cases they receive academic credit. Civilians and officers study together, and the faculty composition is also mixed. Civilian and military students are exposed to ‘real world’ problems, as well as to each other’s views, perceptions, values, and way of thinking; curricula are focused on strategy and policy, etc. through lectures by active politicians and state officials and visits to different organizations and military facilities.

In the last several years, several educational institutions in NATO countries invited students from CEE countries to attend their regular courses. However, this practice is considered much less effective than it should be “because the Western course organizers are unable to tailor them to the psychology, mentality and value system of the audiences.” Therefore, the establishment of a national institution to educate civilians, specializing in defense and national security, has no real alternative.

The proposal to institute a new structure to educate civilians within the system of military education may seem contradictory to the principle of civilian control of the military. However, even NATO experts reason that “Democratic control brings a responsibility for the military to educate civilians in the government, parliament and media on military affairs, and it is incumbent on civilian officials to be prepared to learn, so that civilian and military can collaborate effectively.” Nonetheless, even if the future system is completely within the Ukrainian system of military education, it will not mimic all its components. Both civilians and military will manage it. The faculty will

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194 Ibid.
bring together civilian and military experts in civil-military relations, national security, international relations, strategy, military doctrine, operational issues, organization and structure of the Armed Forces, planning, programming, and budgeting, human resource management, etc. Its effectiveness will increase if civilians and military officers study together. Finally, it should be widely open to both the national and international academic community.

4. **Military Educational System and Societal Awareness**

Of particular importance for the establishment of democratic and effective civil-military relations is the level of societal understanding of defense and security problems, the transparency of military and governmental defense decisions and actions, and the level of development of civil society in Ukraine. Efforts in this direction have a long-term effect, but cannot be easily structured. However, there is no doubt as to the potential role of Ukrainian military education.

Therefore, the system of military education should be open not only to military and academic partners, but to the general public as well. Seminars with journalists, patriotic education of the youth, ‘open house’ days, and the publication and dissemination of information pamphlets are just a few of the available options.

The opportunities to educate the public are strengthened by advanced information technology. Information processing and communications advances, for which Internet is an excellent example, allow for the education, i.e., organized by the service academies, of not only military but everyone interested in defense and security. A first step is the development of World Wide Web homepages of all military academies, colleges, and institutes. Thus, telecommunications and open system aspects could contribute to the increased understanding and support for the military, giving the future system of military education the capability to reach larger audiences such as the media, parliament, and the public at large.

Finally, this is not the only area of useful ‘technological’ contributions. Information technology may have a powerful impact on military education, easing both life-long learning and interaction between the military and society.
5. **Information Technology and New Educational Opportunities**

The technology of the Information Age and its all-encompassing influence not only demand changes, but also provide tools to facilitate the harmonization of civil-military relations. Today's distance learning, multimedia, virtual reality, and telepresence concept allow the development of a new philosophy in educating officers and civilians, and calls for a relevant restructuring of the military educational system.

Technology enables us to facilitate learning in new and innovative ways and to provide access to the wealth of information available. Schools, academies, and colleges can serve as the catalyst for these changes. Technology cannot substitute for good teachers but can allow a teacher to facilitate and tailor learning to individual students. The emerging concept requires redefining the way military schools are organized and what occurs within the school, as well as rethinking how teachers teach and students learn. Both formal and informal learning opportunities can be advanced. Technology enables this restructuring of the military educational system by providing new and more powerful ways for students to receive, understand, and manipulate information; enabling students to become active learners; escaping the boundaries of a school in a fixed location to facilitate interaction with people and events in faraway places; encouraging international, multi-disciplinary project-oriented education; promoting cooperative learning; allowing both independent and distance learning opportunities; matching teaching methodologies to the learning styles and preferences of student and developing new methods to assess student performance.196

a. **Virtual Learning Environment and Distance Learning**

A virtual high school, technical school, or university can be easily imagined which provides access to information and expertise anywhere in the world. Even difficult concepts, skills, and attitudes can be taught using vivid, three-dimensional and tactile representations of real world objects and issues.197 Multimedia and virtual reality provide effective ways for the military student to acquire technical skills, ‘combat’ experience, practice in planning and ‘conducting’ conventional, as well as non-conventional, i.e., peace-keeping, military operations.

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Furthermore, this kind of learning environment can be embedded in the work environment, even when the latter is a non-virtual one. In such way, a ‘virtual residency’ education may provide a system for distance learning. This Information Age education is communications, and not transportation intensive. The learner can access educational resources produced and distributed anywhere in the world. The application of this concept to the military education has the potential of training more military officers and civilians, more effectively, for less.

A positive example is provided by the experience of the U.S. Air Command and Staff College in teaching operational art combining multimedia, the college’s World Wide Web homepage, and dedication of enthusiastic faculty members.198

b. Continuous Education

In the Information Age, formal schooling provides only the first step in a lifelong process of learning and utilizing technology. Learning is truly becoming a life-long endeavor rather than an activity that ends with formal schooling. Thus, students must learn ‘how to learn’ which means being able to collect, organize, analyze, evaluate, and communicate all types of information. Military students must become active problem solvers and collaborative learners. They must also learn to become effective users of information technology.

Their education must be continuous, combined with training, coherent with the whole process of professional development and career planning. A long educational process or training separate from real practice is not the solution. The technology of the Information Age provides a way for everyone to learn what they need, at a time they find convenient, from their location, and in the manner they prefer. Furthermore, the new technologies will greatly facilitate the comparison of education and will contribute to the emergence of a reliable educational assessment system.

A prerequisite is the openness of military academies and colleges to each other, toward civilian universities, as well as toward foreign and international military and civilian colleges.

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c. **Openness of Military Educational Institutions**

The telecommunications aspect of military education will have a positive impact not only on the student but on the faculty as well. The strength of an academic department today depends on the extent to which each faculty member is interconnected with other professionals worldwide pursuing similar interests.

Furthermore, to efficiently use military resources, information should be shared with other military colleges and services, as well as with civilian institutions, especially in the development of research and curricula. For example, for a country like Ukraine, and especially in this early stage of democratic development, integration and support in the field of education, training and professional development may be achieved through the development of a network of situation centers. It is vital to use foreign and domestically built centers to discover military needs and capabilities, as well as to increase the effectiveness of military education. No real alternative to the development of open systems, integrated with international facilities exists.

Such projects can solve the problems of integration between military and civil structures. Civilians and the military will use identical products and services in a large area. Thus, specialists will transfer experience from one field to another, which will accelerate their professional development. On the other hand, an increase in technology transfer, students’ experience in adapting commercial-off-the-shelf and state-of-the-art technologies to specific military requirements, and the resulting improvement in effectiveness will be seen.

Finally, the system of military education can and should be widely open to foreign counterparts. The integration of the Ukrainian military within European and Euroatlantic security structures can be achieved after further reforms in the system of Ukrainian educational institutions and their curricula. The freedom of students to choose and their participation in real projects at higher educational levels, the increase of their contacts with outstanding specialists in and outside the organization, will support the reform and lead to the prevention of serious mistakes.

The equipment to implement the concept for continuous distance learning is becoming more affordable and user-friendly. The lack of expertise and training is
becoming less significant. The American experience shows that management resistance seems to be the most significant factor hindering the development of educational opportunities.\(^{199}\) The first step is to fully understand the dimensions of the problem. Until then, the promise of technology in education will never be fulfilled. The first step to understanding is to formulate and discuss the problems, which was one of the objectives of this thesis.

The Ukrainian system of military education has a long and successful tradition of preparing cadets and officers for continuous service in the Armed Forces. In this world of unprecedented change, however, traditions are often questioned, and new opportunities arise. Currently, Ukrainian military education is evolving slowly due to rigid traditional attitudes. This is not surprising, considering the lack of effective civilian control and the importance of fulfilling the requirements of the modern higher education for the very existence of the military higher education institutions. Nevertheless, this reactive way of thinking can turn against military education. There are no clear answers to the question of how to change the military educational system. In the study of different systems for military education, the conclusion that neither a ‘standard’ nor a 'best' system exists can be concluded. However, under conditions of rapid social and technological changes, a reactive educational system should not be looked for and, but rather, a proactive and preemptive educational process. Military education, in order to prepare the professional officer corps of the 21\(^{st}\) century, should focus on ambiguity and unpredictability, cultural and human rights awareness, information revolution and the revolution in military affairs. To support democratic changes, officers who accept civilian control as natural and possess an elaborate understanding of civil-military interactions in a pluralistic political system must be educated. By opening themselves to the public, military educational institutions may “educate” the youth, journalists, and every citizen interested in defense and national security, thus contributing to the development of Ukrainian civil society, the transparency of the military and, hopefully, increase their prestige. Of particular importance for the establishment of effective civilian control in Ukraine is the education of civilian defense and security experts. A new educational

organization and institutionalization of the process of educating civilians is urgently needed. The most effective solution is the creation of a unified national institution within the system of military education where civilians and the military will study together. The NATO Defense College in Rome may serve as a model. Such institution will effectively use existing facilities, faculty experience, and opportunities for the methodological and infrastructural support from international cohorts. Only informed people may transform the Ukrainian defense establishment according to democratic ideas and principles. The system of military education, in cooperation with national and international partners, may educate these people and transform itself at the same time. The issue is straightforward. Either the military academies and colleges become agents for change within the Armed Forces or they become anachronisms.
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