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THESIS

**CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN UKRAINE, DURING
THE TRANSITION FROM THE SOVIET UNION TO THE
INDEPENDENT UKRAINIAN REPUBLIC**

by

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March 2004

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FROM THE SOVIET UNION TO THE INDEPENDENT UKRAINIAN
REPUBLIC**

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Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

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ABSTRACT

This thesis analyzes three case studies that chronologically review the main factors that influence the creation of the system of civil control over the Armed Forces of Ukraine. The first case analyzes the period of time before the collapse of the Soviet Union. The second case examines the creation of the Armed Forces of Ukraine from 1991 until 2000. The third case reviews the present system of civil-military relations in Ukraine. The conclusion summarizes all findings of the three case studies and states that neglect of the defense issues today will lead to the risk of losing statehood tomorrow or shifting responsibility and financial burden to the future generations. Only a well-funded and well-defined program of reform can help to build modern, highly capable, professional western-type Armed Forces with good quality civil control over the military. Ukraine has great experience of building and reforming its military structure and system of civil control. The best proof of this is that Ukraine prevented involvement of the army in politics.

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I. INTRODUCTION

In 1991, during the collapse of the Soviet Union, all former soviet republics received independence and became sovereign states. Ukraine, as one of these states, started its independence on 24 August 1991 by proclaiming sovereign status. In the present situation, while Ukraine has taken many steps towards becoming a democratic country, one of the most important questions has arisen regarding civil control over the Armed Forces. Civil-military reform in the Ukraine is one among several priorities facing it in the transition to a post-communist, democratic state. However, Ukraine has made progress with the replacement of an authoritarian, communist form of control over the military to a democratic method with civilian control over the army.

In order to create a well functioning system of civil-military relations in the Ukraine, an analysis of the reforms made in the country is necessary. This analysis will help to avoid mistakes in the future and can help other democratizing countries, such as Central Asian or other countries, which still have authoritarian regimes, create their own system of civil control over the military.

The purpose of this thesis is to examine civil-military relations in the Ukraine, starting from the Soviet Union before its collapse, and the dynamics of establishing and reforming civil-military relations in the independent Ukraine. The main subject of interest is the analysis of those main factors that were instrumental in shaping the system of civil-military relations in the Ukraine.

Ukraine, as with any of the other post Soviet countries, is experiencing several problems with the creation of the system of civil control over the army. A host of issues exist including internal and external problems; political and social problems; problems in reforming the army; resistance between the military and civilians; and the *Ukrainization* (Nationalization) of the Ukrainian Army, to name a few.

This thesis attempts to examine the system of civil-military relations in Ukraine, from the first day of independence to present day, in order to understand the key factors shaping the formation of this system and identify lessons that can be learned from the Ukrainian experience of building this system.

This work is based on the study described in the book *The Post Modern Military, Armed Forces After the Cold War*, edited by Charles C. Moskos, John Allen Williams and David R. Segal. In this book, the authors argued that Western-developed democracies “are moving from what can be termed *Modern* to *Postmodern* forms of military organization.”¹ They consider the *Modern* type of military organization to be fully immersed in the development of the nation-state mostly in combination with a conscripted enlisted and professional officer corps. On the other hand, the *Postmodern* type is characterized by losing contact with a nation-state in the form of a general volunteer force with multipurpose missions cooperating extensively with the civil society.² This assumption helps to develop the structure of the thesis, because the Ukraine had a purely *Modern* type of military structure inherited from the former Soviet Union. On the other hand, currently, the Ukrainian military is moving in the direction of the *Postmodern* type army.

Following its independence in 1991, the Armed Forces of Ukraine consisted of 780,000 active duty personnel inherited from the Armed Forces of the former Soviet Union (FSU).³ One of the main goals for the new country was to create its own national Armed Forces. That process went through the nationalization of the FSU troops. Thus, it is very important to understand the Soviet system of civil-military relations in order to develop a modern system of civil-military relations. The Soviet regime strongly influenced the army, as the Communist party had controlled all spheres of the state. Additionally, the Soviet system of civil-military relations greatly affected the Ukrainian system as well, because all Ukrainian Armed Forces were created from the former Soviet Army troops that were located on Ukrainian territory.

¹ Charles C. Moskos, John Allen Williams and David R. Segal, *The Post Modern Military, Armed Forces After the Cold War*, p. 1, Oxford University Press New York, Oxford, 2000.

² Ibid.

³ This information available [online]: <http://www.mil.gov.ua/old/eng/index.htm>, accessed 16 June 2003.

Another very important issue during the transition from the post-communist system of civil-military relations to the democratic system was to create a working legislative system and system of the other democratic institutions. That process was one of the most painful for the Ukrainian government and army, because even if a law existed, it was not possible to exercise it.

Different international treaties and programs such as the “Partnership for Peace”, greatly assisted in the creation of a well functioning system of civil-military relations. Moreover, Ukraine proclaimed its view concerning NATO and the EU. In this case, if “we want to be in the club”-- we have to seek to fit its standards.

The current system of civil-military relations is based on the reform of the army as well as the legislative, executive and judicial systems. On 29 May 2000, the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine, jointly with the President, adopted a revised program for the development of the Armed Forces, covering the period up to the year of 2005. The main goal of this program was to create a professional modern army with very effective civil-military relations.

Three case studies are analyzed in this work:

- The system of civil-military relations in the Soviet Union before August 1991 – it reviews the basis of the Ukrainian army after the collapse of the Soviet Union.
- The system of civil-military relations during the nationalization of the Ukrainian military from 1991 to 2000 – the most difficult time for the newly emergent independent state when *Nationalization* of the military was done and the basis of the democratic civil-military relations laid out.
- Current system of civil control over military in Ukraine from 2000 to the present time – the present situation with civil-control over the military, methods to reform and cooperate with the West.

In these cases, the following indicators of civilian control of the military were chosen:

- *Military doctrine and major mission* – this variable helps to uncover the state’s priorities concerning national security and military development and reform issues, and moreover, differences in understanding the perceived threat to the state during different time periods.

- *Force structure* – helps identify different approaches in building military forces with regard to national security doctrine and military building or reform programs.
- *Promotions system* – uncovers democratic changes in the military structure and some aspects of civil-military relations during different periods of reform.
- *Military financing* – clearly discovers one of the major instruments of civil control over the military's financial questions with regard to the creation of the military budget, its approval, and control over its implementation.
- *Political involvement of the military* – discloses major aspects of military involvement in politics, participation in different political parties and movements, electoral questions, and so forth.
- *Relations with the media* – uncover military transparency and its attitude toward the media, as well as, the attitude of the media toward the military, and civilian feelings about the army.

The first chapter is an introduction describing the purpose, importance, structure and theoretical background of the thesis as well as the case variables.

The second chapter concerns civil-military relations in the Soviet Union, and mainly discusses the system of civil-military relations in the Soviet Union. It discovers the main aspects of the Communist system of civil control over the army, and assists in understanding the root cause of most of the problems and difficulties in building the Ukrainian military system during the first years of independency.

The third chapter presents the transition from the Communist system of civil-military relations to the democratic system, covering questions of the nationalization of the Ukrainian army, the creation of the legal and institutional base of the future system of civil-military relations, uncover difficulties in building and later reforming the new military structure.

The fourth chapter discusses the modern system of civil-military relations in Ukraine, and discovers reforms of the Armed Forces, legislative and executive systems and discloses the role of the international treaties and programs in building the system of civil control over the military.

The fifth chapter summarizes and concludes all the work done in the thesis and provides answers to the main question: What are the key factors that drove the shaping of the Ukrainian system of civil-military relations?

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II. CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN THE SOVIET UNION

The Ukrainian Armed Forces were created on the bases of the forces located on Ukrainian soil after the collapse of the Soviet Union, and was the largest group of forces, after the Russians, in the former Soviet Union. However, the Ukraine, as a former Soviet republic, did not have a complete working military structure until today. Thus, one of the main goals for the new country was to create its own national Armed Forces. It is very important to grasp the Soviet system of civil-military relations in order to understand a modern system of civil-military relations as well as the root of many of the problems that occur during the creation and reform of the military structure in a newly independent state.

The Soviet regime strongly influenced the Army, as the Communist party controlled all spheres of the state, which shaped civil-military relations in the Soviet Union. However, in the late 1980's, that system began to collapse. Gorbachev's *Perestroika* even brought some "fresh air" into the military structure, but that led to the loss of power by the military and split the functions between the Ministry of Internal Affairs (or Russian MVD) and the Armed Forces. This period was characterized by the wide variety of changes in national security questions. They led to budget and forced cuts, far reaching arms control treaties, the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the withdrawal of the Soviet Armed Forces from Eastern Europe, the removal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan, and the change in military doctrine and priorities in the main military missions. The military resisted these changes, but it was impossible to stop them, and, finally, they carried out the orders. Generally speaking, military involvement in the internal conflicts such as Tbilisi, Vilnius, Baku, and finally the attempted coup in August 1991, were a great test for the military and the system of civil control over the military.

A. MILITARY DOCTRINE AND MAJOR MISSION OF THE ARMED FORCES

Soviet military doctrine had not change much since the creation of the rocket launch nuclear weapon program in the 1950's. The military doctrine was defensive in nature, despite the fact, that during the 1970's the Soviet military handbooks stated that it

was offensive in nature.⁴ The main element of the doctrine was that Soviet military forces must prevent large-scale destruction of the homeland during war and be able to defeat and destroy aggressors on home soil. However, during Gorbachev's *Perestroika*, some changes did occur. The new doctrine featured the following elements:⁵

- Reasonable sufficiency.
- Defensive defense.
- Primacy of political means in guaranteeing one's security.
- Emphasis on the avoidance of war as the key objective of Soviet military policy.
- The proposition that war, whether conventional or nuclear, is no longer a viable instrument of policy.

The main element of the new doctrine was "reasonable sufficiency." The main argument of this concept can be explained in the words of Colonel (ret.) Semeiko:

Sufficiency does not preclude but, on the contrary, presupposes the presence of strategic parity; that is decisive in preventing war. It is necessary to have within the framework of parity a reasonably sufficient military potential capable of reliably ensuring the security of the USSR and its alliance. This means that under contemporary conditions we are obligated to have a guaranteed potential for nuclear retaliation designed to prevent an unpunished nuclear attack under any, even under most unfavorable, nuclear attack scenarios. In any situation, an answering strike must unacceptably damage the aggressor.⁶

"Reasonable sufficiency" was welcomed by the West, because it was what NATO had wanted since the end of the Second World War. However, inside the Soviet Union, it was greatly opposed mostly by the military, who reacted negatively.

⁴ This section, unless otherwise noted, draws from Green, William C. and Karasik, Theodor, *Gorbachev and His Generals, The Reform of Soviet Military Doctrine*, Westview Press, 1990, Quote from p. 2.

⁵ An analysis of the development and evolution of the Soviet Military doctrine during the Gorbachev era can be found in the chapter written by Paula J. Dobransky and David B. Rivkin, Jr., *Changes in Soviet Military Thinking: How Do They Add Up and What Do They Mean for Western Security* in Green, William C., Karasik, Theodor, *Gorbachev and His Generals, The Reform of Soviet Military Doctrine*, pp. 147-184, Westview Press, 1990. Quote from p. 166.

⁶ Green, William C. and Karasik, Theodor, *Gorbachev and His Generals, The Reform of Soviet Military Doctrine*, Westview Press, 1990, p. 5.

After World War II, the military had an opportunity to elaborate on the main elements of military doctrine without the intervention of the Communist party. Of course, it was done under the close supervision of the party but without intervention, because all high-ranking military personnel were party members, so their work was conducted in the interests of the party. During the Khrushchev era, some attempts were made to interfere in the military realm which was one of the reasons why he lost his chair as General Secretary of the Communist party. Regardless, Gorbachev wanted to make economic and political changes in the country that could not be done without intervening in the military arena. He empowered civilian actors, such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Shevardnadze and policy specialists such as Anatolii Dobrynin and Aleksandr Yakovlev, and gave them more power to formulate military doctrine and national security policy questions. Moreover, in the Supreme Soviet, a special committee was established to oversee the Ministry of Defense and the KGB. Overall, the General Staff had started to lose the total monopoly they had enjoyed over the formulation of Soviet military policy.⁷ Later, Gorbachev's idea of "reasonable sufficiency" appeared in the 27th Party Congress program. It stated that the party had a dominant role in military affairs and also indicated a lower priority for defense needs:

The basic foundation of the strengthening of the defense of the socialist homeland is the Communist Party's guidance of military construction and the Armed Forces. Policy in the field of defense, and the country's security policy, and Soviet military doctrine, which is purely in nature, are worked out and implemented with the party playing the guiding role.⁸

Such a stance by Gorbachev was very interesting, because it was unusual for the Soviet Union and had not occurred since the Khrushchev era in the 1950's:

- It indicated that Gorbachev was ready to take over military affairs.
- It showed that Gorbachev had enough power to implement his ideas.
- Gorbachev's concept opposed the military's point of view, in particular with regard to the reciprocal measures on the West similar to the Soviet idea of "reasonable sufficiency".⁹

⁷ For the references see Green, William C., Karasik, Theodor, *Gorbachev and His Generals, The Reform of Soviet Military Doctrine*, Westview Press, 1990, pp. 147-184.

⁸ Ibid., p. 43.

⁹ Ibid., p. 44.

These indicators of civil involvement show Gorbachev's willingness to change the situation by implementing civilian involvement in military affairs. The military establishment seriously resisted these steps that finally led to several changes in high ranking military positions, such as the "resignation" of Marshal Akhromeev in December 1988 as the Chief of General Staff. He was one of the main opponents against the "one-side" Soviet reduction of force. Other examples of confrontations between the military and civilians were the firing by the Politburo of the Minister of Defense Marshal Sokolov and Marshal of Aviation Koldunov in May 1987. Both were staunch opponents of Gorbachev's plans.¹⁰

At the same time, the missions of the Armed Forces started to change. The Armed Forces had always thought that its main mission was external defense of the state, not policing or being involved in any kind of domestic politics. Thus, in the late 1980's, the military started to become involved in internal policing, such as the suppression of ethnic violence on the periphery of different Soviet republics for instance, the events in Tbilisi (Georgia) in April 1989, Baku (Azerbaijan) in January 1990, and Vilnius (Lithuania) in January 1991. During that time, the military started to be used for internal domestic operations that are not military missions and have not been since the end of the Civil War in the Soviet Union. Most of the officers ranging from the low ranking officers to the Ministry of Defense opposed this, but they could do anything against the order.¹¹ Moreover, the military forces were not prepared for such types of operations that led to extra casualties, because of the use of lethal weapons and tactics. The Minister of Defense, Marshal Yazov, repeatedly declared that the army had a single, external mission, and only in extreme situations can the Armed Forces be used for internal missions. However, he argued that after MVD troops were strengthened, it would become unnecessary for the military to be involved in internal conflict situations. Another very well known person, and one of the eye-witnesses, General Lebed stated:

¹⁰ There are only a few major examples from the succession that had taken place during 1985-1989. Many of these facts can be found in *Gorbachev and the Soviet Military: A Chronology* by Randall E. Newnham in the book of William C. Green, Theodor Karasik, *Gorbachev and His Generals, The Reform of Soviet Military Doctrine*, Westview Press, 1990, p. 2, and *Perestroika and Soviet Military Personnel* by Patrick Cronin in the same book.

¹¹ Taylor in *Politics and the Russian Army, Civil-Military Relations, 1689-2000* did attempt to answer the question of who was behind the use of the army in "hot spots" on p. 227.

I thought then and I think now: it's not the army's job to deal with internal disorder ... Placing police functions on the army in general, and on the airborne forces in particular, is the greatest humiliation for the army. The army is not psychologically prepared for that sort of activity, and if it is still forced to undertake it this will lead to only one result – wild bitterness and difficult and unbearable insults on the part of the crowd towards the army.¹²

In 1990, the military magazine *Voyenniy Vestnik* conducted several polls on military involvement in internal conflict situations. One of them was done in the Moscow Military District. The results follow below.¹³

- 52% of the officers and enlisted men thought that the Armed Forces should not be used to “support social order”.
- More than 1/3 believed that the military could be used internally but only in severe circumstances.
- 100% agreed that the decision to use military force in internal conflict situations should be decided exclusively by the Supreme Soviet.

As can be seen, all ranking military personnel opposed the use of the Armed Forces in internal conflict situations. Notwithstanding, they were used to suppress disorder in many parts of the Soviet Union that led to the army losing prestige and integrity. Moreover, the main lesson of such a situation came to be known as “Tbilisi syndrome.” In the words of the “Minister of Defense Yazov officers were ‘fettered’ by the ‘Tbilisi syndrome,’ which caused hesitation in carrying out their orders and duties in emergency situations.”¹⁴

The attempted coup in August 1991 became the greatest test for the military and the system of civil control over the army. GKChP¹⁵ failed mainly because high-ranking military personages, such as Yazov, Grachev, Shaposhnikov and others, delayed implementing orders and finally refused to execute the GKChP orders.

¹² Lebed, Aleksandr, *Za derzhavu obidno*, Moskovskaya Pravda, 1995, p. 249.

¹³ Very good analyses of the poll information and discussions of different articles in the Soviet press of that time can be found in the works of the Green, William C., Karasik, Theodor, *Gorbachev and His Generals, The Reform of Soviet Military Doctrine*, p. 2, Westview Press, 1990 and Taylor, Brian D., *Politics and the Russian Army, Civil-Military Relations, 1689-2000*, Cambridge University Press, 2003, Quote from the Taylor's Book, p. 221.

¹⁴ Taylor, Brian D., *Politics and the Russian Army, Civil-Military Relations, 1689-2000*, Cambridge University Press, 2003, pp. 222-223.

¹⁵ GKChP is State Committee on the Emergency Situation (*Gosydarstvenniy Comitet po Cherezvichainomu Pologeniu*)

Even Yazov's behavior suggests that he understood he had violated his own conception of the military's role and position (auth. opposing involvement of the army in internal conflict situation) by becoming involved in the coup. Yazov pursued half measures almost from the beginning, and gave the order to withdraw the troops – his refusal to order force caused the coup to collapse.¹⁶

The Armed Forces were placed in a position in which officers could not just simply follow orders, because they were involved in internal struggles for power and control of the state. That mission was against all canons of Soviet military science, and therefore, it was greatly resisted by most of the officers. Soviet officers always thought that “the army and people are united” and “the army will never go against the people.” As Shaposhnikov mentioned:

... that these words had become a “hackneyed stereotype, and were treated as such. The extreme situation of August 19-21 suddenly showed that these were not words, they were reality!”¹⁷

The fear of military involvement in internal conflicts allowed the leaders of Ukraine, Russia and Belarus to declare the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The Army refused to intervene in that process despite the fact that many officers were against this.

Finally, during Gorbachev's era, the military faced many challenges that led to a change in military doctrine and a rethinking of the major missions. However, the Soviet military globally demonstrated that it was the army of the people that could not be used against its own people inside the country, and that the main mission of the Armed Forces was external without any military involvement in internal conflict situations.

B. FORCE STRUCTURE

Gorbachev's policy of “reasonable sufficiency” led to the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the withdrawal of the Soviet Armed Forces from Eastern Europe, and the removal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan. Such as actions required that changes be made within the structure of the Armed Forces. The Soviet Union could not longer afford so many forces. Moreover, it was not possible to house so many forces that returned due to the withdrawal of forces from European countries and Afghanistan.

¹⁶ Ibid., p. 244.

¹⁷ Ibid., p. 245.

One of the main challenge for the military became how to reduce forces in order to fit the Gorbachev's policy of "reasonable sufficiency". On December 1988, Gorbachev announced a large cutback in military financing, standing troops, weapons and military equipment:¹⁸

- Half a million men, including 100,000 officers.
- 10,000 tanks worldwide, including six tank divisions (5,000 tanks) from Eastern Europe.
- One air assault brigade and all assault-landing bridging formations forward deployed in Eastern Europe.
- Nearly one-fifth of all Soviet armament production.
- Military spending reduced by 14.2 percent.¹⁹

More than 20 highly capable divisions were removed from Eastern Europe which comprised hundreds of thousands of people in a very short period of time. This situation created a huge problem for the military, because it had not prepared bases for these troops. Moreover, during the withdrawal process, many immovable properties were left without receiving any reimbursement, and many items were stolen or broken.

However, if 400,000 conscripts could be reduced very easily without any social problems, even more so with some benefits going to civilians, at the same time, a reduction of 100,000 officers could cause a very big problem, as they needed a place to live, and employment. Of course, from an economic point of view, such a reduction could save millions every year. It would require one money input for reductions and later savings because of a smaller army.

A very large debate surfaced over the type of Armed Forces. The conscript army was too expensive and very unpopular among the young people. Some experts proposed making a shift toward the smaller professional army or territorial militia, but the military responded that it would be difficult to prepare a suitable reserve for the possible war with the West with this kind of army.

¹⁸ This section, unless otherwise noted, draws from Green, William C., Karasik, Theodor, *Gorbachev and His Generals, The Reform of Soviet Military Doctrine*, Westview Press, 1990.

¹⁹ Good analyses on force reduction in the Soviet Union and former participants of the Warsaw Pact can be find in Cronin, Patrick "Perestroika and Soviet Military Personnel" in Green, William C., and Karasik, Theodor, *Gorbachev and His Generals, The Reform of Soviet Military Doctrine*, pp. 125-146, Westview Press, 1990, Quote from p. 129.

The Soviet Armed Forces were under the control of two organizations that were directed by the Communist party. The first was the Main Political Administration (MPA), which had control over the deputy commanders for political activities. Previously, it was designed for internal spying, but over time, the MPA's main missions were to indoctrinate and politically educate officers and soldiers. The second organization was a Third Directorate of the KGB – military counterintelligence. Every independent unit had an officer from this organization. The main functions of the KGB in the army were to prevent treason, the leakage of information, and any attempted coup. However, both these organizations lost some power during Gorbachev's reforms, especially the MAP, because of the weakening of the Communist Party's position in the state.

At the same time, Gorbachev's reforms allowed him to create civilian, and not party, control over the military in the Supreme Soviet which established a special committee called the Committee for Defense and State Security. Its main function was to oversee the Ministry of Defense and the KGB. In the words of the first chairman of the committee, Vladimir Lapygin:

The committee will examine very important programs for the development of the Army and Navy and the branches and categories of troops with due regard for our military doctrine and their reasonable and reliable sufficiency to ensure strategic stability... We will analyze how the demands connected with enhancing quality parameters in military building are being realized. To this end we will listen to the defense minister, other ministers working for defense, and top military leaders. If necessary, we will go out to the troops.²⁰

Also, the new structure would control the military budget and maintenance problems within the army. However, the organization of the committee's work faced many problems that included not only organizational problems in finding space for meetings and the staff to work, but also being lucky enough to know that this was the first attempt at creating something called civilian control that no one in the Soviet Union know how to do.²¹

²⁰ Green, William C. and Karasik, Theodor, *Gorbachev and His Generals, The Reform of Soviet Military Doctrine*, Westview Press, 1990, p. 54.

²¹ Ibid.

The next issue that drew attention was the multi-ethnicity of the Army. By 1990, more than 20% of the conscript soldiers were from the Central Asian republics. This led to an increase in ethnic conflicts among different nationalities. Soldiers started to form so-called friendly associations of people from the same area whose main function was to protect the interests of the groups. This became one of the major problems in many units, especially during the late 1980's when some Soviet republics started to adopt different laws concerning military service "that challenge the Ministry of Defense's conscription and basing policies."²²

Historically, most of the officers were Slavic. However, the composition was approximately 60% Russian, more than 25% Ukrainian, and all others were split between the remaining Soviet nationalities.²³ The presence of different nationalities among the officers greatly impacted the use of force in internal conflict situations. Many "native" officers could not be used under such conditions, because it could lead to treason and the failure of the mission. This situation was also truly awful for the enlisted men. Such circumstances, finally, led to very difficult situations when soldiers refused to carry out an officer's order and some military units started to fall apart leading to a very dangerous situation for the unity and effectiveness of the troops.

Thus, a few issues existed that could capture attention. These included a huge reduction in forces and the resulting problems, the multinational composition of the troops, the weakening of party control over the army and the growing control from civilians, and in particular, from the Supreme Soviet.

C. PROMOTIONS²⁴

During the late 1990's, the winds of "new thinking" reshuffled the top military leadership. Gorbachev made huge changes in the Ministry of Defense and General Staff, the likes of which had not occurred since the end of WWII. He fired or changed most of the "old" officers in key positions. "He replaced eight of the sixteen military district

²² Taylor, Brian D., *Politics and the Russian Army, Civil-Military Relations, 1689-2000*, Cambridge University Press, 2003, p. 214.

²³ Baev, Pavel K., Bukvoll, Tor, "Ukraine's Army Under Civilian Rule," *Jane's Intelligence Review*, January 1996.

²⁴ This section, unless otherwise noted, draws from Green, William C. and Karasik, Theodor, *Gorbachev and His Generals, The Reform of Soviet Military Doctrine*, Westview Press, 1990, pp. 163-169.

commanders, three out of five commanders of military services, eleven out of sixteen deputy ministers of defense.”²⁵ He also replaced the Minister of Defense and the Chief of the General Staff. Most of these officers opposed the manner in which Gorbachev forced the military reforms, and as a result, lost their positions. Thus, newly appointed generals supported these new policies.

At the same time, Gorbachev did not promote any of the newly appointed officers in rank. This was a break with the Soviet military tradition of promoting the Minister of Defense and the Chief of General Staff to the rank of Marshal of the Soviet Union. Besides, Marshal Kulikov was the last Marshal in the Soviet Union. Also, Gorbachev removed the Minister of Defense from the Politburo that, together with his refusal to promote the newly appointed generals in rank, demonstrated the decline of the military’s role in Soviet hierarchy.

The system of promoting regular officers only changed with a few exceptions. One was that membership in the Communist party was no longer necessary in order to be promoted from lower positions, and the other was the country’s general attitude toward the Communist party that led to a slight loss of power by the MPA.

D. MILITARY FINANCING

The main reason for *Perestroika* was economic and political reform in the Soviet Union. National security and the Soviet Armed Forces were the main items of expenditures. Some analysts stated that in the middle of the 1980’s, 20% of the budget was spent on the army. Moreover, during the last years of Brezhnev’s rule, “Defense took priority and military spending was growing twice as fast as the Soviet GNP.”²⁶ Before Gorbachev came to power, the military had had everything they wanted in funding, weapons, and munitions. However, even the military understands that production growth during Brezhnev’s era was very low, and not enough for the growing demands of the army. They understood that the country needed deep economic reforms, because in the near future, the old system would not be able to support a first-class army.

²⁵ Green, William C. and Karasik, Theodor, *Gorbachev and His Generals, The Reform of Soviet Military Doctrine*, Westview Press, 1990, p. 164.

²⁶ Baryliski, Robert V., *The Soldier in Russian Politics. Duty, Dictatorship, and Democracy Under Gorbachev and Yeltsin*, Transaction Publisher, New Brunswick, New Jersey, 1998, p. 38.

Thus, despite the fact that Gorbachev's cuts in military spending were unpopular, the military understood the need to do this and supported reforms. However, they warned some very radical reformers against inappropriate funding cuts, because that could jeopardize national security that was already weakened by the decision to remove all standing forces from Eastern Europe. Moreover, the military could not easily reduce the number of standing forces without an appropriate level of financing.

Marshal Akhromeev argued that defense cuts could be done without jeopardizing national security, only if the quality of the remaining forces is improved and suitable doctrinal, operational, and technological adjustments are made:

The defense orientation in the structure of the Armed Forces is combined with the new means of maintaining military potential at a level that guarantees our country's reliable security under the conditions of the possible reduction of both nuclear and conventional weapons. Under these circumstances, the combat effectiveness and quality of the arms and military equipment deployed in the Army and Navy assume decisive importance, since they permit us to cope with our military task with a smaller range of military weapons and equipment.²⁷

Thus, the military agreed to defense cuts, but only to the degree that national security would not be jeopardized.

The second important issue concerning military financing was changes in the development and approval of the military budget. As previously mentioned, the Supreme Soviet created the special Committee for Defense and State Security whose main function was to control the military budget during its development, approval and monitoring of its fulfillments. However, that committee could not perform its duty, because of the lack of specialists and knowledge. Most of the members of this committee were active or former military and KGB officers or representatives from the military industrial complex. Moreover, the military budget of the Soviet Union was always a classified document. In Gorbachev's words, when he was a member of the Politburo:

²⁷ Green, William C. and Karasik, Theodor, *Gorbachev and His Generals, The Reform of Soviet Military Doctrine*, Westview Press, 1990, p. 167.

This Moloch [Ed:growing defense spending] devoured the fruit of hard labor and mercilessly exploited the industrial plan.... Worst of all, the problem could not be analyzed. All statistics concerning the military industrial complex were top secret, inaccessible even to members of the Politburo.²⁸

It is understandable that the newly elected people could not perform their duties under these conditions. Moreover, no working procedures existed on how to deal with a military budget. Also, there was no staff to do the work. Finally, the Committee for Defense and State Security did not start working appropriately on the budget issues up to the collapse of the Soviet Union.

E. POLITICAL INVOLVEMENT OF THE MILITARY

Historically, the military in the Soviet Union did not have much time to be involved in politics. The Soviet system required officers to be a member of the Communist party in order to receive a position higher than platoon leader as a mechanism to insure loyalty to the state regime. Moreover, the MPA and KGB also controlled all spheres of military life. However, during *Perestroika*, the situation started to change.

The most widespread military involvement in politics was elections to the Supreme Soviet or other low rank soviets, such as republican, regional or towns. Nonetheless, their presence was directed by the Communist party guidelines to show a unity of the army and the people. However, after the 1989 election, 82 deputies in the Soviet Congress were active military officers from the Armed Forces, KGB, MVD or Border guards. It is less than 4% of the 2,250 deputies. At the same time, more than 9,000 military deputies that constituted less than 2% of the officer core, were elected to all levels of the government.²⁹

The Soviet political leadership did not prevent such situations for the same reasons as previously noted. Unfortunately, the military deputies were not united in one front. They represented a wide political spectrum ranging from the left (mostly old school officers against reforms) to the right (mostly relatively young officers, some who were

²⁸ Baryliski, Robert V., *The Soldier in Russian Politics. Duty, Dictatorship, and Democracy Under Gorbachev and Yeltsin*, Transaction Publisher, New Brunswick, New Jersey, 1998, p. 38.

²⁹ This section, unless otherwise noted, draws from Taylor, Brian D., *Politics and the Russian Army, Civil-Military Relations, 1689-2000*, Cambridge University Press, 2003, Chapter 6, pp. 206-258, Quote from p. 229.

not Russian, who supported reforms). “Yazov made clear that military deputies should concentrate on defense issues and explaining Supreme Soviet decisions to the units.”³⁰ However, some officers did what they wanted to do in order to fulfill their responsibilities.

During the attempted coup in August 1991, the military showed their loyalty to the legitimate civilian authority and were mostly very reluctant and passive during the coup. It is obvious that without the Armed Forces, any coup in the Soviet Union was impossible, but nevertheless, the military did participate, and they were not very active in executing GKChP’s orders. Most of the key officers did not believe in the legitimacy of the GKChP. Additionally, the military had a very bad experience of doing “dirty” work for the government (Tbilisi, Baku, and Vilnius) and finally carried out all responsibilities alone.³¹ In addition, most officers had Tbilisi syndrome and they were afraid of becoming involved in domestic violence conflicts. Finally, these led to the failure of the attempted coup.

During the coup, officers took a fence-sitting posture. They simply acted very cautiously and slowly to try to find any possibilities of avoiding executing orders. The Soviet officers had to follow orders under any circumstances, or otherwise, face a tribunal. Adopting a wait-and-see attitude helped most of the officers in the “hot seats”, such as Grachev, Gromov, Lebed, to survive during the coup and, at the same time, avoid bloodshed.³²

Finally, during Gorbachev’s era, the military had received more political freedoms that they could express freely. However, the attempted coup in August 1991 demonstrates that the military did constrain themselves from political involvement in internal violence.

F. RELATIONS WITH MEDIA

The old Soviet system required the presence of the newspaper in every unit starting from the army core and higher. Moreover, every service and branch of the

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ Taylor in *Politics and the Russian Army, Civil-Military Relations, 1689-2000* did attempt to answer the question of who was behind the use of the army in “hot spots” on p. 227.

³² Analysis of the event of the August coup and military reaction to it was disclosed in Taylor pp. 231-248.

Armed Forces, as well as the Ministry of Defense, had their own published magazines or newspapers. Of course, all of these sources were under the tight control of the Communist party, because the MPA was their main publisher. Information about the military in the central press always went through the chain of control organs that censored all publications.

However, after Gorbachev took power, the media, and especially the press, had had an open, to some degree, discussion concerning military issues. Different military and civilian specialists had debates about the role of the army, the future of the military structure, the issue of “reasonable sufficiency” concept and others.³³ At the same time, some officers and civilian authorities had used the media to present their point of view, different from the official party line, on the different military questions. As in May 9, 1987, Marshal Akhromeev wrote the article in *Krasnaya Zvezda*, the daily newspaper of the Ministry of Defense, about military reforms and new thinking. Sometimes these debates could spill over to the foreign press using the newspapers of the other socialist countries in Europe.³⁴

Moreover, during the late 1980’s, the Soviet military started to publish newspapers and magazines in foreign languages, such as English and Spanish. These were *APN Military Bulletin*, *Socialism: Theory and Practice*, *Soviet Military Review*. The main reason was to show the West the openness of the Soviet society to foreign countries.

With Gorbachev’s new way of thinking, the Soviet press had received a lot of freedom in publishing different materials that would definitely have been prohibited under the old regime. This allowed society and average officers to participate in the open discussion about the future of the military structure in the Soviet Union.

³³ Multiple examples of the different media discussions can be found in the book written by Taylor, Brian D., *Politics and the Russian Army, Civil-Military Relations, 1689-2000*, Cambridge University Press, 2003 and Green, William C. and Karasik, Theodor, *Gorbachev and His Generals, The Reform of Soviet Military Doctrine*, Westview Press, 1990.

³⁴ See examples in Tomas Nichols and Theodore Karasik *Civil- Military Relations Under Gorbachev: The Struggle over National Security*, pp. 29-62 in the Green, William C. and Karasik, Theodor, *Gorbachev and His Generals, The Reform of Soviet Military Doctrine*, Westview Press, 1990, Quote from p .46.

In conclusion, the Soviet system of civil military relations faced many changes during Gorbachev's rule that touched all spheres of military life. The most significant were the military's involvement in internal struggles for power, the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Eastern Europe, the collapse of the Warsaw Pact, finally the abortive coup attempt in August 1991. These facts led to a change in the military attitude toward civilian authorities that finally prevented bloodshed during the coup and placed the army far from internal politics.

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III. TRANSITION FROM THE COMMUNIST SYSTEM OF CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS TO A DEMOCRATIC SYSTEM

Since August 1991, one of the most challenging and potentially dangerous missions for the newly emerged independent Ukraine has been the transformation of the forces inherited from the Soviet Union into its own army and the development of the national security and defense policy. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Armed Forces of Ukraine consisted of:

Totaled 780,000 personnel, 6,500 tanks, more than 7,000 armored vehicles, up to 1,500 combat aircraft, more than 350 ships and support vessels, 1,272 strategic nuclear warheads for inter continental ballistic missiles and more than 2,500 tactical nuclear weapons.³⁵

The following formations were based in Ukraine: a Strategic Rocket Army, three Combined Arms Armies and two Tank Armies, one Army Corps, four Air Armies, a separate Air Defense Army and the Black Sea Fleet.³⁶

Ukraine had inherited a huge military structure that was prepared for total war with the West and was not sufficient for Ukrainian needs, which was to secure the entire territory of the state. Moreover, Ukraine had had the third largest nuclear weapon potential after Russia and the United States that was inappropriate under the new circumstances, in which Ukraine has declared a non-nuclear status. Thus, it was one of the main goals for the new country to create its own national Armed Forces. That process went through the Nationalization (Ukrainization) of the FSU troops. During that process, the Armed Forces had been:

- Downsized by more than 410,000 personnel.³⁷
- Denuclearized – all tactical nuclear warheads were transferred to Russia by the end of 1992 and all strategic nuclear warheads were transferred to Russia by June 1, 1996.
- Shaping of the first national security doctrine, together with the military doctrine.

³⁵ This information available [online]
<http://www.mil.gov.ua/index.php?lang=en&part=history&sub=history> accessed 16 February 2004.

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ Ibid.

Historically, Ukraine has been going through three phases:

- 1991 – 1996 – formulation of the structural and legal basis for the Armed Forces;
- 1997 – 2000 – the planned development of the Armed Forces;
- 2000 to the present – reform and development of the Armed Forces in order to match NATO standards.

This chapter will cover the first and second phases. The main features of the first period were the creation of the legal basis for the Armed Forces, reorganization of their structures, establishment of the respective command and control systems, support systems and other elements necessary for their proper functioning. All these steps led to a considerable decrease in the number of military organizations, downsizing of personnel, weapons and equipment. The main goal was:

- To have a small army that meets the requirements of the Ukrainian national security doctrine.
- Transformation of the Soviet army into an army loyal to the Ukrainian state.
- Creation and transformation of the political system in order to build a structure where the military was placed under civilian control, not one party as it was during Soviet rule.

Finally, after almost ten years of independence, all Ukrainian efforts led to the creation and transformation into a new Armed Forces that more or less meets the requirements of Ukrainian national security.

A. MILITARY DOCTRINE AND MAJOR MISSION OF THE ARMED FORCES

After the failed coup attempt in August 1991, Ukraine declared its independence and control over the troops and units located on Ukrainian soil. In September 1991, Major General Morozov was appointed as the first Ukrainian Minister of Defense. By October 1991, the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet had adopted much of the legal basis for its own armed forces. All these steps were taken in order to create the independent state of Ukraine, because Ukraine had a bad experience when an attempt to declare independence failed in 1918 during the Soviet military invasion. Thus, in order to avoid a similar situation, Ukraine started to build its own military structure. At that time, Morozov clearly stated:

We reject the idea of a unified military command. Our approach will be step-by-step towards an independent Ukrainian army.³⁸

In order to fulfill these demands, the first step was the adoption of the new Ukrainian oath. After the referendum for independence on December 6, the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet passed the law about the new military oath of allegiance to Ukraine. The first person who took the oath was Minister of Defense Konstantin Moroz. That event had a huge impact on the military. Due to the Soviet policy, many conscripts serving in Ukraine were from the other republics of the Soviet Union, and they did not want to take the new oath and asked for a transfer to their own countries. The same situation occurred with the officers. More than 70% were not from Ukraine but were mostly Russian.³⁹ If conscripts were simply sent back to their home countries, many officers had to decide between going somewhere without any visible hope of receiving a good position and a place to live or taking the Ukrainian oath and staying in Ukraine, which was one of the best places in the Soviet Union to serve after Moscow and Leningrad. Thus, many of them decided to take the new Ukrainian oath and serve in the Ukrainian army.

Despite the fact that the Ukrainian government succeeded in forcing their soldiers to take the new oath, the final result was different than expected. Ukraine received an army that mostly did not believe in Ukrainian independence and whose loyalty was questionable, only uncertainty about the future forced most of the officers to join the new Armed Forces.

During the first years of independence, a big debate took place about the nuclear status of Ukraine. Prior to its independence, Ukraine declared its desire to become a non-nuclear state. From 1991, the time when the creation of the Ukrainian army had begun, to 1996, when the last warhead left Ukrainian soil, control over the nuclear forces located in Ukraine was delegated to the Russians. However, they could not use them without the permission of the Ukrainian government.

³⁸ D'Anieri, Paul, Kravchuk, Robert, Kuzio, Taras, *Politics and Society in Ukraine*, Westview Press, 1999, p. 238.

³⁹ Baev, Pavel K., Bukvoll, Tor, "Ukraine's Army Under Civilian Rule," *Jane's Intelligence Review*, January 1996.

The first draft of the military doctrine was produced by the Ministry of Defense in early 1992. However, this draft was rejected by the Parliament twice in October 1992 and April 1993. Only in October of 1993 did the new doctrine pass Parliament. The military doctrine of Ukraine is based on the Declaration of the Sovereignty of 1990 and Declaration of Independence of 1991. The main characteristics of the doctrine are nonintervention, respect for territorial integrity, national borders and national independence of other states, and the rejection of the idea of using military forces as an instrument of foreign policy.

The Military Doctrine of Ukraine has three main sections:

- Military and political goals and priorities of Ukraine in ensuring national security.
- Causes of military insecurity and Ukraine's attitude towards war.
- Attitude of Ukraine towards nuclear arms and other kinds of weapons of mass destruction.⁴⁰

The strategic task for Ukraine is to protect the country's sovereignty and political independence and to preserve its territorial integrity. The military doctrine is a part of the national security concept which also includes political, economic and foreign policy elements. The Ukrainian military doctrine has a defensive character – Ukraine does not have enemies. According to the doctrine, the use of nuclear weapons or weapons of mass destruction is unacceptable.

Ukraine has a non-block neutral status that was used in order to prevent any attempts from Russia to involve Ukraine in any military blocks. However, Ukraine has established tight contacts with the West. Ukraine has joined the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program and later president Kuchma proclaimed the desire for Ukraine to broaden its contacts with NATO to the extent of full membership. Despite the fact that Ukrainian military doctrine has become irrelevant in some aspects, in most, it was a product of its time. It was the document that Ukraine needed in the first years of independence.

During the second part of the 1990's, many experts raised the questions of the inadequacy of the military doctrine for the new reality. Since the time when the doctrine

⁴⁰ This information draws from Military Doctrine of Ukraine adopted by the Parliament in October of 1993.

was adopted in 1993, significant changes occurred in the international arena. Ukrainian military doctrine had to be changed, because it contained some paradoxical items. First of all, the doctrine states that “Ukraine is against the presence of foreign troops on its territory”, but the Russian Black Sea Fleet stayed in the Crimea and will stay there for the next few years. Secondly, the military doctrine does not have a general concept of the military reforms. It should reflect the tasks and forms of the Ukrainian military structure. However, by the end of 2000, no changes with the doctrine were completed.

B. FORCE STRUCTURE

Ukraine inherited a huge military structure, too big for the relatively small country of Ukraine.⁴¹ Thus, the first step after the Nationalization of the former Soviet troops was a reorganization and downsizing to a desired military structure.

After big debates on 19 October 1993, the Ukrainian Parliament approved 450,000 people as the number of people in the Ukrainian Armed Forces. That number was arrived at because Ukraine agreed on the limitation of the “Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe”(CFE) that was signed by NATO and the Warsaw Pact on 19 November 1990. According to this agreement in 1995, Ukraine could have:

- Armed Forces – 450,000.
- Tanks – 4,080.
- Armored Combat Vehicles – 5,050.
- Artillery – 4,040.
- Aircraft – 1,090.
- Combat Helicopters – 330.

In 1992, two Operational Commands in Odessa replaced three former military districts of the Soviet Union and L’viv with the Central Military Command based in Kiev. Major ground operational forces were divided between operational commands, all other installations such as military institutes and big logistic units were transferred under the central command. During this time, the Ukrainian military structure had had Army, Navy, Air Force, and Air Defense forces. The last two were combined and separated later.

⁴¹ Total number and structure of the forces inherited by Ukraine is presented in the introductory part of this chapter.

The main problem during the reorganization of the military structure was that it did not have the proper coordination at the state level. The military was on its own, so they created what they wanted. Each component of the structure formed itself, such as command and control, logistic, maintenance, education and training, acquisition, and research subsystems. That process was initially incorrect and very costly to the state.⁴² For example, Ukraine still has two separate fleets – Military Navy and Border Troops naval units. Both have a full structure and operate on the same water, but both lack money for their needs. It would be much more useful to make some changes. The same situation was created around other elements of the military structure.

New structures were created on the Soviet Union model. The organization starting from the Ministry of Defense and General Staff and down to the platoon was copied from the Soviet army, because all senior officers did not have any experience other than Soviet experience. Only at the end of the 1990's, after a long period of consultations and help from Western countries, did the military structure start to change.

The first phase of restructuring in the Army was a change from the present army-division order of battle to the corps-brigade operations. This transformation was scheduled to occur by the end of 1995, although it was done in full by the end of the 1990's. This step of reorganization allowed the gradual downsizing of the excess forces and changed the structure in accord with new missions and reality. However, the Ukrainian military failed to implement reforms on time, because of a lack of funds for reforms and a lack of attention from the government and society.

The Ukrainian Navy went through a long struggle for their fleet and for a long time was the weakest link in the entire military system. From 1991 to 1995, Ukraine and Russia was trying to find the best solution in order to split the Soviet Navy forces on the Black Sea. It took six attempts at a high level to solve this problem. Finally, the Ukrainian Navy was built on the part of the Soviet Black Sea Fleet that Ukraine received by implementation of the agreement with Russia signed by the presidents of both countries in June 1995. That agreement states that:

⁴² *National Security and Defense*, UCEPS Analytical Report, 2000, No. 1. Internet http://www.uceps.org/eng/section/National_Security_and_Defence/ accessed 16 February 2004.

- Ukraine will receive 18 percent of the fleet vessels, Russia 82 percent.
- Property will be split 50/50.
- The Russian Black Sea Fleet and Ukrainian Navy will have separate bases.
- The fleet's main headquarters will be located in the city of Sevastopol.
- Russian will take part in the social and economic development of the Sevastopol.⁴³

All parts of this agreement were implemented in full by the end of the 1990's.

The Ukrainian Air Force was built on the base of inherited Soviet troops. The inventory includes a full spectrum of aircrafts such as long-range strategic bombers, transport planes, strike aircrafts, tactical and air defense fighters, reconnaissance and electronic warfare planes. Also, the former Air Defense forces were included in this structure as a subcommand. However, it was a major conflict between these two structures. As Minister of Defense Morozov stated, the two-year phased plan for integration of the Air Defense with the Air Force of Ukraine will not be fully implemented until the end of 1995.⁴⁴

Finally, because of the conflict between the two forces in the middle of the 1990's, a decision was made to stop integration and live with both structures. However, by the end of the 1990's, after long consultations and debates, this decision was changed and presently, the Air Defense and Air Force started the process of integration.

By the middle of the 1990's, Ukraine had a full working military structure. All reorganization and major downsizings were done with few exceptions. That process was characterized by a drastic underfinancing of the military reform needs. Most money for the reorganization was found in internal sources such as the sale of equipment, weapons, and land, but that was a major problem for the whole state.

In 1994, President Kuchma appointed a new civilian Defense Minister, Valeriy Shmarov. Shmarov had a major mission to reform the military structure. The plan of reforms was based on the revised notion of Ukrainian security and on the need to save money. The main components were:

⁴³ Kuzio, Taras, *Ukraine: Back from the Brink*, European Security Study number 23, London, 1995, pp. 33-34.

⁴⁴ *Narodna Armiya*, 17 April 1993.

- Reducing the troop level to 220,000 by the year 2000.
- Focusing on the expenditure of equipment rather than size.
- Focusing on mobility rather than size.
- Changing the geographical basis of deployment from the Soviet era military districts to seven operational groups.
- Moving to a professional military rather than relying on universal conscription.⁴⁵

On 6 January 1996, the National Security Council approved the draft of the concept of the military reforms provided by Shmarov. One of the main attributes of this concept was the creation of three Operational-Territorial Commands with their autonomous logistic systems and rapid reaction forces as the main battle component of the military structure.

However, this concept of the military reforms was greatly criticized by the military and civilian sides. That happened because of the secrecy that surrounded the project until its approval by the National Security Council. Even key positioned officers did not know about the new concept. Finally, a major argument took place between the Minister of Defense Shamarov and Chief of Staff Lopata that led to the early retirement of Lopata in February 1996 and the forthcoming change of the Minister of Defense in June 1996.

On 20 January 1997, the State Program for Organization and Development of the Armed Forces until 2005 was approved by the decree of the President of Ukraine. This program determined the stepwise realization of the main provisions for the organization and development of the Conception of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. However, during the next few years, this program was changed and improved and on 28 July 2000, the State Program for the Organization and Development of the Armed Forces of Ukraine until 2005 was approved according to the Presidential Decree.⁴⁶

Finally, between 1991, when Ukraine gained its independence, and to 2000 when Ukraine started deep military reforms, they created a working military system. The main

⁴⁵ Kuzio, Taras, "Crisis and Reform in Ukraine – Part 2," *Jane's Intelligence Review*, November 1996, pp. 496-497.

⁴⁶ Chronicle of the major procedures in the defense sphere of Ukraine can be accessed on the internet <http://www.mil.gov.ua/index.php?lang=en&part=history&sub=chronicle> accessed 16 February 2004.

characteristics of this period were lack of attention from the government and parliament, dramatically low funds for reforms from the state budget, and the military reorganized themselves without proper direction from civilian authorities.

C. PROMOTIONS

The Ukrainian Armed Forces were built on the basis of the Soviet army, so the promotion system was inherited from the past. However, Ukraine did make some changes.

First of all, in the new army, membership in the ruling party was not necessary in order to be promoted. Nonetheless, during the first years of independence, the Union of Ukrainian Officers (SOU) had some influence in the appointments.⁴⁷

Second, in order to discover the qualities of the officers in every separate unit, a special Certification Commissions (*Atestaciina Comissiya*) and Higher Certification Commission (*Vyscha Atestaciina Comissiya*) on the level of the Ministry of Defense was created. The main function of these commissions was to check the professional level of the candidate. However, during the first years, they became an ideological weapon. Every person suspected of pro-Russian views was blamed and had problems being promotion.

Nonetheless, *Atestaciina Comissiya* helped to improve the whole system, because with time they started to work properly. In order to find out the professional level of the candidates special tests were created that helped to determine whether or not this person is able to carry out the orders and responsibilities of the new job. Moreover, such tests became a mandatory attribute of the entrance examination in every military institute.

On the level of regular promotions, the Certification Commissions chooses the candidates for the different positions and approves the promotion for the rank of every officer. Moreover, every officer, in order to be able to study at the Academy, has to go through the commission. Plus, all candidates for studying abroad (the IMET program or other programs) have to be approved by the Higher Certification Commission.

⁴⁷ For more detailed information about the role of the SOU see part E – Military Involvement of the Military.

The creation of the Certification Commission system democratized the way of doing promotions and helped to avoid the “dictatorship” of the commanding officer when he was the only person, together with the Communist party, who chose the right person. Moreover that help, to some degree at the lower levels, avoids corruption and patronage in questions of promotions in the Armed Forces.

Another reality of the Ukrainian army was that officer could not be promoted to a higher position in another place if he did not have a place to live there. The question of housing became a very important issue in military promotions, this is especially true for the big cities such as Kyiv, Odessa, L’viv, etc. In order to receive a place in Kyiv, graduates from the military institute must have a place to live, either a house or an apartment. If not, it is almost impossible to find a place to serve there.

Finally, the Ukrainian military great improved the promotional system. It became more open and democratized. However, during the first few years, many appointments were done on ideological grounds. At that time, your loyalty to the new independent state came first and everything else later. Nonetheless, with time, the system was improved and started to work more or less properly. One of the major restraints for the appropriate work was financial problems that the military experienced at that time. In order to transfer the officer from one location to another, the army pay had to provide everything needed for normal life, especially housing. However, the weak economic situation in the country did not provide appropriate funds for the military that led to a chain reaction in every sphere of military life.⁴⁸

D. MILITARY FINANCING

After gaining its independence, Ukraine has started to have problems with its economy. In that situation, the military had limitations on financing. After the almost uncontrolled funds during the Soviet era, the Ukrainian military was put on a very strict financial diet. Some analysts stated that in the middle of the 1980’s, the Soviet Union had spent approximately 20% of the budget on military financing.⁴⁹ At the same time, the State Budget of Ukraine in 1992 planned only 2.4% of the GDP for defense needs.

⁴⁸ For more detailed information on the defense budget see part D – Military Financing.

⁴⁹ Baryliski, Robert V., *The Soldier in Russian Politics. Duty, Dictatorship, and Democracy Under Gorbachev and Yeltsin*, Transaction Publisher, New Brunswick, New Jersey, 1998, p. 38.

That was a huge reduction in funds, but Ukraine simply could not keep such a big military structure, because of a steady economic decline. From year to year, the army had less and less money not only because of fewer funds in the budget (see Figures 1 and 2), but also because the Ukrainian economy did not grow; even more, it steadily shrank.

However, according to the law of Ukraine “About the Defense”:

State budget of Ukraine must guarantee financing of the needs of the national defense. It must assure necessary funding for the defense tasks. This must be determined annually in the State Law of Ukraine “About the State Budget of Ukraine,” but amount of funds has to be not less than three percent of the planned gross domestic product.⁵⁰




Figure 1. Funding of Ukrainian Armed Forces, % of GDP (After *National Security and Defense*, UCEPS Analytical Report, 2000, No. 1)⁵¹

That law has never been implemented. The Ukrainian military forces were just surviving during this period of time. Budget funds were spent on the fund for conscription and salary for officers and civilian personnel. The Military complained about cutting funds, because they were not enough for the elementary modernization of the weapons and equipment. In 1995, Defense Minister Shmarov claimed that budget funds for the military sphere were barely sufficient to maintain the armed forces. Further

⁵⁰ Andresiuk, Boris, *Reformuvannia Zbroinykh Syl Ukrainy na Suchasnomu Etapi*, Pulsary, 2002, p. 9.

⁵¹ This information can be accessed through the internet http://www.uceps.org/eng/section/National_Security_and_Defence/ accessed 16 February 2004.

escalation of this could lead to crossing the line when the negative process now under way will be irreversible.⁵² The lack of money led to a reduction of 65,000 personnel and the sale of some military equipment, installations, and land.




Figure 2. Funding of Ukrainian Armed Forces, in Million US Dollars (After *National Security and Defense*, UCEPS Analytical Report, 2000, No. 11)⁵³

While the armed forces received 34% of their financial needs in 1993, in 1994 they received only 28%, and 1995 only 16.9% of the army requirements.⁵⁴ As chief of the Central Financial Department of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, General Muntiyanyan mentioned:

Given the actual economic situation in the country, Ukraine's MoD determine the minimum necessary requirements of funds, i.e. the level which allows Ukraine's Armed Forces to ensure the survival of the troops till the moment of economic stability in the country – UAH 3.1 billion.

⁵² Kuzio, Taras, *The Ukrainian Armed Forces in Crisis*, Jane's Intelligence Review – Europe, p. 306.

⁵³ This information can be accessed through the internet http://www.uceps.org/eng/section/National_Security_and_Defence/ accessed 16 February 2004.

⁵⁴ For the references see Muntiyanyan V. The Problems of Ukraine's Defence Budget. Democratic Control and the Armed Forces of Ukraine (the materials of the seminar, January 25, 1999). The Ukrainian Center for International Security Studies. DCAF Occasional papers, May 1999, No. 9, pp. 24-30, <http://www.isn.ethz.ch/cmri/library/index.htm>, accessed 16 February 2004.

Pursuant to the law of Ukraine “On the State Budget in 1999” the amount of expenses on national defence was established equal to UAH 1.7 billion.⁵⁵

However, according to the estimates done by the military, the normal requirement for the military budget in 1999 was equal to UAH 29.6 billion, and the minimum requirement was UAH 9.8 billion. Such a situation when the military funds were spent only on food, salaries, and communal utilities came to a full stop of military reforms (see Figure 3). In order to survive and keep a minimal possible combat readiness, the Armed Forces were trying to find different ways of doing so. One of the methods was the sale of the old and excess weapon and military equipment, facilities and installations. Also, the military was sent to participate in peace keeping operations that helped to maintain and prepare military personal and equipment for the UN costs to the Ukrainian needs.




Figure 3. Structure of Ukrainian Defense Budget in 1999 (After *National Security and Defense*, UCEPS Analytical Report, 2000, No. 1)⁵⁶

There were several attempts by the Parliament and the military to change the situation in order to at least receive guaranteed money for the reforms, but they always failed. Only in 2000, by incredible efforts of the Ministry of Defense and some deputies

⁵⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁶ This information can be accessed through the internet http://www.uceps.org/eng/section/National_Security_and_Defence/ accessed 16 February 2004.

in the Parliament, did the military start to receive some funds directly from the budget for the army reform needs, UAH 350 million (approximately \$ 70 million) instead of UAH 450 million were guaranteed for the reforms.⁵⁷

During the analyzed period of time, the Ukrainian Armed Forces suffered from insufficient funds. That happened because of a dramatic decline in Ukrainian economic capabilities. However, the military and the government found several ways to keep a minimum possible military potential by selling excess military equipment, weapons and land. These steps helped to keep control over the army, prevented the total destruction of the military structure that helped, in turn, to keep Ukraine as an independent state.

E. POLITICAL INVOLVEMENT OF THE MILITARY

The recent experience of Ukrainian army shows that it was not involved in any political struggle. So, one can assume that the military in Ukraine has not supported any particular political party or movement. Unlike the Soviet Armed Forces, the Ukrainians have been freed from political involvement. In order to ensure that the military refrains from involvement in politics, and at the same time give them rights like other citizens, to express their will during elections, the Ukrainian system of civil-military relations had few instruments to deal with such situations.

First of all, the Ukrainian Army was freed from the political supervision by the MPA. A new democratic system of civil-military relations does not have a place for such an organization as the MPA. However, during the first few years of independence, the Union of Ukrainian Officers (SOU) was created. By the autumn of 1992, SOU became the biggest civic group in Ukraine with approximately 70, 000 members. The second largest was *Rukh* with 50,000 members.⁵⁸ That organization had a nationalistic character. Most of the officers were ethnic Ukrainians, and it was they who took the new loyalty oath. However, despite the fact that SOU was criticized by the communists, socialists and a major part of the military community, it had a great influence on the development of the Ukrainian army. SOU was created with the support of the right wing parties such as *Rukh* and the Ukrainian Republican Party. The main demands of the SOU were:

⁵⁷ Andresiuk, Boris, *Reformuvannia Zbroinykh Syl Ukrainy na Suchasnomu Etapi*, Pulsary, 2002, p. 19.

⁵⁸ *Vechirni Kyiv*, 4 September 1992.

- Departicized military;
- All military have to take the loyalty oath to Ukraine;
- Political officers should be retired;
- Ukrainian officers serving outside the republic should be returned home;
- Restructuring of the military industrial complex;
- Reform of the Ukrainian KGB as well as the military structure;
- Creation of the National Security Council and Ukrainian Ministry of Defense.⁵⁹

However, by mid 1992, all these demands were implemented. At the same time, the SOU took over some functions of the former MPA, particularly in Ukrainian indoctrination of the military personnel. The SOU had a great influence in Socio-Psychological Service (SPS) and the Higher Certification Commission of the Ministry of Defense. That happened because the chief of the SPS Volodymyr Muliava, retired sergeant and professor of history, later became a major-general and active member of the SOU and the Democratic Party. However, after the Parliament approved some laws, the military organization was removed from SOU influence, but they still had a great influence on the military issues in the parliament.⁶⁰

Secondly, the Ukrainian Parliament approved several laws that helped to keep military political involvement. The law of Ukraine “On the Armed Forces of Ukraine” article 11 clearly states “activity of any political parties and movements in Ukraine’s Armed Forces is prohibited.”⁶¹ Similarly, article 5 of the law of Ukraine “On Social and Legal Protection of Servicemen and Their Dependants” indicates that “Servicemen cannot be member of any parties or movements.”⁶² Such laws have been helping to stay civil control over the army by keeping political parties out of the military and the military out of political involvement. The Ukrainian military organization remains free from political parties that help to exercise civilian control.

⁵⁹ Parrott, Bruce, *State Building and Military Power in Russia and the New States of Eurasia*, M.E. Sharpe Inc., 1995, pp. 169-170.

⁶⁰ Good analyses of the role that SOU had been playing in Ukrainian military building and reforms can be found in book Parrott, Bruce, *State Building and Military Power in Russia and the New States of Eurasia*, M.E. Sharpe Inc., 1995, pp. 169-172 or Kuzio, Taras, D’Anieri, Paul, *Dilemmas of State-Led Nation Building in Ukraine*, Praeger Publisher, 2002, pp. 150-153.

⁶¹ The Law of Ukraine “On the Armed Forces of Ukraine,” 1993.

⁶² The Law of Ukraine “On Social and Legal Protection of Servicemen and Their Dependants,” 1993.

However, the Ukrainian military are allowed to vote during the elections. Moreover, they can participate in them and become a deputy. During all past elections, officers have become members of the parliament. In order to run their elections, they can take a few weeks leave. However, according to the law, they are required to leave active duty service and join the reserves in case of election to the parliament. After the end of the membership in the parliament, officers can join the army again. This is one more mechanism that insures the armed forces form the political influence.

Some analysts mentioned that from the very beginning, the Ukraine should avoid military involvement in politics, because it was no “head”, in other words, no military leaders could take a leading role. During Soviet rule, Ukraine did not have an autonomous military structure. It was only separate units without a unified command. These were no organizations that could rule the army such as the Ministry of Defense or General Staff, no independent organization capacity, and no Ukrainian command structure. So, when the state just started to build its structure, it was weak, as well as the military organization that was in poor condition.⁶³

Finally, despite the fact that the Ukrainian Armed Forces had experienced the influence of political parties and movements during its formation, by the mid-1990’s, the army was freed from any political influence. Passing and implementing several legislature acts that restrict political involvement of the military have been its job since then. That can be a helpful hint for some countries that experience problems similar to Ukraine.

F. RELATIONS WITH MEDIA

The Ukrainian Army, similarly as the Soviet Union, has created few military published sources of information, as well as military TV that has produced and released military reports. *Narodna Armiya* (People’s Army) was established as a central organ of the Ministry of Defense on October 1, 1991, and based on the Soviet newspaper known as *Leninskoye Znamye* (Lenin’s Standard). One of the main characteristics of this paper was historical education and Ukrainian indoctrination in other words – *Ukrainization* of the Former Soviet troops located on Ukrainian soil. Since its creation, *Narodna Armiya*

⁶³ D’Anieri, Paul, Kravchuk, Robert, Kuzio, Taras, *Politics and Society in Ukraine*, Westview Press, 1999, p. 255.

always has had historical articles mostly dealing with the Cossacks, Ukrainian culture, Ukrainian borders, Ukrainian military formations during the World War II (OUN-UPA), and Ukrainians in the Crimea. During the first few years, the newspaper had a very nationalistic character as most of the articles criticized Russia and tried to rewrite history or, at least, change some of its episodes. However, when Kuchma took power, *Narodna Armiya* changed its attitude toward a moderate view and started to publish very interesting articles on different topics related to the history of Ukraine, information about different security blocks and organizations, and even articles that criticize the Ukrainian government for being too soft on Russia.⁶⁴ However, it was still the same Soviet style military newspaper with slight changes whose main function was to indoctrinate the personnel, not to provide information.

The same can be applied to the other Ukrainian military publications such as *Flot Ukrainy* (Ukrainian Navy), *Pykordonnyk Ukrainy* (Ukrainian Border Guard), *Vartovi Neba* (Sentry of the Sky), *Viysko Ukrainy* (Ukrainian Forces). However, some of them published specific technical articles, but, in general, most publications were educational with the main function to indoctrinate and *Ukrainize* the army.

In order to accelerate the process of the military *Ukrainization* series of lessons on the Ukrainian language were published in different military media sources. That helped former MPA officers, now officers of educational and psychological service, to teach other officers and enlisted personnel the Ukrainian language, because most of them did not know the state language.

One of the most significant steps was the creation of a public affairs office and press service of the Ministry of Defense whose one of the function was to prepare press releases for the media and analyze media publications concerning military issues. Moreover, at the end of the 1990's, a web-site was created in which can be found some of the information with regard to the Ukrainian military.⁶⁵

⁶⁴ Kuzio, Taras, D'Anieri, Paul, *Dilemmas of State-Led Nation Building in Ukraine*, Praeger Publisher, 2002, p. 159.

⁶⁵ This is a link to the web site of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine <http://www.mil.gov.ua/>, accessed 16 February 2004.

The Ministry of Defense publishes 14 newspapers and magazines, it has TV and radio studios in the Ministry of Defense, in the Staff of every service, in every Operational Command, and in every military institute. According to “The Concept of Development of the System of Ukrainian Armed Forces Mass Media”, their main function is “to provide coordinated actions of different social institutes, groups, ordinary citizens for strengthening the countries defense capabilities.”⁶⁶

Since 1991, civilian Ukrainian media have showed a gradual increase in being interested in military problems. Brief analyses of the periodic newspapers (*Ukraina Moloda*, *Den'*, *Holos Ukrainy*, *Zerkalo Nedely*, and others) that regularly published articles on military issues between 1996 and 2000 shows that the number, quality and spectrum of the publications has steadily increased. (See Figures 4 and 5).




Figure 4. The Number of Publications on Military Issues (After *National Security and Defense*, UCEPS Analytical Report, 2000, No. 11)⁶⁷

⁶⁶ “The Concept of Development of the System of Ukrainian Armed Forces Mass Media”, approved by the Minister of Defense of Ukraine on 20 January 1994.

⁶⁷ This information can be accessed through the internet http://www.uceps.org/eng/section/National_Security_and_Defence/ accessed 16 February 2004




Figure 5. Military Issues Covered in the Mass Media and its Number (After *National Security and Defense*, UCEPS Analytical Report, 2000, No. 11)⁶⁸

The large number of publications on Combat Readiness and Arms and Military Hardware can be explained only in one way. The Ukrainian military had a tactical missile that hit a civilian residential building in the Kyiv's satellite town of Brovari. Also, a few other publications are about the condition of ammunition storage at the military depot outside Kyiv and security regimes on some important military objects. These articles were very critical. However, they help to show to the general public some problems of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and to draw attention to the government and Parliament to the military needs.

Some analytical newspapers and magazines such as *Vezha* (The Tower), *Sposteregach* (Observer), *National Security and Defense* published several analytical papers and articles about the current and future military structure, civil-military relations, Ukrainian-NATO relations, and international military cooperation. These publications deeply analyzed Ukrainian military history, the current situation in the army and the future of the military structure in Ukraine. Most of the scientists and specialists

⁶⁸ Ibid.

understand that without drastic changes in the military structure, Ukraine cannot have a good quality modern army. However, most of these media sources are very specific and difficult to find for regular sale.

The main attributes of the military relations with the media in Ukraine during its first five years of independence was ignorance of the army problems in the civilian media, as well as ignorance of them by the Ukrainian government. Later on, after the Brovari incident, the media started to pay more attention to the military problems, because people wanted to know the truth about their army. Such situations occurred because of the difficult social and economical situation in the entire country and the military was not the worst part of the entire picture. In the words of Major A. Zaccor:

Low support translates into a low budgets and conscription laws which exempt many of the best potential recruits. Low quality personnel and limited resources for training and modernizing the forces results in poor performance. This poor performance, which might include indiscipline, abuse of soldiers, and unsafe or insanitary living or working conditions, gives the armed forces a bad time. This poor reputation leads to further erosion in public and political support for the military.⁶⁹

This could be a dangerous situation in any other states with the final result being attempted military coup, as in some Latin American countries, but the Ukrainian military inherited the Soviet military attitude towards the state and did not want to go against civilian authorities. Moreover, during the first ten years of independence, the Ukrainian military did not make any attempts to show their insubordination to the civilian government, they just simply followed their orders.

Finally, the words of colonel-general Viktor Bannykh, former Deputy Minister of Defense of Ukraine for Policy and Military Cooperation are the best conclusion for this topic:

Ukraine's citizenry could be better informed about the activities of the Armed Forces by introducing the military policy observer position on the staff of mass media editors boards, or by appointing persons competent in

⁶⁹ Grytsenko, Anatoliy S., *Defense Reform in Ukraine: Chronology of the First Five Years*, Bundesinstitut Für Ostwissenschaftliche und Internationale Studien, 1998, p. 33.

military issues to take charge of such work. Experience shows that this practice can produce positive results for the benefit of both the Armed Forces and the publishing house.⁷⁰

In conclusion, Ukraine went through several stages of building and reforming the military structure. However, in 2000, the military was very far from being the ideal armed forces. Analyses shows that the military doctrine should be revised as soon as possible, the military organization should be changed and reduced, the state should provide appropriate funds for military reforms, the state should guide the military, because the state needs the appropriate national security and priorities for the army.

⁷⁰ Bannykh, Viktor, *Defense Ministry – for the Effective Co-operation with Mass Media*, National Security and Defense 2000, No. 1, http://www.uceps.org/eng/section/National_Security_and_Defence/ accessed 16 February 2004.

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IV. CURRENT SYSTEM OF CIVIL CONTROL OVER THE MILITARY IN UKRAINE FROM 2000 TO THE PRESENT

Starting in 2000, a slight improvement in the economic situation gave the Ukraine Armed Forces a chance to implement its drastically needed reforms. At that time, many experts felt that the army had reached the bottom line of its crisis and started the real development for its future structure that will be adequate to the country's needs. On 29 May 2000, the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine, jointly with the President, adopted a revised program for the development of the armed forces, covering the period up to 2005. The main goal of this program is to create a professional modern army with very effective civil-military relations.

In recent times, a Ukrainian president Kuchma declared the desire of the country to join NATO in the near future. That was specified by the state's desire to join the European community. In order to fit NATO standards, Ukraine has to make deep military reforms that were understandable to all parts of this process. However, the approval of the military reforms went through the misunderstanding between the executive and legislative branches that led to freezing them during 2000 and 2003, because of the lack of money for the reorganization. However, in 2003 – 2004, these problems were solved and the army has started to receive money for military reforms.

Since 1991, when Ukraine received its independence, the newly independent state established very close relations with NATO. Long participation in the PfP program, a special partnership and creation of the Ukraine-NATO commission, helped the government and military to ascertain how the Ukrainian army will look in the future in order to join NATO. Those findings were put into the foundations of the State Program for Reforming and Development of Ukraine's Armed Forces by 2005, the Concept of Reform of the Armed Forces Command Structure by 2010, and the State Program of Transition of the Armed Forces of Ukraine to Manning with Contract Servicemen. This is the main document that the Ukrainian government adopted in order to manage military reforms.

According to the new programs, by 2015 Ukraine will have modern professional military forces with good quality civilian control that will fit NATO standards and will be the true guarantor of Ukrainian independence. This is the main goal of the military reforms.

A. MILITARY DOCTRINE AND MAJOR MISSION OF THE ARMED FORCES

The normative base adopted in Ukraine defines the role of the armed forces. Several steps were taken and several steps will be completed in the near future in order to create a full normative base for army reforms.

- From the beginning in 1997, the National Security Concept was approved by the parliament. It defines the principles of Ukrainian security.
- The second step was the State Program of Armed Forces Development and Reform until 2005. It identified the overall schema for armed forces development.
- The third step was the adoption of the State Program for Weapons and Military Equipment Development. It discovered a detailed schema of implementation for individual Armed Services and programs for non-MOD military forces.
- The next step will be the revision of the National Security Concept in 2004. It should reflect new challenges for Ukraine in the present international reality.
- Following these aforementioned steps will be the reconsideration of the Military Doctrine that should fit the new National Security Concept regulations.

All documents are based on the Ukrainian desire to join NATO and the EU. Thus, most of them were created through close cooperation with NATO, OSCE and the EU.

However, the process of adapting the law in Parliament has several problems. First of all, the State Program of Armed Forces Development and Reform until 2005 was made a presidential decree and not a Parliamentary law. That happened because the state constitution does not have any regulations about this topic, so state authorities decided to go the easiest route to do a presidential decree in order to avoid parliamentary hearings and delays. This created a problem for military financing, because the people's deputies

did not feel responsible for the implementation of a new state program of military reforms and some of them, particularly communists, were totally against it, because it was built on the assumptions that Ukraine will join NATO.⁷¹

Nonetheless, in January 2004, the Minister of Defense Evgen Marchuk presented the Parliament with the new law of Armed Forces Development and Reform to 2005 that contains the main regulations about military reforms in financing and implementation. Later, that law successfully passed the first hearing, and in the near future, it will be adopted.

At the same time, the Parliament Committee on National Defense and Security is working on the new revised Military Doctrine of Ukraine. The new doctrine will be based on the following assumptions:⁷²

- Acceleration of the process of world integration and globalization.
- Strengthening of the trust and widening of cooperation in the military sphere.
- Extension of the collective security zone, mostly because of NATO enlargement.
- Absence of a concrete military threat for Ukraine from other countries.
- Widening of the spectrum and scale of threats to international security, first of all, international terrorism.

Currently, the main functions of the Armed Forces of Ukraine will be the containment of any aggression against Ukraine and protection of the territorial integrity of the state. Based on these assumptions, the main missions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces are:

- Neutralization of any military conflicts of low intensity using rapid reaction forces.
- Ensuring mobilization preparedness against local or regional wars.
- Continual readiness of one brigade (2000-3000 people) for peace keeping operations.
- Maintenance of constant combat readiness.

⁷¹ Polyakov, Leonid, *Ukraine's Security Sector Reform: is Progress Conditioned by the Interest of Society?*, Occasional Paper, DCAF, available [online] <http://www.dcaf.ch> accessed 18 February 2004.

⁷² *Narodnaya Armiya*, 5 January 2004, accessed [online] <http://uamedia.visti.net> on 16 February 2004.

- Barring or preventing any possible provocation and infringement on the Ukrainian sovereignty.
- Prevention of foreign interference in internal conflicts and their localization.
- Implementation of international obligations about peace keeping and international security.
- Accumulation of the mobilization recourses.
- Ensuring operational and mobilizational deployment of the force.⁷³

The Ukrainian military reforms are based on the annual Target Plan in the Framework of the NATO-Ukraine Action Plan. During 2003, the Target Plan had 259 arrangements from which 83 were the responsibility of Ukraine. Most of the actions are long-term. At the same time for 2004, the Target Plan stipulates 207 actions from which 52 are the responsibility of Ukraine. Most of these arrangements concern structural reforms of the army, Defense democratic civil control over the military, and Defense Review. Much attention was given to the social questions, conversion of the military bases and installations, utilization of excess ammunition, ecological problems of the military activity, and informational support of the military reorganization. To conclude:

Significant progress has been made in helping Ukraine reshape its defense establishment through the work of the Joint Working Group on Defense Reform. It provides a forum in which NATO and Ukraine are able to exchange views and expertise on a broad range of defense issues, including the revision of national security concepts, military doctrine, force planning, budgeting, military downsizing and the transition of personnel from the military to the civilian sectors.⁷⁴

For the last few years, Ukraine has been making significant steps in military reforms. The declaration of the course to join the European community and Euro-Atlantic security organization forced the legislative and executive branches to accelerate military reforms. For the first time, since gaining independence, the Ukrainian Armed Forces experienced much attention from the government and more or less the appropriate money from the budget. Military reforms were a necessary step to further the democratization of the army and the state.

⁷³ Ibid.

⁷⁴ For the extra information on Ukraine-NATO cooperation see <http://www.nato.int/docu/facts/2000/nato-ukr.htm> accessed 10 March 2004.

B. FORCE STRUCTURE

According to the State Program of Armed Forces Development and Reform until 2005, the Ukrainian Armed Forces will have three main components divided by spheres of operation: air (Air Force together with Air Defense), sea (Navy), land (Army). This will make it possible of the structure of the military forces to be similar to the Western model.

Functionally Armed Forces of Ukraine will have three main elements:

- Rapid Reaction Forces with the main function to preserve the state from any possible aggressions against Ukraine, implementation of the international obligations about peace keeping, and liquidation of the possible natural and man-caused disasters.
- Main Defense Forces with the main function to repel aggressions, defeat the enemy, stop the fighting and create conditions for peace resolution.
- Strategic Reserves with the main function to ensure the stability of defense.

In order to ensure civil control over the military, the State Program of reform anticipates the distribution of the functions and missions between the Ministry of Defense and General Staff.

The Ministry of Defense executes the program of the state policy in questions of defense and military building, provides the Armed Forces of Ukraine the necessary people, materials, technical and financial resources, and social programs.

The General Staff has to concentrate its attention on the planning of the proper use of the Armed Forces, organization of combat and mobilization readiness, and preparation of forces and staffs of different levels for proper use.⁷⁵

The program of military reform states that in 2005 the total number of the Armed Forces of Ukraine will be 220,000 people of which 160,000 will be military. During the next two years, the army will be reduced by more than 155.000 people (see Figures 6 and 7).

⁷⁵ *Narodnaya Armiya*, 5 January 2004, accessed [online] <http://uamedia.visti.net> on 16 February 2004.




Figure 6. Planned Number of Military and Civilian Personnel in the Armed Forces of Ukraine, in Thousands of People (After *Narodnaya Armiya*)⁷⁶

During 2004-2005, 370 military structures will be disbanded and more than 150 reformed. These actions will help to adjust the military structures to Western standards. At that time, the number of tanks will be reduced by more than 2,000, combat armored vehicles by 2,300, artillery systems by 2,000 with a caliber of more than 100 millimeters, and 100 aircrafts.

The analyses of the future force structure shows that the Armed Forces of Ukraine will have 25 brigades in the Army, 40 brigades in the Air Force (Air and Air Defense), and 50 vessels in the Navy. The number of people in the army will be 308,000 during a possible wartime situation with 54,000 officers, and 220,000 in peace time with 39,000 officers.

By 2005, Ukraine will have a combined conscript-professional western type army. By 2015, the Armed Forces of Ukraine will become professional. The structure and number of people and weaponry in the army will be adjusted to western standards and will answer to the new military doctrine and new reality.

C. PROMOTIONS

Beginning in 2000, the promotion system was not changed. The main principle of its work is the Certification Commissions which checks the professional level of the candidate for officers being promoted in rank or position. However, after the adoption of

⁷⁶ Ibid.

the reform plan in January 2004, the main goal was to create a safe atmosphere for the most professional and talented officers and enlisted men to be promoted in order to avoid losing the best people. People working on the commissions created a special “social card of the serviceman” with information about the familial and living conditions of every candidate. That procedure helps to prevent social problems and helps to find the best solution in each particular case. As Minister of Defense Marchuk said: “social warranties will be the priority in military reforms, at the same time, reforms should not affect military efficiency.”⁷⁷

Nonetheless, the composition of the Certification Commissions was changed. In the past, all members of the commission were active duty officers. However, now some members can be civilian. Even chairmen of the Higher Attestation Commission became civilians, as in the First Deputy of the Minister of Defense of Ukraine from the Humanitarian Policy Valerii Goshov's'kii. That concern with the new policy in including more civilian personnel in the military structure is to ensure civilian control over the military.

More than 13,000 people were discharged from military service in 2003. During 2004-2005, 31,720 officers will be discharged from the military, (in 2004 – 15,400, in 2005 – 16,270), 23,600 warrant officers (in 2004 – 13,700, in 2005 – 9,900), and 49,370 civil workers of the Armed Forces (in 2004 – 29,400, in 2005 – 19,970) (see Figure 7).⁷⁸ In order to ensure discharged military personnel adequate social protection and adaptation, Kyiv receive help from the OSCE. The Coordination Office of the OSCE in Ukraine at the beginning provided technical help and consultations for the military. Later, education programs and special centers for adaptation of the discharged military personnel were created. Also, the OSCE helps the adaptation of the closed military bases to civilian life.

⁷⁷ *Narodnaya Armiya*, 28 January 2004, accessed [online] <http://uamedia.visti.net> on 16 February 2004.

⁷⁸ Online informational server *Korresponden.nett* available [online] <http://www.korrespondent.net/main/88733> accessed 10 March 2004.




Figure 7. Planned Reduction of the Military and Civilian Personnel in the Armed Forces of Ukraine, in Thousands of People (After *Narodnaya Armiya*)⁷⁹

One of the main reasons for military reforms is to change the balance between the senior and junior officers that experience the Ukrainian Armed Forces of today. That became a big problem for the military structure when there were not enough junior officers in the units for the positions of platoon leaders and company commanders and at the same time there were too many officers at the rank of major-colonel who had positions not adequate to their pay grade. Military reform anticipates the number of the officers in each rank, minimum and maximum time of serving in each rank and the maximum time of military service before retirement. In 2005, the Ukrainian army will have 60 percent junior (lieutenant-captain) officers and the rest will be senior (major-colonel) and higher (major general – general of the army) officers.⁸⁰ This ratio is usual for the western model of the military structure.

Generally speaking, the present promotional system was created in order to democratize the fields of assignments and promotion in ranks make this process more open and equitable. The work of these organizations can help to promote the best people and create a truly professional army.

⁷⁹ Ibid.

⁸⁰ *Narodnaya Armiya*, 6 December 2003, accessed [online] <http://uamedia.visti.net> on 16 February 2004.

D. MILITARY FINANCING

On 29 May 2000, the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine, jointly with the President, adopted a revised program for the development of the armed forces, covering the period up to 2005. However, the implementation of this program was delayed, because of the lack of money in the budget.⁸¹ According to the chief of General Staff Petro Shuliak in 2001:

... only 50 % of the planned amount necessary to carry out reforms planes were delivered (UAH 175 million instead of UAH 350 million), and this year (2002 - auth.) it is planned to allocate UAH 254 million instead of required UAH 550 million. With this kind of attitude of the state to its armed forces there is no sense to speak about Ukraine's integration to Euro-Atlantic structures.⁸²

Instead of reforming the Armed Forces budget, 90 percent of the funds were spent for the maintenance (mostly salaries and food for soldiers) and only about 10 percent for the development of the army, but in 2004, the situation will be changed (see Figure 8).




Figure 8. Spending of the State Budget Funds for the Armed Forces of Ukraine in 2003 and 2005, in Percent (After *Narodnaya Armiya*)⁸³

⁸¹ The cause of this problem can be read in part A - MILITARY DOCTRINE AND MAJOR MISSION OF THE ARMED FORCES and also in the work *Ukraine's Security Sector Reform: is Progress Conditioned by the Interest of Society?* written by Leonid Polyakov, Occasional Paper, DCAF, available [online] <http://www.dcaf.ch> accessed 18 February 2004.

⁸² Interview with the Chief of General Staff Petro Shuliak, "Professional Army Needs State's Support", *Narodnaya Armiya*, 25 July 2002.

⁸³ *Narodnaya Armiya*, 21 February 2004, accessed [online] <http://uamedia.visti.net> on 05 March 2004.

The state budget for 2004 will provide sufficient funds for military reforms. In 2004, the military will receive almost UAH 6.4 billion (\$ 1.2 billion) or 76.6 percent of the needed money. This number is much larger than in 2003 when the army received half of the funds received in 2004. The absolute number of the military budget for 2004 is 10 percent of the state budget and 1 percent of the GDP. The government is planning to spend UAH 1.24 billion in 2004 and UAH 1.71 billion in 2005 only for military reforms.⁸⁴

The budget for 2004 will provide more money not only for military reforms, but also for different military needs, such as:⁸⁵

- Combat and operational training: 2003 – UAH 6.8 million, 2004 – UAH 31.6 million.
- Support of the security of the ammunition depots: 2003 – UAH 5.3 million, 2004 – UAH 32.3 million.
- Utilization of the ammunition: 2003 – UAH 3.6 million, 2004 – UAH 20 million.

The reduction of the armed forces will free more than 28,300 pieces of military weapons and equipment. Their utilization will cost approximately UAH 28.6 million (2004 – UAH 4 million, 2005 – 24.6 million). However, some of these excess weaponry can be sold. Moreover, the military will vacate more than 142 bases and installations that also can be sold.⁸⁶

Reduction of the military forces will help them to be up to the new challenges of the Armed Forces. The ratio of the people in the army to the total population of the state in 2005 will be 0.41 percent that will make it possible to spend money on the development of the armed forces and not just maintenance. The normal ratio in NATO countries is 0.34 – 0.53 percent. In Ukraine it is now 0.73 percent (see Figure 9).

⁸⁴ Online informational server *Korresponden.net* available [online] <http://www.korrespondent.net> accessed 10 March 2004.

⁸⁵ *Narodnaya Armiya*, 21 February 2004, accessed [online] <http://uamedia.visti.net> on 05 March 2004.

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*




Figure 9. Ratio of the People in the Army to the Total Population of the State in NATO Countries (Average), in Ukraine Present Time and in 2005, in Percent to the Total Population of the Country (After *Narodnaya Armiya*)⁸⁷

The Ukrainian army needs money for the reforms. Delays in budget funding caused a dramatic decline in the combat readiness of the military forces. The Ukrainian military has only been surviving for the last 12 years. Only proper financing can help to reform the Armed Forces and build a small western type army.

E. POLITICAL INVOLVEMENT OF THE MILITARY

The Ukrainian military is staying out of politics. This is the law. The army lives according to the law. The military is not involved in political struggles, and political parties and movements are not trying to involve the armed forces in the struggles for political power.

In the last few years, there was no significant change, with one exception. In 2003, the former head of the National Security Council, a civilian, Evgen Marchuk, has become a Minister of Defense of Ukraine. This is the second attempt to put a civilian in the leading position in the Ministry of Defense. The first time, Shmarov remained in the palace for two years and was changed by the president because of the failed attempt of military reform. Presently, the new minister started reforms by enlisting the support of the president, government and parliament. As a former chief of the Security Service of Ukraine, the people's deputy in the parliament, prime-minister in the government and the

⁸⁷ Ibid.

head of the Security Council of Ukraine, he has the experience necessary for the implementation of the state policy towards the army. New reforms were started by exchanging military personnel in the Ministry of defense with civilian personnel (see Figure 10).




Figure 10. Current and Planned Ratio of the Military and Civilian Personnel in the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, in Percent (After Online Informational Server *Korresponden.net*)⁸⁸

Moreover, the Minister of Defense Marchuk created new structures within the Ministry such as the Department of Interaction with the Parliament, Medical and Resources Protection, very similar to the western model of the Ministry of Defense, in order to ensure civil control over the military. In his comments about these changes, Marchuk stated:

Demarcation of the functions between General Staff and Ministry of Defense can be explained very easy: military should not participate into the politics. Not only personally, but also military as a structure should not participate into the politics. They should be ready to carry out the military-political orders. And this is a big difference. But that does not mean “isolation” of the military. For example right now, the Chief of General Staff colonel-general Oleksandr Zatynaiko is not a deputy of the Minister of Defense (as it was previously in Ukraine and in the Soviet Union –

⁸⁸ Available [online] <http://www.korrespondent.net> accessed 3/10/2004.

auth.), but he is a member of the National Security and Defense Council under the President of Ukraine. In other words his opinion, as a high level professional, will be heard.⁸⁹

Also, the Ministry of Defense received a lot of help from NATO specialists that worked in close contact with Ukrainian experts on the plan of military reforms in order to avoid making the mistakes made by other newly democratize countries of the former Warsaw Pact that had already experienced the stages that the Ukrainian military are going through currently.

Over time, some political organizations such as the Union of Ukrainian Officers and *Rukh* that influenced the army during its Nationalization had to change their attitude towards the military. This occurred because different NGO's, independent experts, the media, and scientists started to pay more attention to the problems of the armed forces that led to the exclusion of the political motivation in the military.

The most significant Ukrainian achievement since gaining independence has been the isolation of the military from political influence and military involvement in politics, which helps to build a system of civil control over the military and ensure their loyalty to the state.

F. RELATIONS WITH MEDIA

For the last few years, the Ukrainian security environment has been changing. Since the end of the 20th century, Ukraine experienced different security developments such as Kosovo, September 11, NATO and EU enlargement, the "cassette scandal", the accusation of selling weapons to Iraq, the Ukrainian missile hitting a residential building and the Russian aircraft Tu-154. Such situations caused the Ukrainian society to being to think about the security of the state. The network of non-governmental organizations is expanding from year to year. These public institutes accumulate a significant amount of knowledge and information on military related questions, most of which find their place in the media. Moreover, the government started to pay more attention to the use of NGO's. As one of the foreign observers noticed:

⁸⁹ Online informational server *Korresponden.net* available [online] <http://www.korrespondent.net> accessed 10 March 2004.

An impressive feature of the seminar and conference scene in Ukraine is that, even when attendance is restricted to small numbers and very senior official participants, representatives of the more prominent NGO's now tend to be invited as a matter of course.

Although this still be said of the news media, here too, shyness and hostility are disappearing. Western activity and presence by means of NATO and bilateral training programs and the funding of NGO's has reached significant levels. A number of foreign specialists now regularly collaborate with official structure as well as NGO's on defense reform and other issues relevant to Ukraine's national security. This activity played an instrumental role in breaking down barriers in Ukraine.⁹⁰

At the same time, the mass media have been starting to play a more important role in addressing military subjects. The number and spectrum of the publications dealing with military problems significantly increased which helps to focus the attention of the authorities and public on the problems of military reforms.

Thus, by publishing materials on the topic of military reform, the public has access to the experts that create the program of military reforms. For example, public discussion of the conscript service led to a declaration for reducing conscript service to 12 months and a full transition to the professional forces by 2015. Also, criticism on the lack of a clear government position on the priorities and defense reform planning helped to discover the correct direction towards the small, mobile, professional, highly capable forces integrated with NATO.

The plan of military reforms also anticipates the establishment of the close relationship with the media. The military are planning to hold special events for the press in Operational Commands, Internet conferences with senior military authorities, press-tours for the media in different units including peace keeping. At the same time, on the Internet web-site of the Ministry of Defense, new page were created with information about Defense Review, military reforms and contract service.

The media in Ukraine started to pay more attention to the military problems, and in return, this allowed military reforms to be influenced by publishing the opinions of independent experts on the proposed programs of the reforms. The media is a very

⁹⁰ See Sherr, J. "Security, Democracy, and 'Civil Democratic Control,'" *Ukrainian Foreign and Security Policy: Theoretical and Comparative Perspectives*, Edited by D. P. Moroney, T. Kuzio and M. Molchanov, PRAEGER, 2002, p. 103.

important democratic instrument of civil control over the military. It is only the place where society can discover information about military problems and by publishing their criticisms, they can express public opinion about particular questions.

In conclusion, 2004 is a turning point in the history of military reforms in the Ukrainian Armed Forces. After almost 13 years of independence, the Ukrainian authorities have overcome military problems and began to meet their needs. The military insisted that the army was not ready for responding to the government requirements, because of a lack of money for the reforms and development of the Armed Forces. Western aid and radical changes in the state policy towards the military will help to build a modern, highly capable, professional Armed Forces that will fit NATO standards in order to join the Euro-Atlantic security organization in the future.

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V. CONCLUSION

The basic hypothesis that Ukraine is moving toward the *Postmodern* forms of military organization was proven by analyzing three case studies that cover the entire history of the independent state of Ukraine starting from 1991 to the present. The Ukrainian military, by moving towards an all volunteer force army, has started to lose contact with a nation state when the army was conscript and created to fight big wars. On the other hand, a volunteer force created for multipurpose missions experiences greater cooperation with civil society. The main goal of military reform in Ukraine is to have a pure professional *Postmodern* type military by 2015.

For the last 13 years, Ukraine created a working system of civil control over the military. An analysis of the three cases in this thesis discussed the main factors that drove the shaping of the Ukrainian system of civil-military relations. From the very beginning to the present, this process has gone through several stages of development:

- First – institutionalization of the Armed Forces and bases of the system of civil control.
- Second – development of the military structure and system of civil control.
- Third – creation of the legislative base for military reform, including a mechanism of democratic control.
- Fourth – military reform and transformation together with further improvement of the system of civil control over the military.

The main factors that influence system of civil control over the military are described as follows.

Soviet heritage – Soviet civil military relations faced many changes during Gorbachev's rule that touched all spheres of military life. The most significant were that military became involved in the internal struggle for power, Soviet troops were withdrawn from Eastern Europe, the Warsaw Pact collapsed, and finally, the abortive coup attempt in August 1991. These facts led to a change in the military's attitude towards the civilian authorities that finally prevented bloodshed during the coup and forced, at least for while, the army out of internal politics.

Between 1991, when Ukraine gained its independence, and the present when Ukraine started deep military reforms, a working military system was created. The main characteristics of this period were the lack of attention from the government and parliament, dramatically low funds for reforms and the military reorganized themselves without proper direction from civilian authorities.

The Ukrainian military greatly improved the promotional system. It was created in order to democratize the fields of assignments and promotion in the ranks to make this process more open and equitable. This can help to promote the best people and create a truly professional army. One of the major constraints for the appropriate work was the financial problem that the military experienced at that time. In order to transfer an officer from one location to another, the army had to pay to provide everything needed for normal life, especially housing. However, the country's weak economic situation did not give appropriate funds to the military that resulted in a chain reaction in every sphere of military life.

During the analyzed period of time, the Ukrainian Armed Forces suffered from insufficient funds because of a dramatic decline in Ukrainian economic capabilities after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. However, the military and the government found several ways to keep the minimal possible military potential by selling excess military equipment, weapons and land. These steps helped to keep control the army, prevented total destruction of the military structure that helped, in turn, to keep Ukraine independent. Delays in budget funding caused a dramatic decrease in the combat readiness of the military forces. The Ukrainian military surviving for the last 12 years. Only proper financing can help to reform the Armed Forces and build a small western type army.

The importance of adopted legal acts should not be underestimated. History shows that most were more declarative than substantial. Only proper implementation of legal acts can ensure the proper realization of civil control over the military. This mostly concerns the execution of the State Budget.

Even though the Ukrainian Armed Forces had experienced the influence of political parties and movements during its formation, by the mid 1990's, the army was freed from any political influence and military involvement in politics. Passing and implementing several legislative acts that restrict political involvement of the military have been making their impact since then, which helps to build the system of civil control over the military and ensure their loyalty to the state. It can be a helpful hint for countries with experience similar to Ukrainians.

For the last few years, Ukraine has been taking significant steps towards military reforms. The declaration of the goal to join the European community and Euro-Atlantic security organization forced the legislative and executive branches to accelerate military reforms. For the first time since gaining independence in 2004, the Ukrainian Armed Forces experienced more attention from the government, foreign experts and received money from the budget. Military reforms were a necessary step for further democratization of the army and the state.

The media in Ukraine started to pay more attention to military problems, which influenced the military reforms by publishing the opinions of independent experts on the proposed programs of the reforms. The media is a very important democratic instrument of civil control over the military, because it is the only place where society can discover information about military problems and by publishing their critiques to express public opinion about particular questions.

Neglect of the defense issues today will lead to the risk of losing statehood tomorrow or shifting responsibility and financial burdens to future generations.⁹¹ Only a well-funded and well-defined program of reform can help to build a modern, highly capable, professional western type Armed Forces with good quality civil control over the military. Ukraine has great experience in building and reforming its military structure and system of civil control. The best results are that Ukraine prevented the involvement of the army into the politics.

⁹¹ Polyakov, Leonid, *Ukraine's Security Sector Reform: is Progress Conditioned by the Interest of Society?*, Occasional Paper, DCAF, available [online] <http://www.dcaf.ch> accessed 18 February 2004.

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