Searching for Partners: Regional Organizations and Peace Operations

William H. Lewis and Edward Marks
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William H. Lewis and Edward Marks

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1.
"Peacekeeping is a U.N. Invention"

So declared Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali in 1994. Indeed, peacekeeping emerged in the post-Cold War period as the “most prominent U.N. activity.” The organization was freed of the shackles placed upon it by superpower rivalry that heretofore had rendered U.N. machinery inoperative in coping with local crises and was suddenly becoming “the center of international efforts to deal with unresolved problems of the past decades as well as the array of present and future issues.” Between 1988 and 1993, more than a dozen new peacekeeping operations were launched, involving more than 70,000 military and civilian personnel for field operations, at an annual cost to the United Nations in excess of $3 billion.

Why this sudden explosion of U.N. peacekeeping activity? Relaxation of Cold War restraints was partially responsible, but it coincided with a sea change in attitudes toward the nation-state. “The norms governing intervention have evolved,” as Barry Blechman put it. Governments have come under increasing scrutiny and criticism for failure to adhere to a growing body of international standards in areas formerly considered purely internal matters, for instance, human rights and political freedom. However, while world opinion is more willing to consider intervention in principle, it is also increasingly leery about military intervention in practice except in
extreme cases, such as the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. Many governments have attempted to square this circle by calling on the United Nations as the legitimizing authority for intervention.

This approach is especially useful when dealing with crises not solely political or military but those where a serious humanitarian emergency exists. Here the United Nations has the potential to accomplish things no other international organization or ad hoc coalition can do. In theory, at least, it can deal with modern plagues, assist refugees, and help countries cope with natural disasters. However many of these emergencies reflect the failure of governing institutions to address effectively deep-seated economic and political problems. These problems, natural and manmade, have recently and increasingly overlapped, creating "complex emergencies," which have sometimes overtaxed U.N. competence and capability. Somalia (1993), Bosnia (1994-95), and Rwanda (1994) were dramatic examples of this development. On the other hand, the U.N. operation in Cambodia demonstrated that, with adequate international support and political will, the United Nations could fulfill an important intervention role on behalf of the international community. The 1997 internal crisis in Cambodia pointed, however, to the need to treat at length with extreme factionalism to assure postelections stability.

The expansion of U.N. peacekeeping or peace enforcement activities through Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter has caused the United Nations to run into trouble. The question of the use of military force by the United Nations, both with respect to competence and to legitimacy, has not been fully answered, as was shown in Somalia and Bosnia. The use of force is difficult enough when viewed in clearcut political situations that can be considered threats to international peace and security, but force becomes even more complex when applied to humanitarian and resettlement concerns. For instance, does uninvited humanitarian assistance constitute intervention in violation of Article 2(7) of the U.N. Charter relating to interference in the domestic affairs of sovereign member states, and to what extent is such intervention to be justified when governments brutalize their populations or cannot provide minimal services to their citizens?
Although there was a lack of an international consensus on such questions, fairly broad agreement existed that some increased level of international cooperation under U.N. auspices was needed to deal with the epidemic of emergencies that erupted with the end of the Cold War. U.N. missions were called in and sent off with a handful of vague mandates involving some form of expanded or second-generation peacekeeping, usually combined with responsibility for dealing with life-threatening challenges to populations, and often with a charge to re-establish minimal government controls. Not surprisingly, the U.N. system suffered severe setbacks as it became clear that the system had only a limited capacity to deal with complex crises. As the United Nations found itself overburdened and underfunded in the years following 1988, a number of member states pushed for extensive reform and reorganization, with special emphasis on humanitarian assistance and peacekeeping. In due course, three new departments were created by combining, amalgamating, and expanding existing units and creating new elements:

- Department of Peacekeeping Operations
- Department of Political Affairs
- Department of Humanitarian Assistance

These changes had been urged on the Secretary-General by concerned member governments that were wrestling with such operational questions as augmenting U.N. field mission capabilities, organizing the diverse and divergent U.N. agencies concerned with peace support and humanitarian assistance, and arranging for more effective coordination among the U.N. system, member states, and nongovernment organizations (NGOs). Beginning in 1990, the reforms led to the expansion or introduction of numerous relevant capabilities in the U.N. system: interagency cooperation and coordination, joint financial appeals, mission planning staff, 24-hour situation room and communication system, training arrangements, and a rudimentary intelligence-sharing system.

As these reforms were implemented, Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali pursued two complementary initiatives. First, in his 1992
Agenda for Peace report, he attempted to provide a comprehensive concept of U.N. peacekeeping; reaction from governments produced modifications and amendments to his original approach, amendments that essentially distinguished between U.N. authorization for intervention in the name of peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance, and U.N. implementation of the same. Most governments clearly believed that Chapter VII forceful intervention is best left to ad hoc coalitions to conduct, albeit with U.N. Security Council authority.

In 1994, the Secretary-General reached out to regional organizations in an attempt to energize more active cooperation between them and the United Nations under Chapter VIII of the Charter. Arguing that U.N. resources were, and would likely remain, inadequate to meet all needs, he called on regional organizations to merge their efforts. Although two meetings of leaders were held in New York and the subject remains under consideration, little concrete has resulted. However, several governments remain interested in pursuing increased regional peacekeeping. The United States is actively engaged in organizing support for the Organization of African Unity, and the Russian Federation claims to be creating a regional collective security organization among the former members of the Soviet Union.

While these initiatives were underway, the number of peacekeeping and humanitarian operations expanded, and a perception of U.N. incompetence emerged. In the past 2 years the number of operations and personnel deployed has been sharply reduced as member states have cut back on their support. Nevertheless it is obvious that the United Nations will not return to its "traditional peacekeeping" days but will continue to be called upon to act on behalf of the international community. Under what conditions the United Nations will be involved, and to what degree regional organizations—the subject of this study—will participate are yet to be determined.
Notes
2.

Altered Perspective, Altered Roles

Containment of communism defined the national security policy of the United States for more than four decades. The strategy provided coherence and a persuasive rationale for policy initiatives on a global scale. With containment as the strong strategic focus, successive American administrations helped to organize new international organizations, form alliances, and develop close ties with government leaders of varied ideological outlook. Throughout much of the post-World War II period, the United States formed "coalitions of the willing" on the assumption that its partners shared similar security concerns. Some such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) proved enduring; others such as the ill-fated Baghdad Pact in the Middle East fell of their own internal contradictions. Rarely did the United Nations loom large in the U.S. security spectrum during much of this period.

The collapse of the Soviet Union and its own attendant network of alliance partnerships has yielded new challenges in the post-Cold War era, a period characterized by some as one of political fragmentation and "Third World chaos." Containment is no longer a basis on which to build coherent policies and a supporting rationale. Different policy tools and intervening capabilities are needed to deal with internecine civil wars, the collapse of governing institutions in war-ravaged societies, and the displacement of populations as a result of such conflicts. The challenges posed demand responses far more complex in some respects than the zero-sum arithmetic of the Cold War demanded.

In his celebrated 1992 report to the Security Council, Agenda for Peace, Boutros-Ghali underscored the productive roles that regional organizations could play in the areas of preventive diplomacy, peace operations, and postconflict peace building. He urged the United
Nations to husband and encourage regional organization activity in these fields. Noting that the Security Council could continue to retain primary responsibility under the Charter for "maintaining international security," the Secretary-General opined that regional bodies could "not only lighten the burden but also contribute to a deeper sense of participation, consensus, and democratization." Agreeing, the Security Council in January 1993 invited regional organizations to examine "ways and means to strengthen their functions to maintain international peace and security within their areas of competence." Among the areas identified: "preventive diplomacy, including fact-finding, confidence-building, good offices, peace building, and, where appropriate, peacekeeping." Nowhere was there mention of military units to be made available to the United Nations Security Council for Chapter VI (peacekeeping) or Chapter VII (enforcement) operations.

The proposals set forth by the Secretary-General were not well received by many U.N. veterans with substantial experience in peace operations. One of them expatiated in 1993 that regional organization are not the best first line of defense against most conflicts because "they do not cover some conflict areas in any sensible way." A special defect, the former official observed, revolves around the accepted principle of "impartiality:" "It frequently happens that regional organizations are regarded as less objective and less impartial than the U.N." Moreover, he contended, such organizations "really don't have the capacity for things like peacekeeping." He suggested their potential lay as partners with the United Nations in some conflict intervention operations where an "unacceptable degree of massive retribution" by U.N. mandated forces will lead adversaries "to come to the bargaining table more than they want to fight." Because most regional organizations lack the capacity to organize and direct large-scale military operations, proponents of this view tend to favor the creation of a U.N. standing force of several brigades (15,000 to 20,000 personnel) for crisis prevention and enforcement purposes. Despite rhetorical outpourings of support by some member states and private interest groups, most U.N. members have proffered only lukewarm support and, given the substantial funding required for such
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a force and existing budget shortfalls, the issue appears to be a dead letter diplomatically.

At the opposite end of the debate is a “regionalist” bloc of member states who, since the organization’s founding at San Francisco in 1945, have argued for recourse to regional bodies as a means to counter perceived U.N. “dominance”—involving weakening Security Council “Perm Five” hegemony in matters of peace and stability. The “regionalist” bloc included several British Commonwealth member states, the Arab League, and the Latin American States. The Organization of American States (OAS) was particularly outspoken in this regard, its members contending that the OAS should serve as a pillar of regional collective security. The initial American view was to tilt U.S. policy in favor of the United Nations as the progenitor of actions intended to maintain international order and stability. Ultimately, however, the U.S. Government acquiesced in support of the OAS position, producing a Charter that, in the words of Innis Claude “conferred general approval upon existing and anticipated regional organizations, but contained provisions having the purpose of making them serve as adjuncts to the United Nations and subjecting them in considerable measure to the direction and control of the central organization.” The U.N.-NATO “partnership” approach in Bosnia at the height of the crisis (1993-95) demonstrated the basic impediments involved in any arrangement for joint military operations under U.N. auspices and civilian direction.

The initial U.S. response to Boutros-Ghali’s recommendations has been to consider a triangular crisis management approach involving the United Nations, regional organizations, and ad hoc coalitions. Each leg in this strategic tripod has certain strengths and weaknesses, and the decision as to which one or combination to use in a given situation is high policy indeed. The regional crisis that arose from Iraq’s 1990 invasion of Kuwait generated wide international concern and a U.N. authorized ad hoc coalition of military forces under U.S. leadership that succeeded in expelling the Iraqis. However, that coalition became increasingly frayed; by early 1997, it was exhibiting geriatric infirmities. Another U.N.-organized and -directed force, the U.N. Protection Force (UNPROFOR), performed abysmally in Bosnia and had to be replaced by a combination of NATO and other forces.
(U.S. led) in 1995-96. In Somalia, a mixed command arrangement under the U.N. Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II), in which command and control arrangements were truncated, produced a shattering debacle in 1993 and the collapse of the U.N. mission shortly thereafter. Earlier, however, the U.N. proved eminently successful in organizing national elections in Cambodia and "stitching together" a national coalition to govern the country. Notable achievements were registered elsewhere: in Mozambique, by ending civil war and establishing civilian authority, and in South Africa, by monitoring elections in 1994 that produced a postapartheid multiracial government.

**First Leg of the Tripod**

The lesson learned is that the first leg in the U.S. tripod, the United Nations, has no warfighting capability, nor should it be expected to develop one. Its primary strength exists in the areas of traditional peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance, to wit:

- Establishing a mandate for interposition of impartial U.N. forces, lightly armed (and at the request of conflicted parties) to monitor adherence to the agreed terms of the cease-fire
- Providing humanitarian assistance to populations displaced or otherwise adversely affected by the preceding conflict
- Encouraging thereafter negotiated settlement of outstanding differences either by serving as intermediary or urging other third parties to do so.

The Security Council, over four-plus decades, authorized seven distinct types of peace operations: interposition, observation, humanitarian support, election monitoring, containment as well as disarmament of forces, and peace enforcement. Apart from the single peace enforcement operation (Congo, 1960s), the United Nation's very real successes in the majority of its operations were predicated on the consent of the contending parties.

When Chapter VII enforcement requirements arose after the end of the Cold War, most recently in Kuwait, Somalia, and Bosnia, the United Nations was without adequate or effective resources. Prior to
1990, the Headquarters Secretariat had neither honed nor adequately conditioned its staff to oversee ambitious field operations. It lacked effective communications and logistics to support operations and maintained an ossified bureaucratic culture ill-equipped to deal with the new array of challenges called for by complex emergencies and peace enforcement mandates.

The Security Council itself levied these obligations on this inadequately funded and undermanned U.N. “system.” The United States bears special responsibility, as the leading member of the Council’s “Perm Five” bloc, for having placed unsupportable burdens on the Secretariat since the end of the Cold War, all in the name of a collective security concept characterized as “assertive multilateralism.” Little serious thought was apparently given to the changing nature of post-Cold War conflict situations in which the center of gravity was shifting from interstate rivalries to complex internal wars. Hitherto, the Secretariat peacekeeping culture had been conditioned to manage holding operations rather than direct multifunctional operations needed to deal with failed states, ethnic feuds, and political separatist movements. The Council now insisted on intervention, often under Chapter VII enforcement mandate, but discovered that the U.N. was ill-suited for agile use of armed forces linked with civilian agencies for ill-conceived political purposes.

Recognizing some of the organization’s basic infirmities, Secretary-General Perez de Cuellar and then Secretary-General Boutros Ghali, at the urging of the United States, Canada, and others launched a number of initiatives to strengthen U.N. competence to manage complex emergency operations. The organization’s peacekeeping infrastructure was reorganized, and highly qualified personnel were added. A new structure was created in the early 1990s, rationalizing and expanding existing peace and humanitarian operations. Three new departments, the Triad, were created to function as crisis management and coordinating centers for the Secretary-General:

- The Department of Political Affairs (DPA), to deal with political questions.
The Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), to be the mission planner and operator.

The Department of Humanitarian Affairs (DHA), to coordinate U.N. civilian agencies in the delivery of humanitarian assistance.

The integration of disparate civilian and military Secretariat elements such as Field Operations into a unified DPKO was a major part of the reforms. These changes of the past several years have given the United Nations its first integrated apparatus for managing the expanded responsibilities of "second generation" peacekeeping. These include:

- A clearly identified senior leadership
- A major increase in the number of specially trained staff for DPKO, including secondment by member countries of over 100 military officers
- Creation of a 24-hour situation room to monitor field operations and to provide early warning of crises
- Establishment of a mission planning staff to provide estimates of troops, materiel, and financial needs when contemplating peace operations
- Creation of a professional training program for officers assigned to peacekeeping missions
- Development of an intelligence sharing system, largely U.S. assisted, responsive to the needs of senior Secretariat officials.

The U.N. leadership has also established a small core staff of experienced military officers for contingency planning and immediate dispatch to crisis areas as an advance Headquarters unit.

Coincident with the push for organizational reform and reorganization, U.N. member governments entered into a dialogue about the purpose, scope, and theory of U.N. peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance. A long and complicated debate on these subjects was conducted in the General Assembly's Second Committee and in the Economic and Social Committee of the United Nations in 1990 and 1991 on the proposal to create a new Department of Humanitarian Assistance and the implications therein for wider U.N.
involvement in humanitarian crises. A primary concern for many governments, mostly those of the Third World, was a fear that new legitimacy might be created for intervention in the internal affairs of countries on the grounds of providing humanitarian assistance.

Artful language, drafted in the best tradition of the United Nations, finally produced a compromise resolution which created the new department charged with coordination of humanitarian assistance, rather than direct involvement and management of field operations. Nevertheless, this innovation created an additional comprehensive role for the U.N. in humanitarian assistance and in peacekeeping activities requiring assistance to endangered populations.

As the Department of Humanitarian Affairs issue was resolved, the U.N. member states, in the form of the Chiefs of State Summit Security Council session of December 1991, charged Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali with the responsibility of defining the appropriate role for the United Nations in the post-Cold War era. In February 1992, the Secretary-General issued U.N. document A/47/277-5/2411, “An Agenda for Peace,” in which he outlined a comprehensive range of U.N. peacekeeping activities: from preventive diplomacy through traditional peacekeeping to peace enforcement and finally on to reconstruction and rehabilitation of damaged or destroyed societies. This ambitious document was well received initially but a backlash ensued. In a sober reevaluation of his “Agenda,” issued in 1995 and entitled “A Supplement to the Agenda for Peace,” the Secretary-General modified his original conceptual approach.

Essentially, the modification called for a division of labor, differentiating between the authorization of international peacekeeping operations and their implementation. Accepting the very real practical and political limitations of the United Nations, Boutros-Ghali proposed that the United Nations continue to be the authorizing authority for the full range of peacekeeping operations (in the form of Security Council resolutions) but would actually implement only those not requiring the use of coercive force (that is, Chapter VII or peace enforcement operations). Enforcement of Chapter VII type operations would continue to be authorized by Security Council resolutions but would be implemented by “contract”
to an existing regional organization (e.g., NATO) or an ad hoc coalition led by a lead nation (e.g., the United States in the Gulf War).

Proliferating conflict situations, financial stringencies, the reticence of some U.N. members, and competing interests within the United Nations currently impede additional reform measures. Despite improved oversight capacities, the Security Council “Perm Five” have indicated that they intend to be cautious in authorizing new peacekeeping operations, especially when cease-fire agreements by disputants are absent. As a result, major U.N.-directed peace enforcement operations are less likely in the immediate future.

**Second Leg of the Tripod**

Within the past 2 years the United States has turned to the second leg of the tripod, regional organizations, to relieve mounting pressures on the United Nations in the areas of crisis prevention, peace operations, and peace making. Chapter VIII of the U.N. Charter provides legal and political foundation for this approach. The Chapter suggests that regional organizations should serve as “courts of first instance” in seeking to resolve local disputes. Such regional organization involvement can occur at the invitation of the states involved in disputes or “by reference from the Security Council.” (The Charter is mute on the question of intra-state conflicts.) On the other hand, Delegation of responsibility to regional institutions is not total. Chapter VIII makes clear that the Security Council does not surrender its right to investigate or otherwise intervene in a dispute by turning to regional organizations, nor are disputants precluded from bringing their disagreements directly to the Security Council.

Chapter VIII stipulates that no enforcement action may be initiated by regional institutions without prior Security Council authorization. This does not preclude regional body enforcement action because the Security Council may “where appropriate, utilize such regional arrangements or agencies for enforcement action under its authority.” This approach was taken by the Council in urging member states and NATO in particular to provide military support for its UNPROFOR operations in Bosnia 1993-95.

In short, Chapter VIII provides the opportunity for regional organizations to act in the face of impending crises that threaten
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regional peace and security. Significantly, they are not required to do so absent specific authorization or urging by the Security Council. When regional bodies do determine that action is required the measures taken must not be at odds with the U.N. Charter, most particularly its “Purposes and Principles:"

- **Purposes:** the prevention and removal of threats; suppression of acts of aggression; adjustment or settlement of international disputes; strengthening universal peace; and furthering international cooperation.
- **Principles:** sovereign equality; fulfilling the obligations of membership; refraining from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity and political independence of states; cooperation with U.N. efforts for crisis prevention and peace enforcement; and avoiding interference in the domestic affairs of states. (The latter is a policy issue of great sensitivity to the majority of member states.)

As noted, some limitation is placed upon regional organizations. Of particular significance, enforcement action in theory may be taken only with the specific authorization of the Security Council. Under Article 51 of the Charter, however, organizations are not precluded from exercising the “inherent right . . . of collective self-defense.” Article 51 provided the foundation for the formation of NATO in 1949, and its justification was to be found in the Rio Treaty of 1943, long before the creation of the United Nations itself. Even this provision does not remove the obligation to keep the Security Council informed of any regional organization action contemplated that might impact adversely on “international security.”

Initial efforts to use the resources available in regional organizations were intensified after 1988. Five years later, 16 regional organizations were cooperating, or evincing interest in cooperating, with the United Nations in peacekeeping or peace-related activities. Of these organizations, three were regional, eight were subregional, four were interregional, and one global in terms of membership. Only about one-third of the participating organizations had well-established mechanisms for strengthening peace and security. With
respect to their general mandates, eight of the participating entities could be considered general purpose, four were economic organizations, two had been organized for defense purposes, one was concerned with legal issues, and one dealt with human rights issues. The interests of participating organizations whose official mandates were primarily economic or legal reflected a growing concern for a comprehensive approach to the maintenance of peace and security.

Of particular importance, the Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the Organization of American States (OAS), and the Organization of African Unity (OAU) had a membership umbrella covering all countries in their respective regions (i.e., Europe, the Americas, and Africa). A general lacuna existed for the East Asia and Pacific region. The Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), however, was beginning to reach out to nonmember countries, through the framework of its Regional Forum, to discuss peace and security issues.

By 1994, recognizing that the United Nations was suffering “system overload” with respect to peace operations and humanitarian programs, Boutros-Ghali determined that a burdensharing approach involving close consultation with regional organizations would be appropriate. Responding to an inquiry from the Security Council and the expressed interest of the General Assembly, he launched consultations with major regional organizations as to appropriate roles they could play in the maintenance of international peace and security. Invited to participate in the consultations were representatives from: the British Commonwealth; Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS); CSCE; Economic Community of West Africa; European Commission; the Arab League; NATO; OAU; OAS; Organization of the Islamic Conference; and the Western European Union.

While definitive action was not taken, the following proposals were put forward in a concluding statement by the President of the U.N. General Assembly:

- A study should be prepared of intrastate conflicts and the comparative advantages of regional and other multilateral alternatives to U.N. peacekeeping.
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- An inventory of capabilities should be prepared by the U.N.
- A regional organization permanent presence in New York might be approved to contribute to better coordination
- A series of high political level seminars and meetings might be held to further collaboration
- A General Assembly working group on Security Council reform might be created.

None of these proposals was put to a vote, but the participants agreed that a follow-on meeting should be organized.

Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali convened a second meeting in February 1996, bringing together the U.N. leadership and several regional organizations. Its purpose was to explore opportunities for enhanced cooperation in the areas of preventive diplomacy, peace making, and peacekeeping operations. The primary emphasis was on establishing agreed mechanisms for regular consultation. Held in New York, the talks also dwelt on situations in which there might be co-deployment of U.N. and regional organization elements, as had already occurred in Georgia and Abkhazia with the OSCE and the CIS, in Burundi with the OAU, and Liberia with the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) West African regional organization. Other examplars were the operational support provided by NATO during the U.N. Protection Force (UNPROFOR) phase of operations in Bosnia, and joint operations with the OAS in the human rights phase of the recently completed peacemaking program in Haiti.

The February 1996 meeting included representatives from nonregional groupings (League of Arab States), some primarily economic (European Union), and subregional (Economic Community of West African States, ECOWAS). Only NATO and CIS participants represented organizations with significant military capabilities. The February consultations evidenced reluctance on the part of most regional organization participants to assume broadened responsibilities for the purely military aspects of peace operations. Their hesitance was largely driven by the limited financial resources available to them for such operations, rivalries among member states in several of the organizations, inadequate military expertise on the part of some, and fears that their organizations might become
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enfeebled if burdensharing responsibilities were assumed prematurely. The participants were prepared, however, to share responsibility with the United Nations in the fields of preventive diplomacy, elections and human rights monitoring, and police “monitoring.”

Despite the hesitancies of the February participants, “regionalization” of peace operations is likely to be on the U.N. agenda for the remainder of this decade and beyond. NATO’s direct involvement in the form of an implementation force (IFOR) beginning in late 1995 was an important element in the ongoing effort to bring peace and unity to Bosnia. Russian involvement, in the name of the CIS, in peace operations in Tajikistan and Georgia is part of an ongoing pattern for most “Near Abroad” republics. Nigerian influence over ongoing Liberian peace operations is also likely to be a given, as is American involvement in Haiti.

Regional organizations have both advantages and disadvantages as potential partners in complex emergency type peace operations. The sentiments of “ownership” member states feel in regional organizations encourages a greater sense of legitimacy in deliberations and decisions taken. The more modest scope of these deliberations and decisions tends to allay concerns over blatant interventionism and derogation of sovereignty. Being more homogeneous than the 185 plus members of the United Nations, they can sometimes more easily produce consensus (although not always in a timely fashion); their involvement may have greater acceptability by the disputants; and, presumably, they have greater insight to local problems and the root causes of conflict.

However, some observers express concern about the ability of some regional organizations to exercise impartiality. Moreover, apart from NATO and the EU, few regional organizations have significant resources or effective bureaucracies. In addition to past and existing conflicts of interest among members, most regional organizations have experienced difficulty reconciling the diverse interests of member states in decisionmaking and in coordinating field operations. Member countries tend to worry about the temptation of larger local powers to use regional organizations as cover for unilateral interventions. In particular, this problem has bedeviled the
Organization of African Unity (OAU) since its founding, beginning with the ambitions of Nkrumah of Ghana and continuing to this day with Nigerian attempts to use its geographic size and oil riches to assume a leadership role in decisionmaking.

The major advantages and disadvantages involved in regional organization peacekeeping intervention are presented in chapter 7. The values and disabilities portrayed are outlined recognizing that each crisis situation has its own properties and internal dynamic (table 1).

Table 1. Peace operations and regional organizations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Potential Roles</th>
<th>Pro</th>
<th>Con</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Regional organizations have the potential to cover the full gamut of peace operations.</td>
<td>Most existing regional organizations have little if any security-military capabilities.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crisis Intervention</td>
<td>Geographic proximity facilitates early crisis warning and diplomatic intervention.</td>
<td>Traditional rivalries and mutual suspicion impede early and effective intervention.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter VII, Enforcement</td>
<td>As “courts of first instance,” regional organizations can provide legitimacy for enforcement.</td>
<td>Even with “legitimacy,” actions to be taken require U.N. Security Council authorization and monitoring.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Capabilities</td>
<td>National contingents for peace operations are most readily available from within each region.</td>
<td>In most regions, available forces are ill-equipped, lack mobility, and do not share a common military doctrine.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Intervention</th>
<th>Regional organizations provide the potential centers of gravity for approving multinational intervention in local disputes and intrastate conflicts.</th>
<th>In reality, most member states are ambivalent about intervention; current impulses supporting intervention are lodged in the U.N. Security Council.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Knowledge and Awareness</td>
<td>Regional organizations have greater in-depth knowledge and sensitivity to issues.</td>
<td>Culture and historical prejudices can distort local perceptions and limit effectiveness of regional organizations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low-End Spectrum</td>
<td>Cease-fire observers and election monitors are readily available.</td>
<td>Fear of local participant prejudices often necessitates accompanying U.N. participation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High-End Spectrum</td>
<td>Despite limitations in most regional organizations, given advance warning and extended external assistance, they could mount reasonably “robust” multinational forces.</td>
<td>Problems of command and control, training, rules of engagement and financial support serve as obstacles to “robustness.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External Support</td>
<td>Regional organizations are increasingly inclined to work in tandem with “world bodies” to enhance the effectiveness of their operations.</td>
<td>The degree of mutually advantageous collaboration varies from regional organization to regional organization.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Other factors influence the capacity and willingness of member states to undertake complex peace operations and humanitarian missions. The most basic is the disinclination to become embroiled in the internal affairs of others. The failure of member states to meet their international obligations may lead to censure by regional
organizations or expulsion (although such cases are rare), but direct intervention in the offending state to correct human rights abuses has generally been felt to be a potential derogation of sovereignty. With the end of the Cold War, nonregional power intervention without Security Council sanction has been much frowned upon. Nevertheless, self-denying boundaries have become somewhat blurred in recent years. Decisions taken by the Security Council on Somalia, Haiti, and other jurisdictional questions suggest a subtle shift in attitudes by some member states. Not all regional organizations accept, however, that violations of “universally” accepted human rights standards, failure to comply with treaty obligations, or the collapse of national institutions provide sufficient cause for forcible intervention by external parties.

In some regions, a multiplicity of overlapping regional and subregional entities exist that, taken together, can occasionally impede effective action in the security, economic, and diplomatic realms. Europe is the prime example today. In the security area, the notion of Baltic republic security ties and dependency has become tangled and complicated by Baltic membership in a wide array of institutions, regional and subregional. In the years since Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania gained their independence from Moscow, they have become members of the OSCE, the Council of Europe, and the more recently created Council of Baltic Sea states. They have also become Associate Members of the European Union and Associate Partners of the Western European Union, the military arm of the European Union with links to NATO. Concomitantly, they are participants in several NATO bodies, notably the Partnership for Peace program and the North Atlantic Cooperation Council. Whether this web of memberships provides Baltic states insurance against future aggression remains an open question. In no region outside Europe do comparable networks of organization exist.

There are a number of modalities in which the United Nations have cooperated with regional organizations in peacekeeping and other peace-related activities. In the recent past, the United Nations launched an increasing number of small, joint missions with regional organizations. Initial efforts at cooperation were complicated by vexing questions relating to financing of missions, command and
control arrangements, and differing criteria established by each organization by which to measure mission progress, procedures for coordination, and dates of termination. As already noted, one effective approach devised to overcome the problem of coordination is for one organization to play a leading role and others to support the lead organization. This modality has been applied with some success between the United Nations and OSCE in jointly engaged peace efforts in Georgia, Moldova, Nagorny Karabakh, and Tajikistan. Alternatively, two or more organizations can be engaged in parallel peace activities in the same area, e.g., the United Nations, the British Commonwealth, EU, and OAU in South Africa. A similar relationship exists between the United Nations and the West African regional organization, ECOWAS, in crisis-ridden Liberia and Sierra Leone.

Conventional wisdom and recent experience argue that most regional organizations are better suited to play an active role at the low end of the peace operations scale—preventive diplomacy, mediation, monitoring and observing, and other traditional forms of peacekeeping. The balance of their strengths and weaknesses suggests as well a potentially useful role in crises dominated by humanitarian concerns. Regional organizations also could serve as legitimizing authorities for specific peace operations, wrestling with the problems of collapsed governments and failed states, and providing expert input when nonregional actors intervene in local conflicts. On the other hand, close proximity to local conflicts and regional politics may undermine the credibility of regional organization involvement in conflict situations. The reputation of the OAS, for example, was tarnished somewhat by its supporting role in the international intervention in the Dominican Republic in 1965, where the OAS was perceived as functioning as a pliable instrument of U.S. policy. Its lustre was restored in the late 1980s with its participation in the Central American peace process. The CIS suffers somewhat comparable problems associated with Russia's dominant role in that organization. While the two situations of great power preeminence are not entirely comparable, many impartial observers worry that the OAS and CIS could well lose their status as unfettered entities if unduly influenced by Moscow and Washington and perceived as evolving into spheres of influence of either regional "eminence gris."
Third Leg of the Tripod

History has shown that the formation, management, and performance of military coalitions can have powerful effects on both the security of individual states and the stability of regional systems. Over the centuries, city-states, empires, and modern nation-states have joined forces to increase their power and enhance their security. The ability to organize effective military coalitions can be a formidable asset for any great power. The United States is no exception to this basic strategic principle. In the past, the United States has relied on allied support on numerous occasions, especially since its rise to great power status at the onset of this century. The value of ad hoc coalitions was reaffirmed during Desert Storm in 1991.

The 1990-1991 Gulf War produced an avalanche of studies favoring the adoption of ad hoc coalition strategies on the part of the United States to deal with acts of aggression, as exemplified by Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. Only belatedly was a key lesson learned—that timing is critical, i.e., the 6 months available to Washington to deploy American forces and to marshal an array of other national contingents prior to the launching of Desert Storm should not be counted on in future crisis situations. The half-year grace period prior to the launching of Desert Storm proved ample time for diplomats to conduct negotiations for peaceful withdrawal of Iraqi forces while the coalition was being formed, for command and control arrangements to be completed, and for military forces to be deployed into the Persian Gulf region. The effectiveness of the operation was without parallel in modern military annals, but it should be regarded as unique and not always replicable.

The United Nations leadership adopted, in modified form, some of the lessons learned from Desert Storm. The principal tutorial to emerge was the need to buttress U.N. capabilities to monitor and oversee the plans and operations of the lead nation, including crises of a lesser order of magnitude than that provided by the Gulf experience. (Some U.N. members objected strenuously to the delegation of power accorded to the United States in the Gulf conflict and the limited oversight afforded the Secretary-General and the Security Council.) In part because of member complaints, Boutros-Ghali had called for systematized standby arrangements "by which
governments commit themselves to hold ready, at an agreed period of notice, specially trained units for peacekeeping service. A special registry has been established and more than 60 member governments have pledged support—with serious reservation, however, as to the use and funding for operations. In short, the majority refuses to offer prior consent and reserve the right to respond on a case-by-case basis to future calls for national contingents.

Given this unsatisfactory response, other member governments have called for creation of a standing rapid response force, of varying numerical size and capability, to be made available to the Secretary-General and the Security Council to deal with emerging emergencies. The proposal itself is not new. It is imbedded in Articles 43 through 46 of the U.N. Charter, which was intended originally to provide a pillar for “collective security” under U.N. auspices. Disagreement between Washington and Moscow, however, laid to rest these ambitious plans. As the Cold War unfolded, the veto was a major impediment and can still be used to frustrate Council decisions or their effective implementation, the existence of a standing force notwithstanding.

The end of the Cold War has engendered no appreciable member support for a standing military force. The reasons cover the gamut from financial stringencies to the growing lethality of peace operations environments and the risks of casualties. As a result, there is renewed interest in the United States in ad hoc multinational force approaches. To be effective, however, such forces must be organized and deployed in a timely manner, have clearly established mandates, be adequately staffed for the assigned task, and share common training and doctrines for field operations. The approach has certain intrinsic drawbacks. It is likely to have limited rapid response capabilities as emergencies crystallize; participants may not share common political and military objectives or common purposes; their ability to adapt to rapidly changing circumstances may be circumscribed; and decisions taken at political levels could well result in ambiguous guidance to deployed forces.

The performance of the allied coalition in the period preceding and during the Gulf War is instructive. The coalition of 30-plus nations faced formidable obstacles in overcoming national
sensitivities. The British, for example, were the only allied nation to have a senior officer participate directly in the actual planning of the campaign, which greatly irritated several other European force commanders and their governments. French forces operated independently under their own national command and control until immediately prior to the onset of hostilities. Control of Arab-Islamic forces fell outside the direct command of General Schwartzkopf; throughout the campaign it remained under the “control” of the Saudi General Staff, a situation that violated the principle of unity of command. Schwartzkopf managed to bridge the gap by insisting on the formation of an informal planning group, the Coalition Coordination, Communication and Integration Cell, to form a common understanding of strategies and operations to be applied at the onset of hostilities. Even then, the Saudi Government insisted that Arab ground forces be used solely for joint operations intended to recover Kuwaiti territory, i.e., Arab ground forces should not be expected to engage enemy forces outside the confines of Kuwait.

Allied naval and air units also encountered major obstacles in force planning and integration. General Homer, for example, had direct command of only American aircraft in theater, and while he had air space control authority, each contributing nation reserved the right to refuse any air mission assigned to their forces. With the exception of British, Australian, and Dutch naval forces, other participants were not able to operate within U.S. Tactical Naval Command. Reduced naval efficiency was reflected in the assignment of national forces to separate patrol zones, thus weakening overall mutual support capabilities.

At the supply and systems support levels, comparable difficulties arose. Sea and airlift deficiencies were finally overcome through recourse to civilian carriers. For the United States in particular, reserve military military forces had to be mobilized to cover shortfalls in engineer support, medical staff, logistics personnel, and other combat support elements. Other major coalition participants experienced comparable problems, especially in meeting organic support for combat units. Overall, Desert Storm provided many insights concerning the challenges to be met in organizing large numbers of national contingents on an ad hoc basis for enforcement operations.
The United States, if it is to avoid unilateralist approaches to crisis management, will be confronted in the future with painful policy choices: whether to exercise leadership in coping with “complex emergencies” through the U.N. “system” or regional organizations, or to rely on the formation of ad hoc coalitions. The United States will either assume sole responsibility for coalition formation to cope with complex crises such as Bosnia (an unlikely prospect) or abdicate responsibility for a leadership role and suffer an erosion of its influential position in Europe and elsewhere.

The United Nations and various regional organizations are breaking new ground as they address the variegated problems of the post-Cold War international security environment. No single institution or strategy will suffice in dealing with these problems, in part because each crisis or situation has its own unique properties, and in part because solutions may not be readily at hand. However, several realities will have to be faced in the period immediately ahead. Each of the options available to the United States has its own limitations and drawbacks. Whatever tripod is selected to deal with emergent crises, there must be clear recognition that the application of coercive force has consequences: the notion of neutrality and impartiality will no longer obtain; the use of force may bring order in its wake but does not ensure long-term stability; and perhaps most crucial, use of coercive force constitutes a state of belligerency and thus requires application of accepted rules of war. The latter imperative cannot be ignored or obscured with traditional peacekeeping rhetoric. These are issues that present choices and risks that the United States and regional organizations will ignore at increasing peril to their interests and the “international order.”

Two important implications arise from the analysis thus far. First, the ability of the U.S. to forge and manage future coalitions will largely be a function of the external security environment. Although shared values and similar political systems can facilitate formation of ad hoc coalitions, voluntary contributions will be made on the basis of narrow national self-interest. Second, the U.S. ability to play a leading role will depend on our own willingness to make significant financial and military contributions. While there has been much discussion of formation of “vertical coalitions” in which the U.S.
provides logistical and technical support while others provide combat manpower, there is little likelihood of acceptance during the initial stages of an enforcement action. On the other hand, as recently demonstrated in Haiti, members of a coalition may be prepared to assume heightened responsibility for maintenance of “law and order” once U.S. forces have disarmed malcontents and unruly elements.

The logic of “vertical escalation” has some merit. The logic reposes in a division of labor; states with different but complementary capabilities can specialize in areas of relative advantage and create a coalition that is stronger than one where there is duplication of effort. This was demonstrated during Desert Storm: the United States provided high-tech weaponry, airpower, intelligence, and most of the land forces, while Egypt and Syria gave the coalition greater legitimacy among other Arab states, and Saudi Arabia provided the territory from which to prepare and launch the assault.

The value and durability of ad hoc coalitions will be determined largely case by case. Some coalitions are likely to have a lengthy shelf-life, particularly where security interests are not directly engaged. Some will not entail U.S. participation or only indirect involvement. The 1997 Italian-led intervention in strife-torn Albania, for humanitarian purposes, may prove instructive in this regard. However, the growing importance of Chapter VII enforcement actions in local disputes involving Security Council authorization for formation of ad hoc coalitions will frequently require some measure of direct U.S. involvement. This requires the United States to maintain an active diplomatic presence as well as robust military power projection capabilities to deal with conflict situations in many geographic regions. It may be possible to create future coalitions “from scratch,” but it will be easier for the United States to do so if it is actively engaged with potential partners and if it possesses and is willing to deploy combat capable forces.

Overriding Questions and Issues

for the United States

While inevitable, and not infrequently worthwhile, the “regionalization” of peacekeeping responsibilities poses some serious
questions for the U.S. national security policy community. In some instances, e.g., Africa, regional sponsorship may mean less timely local intervention and limited African resources for settling internal conflicts that threaten to widen. Past failures of ECOWAS in Liberia threatened the stability of neighboring Sierra Leone and others; in Central Africa, the Rwanda and Burundi problems have overflowed the borders of Zaire and could have adverse consequences for Tanzania and Uganda. While the United States can make a contribution in the form of advice and material support for ad hoc African military coalitions, the challenge is to find “coalitions of the willing.” If the OAU is not able to do so, the U.N. Security Council will probably become a hospice for African lost causes, a debilitating prospect at best. Paradoxically, many of the developing countries, fearful of Security Council “interventionism,” would prefer to see the Council sidelined or at least far less active. In their view, “regionalization” is a way to constrain Secretariat capabilities for management of peacekeeping operations. The recent reorganization of the peacekeeping “system” urged by the United States and others is to be neither applauded nor ignored in their view.

The ability of the United States to reshape these skeptical attitudes has declined appreciably over the past 2 years. As noted in a 1996 State Department study, Washington’s influence with other U.N. members has eroded; members are increasingly reluctant to support U.S. ideas about reform. The United States suffers from a number of disabilities that diminish its capacity to influence the policies of the overwhelming majority of member countries. The two most obvious have been the successful but heavyhanded U.S. effort to deny Boutros-Ghali a second term as Secretary-General despite the support he enjoyed among most members; the second revolves around the refusal of the U.S. Congress to meet U.S. financial obligations, as stipulated under the terms of the U.N. Charter. As of January 1997, the United States was at least $1.0 billion in default on payments to the operating and peacekeeping accounts. According to the State Department study, “The financial crisis has undermined the ability of the United States and the United Nations to carry out some (peacekeeping) reforms . . . given its role in the financial crisis, the United States is not a credible advocate for some financial reforms.”
Regional organizations as well as the United States face a number of vexing questions when complex peace operations and humanitarian assistance are contemplated, including:

- What limitations should obtain on the third party or regional organization “right” to intervene in internal wars or intrastate conflicts?
- Can regional organizations maintain a neutral or impartial position or should such notions be set aside? If so, what general guidelines should obtain?
- Should humanitarian assistance interventions occur without clearly defined political objectives and precise end states?
- What initiatives should be taken by regional organizations and their members to provide essential crisis management, joint military planning, and standby forces for peace operations?
- If these forces are to be multinational in composition, how should they be organized, trained, and equipped to ensure the highest degree of integration and effective command and control of operations?

Command and control is a particularly sensitive issue since governments providing military units are loath to place them under foreign command or to subordinate their national and political interests to the purposes for which a regional organization may have solicited their support.

An overriding question lies in the difference between the purported advantages and alleged disadvantages of regional organizations in the sphere of peacekeeping in that the former may be largely theoretical while the latter are inherently practical—and therefore determinate. In other words, with respect to regional organizations, there may be less there than meets the eye. If so, both the United Nations and the United States may find themselves unable to pass on responsibility as much as they want.

Clearly, a better interagency process to shape U.S. peace operations is also needed. The establishment of guidelines in 1994 by the Clinton administration was a useful beginning, but only a beginning. The fact that U.N. humanitarian and peace-building
operations embrace not only U.N. civilian and military elements but also NGOs and Private Voluntary Organizations (PVOs) suggests the importance of establishing a wider planning and decisionmaking network within the U.N. Security Council system. But evolving U.N. and regional organization arrangements for multinational peace operations must be matched by comparable efforts within the U.S. Government. Associated with this effort is a clear willingness to invest at least a minimal level of political capital and resources in American involvement. Our experience in Bosnia may prove helpful in shaping understanding of challenges presented in dealing with complex emergency operations. The participants quickly learned the importance of an active, reasonably functional network of international reconstruction and political activities closely tied to the missions of deployed military forces from NATO and others engaged in the military coalition. Critical is the maintenance of close, constant cooperation and coordination among the military, political, and humanitarian elements of any future peace operation built on regional organization involvement and ad hoc civilian and military coalitions.

Notes

3.

The Search for
A New European Architecture

On initial examination, the several regional organizations in Europe, when viewed together, appear to offer the greatest potential among other such entities for the maintenance of peace and stability in Europe. Most have a potential to relieve the U.N. of some of its burdens in dealing with “complex emergencies,” in Europe and, conceivably, adjacent regions. A number of reservations must be addressed, however:

- The geographic reach of Europe has proved exceedingly elastic historically. This is evidenced today by the consideration being given within the confines of NATO, the European Union, and the Western European Union to expanded membership to include Eastern and Central European former members of the now defunct Soviet Union.
- Concomitantly, the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), dominated by Moscow, has roots both in Europe and Asia. Some of its members are currently seeking special economic and security ties with Western Europe.
- The United States, as the leading member of the Atlantic Alliance, is excluded from membership in the WEU and EU. Nevertheless, the U.S. Government has offered “lip service” to the expressed European desire to fashion a regional defense “identity”—sans U.S. participation.
- None of the existing regional organizations has the ability to handle “complex emergencies” in all their phases. Each must rely on the others for resources, cooperation, and coordination (as exemplified in Bosnia at present).
Searching for Partners

The inherent fluidity of Europe's geographic boundaries is reflected in the histories of several individual nation-states. Germany has experienced five alterations in its territorial boundaries over the past 200 years, the most recent coming with the unification of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) and the German Democratic Republic (GDR) in 1990. East Germany was not only incorporated by its West German neighbor but, as a result, now forms NATO's new security boundary with Central Europe. Poland's territorial history is comparable, having suffered three partial annexations, foreign occupation, and truncation as a result of the exigencies of World War II. Hungary, former Czechoslovakia, and others reflect similar boundary adjustments and associated "traumas." In brief, geographically Europe is an entity lacking territorial durability and stability. As some scholars observe, Europe is more a state of mind than a clearly defined entity.

NATO itself was certainly not prepared for the pace of change that followed the fall of the Berlin wall and the collapse of the Warsaw Pact. In the fall of 1989, as the Berlin wall was being breached, a survey of over 30 NATO and Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) staff officers could find only two who were willing to consider adopting a new NATO strategy in response to the changes underway in Europe. Yet little over a half year later, the NATO heads of state convened in London and directed the Alliance to undertake a "fundamental" revision of NATO strategy and to "build new partnerships with all the nations of Europe" by reaching out to NATO's former adversaries in the East and extending to them "the hand of friendship." To further that end, NATO heads of state invited the members of the then existing Warsaw Pact to establish regular diplomatic liaison with NATO. At its next summit meeting, in Rome in November 1991, NATO created the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) and adopted its new Strategic Concept. From that point, the Alliance has sought to adapt to the rapid pace of political and economic change occurring in the former Soviet Union countries, the Balkans region, and in the Mediterranean basin.
A Plethora of Organizations

At present, there are five crisis resolution institutions in Europe and the former Soviet Union, all of which claim roles and responsibility for management of conflicted problem areas. The CIS will be addressed in the following chapter, but suffice it to note that the challenge for statesmen in Europe and the United States will be the creation of a system of mutually reinforcing institutions in the realm of European security. Attendant problems are particularly arduous because many of these institutions have responsibilities that extend beyond the resolution of local disputes. The principal need is to sort out these manifold responsibilities and to assign clearly defined roles in an atmosphere of mutual accommodation, a something-for-everybody approach.

FIGURE 1. Interlocking European organizations
Searching for Partners

It is important to recognize that each institution is undergoing subtle changes in the wake of the collapse of the former Soviet Union and therefore each remains a work in progress. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) was initially formed as a political consultative process. Established in 1975 as a result of the Helsinki Final Act, OSCE was the product of the Cold War, intended primarily to overcome East-West divisions through formal consultations. With the end of the Cold War, the organization's institutional responsibilities were broadened, beginning with the Paris Charter of 1990 and followed by a 1994 meeting in Budapest that transformed the OSCE into an entity with enlarged mandate. Currently, its three principal functions are to act as a framework for:

- The creation of norms in the OSCE area related to international law, human rights, minority rights, democracy, the rule of law and market economy
- The process of arms control in Europe
- Early warning, conflict prevention, and conflict resolution, supported by confidence-building mechanisms and the appointment of a High Commissioner for National Minorities.

The OSCE is a recognized regional organization within the terms of the U.N. Charter, Chapter VIII, which provides it with authority to mandate the initiation of peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations within Europe. The primary mission of OSCE is crisis prevention, however. It is compelled to look to other organizations in Europe, notably NATO, for use of coercive military instruments to enforce its decisions. This is one justification for NATO assistance in peacekeeping operations, assistance that is hedged by a declared willingness to respond case by case.

The present 53-member OSCE has several other disabling limitations. The size of its membership and geographic reach from Vancouver to Vladivostok impairs early and effective action in most realms. OSCE operating on a consensus basis requires unanimity minus one, the minus one being the offending party or state. The organization is at best a forum of states unlikely to develop an executive body capable of organizing or directing field operations.
Even in the realm of protecting human rights, OSCE has lost substantial ground to the Council of Europe. Its greatest potential appears to lie in the conflict prevention field through fact finding, mediation, and cooperation with other security organizations.

In anticipation of an expanded post-Cold War role, OSCE began to direct its efforts toward crisis resolution. By 1990, a serious initiative was undertaken to reorganize, beginning with an annual council meeting of foreign ministers and creation of a standing committee of senior officials. This was followed by development of a Crisis Prevention Center in Vienna, an Office of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights in Warsaw, and a secretariat in Prague. Emblematic of its new active role were efforts to mediate among belligerents in Chechnya, oversight responsibility for the preparation of elections in Bosnia (1996), and monitoring of the 1996 elections in Albania. While the potential for mediating and monitoring roles is readily available, OSCE has little capacity to stop acts of aggression or civil wars. Major impediments are its slender financial resources, the need for member unanimity in the policy action field, and the organization's intrinsic inability to expel recalcitrant members. The European Union also has a significant role to play, but largely in the economic and political realms. Founded in 1957 under the Treaty of Rome, the organization enlarged its mandate at the Maastricht (Netherlands) summit in December 1991, when the European Community member states adopted a Treaty on Political Union and a Treaty on Economic and Monetary Union, which together form the Treaty of European Union (EU). With the adoption of the Maastricht Treaty, the EU countries committed themselves to a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), which includes formulation of policies relating to the former Soviet Union, including the eventual framing of a common defense policy. Some EU members believe that the latter could produce a common defense policy compatible with that of the Atlantic Alliance.

The EU record on security matters has not been reassuring. The organization demonstrably failed to deal effectively with the 1990 Persian Gulf crisis, and its diplomatic efforts as the Yugoslav federation foundered proved counterproductive. More recently, EU diplomatic initiatives in crisis torn Bosnia failed badly, as did its
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military exertions. In addition, EU members have been loathe to surrender national sovereignty in the interests of establishing a common foreign and security policy. Nevertheless, the EU does have an important role to play in providing an entry point for Russia and Eastern European states to acquire membership and to share in the benefits of a cooperative economic system that continues to evolve.

FIGURE 2. WEU organization

The European foreign and defense ministers attending the Maastricht summit announced that the West European Union (WEU), an arm of the EU, would assume the dual commitment of serving as the embodiment of the European defense entity and function as the European pillar within NATO. The WEU had grown out of the Brussels Treaty of 1948, a Western European initiative aimed at preventing a resurgence of military threats. At Maastricht, WEU was endowed with responsibility for "strengthening the European pillar of
the Atlantic Alliance." The organization has four membership categories:

- Full members are participants in both the EU and NATO
- Associate members are the European members of NATO, which are not members of the EU
- Observers are (except Denmark) traditionally neutral countries, members of EU, but not of NATO
- Associate partners are the countries that have concluded "Europe Agreements" with the EU—those Central and Eastern European countries expected to become EU members.

At the NATO Summit in 1994, NATO's Heads of State and Government acknowledged the WEU dual role and enhanced its further development by announcing readiness to make NATO's collective assets available. The basis for cooperation would be consultations in the North Atlantic Council for WEU operations undertaken by the European allies in pursuit of CFSP goals. In the June 1996 NATO Ministerial Meeting, the participants announced plans to impalement the concept of Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF) in collaboration with the WEU. This approach will permit asset sharing, including command and control arrangements to permit "the use of separable but not separate military capabilities in operations led by the WEU."11

Despite this collaborative effort, the WEU must clarify how its intends to organize its own integral military system, in particular, the extent to which its proposes to integrate its military planning with the economic imperatives of the EU. There is a convincing case to be made for keeping the two organizations separate and distinct—to wit, it would simplify decisions to admit the Central and East European countries into the EU without there being the need to extend security guarantees to them. On the other hand, given the growing defense planning collaboration between NATO and the WEU, there is some doubt that a country could become a full member of WEU without also achieving comparable status in NATO. Of the WEU's 14 European members, only one, the Republic of Ireland (and then only as one of the observers), is not a member of NATO. For the future,
WEU is likely to resemble the purpose and intention of NATO, without America and Canada.

The WEU has attempted to avoid duplication with its NATO counterpart. A 40-member planning cell has been created in WEU to refine the three main tasks likely to be given to armed forces placed under WEU command: humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping, and crisis management. However, NATO and WEU received much unfavorable publicity in 1992 when they both sought to form up naval forces for service in the Adriatic to monitor and subsequently impose economic sanctions (under U.N. mandate) against the former Yugoslavia. In due course, missions and roles were assigned to naval units representing each organization and mutually beneficial collaboration ensued.

The main pool of military manpower for WEU intervention operations lies in the Eurocorps, which became operational in 1994. The principal components are French and German armored divisions supported by Belgian and Spanish formations. Armored divisions may be useful for imposed cease-fires, such as in 1996 in Bosnia, but do not provide the flexibility and rapid response capability when operations occur outside the immediate European theater. The German component is also politically constrained at present given the public disinclination to provide “heavy” combat units for peace operations.

There is general agreement in NATO that the WEU is likely to serve as the primary organization for implementing Europe-only missions outside the NATO “area of responsibility.” For major military operations, however, the WEU will require logistics, communications, and intelligence support from NATO. The United States will also be required to provide assistance, given its advanced technological capabilities. NATO’s North Atlantic Council (NAC) will determine what role the organization will play in such missions. The United States, hence, will have a veto right and, in theory, a significant presence in most European decision-making where out-of-area operations are under consideration.

NATO: The Emerging Transformation

The 1949 North Atlantic Treaty proclaiming the emergence of a new European collective security system, including the United States and
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Canada, is not unlike the Charter of the United Nations. Both have to address the security issues of the 1990s, not the 1940s; articles in each require redefinition, and the old concept of territorial defense has given way to the requirement to redraft articles that allow for normative defense. In addition, NATO has begun to shift its main point of reference from collective defense to peacekeeping and peace enforcement roles while dealing with the pressing issues of expanding membership and establishing a special relationship with Russia and the Ukraine.

FIGURE 3. SHAPE Command Group

The NATO leadership has proceeded cautiously on the question of expanded peacekeeping roles. Change is recorded in the emergence of the Alliance’s “Strategic Concept” paper in November 1991. It formed the basis for NATO’s defense policies, its operational concepts, and its future planning doctrine. Among the major imperatives was an examination of how the Alliance’s political and military structures and procedures might be developed and adapted to conduct the Alliance’s several missions more efficiently and flexibly, including peacekeeping. The need to adapt, it was
recognized, would have to occur against a background of shrinking financial and manpower resources.

The initial result of the examination conducted was an update of MC 400, which was first approved in December 1991. The examination was influenced by supplementary political guidance that emerged from several high-level meetings over the following several years. Key among them were the following:

- In June 1992, the Alliance Foreign Ministers met in Oslo and stated their preparedness “to support, on a case-by-case basis, in accordance with our own procedures, peacekeeping activities under the responsibility of the CSCE, including by making available Alliance resources and expertise.” A similar undertaking was proffered the U.N. Security Council.
- The 1994 Brussels Summit, inter alia, endorsed the concept of Combined Joint Task Forces (with WEU) as “a means to facilitate contingency operations, including operations with participating nations outside the Alliance.”

The commitments to the United Nations and OSCE have drawn NATO closer to a broader European security environment. Potential crisis regions, their security impact on Alliance members, and routes to these regions are of direct interest to NATO. It was agreed that NATO commitments might well result in NATO participating in operations in a wider geographic theater. Attention is being devoted to peace and stability of countries on the periphery of Europe—particularly given “the build up of military power and the proliferation of weapons technologies in the area, including Weapons of Mass Destruction and ballistic missiles capable of reaching the member states of the Alliance.” Among other matters of concern: international terrorism, radical transnational movements, territorial disputes, disruption of the flow of vital resources, and mass migration.

With direct reference to peace support operations (PSO), such operations are expected to be conducted as part of a combined political, economic, diplomatic and military plan. Alliance participation is to be decided by the North Atlantic Council case by case. All military PSO activities are subject to close political control.
"at all stages and at all levels." Military participation in a specific PSO is subject to national decision by member states. There is also an agreed need to assist the participation of non-NATO members, an important consideration as demonstrated in the 1996 IFOR operation in Bosnia.

Although individual NATO nations have been consistent contributors to U.N. observer missions and U.N. troop deployments, as in UNPROFOR in the Former Republic of Yugoslavia and Somalia, NATO as an institution with its integrated military command first became involved in U.N. peace operations in 1992. Operation Deny Flight, the "no fly zone" enforcement mission over Bosnia-Herzegovina; Operation Sharp Guard, the Adriatic maritime embargo mission; and IFOR, after the 1995 Dayton accords were signed governing the restoration of order in Bosnia, are examples of NATO forces operating under U.N. and OSCE mandate. The actual operations have occurred under the operational control of a major Regional Major Subordinate Command—AFSOUTH. In addition, NATO resources in the form of a mobile headquarters from Northern Army Group (NORTHAG) were provided to the U.N. Bosnia-Herzegovina Command (BHC) of UNPROFOR up until the latter's termination in 1995.

A brief assessment of NATO's capability to conduct peace operations suggests that the new Strategic Concept's focus on crisis prevention and crisis management enhances the organization's potential to conduct such peace operations. Further, with its integrated military command and interoperable forces, it is well suited for both peacekeeping and peace enforcement, and with regard to command and control, it is well prepared at the operational and tactical levels. Given the involvement of Russian and other non-NATO forces in Bosnia, NATO is strengthening its operational experience within NATO and the associated Partnership for Peace program.

Cooperation with Other Security Structures

Despite impressive progress to date, the various European regional organizations have yet to develop effective coordination and joint planning procedures. For example, the agendas of all differ on how
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to arrive at an agreed mandate for future peace operations. The mandate is the essential start point for mission planning and must include clear, well-defined, and achievable political and military objectives with assured resource availability and an agreed termination date. Included in the mandate, especially when civilian involvement is required, are civilian-military coordination procedures and the appropriate military doctrine applicable to the conduct of multinational operations.

Doctrine determines what the assigned military forces will do and how, including organization, equipment, training, and rules of engagement. When the mandate and military doctrine are established, a division of labor must then be addressed. It may be derived functionally in terms of conflict prevention (e.g., the former Republic of Yugoslavia of Macedonia), or crisis management (e.g., UNPROFOR in Bosnia), or a combination of both (e.g., contemporary Bosnia—IFOR). If crisis management, it may entail traditional peacekeeping (Cyprus) or peace enforcement (Somalia) and may involve a range of civil-military interactions (with NGOs, private societies, and others).

The mission or mandate involves a division of labor among security structures and among nations within these security structures. The United Nations and OSCE provide observers, fact finders, and monitors (conflict prevention); the United Nations, NATO, and WEU execute preventive deployments and peacekeeping (crisis management); and the U.N. and OSCE (by authorization) and NATO and WFU (by execution) execute peace enforcement. Today, division of labor by function, structure, and geographical focus is developed by trial and error with little overall planning coordination among the various European security organizations.

Another area for resolution involves unity of command. Most multinational peace operations almost inevitably experience tensions over national sovereignty and the military principle of unity of command. In both U.N.-directed and U.N.-authorized peace operations where different structures are involved, unity of command is virtually impossible to achieve. Unity of purpose, however, can be achieved and disruptive incidents minimized as long as the mandate and accompanying military doctrine are mutually understood and
agreed, and where that understanding and agreement are constantly revalidated if the mission is changed or modified ("mission creep").

NATO and WEU are entering a new era of cooperation and coordination stemming from the 1994 NATO Brussels Summit. The primary focus is on giving form and substance to the "separable but not separate" concept of NATO capabilities linked to efforts to make the European security and defense identity a reality. The CJTF is the principal vehicle that can be used by both NATO and the WEU to provide either organization the capability to pursue out-of-area peace operations. Strategic level issues remain to be resolved, including provision of political guidance to CJTF; creation of policy coordination management mechanisms at the strategic level that can provide advice to the WEU and coordinate with and perform the functions performed by the NATO Military Committee; and creation of a workable theater headquarters mechanism for the WEU to provide the bridge between the strategic level (WEU) and the tactical level (CJTF). For the foreseeable future, however, the WEU organizational structure is likely to remain weak and will not be able to compete with the more sophisticated NATO military and political structures. To be coordinated effectively there will continue to be a need for reciprocity and transparency in terms of the WEU keeping NATO fully informed of WEU planning. A similar need obtains with the OSCE, because there is growing wariness by the Atlantic Council of being coopted or NATO becoming a "subcontractor" for OSCE ventures.

**Problems of NATO and U.N. Collaboration**

Bosnia has proved a particularly unfortunate test case for collaboration between the military arm of NATO and the United Nations "system." The introduction of NATO into the Bosnian crisis occurred in 1993, at the height of the genocidal activities of Serb and Croatian forces. The arrangement came in the form a subcontract—NATO air and naval capabilities were to be placed at the disposal of U.N. officials in place in Bosnia and Croatia. Representatives from the two organizations had divergent approaches to the military requirements at hand: NATO official doctrine, predicated on anticipated conflict with Warsaw Treaty forces in the four preceding
decades, emphasized the importance of “overriding force” to neutralize adversaries as expeditiously as possible. The U.N. leadership on the ground, military and civilian, adhered to a different doctrine—minimal use of force, largely in a self-protection mode, on the assumption that parties to a conflict were prepared to honor cease-fire agreements.

By mid-1995, the two organizations were deeply and publicly at odds as to how to respond to Serb acts of aggrandizement. The depth of their differences was revealed several months previously when the credibility of both organizations was exposed to public criticism. This was a period of U.N. Protection Force (UNPROFOR), which was responsible for providing humanitarian assistance to displaced persons located mostly in urban centers surrounded and threatened with bombardment by Serbian and Croatian militia forces. In September 1994, French troops at Sarajevo were under attack by Serbian military units, and the local French commander could neither protect the capital from attack nor secure ready supply of food and medicines for the civilian population. He requested that NATO air elements be dispatched to the area surrounding the capital and relieve Serb pressure.

The request reached the headquarters of the U.N. military commander, General Bertrand de Lapresle, who was located in Zaghreb. He opposed the request on the grounds that an air strike of major magnitude would constitute a “provocation,” one that could well jeopardize UNPROFOR units elsewhere and undermine the U.N. mission in Bosnia. The U.N. local civilian authority, Special Representative Yasushi Akashi, agreed and concluded that only a symbolic military action would be justified. Akashi ordered the destruction of an obsolete Serb tank located in an “arms exclusion zone” located outside Sarajevo, the gesture intending to serve the dual goals of “deterrence” and “retaliation.” Serb forces were given a 20-minute warning of the scheduled air strike, which involved the dispatch of five aircraft from Italy to destroy the abandoned tank. Thus the U.N. reputation for impartiality remained intact.

NATO commanders were outraged, however. The air strike was hardly punitive, would not dissuade the Serbs from further violations, and had placed at jeopardy the lives of five airmen as a result of the
advanced warning given. NATO defense ministers shortly thereafter forwarded a formal complaint to Boutros-Ghali and urged the adoption of firmer military measures in the future. A NATO team sent to Secretariat Headquarters in New York urged the adoption of more robust rules of engagement, but returned largely empty handed. The differences proved irreconcilable, and the six U.N. declared “safe zones” were to remain hostages to ill fortune, as history would soon demonstrate.

The ideological and doctrinal gulfs separating U.N. and NATO leaders should have been recognized and addressed early in their efforts at collaboration. Necessity and official myopia prevailed because neither Brussels nor New York was prepared to accept responsibility for collapse of the save-Bosnia effort. At the same time, government officials in the United States and Western Europe were unwilling to shoulder the risks and burdens involved in forceful military intervention and classical nation building.

Bosnia-Herzegovina emerged from the demise of the Yugoslav federation with weak credentials for international recognition as a workable nation-state. It had no historical record as a political entity separate from its neighbors and capable of assuming international obligations and duties associated with independent status. Indeed, with the implosion of the Yugoslav federation, Serbian “leaders” were required in 1992 to fashion political and constitutional bonds for a state whose population had little sense of nationhood. It was populated by Southern Slavs speaking a common language but divided into three major national groups: 43.7 percent Muslims; 31.4 percent Serbs; and 17.3 percent Croats. An additional 5.5 percent were designated “Yugoslavs,” essentially the offspring of mixed marriages. By 1992, state institutions were beginning to disintegrate, and each group began to seek security in its own community.

The opening rounds of armed conflict had actually begun in 1991, when Serbians and Croatians fought for control over the Croatian town of Vukovar and adjoining areas. In due course, Serb forces, reinforced by the Yugoslav Army, gained control over 15 percent of Croatian territory. By 1992, the armed conflict had spread into Bosnia-Herzegovina. The European Union, which had fruitlessly sought to broker a series of cease-fires and peace accords, found itself
powerless to stop the widening warfare. By spring 1992, Serb militia forces backed by the Yugoslav Army were attacking Croatian and Bosnian Muslim communities throughout much of the region, generating large refugee flows and displaced populations.

A number of peace plans were introduced by U.N., European, and U.S. diplomats throughout 1992-93, all reflecting a desire to avoid the use of military force to end the strife. Each peace plan was summarily rejected by one or another of the contending parties. Based on the notion of ethnicity, each of the peace plans reflected progressive acknowledgment of partition as a logical outcome—and the geographical reduction of Sarajevo to a small principality. The most noteworthy effort was jointly launched by the United Nations and the soon-to-be renamed European Community. Former Secretary of the Army Cyrus Vance represented the United Nations; former U.K. Foreign Secretary Lord Owen did the honors for the European Union. The Vance-Owen peace plan of 1993 was rejected by Serb “leaders” in Bosnia. The U.S. Government also opposed the plan, provoking widening strains in the Atlantic Alliance. However, the United States generated no acceptable approach of its own and was perceived in much of Europe as vacillating and increasingly contradictory.

The United Nations, with U.S. endorsement, had begun to organize an humanitarian relief effort in 1992, including formation of the multinational UNPROFOR. This force received as its initial mandate provision of emergency supplies to Sarajevo and surrounding areas, included the opening of a land corridor for unfettered delivery of aid. In August 1992, Security Council Resolution 770 enjoined UNPROFOR to use “all measures necessary” to deliver humanitarian assistance. However, the Council refused to recognize that the situation in Bosnia was a civil war in which the parties involved were loathe to accept “impartiality.” If anything, relief goods and supplies were viewed as items to be controlled and embargoed should circumstances require. Hence, protection of Sarajevo and the provision of humanitarian assistance could be vouchsafed only by the use of overriding force—such force was also required to protect other U.N. designated “safe areas.” UNPROFOR, however, was ill equipped to meet such requirements.
With the situation in growing deterioration, NATO was invited to provide backup for UNPROFOR. Together with the European Community, naval forces were dispatched to the Adriatic to enforce U.N. declared embargoes, and a no-fly zone was declared for northern Bosnia—all ostensibly to enforce U.N. “all necessary means” resolutions. Decisions on the means to be applied would be determined by the U.N. Secretary-General’s representative in the region, Mr. Akashi, and the U.N. military commander. Their assigned priorities were maintenance of “impartiality” in the conflict, protection of UNPROFOR units, and delivery of humanitarian aid to the “safe areas.” NATO could initiate no military action without prior U.N. approval. Thus, a joint “turnkey” or parallel management arrangement had to be fashioned, one clearly at odds with the traditional NATO doctrine of unity of command.

Serious disagreements were to develop under this turnkey arrangement and crippled both organizations. For the Secretary-General and U.N. field representatives, mission survival was the primary imperative. Therefore, UNPROFOR was to remain lightly armed and unthreatening. Its numbers were too limited, given the geomorphology of Bosnia, and therefore stretched too thin to conduct major military operations to protect “safe areas.” For example, the “weapons exclusion zone” around Sarajevo could not be enforced with available ground forces. Indeed, the Serb units were ensconced atop the surrounding hills with ample fields of fire for artillery and tank units. When UNPROFOR did unleash compliance efforts (primarily at U.S. urging), dozens of U.N. personnel were apprehended by the Serb forces, disarmed, and subjected to public humiliation. The U.N. leadership concluded that it could not enforce any peace accord but could only hope to monitor such accords and feed where possible displaced populations.

NATO, by comparison, saw Bosnia as an opportunity to develop new missions and roles for itself in the wake of the collapse of the Warsaw Treaty Organization and the former Soviet Union. However, its members agreed to the dual turnkey arrangement only after extensive debate, noting that NATO was assuming a quasi-surrogate status vis-a-vis the United Nations. However, the NATO leadership assumed that the organization would be empowered to force local
solutions in Bosnia by force when circumstances required. In adopting this approach, a measure of self-delusion was involved:

Since NATO’s members were not sure that they really wanted their military engaged in conflict, the North-Atlantic alliance built in a safety catch: It made intervention in Bosnia dependent not only on a general mandate by the U.N. Security Council but also on authorization by the secretary-general, who in turn delegated the decision to his representative on spot. In short, NATO has made an organization unwilling to use force the guardian of its ability to use force.

NATO would have been well advised to proceed with greater caution. As one former U.N. assistant secretary observed in fall 1994, “The institution of the Secretary-General is inherently inappropriate to manage the use of force. . . . By involving itself in decisions on the use of force, the institution of the Secretary-General compromises the impartiality critical to its capacity as a negotiator.” Nevertheless, NATO had wittingly delegated decisionmaking authority to an institution conditioned not to manage the use of force under Chapter VII mandate.

The tragic consequences of this division would be acted out at Srebrenica in mid-1995, when a small Dutch UNPROFOR unit surrendered the city’s Muslim population to the mercies of Serb conquerors.

**Bosnia Phase Two**

The abject failure of the United Nations, NATO, and other parties to deal effectively with the widening Bosnia crisis was undermining their credibility and demanded reexamination of existing strategies. Their moral standing had been shredded as Serb forces slaughtered unarmed Muslims after the fall of the Srebrenica “safe area,” bombed the enclave of Tuzla, and took several hundred U.N. Blue Helmets hostage in reprisal for limited NATO air attacks (again at U.S. urging). To stiffen resistance to ongoing Serb attacks, Presidents Chirac and Clinton received approval for transfer of overall military command authority to NATO forces, thus ending the dual turnkey approach,
and called for the creation of a 10,000 man Rapid Reaction Force (heavily armed). At the same time, UNPROFOR units were concentrated in defensible areas, which required their removal from much of eastern Bosnia, and thus leaving remaining "safe areas" in the east to Serb control.

TABLE 2. *Summation of arguments*

The key arguments for retaining a U.S. commander at AFSOUTH are:

- AFSOUTH has emerged as a very important region in NATO and must remain a strong symbol of trans-Atlantic resolve and capabilities.
- The NATO command structure is intended to respond to risks that threaten the shared interests of all NATO members.
- This is the only U.S.-led regional command in Europe and losing it will weaken U.S. operational and political support for NATO.
- Significant measures have already been taken to enhance ESDI within NATO.
- Removing the command link between AFSOUTH and the Sixth Fleet will increase reaction time in crises.
- IFOR/SFOR demonstrates the continued need for U.S. leadership in the area.
- Successful U.S. diplomacy in this vital region has been strengthened by the U.S. command at AFSOUTH.
- U.S. command at AFSOUTH can help stabilize tensions throughout the Mediterranean area.
- NATO responses to new ballistic missile proliferation threats against the AFSOUTH area will benefit from a U.S. command.
- U.S. command facilitates participation by Partner countries, including the Russians.
- U.S. command maximizes the effectiveness of modern C4I assets.
- Complicated command arrangements, such as a bifurcated regional and functional command at AFSOUTH, can harm NATO’s responsiveness in crisis.

By summer 1995, the balance of local power was beginning to shift unfavorably against Serb interests. At a conference held in
London, NATO was authorized to launch "massive" air attacks in the event of future Serb depredations. In August, Croatian forces took the offensive in the Krajina salient, defeating Serbian units, while Bosniac commanders launched separate campaigns. The United States, rhetorically and otherwise, supported both efforts, as did the majority of Western European governments. The Rubicon was being crossed and, quite obviously, UNPROFOR could not expect to return to its traditional doctrines and roles. Nor could the threatened use of overriding force by its adversaries be blinked away by Belgrade and local Serb chieftains.

The 1995 Dayton accords laboriously negotiated by the various parties to the conflict under U.S. auspices produced a new threshold of expectation that peace was at last close on the horizon. The accords contained a number of internal contradictions and unsettled questions, however:

- The accords accept the territorial ethnic status quo resulting from the war while simultaneously seeking to restore Bosnia's prewar multiethnic "essence."
- It seeks to end the wartime ethnic partitioning of ethnic communities but provides no vehicle for the assured return of refugees to original places of residence.
- It seeks through national and municipal elections to provide a constitutional and institutional framework for state building but fails to provide safeguards against separate ethnic nation building.
- It authorizes the formation of a multinational 60,000-man plus military entity under NATO to replace UNPROFOR, but the soon-to-be constituted Implementation Force (IFOR) was to have a limited enforcement mandate and to be disbanded 1 year after its formation.

In December 1996, lack of realism regarding the IFOR exit date and appropriate exit strategies led NATO to agree to a Followon Force (FOFOR) deployment of approximately 30,000 men (including 8,500 American troops) to remain through March 1998. IFOR, during its tenure, succeeded in separating the various militias, fashioning a separation zone of 2 to 3 miles, and securing the cantonment of some
militia armaments under IFOR inspection. IFOR units made useful contributions in repairing roads and opening electrical supplies to hardpressed communities. In the view of some observers, IFOR failed to carry out missions called for under standard NATO guidelines and understandings that were assumed to have emerged at Dayton. Official NATO doctrine adopted by NATO in February 1994, more than 18 months previous to the signing of the Dayton accords, includes the following:

- Confirming withdrawal of foreign forces from the conflict area
- Observing and reporting human rights abuses
- Supervising and validating the conduct of referenda or elections
- Inspecting areas and facilities for compliance with terms agreed among parties to the conflict
- Provide a temporary law enforcement authority in the mission area
- Coordinate humanitarian aid efforts by national and international civil or military agencies
- Assist in the handling of refugees and displaced persons.

The Dayton accords created a separate and distinct range of responsibilities for organizations other than NATO. For example, EU has been delegated authority to arrange for the economic rehabilitation of Bosnia as well as the arranging of elections, national and local; the United Nations has been required to organize a small, unarmed police force to control ethnic conflicts; the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees is to secure their repatriation. The approach that emerged jerrybuilt out of Dayton gives overall responsibility to one agency or organization, thus violating one of the basic management principles for multifunctional operations.

The IFOR effort has been evaluated by NATO officials and Secretary of Defense Perry as "successful." The evaluation has been tendered in terms of criteria that are narrowly based. IFOR managed to complete its perceived mission with few combat-related casualties. Its various national contingents gained valuable chain of command, intelligence/information collection, and related field experience. For
Russian officers and those participating Partner for Peace members, a growing awareness of areas for collaboration and NATO's peacekeeping potential helped to reduce suspicions and mistrust. For the United States, the "exercise" sensitized unit commanders to complex subtleties of enforcement operations under constrained rules of engagement. In addition, experience gained in the area of C2 operations, especially for ad hoc coalition partners, could prove of great value in the future.

There is an accompanying downside to any objective evaluation of IFOR. IFOR interpreted its mandate in narrow operational terms and did little to diminish tensions and disagreements amongst the ethnic communities. These were largely set aside for future validation, as well as the growing doubt within some NATO circles about the efficaciousness of using military power over an abbreviated period of time to secure satisfactory political outcomes. Equally important, there is greater appreciation regarding obstacles to be overcome in divergent international bureaucratic cultures where customs and procedures are at variance with those of other organizations. Effective "lock step" is much desired but difficult to attain. Not to be ignored, any evaluation of IFOR effectiveness has been the reconciliation of the conflicted agendas of local parties in the civil war.

Some of the local participants and signatories viewed their acceptance of the accords as contingent, leading NATO observers to conclude that the signatories and associates viewed their signatures as having no lasting value.

Any assessment of IFOR performance must take into account its role and impact on NATO expansion plans. Attention should be accorded NATO and CIS peacekeeping operational zones as potential spheres of influence. Where the interests of NATO members are not at risk, the inclination will be to accept CIS "zones of influence," the exceptions being the grey geographic areas of Eastern and Central Europe. Barring membership in NATO, countries in these two areas are likely to become marshlands of uncertain security status, much like Bosnia, where the NATO-CIS relationship may evolve into either collaboration to secure peaceful resolution or one of open competition.
Bosnia will also likely prove a significant testing ground for European peacekeeping staying power, as well as a litmus test as to the capacity of Moscow, Washington, and Brussels to reach agreement on common purposes and goals. Bosnia will also test the ability of European organizations, notably CSCE and EU, to provide the diplomatic and economic resources and skills to bring Bosnia into the "community of European nations." The challenge for EU is heightened by the fact that member states view foreign policy as an extension of national self-interest. Constituent EU members of the WEU have little desire to project force while subordinating this interest, particularly if it involves risking their soldiers' lives to a common policy dictated by others. With the WEU treaty up for possible renegotiation in 1998, members have an obligation for "mutual defense," which is difficult for traditional neutrals such as Austria, Finland, Sweden, and Ireland to accept unconditionally. The Economist recently underscored the EU/WEU dilemma:

If the EU one day includes the Baltic states, they are likely to be virtually indefensible, whatever the wording of WEU members' duties. Yet how, then can membership of the WEU be a condition for countries wanting to join the WEU? And how can the EU be "integrated" into the WEU as the Union's "defense pillar" within NATO?

This is not to say that progress is not being made in the development of NATO and WEU doctrine for peace operations. Current efforts to draw on the lessons of the former Yugoslavia have identified potential NATO roles in a spectrum of operations, including humanitarian assistance, conflict prevention, traditional peacekeeping, and peace enforcement operations, should a situation emerge that would require the use of force. Such NATO roles, to be carried out in support of U.N. or OSCE mandates, are designed to build on unique capabilities that the Alliance has fashioned over the past 40-plus years:

- A proven command and control structure
- The development of NATO standardization agreements on procedures and equipment
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- The availability of Alliance infrastructure and communications systems
- The maintenance of readily available multinational forces, to include standing forces and reaction forces that have already exercised and trained together.

One of the clear lessons of the Yugoslav experience, however, has been that as impressive as these capabilities may be, NATO is unlikely to be called upon to act alone in peace support operations. Provision will have to be made to incorporate non-NATO forces and organizations alongside those of the Alliance.

The Way Ahead

Secretary of State Madeleine Albright observed that the period immediately ahead represents a critical time line for the European region. Organizations that served as benchmarks during the Cold War period have either dissolved or are engaged today in efforts at realignment, reorganization, or reexamination of their basic purposes and roles. Western Europe is moving toward economic and monetary union, and a number of former Warsaw Treaty Organization member states east of the Elbe are casting their lot to seek membership in the European Union and its military adjunct as well as in NATO. The period ahead, from 1998 through 1999, is a crucial one as various European organizations are compelled to evaluate the credential of applicants for membership. The European Union has pledged to expand its rolls; the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), has already welcomed Poland, Hungary, and Czech Republic to its ranks; and the OSCE is promoting democratic standards throughout Europe, but is still seeking to define a meaningful role for itself in the security realm. The OSCE performance in Bosnia may prove the litmus test defining its future usefulness.

NATO, however, will almost certainly prove the primary organization in shaping the future of Europe in terms of peacekeeping roles and missions. NATO confronts several challenges within the organization and from neighborhoods once considered threatening. The alliance has proved enduring despite many internal
disagreements over the past 30 years. However, “victory” is not an unmixed blessing. The organization today has an increasing number of critics who question its continued utility given the changed regional security environment, which many NATO members concede is not longer “threatening.” In the words of Secretary Albright, the clear imperative is to fashion a “new NATO” or else face the risk of being considered an “ossified institution.”

The “new” NATO contemplated is one prepared to extend membership to selected countries east of the Elbe that fully meet NATO standards in the military, economic, and political realms. The organization has in recent years established two entities to facilitate cooperation and joint military exercises with former Warsaw Treaty Organization members—the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) and the Partner for Peace program (PfP)—as well as to engage in joint military planning and exchanges of military information.

NATO has been adapting its military structures and procedure since July 1990, when the allies declared, “The Alliance’s integrated structure...will change fundamentally.” A major facet of change has been the increased European representation on higher staffs and in senior billets. In addition, since WEU moved to Brussels in January 1993 to undertake its new roles of strengthening the European pillar of NATO, NATO has taken significant steps to empower WEU with real military assets to accomplish its tasks. WEU and NATO meet quarterly in joint Council sessions, their secretaries-general meet often to discuss matters of common interest, and the WEU Secretary-General is invited to North Atlantic Council ministerial meetings.

Implicit in NATO’s expanded ties is its future roles and missions. In particular, NATO must address the extent to which it is prepared to undertake “out of area” actions, that is, areas that do not fall within the traditional alliance operational zone. Members of the alliance have supported operations in Bosnia and adjacent areas, as authorized by the United Nations and the OSCE. Alliance leaders have made clear that they are prepared to consider future missions, but have yet to provide clear guidelines for planning purposes on which geographic zones constitute “areas of interest” in which NATO would be prepared to deploy forces.
A further consideration is the future of NATO relations with the OSCE, particularly problems to be surmounted at the strategic level on the use of military force. During the UNPROFOR phase of the Bosnia peace operation, confusion arose not only over chain of command considerations but conceptual preconceptions. The notion of mixing U.N.-directed “peacekeepers” with NATO “peace enforcers” in the same tactical context and theater of operations proved unsound, conceptually and practically. For NATO, the issue remains on the table with respect to future peace operations. What did emerge in Bosnia was the clear understanding that use of coercive military force by an organization inevitably makes that organization a co-belligerent in the eyes of other belligerents, and where certain nations provide units for both peace enforcement and peacekeeping, the belligerent who is under attack may be unwilling to distinguish between the two.

Notes

2. Ibid., 76.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid., 76.
7. Ibid.
8. The Economist, May 18, 1995, 41.
4. Commonwealth of Independent States

It seems to be almost instinctual to attempt to create a successor organization to a dissolved empire. The English smoothly moved from Empire to the British Commonwealth, the French to Francophone Community, and the Portuguese have recently announced the formation of a Luso League. The creation of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) after the dissolution of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, therefore, can be seen as a reflex action as much as a deep-dyed plan to reestablish Moscow's authority or a far-sighted liberal dream of a new, consensual form of regional relationship.

Certainly prominent military and civilian figures in Moscow, soon to be leaders of the new Russian Federation, were the originators and instigators of the CIS project, and it is reasonable to assume that these individuals and institutions each had different agendas, from empire to commonwealth to personal motives. The last category probably included tactical political calculations by Boris Yeltsin in his competition with Gorbachev for Russian leadership. The dissolution of the USSR left Gorbachev with no role or status while conversely transferring to Yeltsin, as leader of the new Russian Federation, the governance powers inside Russia hitherto belonging to Gorbachev as chief of state of the USSR. The CIS, then, offered Yeltsin at least a potential formal role in the neighboring countries where Gorbachev had exercised sovereign powers.

The various Russian sponsors of the CIS proposed different and often competing characters for that organization: military, economic, financial, even cultural. None has taken firm shape, although the military has been the most prominent, partially because of a lack of
consistency on the part of the Russian Government. A recent development has been the effort, or at least the interest, of some members of the CIS to attempt to leverage their membership to influence Russian behavior and policy. Most successful in this has been Georgian President Shevardnadze who has managed to use the CIS forum to bring pressure on Russia in the spring and summer of 1997 to help end the Ossetian secession. Meanwhile, outsiders in Western Europe and the United States have been uncertain how to deal with this Russian regional innovation, but through NATO's Partnership for Peace have pursued a somewhat independent new relationship with many of the members of the CIS. Not unlike the proverbial elephant, therefore, the CIS appears to be a very different creature to different observers such as Russians, other CIS members, the United Nations, and Americans.

From its beginning, the CIS has pursued three major themes: membership, institution building, and—most ambiguous and yet most important of all—role seeking. The last item can be encapsulated in the question, "Commonwealth or Empire?" framed by William Odom and Robert Dujarric in the title of their Hudson Institute study. Indeed, Russian policy toward the CIS often has been ambivalent, reflecting the internal debate between the neo-Communist and imperial forces and the liberal reform movement. The leadership of the other countries has been equally ambivalent and changeable, with the old "apparatchik" figures anxious to retain as much as possible of the ties and policies of the USSR, while the more nationalist and reform forces seek greater actual independence.

In Moscow, the CIS was viewed as an instrument of Russian policy toward Central Asia and the Caucasus, although there was little agreement on the character of the desired relationship—commonwealth or empire or something in between. In Central Asia the old Communist elites still in power wanted to continue with the old command arrangements and limit democratic political expansion, while obtaining a degree of local authority for themselves. Kazakhstan's president was especially forceful in pushing this policy of a strong, highly integrated CIS—"a new Soviet Union with local autonomy"—but it failed to develop rapidly or institutionally. Elsewhere the CIS "project" was viewed with suspicion but could not
be summarily rejected. Out of the complex motives and maneuverings, the idea of regional organizational peacekeeping has emerged as a possible limited type of activity and, because limited, possibly acceptable.

**Founding**

The CIS was inaugurated when Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus signed an initial agreement on December 8, 1991, in Minsk, Belarus. This move by the three Slavic states created some unease among the other Former States of the Soviet Union. The five Central Asian states issued a statement almost immediately, on December 13, which commented favorably on the agreement signed and expressed a desire to join as equal founders, given certain modifications and amendments. They called for a summit meeting of the former republics to discuss the issues, which was held in due course in Alma-Ata on December 21, 1991. This meeting enlarged the CIS membership to 11, all designated as High Signatory Parties with equal footing as co-founders. Only four of the FSU republics stayed out: Georgia and the three Baltic states. Georgia later applied (or was coerced) for CIS membership in 1993, but the Baltic states have resolutely remained outside and show no signs of changing their minds.

On January 22, 1993, the Charter of the CIS was formally adopted, initially by only seven states, and entered into force in January 1994. Even prior to that, a Coordinating and Consultative Committee was established at the deputy head of government level. The CIS Minsk “working group” was transformed into a formal secretariat. In September 1993, a council of foreign ministers and a commission on human rights were established. At the time an agreement for a CIS economic union was also signed, but only Turkmenistan and Ukraine signed on initially. Although this was potentially an important step toward institutionalization and consolidation of the CIS, it has not been implemented, and the CIS remains essentially an intergovernmental forum, with little in the way of executive authority or institutions.
Whence the CIS?
Much of the confusion about the true present character or likely future role of the CIS arises from the understandable lack of agreement on the likely future character of the post-USSR Russian Federation itself, although “decentralization and regionalization of power are the predominant trends.” Whatever it turns out to be, the Russian Federation will be a major power with appropriate interests and concerns. Mr. Paul Goble of Radio Free Europe has outlined what he calls the “trend line of Russian foreign policy,” which is based on 10 challenges or issues in current RF foreign policy:

- NATO expansion
- Former Yugoslavia
- China
- The “Near Abroad,” especially concern for Russian citizens there
- Relations with Iran, especially with respect to the Caucasus
- Oil prices
- Rebuilding the Navy’s ability to project force
- Arms Control, re-open the existing agreement
- Economy
- Building of national institutions

Russia, however, can pursue these interests in various ways. Two obvious strategic choices—at opposite ends of the conceptual spectrum—would be one based on cooperation with the West, while another might be focused on resurgence of Russian imperialism in the area of the former Soviet Union. It appears, for the moment at least, that Moscow is attempting to pursue these policies simultaneously. “The new Russian foreign policy wants both membership in the Western club and a privileged role in Eurasia.” This approach is not surprising, given Russia’s urgent need to concentrate on internal matters for the foreseeable future combined with the lack of a national consensus on a wide range of questions, from a definition of Russia itself to agreement on the desirable political and economic models to be adopted.
Membership and Character
The membership question has remained confusing. The three original members were joined by eight others, but in October 1992 Azerbaijan’s Parliament refused ratification of the agreement establishing the Commonwealth, and Moldova failed to ratify later in mid-1993. Nevertheless both Azerbaijan and Moldova continued to participate in CIS meetings in one capacity or another. The CIS charter makes a distinction between “founding members” and later adherents, although there does not appear to be any significant difference in the quality of these memberships. The charter also provides for the status of associate members for those who wish to participate only in selected activities, and other states may attend meetings observers if so approved by the Council of the Heads of States. Membership of the CIS finally consisted of 12 countries of the old USSR minus the three Baltic states: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan. Despite concerns, fears, and objections, Moscow has obtained (by various means) affiliation by all of the former states of the USSR except the Baltics.

It is not completely clear, however, what affiliation or membership means. Different countries pursued different approaches to their obligations and to their participation in decisionmaking in the CIS. The December 30, 1991, Agreement creating the Councils of Heads of State and Heads of Government of the CIS stipulated that decisions in both councils would be reached by consensus. However the agreement also permitted members to abstain in a particular case, with such abstention not to be considered as an obstacle to the adoption of a decision. Individual members therefore possess a veto over any given decision but may also abstain without breaking consensus. These arrangements have been confirmed in later procedural agreements.

This right not to participate (which is similar to the voting process in the United Nations) is widely employed by members of the CIS, who practice a form of selective signing. In fact, only a few of the many CIS agreements have been signed by all member states. Russia, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan have formed the hard core of the CIS by signing almost all of the agreements. (Now that Belarus has
moved into a much closer bilateral relationship with Russia, it may join this core group.) Most other members have been especially cautious about signing agreements that establish any supranational or permanent executive bodies, although they are more willing to go along with the creation of coordinating bodies in the economic and social areas.

In any case, few of the CIS agreements are legally binding; rather, they are declarations of intention. Where Russia has maintained or reinstated tighter ties (as in Belarus, Georgia, and Azerbaijan), it has done so by manipulating bilateral pressures. Proposals for some form of military integration and economic union have been the most difficult and the most contentious of the core questions that will determine the character, and future role, of the CIS. The experience to date in these two central areas has not been definitive.

**Military Relations**

Resistance to military integration is particularly strong, and Moscow is having trouble maintaining even limited border troop arrangements in a few countries. In essence, all Russia's partners in the CIS, except for Belarus, are leery of having the Commonwealth turn into a military control mechanism as was the Warsaw Treaty Organization. They accept that they must maintain or reinstitute some economic ties but are attempting to limit the security relationship and demonstrate a viable political independence—minimizing their ties while maximizing benefits.

While Ukraine has been the most visible in pursuit of Western security arrangements to counterbalance those with Moscow, other CIS countries have pursued similar policies in varying degrees. All have signed their own individual Partnership for Peace agreements; there are no CIS-PfP links. Countries of the CIS participating in the Bosnian adventure are doing so with national units, with no CIS identity or cohesion. Even the bilateral agreements Russia has procured allowing Russian forces to be based in CIS countries (such as Georgia, Armenia, and Tajikistan) permit indigenous personnel to join those units in significant numbers.

A major Russian CIS initiative is the effort to obtain security treaties, but those few signed to date have lacked substance. A major
question for all of the members of the CIS is that of successor arrangements for the USSR military structure, beginning with the sharing out of its assets and military equipment. Also, it has been noted that the legacy of the Soviet Union is the heavy involvement of the Russian Federation in the “near abroad,” partially through troops stationed there, partially through the recent CIS and bilateral treaties.

Clearly, some senior Russian military officials expected (or at least hoped) that the CIS would provide for a continuation of the complete Soviet military structure—under Russian leadership. This did not occur, as all the FSUs eventually insisted on the right and need to create their own military. Especially in the military area, many view a comprehensive military arrangement as continuation of Moscow’s central authority.

At the Tashkent summit in May 1992, Russia essentially shifted the whole discussion to another plane by introducing a proposal for a collective security treaty for the CIS. By doing so, Moscow came down on one side of an argument that had been central to the question of CIS military policy: whether to follow the old Warsaw Pact (centralized) or the NATO (looser) model. A collective security pact was closer to the NATO model and was based on the existence of national military policies and structures; further, it essentially closed the argument over the character of CIS military arrangements by opting for national forces. However, this agreement is vague in many details and is far from providing for the continuation of an integrated regional military system. Many have expressed reservations and concerns—Ukraine thought the treaty was incompatible with other CIS agreements, and Belarus thought it incompatible with its own constitution. Nevertheless, while most have resisted the continuation of Russian central military authority, Moscow has established Russian military presence in several of the CIS member states.

Five CIS summits were held in 1993, with little further progress made with respect to military matters, and attention shifted more toward economic questions. In May, the CIS Council of Defense Ministers abolished the post of commander in chief of CIS Armed Forces and in December eliminated the CIS Armed Forces Command itself. In essence, by the end of 1993 the effort to create a combined
CIS military structure had collapsed. Russia itself had reconstituted a national military as had the others. Continued deployment of Russian troops outside the Russian Federation required fig leaves in the form of bilateral agreements or a regional multinational arrangement. Earlier work on the creation of CIS doctrine and authority for peacekeeping deployments was pursued, and the concept paper on the prevention and settlement of conflicts on the territories of the CIS member states referred to above was adopted in early 1996. Therefore, a legal structure for multinational CIS military relations has been created, in case anyone might wish to use it.

Peacekeeping, therefore, might offer Moscow a form of acceptable military cooperation less satisfactory than outright military integration but still somewhat more structured than a collection of bilateral agreements.

**Peacekeeping**

One major concern of members of this regional organization is that of collective security, although there is a sharp distinction between the attitude of Russia (proactive) and the others (suspicious). While Russian interest initially focused on questions such as the future of the USSR military structure and the protection of borders, war in Nakorno-Korabagh and conflicts in Georgia and Moldova resulted in introduction of “peacekeeping” or “peacemaking” into the collective security agenda at the Kiev CIS Summit in 1992. All CIS members (except Turkmenistan) signed “The Agreement on Military Observer Groups and Collective Peace-Keeping Forces in the CIS.” The agreement included many restrictive conditions, similar to U.N. “terms,” which called for a request from all parties and a cease-fire in place—but still introduced the concept as a possible task for the CIS as a regional organization.

Subsequent agreements were signed, such as “The Protocol on the Status of Military Observer Groups and Collective Peacekeeping Forces” and “The Protocol on Manning, Structure, Logistic Support and Financing of the Military Observer Groups and Collective Peacekeeping Forces in the Commonwealth of Independent States,”

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Russian "Peacekeeping" Forces in the "Near Abroad"
in May 1992 in Tashkent. Further discussion and elaboration over the succeeding years resulted in a paper, “Concept for the Prevention and Settlement of Conflicts on the Territories of the Member-States of the Commonwealth of Independent States,” which was accepted as a resolution of the Council of the Heads of States of the CIS on January 19, 1996. This concept paper lays out arrangements almost identical to those of classic U.N. peacekeeping: consensual operations by voluntary forces financed by special assessment. Particularly significant elements of the concept paper are:

- “The member-states of the CIS will strive to strengthen the role of the Commonwealth in the peaceful settlement of conflicts” by joint agreement and action.
- Special note was made of the desirability of “heavy participation of the United Nations and the OSCE in efforts to regulate conflicts on the territories of the member-states of the Commonwealth.”
- Any such activity will be regulated by the U.N. Charter, the Charter, and other documents of the CIS, the generally recognized principals and norms of international law, relevant U.N. Security Council resolutions, OSCE documents, and other relevant agreements between member-states of the CIS.
- With regard to the settlement of conflicts in the territories of its member-states, the CIS will operate as a regional organization in conformity with Chapter VIII of the U.N. Charter.
- The Council of the Heads of States of the CIS is the authority for defining and authorizing of peacekeeping mandates and operations.
- Peace enforcement operations (Chapter VII type authority for the use of force) are permitted only when so authorized by the U.N. Security Council.

This convention, interestingly enough, codifies the limited nature of CIS peacekeeping to conflict resolution. None of the CIS states (or, for that matter, Russian states, until the current Bosnia operation) has engaged in any of the humanitarian assistance or complex emergency management activities so characteristic of recent U.N. peacekeeping.
operations. When humanitarian assistance has been called for, it has been left to U.N. or nongovernmental organizations to conduct, such as the UNHCR in Georgia and Azerbaijan. Nothing in any of the relevant CIS agreements or documents touches on the problem of "failed states" or complex emergencies, and the above discussed "concept" paper clearly prohibits "Chapter VII" type peace enforcement operations unless authorized by the Security Council. Essentially, therefore, the CIS peacekeeping authority is limited to what is generally referred to as "traditional" or consensual peacekeeping under the provisions of Chapter VI of the U.N. Charter.

The CIS, therefore, has adopted criteria and standards whereby it could "provide an international framework for specific interventions by regional actors." However, many observers believe that "oversight arrangements are needed to make the legitimacy of such action conditional on international standards," such as the U.N. Observer Force linked to the CIS peacekeeping operation in the Abkhaz region of Georgia.

The Russians sought formal U.N. recognition (and the financing that would go with it) in 1994, but Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali made it clear during a visit to Moscow that the request would not be met and that U.N. peacekeeping operations would be only those under U.N. control from beginning to end. Moscow continued this effort to obtain international recognition, and in the spring 1996 session of the General Assembly's Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, the Russian representative stated that the Russian Federation attached particular importance to the establishment of working relations between the CIS and the United Nations, favoring participation of the United Nations and the OSCE in dispute resolution activities within the CIS, to include peacekeeping operations. He added with some asperity, "So far, unfortunately, we have to note that Russia is still obliged to carry the main burden of moral, political, and financial responsibility for peacekeeping in the CIS States."

In Moscow's eyes, the CIS is an established regional organization of the type covered by Chapter VIII of the U.N. Charter, and no formal or procedural recognition by the United Nations is needed or even provided for. Former Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali at least
Lewis and Marks

appeared to agree; he formally attended and addressed CIS summit conferences.

Russia first attempted to utilize CIS “peacekeeping authority” in mid-July 1993 in Tajikistan. Previous operations, however, were more on the order of bilateral activities, such as the agreements concluded concerning the Trans-Dniester region between Russia and Moldova (1992) and those between Georgia and Russia (several in 1992 and 1993).

Later developments in Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan resulted in these countries joining the CIS, the later deployment of a CIS peacekeeping force in the Abkhazia region of Georgia, and an ad hoc peacekeeping force in the South Ossetian region of Georgia. No force obtained the right to wear U.N. blue berets.

Meanwhile, developments in the Dniester River area of Moldova enabled the Russians (who had large army units stationed in the country) to play an active role in local developments. Although the attempt to break off part of the country and have it join Russia failed for the moment, Russia was able to retain a position and role in the country by relabeling its forces as CIS peacekeepers.

Moscow offered another peacekeeping force to assist with the Nakorno-Karabagh conflict, but both parties, especially the Azerbaijan Government, strongly prefer either a CSCE or U.N. force. Nevertheless, Moscow will probably continue to attempt to consider peacekeeping operations as a policy option in the geographic area of the former USSR. While many will continue to harbor suspicions about Russian intentions in doing so, the reality remains that inter- and intrastate conflicts in the area, present and future, will require attention.

Regardless of their internationally recognized status, or lack thereof, four Russian-sponsored “peacekeeping forces” were, and still are, deployed, in Tajikistan, Georgia (Abkhazia and South Ossetia), and Moldova.

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Russian troops in Tajikistan (both army and Border Troops) had been actively engaged in the civil war in Tajikistan when 23 Russian Border Troops were killed on July 13, 1993. Moscow notified the U.N. Security Council that it would assist Tajikistan and appointed Foreign minister Kozyrev as "special representative" to coordinate all Russian operations there. Kozyrev addressed the U.N. General Assembly in September and proclaimed a special peacekeeping role for Russia in the CIS and asked that Russian peacekeeping forces be given the status of U.N. peacekeepers.

To bolster this request, Russia obtained promises of support from Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Kazakhstan and launched a diplomatic campaign to obtain U.N. sanction. The diplomatic effort failed, and the United Nations declined to grant the Russian request, but the effort signaled a Russian policy of claiming a special role for peacekeeping under CIS cover. This was actually Russia's second attempt to place a "peacekeeping" force in Tajikistan. The first operation had been authorized by the CIS in January, 1993 in an attempt to stabilize the political environment in Tajikistan. Although deployed, it consisted only of Russian troops and had little success, if only because a cease-fire agreement was never achieved.

The second and more ambitious operation produced the Coalition Peacekeeping Forces (KMS), which numbered approximately 25,000 troops (the vast majority Russian) under the command of a Russian general. (The command and control arrangements, however, appear somewhat ambiguous, as the KMS commander does not appear to have clear cut authority over Russian units, much less those from other CIS states.) The mandate of the KMS is also more ambitious, representing a full-scale intervention under the authority of the CIS Collective Security Treaty, which smacks more of peace making than peacekeeping. Some have described it as turning Tajikistan into a de facto Russian-CIS (actually Russian-Uzbek, in the opinion of some) protectorate.

The KMS remains deployed in Tajikistan, mostly as backup to the border troops on the southern border with Iran although one major unit is deployed in the Tajik capital where it performs the function of propping up the government. Both within the context of the KMS
context and with the help of the United Nations, a series of cease-fire accords have been negotiated, and each in turn failed. In essence, the KMS has become a regional coalition operating in support of the Tajikistan Government.

Although approached by the participants to play a peacekeeping role, the Security Council has declined to do so, limiting U.N. involvement to the authorization in December 1994 of an observer force (UNMOT-U.N. Mission of Observers in Tajikistan) with an authorized strength of 84, including local civilian staff. In this connection, the Secretary-General appointed a Special Envoy. Both the Special Envoy and UNMOT were authorized to pursue the usual mediation, cease-fire agreement monitoring, and humanitarian assistance tasks, and were specifically instructed to maintain close liaison with the "Collective Peace-keeping Forces of the Commonwealth of Independent States in Tajikistan" as well as with the Mission of the Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe and local forces.

This effort began to unravel in late 1996, when the Tajik opposition several times routed superior but clearly unmotivated government forces in the narrow middle section of Tajikistan that connects the western and eastern parts of the country. Continuing discussions among the various parties produced another peace agreement in late June 1997, but did not, at least immediately, result in any noticeable increase in civil accord. In fact, the alignment of forces among Tajiks became more complicated, with various government forces apparently aligned against the Government. In early August, Russian officials (speaking for the CIS FORCE) and opposition leaders announced they would remain neutral in these intragovernment squabble. Concurrently, Russia continues to pursue an active bilateral policy, reaching across the border into Afghanistan in an effort to frustrate the anti-Russian Tajik rebels.

**Georgia (Abkhazia)**

Relations between the minority Abkhaz and the majority ethnic Georgians, tense for decades, erupted in 1992 in the aftermath of the breakup of the USSR, when the local Abkhaz authorities attempted to separate from the newly independent Georgia. Russian involvement
in the Abkhaz attempt is widely assumed and played a role in bringing Georgia into the CIS. Meanwhile a de facto division of Georgia had occurred and a cease-fire was agreed to. The CIS operation was initiated in June 1994 and consisted of 3,000 troops, mostly Russian with minor Tajik participation. Its mandate is focused on maintaining the demilitarized zone along the Abkhaz-Georgian “border.”

However, the CIS peacekeeping operation in Abkhazia is not alone; it shares the field with UNOMIG (UN Observer Mission in Georgia), a Special Envoy of the U.N. Secretary-General, individual U.N. specialized agencies and programs, and a resident mission of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Although the United Nations declined Russia’s request that the CIS force in Georgia be granted U.N. status, the Security Council resolution mandating UNOMIG does specifically mention the CIS peacekeepers and thereby link them to U.N. efforts. However, the multinational effort in Georgia-Abkhazia has been noted for its lack of cohesion and integration among the various players.

Little progress was made throughout 1995 and the first half of 1996, but the political situation appeared to improve when Georgian President Shevardnadze won the November 1995 election, thereby significantly strengthening his efforts to stabilize the country, and the Abkhaz leader announced a new position accepting the principle of a “Federate Union” (undefined). In addition, several changes were introduced to improve the integration and effectiveness of the overall operation in early 1996, and the mandates of both forces were extended.

These developments enhanced the peacekeeping and regional organization credentials of the CIS. Russian Foreign Minister Primakov himself chaired meetings in February 1996 between the disputants in Moscow, although without any particular success. Later in the year, the Georgian Government began to make public noises about the possibility of it asking Russia to withdraw the force, unless it could produce acceptable results quickly.

Diplomatic and political activity in 1997 did result, however, in some direct contact between the Abkhaz and Georgian leaders and a joint statement in August 1997, in which both pledged to refrain
from the use of force. Russian President Yeltsin stated that if these talks moved forward and produced a political settlement, he would propose a phased withdrawal of the now 1,600 Russian/CIS peacekeepers now deployed on the current cease-fire line.

**Georgia (South Ossetia)**
The South Ossetian conflict is similar to the Abkhazian in that it involves a minority ethnic group in a newly independent country, but differs in that the group in question shares its ethnicity with kin across the border in Russia (North Ossetia). Open tension between the Ossetians and the Georgians developed in 1989 and after as the new Georgian Government instituted a Georgian language program as well as other Georgian nationalist initiatives. Increasing tensions resulted in South Ossetian local government declaring its independence, which the Georgian Government rejected, and abolishing South Ossetia’s previous autonomous status. The conflict escalated, and by mid-1991 there were interethnic war with blockades, hostage-taking, and artillery attacks. Georgian President Gamsakhurdia fled and was replaced by Edward Shevardnadze, but the conflict continued and Russia increased its involvement, finally organizing a meeting in June 1992 near the Russian city of Sochi, which produced a cease-fire agreement and the organization and deployment of a joint peacekeeping force.

The South Ossetian mission is not a CIS operation but the first attempt by Moscow at what has been described as a local coalition model. The force of approximately 1,500 is composed of troops from both sides of the conflict as well as Russia (both Russian Federation and “local” troops from North Ossetia). As the largest contributor as well as political patron, Russia dominates and leads the force.

The force’s mandate was originally to separate the warring sides by creating a buffer zone between South Ossetia and Georgia. By mid-1993 the operation appears to have expanded into a more general policing and monitoring activity throughout South Ossetia, as the South Ossetian government does not appear to have been able to establish anything serious in the way of local police administration. Little progress has been made in resolving the conflict since then, although the Georgians and the South Ossetians signed an accord in
June 1996, mediated by Russia and the OSCE, that carried forward the cease-fire and called for action on the outstanding issues. Meanwhile, the peacekeeping force, somewhat reduced as Russia deals with other demands for troops, continues to function in its dual monitoring and policing role.

**Moldova**

The peacekeeping operation in Moldova is also an ad hoc arrangement: a bilateral agreement between Moldova and Russia, not CIS authorized. It is designed to separate regional factions along the Dniester River; half is composed of Russian troops and the rest comprises Moldovan and Dniesteran battalions.

Although billed as a peacekeeping operation, the force more clearly represents a direct Russian involvement in the internal affairs of a former Soviet republic. The conflict arise from the efforts of the east bank region of the Dniester River to secede from Moldova, an especially strong impulse following the collapse of the USSR and Moldovan independence. The conflict is political rather than ethnic and was exacerbated by the role of the Russian 14th Army, which was based in the region and which actively supported the Dniester forces. Negotiations among Moldovan, Russian, and Dniesteran authorities resulted in a cease-fire agreement in July 1992 in Moscow.

In what Kevin O’Prey calls “Moscow’s local coalition model for mediation and peacekeeping,” the Russian and Moldovan presidents agreed to act as joint guarantors of peace and authorized a peacekeeping force. In the event only Russia was willing to contribute peacekeepers to the Moldovan mission, other CIS and some East European states had offered to send peacekeepers but backed out and called for the use of OSCE mechanisms. However, when the OSCE in July 1992 refused the Moldovan Government’s request for a OSCE peacekeeping force, Chisinau finally accepted a Russian proposal for a tripartite (Russian, Dniester, Moldovan) force to be labeled as CIS peacekeeping force. The peacekeepers, about 4,000 strong, were deployed in July and August 1992 in a buffer zone separating Moldovan and Dniester forces. In addition, the OSCE sent a resident observer mission.
Although there has been no outbreak of large-scale hostilities since the operation has begun, there have been persistent charges that the force has not been impartial; that it has consistently favored the Dniester side. A treaty for withdrawal of the force was negotiated in early 1996 but has not yet been ratified by the Russian Duma. However, Moscow has actually withdrawn a significant portion of its contribution to the peacekeeping force over the past 2 years, arguing that some of their functions could be assumed by its 14th Army units stationed in the area, thereby further diluting the neutral character of the peacekeeping force.

Cohesion

The passion for their new-found independence by most of the former members of the USSR is obviously why there has been little progress in new institution building and the evolution of common policy (and the consequent continued parallel growth of Russian bilateral policies in the area). In reality, the CIS was created largely in an ad hoc manner, without a unifying concept of coherent structure. Most of the agreements concluded have been reached though a process of compromise that has attempted to meet Moscow’s bottom line of preventing a further disintegration of inherited relations, while enabling the other members to pursue varying degrees of independent national political life. The key word or concept is “reintegration,” but there is little agreement of what that means. Increasingly it appears to mean a mixture of economic and military ties, varying from country to country.

However, by late 1993, the CIS took on new life with the accession of Georgia and Azerbaijan (even though their new membership was less than fully voluntary). Each of the three Caucasian states discovered that, for different reasons, it could not retain full independence from the Russian Federation.

Not surprisingly, apart from the Russian Federation each member of the CIS is attempting to pursue a membership policy that brings it some advantages (e.g., Russian support for Armenia in Nakorno-Karabagh), while limiting Russian influence. Russia’s intentions, as noted above, are not fully transparent, or maybe just not yet fully developed. Everyone, including Russia, has a separate agenda.
Reuters classified the member states of the CIS as follows with respect to their views on the institutionalization of the CIS:

- **Integration enthusiasts**: Russia, Belarus. The two Slav neighbors signed an accord in April 1996 creating a “Community” with some supranational bodies and a timetable for the creation of a common market and monetary union by 1997, and joint transport and energy systems. They are to coordinate their defense and foreign policies but insist each will maintain its individual sovereignty.

- **Pro-integration but suspicious of outright union**: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan. These two have joined Russia and Belarus in a pact with less integrated structures promoting economic integration and a customs union within the broader CIS framework. However, there are no supranational bodies envisaged.

- **Less interested in integration but dependent on Russia**: Georgia, Armenia, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan. All four belong to a collective security system within the CIS dominated by Russia. Georgia depends on Russia to keep separatists in check; Armenia sees Russia as a protector against its Muslim neighbors; Tajikistan has 25,000 Russian troops to fight Moslem rebels; and Uzbekistan has few resources and little ability to resist Russian pressures. Although members of the NATO Partnership for Peace (except Tajikistan), they have refrained to date from holding joint exercises with Western countries.

- **Hostile to integration**: Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Moldova. None is active in CIS activities; Ukraine and Turkmenistan have not even signed the CIS charter. Ukraine leads the resistance. This group is less dependent on Russia. Turkmenistan has gas and Azerbaijan has oil. Neither Azerbaijan nor Moldova has agreed to hoist Russian bases or forces, and Turkmenistan has proclaimed itself Central Asia's first neutral state.

- **Totally opposed**: The Baltic States. These three led the drive to leave the USSR, inspiring nationalists elsewhere. All three have refused to joint the CIS and have declared their intention to join NATO and the European Union.
The View from Moscow

The Russian Federation is caught between conflicting pressures and memories: trying to reconstruct a post-Communist viable society and government, while also attempting to sort out its relations with the outside world. Lack of consensus on this fundamental question is reflected in the lack of coherent policy in a number of areas, including the purpose and future of the Commonwealth of Independent States, a Moscow creation.

In the foreign policy area, Moscow has shifted from a world view to a focus on its “frontier,” now largely composed of former constituent parts of the USSR. Many Russians, of course, want to bring these “neighbors” of what they call the “Near Abroad” back into the fold but are facing questions of how to do so and then how to define the new relationship. The other successor states of the USSR naturally view Moscow’s interest in reintegration with mixed interest and suspicion, as do many Western observers.

A major instrument for official Russian Federation policy on this question appears to be the CIS. Moscow is touting this organization as a natural development, based on history, common interest, and mutual consent, designed to provide for a reintegration of many of the successor states of the USSR into a more or less coherent regional space. Two aspects to this policy merit close watching: first, the degree of success in reintegration of the region; second, the character of the institutional result. For the United States and Western Europe, the final judgment, according to U.S. Ambassador to the Russian Republic Thomas Pickering, will depend upon:

- The degree of mutual consent by which the process is pursued
- The degree of mutual advantage shared by the participants, especially the smaller nations
- The degree to which the CIS permits political, economic, and social interaction with outsiders (such as the United States and the European Union).

The CIS, apparently conceived by Moscow in the hectic days of 1991 to be the successor institution to the USSR, failed to take form in any meaningful way in its first few years. Moscow attempted to
give it new life in 1993, beginning with operations in Georgia and Azerbaijan. Since then, under Foreign Minister Primakov, Russian official interest in the reintegration of the successor states of the USSR has solidified into a policy of seeking influence rather than reinstating rule. Russian diplomats now present, to whoever will listen, a formal description of the CIS as both a process and an institution for the reintegration of the former states of the Soviet Union into a new politico-economic-social space. They claim that even without the institution the process is actually underway and will lead sooner or later to a more or less reintegrated regional entity based on the following realities:

- **Economic**: the USSR was an integrated economy built on the organizing principle of no “duplication” of economic activities; few if any of the successor states are yet able to pursue an independent economic life.
- **Security**: the USSR had centralized military institutions, and the CIS countries are now forced to build their own institutions from scratch and at enormous cost. The complex border situation (between the Russian Federation and CIS members; between the CIS members and the external world; and from there back again into Russia itself) makes that task even more difficult.
- **Common heritage**: History exists, and there is a vast common heritage of language, customs, bureaucratic cultures, and memories (e.g., of the Great Patriotic War).

The border questions are particularly pressing. The internal borders within the former USSR were rather casual affairs, and all the infrastructure of border protection and control was placed on the external borders of the USSR. The breakup of the USSR has left the Russian Federation essentially without clearly demarcated borders with many of its new neighbors, especially in the Caucasus and Central Asia. The political problems connected with obtaining clearly marked borders, e.g., between Russia and Georgia, are reportedly vexing.

Russian policy thinkers have formulated the idea of the “Near Abroad,” a contiguous area consisting of former republics of the USSR.
for which the Russian Federation claims special responsibility and in
which it claims special authority. Some Russians, including President
Yeltsin in an election speech, go so far as to claim the right to use
military force to protect ethnic Russians living in the Near Abroad.
While Yeltsin may only have been engaging in electioneering rhetoric
in 1996, other Russian candidates clearly meant to claim that right.
Needless to say, the whole concept of the Near Abroad raises
eyebrows, at minimum, in those countries so designated.

At the same time, the transformation of former USSR border
regions (under Moscow’s control as states of the centralized USSR)
into independent states leaves Russia without an external geographic
security buffer. In attempting to deal with this disturbing nakedness,
Moscow has pressed for bilateral agreements that permit the
deployment of Russian border troops (which include a large number
of recruits from the host countries) manning Georgia and Armenia’s
borders with Turkey and Iran. However, even a satisfactory
arrangement with respect to purely security matters will not alleviate
Russian concerns arising from an essentially wide-open movement of
goods and peoples across these borders, given the weak or even
nonexistent capability of these newly independent countries to
control their borders. As long as these conditions exist, Russian
concerns about smuggling, arms transfers, crime, and terrorism will
continue.

In sum, Russian officials argue that existing “objective” factors
lead to some form of reintegration, which they insist is not a cover for
re-establishment of the imperial relationship of the USSR. The issue
surfaced in Russian internal politics in March 1996, when the
Communist-dominated State Duma passed a resolution declaring
invalid the dissolution of the USSR in December 1991. Boris Yelstin
turned this action of the Duma against the Communists in the
electoral campaign by making the case that he was more able to bring
about some form of reintegration of the former republics than were
the Communists, in the form of a consensual CIS. He obtained the
support of most of the leaders of the other former Soviet republics for
his position. Nevertheless, clear policy on the future of the CIS is
absent, and pending the achievement of any consensus, the
Government of the Russian Federation under President Yelstin’s
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leadership appears to be pursuing a procedural policy whereby the CIS is kept busy with meetings, conferences, and resolutions without much concern for their relevance, pending the day when a policy consensus will enable the organization to take on more substance.

Finally, as a short-term expedient, Moscow is attempting to use the CIS as a mechanism for dealing with local conflicts in the neighboring former states of the Soviet Union that now belong to the CIS. Conflicts in Tajikistan and Georgia resulted in the introduction of the concept of peacekeeping into the CIS agenda, followed by an agreement among several of the CIS members to create CIS “peace maintenance forces.” These are currently deployed in Georgia and Moldova, and Moscow has indicated interest in further CIS peacekeeping operations in the region. As explained by the Russian Ambassador to the United Nations, Sergey Lavrov, “The emergence of conflicts on political and ethnic grounds in the newly independent states in the territory of the former Soviet Union poses a serious threat to the security and stability of those states and Russia, ... as well as to regional and international peace in general” and therefore “defined as an international organization under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, the CIS is already making its contribution to peacekeeping in Commonwealth territory.”

The View from Transcaucasia

The Transcaucasia region constitutes a complex geopolitical matrix—a version of three-dimensional chess that illustrates again the validity of General de Gaulle’s comment about geography making politics. At one level there is the intricate, intimate, and occasionally conflict-ridden relationship among the peoples of Caucasus region: primarily the secessionist movements of the Abkhaz and the South Ossetians of Georgia, the Armenians of Nakorno-Karabagh in Azerbaijan, and the peoples of the Russian Federation across the border in the Transcaucasus (most notably the Czechens). At another level there is the interplay between Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan (and their various peoples) and the surrounding layer of major regional powers—Russia, Turkey, and Iran—who were all once suzerains in the Caucasus and might wish to be so again.
The novelty of Caucasian independence is matched by the passion for trying to keep it, but the fragility of the newly independent economies and institutions combined with geographic isolation poses problems. For instance, with no substantive progress to date in the political talks on the issue related to Nagorno-Karabakh and to Abkhazia, the future of more than one million refugees and internally displaced persons continues to be uncertain. Out of this number, more than 900,000 people (250,000 in Armenia, 405,000 in Azerbaijan, and 250,000 in Georgia) are receiving international humanitarian assistance. This combination of fragile governments, internal and intrastate conflict, and economic deterioration following the collapse of the USSR is an obvious arena for regional peacekeeping initiatives.

Armenia
The Armenian Government is focused on four foreign policy issues:

- The future of Nakorno-Karabagh and relations with Azerbaijan
- Establishing relations with its other neighbors, especially Turkey, but also with Georgia and Iran
- How to break out of economic as well as political isolation
- The character of the CIS and Armenia’s role in it.

Yerevan joined the CIS at its inception, seeing in it both an opportunity and a danger. It offers the prospect of an acceptable relationship with Russia, which Armenia needs for security reasons — to maintain Russian sympathy in the Nagorno-Karabagh conflict and, in the longer run, to counter the “Turkish Threat.” The Nagorno-Karabagh question is particularly important for the current Armenian Government, which wants to concentrate on nation-building tasks but is caught between a more militant diaspora political movement (the Dashnak party) and the Nakorno-Karabagh regime. This conflict raises all sorts of internal and international problems for the Armenian Government, which finds itself isolated both economically and politically.

Moscow’s continued sympathy and potential for assistance in resolving these problems is important for Yerevan. Yerevan has
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therefore signed a number of Moscow proposed agreements in the CIS context and has even had to accept the stationing of Russian troops. (Relations between Armenian forces and Russian forces reportedly remain close, in a version of an “old boy network” if not officially, and includes, according to Azerbaijani claims, significant transfer of weapons and other materiel.) Moscow has also offered to sponsor a CIS peacekeeping force in Nagorno-Karabagh. While Yerevan does not wish to offend Moscow or discourage it playing a constructive (pro-Armenian) role in the conflict, it must be cautious about the implications of a truly neutral CIS involvement and, like Azerbaijan, will want to see the shape of the agreement before it agrees to the deployment of a peacekeeping force. (The inviolability of national borders is a traditional preoccupation of newly independent states.)

Azerbaijan

Azerbaijan’s problems are equally daunting. It resisted joining the CIS until late 1993, when continued internal instability (some say Russian fomented) and defeat in the war in Nakorno-Karabagh produced economic as well as political chaos. Azerbaijan is opposed to the concept of reintegration among the former states of the USSR (if only because of the conflict over the future ownership and disposition of Caspian Sea petroleum), but joined the CIS under Russian pressure and with the Russian promise that in doing so it could obtain Russian assistance in resolving the Nakorno-Karabagh problem. Baku remains bitter about what is believes is Russian support (including provision of military supplies) for Armenia and nervous about Russian attempts to remain a major player in the Caspian Sea petroleum developments.

In the event Azerbaijani membership in the CIS has not produced any noticeable or significant change in Russian policy with respect to the Nakorno-Karabagh situation, and Azerbaijani participation in the CIS has been accordingly less than enthusiastic. They have refused to sign most of the agreements, especially those relating to security and the deployment of “CIS” border troops in Azerbaijani territory.

Specifically Baku has resisted Russian suggestions for a CIS peacekeeping force in Nakorno-Karabagh, absent a negotiated agreement, and attempted to pre-empt this proposal by turning to the
Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), whose so-called “Minsk Group” has been serving a negotiating forum for the Karabakh problem. The Azerbaijan Government has also attempted to foster Western ties by proposing participation in the Partnership for Peace, raising the idea of NATO peacekeeping during a presidential visit to Brussels in April 1996.

Georgia

Georgia was essentially dragooned into the CIS in 1994 following an initial period of postindependence instability, which most observers believe was fostered by Russia or by individual Russian officials operating independently.

Georgia would prefer to avoid a too tight security embrace by Russia but finds itself in need of Russian assistance in a number of areas, apart from the obvious economic and transportation ties. The CIS peacekeeping force in Abkhazia is completely Russian, and Moscow must obviously be a party to any solution of the Abkhaz secession. Russia continues to play the role of mediator in the South Ossetian problem, most recently during the latest accord signed by the two parties in May 1996. And Russia maintains troops in Georgia in three different and distinct categories: border troops on the Turkish border, a regular garrison remaining from Soviet days, and the CIS peacekeeping force. Georgia hopes somehow to cut itself into Azerbaijan’s oil future, and this also may require Russian support. In other words, while Tbilisi may see Moscow as part if not the sole source of most of its problems, it also sees the Russian Federation as a necessary participant in the solution of those very same problems.

Nevertheless, developments in 1996 indicate that President Shevornadze and his Government believe the time is ripe for a reappraisal of relations with Moscow, relations essentially forced on Tbilisi in the early, chaotic days of Georgian independence. In early September, Georgia and Uzbekistan signed a bilateral military agreement, outside of the CIS context, and a military training agreement with Germany, and a military cooperation agreement with Turkey. Throughout 1996, Shevardnadze and the Georgia Parliament publicly criticized the CIS peacekeeping effort and Russian policy for freezing the situation in Abkhazia, thereby protecting the Abkhaz
rebels and warned that if the situation did not improve, Georgia would terminate the CIS peacekeeping mandate. In response, Moscow suspended its military assistance program to Georgia, an action it reversed at the late October CIS defense ministers meeting; Moscow also agreed to the “joint” appointment of the new commander of the peacekeeping force in Abkhazia. In other words, Shevardnadze is attempting to use the CIS and the Russian-Georgian military relationship as instruments to encourage Russia to serve Georgian interests as well as its own.

The View from Central Asia

The Central Asian members of the CIS—Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan—all share geographic proximity, ethnic, and cultural affinities and a Russian/Soviet experience. On the other hand, there is considerable disparity in size, population, resources, and internal political situations. Even their Russian experience varied, as well as the economic consequences of the collapse of the USSR. Finally, of course, the ambitions and rivalries of their individual leaders play a role in their attitudes and policies toward regional and international issues.

As noted earlier, Central Asian attitudes toward reintegration of the former Soviet space and the CIS vary considerably. Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan favor both; Uzbekistan and Tajikistan are less interested but very dependent in different ways on Russia; and Turkmenistan is flatly opposed. The subregional view of CIS peacekeeping is equally skeptical, as evidenced by the clear preference for U.N. involvement in CIS peacekeeping operations. It is interesting to note that Uzbekistan has, like Russia, found the concept of CIS peacekeeping of some use in pursuing its own foreign policy objectives in Tajikistan.

In the past few years, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Kazakhstan have made serious efforts to cooperate among themselves in economic and fiscal matters as well as in defense and security matters. However, in spring 1996 they agreed to create a Central Asian peacekeeping battalion to be earmarked for U.N. sponsored operations and scheduled joint exercises in 1997 as part of NATO’s PfP program. Tajikistan was not invited to participate in this program,
presumably because of its civil strife, and Turkmenistan declined to join, citing its general neutral status (an excuse it uses to avoid participating in CIS military activities). All these attitudes reflect the fundamental skepticism about Russia.

Future developments will depend to a great deal on the evolution of the CIS as a multinational regional organization. In that context, Uzbekistan and other Central Asian countries may well reach consensus on a core agenda. They seek both to secure their countries' secular orientation and to deny Moscow an opportunity to reestablish regional hegemony under the guise of combating "Islamic fundamentalism."

Tajikistan is unique in Central Asia as the "beneficiary" of a peacekeeping operation. Although cautious and skeptical about Russian plans for reintegration of the countries of the area, the Government of Tajikistan is so dependent on Moscow merely to remain in power that its views are muted at best. The anti-Russian rebels are very real, but the Government has no choice except to go along with Russian activities and policies. Tajikistan is therefore caught between Russia's aim to ensure that other powers do not step in to fill the power vacuum left by the USSR and the other newly independent states of Central Asia. Among these countries, the one with the strongest cards to play is Uzbekistan, which has influence in sizable areas of Tajikistan and Afghanistan, a large if obsolete military arsenal, and links with Afghan leaders.

The Views of the Other FSUs

Ukraine is the most significant member of the CIS after Russia. While not exactly a challenger for leadership, Ukraine is interested in limiting Russian influence. It also has its own fish to fry, notably the ongoing argument with Moscow over the division of the Black Sea fleet and naval bases. In an effort to reduce Russia's role as the primary source of military and technical assistance, Ukraine concluded bilateral security cooperation agreements in 1996 with Turkmenistan, Georgia, and Uzbekistan.

A regular meeting of the CIS Council of Defense Ministers, held October 29, 1996, in Dushanbe, provided a clear view of the attitude of most CIS members toward any aggressive CIS peacekeeping. The
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meeting marked an inauspicious debut for Russian Defense Minister General Igor Rodionov as chair of the CIS defense agency, as a number of Russian proposals were rejected.

Moldova, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan failed to attend the meeting, while Ukraine was there only as an observer and limited its participation to issues affecting its own interests. A majority of the delegations in attendance rejected Moscow's proposal to appoint General Mikhail Kolesnikov as head of the CIS Military Cooperation Staff, arguing that his predecessor had also been Russian and that the post must not be monopolized by Russia. The Ukrainian delegation's head, Deputy Defense Minister General Ivan Bizhan, stated that Ukraine will participate only in U.N. or OSCE "peacekeeping" operations and not those under CIS.

The situation in Afghanistan and on the Tajik-Afghan border was a major topic. Some unspecified countries (very probably the Central Asian) endorsed a proposal to prolong the mandate of "CIS peacekeeping" forces in Tajikistan. Some (again unspecified) ministers supported the formation of "regional and subregional security systems" in fulfillment of the draft CIS collective security concept. Tajik president Imomali Rahmonov, together with the Russian delegation, urged approval of that proposal. There was no word on the agenda item regarding the mandate of Russian "peacekeepers" in Abkhazia and the appointment of a new commander of that force, a point of controversy between Russia and Georgia. The meeting ended after a half-day, instead of the day-and-a-half originally scheduled. The rejection of Kolesnikov leaves the CIS Military Cooperation Staff headless as its former chief, General Viktor Samsonov, was named recently to Kolesnikov's former post as head of Russia's General Staff.

Moldova is another "beneficiary" of Russian bilateral peacekeeping and therefore not in a position to have much of a view of the concept in a theoretical sense. Most observers agree that peacekeeping as practiced in Moldova has had little of the neutral character usually required but has been more in the nature of Russian intervention. In recent months, the Government of Moldova has felt emboldened (or desperate enough) to complain publicly about Russian failure to comply with certain elements of the 1994 agreement, notably the withdrawal of Russian troops. Given
Moldova's resistance to Moscow's call for reintegration of the former republics of the USSR and its own experience with "peacekeeping," it is reasonable to assume that the CIS would have to have a much firmer and demonstrated multinational and consensual character before Moldova would look very favorably on an active CIS peacekeeping role in the region.

Belarus is in the unique position of appearing to want more integration with Russia than Russia is willing to give. Moscow sees Belarus as the catalyst for integration in the CIS, as well as a traditional part of the motherland wishing to return home, but is leery about the very significant economic costs involved.

**Conclusions**

The problems the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) faces in obtaining recognition as a true regional organization begin with its Russian origin and character; it is seen by too many as a facade for Moscow's true imperial intentions. Without greater acceptability, its ability to perform regional peacekeeping functions will remain limited.

Although many observers will agree that the new Russian Federation is made up of disparate tendencies, and that not all Russians or Russian leaders wish to renew Russia's traditional imperial vocation, Moscow's propensity for political interference and general mischief making, as exemplified in the concept of the Near Abroad, remains and cannot be ignored. This bent is exacerbated by the transitional stage of politics and policy making in the Russian Federation. Without a consensus on the character of the post-USSR Russian Federation, individual Russians (military and civilian) find opportunities for entrepreneurial politics. "Despite its claims to the contrary, the military engages in politics, resists reform, seeks to preserve the military-industrial complex, . . . and generally poses a considerate threat to the future of Russian democracy and the tranquility of its neighbors."

In addition there is the question of what Paul Goble calls capability: the difference between what Moscow might want and what Moscow can obtain. He notes that Moscow probably wants to recover the Ukraine and the three Baltic states but can't, and
probably does not want to take back Belarus and the Central Asian states even though it probably could. However, there is the perspective, outlined by former U.S. Ambasador to Russia Jack F. Matlock, that Russia needs good relations with its neighbors as much as they and may be coming to understand that. The tragic conflict in Chechnya has shown that Russia's frontier region is volatile at best and that great dangers lie ahead for Russia if it continues to stir up conflicts and ethnic animosities in the region beyond its borders. Ambassador Matlock points out that Georgian President Shervardnadze has shrewdly pressured Moscow, through clever manipulation of the CIS forum and the Russian-Georgian military relationship, to play a more constructive role in the Abkhazia situation by using its influence on the secessionists.12

All these swirling currents can be seen in the four so-called peacekeeping operations currently underway in the territories of the member states of the CIS and the one proposed but not yet accepted. Of these four, two can be reasonably called peacekeeping operations in the sense usually meant, using criteria derived by the U.N. tradition and experience. In Georgia, both the Abkhazian and South Ossetian operations, despite suspicious beginnings and ambiguous objectives, now appear to be functioning within generally accepted guidelines for Chapter VI peacekeeping operations. However, in Tajikistan the Russian (with Uzbekistan support) operation, under the guise of peacekeeping, is clearly functioning as an external support for a local government facing a rebel challenge. A similar situation obtains in Moldova, where the exclusively Russian peacekeeping force is providing external support for a breakaway movement.

The present state and future possibilities for CIS-authorized and CIS-sponsored peacekeeping in the CIS region can be studied in the unfolding Nagorno-Karabagh situation. The existence of the CIS and the fact that both contestants are members would appear to offer an almost textbook opportunity for regional organization conflict resolution and peacekeeping. In this situation, the role of a major outside player (especially one also a member of the relevant regional organization) could well be constructive. In fact, Russia has offered to assist with mediation and to provide a peacekeeping force, an offer the Azerbaijan Government has firmly rejected, at least for the
moment. Russia's bone fides are just not acceptable, certainly to Baku and probably not without some direct negotiation, to the Armenians of Nakorno-Karabagh. And without acceptance of Russia's credentials, the role of the CIS as a peacekeeper remains doubtful, given Russia's dominant role in the CIS.

However, it should be noted that the recent CIS-approved "Convention on Peacekeeping" lays down the criteria for such a role. The Convention was clearly motivated by concern, if not fear, of additional Russian attempts (following Moldova and Tajikistan) to appropriate the peacekeeping label for unilateral, hegemonistic activities. The Convention is an obvious effort to set limits to Russian activity but also creates positive criteria for truly consensual, regional multilateralism. The problem will be to create CIS legitimacy and credibility. One interesting approach has reportedly been floated—to bring in the United States and possibly others to participate with Russia as joint mediators and possibly peacekeepers in the Nakorno-Karabagh situation. While such a suggestion might well be unwelcome in Moscow (and in Washington, for different reasons), it could offer a way to unblock the Nagorno-Karabagh situation while pushing the CIS toward a more transparent and credible regional organization.

The CIS was clearly seen as an artificial formation in its early days, but in 1993 its Russian proponents initiated a more sophisticated presentation that focuses on the effort to reintegrate former Soviet republics on a more consensual basis. As part of that approach, Moscow is also attempting to present the CIS as the regional peacekeeping organization of choice, seeking recognition as a U.N. Chapter VIII regional organization, similar to the OAS. However, regardless of Russian intentions, trustworthy or not, the CIS faces the additional problem that the vast majority of its members is still shaky as independent nation-states. If it is difficult to make bricks without straw, then it is equally difficult to create a multinational organization without viable nations as members.

One practical aspect of this problem is that CIS peacekeeping is too dependent on Russian resources. This is the problem with those operations currently underway and gives too much scope to Russian
tendency (not an unusual characteristic of the sovereign nation-state) to pursue its own interests rather than to act neutrally.

In the Transcaucasus region, Armenia and Georgia may be tempted by the general concept of a regional organization but have reservations about specifics. Azerbaijan is even more hesitant, anticipating its own petroleum-financed golden age. The same is true in Central Asia, except possibly for Tajikistan, where the Government’s life depends upon support from Moscow. Belarus is a panting suitor for Russian favors, while Moldova is a “victim” or target; successful evolution of the CIS is not a pertinent concern at this time for the Government of Moldova. Ukraine is the major “competitor” for influence within the CIS, but obvious limitations make it more of a “spoiler” trying to keep Moscow honest than a real competitor.

Each of these members of the CIS has its own internal conflicts and transition problems, but all share suspicions of Moscow’s real intentions combined with varying degrees of dependency on Russia. Nevertheless, each CIS capital recognizes, at least in principle, its own need for some form of regional cooperation. This need includes a mechanism and process for conflict resolution and peacekeeping. The CIS region is rife with interstate and intrastate conflicts, some ethnic, others more political. The problem of ethnic Russians living in all of the former republics of the USSR can easily create new conflicts. However, all the former Soviet Union members continue to express much greater confidence in external organizations like the United Nations (the CIS and the Economic Commission for Europe signed a memorandum on economic standards and norms in April 1997), the OSCE, and NATO (eight of them, including Russia, are active in the Partnership for Peace program).

The prospects for regional peacekeeping by the CIS constitute a subset of attitudes toward the broader questions of the future of the CIS as a reintegrating and/or collective security organization. From its beginning, it has been dogged by suspicion and skepticism. Its Russian sponsors have alternated between fostering it as a military union, a currency union, and an economic union, sometimes concurrently and competitively and without significant success.
Yet the CIS may be one of those institutions that, if it did not exist, would have to be created, especially in light of developments in the rest of Europe. At least for the immediate future, the expansion of Western Europe's institutions will stop short of the former borders of the USSR. This leaves 14 countries at loose ends in the post-Cold War world that need to create a new and viable relationship with Russia as well as find an independent role in the wider world. In addition there is the question of the evolution of a post-Cold War Russia. There is an ongoing internal Russian debate between proponents of a "big Russia" and those who wish for a "small Russia." In other words, geography and mass dictate that Russia will be a major power, if not the major power, in Halford J. Mackinder's World Island, but the answer to the question of what kind of hegemon is still open to discussion. The creation of a robust regional organization with the Russian Federation as primus inter pares is a possible palatable alternative to the dangers of a "great Russia" on the one hand, and the destabilizing frustration of a "small Russia" on the other. Whether the United States and others can assist in this development is an open question, but use of the international and multinational peacekeeping process, under UN patronage and mentorship, may offer one low-cost, low-risk option.

Notes
2. Angela Stent and Lilia Shevtsova, "Russia's Election: No Turning Back," Foreign Policy no. 103 (Summer 1996).
3. Ibid.
6. Reuters (Kiev), April 8, 1996.
7. Ambassador Thomas Pickering, remarks made at a presentation at the Middle East Institute, June 1996.


Peacemaking was not an integral part of the lexicon of diplomats as they contemplated the end of World War II and the creation of a new international organization to replace the defunct League of Nations. Prime Minister Winston Churchill sought to point the way by suggesting a network of institutions that could serve as pillars for the soon-to-be formed United Nations. Noting the potential contribution of regional associations or “councils,” Churchill suggested, “There should be several regional councils, august, but subordinate; these should form the massive pillars upon which the world organization should be founded in majesty and calm.” The prime minister’s meditation on the subject was well received by many delegates at the San Francisco founding conference.

However, the Churchill suggestion proved more eloquent illusion than substantive pillar. Left for future consideration and elaboration was the nature of the “councils,” existing and future. For example, was the British Commonwealth truly capable of maintaining peace and security on a global canvas? To what extent should London, with an assured veto as a member of the Security Council, subordinate its Commonwealth interests to those of the General Assembly? Should France, with extensive colonial holdings in Africa and Asia, not have comparable privileges? And, for the United States, as the Goliath of the Western Hemisphere with overriding military force at its disposal, should not the Organization of American States (OAS) formed in 1943 serve as an American “pillar”?

History in the form of the emergent Cold War and processes of decolonization ultimately provided the answers. Serious economic difficulties at home that helped diminish the attractiveness of colonial possessions in times of financial stringency led to the termination of British imperium in much of Africa and Asia. In the process, the
Commonwealth was transformed into a form of international leisure club for English-speaking colonial statesmen. Belgium, in due course, terminated control over Congo, Rwanda, and Burundi; the Dutch followed in Asia. Spain, after the death of Francisco Franco in 1975, ended its colonial presence in Africa, as did Portugal with the demise of Salazaar. Only the English-speaking territories in southern Africa remained to have their futures determined as the period of the Cold War entered its final stages.

One issue remained to be resolved. It proved a difficult and exasperating conundrum involving the division of labor between the United Nations and regional organizations in defusing or otherwise intervening into conflicts involving intrastate contending parties. Conventional diplomatic thinking held that interstate conflicts that threatened the order and stability of a region should be susceptible to third-party intervention, which would be disinterested, impartial, and intended to bring the conflict to early resolution through good offices and mediation. Where internal disorders and civil wars were involved, the fear obtaining among many U.N. member states was that neighbors (for a variety of reasons) would not be disinterested and impartial. Thus, the issue was posed. Could regional organizations such as the OAS prove effective in efforts to maintain peace and stability, or to raise forces to ensure such condition? Indeed, could the OAS be expected to act vigorously in the face of U.S. opposition, or Soviet intervention to support local surrogates?

The emerging Cold War made the issue of intervention by regional organizations moot as the two superpowers transferred their rivalries to Africa and the Western Hemisphere. Both sought local allies and supported "wars of liberation," covertly transferring arms to those willing to accept the "guidance" of Washington and Moscow. The United Nations, for its part, sought to fill in with peacekeeping missions when and where the superpowers were prepared to accede, i.e., when vital national interests were not perceived as engaged or others welcomed the conflict resolution efforts of the United Nations. The majority of OAS member states welcomed U.N. involvement in mediating local disputes, fearing that to do otherwise would subordinate them to the will and wishes of the two superpowers. They continued to hope that the OAS might assume some of the same
burdens; however, a consensus or conceptual foundation for undertaking such action foundered on local rivalries, and those initiatives launched proved fruitless.

The Organization of African Unity (OAU), with headquarters in Addis Ababa, suffered its own disabilities. Key among them were suspicions and enmities between the Arab north and Black African states rooted in religion and history; ideological and foreign policy differences among founding members, particularly those willing to maintain close ties with the West and others linked to Moscow for foreign policy and economic planning inspiration; and the disinclination of the overwhelming majority to see the OAU become an organization of mobilizing diplomatic and military resources to bring local conflicts to early conclusion. The ineffectual performance of the OAU can also be traced to the Cold War rivalries injected into the continent after many colonies severed their colonial moorings. Africa became an arena in which covert action, liberation movements, and massive arms transfers propped up unpopular governments and polarized much of the continent.

In the postindependence and post-Cold War era, many of the distortions and distractions remain imbedded in Africa. Superpower rivalries have receded; Washington and Moscow have collaborated in efforts to end local conflicts by supporting United Nations and OAU peacekeeping efforts. But the continent has evolved into a zone of growing political instability. The overwhelming majority remains heavily dependent on external sources of support for economic and security assistance. French military contingents based in Africa continue to intervene in Francophone states whose civilian governments are imperiled by military mutineers, largely to restore internal order and rescue threatened European communities. In the economic realm, the European Union has supported the Lome Convention over the past 30 years. The Convention has yielded over $15 billion in assistance to African and Caribbean states. However, the Convention expired in 1997, and donor fatigue is likely to lead to substantial revisions and marked declines in assistance levels.
Organization of African Unity

At its founding in 1963, the attending godfathers laid down several binding markers subsequently codified in the OAU Charter. Seminal among them was the acceptance of territorial boundaries inherited from the colonial period, along with the admonition that any disputes that might arise should be resolved through peaceful negotiation, either bilaterally or through the good offices of the OAU. A second admonition contained in the Charter enjoined nonintervention in the internal affairs of member states. The basic hope and expectation were that crises and conflicts would be self-contained.

The hope of containment has never been realized. Cold War rivalries produced blatant acts of intervention by great power surrogates—Somalia in Ethiopia, Zaire in Angola, Libya in Chad. Moreover, with or without great power meddling, the sub-Saharan region proved a zone of endemic disorder and instability. Beginning in the early 1960s, wars in the Western Sahara, Chad, the Horn region, Sudan, Mozambique, Southern Rhodesia, Mozambique, and others claimed more than four million lives and caused large numbers of displaced persons and refugees. Genocide, most recently in Rwanda, has claimed more than 500,000 lives and the number is likely to rise as the crisis in neighboring Burundi and Zaire deepens. An historical perspective has been provided by one American scholar:

Political instability has plagued Africa since most of its countries became independent in the 1960s. Between 1960 and 1980, eight civil wars took place on the continent; ten more occurred over the next decade. Almost one-third of the world’s genocides between 1960 and 1988 (eleven of thirty-five took place in Africa. Between 1963 and 1985, sixty-one coups d’etat occurred in Africa—an average of almost three coups per year. Between 1960 and 1990, Africa’s conflicts accounted for more than 6.5 million deaths.2

As a result of spreading disorders and instability, the OAU has suffered various forms of system overload, resulting in near paralysis when crises arise. Many of its honest broker efforts over the years have failed abysmally. In due course, the organization has come to be overshadowed by the United Nations and various non-African...
interlocutors in various peacekeeping efforts. Part of the difficulties confronting the OAU are integral to the organization itself. Its maladies include:

- Weak organizational structure and poor staffing, as reflected in the OAU's inability to identify emerging crisis situations and deal with them with dispatch
- Severe shortages of qualified political-military specialists and a bureaucratic system which suffers perennial gridlock
- Petty jealousies and rivalries among member states
- The absence of a consensus-building system to ensure that adequate financial resources are available when addressing looming problems.

The frailties of the OAU, particularly the absence of a tradition of consensus building, was reflected late in 1996 in failed member support for the candidacy of Boutros-Ghali for a second 5-year term as U.N. secretary-general.

Accompanying the frailties of the OAU has been the authoritarian character of state systems constructed in the postindependence period. Most states emerged with a limited educated class and cadre of well-trained bureaucrats and technocrats. The policies adopted by narrowly based power elites were intended primarily to assure their continuation in power over an extended period of time. In addition to creation of autocratic single-party regimes, they organized patrimonial systems that recruited poorly trained followers into bureaucratic ranks, established patron-client networks, and adopted economic plans predicated on centralized state control and direction. The form of patrimonial politics and economic planning that emerged ultimately failed to meet popular needs and undermined the legitimacy of both the state and its leadership.

Weak legitimacy and failed popular support had untoward consequences for the OAU, as might be expected. There were periods of intervention by the organization. For example, the OAU sought to bring warfare in Chad (where Muammar Qadafi's forces had been injected) and in Western Sahara (where Morocco had launched an irredentist campaign of military occupation) to an end but was
unsuccessful, OAU resolutions and invocations seeking to end the 1978 Ethiopian-Somali war proved ineffectual, as were efforts directed toward conflict resolution in Angola, Liberia, and several other strife-ridden areas. In 1983, acknowledging the need to buttress its conflict resolution capabilities, the OAU created a mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution. Oriented primarily around a crisis early-warning approach, the mechanism was expected to develop enhanced peacekeeping, peace building, and peacemaking capabilities for the OAU. The U.S. Government has supported these efforts, primarily with financial aid concentrated on improving the mechanism's communications crisis tracking system.

However, a sense of limitation existed almost from the time of the mechanism's founding. Its mandate carried the following provision: If conflicts "degenerate to the extent of requiring collective international intervention and policing, the assistance or, where appropriate, the services of the United Nations will be sought." In 1994, Rwanda provided the best example of the OAU's sense of limited competence:

When asked by the U.N. Secretary-General to assume responsibility for peacekeeping in Rwanda, the OAU declined on the ground that the U.N. was better equipped to do it. The OAU is only able to deploy small observer groups (as it did in Rwanda when the first peace agreement was reached). Involvement in intrastate conflict also poses a problem for the organization.³

In the absence of an OAU consensus on intervention in intrastate conflicts, non-African third-party intervention has proved more the rule than the exception. British and American collaboration ended Southern Rhodesia's white-dominated rule and brought the country (subsequently renamed Zimbabwe) to independence in 1978-79; the former Soviet Union dispatched $1 billion in military hardware and a large advisory team to Ethiopia, which helped remove Somali invaders from Ethiopia's Ogaden province in 1978-79; and French forces restored order in a number of Francophone African states.

In the case of Rwanda, efforts on the part of the United Nations to find an equitable solution ultimately failed, producing an outpouring of one million refugees into neighboring Zaire, Tanzania,
and Kenya. As genocide spread in Rwanda in 1994, the small U.N. peacekeeping force suffered several casualties (primarily within the Belgian contingent) and was summarily removed. Both the OAU and concerned African leaders in neighboring state have attempted to end the widening conflict but without success. The United Nations has suffered similar failure in addressing the manifold issues associated with the widening crisis, one which threatens to spill over into neighboring African Lakes Region countries. In mid-1997, anti-Mobutu forces, with assistance from Rwanda, Uganda, and Angola, toppled the Mobutu regime that had ruled Zaire since 1965.

The recent record of U.N. efforts in Africa has shown some notable successes, as well as traumatizing failures. Its collaborative approach with the U.S. in Somalia proved disastrous for a number of reasons. The failure to establish well-defined political objectives together with deeply flawed military planning and confused chain of command arrangements helped to produce the October 1993 debacle in which 19 U.S. soldiers were killed and the termination of U.N. operations in Somalia the following year. The principal lesson to be learned was amply identified by two African affairs specialists in a recent article:

The broad lesson to be drawn . . . is that military and diplomatic interventions have a much greater chance of succeeding when they are linked to a genuine political settlement or an ongoing, sustained, political process for obtaining one. Military action without a clear political context is without utility. Likewise, diplomacy needs an element of pressure (again, usually sustained) to be effective.  

Successful U.N. intervention in Africa has occurred when a clear, balanced peace settlement plan had been negotiated and agreed to by the main parties to a dispute. In Mozambique and Namibia, the peace plan fashioned covered a wide spectrum of issues including cease-fires, cantonment of forces, demobilization, internationally monitored elections, reforms of the judiciary, and reorganization of security institutions. In the case of Angola, final settlement has yet to materialize. For its part, the United Nations learned several valuable lessons in Angola. In 1991-92, the Security Council was unable to organize and deploy a sufficiently large peacekeeping force to
oversee the entire spectrum of requirements for the process to “take.” In the run up to the elections, Jonas Sevimbi and official government suspicions remained, and the elections themselves came to be regarded as a zero-sum game by the adversaries. Since 1992, the United Nations has digested these lessons and is embarked on a new round of negotiations to get the peace process on track. Most observers are hopeful that ultimate reconciliation will occur, and the nation will be able to get on with the job of peace building, much as has occurred in Mozambique under U.N. auspices.

In recent years, civil war in Liberia drew the attention of a subregional organization, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). The military intervention of ECOWAS occurred in August 1990, approximately 8 months after the war had erupted. Nigeria, as the largest and militarily most powerful member of ECOWAS, argued that intervention was justified on the grounds that continued conflict threatened the stability of Liberia’s neighbors, as ultimately would prove the case. The proposed intervention would become a peace enforcement operation involving a multinational West African force that would rise to 14,000 men. The forces injected, designated ECOMOG, were commanded by the Nigerians.

Rather than bring the Liberian conflict to early conclusion, the injection of the multinational force actually widened the war. In due course, jealousies and rivalries between Francophone contributors and English-speakers undermined unity of command. Nigeria, under a military dictatorship, lost credibility as an honest broker, and the competence of its military commanders was questioned. Financial constraints, an underdeveloped logistic support system, and declining troop morale further enfeebled the ECOMOG efforts. By 1996, ECOMOG lost complete control over the capital of Monrovia as rival factions invaded the city and looted its shops and international assistance agency facilities. The United Nations, which had maintained a small observer group in Monrovia, was compelled to evacuate it and close down its operation. For some observers, the failures of the ECOMOG operation raised serious doubt about the future of subregional peace enforcement in Africa.

The U.S. response to the crises recently emerging in Africa was tentative on the whole. During a 1994 conference with Americans
specializing in African affairs in 1994, senior U.S. officials pledged to provide support for OAU efforts to limit and contain the burgeoning number of crises in the region. With the approval of Congress, funds were earmarked to augment the existing OAU communications system and to encourage formation of a crisis-warning and planning system. The latter was slow to emerge, in part because the limited number of experienced African personnel available and the shortage of African matching funds. In addition, the U.S. Government established an "Interagency Core Group" to plan and program for an Enhanced International Peacekeeping Capabilities (EIPC) initiative. Not directed exclusively toward African recipients, the program has been useful in mobilizing resources across existing U.S. programs—notably, our International Military Education and Training program (IMET) and financing of military equipment purchases.

The U.S. Government has also launched preliminary consultations with European governments that traditionally have been contributors to U.N. peace operations. The purpose of the discussions was to explore ways to enhance peacekeeping capabilities in selected African countries through a combination of training and material support, as well as to encourage several African governments to play a lead nation role.

The most recent effort on the part of the Clinton administration was an ill-fated action in 1996 by Secretary of State Warren Christopher to encourage several African governments to join in formation of a standing force bringing together approximately 10,000 men. In travels through Africa, the secretary received a luke-warm response from several African leaders, who expressed concern that Washington's initiative might lead to excessive U.S. influence in African problem areas. Others apparently felt that Washington, disinclined to make U.S. forces available, was unfairly asking unprepared African governments to shoulder an unwanted burden.

**Organization of American States**

With the end of the Cold War, Latin America has begun the arduous process of reconceptualizing the basic crisis management goals of multilateral organizations in the region. At the center of discussions
between member states are the circumstances and justifications for the use of military force to intervene in the internal affairs of participating members. Three basic criteria under consideration are:

- Promoting democracy
- Combatting drug trafficking
- Peacekeeping.

At the center of discussion are the responsibilities and mandates that the region's most venerable organization, the OAS, should assume. At its founding, participating delegates hoped the organization might serve as a useful vehicle to eventually change the old hemispheric political order in which interstate conflict unsettled the regional equilibrium. The OAS Charter was quite explicit on this point, underscoring the need to "generate a regional institutional framework to formalize and consolidate . . . peaceful relations among the states in the region."

Almost from inception, the OAS failed to live up to official expectation. Little consideration was given to peacekeeping roles, thus blighting prospects for uninvited intervention in interstate conflict situations. Traditional suspicion of U.S. hegemonic ambitions in the region provided the primary motivation for member state hesitancy in embracing a broad peacekeeping mandate for the OAS. The original inspiration in creating the OAS—to develop a regional collective security system at the height of World War II—languished in the postwar period as historic rivalries and suspicions surfaced.

During the decade following its founding, the OAS, spasmodically and without great enthusiasm, did undertake limited mediating and peacekeeping initiatives. (The organization's tentative embrace of traditional peacekeeping as an important element of institutional responsibility would have to await the demise of East-West rivalries.) A monitoring role evolved when small teams of military advisers were dispatched to conflicted border regions: the Nicaragua-Costa Rica border in 1948-49; the Nicaragua-Costa Rica border once again in 1957; and, more than a decade later, a small OAS peace observer team deployed along the Honduran-El Salvador frontier in the wake of the 1969 "soccer war."
Cuba proved a fulcrum for a drastic shift in OAS conceptual perspective. The overthrow of the Batista Government and the 1959 installation of a Communist regime under Fidel Castro provoked a new national security debate within the hemisphere. For its part, the U.S. Government viewed this development in Cuba as an extension of Soviet global ambitions and a profound threat to hemispheric stability. The Kennedy administration adopted a two-pronged strategy to deal with the perceived threat—a counterinsurgency program closely coordinated with like-minded governments in the region targeted against Cuban-backed liberation movements, combined with massive economic development assistance to address the underlying causes of popular alienation vis-a-vis local governments. Latin America and the Caribbean regions were viewed by Washington as arenas for Cold War competition requiring the U.S. to fashion special ties with local military establishments and security forces. At the same time, covert-action programs were fashioned by the U.S. intelligence community to cope with liberation movements throughout the hemisphere.

A not inconsiderable consequence of this multifaceted U.S. approach was to shrivel OAS crisis intervention capacities and to arouse additional suspicions in some Latin American circles that the American "crusade" would ineluctably lock Washington into support for conservative, inherently authoritarian regimes. This was exemplified during the 1965 crisis in the Dominican Republic. A political upheaval was looming as local parties fell into dispute over election results and fierce fighting erupted in the capital of Santo Domingo. The landing of U.S. military forces in April and May 1965 to safeguard foreign nationals was a unilateral action undertaken without consultation with OAS ambassadors. The U.S. Government contended that the OAS crisis review procedures were too cumbersome to ensure early and effective action—this despite the fact that the OAS had reached a decision within 12 hours during the October 1962 Cuban missile crisis. In due course, the United States urged the creation of an inter-American force to replace American troops.

The U.S. demarche to the OAS was received with only modest levels of support. The OAS resolution creating the proposed force
barely received the two-thirds vote required, many ambassadors feeling that public support for unilateral U.S. military intervention should be condemned. Outside the hemisphere, support for the newly formed Latin American force was tepid at best, particularly within the U.N. Security Council where the Soviet Union and others contended that such a force would serve as after-the-fact legitimization for U.S. intervention. In due course, the size of the American military contingent diminished substantially and the OAS unit, approximately brigade sized, suffered a number of casualties after its deployment.

The Dominican experience further ‘soured’ the OAS on multilateral peace operations. For many years thereafter, the OAS even avoided use of the term “peacekeeping,” preferring instead “peace observation” or “verification.” The 1980s saw a further erosion of OAS capacities in crisis resolution, particularly with the internal conflicts in Guatemala, El Salvador, and Nicaragua, which had problems subsumed under Cold War considerations and the introduction of Reagan “doctrine” strategies for countering Communist influence in Central America and the Caribbean regions. With the phasing out of the Cold War, local leaders in Central America, most notably President Arias of Costa Rica, undertook individual and collective initiatives to end ongoing conflicts. In the process, the OAS benefitted. It dispatched help to monitor the 1990 election in Nicaragua, which ended the Communist dictatorship there; participated in the joint mission with the United Nations to assist in the demobilization of Contra forces there as part of the Central American peace process; and in December 1990, dispatched observers, along with the United Nations, to monitor elections in Haiti. However, the OAS demonstrated it had a limited capacity to compel the return of President Aristide to office after his ouster by a military cabal. It required the threat of forceful U.S. military intervention in 1995 to restore Aristide to office.

Structural Change and Military Roles

The OAS, unlike its African counterpart, has demonstrated in recent years that it can make significant contributions to Latin American peace and stability, although it is not yet capable of organizing large-
scale multinational military operations. As the problem between the U.S. and Panama's President Noriega escalated in 1989, OAS efforts to defuse the situation through mediation failed, and the United States felt compelled to undertake unilateral military action and seek the imprisonment of the Panamanian leader. In consequence, doubts were aroused regarding the willingness of the hemisphere's major power to restrain the use of military force barring an OAS mandate. The need materialized to harmonize hemispheric interests with U.S. desires not to diminish its capacity for autonomous actions where its national interests are at risk. In short, how and when could the United States be induced to surrender its "cop on the beat" approach to problems arising in the Western Hemisphere?

The OAS has concentrated on reshaping without destroying existing institutions and bodies most prominent in the old hemispheric order. The OAS has one significant advantage in this regard—it possesses the "largest storehouses of vintage security instruments"—as Richard Downes noted in an unpublished article. Unfortunately, many existing organizational entities have either atrophied or failed to reach mature development since their creation. The Advisory Defense Committee, contemplated in Articles 65 and 66 of the OAS Charter, as a source of advice to emergency meetings of foreign ministers, has never convened. The 1947 Treaty of Inter-American Reciprocal Assistance (TIAR) was not successfully employed once to deal with minor border disputes and mini-invasions from dissident political factions in the 1960s and 1970s. The assistance tendered by the United States to the British during the 1982 Falklands-Malvinas crisis and its subsequent arming of the "contras" during the Central America wars of the 1980s further weakened the credibility of the TIAR as a multilateral instrument for dealing with aggression, internal or external. Similarly, the 56-year-old Inter-American Defense Board (IADB) has long languished as an appendage of the OAS, which oversees its budget without according the Board full status within the OAS system.

Promoting consultation of security issues has recently formed a significant part of the OAS's re-invention efforts, as Richard Downes has observed. Delegates to the OAS General Assembly approved the benchmark "Santiago Commitment to Democracy and the Renewal
of the Inter-American System” designed to make the OAS “more effective and useful” through the creation of a “relevant agenda” that would “respond appropriately to the new challenges and demands of the world and in the region.” Integral to this effort is the OAS’s highly visible dedication to “consultation on hemispheric security in light of the new conditions in the region,” a process that led to creation of a Commission on Hemispheric Security in 1992. Subsequent OAS General Assembly resolutions have called for sharing information on defense spending, registration of conventional arms, and consolidation of nuclear nonproliferation treaties. Major regional conferences on security and confidence-building measures that might be adopted have also emerged.

Closely related to initiatives involving institutional re-invention is an accompanying broad-based effort to underscore two hypotheses deemed proven by Western and especially European experience—that civilian control of military forces should be strengthened and that the promotion of security confidence-building measures will raise the region’s security to a more comfortable level. With respect to the first consideration, a Unit for the Support of Democracy was formed in 1990; the OAS’s Resolution 1080, passed in the 1991 General Assembly meeting in Santiago, Chile, commits the organization to convene an emergency meeting of the OAS foreign ministers within 10 days of “any sudden or irregular interruption of the democratic institutional process” in a member state. The OAS has employed this process in three cases: following the September 1991 coup d’etat in Haiti; after Peruvian President Fujimori’s self-coup of April 1992; and in May 1993, in response to Guatemalan President Serrano’s suspension of the constitution. While the OAS was unable to bring about a return to democracy in Haiti, its efforts did reverse threats to democratic government in the Peruvian and Guatemalan cases.

A similar prominence has been afforded to promoting proper civilian-military relations by the U.S. defense establishment and civilian academics and politicians hemispherewide who are weary of the abuses of nearly 30 years of praetorian rule. An important subtext of the 1994 Summit of the Americas was support for civilian leadership in the Americas and implicit rejection of the abuses of the military government prevalent during the previous three decades. The
U.S. Department of Defense, with considerable support from nongovernmental institutions, has accorded priority to strengthening civilian management of defense establishments. Of the six “Principles of Williamsburg” announced by the U.S. Secretary of Defense following the historic July 1995 Defense Ministerial, three endorse democracy as a concept or cite the need for improved civil-military relations.

The vigorous support by the U.S. Government for civilian control of military forces has not been widely acclaimed by groups concerned with perpetuating strong military establishments. Some local observers believe that the United States seeks downsizing of Latin military forces, ultimately hoping to convert them into police forces. Others believe that downsizing will afford the United States the luxury of justifying preservation of what some believe is an overly large U.S. military establishment. Still others contend that existing civilian authorities lack expertise in military matters, and thus civilian oversight could well engender tensions between civilian leaders and military commanders. A further consideration is the absence of an OAS enforcement mechanism, reflecting the historic unwillingness of the OAS to sanction the use of force against offending parties and the lingering uneasiness throughout the hemisphere about U.S. unilateralism. Failing the absence of an enforcement mechanism, the OAS must rely on diplomacy and threats of economic sanctions to discourage deviation from the democratic standard. While provisions exist for the suspension of a member state whose government has been overthrown by force, ratification is required by two-thirds of the membership—an exceedingly high requirement that has yet to occur.

One measure worthy of serious consideration and support by the U.S. Government is a long-standing Argentinian proposal to establish a regional center under U.N. auspices where Latin American military forces could train with Western militaries for international peacekeeping duties. A number of Latin American military establishments have lent military units for peacekeeping duty under U.N. direction in the Middle East, Africa, and elsewhere. A well-rounded training program coordinated with European and U.S. military specialists could well serve as a suitable area for exploration.
by the Clinton administration, particularly the Departments of State and Defense.

By comparison, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) has meager experiences and resources with which to fashion a comprehensive regionwide approach to conflict management and complex multinational peace operations. The end of the Cold War and the demise of the eastern bloc opened opportunities for localized strife in much of Sub-Saharan Africa. Military conflicts have erupted or in some instances intensified in Sudan, Somalia, Burundi, Zaire, and a half-dozen other countries. Most of these conflicts are internal but, as noted earlier, offer the prospect of contaminating and destabilizing neighboring states. In the process, governing institutions have suffered severe erosion and their legitimacy has been placed in doubt. The military capacities of most OAU members are low, as William Thom, a long-time observer of the African scene, has written:

Most African state armies are in decline, beset by a combination of shrinking budgets, international pressures to downsize and demobilize, and the lack of the freely accessible military assistance that characterized the cold war period. With few exceptions, heavy weapons are dormant, equipment is in disrepair, and training is almost nonexistent. Most militaries would have a difficult time in scraping together a company or battalion for international peacekeeping duties. In short the principal forces of order are in disorder in many countries at a time when the legitimacy of central governments (and indeed sometimes the state) is in doubt.

African weaknesses are becoming apparent at a time when the United Nations and the OAU have demonstrated a growing inclination to turn a blind eye to emerging African crises or to declare powerlessness in resolving those in which government and state authorities have virtually evaporated. Both organizations appear to be doing peacekeeping less and entertaining the prospect of military intervention with greatly diminished enthusiasm. When the challenge of peacekeeping intervention arises, it is fueled by humanitarian considerations. As the 1993-94 Somali debacle underscored, however, humanitarian intervention unaccompanied by clearly
defined political goals and adequate military forces will likely produce unsatisfactory consequences.

Nevertheless, non-African pressures for major African states to develop self-help peacekeeping measures are clearly on the rise. An example of such efforts was the attempt of the Clinton administration, notably Secretary of State Warren Christopher, to generate support in Western Europe and sub-Saharan Africa for formation of an All-African Crisis Response military capability to deal with local crisis situations. The proximate cause for this late 1996 initiative by Christopher was the widening humanitarian problem arising in eastern Zaire, Burundi, and Rwanda, together with the prospect that one million would be at risk with the eruption of widening armed conflict in the region. The Christopher approach was not supported by most Western governments, and France signaled its general opposition to the effort. In Africa, public protestations of support were followed by nonaction, and the initiative fell of its own weight.

A number of factors came into play to undermine the Christopher effort. Primary was lack of recognition in Washington of the fundamental infirmities of most African military establishments and the shortage of human and financial resources to underwrite the venture. Second, the question of command and control was certain to confuse the situation with potential contributors unwilling to place their forces at the disposition of a noncountryman. A subsidiary consideration was the legitimizing or authorization of a mandate for such a force and the ability of contributing nations to share in the decisionmaking processes regarding overall missions and roles. Equally important were worries about rising costs associated with long-term peace operations and the ability of governments within the OAU to share the burden of responsibility for operational costs. While the United States signaled its willingness to assume some of the attendant costs, African fears of non-African domination of operations could not be laid to rest.

For the immediate future, the OAU and most African governments are likely to “punch considerably below their potential weight,” therefore peace operations are likely to arise. The OAU lacks the experience and institutional foundations for organizing and directing such operations. As a result, whatever major interventions occur are
likely organized by and sustained with military and civilian elements from outside the continent. In some instances, notably France, light intervention forces will continue to be available for injection in a number of former colonial dependencies, but the consequence will be perpetuation of a dominant French role that appears to be neocolonial both in appearance and in substance.

Notes
3. Ibid., 293.
6. Ibid., 16.
7. Ibid.
8. Ibid., 18.
Peacekeeping in Asia

The countries of Asia are undergoing enormous changes, economic as well as political. The Cold War framework that influenced so much of the world's political development is gone and not yet replaced by a new structure. This is true of Asia, even though the Cold War, at its height, was not the sole determinant of Asian developments. What it did determine was how the United States and the Soviet Union approached the region as well as the manner in which they interacted with China. The end of the Cold War has removed this particular influence but not the influence of these major global powers, at least of the United States. It has also exposed more openly the region's own economic and political-security issues, its own personality rooted in its own economic dynamism, differential growth rates, and still unsettled political character.

In this context the countries of the region have entered into a complex discussion of collective security, the central element of which is to define what that term means for the Asia-Pacific region. As in so many areas, the end of the Cold War requires some new thinking. It is true that the central security role played by the United States continues, but the fluidity of the post-Cold War environment implies that the existing triangular relationship among the United States, China, and Japan (and one can add Russia occasionally) and their roles in the region may evolve. With this consideration in mind, member states of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) launched the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) as a consultative process by which they hope to engage other countries in the region—and most especially the four "outside" majors—in a dialogue on security concerns. Although formally defined as a consultative forum, not an operational organization, ARF has launched several very limited and
modest efforts of multilateral cooperation and has included in its
dialogue various questions relating to peace operations.

One characteristic of the Asia-Pacific region is that it is the only
geographic region without a “universal” regional political
organization. “Although Pacific Asia is now a world force, its
institutions for cooperation and coordination are in their infancy,” as
Richard Baker puts it. The regional political dynamic is very fluid,
and the end of the Cold War has only strengthened the anticolonial
commitment to the independent nation-state. The nation-state
continues to be the beneficiary of anticolonial emotions, the focus of
the new allegiances of these rapidly industrializing countries, and the
funnel through which much of the benefits of this industrialization is
distributed. Even separatist movements in the region pay tribute to
the nation-state idea as they attempt to create their own. The
widespread Asian resistance, at least among government elites, to
Western ideas of human rights (seen as attempts at external
interference into their internal affairs) is at least partially due to this
commitment to this now sacrosanct idea of national sovereignty.

Although the Cold War generally inhibited regional development,
concerns over developments in Vietnam and Cambodia contributed
to the growth of ASEAN. The first effort toward an indigenous regional
effort divorced from the tensions of the Cold War was the
establishment in 1967 of ASEAN, founded by Thailand, Indonesia,
Malaysia, Singapore, and the Philippines and later joined by Brunei
and then Vietnam. The dramatic economic growth (at least partially
fueled by the economic and commercial opportunities offered by the
Vietnam War) led to efforts to establish economic cooperation, but
they did not produce any significant results until 1989, with the first
meeting of the Asian-Pacific Economic Council (APEC). APEC was
created as an economic process for extending that dialogue to
important “external” economic powers. Then, in 1993, ASEAN
initiated the idea of a regional security dialogue, and in 1994 ARF
held its first meeting in Bangkok.

ASEAN was created as a limited economic organization, albeit
one with a hidden political agenda. Although it has developed quite
impressively, with Laos, Cambodia, and Myanmar about to enter, a
definite effort was and continues to be made to prevent infringements
of sovereignty in the economic sphere from spreading to other domains, notably political. The ASEAN countries—some of them relatively new as independent states, but all marked by the colonial era—remain focused on norms such as sovereignty, territorial integrity, and noninterference in domestic affairs. As a result, the support among regional governments for international institutions is limited, except, of course, for the United Nations, which is seen as nonthreatening for a number of reasons, including the prominent role of the Non-Aligned Movement.

The general preference remains for some form of coordination well short of collective action while avoiding turning their organization into a pure debating society like the European Parliament. These attitudes have led to the enunciation of what is called the “Asian Way”—a commitment to its own diplomatic style of musyawarah and mufakat, or consultation and consensus. That means the organization does not take stands on issues that exceed the comfort levels of all its members. Achieving this requires a delicate balancing act, described in one official publication as not moving “too fast for those who want to go slow, and not too slow for those who want to go fast.” The resulting consensus politics may be used to smooth over, obviate, and even occasionally resolve interstate disputes and conflicts among its members, but its two primary functions are to ensure the primacy of national governments and to prevent interference in their internal affairs, especially by governments external to the area.

ARF was created in 1994 by the ASEAN countries as a means and process for engaging the major external powers (especially the United States, China, Russia, and Japan) in a security dialogue. While the Russian Federation does not raise the concerns of the old USSR, and China remains the great question, the United States is clearly the strongest single military power in the Pacific—and the future of the American commitment in the area is at least open to discussion. Most Asia-Pacific governments desire that the United States continue its security role but at the same time are strengthening their own defense capabilities. Meanwhile, everyone watches China to “see what it will be like when it grows up,” as one knowledgeable observer puts it. It is too early to tell if a new security configuration will emerge in the
Searching for Partners

next few years, and if it does whether it will be dominated by one or more powers, reflect a balance of powers, or incorporate some kind of collective security arrangement.

Consultation and consensus currently rule ARF, now in its fourth year and potentially ASEAN's most important spinoff. The forum is by design informal and gradualist. It does not have a permanent secretariat, and decisions are made without official votes, as is customary with ASEAN. As a result, no country wants to participate in an ARF meeting without at least trying to appear conciliatory. Hence China helped temper tensions over the disputed Spratly Islands by offering for the first time to negotiate its claims in the context of accepted international norms. At the same time, Beijing promised to publish more information about its defense budget. Such moves conform with the forum’s stress on building confidence among members before moving on to other stages of crisis management. Consensus is the norm as well as the process, and the fact that many of the potentially serious problems (for instance, Korea) are not in ARF’s in-basket enables its members to use this period of relative noncrisis to create new habits and new relationships.

The organization and procedures of ARF are carefully designed to ensure that ASEAN’s members remain the directing core. Despite its elaborate membership structure—Consultative Members, Sectoral and Dialogue Partners, and Observers—attendees participate as simple members except for the guarantee that an ASEAN member will occupy the chair (at least through the first 7 years). The “ASEAN Way” was thereby extended formally into the security area. ASEAN and ARF are primarily forums or venues, intergovernmental bodies for dialogue and consensus building. ASEAN has evolved certain executive organizations, but ARF is still in an embryonic state organizationally.

Several so-called “Track II” efforts (where academic and policy analysts discuss and review regional confidence-building measures, environmental issues, etc.), such as CSCAP (Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific) and NEACD (Northeast Asian Cooperation Dialogue) have been created. They fit nicely into ASEAN/ARF’s consultative ambiance and provide an even less formal
process for discussing issues without the danger of setting precedents or creating commitments.

Security Questions

The removal of the Cold War "overlay" in Asia uncovered the local dynamics underneath. ASEAN created ARF in 1994 to deal with the major external (that is, outside of Southeast Asia, not outside of the Pacific Rim area) powers on security questions. Although most have recently become robust economies, most Asian governments are relatively new and tentative political systems. The expected latest three members (Cambodia, Myanmar, and Laos) have been characterized by *The Economist* as the "awkward" squad in recognition of their economic and political weakness compared to their neighbors.\(^1\) Internal dissension and conflicts can easily spill over into neighboring countries, although no serious security problems are perceived to exist at the moment in the South East Asia area. The real danger area is seen as North Asia, especially Korea. Although potential problems exist in South East Asia, for instance in the South China sea with its conflicting territorial claims, by and large political stability and economic growth have put the area in the best shape it has been in decades, if not generations. One pre-ARF situation did create concern and lead to collective action. Although ASEAN's members turned to the United Nations to run the Cambodian affair, it was nevertheless seen as a high moment for ASEAN political action.

Internal affairs must be a major preoccupation for these governments, with a concomitant concern for international norms such as sovereignty, territorial integrity, and noninterference in domestic affairs. With this attitude, support for international institutions will be cautious; relatively high for the nonthreatening United Nations and more suspicious of those with a hint of supranational norm-setting (human rights) or governance. The key security question is how to deal with China when "it grows up." Regional interaction with Japan and Russia are important questions but slightly less pressing. The United States is and will remain a major player but it is not a consistent hegemon, and there are concerns by some that there could be a gap between a withdrawing United States and the failure to develop replacement powers or

Dramatic economic progress in the area has been the primary contributor to the growing legitimacy of the governments of the region. Development and economic growth remain government priorities, if only for this political reason. The financial and economic problems faced by Thailand in mid-1997, and by extension its regional partners, obviously created a strain but should be manageable, at least in political terms.

The importance of economic development in national priorities, development founded on outward oriented economy policies, provides a somewhat contradictory theme for these governments. The policy problem for Asian countries was how to involve the outside powers (especially China) in these concerns (both political and economic) while retaining some measure of control. APEC and other Track II arrangements were efforts to do so in the economic sphere. Although ASEAN and APEC were, and are, essentially economic cooperative arrangements, they have had implications in the politico-security area, if only as examples.

The five original members of ASEAN (ranging in political styles from monarchy through various forms of authoritarianism's and democracies) have not been at war despite numerous territorial conflicts and other tensions since the founding of the organization. While these tensions and potential trouble spots continue, the norm of nonuse of force to resolve disputes amongst them has gained increasing acceptance, a trend attributed at least partially by many observers to the beneficent and calming effect of a habit of dialogue and collegiality developed over 30 years in the corridors of ASEAN. (Obviously, growing economic interdependence supports and, in a sense, "funds" this process.) However, the political, not to mention economic, character of the newest candidates (Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar) will obviously create problems. The ASEAN claim that it
has discovered a different, more effective, more “Asian” way of resolving political problems will be severely tested by these new members. Events in Cambodia in mid-1997 and the ongoing internal tensions in Myanmar may be only the beginning of the rest of ASEAN’s collegial style.

APEC has persistently expanded its approach into a wider area, beyond its own limited ASEAN membership. APEC summit meetings and regular meetings of officials and businessmen provide further opportunities for accommodating diverse interests. This process in APEC duplicates that which occurred in ASEAN, where contacts and channels pursued over a period of time helped create a sense of common interests to balance against special national interests. This development in the economic area could stimulate similar efforts in the security sphere. In Asia, trade and economic arrangements such as the Pacific Area Free Trade and Development (PAFTAD) and the Pacific Economic Co-operation Council (PECC) preceded various security conferences and meetings such as the Kuala Lumpur Asia-Pacific Roundtable and the Conference on Security Co-operation in the Asia-Pacific Area. ARF followed APEC. Interaction between the two spheres is normal and therefore likely to continue.

In the security area, ASEAN has also provided private “corridors” where its members could quietly discuss and attempt to ameliorate regional problems and manage relationships in the region. For instance, Philippine-Indonesian tensions have been moderated over the years by formal and informal contacts in the ASEAN context. This is a form of preventive diplomacy and conflict resolution at the low end of the peacekeeping scale. ASEAN members played an important role in the Cambodian situation, by supporting the anti-Khmer Rouge resistance movement (a political decision) and then turning to the United Nations (an operational decision). They did so, however, not by raising the ASEAN “flag” but by coordinating and agreeing informally within the ASEAN context.

ARF was the initiative to accomplish the same in the security area but with the participation of other Pacific powers. ASEAN views ARF as a forum for dialogue and consensus building. It is not viewed as an executive body or agent of the intergovernmental process, or as a precursor to any form of collective security agency, like NATO. Both
ASEAN and ARF operate as problem-management processes, not problem solvers. Their objective is to avoid confrontation when no solution exists. Specifically, ARF is an expansion of the “Asian Way” political process employed within ASEAN to moderate interstate political as well as economic disputes. As noted previously, political developments in Cambodia and Myanmar may pose severe challenge to the “Asian Way.”

It is unlikely that ARF will expand in some manner to become a form of regional “governance,” even in the limited form claimed by some other regional organizations. First of all there are too many overlapping concerns, involving overlapping regions and powers. (The claim of the United States and Russia, for instance, to be Asian countries may be true, but ignores that they are also the nation-state equivalent of cosmopolitan individuals and private corporations with serious out-of-area interests.) The tension between the ASEAN desire to retain control over the course of events in Asia and the need for accommodation of the external “Great Powers” will certainly inhibit ARF institutionalization. This tension between insecure regimes and external pressures and influence will continue for the foreseeable future. Finally the rapid expansion of ARF, now with 21 members, “exacerbates the forum’s tendency towards process rather than substance.”

However, in that form, ARF, along with numerous bilateral and multilateral agreements and relationships, is a process rather than a specific organizational project that throws a “spider’s web” over the Gullivers of major powers. Whether it might yet develop into a more concrete project or organization is a matter for the future, but at the moment its members resist even a formal relationship in U.N. Charter Chapter VIII terms with the United Nations.

**Peace Operations**

Individual South East Asian states have been very active in international peacekeeping, often participating in U.N. “traditional” peacekeeping operations. The Cambodia operation was of that genre, although much more ambitious and located in the Asian region. Both individually and collectively as ASEAN, the countries of Southeast Asia have been interested in peacekeeping in their region, but mostly
as an informal process at the low end of the peacekeeping scale: preventive diplomacy and informal mediation. The corridors of ASEAN meetings have proven to be an excellent venue for these type of activities.

ARF itself has carefully avoided all implications that it might become an organization for the authorization and mounting of peacekeeping operations. Nevertheless it has begun to inch into the general subject area, beginning with a seminar on "Peacekeeping: Challenges and Opportunities for the ARF," held March 7-9, 1995, in Brunei. At the seminar there was wide-ranging discussion of options to strengthen the capacities of the United Nations in peacekeeping. The focus was substantially on those ideas with relevance to the ARF. Participants emphasized support for the U.N. peacekeeping efforts illustrated by the growing numbers of ARF members contributing to peacekeeping operations. Discussion also focused on the role for regional groupings as called for by the then U.N. Secretary General in his "Agenda for Peace." There was a strong sense that peacekeeping should be viewed as part of a continuum involving preventive diplomacy, peacekeeping, peace making, and peace building (with no clear cut demarcations noted). A number of participants felt that more attention should be paid to preventive diplomacy. While noting that there was clearly a substantive role for ARF members and the ARF as a grouping to support the United Nations, the general sense was that an excessive focus on "regionalization" might detract from effective U.N. operations. It was also pointed out that the ARF is a fledgling forum, and premature demands should not be made upon it now.

At ARF's first Inter-Sessional Meeting (ISM) on the subject, held in Kuala Lumpur on April 1-3, 1996, a statement was released that noted, "The participants were of the view that the discussion on the subject of peacekeeping within the ARF context promoted greater understanding in the Asia-Pacific region." The meeting was organized around three main presentations: the "Current Status on United Nations Peacekeeping Operations," "Training for Peace Support Operations," and "Stand-by Arrangements." However, several delegates told outside observers that as peacekeeping is really a U.N. matter and ARF members' views are very diverse, only abstract
proposals were discussed, such as the importance of training peacekeepers based on U.N. standards and the possibility of the ARF being involved in U.N. standby arrangements.

The ISM on peacekeeping was followed by a Senior Officials Meeting in Indonesia on May 10-11, 1996, which decided to continue the intersessional process on peacekeeping for another year. This was somewhat of a surprise, as the original proposal for ARF consideration of peacekeeping was limited to 1 year, and most observers had thought that the ISM had pretty much exhausted the interest of ARF members in the subject. The Senior Officials Meeting also agreed to schedule intersessional meetings on demining and "training the trainers." All these considerations and proposals were reviewed at the Third ARF, held in Jakarta on July 23, 1996. Specifically noting that "the ARF should expand carefully and cautiously," the Chairman summarized the participating ministers' acceptance of the proposals of the ISM on Peacekeeping Operations by stating that ARF participants should:

- Work together more closely both within the ARF context and in the United Nations as part of the ongoing dialogue on U.N. peacekeeping operations
- Promote greater sharing of peacekeeping experience and expertise among themselves through, inter alia, training courses, developing a roster of trainers, sharing national training programs and facilities, contributing to financing of such training, and fostering cooperation among national peacekeeping training centers
- Support a U.N. peacekeeping capacity, working closely with the U.N. Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO), through loan of military and civilian personnel and other bilateral support arrangements and specifically by taking part in Standby Arrangements to facilitate the planning and deployment of U.N. peacekeeping operations.

The Third ARF also agreed that the ISM on Peacekeeping Operations, co-chaired by Canada and Malaysia, would continue its activities for another year to coordinate the implementation of these
Lewis and Marks

various recommendations, including the convening of a regional “Train the Trainers” workshop in Kuala Lumpur (as well as a course on demining to be hosted by New Zealand).

Later in 1996, ARF focused on another aspect of peace operations, preventive diplomacy, in a meeting in Paris at the so-called Track II level (government officials meet in their private capacities with nongovernment specialists for what are billed as free-flowing discussions). At previous ARF-sponsored meetings of this type, preventive diplomacy was broadly defined as “action aimed at preventing severe disputes and conflicts from arising between and within states, or preventing them from escalating into armed confrontation.” This definition fits comfortably into the range of peace operations enunciated by then U.N. Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali in his “Agenda for Peace” and his subsequent efforts to engage regional organizations in a closer collaborative relationship with the U.N. in peace operations.

This initiative is another, albeit modest, move by ARF toward a more active collective security role. In 1995 the then ARF chairman stressed the Forum’s focus on confidence-building measures but noted that preventive diplomacy would be a “natural follow-on.” The 1995 ARF Concept Paper set out ways to proceed with preventive diplomacy and notes the possibility of developing a set of guidelines for the peaceful settlement of disputes. All these events are still well situated in the dialogue or discussion mode, but it is interesting that these events indicate at least a willingness to consider an active preventive diplomacy role for ARF in the future.

Meanwhile, ASEAN’s members prefer to turn to the United Nations if a peacekeeping operation is deemed necessary in the region (e.g., Cambodia). Actually, there have been few other situations that called for action. Papua New-Guinea was an unusual and perhaps “the precedent setting case, with Australia leading an ad hoc regional peacekeeping coalition under at least informal approval from its regional neighbors. A 400-strong South Pacific Regional “peacekeeping force” was organized ad hoc by several countries of the area when the conflict on the island of Bougainville escalated in the early 1990s and resulted in a temporarily successful negotiation. The force was deployed in October 1994 to ensure the safety of the
Searching for Partners

Arawa Peace Conference participants (a version of the classic peacekeeping observer force function). It was composed of troops from Fiji, Tonga, and Vanuatu plus naval units, support, logistical, and command arrangements from Australia and New Zealand. However, the conference was a nonstarter, and the operation was not pursued.

What is the likelihood of other conflicts in the region that might call for regional peacekeeping efforts? Probably small, East Timor and the Spratlys notwithstanding. Asian countries are firmly, even doctrinally, opposed to interference in internal affairs, and there is a general feeling of lack of need as well as lack of interest. Some of the conflicts are too big or explosive for peacekeeping (Korea and Taiwan), but Cambodia could return and who knows what will be Burma's future?

As for the Spratlys, China would probably prefer to negotiate separately with each of the claimants, but this approach would be unlikely to settle all the conflicting claims. Indonesia has sought to broker a peaceful settlement, but to date the claimants have been unable to resolve their differences. An overall settlement might be possible by establishing a multilateral regional regime guaranteeing freedom of navigation to ships of all nations and access to gas resources according to an agreed upon apportionment formula, but such an approach can obviously not be forced on any of the claimants, especially China. (China rejects any formal organization which includes Taiwan.) However, now that Vietnam has become a member of ASEAN, the ASEAN claimants may find it easier to reach some reasonable settlement. Even if such a proposal were rejected by China and Taiwan, it would at least serve to produce an agreement among the ASEAN claimants and thereby reduce tension among them. Nevertheless, the very process of organization and meetings is shaping policies and programs in certain areas, such as search and rescue (not really peacekeeping but collective action nonetheless), humanitarian assistance, and peacekeeping activities such as preventive diplomacy. In these subjects, at least a problem definition stage is underway. However, with respect to these subjects, the orientation is well within Chapter II rules (peacekeeping) and far short of any thought of Chapter VIII operations (peace enforcement).
But here again we are discussing preventive diplomacy, multilateral consultation, and mediation, not the authorization and deployment of peacekeeping missions. As the third ARF made clear, its ASEAN members at least have not accepted any responsibility for mounting regional peacekeeping operations. Instead, they are focusing on preventive diplomacy and informal consultations as roles for themselves as an organization, and fostering participating by their members in U.N. activities (training, financing, standby arrangements, etc.). Peacekeeping for ASEAN and ARF is not an active project, but rather a hook for dialogue.

However, more active future activity is not foreclosed. It is worthwhile to note that ARF is showing persistent interest in the subject of search-and-rescue coordination and cooperation. An ISM on that subject has also been established that proposes a fairly extensive program of sharing training, expertise, facilities, cross-posting of personnel, and joint exercises. These subjects were probably selected as they are politically neutral and noncontroversial, and yet can move a little further down the road toward regional operations.

Neither ASEAN nor ARF showed any interest in the field of disaster relief until 1996. However, the third ARF authorized the convening of an ISM on the subject and will presumably consider its proposals at the next ARF. Disaster relief required by purely natural catastrophe, of course, is a benign and nonpolitical activity. However, the demand for disaster relief and humanitarian assistance arising from local or regional conflicts has become a major element of contemporary crisis and conflict management. In fact, the importance of nonmilitary humanitarian assistance has become the distinguishing character of so-called second generation peacekeeping. ARF movement in this area, if any occurs, could be a significant addition to peacekeeping capability of the organization.

When the subject of peacekeeping in the global context is raised—that of U.N. peacekeeping operations—Asians appear to be very comfortable and are very supportive of U.N. peacekeeping when peacekeeping appears called for. Four ASEAN member states (Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand) have participated or are currently participating in U.N. peacekeeping operations, and two
of those operations were in ASEAN's immediate geographic area (West New Guinea and Cambodia). After all, U.N. operations essentially require consensus in New York, which provides ASEAN's members with an active role. They tend to view the United Nations as the global 911 number.

**A Work in Progress?**

Clearly, ASEAN contributes to political security in the Asia-Pacific region, if only as a corollary to its focus on regional economic development. However, actual and potential conflicts exist, and regional economic development can lead to further tensions as well as tighter links among countries. Southeast Asia is growing politically as well as economically, and population growth as well the adhesion of new countries will increase ASEAN's role on the world scene, if that expansion is managed successfully. Economic growth is not shared at the same level, and the three expected new members are both politically and economically much less developed. Their membership is bound to create some tension.

Nevertheless, these countries have historically worried about the actual or potential dominance from the powers from China and Japan (and the USSR in the Cold War period). They therefore both seek and appreciate the balancing presence of the United States, although neither Myanmar nor Cambodia is likely to focus on this beneficial aspect of relations with the United States for the foreseeable future.

How far ARF can go as a security instrument is a subject for continual discussion. For instance, there is little institutionalized contact among defense establishments at the policy level, although there is an elaborate process of contact at the operational or military level, much of it fostered by the United States through its Pacific Command. U.S. Secretary of Defense Perry launched a trial balloon in early 1996 when he proposed a meeting of defense ministers from the 44 nations in the Asia-Pacific area. It was apparently conceived of as a useful complement to the ARF process and would symbolize the evolving security equation in the post-Cold War period while highlighting U.S. leadership. Although the proposal was not made in the context of ARF, such a meeting would clearly engage the ASEAN initiated process, especially if it were to lead to an effort at
institutionalization of the contacts and cooperation implied. It was not clear whether the initiative was intended to spark a process or an institutionalized forum. A process of institutionalization in this area would either have to be absorbed within ARF or compete with it.

Given the long-standing aversion in Asia to formalizing multilateral defense contacts, ARF notwithstanding, Secretary Perry's proposal did not strike fire. (Also, he made it in the APEC context, which presumably raised other concerns.) The Southeast Asians share a cultural ethos of consensus, if only because of their shared interest in national governance and their shared abhorrence of external interference in their internal affairs. Also, they share a perspective of realism and pragmatism with respect to feasible political developments. That is, they neither want nor believe in possible robust regional political organization. Obviously, their concern over the inevitable prominent if not dominant role of China in a regional body reinforces this perspective. Bringing China into a consensus-type organization is obviously quite different from bringing it into a more cohesive institution.

Discussion over the future character of ARF has included some thought of moving ARF toward a more formal, structured character with some executive responsibilities in the security area, but there appears to be little real interest in this approach among ASEAN members. Others—notably in the American, Canadian, and Australian Governments—have shown periodic interest (if generally only speculative and informal) in institutionalizing ARF as a regional security organization. Secretary Perry's proposal may seen as one manifestation of this interest. However, given the reluctance of Asian governments to seriously consider this approach, the prospects are not high for any move in this direction, and any such proposals are now obviously low on the priority list. As a result, and as a deliberate policy, the U.S. Government has adopted a passive role toward ASEAN's potential in this area, eschewing any temptation to pushing institutionalization. On the other hand, there is a persistent Western interest (possibly arising from cultural preferences for institutionalization) in moving ARF down the road toward a more active regional role in collective security and conflict resolution.
Even in this context, ARF obviously contributes to regional cooperative security but within very definite limits. If nothing else, Chinese reluctance to see a regional security organization take form provides a major break on ASEAN development in this direction. But, “Beijing still seems reluctant to use the multilateral forum to settle sovereignty disputes in the South China sea.” Two major differences in perspective separate ARF from further movements toward a more concrete role:

- Whether ARF should become a player in “out of area” situations, e.g., North Asia
- Whether potential “in area” situations (e.g., the Spratlys) are imminent enough to require action now.

ASEAN’s members are generally reluctant about the first question and doubtful (given Chinese attitudes) about the second. Therefore, they see no need for ARF to attempt to substitute the United States, or for the triangular relations among the United States, China, and Japan, even if they could figure out how to do it. Nevertheless, ARF can contribute to the stability of that relationship, if only marginally, and as a supplement for bilateral arrangements.

A subtheme of the collective security perspective is that of regional peacekeeping—whether or not ASEAN, presumably working through ARF—might wish to create a regional peacekeeping capability (peacekeeping as usually understood in terms of traditional U.N. Charter Chapter VI consensual operations in support of a cease-fire agreement). Here as well, the countries of the Asia-Pacific region do not show much interest, even though several of them are enthusiastic supporters of and participants in U.N. peacekeeping operations. In the Southeast Asia region, the above-mentioned aversion to formalizing multilateral defense contacts is combined with the general reluctance to create robust multilateral political organizations.

In addition, there is the always dominant consideration that major actors in the area are in fact “outsiders.” Creation of a “local” conflict resolution capability implies an invitation to these outsiders, some form of formal participation by them in the area. While the roles of
China, Japan, and the United States in the area are realities, the members of ASEAN are attempting to direct them through the ARF process, which is consultative, not executive.

However, actual and potential local conflicts do exist in the area. The present attitude of the area’s governments appears to deal with these problems, when forced to, by an ascending process of bilateral contacts, informal consultation, and discussion in ASEAN’s corridors, ad hoc local peacekeeping arrangements (such as Bougainville), and then if necessary a call to the United Nations. In this context the focus on confidence-building measures, the tentative initiative toward an ARF preventive diplomacy process, practical cooperation on demining and search and rescue, and ongoing discussion on various aspects of peacekeeping operations combine to hint at a potentially more active ARF in the general area of peace operations.

Notes
1. Richard Baker, interview by Edward Marks, June 22, 1996, Honolulu, HI.
2. Ralph Cossa, interview by Edward Marks, June 23, 1996, Honolulu, HI.
It is commonplace to observe that the United Nations has reached its limit in enforcement in the maintenance of international peace and security. (It still offers potential in terms of the formation of international norms—of a “Global Code of Ethics”—but that is a different subject.) The organization does not possess the instruments needed for enforcement implementation, and its ability to operate under a committee approach based on “consensualism” impedes its capacity to meet crises expeditiously. The unfolding 1996 breakdowns in Central Africa affecting Rwanda, Burundi, and Zaire and the feckless performance of the United States, France, and African “leaders” underscore the point.

Therefore, the search for additional support or for substitutes will continue, specifically for regional organizations. In some circumstances, the United States will even encourage the formation of new such entities, as underscored in April 1996, when then Secretary of Defense William Perry proposed a series of steps that might be taken by Balkan nation defense establishments to enhance their capability to conduct joint peacekeeping operations in their region. He urged their participation in “every NATO-organized peacekeeping exercise in the region” to develop habits of military cooperation, thus raising a question in the minds of some observers if the security boundaries of NATO were becoming too elastic.

However, a wide range of regional organizations with primarily security mandates already exists. Some of these organizations have overlapping mandates, and they have differing relationships with the United Nations. A number have formal observer status in the General Assembly, while NATO has a liaison relationship with the Department of Peacekeeping Operations. Almost all have had some involvement in peace operations (see the appendix, annex 1), and/or
in an actual working relationship with the U.N. in at least one situation offering a threat to international peace and security (see appendix, annex 2).

Table 3. *Regional and subregional organizations*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Organization</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Africa</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td>The Organization of African Unity (OAU)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Economic Community of Central African States (ECOCAS)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Southern African Development Community (SADC)</td>
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<td><strong>Americas</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td>The Organization of American States (OAS)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Caribbean Community (CARICOM)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Organization of East Caribbean States (OECS)</td>
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<td><strong>Asia</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td>Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) and</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)</td>
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<td><strong>Europe and North Atlantic</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td>European Union (EU)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Organization for Security Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Western European Union (WEU)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Middle East</strong></td>
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<td>Arab League (AL)</td>
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<td>Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC)</td>
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<td>Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)</td>
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<td>Arab Cooperation Council (ACC)</td>
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<td>Arab Maghreb Union—North Africa (UMA)</td>
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With the exception of NATO and possibly CIS, most of these organizations possess limited experience in organizing multinational forces to deal with "complex emergencies." A number of obstacles would have to be overcome if effective peace operations were to be organized. An agreed command and control arrangement structure...
would be essential, as well as common training and indoctrination, a capable logistics management system, agreed operational procedures and rules of engagement, common equipage, and appropriate links to civilian authority. In addition, mission mandates would have to be precisely worded and within the capability of forces deployed to execute. Finally, financial support for field operations would have to be assured, including appropriate recompense for serving military and civilian personnel in the field.

One question that will require special attention relates to the level at which integration of command for multinational forces should occur. The distinction in military parlance between command and operational control may be useful. Command applies to such matters as overall direction, discipline, morale, and logistics. These responsibilities are by tradition met by participating member states. Operational control is of a different order of responsibility, involving tactical decisions in the field undertaken by the area commander, his staff, and subordinate commands. The extent to which member states are prepared to surrender control of their forces to a foreign commander has proved a vexing issue.

An additional area that requires close examination involves missions and roles. In “complex emergencies,” the distinctions drawn between purely military or security enhancing operations and those entailing civilian support functions frequently prove illusory. Conventional wisdom surrounding “mission creep” provides no meaningful guidelines for forces assigned to the field, especially since civilian components of the operation depend heavily on the maintenance of a secure environment in which to function. Overlapping assigned missions and roles are shown in table 4.

As was demonstrated in Bosnia, disagreements may emerge between civilian-led and military components involved in operations generated in part by differing cultural and bureaucratic perspectives, difficulties in generating timely financial support among government agencies and NGOs, different “lag times” in initiating field operations, and incompatible staffing arrangements. In addition, strategies adopted for “existing” operations may differ quite markedly. Missions and roles also have to be tailored to actual conditions in the area of operation, with unanticipated local crises threatening to disrupt
planning and timetables. These crises require innovative handling and occasional readjustments in assigned missions and roles. The degree of flexibility required is currently being tested in Bosnia (chapter three).

### Table 4. Roles and missions for multinational forces to deter unwanted behavior

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Provide Early Warning</th>
<th>Deter infiltration, aggression</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Maintain territorial integrity, political independence</td>
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<tr>
<td>Compel Prescribed Behavior</td>
<td>Create safe havens, weapons free zones</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Disarm, demobilize local forces</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Deny combatants freedom of movement</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Remove “rogue” leaders</td>
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<td>Locate, detain war criminals</td>
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<td>Conduct punitive strikes</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Enforce economic, arms embargo</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Secure withdrawal of foreign forces, advisors, mercenaries, paramilitaries</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Liberate seized territory</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Restore government, provide security</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dismantle, destroy arms inventories and production facilities</td>
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<tr>
<td>Humanitarian Relief</td>
<td>Protect relief operations</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Provide emergency relief from manmade disasters (medical, shelter, water, etc.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Conduct relief operations (convoys, air drops, etc.)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Noncoercive Support</td>
<td>Establish buffer zones between combatants</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Monitor cease-fire; investigate violations</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Patrol borders</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Supervise prisoner exchanges</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Monitor disengagement, withdrawal of forces</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Clear mine fields</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Provide security for elections</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Assist in restoring law and order</td>
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<td>Support rebuilding of infrastructure</td>
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132
Recent trends suggest that international organizations are building constituencies of their own. The primary vehicles are NGOs and private voluntary organizations, which are establishing direct connections to the world’s citizens. If this assessment is valid, new tensions are likely to arise among these private entities and regional organizations, as well as with the United Nations. The former often have agendas at odds with established state authority and the agendas of regional organizations. While the regional organizations and the United Nations have the capacity to provide the adhesive necessary to ameliorate tensions that are emerging, they have yet to devise successful strategies that tie together the national institutions of failing states with the plans and actions of the multiple players increasingly involved in humanitarian assistance and peace operations. The United States is well positioned to encourage efforts to integrate and coordinate the programs and activities of institutions and agencies concerned with the two fields of endeavor.
Appendix
The Secretary-General has the honour to transmit to the members of the General Assembly the report of the Joint Inspection Unit entitled "Sharing responsibilities in peace-keeping: the United Nations and regional organizations" (JU/REP/95/4).
REPORT ON
SHARING RESPONSIBILITIES IN PEACE-KEEPING:
THE UNITED NATIONS AND
REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

Prepared by
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Boris P. Krasulin

Joint Inspection Unit
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Acronyms

ASEAN  Association of Southeast Asian Nations
CIS    Commonwealth of Independent States
CSBMs  Confidence and security-building measures
CSCE  Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
DDSMS Department for Development Support and Management Services
DHA   Department of Humanitarian Affairs
DPA   Department of Political Affairs
DPKO  Department of Peace-keeping Operations
ECHO  European Community Humanitarian Office
ECOMOG Military Observer Group (of ECOWAS)
ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States
EU    European Union
IPFs  Indicative planning figures
JIU   Joint Inspection Unit
LAS   League of Arab States
MICIVIH International Civilian Mission (in Haiti)
NATO  North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NMOG  Neutral Military Observer Group (of OAU)
OAS   Organization of American States
OAU   Organization of African Unity
OIC   Organization of the Islamic Conference
OSCE  Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
UNDP  United Nations Development Programme
UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNITAR United Nations Institute for Training and Research
UNMOT United Nations Mission of Observers in Tajikistan
UNOMIG United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia
UNOMIL United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia
UNOMSA United Nations Observer Mission in South Africa
UNPROFOR United Nations Protection Force
WEU   Western European Union
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

In recent years, the world has seen many outbreaks of conflicts which are increasingly of a national, ethnic or religious nature. Owing to these threats to international peace, the number of United Nations peace-keeping operations has increased dramatically. Many of these operations are multifaceted. Because of the expansion in both size and mandates, the United Nations' capacity to carry out peace-keeping activities has been overstretched. At the same time, the comprehensive approach required to maintain international peace and security inevitably influences the manner in which the United Nations carries out its duties effectively. There is now a need to share responsibilities in collective security with other organizations.

Against this background, interest over the involvement of regional organizations in collective security has increased within the framework of Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations, which calls for the Member States to make every effort to achieve pacific settlement of local disputes through regional organizations before referring them to the Security Council. The Inspectors conclude that, both the legal framework and political will are sufficient for implementing the provisions of Chapter VIII; and that what is required now is the effort to translate the provisions into action.

There are many peace-related activities which regional organizations have been undertaking. Many of them place their emphasis on preventive diplomacy and peacemaking. At the same time, certain regional organizations are also involved in or are planning peace-keeping missions. In order for other regional organizations to participate more actively in peace-keeping, there is a need to enhance their capacity to plan, launch, manage and provide administrative and logistical support to field operations. It is not within the mandate of JIU to evaluate the capacity of regional organizations to carry out their tasks effectively in this field. Accordingly, no such attempt is made in the present report. It does, however, presents views of Member States and regional organizations, as contained in the United Nations documents and other materials, as well as those provided to the Inspectors during their consultations with representatives of Member States and certain regional organizations. Since it is difficult to make a precise distinction between peace-keeping and other peace-related activities, the present report is also concerned with these activities.

Regional organizations differ in mandate, structure, capacity and experience in carrying out activities aimed at maintaining peace and security. Therefore, there should not be a rigid formula for the division of labour between them and the United Nations. Since no two conflicts are the same, a flexible approach is called for in selecting the modality for cooperation appropriate to each conflict situation. Cooperation between the United Nations and regional organizations in peace-keeping is a relatively recent undertaking, and consequently there is insufficient knowledge on the effectiveness of each modality. It is, therefore, necessary to conduct an evaluation of each experience in cooperation with regional organizations and to create a knowledge bank containing the results, so that lessons learned can be taken into account in the planning of similar activities in the future.
If regional organizations are expected to be involved more actively in the maintenance of peace and security, they should be given all possible assistance to do so. The United Nations has been helping them in various ways, both financial and technical. In view of resource constraints of the United Nations, new ways of providing assistance should be devised in order to maximize the benefits of this assistance.

So as to increase cooperation between the United Nations and regional organizations, it is necessary, as a prerequisite, to enhance coordination and cooperation among various entities of the United Nations. A comprehensive approach to peace and security also requires increased coordination within the United Nations system, since such an approach calls for more active participation by organizations of the System whose mandates are mainly in the economic and social sectors.

While a number of decisions regarding more active involvement of regional organizations in peace-keeping and other peace-related activities have been adopted lately, the Inspectors believe that further measures aimed at enhancing cooperation in this field between the United Nations and regional organizations are needed in order to decentralize these activities.

Planning and management at Headquarters, at the inter-organizational level and in the field

Headquarters:

Recommendation 1

(a) To prepare and present for consideration by the General Assembly a comprehensive strategic programme of cooperation with regional organizations in peace-keeping and other peace-related activities. This programme should be aimed at decentralization of peacemaking activities and enhancing the role of regional organizations in accordance with Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter, while ensuring that the primary responsibility in these matters remains with the United Nations Security Council. A project team composed of representatives of all departments concerned should be established for the elaboration of such a programme. It should not be a universal model for cooperation between the United Nations and regional organizations; rather, it should reflect a flexible and pragmatic approach which would allow modifications, taking into account the particular needs and potential of regional organizations. Since the aim of the programme is to enhance the role of regional organizations, it would be useful to involve some of them at one point in the work of the proposed team.

(b) In order to coordinate the practical implementation of such a programme, a small unit with a clearing house function should be established. This unit will also serve as a focal point to deal with and respond to queries of Member States and regional organizations.
(c) The three departments directly involved in peace-keeping (DPKO, DPA, DHA) should develop mechanisms, for example a project team for each conflict area, in order to increase interaction at the working level with regional organizations. Work of project teams should be reviewed at meetings of the Directors concerned.

(d) The United Nations development system in general, and humanitarian organizations in particular, should be encouraged by their respective governing bodies to contribute to promoting and strengthening national policies and structures of peaceful governance as an indispensable adjunct to regional arrangements for peace and security. More recognition should be given to the potential contribution of UNESCO and UNDP in this area.

Inter-organizational level:

Recommendation 2

(a) Conclusions of bilateral framework agreements between the United Nations and regional organizations concerning practical aspects of peace-keeping and other peace-related activities.

(b) Creation of a mechanism for cooperation between the United Nations and regional organizations:

- Institutionalization of periodic meetings between the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the heads of regional organizations to review the status of cooperation and to explore new steps to further progress in this field;

- Participation of specialized agencies in the proposed meetings in order to deal with specific areas of cooperation;

- Establishment of a permanent working group composed of representatives of the United Nations and regional organizations for practical implementation of the recommendations of high-level meetings and for dealing with current issues.

The field:

Recommendation 3

Since the Member States of the United Nations confer primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security on the Security Council, the Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General should be given the responsibility for overall coordination of peace-keeping operations with the participation of regional organizations.
Training and advisory services:

**Recommendation 4**

(a) Eligibility for receiving United Nations training and advisory services related to peace-keeping should be extended to regional organizations. This may include, inter alia, the United Nations peace-keeping fellowship programme (similar to Disarmament fellowships), training of trainers programme, advisory services on the necessary infrastructure and procedures, standards and principles for planning and managing United Nations peace-keeping operations.

(b) The existing United Nations training facilities, such as the International Training Centre of the International Labour Organisation in Turin, should be utilized for these purposes.

(c) The General Assembly may wish to encourage Member States and regional organizations to put their facilities and human resources for standardized training at the disposal of the United Nations, other regional organizations and Member States. They should be encouraged to organize workshops and seminars dealing with different aspects of peace-keeping operations and United Nations specialized personnel should be invited to lecture.

Financing

**Recommendation 5**

(a) The General Assembly may wish to recommend the establishment of voluntary trust funds in regional organizations for their peace-keeping operations and other related activities and call upon Member States, as well as non-governmental and private organizations and individuals, to make contributions to such funds.

(b) The General Assembly may wish to consider establishing an emergency revolving fund to finance regional organizations' activities in maintaining peace and security. If it so decides, the Secretary-General should submit a feasibility study to the Assembly for establishing such a fund. The study should cover all important aspects such as the size and type of activities to be financed, the criteria for determining eligibility to borrow from the fund, funding methods, repayment procedures and so on.

(c) The General Assembly may also wish to consider establishing a trust fund to finance United Nations training programmes for peace-keeping and other peace-related activities. It is proposed that such a fund should be financed by voluntary contributions from other organizations (both public and private), and from Member States. Resources from the proposed fund should be used, inter alia, to enable representatives of regional organizations to participate in United Nations programmes.

/...
I. INTRODUCTION

1. The number of United Nations peace-keeping operations has increased dramatically in recent years, taking different forms to meet a number of different crises: inter-state territorial wars, intra-state civil strife, ethnic and social tensions. As a result, the capacity of the United Nations to carry out activities for peace and security has been overstretched. There is a need to find partners who would share responsibilities in collective security.

2. The present report puts forward the findings and recommendations of a study recently undertaken by the Joint Inspection Unit (JIU) on cooperation between the United Nations and regional organizations in the maintenance of peace and security. Its objective is to contribute to the current efforts to increase the involvement of regional organizations in collective security, in the hope that this would ease the burden on the United Nations. The Inspectors are aware that there is no agreed definition of "regional organizations", and that the Charter of the United Nations uses the phrase "regional arrangements and organizations". For the sake of semantic simplification, however, they are collectively referred to as "regional organizations" in the present report.

3. The Inspectors consider that regional organizations should be the first port of call for the prevention and peaceful settlement of local disputes, without prejudice to the global responsibility of the United Nations Security Council for international peace and security. Since many conflicts are increasingly local or civil in nature, there is a growing consensus that they could more easily be prevented or speedily resolved through regional initiatives and approaches.

4. The Inspectors believe, however, that there is no external substitute for the primary and fundamental responsibility of Member States in each region for building comprehensive domestic peace and security systems in keeping with the Charter of the United Nations. Regional arrangements for fostering peace and security will owe their success, in the final analysis, to effective actions by Member States in the respective regions to strengthen their national policies and institutions for peaceful governance.

5. Since the cooperation between the United Nations and regional organizations in peace-keeping and other peace-related activities is a relatively new trend, the Inspectors consider the present report as interim in nature. In-depth evaluation of such cooperation can be undertaken when more experience in this area has been gained by the United Nations and regional organizations.

6. In conducting this study, the Inspectors had a series of discussions with United Nations officials responsible for peace-related activities. They also consulted a number of representatives of Member States who were actively involved in the deliberation of issues related to peace and security. They visited the headquarters of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in Jakarta, the European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in Brussels, the Organization of American States (OAS) in Washington, D.C., and the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in Addis Ababa, and discussed the subject with the Secretary-General of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in Vienna. Owing to the limited resources available to JIU, /...
they could not visit other organizations. They also exchanged views with the officials of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) who were visiting Switzerland. The Inspectors wish to thank all of them for contributing their ideas and expertise.
II. LEGAL AND POLITICAL FRAMEWORKS FOR COOPERATION BETWEEN THE UNITED NATIONS AND REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

7. In order for the United Nations and regional organizations to share responsibilities in peace-keeping and other peace-related activities successfully, the presence of legal and political frameworks that are conducive to such sharing is essential.

The Charter of the United Nations

8. The Charter of the United Nations provides in Chapter VIII a legal framework for sharing responsibilities in the maintenance of peace and security between the United Nations and regional organizations. Chapter VIII also calls for the Member States to make every effort to achieve peaceful settlement of local disputes through regional organizations before referring them to the Security Council. It also requests the Security Council to encourage the development of peaceful settlement of local disputes through regional organizations either on the initiative of the states concerned or by reference from the Security Council, and where appropriate, to utilize regional organizations for enforcement action under its authority. In addition, Chapter VI of the Charter refers to regional organizations as one of the means for the peaceful settlement of disputes. Thus, Chapter VIII of the Charter provides for appropriate regional action.

General Assembly

9. In its resolution 46/58 of 9 December 1991, the General Assembly requested the Special Committee on the Charter of the United Nations and the Strengthening of the Role of the Organization to consider the proposal on the enhancement of cooperation between the United Nations and regional organizations, as well as other specific proposals relating to the maintenance of international peace and security (paragraph 4 (a)). In March 1994, the Special Committee adopted a draft declaration on cooperation between the United Nations and regional organizations in this field, which reaffirms the role of regional organizations, as envisaged in Chapter VIII of the Charter. The text of the draft declaration has been submitted to the General Assembly for consideration and adoption at its forty-ninth session. In its resolution 49/57 of 9 December 1994, the General Assembly approved the Declaration on the Enhancement of Cooperation between the United Nations and Regional Arrangements or Agencies in the Maintenance of International Peace and Security.

Security Council

10. On 31 January 1992, the Security Council met at the level of Heads of State and Government. The presidential statement made at the conclusion of the meeting invited the Secretary-General to prepare his analysis and recommendations on ways of strengthening and making more efficient, within the framework and provisions of the Charter, the capacity of the United Nations for preventive diplomacy, for peacemaking and for peace-keeping. The statement also suggested that the Secretary-General's analysis and recommendations could cover, inter alia, "the contribution to be made by regional organizations in accordance with Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter in helping the work of the Council" (S/23500, page 3).
11. On 28 January 1993, the President of the Security Council made a statement that the Council was inviting regional organizations, within the framework of Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations, to study "ways and means to strengthen their functions to maintain international peace and security within their areas of competence, paying due regard to the characteristics of their respective regions". The Council also invited regional organizations to study "ways and means to further improve coordination of their efforts with those of the United Nations" (S/25184, page 2).

12. On 28 May 1993, the Security Council issued a presidential statement in which it reaffirmed the importance it attached to the role of regional organizations and to coordination between their efforts and those of the United Nations in the maintenance of international peace and security. The Council, acting within the framework of Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter, called again upon regional organizations to "consider ways and means of enhancing their contributions to the maintenance of peace and security". The Council then expressed "its readiness to support and facilitate, taking into account specific circumstances, peace-keeping efforts undertaken in the framework of regional organizations and arrangements in accordance with Chapter VIII of the Charter" (S/25859, page 3).

13. On 3 May 1994, the Security Council expressed, in a presidential statement, its view that one of the factors that should be taken into account when considering the establishment of new peace-keeping operations was the existence of regional or subregional organizations and whether they were ready and able to assist in resolving the conflict (S/PRST/1994/22, page 2).

14. On 22 February 1995, the President of the Security Council made a statement concerning the Secretary-General's position paper entitled "Supplement to an Agenda for Peace" (A/50/60-S/1995/1). In that Presidential Statement (S/PRST/1995/9), the Security Council recognized that the responsibilities and capacities of different regional organizations varied, as well as their readiness and competence to participate in efforts to maintain international peace and security, as reflected in their charters and other relevant documents. The Council welcomed the Secretary-General's willingness to assist regional organizations as appropriate in developing a capacity for preventive action, peacemaking and, where appropriate, peace-keeping. It then drew particular attention in this regard to the needs of Africa.

Special Committee on Peace-keeping Operations

15. The Special Committee on Peace-keeping Operations repeatedly encouraged all regional and subregional organizations to be involved in peace-keeping operations in their respective areas of competence and mandates, in accordance with Chapter VIII of the Charter. The Committee also stressed the need to enhance cooperation between regional organizations and the United Nations, and suggested a number of ways to enhance such cooperation. The recommendations of the Special Committee are reflected in General Assembly resolutions concerning a comprehensive review of the whole question of peace-keeping operations in all their aspects. For example, in paragraph 53 of its resolution 47/71 of 14 December 1992, the General Assembly emphasized that "any deployment of peace-keeping operations should be accompanied, as appropriate, by an intensification of coordinated political efforts by the States concerned, by regional organizations and by the United Nations itself as part of the ..."
political process for a peaceful settlement of the crisis situation or conflict in accordance with Chapters VI and VIII of the Charter". In paragraph 65 of its resolution 48/42 of 10 December 1993, the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General, "in accordance with Chapter VIII of the Charter, to consider ways to provide advice and assistance, in a variety of forms such as advisory services, seminars and conferences, to regional organizations and arrangements in their respective areas of competence, to enhance their capacity to cooperate with the United Nations in the field of peace-keeping operations".

Secretary-General

16. In his "An Agenda for Peace", the Secretary-General recommended a greater role for regional organizations in peace-related activities:

"But in this new era of opportunity, regional arrangements or agencies can render great service if their activities are undertaken in a manner consistent with the Purposes and Principles of the Charter, and if their relationship with the United Nations, and particularly the Security Council, is governed by Chapter VIII ... Under the Charter, the Security Council has and will continue to have primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security, but regional action as a matter of decentralization, delegation and cooperation with United Nations efforts could not only lighten the burden of the Council but also contribute to a deeper sense of participation, consensus and democratization in international affairs ... And should the Security Council choose specifically to authorize a regional arrangement or organization to take the lead in addressing a crisis within its region, it could serve to lend the weight of the United Nations to the validity of the regional effort ..." (A/47/277-S/24111, paras. 63-65).

17. In "Supplement to an Agenda for Peace", the Secretary-General stated that it would not be appropriate to try to establish a universal model for the relationship between the United Nations and regional organizations as their capacity for peacemaking and peace-keeping varied considerably. The Secretary-General, however, identified certain principles on which the relationship should be based. Such principles include those concerning the need for agreed mechanisms for consultations, respect for the primacy of the United Nations as set out in the Charter, the division of labour and consistency by members of regional organizations who are also Member States of the United Nations in dealing with a common problem of interest to those organizations (A/50/60-S/1995/1, paras. 87-88).

18. Charters and other instruments of a number of regional organizations also provide legal and political frameworks for coordination and cooperation between them and the United Nations in matters relating to peace and security (see III.B of the present report).
III. REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS: MECHANISMS AND CURRENT ACTIVITIES IN PEACE-KEEPING

A. Actual and potential role of regional organizations in peace-keeping and other peace-related activities

19. In Chapter VII of his "An Agenda for Peace", the Secretary-General points out that the Charter of the United Nations deliberately provides no precise definition of regional arrangements and agencies. This allows "useful flexibility for undertakings by a group of States to deal with a matter appropriate for regional action which also could contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security" through associations or entities. They could include treaty-based organizations, security and defence organizations, organizations for general regional development or for economic cooperation, and groups created to deal with specific political, economic or social issues. Thus, regional organizations can contribute to international peace and security in accordance with their mandates and capabilities.

20. There are 16 regional organizations which are cooperating or have shown interest in cooperating with the United Nations in peace-keeping and other peace-related activities. Most of them have responded to the note verbale of the Secretary-General in which he transmitted the text of the presidential statement of the Security Council dated 28 January 1993 (see para. 11 above). Among these organizations, three are regional, eight are subregional, four are interregional and one is global in terms of membership. Nine have observer status with the United Nations General Assembly. About one-third of them have well-established mechanisms for peace and security, many of which are for preventive diplomacy and peacemaking. With respect to their characteristics, nine can be considered as organizations for general purposes, four are economic organizations, two are concerned with defence and one with legal issues. The interests of those organizations whose primary purposes are in the economic or legal field appear to reflect a growing concern for a comprehensive approach to the maintenance of peace and security. This also suggests the need for the United Nations to identify those regional organizations involved in economic, social, legal and humanitarian affairs which have the potential for contributing to international peace and security, and to increase cooperation with them. (For more detailed information, see annex I.)

21. OSCE, OAS and OAU already cover practically all countries of their respective regions (i.e., Europe, the Americas and Africa). A great lacuna exists in the "Asia and Pacific" region. ASEAN is, however, reaching out to non-member countries through the framework of its Regional Forum, to discuss peace and security issues. The first such Forum was held in July 1994; another will be held in 1995.

22. The Inspectors recognize the following advantages of regional organizations in carrying out activities in the maintenance of peace and security:

- proximity to the conflict situation. This enables a regional organization to have an intimate knowledge of the conflict situation;
- the shared historical experience and culture of its Member States which could facilitate the solution of regional problems.
less expenditure required for field operations of regional organizations in certain regions, provided that those organizations have the experience and capacity to provide logistic support efficiently.  

In addition, sometimes it is easier procedurally to make use of regional organizations since some of them have a mandate to intervene peacefully in internal affairs and/or have unique instruments not available elsewhere.  

23. However, geographical proximity and shared historical experience may have negative effects on mediation capacity in some cases. Furthermore, in some instances, parties to the conflict may see the United Nations mission as an expression of concern by the international community as a whole and therefore providing impartial support to conflict resolution. Under such circumstances, parties to the conflict may prefer that the United Nations, rather than the regional organization, play a leading role in conflict resolution, as has been the case with a number of recent United Nations operations.  

24. The Inspectors understand fully and share the intention of regional organizations to emphasize early warning and conflict prevention since many of them are not well equipped, either financially or institutionally, to carry out full-scale peace-keeping activities, although they can participate actively in preventive diplomacy and peacemaking. The Inspectors nonetheless consider that regional organizations can play a more active role in peace-keeping, as demonstrated by organizations such as CIS, OAU and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). OSCE is also developing peace-keeping capabilities. Organizations charged with security and defence, such as NATO, are certainly better prepared than the United Nations to launch peace-enforcement operations. Furthermore, use of the military in humanitarian assistance is increasing. Because recent peace-keeping operations are becoming more and more multifaceted, the involvement of those organizations concerned with economic and social development and human rights issues is expected to increase. It is, therefore, important to provide a flexible formula for division of labour between the United Nations and regional organizations as the latter differ so much in mandates, structure, experience and resources. At the same time, the Inspectors note the concerns of regional organizations that cooperation between them and the United Nations should not be based on a hierarchical relationship. Accordingly, the Inspectors agree with the view that division of labour should be established in such a way as to optimize the comparative advantages of the two based on mutual understanding and agreements. A flexible and pragmatic approach is necessary to meet the particular needs of each specific situation.  

B. Mechanisms and instruments of a selected number of regional organizations  

1. Organization of African Unity (OAU)  

25. By the Declaration adopted at the Twenty-ninth Ordinary Session of the Heads of State and Government held in Cairo from 28 to 30 June 1993, the OAU established a Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolutions. The primary objective of the Mechanism is the anticipation and prevention of conflicts. The Declaration (AHG/DECL.3 (XXIX), Rev. 1) states that “emphasis on anticipatory and preventive measures, and concerted action in peace-making and peace-building will obviate the need to resort to the complex and
resource-demanding peace-keeping operations”, which OAU “countries will find difficult to finance”. The Declaration defines the relationship between its Mechanism and the United Nations as follows: “In the event that conflicts degenerate to the extent of requiring collective international intervention and policing, the assistance or where appropriate the services of the United Nations will be sought under the general terms of its Charter”. In this instance, respective countries of OAU “will examine ways and modalities through which they can make practical contribution to such a United Nations undertaking and participate effectively in the peace-keeping operations in Africa”.

26. The Mechanism is built around a Central Organ, which is composed of the States members of the Bureau of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government. In order to assist the Central Organ, the Conflict Management Division was established in 1993 within the OAU Secretariat. The Cairo Declaration also established the “OAU Peace Fund” for the purpose of “providing financial resources to support exclusively the OAU operational activities relating to conflict management and resolution”. The fund is financed from appropriations from the OAU regular budget, voluntary contributions from Member States as well as from other sources within Africa. In this context, during the 30th African Summit held in June 1994 in Tunis, the President of South Africa, Nelson Mandela, announced a contribution of US$ 300,000 to the “OAU Peace Fund”. With the consent of the Central Organ, voluntary contributions from sources outside Africa can also be accepted. In September 1994, the United States Congress authorized the President to provide assistance to strengthen the conflict capability of the OAU and to allocate for these purposes not less than US$ 1,500,000 for each of the fiscal years 1995 through 1998. This proceeds from the assumption that it is in the national interest of the United States to help build African capability in conflict resolution since, inter alia, it would reduce the enormous human suffering which is caused by wars in Africa together with the need for United Nations intervention as African institutions develop the ability to resolve African conflicts.

27. With respect to cooperation between the United Nations and OAU, Article II of the OAU Charter lists as one of its aims the promotion of international cooperation in keeping with the Charter of the United Nations. The above-mentioned Cairo Declaration states as follows:

“The OAU shall also cooperate and work closely with the United Nations not only with regard to issues relating to peace-making but, and especially, also those relating to peace-keeping. Where necessary, recourse will be had to the United Nations to provide the necessary financial, logistical and military support for the OAU’s activities in Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution in Africa in keeping with the provisions of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter on the role of regional organizations in the maintenance of international peace and security” (AHG/DECL.3 (XXIX), Rev.1, para. 25).

2. Organization of American States (OAS)

28. The amendments to the OAS Charter, adopted by its General Assembly in December 1985, gave greater powers of mediation to the Permanent Council by allowing it to “resolve a dispute between members, whether or not all the parties concerned had (as previously stipulated) agreed to take the matter before the OAS”. The amendments also increased the
executive powers of the OAS Secretary-General by allowing him to "take the initiative in bringing before the Permanent Council matters that might threaten the peace and security of the hemisphere or the development of the member states, something which previously only a member country had been permitted to do". The OAS General Assembly, in its resolution AG/RES 1180 (XXII-0/92) of 23 May 1992, instructed the Permanent Council to establish a Special Committee on Hemispheric Security to continue consideration of the agenda on cooperation for hemispheric security. The Permanent Council has also established special committees which may contribute to the maintenance of peace and security, for example, the Special Committee to Monitor Compliance with the Trade Embargo on Haiti. The OAS convenes a meeting of ministers of foreign affairs whenever needs arise. Such a meeting was convened in May 1993, to discuss the situation in Guatemala and the OAS Secretary-General was requested to send a fact-finding mission. OAS is convening a Regional Conference on Confidence and Security-Building Measures in the Region in 1995 (AG/RES. 1288 (XXIV-O/94), para. 6).

29. The OAS Charter provides a legal framework for cooperation between the United Nations and OAS in general terms. The preamble of the OAS Charter "reaffirms the principles and purposes of the United Nations and Article 1 defines OAS as a regional agency. Article 2 proclaims the purposes of OAS in order "to put into practice the principles on which it is founded and to fulfill its regional obligations under the Charter of the United Nations (SI25996, page 12). Artic1e 53 concerns cooperation between the United Nations and OAS. With respect to cooperation in peace and security, the General Assembly of the OAS has adopted a number of resolutions. For example, resolution AG/RES. 1236(XXXI-0/93) of 11 June 1993 requested the Special Committee on Hemispheric Security to give priority in its programme of work to, inter alia, "the relationship between the OAS and the United Nations in all matters related to regional security within the framework of their respective normative instruments". In its resolution 49/5 of 21 October 1994, the United Nations General Assembly welcomed "the offer of the President of the Permanent Council of the Organization of American States to the President of the Security Council concerning the readiness of the Organization of American States to cooperate with the United Nations in its efforts to improve measures for the prevention and peaceful solution of regional and international conflicts" (para. 4). It requested both Secretaries-General (of the United Nations and OAS), or their representatives, to resume consultations with a view to signing, during 1995, an agreement for cooperation between the United Nations and OAS (para. 7).

3. Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)

30. According to the Secretary-General of OSCE, its greatest emphasis is on early warning and conflict prevention since "prevention is preferable to cure". OSCE mechanisms used for these purposes include: the Vienna Mechanism on Unusual Military Activities, established in 1990; the Berlin Mechanism on Serious Emergency Situations, established in 1991; and the Moscow Mechanism on Human Dimension, established in 1991. The OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities and the Warsaw Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights also contribute to early warning. OSCE confidence and security-building measures (CSBMs) can also serve as an early warning indicator. As for a mechanism for peaceful settlement of disputes, OSCE established The Valletta Mechanism in 1991, and modified it in 1992. In addition, the Convention on Conciliation and Arbitration within the OSCE has been in force since December 1994. The OSCE Provision for Directed
Conciliation and the Conciliation Commission are also concerned with peaceful settlement of disputes. The Conflict Prevention Centre, which was established in 1990, is responsible for, inter alia, the overall support of OSCE tasks in the fields of early warning, conflict prevention and crisis management, and operational support of missions in the field. In 1992, OSCE established a Forum for Security Cooperation in Vienna. The Forum is concerned with negotiations on arms control, disarmament and confidence-building. Its aims are to enhance regular consultation and intensify cooperation on security matters and to further the process of reducing the risk of conflict. It is responsible also for the implementation of CSBMs. OSCE establishes ad hoc steering groups specifically assigned to deal with conflicts; for example, the Minsk Group charged with mediation and settlement of the conflict around Nagorny Karabakh. One of the most important channels of conflict prevention and crisis management are activities under the aegis of the Chairman-in-Office.

31. With regard to cooperation between the United Nations and OSCE, the “Helsinki Summit Declaration”, adopted on 10 July 1992, states in paragraph 25 the views of the participating States of OSCE, formerly the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), as follows:

“Reaffirming the commitments to the Charter of the United Nations as subscribed to by our States, we declare our understanding that the CSCE is a regional arrangement in the sense of Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations. As such, it provides an important link between European and global security. The rights and responsibilities of the United Nations Security Council remain unaffected in their entirety. The CSCE will work together closely with the United Nations especially in preventing and settling conflicts”.

32. An agreement on a framework for cooperation and coordination between the United Nations and OSCE was signed by the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the Chairman-in-Office of the OSCE Council in May 1993. In its resolution 48/19, the General Assembly endorsed the framework for cooperation and coordination (A/48/185, annex). Efforts to further improve cooperation and coordination between the United Nations and OSCE have continued. In his letter to the Secretary-General, dated 14 June 1994, the Chairman-in-Office of OSCE stated that what appeared necessary was a more updated definition of the tasks and the attributes of OSCE as a regional arrangement under Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations. He also mentioned that the fundamental issue of linking the OSCE’s preventive diplomacy and crisis management activities with those of the United Nations would be dealt with at the OSCE Summit, held at Budapest on 5 and 6 December 1994. A joint proposal by Germany and the Netherlands, “OSCE First”, was submitted to the Budapest Review Conference. The proposal (Doc.828/94 of 17 May 1994) calls for the participating states to commit themselves to make every effort to achieve pacific settlement of local disputes through OSCE before referring them to the United Nations. The Secretary-General of the United Nations in his report on the cooperation between the United Nations and OSCE states:

/...
In sum, 199. has seen further development of the practical links between the United Nations and CSCE. This cooperation and coordination will be maintained and enhanced with the aim of extracting the best possible use from the resources made available by Governments to international organizations to carry out the tasks assigned to them. The avoidance of duplicative or overlapping mandates will facilitate such cooperation and lead to effective coordination" (A/49/529, para. 13).

4. European Union (EU)

33. The Treaty on European Union, signed in Maastricht on 7 February 1992, provides a legal basis for the Union to develop its common foreign and security policy. Article J.1, Title V of the Treaty stipulates that the objectives of the policy are not only to strengthen the security of the Union and its Member States, but also to preserve peace and strengthen international security. Article J 4, Title V recognizes the Western European Union (WEU) as an integral part of the development of the Union. The Declaration on Western European Union, attached to the Treaty, states that WEU will be built up in stages as the defence component of the European Union.

5. Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)

34. Article 6 of the Minsk Agreement of 8 December 1991, which established the CIS, stipulates that the Member States of the Commonwealth will cooperate in safeguarding international peace and security. CIS has adopted a number of legal instruments concerning appropriate arrangements for peace-keeping. They include: the agreement concerning groups of military observers and collective peace-keeping forces in CIS and associated Protocols, adopted on 20 March 1992; the Collective Security Treaty of 15 May 1992; and the agreement concerning collective peacemaking forces and joint measures for their material and technical support, adopted on 24 September 1993. The authority to establish peace-keeping operations is vested in the Council of the Heads of State.

35. The Security Council was informed in June 1994 that on the basis of the provisions of Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations, the Council of the Heads of State of CIS had decided to deploy the CIS Peace-keeping Force to Abkhazia, Republic of Georgia. In accordance with Article 54 of the Charter, the United Nations Security Council has been kept informed of the size of such forces and of their activities (S/1994/732, annex).


36. The NATO Summit held in Rome in November 1991 adopted the new Strategic Concept which recognized the importance of preventive diplomacy and successful management of crises. NATO reported that in December 1992 the Allied Ministers had stated "their readiness to respond positively to initiatives that the United Nations Secretary-General might take to seek Alliance assistance in the implementation" of the resolutions of the United Nations Security Council (S/25996, page 18). In the Declaration adopted at the NATO Summit in Brussels in January 1994, it was stated that its Member States would work in concrete ways towards "creating an ability to operate with NATO forces in such fields as peacekeeping, search and rescue and humanitarian operations".11
C. Cooperation of regional organizations in recent peace-keeping operations of the United Nations

As of December 1994, there are 17 active peace-keeping missions of the United Nations. Among them, five were launched before 1988. They are traditional peace-keeping missions, and no regional organization is cooperating with the United Nations in any significant manner. On the other hand, most of those established after 1988 have more multifarious mandates, including peace-keeping in the traditional sense, assistance in political settlements, electoral assistance, human rights monitoring and humanitarian assistance. Accordingly, mission components include not only military elements but also civilians responsible for a variety of functions. Ten regional organizations have been cooperating with the United Nations in recent peace-keeping missions (see annex II). The more active involvement of regional organizations in the maintenance of peace and security was a result of the relaxation of international tension after the end of the cold war. Their involvement may also have escalated because of the increasingly complex nature of United Nations peace-keeping operations, which requires the United Nations to seek the cooperation of regional organizations within their areas of competence. The following are examples of peace-keeping and other peace-related activities of regional organizations.

Assistance in political settlements

The OAU has undertaken a series of diplomatic initiatives for the solution of conflicts in Angola, Burundi, Liberia, Rwanda, Somalia and the Western Sahara. Both the League of Arab States (LAS) and the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) have been involved in diplomatic initiatives concerning Somalia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina. They have also participated, together with the United Nations and OAU, in the National Reconciliation Conference for the political settlement of the Somali conflict. ECOWAS has been playing a central role in the efforts for a peaceful settlement of the Liberian conflict. OAS has been involved in the peace process in Central America and Haiti. OSCE has been playing the leading role in peacemaking in South Ossetia in the Republic of Georgia, Nagorny Karabakh, and Moldova. It also has field missions in Skopje (the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia), Estonia, Latvia, Sarajevo (Bosnia and Herzegovina) and Tajikistan. OSCE is cooperating with the United Nations in Abkhazia (Georgia) and Tajikistan. The European Union and the United Nations co-sponsor the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia. The European Community (Union) has deployed the European Community Monitoring Mission in the former Yugoslavia. Its mandates are to help stabilize the agreed cease-fires and mediation and confidence-building. CIS has been involved in negotiations for the political settlement of conflicts in South Ossetia and Tajikistan. At the initiative of ASEAN, the United Nations sponsored the International Conference on Kampuchea in 1981.

Deployment of military observers/peace-keeping forces

ECOWAS created a Military Observer Group (ECOMOG) in August 1990. ECOMOG is cooperating with the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL), which is the first United Nations peace-keeping mission undertaken in cooperation with a peace-keeping operation already established by another organization. OAU established the Neutral Military Observer Group (NMOG) in 1992 to monitor the cease-fire in Rwanda. NMOG elements
were absorbed into the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) in November 1993. OAU also has military observers in Burundi. CIS has deployed a peace-keeping force in Abkhazia (Georgia) in order to monitor the compliance of the parties involved with the Agreement on a Cease-fire and Separation of Forces, signed in May 1994. The CIS peace-keeping force is cooperating with the United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG). Under the authority of CIS, a tripartite peace-keeping force (Joint Russian-Georgian-Abkhaz Peace-keeping and Law-enforcement Forces) is deployed in South Ossetia. Preparations are at an advanced stage to launch a peace-keeping operation by OSCE in the context of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.12

**Peace/sanctions enforcement**

40. NATO and the WEU are engaged in the joint monitoring and enforcement of the arms embargo and the economic sanctions against the former Yugoslavia in the Adriatic, in order to ensure the strict implementation of the relevant Security Council resolutions. In addition, the WEU is involved in the implementation of the sanctions against the former Yugoslavia in the Danube operation. NATO is also implementing a number of Security Council resolutions concerning the former Yugoslavia, including the monitoring and enforcement of a “No-Fly Zone” over Bosnia and Herzegovina. It is also providing close air support for the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR).

**Sanctions assistance**

41. The EU and OSCE have jointly deployed Sanctions Assistance Missions in the countries neighbouring the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). They have also provided these countries with some necessary resources to facilitate their enforcement of the sanctions. Sanctions Assistance Missions are currently stationed in Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Hungary, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Romania and Ukraine. Under the direction of the joint EU-OSCE Sanctions Coordinator and the Sanctions Assistance Missions Communications Centre in Brussels, mission officials advise the authorities of the host countries on the implementation of sanctions imposed by the United Nations Security Council Committee on Sanctions against former Yugoslavia.

**Mine clearance**

42. The WEU conducted mine clearance activities in the Gulf in the framework of the relevant Security Council resolutions. OAS has provided mine-clearing assistance to Nicaragua.

**Human rights/political process monitoring**

43. The Commonwealth Secretariat, EU and OAU co-operated with the United Nations in monitoring the transitional process in South Africa. EU has recently concluded an agreement with the United Nations for the dispatch of human rights monitors to Rwanda. OAS and the United Nations have established the International Civilian Mission (MICIVIH) to verify respect for human rights as laid down in the Haitian Constitution and in the international instruments to which Haiti is a party. OSCE deals with human rights issues through its Warsaw Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights and the High Commissioner
on National Minorities. The OSCE mission in Tajikistan mentioned in para. 38 above, is also concerned with human rights issues and democratic institution-building. Assistance in constitution (legislation) drafting has also been provided in a number of countries, such as Georgia and Moldova.

Electoral assistance

44. The Commonwealth Secretariat, EU and OAU, cooperated with the United Nations in the electoral observation and verification in South Africa. OAS has been increasingly providing electoral assistance to its member countries. For example, in 1993, it sent election monitoring missions to Paraguay, Peru, Honduras, Venezuela, Costa Rica and Nicaragua. The OSCE Warsaw Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights also provides electoral assistance.

Humanitarian assistance

45. In June 1994, the OAU Council of Ministers adopted resolution CM/Res.1527 (LX) on the holding of a regional conference on assistance to refugees, returnees and displaced persons in the Great Lakes region in Burundi, which was endorsed by the Heads of State and Government of OAU. The United Nations General Assembly, in its resolution 49/7, endorsed the OAU resolution and invited the competent bodies of the United Nations system to take part in the implementation of the OAU initiative. The European Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO) was established in 1992 in order to provide humanitarian assistance to populations from any part of the world outside the Community who are affected by natural catastrophes or emergencies, many of which are in conflict zones. ECHO cooperates with a number of United Nations agencies, with the most important partner being the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).

46. The above-mentioned activities of regional organizations are only examples, not an exhaustive list. Nonetheless, it can be concluded that the most active area in which regional organizations are involved is assistance in political settlements. In 9 of the 12 active peace-keeping missions which were launched after 1991, regional organizations have cooperated with the United Nations in the efforts for a political settlement of the conflicts (see annex II). At the same time, regional organizations are increasingly being involved in other functions, from peace-keeping to humanitarian assistance. The use of military personnel in humanitarian relief operations has proved to be advantageous to the success of these operations. Cooperation between the United Nations and defence/security organizations in this area is, therefore, expected to grow.

Modalities for cooperation

47. There are a number of modalities in which the United Nations have cooperated with regional organizations in peace-keeping and other peace-related activities. In the past, the United Nations launched a small number of joint missions with regional organizations. Those missions were carried out with some predictable, early stage difficulties inasmuch as each organization had a different way of doing business. In addition, there were problems of how to divide the cost, who was responsible for providing logistic support and so on. Furthermore, it became apparent that a single chain of command was essential for peace...
keeping operations to succeed. This is difficult to achieve because each organization is
responsible to different governing bodies; and each body formulates policies by different
criteria and different procedures. Even a small policy difference may produce a devastating
result in the field where quick decision-making and action are required, and there is not
enough time to reconcile differences. This suggests the need for a thorough examination of
possible difficulties before undertaking a joint mission between the United Nations and
regional organizations.

48. Another modality for cooperation is that of one organization playing a leading role and
others supporting the lead organization. This modality has been applied to the relationship
between the United Nations and OSCE in the context of their peace efforts in Georgia,
Moldova, Nagorny Karabakh and Tajikistan.

49. Two or more organizations can be engaged in parallel peace activities in the same area.
One such example is the recent efforts by the United Nations, the Commonwealth, the EU
and OAU in South Africa. The CIS Peace-keeping Force and UNOMIG are in place in
Abkhazia, Georgia. They "function as two separate and independent operations, each under
its own command, but in close cooperation and coordination with each other" (S/1994/529/Add.1,
para. 4). A similar relationship exists between the United Nations and ECOWAS in Liberia. The presence of many organizations is sometimes necessary to build
confidence among the parties to the conflict.

50. Different organizations could be assigned different functions, such as peacemaking,
peace-keeping, peace-enforcement and peace-building. Since each organization is
autonomous, the assignment of functions should be based on mutual understanding among
the organizations. Difficulties with this modality could be minimized by each organization
assuming the leadership for a different stage of the conflict, on the condition that clear
understanding exists among the organizations involved as to their respective roles and the
requirements for the smooth transition of authority. However, in many conflict situations,
various functions are required at the same time. In this type of situation, the issue of
command and control may make this modality difficult to utilize successfully.

51. Each modality mentioned above requires different methods of cooperation. Methods
of cooperation required at the level of headquarters and the field are different, as are those
for different functions. However, it is possible to replicate successful features of cooperation
at the operational level. The successful methods for exchange of information and
coordination of activities selected by the United Nations Observer Mission in South Africa
(UNOMSA) and cooperating organizations can, therefore, be adopted by future missions of
a similar nature. The experiences of the Coordinating Committee, the Technical Task Force
and the Joint Operations Unit merit a thorough examination, since they could provide useful
information for future missions. Various methods have been proposed for cooperation and
coordination between UNOMIG and the CIS Peace-keeping Force. Specific methods are
suggested for cooperation and coordination at each of the four levels: force headquarters,
sector zone headquarters, UNOMIG monitoring team with CIS battalion, and UNOMIG
patrol with CIS patrols (S/1994/818, paras. 14-20). It is too early to assess their
effectiveness. However, evaluation of the UNOMIG experience with CIS should be
undertaken at appropriate times and the lessons learned should be used later.

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52. Even though a rigid formula for cooperation between the United Nations and regional organizations is not recommended, there are some features of cooperation that could be applied to any situation. During the consultations with regional organizations on the present study, the Inspectors were repeatedly informed that there was a need to increase contact at the working level, and to involve regional organizations from the planning stage. As mentioned earlier, detailed plans were worked out between the United Nations and CIS with respect to cooperation and coordination between UNOMIG and the CIS Peace-keeping Force. Whether this could be one of the crucial success factors, only time can tell.

53. Cooperation between the United Nations and regional organizations in the maintenance of international peace and security is a relatively new trend. Therefore, sufficient knowledge does not exist as to which modality for cooperation or methods of cooperation to employ for what types of situations and needs. For this purpose, there should be an assessment of cooperation, with the participation of all the organizations involved, after the completion of each United Nations mission. Lessons thus learned should be utilized when planning new missions. In his final report on the question of South Africa, the Secretary-General stated his intention to invite regional organizations to "work out together guidelines for future cooperation based on the success, as well as the mistakes", of the common experience in South Africa and elsewhere (S/1994/717, para. 139). One such meeting was held on 1 August 1994 at United Nations Headquarters. Meetings on cooperation in the maintenance of peace and security between the United Nations and regional organizations should be institutionalized, and ex post assessments mentioned above should be studied at those meetings.

54. At a meeting held in September 1993 between the secretariats of the United Nations system and OAU, a set of recommendations for concrete action were adopted, including those on cooperation in conflict prevention, management and resolution in Africa. Those recommendations included assistance to be provided by the United Nations system (see A/48/475/Add.1, paras. 21-24). One year later, the implementation process of some recommendations has still not begun. Such a low level of implementation can be attributed partially to the lack of a time-frame and unclear identification of responsibility for implementation. In future agreements concerning United Nations assistance, those United Nations entities responsible for implementation should be clearly identified and a time-frame should be established.

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IV. SHARING RESPONSIBILITIES IN PEACE-KEEPING AND OTHER PEACE-RELATED ACTIVITIES

55. Very often, care and attention are paid to the formulation of policies but not enough to the provision of ways and means for implementing those policies. As a result, even good policies may fail. As Sections I and III.B of the present report have illustrated, there are legal and political frameworks that are conducive to the sharing of responsibilities in the maintenance of peace and security between the United Nations and regional organizations. Equally important is the existence of factors for the successful implementation of policies contained in legal instruments and manifested in the political will of Member States and organizations. Such factors may include: the preparedness of the United Nations to increase cooperation with regional organizations; and the capacity and experience of regional organizations to plan, launch, manage and provide administrative and logistics support to field operations. United Nations assistance can contribute to the enhancement of the capacity and experience of regional organizations in these areas.

A. Preparedness of the United Nations to increase cooperation with regional organizations

56. The Inspectors consider that in order for the United Nations to increase cooperation with regional organizations, it must have, as a prerequisite, mechanisms to plan its activities effectively and efficiently and to ensure smooth information flow and the sharing of experience within the United Nations.

57. There is a close relationship between peacemaking, peace-keeping and humanitarian actions. There is also a strong link between peace and development. Prevention is preferable to cure, and prevention of conflicts ultimately requires people's conviction that peace is good for everybody. In this connection, the Inspectors note that in February 1994 the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) established a Culture of Peace Programme. UNESCO is contacting organizations of the United Nations system and regional organizations to ensure that its Culture of Peace Programme is carefully harmonized with related activities. Organizations of the United Nations system whose mandates are in the economic and social sectors are increasingly involved in peace-related activities. The Inspectors, therefore, agree with the view of the Secretary-General that "the second-generation United Nations peace-keeping operations may involve the entire United Nations system in comprehensive reconstruction efforts" (see SG/SM/94/178 of 31 October 1994). Therefore, there is a need for a comprehensive approach to maintain international peace and security, one element of such an approach is increased cooperation between the United Nations and regional organizations.

58. At present, each department of the United Nations plans its activities based on analysis done by its own staff within the area of its competence. For example, the Policy and Analysis Unit of the Department of Peace-keeping Operations (DPKO) "acts as a think-tank, providing in-depth analysis of policy questions within the Department's sphere of responsibility" (A/49/336, para. 62). It appears that after having made the overall plans for their own activities, departments coordinate with each other in the implementation of these plans. While this is an improvement over past practice, which did not include a high level...
of coordination in policy implementation, the Inspectors consider that coordination at the policy formulation stage is essential to develop effective strategies for the implementation of a comprehensive approach to peace and security, which requires increased cooperation between the United Nations and regional organizations.

59. The Inspectors note that the Mission Planning Service of DPKO works in close cooperation with other departments of the Secretariat, United Nations agencies and concerned regional organizations to "design carefully integrated (civilian and military) plans for complex, multidimensional operations" (A/49/336, para. 64). While the Inspectors welcome the efforts of DPKO at the operational level, they nonetheless consider that there is also a need for a continuous strategic analysis of what the United Nations can do and should do as a whole to promote and maintain peace and security, by itself or with other organizations, including regional organizations. The results of analyses done by various departments, not only by those concerned with political and military activities but also by those involved in the economic and social sectors, should, therefore, be consolidated to allow one comprehensive strategic analysis for each conflict area or situation. Such comprehensive analysis should be undertaken by a project team created for a specific area or situation and composed of the representatives of all the departments concerned. The results of such analysis should be used to facilitate decision-making by the Secretary-General and his top aides. The project team should then prepare overall strategies for implementing the plans made by the Secretary-General, and approved by governing bodies. Each department or office should, in turn, base their implementation plans on these overall strategies. In order to assist project teams and to inform various departments and offices on recent developments, the establishment of a small unit may be necessary. Such a unit should be entrusted with a clearing house function (i.e., to act as depository and disseminator of information in a systematic manner) for peace-related activities as well as with responsibilities for providing administrative and technical services to project teams.

60. The Inspectors are concerned that the results of discrete and independent analyses conducted by various departments, no matter how useful they are to serve their own purposes, may not facilitate the Secretary-General and his top aides in taking a proactive approach and long-term planning from the strategic perspective. The Inspectors were informed by the Secretariat that elaborate consultative arrangements have been made by DPKO, the Department of Political Affairs (DPA) and the Department of Humanitarian Affairs (DHA) and, therefore, the small unit described in paragraph 59 above would not be necessary. At the same time, one department stated that the project team approach suggested by the Inspectors would be difficult to put into effect. Owing to time constraints, it was not possible at this time for the Inspectors to examine whether the consultative arrangements among the three departments would address the concern of the Inspectors fully or how difficult it would be to implement the project team approach. However, a JIU report on the strengthening of the capacity of the United Nations system for conflict prevention, which is currently at the initiation stage, will examine these issues.

61. A comprehensive approach to peace and security increases the involvement of regional organizations. DPKO, DPA and DHA all have regional divisions through which liaison with regional organizations is maintained. However, in order to facilitate the dissemination of information to interested regional organizations, the small unit mentioned above should also be responsible for the clearing house function on United Nations relations with regional
organizations in the field of peace and security. This would allow the interested regional organizations to obtain basic information on the whole range of United Nations peace-related activities from one source and be directed to the appropriate divisions of the departments concerned. The function of this unit is to facilitate the initial contact between the various offices of the United Nations and regional organizations. Once such contact is made, regional organizations can work directly with the United Nations offices concerned.

62. Information sharing among the Headquarters departments concerned with peace and security has improved significantly in the past few years. A Task Force established by the Secretary-General includes the Secretary-General himself, his two Senior Advisors, the Legal Counsel and the Under-Secretaries-General for Humanitarian Affairs, Peace-keeping and Political Affairs. It meets weekly. The Under-Secretaries-General of the three Departments also meet weekly, followed by the meeting in which all the Directors of the three Departments participate.

63. There is, however, room for improvement, particularly at the working level, where important information is not consistently transmitted to all officers concerned. Based on the understood link between peacemaking, peace-keeping and humanitarian activities as well as the expected increase in the number of regional organizations cooperating with the United Nations in these areas, there is a need to increase interaction among staff members engaged in activities related to these functions. It is suggested that DHA, DPKO and DPA establish mechanisms to ensure a smooth information flow and increase interaction at all levels. With respect to the working level, they could create a project team or a task force for each conflict area, not only to exchange information and experience but also to help each other in performing their tasks. This would avoid duplication of efforts and increase utilization of the best talent available. For instance, a Political Affairs Officer who has been involved in activities for peacemaking in a certain area could participate in a fact-finding mission of DPKO to the same area; DPKO and DHA desk officers could contribute to policy analysis done by DPA, and so on. Results of the work done at this level should then be reviewed at the meeting of the Directors concerned. It is time for the United Nations to loosen rigid bureaucratic demarcation in order to utilize resources more efficiently and effectively.

64. The sharing of information at the working level outside Headquarters is based on good will and is not institutionalized. Since a comprehensive approach to peace and security would require increased coordination and cooperation not only among the organizations of the United Nations system but also between the United Nations and regional organizations, there is a need to improve information flow at the working level.

65. The Inspectors have been informed by those with field experience that coordination at the field level is sometimes poor, because many organizations are not coordinating their efforts with others. Since peace-keeping operations are increasingly multifaceted, the involvement of regional organizations with different mandates is expected to increase. These regional organizations may be cooperating directly with a United Nations mission or with the specialized agencies in the same area. This would make coordination even more difficult. It is, therefore, suggested that in a large-scale peace-keeping mission with multifarious mandates, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General in the area should be given the responsibility for overall coordination. The United Nations, organizations of the system and regional organizations in the area could create task forces at various levels to facilitate the...
work of the Special Representative to ensure effective coordination in order to maximize the benefits brought about by the activities of all organizations concerned.

66. The Inspectors take note of a recently established policy by which Special Representatives of the Secretary-General are given the overall authority for coordination of United Nations peace-related activities in countries or regions to which they are appointed. Humanitarian Coordinators, who are designated by the United Nations Emergency Relief Coordinator, function under the overall authority of the Special Representative concerned, with responsibility for coordination of United Nations humanitarian assistance for the complex emergency in question. The extent of implementation as well as the effectiveness of this policy in enhancing coordination in the field are still being evaluated. The forthcoming JIU reports on humanitarian assistance will address relevant aspects of these issues.

B. United Nations assistance

67. Many regional organizations lack resources and experience in peace-related activities, particularly in peace-keeping. However, since regional organizations differ in mandates, structure and the size of membership, their needs also vary. With respect to early warning and preventive diplomacy, an area of priority for many regional organizations, the need to strengthen their capacity may be less acute. In fact, some regional organizations seem to have more advanced mechanisms in this respect than the United Nations.

68. Peace-keeping is the area in which regional organizations generally need assistance. Even those organizations with large budgets lack practical experience in planning, launching and managing operations. Furthermore, in launching a large-scale peace-keeping mission with multifarious objectives, many organizations would need external assistance, because, unlike the United Nations, they do not have a network of agencies engaged in various types of operational activities required for such a mission. For organizations which are at the early stage of developing their capacity for peace-keeping, external assistance for evaluating their mechanisms, administrative procedures and structure may be necessary. Some of those organizations with established mechanisms may still need financial assistance to cover the cost of peace-keeping operations. Limited membership may mean lack of the necessary persuasive influence, particularly in a situation where there is insufficient political agreement among Member States or where a regional power is closely involved. In such a case, political support from organizations with universal membership, such as the United Nations, may be necessary for the regional organization concerned to carry out peace-keeping tasks. For regional organizations with specific mandates, such as defence organizations with advanced structure and capability, a clear understanding of their role may be the only incentive necessary for them to cooperate effectively with other organizations in conflict resolution.

69. If regional organizations are encouraged to be more actively involved in the maintenance of international peace and security, it is axiomatic that assistance should be provided to meet their needs. Without appropriate assistance, they may be driven into a quagmire where resources do not match mandates. In this connection, the United Nations has been giving assistance to regional organizations. Resources permitting, its assistance
should be expanded. New forms of assistance should be developed and new sources of funding technical assistance activities should be explored.

70. Certain regional organizations have insufficient resources to mount and maintain peace-keeping operations. One such organization is ECOWAS. In order to assist its peace efforts in Liberia (i.e., ensuring the implementation of the Peace Agreement signed at Cotonou on 25 July 1993), the President of the United Nations Security Council, in his letter of 27 August 1993 (S/26376), informed the Secretary-General that the Council would support the establishment of a voluntary trust fund. A Trust Fund for the Implementation of the Cotonou Agreement in Liberia was thus established pursuant to paragraph 6 of Security Council resolution 866 (1993). Its purpose is to "receive voluntary contributions in order to provide support for the implementation of the Cotonou Accord, including deployment of ECOMOG peace-keeping troops, demobilization of combatants, elections and humanitarian assistance". It is managed by the United Nations and the disbursement of funds is made through the Special Representative of the Secretary-General in Liberia. On 13 July 1994, the Security Council expressed its concern that sufficient financial and other support for the ECOMOG troops had not yet been forthcoming despite the importance of their continued presence in the Liberian peace process. The Council, therefore, called on "all Member States urgently to consider providing financial or material support either through the United Nations trust fund or on a bilateral basis to enable ECOMOG to fulfil its responsibilities in accordance with the Cotonou Agreement" (SIPRST/1994/33, page 2). As of 30 September 1994, the Trust Fund received cash contributions of USS 17.8 million from four donor countries, of which USS 1 million was earmarked for humanitarian assistance. The rest was for the use of ECOMOG, mainly in procurement and maintenance of equipment and rations. In addition, one donor country made in-kind contributions (trucks).

71. In paragraph 10 of its resolution 937 (1994) on the situation in Georgia, the Security Council requested the Secretary-General to establish "a voluntary fund for contributions in support of the implementation of the Agreement on a Cease-fire and Separation of Forces signed in Moscow on 14 May 1994 and/or for humanitarian aspects including demining, as specified by the donors, which will in particular facilitate the implementation of UNOMIG's mandate". The Fund was established on 26 July 1994. Depending on the stipulation of the donors, resources in the Fund could be used to finance certain CIS activities in order to implement the Agreement. It should be mentioned that UNOMIG has received practical support from the CIS Peace-keeping Force when its resources have not been sufficient (S/1994/1160, page 5).

72. Since the United Nations has long experience in organizing pledging conferences for voluntary contributions, it could provide technical assistance and/or facilities to the interested regional organizations for the holding of such conferences.

73. Some regional organizations were not able to raise funds in a timely manner to finance fact-finding missions or activities connected with political negotiations. Delays in carrying out such activities had negative consequences on the peace process. If there had been a revolving fund from which these organizations could borrow to finance their emergency activities, they might have succeeded in diffusing tension and instability. The Central Emergency Fund was established by the Secretary-General under his authority in accordance with General Assembly resolution 46/182 of 19 December 1991. It is "designed as a cash-
flow mechanism to ensure the rapid and coordinated response of the Organizations of the United Nations system for emergency assistance" (ST/SGB/251, para 1). It is financed by voluntary contributions and managed by DHA. With the exception of the International Organization for Migration, which was included in accordance with paragraph 9 of General Assembly resolution 48/57 of 14 December 1993, the users of the Fund are limited to the organizations of the United Nations system. A similar revolving fund could be established, under the auspices of the United Nations, for financing activities related to the maintenance of peace and security. However, since the scope of such a fund is expected to be broad, the Inspectors are not in a position to recommend the establishment of such a fund without a thorough examination of such aspects as the size, type of activities covered, criteria for determining the eligibility to borrow from the fund, funding methods, repayment procedures and so on.

74. One of the mandates of UNDP is to promote the transfer of know-how through institution building. This applies to conflict resolution. Furthermore, peace and security are necessary to sustain development. At the same time, as the UNDP Administrator stated, "lasting peace and security depend on development that eliminates great disparities". Therefore, UNDP is assisting in the area of conflict resolution through institution building. For example, an on-going project entitled, "Improvement of the OAU administrative management capability (RAF/87/101)" has a fellowship component on conflict management, which was implemented in May 1994. An OAU proposal for a new project on conflict prevention, management and resolution, and democratization process is currently under review. In May 1994, the UNDP Administrator stated that UNDP would contribute to the OAU Peace Fund "by providing three million dollars to be used as seed money to strengthen OAU's capacity for the development of the programmes to operationalize the activities envisioned under the Fund."*~

75. The UNDP Administrator stated in his report on the preparation for the fifth programming cycle that the financial resources of UNDP for regional programmes were reduced by 26 per cent as a result of the UNDP Governing Council decision 90/34 to allocate more IPFs to low-income countries (DP/1991/24, para. 21). Therefore, the strategy of UNDP is to set priorities and to develop new ideas and model projects which attract donors. It may also be possible to use IPF funds for regional organizations. For example, UNDP made significant contributions to United Nations activities related to electoral assistance. In the case of Mali, funding from the IPF was released to finance the participation of observers affiliated with OAU (A/47/668, para. 60).

76. Although the General Assembly has recognized that the training of peace-keeping personnel is primarily the responsibility of Member States, it requested the Secretary-General to develop and publish peace-keeping training guidelines, manuals and other relevant training material. It also requested that the Secretary-General review and improve arrangements for training civilian, police and military peace-keeping personnel, using the appropriate capabilities of Member States, regional organizations and arrangements, in accordance with their constitutional mandates and Chapter VIII of the Charter, and of non-governmental organizations and the Secretariat (General Assembly resolution 48/42). Thus, the United Nations is expected to cooperate with regional organizations in improving training of peace-keeping personnel.
77. In accordance with the mandates given by the General Assembly, the Training Unit of DPKO surveys peace-keeping training programmes of Member States, prepares manuals and handbooks, develops curricula for national staff colleges, coordinates training seminars and workshops and provides pre-mission training. It is also developing a programme on demonstration teams, which is similar to "training of trainers", as requested by General Assembly resolution 48/42. After the successful implementation of this programme, the Unit will also be in a position to act as a clearing house for peace-keeping training. However, the target of the Unit is Member States, and it does not have enough resources to provide assistance to regional organizations systematically.

78. The Centre for Human Rights provides technical legal assistance and advisory services in connection with national elections. The Centre's Voluntary Fund for Technical Cooperation in the Field of Human Rights can provide funding for human rights components of electoral assistance. The feasibility of utilizing the Centre's programmes for technical assistance and advisory services as well as the Centre's Voluntary Fund in efforts to enhance the capacity of regional organizations in human rights monitoring should be examined. The Department for Development Support and Management Services (DDSMS) also provides technical assistance in electoral administration. Although the resources of DDSMS cannot be used for regional programmes, its technical expertise in this area should be utilized on an informal basis to assist regional organizations, for example, training programmes organized by other United Nations entities in this area.

79. The International Training Centre of the International Labour Organisation located in Turin, has assisted DPKO in the development of a peace-keeping training manual by preparing the pedagogical design, layout and illustrations. The manual was printed by the Turin Centre and is now being tested at various seminars and courses before being finalized. It is designed to assist commanders of national contingents and their training officers in preparing and conducting in-country training programmes before deployment in peace-keeping operations. DPKO, the Turin Centre and the United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR), have collaborated in peace-keeping training.

80. As the preceding paragraphs indicate, various entities of the United Nations are involved in technical assistance and training in the fields of peace-keeping and related functions. There should be a clearing house for these activities so that interested Member States and regional organizations could obtain information from one source on the assistance provided by the United Nations. The DPKO Training Unit could assume the clearing house function since its training programme covers a wide area of activities. It is also necessary to establish a task force on United Nations technical assistance in peace-keeping and related functions, with the participation of all entities concerned. The task force could be responsible for developing a comprehensive approach to technical assistance including practical steps of implementation. It could also undertake periodic assessment of the implementation, with a view to improving further the way such United Nations technical assistance is provided.

81. In order to include regional organizations in United Nations training programmes on peace-keeping and other peace-related activities, a trust fund could be established. Alternatively, other organizations could be solicited to provide funds for these training programmes. Such funds could be used to sponsor trainees or fellows participating in United
Nations training for peace-keeping and related functions, including those from regional organizations. Until the end of 1994, it was difficult for the United Nations to receive funds from the European Union owing to the need to observe their respective financial rules and regulations, some of which were not compatible. However, the agreement between the United Nations and the Commission of the European Union, which became effective on 1 January 1995, will make it possible for the United Nations to accept contributions from the European Union.

82. Dissemination of information is an area in which the United Nations has long experience. Therefore, it can assist regional organizations to access information on current activities being undertaken by others. The Electoral Assistance Information Network was established in 1992. The Network is managed by the United Nations Electoral Assistance Division in DPKO. The Division produces an annual report on electoral assistance activities undertaken by the Network members. The report should be issued more frequently, not just on an annual basis. A periodic report on the activities undertaken by regional organizations in the fields of peace-keeping and related functions can also be useful as a tool for cross-fertilization. At present, only four intergovernmental regional organizations (the Commonwealth Secretariat, OSCE, OAS and OAU) belong to the Network. The Division should make efforts to reach out to other regional organizations.

83. In the JIU report entitled "Staffing of the United Nations peace-keeping and related missions (civilian component)", it was recommended that regional organizations should be encouraged to second personnel to United Nations missions (JIU/REP/93/6, Recommendation IV (d)). Following the JIU recommendation, it has been reported that regional organizations had been encouraged to second personnel to United Nations field operations (A/48/1945, para. 52). However, there is no evidence that such encouragement was made on a systematic basis. Participation in United Nations field operations by personnel of regional organizations in United Nations field operations can be not only beneficial to the United Nations but also to those organizations in gaining practical experience. Conversely, United Nations personnel can also be seconded to field operations of regional organizations. United Nations retirees with field experience could be sponsored by the United Nations or donors to participate in peace missions of regional organizations.
Notes


3. For example, in 1994 the soldiers of the Ecowas Military Observer Group (ECOMOG) in Liberia were paid about one sixth of the soldiers of the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNAMIL).

4. For example, the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities.

5. To date, the Government of South Africa has contributed US$ 377,840 to the OAU Peace Fund.


7. Wilhelm Hoynck (Secretary-General of OSCE), "CSCE works to develop its conflict prevention potential", *NATO Review*, April 1994, p. 16.

8. Ibid., p. 17.


10. Ibid., p. 2.


13. JIU interviews with the Secretariat staff.


15. Ibid.
### Annex E.1 Regional, subregional and interregional organizations cooperating with the United Nations in peace-managing and other peace-related activities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Members</th>
<th>Primary purposes</th>
<th>Major mechanisms, specialized agencies and mechanisms for peace and security</th>
<th>Areas of activities; actual (potential)</th>
<th>Recent activities</th>
<th>Observer status with the UN General Assembly</th>
<th>Comments on cooperation and coordination</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Organization of African Unity (OAU)</td>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>53 (43 Member States of the United Nations and 10 non-Member States of the United Nations)</td>
<td>General: to promote unity and solidarity; to improve living standards; to extend sovereignty, national integrity and independence; to make all forms of colonialism; to promote international cooperation; ...</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central African Customs and Economic Union (CACEC)</td>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>6 Member States of the United Nations</td>
<td>Uniform: to develop economic integration through customs union, to promote fiscal policies and development planning; (Finance building)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Annex 1.2: Regional, subregional and interregional organizations cooperating with the United Nations in peacekeeping and other peace-related activities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Member States of the United Nations</th>
<th>Primary purposes</th>
<th>Area of activities (actual/potential)</th>
<th>Recent activities</th>
<th>Observer status with the UN General Assembly</th>
<th>Comments on cooperation and consideration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)</td>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>16 Member States of the United Nations</td>
<td>Economic and social development, cooperation and development in economic, social and cultural affairs, to raise the standards of living of the people of the member countries, to ensure and maintain economic stability.</td>
<td>Peacekeeping</td>
<td>Contribution to the adoption of the CEPT Agreement in Sierra Leone. ECOWAS has been playing a central role in the implementation of the CEPT Agreement, including the deployment of peacekeeping forces.</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN)</td>
<td>Asia and the Pacific</td>
<td>10 Member States of the United Nations</td>
<td>Economic and social development, cooperation and development in regional areas and stability. to promote active participation and mutual assistance.</td>
<td>Peacekeeping</td>
<td>Provisional diplomacy; building the Peace of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality. The South-East Asia Regional Peace-building Plan (1993).</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: The comments on cooperation and consideration are marked as 'No' as they are not provided in the document.*
### Annex I.3 Regional, subregional and interregional organizations cooperating with the United Nations in peacekeeping and other peace-related activities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Region/Member States of the United Nations</th>
<th>Members</th>
<th>Primary purposes</th>
<th>Areas of activities and missions for peace and security</th>
<th>Recent activities</th>
<th>Observer status with the UN General Assembly</th>
<th>Comments on cooperation and coordination</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)</td>
<td>Europe (and North America) (53 Member States) and 29 non-member States of the United Nations in Europe (9)</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>Provides mechanisms for human rights, democracy and the rule of law, to strengthen peace, and to promote unity in Europe</td>
<td>Peacekeeping in the former Yugoslavia Republic of Kosovo and former Yugoslavia Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina in cooperation with the UN in the political settlement of conflicts in the former Yugoslavia Republic of Serbia and Montenegro</td>
<td>Participating in South Ossetia Republic of Georgia, Republic of Abkhazia and Abkhazia</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td><strong>Note:</strong> At the 63rd Council meeting (Doc. 1922) it was decided that the relationship between the United Nations and OSCE should be developed further. It was reported, within the framework of the UN, that the practical implementation of the understanding expressed in the footnote to the Agenda, that the General Assembly of the United Nations should be reviewed (Doc. 1015366, page 13, para 91).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Annex 5.4 Regional, subregional and interregional organizations cooperating with the United Nations in, or facilitating and other peace-related activities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Members</th>
<th>Primary purposes</th>
<th>Major mechanisms, processes, bodies and mechanisms for peace and security</th>
<th>Area of activities, actual (potential)</th>
<th>Recent activities</th>
<th>Observer status with the UN</th>
<th>Membership on cooperation and coordination</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Europe Union (EU)</td>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>28 Member States of the United Nations</td>
<td>General to promote throughout the Union a harmonious and balanced development of economic activities, tourism and other voluntary growth and cooperation; strengthening and solidarity among Member States.</td>
<td>The European Union does not have a permanent mechanism for peace and security. However, at Munich on 1 February 1992, it was agreed to develop EUGA as the defence component of the European Union and as the means to strengthen the European Union as the Atlantic Alliance. EC/EU European Community Humanitarian Office</td>
<td>Peacekeeping, peace building, humanitarian assistance</td>
<td>EU Observer Mission in South Africa in response to Request for Mission; Resolution 726(1992)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: "..." indicates the need to coordinate the efforts of regional arrangements and organizations with those of the United Nations. This cooperation is not a goal in itself but aims to be part of the overall strategy for the peaceful resolution of conflicts and the implementation of the United Nations Charter. As defined in "An Agenda for Peace," the two regions or subregions are the only regions involved in these matters. The "no" is not a definitive conclusion, but rather a call for appropriate action. The appropriate amount of training is called for to ensure the adaptation of the appropriate methods to the specific situation. For specific details, see page 58 of...
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Members</th>
<th>Primary purposes</th>
<th>Major mechanisms, organisations and institutions for peace and security</th>
<th>Areas of activities (actual/potential)</th>
<th>Recent activities</th>
<th>Observer status and the UN General Assembly</th>
<th>Comments on cooperation and coordination</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Western European Union (WEU)</td>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>15 Member States of the United Nations</td>
<td>Peace and security</td>
<td>WEU Planning Cell established in 1995. EPSC to be operational by 1996</td>
<td>Peacekeeping, peace enforcement</td>
<td>Monitoring and enforcement of arms embargo at the ARES, monitoring and enforcement of sanctions against the former Yugoslavia in the Eupolex operation</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Th iner Petersburg Conference of 19 June 1992 / Foreign and Defence Ministers of WEU defined the three types of missions for which military units acting under WEU authority could be employed: interdiction, humanitarian and crisis management. Peacekeeping missions include peacekeeping activities of the CCEC and the United Nations Security Council (S/1993/6/Add. 1, page 3, para. 21)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)</td>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>12 Member States of the United Nations</td>
<td>General cooperation in the sphere of foreign policy, in fighting and clipping the illegal weapons, in establishing customs policies, in the protection of natural resources.</td>
<td>Council of Defence Ministers Provisional joint staff for coordinating military cooperation between the members of the Commonwealth</td>
<td>Peacekeeping</td>
<td>Department of the CIS Peacekeeping Forces in Belarus and Russian Federation</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Annex I.4 Regional, subregional and interregional organizations cooperating with the United Nations in peace keeping and other peace-related activities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Members</th>
<th>Primary purpose</th>
<th>Major mechanisms, specialized legislative bodies and mechanisms for peace and security</th>
<th>Areas of activities, actual (potential)</th>
<th>Recent activities</th>
<th>Observer status with the UN General Assembly</th>
<th>Comments on cooperation and coordination</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Black Sea Economic Cooperation</td>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>11 Member States of the United Nations</td>
<td>Encouraging regional trade and cooperation in developing transport and infrastructure</td>
<td>Peace-building</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>- the Black Sea Economic Cooperation is based on the principles laid down in the Istanbul Charter (Ad Hoc). Considered as a model based on economic cooperation, the Black Sea Economic Cooperation is envisaged to contribute to regional and international peace through economic cooperation and development. (A/51/356/Add.4, paras. 1-2). - Economic and social development of the countries of the region and the level of their interaction and collaboration, including economic, environmental, scientific and technological, social and other problems are genuine preconditions for regional identity. (A/51/356, para. 41).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Name | Region | Members | Primary purpose | Major implementing bodies and mechanism | Areas of activity | Recent activities | Observer status with the UN | Coordinator or cooperating and coordinate
|------|--------|---------|----------------|------------------------------------------|-----------------|----------------|----------------------|---------------------------------|
| Organization of American States (OAS) | Americas (35 Member States of the United Nations) | 35 | To promote peace and security, economic development, social progress, and cultural cooperation in the Western Hemisphere | By a series of arrangements in its organs, the OAS has established mechanisms, bodies, and procedures to promote security, economic development, and cultural cooperation | Areas of activity not specified | Recent activities not specified | Yes | OAS
| Caribbean Community (CARICOM) | Americas (15 Member States of the United Nations) | 15 | To promote the establishment of a common external tariff and a common market for trade, to coordinate economic policies and development planning | Essential to promote economic integration and cooperation among its member states | Recent activities not specified | Observer status not specified | No | CARICOM

The table above outlines the regional, subregional, and interregional organizations cooperating with the United Nations in peacekeeping and other peace-related efforts. Each organization is listed with its name, region, members, primary purpose, major implementing bodies and mechanisms, areas of activity, recent activities, observer status with the UN, and coordinator or cooperating and coordination details.
### Annex I/8 Regional, subregional and interregional organizations cooperating with the United Nations in peace keeping and other peace-related activities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Members</th>
<th>Primary purposes</th>
<th>Major mechanisms, specialized legislative bodies and mechanisms for peace and security</th>
<th>Areas of activities, actual (potential)</th>
<th>Recent activities</th>
<th>Observational status with the UN General Assembly</th>
<th>Comments on coordination</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Asian-African Legal Consultative Committee (AALCC)</td>
<td>Africa, Asia, Middle East, United Nations</td>
<td>43 Member States of the United Nations</td>
<td>Legal to consider legal problems relating to AALCC, member countries, and to be a forum for Asia-African cooperation, international law and economic relations.</td>
<td>(Preventing diplomacy, peacebuilding)</td>
<td>AALCC has the initiative to promote a wider role for the International Court of Justice in the context of the peaceful settlement of disputes. It is also engaged in promoting the concept of 'unity' in the context of refugees problems.</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>AALCC can identify and organize the services of legal experts from the Asian-African region to undertake fact-finding missions and other functions related to the peaceful settlement of disputes. It can also provide services and expertise in the field of peacebuilding, such as holding of sessions, drafting of relevant legislation and international agreements, and participating in the administration of justice and human rights measures. (S/2008/6, page 8, para 31)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commonwealth Secretary</td>
<td>Worldwide</td>
<td>50 Member States and 48 Member States of the United Nations (in addition there are 17 observers)</td>
<td>General to promote international peace and order, equal rights for all citizens, and the liberty of the individual, to stimulate international cooperation and social opinion, to help to achieve a new global society.</td>
<td>The Commonwealth does not have a permanent mechanism for peace and security. It establishes, whenever necessary, mechanisms aimed at assisting in the maintenance of peace and the resolution of disputes, e.g., the Commonwealth Action Group on Cyprus, the Mission Group on Peace and the Committee of Foreign Ministers on Southern Africa.</td>
<td>(Preventing diplomacy, peacebuilding)</td>
<td>The Commonwealth Observer Mission in South African response to Security Council resolution 772 (1992)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Cooperation with the United Nations is pursued through the Secretary's observatory status in the General Assembly. There is a constant and close interaction between officials of both organizations. In 1995, Commonwealth leaders were again underscored the need for sustaining Commonwealth support to the United Nations. (S/2008/6, page 31)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Annex 1.9 Regional, subregional and interregional organizations cooperating with the United Nations in peacekeeping and other peace-related activities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Members</th>
<th>Primary purposes</th>
<th>Major mechanisms, specialized legislative bodies and institutions for peace and security</th>
<th>Areas of activities; actual (potential)</th>
<th>Recent activities</th>
<th>Observer status with the UN General Assembly</th>
<th>Comments on cooperation and coordination</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>League of Arab States (LAS)</td>
<td>Africa, Middle East</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>General, to strengthen links between Member States, to coordinate their political stances in such a way as to ensure cooperation between States, safeguard their independence and their sovereignty, to consider all matters affecting Arab countries and their interests.</td>
<td>Arab Unified Military Command, Joint Defence Council, Permanent Military Commission, Arab Defense Force.</td>
<td>Preventive diplomacy, peacemaking (peacekeeping; peace-building).</td>
<td>Mediterranean efforts between the meeting of the Security Council, Mogadishu, 1993, participation in the National Reconciliation Conference.</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>The position of LAS on &quot;An Agenda for Peace&quot; must be based on the principles contained in the charter of LAS, which are complementary to those of the United Nations, in particular those which affirm the right of every State to sovereignty, freedom, as well as their right to growth and development and the need to observe United Nations resolutions.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Annex I.10 Regional, subregional and interregional organizations cooperating with the United Nations in peacekeeping and other peace-related activities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Members</th>
<th>Primary purposes</th>
<th>Area of activities: actual (potential)</th>
<th>Recent activities</th>
<th>Observations and considerations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)</td>
<td>Europe, North America</td>
<td>16 Member States of the United Nations</td>
<td>Peace and security: to maintain peace and extend member countries' freedom through political means and adequate military defence to deter or repel possible forms of aggression against them.</td>
<td>Peace enforcement (humanitarian relief operations)</td>
<td>Monitoring and enforcement of the minefields on former Yugoslavia. Enforcement of a safe zone over Bosnia and Herzegovina. A protector for UNPROFOR.</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*In December 1992, Allied Ministers stated their readiness to respond positively to requests that the United Nations Secretary-General might take to that Alliance members in the implementation of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 757/1992, page 19, para. 27.*

**NATO** undertook contingency planning for the implementation of the United Nations peace plan for former Yugoslavia, including the proposed establishment, at an appropriate time, of an Allied Planning Commission Group, comprising of representatives of those contributing armies and relevant international organizations. [Ref. page 18, para. 9]
### Annex I:11 Regional, subregional and interregional organizations cooperating with the United Nations in peace-keeping and other peace-related activities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Members</th>
<th>Primary purposes</th>
<th>Major mechanisms, specialized legislative bodies and institutions for peace and security</th>
<th>Areas of activities, actual (proposed)</th>
<th>Recent activities</th>
<th>Observer status with the UN General Assembly</th>
<th>Comments on cooperation and coordination</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC)</td>
<td>Africa, Asia, Europe, Middle East</td>
<td>51 Members</td>
<td>To promote Islamic solidarity among Member States, considering cooperation among them in economic, social, cultural, scientific and other fields of activity; to endeavour to eliminate racial segregation and discrimination and promote cooperation; to take measures necessary to support international peace and security.</td>
<td>Relevant policies are made at the Summit and Ministerial Conferences</td>
<td>Preventive diplomacy, peacekeeping, conflict resolution, initiatives to create trust and confidence, economic development and cooperation, and other efforts to promote peace and security.</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Permanent Observer</td>
<td>UIC states: &quot;The view that regional arrangements and organizations should, wherever appropriate, be utilized to contribute effectively to the maintenance of international peace and security. Evolving the concept of regional and subregional organization to aid in the maintenance of international peace and security.&quot; [A/49/559, Add. 3, para. 17].</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** Item "Region" is based on the geographical regions used for grouping Member States in annex II of the United Nations document on the composition of the Secretariat [A/49/559], with some modifications.

**Source:** The Future World Year Book, 1993; Africa, South of the Sahara, 1994; Yearbook of International Organizations, 1993/1994; S/25956 and Add. 1; A/48/403/Add. 1.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of operation</th>
<th>Starting date</th>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Mandates</th>
<th>Mission component</th>
<th>Cooperating regional organization</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UNIFIL</td>
<td>June 1994</td>
<td>Middle East</td>
<td>Supervise the truce in Palestine; supervise the cessation of armed conflict between Israel and Egypt; Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria; maintain cease-fires in the Golan Heights and the Gaza Strip; assist and cooperate with UNIFIL and UNDOF</td>
<td>Military</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMOGIP</td>
<td>January 1948</td>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>Monitor cease-fires in South and Pakistan in the State of Jammu and Kashmir</td>
<td>Military</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNFICYP</td>
<td>March 1964</td>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>Maintain peace and order; from 1974, assist in the security of the buffer zone between Israel and the United Arab Emirates</td>
<td>Military</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDOF</td>
<td>June 1974</td>
<td>Middle East</td>
<td>Supervise the cease-fires between Israel and Syria in the Golan Heights; supervise withdrawal and separation of forces</td>
<td>Military</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNFIL</td>
<td>March 1978</td>
<td>Middle East</td>
<td>Monitor cease-fires and cease-fires in southern Lebanon; assist in the restoration of Government authority</td>
<td>Military</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNIFIL/UNDOF</td>
<td>April 1991</td>
<td>Middle East</td>
<td>Monitor cease-fires and cease-fires in the buffer zone along the Iraq-Iranian border</td>
<td>Military</td>
<td>WEO (non-clearance)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNAVEMID</td>
<td>June 1991</td>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>Monitor cease-fires and cease-fires in the buffer zone between armed forces; observe and monitor elections</td>
<td>Military/police, civilian (electoral)</td>
<td>OAS (election monitoring)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AUOSAL</td>
<td>July 1991</td>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>Monitor human rights and verify implementation of the peace accord</td>
<td>Military/police, civilian (human rights, electoral)</td>
<td>OAS (election monitoring)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MINURSO</td>
<td>September 1991</td>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>Conduct referendum on independence or integration with Morocco</td>
<td>Military, security/police, civilian (electoral, reparations)</td>
<td>OAS (joint mission of good offices with UN in 1995)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name of operation</td>
<td>Starting date</td>
<td>Region</td>
<td>Mission components</td>
<td>Co-operating regional organizations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNPROFOR (United Nations Protection Force)</td>
<td>March 1992</td>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>Monitor cease fire in Bosnian, supervise withdrawal of Yugoslav forces, ensure UN Peacekeepers in devastated and ethnically polarised areas, ensure UNPROFOR's delivery of humanitarian relief in Bosnia and Herzegovina, collect accurate and functioning of Sarajevo airport, place UN personnel including the 12 UN police in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Preventive deployment of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia</td>
<td>EUSOSCE (diplomatic, political, economic assistance)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OHMIZO (United Nations Mission in Mozambique)</td>
<td>December 1992</td>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>Ensure demobilisation and disarmament of forces, and withdrawal of foreign troops, assess and monitor assistance to the organisation of elections, coordinate humanitarian assistance</td>
<td>Military police, civilian, human rights, humanitarian relief</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNPROFOR II (United Nations Operation in Somalia II)</td>
<td>May 1993</td>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>Ensure maintenance of security environment for humanitarian relief operations, reducing by disarmament, foster national reconciliation and restoration of national institutions</td>
<td>Military observers, cooperation in humanitarian relief, civilian, human rights, and political assistance</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMONIAD (United Nations Observer Mission in Darfur)</td>
<td>August 1993</td>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>Monitor and verify compliance with the cease-fire agreement, to monitor reports of human rights violations and to assist to resolve such incidents with the parties involved</td>
<td>Military observers</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMIL (United Nations Mission in Liberia)</td>
<td>September 1993</td>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>Work with ECOMOG in the implementation of the Laposoa Peace Agreement</td>
<td>Military observers, civilian (political, humanitarian, civil, political)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMIS (United Nations Mission in Sudan)</td>
<td>September 1993</td>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>Help the Government in monitoring the activities of all the armed forces involved in carrying out peacekeeping functions, provide guidance and advice, monitor the conduct of police operations</td>
<td>Military, police monitors</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMIS (United Nations Mission in Haiti)</td>
<td>September 1993</td>
<td>America</td>
<td>Help the Government in monitoring the activities of all the armed forces involved in carrying out peacekeeping functions, provide guidance and advice, monitor the conduct of police operations</td>
<td>Military, police monitors</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>EASO (diplomatic, economic, humanitarian, political, political)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Annex II.3 Cooperation of regional organizations in current United Nations peace-keeping operations (December 1994)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of operation</th>
<th>Starting date</th>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Mandate</th>
<th>Mission components ¹</th>
<th>Co-operating regional organizations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UNAMIR (United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda)</td>
<td>October 1993</td>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>Mandate was endorsed in May 1994; contribute to the security and protection of refugees and civilians at risk; provide security for relief operations to the degree possible.</td>
<td>Military assistance to humanitarian relief, military police, civilian police, civilian humanitarian relief.</td>
<td>DAU/diplomatic missions - Support to the Amulfo Task, deployment of UNMIL staff in a mission phase unit.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMEST (United Nations Mission of Observers in Eastern Slavic)</td>
<td>December 1994</td>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>Assist the Joint Commission to monitor the implementation of the temporary cease fire agreement of 17 September 1994, investigate and report on cease fire violations, provide good offices.</td>
<td>Military observers</td>
<td>OSCE (Deployment of the Collective Peacekeeping Forces)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Provide political liaison and coordination services to facilitate humanitarian assistance to the mission area community.</td>
<td></td>
<td>OSCE (Mission in Eastern Slavic States) to monitor cease fire violation and confidence building.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


¹ Excludes civilians engaged in administrative support activities.
About the Authors

**William H. Lewis** is a distinguished political-military affairs specialist with extensive experience in the academic and foreign policy fields. He has served on Presidential Task Forces, co-authored foreign assistance legislation, and, as a senior State Department officer, played a seminal role in establishing the Office of the Under-Secretary of State for Security Assistance (1972-73). Previously he served on the Policy Planning Staff of the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Upon retiring from the Department of State, Dr. Lewis was appointed a member of the faculty, The George Washington University, where he founded and directed the graduate level program in security policy studies. Until 1996, he also was appointed a Senior Fellow of the Institute for National Strategic Studies of the National Defense University, where he played a leading role in conducting research efforts relating to U.S. involvement in peacekeeping operations.

Dr. Lewis has published widely in political-military subject areas and is the co-editor of *Riding the Tiger: The Middle East Challenge After the Cold War* (1993). His articles have appeared in *Foreign Policy, The Review of Politics, The Middle East Journal, Strategic Forum,* and *Mediterranean Quarterly.* He currently serves on the editorial advisory board of three journals and is a consultant for several advanced research organizations.

**Ambassador Edward Marks** is a retired senior American diplomat currently involved in a number of projects and activities concerned with multinational and national management of complex emergencies. These include research and a conference series on the role of civilian police in international peacekeeping under the sponsorship of the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and the Police Executive Research Forum, and design and management of crisis management exercises for the U.S. military as a consultant with private firms. He is an Adjunct Fellow at CSIS and the Center of Excellence in Emergency Management of Honolulu.
While in the U.S. Foreign Service, Ambassador Marks' assignments included Senior Visiting Fellow, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University; Deputy U.S. Representative to Economic and Social Council of the United Nations; U.S. Ambassador to the Republics of Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde; and Deputy Director for Counter-Terrorism of the Department of State. He is a graduate of the National War College and spent a year as a Visiting Senior Fellow at CSIS in Washington.

Ambassador Marks is the author of several works on peacekeeping and the United Nations, as well as articles on terrorism, the professional U.S. military officer, and crisis management exercises. He is currently Chairman of the Editorial Board of the Foreign Service Journal.
The McNair Papers are published at Fort Lesley J. McNair, home of the National Defense University. An Army installation since 1794, the post was named in honor of Lieutenant General Lesley James McNair in 1948. McNair, known as the "Educator of the Army" and trainer of some three million troops, was about to take command of Allied Ground Forces in Europe under General Eisenhower, when he was killed in combat in Normandy on July 25, 1944.

The following is a complete list of McNair Papers. For information on availability of specific titles, contact the NDU Press.

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55. Roman Popadiuk, American-Ukrainian Nuclear Relations, October 1996.
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