GETTING BACK TO BASICS – MILITARY DETERRENCE IN THE “POST” WORLD

By

COLONEL MICHAEL N. SMITH
United States Army

Dr. Charles A. Pentland – QCIR
Colonel Joseph Núñez – AWC
Project Advisors

The views expressed in this academic research paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Government, the Department of Defense, or any of its agencies.

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ABSTRACT

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While most agree that deterrence is better than conflict, in the post-Cold War era most discussion on deterrence has focused narrowly on the changing roles of nuclear weapons. This is a result of the part played by nuclear weapons in the Cold War, and many writers, particularly in America, have no other frame of reference for deterrence. However, if America is to continue to remain engaged in world events, and serve as a global leader, it must re-adjust its vision of deterrence in light of the changed world. America’s national security workers need to understand what sort of world this “post” world is, they must acknowledge the place of deterrence in American National Security Policy, establish a realistic relationship between the roles of conventional and nuclear forces in deterrence, and establish a methodology to emplace deterrence in our national security framework. This work argues that the changed world is more than just “post Cold War,” that we need to educate ourselves about this new world, and the roles of both conventional and nuclear assets in deterrence, and integrate a deliberate approach to deterrence into our national security framework.
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The better equipped the Department of Defense is to fight, the better it serves its role of a deterrent to war.

—Secretary of Defense Robert Lovett

As Americans watched the end of the Cold War on their televisions, with images of the destruction of the Berlin Wall and the passenger trains and loaded Trabants moving West still fresh in our memories, many hoped that with the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union, that the “New World Order” would be one where the scourge of nuclear weapons would be removed. Alas, as with so many ideals and dreams, the utopia never emerged. Instead, the type of threat metamorphosed, and has challenged globally engaged nations to re-examine how they function in the new environment.

It is important to realize that while the end of the Cold War was significant, it occurred on top of a more profound change – “globalization.” Globalization began well before the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, though the opening up of the former Soviet-Bloc countries certainly enhanced the pace of globalization. The paradigm of this age is information, and the propagation and use of information is what is driving “globalization” or “the global economy” or “the third wave,” or any other term one cares to employ. It is this nexus between the end of the Cold War and the exponential acceleration of globalization that presents us with a completely new operating environment.

Yet the vast majority of writings in the United States on deterrence still seem focused on the implications of nuclear weapons. Many writers continue trying to determine how many warheads are needed, what is the best/fastest/most stable way to reduce weapons while at the same time maintaining a deterrent capability that is increasingly less germane to the vast majority of the threats facing the United States. It would seem that in this era of “Transformation” and the “Revolution in Military Affairs” American strategic thinkers and writers have a pre-disposition to think of deterrence only in, or substantially in, terms of nuclear weapons, or they advocate a retreat from deterrence in favor of military action.

There are three reasons for this continued fixation with nuclear deterrence. First, many do not understand the true nature of the world that emerged following the end of the Cold War.
Secondly, the United States has so little recent experience with conventional deterrence (having only known deterrence in the nuclear context), and thirdly the process for developing and implementing a national security policy does not integrate conventional deterrence as a key enabler.

**WHAT MUST BE DONE TO ADJUST TO THE “POST” WORLD**

An objective reappraisal has led to the realization that deterrence now and in the near-term (over the next 20-50 years) is better served by a combination of nuclear and conventional (non-nuclear) assets, which may be employed over a wide spectrum of the operating environment to meet a wide range of both immediate and longer-term strategic objectives. To do this requires an understanding of the 21st century world, an acknowledgement of the roles played by both nuclear and conventional forces in deterrence, and the embedding of deterrence into the national security strategy.

This paper sets out to describe the need to adjust perceptions of what is the nature of the current and near-term future world environment, and why that matters now; discuss the role of nuclear deterrence and explain why conventional forces should be the principal focus of American deterrence efforts; and propose a methodology for how deterrence, and specifically conventional deterrence, could be integrated into a national security policy-making process.

**WHAT IS DETERRENCE?**

*Let him who desires peace prepare for war*

— Flavius Vegetius Renatus

Before jumping into why conventional deterrence is the preferred policy, it is important to discuss what is meant by deterrence given its rather limited focus during the Cold War era.

There are many definitions of deterrence, but this paper will use the one from *Conventional Deterrence* by John Mearsheimer, in which he explains that “deterrence, in its broadest sense, means persuading an opponent not to initiate a specific action because the perceived benefits do not justify the estimated costs and risks.”

Deterrence works on the recipient by the specified or implied threat of credible action. What matters is how the target of the deterrence, not the nation seeking to deter, views the deterrent effort/effect. To help gain such understanding, a good knowledge and understanding
of cultural imperatives, past behavior and decision making is essential. A corollary is that both sides need to have interests that can provide a basis for the deterrence, such as not wanting to interrupt natural resource production, or wanting to protect the rights of a specific minority group or ensure food for a population. The interests may or may not be the same for both parties, but it is essential that each actor understand both interest sets.

Deterrence need not be overt (i.e. the “if you do ‘X’ I will do ‘Y’ theory”), though it must have a specific end-state, unlike “compellence,” which is more open-ended. Deterrence may be indirect, or tacit. In fact it will often be more successful if it is indirect because there is no overt challenge to the actor that is the target of the deterrence effort. However, whether explicit or implicit, it depends on a certainty in terms of capabilities combined with uncertainty/ambiguity in terms of threshold for action/reaction. The object of the deterrence must know (or think he knows) that the capability exists that can be directed against him, but he should not know exactly what the trigger would be to execute the action. A deterrence plan is a dynamic process. Rather like a chess game, achieving the desired endstate may require conducting a series of actions/reactions against the target of the deterrence, which ideally lead to a point where the target of the deterrence’s ‘best’ option is the one the deterrer wants him to choose. Additionally, particularly where the intent is to establish long-term conditions, rather than deterring a single action, it is not enough to merely focus on the target of the deterrence, but planning and execution must be conducted with an appreciation for the effort’s effects on others in the region.

Deterrence works because the cost of action for the target of the deterrence is too high for the benefit gained by the action (or inaction). Costs are usually not monetary but often include, as a minimum, manufacturing/production capacity, societal disruption, casualties (both dead and injured, military and civilian) and resources. This cost may be one that is borne even if there is battlefield success, such as the imposition of sanctions on the “victor” after a conflict (as was done in response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan), the severing of diplomatic relations, or termination of trade agreements. Also, different cultures may assign different values to various costs, and it is important to know what your opponent values.

Determining what assets are valuable to an adversary will require much more rigorous analytical effort at the national level than what appears to be done currently. The United States Army already does something similar at the tactical and operational levels by identifying
the high value targets (HVTs), which give the best return in terms of enemy actions, inactions, and effects, because they are high cost items to the target of deterrence. Identifying such HVTs at the national level enhances the potential for successful deterrence. Even more so than at the tactical level, very specific criteria must be established that determines what those HVTs are, since there are both physical and fiscal limits to the assets available to apply against the various threats.

Since some of these emerging threats (such as terrorist organizations) tend not to have a discrete geographic locale, the deterrent HVT may instead be a node that when disrupted forces a change of plans that makes action more costly. In countering a terrorist group, the interdiction of the group’s supply lines in an adjacent nation is an example of targeting a node that is high value because of the nature of the organization (lack of a robust logistics infrastructure).

It is important to note that deterrence as proposed in this work focuses on extended deterrence. For the United States, it is deterrence of actions against elements with whom the United States is allied with in some manner. There are very few active, direct threats to the national security of the Continental United States, and even where the United States identifies active threats, virtually all of them are located outside the Continental United States.

WHAT CONSTITUTES THE NEW WORLD ORDER?

Some believe that the Cold War ended not as the result of conscious national security actions by the United States and NATO, but either as a result of the internal contradictions of the Soviet communist system, or because of the rise of globalization and its attendant emphasis on market economics and the information revolution represented by the internet. I believe the current “post” world is the product of principally of the collapse of the Soviet bloc and the international communist system and the rise of information access via the internet. As Thomas Friedman described it in The Lexus and the Olive Tree, there is no single phenomenon, but an inter-related series of phenomena, which have reacted synergistically to produce the current world order.

A starting point is to understand, and incorporate within our decision-making, what globalization means in the context of national security. There are too many actors (both state
and non-state) with access to incredible amounts of information, so America’s national security processes must change to accommodate this change, or America will have no national security.

It is said that “those who do not read history are doomed to repeat it” and what reading of history must reveal is that things change, and those who do not adapt to change, perish. Every system changes and leaves behind the carcasses of those who failed to change for the carrion birds of history. Whether it is the French knights at Crécy and Agincourt who failed to appreciate the military change brought by the long bow; the feudal lords who failed to understand the implications of a rising merchant class and the power of money; the Catholic Church which failed to appreciate the implications of a revisionist theology embodied in the Protestant Reformation; the Czarists in Russia who, like the Bourbons in France, failed to understand the power of the people in politics when the masses gain access to power; or K-mart which failed to understand the implications of high overhead costs and slow recapitalisation efforts that left them behind in the age of the super Wal-Mart – those who do not recognize the changes of the period in which they live, and who do not adapt, are discarded. In effect, it is social Darwinism writ large, and the United States needs to adjust quickly if it is to maintain its dominant world position in the 21st century.

Both national and military leaders (and strategic planners) need to understand how the world has fundamentally changed in the past 10-15 years, roughly corresponding temporally with the end of the Cold War, but not as a result of the end of the Cold War. Such leaders understand that the world has changed, but many do not truly understand how things have changed. They think in terms of the Cold War, and believe that the change is simply the shift from a bi-polar to a uni-polar world. The significance of the change is in the growth in both the amount of information that is available to increasing numbers of people, and the interrelationships between what had been discrete disciplines.

The operating environment (hereafter OE) out to approximately 2020 is one that emphasizes the emergence of non-state actors, the increasing importance of ethnic and social divisions, exploitation of terrain sets (particularly urban terrain), increasingly sophisticated actors, and the increasing ability of individuals and groups to both gather and propagate information world-wide via the internet. The ability of individuals to access data, and do something with it, (whether forwarding an article or transferring their savings from one hedge fund to another) without leaving their computer is enormous. Perhaps even more important is the inability of governments to effectively eliminate this sort of trans-national information
Even the People’s Republic of China (PRC), which has one of the most extensive combinations of hardware, software filters and physical “overseers,” is incapable of completely stopping this exchange. As information technology (IT) gets more and more sophisticated, with satellite cell phones linked to high-speed modems, and compression and encryption technology becoming ever more available, the power of the individual will become paramount.

Given this OE, the United States’ current approach in the issuance of broad guidance, which is refined iteratively once a crisis develops, may no longer be viable. There are too many potential crises, which must be averted before they develop, because the consequences may be catastrophic. Given the rise of the power of the individual, or small groups, to influence actions on a global scale, America must reappraise how it will deter. Given the threats from such a diverse group of actors, it is imperative that the United States shows itself to be both discriminate when using force, and strong and relentless in the pursuit of objectives. Conversely, particularly for the military, we cannot merely “do more of the same” using the Cold War model, because missions are already exceeding the capacity for sustained action using that model. The significant advantage available now, which was not available to the Truman administration when it elected to focus almost exclusively on nuclear deterrence, was globalization. The same information age technology that creates such hazards also provides the opportunity for overcoming the hazards. By transforming our process to collect and process the vast amounts of information with the microprocessor based technology available to us, the United States can provide the necessary specificity to the executors of national security.

Transforming our information management processes potentially provides a quantum leap forward in terms of setting the conditions for success, but currently the United States lacks both the force structure and the political will to continuously move military forces as fire brigades from one trouble spot to another, as is being done now. Unless the operational method changes, the United States may soon find that it is militarily on a ‘war footing’ with large numbers of both active and reserve forces deployed continually at a plethora of locations world-wide, requiring significant resources in terms of both personnel and dollars, while emotionally the nation remains on a ‘peace footing.’ Such a policy runs the risk of being untenable in terms of both public support and the budgeting process, as Lyndon Johnson found with his “guns and butter” policy in the 1960s, trying to meet the needs of both the Great Society programs and the Vietnam war. Already there has been reluctance in the past few Congressional sessions to allocate funds beforehand for military missions of indeterminate size and duration.
The FY 2002 supplemental budget (the last one done) was for $14 billion, which was roughly a 4% addition to the amended budget request for $328.9 billion. In FY 2001, the budget of $291.1 billion required a supplemental of $6.1 billion, roughly 2% more, in FY 2000, the $267.2 billion budget, a supplemental of $2 billion, less than 1% more. Such increases cannot continue, and so we must find a more “cost effective” way to conduct business.

In addition, there is no reason to expect a change to this state of affairs in the future particularly in terms of the public support. The Department of Defense is already running into problems with the overextension of forces in current operations. For instance, Army reserve personnel being re-deployed less than one year after returning from overseas; navy battle groups are being extended on deployments to nine months from six, and the Air Force has to depend on Army reserve forces to defend bases within the United States.

NUCLEAR VERSUS CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN DETERRENCE

In the post-Cold War era the nuclear deterrence issue still remains paramount for a vast majority of America’s strategic thinkers, and much has been written on how nuclear weapons can contribute to deterrence in this “post-” world. However most threats (whether nations or trans-national actors such as terrorists) lack a comparable weapon, and most crises are at a level below the threshold of either national survival or of risk to national interests. Knowing, and exploiting, the United States’ emphasis on nuclear weapons as the deterrent of choice provides opponents with a ready-made “asymmetric” capability.

Nuclear weapons played a significant role during the Cold War, but the enormous risks associated with their use, particularly once most nations realized that there was no such thing as limited nuclear war, tended to relegate to them a sort of boundary purpose. Nations would evaluate how far they could push an opponent based on when they thought either a nuclear nation or its surrogate would cross the nuclear threshold.

There are still some situations where nuclear deterrence plays a role, but the situations involve those potentially hostile nation-states possessing significant nuclear arsenals, such as Russia and China. The role of nuclear deterrence remains similar to its role during the Cold War; it serves as a constraint on action by actors by forcing objective assessments of the costs and benefits of employment of such weapons in a given situation. The more successful non-proliferation regimes are, potentially the more restricted the utility of the nuclear deterrent,
though as Louis Delvoie points out, the demise of the Cold War has not relegated nuclear weapons to the dustbin of history, and they still have an important, albeit smaller, place in the international relations kit bag.\textsuperscript{50}

So what prevents the United States from just continuing to rely on nuclear weapons to deter the real threats, the Russians and Chinese, who are the only ones with the combination of large numbers of nuclear weapons and delivery systems to pose a threat to the continental United States? After all, it was good enough for the Cold War, it was relatively cheap, and it is something the United States and other world powers understand.

The deterrence of the Cold War, which revolved around avoiding a crossing of the nuclear Rubicon, was an anomaly.\textsuperscript{51} For the first time in recorded history a nation-state had the potential to defeat an enemy by destroying its homeland infrastructure without recourse to destroying some or all of the enemy’s (or its own) military.\textsuperscript{52} It is hard to understand the significance of this change, because it was the only condition that most of the current generation has known.

Nuclear deterrence dealt with a level of precision and avoidance of ambiguity that was previously unknown, given the potential results of even a single slip (poignantly brought to bear in the movie “Failsafe”), but it also seems to have clouded minds as to the requirement for conventional deterrence.\textsuperscript{53} For many, nuclear deterrence became the only deterrence that mattered, and the standard by which most discussions of deterrence were framed. This was, as Alexander George and Richard Smoke observed, “largely because deterrence theory at the strategic level has been so much better developed in so many respects, there has been a marked tendency for theorists to employ strategic deterrence as the \textit{paradigm case} (authors’ italics) for thinking about deterrence in general.”\textsuperscript{54}

Many professionals felt that nuclear weapons had changed the entire deterrence debate, and that only nuclear weapons had any deterrent value. As a writer on deterrence observed in 1961, “the need to choose between deterrence and defense is largely the result of the development of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons and long range airpower.”\textsuperscript{55} Instead of applying a deterrence construct to conventional forces, American strategists for the most part consigned conventional forces to defending against, or responding to, aggression, rather than seeking a way to use them to deter aggression beforehand. But such forces were only capable of being used to deter the enemy from escalating a conflict already underway.\textsuperscript{56} It can be
argued that this relegation of conventional forces to only being used after a conflict was underway led to the escalatory principle of coercive deterrence seen in Vietnam. While I do not subscribe to this concept, there appears to be a clear lack of acknowledgement that conventional forces had a capacity for deterrence during this period, the height of the Cold War. Some part of this can probably be ascribed to the rise of leaders such as Robert McNamara, who were familiar with systems analysis and felt that by applying it to defense you could quantify the results. You knew what you could launch, could scientifically/mathematically determine loss rates, and knew what level of destruction you could impose on the enemy.  

However, this is not the first time the United States has been in this situation. A review of Eisenhower’s “New Look Strategy” provides an example of where in the past (in this case the post-Korean War period) the world had undergone significant change, but the United States was the only true super power.  

Even in the 1960s, as the United States was attempting to deal with multiple actions marginal to national interests such as Vietnam, the Dominican Republic, and South Korea, the focus remained on the nuclear issue. Though the Kennedy administration oversaw an increase in the conventional/non-nuclear forces (notably in rise of Army Special Forces, and the Airmobile concept), these forces were designed for employment once conflict was occurring, and were not viewed as deterrent forces. In some aspects the acknowledgement of the need for a new kind of fighting force is similar to what is now known as “Transformation.”

Within the United States Army, the concept is known as “the Objective Force” and it is an attempt to organize, equip, man and field organizations that are capable of operating across the spectrum of conflict in the 21st century world. Similar efforts are underway within all the services, and within the Department of Defense, to develop and field forces capable of conducting conventional operations in this new era.

The United States cannot afford to focus only on conventional deterrence of actors who pose a direct and dire threat to America’s national security (i.e. those with weapons of mass destruction and credible delivery means). Such an approach is simply Cold War deterrence by another name, and is almost identical to the approach taken by the Truman administration at the start of the Cold War. It ignores the underlying transformation of the international arena, which has seen the rise of strong trans-national and asymmetric threats. America’s leaders, and here that includes senior members of the Department of Defense (both civilian and military) need to acknowledge and understand the paradigm shift that has occurred, and adjust to it. Otherwise,
they run the risk of ignoring areas and actors that can have a drastic impact on the United States economically and/or politically. 63

However, like the Truman administration, which viewed deterrence against things other than nuclear strike as too complex for the risks and rewards (i.e. bad cost-benefit), up until now the national security bureaucrats/professionals have, as a result of their Cold War upbringing, tended to view the need for deterrence more as something appropriate only for actors who pose a grave risk to national survival. 64 Some recent publications provide some guidance for policymakers, 65 but there seems to be very little substance beyond an acknowledgement of the fact that the world has changed. 66 There are references throughout the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) to the fact that the world environment has changed; however, the fact that the QDR was “…the product of the senior civilian and military leadership of the Department of Defense,” and “…was truly “top down” hints at the possibility that not enough “agents of change” were involved in the process. 67 It is important to understand that America cannot ignore the place nuclear weapons have in any deterrence strategy, or to overstate the ability of conventional forces alone to provide a deterrent capacity. What is likely to be found, however, is an increasingly smaller number of situations that are capable of being deterred by nuclear weapons, since their utility is dependent on well-defined (geographically) targets, in response to explicit threats of mass casualties. 68

Rather like the Flexible Response construct for nuclear deterrence which developed in the 1960s when the administration acknowledged that massive retaliation could not be used as the sole strategic response, the United States needs to use the technologies that are available to develop a capacity for Fluid Deterrence by having a wide variety of force structures and capabilities available to both fight and deter enemies. However, unlike the unintended consequences of Flexible Response, which caused European nations concern that the United States was abandoning its commitment to the nuclear defense of NATO, 69 Fluid Deterrence should enhance nations’ confidence in the ability and the willingness of the United States to support friends and allies against a wide variety of threats, because it brings the United States into an area in smaller numbers, for limited operations, to prevent conflict.

Most senior leaders in the international security studies arena grew up in and studied the Cold War, so it is not surprising that they may view the current world as one not requiring a conventional deterrence strategy. As Dr. Condoleezza Rice stated during the 2000 Presidential campaign, “…I’m not sure a grand strategy is really necessary.” 70 When the person who is now
the National Security Advisor, an acknowledged expert in her field, who served in the first Bush presidency at the end of the Cold War, and who is generally credited as the principal author of the current NSS, makes that statement, it may be symptomatic of a more pervasive issue. Bear in mind that Dr. Rice’s area of expertise is the (now defunct) Soviet Union, and if the sole major threat to the United States was the Soviet Union as during the Cold War, perhaps, as some have written, we could get by without a grand [read national] strategy, since nuclear deterrence had relegated virtually everything else to being a crisis of one type or another.\(^7\) But the Soviet Union is gone, and it is not coming back. There exists a need to gain an understanding of how the world has changed, so that those who are trained in international relations are able to properly apply their skills to the world in which they find themselves.

This is a world unlike that which they (and we) grew up in, studied and practiced their craft in. Americans no longer live in a world where the realist approach (looking at IR in terms of quest for power and political advantage) works as it did in the Cold War, since many of the threats are not traditional state actors.\(^7\) They are terrorists and trans-national criminal organizations, ethnic and religious groups with perspectives and viewpoints not in consonance with international relations theory, which has been based for the most part on a “Westphalian” world where the nation-state was the principal source of power. There are inklings of this in the Balkans, where most people outside the region are unable to understand the interfaces and positions of the Croats, Serbs, and Muslims who have multiple, complex views of history and what is right and wrong; or in the acts of September 11, 2001, when a terrorist organization with a religious ideology principally focused on establishing theocracies in the Middle East chose to attack the United States for reasons which most Westerners cannot fathom.

Rather like the period of the 1950s and early 1960s, this is a transition point, and there are lessons to be learned from those who went before. Just as the Kennedy administration understood the need for a flexible force structure capable of not only nuclear deterrence, but conventional engagement and combat as well, to face a world which was significantly different from either World War II or the colonial period, America needs to objectively assess this new world and adjust to it.\(^7\) This is not an uncharted piece of terrain to tread across—but the ‘coin of the realm’ is deterrence, not mutually assured destruction.

We must use the strength in the management of information (often listed under the rubric of C4ISR – Command, Control, Computers, Communications, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance) to determine in the requisite detail the requirements, in terms of the deterrent
objective, the timeframe for the operation, and the force structure necessary to achieve the objective. This is the Information Age and the application of information technology needs to be made the cornerstone of the deterrent effort, as the Joint Chiefs of Staff have made it the cornerstone of the warfighting doctrine for the 21st century. The United States is the pre-eminent world power in Information Technology (IT), and as our industrial prowess was exploited to win World War II, so America’s technological prowess needs to be exploited to set the conditions for global security in the 21st century.

Books such as Deterrence in the 21st Century, which evolved from a symposium at the United States Army War College, are harbingers of a new way of thinking that re-assesses the role and more importantly, the criticality of conventional deterrence. This book is however a very small piece of the literature available, and much of it is written about nuclear deterrence, or the role nuclear weapons have in deterrence in this century. Additionally, given the pace of change in the world today, America must quickly implement an execution methodology that incorporates the full spectrum of deterrence in American national strategy.

Washington needs a deterrence strategy to mitigate risk without the unrealistic resort to the nuclear threat. Deterrents must be credible, and even with the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction/Effect (WMD/E), nuclear weapons have very little deterrent value—their destructive and residual effect, both physical and emotional, is simply too great. The need is to understand our potential adversaries, determine their goals and exploit their weaknesses, by developing a realistic approach to deterring conflicts rather than fighting them.

ADJUSTING OUR STRATEGIC VIEW

So, how can conventional deterrence be returned to the IR “tool bag” in the 21st century? There are four steps that need to occur. The first step requires establishing a common basis among the national security leadership as to the scope and implications of the change that has occurred in the world over the past decade. Most, if not all, senior leaders probably have varying degrees of knowledge as to what the 21st century world looks like, but it is essential to arrive at a common vision and understanding, so that everyone’s efforts will be supportive of one another. A key is to gain an understanding that this change has little to do with the end of the Cold War, and that it requires a much broader grasp of areas outside the traditional venues of national security (i.e. diplomacy, economics and military power). The currents of globalization were moving well before the Berlin Wall came crashing down in 1989, though their strength
increased markedly as markets opened across the world. Second, acknowledge the important though limited role nuclear weapons play in deterrent strategy, and determine the balance between nuclear and conventional deterrence capabilities and requirements. This will require an appraisal of not only the various threats, but what their motivations and costs are, as well as an analysis of force structure implications. Third, incorporate a methodology into the national security process that applies deterrence and inculcates a concept of deterrence germane to the current and projected world environment. Where appropriate, coalitions and alliances, and the use of international organizations such as the United Nations should be included, particularly with regard to deterrence aspects where the risks and consequences of failure may be less. Lastly, the Department of Defense needs to embrace transformation and ensure that transformation efforts result in a better capability to conduct deterrent missions. Transformation must continue to be implemented not only in the services, and the efforts articulated in the QDR must be intensified to streamline in particular the acquisition processes necessary to field forces appropriate to the 21st century OE.

STEP ONE: UNDERSTANDING THE ELECTRONIC HERD, LIONS, GAZELLES, AND TURTLES

The world is a changed place, and it is crucial to get everyone involved at all levels to understand and internalize that change. International affairs, politics, economics and a myriad of other disciplines are exhibiting rates of change comparable to that expounded in “Moore’s Law.” With globalization, various principles and theories of national security, economics, politics, religion, and philosophy, are being promulgated, interpreted and re-interpreted and changed so rapidly through electronic media (principally the internet) among an increasingly large group of individuals that they, too, essentially embody Moore’s Law. America’s own posting of national security documents on the web highlights the pervasiveness of globalization, and underscores the need for us to understand the implications of this electronic medium that is the infrastructure of this information age.

To achieve the rapidity and depth of change necessary will require a concerted effort by our national leaders to change themselves and to change the organizational ethos of those organizations involved in national security. In the United States Army, the way the leadership in recent years has emphasized major changes has been through the use of the “chain teach” method, where each echelon of leadership personally taught their subordinates specific key objectives. This methodology was followed during the early 1990s with the Equal
Opportunity/Prevention of Sexual Harassment Training (EO/POSH) and in the late 1990s when the Army instituted Values training.  

In both cases, the level of commitment by the senior leaders was expressed by their commitment of personal time and energy to the teaching and it resulted in the message getting promulgated quickly and correctly to the lowest levels of the organization. A similar sort of Chain Teach will probably be required to ensure accuracy and consistency of the message, along with helping to gain acceptance from each echelon of leaders and executors. As in the case of “digitization” in the mid-1990s as part of the U.S. Army’s Task Force XXI experiment, the junior soldiers actually had a better grasp of the situation than the senior leaders, and are probably more prepared to rapidly embrace the changes.

STEP TWO: “WHEN YOU CARE ENOUGH TO SEND THE VERY BEST”

Nuclear deterrence may become the back-up when conventional deterrence fails against an actor that has grown into what William Perry and Ashton Carter call an “A list” threat. Even so, the general utility of nuclear deterrence against an emerging “A list” threat is doubtful because deterents must be credible, which means to many a threat comparable to the former USSR’s capacity for nuclear destruction of the American homeland. Given our strong position on the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, America will be viewed by others as being hypocritical if we routinely threaten (whether explicitly or implicitly) to use nuclear weapons against too many threats. Some actors may see the United States’ continued reliance on nuclear threats as a validation of their utility, exactly the opposite of the intent of our continued counter/non-proliferation efforts.

As Vice Admiral (ret) Cebrowski said in a speech to the Network Centric Warfare 2003 Conference, in January 2003:

In the period of time before 1990, we were concerned about balancing our global interests with homeland security. We balanced it on the fulcrum of mutually assured destruction and containment. It worked well vs. the Russians, but what it yielded was surrogate wars. We lived a useful fiction that depicted all surrogate wars as really lesser included cases, which of course they weren’t… Now we are rebalancing our concerns.

What Washington must do then is seek an optimum balance that provides a broad-based capability, which has applicability in a wide variety of scenarios, so that as many actors as possible are deterred from actions that are injurious to the United States. The QDR mentions
this, acknowledging that America “requires non-nuclear forces that can strike with precision at fixed and mobile targets throughout the depth of an adversary’s territory.” Its shortcoming is the focus on response, rather than on deterrence. Transformation must incorporate the need to achieve a balance between our conventional and nuclear forces so that we can reduce our exposure to “asymmetric” threats by deterring them.

The national security decision-making apparatus must utilize information technology to assist in determining various deterrence vulnerabilities of actors we are confronting, and assess whether the deterrence objective is best achieved by nuclear or conventional deterrence. Computing power and information access gives our policy makers the capability to conduct exponentially more detailed assessments than was possible in previous eras, and that capability must be exploited.

STEP THREE: MAKING DETERRENCE A PILLAR OF NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY

Similar to the view enunciated in Preventive Defense, America needs to view deterrence as one component in a National Security Strategy, neither more nor less important than some other components. While much of the work revolves around the implications of the Nunn-Lugar Act, it is important to note that the authors identified and understood the rise of what they described as catastrophic terrorism and saw the need to deter against that threat. While The National Security Strategy of the United States (hereafter NSS) encompasses much more than merely the Department of Defense (DoD), deterrence is principally a DoD responsibility because it generally involves the application (overtly or covertly/tacitly) of a threat of military action. The logical starting point is the NSS, since it is the keystone document.

Anyone who has read the past couple of editions of the NSS might make a case for the argument that deterrence was discussed. In the current version however, it is only mentioned once in a positive way, and the first time it is mentioned is in discussing the Cold War. In fact, this current NSS discounts the ability to deter aggressors, describing “the inability to deter a potential attacker.” This approach resulted in the enunciation of a doctrine of “pre-emption” which has proven very contentious even against a threat such as Saddam Hussein (who most nations readily admit is a threat to the international community), because it depends upon a subjective assessment of the level of risk to national security. At the end it states that the military is tasked to “deter threats against U.S. interests, allies and friends…” but provides no guidance as to how, why or against what threats. The NSS juxtaposition of descriptions
minimizing the potential benefits of deterrence while tasking the DoD with the mission to conduct deterrence highlights the lack of real strategic coherence in the NSS. This shows up in pseudo-crisis such as the imbroglio with the Democratic Peoples’ Republic of Korea (DPRK) (North Korea) over its nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs.

Clearly every leader in the national security system understands the criticality of the DPRK’s two offensive programs, nuclear weapons and missiles. Yet no discussion of how to deter them from continuing efforts on the program appears anywhere in the NSS. Moreover, now the American administration appears to be floundering as it seeks a solution to a crisis that has really been around for almost 10 years. The US posture on the Korean Peninsula is still framed in terms of “defense” vice “deterrence,” though it is clear that the purpose of the United States Forces Korea (USFK) is to deter the North Koreans from seeking a military solution to re-unification. This scenario also provides a case where understanding what the target of deterrence values (security, respect, fuel oil, and rice) and what the deterrer values (non-aggression, non-nuclear peninsula, non-proliferation of WMD) provide the basis for deterrence.

With the exponential growth of the internet between the time of the Agreed Framework in 1994 and the start of the current situation (2002), information such as weather patterns, drought effects, travel reports, financial statements from Chinese and South Korean companies doing business with North Korea was readily available. Combined with classified information, and information from the DPRK’s web site, enough information was probably available to gain an understanding what was happening within the DPRK. Although the DPRK is a closed nation, it has some limited links, in terms of commerce (primarily selling military technology and hardware), tourism (primarily with the ROK), and ideologically (primarily with the PRC) which could have been exploited had the United States adopted a holistic view to deter the DPRK from pursuing either WMD or ballistic missile technologies.

The Korean situation also points out the need for a NSS that is clear and unambiguous, using terminology that means something (and the same thing) to everyone who reads it. Given the ambiguity in the field of international relations, it is crucial to reduce the potential for misinterpretation by using words like “deterrence” and “defeat,” and phrases such as “collective security” which all have reasonably well-defined meanings. National security documents should avoid words like “engagement” and “shaping” which have no common meaning, and which can be easily misconstrued by those whose historical, cultural and scholarly backgrounds are significantly different from ours.
In some cases America will deter by focusing efforts against actors who may not be the principal targets, but who provide support in some fashion to the deterrence target. The following is a short example of what this means. The United States deploys to country “J” forces that then conduct, in conjunction with the forces of the host country, well-advertised mobile strike operations against fictional terrorist organization training camps. Adjacent to country “J” is country “S,” which tolerates a terrorist organization that has threatened the United States (or an ally) by allowing it to operate training facilities in remote areas of country “S.”

The case above requires a NSS that states objectives of defeating terrorist organizations, deterring those who support them, and retaining the right to act preemptively against credible or immediate threats. Properly articulated, this translates to a National Military Strategy (NMS) that describes the need for a demonstration of deployment/redeployment and combat capability in proximity to country “S.” The Combatant Command and services are then able to properly plan, prepare and execute the mission, because they have been given ample time to adequately resource the mission. When executed, the operation may be enough to convince the leadership of country “S” to withdraw its tacit support for the terrorist organization, causing a series of secondary and tertiary actions, which combine to prevent the terrorist group from conducting any active operations for some period of time. In this example, the policy deters country “S” from supporting organizations that America finds offensive, and the terror organization is deterred from conducting operations because their training effort is disrupted. America avoids the need to conduct a pre-emptive military attack, with all the attendant political and legal issues, and instead builds a relationship with a regional actor (country “J”), and gains valuable training for the forces involved.

A key enabler of this proposed deterrent strategy is basing most of the force in the United States. The world has changed, and America cannot garrison forces around the globe, which we did during the Cold War (as did the Romans and as many European nations did before us).

Three reasons for this are that forward basing is fiscally expensive for both America and the host nation; forward basing elements reduces the flexibility of using those forces for operations outside their geographic location (when was the last time America sent units from Korea to another location for operations or training?); and overseas basing increases the force protection risk, particularly in light of the increasing threat from non-state actors.
The current QDR states a need to "strengthen its forward deterrent posture" and for "a forward deterrent posture" and describes requirements "to depend heavily upon the capability resident in forward stationed and forward deployed...forces," and "places a premium on securing additional access...agreements," which seems to indicate a desire to expand the requirement to have forces forward stationed. The statements above run counter to the front of the document, which repeatedly underscores the continental United States as "the most critical base of operations," and how it is "essential to safeguard...the source of its capacity to project decisive military power overseas."

As recently seen in South Korea, the enduring presence of American forces makes a convenient scapegoat for elements of society who either disagree with American policies, or see a way to avoid having to confront issues within their own society. Spending billions of dollars annually to have American military personnel and their family members be confronted by anti-American protests from the population those same forces are protecting is an issue that must be resolved. Additionally, the presence of American forces even without dependants, as in Saudi Arabia and the Philippines, provides a ready-made sign of "American Imperialism" for followers of people like Osama Bin Laden.

In first months of 2003, there have been discussions of moving elements of European Command (EUCOM) out of Western Europe, where they have been since the end of the Second World War, to either the United States or into Eastern Europe. Additionally, discussion of the use of expeditionary-type forces, which would rotate in and out of forward bases in Europe, has come to the fore. These discussions appear, in many cases, to be fomented by the recent actions of France and Germany concerning Iraq, but their underlying rationale is a lowering of cost to the Department of Defense and the American Government, and an increase in both readiness and quality of life. Rather than waiting on unforeseen political events driving the DoD to solutions, it should be integrating such concepts as restationing back to CONUS, and the increased use of expeditionary forces into a cohesive strategy.

The QDR acknowledges, "the United States cannot predict with a high degree of confidence the identity of the countries or actors that may threaten its interests and security." Uncertainty in forecasting where the threats may arise, combined with the high fiscal, personnel and personal costs in forward basing, makes it prudent to maintain most deterrent forces in CONUS.
Using the Army’s Objective Force concept as an example, the necessary components are already identified to execute deterrence operations from CONUS. The concept is built on employing information systems to maximize the operational capability of deployed forces, while minimizing their actual in-theater presence. As the Objective Force White Paper states, “Installations are the foundation for the Objective Force in 2015…providing seamless support to The Army and Joint force across the full spectrum of operations.” What must be done is to amplify the Army’s concept into both the joint arena and provide details to address the specifics of deterrence operations.

STEP FOUR: COORDINATING TRANSFORMATION TO SUPPORT DETERRENCE

The DoD needs to strengthen its transformation efforts, with an objective of forces manned, equipped, organized, trained and doctrinally prepared to execute missions all along the operational continuum, from deterrence to global war.

DoD’s procurement system requires a clearly articulated vision from the Secretary of Defense (SecDef) and Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) down to the service chiefs and their staffs of the requirements for a transformed DoD. With long lead times, huge capital outlays, and legal constraints, the acquisition bureaucracy is understandably resistant to change, since change may lead to additional risk to the successful completion of a program.

The good news is that both at the department and service level, there is a great deal of command emphasis on transformation. Senior leaders within DoD (both uniformed and civilian) seem to have recognized that the world has changed, and are working to adjust to their new vision of the OE. However, a quick review of the most recent QDR provides numerous instances of where “mixed signals” are being sent. As was noted above, the contrast between the need to have a power projection military, with global reach; the need to increase basing outside CONUS; the acknowledgement that there is a shortfall in strategic lift to support power projection are but three examples. Once a consistent and coherent global vision of what the 21st century looks like permeates the organization.

Additionally, the QDR needs to provide more detail in addressing the requirement for implementing changes to the budgeting and acquisition systems. The foreword allocates only part of one sentence to the resource allocation process and Section VI, which includes an acknowledgment of the need for changing the business processes, overlooks the requirement to shorten the acquisition timelines. Successful deterrence is dependent in part on the new
generation of forces resulting from DoD’s transformation efforts, so the implications of synchronizing the budgeting and acquisition systems with the need for deterrence capabilities are immense. Part of the teaching process must address the unique requirements globalization placed on the acquisition bureaucracy and leaders.

As seen with the cancellation of the Army’s Crusader Field Artillery system in 2002, powerful constituencies both inside and outside the uniformed services react strongly due to strongly held beliefs that the system in question is critical for mission accomplishment. But, as Secretary Rumsfeld stated himself last year, “…even with the significant increase in the budget proposal, these transformational investments cannot be made without terminating some programs.”111 DoD’s transformation chief, Vice Admiral (ret) Cebrowski understands this, expending great effort to further the understanding of what globalization is, and what it means not only in military terms but in economic and social terms as well.112

By taking the four steps listed above, the United States will be well on its way to implementing the most significant change to designing national security since the Second World War. Once the teaching is complete, having established that there is a place for nuclear weapons in a conventional deterrence framework, and DoD’s acquisition system is focused on transformation efforts relative to the new OE, the hard work begins.

INTEGRATING DETERRENCE INTO THE NATIONAL SECURITY PROCESS

As with most undertakings, there is a critical step, which involves the methodology necessary to translate the deterrence mission into the products (from the President’s National Security Strategy down to the Combatant Commanders’ Theater Security Cooperation Plans and Service Chiefs’ Annual Training Guidance) necessary to actually make things happen. What I propose to do is to provide a road map to show how in principle America’s national security team can embed deterrence into the tools of American national security policy.

We will start with the integration of deterrence into the NSS. This is the most crucial component of adjusting America’s approach to international relations, since all other implementing documents build upon the NSS. A short discussion then follows on how the Office of the Secretary of Defense can integrate the deterrence requirements, which are then translated into operational missions by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). In many cases, this merely means a refinement in terms of goals and/or objectives of security cooperation missions currently executed throughout the world.113 The section will close with a short discussion of the
how the services and Combatant Commanders might integrate the services’ force provision functions with the Combatant Commands’ execution.

Figure 1 provides an overview by echelon.

**EMBEDDING DETERRENCE INTO NATIONAL STRATEGY**

- **NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL**
  - Determine the deterrence objective – in terms of time, and effect
  - Specify what “success is”
  - Identify lead and supporting agencies (DOD, DOS, Treasury, etc.)
- **DOD (OSD)**
  - Determine force-structure/infrastructure needs
  - Ensure budgetary requirements are identified and programmed
- **JOINT STAFF/CHCS**
  - Determine the military objectives
    - “How force achieves deterrence effect
    - Specify constraints/limitations, priorities and/or sequences
  - Specify command and control relationships
  - Arbitrate between the service(s) and combatant commander(s)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SERVICE</th>
<th>COMBATANT COMMAND</th>
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<tr>
<td>• Specifies units for each mission</td>
<td>• Coordination with supporting agencies</td>
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<td>• Allocate resources – both dollars and assets</td>
<td>• Coordinate with host nation</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Synchronize personnel, infrastructure, force modernization, and training schedules</td>
<td>• Determine “operational” missions:</td>
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<td>• Tactical mission with host nation</td>
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<td>• Deterrence mission in support of the NSS/NMS</td>
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**FIGURE 1**

THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL (NSC) First and foremost, the NSC needs to clearly identify the deterrence objectives that support a national security strategy, not simply short-term goals. With senior policy makers, principally the National Security Advisor, understanding both the nature of the 21st century world, as well as where the administration wishes to focus its efforts, the key component is the staff work.

The National Security Advisor or deputy will need to be personally involved to ensure a clearly articulated vision results in very specific deterrence objectives. The NSC oversees the assimilation of a great deal of intelligence, from all executive departments, in much greater
detail than in the past. Through an iterative process, with recurring guidance sessions from the NSC principals, the deterrence objectives can be integrated into the NSS, providing a linkage between whatever the short-term goals are (those from 6 months to 2 years in the future) with the real strategic goals (those more than 2 years in the future).

The NSS must specify the requirements for deterrence, using very precise language when describing who and where (and perhaps even when) America intends to deter. In some cases the deterrent objective may not be explicitly stated, so language is critical, which is one of the reasons why principals need to be involved. There must be an understanding of what messages are to be “sent” by the NSS, and the specific language used must be precise enough to convey the exact meaning to the various target audiences. Knowing how the target of the deterrence will likely react may drive the how obvious the language is, or whether the specifics are left for a classified supporting document. This is not something to be left to an action officer, regardless of how gifted, but must be done by those with senior level experience and responsibility. This description needs to be framed both geographically and ideologically, so that it is appropriately clear to executors, friends and foes what America’s intentions are.

An effective NSS is the first step in deterrence; it describes deterrent activities in terms that mean something to the intended subject of the deterrence, as well as to the agency of government tasked to be the lead agent. America’s national security community must acknowledge that various actors, whether nation-states or drug cartels or other hostile groups, have an infrastructure and leadership hierarchy that collects information from the United States, processes it, and determines the implications for that particular actor. In this global information age, America needs to maximize the information flow to our advantage and start setting the stage early.

The first component in integrating deterrence into the NSS is developing detailed intelligence products that address what the threats are, why they pose a threat, what their decision making processes are, what actions(s) would deter them from presenting a threat, and any restraints or other considerations (including timeframes and impacts on allies). This sort of comprehensive intelligence assessment requires a synchronization of efforts, which is in line with the original intent for the NSC upon its establishment in 1947. As a policy integration mechanism, the NSC must start with “primary sources,” the intelligence that each of the departments can access. As the integrator, the NSC would ensure appropriate collection and
analysis efforts were undertaken to provide comprehensive, detailed information on potential, emerging or continuing threats to national security.

Using these intelligence estimates as a start point, the staff would then rank-order the threats, based on the consequences of the threat action, the likelihood of the threat action, and the ability to deter the threat action. As part of the process, there would need to be a line established, above which would be the “must deter” threats and below which would be the “should deter” threats. The reality is that there will be more threats than Washington is capable of addressing, but only a discrete number will pose sufficient threat to require deterrence. As part of the process, the National Security Council Principals Committee (NSC/PC) would provide guidance as the list was developed, and would determine when it was ready for presentation to the President. This prioritized list would then need to be approved by the President, and then the NSC staff would begin the process of assigning deterrence objectives, for inclusion in the NSS itself or as a classified support document.

As part of the process the various departments, such as Defense or Treasury, would have an opportunity to provide input as to what they can reasonably be expected to do. The NSC Deputies Committee (NSC/DC) would provide the venue for agencies to have input into what their capabilities are, and what they might feel is a mission suitable for their department or agency. Using the NSC/DC also enhances the interagency nature of deterrence, encouraging a team approach to problem solving which leads to cooperation from the top down.

As a result of this, deterrent objectives, which delineate the agencies that are tasked to be responsible for accomplishing the deterrence, what is the target of the deterrence, and (if appropriate) when the deterrence needs to be accomplished is developed and briefed to the principals group. Timing may be critical in some cases, because synergistic effects may need to be achieved by simultaneous or concurrent deterrent operations, thus reducing the level of effort necessary to achieve the deterrence. Conversely, deterrent operations may adversely affect one another, or one operation may be dependent upon the successful completion of another deterrent operation. The NSC/PC would bear responsibility for providing the staff approval of the deterrent objectives, and the timing of actions if necessary. The final proposal would need to be briefed to, and approved by, the President to ensure it meshes with his/her vision of the current global environment and where he/she intends to focus the administration’s efforts over the next several years.
Given the fiscal and operational realities, it is possible, even probable, that some deterrent missions will not be accomplished. While recognizing this, the important issue is to make reasonable decisions as to what to deter and what to ignore. Such assessments would be predicated on a sound understanding of the relative risks—a critical function of intelligence.

Some of those threats that America chooses to ignore may however become crises that require action. But, given the preceding prioritization and detailed capability assessments, at least the threats would be “on the table” in priority, and there would have been a rudimentary analysis of the implications of each discrete threat in terms of other known or projected threats. This work in advance mitigates the risk of attempting to deal with crises as discrete events, ignoring or forgetting the often-significant secondary and tertiary effects generated by such crises.

National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) 1 assigns the NSC/DC responsibility for “prompt crisis management,” so the involvement of the NSC/DC in determining what is above the line and what is below the line enhances the ability of the NSC/DC members to provide timely and accurate recommendations during times of crisis. The Korean nuclear crisis provides an example where, had a deterrence assessment been made before the north Koreans announced they were continuing development of nuclear weapons, senior leaders would have at least had the rudimentary guidelines as to the implications for the United States, South Korea, Japan, China, the International Atomic Energy Agency, and the Agreed Framework. Thus, the administration would have been able to provide a cohesive and comprehensive response, without seeming to waiver back and forth on the actions to be taken, or not taken.

Once the NSS is approved, and more likely while it is still being staffed, each agency staff would be conducting a similar staffing action, further refining intelligence to provide the requisite detail to determine force requirements and actions. In the case of the DoD, the intelligence estimate would allow decisions to be made as to who the supported and supporting commanders would be, and what the likely force packages would be to execute the mission(s).

THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE: There are two components to DoD: the civilian staff, the Secretary and his civilian deputies who are responsible for resourcing and guidance, henceforth the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD); and of the Joint Staff (JS) who are the uniformed executors. The process is overlapping at times in function, and both sides have to provide continuous input to one another to produce the high quality products necessary for
successful execution of any missions. From the OSD perspective, an analysis of assets (forces and infrastructure) would be necessary in a given timeframe to execute deterrent missions desired in the NSS. This analysis would need to be incorporated into the Defense Planning Guidance (DPG), as well as into the QDR.

Within the OSD the principle mission will be to ensure the proper resourcing of the deterrent missions, in concert with any other missions specified by either the NSS or Public Law. If the NSS’ focus is correct, the impact on the DPG and QDR will be to drive a more long-term vision of where the DoD’s emphasis is to be, and less on the immediate future. Such a focus is in contrast to the current QDR, which makes numerous references to September 11, 2001 and the threat posed by terrorists and other trans-national/non-state actors, but provides little guidance on what the DoD must do, and how it must do it, to achieve a long term global objective of a stable global environment encouraging freedom, democracy and free market economies, which are three key goals of the current NSS.

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF: The joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) staff would have the mission to synchronize the NSS, the DPG and the QDR, and operationalize it for combatant commanders. The joint Staff would also coordinate with the services to ensure that the services were capable of supporting the missions assigned to the combatant commands. This would be done within the context of the Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS).

The principle venue for the Chairman, JCS to provide guidance to the Secretary of Defense, the President, Combatant Commanders and Service Chiefs, is the National Military Strategy (NMS), which should be issued every four years as an adjunct to the NSS. While the QDR serves as an overarching DoD-wide document, the NMS provides refinement and guidance for Combatant Commands and services to know the missions and priorities.

One of the principal NMS functions is to provide advice to the President, the NSC and the Secretary of Defense; it provides a feedback mechanism to ensure guidance is being transmitted correctly. The services’ and Combatant Commanders’ operations directorates would all be intimately involved in developing the NMS, to ensure reasonable estimates of what missions would be executable were provided via the NMS to the NSC staff. The unclassified NMS is read by most (if not all) foreign governments, and probably by some of the more sophisticated trans-national actors, so it provides a venue for additional dissemination of the deterrence objectives to the targets of such deterrence.
Further refining the guidance in the NMS, the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) would assign deterrent missions to specific combatant commanders, along with any specific implementing guidance, such as sequencing. Specific goals (both minimum and desired if appropriate), any guidance on how to know that the deterrence objective is achieved, command and control relationships, and specific guidance to the services regarding the provision of forces to the missions would also be included in the JSCP.\(^2\)

The JSCP will be the most difficult document, because it will need to identify discrete, quantifiable results so that the combatant commander knows when the deterrence objective has been met. The current planning horizon for the JSCP is based on “completed program and budget” actions that are addressed in the Future Years Defense Plan (FYDP).\(^2\) The FYDP provides an acceptable planning horizon (4-5 years) for deterrence missions, and is integrated within the current Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS).\(^2\)

The DPG should not merely focus on warfighting.\(^3\) It would be expanded to provide guidance on how much of the force would be used for deterrence, how much would need to remain uncommitted operationally at any given time to deal with crises, and how much would be conducting the training and maintenance (both of equipment and personnel) necessary to prepare a force for operational missions.

The DPG would also be required to provide guidance on any criteria for deleting deterrence missions based on emerging crises. This step would help mitigate the risk of being so engrossed in deterrence that leaders look up one day and find that there are no forces, or insufficient forces, to execute the primary mission of a military, -- to fight and win the nation’s wars. The DPG would, like the NSS, need to specifically address the deterrence objectives to continue to maintain the appropriate focus for the services as they execute their budgetary planning. Ideally, developing an appropriate deterrent strategy would eliminate the need for budget supplementals to support crisis operations. Two of the past three supplementals have had in their titles the names of crises (Kosovo, East Timor and Terrorism), which DoD was responding to.\(^3\) The Joint Planning Document (JPD) is the primary means to alter the DPG,\(^3\) and the JPD is one of the four components of the JSPS.\(^3\) The JPD builds on and supports the NMS by addressing budgetary and programming requirements to support the NMS.\(^3\) It is crucial that deterrence planning be embedded in the NMS, so that there is linkage to the DPG, which then gets the missions programmed.\(^3\)
As part of this staffing process, the Joint Staff, the combatant command staffs, and the service staffs validate their current status and transformation plans against the requirements projected in the NSS. This validation serves to highlight any mismatch between force structure/capabilities and requirements for deterrence.

A big-ticket program or system having no deterrence value is seen as a budgetary burden, rather like the Army’s Crusader artillery system, which was designed against the Cold War paradigm, but which had little value in the future OE, and was eventually cancelled. The validation would also reinforce the requirement for multi-purpose forces and assets capable of full spectrum dominance in line with Joint Vision 2020 (JV2020).

JV2020 already incorporates the idea that the military force must be “persuasive in peace” which is the essence of deterrence, but the idea does not appear to be developed in detail. JV 2020’s mandate is to:

…describe the operational concepts and capabilities anticipated of future joint forces. It provides a conceptual template for conducting future military operations and establishes a common azimuth for the services, combatant commands, Defense agencies, and Joint Staff as they develop plans and programs to evolve the joint force to meet future warfighting requirements.

JV 2020 provides the long-term outlook, and by specifically articulating the deterrence requirement as an equal to warfighting, would bring the deterrence requirement to the forefront. The current JV 2020’s focus is on “fighting and winning the Nation’s Wars,” with virtually no discussion of deterrence. In fact, the word deterrence appears only one time in the speaker’s notes of the Joint Vision 2020 briefing from the Joint Staff, and never on any of the slides. Such an omission leads one to believe that deterrence is not as important of either combat or Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) such as peace keeping or peace enforcement. “Deter War” is listed as a “General US Goal” in the JV2020 document, but that is much too broad a term, and the examples include such things as Peace Enforcement, Counterterrorism, Raid, Show of Force and Nation Building, many of which the United States conducts in response to a crisis, rather than to prevent one. This approach presupposes that the United States is reacting to something, rather than operating proactively.

The Joint Staff needs to develop a schedule of deterrent missions, the listing of supporting and supported commanders, and what the objectives are for the deterrence missions. This could be an enclosure to the JPD, either by inserting it in Chapter 2 “Joint Readiness,” or
Chapter 9, “Future Capabilities,” or by adding a new chapter that specifically is titled “Deterrence Missions” under the purview of the Operations Directorate (J3).

**COMBATANT COMMANDS AND SERVICES:** Both the Combatant Commands and the services are intimately involved in the processes that lead to the development of the all the documents discussed above in the Joint Staff section. This provides a critical component by having both the war fighter (the combatant command) and the force provider (the services) working on parallel axes to accomplish the mission.

**COMBATANT COMMANDS:** A benefit for the Combatant Command is that it provides a list of forces that will be available to conduct operations in theater. This is not much different from what is done now, with one notable exception; the provision of forces is based on the execution of deterrent missions in support of the NSS and NMS, not merely to exercise with a regional power or powers. The Combatant Commander’s *Theater Security Cooperation Plan* (TSCP) would be the logical product for addressing holistically the deterrence requirements, since the TSCP(s) build from guidance in the JSCP for “peacetime engagement” already.

**SERVICES:** The benefit for the services is that it provides a more reliable schedule of when forces and what forces will be deployed in support of missions. Ideally, as the various staffs are building the FYDP, they are conducting collaborative planning to determine force requirements, which, from the services perspective includes those forces not deployed that are undergoing training, refitting or force modernization. Force modernization in particular, can be very disruptive to organizations, and involves not simply handing over equipment, but often includes organizational changes, and will usually involve a period of detailed training to optimize the ability of the organization to employ the new equipment.

This process would allow DoD, the JCS and the services to integrate deterrent missions into the service training programs as part of their overall programs. Such integration would have significant benefits for the services by allowing them to better forecast financial obligations, better manage personnel turbulence, and allow them to integrate established training doctrine with operational requirements. This would reduce the friction between the timelines for training programs (using the U.S. Army’s *Field Manual 7.0 Training the Force* as an example), and the need to accomplish known real-world missions. Given the planning timelines in FM 7.0, providing the deterrent guidance in the NSS would integrate well with the requirement to issue...
planning guidance at each echelon of command, as well as overlapping the training planning horizons.\textsuperscript{143}

What results from the process described above is a coherent understanding from the SecDef down through the Combatant Commanders and Service Chiefs of the deterrence missions, and an integration of new requirements into the current PPBS cycle. It would also, for the first time, integrate the transformation efforts of both DoD and the services to provide capabilities for the future OE, while synchronizing the implementation of those capabilities through force modernization plans that are designed in concert, not conflict, with operational requirements.

Below are two short ‘case studies’ to present scenarios on how a conventional deterrence strategy and methodology might be executed in the near future. The scenarios describe the linkage between the various echelons to result in the conduct of a mission in support of a specific deterrent goal.

**Sub-Saharan Africa:**

For this example, the United States has determined that the deterrent goal, stated in the NSS, is to reduce internal threats within nations currently attempting to establish democratic institutions, and to demonstrate the United States’ resolve to support such governments against both internal and external threats.

The DoD and JCS determine that Chad is a nation which meets the conditions, having a weak democratic government that is battling an insurgency sponsored by Libya, and program funding to execute two missions in the next 18-24 months to Chad, conducted by Army and Special Operations forces under the command of the European Command (EUCOM) combatant commander. The NMS includes a specific requirement to “conduct tactical operations in Chad which convey to other regional powers, specifically Libya, that the United States is able and willing to rapidly provide forces to support Chad’s government in countering insurgent operations supported by outside agencies.” The EUCOM commander, in conjunction with his Army and Special Operations component commanders, determines where the forces should come from, and determines training and resourcing requirements to execute the mission. As part of the staffing, EUCOM and the services would determine the actual force requirements, so that both commands could properly resource the requirements. A timeline for taking and relinquishing control of the unit(s) would also be established.
In their annual training and budgeting documents, the Service Chiefs program resources, and specify tactical missions to be conducted to support the mission; to include if necessary identifying the major command that will provide the force. For the Army guidance this might include training that culminates in a Mission Rehearsal Exercise (MRE) at the National Training Center or Combat Maneuver Training Center to validate their level of proficiency.

**South America**

In this case, the United States has determined that the deterrent goal, stated in the NSS, is to reduce internal threats within nations currently attempting to reduce the growth of coca (used in the production of cocaine) by supporting their internal security and agricultural/economic programs, and to demonstrate the United States’ ability and willingness to support such governments’ efforts. The Department of State (DoS) is the lead agency, with Agriculture and Defense as supporting agencies.

The DoS determines that Bolivia is a nation that meets the conditions, having a less well-entrenched drug cartel than Colombia, moderate democratic institutions, and limited a transportation network that forces the cartels to use aircraft for delivery. The potential for success is rated as good. DoD and JCS, in consultations with the DoS determine what assets would be appropriate, given the combination of military, economic and agricultural efforts, and funding is programmed to execute three missions in the next 18 months, conducted by Special Operations (to conduct counter-insurgency training for/with the Bolivian military), Army Civil Affairs elements (to build/repair infrastructure to allow farmers to transport goods to/from market towns), and Air Force elements (to train with the Bolivian Air Forces in air superiority missions to discourage drug traffickers from using aircraft to transport coca products out of Bolivia. The forces would execute missions under the command of the Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), the combatant commander.

To counter a trans-national threat such as the drug cartels, there is a need to look at the regional implications of the effort. Unlike Libya above, the cartel has no defined geographic location, so it can simply shift operations to another country such as Colombia, Peru or Ecuador (the “balloon effect”). As discussed earlier in the work, this deterrence effort would need to take a long term, regional approach, with an understanding of the implications for all the regional actors – each of which might need a slightly different deterrent approach.
The NMS includes a specific requirement to “conduct short notice deployments of forces to conduct missions to support the government of Bolivia’s counter-narcotics campaign through tactical training and operations and by rebuilding infrastructure to reduce the costs (in terms of time and effort) for farmers to deliver legitimate products to market towns.” These missions will serve to demonstrate the United States’ commitment to both the Bolivian government and the Bolivian to support their development of a viable, legitimate market-based economy. The SOUTHCOM commander, in conjunction with his Army, Air Force and Special Operations component commanders, determines where the forces should come from, training and resourcing requirements. SOUTHCOM and the services jointly determine the actual force requirements, so that all commands could properly resource the requirements. A timeline for taking and relinquishing control of the unit(s) would also be established. Given the complexity of the operation, synchronizing the efforts of three components, SOUTHCOM might also conduct a series of planning conferences at its headquarters in Miami with representatives from DoS, Agriculture and the Bolivian military/government. A standing regional multi-national force could also provide the core for any military deterrence effort. Such a standing organization would provide a significant deterrent to trans-national threats by reducing their ability to find sanctuary merely by crossing a national boundary. There would also be an incentive for smaller nations, by giving them a venue to influence the actions of a major power, such as the United States, by providing assets.

In their annual training and budgeting documents, the services program resources, and specify missions to be conducted to support the mission; to include if necessary identifying the major command that will provide the force. For the Army this might include training that culminates in a Mission Rehearsal Exercise (MRE) or in a specific training exercise orchestrated by experts on Central and South America and the Caribbean.

CONCLUSION

The United States enters the 21st century as the pre-eminent global power. We must adjust our national security strategy to meet the demands of the information age. Americans must understand the world we find ourselves in. National security experts must assess how we can do deterrence, looking at both the nuclear conventional relationship, and at what sort of path DoD’s transformation efforts should take. Lastly, we must embed deterrence into our national security decision-making processes.
Globalization is a phenomenon that sets the conditions for the world we will live in, that it both increases the risks to the United States by empowering individuals with extraordinary abilities via the internet, and increases our ability to mitigate risks by using computing power and information management to provide the best possible deterrent force for the United States.

Deterrence now and in the near-term (over the next 20-50 years) is better served by a new balance between conventional and nuclear assets, capable of being employed over a wide spectrum of the operating environment to meet a wide range of both immediate and longer-term strategic objectives. By understanding the 21st century world, and acknowledging the roles played by both nuclear and conventional forces in deterrence, the necessity to embed conventional deterrence into the development of a national security strategy becomes clear.

The costs and benefits of both conventional and nuclear assets, for planned, prepared and executed deterrent missions (as opposed to unforeseen, unplanned, and unbudgeted crises) can provide realistic estimates of resource costs (in terms of dollars, personnel tempo, and operational tempo). DoD can then more accurately determine a force structure (some of which, like the Objective Force, is already being developed) that is both affordable and reasonable given the threats anticipated in the 21st century. Emphasizing deterrence also increases the potential for international support, because both friends and allies will feel that the United States is striving to stay engaged, and is not seeking to exercise unilateral military power. If interagency cooperation becomes the standard at both the cabinet principal and action officer levels as a result of the necessary collaboration on producing the NSS, Washington's message will be broader in appeal to actors and more homogeneous in presentation by all members of the administration.

Adjusting our transformation visions for both the DoD and the services embeds deterrence in our programs. The DoD has identified the need to transform, and the services are all executing transformation efforts, what is needed is to ensure that those efforts yield results consistent with the requirement to conduct deterrent missions, whether in terms of equipment, organization, doctrine, or manning. Once everyone understands the nature of the changed environment, the national security policy makers will need to articulate that vision within the NSS, and embed within the NSS a requirement to deter where possible. Deterrence provides the overarching “why” for many of our missions on the operational spectrum.
DoD (in the personas of the OSD and military staffs) can then embed deterrence into the policy documents that drive the DoD from both an operational and a fiscal perspective. The relationship between objectives and resource constraints is the most crucial one, and one which can be addressed only by ensuring that deterrence requirements are addressed in all the documents. Only by internalizing the requirement in a process can it be successfully (and quickly) applied to American policy-making.

The amount of change needed can be measured in degrees. By focusing and refining our efforts, we can gain a far greater capability. Once deterrence is embedded and integrated into the complete strategic cycle, encompassing strategic guidance and programming, planning and budgeting, force modernization and training, America’s dominance in warfighting will be matched or exceeded by its prominence in deterrent operations. In terms of both intellectual capital and systems or processes, America’s national security and defense establishments are clearly capable of executing the small changes suggested here both effectively and efficiently.

In the words of Sun Tsu, “supreme excellence consists in breaking the enemy’s resistance without fighting.” A comprehensive, properly executed deterrent approach ultimately results in less expense and fewer service members being sent in harm’s way. All that is required is for the new mission to be given.

Word Count= 13,347
1 Thomas L. Friedman, *The Lexus and the Olive Tree* (New York, NY: Anchor Books: 2000), 7-16. Friedman makes the point, albeit indirectly, that globalization has been going on throughout history, although the rise of computing power and the internet have significantly enhanced the pace, and the explosion of “simultaneity” in globalization coincided with the end of the Cold War.

2 Ibid, 7.

3 As an example of this pre-disposition to think principally in terms of nuclear terms, one needs look no further than the recently published *Deterrence in the 21st Century* (Ed. Max Manwaring). In the second section of the book, entitled “Rethinking Problems and Responses,” three of the six articles deal with nuclear weapons/deterrence. The book does however, provide some very good points on how the world has changed, and makes an effort at understanding the current/emergent global environment and the place deterrence has in America’s future.

4 Daniel Goure, “Nuclear Deterrence, then and now,” *Policy Review* (December 2002/January 2003); available from <http://proquest.umi.org>; Internet; accessed 30 January 2003. This article acknowledges the significance of the change to the world order, but focuses completely on the role of nuclear weapons, which are viewed as the only strategic deterrent for the United States.

5 *Transformation Study Report Executive Summary* (Office of the Secretary of Defense, Washington, D.C., 2001), 3. Transformation is defined as “…a process of change that involves developing new operational concepts, experimenting to determine which ones work and which do not, and implementing those that do.”

6 Elinor C. Sloan, *The Revolution in Military Affairs* (Montreal & Kingston; McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2002), 3. Sloan provides numerous definitions of “RMA,” any one of which is appropriate for this discussion. The consistent theme is one of significant change in the conduct of military operations relative to adversaries, due to technological, doctrinal, or organizational changes.


8 While many writers talk in terms only of a “post-Cold War” or “post-9/11” world, the world that we currently live in is not formed by any such singular event. It is instead a combination of a plethora of “posts:” post-Cold War dissolution of the Soviet Bloc, the post-industrial age emergence of the “information age,” and the post 9/11 terror attacks which have seen the United States and others embark on a long-term campaign against international terrorist organizations. Thus, to talk in terms only of “post-Cold War” or some other specific event is, I believe, too limiting a construct.

9 While “near-term” can have different ranges in time, depending on the context, for the purposes here it will mean a time frame up to approximately AD 2050. This planning scope provides a good horizon for assessing technological potential and the acquisition, and strategic planning in the United States.
Louis Delavoie, Senior Fellow at the Queen’s Centre for International Relations reiterated many times that the idea of deterrence was well established in the past, as noted by this quote from the Roman General Flavius.

John J. Mearsheimer, *Conventional Deterrence* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983), 14. David E. Johnson, Karl P Mueller, William H. Taft, V, *Conventional Coercion Across the Spectrum of Operations – The Utility of U.S. Military Forces in the Emerging Security Environment* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corp.; 2002), 16. With minor variations, this definition is used in the vast majority of writings on both nuclear and conventional deterrence, and it provides a description totally divorced from any specific method, force or time period. Also, deterrence can be categorized as either “accommodation,” which is positive, offering incentives for compliance; “punishment,” which threatens to impose high costs for failure to comply; and “denial,” which seeks to convince the adversary that resisting the demands is futile. Stephan J. Cimbala, *Strategy After Deterrence* (New York, Praeger Publishing; 1991), xii. Deterrence as defined here incorporates the concept of “dissuasion” which is defined as “the credible threat to prevail in battle or to deny the opponent a military victory at an acceptable price.”

It is important to note that without exception, every work on deterrence that was researched for this work emphasized the necessity of that small word, “credible.” The Mearsheimer and Schelling works spent a great deal of effort to emphasize the need for credibility, and Paul Huth’s work included a list of “structural features” that focus on military capabilities to compare the attacker and defender. Uri Ra’an an, Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr. and Geoffrey Kemp, editors, *Projection of Power – Perspectives, Perceptions, and Problems* (Hamden, CT: Archon Books, 1982), 11. The description here is “that power is a) believable, b) real and c) realistically projected and fit to fight.” This description also highlights the need for a force that can fight, since we must always be ready to fight should deterrence fail.

Paul K. Huth, *Extended Deterrence and the Prevention of War* (Ann Arbor, MI: Yale University Press, 1998), 47. Huth describes this requirement as “Hypothesis 5.1,” which states that “The past behavior of the defender in confrontations in which the current attacker was directly involved will have a greater impact on deterrence outcomes than in cases in which the current attacker was not directly involved.” The caution would be that when there has been a significant change in governmental/leadership structure and/or culture, as we have seen with the end of the Cold War, and the rise of new national governments, the hypothesis might need to be more focused on cultural/ethnic aspects of decision-making. Huth, 2. The more secretive and closed an opponent’s decision cycle is, the more difficult to gauge precisely the consequences of deterrent actions, and thus they may have less potential for success. However, for regionally based threats, assuming the United States efforts are in an extended deterrence framework, the local allies can often provide critical assessments and insights that mitigate this risk. A very good example of this, of which I have first hand experience, is the intelligence apparatus in the Republic of Korea (ROK), where the “Combined Forces Command” is able to get very good analysis of decision making in the Democratic Peoples’ Republic of Korea (DPRK) due to a combination of US and ROK collection and analytic capabilities, even though the DPRK is one of the most closed societies in the world. This operational success can be credited with contributing to one of the most successful periods of conventional deterrence since the end of the Second World War.


Johnson, Mueller, Taft, 14.
Schelling, 1. Schelling provides a very good description of the strategy in terms of game theory, where it’s not merely sufficient to have a plan to achieve an objective. It is necessary to understand that strategy as he uses it is a “contest” where the best course of action depends on how other players react and interact with one another. While the work is a difficult read, it provides a very good conceptual basis for really understanding what deterrence is, and placing it in the context of a strategy for success.


Huth, 13. It is important to remember that there are “costs” for both action and inaction by both sides in a situation, and that part of the decision making process is to assess such costs for both yourself and your opponent.


Cimbala, xi.

Conversation with Louis Delavoie, retired Canadian diplomat and government official, 18 March 2003. He noted that when Pierre Trudeau was visiting nations as part of his disarmament/non-proliferation effort in the early 1980s, that during a meeting with President Deng of the People’s Republic of China that Deng commented that they (the Chinese) could absorb the losses of 300 million people and survive. Given the Western aversion to casualties, this was shocking to Prime Minister Trudeau. It provides an excellent example however of the necessity to understand what your adversary values, in this case the PRC did not value human life.

Paul K. Davis, Brian Michael Jenkins, Deterrence & Influence in Counterterrorism – A Component in the War on Al Qaeda (Santa Monica, CA; RAND Corp; 2002), 17. The chart provides a succinct example of the level of detail necessary to gain the requisite knowledge to focus deterrent efforts well.

FM 101-5-1 Operational Terms and Graphics (Department of The Army, 30 September 1997), 1-77. The actual definition is, “High Value Target: Assets that the Threat commander requires for successful completion of a specific course of action.”

Davis and Jenkins, xi, 15. The chart on page 15 is particularly useful, because it highlights the “indirect approach.” As Davis and Jenkins point out in the work, with organizations like Al Qaeda, whose leadership is totally committed, you must identify the vulnerabilities in the support structure. This can be extrapolated to such organizations as drug cartels, whose leadership and “production base” may be invulnerable, but who has a weakness in transport and/or distribution networks that can be exploited for their deterrent value.

Huth, 1. It is imperative to note that embracing the need for an extended deterrence methodology brings with it some additional requirements, which will not be discussed in this work. In the first respect, the need to gain consensus among all the nations involved in what the threat is “determining the intentions and capabilities of adversaries” and “the sensitivity of foreign policy leaders to potential security threats and challenges to their country’s bargaining reputation.” For purposes of this work, the need to address these challenges is subsumed.
under the need for detailed analytical work as part of the determination of what the deterrent “targets” are.

27 *Quadrennial Defense Review Report* (Office of the Secretary of Defense, 30 September 2001), 14. America’s preference is to engage threats away from the homeland, though as the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) notes, homeland protection is the Department of Defense’s primary function.

28 Friedman. Friedman’s book, which many senior leaders often refer to, makes a very strong argument that given the convergence of various technologies and policies, it is the force of market economics which is at the core of many, if not most, decisions made by governments in the international arena, and that national governments need to understand and internalize the forces that have been unleashed which can impact their nations over the internet, and which they have little if any control over. Generally described as the “electronic herd,” this amorphous mass of individuals with their internet connections have the capacity to influence nations from half-way around the globe, without necessarily thinking about the impact their individual actions may have. In some respects, there may be a case that the Departments of State and Treasury may be the principal actors in future NSS should this concept of globalization take root among the nations (and non-state actors) of the world.

29 Ibid, xvi-xxii.

30 Ibid, 22-23. The complex interrelationship of Friedman’s “six D’s” (national security, politics, finance, culture, technology, and the environment/environmentalism) really means that there isn’t a “uni-polar” world, because no one nation dominates/controls these facets. Those who talk in terms of a uni-polar world tend to think in terms of military and perhaps economic power alone, which is too limited for accurate assessments and forecasting future requirements.

31 Phonecon with Mr. Joe Green, the Director of the Intelligence Directorate, United States Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) on 16 January 2003.

32 Friedman, 14.

33 Whether writing and electronically distributing a political tract, building and presenting a briefing for their group (coffee group, church/mosque/synagogue/temple or terrorist group), the ability of individuals to impact much larger groups is critical. The rise of groups such as Al Qaeda, which use the internet to avoid having to physically establish contact, is a prime example of “learning” organizations, which use readily available tools to increase their effect.

34 Friedman, 14.


36 Huth, 40. “If policymakers believe that a quick and decisive attack will be successful, then deterrence is likely to fail.” By actively conducting deterrence, America can induce uncertainty, which mitigates the risk of confrontation.

37 Davis and Jenkins, xvi.

38 Ibid, 10.

39 *QDR*, 8.
Irving Bernstein, Guns or Butter: the Presidency of Lyndon Johnson (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996). Bernstein’s book goes into great detail about the conflict within the administration, and within the political system over the need to fulfill two great tasks, the “Great Society” and the establishment of a viable and free democracy in Vietnam.


As an example of this pre-disposition to think principally in terms of nuclear terms, one needs look no further than the recently published Deterrence in the 21st Century (Ed. Max Manwaring). In the second section of the book, entitled “Rethinking Problems and Responses,” three of the six articles deal with nuclear weapons/deterrence. The book does however, provide some very good points on how the world has changed, and makes an effort at understanding the current/emergent global environment and the place deterrence has in America’s future.

Huth, 5.

Ibid, 42.

Sloan, 108. Asymmetric threats are those that seek to exploit a weakness in an opponent’s capability by attacking a known/assumed weakness (in technology, organization, equipment or psychology). Thus, by using a WMD that is not nuclear, an opponent could exploit a weakness in America’s ability to respond effectively in a timely fashion.


Alexander L. George and Richard Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice (New York, NY; Columbia University Press, 1974) 47. The vulnerability of the United States homeland to large-scale strategic strike with nuclear weapons – a unique combination similar to the “junction of technology and terror” described in the 2002 NSS, caused nuclear deterrence to the overwhelming focus for deterrent discussions.

George and Smoke, 21.

Dockrill, 4. While the “New-Look” was a “deterrence oriented strategy, it became associated with the “Massive Retaliation” theory which was the beginning of the end for the
primacy of conventional deterrence, since the threshold for error was so small with regard to nuclear weapons.

54 George and Smoke, 46.
56 Ibid, 11.
57 George and Smoke, 49. “Historically, the complexity (in original) of problems and the measurability of their variables have comprised another major determinant of the focus of analysts’ attention.”
58 Dockrill, 1-3. This strategy, which evolved throughout Eisenhower’s term, was important in that it emphasized the need to precisely determine basic national security interests and to select the means to defend these interests, and in its “long-haul” approach in abandoning the idea of a “critical date” as articulated in NSC 68. The strategy also addressed the need to maintain America’s economic strength and world leadership role, rather like the 2002 National Security Strategy of the United States.
59 George and Smoke, 31.
60 The Objective Force 2015 White Paper (Final Draft) (Department of the Army, Washington, D.C., 2002), i, ii. The definition provided for the Objective Force provides the most succinct description of the type of forces needed for the 21st century, not tied to specific organization or equipment paradigms.
61 It must be noted however that the “transformation” plans articulated by the other services are rooted more in the current world than in the anticipated environment of the 21st century. The U.S. Navy’s efforts continue to be framed around the need for a carrier-based force (the cornerstone of which is the CVN (X) program), the U.S. Marines are working to expand their “over the shore” doctrine to “over the horizon” and the U.S. Air Force continues to focus on Air Superiority (hence the F-22 being renamed the F/A-22 as a sop to the need for close air support). Only the U.S. Army has conducted a rigorous self-assessment based on the evolving environment to determine what sorts of future forces are needed, and has conducted a serious internal debate about the manner and scope of that change.
62 George and Smoke, 33.
63 Johnson, Mueller and Taft, 3.
64 Ibid, 11.
65 The Davis and Jenkins paper for RAND, referenced earlier provides a very good description of the problems and processes for dealing with terrorist organizations such as Al Qaeda. A similar effort, though much broader in scope would be necessary to fully address the totality of the 21st century threats.
QDR, v.

Huth, 42. The implications for “horizontal escalation” are very important, since the possession of non-nuclear WMD, while often condemned, brings with it a much less stigma than nuclear weapons. One has only to look at those many nations which possess chemical weapons, such as Egypt, Syria, Libya, DPRK, Russia, but which are not generally condemned for it.

Discussion with Dr. Charles Pentland, 20 March 2003. The French in particular viewed the United States’ “Flexible Response” as a sign of lack of resolve to “trade Chicago for Paris” should the Warsaw Pact ever conduct a nuclear attack on European cities.


Coral Bell, The Conventions of Crisis (London, Oxford University Press, 1971), 2. The quote, “Today there is no longer any such thing as strategy; there is only crisis management” reflected a feeling among many decision makers in the Department of Defense, notably Robert S. McNamara, the former Secretary of Defense. Given the significant nature of the nuclear threat, they can perhaps be forgiven for choosing to make such a broad characterization of other world events.

Friedman, 23.


Max G. Manwaring, ed. Deterrence in the 21st Century (Portland, OR; Frank Cass, 2001). This book provides a pretty good assessment of where the threats are going in the 21st century, although I think it still ascribes too much potential to the use of nuclear weapons. It is important to remember that deterrents must be credible to serve their purpose, and given the wide psychological gap between nuclear weapons and other weapons, I do not think it is rational to believe that there are many situations other than a large-scale threat to the national homeland when the United States or any other nation would consider the use of nuclear weapons.

Huth, 2. The more secretive and closed an opponent’s decision cycle is, the more difficult to gauge precisely the consequences of deterrent actions, and thus they may have less potential for success. However, for regionally based threats, assuming the United States efforts are in an extended deterrence framework, the local allies can often provide critical assessments and insights that mitigate this risk. A very good example of this, of which I have first hand experience, is the intelligence apparatus in the Republic of Korea (ROK), where the “Combined Forces Command” is able to get very good analysis of decision making in the Democratic Peoples’ Republic of Korea (DPRK) due to a combination of US and ROK collection and analytic capabilities, even though the DPRK is one of the most closed societies in the world.
This operational success can be credited with contributing to one of the most successful periods of conventional deterrence since the end of the Second World War.

77 Friedman, 9.

78 Ibid, 13. Throughout his work, Friedman makes reference to the “electronic herd,” which refers to the mass of individuals who impact on world events through their computer terminals. The lions and gazelles refers to those who understand that they either “eat” or “get eaten” based on how well they perform/interact with competitors, and the turtles are those who just cannot accept/understand/maintain the pace of an interconnected world, who pull into their shells and try to ignore what is going on around them (like the DPRK).

79 The Jargon Dictionary; Electronic publication; available at <http://info.astrian.net/jargon/terms/m/Moore_s_Law.html>; Internet; accessed January 21, 2003. Moore’s Law is a tenet of computer automation, which basically states that computing/processing power will double roughly every 18 months.

80 Friedman, 194-211. This entire chapter, “Shapers, Adapters and Other New Ways of Thinking About Power” describes how everything and everyone who deals in information is fundamentally changed.

81 As a Squadron Commander at Fort Knox, Kentucky, I personally trained my cadre on the use of deadly force during a period of enhanced awareness over the potential for loss of arms, ammunition or explosives. By doing so personally, I was confident that each and every soldier and civilian in the organization who might have occasion to use deadly force understood exactly what the requirements and responsibilities were.

82 As Brigade S3 for 1st Brigade, 2d Armored Division, later 1st Brigade, 4th Infantry Division from January 1995 until May 1997, I personally observed how the most junior soldiers and leaders were the ones most comfortable with both the changing technology and with implementing changes to doctrine, training and operations to maximize the effects of the new technology. Whether because these individuals were simply more open-minded or simply less “imprinted” with a specific set of ways to do things I do not know, but they clearly adapted to the necessary changes much faster as a group than any group of senior leaders.

83 Ashton B. Carter, William J. Perry, Preventive Defense A new Security Strategy for America (Washington, D.C.; Brookings Institution Press, 1999) 11. It is important to note that I do not view the authors’ view of preventive defense as deterrence because of its emphasis on weapons of mass destruction and counter-proliferation. While I respect their views, I am concerned that the book’s emphasis really is not on a strategy for the United States, but a strategy to mitigate the risks of proliferation, which is important; but in and of itself, it (rather like deterrence) is not a strategy.

84 Johnson, Mueller, Taft, 55.

85 Sterling, 5. This brief provides a very good assessment of the risks of too much reliance on a nuclear deterrent-based strategy.

86 Transformation Trends – 17 February Issue; (Office of Force Transformation, OSD; Washington, D.C., 2003); [Electronic publication]; received from Mr. Robert Holzer, Outreach Director, via e-mail on 18 February 2003.

87 QDR, 12.
Johnson, Mueller, Taft, 19.

Carter, Perry, 162.

Ibid, 151.

Snyder, 12. The author notes that while there are other facets of deterrence that fall within areas of economics and politics, that the military potential for deterrence is the most widely used. This carries over to the NSS’s discussion of deterrence where no other executive department is tasked to conduct deterrence in support of America’s national security or interests.


Ibid. 15.

Ibid. 29.

The nature and timing of the current Korean situation suggests that even the Clinton administration; the first led by a post-World War II President, whose administration championed globalizaton, making the case that the world was fundamentally changed from its Cold War persona, was unable to develop a suitable deterrence methodology against a nation which for all intents and purposes is the last remaining Stalinist nation.


Schelling, 11. In this case, both parties could be “deterring” from their point of view, and could thus be “successful” by maintaining the status quo.

QDR, 20.

Ibid, 21.

Ibid, 25.

Ibid, 4.

Ibid, iv.

Ibid, 14.

Having spent three years in Korea, with a Korean wife, and a mother-in-law who fled South during the Korean War, I have observed a significant rise in the degree of anti-American feeling over the past 19 years. It is interesting to note that those parts of Korea where the sentiment is the strongest are also those parts where American family members are most visibly present. By reducing the family members, the American presence is at least symbolically reduced, which results in a higher level of force protection for those remaining.

I am personally aware that in the current Korean situation, even Korean-born spouses of American service members have been accosted and physically assaulted by younger Koreans who disagree with the stationing of American forces on the peninsula.

QDR, 3.
Ibid, 52. While this section acknowledges the need to “flatten” the organizational structure, there are no temporal goals to drive the process. Merely flattening the organization, and mandating the taking out people does nothing to enhance the acquisition/business processes. Without analysis to know how rapidly you need to train, equip, and man the forces you foresee needing, you cannot determine what organizational structure and business processes are suitable.


Joel E. Williamson and Dr. Jennifer D.P. Moroney, “Security Cooperation Pays Off,” Current Defense Analysis (DFI Government Practices, Inc. 16 December, 2002); available from http://www.dfi-intl.com/govt/resources/dficurrent.cfm; Internet; accessed 18 December 2002. This document provides a good analysis of the benefits of security cooperation in the Global War on Terror. While not directly making the case for deterrence, the methods and results are in fact deterrent by nature.

Ivo H. Daalder and I.M. Dressler, A New NSC for a New Administration Policy Brief #68 (Brookings Institution, Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland; 2000); [journal on-line]; available from <http://www.brook.edu/dybdocroot/comm/policybriefs/pb068/pb68.htm>; Internet; accessed, 4 March 2003. The authors clearly articulate in the second paragraph that the NSC has become too focused on short-term actions, rather than providing the necessary coordination of policy for the President.

Daalder and Dressler, paragraph “The NSC as Daily Business Manager”. This highlights the need for the NSC to remain focused on critical issues.

National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) 1 (The White House, 2001); available from <http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/nspd-1.htm>; Internet; accessed, 4 March 2003. In NSPD 1, the principals are: the Secretary of State; the Secretary of Defense; the U.S. Representative to the United Nations; the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (Chair); the Director of Central Intelligence; the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; and the Assistant to the President for Economic Policy, as appropriate. The Secretary of the Treasury, the Attorney General or other heads of departments or agencies shall be invited as needed. While each President may choose the make up of the principals group, this represents a good characterization of the level necessary to ensure that the efforts are at the appropriate level.

Daalder and Dressler, paragraph “Back to Basics: Eight Features of an Effective NSC” has as the fifth requirement the need for senior personnel in the NSC. They recognize the need
for a small number of “young thinker-operators,” but understand that you need to have senior leaders who understand the environment setting the tone.


119 NSPD 1, paragraph 8.

120 However, it is important to note that the process may not be as integrated as the Joint Doctrine Encyclopedia would have one believe (pp 433-434). One need only look at the “Army War College Model” (How the Army Runs, USAWC, 2001, figure 2-3) to note that the arrows at the pentagon level are all one way. There are no “feedback loops” or indications of iterative/spiral development.

121 QDR. The QDR starts its first sentence with “On September 11, 2001,” and that is the only consistent historical reference throughout the 71 pages of the document. There are no specific targets, other than budgetary and infrastructure figures throughout the document. Even section III, which according to Annex A (p 71) contains the mission statement for DoD does not provide any specific requirements, much less prioritization of effort.

122 The Joint Doctrine Encyclopedia (Joint Staff, Washington, D.C; 2001) 433-434. The four components of the JSPS are the NMS, the Joint Planning Document (JPD), the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) and the Chairman’s Program Assessment (CPA). The Joint Strategic Review (JSR) already provides a framework that addresses the need to integrate deterrence, since it is designed to “assess the strategic environment for issues and factors that affect the National Military Strategy (NMS) in the near-term or the long-range.”

123 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3100.01A Joint Strategic Planning System (CJCS, Washington, D.C.; 1999) A-1, para. 3.b. “The NMS articulates the Chairman’s recommendations to the NCA on how the United States should employ the military element of power in support of the President’s National Security Strategy.”

124 The Joint Doctrine Encyclopedia, 434. “The NMS is designed to assist the Secretary of Defense in the preparation of the Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) and to guide the development of the JSCP.” It is important to note that the last NMS was published in 1997, when General Shalikashvili was the CJCS.

125 Ibid, 542. Since the combatant commanders and service chiefs are involved in the development of the NMS, if it is accepted by the President with deterrent tasks that have already been reviewed by the services and combatant commanders, there should be few, if any, “surprises” during execution.

126 CJCSI 3100.01A, B-2, para. 3.c.

127 Ibid, 434. “The JSCP provides a coherent framework for capabilities-based military advice provided to the NCA.”

128 There is some confusion over what exactly FYDP stands for. In CJCSI 3100.01A, it is called the “Future Years Defense Plan” (p. c-1, para. 3.c.); while in the DoD Dictionary of Terms (available at <http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/iel/doddict/acronym/f/01936.html>) it is the “Future Years Defense Program.” The source document is listed as JP 1-02, which does not define the term).
However, the current PPBS system is over 30 years old, having been instituted by Robert MacNamara in 1962, and modified by Melvin Laird in 1969. Given the current automation capabilities and a much more ambiguous international environment, some consideration should be given to revising the system to make it more apropos for today.


*Department of Defense FY 2002 Supplemental Request to continue the Global War on Terrorism* (Washington, DC, DoD, March 2002), and *Department of Defense FY 2000 Supplemental Request for Kosovo & East Timor and Other Requirements* (Washington, DC, DoD, February 2000).

*CJCSI 3100.01A*, A-2, para. 6.a.

*The Joint Doctrine Encyclopedia*, 434. The four components of the JSPS are the National Military Strategy, the Joint Planning Document, the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan and the Chairman’s Program Assessment.

Ibid, 434. Also, since the JPD is coordinated among the Combatant Commanders and the Service Chiefs, it provides relatively precise assessments by functional areas of what can and cannot be done, and the implications for the force as a whole.


*JV 2020 Baseline Briefing*; [Electronic publication]; available at <http://www.dtic.mil/jv2020/baseline.htm>; Internet; downloaded 7 January 2003. This briefing provides a very good overview of both where the JCS believes the transformation effort (both departmental and service) needs to go, as well as a reiteration of the need for full-spectrum dominance.

*CJCSI 3100.01A*, A-2, para. 4.

“JV 2020 Baseline Briefing”


*CJCSI 3100.01A*, D-5, para. 5.a. (5). Since the chapters are not mandated, the location may change from iteration to iteration.

Ibid, C-1, para. 3.a.

As the TFXXI Brigade S3, I integrated the wholesale reorganization of a Brigade Combat Team of over 3,500 personnel with well over 1,000 vehicles and 10s of thousands of pieces of individual equipment. The planning and execution of that conversion, from getting the requirement formally, until the final collective training was completed was 25 months. The current “Unit Set Fielding” program for the United States Army, which revolves around re-equipping Brigade-sized formations, takes between 6 and 9 months. Therefore, it is imperative that time is allocated for the services to conduct the sort of continuous enhancements necessary to ensure forces are fully modernized and capable of executing their missions.
FM 7.0 Training the Force (Department of the Army; October 2002). Figure 4-4 lays out succinctly the timelines and horizons for planning and issuing guidance, and these clearly indicate the need to have fairly specific mission guidance to the Army at least one Fiscal Year ahead of the execution. With this integration, such secondary and tertiary actions as budgeting, personnel transfers, equipment fielding, OES/NCOES, pre-deployment training, etc. can be factored in. What this in fact allows, is for each of these deployments to become in effect training events, which the commanders and staffs at each level are able to execute on an extended timeline that allows for mistakes and retraining as necessary. This is in stark contrast to the services' current training methodology in the Army, where (particularly at the higher levels), the unit/organization only may get one full-blown practice of a mission before deploying either to a Combat Training Center or on a real world operation, and most missions are executed in a compressed timeline because of competing, generally unplanned, missions.

Joseph R. Núñez, Fighting the Hobbesian Trinity in Colombia: A New Strategy for Peace, (Strategic Studies Institute, Carlisle, PA: April 2001), 17. Colonel Núñez addresses the “balloon effect,” and the implications with regard to the counter drug strategy pursued by the United States in Colombia.

Núñez, A 21st Century Security Architecture for the Americas: Multilateral Cooperation, Liberal Peace, and Soft Power (Strategic Studies Institute, Carlisle, PA: April 2001). This monograph proposes the establishment of a permanent multi-lateral force that would serve to enhance both democracy and deterrence throughout the Western Hemisphere. Such a force would provide substantial deterrent effect against nation-state as well as, trans-national, actors. It would also reduce the appearance of American Imperialism when force was needed.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CJCS</td>
<td>Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff</td>
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<td>CPA</td>
<td>Chairman's Program Assessment</td>
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<td>QDR</td>
<td>Quadrennial Defense Review</td>
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<td>DoD</td>
<td>Department of Defense</td>
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<td>DoS</td>
<td>Department of State</td>
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<td>DPG</td>
<td>Defense Planning Guidance</td>
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<td>DPRK</td>
<td>Democratic Peoples’ Republic of Korea (North)</td>
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<td>EUCOM</td>
<td>United States European Command</td>
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<td>FM</td>
<td>Field Manual</td>
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<td>JS</td>
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<td>National Security Council, Deputies Committee</td>
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<td>NSPD</td>
<td>National Security Presidential Directive</td>
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<td>NSS</td>
<td>National Security Strategy</td>
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<tr>
<td>OE</td>
<td>Operating Environment</td>
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<tr>
<td>PPBES</td>
<td>Planning, Programming, and Budget Execution System</td>
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<td>ROK</td>
<td>Republic of Korea (South)</td>
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<td>SecDef</td>
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<td>United States Southern Command</td>
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<td>Theater Engagement Plan</td>
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<td>Theater Security Cooperation Plan</td>
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<td>USFK</td>
<td>United States Forces Korea</td>
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Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3100.01A Joint Strategic Planning System. Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff: Washington, DC, 1999.


