Interim Report on Interagency National Personnel Recovery Architecture

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PREFACE

This document was prepared by the Institute for Defense Analyses for the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Prisoner of War and Missing Personnel Office (DPMO) in partial fulfillment of the task National Personnel Recovery Architecture. The objective of this effort was to provide an independent study of the current capacity for recovering isolated U.S. Government personnel in overseas locations, and to propose a National Personnel Recovery Architecture that would provide coherent, integrated, interagency response capability to recover such personnel. Congress directed the study, assigning responsibility to the Defense POW/Missing Personnel Office. DPMO selected the Institute for Defense Analyses to conduct the study, and it was assigned to the Operational Evaluation Division.

The study parameters included defining the terms of reference and focusing the scope of the study to ensure that any proposed architecture would reflect current and evolving U.S. policy, be feasible, and meet the Congressional and sponsor intent. Research included document searches, interviews, workshops, and attendance at policy and operationally-oriented conferences and meetings.


Mr. Robert R. Soule, Director of OED, chaired the IDA Technical Review Committee. Members were Mr. Phil Major, IDA Vice President; Dr. David Graham, SFRD; Dr. John Shea, SED; Dr. Gary Comfort and Dr. Rex Rivolo, OED; LCDR Mike Sheahan, JAWP; and Mr. Joe Stahl, CARD. Additionally, Mr. Rick Sayre, a former team member now serving on the Army Staff, provided a valuable review of the draft.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

A. INTRODUCTION

In 2001, the House Appropriations Committee tasked the Defense Prisoner of War/Missing Personnel Office (DPMO) to conduct a government-wide, interagency needs assessment in order to describe a fully integrated National Personnel Recovery Architecture (NPRA). In April 2002, the DPMO tasked the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA) to conduct a two-year study to define the interagency national personnel recovery architecture. This report provides the interim status of this task.

With the increased requirements for humanitarian assistance, peace support operations, counter narcotics operations, and the Global War on Terrorism, U.S. personnel will continue to be deployed overseas in harm’s way. Traditionally, the U.S. government has felt a moral obligation to return military personnel home safely. With the widespread deployment of a full range of personnel—government civilians and contract employees, as well as military service members—the government may find itself obligated to provide personnel recovery assistance to a much broader set of personnel when incidents occur in the future. This study recommends that the policy and planning implications of such a broadening of personnel recovery obligations be considered in advance of future incidents. The second phase of the study will explore the program and resource implications of these policy considerations.

The interagency focus for operations is not just a matter of congressional interest. The Department of Defense (DoD) stresses the importance of interagency operations in the Joint Vision 2020, Contingency Planning Guidance, and in the Secretary of Defense memorandum dated 17 September 2002 on top 10 legislative priorities for Fiscal Year 2004. Throughout this interim report the term interagency refers to both DoD and non-DoD agencies. With regard to personnel recovery, DoD is a key constituent of the architecture.

1. Study Objectives

The study objectives are to (1) describe the national personnel architecture as it exists today (baseline), (2) develop a strategic vision for personnel recovery (PR), (3) identify shortfalls and gaps in the current NPRA, and (4) then identify alternatives to improve the national architecture to achieve the strategic vision, with emphasis on including the USG interagency. Although the task order does not task IDA to develop a plan to implement the improved national architecture, IDA will propose an approach for the development of such a plan.

2. Scope

The study includes all American military personnel, government civilians, government contractors deployed overseas in an official capacity, and others designated by the Secretary of Defense or the President. Contractors have become an important element of recent operations, constituting over ten percent of
forces deployed in the Balkans, Afghanistan, and Iraq. This study considers, but does not focus on, coalition PR (already covered in IDA Paper P-3705, May 2002) or civil search and rescue conducted by host nations or the U.S. Coast Guard.

3. National PR Assessment Logic

The term architecture means different things to different people. For the NPRA study, architecture is broad and includes military and non-military PR requirements, and interagency PR capabilities (force structure, doctrine, training, C4I, etc.). The PR architecture consists of three main components: (1) direct and guide, (2) plan and prepare PR force elements, and (3) mission execution. Using these three components of PR architecture, IDA developed a PR vision document (IDA Document D-2775, October 2002). Figure 1 shows the assessment logic. First, a baseline capability is defined for the three components. Then, the baseline capability is compared to desired end states of the PR vision, and shortfalls and gaps are identified. Further, a solution set is identified for each component. This process will have to be iterated in the future to achieve the end states.

B. DATA COLLECTION

Data collection efforts involved visiting various U.S. government (USG) agencies. IDA made 18 visits to non-DoD departments and agencies such as Department of State (DoS), Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Department of Justice (DoJ), Central Intelligence Agency, Coast Guard, Department of Treasury, Drug Enforcement Administration, U.S. Agency for International Development, and General Services Administration. IDA also visited all four Services, four Combatant Commands, and attended many PR Response Cell (PRRC) and PR Advisory Group (PRAG) meetings and a PR conference. Data collection efforts for this phase of the study culminated with an interagency workshop at IDA on 5-6 February 2003.

Besides gathering data, the visits provided several positive side benefits: (1) increasing interagency participants’ awareness of PR risks, (2) developing an active interagency PR network, and (3) identifying several non-DoD interagency needs, such as standard PR procedures and access to DoD training.

C. DIRECT AND GUIDE

The term PR is much broader than Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR) or the recovery of a downed pilot. Presently there is no personnel recovery doctrine and the U.S. operates largely on CSAR doctrine. However, this situation has not hampered us from conducting coalition and interagency PR

Figure 1. NPRA Assessment Logic
during Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom.

1. Baseline National Level Policy and Doctrine

While the Chief of Mission (COM, almost always the U.S. Ambassador), generally has the primary responsibilities for evacuation and PR of USG personnel, the capabilities to conduct those operations lie outside the Embassy or Post. The COM may rely on the host country for assistance, use commercial means, or ask for military assistance from the Combatant Commander. When there is no COM, such as in Afghanistan or Iraq, the Combatant Commander assumes responsibility for all USG personnel.

Presently there is no joint PR doctrine within DoD and there is no interagency PR doctrine. Joint doctrine today is contained in JP 3-50.2 for Joint Combat Search and Rescue, but not for PR. The Joint Personnel Recovery Agency (JPRA) is expecting the approval of JP 3-50, Joint Doctrine for Personnel Recovery, in April 2004. PR policy is covered by DoD Directive 2310.2, Personnel Recovery. Other key documents are National Security Presidential Directive NSPD-1, Organization of the National Security System, and NSPD-12, U.S. Citizens Taken Hostage Abroad.

The DoD policy documents establish two interagency groups: the PRAG and the PRRC. PRAG is an advisory group and meets semiannually, while PRRC convenes as necessary in response to PR incidents. The PRRC is charged among other things to determine the legal status of isolated personnel and provides a PR lessons learned report upon conclusion of the incident.

2. Interagency PR Definition

The DoD PR definition from DoDD 2310.2 is directly applicable to interagency PR if the term “personnel” is taken in a broader context. Those in the DoD PR community generally interpret the definition in terms of who the individual is, his/her individual and duty status, and the environment. However, there are no accepted guidelines for limiting the scope of interagency PR efforts. In the absence of such limitations, this study will address a broad definition of interagency PR responsibilities, to include U.S. military personnel, Government civilians and contractors, without regard to the situation or environment. Hence, for this study, the DoD PR definition is not changed but the context of the definition is significantly broadened to allow the study to examine fully the policy, planning, and program implications of future interagency PR issues.

3. Shortfalls in Interagency Direct and Guide

There is no national level policy or guide for interagency PR, and there is no doctrine for interagency PR. The DoD doctrine document is expected to be promulgated by April 2004. DoD Directives and Instructions establishing the PRAG and PRRC are lacking because they do not provide the necessary structure and authority to the PRAG and PRRC to improve PR capabilities.

4. Interim Direct and Guide Issue

Because of the lack of national level guidance, there is no consensus on the definition and scope of interagency PR. There is a lack of PR doctrine within DoD and a lack of policy and understanding outside DoD. National level PR requirements and capabilities are not yet defined. Current PR architecture is DoD-centric and interagency capabilities are not integrated. Within
DoD, closely related PR methods are treated as separate, and synergy among these methods is lacking.

D. PR FORCE PLANNING AND PREPARATION

The second key PR architecture component is planning and preparation of PR forces; for the interim, focus is on the training of isolated individuals, recovery forces, and staffs. Both “rescuees” (those at risk of becoming isolated personnel), and the “rescuers”, (the recovery forces and the commanders and staffs that will employ them) are considered elements of Personnel Recovery Forces. Personnel who are at risk of isolation can take an integral, active role in their own recovery.

The DoD has developed three levels of survival, evasion, resistance and escape (SERE) training for personnel who are at risk of isolation, capture, or exploitation. Level A is classroom training that explains the Code of Conduct. Level B is academic training and B+ has some practical field training. Level C includes level B+ plus resistance laboratory training and level C+ is a graduate level training tailored to specific missions and needs.

1. Training Requirements

Combatant Commands generally decide who needs what level of training with level C requirements being generally unconstrained by training capabilities and funding. Service requirements are based on career fields that have historically faced high risks. The estimated annual wartime level C training requirements are: 4,300 for the Army, 3,430 for the Navy, 4,540 for the Air Force, and 300 for the Marines.

Although non-military agencies know that they have individuals at risk, their exact requirements are not yet defined. According to the DoS F-77 report, 6,000 U.S. government personnel and their contractors are in high threat countries. It is recognized that not all 6,000 need level C training; IDA is working with the DoS Diplomatic Security to define who needs what level of training.

2. Training Capability

DoD has significant SERE training capability. The Joint Personnel Recovery Agency (JPRA) and Air Force SERE schools are at Fairchild Air Force Base in Spokane, Washington. The Air Force also has a school at the USAF Academy in Colorado Springs. The Navy has schools in Brunswick, Maine and San Diego, California, and Army schools are at Fort Bragg, North Carolina and Fort Rucker, Alabama. Some DoS personnel have gone to JPRA’s PR Academy at Fairchild. The Idaho National Guard offers hostage and abduction survivor training at Couer d’Alene, Idaho. There is also a Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC) at Glynco, Georgia, which trains numerous interagency organizations in law enforcement, and the National Foreign Affairs training center, which trains Foreign Service Officers for overseas assignment. IDA will explore these venues for interagency training in the next phase of this study.

Schools for commanders, staff, and planners are located at JPRA’s campus in Fredericksburg, Virginia, and at Fort Belvoir, Virginia, and at the C2 Warrior School at Hurlburt Air Force Base in Florida.

Rescue forces are trained at Nellis Air Force Base, Nevada, Naval Air Station, Fallon, Nevada, Marine Corps Air Station, Yuma, Arizona, and Fort Bragg, North Carolina. Exercise Desert Rescue focuses on the Combat Search and Rescue mission area and is conducted annually at Fallon, Nevada. Exercises Red Flag (Nevada), Foal Eagle (Korea) and Cope Thunder (Alaska) provide limited opportunities to conduct PR force training.
3. Shortfalls in PR Force Planning and Preparation

During the IDA team visits, the Air Force and Navy indicated that their level C SERE training capacity matches their present requirements. Some modernization of their capability is planned. Marines generally are not meeting their requirements because they do not have their own capability and rely on space available at the other Service schools. The Army also is not meeting its present requirements and has developed a plan to increase capacity, but the plan is not yet funded. JPRA’s PR Academy has built a new facility that will increase its capacity five-fold. However, they are not presently funded for the increased instructor staff of about 50 to 80 instructors.

PR training and exercises for joint rescue forces are significantly deficient. Venues for conducting full end-to-end training with survivors and PR recovery forces are lacking. Non-DoD agencies are presently not participating in the limited DoD PR force and staff training.

4. PR Force Planning and Preparation Issue

For both DoD and non-DoD agencies, PR planning and preparation are significantly inadequate. However, it should be noted that in recent operations such as Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom, there have been frequent PR operations, in some cases involving interagency and coalition elements, and the success rate has been good. There is a lack of a common PR knowledge base in the interagency and requirements are not yet determined. Current PR capabilities are primarily in DoD, but they do not integrate non-DoD capabilities. The SERE force and staff training capabilities in DoD do not accommodate interagency requirements.

E. PR MISSION EXECUTION

The third critical component of the PR architecture is to execute the PR mission to recover isolated individuals. Currently, in theaters such as Afghanistan and Iraq, DoD is well-organized and equipped to conduct interagency and coalition personnel recovery operations at the JTF level, and roles and responsibilities are well-articulated. However, that may not be the case for different scenarios such as Colombia, Bosnia, or the Philippines, primarily because DoD does not have assets in place, and the State Department is responsible, in conjunction with the host nation, who might in turn request the Combatant Command’s support. Thus, mission execution is dependent on the scenario, the theater, and any prior agreements that might exist. Figure 3 shows the nominal coordination that takes place in theaters where a Combatant Command alone does not have total PR responsibility. IDA is conducting a case study of the downing of a Cessna 208 in February 2003 in Southern Colombia to document the interagency coordination process involved.

1. Shortfalls in Mission Execution

The interagency coordination process is not defined or understood and appears to be ad hoc. Coordination is thus time consuming and could adversely impact mission success.

2. Mission Execution Issue

The roles, responsibilities and authority of USG agencies to execute the PR mission are not well defined. Command and control relationships are not defined in an interagency context and must be codified. Many non-DoD agencies have the unrealistic expectation that when they need PR help, DoD will be there to provide immediate assistance. Once again, if adequate
planning and preparations are not accomplished ahead of time, the success of the mission could be in doubt.

The PRRC and PRAG should be re-engineered to give them more structure and authority for improving PR capability over time. The PRAG should be renamed as the PR Oversight Group (PROG), and empowered with commensurate authority to conduct oversight of the PR Implementation Plan. The PRRC should be comprised of a core membership that is familiar with PR policy issues, meets on a quarterly basis, makes informed decision based on information provided by Combatant Commands, CoMs, and intelligence agencies, and informs the PRAG of PR incident trends and lessons learned.

2. Interim PR Force Planning and Preparation Solution Set

JPRA should integrate interagency and coalition aspects of doctrine and TTPs in the documents they are writing. The DoS should provide PR guidance in the Emergency Action Planning Handbook. The DoS also should explore PR training at the Idaho National Guard and at FLETC. The Joint Staff should develop a PR Joint Mission Essential Task List, including interagency and coalition tasks. Combatant Commands should exercise these tasks during JCS-sponsored exercises.

The Services should address SERE training shortfalls at Service SERE schools and ensure adequate resources. DoD should expand PR play in existing and ongoing exercises. USG agencies should identify their PR training requirements. These requirements need to be considered in the overall USG training requirements. To improve awareness of the importance and shortfalls of PR, JPRA should develop senior-level briefings to address full spectrum PR for all interagency managers. DPMO needs to support increasing PR Academy instructor staff so that the Academy can support SERE training of all interagency groups.

At present, DoD resistance training is conducted separately for three situations: POW, terrorist hostage, and peacetime
government detainee. In the new conflict environment of the global war on terrorism, these situations might overlap significantly. DoD should transform training by providing core training that is common to all three situations, followed by specialized training for each situation, as needed, as shown in Figure 2.

![Figure 2. SERE Training Re-Engineering](image)

3. Interim Mission Execution Solution Set

Over the years, DoD has developed recovery tools such as: Isolated Personnel Report (ISOPREP), Evasion Plan of Action (EPA), evasion charts (EVCs), blood-chits, and pointee-talkies. Non-DoD agencies could adopt these tools. Also, interagency tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) should define the coordination process so that real-time coordination can be efficiently minimized and expedited. DoD should encourage interagency personnel to participate in the Joint Search and Rescue Center (JSRC) and Unconventional Assisted Recovery Coordination Center (UARCC) operations as liaisons and should loosely integrate interagency assets capable of supporting PR.

G. THE ROAD AHEAD

This interim report provides the sponsor the status of progress at the study mid-point. The final report will be completed in time for inclusion of the annual Personnel Recovery Conference scheduled for April 2004. Additional data collection and analysis is programmed in the meantime. While the interagency emphasis in this report has been placed on the Direct and Guide component (focusing on policy and doctrine) and the Plan and Prepare component (focusing on planning and training), subsequent efforts will devote attention to the other DOTMLPF aspects such as materiel development, technology, and leader development, as well.

Data collection efforts will initially concentrate on the development of two case studies. One case study is intended to capture the condition in which a combatant commander has the dominant authority and responsibility for PR; the other case is intended to address the general condition in which an Ambassador has primary responsibility for PR. At this time Operation Iraqi Freedom and Bogotá, Columbia are the likely candidate cases. Data collection has also begun on identifying materiel, software, technology, and Advanced Concept Technology Demonstrations that might be applicable to PR forces.

Workshops will continue to be an integral part of the study process with the intent of expanding the network of PR knowledgeable personnel throughout the interagency, while at the same time, exploring new common ground and developing consensus on issues and future initiatives.
As indicated in the study, the absence of national level guidance and directives is a major issue that will be further explored and developed with the use of workshops. While the development of an NSPD on PR is being considered at this time, it may be that a like document or a similar instrument may prove more feasible and effective. Our objective will be to stimulate discussions, generate interest and hopefully consensus on the need for national level policy and then to initiate the process for its formulation. The directives or guidance will attempt to address identified shortfalls in the policy area that impede planning, preparation, or execution of Full Spectrum PR.

The IDA study team will help facilitate workshops, as necessary and feasible, on a Code of Behavior for non-DoD Departments and Agencies. Again, the attempt here will be to first stimulate interest, then develop a consensus on the need for a Code, and finally to coordinate and support an initiative for its development.

Existing organizations, such as the Policy Coordinating Committee (PCC)/ Counter-terrorism Security Group, the PRAG, and the PRRC will be explored further and examined as to their applicability to Full Spectrum PR. If appropriate, the study will provide recommendations for the modification or reengineering of authorities, relationships, or organization for improved effectiveness.

A requirements definition process is being developed by DoS for the identification of high-risk personnel stationed or deployed overseas. The IDA study team will continue to work with DoS in the refinement of that process and will assist in making recommendations as to the SERE training associated with those personnel identified to be at high-risk.

JPRA is in the process of staffing the development of Joint Publication 3-50 on PR. IDA will work closely with JPRA to insure they are fully informed of issues and recommendations of the NPRA study.
IDA Paper P-3779

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In support of the Defense POW/Missing Personnel Office
OUTLINE

This outlines the annotated briefing report that describes the interim results of the NPRA study, as performed by the Institute for Defense Analyses.
Outline

- Executive Summary
  I. Introduction
  II. Data Collection and Consensus Building
  III. Strategic Vision
  IV. Direct and Guide
  V. Plan and Prepare
  VI. Mission Execution
  - References
  - Appendices
    - A – Acronyms
    - B – Glossary
    - C – Data Collection
CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION

This chapter introduces the study, provides the background, identifies the study objectives, and describes the methodology. It also places the concept of personnel recovery in an interagency context. Annex B, Glossary, provides expanded definitional context.
Chapter I. Introduction

- Background
- Objectives
- Study Methodology
- PR Definition
- PR in an Interagency Context
BACKGROUND

A number of organizations have conducted nine studies in the past eight years (see references 1 through 9). However, none of the studies completed to date have addressed the interagency dimension of PR at the national level.

The last decade of the 20th century saw a significant increase in U.S. deployments of teams and individual personnel to situations characterized by heightened “risk of capture.” Humanitarian assistance missions, peace support operations, counter-narcotics activities, and the Global War on Terrorism have increased exposure of personnel in many Executive Branch departments and other agencies to threats from states, failed states, transnational actors/groups, and individuals. The nature of the national security situation involves DoD both as the lead agent in combat operations and as a pro-active partner and participant with the rest of the interagency in all national security activities. Civilians and government contractors from the other Government agencies partnered with DoD now work hand-in-hand with the armed forces on the front lines of these national security operations. Contractors now account for over 10 percent of operational and support personnel. Others, such as USAID and the DoJ, have significant numbers of personnel operating in small numbers in remote locations as a matter of course. For certain functions, the non-DoD aviation community of the USG has become larger and undertaken more risk. These civilians share similar risks as the military; they deserve the same level of assurance of rescue and recovery.

While other Government agencies have had to deal with isolated and missing people, most have not documented the procedures to recover their missing or captured persons. Although a draft memorandum of agreement between DoD and the State Department does exist, it is not finalized. The current rescue and PR processes within the USG are ad hoc.

Congress directed DPMO and funded this study to investigate and propose NPRA. DPMO selected IDA to conduct the study because of IDA’s prior expertise in combat search and rescue. In 1994, IDA provided analytical support to the DoD Commission on Roles and Missions on the Joint Combat Search and Rescue (JCSAR) issue. From August 1994 until September 1999, IDA provided independent assessment of the JCSAR joint test chartered by the Director, Test, Systems Engineering and Evaluation (DTSE&E) in OSD. Since October 1999, IDA has been supporting DPMO on developing policy issues on PR in a coalition environment. This effort was completed and briefed at the 2002 PR Conference leveraging the prior efforts. IDA Paper P-3705, documenting the coalition-study findings, has been published and distributed.

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Background

• There have been nine major PR-related studies in the past 8 years
  – None has addressed interagency rescue as a primary focus

• With increased requirements for humanitarian assistance, peace support operations, counter-narcotics, and the more recent advent of the Global War on Terrorism, the entire Interagency is now significantly more involved in conflict environments
  – National Security Environment has changed, blurring peacetime and wartime conditions
  – USG civilians and contractor force has grown – reduction of military force size also a factor

• Many non-DoD agencies lack established procedures to recover their personnel
  – Signed MOA between DoD and CIA. Some draft MOAs exist between DoD, DoS and DEA
  – Current process is ad hoc

• Congress directed and funded the study of a National Personnel Recovery Architecture
  – Sponsored by DPMO
  – Conducted by IDA
INTERAGENCY FOCUS FOR THE STUDY

Although Congress tasked and provided the interagency focus, JV2020, the Contingency Planning Guidance (CPG), and the SecDef have all emphasized the interagency aspects of PR. While SOUTHCOM’s mission analysis explores the interagency dimension within the SOUTHCOM theater, this IDA study is the first personnel recovery study to examine the mission area globally and on a national level.

IDA felt this ambitious study would require 2 years to complete, and DPMO agreed.
Interagency Focus for the Study

• Congressional Language:
  “…conduct a government wide interagency needs assessment in order to define the components of a fully integrated national personnel recovery architecture. The assessment should include a consideration of service personnel, civilians and contract personnel, and examine the possible consolidation of training programs. The study should recommend a coordinated national goal for personnel recovery, roles and responsibilities of each department, agency or office…DPMO lead.”

• Joint Vision 2020
  “The joint force must be prepared to support civilian authorities in a fully integrated effort to meet the needs of U.S. citizens and accomplish objectives specified by the National Command Authorities.”

• Contingency Planning Guidance (CPG)
  “the CPG emphasizes importance of close interagency coordination in a number of areas…plan for PR operations to ensure return of …designated personnel from US Government (USG)…”

• SecDef Memo Top 10 priorities, 17 September 2002
  “Improve Interagency Process, Focus and Integration.”
STUDY OBJECTIVES

The study team established four objectives, which also serve as milestones over the course of this 2-year effort. The first objective is to define the existing national personnel recovery architecture as it exists in the interagency environment, and to benchmark it as the baseline. This is done by data collection visits made to numerous agencies as described in Chapter II.

The study team defined the interagency environment as encompassing all U.S. Government departments within the Executive Branch, including the DoD as an “equal” member, as well as other agencies of the U.S. Government. The study team’s second objective was to develop a strategic vision that defined the end states, or goals, for NPRA. The strategic vision and end states are defined in Chapter III. Once the team defined the baseline and the end state, which serve as the beginning and end of the process, the next objective is to identify the differences between the two states. Those differences can be labeled as shortfalls or gaps. The study team’s fourth objective is to identify alternative courses of action to improve the NPRA. Each alternative course of action should address a shortfall or close a gap to move the architecture closer to the end state described in the strategic vision.

The study team achieved some success with the first four objectives, and interim results are contained in the following chapters of this report. The study team feels that an implementation plan is required to ensure that the study recommendations are implemented. Although it is not in the current IDA task order, the study team will develop an implementation plan in the final phase of this study.
Study Objectives

• Define the national personnel recovery architecture baseline
• Develop a strategic vision
• Identify shortfalls and gaps
• Identify alternatives to improve the national architecture to achieve the strategic vision

• Follow-on Effort – Develop an implementation plan to improve the NPRA
STUDY SCOPE

The scope of the study covers two areas: “who” and the “where” of personnel recovery. With regard to “who,” the study focuses on recovery of Americans acting in an official capacity, such as the U.S. military, USG civilians, U.S. Government contractors, and others, as designated by the Secretary of Defense or the President. Family members of USG personnel and tourists are covered by the DoS evacuation process before the situation in a foreign country deteriorates. If the President or the Secretary of Defense so decides, these individuals are covered in specific PR cases. In any event, their safety and security continue to be the responsibility of the Chief of Mission (CoM).

With regard to “where,” the study team chose to focus on Americans deployed overseas. The study considers, but does not address, civil SAR, which is conducted overseas by other nations in support of civilians, including American civilians, especially in a permissive environment. The study team does not address personnel recovery as an element of homeland security, which has significant interagency issues, but most of these are in the domestic area rather than overseas. Additionally, the study excludes coalition personnel recovery, since it has recently been addressed in another IDA study for DPMO (IDA Paper P-3705, “Improving Personnel Recovery in a Coalition Environment,” May 2002).
Scope of Isolated Personnel

• Focus on Americans acting in an official capacity overseas in potential or “at risk for PR” situations
  • Military
  • Government Civilians
  • Government Contractors
  • Others (as designated by the Secretary of Defense or the President)
• Family members and tourists are ordered to leave or evacuated by DoS
• This study does not focus on:
  • Homeland Security
  • Civil SAR
  • Coalition personnel recovery
PR ARCHITECTURE ASSESSMENT APPROACH

Architecture is a broad term and means different things to different people. In the NPRA context it is not a communications wiring diagram, but rather consists of defined requirements with respect to who in the interagency is at risk of capture, defined U.S. capabilities to recover U.S. personnel, and the identified shortfalls in these capabilities. All shortfalls are then addressed in their respective Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leader Development, Personnel, and Facilities (DOTMLPF) categories.

The baseline architecture consists of the baseline requirements and capabilities. Requirements consider, but are not necessarily based on the number of people at risk of isolation, capture, and exploitation. The numbers can be broken down into various categories. Capabilities are based on the recovery methods, their reach, and their effectiveness in the operational environment. Capabilities are broken down into equipment, people, guidance, training, information, and technology. The study team assessed PR capabilities in relation to PR requirements to identify shortfalls and gaps. The shortfalls and gaps are broken down by DOTMLPF category. The study team recognizes that material solutions alone cannot solve all the problems unless they are coupled with necessary changes in doctrine, organization, and training.
PR Architecture Assessment Approach

**Baseline**

**Identify Baseline Requirements**
- # of people at risk by
  - Occupation
  - Location
  - Risk
- Situations/Scenarios

**Identify Baseline Capabilities**
- PR Force Structure
- Doctrine & Guidance
- Training & Exercises
- Information, C4I Assets
- Technologies

**Identify**
- Shortfalls/Gaps
- For five PR execution tasks*
- In DOTMLPF categories

**Examine potential solutions & architectural changes**
- Doctrine/TTP
- Organization
- Training
- Material
- Leadership
- Personnel
- Facilities

* Report, Locate/ID, Support, Recover, Repatriate
PR ARCHITECTURE COMPONENTS

The architecture is categorized in terms of three components: (1) Direct and Guide, (2) Plan and Prepare Force Elements, and (3) Execute the Mission.

DIRECT AND GUIDE

The Direct and Guide component is made up of all the documents that provide direction and guidance to the PR community to provide the desired capability to meet PR requirements. Documentation includes doctrine, policy directives and instructions, regulations, procedures, reports, and memoranda of agreement and understanding. The Direct and Guide component is described in detail in Chapter IV.

PLAN AND PREPARE

The Plan and Prepare component is made up of all the efforts to prepare personnel, forces and assets to conduct PR missions prior to the actual execution of missions. Forces are broken down into three elements: isolated personnel, commanders and their staff, and recovery forces. Each element is prepared by organizing, training, equipping, and supporting it using the DOTMLPF construct. The Plan and Prepare component is described in detail in Chapter V.

EXECUTE THE MISSION

The Mission Execution component is made up of the five critical tasks of personnel recovery: report, locate, support, recover, and return. Mission Execution is described in detail in Chapter VI.
PR Architecture Components

1. Direct and Guide
   • Doctrine
   • Policy/Regulations
   • Procedures/Reports
   • Agreements/MOUs

2. Plan and Prepare
   • Isolated Personnel
   • Commanders and Staff
   • Recovery Forces

3. Execute the Mission
   • Report
   • Locate
   • Support
   • Recover
   • Return/Repatriate

Improvement/solutions implemented through DOTMLPF process
NPRA ASSESSMENT LOGIC

This assessment begins with research and data collection to define the three components of PR architecture, printed in red across the top: Direct and Guide; Plan and Prepare Force Elements; and Execute the Mission.

In order to achieve the PR transformation, one must first of all have a common understanding of the mission requirements and doctrine; then the nation must have planned and prepared PR force elements with the ability to effectively execute tomorrow’s mission. Materiel solutions by themselves are likely to fall short of the mark unless they are introduced with the full recognition of the interdependencies and potential synergies of doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leader development, personnel, and facilities. The U.S. interagency needs not only clear definition of end states, but also a common understanding of the ways and means to achieve those end states.

The baseline effectiveness of these three components will be compared with the desired end states to determine the gaps in DOTMLPF categories. Enhancements to DOTMLPF will be identified in Chapters IV through VI to mitigate these gaps. These enhancements will then be assessed for effectiveness. The cost-feasible DOTMLPF changes can then be implemented to improve PR capability. Since all enhancements cannot be accomplished at once, the above described process of comparing baseline with the desired end states might have to be repeated over a number of years until the baseline capabilities match the desired end states.
NPRA Assessment Logic

Plan and Prepare Force Elements
- Isolated Personnel
- Recovery Forces
- Commanders and Staff

Execute the Mission
- Strategic
- Operational
- Tactical
  - Report
  - Locate
  - Support
  - Recover
  - Return/Repatriate

Identify Gaps
- Doctrine
- Organization
- Training
- Materiel
- Leader Dev.
- Personnel
- Facilities

Desired Strategic Vision
End States

Assess & Recommend Changes

Direct and Guide
- Doctrine
- Mission Requirements
DEFINITION: PERSONNEL RECOVERY (DoDD 2310.2)

The DoD definition of PR (taken from DoDD 2310.2) is applicable for interagency PR under the condition that “personnel” means all U.S. military, government civilian employees, and their contractors. The definition issue in the interagency context is discussed further in Chapter IV.
Definition: Personnel Recovery (*DoDD 2310.2*)

Personnel Recovery – “The aggregation of military, civil, and political efforts to recover captured, detained, evading, isolated or missing personnel from uncertain or hostile environments and denied areas. Personnel recovery may occur through military action, action by nongovernmental organizations, other U.S. Government-approved action, and diplomatic initiatives, or through any combination of these options. Although personnel recovery may occur during non-combatant evacuation operations (NEO), NEO is not a subset of personnel recovery.”

- Also applies to any individual or organization designated by the SECDEF or the President.
PERSONNEL RECOVERY
TASKS AND MEANS – DoD EXAMPLE

PR within the DoD derives from a foundation based on the recovery of downed pilots. The formal systems and physical capacities necessary to recover uniformed personnel are currently found in aviation communities. Non-aviation members of the Armed Forces receive some training in elements of PR, usually Code of Conduct and low level SERE related or derived training and familiarization.

All elements of PR forces (isolated personnel, recovery forces, and commanders and staffs) must be prepared to conduct PR operations and missions before they happen. Preparation includes awareness, education, training, exercises, establishing requirements, research and development, acquiring new equipment, and test and evaluation. Once an isolation event occurs, all three PR force elements must together accomplish the five core tasks of PR: report; locate/authenticate; Support/C2; recover; and return (the task of preparing is done before an isolation incident occurs).

The reporting task includes notifying the responsible commanders and staffs that an incident has occurred, and communicating the important facts about the incident. The location/authentication task is the most difficult and yet most critical task today. This task includes a continuous process of communicating the isolated person’s physical whereabouts to the forces responsible for recovering that person. The process is continuous because the person’s location must be known with increasing accuracy as the forces get closer to effect the recovery. It is also continuous because the isolated person is likely to be moving. The other aspect of this task is authentication: ensuring that the person claiming to be isolated is, in fact, who he/she claims to be. Successful authentication is critical to ensure that adversaries are unable to lure recovery forces into a trap. The support task includes providing for the isolated person and family members until a recovery can be effected. Support may in the form of information, morale, protection, or physical support such as food, water, clothing, and other supplies. The recover task is the actual recovery of the isolated person and return to friendly control. There are three recovery options: diplomatic, military, and civil. The diplomatic option usually involves negotiations and diplomacy with the captors. The military option is that used by the Defense Department, and typically involves the force of arms. The civil option uses assets and processes that are usually employed to rescue civilians in distress. The vast majority of governments, including foreign, state, and local agencies, can exercise the civil option. The Defense Department also has assets capable of employing civil recovery methods. The return task is the final task, and includes moving the isolated or captured person to friendly areas, repatriation, and assisting with the healing process for the individual and the family so that he/she can return to duty.
PERSONNEL RECOVERY
Tasks and Means -- DoD Example

**Tasks**
- PREPARE
- REPORT
- LOCATE/ AUTHENTICATE
- SUPPORT/ C²
- RECOVER
- RETURN

**Means**
- Awareness, Education, SERE Training, Exercises
  - Self, Wingman, Unit, other reports
- PRC-90, PRC-112, HOOK-112, CSEL, ISOPREP
  - JFACC, JSRC, RCC, JFSOCC, UARCC, etc
- Recovery Vehicle
- Airborne Mission Commander
- Rescue Escort/ On Scene Cmdr
- Rescue CAP
- Isolated Person
PERSONNEL RECOVERY
TASKS AND MEANS – INTERAGENCY EXAMPLE

A broader application of the same principles to the wider population of personnel at risk of capture as determined in the scope of this study will introduce many agencies and personnel to a fuller understanding of the system and its inherent tasks. Clearly, standardization in training the at-risk population, increased access to capabilities that can be brought to bear, and improved integration of leaders and staffs from a wider array of agencies are necessary.
PERSONNEL RECOVERY
Tasks and Means – Interagency Example

**Tasks**
- PREPARE
- REPORT
- LOCATE/ AUTHENTICATE
- SUPPORT
- RECOVER
- RETURN

**Means**
- Awareness, Education, Training, Exercises
- Self, Eyewitness, Overdue, Other
- Telephone, radio, signal, witness
- Ambassador, Host Nation, FEST¹, CIA, DoD
- Military Recovery
- Diplomatic Recovery
- Civil Recovery
- Isolated or Missing Persons

¹ Foreign Emergency Support Team
PR OPTIONS, CATEGORIES & METHODS

As this chart shows, the U.S. Government can choose to employ any mix of Diplomatic, Military, and Civil recovery options. It is important to note that civil PR options are different than civil search and rescue (SAR). Civil SAR is “civil” with respect to its end result: the rescue of a civilian. A Civil PR option is “civil” with respect to its means: the use of civilian assets or methods to rescue a government person. Within DoD, there is very little written about diplomatic and civil recovery options. By definition, the military does not use civilian methods. Because the chart categorizes everything into clearly-delineated elements, it does not capture the synergies that can be achieved by a coordinated and synchronized effort by multiple organizations to execute multiple, simultaneous PR methods and options. The chart also does not capture the dynamic aspect of PR missions. As PR scenarios evolve, new PR options, categories, and methods become feasible, as others become impractical. By defining different options, categories, means and methods, the PR community has compartmented, fragmented, and stovepiped PR into numerous bins.

Each Service or component has its own way of conducting PR operations. But if properly prepared, each Service or component can employ common methods across a variety of categories, to include joint, interagency, and multinational, to enhance the capabilities of a particular force.

NGO – Non-Governmental Organization
PVO – Private Volunteer Organization
CSAR – Combat Search and Rescue
TRAP – Tactical Recovery of Aircraft and Personnel (USMC term)
UAR – Unconventional Assisted Recovery
SAR – Search and Rescue.
## PR Options, Categories, & Methods

### Personnel Recovery

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Diplomatic</th>
<th>Military</th>
<th>Civil</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Negotiation</td>
<td>Armistice</td>
<td>Int’l Organizations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armistice</td>
<td>Treaty</td>
<td>Personal Appeal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treaty</td>
<td></td>
<td>NGO / PVO</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unassisted</th>
<th>Opportune</th>
<th>Component</th>
<th>Joint</th>
<th>Multi-national</th>
<th>Interagency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CSAR</td>
<td>TRAP</td>
<td>Evasion</td>
<td>SAR (permissive)</td>
<td>UAR</td>
<td>Multi-national</td>
</tr>
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<td>Interagency</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(Non-military)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CURRENT INTERAGENCY PR RESPONSIBILITIES

Like the previous chart, this chart also categorizes everything into clearly-delineated situations. While illustrating the various environments and isolated personnel categories and aligning responsible agencies, it fails to illustrate the fluid and ambiguous situations that frequently confront the policy maker in the real world. The chart also points out that the lead responsibilities are still undefined and the lead agency is still undesignated.
Current Interagency PR Responsibilities

- Current capability is compartmentalized rather than integrated
- National architecture should benefit from synergy between agencies

Lead Agency Indicated Within ( )
CHAPTER II. DATA COLLECTION AND CONSENSUS BUILDING

This chapter discusses the data collection portion of the NPRA study. Central to this portion of the study has been an active interview program that provided several positive though unexpected side benefits.

The interviews provided a wealth of information, mostly in the form of discussions that were largely unstructured. The information derived was somewhat subjective, and not conducive to objective formatting. Although IDA made an attempt to develop a standardized interview process, after numerous visits, the team concluded that the discussions needed to be free-flowing to be most useful.

IDA obtained access to the DoS F-77 report that accounts for personnel within countries for whom ambassadors are responsible. Detailed numbers of personnel of various categories were provided, but the data tends to overestimate the individuals at risk and an effort is being planned to refine these numbers. However, discussions with the interagency contacts showed clearly that there were personnel doing official work in remote and potentially dangerous regions in many countries. IDA is still attempting to develop a credible estimate of the “at-risk” population.
Chapter II. Data Collection and Consensus Building

- Data Collection
- Awareness of PR
- Interview Results
- Summary
- Further Work
DATA COLLECTION

The data collection plan focused primarily on the interview program. Within the non-DoD interagency, the DoS was expected to be (and was) key to developing leads in the interagency. DoS responsibility for and experience in evacuation processes and their involvement in overseas hostage situations proved very helpful.

Similarly, the DoD PR community proved to be an invaluable source of information. The extensive network of PR personnel embedded within many commands, organizations, and offices is very effective and has been helpful.

In general, very good support was provided to the IDA team across the board. Several challenges are described below.

Entree into the interagency (non-DoD) departments and agencies, and access to individuals to be interviewed, was sometimes at a senior level, but was more often at lower staff level (planner and Action Officer). A formal introductory request from a senior DoD official to the interagency offices selected for interview would have been useful to both advise the interagency leadership and assist in access for the study team.

IDA had limited but adequate access to compartmented programs. This situation will be resolved prior to the completion of the study.

The team visits to four combatant commands – USJFCOM, USOCOM, USSOUTHCOM, and USEUCOM – were useful. USPACOM and USCENTCOM have not been visited and should be. USSOUTHCOM will be revisited to conduct an interagency coordination case study for the ongoing Colombia incident related to the downing of a Cessna 208 on 13 February 2003.
Data Collection

• **Data collection plan was developed to conduct research and collect data**
  – Interview portion of plan emphasized high priority within the interagency on non-DoD Departments and Agencies, with appropriate emphasis on relevant DoD commands and organizations
  – DoS was anticipated to be a primary source of information and within DoD the PR community was expected to be essential
  – Within entire interagency, support for IDA efforts was very good
AWARENESS OF PR

Due to the wide variance in familiarity with PR issues among those interviewed, significant time at the outset of each visit had to be spent not only to describe the IDA study, but also to attempt to establish a common understanding of concepts and terms. Only after that was achieved could meaningful discussions be conducted and useful information obtained. In fact, at the end of some interviews there was still a question as to whether the differences between the DoS-conducted “evacuations” and DoD-unique “Personnel Recovery” were fully appreciated.

Not unexpectedly it was evident that DoD personnel at the tactical and operational levels had a better grasp of PR issues than at the strategic level.

A principal strength of the PR community appears to be in the operational aspects; as with other small communities, the wide separation within DoD of training, resourcing, and experimentation efforts has a significant adverse impact on PR capability.
Awareness of PR

• **Realities in DoD:**
  – Within DoD PR community, most individuals contacted had in-depth understanding of PR, but paid little attention to other forms of rescue, and also had limited exposure to interagency.
  – Within DoD, training, resourcing (including acquisition), and experimentation aspects have limited synergy.

• **Realities in non-DoD Agencies**
  – Within the wider non-DoD interagency, most understood evacuation, some spoke NEO, and almost none spoke PR.
INTERVIEW RESULTS

Significant mutual education developed within the interagency network of contacts as a result of the IDA’s interview and workshop programs.

Many different cultures exist within the interagency. As one example, DoD has a very formal planning process for the near- and far-term in the form of deliberate, contingency, and crisis operational planning processes, and of the programmatic, POM (Program Objective Memorandum) planning. The planning and programming horizon for the other departments and agencies is much nearer than DoD’s, more in the contingency-crisis range.

At DoS, any planning relevant to PR would likely be done within the Political-Military Bureau by the Office of Contingency Planning and Peacekeeping (OCPP), whose scope includes plans for implementing U.S. policy in areas requiring close coordination among U.S. Government agencies. Additionally, the Diplomatic Security Bureau is responsible for Emergency Action Planning (EAP) both at DoS and at the diplomatic posts (embassies and consulates).
Interview Results

- Accordingly, data collection visits accomplished several purposes:
  - Within DoD in general, increased familiarity with PR.
  - Within DoD PR community, educated many on interagency.
  - Within wider non-DoD interagency, educated many on uniqueness of PR as different from evacuation.
  - Overall: Raised the consciousness towards national PR matters of many including some senior leadership
A number of developments throughout the data collection efforts were often very gratifying as well as useful. The network of contacts established proved very key to commencing the development of a common ground for interagency discussion and understanding. Additionally, those contacts were essential in obtaining attendance at the IDA Interagency Workshop conducted on 5-6 February 2003.

The IDA team was not fully aware of the Federal Government aviation community until meeting with the General Services Administration (GSA) office responsible for developing aviation policy. The Federal aircraft fleet inventory (less DoD and the intelligence community) includes some 1,300 aircraft, many of which operate overseas, often in hazardous areas by agencies such as DEA, DoS, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, and U.S. Customs bureau). Aviation personnel in those organizations are often former military and to varying degrees are familiar with the existence and capability of the DoD PR forces. The GSA coordinates a forum for discussing interagency aviation issues on a national basis; the Interagency Committee on Aviation Policy (ICAP) that meets quarterly with representatives of the 18 Department and Agency members of the ICAP. The intelligence community and DoD are not members (DoD provides an observer at the meetings). The IDA team briefed an ICAP meeting regarding the NPRA study with positive results.

Regarding Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, as of January 2003, some 104 operations falling within the broader PR definition had occurred in Afghanistan, with active participation by interagency and coalition elements, both in rescue and as rescues. Operation Iraqi Freedom was staffed by the largest JSRC in history, executing 55 missions and saving 73 personnel as of 30 April 2003. Thus, although without explicit doctrine and procedures, the PR community is contributing positively to military, civilian, and coalition personnel safety.
• Additionally, research and data collection resulted in several unique and positive side benefits:
  – Developed an active interagency PR network.
  – Identified several non-DoD interagency needs such as standardizing PR techniques and access to DoD training and experience.
  – Informed many as to how PR is conducted in the current operational environment.
  – Identified an active interagency aviation policy forum.
  – Research interviews supported the study objectives, and indirectly served to benefit overall PR process.
  – Interagency would like to rely on DoD capabilities and is willing in principle to work to integrate non-DoD capabilities and develop procedures without creating new organizations.
SUMMARY

All visits and interviews (as well as meeting and conferences attended) were documented in comprehensive trip reports provided to the sponsor and other team members.
Summary

• **Interagency visits and interviews:**
  – Details in Annex C
  – Nineteen interviews with non-DoD Departments and Agencies including
    » Departments of State, Justice, Treasury, and Transportation; the Central Intelligence Agency, National Security Council, General Services Administration, and the U.S. Agency for International Development
    » At DoS, five separate Bureaus
  – Nineteen interviews with DoD commands and organizations
    » Including four unified combatant commands, OSD, the Joint Staff, and Services
SUMMARY (CONT’D)

The meetings and conferences were particularly useful as a source of information as well as providing new contacts throughout the PR community. The interagency workshop at the 2002 Annual PR Conference was held at the unclassified level, and although there was active interest in and discussion of the NPRA study, there was little opportunity for free discussion. Accordingly, the Interagency Workshop conducted at IDA was at the Secret level and the discussions were wide-raging. This event was considered particularly useful by all attendees. The only general criticism was that no positive steps to improve the PR in the interagency were identified. That problem is now under active work by the IDA team.
Summary (cont’d)

• Participated in 15 meetings and conferences devoted to PR issues
  – Examples included the PRAG and PRRC
  – Observed Exercise Desert Rescue X
  – Chaired Interagency Workshop during 2002 PR conference

• Conducted dedicated Interagency PR Workshop at IDA
  – Co-chaired by DoS and DoD
  – Attendance included eight interagency Departments and Agencies
  – Workshop served as Study Council and vetted initial findings at study mid-point
FURTHER RESEARCH

These are some specific examples of work still to be done in the second half of the NPRA study. Work on some items is already underway.

A key next step is to develop an action document within the interagency to further the development of standardized PR processes and procedures, and to improve the exchange of PR-relevant information such as through training courses. Work on this item is in progress.

Another key step is to obtain a credible estimate of those personnel particularly “at risk of capture” within the population for which U.S. Ambassadors are responsible overseas. Among other things, such an estimate would help to size the requirements for special survival training. In coordination with the IDA team, contacts at the DoS/Diplomatic Security Bureau and GSA have initiated actions to assist in this effort.

The following organizations are already a part of the national architecture; they need to be considered further to determine whether they could or should play a more central or better-defined role in the NPRA.

- FEST – Foreign Emergency Support Team
- NSARC – National Search and Rescue Committee
- PMAT – Political Military Action Team
- JIACG – Joint Interagency Coordination Group
- JIATF – Joint Interagency Task Force
- ICAP – Interagency Committee for Aviation Policy
- PRTFG – Personnel Recovery Technology Focus Group.
Further Research

- **Continue Interview Program with:**
  - Department of State (Office of the Coordinator for Counter-Terrorism and Office of Contingency Planning), Federal Aviation Administration, NASA, U.S. Marshals, and National Defense University
  - Explore FEST, NSARC, PMAT, JIACG, JIATF, ICAP and PRTFG roles with regard to PR national architecture
CHAPTER III. STRATEGIC VISION FOR FULL SPECTRUM PR

To meet the goals of Joint Vision 2020, DoD and the nation need a new strategic vision for PR. One part of IDA’s National PR Architecture task was to develop this Strategic Vision.

Increasingly in the 21st Century, U.S. personnel, including military forces, government employees, and contractor personnel, will be placed in harm’s way. The U.S. will be called upon to intervene in a wide range of operations, from peace support operations through major theater war, to include transnational threats such as global terrorism and drug trafficking. Inevitably, some of the personnel involved in these operations will become isolated and placed in life threatening situations. America has a moral obligation to these people to do everything in the nation’s power to return them home safely.

The current architecture for PR is DoD-centric and does not adequately consider the capabilities and requirements of other Government agencies and coalition partners. PR doctrine is Service-centric and combat focused. For the 21st Century, PR must be transformed into Full Spectrum PR to meet one overarching goal—to return all isolated U.S. personnel home as soon as possible and to leave no one behind.
Chapter III. Strategic Vision for Full Spectrum PR

- Strategic Context
- PR Community Today
- Full Spectrum PR
- Strategic National Tasks
- PR in 2020
- Desired End State
FULL SPECTRUM PR – STRATEGIC CONTEXT

The United States today faces a world in which adversaries have the ability to attack the U.S. homeland, American forces, and allies with little or no warning. These adversaries are smart, however, and rather than face our forces on open battlefields, they will seek to use any asymmetric advantage open to them. If weakness in U.S. PR capabilities is perceived by our foes as an asymmetric vulnerability, they can be expected to exploit it.

U.S. PR capabilities currently date from the 20th Century. As previously indicated, these capabilities are DoD-centric and focus on combat search and rescue. They must be transformed to meet the challenges of 21st Century threats and to achieve the full spectrum of PR operations, for the full range of personnel that might become isolated. To achieve this transformation, the Interagency must first have a common understanding of the mission requirements and doctrine; then it must plan and prepare PR force elements with the ability to effectively execute tomorrow’s mission. We need a clear definition of end states and also a common understanding of the means to achieve them.

Under JV2020, DoD PR forces will operate not only as one element of a national PR effort but also in concert with multinational forces and other Government agencies. Collaborative planning and interoperability will be the mandates that carry the day, especially in terms of communications, standard operating procedures, and shared information systems. America must transform its combat PR capability into a national, Full Spectrum PR capability that is dominant across the full spectrum of engagement, assuring full dimensional protection to all isolated personnel in any environment.
Full Spectrum PR – Strategic Context

Joint Vision 2020

Full Spectrum Dominance
- Dominant Maneuver
- Precision Engagement
- Focused Logistics
- Full Dimensional Protection

Joint/Coalition Planning

Interagency Coordination

NATIONAL GOALS

National Strategy

Military Strategy

Strategic National Task
- Support Personnel
- Recovery
- Worldwide

Strategic Vision
For PR
THE PR COMMUNITY TODAY

This chart illustrates the current state of the PR community, with its many elements, each effective within its defined area, but it clearly shows that overall, in fact, there is no “PR Community.” The constituent organizations are fragmented, and there is effectively no single advocate for PR. There are actually several voices speaking for parts of PR or for PR-related activities, each with its own purpose, and the results are mixed messages.

There are a few identifiable major sub-communities, namely the OSD, Services, and the Coast Guard (formerly a part of the Department of Transportation, now in the Department of Homeland Security). These are primary stakeholders, who have major interests, equities, responsibilities, and capabilities in the various major pieces of the PR mission area. Given the need for National Architecture for PR, the rest of the Interagency group might also be considered a sub-community with its various constituencies of State Department, CIA, Customs, DEA, Justice, etc.

Not shown on this chart are the Combatant Commands, each also distinct, particularly in their relationships for PR with coalition partners and host nations (see IDA’s Coalition PR Report, P-3705, May 2002).

There are many resources and capabilities reflected in this chart. To achieve 21st Century, Full Spectrum PR capabilities, leadership is needed to pull these pieces together. The PR Strategic Vision provides a focus for doing this.
The PR “Community” Today

Fact: Several Voices + Varied Purposes = Mixed Results
PERSONNEL RECOVERY – DOD VIEW

The popular view of PR in the DoD consists of the following missions (please see Glossary at Appendix B for explanation of terms):

- NAR: Non-Conventional Assisted Recovery
- UAR: Unconventional Assisted Recovery
- JCSAR: Joint Combat Search and Rescue
- MEDEVAC: Medical Evacuation
- CASEVAC: Casualty Evacuation
- CSAR: Combat Search and Rescue.
Personnel Recovery – DoD View

Operational Environments

Personnel Recovery Categories

- Permissive
- Uncertain
- Hostile

- CSAR
- MEDEVAC/CASEVAC
- NAR
- JCSAR
- UAR

Personnel Recovery Categories

- Permissive Uncertain
- Hostile
PERSONNEL RECOVERY – BROADER VIEW

This chart shows the entire range of 20th Century activities that when integrated, could be considered appropriate for 21st Century PR. Certain activities, such as Noncombatant Evacuation Operations (NEO) and Hostage Rescue, are currently defined as outside the scope of PR activities because the former is formally defined within DoD as not PR, and because the latter is within the portfolio of other Federal agencies. Other activities, such as Civil SAR and Mass Rescue operations, are also currently defined as outside the scope of PR, as they generally are conducted in a permissive environment.

The reality, however, is that as envisioned in JV2020, the United States now has, and will have well into the future, global interests and engagement with many regional actors. Civil SAR authorities (e.g., Coast Guard in U.S. maritime regions) will continue to be the experts in search and rescue (i.e., PR in permissive operating environments); when DoD and other personnel become isolated in permissive (yet environmentally hostile or dangerous) locations in other countries, the host country’s civil SAR authorities are responsible for PR. The IDA Coalition PR report found that relationships among civil SAR authorities could be (and frequently are) assets in developing coalition PR strategies for various theater combatant commanders, when the operational environment may not be so permissive.

Similarly, capabilities employed for NEO and hostage rescue may be very similar to those used for PR. For example, training for potential isolated persons, C4ISR and training for commanders and staffs, and tactics, training, and procedures for rescue forces for PR could very well apply to these other types of operations.

Thus, when one considers the full range of military, civilian, and contractor personnel, plus others designated by the President (which could include non-government organizations (NGO), allies, and coalition partners), it is clear that Full Spectrum PR should consider how to leverage all PR-related capabilities. It is also clear that all potential isolated persons should have some basic knowledge of PR operations.
Personnel Recovery Categories

- Civil SAR*
- SAR
- Mass Rescue
- UAR
- JCSAR
- NAR
- MEDEVAC/CASEVAC
- CSAR
- Hostage Rescue

Operational Environments

- Permissive
- Uncertain
- Hostile

*DoD supports on a not-to-interfere basis
This chart shows the PR-related activities that should be integrated within 21st Century Full Spectrum PR. This chart is identical to the previous illustrations but uses the same shading for all component missions to indicate that these are integrated rather than compartmented to achieve synergy among them. Hostage rescue is the responsibility of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict (ASD/SOLIC). Non-Combatant Evacuation (NEO) executed by DoD in support of DoS ordered evacuation, is also outside the bounds of PR as currently defined. As an intermediate objective, IDA recommends that PR and hostage rescue operations be integrated and coordinated so that one operation does not begin where the other ends. With the ultimate objective of providing seamless policy, training and execution, Full Spectrum Personnel Recovery is defined as the sum of military, diplomatic, and civil efforts to prepare for, recover, and return of U.S. military, government civilians, and government contractors, or others as designated by the President, Secretary of State, or the Secretary of Defense, who are isolated or missing in all situations and all scenarios.
Full Spectrum Personnel Recovery

Operational Environments

Integrated rather than compartmented CONOPS

Personnel Recovery Categories

Permissive  Uncertain  Hostile

Mass Rescue*  MEDEVAC/CASEVAC

Civil SAR*  Evacuation/NEO

SAR

Hostage Rescue

NAR

UAR

JCSAR

CSAR

*On a not-to-interfere basis

PR doctrine should seamlessly integrate all PR environments and scenarios—across the entire spectrum of operations.
A STRATEGIC NATIONAL TASK

The strategic national task already recognizes the interagency and broader aspects of PR. This UJTL (Unified Joint Task List) task is also broad — PR is for anyone, anywhere, and using all available tools and techniques. Overall, the strategic national task recognizes the need for Full Spectrum PR.

What is needed is a way to help focus the national level policy, plans, and strategic direction; to develop the relationships and trust needed to support and leverage interagency coordination; to understand who might be at risk as potential isolated persons, and then train and prepare them; and to leverage the significant capabilities available in the combat, interagency, and civil SAR communities.
Universal Joint Task List, SN 3.4.9, Support Personnel Recovery Worldwide:

This task includes reporting, locating, supporting the person and their family, recovery, and return of the isolated person to their family or duty. This support includes developing national level policy, plans, and strategic direction to military support missions requiring national and interagency coordination, such as special operations support to unconventional assisted recovery mechanism (UARM) and other recovery methods. It also includes setting worldwide standards for survival, evasion, resistance, and escape (SERE) training. Included within this task are civil search and rescue, combat search and rescue (CSAR), and evasion and escape.
DESIRED END STATES: DIRECT AND GUIDE

The desired end states are organized in three components of the personnel recovery architecture: (1) Direct and Guide, (2) Plan and Prepare Force Elements, and (3) Execute the Mission. Associated end states for each dimension are as follows:

DIRECT AND GUIDE

1. Currently there is no PR doctrine per se. The existing doctrine is for the CSAR mission and needs to be broadened across the full PR spectrum. Most future U.S. military operations will be conducted in a joint and combined environment, with multiple government agencies, and with the support of coalition/allied forces. Hence, PR services must be extended to all participants, including interagency personnel, coalition personnel, and contractors, who are often key to the success of military operations.

2. There are several categories or types of PR operations, which might be conducted in a range of friendly to hostile operational environments. There are:
   - SAR – Search and Rescue
   - J/CSAR – Joint/Combat Search and Rescue
   - CASEVAC – Casualty Evacuation
   - MEDEVAC – Medical Evacuation
   - NEO – Non-Combatant Evacuation
   - UAR – Unconventional Assisted Recovery
   - NAR – Non-conventional Assisted Recovery.

The units conducting these operations are compartmented to support different missions, and many times the same resources may be used for multiple missions. PR scope should be broad and should encompass all of these missions, so that the decision maker is not confused as to how to task these missions. Hence, the PR requirements must be well articulated. Similarly, there is confusion as to who receives the PR services, i.e., whether non-DoD government personnel and allies are eligible. Any successful operation must provide the same level of services to all people placed in harm’s way to conduct a mission. Otherwise, there will be a lack of cohesion.
Desired End States: Direct and Guide

1. PR Doctrine:
   » That PR doctrine is well articulated to ensure that the Services, as force providers, are responsible for planning and budgeting for PR but the execution is conducted by a joint task force (JTF) commander or a unified Combatant Commander, considering interagency and coalition issues.

2. PR Mission Requirements and Scope:
   » That the PR mission requirements and scope are articulated to seamlessly integrate all PR methods and categories across the entire spectrum of operations.
DESIRED END STATES: PLAN AND PREPARE

PLAN AND PREPARE FORCE ELEMENTS

3. The operational commanders and staff at all levels must be educated in PR doctrine, requirements, and mission execution. The commanders and staff must also be trained in strategic and operational C4ISR (command, control, communication, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance) capabilities. Individuals that have potential of being isolated should receive survival, evasion, resistance, and escape (SERE) training. Their level of training and their equipment must be commensurate with the risks they face. Also, the PR units and forces must receive periodic training in end-to-end mission execution involving the five PR core tasks (report, locate, support, recover, and return). Finally, it is desirable to establish readiness standards for all the elements of the entire DoD capability, and then, on a routine basis, to review, assess, and report the readiness of the overall PR system.

4. The current PR capability should be improved to provide PR support for two Major Theater Wars (MTW), or for the Global War On Terrorism (GWOT) along with one MTW. The capability is fragmented among Services, SOF, and the National Guard. Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) must provide adequate focus for the PR mission and the Services must budget for PR force modernization, readiness, and training via the Planning Programming Budgeting System (PPBS) process. Without resources, PR capability will not improve.
3. **PR Force Elements:**
   » That the PR force elements consisting of isolated personnel, commanders/staff, and recovery forces are adequately programmed, organized, trained, and equipped.

4. **PR Force Elements:**
   » That the PR force elements consisting of isolated personnel, commanders/staff, and recovery forces are adequately resourced.
DESIRED END STATES: MISSION EXECUTION

MISSION EXECUTION

5. The present capabilities to locate, identify, and authenticate isolated personnel are limited in effectiveness and reliability and must be improved in timeliness, accuracy, covertness, and worldwide availability. Because other government agency, contractor, and coalition personnel need PR support, this area must be reexamined to provide simpler and more reliable systems.

6. The present strategic level PR C4ISR system components must be integrated to improve the synergy among them. The operational level PR C4ISR, consisting of Joint Search and Rescue Centers (JSRCs), Rescue Coordination Centers (RCCs), and Unconventional Assisted Recovery Coordination Centers (UARCCs), need to be better integrated into theater systems.

7. PR forces employ equipment that is aging and must be modernized. It would be desirable to have all Services and Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) develop common modernization systems for both conventional and non-conventional recoveries. New equipment will be effective and suitable in all environments and all scenarios.
5. **Location, Identification, & Authentication Capabilities:**
   » That the location, identification, and authentication capabilities for isolated personnel are operationally effective, suitable, and available when/where needed.

6. **PR C4ISR Systems:**
   » That the PR C4ISR systems operate effectively all levels from strategic and operational to the tactical.

7. **Deployed PR Forces:**
   » That deployed PR forces have effective capability to conduct missions in any scenario and environment.
CHAPTER IV. DIRECT AND GUIDE

With data collection completed (to the extent indicated in Chapter II) and a proposed strategic vision for PR as described in Chapter III, the IDA study team could then begin to construct the beginning (referred to in this report as baseline) and end states for national PR capabilities. Concurrently, the study team is in the process of conducting a comparative analysis to identify shortfalls in the current national PR capability. As shortfalls are identified, they are synthesized into a single, comprehensive component issue with a proposed DOTMLPF solution set.

This chapter reviews the analysis conducted to date for the first of the three components of PR architecture – the Direct and Guide component – beginning with baseline policy for the overall security and safety of USG personnel and concluding with a recommended solution set for identified shortfalls. Keep in mind that these recommendations are interim findings based on research and analysis conducted to date, at the mid-point of the study. The second phase of the study will explore the program and resource implications of these policy considerations.
Chapter IV. Direct and Guide

- Baseline
  - Policy
  - Doctrine
  - Directives
  - Key Definitions

- Shortfalls and Deficiencies

- Issue

- Solution Set
BASELINE POLICY

The Chief of Mission (CoM) and the Combat Commander bear overall responsibility for the safety and security of USG personnel and American citizens.

The CoM generally has the responsibility for evacuation of USG personnel. That does not mean that there are required capabilities on-hand to conduct the evacuation; this is particularly true in an unstable country with a small Embassy. Capabilities required for an evacuation range from use of regularly scheduled commercial air to commercial charter air to military air or naval shipping; in some scenarios, evacuation could be overland by bus, privately owned vehicle (POV), rail, or military vehicle. None of these capabilities are organic to a post (less perhaps some vehicle and very limited air assets) and would have to be arranged by direct commercial contract or by a request to the Combat Commander.

The principal means to identify personnel for evacuation at Diplomatic posts is the DoS F77 Report, which lists numbers of personnel in a country in administrative categories such as those indicated under the first bullet of the slide. Recently DoS and other non-DoD agencies have begun to think more seriously about identifying those personnel “potentially at risk for PR.” In coordination with DoS, and GSA, and other agencies, IDA has embarked on a process to identify numbers of personnel for whom the CoM has responsibility and who fall into the “at risk for PR” category.

In an evacuation, the CoM may also have responsibility for certain non-US personnel, such as third country aliens, based on prior agreements. Of interest, a particular concern at DoS are the “TDY’ers,” those personnel who may be official USG, or contractor, or others, who come to a country for a short period, often with inadequate prior security indoctrination and sometimes with limited contact with the Diplomatic Post, but for whom the CoM has responsibility.

Evacuation scenarios might range from assisted (authorized) evacuation as a situation deteriorates, to directed (ordered) evacuation (which in latter stages may include a request for DoD support), to the rare worst case in which the mission is closed. In an evacuation scenario the CoM may authorize direct evacuation by government or commercial means. When necessary the CoM may request assistance from DoD. The policy of “no double standard” requires that the CoM provide equal priority for all American citizens in an evacuation by (for example) reserving the same number of seats on commercial aircraft for American citizens in the private sector as for official USG personnel.

In a PR situation, the CoM may assist by employing diplomatic means, requesting host nation assistance, requesting DoD assistance, and/or employing other assets that might be available.

In a hostage detention scenario, the CoM may coordinate the negotiation process, or request and authorize the use of force.
Baseline Policy

- All US personnel, except those assigned to the Combatant Commander, in a foreign country are the responsibility of the Chief of Mission (CoM) for evacuation in a deteriorating security situation. Personnel include the following:
  - USG official personnel including contractors
  - American citizens in the private sector
  - American citizen tourists

- The CoM plays a key role in the following:
  - Evacuation
  - Personnel Recovery
  - Hostage Situation

- The Combatant Commander is responsible for all personnel assigned to his command
BASELINE DOCTRINE

Doctrine is defined in Joint Publication 1-02 as the “fundamental principles by which the military forces or elements thereof guide their actions in support of national objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgment in application.” The following publications pertain to PR. If there is a conflict between a joint publication and a Service publication, the joint doctrine takes precedence for joint forces. Military doctrine, which is based on time-tested principles intended to shape the employment of Armed Forces, is authoritative in nature.

**Joint Doctrine Documents**

- Joint Pub 3-50.2, Doctrine for Joint CSAR
- Joint Pub 3-50.21, Joint TTP for CSAR
- Joint Pub 3-50.3, Joint Doctrine for Evasion & Recovery

**Multi-Service Doctrine Documents**

- FM 90-18/FMFRP 2-70/MACP 64-3/ACCP 50-51/CI M16120.8/ USAFEP 50-51/PAC AFP 50-52, Multi-Service Procedures for CSAR (rescinded)
- AFM 200-3(rescinded)/FM 21-77A/NWP 43(A), Joint Worldwide E&E Manual
- FM 21-76-1/MCRP 3-02H/NWP 3-50.3/AFTTP(I) 3-2.26, Multi-Service Procedures for Survival, Evasion, & Recovery

The importance of doctrine as a catalyst for the implementation and management of change cannot be overstated. Doctrine embraces everything from policy to multi-service manuals and publications, to unit tactics, techniques, and procedures (some primary examples indicated below). Unfortunately, baseline doctrine for PR is rooted in outmoded service CSAR concepts and lags seriously behind joint warfighting concepts and current successful operational missions. JPRA is working diligently to fill the void and has a draft Joint Publication 3-50 on PR out for staff coordination.

**Air Force Doctrine Documents**

- Air Force Doctrine Document 2-1.6, CSAR

**Army Doctrine Documents**

- Field Manual 1-111, Aviation Brigade (Appendix D, CSAR)
- Army Regulation 525-90, CSAR Procedures
- Field Manual 3-50.2, CSAR (draft)
- Field Manual 3-05.231, Special Forces PR (draft)
- USAJFKSWCS Pub 525-5-14, Unconventional Assisted Recovery

**Navy Doctrine Documents**

- Naval Warfare Pub 19-2, Navy CSAR Supplement

**Marine Corps Doctrine Documents**

- FMFM 5-70, MAGTF Aviation Planning (Chapter 9, TRAP).
Baseline Doctrine

- There is no “Personnel Recovery” doctrine, per se
  - The only doctrine document entitled “Personnel Recovery” is FM 3-05.231, which is currently in draft.
    » “The PR system is best characterized as the sum of unrelated subsystems, command and control (C2) nodes, units, elements, and organizations united for the purpose of performing tasks and functions associated with the recovery of personnel who are in harm’s way.” (FM 3-05.231, page 1-1)
  - FM 3-05.231 is derivative of existing Joint CSAR doctrine and TTP

- However, when addressing PR issues, the DoD “PR community” refers to doctrine in the following mission areas
  - CSAR (predominant source of doctrine)
  - Joint CSAR
  - SERE
  - UAR

- Universal Joint Task List (UJTL) has been developed for PR
BASELINE POLICY AND DIRECTIVES

Title 10, U.S. Code, Section 1501, “Missing Personnel,” establishes an office within DoD to have responsibility for matters relating to missing persons – including the policy, control, and oversight of the entire process for investigation and recovery related to missing persons – and for coordination with other departments and agencies of the United States on all matters concerning missing persons.

Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (GPW), Article 17, concerning military personnel and civilian personnel accompanying the Armed Forces, provides that “... each party to a conflict is required to furnish the persons under its jurisdiction who are liable to become prisoners of war with an identity card showing the owner’s surname, first names, rank, army, regimental, personal or serial number or equivalent information, and date of birth.”

The following Directives and Instructions are intended to implement current PR policy.

DoD Directive 2310.2, “Personnel Recovery (PR),” establishes definitions for PR and Non-conventional Assisted Recovery (NAR) and designates the Commander, United States Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM), as the DoD executive agent for PR.

DoD Instruction 2310.3, “PR Response Cell (PRRC) Procedures,” establishes a PRRC with the function to facilitate informed decision-making by OSD principals in an actual PR incident.

DoD Directive 1300.7, “Training and Education Measures Necessary to Support the Code of Conduct,” provides guidance to train members of the Armed Forces and directs that commanders of Combatant Commands shall designate the level of training.
Baseline Policy and Directives

- Title 10, U.S. Code, Section 1501, “Missing Personnel”
- Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of August 12, 1949 (GPW)
RELATED DIRECTIVES AND GUIDANCE DOCUMENTS

Department of Defense Instruction 1000.1 revises requirements for the form, issuance, and use of identity cards required by the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, for the Protection of War Victims.

Executive Order 12656 paragraph 13 (F) assigns the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretaries of Defense and Health and Human Services, with lead responsibilities for the protection or evacuation of United States citizens and nationals abroad and safeguarding their property abroad.

PDD 29 was an effort to codify operating principles and processes for the interagency environment. It was superseded by the adoption of NSPD-1 (see below), which shifted responsibilities for executing PDD 56 and 29 functions to regional and functional Principals and Deputies Committees (PCCs).

PDD/NSC 56 defines “complex contingency operations.”

National Security Presidential Directive 1 was the first in a series of National Security Presidential Directives issued under President George W. Bush. Under this directive, National Security Presidential Directives shall replace both Presidential Decision Directives and Presidential Review Directives as an instrument for communicating presidential decisions about the national security policies of the United States. It establishes that management of the development and implementation of national security policies by multiple agencies of the United States Government shall usually be accomplished by the NSC Policy Coordination Committees (NSC/PCCs). The NSC/PCCs shall be the main day-to-day forums for interagency coordination of national security policy. Six NSC/PCCs were established for the following regions: Europe and Eurasia, Western Hemisphere, East Asia, South Asia, Near East and North Africa, and Africa. Eleven NSC/PCCs also established for specific functional areas. The previous system of Interagency Working Groups (IWGs) was abolished.

NSPD 12 is one of the first in the current generation of NSPDs since NSPD 1, under President George W. Bush. As such, it not only serves as a precedent, but it addresses a related mission area of PR, namely Hostage Recovery. The directive announces the taking of hostages anywhere overseas is a violation of Federal Law and establishes policy for their safe return.

Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) and Contingency Planning Guidance (CPG) provide the most relevant and current guidance to military departments and defense agency planning in support of the National Security Strategy.
Related Directives and Guidance Documents

- DODI 1000.1 – Identity Cards Required by the Geneva Conventions, 30 January 1974; Incorporating Change 2, 5 June 1991
- Executive Order 12656 – Assignment of Emergency Preparedness Responsibilities, November 18, 1988
- PDD-29 – Security Policy Coordination, 27 Sep 1994
- PDD/NSC 56 – Managing Complex Contingency Operations, May 1997
- NSPD 1 – Organization of the National Security Council System, 13 Feb 2001
- NSPD 12 – United States Citizens Taken Hostage Abroad, 18 Feb 2002
- Defense Planning Guidance (DPG)
- Contingency Planning Guidance (CPG)
PR ADVISORY GROUP BASELINE DIRECTIVE

DoDD 2310.2, establishes the purpose, composition and tasks for the PRAG.

In accordance with the Missing Persons Act (MPA), DPMO is responsible for “coordination for the Department of Defense with other departments and agencies of the United States on all matters concerning missing persons” and “within DoD among the military departments, the Joint Staff, and the commanders of the combatant commands.” The PRAG provides a forum for DPMO to exercise this aspect of its responsibilities under the MPA at a senior level. The PRAG’s primary focus is on long-term, enduring issues central to PR planning. However, the PRAG might also be convened at the request of the DASD (POW/Missing Personnel Affairs) or any of the PRAG’s principal members to address problems of a more immediate nature or provide crisis support to the Secretary of Defense.

Membership on the PRAG consists of the following principals:

- DASD(POW/Missing Personnel Affairs)
- Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Advanced Systems and Concepts
- Director, Overseas Citizens Bureau, Department of State
- Director, Policy Support, DIA
- Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs
- Chief, Military and Special Projects Division, CIA
- Service and SOCOM Representatives
- Dep. Dir. for Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence Surveillance, Reconnaissance (C3ISR) in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command Control, Communications, and Intelligence
- Dir. of Operations and Policy, USCG
- DASD for Policy Support, ASD(SO/LIC)
- Deputy Director for Operations, The Joint Staff
- HQ, AF/DXOO
- Director of Defense Policy, National Security Council.
• **DODD 2310.2**, establishes the purpose, tasks, and composition of the Personnel Recovery Advisory Group (PRAG).

• **Purpose**
  – The purpose of the PRAG is to review DoD progress toward developing a fully integrated PR architecture that ensures its ability to recover isolated personnel.

• **Specified Tasks**
  – Work collaboratively to develop, review, and recommend policy-level actions or initiatives to support achieving the DoD goal of having a fully integrated PR architecture that ensures the recovery of isolated U.S. personnel worldwide.
  – Provide pre-crisis advice to DoD and other U.S. Government principals on personnel recovery policies.

• **Membership**
  – Principals from within Services, OSD, and the Joint Staff
  – Limited representation from NSC and Non-DoD agencies
PR RESPONSE CELL BASELINE INSTRUCTION

Department of Defense Instruction 2310.3, directs that upon notification that the USD(P) had decided to activate a PRRC, the DASD(POW/MPA) shall convene a PRRC for the purpose of facilitating informed decision-making by OSD principals. It further directs that the PRRC will accomplish this by addressing issues that have impact on the PR incident, and by expeditiously developing coordinated policy options for the Secretary of Defense and/or the President. The PRRC serves as the Department of Defense point of contact for PR interagency coordination. The PRRC deactivates after recovery has been accomplished, or recovery had been determined to be impossible. In the event the USD(P) decides a PRRC is inappropriate, DPMO shall function as an operational coordination center in support of the OSD for evolving PR policy issues until the incident is resolved.

The incident report will be provided to the SECDEF through the USD(P). This initial report shall provide, as time permits, a status report on the situation, legal status of those involved, public affairs guidance, and summary of the interagency’s response to the incident, and shall recommend policy options for managing the incident. The PRRC shall provide update and spot reports covering significant developments throughout the duration of the incident.

The specified tasks listed on the slide are explicitly stated in the DoDI; the implied tasks are not stated, but derived as necessary tasks in order to accomplish the directed, specified tasks.
• DoDI 2310.3 – Personnel Recovery Response Cell (PRRC), 6 June 1997, establishes authorities and responsibilities.

• Specified Tasks
  – Facilitate the development of coordinated policy options for the SECDEF and the NCA.
  – Provide a PR incident report within 3 hours of the cell convening.
  – Provide update and spot reports throughout the duration of the incident.
  – Write a PR lessons-learned report for OSD distribution, and a PR after-action report for DoD historical files.

• Implied Tasks
  – Maintain near real-time intelligence and Situational Awareness of PR incidents.
  – Maintain a membership that is familiar with PR issues, capabilities, and limitations.
  – Conduct centralized oversight of the incident, while permitting decentralized execution.
ANALYSIS OF CURRENT PR DEFINITION

This slide and the analysis below illustrate the problem inherent in the current definition of PR. As discussed and developed in Chapter III, the IDA NPRA study proposes a much broader and more inclusive definition of PR – termed **Full Spectrum PR**. Full Spectrum PR is broader in the sense that it serves as the umbrella term for related rescue and recovery missions (such as SAR, MEDEVAC/CASEVAC, Evacuation/NEO, CSAR/JCSAR, NAR/UAR, Mass Rescue, and Hostage Rescue). Full Spectrum PR is also more inclusive in terms of both “personnel” (referring to DoD, USG interagency employees, government contractors, other American citizens, multinational, and coalition partners) and operational “environments” (referring to benign, uncertain, hostile, and denied). A Full Spectrum PR capability recognizes the unique aspects of each mission and the consequences of a more inclusive definition while capitalizing on the synergy of common requirements, like assets, and similar architecture.

An analysis of the definition of PR, as currently defined in DoDD 2310.2, shows that a scenario or incident must successfully pass four tests to be considered a PR incident.

- The first test is for the “target set,” or individual who is the subject of the incident. The individual must be a member of the U.S. military, a DoD civilian, a DoD contractor, or must be designated by the Secretary of Defense or the President.

- The second test is for the status of the individual. The individual must be captured, detained, beleaguered, evading, isolated, or missing. Each of these statuses is defined in DoD guidance. Hostages, evacuees, and persons who are besieged do not pass the test for PR.

- The third test is for the environment. The individual must be in an uncertain or hostile environment, or in a denied area. Each of these environments is defined in DoD guidance. Individuals in permissive environments do not pass the test for PR. There is, however, a discrepancy between the environment test and the individual status test. An individual can qualify as an isolated person in any environment, according to the definition. Therefore, it is possible for an individual to be an isolated person, yet still not be the subject of a PR incident.

- The final test is for the duty status of the individual. The individual must be engaged in an official U.S.-sponsored activity or mission.

While the aforementioned tests may well be necessary to determine the legal status of an individual being rescued or recovered, the technically restrictive definition also constrains proactive, cooperative, integrated efforts that could lead to successful PR operations.
### Analysis of Current PR Definition

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>“Target Set”</th>
<th>Individual Status</th>
<th>Environment</th>
<th>Duty Status</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Military</td>
<td>Captured</td>
<td>Uncertain</td>
<td>Yes/No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DoD Civilian</td>
<td>Detained</td>
<td>Hostile</td>
<td>Yes/No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DoD Contractor</td>
<td>Beleaguered</td>
<td>Denied</td>
<td>Yes/No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(or as directed by SecDef or President)</td>
<td>Evading</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Isolated</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Missing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note 1:** Existing DoDD 2310.2 required all four criteria be met and answered “Yes”.

* JP 1-02 definition of “isolated personnel” makes Environment irrelevant.

Current Criteria are restrictive; Impeded achievement of Full Spectrum PR
INTERIM INTERAGENCY DEFINITION

While the criteria associated with determination of an isolated person's status are restrictive and preclude comprehensive, integrated solutions to PR, there is much that is relevant and effective in the definition of Personnel Recovery that is currently in use. Much of the unnecessary compartmentalization with which organizations approach the issue has to do with the categorization of personnel status, rather than anything inherently wrong with defining the issue. Therefore, in the interim, a way to achieve a more comprehensive and integrated approach to PR may be to discard the legalistic and discrete tests outlined on the previous page and interpret the word "personnel" to encompass all those who may be at high risk of capture. By broadening this interpretation, the interagency still receives the guidance necessary to develop and sustain capabilities, while personnel involved in day to day personnel recovery operations and crisis management are given the flexibility to exercise good judgment in making decisions about when and how to execute PR operations.
Interim Interagency Definition

- **Personnel Recovery** – “The aggregation of military, civil, and political efforts to recover captured, detained, evading, isolated or missing personnel from uncertain or hostile environments and denied areas. Personnel recovery may occur through military action, action by nongovernmental organizations, other U.S. Government-approved action, and diplomatic initiatives, or through any combination of these options. Although personnel recovery may occur during non-combatant evacuation operations (NEO), NEO is not a subset of personnel recovery.”

*DoD Directive 2310.2*

The term **personnel** means all U.S. military, government civilians, and government contractors in all situations and all scenarios.
DIRECT AND GUIDE – SHORTFALLS AND DEFICIENCIES

To date, the data collection effort revealed that there is virtually no guidance at the interagency level concerning PR. NSPD 1 establishes that NSPDs shall replace both Presidential Decision Directives (PDDs) and Presidential Review Directives (PRDs) as an instrument of communicating presidential decisions about national security policy; it also establishes Policy Coordination Committees with specific regional or functional national policy responsibilities. PR is not specifically addressed in either NSPDs and it has never been addressed specifically in a PCC or Sub-PCC.

DoS intuitively associates PR under the general rubric of “evacuation” as a part of Emergency Action Planning; however, while evacuation is addressed in some detail in the Emergency Planning Handbook, PR is not addressed.

As indicated earlier, currently there is no PR doctrine, per se. Mission Essential Tasks (METs) for PR have been developed for the Strategic National, Strategic Theater, Operational, and Tactical Levels; however they do not seem to be well understood or applied. The PR related METs in existing Joint Mission Essential Task Lists (JMETLs) vary widely among the combatant commands.

With exception of the DoDD 2310.2 and DoDI 2310.3, other Directives and Instructions are generally adequate in implementing “existing” PR policy – recognizing that PR policy in itself is lacking. However, the DoDD concerning the purpose of the PRAG is too vague and promotes a passive management style without establishing requisite authorities for planning and providing oversight. Likewise the DoDI regarding the PRRC lacks sufficient structure to enable it to perform implied task and thus make it a viable organizational entity within the architecture.

While DoD has a codified “Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms,” promulgated in Joint Publication 1-02, DoS has no common lexicon except as defined in national level directives. While one might argue that the lack of precise and common definitions usually do not present major obstacles in the execution of a mission when human lives hang in the balance, they could create considerable angst or disappointment, and have serious implications in determining legal status and attendant responsibilities, pay, and medical benefits.

Finally, PR guidance is lacking in both DPG and CPG, although DPMO is trying to provide emphasis on PR in DPG.
Direct and Guide: Shortfalls and Deficiencies

• **Policy**
  – There is no national level policy or guidance on PR
  – NSPD 1 establishes NSC PCCs, and a Sub-PCC for Defense POW/Missing Personnel matters was formed on 18 June 2002.

• **Doctrine**
  – There is no joint Doctrine for PR.
  – PR related Joint Mission Essential Tasks (JMETs) are applied inconsistently among combatant commands
  – Existing Service doctrine is outdated and CSAR-focused.

• **Directives**
  – DoDD 2310.2 in regard to the PRAG purpose statement is too vague.

• **Instructions**
  – DoDI 2310.3 lacks sufficient structure to make PRRC an effective organizational body.

• **Definitions**
  – There is no interagency definition for PR, and the current definition of PR, and related terms vary widely among Services, departments, and agencies.

• **Guidance**
  – Specific PR guidance is lacking in both DPG and CPG.
ISSUE

Aggregating the shortfalls and deficiencies stated on previous slides led the IDA study team to the conclusion that the central issue is that, as a result of lack of national guidance, there is little or no consensus on the definition and scope of USG PR. While the DoD PR definition from DoDD 2310.2 is directly applicable to interagency PR if the term “personnel” is taken in a broader context, those in the DoD PR community generally interpret the definition in terms of who the individual is, his/her individual and duty status, and the environment. However, there are no accepted guidelines for limiting the scope of interagency PR efforts. In the absence of such limitations, this study will address a broad definition of interagency PR responsibilities, to include U.S. military personnel, Government civilians and contractors, without regard to the situation or environment. Hence, for this study, the DoD PR definition is not changed but the context of the definition is significantly broadened to allow the study to examine fully the policy, planning, and program implications of future interagency PR issues. Until there is interagency policy that defines full spectrum PR in terms of vision, scope, and goals, deliberate planning and preparation will be, at best, ad hoc and inefficient.

NSPD 1 establishes that the “management of the development and implementation of national security policies by multiple agencies of the United States Government shall usually be accomplished by the NSC Policy Coordination Committees (NSC/PCCs). The NSC/PCCs shall be the main day-to-day for interagency coordination of national security policy. They shall provide policy analysis for consideration by the more senior committees of the NSC system and ensure timely responses to decisions made by the President. Each NSC/PCC shall include representatives from the executive departments, offices, and agencies represented in the NSC/DC.”

Additionally, the directive states the “except for those established by statute, other existing NSC interagency groups, ad hoc bodies, and executive committees are also abolished as of March 1, 2001, unless they are specifically reestablished as subordinate working groups within the new NSC system as of that date.”

If Full Spectrum PR is to be a national priority consisting of a credible capability with a coherent architecture and a coordinated interagency effort, policy formulation should be an essential and fundamental requirement. Without national level policy and clear supporting doctrine, PR will continue to default to DoD capabilities on an ad hoc basis without the benefit of supporting capabilities and efforts from other agencies.
• ISSUE: As a result of the lack of national level guidance, there is no consensus on the definition and scope of USG PR.
  – There are lack of PR doctrine within DoD and lack of PR policy and understanding outside DoD.
  – National PR capabilities and requirements are not yet defined.
  – The current architecture for PR is DoD-centric and does not adequately consider the capabilities and requirements of other USG agencies and coalition partners.
  – Closely related missions (e.g., CSAR, SAR, evacuation, hostage rescue) are treated as separate entities.
A National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD), or similar document is needed to ensure a common understanding of PR policy and to establish a national policy with defined interagency roles and responsibilities. The essential ingredients of the NSPD are elaborated in the next chart. Ultimately, the NSPD should stimulate the development of a coherent and cohesive policy/doctrinal infrastructure in the form of supporting directives, instructions, doctrine, and tactics, techniques and procedures.

With the increased requirements for humanitarian assistance, peace support operations, counter narcotics operations, and the Global War on Terrorism, U.S. personnel will continue to be deployed overseas in harm’s way. Traditionally, the U.S. government has felt a moral obligation to return military personnel home safely. With the widespread deployment of a full range of personnel—government civilians and contract employees, as well as military service members—the government may find itself obligated to provide personnel recovery assistance to a much broader set of personnel when incidents occur in the future. This study recommends that the policy and planning implications of such a broadening of personnel recovery obligations be considered in advance of future incidents. The second phase of the study will explore the program and resource implications of these policy considerations.

Better use could be made of DPG concerning PR by providing firm guidance in the form of goals, priorities, and objectives, including fiscal constraints, for the development of the Program Objective Memorandums for PR by the Military Departments and Defense agencies. Contingency Planning Guidance (CPG) also provides an opportunity to clarify and emphasize the importance of PR in interagency and multinational planning.
DOTMLPF Solution Set: Policy/Doctrine

Policy/Doctrine

- Develop an NSPD to identify responsibilities for conducting full spectrum PR for USG personnel of all departments and agencies.
- Develop doctrine to address full spectrum PR.
- Consider development of code of behavior to support resistance training for non-military personnel.
- Ensure JMETLs include full spectrum PR and interagency and coalition requirements.
- Address full spectrum PR in DPG and CPG.
As mentioned, a new directive or guide is needed for interagency PR. Such guidance is needed at the national level to make interagency PR the responsibility of the National Security Council as NSPD-12 does for hostage recovery. The guidance needs to define PR in an interagency context and identify who is responsible for PR under various circumstances. The guidance should also describe interagency PR roles and responsibilities, as well as an interagency coordination process tailored for PR. The guidance should define the requirements for U.S. personnel who are on official duty overseas in high-risk areas. These requirements should be in terms of training, equipment, and procedures. The guidance should also identify the code of behavior that serves as the foundation for PR. The specific code would be described by another policy document.

IDA intends to organize an interagency workshop to develop such a National Directive or multi-agency MOA.
• A Directive or Guide is needed to establish interagency PR policy that would:
  – Define PR and associated terms in interagency context
  – Ensure a comprehensive scope that addresses government employees, civilians, and contractors in all environments
  – Identify interagency roles and responsibilities with regard to PR policy, planning, training, and execution
  – Describe the interagency coordination process for PR incidents
  – Prescribe minimum standards for U.S. personnel to enter high-risk countries (e.g., level of training, awareness, equipment)
  – Describe fundamental principles of a civilian code of conduct or behavior
  – Promote appropriate coordination mechanisms for interagency, coalition, and international organizations.
CIVILIAN CODE OF BEHAVIOR

The Code of Conduct (CoC) guides the actions of every member of the Armed Forces during peacetime or wartime. The CoC not only establishes standards of conduct, but also provides the basis of training and instruction as to the proper procedures to be employed when isolated, evading, or captured. SERE training for the Armed Forces is conducted on three levels according to the following categories of personnel:

- Level A – Minimum level of understanding for all members of the Armed Forces, imparted during entry-level training.
- Level B – Includes members of ground combat forces, security forces for high threat targets, and those close to the forward line of troops.
- Level C – Minimum level of understanding for Military Service members whose military jobs, specialties, or assignments entail high risk of capture and exploitation. This training includes combat aircrews, special operations forces, military attachés, and the like.

While the CoC is founded on the Uniform Code of Military Justice, which allows the military to take punitive action when the situation warrants, instruction on the CoC (1300.7) is primarily motivational. Past experience of captured Americans reveals that honorable survival in captivity requires a high degree of dedication and motivation and a strong belief in the following:

- Love of and faith in the United States and a conviction that the U.S. cause is just.
- The values of American democratic concepts and institutions.
- Faith and loyalty to fellow captives.
- Maintaining the highest standards of integrity.

The IDA study team has determined that a corollary “Code of Behavior” may be needed for the non-uniformed interagency, which includes government civilians and contractors. Code of behavior is valuable when military and non-military personnel are isolated together. The policy should be motivational, rather than punitive, but should be underpinned by the oath of office employees take upon assuming their official duties, and legislation concerning unauthorized release of classified material. A strong belief in the above principles enables POW’s or detainees to survive long and stressful periods of captivity, and return to their country and families honorably and with self-esteem intact. Code of behavior will form the basis for civilian survival training.
Civilian Code of Behavior

• Code of Conduct is applicable to situations involving Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and Escape

• Guidance would be beneficial for the non-military (government civilians and contractors) to survive with honor if they are “at risk of capture.” This guidance would be motivational rather than disciplinary – distinctly reduced function from military Code of Conduct.

• Proposed Civilian Code of Behavior; Corollary to the CoC:
  – I am an American. I serve to protect the American way of life.
  – I will do all I can to avoid being captured or detained.
  – If I am captured or detained, I will resist to the utmost of my ability.
  – If I am captured or detained, I will keep faith with and trust in my fellow detainees. I will give no information that might be harmful to my comrades.
  – I will make no oral or written statements disloyal or harmful to my country.
  – I will never forget that I am an American, responsible for my actions and dedicated to the principles that made America free.

• Civilian Code of Behavior document will be developed by coordination and workshops
The fragmented organizational responsibilities for PR contribute to the lack of interagency focus, oversight, cooperation, and capabilities. Definition and exercise of organizational authority and responsibility is essential for improvement.

- Dedicated responsibilities of DoS and DoD and the PRAG and the PRRC need to champion oversight and advocacy of full spectrum PR for USG
- Centralization of responsibility for oversight of PR-related policy, issues, programs, and activities
- Provision for greatly increased Congressional, interagency, and international coordination.

Revisions of the PRAG and the PRRC will be addressed next.
DOTMLPF Solution Set: Organization

- **Organization**
  - Resource designated lead agency to provide oversight and advocacy for Full Spectrum PR for USG
  - Refine the role, tasks, and functions of PRAG and PPRC.
  - Establish an Interagency PR Committee
PR ADVISORY GROUP RE-ENGINEERING

Communication within the PR community is a major challenge. Although, many agencies from throughout the Government, especially within DoD, are undertaking significant initiatives to improve USG PR capabilities, not everyone is aware of the various projects underway. The PRAG normally meets biannually, but it can be convened at any time at the call of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Policy (DASD-P) to address issues or provide crisis support to the SECDEF. Periodic meetings are normally held on a semiannual basis; however, agenda compression usually results in information briefings on initiatives rather than decision briefings on policy or programmatic issues that will guide progress toward developing a fully integrated PR architecture that ensures the USG’s ability to recover isolated personnel in the sense of full spectrum PR (as defined earlier in this study; including related missions, interagency, and coalition requirements). In order to accomplish those additional tasks, the scope and membership of the PRAG need to be expanded.

In order to facilitate decision-making at the senior level, more process structure must be applied to ensure a better, more focused, and more efficient output. Oversight of major issues concerning PR experimentation, acquisition, training, and exercises is the most important function the PRAG could and should perform. Accordingly, this proposed oversight charter should be emphasized by redesignating the PRAG to be the PR Oversight Group (PROG). The PROG should exercise its oversight responsibilities by monitoring milestone objectives contained in the Strategic Implementation Plan.
PR Advisory Group Re-Engineering

• **Purpose**
  – Change to decision-making function from information sharing function
  – Maintain oversight on major issues concerning PR experimentation, acquisition, training, and exercises
  – Change title to PR Oversight Group (PROG)

• **Implied Tasks**
  – Approve (published under the DASD) a Full Spectrum PR Objectives or Vision statement
  – Identify PROG decision points and issues
  – Publish a list of key exercises, programs, and milestones for PROG oversight
  – Solicit issues from PR-related forums that require senior level decisions
  – Oversee the PR implementation plan

• **Membership**
  – Expanded interagency and coalition representation
  – Define voting membership
PR RESPONSE CELL RE-ENGINEERING

One of the major problems with the PR Response Cell is that it is convened only when a PR incident takes place; therefore, members are on call, as necessary. The reality of the matter is that there might be long periods of time, because of an absence of PR incidents, that the PR Response Cell does not meet. During such periods, it has been determined that the essential knowledge of PR requirements, processes, and issues perishes over time because of personnel turnover or operational tempo. In order for the PR Response Cell to be an effective body in the execution of its crisis mission, it needs to be fully informed and up to speed on PR policy and procedures. As such, membership ought to consist of a standing, permanent body of core members with representatives not only from OSD and DoD components, but also from DoS. Quarterly meetings should focus on a review of PR policy and procedures combined with scenario-based training in the form of table-top exercises or seminars that review “likely to occur” PR incidents. The PR Response Cell should maintain a standing status to review and document PR issues, trends, and lessons learned and brief them semiannually to the PR Advisory Group. The implied tasks listed in the baseline DoDI should be specified to clarify any ambiguity as to the intent, purpose, and functions of the PRRC.
PR Response Cell Re-Engineering

• **Membership**
  – Nucleus comprising standing “core” members.
  – Membership to meet on a routine, periodic basis, in addition to crisis response.
  – Members graduates of PR 101.
  – Permanent core membership that includes DoS representation.
  – Supporting members tasked as appropriate.
  – Responsible combatant commanders and Intel agencies.

• **Specified Tasks**
  – Review application of current policies and directives based on current and anticipated full spectrum PR incidents.
  – Determine legal status of concerned personnel within 72 hours of notification of incident.
  – Determine and establish a reporting chain and associated responsibilities for incident management and updates.
  – Maintain oversight for the duration of the incident.
  – Provide periodic reports on policy issues, trends, and lessons learned to the PRAG.
CHAPTER V. PR FORCE PLANNING AND PREPARATION

This chapter addresses PR force planning and preparation. Planning and preparation are described in terms of baseline requirements and capabilities, shortfalls, and issues. The baseline consists primarily of DoD requirements and capabilities, as those are defined. Preliminary non-DoD requirements and capabilities are addressed. This chapter, which focuses on training in the context of the DOTMLPF construct, examines training for command and control, planning staffs, forces, personnel at risk of isolation, capture, and exploitation, exercises, and infrastructure. The IDA study team will fully address material and facility solutions to planning and preparation shortfalls in the second phase of the study. Information in this chapter is based on findings of recent studies as well as visits to Service and Joint SERE Schools and interviews of PR training experts.

Recent Studies include the following (see references):

- DPMO Coalition PR Study (1999-2002)
- DPMO PR Mission Area Analysis (1999-2001)
- JCRA CSAR Requirements Study (1997-1999)
Chapter V. PR Force Planning and Preparation

• Baseline
  – DoD SERE Training Requirements
    » Isolated Personnel
  – Non-DoD SERE Training Requirements
    » Isolated Personnel
  – DoD Training Capability
    » PR Training Centers
    » Exercises
    » SERE Schools

• Shortfalls
  – Training and Exercises
    » PR Forces
    » PR Staffs
    » Isolated Personnel
  – Training Capacity (Personnel and Facilities)
    » Isolated Personnel

• Issue

• Solution Set
DoD has defined three major levels of SERE training:

**Level A** – Academics on the Code of Conduct (unclassified)

**Level B** – Academics on Survival, Evasion, and Resistance (confidential). Minimal academics on escape and recovery.

**Level B+** – Level B training augmented with practical field exercises.

**Level C** – Level B academics, plus thorough practical field exercises, plus experiential training in a resistance training laboratory (secret). No practical escape or recovery exercises.

**Level C+** – Graduate level resistance academics and practical exercises, tailored to specific missions and needs (secret+). Limited to resistance training only.

Current policy requires that the Combatant Commands determine the level of SERE training required for personnel assigned or deploying to their theaters. The process for determining these requirements is ongoing, but it is likely that SERE training throughput requirements will increase significantly. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) has identified its current level C SERE training requirements for wartime and peacetime training. Other Combatant Commands are in the process of identifying their SERE training requirements. According to the JPRA, there is currently no uniform requirements process that reviews, defines, and validates requirements throughout the SERE training community. Because the combatant commands have not exercised their authority to define their level C training requirements, the Services have identified specific career fields that have been historically categorized as high risk, and have, in most cases, programmed for their SERE schools to train those career fields. Service guidance currently requires Level C combat training for personnel in 54 identified occupational fields or assignments, and the major portion of Level C training is provided to aviation, special operations, and special mission personnel.

There are no established criteria or direction for determining who requires specialized or advanced training. Attendance at these courses, while open and offered to a variety of military and other USG agency users, is largely determined by user perception of need and the availability of user resources. While this arrangement satisfies the need for narrow and well-defined audiences, it might not fully recognize the peacetime risk level inherent in military operations other than war for a potentially large number of military personnel. The changing battlefield environment, including asymmetry, non-state actors, transnational threats, terrorists, and narco-trafficking, further complicates the training requirements determination effort.
Baseline – SERE Training Requirements Process

- **DoD has three levels of SERE training**
  - Level A for everyone in the military
  - Level B for moderate-risk personnel
  - Level C for high-risk personnel

- **Combatant Commands are responsible for determining the level of risk of personnel assigned or deploying to their theaters**
  - As a consequence, Combatant Commanders should determine how many people get what level of training

- **Only Special Operations Command has done this**
  - Other Combatant Commands are still working this issue

- **In absence of requirements from the Combatant Commands, the Services provide level C SERE training to career fields that have historically been high risk**
BASELINE – SERE TRAINING REQUIREMENTS

The IDA study team estimates the total requirement for DoD’s wartime level C SERE training at about 12,600 students per year. Based on a new understanding of the modern battlefield, SOCOM and the Army have determined that the requirements for wartime and peace-time governmental detention/hostage detention (PGD/HD) resistance training are roughly the same. If all Services apply the same standard, then the total requirement for DoD’s peacetime level C PGD/HD resistance training is also about 12,300 students per year.
### Wartime Level C SERE Training

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<th>Service/Component</th>
<th>Annual Requirement</th>
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<tr>
<td>Army</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>3,430</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>4,540</td>
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<tr>
<td>Marine Corps</td>
<td>300</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

### Peacetime Detention/Hostage Level C Resistance Training

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Service/Component</th>
<th>Annual Requirement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>Army</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>3,460</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>4,420</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marine Corps</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The DoS F77 Report of Potential Evacuees Abroad contains a wealth of information as to numbers of personnel in countries worldwide to assist the DoS in calculating the number of people (largely American citizens) potentially requiring assisted or directed evacuation if the local situation requires such a drawdown. The personnel are listed by several categories including USG officials and estimates of tourists, among many others.

IDA did an assessment based on DoS travel and other Warning Advisories to develop an arbitrary list of high-, medium-, and low-threat countries. Then the number of personnel including primarily USG employees, USG contractors, and USG “TDY’ers” was determined from the F77 Report. It was anticipated many of these people will be in the embassy and other secure locations; however, many will also be out in the field doing tasks in the national interest. Of interest, serious concern was expressed during several interviews for those in the TDY group, since these often arrive in country with little specific country indoctrination and often find their tasks take them a distance away from the Post compound. The F77 Report does not contain an assessment of relative risk to personnel (e.g., those who primarily work in the embassy as compared with those out in the field. In some situations, one might argue those in the embassy might be at higher risk for such things as terrorist attack than those in more distant locations).
Baseline – USG Estimates of Personnel at Risk

- Departments of State, Treasury, and Justice, and CIA have identified limited career fields that desire SERE training
  - Requirements are not formalized

- There is an identified need to determine numbers of all USG personnel worldwide “at risk”
  - Critical element of the PR resource triad along with recovery force and command and control elements
  - Numbers needed to identify SERE training requirements
  - DoS has identified numbers for evacuation requirements in F77 Report

- Based on F-77 data, IDA computed a rough estimate of personnel at risk in selected high threat countries:
  - USG employees (e.g., DoS, DoJ, AID, DoD [less those assigned to Regional Combatant Commands])
  - USG contractors
  - USG TDY’ers
IDA has drafted a proposed cable for DoS to send out to selected high-threat countries in an attempt to narrow the actual number of personnel for whom the ambassador is responsible. That cable, however, has not yet been sent because of the press of other business at DoS. Additionally, GSA has asked the members of the Interagency Committee for Aviation Policy (ICAP) to provide estimates of personnel who are at risk overseas from their department or agency, and to provide estimates of capabilities to assist in a PR operation as necessary. Responses are coming into GSA, and that information will be incorporated in the IDA report.

It is not expected that there will be a high number of personnel requiring Level C SERE training, but it is anticipated that information useful in sizing the level B and C training requirements will become available.
Baseline – USG Estimates of Training Requirements

• IDA’s initial estimate in selected F77 categories (all locations in selected high-threat countries worldwide) was approximately 6,000
  • It is recognized that not all 6,000 require the highest level of training

• IDA is working with DoS (Diplomatic Security) to provide numbers of personnel at risk

• IDA will continue to refine training requirement estimates and level of SERE training required for those at risk
BASELINE – TRAINING CAPABILITY

The DoD has a training capability for all three components of the PR force structure. The Army offers its Level C course at the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, Fort Bragg, North Carolina, and a satellite level B+ course at the Aviation Center, Fort Rucker, Alabama; the Navy conducts its Level C course at North Island Naval Air Station, California and Brunswick Naval Air Station, Maine; and the Air Force provides Level C training at Fairchild AFB, Washington. The Air Force also runs a separate Level B+ course at the Air Force Academy, which is completed at Level C by attendance at the resistance training laboratory portion of the Fairchild course. The Joint PR Agency offers advanced resistance training at the PR Academy, Fairchild AFB. Training is tailored for peacetime government detention and hostage detention. The SERE schools at the Air Force Academy and Fort Rucker are considered Level B+ schools because they do not conduct the resistance training laboratory, although the Academy has the facility. The Marine Corps is discussing the possibility of providing SERE training at its mountain warfare training center in Bridgeport, California. The Marine Corps already teaches two environmental survival courses there (mountain and winter).

The Air Force Academy Course MT-220 program completes the Survival, Evasion, and Recovery requirements of the Basic Combat Survival Training course taught at Fairchild AFB, Course SV-80-A. In November 1997, the Air Force Academy and Air Education and Training Command established a Memorandum of Understanding to conduct the resistance laboratory portion at Fairchild. This “top-off program” requires that all Air Force Academy graduates going to career fields that demand Level-C training receive their resistance training at the Air Force Survival School.

JPRA and the Air Force provide all of the available PR training for commanders, controllers, and planners. JPRA’s courses are taught at Fredericksburg, Virginia, or by mobile training teams. The Air Force teaches a Joint CSAR Controller Course at the C2 Warrior School, Hurlburt AFB, Florida.

The Air Force, Navy, Marine Corps, and Army Special Operations Command all conduct advanced training for rescue forces. The Air Force conducts CSAR training at the USAF Weapons School and at Red Flag, at Nellis AFB, Nevada. The Navy conducts CSAR training at the Naval Strike and Air Warfare Center, at NAS Fallon, Nevada. The Marine Corps conducts Tactical Recovery of Aircraft and Personnel (TRAP) training at Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics Sqdn-1, Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Yuma, Arizona. Army Special Forces conduct unconventional assisted recovery training at the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School (USAJKFSCWCS), at Ft. Bragg, North Carolina. The Army has no doctrinal foundation for conventional PR training, such as SAR, CSAR, or TRAP.
Baseline – Training Capability

- **SERE training (Level C and Level B+)**
  - JPRA and AF SERE Schools, Fairchild AFB, WA
  - AF SERE School, USAF Academy, CO
  - Navy SERE Schools, Brunswick, ME and San Diego, CA
  - Army SERE School, Fort Bragg, NC
  - Army SERE School, Fort Rucker, AL

- **Schools for Commanders, Controllers, and Planners**
  - JPRA, Fredericksburg, VA
    » PR 101 – Introduction to PR
    » PR 301, 302 – PR Planning, UAR Planning
    » PR 501 – Capstone
  - C2 Warrior School, Hurlburt AFB, FL
    » Joint CSAR Controller Course

- **Training for Rescue Forces**
  - USAF Weapons School and Red Flag, Nellis AFB, NV
  - Naval Strike & Air Warfare Center, NAS Fallon, NV
  - Marine Aviation Weapons & Tactics Sqdn-1, MCAS Yuma, AZ
  - USAJFKSWCS, Fort Bragg

- **The Interagency does not have a PR training capability**
BASELINE – PR TRAINING EXERCISES

The IDA study team found that the current situation for PR training exercises has not changed much from that reported in recent studies. The studies reported a number of serious findings: Rescue forces, rescue staffs, and High-Risk-of-Capture (HRC) personnel do not exercise together (Ref. 1, DPMO, Ref. 8). Theaters identified training as inadequate, and cited the need for more frequent exercises. Deficient joint training causes interoperability problems (Ref. 1, Ref. 2, DPMO, Ref. 8). Joint CSAR training is deficient, causing interoperability problems for joint CSAR task forces. There is a lack of interoperability between Services' training.

The Universal Joint Task List (UJTL) and Joint Mission Essential Task Lists (JMETLs) are not used to develop training requirements (Ref. 2, Ref. 5, Ref. 8). Service training is not linked to the UJTL, and the Combatant Commanders do not have a Joint Mission Essential Task (JMET) for Ref. 1, even though JMETL development procedures are in place. The PR community does not train its people to use the Joint Strategic Planning System. There is a lack of training for personnel assigned at all levels on the joint, theater, and Service staffs. There is a lack of validated or prioritized training requirements for PR. Joint CSAR events are not included in the training plans. Assessment of training and exercise adequacy is ineffective (Ref. 5). Unit preparedness and training deficiencies are not fixed because they are not entered into the DoD readiness reporting system. There is a lack of formal assessment and feedback of exercises. Combined training is inadequate (DPMO). Training systems are inadequate (Ref. 1, Ref. 8). There is insufficient force structure and personnel to support joint training. There is no opportunity for planners to establish training relationships between CSAR-capable forces.

Exercise Desert Rescue is the only venue for examining interoperability for Joint CSAR. Units fund their own attendance at this Navy exercise. This exercise is limited in that it focuses only on the planning and execution of Joint CSAR from the unit level. There is no exercise of command and control functions. Services and components reduce emphasis on planning, training, and resourcing for CSAR and Joint CSAR in favor of their primary missions. Services’ CSAR forces are not prepared to the standards of Doctrine for Joint CSAR. Compliance with joint standards varies.

The current policy and guidance are not reflected in action. Thus, the potential for successful Joint CSAR missions is reduced. A Joint CSAR force generally will operate together for the first time when there is an isolated person in a hostile or denied area. Special Operations Command components do not routinely train to recover other components’ isolated personnel, even though they have been repeatedly tasked for high-risk Joint CSAR missions without preparing with the supporting forces.
Baseline – PR Training Exercises

- There are no funded, PR-focused training exercises

- In the past, there were UAR/SERE training exercises
  - Ridge Runner (JSSA)
  - Fleet Deer
  - Foal Eagle (Korea)

- NSAWC hosts Desert Rescue, a CSAR-focused training exercise
  - Unit-funded
  - Hosted on an as-capable basis
  - Limited in resources, capacity, & concept
    » Not suited for end-to-end PR exercises

- Cope Thunder demonstrated a CSAR-focused concept in 1999

- Red Flag has CSAR exercise capability, but not focus

- The interagency does not participate in PR exercises
BASELINE – SERE TRAINING CAPABILITY

Training documentation varies greatly in format and detail from Service to Service; however, training content and objectives are consistent across the spectrum and are driven by compliance to the JPRA Executive Agent Instruction (EAI). Level C course content was assessed based on the 1996 EAI and found to be in compliance for all Service schools.

All Services appropriately view SERE training as an integral part of inherent PR responsibilities. Other than the Air Force, Service representatives share responsibilities for PR matters other than SERE training. This assignment of responsibilities relies heavily on the schools to represent their Services in identifying, advocating, and resolving training issues. In the Army and Navy programs, lacking a career specialty or formal assignment policies that promote the accrual of multiple-tour experience in SERE CoC training, staff qualifications cannot require extensive mandatory prior experience.

For three of the Services, SERE is normally a one-tour assignment, with second assignments to SERE training positions a relatively rare occurrence. As the exception, the Air Force has a long-established career field for enlisted personnel and has a new Combat Rescue career field for officers, which will encompass SERE training.

The Air Force Survival School has several new facilities recently constructed, soon to be constructed, or planned. A Phase II Academic Facility (70-seat planetarium and environmental training room), with a computer based training (CBT) laboratory, video teleconference center with unclassified uplink, and administrative offices, was recently completed. Another building under design is a consolidated water training facility to allow all water survival training to be done at one location. This new water training facility will accommodate the trainer for underwater egress training, all of the water survival non-parachuting training devices, and parachute descent trainers, parachute water drags, and helicopter water recovery training devices.

The new state-of-the-art Phase II academic training building deserves special mention. The new planetarium and wraparound viewing screens present environmental training through multi-imagery and stereo-sound presentation. Each of the student desks has a computer station to facilitate CBT. The 336 TRSS Training Technology Flight is responsible for creating, developing, and programming new training modules. A second feature of this training facility is a distance learning unclassified uplink that provides a new capability for the survival school to export training programs and courseware to DoD or other agencies. However, manning for distant learning studio presentations and additional personnel for computerized modular development are still needed.
Baseline – SERE Training Capability

- **Level C course length: 12-19 days**
  - Course length, curriculum, and instruction techniques are tailored to Service requirements and culture
    - Navy – 12 Days
    - Air Force – 17 Days
    - Army – 19 Days

- **The Air Force treats SERE instruction as a career field**
  - Allows SERE instructors to build depth and breadth of experience
    - Including exchange tours to Army, Navy, and Foreign SERE schools
  - Provides qualified people for staff functions

- **The USAF SERE School (Fairchild AFB) has a state-of-the-art training facility**
  - Facility is brand new, but maturing rapidly
  - Advanced Distributed Learning (ADL) capability
  - Computer-Based Training (CBT) capability
  - Multi-Media Theater
BASELINE – SERE TRAINING CAPABILITY

The USAFKSWCS at Fort Bragg, North Carolina has developed an ambitious plan to expand its SERE training facility. The plan includes an expanded support base, additional survival training areas, evasion lanes, advanced resistance laboratories, and three new resistance training facilities. This will effectively quadruple the school’s throughput from its current level of 960 students per year, to meet its requirement to train 4,300 students per year for the aviation and SOF branches. The plan will also address the requirement for PGD/HD training for 4,100 students per year. The Army has not funded the plan yet. Also, Army Special Operations Command has developed an exportable Level B SERE Program of Instruction (POI) that can be taught in 3 to 5 days. The POI includes academics and practical field exercises.

The Navy SERE school at NAS North Island, California has developed a PGD/HD resistance course with the assistance of JPRA. The Navy’s course evolved from the Advanced Terrorism Abduction and Hostage Survival (ATAHS) course that was developed at the specific request of NAVSPECWARCOM. This 5-day course provides instruction in antiterrorism, knowledge of terrorist actions, threats, global hot spots, and concepts to make an individual a hardened target against act of terrorism. A decision was made to amend the course to comply with the EAI (July 99) for Level C peacetime training, and to provide training for detention by hostile governments during peacetime operations other than war or captivity by a terrorist group. A pilot course of the new curriculum has been developed, and the Navy is prepared to offer it at both Navy schools. Quota procurement for this course is by message or letter to the Commanding Officer Fleet Aviation Specialized Operational Training Group Pacific (FASOTRAGRUPAC) or Commanding Officer Fleet Aviation Specialized Operational Training Group, Atlantic Fleet (FASOTRAGRULANT). The course serves as a model for similar peacetime training courses at other Service schools.
Baseline – SERE Training Capability

- The Army has established a PR Center of Proponenty at Fort Bragg
  - Code of Conduct, SERE, UAR, and RCC

- The USA SERE School (Fort Bragg) has an unfunded plan to quadruple in size to support Army aviation and special forces SERE training requirements
  - More manpower, facilities, training ranges

- The Navy SERE School at North Island has a PGD/HD resistance course
  - Service equivalent of JPRA advanced resistance course
BASELINE – JOINT SERE TRAINING CAPABILITY

JPRA/J7 has significant responsibilities beyond conducting specialized resistance training programs. Oversight and standardization functions for the SERE training community, in addition to normal training program coordination duties, place the Director in a position of both conducting and overseeing training programs. Specialized training conducted by JPRA provides advanced and tailored joint peacetime resistance instruction to selected personnel of all Services as well as U.S. Government agencies outside of DoD.

Attendance at these JPRA-provided courses, while open and offered to a variety of military and other government agency users, is largely determined by user perception of need and the availability of user resources. While this arrangement satisfies the need for narrow and well-defined audiences, it may not fully recognize the peacetime risk level inherent in military operations other than war for a potentially large number of military personnel. Approximately 1,000 personnel received specialized training last year, including two classes specifically for students from the State Department Bureau of Diplomatic Security, Office of Mobile Security Deployments.
Baseline – Joint SERE Training Capability

- JPRA/J7 exercises oversight of Service SERE training programs
  - Effort to improve standardization & interoperability

- JPRA’s PR Academy provides mission-tailored specialized/advanced resistance training
  - Peacetime Governmental Detention (PGD) course
  - Hostage Detention (HD) course
  - Joint Resistance Training Instructor Course (JRTIC)
  - PR Academy courses build on foundation of basic level C SERE courses taught by the Services

- PR Academy provides direct support to the Combatant Commands
  - Theater-specific Isolated Personnel Guidance (IPG)
  - Mobile Training Teams (MTTs) provide ‘just-in-time’ training to forces in theater

- PR Academy has demonstrated an interagency resistance training capability
  - Two classes of students from State Dept.
BASELINE – SERE TRAINING CAPACITY

The table on the opposite page shows the current throughput capacities of DoD’s SERE schools.

A significant disparity exists between the Air Force and other Services in the areas of personnel and infrastructure devoted to level C SERE training and training management. The JPRA and Army SERE schools both have plans for significant expansion in capacity. JPRA’s new resistance training facility will have an un-constrained throughput capacity of 7,488 students per year. The Army’s planned facility will have a throughput of approximately 4,000 students per year. However, neither plan is currently funded.

The Air Force Academy’s SERE facility has the capacity to conduct level C SERE training for 1,200 students every 90 days. The Academy’s requirement to train cadets can be completed in one 90-day cycle in the summer, leaving capacity for up to 3,600 more students (depending on weather and land use permits) to address other DoD or U.S. Government requirements. The Academy is not currently manned or funded to run its facility at this throughput level.
## Baseline – SERE Training Capacity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SERE School</th>
<th>Wartime SERE</th>
<th>PGD/HD Resistance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>USAF, Fairchild AFB</td>
<td>3,500</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAF Academy</td>
<td>700</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USN, San Diego</td>
<td>1,680</td>
<td>168</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USN, New Brunswick</td>
<td>1,680</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA, Ft. Bragg</td>
<td>960</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JPRA, Fairchild AFB</td>
<td></td>
<td>924</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>8,520</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,092</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
SHORTFALLS – PR FORCE TRAINING

Prior studies and tests found that training and exercises for joint rescue forces are inadequate (Ref 1, Ref 2, Ref 5, DPMO, Ref 8). Joint CSAR training is deficient, causing interoperability problems for joint CSAR task forces. Deficiencies show that rescue forces and SOF need more training with live isolated personnel (simulated). As an example, rescue forces do not properly authenticate survivors. Rescue forces do not employ Joint TTP or OPSEC procedures. For example, joint forces do not exercise using secure and anti-jam communications. Also, communication skills are poor, resulting in excessive communication. Night CSAR Task Force capability is not sufficiently exercised. Army SOF aviation units are not organized, trained, or equipped to conduct CSAR, as CSAR training would degrade their readiness for primary missions. Joint rescue forces do not train the way they fight. Instead, they take an ad hoc approach to planning, exercising, and mission execution. The training needed to accomplish Joint CSAR missions is more complex than component CSAR training, yet there are few Combatant Commands with specific requirements for Joint CSAR training or exercises. The Joint Training Plans do not include CSAR. This results in Joint CSAR training that is infrequent, incomplete, and inconsistent.
Shortfalls – PR Force Training (U)

• **Training & exercises for joint rescue forces are inadequate**
  - Joint CSAR training is deficient, causing interoperability problems for joint CSAR task forces
  - Rescue forces and SOF need more training with live survivors
  - Rescue forces do not employ Joint TTP or OPSEC procedures
  - Night CSARTF capability is not sufficiently exercised
  - Army SOF aviation are not organized, trained, or equipped to conduct CSAR
    » CSAR training would degrade their readiness for primary missions
  - Joint rescue forces do not train the way they fight

• **Interagency does not train or exercise rescue forces as done by DoD**
SHORTFALLS – PR STAFF TRAINING

Prior studies and tests found that training & exercises for rescue staffs are inadequate (Ref 1, Ref 2, Ref 4, Ref 5, DPMO, Ref 8). Training for Theater PR planners is insufficient, in tasks such as the SAR A/B frequency selection process. There is no tailored training available for Joint Search and Rescue Center (JSRC) Directors. JSRCs do not exercise with rescue forces or live isolated personnel (simulated). Training for Rescue Coordination Center (RCC) and JSRC staffs is insufficient. As examples, JSRC staffs lack experience working with SOF, and Airborne Mission Commanders (AMCs) lack training. Incomplete JSRC training results in a PR process that is too slow. These delays are introduced by the lack of training. Examples include JSRC Staffs that are not sufficiently trained to support isolated personnel with Evasion Plans of Action (EPAs), and threat assessments that are inaccurate. JSRC staffs are ineffectively trained in duties during mission execution, which result in JSRCs that are not responsive to dynamic situations.

Rescue command and control training throughput is insufficient to sustain Theater JSRCs. There is a shortage of trained intelligence personnel who support PR. There is a lack of education regarding classified information and releasability. The lack of training makes it difficult to identify continuing interoperability problems. PR education programs are insufficient to educate combatant commanders, their staffs, and DoD components on PR doctrine and joint tactics, techniques, and procedures (JTTP). Multimedia training materials are not available to support PR training and curriculum development. Joint CSAR resources, planning and training need standardization throughout the components and Services. Combatant Command J-staff have insufficient CSAR expertise to advise leadership on Joint CSAR. JSRCs have a responsibility to plan for Joint CSAR but most don’t because they are left out of the command’s planning process. Some JSRC personnel have learned from experience how to get involved in PR planning but these skills perish with personnel turnover. Deliberate planning for CSAR and Joint CSAR reflects standardized, templated responsibilities and lacks tasks that apply directly to the intended command.
Shortfalls – PR Staff Training

• Training & exercises for rescue staffs are inadequate
  – Training for Theater PR planners, JSRC/RCC staffs and directors is insufficient
  – JSRCs do not exercise with rescue forces or live isolated personnel
  – Rescue C2 training is insufficient to sustain Theater JSRCs
  – PR education programs are insufficient to educate combatant commanders, their staffs, and DoD components on PR doctrine and Joint TTP
    » Multimedia training materials are not available to support PR training and curriculum development
    » Joint CSAR resources, planning and training need standardization throughout the components and Services
  – Combatant Command J-staff have insufficient CSAR expertise to advise leadership on Joint CSAR
SHORTFALLS – ISOLATED PERSONNEL TRAINING

While Level A training on the Code of Conduct is provided at a number of locations to everyone entering the military, it is strictly academic, and has limited practical application, since the training is not procedural in nature. It serves more as an educational foundation.

Level B training throughput requirements remain largely undefined. The recent development and distribution of video presentations for minimum Level B training provide an interim basis for program development and implementation; however, a process for fully identifying the types and numbers of personnel requiring Level B training is lacking. According to JPRA and the SERE school staffs, the multimedia training materials currently available are not sufficient to support SERE training.

Together, the Services and JPRA provide an excellent set of training courses on survival, evasion, and resistance for a good variety of environments and situations. The Services and JPRA acknowledge that practical training and exercises on escape techniques and procedures are lacking, and practical exercises on recovery procedures for both conventional and unconventional recovery methods are inadequate. Conventional recovery training is limited by the high cost and limited availability of recovery forces. Students at the SERE schools do not get an opportunity to train with actual PR forces or command and control elements, which has an impact on interoperability during actual PR operations. There are a number of significant challenges to synchronizing training for all three PR force elements.

The most rigorous level of training, C, is also the most resource intensive. It builds on the lower levels of training with field scenarios that stress the potential isolated person and subject him/her to conditions replicating those found in actual PR situations. Several aspects combine to lower its priority in resourcing. It is focused on sub-communities within the services. Requirements are hard to quantify, as the training is an “insurance policy” that many ought to have, but few will have to use. When faced with “must-have” or “good to have” decisions, the farther removed from those specific sub-communities, the lower on the priority list the training.
Shortfalls – Isolated Personnel Training

- **Level A Code of Conduct Training**
  - Marginal value added

- **Level B Training**
  - Requirements for training are ill-defined
  - 13-hour video set is an interim solution with limited educational utility
  - Permanent solution is undefined and unfunded

- **Level C Training**
  - The Services and JPRA have limited capacity
    - Limited by manpower and funding
  - Escape and Recovery training is lacking
  - Isolated personnel do not train with PR forces or staffs

- **Interagency does not have isolated personnel training capability**
  - Dependent on DoD
SHORTFALLS – SERE TRAINING CAPACITY

The total throughput of the DoD Level C SERE schools is about 8,500 students per year. Current capacity satisfies about 67 percent of the total DoD requirement, leaving a shortfall of roughly 4,100 training slots annually. This shortfall does not address the significant backlog of untrained SOF and aviation personnel that already exists in the Services, and which grows daily. As previously indicated on page 104, the IDA study team estimates the total requirement for DoD’s wartime Level C SERE training at about 12,600 students per year. SOCOM and the Army have determined that the requirements for wartime and PGD/HD resistance training are roughly the same. If all Services apply the same standard, then the total requirement for DoD’s peacetime Level C PGD/HD resistance training is also about 12,300 students per year. The total throughput of the JPRA and Navy Level C PGD/HD resistance schools is about 1,100 students per year. Current capacity satisfies only 9 percent of the estimated DoD requirement, leaving a shortfall of roughly 11,200 training slots annually.

It is important to note that these shortfalls are for uniformed military personnel in the aviation and special operations career fields. Any requirements for other military career fields determined to be high risk, as well as similar DoD civilian, DoD contractor, and USG occupations (such as aviation) must be considered as added shortfalls over and above those listed on the chart.
# Shortfalls – SERE Training Capacity

## Wartime Level C SERE Training

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Service/Component</th>
<th>Backlog</th>
<th>Annual Shortfall</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>10,500</td>
<td>3,340</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>340</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marine Corps</td>
<td>1,200</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## Peacetime Detention/Hostage Level C Resistance Training

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Service/Component</th>
<th>Backlog</th>
<th>Annual Shortfall</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>14,000</td>
<td>4,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>15,520</td>
<td>2,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>16,000</td>
<td>4,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marine Corps</td>
<td>1,200</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
SHORTFALLS – CAPACITY

Each of the SERE schools occupies permanent facilities that are adequate for current throughput. Under the current scheme of class scheduling, none of the schools has facility capacity (e.g., classroom, resistance training (RT) facilities) to accommodate a significant increase in throughput. Any such increase in the near term must be met by increased use of overlapping class schedules or other workarounds. Training areas are also adequate for current throughput, although constraints on their use (i.e., lease and land use agreements) place limitations on both instructional modes (e.g., limitation on pyrotechnic devices) and class sizes.

Throughput at the Army SERE school is constrained to current levels by the limitations of manning, facilities, training area development, and resistance training spaces. Although, temporary surge requirements can be accommodated through scheduling adjustments, major increases in throughput demands would require equivalent investments in staffing, the available facilities, and renegotiation or extension of training area agreements.

The Navy SERE school staff believe the school’s maximum student load per class of 60 represents the current maximum student production level. This limitation is based on the number of interrogation huts (six at Brunswick), isolation cells (72 at Warner Springs and 62 at Brunswick), assigned manpower capabilities, equipment quantities, and classroom seating capacity (60 at North Island). Student production beyond 3,360 for both Navy SERE Schools combined would require increases in facilities, manpower, and funding. Student production beyond 4,000 for both schools would require extension of training area agreements and additional land leases.

Although the Air Force SERE school is currently operating with a small manpower shortfall, the school is sustaining its throughput with increased student-to-instructor ratios. There are no constraints in meeting the currently programmed throughput because of facility limitations at the Air Force Survival School. Any increase in student production beyond 3,500 would require manning increases, and proportionate investment in base and school infrastructure, such as billeting, transportation, and training equipment. The seven training areas can handle significant increases in student throughput.

JPRA’s PR Academy current instructor cadre can sustain its current throughput, but cannot increase its capacity without added manpower funding. In the summer of 2003, the PR Academy will occupy its new resistance training facility, which will support significant increases in throughput. Proportionate manning is not funded.
Shortfalls – Capacity

- **Training Throughput**
  - Facilities, ranges, and personnel are sufficient for current throughput
  - SERE schools can surge temporarily, but cannot sustain increases
  - All SERE schools have recent or programmed facility improvements

- **Throughput Limiting Factors:**
  - Instructor Staff: RED RED RED RED RED RED
  - Training Facilities: RED RED YELLOW GREEN
  - Training Ranges: GREEN YELLOW GREEN N/A

Red: significant limitation
Yellow: moderate limitation
Green: no limitation
PR FORCE PLANNING AND PREPARATION ISSUE/SOLUTION

The IDA study team found that the central issue was that, within the USG interagency, planning and preparation for full spectrum PR are inadequate. There is a lack of a common PR knowledge base that includes such basic topics as definitions and terms of reference. Interagency requirements for personnel are not yet formally defined. Most USG agencies have not defined levels of risk for their people, nor identified areas of higher risk. Current PR capabilities reside primarily in DOD and do not leverage interagency capabilities. While the DoD is aware of the notion of PR by civil means, the concept is not defined or articulated beyond that notion. The military is generally unaware of what other USG agencies are operating overseas and what their capabilities are. Other government agencies do not have a clear understanding of the PR capabilities and limitations of military assets. Interagency training and equipment requirements are not defined. Because there is a significant shortfall of training capacity for DoD requirements, there is insufficient training capacity within DOD to support interagency requirements, should they ever be identified. Current equipment is inadequate. DoD has identified known equipment shortfalls, and other USG agencies are all more poorly equipped than military forces for PR.

Previous PR studies support the study team’s findings: 1) Training for HRC personnel is inadequate (Ref. 1, Ref. 2, Ref. 5, DPMO). HRC personnel training on EPA development is inadequate. Communications training for isolated personnel is deficient. Authentication training for isolated personnel is deficient. Survivors are too reliant on GPS. Survivors are not sufficiently trained to survive and evade. Signaling and recovery training for isolated personnel is deficient. The result of these training deficiencies is that most potential downed aircrews are not prepared. 2) Training capacity for HRC personnel is insufficient (Ref. 5, Ref. 8). There is a lack of SERE training for many DoD career fields. There is insufficient SERE training capacity. DoD civilians and contractors are not being trained. 3) Training for HRC personnel is not standardized across Services (Ref. 2, Ref. 5, and Ref. 8). SERE training is not standardized. Requirements for SERE training are inconsistently applied across the Services and Commands.

The IDA study team’s proposed solution is to develop a cooperative interagency environment that will promote education, awareness, and training to facilitate collaborative planning and readiness. For this interim report, the IDA study team has focused on the doctrine and training solution elements, with preliminary solutions for organizational, material, personnel, and facilities. The study team will address the DOTMLPF solution set in a comprehensive manner during the second phase of this study.
• **Issue:** Within the USG, planning and preparation for Full Spectrum PR are inadequate
  – The lack of a common PR knowledge base
  – Interagency requirements for PR are not yet defined
  – Current PR capabilities reside primarily in DOD and do not leverage interagency capabilities
  – There is insufficient training capacity within DOD
  – Current equipment is inadequate

• **Solution:** Develop an interagency environment to promote education, awareness, and training to facilitate collaborative planning and readiness
PR FORCE PLANNING AND PREPARATION – SOLUTION SET

At the Interagency PR workshop in February 2003, the interagency representatives made it clear that the interagency would rather use DoD PR guidance than “reinvent the wheel.” Based on that premise, the IDA study team recommends that DoD, led by JPRA, should provide the doctrinal foundation for an interagency PR capability. The IDA study team recognizes that PR tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) must become Joint before TTPs becomes Interagency and Coalition in nature, which has not happened yet. However, IDA recommends that JPRA continue to move doctrine and TTP along the Joint, Interagency, and Coalition vectors simultaneously. The study team also recognizes that doctrine and TTP are living products, and that current TTP does partially address the interagency void. Therefore, DoD should promulgate current Joint PR TTP to those USG agencies who have expressed a desire for guidance. Those agencies should incorporate PR TTP into their own procedural guidance. As an example, DoS should incorporate PR TTP into its EAP handbook and training courses at the Foreign Service Institute (FSI).

If the USG is to leverage any PR capability that resides in the Interagency, that capability must first be exercised. The IDA study team has not found any exercise venue outside DoD where Interagency assets could conduct PR training. The IDA study team has determined that unfortunately, the exercise infrastructure for PR training within DoD falls well short of its own needs, let alone interagency or coalition needs. The study team recommends that the Joint Staff begin the development of a DoD PR exercise infrastructure by establishing a set of joint mission essential tasks for PR. This Joint Mission Essential Task List (JMETL) should reflect the requirement to operate in interagency and coalition environments. The Joint Staff should co-opt the Combatant Commands and Joint Forces Command into an effort to integrate a PR JMETL into every combatant command JMETL, integrate PR events into Master Scenario Events Lists (MSELs) for JCS-sponsored exercises, and provide resources for Joint PR exercise events.

The IDA study team has determined that DoD needs to make organizational changes in order to increase its Level C SERE training capacity significantly. Since a significant increase is needed to address DoD requirements, DoD should take this opportunity to address interagency requirements as well under future re-organization efforts. U.S. Joint Forces Command should take the lead in developing a standard formal requirements definition process that accommodates all theater SERE training requirements (Levels A, B, and C) for assigned or deploying Joint forces of all Services. The Services should develop a common requirements review process that identifies and validates requirements for both combat and peacetime SERE training. Each Service should develop, validate, and implement an approved, Level C PGD/HD resistance training course (in conjunction with existing Level C combat SERE courses) to accommodate Service requirements.
PR Force Planning and Preparation – Solution Set

• Doctrine
  – JPRA integrate interagency and coalition aspects in the development of Joint PR Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTP)
  – DoD promulgate Joint PR TTP throughout the interagency
    » Include PR guidance in the DoS Emergency Action Planning (EAP) Handbook and training courses
  – Joint Staff ensure JMETLs include PR
    » PR tasks should reflect interagency and coalition requirements

• Organization
  – DoD address SERE training organizational shortfalls
    » Ensure adequate capacity to support interagency requirements
The IDA study team knows that this study alone cannot chart the course for the future of PR for the Interagency community. It is essential that the leadership of the interagency understand PR, be involved in identifying the issues, and be willing to address them. In order to foster leader development and involvement, JPRA should develop a version of its PR-501 course that is tailored for the interagency and its broad scope of PR. The National Defense University (NDU) and the Foreign Service Institute (FSI) should incorporate JPRA’s PR-501 course into their curricula. USG agencies who have people at risk or who have PR-capable assets should participate in a regular series of Interagency PR workshops that address major areas of concern and topical issues. These interagency workshops serve as means of sharing lessons learned and best practices among interested agencies.

It is clear to the IDA study team that there is a significant shortfall between requirements for, and capability to provide, PGD/HD resistance training, just within DoD. No further study is necessary to show that JPRA should resource the PR Academy to match its new facility with appropriate instructor staff in order to optimize its student throughput. Even that will be only a partial fix to the overall DoD shortfall. All of the Service SERE schools should be resourced for the manpower needed to optimize their capacity for wartime and peacetime SERE training, and JPRA and the Services should make a concerted effort to get PGD/HD resistance courses up and running at every SERE school.

Once JPRA and the Services have addressed immediate critical shortfalls in PGD/HD resistance training, they should methodically expand DoD’s SERE training infrastructure to address such issues as combined wartime/peacetime basic SERE training; new military Level C training requirements (e.g., USMC, NAVSPECWAR, Army aviation, Army and Navy cadets); Level C training requirements for DoD civilians and contractors; and Level C training requirements for other U.S. Government agencies.
PR Force Planning and Preparation – Solution Set

• Leader Development
  – JPRA develop an exportable Senior Leader/Manager orientation package that addresses Full Spectrum PR
  – NDU, FSI include PR in curricula
  – USG agencies conduct interagency-focused PR Workshops (Code of Behavior, SERE, Intelligence, equipment)

• Personnel
  – JPRA increase PR Academy instructor staff to match facility throughput

• Facilities
  – DoD expand SERE school capacity for DoD and non-DOD requirements, including DoD backlog
PR FORCE PLANNING AND PREPARATION – SOLUTION SET

Capacity shortfalls notwithstanding, it is the IDA study team’s assessment that SERE training for personnel at risk is the forte of DoD’s PR community, and is the best PR program that DoD has to offer the Interagency. To exploit the value of the available training, it is incumbent upon the interagency community to identify those USG personnel at risk, determine the level of risk they face and the appropriate training for that risk, and provide resources to pay for their fair share of the training under the Economies Act.

In addition to training for personnel at risk of isolation, capture, and exploitation, the other training components need to be addressed: training for PR forces, training for PR staffs, and training exercises. DoD needs to develop a robust training infrastructure to serve as a foundation upon which the Interagency can build a PR training program. Once this is done, then DoD should expand its joint training to include the interagency dimension, and the Interagency should participate in PR training courses and exercises. As mentioned earlier, the current DoD program of PR exercises could not be termed robust.

As an interim solution, USG agencies with the resources to do so could participate in Joint Exercise Desert Rescue, an annual unit-funded exercise hosted by the Navy and devoted to PR.

To complement the training of the interagency, JPRA should lead the effort to improve the PR community training within DoD on the interagency dimension of PR. JPRA should include expanded blocks of instruction on diplomatic and civil PR options in its PR-101 and PR-301 courses. As an example, JPRA should include instruction on the State Department’s Emergency Action Planning (EAP) process in its PR-301 course.

After USG agencies have assessed the numbers of people at risk, and the levels of that risk, then those agencies should define their PR equipment requirements to complement their training requirements. JPRA should continue to develop a Joint PR Modernization Plan. This plan will identify what DoD PR equipment is programmed for replacement, and when. As DoD replaces legacy equipment, it can be transferred to the Interagency based on identified requirements.
PR Force Planning and Preparation – Solution Set

• Training
  – DoD expand PR play in existing exercises, wargames, and seminars to include increased emphasis on IA
  – JPRA include DoS Emergency Action Planning in advanced PR courses
  – USG agencies define interagency requirements for SERE and recovery training
  – USG agencies participate in PR courses and exercises

• Materiel
  – JPRA develop a Joint PR Modernization Plan
  – USG agencies define interagency equipment requirements
    » DoD transfer legacy equipment to other agencies
SERE TRAINING FACILITIES – SOLUTION SET

The benefits of consolidating Level C SERE training in a Joint training establishment include consistency of instruction, potential economies of scale, a “train as you fight” Joint environment, and captivity/resistance training. The drawbacks include the loss of opportunity to efficiently incorporate Service-unique training, limitations on currently available training areas, and potential loss of flexibility for a single Service to accommodate variances in instructor and student throughput requirements, and the costs associated with consolidation.

The option of developing a Joint curriculum offers the same types of benefits and drawbacks (except costs) that would accompany consolidation. It is the IDA study team’s assessment that the Services are migrating toward a Joint SERE course curriculum in an evolutionary fashion.

The option of additional or larger Service schools might well be a fact-of-life future requirement that would likely be driven by the involvement of the Combatant Commands in determining training requirements for personnel assigned or deploying to their theaters. Any major increase in training demands would strain current throughput capacities (primarily facilities and instructor staffs) beyond the capability of the schools. The IDA study team’s assessment is that lessons learned from real-world events will drive increased requirements from the Combatant Commands and the Services.

The option of establishment of a Joint Training Laboratory involves the transformation of current JPRA training capabilities from a user-based focus to a trainer-based focus. Several recent initiatives by both the Services and JPRA suggest this transformation as a means of most effectively and efficiently improving the overall posture of the SERE training community. The IDA study team has seen that this is already occurring at an accelerated rate. Examples are the Navy’s and Army’s initiatives to develop government detention/hostage detention (peacetime) resistance training programs and the new Joint Resistance Training Instructor Course. Each of these initiatives reflects a productive application of JPRA’s expertise and effort toward providing support and services to the Service schools – an appropriate role for the Joint agency. Similar opportunities exist in the shift of responsibility for in-depth peacetime resistance training (except narrowly focused, low-density/high-sensitivity courses that must be centrally controlled) from JPRA to the Service schools; in the development of common core training materials, such as the core captivity curriculum illustrated on the opposite page; in the development of new SERE training concepts and techniques; in a role as subject matter expert for Service self-evaluations of training; and in providing the SERE training community ready access to current and background information sources. The IDA study team agrees that JPRA must shift its user-based training capabilities to the Services in order to address the identified shortfalls and backlogs in peacetime resistance training.
SERE Training Facilities - Solution Set

Status Quo – Three separate training curricula for three different captivity situations

Proposed – A core curriculum for all captivity situations
CHAPTER VI. MISSION EXECUTION

This chapter addresses PR mission execution. This chapter focuses on roles and responsibilities within the interagency during the execution of PR missions. The chapter examines the architecture in the context of the five critical PR tasks: report, locate, support, recover, and return. The chapter discusses the baseline, the shortfalls, an interim issue, and an interim solution set. Significantly more research is needed for this area, which will be accomplished during the second-year effort.
Chapter VI. Mission Execution

• Baseline
  – Roles and Responsibilities
  – Mission Execution

• Shortfalls

• Interim Issue

• Interim Solution Set
BASELINE – ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

Every USG agency bears a responsibility for recovering its own personnel. Within the DoD, this delineation includes the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines; each is responsible for its own, but not the others they work with. While this is appropriate in principal, in practice it leads to inefficiencies and because of a lack of sufficient resources, eventually to gaps in capability.

PR dependencies are as varied as the agencies within the USG. They vary across the spectrum from fully external dependencies to fully internal dependencies. Examples of points on the spectrum of power bases include the following: External – The Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) largely depends on Host Nation support for PR; Internal – International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (DoS/INL) depends on its own organic assets (helicopters) for PR support during counter-narcotics and law enforcement operations.

The DoD has thoroughly delineated PR methods for itself, as described Chapter I. DoD doctrine discusses PR options outside the DoD only in concept. DoD doctrine does not address diplomatic and civil methods. This lack of information denies DoD needed visibility into the interagency PR process.

PR is not institutionalized as a process in other USG agencies. Many agencies take a crisis action or task force approach to resolving incidents that involve isolated, lost, or captive personnel. Under this approach, PR methods tend to be personality-driven by members of the task force. As such, some of these methods are derivative of DoD methods, since task force members with prior military experience tend to draw upon those experiences.
Baseline – Roles and Responsibilities

• Every agency bears a responsibility for recovering its own personnel
  – Including Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines

• PR dependencies are as varied as the agencies
  – Across the spectrum from fully external to fully internal

• DoD has thoroughly delineated PR methods for itself
  – DoD doctrine discusses PR methods outside DoD only in concept
    » DoD doctrine does not address diplomatic and civil methods

• PR not institutionalized as a process in other USG agencies
  – Many agencies take a crisis action or task force approach
    » Some methods are derivative of DoD methods
BASELINE – MISSION EXECUTION RESPONSIBILITIES

The IDA study team has identified two extreme scenarios where the outcomes have proven to be significantly different in recent cases. In the first scenario, the authority to execute PR missions in support of U.S. citizens is fragmented between the host nation and the State Department, and U.S. PR forces are not immediately available to execute PR missions. PR results have been unsuccessful in recent cases of this scenario in Colombia and the Philippines. In the second scenario, The Combatant Commander has clear authority to execute PR missions in support of USG personnel, and U.S. PR forces are available to execute PR missions immediately. PR results have been very good in recent cases of this scenario in Afghanistan and Iraq.
Baseline – Mission Execution Responsibilities

- Responsibilities for the execution of PR missions depend on the scenario
  - Scenario 1 – Countries such as Colombia and Bosnia, where there is a U.S. mission, but there are no U.S. PR forces, and PR responsibilities of the host nation and the U.S. mission are fragmented
    » Coordination process is not understood
    » DoS has some responsibility, but no capability, DoD might execute the mission after request is coordinated and PR forces are deployed
    » When a PR incident occurs, coordination must be done in real-time, and could be ad hoc, causing an excessive delay
      • Isolated personnel are likely to be captured or killed by the time coordination is done
  - Scenario 2 – Combat theaters such as Afghanistan and Iraq, when there is no U.S. Mission, there are U.S. PR forces, and PR is a military responsibility
    » The PR Commander and staff (e.g., JSRC, RCC) have the authority and capability to execute PR missions without real-time coordination above the Joint Task Force level
ILLUSTRATIVE BASELINE COORDINATION OF PR MISSION EXECUTION

This is an organization chart showing illustrative coordination relationships that could coordinate for rescue in a region where there is a U.S. Mission, but with no dedicated PR capability in place. Real-world examples include Columbia, The Philippines, Indonesia, and Bosnia. The chart shows representative channels for coordination for diplomatic, military, and civil PR options. The chart also shows the organizations, as well as the illustrative coordination relationships between those organizations, with regard to PR.

The chart is banded into three levels: strategic/national; operational; and tactical. Organizations operating on the strategic/national level typically plan for months to years; operational level organizations plan for the mid-term—weeks to months; and tactical level organizations typically plan for the short term—minutes to hours.

During an isolated personnel incident, State Department headquarters support for a diplomatic recovery effort would center on the regional desk for the region. The regional desk officer would be supported by the Crisis Management Support (CMS) center and the Pol-Mil Action Team (PMAT). The Political-Military Bureau (POL-MIL) within the State Department is the primary coordination channel through which the DoS and DoD communicate.

Within the State Department’s headquarters, there is a Pol-Mil Action Team (PMAT) center that is manned around-the-clock to provide diplomatic and political support for ongoing military operations. The PMAT Mission is to coordinate diplomatic support around-the-clock for world-wide U.S. deployments.

Every overseas U.S. embassy and consulate has a Consular Affairs Overseas Citizens Services (CA/OCS) office. This office becomes the focal point for diplomatic expertise during an isolated personnel situation in the respective region.

For matters of national security, the national architecture is headed by the National Security Council (NSC). The NSC is supported by the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), DoD, and others.

The U.S. Coast Guard monitors and coordinates worldwide operations from a command center within its headquarters. Day-to-day responsibility for these Search and Rescue Regions (SRRs) is tasked to the Rescue Coordination Centers (RCCs) and fourteen District Commands. These commands coordinate with the RCCs of other nations responsible for adjoining SRRs.
Illustrative Baseline Coordination of PR Mission Execution

1. Coordinate with U.S. Mission and Host Nation
2. Execute Mission
   - Report
   - Locate
   - Support
   - Recover
   - Return
ILLUSTRATIVE BASELINE COORDINATION OF PR MISSION EXECUTION  
(WITHOUT A U.S. MISSION)

This is an organization chart showing illustrative coordination relationships that would be used to coordinate for rescue in a region when there is no U.S. Mission, but there is a DoD PR capability in place. Real-world examples include Iraq, North Korea, and Afghanistan. The functions and relationships of the organizations shown are similar to those shown on the previous slide.
Illustrative Baseline Coordination of PR Mission Execution (without a U.S. Mission)

1. Execute Mission
   - Report
   - Locate
   - Support
   - Recover
   - Return
   (No real-time interagency coordination required)
MISSION EXECUTION - SHORTFALLS

In many countries around the world, DoD does not have PR forces in place, and DoD PR commanders and staffs do not have authority to unilaterally execute PR missions. In these countries, execution of PR missions to recover USG personnel is not pre-coordinated. Thus, coordination for PR must be accomplished in real-time once an incident occurs. This coordination is done ad hoc.

Other government agencies face the same technical and resource challenges as the DoD. Detection, identification, location, authentication, and communication with isolated personnel in remote areas and non-permissive environments is technically difficult and expensive. The speed and range limitations of recovery assets affect response time and coverage for PR incidents. USG agency recovery assets lack the ability to operate in any environment at any time.
Mission Execution - Shortfalls

• In the absence of DoD PR capability, PR is not pre-coordinated, and the coordination process is not understood
  – Real-time coordination is ad hoc and time-consuming
  – Isolated personnel may be captured or killed while mission is being coordinated or PR forces are being deployed

• Other government agencies face the same technical challenges as DoD
  – Reporting, identifying, locating, & authenticating isolated personnel in remote locations and non-permissive environments is difficult
  – Speed & range of recovery assets is limited
  – Limited recovery capability in extreme environments
MISSION EXECUTION – INTERIM ISSUE

The key issue regarding the execution of PR missions is a lack of defined roles, responsibilities, and authority for USG organizations that have the potential for involvement. While there are many cells throughout the USG that can contribute to PR, their PR roles and responsibilities are ad hoc, and their relationships are informal. Many relationships are personality-based, but such relationships break down when people rotate out of assignments or duties. Most cells (including formal PR organizations, such as Joint Search and Rescue Centers) are not effectively organized or networked for coordination and collaboration in joint, inter-agency, and coalition operations and environments. Coordination among USG agencies is not institutionalized, formalized, codified, or published. There are few representatives to liaison between agencies. There is a lack of understanding of other government agencies’ missions, cultures, and PR needs. Points-of-entry into other government agencies and suitable PR assets of other agencies are not well understood or widely known.

Many USG agencies outside the Defense Department have a false perception that the Defense Department is always there to fall back on as the PR “cavalry.” The Defense Department, however, does not deliberately plan to provide PR support to the entire USG.

DoD has created a more complex organization and command and control (C2) structure than other USG agencies. This is understandable, given the size of the DoD relative to other agencies. Other agencies tend to have a more vertical and more straightforward organizational structure. There is almost no command and control relationships between USG agencies. Most of the lateral relationships are coordination channels, even within the DoD. This condition results in a command and control structure that is very vertical in nature; relationships are stovepipes rather than networks.
Mission Execution – Interim Issue

• Issue: The roles, responsibilities, and authority in USG agencies to execute PR are not well defined or understood
  – Interagency/civil command and control appears to be informal, ad hoc, and relationship-based
  – The PR coordination process among USG agencies is not codified or published
  – Some agencies have unrealistic expectations of DoD to conduct PR for their personnel when needed
  – DoD PR C2 is complex
INTERIM DOTMLPF SOLUTION SET

The DoD PR community has developed a number of low-cost tools for PR that require a modicum of training and financial investment for personnel at risk to be able to employ properly to improve their chances of being recovered from an isolation event. These tools include Isolated Personnel Reports (ISOPREPs), Evasion Plans of Action (EPAs), Evasion Charts (EVCs), blood chits, and pointee-talkees. ISOPREPs allow PR forces to authenticate isolated personnel. EPAs advise PR staffs and forces on the intentions of isolated personnel. Personnel at risk carry EVCs, blood chits, and pointee-talkees with them for use in case they are isolated. Interagency personnel at risk would provide their ISOPREPs and EPAs to their respective PR liaison officers to establish the linkage to the DoD PR architecture.

The DoD could leverage the inherent PR capability of interagency assets through interagency liaison officers, serving as the coordination link to other USG agencies that have PR-capable assets within an area of interest. To mitigate risk, DoD should develop joint doctrine on the appropriate use of interagency assets in various operational environments.
• **Doctrine**
  – DoD should make available to USG agencies standard tools such as: ISOPREPs, EPAs, EVCs, blood chits, and pointeetalkes, etc.
  – DoD should develop joint doctrine for integration of interagency PR capability to reduce the near-real-time coordination

• **Organization**
  – DoD should integrate interagency liaison officers into DoD PR command and control architecture
The most critical tasks for recovery forces are locating and communicating with isolated personnel. Communications usable in remote areas, such as satellite phones, and navigation tools, such as GPS receivers, can greatly improve an isolated person’s chances of recovery. Interagency personnel at risk should have these tools, and be trained to use them. To be effective, USG agencies would also have to train their personnel at risk to properly use ISOPREPs, EPAs, EVCs, blood chits, and pointee-talkees to enhance their ability to survive, evade, and be recovered.

In order to make interagency liaison officers effective coordinators for PR, JPRA should train them in accordance with joint doctrine to act as effective links between interagency isolated personnel, interagency recovery assets, and DoD PR command and control architecture.
Interim DOTMLPF Solution Set

• Training
  – USG agencies should train personnel at risk to use ISOPREPs, EPAs, EVCs, blood chits, pointee-talkees, and location, identification, authentication, and communication means
  – JPRA should train interagency liaison officers to integrate into DoD PR command and control structure

• Material
  – USG agencies should provide personnel at risk with EVCs, blood chits, pointee-talkees, satellite phones, and GPS receivers
INTERIM DOTMLPF SOLUTION SET

USG agencies will not be able to commit limited resources to the manpower, material, and training needed to improve their PR capability if their leadership does not understand the issues, and the need to address them. JPRA should educate the leadership within the USG and enhance their awareness through exportable courses, such as PR-101 and PR-501.

USG agencies should identify qualified personnel who could serve as interagency liaison officers to DoD. Liaison officers would enhance interagency coordination of PR, leverage the use of PR-capable interagency assets, and facilitate the recovery of interagency isolated personnel.
Interim DOTMLPF Solution Set

- **Leader Development**
  - JPRA should educate USG agency leadership on PR shortfalls, issues, and solutions

- **Personnel**
  - USG agencies should provide liaison officers to DoD PR Commanders and staff

- **Facilities** – No changes recommended
MISSION EXECUTION – INTERIM SOLUTION SET

The IDA study team is planning to conduct case studies of recent interagency PR incidents in Colombia and Afghanistan to identify positive and negative factors that influence the execution of missions to recover interagency personnel.
Mission Execution – Interim Solution Set

• IDA will conduct case studies of recent interagency personnel recovery incidents to identify positive and negative factors that influence the execution of missions to recover interagency personnel
  – Colombia
  – Afghanistan and Iraq
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3. Field Manual 3-50.2, CSAR (draft)
4. Field Manual 3-05.231, Special Forces Personnel Recovery (draft)
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1. Air Force Doctrine Document 2-1.6, CSAR

EXERCISE AND TEST REPORTS
APPENDIX A
ACRONYMS
## APPENDIX A
### ACRONYMS

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>Airborne Command, Control, and Communications</td>
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<td>AC2ISRC</td>
<td>Aerospace Command &amp; Control, Intelligence, Surveillance, &amp; Reconnaissance Center</td>
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<td>ACC</td>
<td>Air Combat Command</td>
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<td>ACT</td>
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<td>Advanced Concept &amp; Technology Demonstration</td>
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<td>Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leader Development, Personnel, Facilities</td>
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<td>Federal Bureau of Investigation</td>
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<td>FEST</td>
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<td>FID</td>
<td>Foreign Internal Defense</td>
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<td>FLETC</td>
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<td>FLIR</td>
<td>Forward Looking Infrared</td>
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<td>Foreign Service Institute, renamed National Foreign Affairs Training Center (NFATC)</td>
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<td>FTX</td>
<td>Field Training Exercise</td>
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<td>FY</td>
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<td>GOB</td>
<td>Ground Order of Battle</td>
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<td>GSA</td>
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<td>GWOT</td>
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<td>Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War</td>
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<tr>
<td>HD</td>
<td>High Demand</td>
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<tr>
<td>HHR</td>
<td>Hand Held Radio</td>
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<td>HHQ</td>
<td>Higher Headquarters</td>
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<td>HLD</td>
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<tr>
<td>HLS</td>
<td>Homeland Security</td>
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<td>HN</td>
<td>Host Nation</td>
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<td>HQ</td>
<td>Headquarters</td>
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<td>HRC</td>
<td>High Risk of Capture</td>
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<td>IAMSAR</td>
<td>International Aviation and Maritime Search and Rescue</td>
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<td>In Accordance With</td>
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<td>IDA</td>
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<td>International Maritime Organization</td>
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<td>Information Operations/Information Warfare</td>
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<td>IP</td>
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<td>ISA</td>
<td>International Security Affairs</td>
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<td>ISOPREP</td>
<td>Isolated Personnel Report</td>
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<td>ISR</td>
<td>Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance</td>
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<td>ITO</td>
<td>Integrated Tasking Order</td>
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<td>JAC2C</td>
<td>Joint Air Command &amp; Control Course</td>
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</table>
JAWP  Joint Advanced Warfighting Program (IDA)
JCET  Joint-Combined Exchange Training
JCRA  Joint Combat Rescue Agency
JCS  Joint Chiefs of Staff
JCSAR  Joint Combat Search and Rescue
JEFX  Joint Expeditionary Force Experiment
JFC  Joint Force Commander
JFACC  Joint Force Air Component Commander
JFCOM  Joint Forces Command
JFSOCC  Joint Force Special Operations Component Commander
JIACG  Joint Interagency Coordination Group
JIATF  Joint Inter-Agency Task Force
JIC  Joint Intelligence Center
JIMP  Joint Vision Implementation Master Plan
JMETL  Joint Mission Essential Task List
JP  Joint Publication
JPRA  Joint Personnel Recovery Agency
JPO  Joint Program Office
JRCC  Joint Rescue Coordination Center
JROC  Joint Requirements Oversight Council
JS  Joint Staff
JSOTF  Joint Special Operations Task Force
JSRC  Joint Search and Rescue Center
JSTARS  Joint Surveillance, Tracking, and Reconnaissance System
JT&E  Joint Test and Evaluation
JTF  Joint Task Force
JTIMS  Joint Training Information Management System
JV2020  Joint Vision 2020
JWCA  Joint Warfighting Capabilities Assessment
JWE  Joint Warfighting Experiment
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<td>LD</td>
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<td>LD/HD</td>
<td>Low Density/High Demand</td>
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<tr>
<td>LNO</td>
<td>Liaison Officer</td>
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<tr>
<td>LOC</td>
<td>Location</td>
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<tr>
<td>LOC/ID</td>
<td>Location and Identification</td>
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<tr>
<td>LOS</td>
<td>Line-Of-Sight</td>
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<tr>
<td>LPD</td>
<td>Low Probability of Detection</td>
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<tr>
<td>LPE</td>
<td>Low Probability of Exploitation</td>
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<tr>
<td>LPI</td>
<td>Low Probability of Interception</td>
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<td>Marine Air Ground Task Force</td>
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<td>Major Command</td>
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<td>Marine Liaison Officer</td>
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<td>MAS</td>
<td>Military Agency for Standardization</td>
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<td>Mission Commander</td>
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<td>MCAS</td>
<td>Marine Corps Air Station</td>
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<td>Multi-Command Manual</td>
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<td>MDS</td>
<td>Mission Designator Series</td>
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<td>MEDEVAC</td>
<td>Medical Evacuation</td>
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<td>Mission Essential Task List</td>
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<td>MEU</td>
<td>Marine Expeditionary Unit</td>
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<tr>
<td>MEU(SOC)</td>
<td>Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable)</td>
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<td>MIJI</td>
<td>Meaconing, Intrusion, Jamming, and Interference</td>
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<td>MOA</td>
<td>Memorandum of Agreement</td>
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<td>MOOTW</td>
<td>Military Operations Other Than War</td>
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<td>MOU</td>
<td>Memorandum of Understanding</td>
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<tr>
<td>MPA</td>
<td>Missing Persons Act</td>
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<td>MRC</td>
<td>Major Regional Contingency (preceded Major Theater War)</td>
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<td>Mass Rescue Operations</td>
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<td>MSEL</td>
<td>Master Scenario Events List</td>
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<td>MTT</td>
<td>Mobile Training Team</td>
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<td>Major Theater War</td>
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<td>NAR</td>
<td>Non-conventional Assisted Recovery</td>
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<td>NAS</td>
<td>Naval Air Station</td>
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<td>NASA</td>
<td>National Aeronautics and Space Administration</td>
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<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>NAVSPECWAR</td>
<td>Naval Special Warfare</td>
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<tr>
<td>NCA</td>
<td>National Command Authority</td>
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<tr>
<td>NCO</td>
<td>Non-Commissioned Officer</td>
</tr>
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<td>NCOIC</td>
<td>Non-Commissioned Officer-In-Charge</td>
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<tr>
<td>NDU</td>
<td>National Defense University</td>
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<tr>
<td>NEO</td>
<td>Noncombatant Evacuation Operation</td>
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<td>NFATC</td>
<td>National Foreign Affairs Training Center, formerly Foreign Service Institute (FSI)</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organization</td>
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<td>NIC</td>
<td>National Intelligence Center</td>
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<td>NMCC</td>
<td>National Military Command Center</td>
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<td>NOB</td>
<td>Naval Order of Battle</td>
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<tr>
<td>NPRA</td>
<td>National Personnel Recovery Architecture</td>
</tr>
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<td>NRAS</td>
<td>Naval Reserve Air Station</td>
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<td>NSA</td>
<td>National Security Agency</td>
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<td>NSARC</td>
<td>National Search and Rescue Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>NSC</td>
<td>National Security Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>NSPD</td>
<td>National Security Presidential Directive</td>
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<tr>
<td>OAD</td>
<td>Operational Aviation Detachment</td>
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<td>OAF</td>
<td>Operation Allied Force</td>
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</table>
OB                      Order of Battle
OCONUS                  Outside Continental United States
OCPP                     Office of Contingency Planning and Peacekeeping (DoS)
ODS                      Operation Desert Storm
OED                      Operational Evaluation Division (IDA)
OIC                      Officer-In-Charge
OJCS                     Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
ONW                      Operation Northern Watch
OOTW                     Operations Other Than War
OPCON                    Operational Control
OPLAN                    Operation Plan
OPR                      Office of Primary Responsibility
OPSEC                    Operational Security
OPSTEMPO                 Operations Tempo
OSC                      On-Scene Commander
OSD                      Office of the Secretary of Defense
OSW                      Operation Southern Watch
OTH                      Over The Horizon

PA                       Public Affairs
PACAF                    Pacific Air Forces
PACOM                    Pacific Command
PCC                      Principals Coordinating Committee (NSC)
PCS                      Permanent Change of Station
PDD                      Presidential Decision Directive
PERSTEMPO                Personnel Tempo
PGD/HD                   Peace-Time Governmental Detention/Hostage Detention
PJ                       Pararescue Jumper
PKO                      Peace Keeping Operation
PLB                      Personnel Locator Beacon
PLS                      Personnel Location System
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PMAT</td>
<td>Political Military Action Team</td>
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<td>POC</td>
<td>Point of Contact</td>
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<td>POM</td>
<td>Program Objective Memorandum</td>
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<tr>
<td>POW</td>
<td>Prisoner of War</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPBS</td>
<td>Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PR</td>
<td>Personnel Recovery</td>
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<tr>
<td>PRAG</td>
<td>Personnel Recovery Advisory Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>PRCC</td>
<td>Personnel Recovery Coordination Center</td>
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<td>PRMAA</td>
<td>Personnel Recovery Mission Area Analysis</td>
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<td>PRMS</td>
<td>Personnel Recovery Mission Software</td>
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<td>PRRC</td>
<td>Personnel Recovery Response Cell</td>
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<td>PRTFG</td>
<td>Personnel Recovery Technology Focus Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>PRTWG</td>
<td>Personnel Recovery Technology Working Group</td>
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<td>PVO</td>
<td>Private Volunteer Organization</td>
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<td>RAAF</td>
<td>Royal Australian Air Force</td>
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<td>RAF</td>
<td>Royal Air Force</td>
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<td>RCC</td>
<td>Rescue Coordination Center</td>
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<td>Reconnaissance</td>
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<td>Rescue Combat Air Patrol</td>
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<td>RESCORT</td>
<td>Rescue Escort</td>
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<td>Rivet Joint</td>
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<td>Rescue Mission Commander</td>
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<td>Rules of Engagement</td>
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<td>Republic of Korea</td>
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<td>Rescue Group</td>
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<td>Rescue Squadron</td>
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<td>Royal Singapore Air Force</td>
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<td>RT</td>
<td>Resistance Training</td>
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<td>RTIC</td>
<td>Real-Time Information in the Cockpit</td>
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<td>Abbreviation</td>
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<td>SAASM</td>
<td>Selective Availability/Anti-Spoofing Module</td>
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<td>Selected Area For Evasion</td>
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<td>SAID</td>
<td>SAFE Area Intelligence Description</td>
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<td>Search and Rescue</td>
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<td>SAR</td>
<td>Synthetic Aperture Radar</td>
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<td>Search and Rescue Dot</td>
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<td>Search and Rescue Incident Report</td>
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<td>SARNEG</td>
<td>Search and Rescue Numeric Encryption Grid</td>
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<td>SARREQ</td>
<td>Search and Rescue Request</td>
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<td>Search and Rescue Satellite Aided Tracking</td>
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<td>Satellite Communications</td>
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<td>Scandinavia &amp; Iceland</td>
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<td>SCI</td>
<td>Sensitive Compartmented Information</td>
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<tr>
<td>SCIF</td>
<td>Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility</td>
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<td>SCSR</td>
<td>School for Combat Survival &amp; Recovery</td>
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<td>SE</td>
<td>Survivor-Evader</td>
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<td>SEAD</td>
<td>Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses</td>
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<td>Secretary of Defense</td>
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<td>SED</td>
<td>System Evaluation Division (IDA)</td>
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<td>SER</td>
<td>Survival, Evasion, and Recovery</td>
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<td>SERE</td>
<td>Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and Escape</td>
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<td>Special Forces Group</td>
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<td>Stabilization Forces</td>
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<td>SHAPE</td>
<td>Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe</td>
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<td>Acronym</td>
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<tr>
<td>SIPRNET</td>
<td>Secure Internet Protocol Router Network</td>
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<td>SIREN</td>
<td>Secure Information Releasability Environment</td>
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<td>Search and Rescue Mission Coordinator</td>
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<td>Subject Matter Expert</td>
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<td>Special Operations Aviation Regiment</td>
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<td>Special Operations Command, Central Command</td>
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<td>Special Operations Command, Europe</td>
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<td>Special Operations Command, Korea</td>
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<td>Special Operations Command</td>
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<td>Special Operations Command, Pacific</td>
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<td>Special Operations Command, Southern Command</td>
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<td>Special Operations Group</td>
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<td>SOLE</td>
<td>Special Operations Liaison Element</td>
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<td>SO/LIC</td>
<td>Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict (DoD)</td>
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<td>SOP</td>
<td>Standing Operating Procedure</td>
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<td>Statement of Requirements</td>
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<td>Special Operations Squadron</td>
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<td>Southern Command Air Forces</td>
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<td>Special Category</td>
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<td>Social Security Number</td>
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<td>Southwest Asia</td>
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<td>TAC-EVAL</td>
<td>Tactical Evaluation</td>
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<td>Tactical Control</td>
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<td>TBMCS</td>
<td>Theater Battle Management-Core Systems</td>
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</table>
TDY  Temporary Duty
TEP  Theater Engagement Plan
TES  Test and Evaluation Squadron
TOA  Transfer of Authority
TOT  Time on Target
TRAP  Tactical Recovery of Aircraft and Personnel
TS  Top Secret
TS/SCI  Top Secret/Special Compartmented Information
TTP  Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures

U.S.  United States
UAR  Unconventional Assisted Recovery
UARCC  Unconventional Assisted Recovery Coordination Center
UARM  Unconventional Assisted Recovery Mechanism
UART  Unconventional Assisted Recovery Team
UBS  UHF Base Station
UFL  Ulchi Focus Lens
UJTL  Universal Joint Task List
UK  United Kingdom
UNC  United Nations Command
USA  United States of America; also United States Army
USAJFKSWCS  United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School
USASOC  United States Army Special Operations Command
USAF  United States Air Force
USAFE  United States Air Forces Europe
USCENTCOM/CENTCOM  United States Central Command
USCG  United States Coast Guard
USD  Under Secretary of Defense
USD(A&T)  Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology
USD(ISA)  Under Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
USD(P)  Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
USD(P&R)    Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness
USEUCOM/EUCOM.  United States European Command
USG    United States Government
USFK  United States Forces Korea
USJFCOM/JFCOM.  United States Joint Forces Command
USMC  United States Marine Corps
USN  United States Navy
USNORTHCOM/NORTHCOM  United States Northern Command
USNR  United States Navy Reserves
USPACOM  United States Pacific Command
USPACOM/PACOM.  United States Pacific Command
USOUTHCOM/SOUTHCOM United States Southern Command
USSOCOM/SOCOM.  United States Special Operations Command
UW  Unconventional Warfare

WESTPAC  Western Pacific
WG  Wing
WS  Weapons School
APPENDIX B
GLOSSARY
APPENDIX B
GLOSSARY

**airborne mission commander** – The commander serves as an airborne extension of the executing component’s rescue coordination center (RCC) and coordinates the combat search and rescue (CSAR) effort between the combat search and rescue task force (CSARTF) and the RCC (or joint search and rescue center) by monitoring the status of all CSARTF elements, requesting additional assets when needed, and ensuring the recovery and supporting forces arrive at their designated areas to accomplish the CSAR mission. The airborne mission commander (AMC) may be designated by the component RCC or higher authority. The AMC appoints, as necessary, an on-scene commander. Also called AMC.

**alliance** – (DoD) An alliance is the result of formal agreements (i.e., treaties) between two or more nations for broad, long-term objectives that further the common interests of the members. See also coalition; multination.

**assistance mechanism** – (DoD) Individuals, groups of individuals, or organizations, together with material and/or facilities in position, or that can be placed in position by appropriate US or multinational agencies, to accomplish or support evasion and recovery operations. See also evasion; evasion and recovery; recovery; recovery operations.

**assisted recovery** – (DoD) The return of an evader to friendly control as the result of assistance from an outside source. See also evader.

**Blood chit** – A small piece of material depicting an American flag and a statement in several languages to the effect that anyone assisting the bearer to safety will be rewarded. See also evasion aid. JP 1-02.

**Chief of Mission** – The senior diplomatic representative of the United States assigned by the President and residing in a country/location. Usually refers to the Ambassador, but can be lower ranking DoS official (chargé d’affairs, consular officer, etc.) based on locale and current policy.
coalition – (DoD) An ad hoc arrangement between two or more nations for common action. See also alliance; multinational.

coalition action – (DoD) Multinational action outside the bounds of established alliances, usually for single occasions or longer cooperation in a narrow sector of common interest. See also alliance; coalition; multinational operations.

coalition force – (DoD) A force composed of military elements of nations that have formed a temporary alliance for some specific purpose.

combat search and rescue – (DoD) A specific task performed by rescue forces to effect the recovery of distressed personnel during war or military operations other than war. Also called CSAR.

combat search and rescue mission coordinator – (DoD) The designated person or organization selected to direct and coordinate support for a specific combat search and rescue mission. Also called CSAR mission coordinator. See also combat search and rescue; component search and rescue controller; search and rescue; search and rescue mission coordinator.

combat search and rescue task force – All forces committed to a specific combat search and rescue operation to search for, locate, identify, and recover isolated personnel during wartime or contingency operations. This includes those elements assigned to provide command and control and protect the rescue vehicle from enemy air or ground attack. Also called CSARTF.

combat survival – (DoD, NATO) Those measures to be taken by Service personnel when involuntarily separated from friendly forces in combat, including procedures relating to individual survival, evasion, escape, and conduct after capture.

combined operation – An operation conducted by forces of two or more allied nations acting together for the accomplishment of a single mission.

component search and rescue controller – (DoD) The designated search and rescue representative of a component commander of a joint force who is responsible for coordinating and controlling that component’s search and rescue forces. See also combat search and rescue; combat search and rescue mission coordinator; search and rescue; search and rescue mission coordinator.
conventional recovery operation – Evader recovery operations conducted by conventional forces.

DoD civilian work force – United States citizens or foreign nationals employed by the Department of Defense and paid from appropriated or non-appropriated funds under permanent or temporary arrangement. This includes employees filling full-time, part-time, intermittent, or on-call positions. Specifically excluded are Government contractors in accordance with DoD Instruction 1400.2 (reference (d)). DoD Instruction 3020.37 (reference (e)) covers contingency and emergency planning for contractor employees.

DoD Contractor – Any individual, firm, corporation, partnership, association, or other legal non-Federal entity that enters into a contract directly with the Department of Defense to furnish services, supplies, or both, including construction. The term “DoD Contractor” may include U.S. nationals, local citizens, or third-country nationals, but shall not include foreign governments or representatives of foreign governments that sell to the Department of Defense, a DoD Component, or foreign corporations owned wholly by foreign governments.

Defense Prisoner of War/Missing Personnel Office – Established by Congress in Title 10, US Code, this office is responsible for policy development and coordination with respect to prisoners of war and missing Department of Defense personnel. The office also has statutory lead authority for coordination of DoD positions within the interagency process.

Doctrine – Fundamental principles by which the military forces or elements thereof guide their actions in support of national objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgment in application. See also multinational doctrine, joint doctrine, and multi-service doctrine. JP 1-02.

Emergency Essential Civilians – A civilian position located overseas or that would be transferred overseas during a crisis situation, or which requires the incumbent to perform temporary duty assignments overseas during a crisis in support of military operations. The position ensures success of combat operations or supports essential combat systems after mobilization, evacuation order, or other military crisis.

evader – Any person isolated in hostile or unfriendly territory who eludes capture.
**evasion** – (DoD) The process whereby individuals who are isolated in hostile or unfriendly territory avoid capture with the goal of successfully returning to areas under friendly control. See also **evasion and recovery**.

**evasion aid** – (DoD) In evasion and recovery operations, any piece of information or equipment designed to assist an individual in evading capture. Evasion aids include, but are not limited to, blood chits, pointee-talkees, evasion charts, barter items, and equipment designed to complement issued survival equipment. See also; evasion; evasion and recovery; evasion chart; recovery; recovery operations.

**evasion and escape** – (DoD, NATO) The procedures and operations whereby military personnel and other selected individuals are enabled to emerge from an enemy-held or hostile area to areas under friendly control.

**evasion and escape intelligence** – (DoD) Processed information prepared to assist personnel to escape if captured by the enemy or to evade capture if lost in enemy-dominated territory.

**evasion and escape net** – (DoD) The organization within enemy-held or hostile areas that operates to receive, move, and exfiltrate military personnel or selected individuals to friendly control. See also unconventional warfare.

**evasion and escape route** – (DoD) A course of travel, preplanned or not, that an escapee or evader uses in an attempt to depart enemy territory in order to return to friendly lines.

**evasion and recovery** – (DoD) The full spectrum of coordinated actions carried out by evaders, recovery forces, and operational recovery planners to effect the successful return of personnel isolated in hostile territory to friendly control. See also evader; evasion; hostile; recovery force.

**evasion chart** – (DoD) Special map or chart designed as an evasion aid. See also evasion; evasion aid.

**evasion plan of action** – (DoD) A course of action, developed before executing a combat mission, which is intended to improve a potential evader’s chances of successful evasion and recovery by providing recovery forces with an additional source of
information that can increase the predictability of the evader’s actions and movement. Also called EPA. See also evader; evasion; evasion and recovery; recovery force.

**Full Spectrum Personnel Recovery** – The sum of military, diplomatic, and civil efforts to prepare for, recover, and return of U.S. military, government civilians, and government contractors, or others as designated by the President, Secretary of State, or the Secretary of Defense, who are isolated or missing in all situations and all scenarios.

**high-risk-of-capture personnel** – U.S. personnel whose position or assignment makes them particularly vulnerable to capture by hostile forces in combat, by terrorists, or by unfriendly governments.

**Hook-112** – Officially the PRC 112B, which has all the characteristics of the PRC-112, but with added commercial Global Positioning System (GPS) receiver that provides the user with location and navigation capability and also has one-way, line of sight, commercially encrypted databurst communications capability with properly equipped aircraft. Databursts provide radio identification, GPS position, and text messages.

**inland search and rescue region** – (DoD) The inland areas of continental United States, except waters under the jurisdiction of the United States. See also search and rescue region.

**isolated personnel** – (DoD) Military or civilian personnel that have become separated from their unit or organization in an environment requiring them to survive, evade, or escape while awaiting rescue or recovery. See also combat search and rescue; search and rescue and personnel.

**isolated personnel report** – (DoD) A DoD Form (DD 1833) that contains information designed to facilitate the identification and authentication of an evader by a recovery force. Also called ISOPREP. See also evader; recovery force.

**Isolated Personnel Training, Level A** – Initial entry training. DoD civilian work force members and DoD contractor employees must demonstrate knowledge of survival, evasion, and recovery techniques, tactics, and procedures. They must demonstrate a knowledge of the captivity environments: combat, peacetime and hostage/detention. Level A isolated personnel
training requirements may be accomplished by completing anti-terrorism and force protection training prior to entry into the theater. Augmentations by JPRA to the pre-deployment preparations briefing may be required. Training may be accomplished through computer-based training.

**Isolated Personnel Training, Level B** – Unit level Training – survival and resistance; minus hands-on/practical exercises. DoD civilian work force members and DoD contractor employees must comprehend survival, evasion, and recovery techniques, tactics, and procedures. The DoD civilian work force members and DoD contractor employees must comprehend principles and concepts relation to surviving all captivity environments. Training may be accomplished through computer-based training.

**Isolated Personnel Training, Level C** – Institutional training – survival, escape, resistance, and evasion; hands-on/practical exercises. The DoD civilian work force members and DoD contractor employees must apply survival, evasion, and recovery techniques, tactics, and procedures. Level C training will be a hands-on derivative of the current prisoner of war camp training captivity environment conducted by the DoD. All phases of captivity environments plus basic survival skills will be trained. Level C cannot be conducted solely by computer-based training.

**joint combat search and rescue operation** – (DoD) A combat search and rescue operation in support of a component’s military operations that has exceeded the combat search and rescue capabilities of that component and requires the efforts of two or more components of the joint force. Normally, the operation is conducted by the joint force commander or a component commander that has been designated by joint force commander tasking. See also combat search and rescue; search and rescue.

**joint search and rescue center** – (DoD) A primary search and rescue facility suitably staffed by supervisory personnel and equipped for planning, coordinating, and executing joint search and rescue and combat search and rescue operations within the geographical area assigned to the joint force. The facility is operated jointly by personnel from two or more Service or functional components or it may have a multinational staff of personnel from two or more allied or coalition nations (multinational search and rescue center). The joint search and rescue center should be staffed equitably by trained personnel drawn from each joint force.
component, including U.S. Coast Guard participation where practical. Also called JSRC. See also combat search and rescue; joint search and rescue center director; rescue coordination center; search and rescue.

**joint search and rescue center director – (DoD)** The designated representative with overall responsibility for operation of the joint search and rescue center. See also combat search and rescue; joint search and rescue center; search and rescue.

**life support equipment – (DoD)** Equipment designed to sustain aircrew members and passengers throughout the flight environment, optimizing their mission effectiveness and affording a means of safe and reliable escape, descent, survival, and recovery in emergency situations.

**maritime search and rescue region – (DoD)** The waters subject to the jurisdiction of the United States; the territories and possessions of the United States (except Canal Zone and the inland area of Alaska) and designated areas of the high seas. See also search and rescue region.

**multination – (DoD)** Between two or more forces or agencies of two or more nations or coalition partners. See also alliance; coalition.

**multinational operations – (DoD)** A collective term to describe military actions conducted by forces of two or more nations, typically organized within the structure of a coalition or alliance. See also alliance; coalition; coalition action.

**non-conventional assisted recovery** – term for methods used by US Government Agencies to set up, maintain, and operate what used to be called Escape & Evasion networks. Also called NAR.

**on-scene commander** – The person designated to coordinate rescue efforts at the rescue site.

**overseas search and rescue region – (DoD)** Overseas unified command areas (or portions thereof not included within the inland region or the maritime region). See also search and rescue region.

**Pararescue team** – Specially trained personnel qualified to penetrate to the site of an incident by land or parachute, render medical aid, accomplish survival methods, and rescue survivors.
**PRC-90** – Survival radio carried by military aircrew members. Vietnam-era system providing two-way, line-of-sight, non-secure voice communications on two fixed frequencies. Also has a distress beacon.

**PRC-112** – Survival radio carried by military aircrew members. Provides two-way line-of-sight, non-secure voice communications on two programmable frequencies. Equipped with a distress beacon. A coded transponder can be interrogated by properly equipped aircraft, providing the range and heading to the survival radio.

**personal locator beacon** – *(DoD, NATO)* An emergency radio locator beacon with a two-way speech facility carried by crewmembers, either on their person or in their survival equipment, and capable of providing homing signals to assist search and rescue operations.

**personnel** – Those individuals required in either a military or civilian capacity to accomplish the assigned mission.

**personnel recovery** — The aggregation of military, civil, and political efforts to obtain the release or recovery of personnel from uncertain or hostile environments and denied areas whether they are captured, missing, or isolated. That includes US, allied, coalition, friendly military, or paramilitary, and others as designated by the National Command Authorities. Personnel recovery (PR) is the umbrella term for operations that are focused on the task of recovering captured, missing, or isolated personnel from harm’s way. PR includes but is not limited to theater search and rescue; combat search and rescue; search and rescue; survival, evasion, resistance, and escape; evasion and escape; and the coordination of negotiated as well as forcible recovery options. PR can occur through military action, action by nongovernmental organizations, other US Government-approved action, and/or diplomatic initiatives, or through any of these. Also called PR. See also combat search and rescue; evasion; evasion and escape; personnel; recovery; search and rescue. DoD Directive 2310.2, Personnel Recovery (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 22 Dec 2000), p.3.

**Pointee-talkee** – A language translation aid containing selected phrases in English opposite same statements in local language. It is used by pointing to appropriate phrases. In Operation Iraqi Freedom, programmable digital devices with sound recognition and speaker capability were also used.
precautionary search and rescue/combate search and rescue – (DoD) The planning and prepositioning of aircraft, ships, or ground forces and facilities before an operation to provide search and rescue or combat search and rescue assistance if needed. The planning of precautionary search and rescue or combat search and rescue is usually done by plans personnel with search and rescue or combat search and rescue expertise and background on a J-3 (operations) staff, a joint search and rescue center, or a rescue coordination center. Also called precautionary SAR/CSAR. See also combat search and rescue; joint combat search and rescue operation; search and rescue.

recovery – (DoD, NATO) In evasion and recovery operations, the return of evaders to friendly control, either with or without assistance, as the result of planning, operations, and individual actions on the part of recovery planners, conventional/unconventional recovery forces, and/or the evaders themselves. See also evader; evasion; evasion and recovery; recovery; recovery force.

recovery activation signal – (DoD) In evasion and recovery operations, a pre-coordinated signal from an evader that indicates his presence in an area to a receiving or observing source that indicates "I am here, start the recovery planning." See also evader; evasion; evasion and recovery; recovery operations.

recovery force – (DoD) In evasion and recovery operations, an organization consisting of personnel and equipment with a mission of seeking out evaders, contacting them, and returning them to friendly control. See also evader; evasion; evasion and recovery; recovery operations.

**rescue combat air patrol** – (DoD) An aircraft patrol provided over a combat search and rescue objective area for the purpose of intercepting and destroying hostile aircraft. Its primary mission is to protect the search and rescue task forces during recovery operations. Also called **RESCAP**.

**rescue coordination center** – (DoD) A primary search and rescue facility suitably staffed by supervisory personnel and equipped for coordinating and controlling search and rescue and/or combat search and rescue operations. The facility is operated unilaterally by personnel of a single Service or component. For Navy component operations, this facility may be called a rescue coordination team. Also called **RCC (or RCT for Navy component)**. See also **combat search and rescue**; **joint search and rescue**; **search and rescue**.

**rescue ship** – (DoD, NATO) In shipping control, a ship of a convoy stationed at the rear of a convoy column to rescue survivors.

**safe area** – (DoD) A designated area in hostile territory that offers the evader or escapee a reasonable chance of avoiding capture and of surviving until he can be evacuated. Also called **selected area for evasion**.

**SAFE area intelligence description** – (DoD) In evasion and recovery operations, an in-depth, all-source evasion study designed to assist the recovery of military personnel from a selected area for evasion under hostile conditions. Also called **SAID**. See also **evasion**; **evasion and recovery**; **recovery operations**; **Safe Area**.

**SANDY** – Callsign for a US Air Force pilot specially trained in search procedures, aircrew survival and authentication techniques, and helicopter support tactics.

**search and rescue** – (DoD, NATO) The use of aircraft, surface craft, submarines, specialized rescue teams, and equipment to search for and rescue personnel in distress on land or at sea. (DoD) Also called **SAR**. See also **combat search and rescue**; **combat search and rescue mission coordinator**; **component search and rescue controller**; **isolated personnel**; **joint combat search and rescue operation**; **joint search and rescue center**; **joint search and rescue center director**; **rescue coordination center**; **search and rescue mission coordinator**.
search and rescue alert notice – (DoD) An alerting message used for United States domestic flights. It corresponds to the declaration of the alert phase. Also called ALNOT. See also search and rescue incident classification, subpart b.

search and rescue incident classification – (DoD) Three emergency phases into which an incident may be classified or progress, according to the seriousness of the incident and its requirement for rescue service: a. Uncertainty phase – Doubt exists as to the safety of a craft or person because of knowledge of possible difficulties or because of lack of information concerning progress or position; b. Alert phase – Apprehension exists for the safety of a craft or person because of definite information that serious difficulties exist that do not amount to a distress or because of a continued lack of information concerning progress or position; c. Distress phase – Immediate assistance is required by a craft or person because of being threatened by grave or imminent danger or because of continued lack of information concerning progress or position after procedures for the alert phase have been executed.

search and rescue mission coordinator – (DoD) The designated person or organization selected to direct and coordinate support for a specific search and rescue mission. Also called SAR mission coordinator. See also combat search and rescue; combat search and rescuer mission coordinator; component search and rescue controller; search and rescue.

search and rescue region – See inland search and rescue region; maritime search and rescue region; overseas search and rescue region.

tactical recovery of aircraft and personnel – A U.S. Marine Corps term describing a mission performed by an assigned and briefed aircrew for the specific purpose of the recovery of personnel, equipment, and/or aircraft when the tactical situation precludes search and rescue (SAR) assets from responding and when survivors and their location have been confirmed. Also called TRAP.

- Unassisted – the evader simply walks out on his own, unassisted…military personnel train for it, it works, but it doesn’t do much to bolster morale.
- Opportune – a matter of being in the right place at the right time…a guy bails out and lands in front of a HUMMMV that gets him back to US control.
- **Component** – in accordance with current joint doctrine, each service component is responsible for the recovery of its own forces within its capability.

- **Joint** – components are also required to contribute PR capability to the joint effort when needed.

- **Multinational** – US capability to recover an isolated person of a coalition partner, coalition partners’ capability to recover US isolated personnel, and the capabilities of a multinational force to recover any coalition isolated personnel.

- **Interagency** – a new category to capture some old and some emerging relationships with other government agencies with respect to PR.

**unconventional assisted recovery** – (DoD) Evader recovery conducted by directed unconventional warfare forces, dedicated extraction teams, and/or unconventional assisted recovery mechanisms operated by guerrilla groups or other clandestine organizations to seek out, contact, authenticate, support, and return evaders to friendly control. See also assisted recovery; evader; recovery.

**unconventional assisted recovery mechanism** – (DoD) That entity, group of entities, or organizations within enemy-held or hostile areas, which operates to receive, support, move, and exfiltrate military personnel or selected individuals to friendly control. See also assisted recovery; recovery; unconventional assisted recovery.

**unconventional recovery operation** – (DoD) Evader recovery operations conducted by unconventional forces. See also evader; recovery operations.

**unconventional warfare** – (DoD) A broad spectrum of military and paramilitary operations, normally of long duration, predominantly conducted by indigenous or surrogate forces who are organized, trained, equipped, supported, and directed in varying degrees by an external source. It includes guerrilla warfare and other direct offensive, low visibility, covert, or clandestine operations, as well as the indirect activities of subversion, sabotage, intelligence activities, and evasion and escape. Also called UW.

**unconventional warfare forces** – (DoD) United States forces having an existing unconventional warfare capability consisting of Army Special Forces and such Navy, Air Force, and Marine units as are assigned for these operations.
APPENDIX C
DATA COLLECTION INTERVIEWS, MEETINGS, CONFERENCES, WORKSHOPS, AND OTHER
(Note: Dates of Interviews include initial meetings and key re-visits)

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<th>Interviews</th>
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<td>26 April 2002</td>
<td>Joint Personnel Recovery Agency (JPRA)</td>
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<td>9-11 July 2002</td>
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<td>12 July 2002</td>
<td>Department of State (7 offices) and US Agency for International Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>15 July 2002</td>
<td>HQ Marine Corps (Aviation Programs and Policy)</td>
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22 July 2002  Department of State (Operations Center, Crisis Management Support)
23 July 2002  Central Intelligence Agency (Special Activities Division)
25 July 2002  Army Staff (Special Operations Division),
30 July 2002  US Southern Command (Joint Interagency Task Force –East)
1 August 2002  US Coast Guard Headquarters (Office of Search and Rescue)
27 August 2002  Department of State (Bureau of Diplomatic Security)
11 September 2002  Department of State (National Foreign Affairs Training Center, Security Overseas Seminar))
26 September 2002  Department of Treasury (Customs Service)
8 October 2002  Department of State (National Foreign Affairs Training Center, Crisis Management Training Team)
11 October 2002  National Security Agency (Special Support Activity)
3 October 2002  US European Command
25 October 2002  Department of State (Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement)
12 November 2002  US General Services Administration (Aircraft Management Division)
4 December 2002  US Agency for International Development (Asia and Near East Bureau)
10 December 2002  Department of State (Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, and Crisis Management)
17 December 2002  Department of Justice (Drug Enforcement Administration)
20 December 2002  Office of the CNO (Plans, Policy, and Operations, and Resources, Requirements, and Assessments)

10 February 2003  Patrick AFB FL (301st Rescue Squadron, DoS-INL, Manned Space Flight Office, and AirScan Inc.)

19 February 2003  US Navy Fleet Aviation Specialized Training Group (SERE School Section)

18 March 2003  JPRA SERE School, Fairchild AB WA

19 March 2003  USAF SERE School Fairchild AB WA

31 March – 2 April 2003  USA SERE School Fort Bragg NC

1-2 April 2003  USA JFK Special Warfare Center and School, Fort Bragg NC

28 May 2003  National Security Council Staff

**Conferences/Meetings/Workshops**

9-11 July 2002  Special Operations Command, Personnel Recovery Working Group

23-26 July 2002  USSOUTHCOM, Soto Cano AB, HO (JTF BRAVO and Central American Search and Rescue Workshop)

6-8 August 2002  2002 DoD Personnel Recovery Conference

4 September 2002  DPMO (In progress NPRA study review)

15 November 2002  Pre-PRAG Meeting

21 January 2003  DoD Personnel Accounting Conference
28 January 2003  Personnel Recovery Technology and Interoperability Forum (PRTIF)
5-6 February 2003  Interagency Workshop at IDA
13 February 2003  General Services Administration (Interagency Committee on Aviation Policy)
21 February 2003  Personnel Recovery Response Cell (PRRC)
4 March 2003  PRRC
14 March 2003  NSA (CSEL Review)
27 March 2003  OSD C3I (CSEL Program Review)
14-16 May 2003  NATO CSAR Conference, Naples, Italy
2-5 June 2003  Colombia: US Mission, MILGroup, etc.

**Other (training, exercises, etc.)**

9-11 April 2002  PR-101, Ft. Belvoir
23-28 June 2002  Joint Exercise Desert Rescue X, NAS Fallon NV
The National Personnel Recovery Architecture (NPRA) is a congressionally directed and funded study to define the current baseline personnel recovery (PR) architecture, shortfalls/gaps in the architecture, and then identify alternatives to improve the national architecture. The architecture is divided into three main PR components: direct and guide, plan and prepare, and mission execution. For each component of the architecture, the baseline, shortfalls, issue, and the interim solution set are defined. The interim report is based on the first year’s effort. The final report will be published around May 2004. Some of the preliminary findings are that the scope of PR should be expanded to “full spectrum” PR, which broadens who is covered by PR and also integrates PR methods rather than treat them as different. Also, a national level guidance is required in order to improve integration of interagency PR operations. Many other specific enhancements are suggested in the doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leader-development, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF) categories.