Progress and Opportunities: Supporting the CINCS’ Warfighting

Integrated Priority Requirements

by

Anthony L. Hardin
Lieutenant Colonel, USAF

A Research Report Submitted to Air University
In Partial Fulfillment of Air Force Fellows’ Requirements

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama
30 April 2002
**Title:** Progress and Opportunities: Supporting the CINCS. Warfighting Integrated Priority Requirements

**Abstract:**

The original document contains color images.
Disclaimer

The views expressed in this academic research paper are those of the author(s) and do not reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. government or the Department of Defense. In accordance with Air Force Instruction 51-303, it is not copyrighted, but is the property of the United States government.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table Content</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Contents</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disclaimer</td>
<td>ii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preface</td>
<td>iv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abstract</td>
<td>vii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Background</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CINC Staffs’ Effectiveness in the IPL Process</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vetting of the CINCs’ Warfighting IPLs Through the Services’ Programming Staffs</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assessing the Joint Staff and SECDEF Roles in the Warfighting IPL Process</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Analyzing OSD PA&amp;E’s Role as Leader of the IPL Process</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusion and Opportunities</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flowchart of Warfighting IPL Process</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sample Questionnaire</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronyms and Definitions</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bibliography</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Preface

From June 1999 until June 2001, I served as the Comptroller and then later as the Vice Director of Programs and Resources (J8) for both North American Aerospace Defense Command and United States Space Command. The positions included some very challenging tasks. Getting support for the commanders in chief’s (CINC) highest unfilled priority warfighting requirements, better known as the integrated priority list (IPL), ranked as the toughest resource task.

In February 2000, I attended the Combatant Commands Comptroller Conference. The attendees highlighted the difficulty of getting funding for the CINCs and support for the warfighting IPLs. The CINCs’ IPL process did not seem to work well and the ineffectiveness of the process piqued my interest. In October 2000, I requested a national defense fellowship as my senior service school preference and selected “Meeting CINCs’ requirements” as my research topic. Upon selection as a fellow, the Commander in Chief of U.S. Space Command (USCINCSPACE) agreed to fund my research topic.

The objective of my research project is to determine if the warfighting IPL process, implemented in the mid-1980s, represents progress in the CINCs’ ability to influence the Services’ program objective memoranda (POMs). More specifically, “are the CINCs’ IPL requirements prepared, validated, and addressed in an effective manner?” While the actual IPLs are classified documents, the research concentrated on the unclassified IPL “process” and its related programming portion of the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS).

I conducted numerous interviews or exchanged e-mails with individuals who have worked, or currently work on, the CINCs’ IPLs. Most notably, I obtained candid input from the former Deputy Secretary of Defense who developed the IPL process, a former CINC, a former
Director of OSD’s Programs Evaluation and Analysis (OSD PA&E), a former staffer (now serves as the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Manpower and Reserve Affairs) in the Office of the Secretary of Defense who implemented the process, former Assistant Secretaries of Financial Management and Comptroller for each military department, a former Deputy CINC, a current senior executive service member within OSD PA&E, a Joint Staff senior official, representatives from the Army, Navy, and Air Force programming staffs, and IPL representatives from the CINCs’ staffs.

The number of people who freely provided information but requested non-attribution initially caused me concern. However, I quickly realized the DOD community has a small number of people who work and understand the IPL. Understandably, the people who requested non-attribution did not want to run the risk of backlash outside their organizations. I do not believe their requests hurt the value of this paper. I realize any assessment of DOD’s resource allocation process, no matter how small a segment, involves some long-standing and powerful process participants – but debate is needed on the warfighting IPL topic. Consequently, I developed two goals for this research project: (1) complete a fair assessment of the IPL process and the roles of the significant participants; and, (2) identify opportunities for improvement.

I owe great thanks to all those who took time out of their busy schedules to provide constructive input. In addition, I appreciate CINCSPACE’s sponsorship. I could not have conducted the face-to-face interviews and document research without CINCSPACE support. It is important for the readers, however, to understand that CINCSPACE sponsorship does not translate to agreement with the conclusion and opportunities. Last, and most importantly, I want to thank my research advisors, Captain Dick Bedford, USN, and Mr. Jake Henry, a member of
the senior executive service. Their combined efforts, to include numerous reviews, e-mails, conversations, and debates kept me focused and productive.
Abstract

For all intents and purposes, the Services shut the CINCs out of the resource allocation process from 1958 until 1984. Since the ultimate goal of PPBS is to provide the CINCs with the best mix of forces, equipment and support attainable within fiscal constraints, the Deputy Secretary of Defense (DEPSECDEF) William Howard Taft IV developed the CINCs’ warfighting integrated priority lists (IPLs) process. He designed the IPL process with the purpose of addressing the CINCs’ highest unfilled warfighting requirements during the programming portion of PPBS, an action that pre-dated the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols legislation.

The purpose of this research project is to perform a follow-up of DEPSECDEF Taft’s initiatives to determine if the IPL process is indeed working as intended. The author conducted numerous interviews, analyzed questionnaire responses, and performed data analysis in reaching his conclusion and opportunities.

The author concluded that while there has been some progress, opportunities for improvement still remain. Unfortunately, many of the significant shortfalls that Taft addressed in the mid-1980s are unchanged. While it is impossible to satisfy all of the CINCs’ unfilled warfighting priority requirements, the paper identifies opportunities for the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Services, the Joint Staff, and the CINCs’ staffs on how to improve the IPL process.
Chapter 1

Introduction

I searched for a sensible way to break the gridlock of Service parochialism in order to give the CINC a voice in DOD’s resource allocation process.

- William H. Taft IV, former Deputy Secretary of Defense

E-mail reply to author, 2 November 2001

CINCs of the combatant commands are responsible for fighting and winning our nation’s wars within their geographic areas of responsibility or by providing functional support. Since the military department secretaries and the Service chiefs are responsible for organizing, training, and equipping our forces to fulfill current and future operational requirements, their support of the CINCs’ warfighting requirements is critical. It is the successful combination of the distinct roles of the Services and the CINCs that ensure the U.S. military can effectively fight and win the nation’s wars.

Beginning in 1958, CINCs had little influence on resources. Services dominated DOD’s resource allocation process, concentrating on “modernization and force structure.” Often the Services would fulfill their role at the expense of the CINCs’ “readiness and sustainability” warfighting priorities. As late as 1984, DOD limited CINCs’ involvement in PPBS to only two appearances before the Defense Resource Board (DRB) during the planning and programming phases.1 As a result, CINCs simply did not feel they had enough influence on the defense resource allocation process to carry out their warfighting roles. They felt the Services largely ignored the needs of the CINCs.2 Given the fact that the ultimate goal of PPBS is to provide the CINCs the best mix of forces, equipment and support attainable within fiscal constraints, many
viewed excluding or minimizing the CINC’s participation in DOD’s defense resource allocation process as a major disconnect that needed to be fixed.³

Increasingly frustrated with the disconnect on resource issues, DEPSECDEF William H. Taft IV stated “I searched for a sensible way to break the gridlock of Service parochialism in order to give the CINCs a voice in DOD’s resource allocation process.”⁴ In the summer of 1984, the DEPSECDEF asked the CINCs if they felt the Services heard them in the PPBS. The CINCs said “no.” By the time the CINCs commented on military service programs, the Services had all but put the POM to bed.⁵

In November of 1984, the DEPSECDEF issued a memorandum that made major changes to CINCs’ involvement in PPBS. He created the CINCs’ warfighting integrated priority lists (IPLs) and provided the following direction⁶:

1. CINCs will submit their highest unfilled integrated priority requirements to the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF), DEPSECDEF, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) each year;

2. CINCs will increase their interaction with their own Service components to ensure the POMs reflect the CINCs’ IPL requirements;

3. Services will prepare a separate annex to their POMs to address how they have met the CINCs’ IPL requirements or provide a rationale in the annex of the POMs when the Services cannot meet the requirements; and,

4. CINCs will be permitted to raise program review issues independently to the DRB and attend meetings on the issues they have raised.

Later in October 1985, the DEPSECDEF issued a follow-up memorandum concerning the involvement of the CINCs in the programming phase of PPBS. The memorandum relieved
the CINCs from the requirement to provide cost data and identify fiscal offsets for their IPLs requirements. The memorandum also directed the standardization of Services’ POM annexes to provide cogent and useful feedback to the CINCs on the status of their priorities.7

Although CINCs can influence DOD’s resource allocation process using products such as the Joint Military Readiness Report (JMRR), Congressional testimony, Chairman’s Program Assessment (CPA), Chairman’s Program Recommendation (CPR), and CINCs’ Quarterly Program Review, the IPLs are the CINCs’ principal programming documents.8

How much progress have the Services made in supporting CINCs’ warfighting integrated priority requirements since the DEPSECDEF’s initiatives in the mid-1980s? Again, the objective of this research project is to determine if the requirement for IPLs resulted in progress in the CINCs’ ability to influence the Services’ POMs. More specifically, are the CINCs’ IPL requirements prepared, validated, and addressed in an effective manner, and if not, why?

Notes


4 Taft E-mail, 2 November 2001 and Dominguez interview, 28 September 2001.

5 Lower: 16.
Notes

6 Ibid: 17.

7 Ibid: 18.

8 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, CJCSI 8501.01, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Commanders in Chief of the Combatant Commands, and Joint Staff Participation in the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System, 1 April 1999: Section B-6.
Chapter 2

Background

IPLs are programming documents.
- CJCSI 8501.01

In order to fully understand the complexities of the IPL process, one must assess the manpower limitations the DEPSECDEF imposed in the mid-1980s, the relationship of the IPLs to the programming phase of PPBS, the flow of the IPLs, and the key roles for which certain offices in DOD are responsible.

Manpower Limitations and Focus of the CINCstr

In October 1985, the DEPSECDEF decided that the CINCstr would not get any additional manpower to develop, analyze, and track their IPL requirements. This denial of manpower surely retarded the development of analytic staffs at the headquarters of the CINCstr. The DEPSECDEF made the decision because he did not want CINCstr becoming captive to vast data collection and data maintenance efforts. He wanted the focus of the CINCstr to remain on warfighting.¹ To keep the proper focus, the DEPSECDEF stressed the need for the IPLstr to contain only those key problem areas that warranted the attention of the most senior DOD decision-makers. The DEPSECDEF expected the Services to give serious support to the CINCstr’s warfighting requirements. He cautioned, however, against the IPLstr degenerating into “wish lists,” which would damage the credibility of the documents.²
Warfighting IPLs and the Relationship to the Programming Portion of PPBS

The DEPSECDEF designed the IPLs as formal communications from the CINCs to the SECDEF, CJCS, and the Services on the CINCs’ high priority operational requirements, shortfalls, and specific concerns. IPLs are programming documents. The operational requirements are addressed in the programming phase of the PPBS. The programming phase focuses on the development of programs, which reflect systematic analysis of missions and objectives to be achieved.

Abbreviated Flow of Warfighting IPLs

The flow of the IPLs is often confusing (See Appendix A), largely due to the complexity of the PPBS process. Several offices are responsible for vetting the IPLs. The process starts before formal instructions are issued. The CINCs decide their highest unfilled priority requirements and the Joint Staff has the continuous responsibility for validating the requirements. The Office of the Secretary of Defense, Program Analysis and Evaluation Directorate (OSD PA&E), is the office of primary responsibility for the IPLs.

Each year OSD PA&E issues instructions and the call for CINCs’ IPLs. In response, the CINCs gather their requirements through various mechanisms, including component input, for incorporation in the Services’ POMs. In addition, the CINCs submit their IPL requirements directly to the SECDEF, DEPSECDEF, CJCS, and Services. The Services are required to specifically address their support for the IPL requirements in their POMs or provide cogent explanations for not meeting the requirements.
After the Services’ POMs are published, the CINCs review and forward comments to the Joint Staff. The comments deal with the adequacy of the Services’ POMs and include an assessment of the risks remaining between the requirements of the defense guidance and the capabilities of the Services’ POMs. The comments are designed to promote changes to the Services’ POMs. If the Services do not adjust their POMs during the program review, the CINCs can appeal decisions to the SECDEF, through the DEPSECDEF, using issue papers or participate in DRB deliberations as appropriate. Ultimately, the SECDEF makes the final decisions. The SECDEF issues Program Decision Memoranda (PDMs) to the Services directing that they adjust their POMs. The SECDEF and CJCS are also required to submit risk assessments and consolidated IPLs, respectively, to Congress that address the Department’s unfilled warfighting requirements.

Key PA&E, Joint Staff, and SECDEF Roles in the IPL Process

OSD PA&E is the office of primary responsibility for the IPL process. The office was created to give the staff of the SECDEF expertise that offered perspectives based on analytical evaluation of alternatives unrelated to the preferences of the Services. The office began with twenty or so analysts and slowly expanded (and occasionally contracted) to its current number of about 150 individuals. OSD PA&E assumed responsibility at the inception of the IPL process in 1984.

The Joint Staff is another key player. The Force Structure, Resources, and Assessment Directorate (J8) is responsible for developing trade-off analyses, resource alternatives, and
resource-constrained force structures. The J8 is expected to function somewhat like a Joint Staff version of OSD PA&E.

The Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC), through the Joint Warfighting Capabilities Assessment (JWCA) teams, serves as the validator for warfighting requirements and programs, though does not rank-order them. In validating requirements, the JROC interacts with the CINCs and the JWCA teams. The JWCA teams perform detailed assessments of programmatic alternatives, tradeoffs, risks, bill-payers, and effectiveness. The most important work of the JWCA teams, however, involves completing independent assessments that provide military recommendations to improve joint warfighting capabilities. It is important to the whole of the process to conduct the assessments properly. Concentrating on programs that do not adequately meet the JROC-validated operational requirements of the joint force may result in shortages elsewhere and a resultant unacceptable level of risk. In a nutshell, the JROC and the JWCA teams, as critical parts of the Joint Staff, have the responsibility of analyzing and validating the Services and joint programs to assess the associated risk and ability of the U.S. military.

The CPA serves as an informal input to the PPBS process. Inputs to the CPA are compiled from a variety of sources, including the CINC's IPLs. In short, the CPA includes alternative program recommendations within projected resource levels. The CPA attempts to achieve greater conformity with the priorities established in strategic plans and priorities established for the requirements of the CINC. The CINC's IPLs, through the CPA, are common to the JWCA and PPBS processes. This connection is important to understand since the CPA provides the CJCS’s personal input to the PDM, the SECDEF’s final decision on programs.
The SECDEF and CJCS are responsible for assuming risks associated with unfilled CINCs’ warfighting requirements. Each year, the SECDEF transmits a report to Congress which defines the deficiencies in defense capabilities of the armed forces of the U.S., as a result of budget decisions made in the future-year defense program. The CJCS has a similar responsibility. The CJCS submits an “Annual Report” to the Committees on Armed Services and Committees on Appropriations of the Senate and House of Representatives. The report contains a consolidation of IPLs and the CJCS’s views concerning the lists.

Notes


2 Ibid: 104.

3 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, CJCSI 8501.01, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Commanders in Chief of the Combatant Commands, and Joint Staff Participation in the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System, 1 April 1999: Section GL-3.

4 Ibid.

5 M. Thomas Davis, Managing Defense After the Cold War, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, June 1997: 15.

6 Author modified from Joint Staff briefing on IPL process.

7 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, CJCSI 3100.01A, Joint Strategic Planning System, 1 September 1999: Section D-2.


9 Taft E-mail and CJCSI 3100.01A: Section D-7.
Notes

10 Taft E-mail and CJCSI 8501.01: Section B-3.

11 Taft E-Mail and PA&E Letter.

12 CJCSI 8501.01: Section B-3.


14 US Code: Title 10, Armed Forces, Sections 153 and 113.

15 Taft E-Mail and PA&E letter.


19 CJCSI 3100.01A: Section D-2.

20 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, CJCSI 3137.01A, The Joint Warfighting Capabilities Assessment Process, 22 January 1999: Reference 5a.

21 Ibid.

22 CJCSI 3137.01A: Section C-1.

23 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, CJCSI 5123.01A, Charter of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council, 8 March 2001: Section A-1.

24 Title 10, Section 113.

25 Ibid, Section 153.
Chapter 3

CINC Staffs’ Effectiveness in the IPL Process

IPLs are good negative tools but lousy positive tools. When CINCs look to have requirements funded, the Services want to know if the requirements are listed on the IPLs. If the requirements are not on the IPLs, the Services can use the IPLs as negative tools to say “no.” By the same token, if the requirements are on the IPLs, it helps but doesn’t result in automatic consideration by the Services.

- Vice Admiral (Retired) Herb Browne, Former DCINCSpace

Interview with author, 27 September 2001

Most unified and bi-national commands question the effectiveness of the warfighting integrated priority list (IPL) process. However, at the end of the day, CINCs are searching for positive responses to their IPLs. A complete understanding of the IPL process by the CINCs’ staffs is a key ingredient to success. To aid the author in assessing the performance of the CINCs’ staffs, those responsible for crafting the IPL responded to a questionnaire on the process (See Appendix B).

Views from CINCs’ Staffs

Although the IPL process has improved over the last three years, most CINCs’ IPL POCs believe the process does a poor job of influencing initial Service resource allocations in the POMs. They believe that while the process is an effective tool for “identifying CINCs’ requirements” (if consistent with the Joint Monthly Readiness Report, CINCs’ Quarterly Letter to the Secretary of Defense, etc), it is ineffective for “meeting” those requirements.
One CINC’s IPL point of contact (POC), with three years of prior experience working the IPLs from a Services’ perspective, believes the system is “predisposed so that the joint community will not adequately be funded in the POMs.” This CINC representative further stated in his response to the questionnaire: “It is a simple matter of probability. It is in the Services’ best interest not to give the CINCs funding in the FY03-07 POM. This particular CINC submitted 13 issues to the Services. The Services know CINCs can only submit five issues for program review. Therefore, it is to the Services’ advantage to simply ignore the CINC’s IPL requirements, when only two out of our original 13 received funding in the program review. Joint programs are largely unfunded in the Services’ POMs and the only way to get satisfaction is via a PDM or Program Budget Decision (PBD). As you can see, the system is biased against the CINCs.”

Most of the other CINCs’ IPL POCs had similar views. In short, CINCs’ IPL POCs feel the Services have no incentive to address CINCs’ warfighting requirements within the current process.

How the IPL is viewed by the Services can inhibit the effectiveness of the IPL process. A recently retired Deputy CINC viewed the IPLs as “good negative tools but lousy positive tools.” He went on to state: ‘When CINCs look to have requirements funded, the Services want to know if the requirements are listed on the IPLs. If the requirements are not on the IPLs, the Services can use the IPLs as negative tools to say “no.” By the same token, if the requirements are on the IPLs, it helps but doesn’t result in automatic consideration by the Services.’

**Staffs’ Knowledge of the Warfighting IPL Process and Its Purpose**

Although five of the CINCs’ IPL POCs who responded to the questionnaire have a workable understanding of the IPL process and how it fits within the programming portion of PPBS, at least two others do not. For example, one POC stated: “The IPL doesn’t attempt to
meet the CINC’s requirements. It is only a letter to the Secretary of Defense on our CINC’s
estimate of current and future needs requiring attention… What it does do is provide the Services
a laundry list of things they need to consider in their planning process regarding money,
manpower, and operations.”9 The POC had neither an understanding of the IPL as a
programming document nor its connection to PPBS. Confirming this lack of understanding, the
requirements of this particular CINC’s added up to a laundry list mentality with little eye
towards how to use the IPL to impact PPBS.

**Involving Components in Developing the IPLs**

CINCs are required to receive feedback on the status of warfighting priorities from the
components or responsible commands throughout the POM development process. It follows that
CINCs will then discuss with the components or Services the degree to which the developing
POMs are meeting the CINCs’ warfighting requirements.10 Though each CINC handles
cOMPONENT involvement differently, the questionnaire results showed that components play a
critical role in developing the CINCs’ IPLs. For example, the components do not just
respond to call letters, but participate in working groups and regular senior-level meetings that
help guide the CINCs.11

Although the components participated in developing the IPLs, the author had difficulty
determining the degree to which the CINCs’ staffs advocate CINCs’ IPL requirements through
the components and the components through their Services’ chains. IPLs are highly focused
supplements to – not substitutes for – a CINC’s normal communication of programming
requirements to the Services (through assigned components or programming support activities).
Getting the components on board to support joint requirements can at times be a difficult venture. On the joint side of the DOD are the Service component commands, which report to the CINCs. However, in reality, the CINCs have only limited control over Service components in peacetime.

In peacetime, the components are, first and foremost, Service commands. After all, their respective Services provide the people, pay, promotion, weapon systems, tactics, and doctrine. Thus, the Services are in a far more powerful and influential position than CINCs. For example, General David Jones told the House Armed Services Committee that as commander of U.S. Air Forces Europe he paid far more attention to the chain of command leading to Headquarters Air Force than to the one leading to the warfighting U.S. European Command (EUCOM).

Warfighting IPL Guidance

Currently, there is no IPL regulation that standardizes the process across the Services and the CINCs. One long-time CINC’s IPL POC stated: “There is no permanent detailed guidance/information on the IPL process. OSD PA&E has largely used temporary employees to serve as the IPL focal point. Three years ago the CINCs’ POCs got together in three separate meetings in Washington, MacDill AFB, and JFCOM [U.S. Joint Forces Command] . . . Since then, most of the CINCs’ POCs have transferred out and have been replaced by other active duty personnel unfamiliar with the process. OSD PA&E might want to consider a permanent person to handle this important process.”
Services’ Vetting of the Warfighting IPL and POM Explanations

Those responsible for preparing the IPL believe the Services’ vetting and support of IPLs are simply attempts to determine how well previously identified program decisions support the needs of the CINC's. The Services provided insufficient or incomplete explanations (in some cases no explanation at all) in the POM annex. For example, the Army used the following canned response for unfilled CINC's IPL requirements: “The Army seeks the rightful balance of all validated requirements throughout the Army based on Department of Defense (DOD) and Army Leadership strategies and priorities. CINC prioritized (and unconstrained) issues can only be addressed within the Army Total Obligation Authority (TOA) framework after validation as Army requirements. Army resources can only be programmed against validated, prioritized Army requirements. The Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations (DCSOPS) prioritizes all Army requirements and resources.” While the canned phrase makes a foggy attempt to explain the Army’s methodology, it does not provide a specific reason as to why the Army funded, partially funded, or did not fund a program.

The Services have not developed a standardized CINC's annex to the POMs, in accordance with the 1985 DEPSECDEF guidance. Overall, there is an apparent inability by the Services to divorce themselves from their own interests in responding to CINC's warfighting requirements. The needs of the CINC's often take a distant second place to core Services' programs, a lingering problem also highlighted over 30 years ago in the 1970 Report of the President's Blue Ribbon Defense Panel.

Analytic Capabilities of the CINC's

Of the ten CINC's (including the bi-national North American Aerospace Defense Command), two submitted IPLs (FY03-07) to the Services that contained no cost data and two
submitted IPLs with incomplete cost data.\textsuperscript{19} Current CJCS guidance requires CINCs to “identify suggested programs and cost estimates within reasonable and realistic fiscal constraints, needed to solve the problem areas.”\textsuperscript{20} Contrary to this guidance is the 1985 DEPSECDEF memorandum (not rescinded) that relieved CINCs of this requirement.\textsuperscript{21} Consequently, some CINCs’ staffs believe the requirement to develop cost data exists, while others do not believe there is any such requirement. When CINCs’ warfighting requirements are not resource-constrained or quantified the Services can pick and choose which items to buy. In the end, the requirements they choose reflect Services’ priorities rather than CINCs’ warfighting priorities.

CINCs’ staffs (except for U.S Special Operations Command and U.S. Transportation Command) generally don’t have the expertise and manpower to perform the relevant cost functions required by the Services. At a 1999 conference of senior-level joint and Services’ personnel, the representatives concluded that CINCs are simply not structured to support their requirements. The participants pointed to the near-term outlook (one to two years) of the CINCs as an inhibiting factor that restricts thinking in-line with the length of the POM.\textsuperscript{22} In addition, the people staffed to cover the various CINCs’ warfighting requirements are not always the same. It is also beneficial that the same individuals who prepare the CINCs’ IPLs also prepare the POM input. For example, at one CINC’s headquarters no one reviewed the recent Services’ POMs to analyze how the Services addressed the CINC’s IPL requirements, as both directorates involved (one prepared the IPL and one prepared the POM input) thought the other had accomplished the task.\textsuperscript{23}

Another view is that CINCs should not worry about resource constraints and cost data. In the 1985 memorandum, the DEPSECDEF directed the CINCs to focus on the warfighting requirements, not costing requirements. The DEPSECDEF believed that CINCs should not tailor
their threat-driven requirements to satisfy someone’s notion of fiscal reality. As a result, the DEPSECDEF intentionally never staffed the CINCs (except for U.S. Special Operations Command and U.S. Transportation Command) to perform cost functions. Over time, in response to Services’ demands, the CINCs have taken resources “out of hide” and grown a limited analytic ability in an attempt to gain greater support for their warfighting requirements.

Notes

1 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, CJCSI 8501.01, *Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Commanders in Chief of the Combatant Commands, and Joint Staff Participation in the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System*, 1 April 1999: Reference 3.

2 Author-developed the Questionnaire. U.S. Pacific Command and U.S. Central Command IPL points of contact did not respond to the questionnaire portion of this paper.

3 Author’s analysis of CINC IPL POCs Questionnaires.

4 Questionnaire Code 409, CINC IPL point of contact response (name of respondent withheld) to author’s e-mail questionnaire, 2 January 2002.

5 Ibid.


7 Ibid.

8 Author’s analysis of CINC IPL POCs Questionnaires.

9 Questionnaire Code 93, CINC IPL point of contact response (name of respondent withheld) to author’s e-mail questionnaire, 14 December 2001.

10 CJCSI 8501.01: Section A-3.

11 Author’s analysis of CINC IPL POCs Questionnaires.

Notes


14 Questionnaire Code 7, CINC IPL point of contact response (name of respondent withheld) to author’s e-mail questionnaire, 28 November 2001.

15 Author’s analysis of CINC IPL POCs Questionnaires.

16 Questionnaire Code 54, CINC IPL point of contact response (name of respondent withheld) to author’s e-mail questionnaire, 14 November 2001.

17 Author’s analysis of CINC IPL POCs questionnaires and interviews with Headquarters Army, Navy, and Air Force IPL POCs.


19 Authors review of FY 03 to 07 IPL submissions.

20 CJCSI 8501.01: Section A-3.


23 Questionnaire Code 110, CINC IPL point of contact response (name of respondent withheld) to author’s e-mail questionnaire, 14 December 2001.

Chapter 4

Vetting of the CINCs’ Warfighting IPLs Through the Services’ Programming Staffs

Generally, the system is effective. If the requirements were defensible and properly vetted, the CINCs were mostly successful.

- Robert F. Hale former Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Financial Management and Comptroller

Interview with author, 25 September 2001

The Services have the important tasks of meeting their core organizing, training, and equipping missions, while satisfying the warfighting requirements of the CINCs. The fiscal realities of supporting the CINCs often force the Services to make some very difficult decisions.

Views of the Assistant Secretaries of Financial Management

The author decided to interview the former Assistant Secretaries (Financial Management and Comptroller) prior to meeting with the Services’ programmers. Since the unmet CINCs’ IPL requirements can impact budgets in the current and future fiscal years, the assistant secretaries are briefed on the Services’ POMs and the degree to which the POMs satisfy CINCs’ warfighting integrated priority list (IPL) requirements. The former Army, Navy, and Air Force Assistant Secretaries all believe the IPL requirements receive the highest possible consideration and the IPL process serves the CINCs well.

The former Assistant Secretary of the Army feels the IPL process works well. “The IPL process was taken very seriously by the Army Staff. It received a great deal of attention. In
spite of our limited resources, I believe we were able to meet the CINC’s most pressing needs. In fact, I can only remember one occasion during my eight-year tenure that I heard from a CINC concerning an IPL requirement. The CINC’s competed well within the system.”

The former Assistant Secretary of the Navy believes the IPL process is unfair to the Services and goes overboard trying to satisfy the CINC’s. “I believe the IPL process is unfair to the Services and adds no value. It is another leftover from the Cold War, and just as the overall CINC organizational structure should be changed, the IPL process should be deleted or severely restructured.”

As a final example, the former Assistant Secretary of the Air Force believes that, “Generally, the system is effective. If the requirements were defensible and properly vetted, the CINC’s were mostly successful. We used a stoplight chart to determine how well we met CINC’s requirements. We were in the green the majority of the time. If we met 70-75 percent of the CINC’s requirements, we considered the CINC’s requirements as being met overall. The CINC’s fared much better than the majority of Air Force Bases.”

After interviewing the assistant secretaries, the author met with the Services’ programmers responsible for vetting the CINC’s IPLs. Based on what the programmers briefed to the assistant secretaries, the author understands how they reached their conclusions. However, a more in-depth review in the programming offices revealed several shortcomings in how the CINC’s IPLs are addressed, the level of support received, and the overall measures of effectiveness.
Addressing CINCs’ Warfighting IPL Requirements

The Services need to work on the IPL evaluation process and reporting procedures. In addition, there is no standardization of reporting procedures by the Services to address CINCs’ IPLs and no cross-flow of information exists between the Services’ IPL POCs.4

Obviously, training is an issue. Although the Navy and Air Force’s IPL POCs are well-qualified individuals, their respective Services placed them in these positions without the benefit of any real training on the IPL process.5 For example, the Navy’s POC was assigned in April 2001 without any training. However, she had made excellent progress by the time of the October 2001 interview. She worked on integrating the IPL requirements into a database for review and tracking. In addition, the POC worked to establish some criteria for fine-tuning the category meanings on the Navy’s IPL scorecard. At the time of the interview, the scorecard would state a requirement has been partially met when the Navy applied a minimum amount of funding. Unfortunately, the minimum amount applied against most requirements would have very little impact.6

The reporting requirements in the Services’ POM annexes lacked standardization and did not provide the CINCs with detailed answers or cogent explanations. The Services’ support for the CINCs’ annex were largely attempts at determining how well previously identified program decisions supported the warfighting requirements of the CINCs. According to Services’ representatives, it is extremely difficult to support requirements that are consistently late.7

The Army, Navy, and Air Force POCs believed the IPLs arrived too late in the POM building process to have any real impact. With the exception of a handful of IPL requirements, the Services’ POCs see the CINCs’ IPL requirements for the first time when they receive the IPLs at the end of the POM process.8 However, the current schedule requires IPL submission
early in the development of the following fiscal years resource process, i.e. FY 04-09 IPLs were submitted in November 2001 and the FY 03-07 IPLs were submitted in September 2000, eight months prior to the submission of the FY 03-07 POM. Although the Services receive the CINC’s warfighting requirements before the start of the following POM process, real attention to the requirements seems to be left until the Services’ POCs are tasked to write the IPL annex to the POM. At this point in the process, it is indeed too late for serious resource consideration.

Getting the IPLs to the Services anywhere in the process does not seem to strengthen support for the requirements. RAND also noted this fact during a 2001 review of theater engagement requirements. RAND determined that IPLs are weak links to formal decision-making processes and only considered after the fact. Although the Services review and give consideration to the IPLs, the IPLs are generally considered exceptions after most of the Services’ programs have already been built.9

The lack of cost data, validation, and Joint Staff prioritization of CINC’s, warfighting requirements also created concerns for the Services’ POCs. They felt that definitive cost data with proper recognition of resource constraints would improve the vetting of these requirements. In addition, the POCs could not tell where the requirements fit into the overall warfighting picture, since the Joint Staff apparently does not validate or prioritize the requirements contained in the IPLs.10 It is interesting to note that neither the OSD PA&E nor the Joint Staff reviews the IPLs from the standpoint of highlighting total warfighting capability.11 Without such a review when competing CINC’s requirements have been evaluated and prioritized, it is difficult for the Services’ POCs to focus attention on the most urgent programming needs.

Services’ POCs had doubts as to whether the IPLs supported the CINC’s’ most pressing warfighting requirements. Many times requirements lacked consistency and, at times, clarity. In
reality, few ground rules exist for constructing IPLs. Therefore, the requirements tend to vary in scope, complexity, and merit. The fact that some CINC’s IPLs contain multiple requirements under the veil of one item needlessly decreases the clarity. The Services’ IPL POCs also have great difficulty matching requirements to existing service-supported programs.12

Services’ IPL POCs also believe that CINC’s staffs need to improve their knowledge of the requirements process. CINC’s staffs lack knowledge about the impact of equipment upgrades, which will be provided to them by the Services between the present and the out-years for which resource requirements are being determined. CINC’s staffs can identify the failings of the equipment they have, but have little to no contact with Service component acquisition developers. Therefore, they are not cognizant of replacement or experimental system developments.13

**Level of Support and Measures of Effectiveness**

In spite of the Army’s use of canned remarks in the POM annex, the level of attention given to CINC’s IPLs appears to be much greater in the Army than in the Air Force and Navy. The Army has devoted the requisite time, effort, and manpower to support its internal evaluation process. For example, within two weeks of receiving the IPLs, the program evaluation groups meet to analyze the IPLs. The program evaluation groups then prepare a CINC’s IPL Book, which contains an analysis of each of the IPL submissions. A Major Command Glossaries Book is submitted by each CINC Army Component Command that identifies the programs that support the CINC’s IPLs. Finally, the Major Command Commander’s Narrative and Assessment Book
identifies the Commanders’ concerns and unfunded requirements. As a result of this process, the Army addresses the concerns and unfunded requirements issue by issue.\textsuperscript{14}

Measuring true effectiveness has proven elusive for the Services. The Army, Navy, and Air Force found it difficult to assess exactly what percent of CINCs’ requirements received support in the POM because, according to the POCs, some CINCs’ IPL requirements are difficult to understand and quantify.\textsuperscript{15} Consequently, the Services either identify existing programs they believe satisfy the requirements or apply minimum funding to the requirements without truly assessing the impact.

Although the Army’s internal vetting process is better than the Air Force’s and Navy’s, it is still predisposed to determining how well previously identified Army program decisions support the needs of the CINCs and, generally, does not support any new requirements identified by the CINCs. For example, of the 116 CINCs’ IPL requirements submitted for FY 03-07, the Army accepted responsibility for 58 of the items. Of the 58, six of the items contained requirements that money simply could not fix. The Army considered 52 of the items as valid requirements and, according to the Army IPL POC, the Army left only 3 requirements unresourced.\textsuperscript{16} That is, the Army either identified existing programs or applied some partial funding to 49 of the CINCs’ IPL requirements. On the surface, the Army at least partially satisfied greater than 80 percent of the requirements. However, no assessment existed to determine if the Army actions satisfied the requirements to any degree, and the Army did not provide clear explanations in the POM annex.

The Navy’s IPL POC could not determine the overall level of support for the IPLs but, as previously stated, she is currently working on a process to better measure the Navy’s support of the CINCs’ IPLs.\textsuperscript{17}
The Air Force determined that 66 percent of the IPL requirements received some funding and less than 33 percent of the requirements received no funding. In addition, the Air Force determined (independent of the CINC’s staffs) that based on the listed IPL requirements, the CINC has some capability to meet 75 percent (indicated as green on stoplight chart) of the requirements. The other 25 percent (yellow or red on stoplight chart) involve some risks, but the CINC can carry out their missions. However, just as in the Army, no assessment existed to determine if either existing Air Force programs or partial funding satisfied the requirements to any degree, and the Air Force did not provide clear explanations in the POM annex.

In general, the CINC’s IPLs contain “capabilities” instead of “platforms.” Consequently, a close working relationship between the Services and the CINC is crucial to decreasing the areas of vagueness. Currently, the Services unilaterally identify programs they believe meet the needed capabilities without obtaining validation or agreement from the CINC’s staffs. The CINC’s staffs are often in disagreement. When the Services routinely label the CINC’s warfighting requirements as “vague,” it becomes far too easy for the Services to consider the CINC’s warfighting requirements as “satisfied” by either identifying existing programs or applying minimum funding support, even when little to no impact on the requirements exists. Consequently, the Services’ “green light” charts portray an inaccurate assessment of the real status of the CINC’s IPLs capability shortfalls.

Notes


2 Charles P. Nemfakos, former Assistant Secretary (Senior Civilian) of the Navy for Financial Management and Comptroller (Retired in August 2001), interview with author, Manassas, Virginia, 12 October 2001.
Notes


4 Interview Code 101, Air Force’s CINC IPL point of contact (name withheld), interview with author, Pentagon, 24 October 2001, Interview Code 1612, Navy’s CINC IPL point of contact (name withheld), interview with author, Crystal City, Virginia, 24 October 2001, Interview Code 609, Army’s CINC IPL point of contact (name withheld), interview with author, Pentagon, 26 October 2001.

5 Interviews Codes 101 and 1612.


7 Interview Codes 101, 1612, and 609.

8 Ibid.


10 Interview with the service programmers.


12 Interview Codes 101, 1612, and 609.

13 Ibid.

14 Interview Code 609 and Interpreting What the CINCs/Commands are Saying, written briefing, Army Programming Staff briefing, Pentagon, 26 October 2001.

15 Interview Codes 101 and 1612.

16 Interview Code 609 and Interpreting What the CINCs/Commands are Saying.

17 Interview Code 1612 and Navy IPL Process.

18 Interview Code 101.
Chapter 5

Assessing the Joint Staff and SECDEF Roles in the Warfighting IPL Process

We never felt we received adequate support for our IPL requirements. Unfortunately, it may take a catastrophe or new legislation before CINCs get any direct input into DOD’s resource allocation process.

- General (Retired) Anthony C. Zinni, USMC, former CINCCENT

Interview with author, 7 March 2002

Is the Warfighting IPL Effective?

According to a Joint Staff official, the CINCs’ IPLs are making a difference. In an interview, that same official who is responsible for reviewing and consolidating the CINCs’ IPLs, said: “The IPL is not effective in and of itself; however, it can be effective if it is consistent with other CINC products. If the tie-ins reflect a consistent message, the IPL becomes a more potent product. In a resource-constrained environment, the CINCs compete well. It is easy to look at all CINCs’ requirements and go down the road that they do not all get met; however, when balanced against all DOD requirements they are competitive.”

Joint Staff View on Improving the CINCs’ Warfighting IPLs

In order to improve the IPL process, this particular Joint Staff representative believes better guidance is one of the keys. The current guidance is simply insufficient. The Joint Staff representative stated that “OSD guidance is not specific enough (how many items, long-term or short-term, what types of items, etc). There is also some question as to the emphasis OSD puts on the IPL. For example, the last two POCs for the IPL worked it three months (summer hire)
and one year. The IPL doesn’t appear to rate high on OSD’s food chain.” The CINC’s IPL POCs had the same concerns.

The Joint Staff representative also believes the focus of the IPLs needs to improve. “The IPL lacks focus. Since CINC’s are in place for a short time, they tend to concentrate on short-term items (out to two years) instead of long-term Future Year Defense Plan issues as the IPL was designed.”

Validation of the IPLs is also an issue. The same Joint Staff representative believes improvements are needed in validating CINC’s IPL requirements. “I’m not sure if anyone truly does a qualitative cut besides OSD PA&E. If the CINC has vetted the IPL requirements within his unified command and put his ink on the list, the list is accepted by the Joint Staff, it is scrubbed by the JWCA teams in areas that they are working. No detailed analysis is done on each topic by the Joint Staff. OSD PA&E is staffed to do that.” In short, the Joint Staff believes OSD PA&E has the sole responsibility for validating CINC’s IPL requirements.

**Joint Staff and SECDEF Factors Which Limit CINC’s’ Warfighting IPLs Effectiveness**

When evaluating levels of support, the vagueness of the definition of joint requirements contributes to lack of support by the Services. It appears the Joint Staff has no clear-cut definition of a joint requirement. Over the last three years, senior officials proposed a number of interpretations. The simplistic approach may be that the generally accepted definition of a joint requirement is simply “what a CINC needs.” This approach may be too simplistic as joint
requirements should not be considered in terms of actual forces (since the Services determine their own force structure requirements), but rather as the joint glue that brings assets together.\textsuperscript{5}

Validating and integrating IPL requirements have also surfaced as big concerns. In general, both the CINCs’ staffs and JWCA teams lack analytic capability. Whereas the Services have their own offices for analyses, Joint Staff capabilities are less developed and often lack institutional continuity, leaving them ill equipped to substantiate or negate data provided by the Services.\textsuperscript{6}

The CINCs need more help with the analytic process. It might be desirable to task Joint Staff (J8) to develop an office that provides analytic services to the CINCs. By keeping it all in one place, it may help to reduce the size of the process. Further, a Joint Staff with a formidable analytic capability could then work with the Services to better validate their assertions. It seems fair that if the CINCs are to be involved in generating requirements, they need to have the capability to fulfill that responsibility.\textsuperscript{7}

In examining the CINCs’ IPLs, the Joint Staff may be in the best position to perform comparative analysis. Because of the unwillingness of the JWCA s to perform comparative system analyses, the JROC has established a poor record in satisfying the CJCS responsibility for producing “alternative” program and budget recommendations “within projected resource levels.” The CINCs simply do not know how their warfighting requirements compare with the requirements of other CINCs. For example, after hearing a lengthy JROC briefing on the assessments performed by the JWCA s, one CINC complained it was difficult to “vote for” the capability being advocated without also knowing what he was “voting against”. No comparative analysis existed.\textsuperscript{8} Perhaps adding a CINC as a voting member of the JROC would assist in comparative analysis and the vetting of the IPL process.\textsuperscript{9} As another example, a former CINC
stated: “During my tenure as CINC, we [the CINCs] got together once, I believe in 1998, to
determine how to get greater support for our requirements. The Service chiefs, however,
objected so vigorously at our having a meeting without them that we never met among ourselves
again.”

The programming function has also become increasingly less integrated among the
Services, and they have made only minimal progress when trying to integrate CINCs’
requirements into their programs. One senior Service official admitted that the current program
development and review process does not result in significantly greater program integration
beyond that which existed when the Services submitted their POMs. As Admiral Bill Owens,
former Director of the Navy’s Force Structure and Resource Assessment Directorate (N8) and
the former Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, once commented: “When I was building
the Navy program I had no idea what the Army or Air Force were doing or why they were doing
it.”

Because there is no comparative analysis of requirements, the same is generally true in
vetting the CINCs’ IPLs. In short, since the OSD and Joint Staffs do not have an organization or
process for integrating the Services’ programs, any integration that occurs is largely the result of
chance.

It is clear that the comparative analysis role is difficult for the Joint Staff and for OSD.
While the Services enjoy great support and have a dedicated following, the Joint Staff and OSD
are viewed as bureaucracies prone to making changes as personnel and personalities change.
These trends, which have accelerated since the end of the Cold War, have resulted in a process
that is not well integrated, leaving programs less and less connected to a joint military strategy
that is supported by justifiable requirements in response to a future threat.
Another problem is that the Joint Staff is forced to move slowly when recommending any changes to Services’ programs. The Services fear that if the Joint Staff becomes overly involved in DOD’s resource allocation process they will become too powerful (German General Staff argument). General Carl Mundy, former Commandant of the Marine Corps, believed the Services should remain vigilant to ensure the Joint Staff does not intervene in DOD’s resource allocation process, hamstringing the Services in their lawful role of building forces. In fact, the Services’ perceptions of the CINC’s encroachment on their Title 10 responsibilities to organize, train, and equip (as interpreted by the Services) remains a chief concern and, in the final analysis, is a roadblock to real progress. DEFSECDEF Taft’s initiatives and the follow-on Goldwater-Nichols legislation have done little to change the Services’ perceptions. As one former CINC stated: “We never felt we received adequate support for our IPL requirements. Unfortunately, it may take a catastrophe or new legislation before CINCs get any direct input into DOD’s resource allocation process.”

The Joint Staff, however, through the CJCS, has an opportunity to ensure the Services integrate the CINCs’ warfighting requirements into the Services’ POMs. The CJCS is responsible for communicating the requirements of the CINCs to other elements of the Department of Defense including the SECDEF via the CPR and the CPA. The CPR should precede the writing of the Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) in order to influence Services’ programming decisions. However the CPR is completed concurrently with the DPG and therefore misses any opportunity to influence the Services’ programming initiatives. Developed after the completion of the POM and program review, the CPA usually mirrors POM issues already identified by the Services and subsequently becomes minimally effective in guiding SECDEF responses to CINCs’ shortfalls. Ideally, the CPA should be resolved before the overall
defense program review. Producing an assessment of the program after the program review is all but completed is a missed opportunity to reshape the Services’ programs.

One of the last opportunities the CINCs have in getting their warfighting requirements satisfied is in the SECDEF’s PDM. The SECDEF publishes changes to the Services’ POMs with the PDM. However, despite these adjustments, well over 90 percent of what the Services request remains intact. The Services have tremendous power and influence. They have their own processes and organizations for countering attempts to alter their POMs. In addition, the Services have considerable bureaucratic leverage as they not only have the power of the first draft, but also are the recipients of the funds once they are actually appropriated by Congress.

Notes

1 Interview Code 13, Joint Staff’s CINC IPL point of contact (name withheld), interview with author, Pentagon, 24 September 2001.

2 Ibid.

3 Ibid.

4 Ibid.


6 Ibid: 35.

7 Ibid.


10 Anthony C. Zinni, General (Retired), USMC, former USCINCCENT and currently U.S. Envoy to the Middle East, interview with author, Columbus, Ohio, 7 March 2002.
Notes


14 Zinni interview with author, 7 March 2002.

15 US Code: Title 10, Armed Forces, Section 163.

16 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, CJCSI 8501.01, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Commanders in Chief of the Combatant Commands, and Joint Staff Participation in the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System, 1 April 1999: Section B-4.

Chapter 6

Analyzing OSD PA&E’s Role as Leader of the IPL Process

For the most part CINCs get what they need. The CINCs could improve the process by increasing their efforts with the Services during the POM building process. By working the requirements early in the process (during the POM), some of the low hanging fruit requirements could be satisfied. That way only the most difficult issues are sent to the SECDEF for resolution. Additional training for CINCs’ staffs in this area could prove beneficial. In addition, the CINCs would benefit from submitting more concrete requirements i.e., specific, quantify, impact.

- Robert R. Soule, former Director, Program Analysis and Evaluation, Office of the Secretary of Defense

Interview with author, 25 September 2001

Former Director of OSD PA&E’s Assessment of the Warfighting IPL Process

OSD PA&E serves as the office of primary responsibility for the CINCs’ IPL process.¹ The former director provided an assessment of the process from his perspective. Since OSD PA&E is the linchpin for the process, a former director’s responses are worth quoting:

Does the CINCs’ warfighting IPL process work the way that it should?

Overall, the system gets a “B.” The CINCs’ requirements are always considered. At times, the courses of action the CINCs prefer are not always doable. In such cases, alternative courses of action are elected. The system works relatively well because of the efforts of the Joint Staff, PA&E, and the OSD Comptroller.²
Do you view the process as an effective tool for meeting CINCs’ warfighting requirements?

For the most part CINCs get what they need. The CINCs could improve the process by increasing their efforts with the Services during the POM building process. By working the requirements early in the process (during the POM), some of the low hanging fruit requirements could be satisfied. That way only the most difficult issues are sent to the SECDEF for resolution. Additional training for CINCs’ staffs in this area could prove beneficial. In addition, the CINCs would benefit from submitting more concrete requirements i.e., specific, quantify, impact. If the requirements are not specific, it’s easy for the Services to say the item is being met. Lastly, the CINCs need to apply pressure for their most pressing requirements. Developing more specific IPL guidance could also improve the process as well as limiting the number of IPL items.³

Do you believe CINCs’ warfighting IPL requirements are given the proper attention during the program objective memorandum (POM) process?

In a resource-constrained environment, the Services are doing what they can and the CINCs are receiving fair treatment. Getting the CINCs’ requirements to the Services early in the process (before the POM build) would improve the process. In addition, early and on-going dialog with the Services will help keep the CINCs’ requirements on the Services’ radarscope. Working the items in the POM instead of waiting until the Issue Paper process could prove
beneficial to the CINCs. Additional training for CINCs’ staffs in this area could prove beneficial.⁴

How would you respond to the widely held view that the Services only support CINCs’ warfighting IPL requirements when the requirements are beneficial to the Services?

The Services and CINCs have “more mission than money” and the decisions are tough. If the IPL items are too broad and the Services can directly and indirectly show how the requirements are met, then the Services will seize such an opportunity. Early and on-going dialog between the Services and the CINCs would help diminish such an impression.⁵

Are CINCs including only their highest unfilled warfighting priority requirements on the lists?

CINCs make the call; however, the CINCs need to ensure they know what they are signing out. Some of the items don’t always seem concrete or defensible.⁶

Do you view the Joint Requirements Oversight Council/Joint Warfighting Capabilities Assessment process as an effective avenue for validating CINCs’ warfighting IPL requirements?

I don't believe there needs to be a requirement for vetting requirements through the JROC/JWCA. CINCs have defaulted to the notion that the JROC/JWCA process is the process for getting their requirements satisfied. If the CINCs have adequately defined and quantified
their requirements, getting the requirements into the Services’ POM process as early as possible is the way ahead – not waiting for the requirements to get vetted through the JROC/JWCA process. In addition, the JROC/JWCA tend to take a longer term view (Myers’ initiative). The CINC’s shorter-term view (what’s around the corner) provides a good counter balance for the Services and JROC/JWCA longer-term views. Hence, deleting any requirement providing the CINC to vet their requirements through the JROC/JWCA. The JROC/CPA was a pretty effective way to deal with major CINC issues. It indeed had a major impact on the resources decision process. The key to effectiveness was a very close working relationship between J8 and PA&E/Comptroller. Through those discussions, the JROC recommendations had a major impact on the decision process. The informal working relationship between J8 and PA&E was critical in getting the issues worked in a timely way, despite the fact that the signed CPA didn’t come in until after the PDM decisions were made in the summer program review.  

Shortfalls of OSD PA&E’s in the CINC’s Warfighting IPL Leadership Role

Joint Staff, CINC, and Services’ IPL POCs all said that OSD PA&E does not provide the continuity, guidance, oversight, and validation of requirements it should as the leader of the IPL process.

OSD PA&E’s recent history of assigning temporary personnel with no prior experience to work the warfighting CINC’s IPL process has created a leadership void, as the CINC’s IPL POCs believe no one is truly running or providing oversight for the process.  

Over 17 years have passed (1984) since the development of the CINC’s IPL process and OSD PA&E has still not issued any regulatory guidance to clarify the roles for the CINCs,
Services, Joint Staff, defense agencies, and OSD. Once established, such regulatory guidance could serve to explain and clarify the linkage between military strategy and service programs. As the military department secretaries advocated in the late 1980s, such guidance would define what constitutes a warfighting priority requirement and provide justification based upon both national military strategy and/or regional plans, and provide guidelines for rank-ordering the priorities.9

Last, one of the original purposes of establishing OSD PA&E was to ensure an independent analysis of programs and requirements. OSD PA&E collects the IPLs from the CINCs but does not analyze the requirements to ensure validity, interoperability, integration, and/or planned (unplanned) redundancy.

OSD PA&E personnel attribute their shortfalls in leadership to a lack of personnel.10 However, the office has experienced steady growth over the last 35 years from its initial staffing of 25 personnel to 150 people, excluding contractors.11 The real issue may be how important is the IPL process to the Department of Defense.

Notes


3 Ibid.
Notes

4 Ibid.

5 Ibid.

6 Ibid.

7 Ibid.

8 Author’s analysis of CINC IPL POCs Questionnaires.


Chapter 7

Conclusion and Opportunities

The ultimate objective of PPBS is to provide the CINC's the best mix of forces, equipment and support attainable within fiscal constraints.

- DODD 7045.14

Conclusion

Support for the CINC's IPL requirements is a mixture of progress and opportunities. Clearly, the CINC's IPL requirements have influenced some key defense programs. However, opportunities still remain for the CINC's to effectively prepare and vet the requirements, the Joint Staff to validate and prioritize the requirements, and the Services to seriously address the requirements.

The Services continue to dominate key resource decisions. Many of the significant shortfalls identified by DEPSECDEF Taft in the mid-1980s still exist today. CINC's, who are not staffed with large resource offices, continue to experience distinct disadvantages when trying to secure operational requirements through PPBS.

Although the Services review and give consideration to the IPLs, the requirements are generally considered as exceptions after most of the Services’ programs have been built and fully funded. As highlighted in the text of this paper, OSD PA&E, the CINC's staffs, the Services, and the Joint Staff all share varying degrees of responsibility for the slow progress.

Some would argue that the slow rate of progress is designed to avoid friction between the Services and the CINC's. Such placation often comes at the expense of the CINC's warfighting
perspectives. Undoubtedly, too much friction is counterproductive. However, a healthy amount of dialog between the Services and CINCs is good and necessary to ensure that warfighting priority requirements are met and that the common goal of all military entities, to fight and win the nation’s wars, is fulfilled. Somewhere along the way, the ultimate objective of PPBS (to provide the CINCs with the best mix of forces, equipment and support attainable within fiscal constraints) has fallen from center stage.¹

What to do now? Greater attention and fulfillment of CINCs’ requirements will result in more balanced defense programs, both now and in the future. Within existing fiscal constraints, it is impossible to meet all CINCs’ warfighting priority requirements. The following opportunities are submitted in hopes of improving the IPL process.

**Opportunities**

*Assign a Permanent Civilian Point of Contact*

OSD PA&E should assign a permanent civilian as DOD’s POC for CINCs’ IPLs. The process is in great need of permanent leadership and continuity. The IPL must be the bridging document between capabilities identified through the Joint Staff and the resourcing of those warfighting capabilities within the PPBS process. The CINCs’ highest unfilled warfighting requirements are paramount to supporting the defense policy goals of Assure, Dissuade, Deter, and Decisively Defeat across the spectrum of conflict.

*Establish and Publish Permanent Guidance*

OSD PA&E should establish, publish and periodically update IPL guidance. Currently the guidance is scattered in several different publications and numerous contradictions exist.
Permanent regulatory guidance would ensure that the Services, CINCs, OSD, and the Joint Staff understand the importance of their responsibilities.

Conduct Yearly Training

OSD PA&E should conduct yearly training (well before the start of the IPL process) with the IPL POCs from the Services, CINCs, and Joint Staff. The majority of personnel responsible for the IPL are military; consequently, there is significant turnover each year.

Submit IPLs at the Beginning of the POM Process

OSD PA&E’s yearly call letter should require submission of the IPLs earlier in the POM development process. The development of the POM process begins with the President’s Budget (PB). Developing an IPL submission date close to release of the PB would provide the CINCs with a program baseline from which to assess shortfalls in capabilities from a resource-constrained baseline. Because the IPLs are capabilities based documents, the Services would acquire greater latitude for consideration of requirement shortfalls during POM development. Current schedules for POM submission and development of issue papers during the program review do not allow sufficient time for the CINCs to analyze Services’ programs, then correlate the POM to the IPLs, and, when applicable, submit issue papers for additional consideration of those CINC issues that are unresolved.

Remove the Artificial Limit on Issue Papers

OSD PA&E and the Joint Staff should delete the artificial limit on the number of issue papers a CINC can submit. When the Services know that only a limited number of requirements can be funded in the program review, it’s easy to dismiss IPL requirements in the POM.
Besides, the limit is arbitrary, as some CINCs legitimately have more than five items while some have less than five. Let the validation and prioritization process determine the overall outcome.

*Work IPL Requirements Through Service Components*

CINCs’ IPL POCs should continuously work IPL requirements through their Service components. While it is clear the components assist in preparing the IPLs, thereafter, there seems to be little component involvement. IPLs are highly focused supplements to – not substitutes for – a CINC’s normal communication of programming requirements through the corresponding Service components or programming support activities.

*Ensure the Same Staff Members Work Programming Documents*

CINCs’ staffs should ensure the same staff members work the POM and IPL inputs. This practice ensures consistency and continuity. However, this practice does not necessarily mean that the members need to be assigned to the same directorate (matrix can work).

*Joint Staff (J8) Should Develop True Analytic Capabilities*

The Joint Staff (J8) should develop analytic capabilities to be used in support of the CINCs. Establishing such a capability would ensure IPL requirements contain cost data prior to submission to the Services. In wake of the looming headquarters staff cuts and a possible realignment of the current CINC structure, placing a cost capability at each CINC (with the exceptions of U.S. Special Operations Command and U.S. Transportation Command, which already have fully-developed cost shops) would not be prudent. The CINCs’ focus should remain on warfighting, not costing requirements. In addition, the Joint Staff, via the JROC and the JWCA teams should take on a greater role in validating and prioritizing the IPL requirements into one consolidated list for submission to the Services.
Produce Timely CPR/CPA

The Joint Staff should produce the CPR and CPA in a timely fashion. The CPR should be submitted prior to the DPG and the CPA prior to the program review, which would ensure alternative program recommendations are addressed in the PDM.

Cogent Explanations in the Services’ POMs

The Services, with the assistance of the CINC’s IPL staffs and OSD PA&E, should establish a standardized method for addressing CINC’s warfighting requirements during the POM and provide cogent explanations when requirements cannot be met. Providing a useful explanation helps the CINC’s in their planning efforts and assists in fulfilling the intent of PPBS. As an alternative, the Services and OSD PA&E should work together to reprogram the automated IPL to include space for Services’ POCs to provide a written reclama for each issue they cannot support. This input should be submitted prior to the completion of the POM and made accessible to all CINC’s in a timely manner. Additionally, the Joint Staff could consolidate the information for submission of Issue Papers concerning unattended shortfalls.²

Develop Clear Criteria for Determining When Warfighting Requirements are Met (or Partially Met)

The Services’ IPL POCs should work with the CINC’s staffs to develop defensible criteria for determining when CINC’s requirements are fully met or partially met. There should be agreement between the CINC’s and Services’ staffs before labeling a requirement as “met” or “partially met.”
Appoint a CINC to the JROC

The SECDEF should appoint a CINC as a voting member of the JROC. Appointing a CINC to the JROC ensures that the warfighting CINCs have a spokesperson to help oversee the funding and distribution of joint CINCs’ requirements. Admiral Bill Owens quickly learned that the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is the only true “joint” member of the JROC. The other members are primarily concerned with their Title 10 roles as Service chiefs.

Notes


Appendix A

Flowchart of Warfighting IPL Process
Appendix B

Sample Questionnaire

Generally speaking, do you view the warfighting IPL process as an effective tool for meeting CINC’s warfighting requirements? Why or Why not?

From your perspective, how can the warfighting IPL process be improved?

How do you involve your components in developing and vetting the warfighting IPL?

Question 4 below pertains to FY 04-09 warfighting IPL

Were OSD PA&E’s warfighting IPL preparation instructions clear, concise, and useful?

Question 5 below pertains to FY 03-07 warfighting IPL

Are you satisfied with the Services’ explanations (located in the Unified Command section of the POMs) for not satisfying your warfighting IPL requirements?

Questions 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10 relate to the FY 02-07 warfighting IPL
Now that we are in FY 02, how many of your warfighting IPL requirements were ultimately satisfied?

How many warfighting IPL requirements are largely unmet?

How many issue outlines/papers did you submit?

How many of your issue outlines/papers were successful in garnering resources?

How much assistance did you receive from your executive agent when attempting to address the warfighting IPL requirements in the POMs?

Acronyms and Definitions

**BES.** Budget Estimate Submission. The DOD Component’s budget submissions to the Office of the Secretary of Defense showing budget requirements for inclusion in the DOD budget.¹

**Budget Review.** The Office of the Secretary of Defense scrub of the budget estimate submissions.²

**CPA.** Chairman’s Program Assessment. The CPA contains the Chairman’s alternative program recommendations and budget proposals for Secretary of Defense considerations in refining the defense program and budget. These adjustments are intended to enhance joint readiness, promote joint doctrine and training, and more adequately reflect strategic and priorities.³
CPR. Chairman’s Program Recommendation. The CPR provides the Chairman’s personal recommendations to the Secretary of Defense for his consideration in the Defense Planning Guidance. The recommendations represent the Chairman’s view of programs important for creating or enhancing joint warfighting capabilities.4

CINCs. Commanders in Chief. CINCs have broad continuing warfighting mission responsibility to the President, through the Secretary of Defense and with the advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. CINCs typically have geographic or functional responsibilities.5

DPG. Defense Planning Guidance. This document, issued by the Secretary of Defense, provides firm guidance in the form of goals, priorities, and objectives, including fiscal constraints, for the development of the Program Objective Memoranda by the Services and defense agencies.6

DRB. Defense Resource Board. A board, chaired by the Deputy Secretary of Defense, established to facilitate decision making during all phases of the PPBS.7

FYDP. Future Years Defense Program. The official document and database that summarizes forces and resources associated with DOD programs. The FYDP is updated and published at least three times during an annual Planning, Programming and Budget System cycle.8

IPL. Integrated Priority List. A list of a CINC’s highest priority requirements, prioritized across Service and functional lines, defining shortfalls in key programs that, in the judgment of the CINC, adversely affect the capability of the CINC’s forces to accomplish their assigned mission. The integrated priority list provides the CINC’s recommendations for programming funds in the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System.9
**Issue Papers.** The Office of the Secretary of Defense documents defining issues raised during review of the POMs.10

**JMRR.** Joint Monthly Readiness Review. The JMRR provides the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff a current and broad assessment of the military’s readiness to fight, across all three levels of war (strategic, operational, and tactical).11

**JROC.** Joint Requirements Oversight Council. An advisory council to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, which has responsibility for the following actions: (1) to provide assistance in identifying and assessing the priority of joint military requirements and acquisition programs; (2) to consider alternatives to any acquisition program that has been identified to meet military requirements; and, (3) to assign joint priority among existing and future major programs meeting valid requirements identified by the CINCs, Services, and other defense agencies.12

**MBI.** Major Budget Issue. A top level Service’s appeal of a PBD affecting a military service program, or programs, from the military department secretary directly to the SECDEF.13

**PA&E.** The Office of the Secretary of Defense Program Analysis and Evaluation Directorate. This office, part of the Comptrollers Office, has overall responsibility within DOD for the warfighting integrated priority list.14

**PB.** President’s Budget. The federal government budget transmitted to the Congress for a particular fiscal year. Includes all agencies and activities of the executive, legislative, and judicial branches.15

**PBD.** The SECDEF decision documents which affirm or change dollar amounts or manpower allowances in the Services’ budget estimate submissions.16
PDM. Program Decision Memoranda. The means by which the SECDEF communicates his final programming decisions, after considering the Services’ POMs, the CPA, and recommendations from the DRB.  

POM. Program Objectives Memoranda (POM). Recommendation by the Services and defense agencies to the SECDEF on the allocation of resources for proposed programs to achieve assigned missions and objectives.

PPBS. Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System. A system based on a cyclic decision-making process with three distinct but interrelated phases of planning, programming, and budgeting. The ultimate objective of PPBS is to provide the CINCs the best mix of forces, equipment, and support attainable within fiscal constraints.

Program Review. Means by which the Office of the Secretary of Defense staff reviews and assesses the adequacy of the Services’ POMs.

Notes

2 Ibid.
3 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, CJCSI 3137.01A, The Joint Warfighting Capabilities Assessment Process, 22 January 1999: Section GL-3.
4 Ibid.
5 Joint Staff, Joint Publication 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 12 April 2001 (as amended through 23 January 2002), 78, definition modified from “combatant command.”
6 Ibid, 122.
7 Defense Systems Management College (DSMC), DSMC Definition of Terms Website: www.miairforcemall.org/defs/FindDefs.asp.
Notes

8 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, CJCSI 8501.01, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Commanders in Chief of the Combatant Commands, and Joint Staff Participation in the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System, 1 April 1999: Section GL-3.

9 JP 1-02: 216.

10 Navy N6 Website.

11 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, CJCS Guide 3401B, CJCS Guide to the Chairman’s Readiness System, 1 September 2000: 10.

12 CJCSI 3137.01A: Section GL-4.

13 DSMC Website.


15 Navy N6 Website.

16 Ibid.

17 Navy N6 Website.

18 CJCSI 8501.01: Section GL-5.

19 CJCSI 8501.01: Section GL-4.


21 DSMC Website.
Bibliography


Bozick, John K., Lieutenant Commander, USN, “An Analysis of the Development of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Program Assessment (CPA) and the Chairman’s Program Recommendation (CPR),” Master’s Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, June 1998.


Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, CJCS Guide 3401B, CJCS Guide to the Chairman’s Readiness System, 1 September 2000.

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, CJCSI 3100.01A, *Joint Strategic Planning System*, 1 September 1999.


Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, CJCSI 5123.01A, *Charter of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council*, 8 March 2001.

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, CJCSI 7401.01A, *CINC Initiatives Fund*, 30 January 1999.

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, CJCSI 8501.01, *Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Commanders in Chief of the Combatant Commands, and Joint Staff Participation in the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System*, 1 April 1999.


Defense Systems Management College (DSMC), DSMC Definition of Terms Website: www.miairforcemall.org/defs/FindDefs.asp.


Executive Agent (EA) Study Outbrief, written briefing, AF/XPPL, Pentagon, October 2001.


FY 02 Budget Review: CINC AO Training, Joint Staff (J8), Program & Budget Analysis Division, Pentagon.


“Integrating Joint Requirements in the PPBS,” message to Deputy Commanders in Chiefs (R 222121Z Apr 99), 22 April 1999.

*Interpreting What the CINCs/Commands are Saying*, written briefing, Army Programming Staff briefing, Pentagon, 26 October 2001.

Interview Code 101, Air Force’s CINC IPL point of contact (name withheld), interview with author, Pentagon, 24 October 2001, written summary, author-maintained, Note: interviewee must approve release or summary.

Interview Code 13, Joint Staff’s CINC IPL point of contact (name withheld), interview with author, Pentagon, 24 September 2001, written summary, author-maintained, Note: interviewee must approve release of summary.

Interview Code 1612, Navy’s CINC IPL point of contact (name withheld), interview with author, Crystal City, Virginia, 24 October 2001, written summary, author-maintained, Note: interviewee must approve release of summary.

Interview Code 609, Army’s CINC IPL point of contact (name withheld), interview with author, Pentagon, 26 October 2001, written summary, author-maintained, Note: interviewee must approve release of summary.


Questionnaire Code 11, CINC IPL point of contact response (name of respondent withheld) to author’s e-mail questionnaire, 12 December 2001, Author-maintained, Note: Respondent must approve release of questionnaire.

Questionnaire Code 110, CINC IPL point of contact response (name of respondent withheld) to author’s e-mail questionnaire, 14 December 2001, Author-maintained, Note: Respondent must approve release of questionnaire.

Questionnaire Code 19, CINC IPL point of contact response (name of respondent withheld) to author’s e-mail questionnaire, 6 December 2001, Author-maintained, Note: Respondent must approve release of questionnaire.

Questionnaire Code 409, CINC IPL point of contact response (name of respondent withheld) to author’s e-mail questionnaire, 2 January 2002, Author-maintained, Note: Respondent must approve release of questionnaire.

Questionnaire Code 54, CINC IPL point of contact response (name of respondent withheld) to author’s e-mail questionnaire, 14 November 2001, Author-maintained, Note: Respondent must approve release of questionnaire.

Questionnaire Code 64, CINC IPL point of contact response (name of respondent withheld) to author’s e-mail questionnaire, 18 December 2002, Author-maintained, Note: Respondent must approve release of questionnaire.

Questionnaire Code 7, CINC IPL point of contact response (name of respondent withheld) to author’s e-mail questionnaire, 28 November 2001, Author-maintained, Note: Respondent must approve release of questionnaire.
Questionnaire Code 93, CINC IPL point of contact response (name of respondent withheld) to author’s e-mail questionnaire, 14 December 2001, Author-maintained, Note: Respondent must approve release of questionnaire.


Requirements to Resources: Linking CINC Joint Warfighting Requirements to DOD Resourcing Processes, written briefing, Joint Staff (J8), 2001.


Szemborski, Stanley R., Rear Admiral, USN, Deputy Director for Resources and Requirements, J8 Joint Staff, Programs and Resources VTC Briefing, written briefing, 29 August 2000.
Taft, William H. IV, presently legal advisor to the Secretary of State and former Deputy Secretary of Defense (1984 to 1989), response to author’s e-mail, 2 November 2001, Author-maintained.


US Code: Title 10, Armed Forces.


Zinni, Anthony C., General, USMC (Retired), former CINCCENTCOM and currently U.S. Envoy to the Middle East, interview with author, Columbus, Ohio, 7 March 2002.