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14. ABSTRACT HIV/AIDS continues to ravage the African continent, threatening already fragile states by creating chaos and disorder. Some states risk losing more than a third of their populations while having to provide for millions of orphans left behind. The resulting instability creates opportunities for terrorist recruitment and refuge. The US has significant national interest in Nigeria for its vast natural resources and its position as a regional anchor in West Africa. In the coming years, as the pandemic overwhelms countries' abilities to function effectively, the US may likely be called upon to respond to the crisis. OPERATION NIGERIAN ANGEL provides a model for a multinational force to address key issues and provides the COCOM a means to restore regional stability and order.					
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**NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
Newport, R.I.**

**OPERATION NIGERIAN ANGEL:
FIGHTING AIDS TO FIGHT TERRORISM**

by

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Commander, U.S. Navy

A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

Signature:_____

29 May 2003

“...the potential is high for Nigeria... to suffer setbacks in the next year... In addition, other failed or failing states may lead to calls for the United States and other major aid donors to stabilize a range of desperate situations.”

George Tenet, Director of Central Intelligence¹

“Nigeria... may be at the takeoff point, where the epidemic becomes much, much, much more serious in the next five years.”

David F. Gordon, National Intelligence Council Officer²

INTRODUCTION

HIV/AIDS is decimating the vast African continent at a pace unlike anywhere else in the world: currently, it is estimated that 70% (28.5 million people) of all adults and a staggering 80% of all children worldwide infected with the HIV virus live in Sub-Saharan Africa. AIDS deaths in 2001 totaled 3 million globally with 2.2 million dying in Africa alone.³ This pandemic is systematically destroying countries' infrastructure by killing the labor force, overwhelming medical systems, hollowing out military forces and leaving in its wake millions of orphans. It further worsens and is exacerbated by severe drought, malnutrition and government corruption experienced by many African states over the last decade and is obliterating much of the economic and social progress made there this century. Indeed, some countries risk losing more than a third of their populations over the next 10 to 15 years. The ensuing disorganization, lawlessness and hopelessness create a fertile breeding ground for terrorist activity as cells seek refuge and recruits.

An example of a country in crisis and of interest to the US is Nigeria, the continent's most populous country (approximately 120 million people), home to the largest concentration of Muslims and Christians in Africa and a vast source of oil and natural gas (currently the fifth largest source of crude oil for the US⁴). It is widely estimated that nearly 6% of Nigeria's adult population is now infected with HIV, a number that represents 8% of the global figure.⁵ While not as dramatic a percentage as the astonishing 40% of Ugandans or 20% of South

African adults who live with the disease, the infection rate in Nigeria is significant for what it portends; like its African neighbors to the South and East, Nigeria's infection rate is expected to soar exponentially in the next five years, producing catastrophic results for the country.

The United States declared the AIDS pandemic a national security threat in 2002 and the National Intelligence Council, an arm of the CIA, warned that five nations who possess 40 percent of the world's population – China, Ethiopia, India, Nigeria and Russia – will experience the greatest numbers of infected people by 2010, with the virus damaging the countries' economic, social, political and military structures.⁶ Given the threat of HIV/AIDS to Nigeria's future, its position as a regional anchor in Africa⁷ and its significance to the US in terms of oil production, it is likely that US Humanitarian Assistance may be requested by the country in the near future to provide relief for this national disaster.

THESIS

Preventive action in the form of Humanitarian Assistance (HA), coordinated by the COCOM, to stabilize a key region at risk from HIV/AIDS is critical to fighting global terrorism. OPERATION NIGERIAN ANGEL is proposed as a model to proactively manage a crisis before it becomes a full-blown emergency - a plan to shore up a "wobbling country" before it falls "off the precipice"⁸ and becomes one of the sources of the terrorist problem.

After analyzing the linkage between the instability caused by HIV/AIDS and the conditions which global terrorists can and will exploit, this paper will explore the parameters of "OPERATION NIGERIAN ANGEL" as a way to answer key "Ends," "Ways," and "Means" questions. This will be followed by an examination of how one might apply the "Principles of MOOTW" to this problem, looking at examples of ways to measure the success of this proposed operation. Finally, counterarguments to the proposed approach will

be examined, ending with clear conclusions regarding the importance of this proactive regional action to fight global terrorism.

ANALYSIS

How AIDS creates instability

“Failed states matter because they don’t just sit there. Failed states are breeding grounds of terrorist organizations who can go there and operate without fear... they’re operating with impunity.”

Colin Powell, Secretary of State⁹

As HIV/AIDS has continued to ravage Nigeria, its effects have been exacerbated by the severe droughts and lack of clean water that prevent people from being able to care for themselves, or even to take medications to treat the disease’s symptoms. Malnutrition and starvation also prevent those who are sick from taking medicines. Nigeria’s relatively poor roads, bridges and infrastructure complicate people’s abilities to receive medical treatment.

Like many African states, Nigeria enjoyed dramatic socio-economic progress during the latter half of the 20th Century following colonial independence and a shift toward democracy and self-government, but this often led to increased chaos and instability as people flocked to cities in search of employment opportunities. This massive, disorganized influx overwhelms metropolitan areas in terms of services and housing and leads to overcrowding, resulting in resource and service shortages.¹⁰ In turn, tensions in cities rise as people try to cope with the ensuing newness and uncertainty of living in an unfamiliar environment. The AIDS virus easily flourishes in these chaotic, unstable metropolitan areas as it ultimately unravels the fabric of society and negates achievements, leading one African newspaper to poignantly remark that Africans have “lost the 20th Century.”¹¹

HIV/AIDS is devastating the Nigerian healthcare system as it overloads medical resources, filling hospitals with terminally ill patients. It is obliterating an entire generation

of workers in their prime productive years and creating massive absenteeism in the workplace from not only employee sickness, but also from time spent arranging and attending funerals. In particular, it is wreaking havoc on the Nigerian education system, killing teachers and forcing students to drop out to caretake sick parents.¹² It is seriously affecting African industry and agriculture as workers become sick and die: in some areas, corporate knowledge of community farming has been lost, leading to loss of farms and property.¹³ Physical infrastructure breaks down because workers cannot keep up with the building or repair of roads and bridges. Tourism and commercial enterprise are affected as travelers shun countries with high rates of infection and businesses avoid sending employees to areas out of fear of contracting the virus.

Women bear an unequal part of the burden – not only are they infected at a greater rate than men, they also are more likely to stay home from work or school to care for family members, even if they are infected themselves. Many lose property upon the death of a husband in illegal “property snatching,” leaving little hope for material support.¹⁴ Perhaps the most troubling result of the disease are the millions of orphans created (a figure expected to exceed 15 million this year¹⁵) which profoundly exacerbates the loss of family and social structure. HIV/AIDS is also beginning to hollow out Nigeria’s military forces because the country cannot field enough conscripts or recruits due to a lack of healthy young men, posing challenges for the multinational oil companies whose personnel depend on Nigeria’s military for protection.¹⁶ This also further undermines the state’s ability to protect itself, to respond to crisis and to provide security for its own people and institutions.

HIV/AIDS creates lawlessness, drains funds from other critical areas and increases corruption. As people become discontented with the state’s inability to adequately handle the

magnitude of the disease's effects, they may turn to disobedience. With so many areas of society affected, the state is increasingly unable to effectively function, so it disintegrates and ultimately fails, leaving its people in chaos and complicating the political environment for its allies and neighbors.

How terrorists exploit instability

“People who look at Central and Southern Africa and say, it's far away, it's distant, it's remote... we said the same thing about terrorists – it happened in Africa, it's distant and remote...”

George Tenet, Director of Central Intelligence ¹⁷

Terrorists, like water, seek the lowest level for their existence, establishing themselves in areas that provide cover and ease of operation for their planning. They also recruit people ready to espouse a cause, willing and able to die. While terrorists flourish worldwide, struggling African nations such as Nigeria may potentially harbor larger numbers due to their relatively chaotic and unstable societies, a critical factor with dangerous consequences.

“Youth bulges” provide an eager and energetic pool of prospective terrorist group members and the stunning numbers of orphans expected in African nations may become “armies of recruits” on the streets of those countries. While young men in their twenties make strong, resilient cell members, even teens and children can be used for “dangerous, frequently suicidal missions, partly because their youth makes them less likely to question their orders, and partly because their extreme youth makes them less likely to attract the attention of the authorities.”¹⁸ This critical weakness shakes the foundation of daily life and allows terrorists to exploit the vulnerabilities in the gaps and seams of a society's fabric. Cells can employ orphans because they are disconnected and easily influenced. These youth have little to risk: they have nothing and so have nothing to lose. Hordes of angry, resentful, disillusioned young males are ripe for terrorist teachings. When faced with the bleak

prospects of disease, death and unemployment, little competes with the terrorist's "promise of immortality, approval by one's peers, and religious sanctification."¹⁹

Although some of the world's more infamous terrorists come from positions of wealth, most recruits are drawn more from less fortunate than from comfortable middle-class environments - many who have known only absolute destitution and "for whom terrorism represents the only way to lash out at society's injustices."²⁰ The relative wealth and promising financial prospects of a terrorist group hold tremendous appeal for these marginalized people.

Another critical factor is the lack of oversight and lawlessness that provide facile conditions for camouflaging funds: monies can be quietly sent to Muslim charities, or traded in small arms, diamonds and gold. In chaotic societies, people attract scant attention as they blend into the local scene, disappearing into civilian life and leaving little trace as they come and go. "Hundreds of companies worldwide form a shadow network capable of providing money and logistical support for continued attacks by Al Queda... many of these suspected front companies... are in countries with few regulations and can pick up and disappear overnight."²¹

Bribes are another effective way of doing business: with little or no income, it is easier to look the other way, especially when that is the local norm. Weapons and contraband can be easily smuggled for relatively small cost in a society whose members have become accustomed to closing their eyes to corruption in order eke out an existence for themselves and their families. Finally, terrorists can easily exploit porous ports and borders to transport contraband, information, and people. Lax law enforcement means transnational networks

encounter little resistance in traversing boundaries of nations that have no effective way of policing their borders, especially in a nation as vast as Nigeria.

RECOMMENDATIONS: OPERATION NIGERIAN ANGEL

“In the words of Secretary of State Colin Powell, AIDS is the No.1 threat facing the world today, because this disease has the power to reverse opportunities for peace and freedom and encourage tyranny and poverty.”

Senator Dick Durbin, (D) Wisconsin

Senator Russ Feingold, (D) Wisconsin²²

Given that Nigeria risks catastrophe in the face of the HIV/AIDS pandemic, the COCOM must have a plan to respond in the region once called to act by the request from the country's Ambassador to the President. The COCOM and his/her subordinates will work with the Ambassador to Nigeria and his country team and other agencies to integrate all the elements of national power – diplomatic, informational, military and economic – to mitigate the HIV/AIDS crisis in Nigeria, supporting a “wobbly” nation and eliminating the havens terrorists seek.

In Nigeria, critical factors will include its poverty, porous borders, declining education, failing physical infrastructure, numbers of orphans and the country's youth bulge, and the overwhelmed medical system.

Ends. The EUCOM strategic objectives include promoting African regional stability and protecting US interests. The COCOM must shape the theater through cooperative engagement and partnership with coalitions and allies to achieve a Desired End State of a politically peaceful, economically stable Nigeria whose country climate is conducive to promoting US interests in a secure environment. To do so in HIV/AIDS affected areas, the political, social, economic and military structures of a country must be fortified in order to

create conditions that repel terrorists and their activity. Denying terrorists sanctuary by mitigating the risks of the chaos and disorder of disease is a key operational objective in accomplishing the COCOM's strategic goals of stabilizing the region.

Ways. The military Operational Objectives of NIGERIAN ANGEL will include providing the 1) security to enable the goods and services to arrive on-site, 2) communications to allow the various agencies and HN personnel to coordinate their activities and 3) logistics that will facilitate the operations themselves. The establishment of a multinational Joint Task Force will coordinate the interagency participation to facilitate the accomplishment of five goals to reduce the effects of HIV/AIDS: 1) ensure delivery of supplies to manage the disease, 2) promote education to stop the spread of infection, 3) replenish the country's military and shore up its police force to provide security, 4) build or repair physical infrastructure decayed due to neglect to allow transportation of goods and services, and 5) provide training for job skills to account for worker loss due to illness and death, as well as provide opportunity for large numbers of unemployed youth. The JTF will lead the operational coordination with many actual tasks performed by the myriad civilian and government agencies trained to provide Humanitarian Assistance.

Means. The most effective way to apply the resources of the Joint Force to accomplish these goals in Nigeria will be to establish a primary CMOC in the large port city of Lagos with a secondary CMOC located in the capital of Abuja to the north. These centers will bridge the gap between civilian and military agencies and provide a positive, impartial gathering place – the “heart” of the operations – to foster the all-important interagency exchange.²³ The

CMOC will create the environment in which participants will decide how to proceed with requesting, staging and delivering supplies; restoring critical services; rebuilding roads, runways, ports and bridges; and educating and training personnel.

The military's role will be to facilitate the teamwork approach to problem resolution. Through daily meetings and close personal interaction, the CMOC will coordinate information, requests and responses from agencies including the International Red Cross, the US Country Team, USAID, the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance, various UN agencies, the military, and representatives from NGOs and PVOs such as Doctors without Borders and the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation. Critical to the process will be the military chaplain, local religious leaders, HN representatives from facilities management such as electric/communications, Public Works and water/sanitation as well as military Public Affairs, Foreign Area Officers, Civil Affairs, Logistics, Information Operations and Security. SEABEES, legal specialists and medical units such as Navy Environmental and Public Health will work closely with Nigerian teams to repair structures and train personnel. In every respect, the CMOC Director, whether US or multinational, must be flexible and communicative and must have unlimited access to the Joint Task Force Commander.

Employing the principles of MOOTW

OPERATION NIGERIAN ANGEL will fight the factors that are the seeds of terrorism from a MOOTW perspective and to be most effective, must include the following considerations in terms of planning and preparation:

Objective. Clear, feasible objectives will drive the success of the operation. The CJTF must completely understand the mission and what success will look like, and be prepared to accommodate shifts in political objectives or the situation itself. Although one of the most complex principles of MOOTW, objectives, once established and then reviewed on a continual basis, will serve as the guidance and reference for interagency actions. It will therefore be critical that the US leadership achieve consensus among the multinational and multi-agency partners concerning agreement with the mission's objectives. The military will be the enabling force that creates the environment for operational success.

Security. Operations security is a critical factor in achieving COCOM's operational goals and will pose many challenges due to the uncertain, rapidly changing nature of unstable areas such as those affected by disease and disorder in Nigeria. This principle forms the central piece of the plan because, without security, no program can succeed. It will be essential to provide for training and retraining of compromised police forces and to assist with plugging the holes of porous Nigerian ports and borders. Military expertise will also be critical to ensure supply delivery, provide safe haven for relief workers, and protect personnel and resources from potential terrorist activity. In terms of protecting NGO, PVO and HN personnel, security forces must work in tandem with Nigerian personnel to ensure complete understanding of operations. ROE will have to be determined; despite working in an other than war operation, participants may face violence from looters or terrorist activity.

Legitimacy. Different audiences will interpret assistance to Nigeria from varying perspectives. Opinions as to the legitimacy of American and coalition AIDS assistance will

cover a wide spectrum: the Nigerian people, international community, relief agencies, the American military and diplomatic communities, and the American people will all weigh in on the issues and actions. Religion and cultural beliefs will play a central role in establishing legitimacy in the eyes of the local population. Finally, Americans will have to be continually convinced that their military should be employed in MOOTW related to a disease in a far-off, distant land. Determining the exit strategy will also enhance legitimacy as JTF transitions to HN assets and resources, and the Nigerians themselves are able to manage the crisis.

Unity of effort. All means must be directed toward a common purpose.²⁴ This principle of MOOTW is especially challenging to managing a humanitarian crisis such as HIV/AIDS in a complex African nation like Nigeria because it is complicated by players from diverse background who interpret objectives differently. Moreover, in terms of chain of command, what is completely clear for a military unit may become completely confusing when the factors of language, culture, custom and viewpoint are added to the daily routine. Unity of effort will only be achieved through unity of cooperation; the COCOM through the JTFC must focus on bringing together disparate local, national and international groups with the goal of mounting a unified plan of attack on the conditions that foster terrorist activity. Liaison and coordination will be key to the Commander's success. Relying heavily on the assets of the Country Team and the vast resources of the NGO/PVOs to complement the specialties and expertise of the military force will create greater opportunities for mission accomplishment. Presenting a united front with the Department of State and insisting on close communication and coordination with volunteer and commercial enterprises will more efficiently accomplish the objective of enhancing regional stability.

Restraint. A challenge to OPERATION NIGERIAN ANGEL personnel will be to develop appropriate ROE to determine if and when to use force while participating in a Humanitarian mission. As previously mentioned, force may be needed in terms of law enforcement or to ensure protection of personnel and supply delivery. In this type of operation, however, restraint is an important key to success because use of force crosses a threshold that marks a distinction between combat and non-combat operations. The principle of restraint will also require training of officers and troops to understand Nigerian cultural beliefs, mores and values to avoid misunderstanding and to more effectively work with the HN forces.

Perseverance. In some cases, MOOTW “may require years to achieve the desired results,”²⁵ and may be true in the case of attacking the factors of instability that produce terrorist beginnings, e.g. multiple operations may be required in several African nations, given the magnitude the damage from the disease. Accomplishing the national strategic objective of combating terrorism through regional operational objectives of fighting a disease and its effects in Nigeria might be difficult to sell to the American public and sustain over time. The humanitarian element of alleviating suffering and providing aid to unstable nations is more easily accepted than is the concept of shoring up a country’s infrastructure to combat the most basic factors that spawn terrorist activity and provide them sanctuary. A strong Public Affairs program that can synthesize information and provide significant coverage of operational success will be key to sustaining the fight.

Defining success

To determine success, the CJTF must select a set of indicators that are measurable and definable. Not only are these Measurements of Effectiveness (MOE) critical to securing and maintaining funding at all levels, they will also signal the appropriate time to end US involvement with turnover to HN and international organizations. Ideally, every indicator will be determined as a result of a concerted effort between agencies, with the Nigerian people ultimately assuming the lead role and responsibility for all programs, leading to the eventual exit of US forces. From managing the actual disease symptoms and teaching preventive measures, to training and employing young men and shoring up faltering law enforcement capabilities, there are numerous indicators for the Commander to consider, and the exit strategy will be event-driven as the indigenous assets are able to manage the crisis.

Some MOE will be tangible while others will be less able to be physically determined. Among the most telling economic/informational indicators, and critical to overall success, will be to actually slow and reduce HIV infection rates in Nigeria over specific periods of time, with the ultimate goal of a reduced death rate. The numbers of babies born HIV-free to women who received counseling is crucial in terms of population health and could be tracked with follow-up studies, using HN and international organization assets (e.g. UNAIDS and WHO). Amounts of supplies ordered and received, such as medicines and condoms, could be measured to determine both what is provided as well as what actually arrives on-site and is used. Numbers of people counseled, flyers posted, meetings held, and trainings presented could also easily be calculated.

More intangible indicators of success that will lead to an exit of US presence include determining the numbers and types of organizations, both HN and from the international

community, that have been fully integrated into the plan of assistance and that are actually satisfied with their inclusion and contribution. Regular and well-attended meetings at the CMOG would be a method of gauging success, but would require close scrutiny to determine what is actually being accomplished. Increased participation by the indigenous leadership, and subsequent acceptance of aid provided by Western nations is a sophisticated indicator of Nigerian views toward US-led coalition presence and assistance. Change in sexual behaviors, to include abstinence and use of condoms, is more challenging to measure but could be accomplished via surveys and information gathering by HN assets such as Africare.

With regard to political/military measurements, numbers of personnel completing training, exchange programs and military exercise participation. Increased foreign military sales can be tracked and measured and their effectiveness determined by local intelligence. The ability of a HN government to continue to provide law enforcement for its population and fill its military ranks with healthy personnel indicates progress and mission accomplishment. Crime rates can be analyzed to determine police force effectiveness. If the US military and its partner agencies are successful in training the local populace, the effects of law and order will manifest themselves in terms of the people's ability to travel freely and safely in the region.

Counterpoint

Critics might argue that the US military is not the appropriate agency to lead a plan to address HIV/AIDS in Africa, citing questions of role, mission and its already overstretched resources. It can further be argued that fighting terrorist activity itself is more appropriate for the employment of US military forces, rather than focusing such intense effort on operations other than war, infrastructure rebuilding and humanitarian causes. However, precedent and

the parameters of the foreseeable future in a Post-Cold War world suggest that the military is still the best choice due to its adaptability, versatility and global influence. Indeed, it has been suggested that the COCOMs have grown into “a powerful force in US foreign policy because of the disproportionate weight of their resources and organization in relation to the assets and influence of other parts of America’s foreign policy structure - in particular, the State Department,” which have shrunk in both personnel and funding even as the military’s role has expanded over the last decade.²⁶ Moreover, with regional positioning of US forces, the military is aligned more efficiently and geo-centrally to meet real-time threats and effect change.

Critics might also point to the prevalence of other global diseases such as malaria, TB and the recent SARS epidemic and wonder “why AIDS, why now?” Unlike these other scourges, HIV/AIDS is a complex phenomenon with a strong component of human behavior, and a disease that has rapidly spread, widely killed and severely shaken the infrastructure of countries. Indeed, if SARS follows a similar pattern as the HIV/AIDS pandemic, it would be advantageous to work from an interagency plan devised to manage AIDS.

To be sure, limiting factors to attacking terrorism at its very base using the Joint Forces as the lead include risks to both lives and resources. Many failing states vulnerable to terrorist activity pose danger to personnel from other diseases, primitive conditions and conflict, so it will be critical to ensure personnel are provided practical information and medical precautions such as vaccinations to ensure their safety. Moreover, with such a widespread and complex disaster such as HIV/AIDS, COCOM resources risk depletion, leaving other areas of US interest lacking in attention. In terms of the COCOM’s objectives, focusing valuable resources over time and distance risks ignoring or deprioritizing other critical

missions in the AOR. This will require reallocation of resources as well as interaction with DOS and PVOs/NGOs to most effectively use their resources.

In the end, however, the United States – the most force-capable, resource-rich and globally-powerful nation – is arguably the world’s most visible target and so, stands to gain the most from taking such a proactive approach to combating the conditions of terrorism at its very core. By taking this battle to the terrorists’ own breeding grounds, using non-traditional methods of warfare, the US will realize tremendous benefit both in terms of national security and humanitarian accomplishment.

CONCLUSION

“Much of Africa is a veritable incubator for the foot soldiers of terrorism... We have to drain the swamps where the terrorists breed.”

Susan Rice, Former Assistant Secretary of State for Africa²⁷

Like many African nations, Nigeria sits on the brink of catastrophe, facing the effects of the HIV/AIDS crisis in every part of its society from education and employment to its medical system and law enforcement capability. As its importance to US national strategic interests deepens with increased natural resource production, and its regional influence in Africa widens, Nigeria’s battle with HIV/AIDS takes on increased significance in the COCOM’s AOR.

Struggling against the chaos of HIV/AIDS asks much of America in general and of its military in particular. It will require tremendous creativity and risk. It will require a sustained, cooperative and comprehensive approach which unites national and international agencies and provides an environment conducive to continued work. And, it will require substantial resources and commitment, provided by the world community under American

leadership. Succeeding in the fight against terrorism is heavily dependent upon the success of this global struggle against the debilitating instability of the HIV/AIDS pandemic.

Acting in a proactive manner and working in a forward-thinking direction by planning a humanitarian response to this crisis will attack global terrorism at its origin – addressing terrorism’s causes as well as its symptoms.

Through OPERATION NIGERIAN ANGEL, the COCOM will ensure supply delivery, promote education, replenish indigenous military and police forces, rebuild physical infrastructure and provide job training in HIV/AIDS affected nations in order to promote the regional security critical to US national interests. Leading the interagency process to accomplish these goals will ensure adequate security and create the environment necessary to stabilizing the area.

By planning and prioritizing now we can avoid the debacles of the future. HIV/AIDS’s global march has cut its swath across the continent of Africa with the island nations of the Caribbean just beginning to tumble catastrophically in its wake. Present infection rates combined with states’ inability to adequately address the pandemic in their own regions bodes poorly for other critical areas of the world: China, Russia and Indonesia appear to be next in line to suffer immense damage from this disaster with, perhaps, even more dire consequences.²⁸ The US cannot afford to wait; it cannot even hesitate to act. It is simply not enough to eliminate terrorists. Terrorism’s ultimate defeat will happen only by destroying its seeds that are firmly rooted in the chaos, disorder and vulnerability of instability.

“But Afrocentrists are right in one respect: we ignore this dying region at our own risk.”

Robert Kaplan, “The Coming Anarchy”²⁹

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²⁴ Ibid., II-2.

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ Dana Priest, The Mission: Waging War and Keeping Peace with America's Military, (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2003), 16-17.

²⁷ "Ignoring Africa Increases Terror Risk, Experts Tell Congress," Africa News Service, Inc., Africa News, 16 November 2001 http://web.lexis-nexis.com/universe/document?_m=83d5fd2d8a6caaec52e0d54ddc5ab7f6... [27 September 2002].

²⁸ David F. Gordon, National Intelligence Council Officer, cited in Donnelly.

²⁹ Kaplan, 76.

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