NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
Monterey, California

THESIS

HOW TO DEFEAT INSURGENCIES:
SEARCHING FOR A COUNTER-INSURGENCY STRATEGY

by

Michael A. Bottiglieri

December 2000

Thesis Advisor: Anna Simons
Second Reader: Gordon McCormick

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Bottiglieri, Michael A.

Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, CA 93943-5000

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Most people say that a hearts and minds campaign is the best strategy for defeating an insurgency. But there may be no one best solution applicable to countering all insurgencies. The opportunities and constraints, which affect both the insurgent and state, dictate the best strategy. I will test this hypothesis against the most difficult form of insurgency. Two Maoist insurgencies will be analyzed to determine the effect of the state’s strategy on the insurgent. Conclusions will then be drawn about the relevance of pursuing a universal counter-insurgency strategy.

While countering the Shining Path insurgency in Peru, the state employed three different strategies. In the end, the state recognized that the insurgency was elitist-based and launched a successful counter-leadership targeting campaign to defeat the insurgency. While countering the Malayan communist party insurgency in Malaya, the state employed two different strategies. In the end, the state recognized that the insurgency be limited to the ethnic Chinese community and adopted a successful campaign to separate the insurgents from the population.

Analysis of each case study clearly demonstrates the success of two different strategies against similar insurgent organizations. In Peru the insurgency was defeated thanks to an inside-out approach, while in Malaya the insurgency was defeated from the outside-in. The strategy used in Peru would not have been successful in Malaya and the same can be said of the Malayan strategy in Peru. However, the cases demonstrate the need to understand general counter-insurgency principles, before applying case specific strategies. Based on these observations, it can be concluded that just as the principles of war guide military operations, there are similar principles which bring success in counter-insurgency operations, with the important caveat that every case must be treated as unique.
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HOW TO DEFEAT INSURGENCIES:
SEARCHING FOR A COUNTER-INSURGENCY STRATEGY

Michael A. Bottiglieri,
Major, United States Army
B.B.A., Texas A&M University, 1989

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Author: Michael A. Bottiglieri

Approved by: Anna Simons, Thesis Advisor

Gordon McCormick, Second Reader

Gordon McCormick, Chairman
Special Operations Academic Group
ABSTRACT

Most people say that a hearts and minds campaign is the best strategy for defeating an insurgency. But there may be no one best solution applicable to countering all insurgencies. The opportunities and constraints, which affect both the insurgent and state, dictate the best strategy. I will test this hypothesis against the most difficult form of insurgency. Two Maoist insurgencies will be analyzed to determine the effect of the state's strategy on the insurgent. Conclusions will then be drawn about the relevance of pursuing a universal counter-insurgency strategy.

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Analysis of each case study clearly demonstrates the success of two different strategies against similar insurgent organizations. In Peru the insurgency was defeated thanks to an inside-out approach, while in Malaya the insurgency was defeated from the outside-in. The strategy used in Peru would not have been successful in Malaya and the same can be said of the Malayan strategy in Peru. However, the cases demonstrate the need to understand general counter-insurgency principles before applying case specific strategies. Based on these observations it can be concluded that, just as the principles of war guide military operations, there are similar principles which bring success in counter-insurgency operations, with the important caveat that every case must be treated as unique.
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I. INTRODUCTION

A. PURPOSE

Most people say that a hearts and minds campaign offers/represents the best strategy for defeating an insurgency. But there may be no one best solution for countering all insurgencies. The opportunities and constraints, which affect both the insurgents and the state, dictate the best strategy. I will test this hypothesis against the most difficult form of insurgency. Two Maoist insurgencies will be analyzed to determine the effect of the state's strategy on the insurgent. Conclusions will then be drawn about the relevance of pursuing a universal counter-insurgency strategy.

B. METHODOLOGY

Case study analysis is the methodology used in this thesis. The two cases used are Peru from 1980 to 1995 and Malaya from 1948 to 1960. The Peruvian case study offers three different counter-insurgency strategies and their effect on a Maoist-based insurgency. The Malayan case study involves two different counter-insurgency strategies and their effect on a Maoist-based insurgency. The range
of government strategies includes both direct and indirect assaults against the insurgent organization, its leadership, and its links to the population.

Case selection was based on three criteria: 1) were the insurgencies Maoist-based, 2) were the insurgencies internal to the country, and 3) could the insurgencies have succeeded? Ever since the Chinese revolution (1940-1950) Maoist-based insurgencies have proven to be the most difficult to defeat. Therefore, selecting Maoist-based insurgencies to study provides a very tough test to evaluate. Vietnam is probably the most documented Maoist-based insurgency in history. However, it did not meet my criteria for case selection. The Vietnam case study was thrown out because in Vietnam there was outside sponsorship, escalation to conventional war, and a government committed to fighting the insurgency with only a conventional strategy. In contrast, in Peru and Malaya there was a fair chance of success for both sides, similarly structured insurgent organizations, no outside sponsorship, and multiple strategies by which to measure the players' effectiveness.
C. ORGANIZATION OF THESIS

In Chapter II of the thesis I examine the Peruvian case, and explore three different strategies: of first attacking the insurgency directly, then indirectly with a hearts and minds campaign, and finally indirectly with a counter leadership targeting campaign. In Chapter III I analyze the Malayan case and examine the two strategies used there: of first attacking the insurgency directly, then indirectly with a population and food control campaign. Chapter IV of this thesis compares lessons learned from both case studies, determines whether the winning strategies were interchangeable, and finally draws conclusions about the relevance of a universal counter-insurgency strategy.

D. DEFINITIONS

The following are important concepts used in this thesis:

Maoist Based Insurgency:

This type of insurgency originated in China under Mao Tse-tung. Mass-oriented insurgency relies on the mobilization of very large numbers of people into an alternative government with many highly specialized political and military agencies. It bases its mobilization on a clear identification of social dysfunctions and an appealing program
for fundamental political change. The element of popular participation is such that the method can be consistent with US values and objectives. Mass-oriented insurgency combines political and military resources to attack and destroy the existing government. Therefore, organized military action will probably be a necessary part of a program to counter it. (Field Manual 100-20, Appendix D)

Direct approach to defeating an insurgency:

This concept involves the use of conventional military forces to engage guerrilla fighters using the same tactics that would be directed against another conventional force (McCormick, 2000). In the Peruvian case this is epitomized by the Argentine strategy which was used throughout Latin America in the 1960s to put down insurgencies. This strategy had military units conducting search and destroy missions in jungle areas where insurgent activity was thought to occur. This same tactic was used early on in Malaya to put pressure on large guerrilla base camps hidden in the jungle.

Outside-in approach to defeating an insurgency

This is an indirect approach to countering an insurgency which involves attacking the outside edges of an insurgent organization first (these are much easier to see
and target) and slowly working towards the center (which is very difficult to see and target) (McCormick, 2000). In Peru, President Garcia attempted to target the population of Peru first with a hearts and mind campaign that he hoped would result in the exposure of senior leadership. In Malaya, the British instituted a plan to separate the insurgents from the population via food and population control. They believed that if they controlled the population the insurgents would have no one to exploit, therefore resulting in their defeat.

Inside-out approach to defeating an insurgency

This is an indirect approach to countering an insurgency by targeting the leadership of an insurgent organization first and slowly working down to the local levels of insurgent activity (McCormick, 2000). The presumption is that if the masses have no leadership, the insurgency will fracture and lose its strategic vision, dropping it below the level of posing a real threat to those in power. In Peru, the reformed security police forces conducted a counter-leadership targeting campaign against the Shining Path. Once the leader of the Shining Path was captured, members began to turn on one another regarding the direction of the insurgency, which resulted
in the arrest of more key leaders and the inability of the organization to pose a threat to governmental authority.
II. THE PERUVIAN INSURGENCY

Map 1: Peru (From World Wide Web 11 November, 2000
The Peruvian Government’s defeat of the Shining Path’s insurgency, also known as Sendero Luminoso, offers a good example of how a short-term approach to defeating an insurgency from the inside-out can be successful. The Peruvian Government tried to attack the Shining Path via three different strategies. At first it tried to attack the manifestation of the problem with a conventional campaign (short-term direct assault). Second, a hearts and minds campaign was used (long term indirect assault). And finally, a counter-leadership targeting campaign (short-term inside-out direct assault) was used. I intend to show that an insurgency can be defeated in the short-run without the long-term benefits of social, political, and economic changes, the need for which lent legitimacy to the insurgency in the first place.

Implementation of an effective short-run strategy came only after a decade of failure in Peru. During the 1980s, both Peruvian Presidents Belaunde and Garcia failed to defeat the insurgency. The government did not make a credible effort to understand the strengths and weaknesses of the Shining Path prior to implementing a national strategy. Instead, Belaunde attempted to use the atypical Latin American counter-insurgency strategy of conventional
armed response (attacking the manifestation of the problem) while Garcia adopted the hearts and mind campaign (attacking the problem over the long-term) as used in South East Asia.

The crisis in Peru seemed to climax in 1991 when the Shining Path declared it had reached a state of strategic equilibrium with the Peruvian government and victory would come within the decade. This claim was backed up by the testimony of leading Peruvian experts during U.S. Congressional hearings in the summer of 1992.

Ironically however, just as Sendero was on the verge of victory, the strategic initiative switched back in favor of the Peruvian Government with the capture of Aleman Guzman (leader of the Shining Path) in September of 1992. By 1999 (which marked Guzman's "no later than date" for overthrow of the Peruvian Government) all the original founding fathers of the Shining Path had been either killed or captured. Sendero never recovered from these key leadership losses and its ability to pose a credible threat to the government was over.

First, I will offer a brief explanation of the preconditions leading up to the conflict. Second, I will
analyze President Belaunde’s short-term strategy of attempting to attack the manifestation of the problem with a conventional assault on Sendero and the population, otherwise called a “dirty war” (Poole, 1992, p. 6). Third, I will examine President Garcia’s long-term strategy of a hearts and mind campaign, otherwise called an “internal war” (Mauceri, 1991, p. 98). Fourth, I will demonstrate how President Fujimori executed a short-term strategy directed at defeating the Shining Path leadership, which ultimately resulted in success. Finally, conclusions will be drawn on how intelligence-driven strategy, such as counter-leadership targeting, presents an effective alternative to defeating an insurgency from the inside-out in the short-run.

A. PRECONDITIONS

During the 1970s Peru was divided along cultural, social, political, and economic lines. Culturally, the country was comprised of two Perus, the Peru of the Sierra, with roots in Indian culture, and the Peru of the coast, with roots in Spanish culture (McCormick, 1992). Socially, the country was split by a class system based primarily on race and secondary on education (Cadena, 1995).
Politically, the country had a long history of civilian subordination to the military. In the twelve years of military rule preceding the Shinning Path's insurgency the political parties of Peru were constantly co-opted by the military regime into supporting whatever policies the military leaders favored at the time. Economically, Peru retained a semi-feudal economy in the countryside, while the failed social experiment of the left-wing military dictatorship (1968-1980) created rising inflation, a large debt, and the flight of foreign investors from the country (Hinojosa, 1998, p. 66).

Analyzing these preconditions helps us understand why Aleman Guzman would have considered the use of armed conflict to be the only viable method for bringing about political change. This realization seems to have resulted from a rational decision on his part. Politically, we see Guzman break off from the Peruvian Communist Party after his disgust at its inability to bring about political change and his sense that the worldwide communist effort had lost its revolutionary appeal (Hinojosa, 1998, pp. 66-76). Once Guzman had the political justification for his effort all he needed was an ideology by which to organize his followers.
B. RELEVANCE OF CASE STUDY

Both the government and the insurgents were bound by opportunities and constraints, which gave each side an opportunity for victory. The state proved to have a formidable military force, stable government, and experience in suppressing insurgencies. The Shining Path had the social and economic preconditions necessary to add legitimacy to its armed rebellion along with a superior organizational strategy. Throughout the course of the insurgency both sides demonstrated the capability to strike at each other's weaknesses. Geographically, the state controlled the urban centers along the coast while the Shining Path had freedom of maneuver in the marginalized areas of the Sierra (Peru Country Study, 1993).

C. INSURGENT STRATEGY

Ideologically, Carlos Mariategui, a Peruvian communist during the 1940s, influenced Guzman. Guzman understood Mariategui's concept of the Peru of the coast controlling the Peru of the Sierra (McCormick, 1990, p. 4). Righting this imbalance would be the mobilizing principle behind Guzman's insurgency. Guzman would name his revolutionary organization after the Shining Path of Mariategui.
Guzman's style of Peruvian communism would come to represent a synthesis of Marxism, Leninism, Maoism and Mariateguism (McCormick, 1990, p. 4). This synthesis was characterized by the adoption of "people's war" from Mao, social purges from Joseph Stalin, Peruvian socialism from Mariategui, and communism from Karl Marx. Understanding this amalgamation gives us insight into why the organization was so violent; it borrowed violence from four different sources.

Guzman split off from the Peruvian Communist Party during the 1970s. He began his recruitment and indoctrination of his initial cadre members at the University of San Cristobal de Huamanga in the department of Ayacucho. The Shining Path would spend almost a decade building political and support bases before it began its armed struggle in 1980. Mao's three-phase strategy of "people's war" would be modified into a five-step plan.

These are (1) agitation and armed propaganda; (2) sabotage against Peru's socioeconomic system; (3) the generalization of the guerrilla struggle; (4) the conquest and expansion of the revolution's support base and the strengthening of the guerrilla army; and (5) general civil war the siege of the cities and the final collapse of the state power (McCormick, 1990, p. 15).
Following Maoist principles the Shining Path created a new revolutionary government as it worked to destroy the existing state structure. The Shining Path would penetrate villages and urban communities, set up a shadow government concealed behind front organizations, and establish support bases. Bolstered by either the active or passive support of the population, the Shining Path could then wage armed resistance to drive out what was left of the Peruvian government. Penetration initially occurred in the rural districts where the government had little or no presence and in the outlying shantytowns of the cities where impoverished and disenfranchised masses congregated (McCormick, 1990).

Guzman’s adoption of a primarily Maoist-based insurgency presented a style of insurgent warfare new to Latin America. The Shining Path maintained its five-step strategy throughout the insurgency and only changed by shifting in and out of the different phases in reaction to the government’s strategy. The violence against civilians by the Shining Path would escalate, however, negatively affecting Sendero’s relationship with the population.

Two causes can be attributed to this increase in violence. First, the loss of initial cadre members and...
recruitment of younger, less educated local commanders or “mandos” (Pino, 1998. P. 169) shifted Sendero’s violence from selective targeting to mass punishment against anyone suspected of being, or being related to, a government informant (Degregori, 1998, p. 134). Additionally, Guzman himself called for an overall increase in violence in 1983 in an attempt to increase the amount of government retaliation. I will later argue that it was this violence which created an opportunity for the government to win the hearts and minds campaign against Sendero in certain districts.

D. POLICE ACTION STRATEGY

Past Peruvian insurgencies had been more of the “foco” or Cuban style insurgency and quick retaliation by Army troops provided the strategic answer to the problem of violence. President Belaunde (President from 1980 to 1985) developed his strategy of a conventional assault on the Shining Path given Peru’s past experiences. Belaunde’s conventional strategy was to first use police and then military forces to hunt down and kill or capture all guerilla forces in the field. He recognized the guerilla
army as the problem and believed its destruction would result in the end of the insurgency.

The organizational and resource mobilization capabilities of the insurgency were not addressed by the Belaunde strategy. Limiting the strategy to attrition warfare in an environment where preconditions favored the insurgent doomed President Belaunde’s strategy from the start. Belaunde sought to defeat the Shining Path in the short-run and failed to recognize that the Shining Path could mobilize resources faster than the government could destroy resources.

Early on President Belaunde attempted to dismiss the Shining Path as a criminal movement. He failed to identify it as an insurgency. He could not believe an insurgency was possible with the return of Peru to civilian control from the military in the early 1980s. Therefore, Belaunde considered the Shining Path to be a group of banditos, who could easily be rounded up by the local police forces.

President Belaunde gave the responsibility of defeating the Shining Path to the Ministry of the Interior from 1980 to 1983. During this period, the Peruvian Government was more focused on outside threats to its
national security rather than on domestic threats (Hudson, p. 278-289). As a consequence, the Shining Path was misdiagnosed as a "foco" type of insurgency made up of a small cadre which was sponsored by an outside force (Poole, 1992, p. 5 & Mauceri, 1991, p. 93).

E. EFFECTS OF POLICE ACTION STRATEGY

The unintended effect of assigning the Shining Path problem to the police was to allow the Shining Path freedom of maneuver in all areas where the state had little or no presence. Worse, the police forces proved unable to deal with the Shining Path during this period, in large part because they were poorly paid, trained, equipped, and supported (Hudson, p. 294-302). The Shining Path took advantage of police weaknesses and conducted several assassinations of policemen in Ayacucho district during this period and its efforts to undermine the Government dramatically increased.

Two leading Sendero experts have gathered statistical evidence to demonstrate this point. Data provided from Nelson Manrique's analysis of the "War for the Central Sierra" demonstrates that political violence in the Ayacucho district rose from around 50 acts to over 400
between 1980 and 1983 (Manrique, 1995, pp. 194-195). Gordon McCormick’s RAND analysis of Sendero’s attacks supports this data by showing an increase in Sendero actions countrywide, from under 250 to around 2000 during this same period, see figure 1 (McCormick, 1992, p. 21). Therefore, during the period when they were being directly assaulted by police forces the Shining Path experienced an almost 400% growth rate in violence and activity.

F. "DIRTY WAR" STRATEGY

With the situation in the district of Ayacucho worsening and Sendero activities beginning to increase in Lima, Belaunde turned to the military to stop the insurgency in 1982 (Mauceri, 1991 p. 90). General Clemente Noel Moral was placed in charge of the Ayacucho emergency zone and was granted complete political and military authority. His counterinsurgency strategy consisted of direct punishment of all persons suspected of being, or supporting, guerrillas.

This internal war strategy was copied from the Argentine approach to counterinsurgency, which proved effective during the 1960s. The short-term effects of General Clemente’s strategy led to a sharp drop in Shining
Path attacks in both the Ayacucho district and Lima (see McCormick and Manrique graphs). The unintended consequence of the strategy, however, was an extreme distrust and hatred of the military by the local population.

G. EFFECTS OF "DIRTY WAR" STRATEGY

The immediate effect on the Shining Path was the death of many of the university cadre initially trained by Guzman in the Ayacucho district. The Shining Path retreated from areas of government control to new areas where the government forces were absent. Also, new, less experienced cadre had to be recruited to replace the key leaders killed or captured during the government's dirty war. Many people in areas vacated by guerrilla forces felt a sense of betrayal and abandonment after the withdrawal of insurgent forces.

The government did not follow up on this opportunity created by the Shining Path's departure. Instead of pacifying of the abandoned population the military's harsh retaliation led to Peru rising to the top of the international communities human rights abuse list, thus further alienating the Belaunde Regime from both the local and international community. Belaunde's strategy, although
initially successful at reducing the ability of the Shining Path to mobilize resources in specific local areas, increased the Shining Path's overall ability to mobilize resources across the entire country. The five years following the Belaunde crackdown would see Shining Path activities more than double countrywide (see figure 3).

H. HEARTS AND MINDS STRATEGY

President Garcia came to power in 1985 by running on a platform aimed at reducing the brutality and corruption of the Belaunde regime. Garcia's strategy was to win the hearts and minds of the Peruvian people. This strategy can only be implemented over the long term and insurgents can make its implementation difficult by their continuing attack on infrastructure and commerce. Garcia ran his presidential campaign on a platform of social, economic, and military reforms to end the internal unrest. However, it turns out President Garcia did not have the economic, political, or military backing to sufficiently prosecute a hearts and mind campaign against the Shining Path. The Garcia years would prove to see the corruption and violence increase within the government, therefore creating an opportunity for the Shining Path to gain power.
Upon taking office President García relieved the commander of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, commander of the Second Military Region, and the commander of the Ayacucho emergency district in an effort to repair the damaged civil/military relationship which resulted from the repressive tactics used by the military under Belaunde. However, the military was itself divided about how to defeat the insurgency. Some officers supported the García “developmentalist” approach while others still firmly believed in the “dirty war” tactics of Belaunde. Inconsistencies in how each general conducted counterinsurgency operations in his emergency zone provided evidence of this split (Mauceri, 99). Without unity of effort the military continued its retaliatory punishment against prisoners and villagers, reinforcing the civilian distrust of the military, and therefore increasing the Shining Path’s ability to mobilize more resources.

García made a small attempt to attack the Shining Path’s organizational and resource mobilization capabilities through a peasant mobilization effort. But it is evident that García did not fully support this short-term approach because it was never sufficiently funded.
In an effort to promote a more robust civil defense and to separate the insurgents from the population, President Garcia reinstated the Ronda program in rural Peru. The Rondas were an organization of villagers who banded together to protect local communities against cattle rustlers and bandits during the 1970s and 1980s in Northern Peru (Starn, 1998, p. 235). However, no weapons or training were provided to the villagers identified as new Rondas. Consequently, the Rondas fell prey to retaliation by the Shining Path for collaborating with the government.

To make matters worse, these vigilante groups with no military supervision or training began to settle old feuds with retaliatory strikes against competing villagers and families. The program was thus easily accused of turning the insurgency into a peasant war. With the Ronda program only being supported in principle it tended to do more harm than good.

I. EFFECTS OF HEARTS & MINDS STRATEGY

As it turned out, Garcia’s long-term hearts and mind strategy not only proved ineffective but actually granted the Shining Path even more freedom of maneuver. Overall, Sendero actions increased from 1500 to 3500 during the
Garcia administration’s five-year tenure, from 1985 to 1990 (see figure 1, p. 33). Manrique’s data also supports McCormick’s RAND statistics showing increased attacks throughout all districts in the Central Region (see figure 3, p. 35). The data sets demonstrate the Shining Path’s readiness to enter Stage Five of its overall strategy to gain control: “general civil war, the siege of the cities, and the final collapse of state power” (McCormick, 1990, p. 15).

The Shining Path gained two advantages over the Peruvian Government by increasing its action in Lima during Garcia’s tenure. First, government forces would have to divert resources to deal with the increased threat in Lima, therefore creating even more freedom of maneuver in rural Peru. Second, Lima’s geographic and economic dependence on two major road networks presented the Shining Path with an opportunity to isolate the capital from the rest of Peru (McCormick, 1992).

By clearly failing to win the hearts and minds of the Peruvian people or inhibit the expansion of the Shining Path the Garcia strategy actually enabled the Shining Path to increase all facets of its operations and the capital city of Lima found itself precariously close to becoming 23
isolated from the rest of Peru. The shantytowns surrounding Lima, although patrolled by the government during the day, became Shining Path strongholds during the night. Slowly the Shining Path had worked its way from the marginal areas of the Sierra to the doorstep of government power in Lima. Tired of the empty promises and corruption of the Garcia Regime, the people of Peru elected a man of mixed origin, President Fujimori, to office.

J. INSIDE-OUT STRATEGY

President Fujimori based his election campaign on uniting the country to stop government corruption and the insurgency. After the election in 1991, Fujimori moved to consolidate power and reduce the restraints placed on the government's intelligence and police forces. It can be shown that Fujimori's top advisor, Vlandemire Mostestino, recognized that the Shining Path was dependent on its senior leadership for organization of its strategic operations. The Shining Path was therefore vulnerable to an internal collapse if the senior leadership could be taken out (inside-out strategy).

The key to this inside-out strategy was being able to get intelligence about the inner workings of the Shining
The official counter-insurgency policy of the Fujimori Regime was a four-step plan very similar to an outside-in strategy. The plan called for the consolidation of government power, protection of key infrastructure, engagement of Shining Path main force units, and social/economic reforms (QueHacer, 1991, pp. 45-50). At the same time, it can also be shown that the government waged an unofficial campaign to kill or capture top Sendero leaders. I will show how the counter leadership campaign destroyed the inner vanguard of the organization, subsequently dealing it a blow from which it could not recover.

Direct correlations can be seen between key arrests of top Sendero leadership in 1992, 1995, 1997 and 1999 and the shrinkage of Shining Path's influence from five regions.
encompassing virtually the entire country, to two small regions - the Huallaya Valley and the capital city of Lima. By the year 2000, only one member of the original Central Committee (a.k.a. Artimo) who had strategic control over Sendero remained at-large.

Once in power, Fujimori moved quickly to combat the insurgency. In an effort to gain unity of effort he disbanded Congress in a 1991 auto coup and appointed Vlandemire Mostestinos leader of DINOCTE, the Peruvian counter-terrorist forces as head of the counter-insurgency effort. He enacted new counter-terrorism laws, which greatly reduced individual freedoms in the emergency zones and granted the military judicial power over all persons accused of subversive activities.

This auto coup enabled Mostestinos and his counter-subversive forces to have unrestricted control to conduct operations. Having been trained by the CIA on subversive and counter-subversive operations, and given his training as a military intelligence officer during the insurgency, Mostestinos had the tools necessary to devise an effective plan to attack the Sendero leadership. A free hand to spy on the Peruvian people and the ability to incarcerate people with minimal probable cause gave the national
security forces an effective means for extracting intelligence from an unwilling population. Reshaping and retraining intelligence and police forces to cooperate with each other enabled the national security forces to efficiently and effectively analyze and process this new found intelligence.

In an effort to gain intelligence from a willing population, Fujimori’s counter-insurgency forces understood they had to be able to protect the population, thereby lowering the opportunity costs of supporting the government and raising the opportunity costs of supporting the insurgents. Having a limited amount of resources (government forces) and a large area to cover Fujimori reshaped the Ronda program to meet this need.

The Ronda program was made more effective by the actual arming and training of Ronda and civil defense forces. President Fujimori enhanced government and popular support for the program by actually visiting and praising Ronda members in an effort to re-instill national pride among the people. Weary of abuse by both the government and the Shining Path, peasants felt safer when armed and working collectively.
A credible effort was also made to bolster the perception that the government and Ronda forces were working together in an effort to create stability. Not just words but actual assistance by the military helped make this a short-term reality rather than simply a long-term goal. The military was directed to conduct civic action programs in the emergency zones, such as rebuilding schools and hospitals. Districts that were considered emergency zones received first priority for supplies and money for these programs. Human rights abuses dropped off and a campaign to retrain ex-Shining Path members was reinstated. The retraining and reintroduction of former Shining Path members back into society offered a return to normalcy for a population tired of war (Trumble, 2000).

A pro-government propaganda campaign was launched to raise the image of the government while undermining the image of the Shining Path. Parades including military, police, Ronda and new, pro-government front organizations were conducted in an effort to revitalize national unity. Former Shining Path members read statements condemning the war and tapes of senior Sendero leaders were shown around the country in an effort to undermine their credibility. Counter-propaganda campaigns were launched to discredit
reports from pro-Shining Path newspapers. Literature was disseminated full of statistics about government victories, including descriptions of the capture of senior Shining Path leaders (Trumble, 2000).

Under Mostestinos the entire counter-insurgency effort seemed to support Mostestinos’ goal of attacking Sendero’s leadership. The police and Ronda forces provided the defensive capability of protecting government infrastructure and the population, thereby allowing other government forces the freedom of maneuver to attack Sendero. By pressuring Sendero military columns in emergency zones the military fixed Sendero’s leadership on waging a war of attrition instead of a Maoist peoples’ war. The Peruvian intelligence forces worked to gain entry into the core of the Shining Path in order to provide DINOCTE (Peruvian counter-terrorist forces) the information required to apprehend the senior leadership (Peru Country Study, 1993).

DINOCTE was the main instrument Mostestinos and Fujimori used to wage the war on Sendero. DINOCTE was able to capture two key videotapes of top Sendero leaders in 1991 and 1995, which allowed government officials and intelligence specialist to put faces to the previously
invisible core of the Shining Path. DINOCTE also displayed considerable patience and restraint by waiting until several top officials were identified before launching seizure operations. The wisdom of this is evidenced in the high concentration of top Sendero members nabbed in each operation. Finally, DINOCTE proved very effective in extracting key information from captured Sendero prisoners. Each capture would lead to more names, revealed more about Sendero’s methods, and the whereabouts of the perpetrators behind the Shining Path.

K. EFFECTS OF INSIDE-OUT STRATEGY

The Fujimori strategy proved very effective in reducing the ability of the Shining Path to mobilize resources in support of the insurgency. As stated earlier, the Shining Path would be reduced from operating effectively over the entire country to only being able to operate in two small regions. On a consistent basis, starting with the capture of Abimael Guzman on September 16, 1992, DINOCTE was able to apprehend those who inherited the leadership from him. Additionally, Fujimori was able to get Guzman to urge his followers to give up the armed conflict and sign a peace agreement with the government. According to Peruvian newspapers and government reports,
Guzman’s peace proclamation caused the a new armed faction, dubbed the Red Path, to split from the Shining Path once the original body ended its combat operations. The leader of the Red Path, Alberto Ramirez Durand (a.k.a. Feliciano) would subsequently be captured in July of 1999.

The capture of Guzman and the propaganda campaign to prove him mortal seems to have had the greatest impact on breaking the will of the insurgency. Guzman was clearly the political entrepreneur behind the success of the Shining Path. While many tried to fill Guzman’s shoes no one was sufficiently capable or in power long enough to operate at the same level of effectiveness. Keeping Guzman in prison and strictly controlling and manipulating his correspondence with the outside world successfully put the Shining Path into a state of limbo. An emergency revolutionary committee was formed to deal with the leadership void. However, continual pressure by the government forced the Shining Path on the defensive and, more importantly, raised the opportunity costs for supporting the insurgency exponentially.
L. CONCLUSIONS

Three different Peruvian Presidents tried three different strategies for destroying the Shining Path insurgency. In the end, President Fujimori's campaign of counter leadership targeting proved an effective method for defeating the insurgency. In order for this inside-out strategy to work, the government needed detailed intelligence on the inner workings and leadership of the Shining Path. The keys to winning the intelligence battle proved to be unity of effort, manipulating opportunity costs, and the restructuring of counter-insurgency forces to support one another. With detailed intelligence in hand, DINOCCTE consistently captured top Sendero leadership, destroying their myth of invulnerability and subsequently bringing about the collapse of the organization from the inside-out.
Sendero Armed Actions in Peru, 1980 to 1990

Figure 1: Sendero Armed Actions in Peru, 1980 to 1990
(From McCormick, 1992, p21)
Figure 2: Sendero Armed Actions by Area, 1980 to 1990 (From McCormick, 1992, p. 21)
Figure 3: Sendero Armed Actions in Peru, 1980 to 1990
(Data taken from Mauceri, p 195)
III. THE MALAYAN INSURGENCY

Map 1: Malayan Peninsula 1948-1960 (From Thompson, 1966, p 46)
The British and Malayan Governments' defeat of the Malayan Communist Party, also know as the MCP, offers a good example of how to defeat an insurgency from the outside-in. Even though government forces prepared for a long-run solution to the insurgency, I will argue that the insurgency was defeated in the short-run once the outside in strategy was employed. This victory would come before long-term programs, such as economic, social, and cultural reforms designed to win the hearts and minds of the people, had time to take effect.

The British and Malayan response can be divided into four phases lasting from 1948 until 1960, when the last remaining members of the MCP surrendered. First, the government confronted the insurgency head-on, contesting guerrilla units in the field, which forced the insurgency deeper underground. Second, when the crisis entered its critical stage in 1950, General Briggs laid out the guidelines for defeating the insurgency from the outside-in which stabilized the situation. Third, General Templer, in 1952, would turn the tide of the insurgency by exploiting Briggs' success and shifting government security forces and momentum to the offense against the MCP. Finally, with the insurgency in remission in 1954, General Bourne continued
Templer's offensive actions with the systematic clearance of remaining MCP holdouts (Komer, 1972, pp. 17-22).

I will demonstrate the effectiveness of the outside-in strategy employed by the British by examining the cause-and-effect relationship between the British and Malayan Governments' responses and their correlating effects on the MCP. Prior to the cause and effect analysis, I will offer background information on the crisis by describing the preconditions leading up to the insurgency, and in the course of this describe the strategy employed by the Malayan Communist Party. The cause-and-effect argument will highlight General Boucher's response of 1948, General Briggs' response of 1950, General Templer's response of 1952, and finally General Bourne's response of 1954. Conclusions will be drawn about why the development of the outside-in strategy proved to be effective for this insurgency.

A. PRECONDITIONS

The Japanese occupation of Malaya during World War II damaged the Malayan infrastructure, the Malayan economy and British credibility in the region. After the defeat of the Japanese, Great Britain moved slowly to reestablish its
presence in the region. Therefore, the power vacuum in the aftermath of World War II created an opportunity for the Malayan Communist Party to seize power.

The Japanese occupation of Malaya crippled a once prosperous British colony. A Japanese military dictatorship replaced government and police authority. Malaya's rubber and tin industries were redirected to support the Japanese war effort. A longstanding hatred and mistreatment of the Chinese by the Japanese caused a flood of ethnic Chinese refugees to pour into rural Malaya. During these hard times the Malayan Communist Party (the MCP) provided the only form of organized resistance against the Japanese (Thompson, 1967, p. 24).

With the defeat of the Japanese, it was difficult for the Malayan government to reestablish law and order. It did not have the money or the infrastructure to accomplish this on its own. In many communities, the MCP was the controlling authority, providing stability to the population. The British made an attempt to disarm the MCP's standing army, the Malayan Peoples Against Japan Army (MPAJA). This effort proved unsuccessful as the MPAJA maintained its stockpile of weapons in preparation for the war against the British. Perhaps the most difficult
barrier to reestablishing order was dealing with the dislocated ethnic Chinese squatters who had become refugees during the war.

Successful infiltration of the Chinese community by the MCP was made possible by the major cultural, social, political, and social differences between ethnic Chinese and Malayans. Differences arose along both ethnic and class lines. About one third of the total population was ethnic Chinese at the outset of the insurgency. Many Chinese were immigrants and, as such, retained close family ties. Secret societies formed social networks unique to the Chinese community, which made underground organization a possibility. Politically, the Chinese did not have a strong representation in Malayan politics and the British favored the Malayans in dealing with the administrative running of the country. Economically, the Chinese demonstrated a tireless work ethic by dominating the rubber, tin and merchant industries, while the Malayans preferred to live a less intense life of subsistence farming (Komer, 1972, p. 6).

Post-World War II Malaya provided an environment conducive to insurgency. The government and the economy were severely weakened by Japanese occupation, which gave
the insurgents a vulnerable opponent. The jungle and mountainous environment comprising 90% of the country provided the insurgents with a place to hide. Diminished British credibility in the region gave the insurgents nationalistic appeal. Lastly, a dislocated and disgruntled Chinese squatter population gave the insurgents a support base to exploit.

B. RELEVANCE OF CASE STUDY

Both the government and the Malayan Communist Party were bound by opportunities and constraints which evened out any advantage one side had over the other. Both sides looked as though they might be victorious at different periods during the insurgency. Early on, from 1945 until 1950, the MCP had the advantage. Later on, from 1950 until 1960, the Malayan government (with British help) would have the advantage. Both Richard Clutterbuck and Sir Richard Thompson, without question the two most knowledgeable experts on the subject, have argued that the Malayan Communist Party had the potential to overthrow the Malayan government from a period lasting from 1945 until 1950 (Thompson, 1967, p. 24).
C. **INSURGENT STRATEGY**

The Malayan Communist Party followed two different communist insurgency models. Lai Tek, a rumored double agent for the British became Secretary General of the MCP in 1939 and modeled the MCP on the Russian Communist Party. Lai Tek focused the party's activities on labor organization and subversion in Singapore. Lai Tek was head of the MCP until 1947, when Chin Peng, a military leader of the MPAJ during World War II, replaced him (Clutterbuck, 1977, pp. 45-55). Chin Peng, more accustomed to open insurgency, followed a Maoist-based strategy. His plan was to liberate areas along the jungle fringes, establish free zones, and finally move with a people's army against the state (Clutterbuck, 1966, p. 44).

The two strategies employ different tactics for mobilizing the masses. The Russian strategy centered on a spontaneous uprising instigated by a vanguard which would infiltrate the labor unions and urban centers. In contrast, the Maoist strategy centered on the systematic takeover of the country through the establishment of liberated areas instigated by a vanguard which would infiltrate the village and rural centers.
The Malayan Communist Party was formed in 1927 based on the Russian Communist Model. It was a legal party at the time and its membership was almost entirely limited to ethnic Chinese (Padget, 1967, p 43). The political, cultural, and social differences outlined earlier seem to be the cause of the limited support by ethnic Malayans. Because of the secretive nature and the organizational abilities of the communist party the MCP was able to survive Japanese occupation during World War II.

The British, constrained by the circumstances of war, reluctantly assisted the Malayan Communist Party during the war with Japan. It was during this period that the newly formed Malayan Peoples Against Japan Army (MPAJA) seized the opportunity to prepare for an insurgency not against the Japanese but against their former colonial rulers, the British. The MPAJA would kill more Chinese civilians during the war than the Japanese, in essence eliminating any political opposition within its own community. Large quantities of the arms and ammunition provided by the British during the war were hidden away in jungle caches for use at a later date. The MPAJA would later be named the Malayan Races Liberation Army (MRLA) by Chen Peng as he
unveiled his plan to openly oppose the recognized Malayan government in 1948 (Joes, 1996, p. 84).

Initially, the MCP kept political and military operations separate. At the center of the organization was the Central Committee Secretary General in control of the Politburo and Military High Command. The political side was then broken down into state committees, district committees, branch committees, and lastly mass organizations (political front organizations and independent cells). The military side was broken down into regiments, companies, and platoons. After 1949 Chen Peng consolidated the political and military chains of command in a defensive move against British reaction to the insurgency. The state committee controlled the regiment, the district the company, and the branch the platoon (Clutterbuck, 1973, p. 171).

The Communist Party was linked to the population through the Min Chong Yuen Tong (Min Yuen), known as the People’s Movement. The Min Yuen was a network of sympathizers not yet in the Communist Party, who provided supplies and information to the Malayan Races Liberation Army (MRLA) (Sunderland, 1964a, p. 79). In Singapore, the
MCP was linked to the people through a series of open and secret organizations. Examples of MCP open organizations were trade unions, women's organizations, and student organizations. Examples of MCP secret organizations were the anti-British League (ABL), MCP sympathizer cells, and the traditional Chinese Secret Societies in place before the insurgency. The secret organizations were responsible for intelligence, recruitment, and agitation (Clutterbuck, 1973, p. 58-68). After the communist party was declared illegal the entire operation went underground.

D. INITIAL RESPONSE

The British had experience in sponsoring and countering insurgencies in Africa, Asia, the Middle East, and the Mediterranean prior to the crisis in Malaya (Sunderland, 1964a, p 30). Based on these past experiences the first response by the British was to attack the insurgency directly through the use of conventional military operations and population control. Military units were tasked to pressure the MRLA in the jungle, police units were tasked with population control, and paramilitary units were tasked with protection of infrastructure. However, command and control of the counter-insurgency
effort was not unified, leaving each civil/military
commander responsible for his own actions and planning. Additionally, prior British success in counter-insurgency operations may have led to underestimation of the MCP’s capabilities. Major General Boucher, in command of the Malaya district during this time, underestimated the time and effort it would take to defeat the MCP (Komer, 1972, p 17).

The MCP proved much more effective than General Boucher estimated as it launched a campaign of terror against foreign businessmen, workers in the tin and rubber industries, and government officials. The severity of these attacks culminated with the assassination of two high level British subjects working in the rubber industry. A State of Emergency was quickly declared under pressure from political leaders back in Great Britain. The Emergency regulations primarily dealt with population control measures. They included regulations for the detention of people for up to two years without trial, the death penalty for illegal weapon possession or guerrilla assistance and, most importantly, the issuance of identification cards to all people over the age of twelve (Clutterbuck, 1966, pp. 35-40).
The police force, depleted during World War II, was primarily responsible for controlling and protecting the population. However, severe expansion and training of additional police and security forces was needed before this goal could be realistically met. Great Britain brought in Mr. W. N. Gray as Commissioner of Police based on his successful operational experience in Palestine (Sunderland, 1964d, p 22). Although senior leadership in the police forces was now qualified to respond to the crisis it would take time to reestablish the credibility of the police (which had existed prior to World War II).

Additional Gurka and British units were dispatched to Malaya in response to the crisis. The plan was to conduct large-scale offensive operations instead of remaining in static defensive positions. These tactics had proven successful during operations conducted in Burma. The intent was to destroy large MRLA formations in the field and prevent the guerrillas from being able to mass against targets of opportunity. Battalions would deploy to troubled sectors and conduct search and attack operations until MRLA activity would drop off (Sunderland, 1964a, pp. 126).
E. EFFECT OF INITIAL RESPONSE

The MCP's strategic objectives were not affected by the initial British and Malayan counter-insurgency strategy. Attempts to undermine the government through attacks on infrastructure and the population continued to increase. What the initial response did do to the insurgency was to force MCP leadership to disperse and decentralize operations. Militarily, the MRLA switched from battalion-size operations to small unit operations. Politically, the MCP expanded its illicit organization of the population in support of the insurgency.

Initially, the MRLA (the military wing or the MCP) used the same successful guerrilla tactics against the British as it did in World War II against the Japanese. The concept was centered on large guerrilla formations conducting operations out of base camps of up to 300 personnel hidden within the jungle. Within a year (1948-1949) the MRLA expanded from eight to ten regiments based on its ability to extract resources from the Chinese squatter population and stay one step ahead of the British militarily.
In 1949 the MCP realized a nationalistic uprising against the British was not possible due to limited support within the ethnic Malayan community. Chen Peng changed the political strategy of the insurgency to mirror the Chinese Maoist based model instead of the Russian based revolutionary model. The Maoist model was more attractive because the MCP was able to establish a foothold within the Chinese squatter community and the MRLA had experienced success against the Japanese with operations conducted in the peripheral areas of Malaya (Clutterbuck, 1973, pp. 170-171).

MRLA tactical operations were decentralized in a precautionary effort against attacks on the large jungle base camps. Most battalion and brigade-size British search and attack operations resulted in minimal or no MRLA casualties. If large size security forces moved into a region, MRLA tactical operations would quiet down while MCP recruitment and indoctrination efforts continued. This tactic gave the illusion of government forces having an immediate effect while in reality the size and support of the MCP was growing. Increased attacks and the ability of the MCP to stay one step ahead of the security forces prompted a heated debate within the British military about
the effectiveness of large unit versus small unit military operations in an insurgency (Sunderland, 1964a, pp. 126-137).

The Min Yuen provided a key link between the population and the insurgents. The Min Yuen provided supplies and recruits to the MRLA and intelligence and recruits for the MCP. Security forces made no concentrated effort to undermine the Min Yuen during these early years. Left unchecked, Min Yuen operations resulted in the MRLA growing faster than security forces could inflict casualties and allowed the MCP to maintain a shadow government within the Chinese squatter communities. Politically, the government could not appeal to the Chinese squatter community and, militarily, police forces could not protect or control the community. These failures allowed the MCP to win the battle for money, men, supplies, and information from the squatter communities, which subsequently meant the MCP was winning the war. Additionally, China would fall to Mao Tse-tung in 1949 giving the MCP a moral boost while instilling a sense of urgency in the British high command (Clutterbuck, 1966, pp. 55-56).
F. THE BRIGGS PLAN

In April 1950, Lt. General Sir Harold Briggs, a successful counter-insurgency commander in Burma, was appointed as Director of Operations for Malaya. This was a new position, under the High Commissioner in charge of Malaya, whereby the Director of Operations was granted operational but not supreme control over all civil and military forces in Malaya. Briggs would attempt to defeat the insurgency from the outside-in through a series of programs, which came to be known as the Briggs Plan.

Several counter-insurgency experts credit Briggs' principles as necessary conditions for defeating an insurgency. The four principles of the Briggs Plan were: 1) separation of the insurgents from the population, 2) unity of effort, 3) quality intelligence, and 4) small unit operations. More importantly, Briggs realized the insurgency was based on the insurgents, their link with the people, and the people themselves. Briggs' principles targeted each part of the insurgency and at the same time offered the population security. In order to implement his plan and allow it time to work, Briggs realized the counter-insurgency effort needed to be shifted to the defensive. Once the situation was stabilized, then
security forces could resume their efforts to turn back the tide of the insurgency. Unfortunately, Briggs would leave Malaya before both government and insurgent forces would feel the effects of his plan (Komer, 1972, p. 19).

In an effort to separate the insurgents from the population Briggs implemented the relocation and resettlement of Chinese squatter populations from the jungle fringes to locations away from the jungle. The new villages were secure compounds guarded by police and military forces. The villages were not concentration camps, but offered the squatters (who had no real land security previously) an opportunity to gain title to land and have a voice in local politics. Villager accountability was further cemented through the establishment of the Home Guard program. This program made the villagers responsible for the defense of their community over time. This was essential for getting the ethnic Chinese who had previously stayed away from government service to join with the government against the insurgency (Sunderland, 1964c, pp. 35-36).

Military forces were now dispersed throughout Malaya at the state and district levels by the end of 1951, as the security forces shifted to small unit operations. The
enemy was no longer considered to be the decisive point of the insurgency. Instead, people occupied this position. By placing security forces with the population and by training the population to defend itself the insurgents were forced back into the jungle. Briggs wanted engagements to occur in the areas between the population centers and the jungle, instead of deep in the jungle. Since the insurgents relied on the people for food and supplies they were forced to return to the population when their resources ran out. As a consequence, the army no longer had to pursue the insurgents; the insurgents came to the army (Sunderland, 1964c, pp. 38).

G. EFFECTS OF BRIGG’S PLAN

The population control, food control, and small unit operations around the relocated squatter villages severely disrupted the MRLA’s logistics lines and made the MRLA fight to the security forces strength. The population control measures kept the MCP out of the villages through the use of ID cards and checkpoints. The food control measures kept rice from reaching the MRLA forces in the jungle. Once food supplies ran out the MRLA units had to risk firefight with British military patrols around the
villages in order to eat. MRLA units could no longer replace combat losses easily without access to the villages. Indirectly, the MCP strategy was shifted to regaining access to the Chinese squatter villages (Sunderland, 1964c, p. 64).

Despite a shift in the balance of power as the Briggs Plan began to take effect, there was a dramatic increase in violence in 1951. The increase in violence was a direct reflection of the MRLA's effort to regain their lost momentum. Additionally, the negative effects of mass punishment against government supporters by the MCP began to cause some animosity within the Chinese community towards the MCP. In reaction to this animosity, Chen Peng shifted MCP mass punishment tactics to direct targeting of enemies of the revolution. The 1951 MCP shift in tactics resulted in the death of the British High Commissioner, Sir Henry Gurney. This assassination provided a small tactical victory for the MCP. However, the MCP would win no strategic victories such as establishment of liberated zones or military defeats over security forces during this period (Clutterbuck, 1973, pp. 180-186).

The MCP attempted to block resettlement through threats of violence and attacks on resettled villages.
However, by 1951 most of the resettlement was complete. Frustrated by the unwillingness of the majority of the Chinese community to openly support the insurgency, the MCP realized the negative effects of its terror campaign against the people. The MCP Central Committee issued a directive in October of 1951 ordering the retreat from terrorism to acts of subversion by directing its acts of violence against selected government sympathizers and officials instead of economic targets and resettled villages (Clutterbuck, 1966, p. 63).

H. THE TEMPLER PLAN

General Sir Gerald Templer was appointed both High Commissioner and Director of Operations in February of 1952 after the assassination of Sir Gurney and General Briggs' tour of duty had expired. Templer exploited the opportunities created by the Briggs Plan. With the MRLA kept in check thanks to the resettlement and food control programs, Templer could afford to focus the security force's efforts on the elimination of the MCP party structure. With the situation having been stabilized by Briggs, Templer could now move to the offensive (Clutterbuck, 1966, p. 86).
Templer consolidated the intelligence-gathering effort by both the military and police forces under the existing police Special Branch. Reorganization within the Special Branch created an intelligence division paralleling the MCP's military and political organization and activities whereas previously it was organized to contend with criminal activity. Profiles and pattern analysis were now done on the MCP leaders and units, which helped the authorities map the underground networks linking the communists with the people. Military forces which were experiencing success engaging MRLA patrols, as they attempted to gain access to the villages, could now be directed against jungle camps which had been identified thanks to the detailed intelligence coming out of the police Special Branch (Sunderland, 1964b, pp. 19-25).

Templer's second and arguably greatest contribution to the counter-insurgency effort was the establishment of White Areas. A White Area was designated a Malayan district or series of districts where the Government's Special Branch believed the MCP political organization to have been undermined and where MCP military forces were destroyed. Once an area was considered White, Emergency Regulations where lifted and extra food rations were
allocated. If MCP activity resumed in a White Area, full
Emergency Regulations would go back into effect.
Throughout the insurgency no area that had been declared
White ever returned to the status of Black (Clutterbuck,

I. EFFECT OF THE TEMPLE PLAN

Templer clearly took the initiative away from the MCP,
which was never able to recover. For the two year period
Templer was in charge, two thirds of the MRLA was
eliminated, insurgent attacks decreased, and security force
casualties decreased. In an effort to survive the MCP
decentralized all of its military operations down to the
level of district committee. Chin Peng eventually moved
the Central Committee across the border to a base camp in
Thailand to avoid potential capture. However, MCP
organization and the Min Yuen still remained intact
throughout much of the country (Clutterbuck, 1973, pp. 195-
199).

The White Area program put the MCP on the defensive.
In Black Areas where the government began its clearing
operations the insurgents were forced to either fight or
flee. Almost always the insurgents fled and subsequent
measures were taken to prevent the insurgents from reentering the newly declared White Areas. Reentry was prevented by government security and civil defense programs, which made supporting the government a much more attractive alternate than supporting the insurgents. Additionally, food rations were increased in White Areas and the unpopular Emergency regulations were lifted. With limited resources the White Area Program could only work so fast, however, the MCP was able to continue to operate in an effort to survive.

J. THE BOURNE PLAN

General Bourne, second in command under Templer, was appointed Director of Operations in the summer of 1954. General Bourne did not deviate from his predecessor's outside-in strategy. He improved the efficiency of operations by redirecting the White Area Program to attack the insurgents' weak areas first and then move, with momentum built, to the harder areas. Additionally, psychological operations were conducted to encourage the surrender of insurgents, pacify the neutral population and reinforce the optimism of government supporters (Komer, 1972, p. 21).
The British began moves towards Malayan independence under Templer and in 1955 independence became a reality. Great Britain still remained a close ally and protector, directing the counter-insurgency effort and economic recovery of the country. However, many of the pre-conditions which provided the communists with an opportunity to expand were eliminated with Malayan independence.

K. EFFECT OF THE BOURNE PLAN

It would take six years for the White Area Strategy to force the last of the MCP hard-liners deep into the jungle along the Thai border. In 1955, in response to Malaya's independence and the elimination of the insurgency's cause of ending Britain's rule, Chin Peng reached out for peace. The new Malayan Government under Tunku Abdul Rahman offered acceptable terms except for the legal recognition of the Malayan Communist Party. Chin Peng withdrew to the jungle determined to die for the Communist cause. At this time only 2000 insurgents remained concentrated into three Black Areas (Clutterbuck, 1966, pp. 135-138).

By 1960 the two remaining Black Area's in Northern Malaya were cleared and Chin Peng remained alone in his
sanctuary in Thailand. Thanks to the surrender of the MCP party boss in each of the two Black Areas the entire underground network could be rolled up. Local surrenders were kept secret to prevent the Central Committee from reestablishing underground ties to the community until it was too late. Once the entire network was eliminated ties to the population were effectively severed. To make the situation even more damaging to Cheng Peng, the Central Committee was kept in the dark about the Police Special Branch successes in the two Black Areas for up to six months (Clutterbuck, 1966, pp. 165-173).

I. CONCLUSIONS

Two different strategies were used to defeat the Malayan Communist Party. In the end, General Briggs' vision of separating the insurgents from the population (the outside-in strategy) proved an effective method for defeating the insurgency. In order for this outside-in strategy to work, the government needed to first stop the expansion of the insurgency and then move systematically to destroy it. Briggs would halt the insurgency, Templer would break its spirit, and Bourne would bring about its elimination.
Population and food control were the key elements to achieving separation of the insurgents from the population. Once operations were under way to create a White Area, the insurgents were forced to fight to regain control of the area, to surrender, or to move on. By achieving overwhelming local superiority in a specific area the government was able to force the communists into a vicious cycle of retreat. With each government success the opportunity costs of supporting the insurgency increased, therefore presenting an effective deterrent to reestablishment of subversive behavior.

In the end, with little hope of success, only the true believers in the communist cause were left and they were forced to retreat deep into the jungle across the Thai border. Removed from the population, the insurgents could no longer disrupt either government infrastructure, or the economy, or intimidate the population. At this stage the insurgency was forced well below the level of posing a threat to the government and was kept at bay with a small number of security forces patrolling the border area.
IV. CONCLUSION

A. LESSONS OF PERU

Three different strategies were employed by the Peruvian government to attack the Shining Path. Each strategy was distinctly different and affected the Shining Path in a different way. A conventional assault against the Shining Path resulted in dispersion of the guerrilla forces and created animosity between the government and the people. An ineffective hearts and minds campaign allowed the insurgency unrestricted freedom of maneuver, which almost resulted in the government's defeat. In the end, however, the government produced the right leadership and resources to defeat the insurgency with its counter-leadership targeting strategy.

The success of the government's counter-leadership targeting campaign can be attributed to several factors. First, the Shining Path made itself vulnerable to such a strategy by relying more and more on centralized control as the insurgency went on. Second, by centralizing its control of counter-insurgency operations the government was able to better maximize its limited resources against the insurgency. Third, by modernizing its intelligence-
gathering agencies and capabilities the government was able to determine the identities and locations of the Shining Path’s key leaders.

The Shining Path made two strategic errors which aided the efforts of the Peruvian government. First, the policy of selectively targeting enemies of the revolution was changed to mass punishment of entire communities in 1983. Increased brutality and violence towards innocent people would have a long-term negative effect on the Shining Path’s ability to enlist the support of the population. This phenomenon caused the Shining Path to be occupied on two fronts: one to control the population, and two to fight the government. Second, the Shining Path moved toward more centralized control of strategic operations after the loss of many of the original founding members by 1985. As Shining Path leaders were killed or captured the quality of their replacements was not the same as that of the original founding members. This led to a greater reliance on centralized control and increased security by the Central Committee. Distrust within the organization led to betrayal and infighting, which distracted the Shining Path from its original objectives.
Unity of effort played a vital role in focusing the security forces of Peru on defeating the insurgency. From 1980 to 1990 politicians, the military, and the police were divided on how to defeat the insurgency. In 1990 the insurgency was made the number one priority by the administration and all forms of government were organized to support one another in the counter-insurgency role. This focus increased the effectiveness of the intelligence effort, improved civil-military relations, and maximized the government's limited resources against the insurgency.

Detailed intelligence was a necessary condition for the success of the counter-leadership targeting (the inside-out) strategy in Peru. From 1980 to 1990 the intelligence-gathering effort by the Peruvian government was lacking and the insurgents were clearly winning the war. From 1990 to 1996 the intelligence-gathering capability improved and large numbers of key leaders were killed or captured. Without detailed intelligence, key Shining Path leaders could not be identified and subsequently targeted. The capture of each key leader was exploited to result in more captures, thereby creating a vicious cycle from which the Shining Path could not recover.
B. LESSONS OF MALAYA

Two different strategies were used by the British to attack the Malayan Communist Party. In the end, the Briggs Plan (the outside-in strategy) proved sufficient to defeat the insurgency. This strategy proved effective because the government was able to halt the insurgents' initial momentum, stabilize the situation, and then take the offensive. The insurgents, initially in control, lost their momentum and were forced into a downward spiral of retreat.

Effective population and food control were the necessary conditions for separating the population from the insurgents in the Malayan case. Resettlement of the Chinese squatters placed the population in an environment where it could be effectively protected and controlled. Food control cut off the flow of resources from the controlled areas to the guerrilla army (the MRLA). Therefore, the MRLA was left with three choices: risk contact with superior security forces, retreat to more isolated areas, or surrender. Time after time the MRLA choose retreat or surrender.
Unity of effort played an important role in implementation of the Briggs Plan. Initially, police, military, and government administrators were waging the counter-insurgency effort as each thought best. Coordination of the effort was disjointed and intelligence and operational gaps were left open for the insurgents to exploit. Consolidation of the counter-insurgency effort under Briggs, and expansion of direct control under General Templer, increased the effectiveness of the intelligence effort and allowed the government to mass its limited resources systematically in the White Area program.

C. COULD MALAYAN LESSONS BE USED IN PERU?

Some of the same lessons learned in Malaya were applied in Peru. However, conditions unique to the geography and population of Peru undermined the ability of the government to separate the population from the insurgents in Peru. First, Peru is four times the size of Malaya and it also borders a hostile nation, Ecuador, in the south. Second, the insurgency in Peru was not limited to members of a single ethnic group; members of the Shining Path transcended ethnic and class lines. Third, the infrastructure linking urban and rural Peru was vulnerable
to disruption, enabling the Shining Path to tie down large numbers of security forces. Fourth, Peru had a long history of government repression and cruelty, which made population control operations look like a return to past government abuse.

The proportionality of government resources to the size of the population and area to be controlled clearly favored the insurgency in the Peruvian case. If the government attempted to separate the population from the insurgents on a nationwide scale it would have been best to start in Lima where the government was strongest and from where it could work towards the mountains of central Peru. However, some form of offensive operations were needed to keep the Shining Path from establishing liberated zones in central Peru while the government was working to pacify Lima. The outside-in strategy would clearly have taken a long time to execute and would have given the Shining Path too great an advantage in rural Peru, which the government then might not have been able to overcome.

D. COULD PERUVIAN LESSONS BE USED IN MALAYA?

Running a counter-leadership targeting campaign in Malaya would have been very difficult. First, the
decentralized nature of the Malayan Communist Party allowed individual leaders to continue operations without direction from higher authority. Second, penetration of the close-knit networks which comprised the Chinese community came only in the later years of the insurgency. Third, jungle strongholds in neighboring Thailand gave Chin Peng, the MCP leader, a secure base from which to operate. Lastly, limitations in technology forced the intelligence collection effort to be based primarily on human intelligence-gathering capabilities.

E. FUTURE CONSIDERATIONS

Analysis of both the Peruvian and Malayan case studies reveals that no one best strategy can be applied to all insurgencies. Both governments were successful in defeating an insurgency using two very different strategies. The British and Malayan governments were able to defeat the MCP at the grassroots level by attacking the MCP from outside the organization and then slowly working their way towards the interior. The Peruvian government applied a different strategy, whereby success was achieved by targeting and attacking the core of the Shining Path leadership first and then working towards the exterior.
Both governments changed their original strategy during the course of their counter-insurgency efforts. These changes were based on strategies that maximized the governments' strengths and exploited the insurgents' weaknesses.

Both governments followed common principles, which led to a successful counter-insurgency program. Three of the four principle outlined in the Briggs plan were critical to success in both case studies. Those principles were: unity of effort, intelligence, and small unit operations. These principles helped to focus the government effort, to separate/segregate the insurgents from the population, and to increase the lethality of government forces. The result of these efforts was the stopping of the insurgents' momentum, the regaining of the initiative for the government, and the subsequent defeat of the insurgency.

Unity of effort in both cases focused each government as a whole on defeating the insurgency and created mutual support between civil, military, and intelligence operations. Detailed intelligence increased the government's understanding of the insurgents' leadership, organization, and support bases. This improved intelligence increased the success rate of operations, lowered civilian casualties, and eliminated the number of
uneventful patrols. Small unit operations expanded the government’s influence at the local level, increased tactical surprise, and increased contacts and success ratios of government security forces.

Taking both these cases and the lessons to be learned into consideration, future counter-insurgency planners must understand there is more to COIN than winning the hearts and minds of the population. Before a government can execute the economic, social, political, and cultural reforms needed to enlist the will of the people it must counter the insurgents’ ability to undermine the government’s efforts. The principles outlined in the Briggs Plan offer future researchers a place from which to start. Future study should be directed towards determining whether Briggs’ principles applied consistently or not in other counter-insurgency efforts. If so, how much impact did they have on the government’s success or failure? Even if Briggs’ principles are shown to have positive effects, they, like studying any general lessons learned from studying post COIN efforts, must be considered a set of list principles to consider and not a one-time solution to defeating all insurgencies.
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