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The U.S. Army's corps packaging concept: improving the readiness of Army National Guard division staff officers

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The U.S. Army’s Corps Packaging Concept: Improving the Readiness of Army National Guard Division Staff Officers by Major Joseph P. Sullivan III, ARNG, 58 pages.

This monograph attempted to determine if the U.S. Army’s Corps Packaging concept could help improve the readiness of Army National Guard division staff officers. The author conducted an historical analysis of National Guard division mobilizations from 1916 to present. The author used a number of primary sources, e.g. The George C. Marshall Papers, after action reports from the mobilization of National Guard divisions for the Berlin Crisis, 1961, and obsolete War Department and Army Regulations. The findings of the historical analysis demonstrated that the readiness of National Guard division staff officers has exponentially increased since 1916. However, the operational experience of these officers remains a serious weakness.

The study then examined past Army affiliation programs for insight into how these past programs were developed and whether they might have relevance to “Corps Packaging”. The author discovered that many of these programs worked well in the past and some could be used as a model for developing the concept of “Corps Packaging.”

The author explored the training and education of National Guard officers and concluded that “Corps Packaging” could influence National Guard division staff officer readiness, if for example corps acted as HICON for ARNG division warfighter exercises. However, the potential effect of “Corps Packaging” on education was negligible.

The study concluded that “Corps Packaging” could best improve the readiness of National Guard division staff officer by offering opportunities for operational experience with associated corps and teemed divisions.
The U.S. Army’s Corps Packaging Concept: Improving the Readiness of Army National Guard Division Staff Officers

A Monograph
by
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Title of Monograph: The U.S. Army's Corps Packaging Concept: Improving the Readiness of Army National Guard Division Staff Officers

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INTRODUCTION

A good staff has the advantage of being more lasting than the genius of a single man.

General Antoine Henri Jomini (1779-1865) ¹

In October 2000, while speaking at the 122d National Guard Association of the United States (NGAUS) convention in Atlantic City, General Eric Shinseki, Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army (CSA) announced a new Army program that would affiliate the eight Army National Guard (ARNG) divisions with Army’s active-component (AC) corps and divisions.² The affiliation was coined “Corps Packaging”. “Corps Packaging” associates the eight Army National Guard divisions with the U.S. Army’s four corps: I, III, V, and XVIII (see figure 1). Within each Army corps, ARNG divisions are teamed with active-component (AC) divisions associated with that Army corps.

Corps Packaging expands on a similar program, divisional pairing, that former Chief of Staff [General] Dennis Reimer announced in September 1998 during the NGAUS conference. Reimer’s teaming concept began a pilot program, “pairing the 49th [Armored Division] with the 1st Cavalry Division headquarterd in Fort Hood, Texas and California’s 40th Mechanized Division with the Army’s 4th Mechanized Division, also headquarterd at fort Hood.”³ Later teaming paired Virginia’s 29th Infantry Division with the 10th Mountain Division and Pennsylvania’s 28th Infantry Division with the 3d Infantry Division. The purpose of division teaming was for ARNG divisions to assist AC divisions in responding to “global crisis” and in

² Kristen Patterson, “Missioning possible?,” National Guard Magazine, October 2000, 22-23.
³ Peterson, “Missioning possible?,” 22-23.
turn the AC divisions were to assist the ARNG divisions “in responding to domestic emergencies or homeland defense."

More of a mutual support association rather than a CAPSTONE type association, which was focused on unit readiness for warfighting. The impetus for these new associations was the Army National Guard Combat Readiness Reform Act (ANGCRRA) of 1992.\(^5\)

The concept of corps packaging and division teaming have their genesis in the “extremely successful CAPSTONE Program”, which during the Cold War aligned Reserve Component (RC) units with active-component units, providing mission focus and early wartime integration of RC units.\(^6\)

Figure 1 below visually describes the alignments under the “corps packaging” concept.

![CORPS PACKAGING Diagram](image.png)

Figure 1. “Corps Packaging” of eight ARNG divisions with AC corps and divisions. Enhanced separate brigades (eSBs) and the two integrated divisions were not included for the purpose of clarity.\(^7\)

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\(^5\) Ibid., 2.


\(^7\) Figure 1. corps and divisions patches clipart from National Defense University website at, [http://www.ndu.edu/NWC/nwcCLIPART/US_ARMY/](http://www.ndu.edu/NWC/nwcCLIPART/US_ARMY/); Information on slide taken from article on Corps Packaging.
Part of the intent behind “Corps Packaging” was to provide the eight ARNG divisions with a geographic focus for training purposes, which would in theory help to improve their mission readiness, in terms of mobilization, deployment, and employment, for future conflicts. United States Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) Regulation 350-4 (interim change) dated 28 March 2001, *Training: Army Relationships*, is the Army’s authoritative document on “Corps Packaging.” It describes the purpose of “Corps Packaging” and assigns roles and responsibilities for its implementation. Roles and responsibilities are delineated for the participants including: Corps commanders, Commander FORSCOM, and the Commanders of First and Fifth Armies. The foundation of Corps Packaging is based on unit readiness. According to FORSCOM Regulation 350-4, “aligning ARNG divisions and eSBs with an Army corps leverages ARNG capabilities in supporting the Army’s requirement to respond across the full spectrum of military operations. Corps Packaging provides an expanded capability that makes better use of ARNG combat units in supporting the wide variety of missions required by our capabilities-based force.”

Under the Corps Packaging – concept, units receive neither additional manpower nor funding for program implementation. Existing programs e.g. Training Support XXI and Mentorship remain unchanged. Within existing resourcing, corps commanders are required to “mentor and, in coordination with CONUSA [Continental United States Army], provide professional development to aligned units.” They execute the concept “Corps Packaging” within their corps through: “oversight and management;” which means providing “mission planning guidance, training and

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10 TSXXI was mandated by Congress in an effort to improve unit readiness. AC Training Support Brigades (TSB) assist in training, evaluating, and mobilizing RC units. In the ARNG that means primarily the Enhanced Separate Brigades. Their focus, in line with the tenets of BOLD SHIFT, is at the platoon and company levels.

11 Ibid.
exercise opportunities;” assisting “aligned units in gaining a go-to-war focus;” and exploring “new ideas, work issues, …”\textsuperscript{12}

The purpose of this monograph is to explore whether or not the concept of “corps packaging” can be an enabler to enhance readiness of ARNG division staff officers.\textsuperscript{13} Many of the studies of ARNG divisions, and RC units in general, for example RAND’s Army Active/Reserve Mix study (1995) and The Reserve Component Employment (RCE) Study 2005, tend to focus on time available for training, equipment modernization, ability of units to mobilize, post mobilization, to mention only a few. However, few address the readiness of National Guard officers and none exclusively focus on the readiness of ARNG division staff officers. This may possibly be an indication of a preoccupation on equipment and technology, and failure to fully consider the human dimension to readiness.

This monograph uses historical evidence from previous National Guard division mobilizations and affiliation programs and from theory, and doctrine to analyze and evaluate the relationship of “Corps Packaging” with the readiness of ARNG staff officers.

Of all things “Corps Packaging” must accomplish, perhaps the most important is to improve the readiness of ARNG staff officers. The importance of competent staff officers is best expressed by Brigadier General James D. Hittle, USMC (Ret), when he wrote, “for the lesson of history has been that no major armed effort is better than the staff of the commander who is directing it.”\textsuperscript{14} Staff officers are developed over the length of an entire career. The institutional and functional schooling, the operational experience fostered in table of organization and equipment (TOE) and table of distribution and allowances (TDA) units, and the mentorship through the years cannot be

\textsuperscript{12} Ibid. 2.
\textsuperscript{13} In focusing on ARNG division staff officers, the author attempted to narrow the scope of research and fully recognized the important role of non-commissioned and enlisted soldiers in the division staff.
planted and harvested, in weeks or months, but take years of development before the winds of war blowing strongly across the fields of readiness. Equipment can and will be upgraded, units can and are filled with conscripts, should the draft be required, and Army doctrine can and will be revised, however, trained and experienced staff officers cannot be churned out as quickly. This has been a lesson of all conflicts, since the development of the concept of a “nation in arms.”

The government of the United States, for economic and constitutional purposes, has traditionally maintained a small professional army augmented by a vast RC during peacetime. Therefore, in great part it has tended to rely on the readiness of ARNG division staff officers.

In an effort to place “Corps Packaging” in today’s U.S. Army Transformation environment and linking it to the readiness of ARNG division staff officers, the author first explores the historical readiness levels of these staffs during previous mobilizations.

**HISTORICAL ANALYSIS**

**Mobilization of National Guard Divisions**

The National Defense Act of 1916, improved upon the National Defense Act of 1903, also known as the Dick Act, when it made the Army National Guard the primary reserve component of the U.S. Army when federalized. Section one of the Act codified the term National Guard, requiring all states to “rename their militias National Guard.” Section three of the Act required all states to organize their National Guard units like Regular Army units. The Act established

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15 The *nation in arms* concept sprang out of the French revolution, with implementation *levee en masse* and was expanded under Napoleon Bonaparte. It led to one of the most significant transformations in the nature of armies in the history of warfare. Through it, the “French” Army gained a comparative advantage over rival European armies. The expansion in the size of armies and the increased distribution of these armies on battlefields led to an enlargement of the staff system and greater reliance on trained staff officers.


17 The 1903 Dick Act, named for its sponsor Congressman George F. Dick, divided the militia into two categories: the organized militia, called the National Guard and the Reserve Militia. It allowed states the optional use of the name National Guard, albeit the majority of the states already referred to their militia as the National Guard. The National Defense Act of 1916 separated reference to the Militia from the National Guard and Organized Reserves. Only the unorganized reserve was called the militia.
War Department eligibility requirements for National Guard officer commissions and in addition to fifteen days of annual training, it provided pay to National Guard members for forty-eight drills per year. As this Act became law the fighting in Europe had been raging for two years, and within two weeks of enactment, 134,000 National Guardsmen were mobilized for service on the Mexican border.

European armies were organized into tactical divisions and corps. The European experience with mobilization and warfare after 1914 convinced the U.S. Army's leadership that it required permanent divisions. The National Defense Act of 1916, Section 3, authorized permanent army divisions and corps. As the war in Europe drew the U.S. closer into the conflict, "the Militia Bureau, formerly the Division of Militia Affairs, began work on the new plans to organize Guard divisions. It scrapped the voluntary Stimson Plan and directed the organization of sixteen infantry and two cavalry divisions. Brigadier General William A. Mann, Chief of the Militia Bureau, sent the states "advance copies of the new tables in January 1917 to acquaint them with the types of units they needed to maintain."

Upon mobilization for World War I (WWI), the National Guard divisions and their staffs were understandably unprepared for combat. For many of them had just returned from the Mexican just before mobilization. Because of this lack of readiness, General Jack Pershing, commander of the American Expeditionary Force, instituted two major reforms: the square division and reserve component staff officer schools. The 28,000 man infantry divisions compensated for the shortage of trained staff officers, "maximized firepower" and were uniquely designed for attrition warfare, and centralized control.\(^{21}\)


\(^{19}\) Henry Lewis Stimson (1867-1950), member of the New Army National Guard (1898-1907) was Secretary of War (1911-1913) under President William Taft and from 1940 to 1945.


\(^{21}\) Ibid. 73.
The lessons of the Army’s WWI experience were high on the national political agenda following the war. One of the chief lessons was the need for trained staff officers. “Organized and officered divisions” wrote Brigadier General John McAuley Palmer, (1870-1955), “…would have passed to war strength under a decentralized system…”

The costly and befuddled mobilization for WWI led to the passage of the National Defense Act of 1920. The law codified the components of the U.S. Army as: the Regular Army, the National Guard and the Organized Reserve. It allowed for the organization of eighteen National Guard infantry divisions, which were organized under corps areas for purpose of training and guidance. The corps area commanders were responsible for the state of training in their corps; therefore, “each corps commander had been given his share of trained officers and noncommissioned officers of the regular army to form his training center troops.”

Budget woes and the prospect of “a peace dividend” after 1920 led Congress to underfund the provisions of the 1916 Defense Act, as amended in 1920. This caused the Regular Army to be undermanned and stagnated the RC reforms enacted by the law. As an added fall out from the peace dividend, Congress did not heed the warning articulated by General Pershing concerning the organization of the Army. For almost ten years following the WWI, the U.S. Army had to make do with doctrine, organization, surplus equipment, supplies from that war. Reorganizing and equipping the Army’s divisions and the Army National Guard’s divisions would have been too costly, in view of American isolation, and the fact that many Regular Army officers favored maintaining the square division organizational structure. Consequently, the United States

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23 Palmer, America in Arms: The Experience of the United States with Military Organization, 176-177.
24 Ibid.
25 General Pershing posited that the square division organization was suitable only for the nature of warfare on the Western Front during WWI and that a triangular division would more applicable to mobile warfare. He believed the U.S. Army was more likely face mobile warfare in the future and therefore, advocated the adoption of the triangular division organization.
mobilized the Army of the United States with a divisional organizational structure designed for the attrition warfare of WWI rather than mobile warfare: a decision that had grave consequences for the Army and the Army National Guard during mobilization for WWII.\(^{27}\)

Setting the conditions for WWII in 1940, then President Franklin Delano Roosevelt (1884-1945) ordered the mobilization of the National Guard for twelve months of training. Weeks after the order, General George C. Marshall\(^ {28}\), (1880-1959), was appointed Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA). Roosevelt wanted to be certain that the National Guard would be ready for war. So, with the Army team forming, for all out war, a critical analysis of the state of readiness of the ARNG divisions was underway.

The ARNG divisions in 1940 were anemic organizations: undermanned, under-equipped and poorly trained at the staff level. Of these conditions, General George C. Marshall, CSA, opined in a memorandum to Colonel [Omar] Bradley that:

> A serious weakness of the National Guard is the lack of trained staffs from battalion up, meaning staff teams that know how to function expeditiously and to the advantage of the troops. Extension courses are merely primary for the training of the individual; team work can only be gained by operating on the basis of a team, whether it is in the armory or in the field, whether it is over some matter or a tactical operation. This staff weakness will be destructive of troop efficiency unless it is thoroughly understood as a weakness and everybody works to meet it.\(^ {29}\)

General Marshall’s comments about National Guard staffs reflected his experience with the National Guard while he was assigned to the Sixth Corps Area headquartered in Chicago, Illinois. In 1933, General Douglas MacArthur had assigned, the then, Colonel

\(^{27}\)Wilson, *Maneuver and Firepower: The evolution of Divisions and Separate Brigades*,


George Marshall to the job of senior instructor with the Illinois National Guard. Marshall strongly opposed the assignment for he had been hoping for a command. He emotionally appealed to the CSA, but failed to change MacArthur’s decision. Thus, for next three years, Marshall served as the senior instructor for the 33d Division, Illinois Army National Guard. Disappointed though he was, Marshall put his full energy into his new assignment. During his time with the 33d Division, Marshall worked hard to improve the readiness of the division’s staff officers. He soon realized that one of the weaknesses of “National Guard training resulted from the lack of contact between the various headquarters units, the several arms, and the services, due to their physical separation. Each branch - whether division staff, Engineer battalion, Field Artillery regiment, aviation - tended inevitably to concentrate on the theoretical aspect of its own specialty, missing entirely the teamwork that is the first necessity of troops actually in the field.”

Over the next three years, Marshall developed “War Games” and supervised Command Post Exercises (CPX) designed, to improve the 33d Division’s staff readiness. Although highly suspect of the readiness of National Guard staffs, he was equally critical of the Regular Army’s training regulations and its failure at Fort Leavenworth to educate Regular Army officers concerning operations with National Guard units. In March 1939, he made known his thoughts on this point in a letter to General Leslie J. McNair (1883-1944), Commandant of the Command and General Staff College, when he wrote:

> With relation to the last force named force [the National Guard], I think our instruction is most defective, and for these reasons: We must be prepared the next time we are involved in war, somewhere and somehow. Now that means we have

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31 Ibid., 228-230.
32 General McNair served as commandant U.S. Army Command and General Staff College from 1939 to 1940. 1940 to 1942 he served as the chief of staff General Headquarters U.S. Army. From 1942 until 1944, he was the Commander in Chief U.S. Army Ground Forces. In 1944, he was killed by friendly fire, US bombers. Source: [http://www.generals.dk/Usa2.htm#M](http://www.generals.dk/Usa2.htm#M)
to employ the National Guard for that purpose, because it will constitute the large majority of the war army of the first six months. This being so, it seems fundamental to me that the training of our officers, our staff procedures, and our manuals, should primarily be based for use with such force. Regular officers should be experts regarding every consideration involved in the training and leadership of partially trained troops...\(^{33}\)

CSA General Marshall had a personal relationship with many of the commanders, of the eighteen National Guard divisions, which was evidenced through the vast amount of correspondences and personal meetings. \(^{34}\) In March 1940, nearly two years before National Guard divisions were committed to battle, Major General Milton A. Reckord, Commander of the Maryland National Guard, proposed to the CSA, that the National Guard be authorized to bring its divisional staffs to wartime strength. In response, the CSA cited “preliminary studies”, which showed that bringing the staffs to wartime strength would involve “an excessive increase in commissioned strength and would require annual funds, for pay only, in excess of $500,000.00.”\(^{35}\) However, the CSA did concur that certain units should be increased and he indicated that the Chief of the National Guard Bureau\(^{36}\) was conducting a study on the matter. The matter was not resolved. National Guard units were still only authorized their peacetime strengths. The decision not to bring ARNG divisions to fully authorized wartime staff levels, had a huge negative influence on the readiness of those divisions. Had the staffs been augmented earlier they would have had more time for team building and training, and in addition it would have helped relieve the burden caused when existing staff officers were sent to Army schools.

On September 4, 1940, Reckord wrote a letter to the Army’s Inspector General, Major General Virgil Peterson, recommending “that the National Guard be authorized immediately to go to war


\(^{34}\) Ibid.


\(^{36}\) The Militia Bureau was renamed National Guard Bureau by the National Defense Act as amended in 1933. See History of the United States Military Policy on Reserve Forces 1775-1957 for more information.
strength rather then [sic] to be held at peace strength until mobilization. His second appeal met with same end as his prior attempt-no increase to wartime strength.

In 1940, National Guard divisions were not ready for war and neither were the staffs. Many factors contributed to the lack of National Guard readiness and few of them were the direct fault of the National Guard. However, four factors had significant influence on staff readiness. First, ARNG divisions failed to make the best use of training time available. Second the Army failed to obtain authorization bringing ARNG division staffs to wartime strength Third, the War Department, bowing to a perceived political pressure, failed to convert the ARNG square divisions to triangular divisions early in the mobilization; and finally the Army failed to ensure ARNG officers met Army education standards prior to mobilization. The result of these four factors alone would prove disastrous for the U.S Army as well as the Army National Guard.

Much of what authors and researchers have written about the mobilization of the ARNG divisions, for WWII, focuses on the Louisiana Maneuvers of 1941. Some writers posited that Marshall and McNair conspired to reclassify the National Guard commanders and replace them with Regulars. In 1941, General Marshall tasked McNair with evaluating “high commanders” in an effort to improve the readiness of corps and divisions. Seven of the nine Regular Army corps commanders were replaced by October 1941 and two more were near the “62-year’s of age policy” and would be replaced due to age. After he evaluated the Corps Area commander, he turned his attention to division commanders. By that time, Regular Army officers commanded six ARNG divisions: 34th, 35th, 36th, 38th, 40th, and 43d. McNair assessed five of the six as satisfactory, but he recommended to Marshall the replacement of one Regular Army officer,

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39 Department of the War policy prohibited general officers 62 years of age and older from serving as division commanders.
Major General Greely, commander of the 2d Infantry Division. He evaluated him as being a “very dubious prospect.”

In his evaluation of the Army National Guard division commanders, McNair was favorably impressed by only three of twelve ARNG division commanders.

The three commanders included: Major General Roger W. Eckfeldt of Massachusetts, commanding the 26th “Yankee” Infantry Division; Major General John C. Persons, (1888-1974) of Alabama, commanding the 31st “Dixie” Infantry Division; and Major General Robert S. Beightler, (1892-1978) of Ohio, commanding the 37th “Buckeye” Infantry Division.

McNair was a fair judge of MG Beightler’s potential. Beightler commanded the 37th Infantry Division, from 1940 through the end of the war in the Pacific. Beightler was the only National Guard officer to command a division for the duration of WWII and was the Army’s longest serving division commander of the war. After the war, the Army gave him a Regular Army commission and he remained on active-duty until 1953. General Persons would also go on to successfully command his division in the Pacific Theater of Operations (PTO) until 1944.

Interestingly in a “review of division commanders” LTG McNair commented of Major General George S. Patton Jr. (1885-1945), commander of the 2nd Armor Division, “good; division

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40 Ibid.


42 Beightler’s military assignments from 1940 until he retired in 1953: 40-46 included: General Officer Commanding 37th Division, Fiji-Solomons-Philippines; 46-47: General Officer Commanding 5th Service Command; 48-49: General Officer Commanding 5th Armored Division; 51-53: General Officer Commanding Ryukyus Command. Source http://www.generals.dk/usa.htm.


possibly his ceiling.” Evidence that McNair was a difficult taskmaster to please, but that he fairly attempted to evaluate both Regular Army and National Guard commanders alike.45

Of the remaining nine National Guard division commanders: one was promoted to Third Corps Area Commander, Major General Reckord, one was sent on special assignment, one died in November 1941, one was deemed “incompetent”, one was removed for age, four were removed for reasons ranging from “lacking military knowledge” to “not a military commander.”

Overall, ARNG staff officers served well during WWII and were better prepared for war than their counterparts in WWI. In the ranks of colonel and below, very few Guard officers were reclassified, less than 1 percent. “At war’s end 19,542 of the original officers were on duty in some capacity; outnumbering the 15,000 who came from the regulars.”46

By the end of WWII, the Army National Guard was once again demobilized into a peacetime force and returned to state control. It was an enormous undertaking and plagued with difficulties, which unfortunately left the United States unprepared for the outbreak of war on the Korean Peninsula in 1950. Just five years before the start of the Korean War, the United States Army had eighty-nine divisions. By 1950, the Army was so hollow that America had to mobilize eight National Guard Infantry Divisions in support of the Korean War effort. Only the 82d Airborne Division and a few other Regular Army units, i.e. separate regiments, in the General Reserve47 remained combat ready.48

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47 The General Reserve was that part of the Regular Army based in CONUS and mainly focused on reinforcing US forces stationed in Europe.
In June 1950, the North Korean People’s Army (NKPA) had launched an all out attack on South Korea. The North Korean force, while outfitted with old WWII Russian era equipment, was far superior to the ill-trained and poorly equipped Republic of South Korean (ROK) forces. Eighth U.S. Army composed of four under strength divisions: 1st Cavalry Division, 25th Infantry Division, 7th Infantry, and the 24th Infantry Division. In order the maintain force structure with a severe manpower shortage, each infantry regiment normally composed of three battalions were authorized only two battalions. Even with the lower authorization, most battalions were only at 70 percent of their authorized strength and most of the soldiers were new replacements. General of the Army Douglas MacArthur (1880-1964) urgently requested that Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) reinforce his Far East command (FEC) initially with 50,000 soldiers, and then “he had asked for 32,000 more by 25 July [1950].” Because the Army’s General Reserve was depleted and the army could not quickly organize new divisions to match the increased requirements, it had to turn to “a force in being”, which were the National Guard divisions.

In response to the crisis on the Korean Peninsula, President Harry S. Truman authorized a partial mobilization of the National Guard and Organized Reserve, for a period of twenty-one months, in July 1950, which initially included four Army National Guard divisions: 28th (Pennsylvania), 40th (California), 43d (Rhode Island) and 45th (Oklahoma). The 28th and 43d Divisions deployed to Europe. Two of the four National Guard divisions mobilized in September 1950, the 40th Infantry Division and the 45th “Thunderbird” Infantry Division, were “eventually sent to Korea.”

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50 Scnabel, Policy And Direction: The First Year, 118.
52 Larry H. Addington, The Patterns Of War Since The Eighteenth Century, (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana, 1994), 278.
Only after, General MacArthur, in December 1950, had requested that the JCS send the four mobilized National Guard Divisions immediately to Japan, where they could complete their post-mobilization training.\textsuperscript{53} General Lawton Collins, the Army Chief of Staff, was quick to remind MacArthur that the four National Guard divisions had been mobilized to back-fill the General Reserve and not for commitment in the Korean theatre of war. Nevertheless, according to Collins, “there was a possibility that two of the four divisions might be sent to Japan.”\textsuperscript{54}

While Army and the JCS considered how to meet General MacArthur’s increasing demand for additional ground combat forces in Korea, the commanders of the four National Guard divisions conducted post-mobilization training. Many in the Army’s leadership doubted the ability of the leadership of the National Guard divisions to bring their units into full readiness.\textsuperscript{55} Perhaps the reason for MacArthur’s willingness to trust the ability of the Guard to be combat ready was his WWI and WWII wartime experience with Army National Guard divisions. In WWI, he was chief of staff of the 42d Infantry Division, a National Guard organization. Moreover, during WWII, four National Guard divisions formed the bulk of his Army combat power during the early fighting in the Pacific.\textsuperscript{56}

The strength of the National Guard divisions was the overwhelming number of officers and noncommissioned officers with wartime experience. On the other hand, these units had several weaknesses: a lack of modernized equipment and the fact that they were, in the main, cadre units.\textsuperscript{57} This meant that draftees filled out the Guard divisions, but the leadership largely came

\textsuperscript{54} Ibid, 639.
\textsuperscript{57} Dr. Robert W. Coakley wrote in “HIGHLIGHTS OF MOBILIZATION: KOREAN WAR” that “The National Guard had 27 organized divisions plus supporting units but its equipment was only 46 percent of requirements. Training was hampered by lack of funds and facilities. The principal strength of ... [the] National Guard lay in the fact that much of their personnel had seen combat service during World War II.”
from the National Guard. Untrained draftees arrived at 45th ID beginning on 5 October 1950. Seasoned guardsmen, in addition to the arduous task of refreshing themselves with Army Field Manuals, had the responsibility for the basic training of the draftees starting on 6 November 1950. Even though mobilization would have been much smoother had these units been manned with trained guard soldiers vice draftees, the existence of the National Guard divisions, as “a force in being”, precluded the organization of “extemporized” units, of the type General MacAuley Palmer had cautioned against, so ardently in the 1920’s. Palmer believed it was infinitely more desirable to have functioning National Guard divisions, rather than creating them from scratch during wartime.

After WWII, America experienced a great economic boom. Demobilized servicemen and women were eager to return to civilian life. However many chose to continue serving the country by joining the reserves. However, despite prolonged WWII wartime experience, many National Guard officers served in different branches, and sometimes in different services, e.g. the US Navy, than they had served during WWII. Therefore, many National Guard division staff officers were not branch qualified and had little time to do so, because they were busy reestablishing themselves in civilian life. Officers who joined the National Guard after the war lacked valuable wartime experience. Some of those officers attended Guard administered post-commissioning training schools, but lacked practical experience. “Few had attended the “associate” versions of basic and advanced courses, and those lacking wartime service in their branch had experience only in weekly drills and two weeks of summer field training.”

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58 John Clayton, “45th Ends One Year’s Active Duty”, (Hokkaido, Japan: 45th Division News, August 30, 1951 Vol. VI NO. 47), 1.
60 Donnelley, “Army National Guard: Korean War mobilization”, 1.
In order to meet the challenge of the training shortfall among these officers, the Army sent them to Army schools, as it had done in WWI and WWII, which resulted in the same personnel turmoil National Guard divisions experienced in previous wars. A trend in readiness had become apparent by the advent of the Korean War. National Guard officers, who had not met the Army’s educational requirements for the branch and grade they held when their units mobilized, were pulled out of their units to attend Army service schools, which depleted the divisions of key personnel. Consequently, the time required, for units to reach an acceptable level of deployable readiness increased.

In March 1951, the 40th and 45th National Guard Infantry Divisions deployed to Japan, where they trained until they relieved the 1st Cavalry and 24th Infantry Divisions in Korea in January 1952. The training focused on tasks, which were not originally part of the divisions’ post-mobilization training, because initially, General Collins, CSA, had not envisioned deploying the divisions to Korea. General Ridgway had wanted to use these divisions as individual replacements for the Eighth Army divisions fighting in Korean. General Collins, however, overrode Ridgway’s plan. He believed this plan would create a political storm by implying the Army did not trust its Mission Training Plan (MTP) to produce combat-ready units, vetoed the idea and directed the divisions to replace two regular ones in Korea.

Between December 1951 and January 1952, guard divisions swapped locations and equipment with the 1st Cavalry and 24th Infantry divisions and remained guard in character until June 1952, when their last guardsmen rotated home.⁶¹ On 5 December 1951, the 180th Infantry Regiment of 45th ID deployed to Korea, the first National Guard unit to enter Korea. The rest of the 45th ID had deployed to Korea by 28 December 1951.⁶² By April 1952, the G-3 of Eighth Army had

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⁶¹ Ibid., 4.

determined that the "combat effectiveness of the two new divisions [40th and 45th Infantry divisions] after a short period in combat was equal to the old divisions..." they had relieved.

More National Guard Divisions were mobilized before the end of the Korean War: two in January 1951, 31st and 47th, and two in 1952.\textsuperscript{64} The two divisions, ordered to active duty in January and February 1952, were the 37th Infantry Division, Ohio Army National Guard, and the 44th Infantry Division, Illinois Army National Guard.\textsuperscript{65} However, these divisions sent to neither Korea nor Europe, albeit they fulfilled an in important part of the Army's effort to increase its strategic and operational levels of readiness. The 37th Infantry Division deployed to Fort Polk, Louisiana, replacing the 45th Infantry Division. The Korean War was still second in importance; Europe was of primary concern to the United States. It feared that the Soviet Union would take advantage of the Korean War to move into Western Europe\textsuperscript{66}, evidenced by General Ridgway's departure for Europe as SACEUR from FEC before successful war termination.

The Korean War mobilization experience demonstrated that with adequate post-mobilization, Army National Guard divisions are capable of same combat effectiveness as Regular Army divisions and they represent "a force in being." The senior officers of the mobilized divisions had significant wartime experience, although the nature of the war in Korea was different from that fought in WWII and therefore Regular as well as National Guard soldiers required time to become acclimated to these new conditions. Unlike most of their counterparts during WWII, the commanding generals of the National Guard divisions remained in command of their divisions.

For example, Major General James Styron had commanded the 45th ID for the first twenty months of the 45th division's federal service, until relieved by a Regular Army officer, Major General


David Ruffner on 21 May 1952. Many junior officers were not branch qualified and they lacked practical experience. In August 1952 National Guard soldiers of the 40th and 45th Infantry divisions came to the end of their term of service and two shadow divisions were created in California and Oklahoma: the 40th Infantry Division (NGUS) and the 45th Infantry division (NGUS). The veterans of the 40th and 45th, manned these organizations, which remained in existence until the 40th and 45th divisions US Army were deactivated and returned to their states' control in 1954. The Korean War demonstrated the need for well trained, modernly equipped, fully manned, and resourced National Guard divisions, if the U.S. Army expected them to be ready for deployment in a reasonable amount of time.

The next federal mobilization of National Guard divisions occurred during the Berlin Crisis of 1961. In August 1961, President John F. Kennedy asked Congress for the mobilization of up to 250,000 reservists, including two Army National Guard divisions: the 49th “Lone Star” Armored Division, Texas ARNG and the 32d “Red Arrow” Infantry Division, Wisconsin ARNG. Mobilization orders arrived in September and by October 1961, the 49th Armored Division was deployed to Fort Polk, Louisiana, where it would remain on federal duty for ten months. The 32d Infantry Division (ID) deployed to Fort Lewis for post-mobilization training to replace the 7th Infantry Division, which had deployed to Europe. President Kennedy’s purpose in mobilizing the two National Division was two fold. First, he demonstrated to Soviets of U.S. resolve and second it allowed the U.S. Army time for the organization and training of two new AC divisions.

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69 49th Armored Division, TXARNG website; available from http://www.agg.state.tx.us/49_division/history.htm; Internet; accessed 02 March 02.
The 32d ID was organized as a Pentomic Division, which had five battle groups and five artillery battalions, only several years earlier, in 1959. It was scheduled for conversion to a Reorganization Objectives Army Division (ROAD) organization, when it was mobilized. President Kennedy had approved the conversion of all Army division to the ROAD organization beginning in 1962. Therefore, the division staff had to become thoroughly familiar with the Army doctrine for fighting a Pentomic division, while they prepared to convert to ROAD organization-no easy task and would have caused major interoperability problems if the division had deployed to Europe.

In December 1961, the Commanding General of United States Continental Command tasked the Freeman Board to "identify and document problem areas associated with the limited mobilization of Reserve Component and individuals in 1961 and to recommend corrective action." Overall, the board believed that the mobilization had been "well conducted." The problem areas the board identified included: lack of security clearances, reception and integration of filler personnel, shortages in Army forms and publications, logistics, administration processing, funding, and mobilization plans that did not consider partial mobilization. A particularly cogent problem, highlighted in the report, was that Army corps' were tasked with greater mobilization requirements relating to the mobilized units; however, during peacetime the corps' had "no responsibilities in connection with the ARNG." In spite of the problems the board noted, "The morale in the majority of units was high, demonstrating true professionalism and can-do spirit."

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72 Ibid.
73 Ibid., 41.
74 Ibid.
The President ordered the National Guard divisions demobilized in August 1962. By that time, both divisions had produced detailed after action reviews, which are located on the third floor of the Combined Arms Library at Fort Leavenworth. In introduction to the 49th Armored after action review, Major General Harley B. West, commanding general, wrote, “We will learn from whatever mistakes we made, and these notes will serve us as well as others as a record of some things which can be done better. All in all, however the mobilization was a successful operation.”

In an earlier draft version, Lieutenant Colonel Karl Wallace, the Assistant Chief of Staff G3, noted, “that personnel assigned to the General Staff be of the highest caliber, particularly as to initiative, imagination, subordinate staff experience, intelligence, and professional education.” Wallace’s advice is as relevant today as it was in 1961. His suggestion that staff officers require experience on subordinate staffs is contemporary problem because of the disparate locations of National Guard headquarters. Disparate locations may mean that National Guard division staff officers may not have the opportunity to serve on subordinate command staffs.

Breaking with the past, the President did not mobilize any of the National Guard’s divisions for the Vietnam War. The JCS wanted the commander in chief to mobilize the reserves for Vietnam, but President Lyndon Johnson decided against it. At the time, he felt that Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara had not made a compelling enough case for mobilizing the reserve component.

However, in 1968, following the Pueblo incident in Korea, and the Tet offensive in the Republic of South Vietnam, the President called two Army National Guard Separate Brigades to active-duty on 13 May 1968: the 69th Infantry Brigade Separate, Kansas Army National Guard and the 29th Infantry Brigade Hawaii National Guard. Several units not organic to these brigades

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76 Department of the Army, Headquarters 49th Armored Division, Narrative Report on Mobilization, (Fort Polk, LA: 1961), Tab C, 6, CARL N-18935.1-B.
were included in the call-up. “The 29th got the 100th Battalion, 442d Infantry, from the Army Reserve, and the 69th included the 2d Battalion, 133d Infantry, from the Iowa National Guard.”

Upon mobilization, the 69th reported to Fort Carson on 23 May 1968, for post-mobilization training and to replace the 1st Brigade of the 5th Infantry Division, which had been ordered to Vietnam as a separate brigade. Post-mobilization training had begun four days after the 69th arrival at Fort Carson and by September, the brigade had successfully completed post-mobilization training. The 29th reported “to Schofield Barracks on 13 May [1968]”.

Once the 69th had completed its training, the Army decided to incorporate the unit into the 5th Infantry Division (Mechanized), a Regular Army division. This was the first time a National Guard brigade had been integrated into a Regular Army division “during conditions of less than total mobilization.” Under the new task-organization, the 69th became a brigade of the 5th ID and Brigadier General John Breidenthal, the commander of the 69th, became an assistant division commander for the 5th Infantry Division. The 69th remained a brigade of the 5th ID until it was demobilized in December 1969. “Almost half of its original personnel were in Vietnam as individual replacements.”

“324 officers and 273 enlisted men of the 69th Brigade served in Vietnam; of these, approximately forty gave their lives in combat.” Although this is an example of a brigade mobilization, brigade staff officers are required to have the same staff competences as their counterparts on division staff. Therefore, this example can be illustrative of the readiness trends gleamed from previous mentioned mobilizations. The brigade’s staff officers were well trained and did not have to be sent off on mass to service schools. Since 1955, the Army had

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79 Ibid.
80 Ibid.
81 Ibid.
82 Interesting to note that LTG Roger C. Shultz, Director of the Army National Guard, was one of the officers of the 2nd Battalion, 133 Infantry (Mechanized), Iowa Army National Guard, mobilized in 1968. He deployed to Vietnam with the 25th Infantry Division, later left active duty, and returned to the Iowa Army National Guard.
83 Williamson, “Call-Up”.
assumed responsibility for training Army National Guard recruits, which allowed units to focus on unit training. While the mobilization of the 69th was not without problems, it was a large improvement over previous mobilizations and demonstrated a trend towards improved readiness.

In February 2000, the 49th Armored Division’s, Texas Army National Guard, headquarters assumed command of Task Force (TF) Eagle, Multi-national Division-North, MND (N), Stabilization Force (SFOR)-7 in Bosnia from the 10th Mountain Division. It marked the first time since WWII that an Army National Guard division had commanded an Active Component unit, which was the 3d Cavalry Regiment. It was the first time in U.S. Army history that an Army National Guard unit had assumed command of an AC unit and tactical control (TACON) of combined forces, a Nordic-Polish (NORDPOL) Brigade, a Russian Brigade, and a Turkish Brigade, during peacetime.84

The 49th Armored Division headquarters, commanded by Major General Robert Halverson, was an AC/RC integrated organization. The RC manned 75 percent, numbering 275 soldiers, and the AC manned the other 25 percent, numbering ninety-three soldiers, of the headquarters. Each coordinating (G) staff section was composed of AC/RC soldiers.85

In September 1998, the 49th AD headquarters was notified by the Army that it was tasked with conducting the SFOR-7 mission. Sixteen months later, the division readied for deployment to Bosnia and Herzegovina where it conducted transfer of authority (TOA) with the 10th Mountain. General Halverson initial commander’s estimate of the mission completed, he realized that his soldiers would need work hard, training more than they typically did in a normal training year to achieve mission success. The thirty-nine days a year, guard training model was insufficient, because the 49th AD had to compress three years of training into one year. The average 49th AD soldier trained for 108 days: thirty-seven days of inactive duty training (IDT), thirty days of

annual training, and forty-one additional training days.\textsuperscript{86} "For officers, the training", included "supervising a mock election at Camp Mabry ... to prepare for Bosnia’s municipal balloting in April, [2000] ... consumed as many as 150 days, far more than the 39 [sic] days a year they signed up for."\textsuperscript{87} Thus, it demonstrated the willingness of National Guard soldiers to commit their time and effort to a cause that their country considers just, so that they will be prepared to professionally meet the challenge.

The 49th AD successfully completed its mission in October 2000 and conducted a transfer of authority for MND (N) to the 3d Infantry Division. In fact its mission and the integration of AC/RC units was such a success, that General Shinseki decided to task all of the National Guard’s divisions, except the 40th ID with one six-month SFOR rotation through SFOR 16, which ends in April 2005. The 29th Light Infantry Division took command of MND (N), SFOR 10, in October 2001 from the 3d ID. It transferred authority to the 25th ID in April 2002. The 25th ID is the last AC division that commands MND (N) at least until the 42d Infantry Division, New York Army National Guard, completes the SFOR 16 rotation in April 2005.\textsuperscript{88}

In stark contrast to previous National Guard mobilizations in WWI, WWII, and the Korean War, staff officers did not have to be sent off to service schools, while the 49th AD prepared for deployment. Proof that the Army’s officer education system (OES) had effectively mitigated one problem area that had plagued National Guard division mobilizations since WWI. Unlike WWI, WWII, Korea or the 1960’s, only 700 volunteer soldiers from the 49th AD deployed. Therefore drawing a relative comparison between this experience and the large-scale mobilizations of the past may be disingenuous; and, in all likelihood not a good reflection of the overall readiness levels of division staffs.

\textsuperscript{86} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{87} Myers, “New Role of Guard Transforming Military.”
National Guard divisions may or may not be a good indicator of relative increased readiness of division staffs. However, this is not meant to detract in any way from the way in which the 49th AD’s commander and staff conducted stability and support operations in a very complex operational environment, one much different from the one most of the staff was trained to operate. If anything, it demonstrates the highly adaptable and flexible nature of ARNG division staffs.

One of the key lessons learned, from the 49th division’s deployment, was that a division must identify and stabilize key leaders and staff officers early in mobilization process “so the individuals can participate in the complete training program.” 89 Another important lesson learned was that teaming concept, which teamed the 1st Cavalry Division with the 49th AD allowed it to leverage the experience and knowledge of the AC. “The value of the Division Teaming Program was tested when the 1st Cavalry Division helped prepare the 49th Armored Division headquarters for its Bosnia command.” 90 A third key lesson learned was that because National Guard divisions do not habitually operate with higher headquarters i.e. corps or echelons above corps (EAC), incorporating these types of headquarters in division exercises is critically important. 91

At this point, it is necessary to explore the utility of National Guard divisions in responding to “Homeland Security” incidents. The two examples that follow, catalogue two “Homeland Security” incidents that demonstrate the flexible nature of response of National Guard divisions, because of their organizational ability, i.e. command and staff, to command and control.

During the Los Angeles (LA) riot of 1992, on 29 April, then California Governor Pete Wilson tasked the 40th Infantry Division with the mission of providing 2,000 National Guard soldiers for immediate state active-duty. Major General Daniel Hernandez put the entire division on alert and

91 Ebel, “Toward Total-Force Readiness”, 258.
started necessary movement. Mayor Tom Bradley demanded that Governor Wilson ask the
President of the United States for federal troops. The Governor agreed to Bradley’s request and
requested federal troops from President George Bush. The President approved the request and
soon after 4,000 federal soldiers and marines arrived in LA. At that time, he also federalized the
40th ID and the 49th MP Brigade California ARNG (CAARNG).

Joint Task Force (JTF)-LA was established with the mission to restore “law and order”. Major
General Marvin Covault, commanding general of the 7th Infantry Division, active-duty army
officer, the commander of the JTF chose to be dual missioned as the army force (ARFOR). This
meant that the 7th ID had responsibilities normally associated with the JTF and the ARFOR. The
ARFOR composed of General Hernandez’s 40th ID, the 49th MP Brigade CAARNG, and 7th ID
units. The marine units were under the MARFOR. General Covault’s 7th ID struggled to organize
itself as a JTF and had to be augmented by I Corps. General Covault might have designated the
40th ID as the ARFOR, which may have been a better use for the 40th ID staff. The battle staff of
the 40th ID assisted their commander with command and control, planned, and synchronized
operations. The staff had established a good working relationship with the local police and state
police; however once they were federalized, they found they were now unable to respond to most
of the incoming requests. Because the CAARNG soldiers were federalized, Federal Law
prevented them from participating in law enforcement-posse comitatus now limited their ability
to respond. By 9 May 1992, the city of LA was calm again and the soldiers of the CAARNG to
include the 40th Infantry Division were defederalized.92

On 11 September 2001, the headquarters of the 42d Infantry Division was conducting its Battle
Command Training Program (BCTP) seminar at the Army National Guard training center, Fort

92 Christopher M. Schnaubelt, “Lessons in Command and Control from the Los Angeles Riots”,
Parameters, Summer 1997, 88-109 available, http://carlisle-
Leavenworth, Kansas. The terrorist attack on the world trade center in New York City caused the 42d ID to end the seminar early and return to New York State.

New York’s Army National Guard 53d Troop Command was activated for state active-duty, and tasked with the mission to stand up a TF, which would coordinate the crisis response. Although Troop Command was organized in a similar manner to a division’s general staff, its staff rarely worked as an integrated team, i.e. they do not conduct organized staff training. It was more of an administrative headquarters than a warfighting one. When compared with the 42d ID staff it had fewer numbers of staff and therefore was unable to conduct sustained command post operations. Consequently, New York State’s Governor George Pataki ordered the returning 42d ID to state active duty and tasked it to relieve in place Troop Command and to establish JTF-42. The 42d ID conducted a relief in place with the 53d Troop Command in late September and established JTF-42.

JTF-42 was composed of the New York Army National Guard, the New York Air National Guard, the New York Guard and the New York Naval Militia, figure 2. New York’s Naval Militia is composed of the U.S. Naval Reserve sailors and U.S. Marine reservists. A special agreement between New York State and the Department of Navy authorizes the New York’s Governor to use these personnel for state active-duty. The headquarters of 42d ID remained in the New York City area on state active-duty until January 2002.
While the 42d ID's experience was neither a federal partial or full mobilization nor federalization, it did demonstrate that a National Guard division, when ordered to state active-duty, with its robust staff is more capable than other types of National Guard organizations in responding to Homeland Security Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) incidents. They have enough staff for sustained command post operations and more importantly, they have experienced staff officers who have the ability to conduct parallel and collaborative planning, from seventy-two to ninety-six hours into the future, while simultaneously executing and synchronizing current operations facilitating the command and control of task organized forces. The 42d ID's experience may also suggest the requirement for future National Guard division training related specifically to conducting joint task force operations.

93 The source of the chart was a 42d ID command brief.
Affiliation Programs and NG Division Readiness

An Evolution

The National Defense Act of 1916 authorized permanent divisions of the AC/RC. The Act authorized and directed the formation of eighteen National Guard divisions, which were to be equipped and organized exactly as Regular Army units. To assist these divisions with training guidance and inspections, Congress authorized the formation of nine Corps Areas. Each Corps Area was to be a composite of National Guard, Organized Reserve Component, and Regular Army divisions. Each of the nine corps areas was associated with two National Guard divisions. The Department of War assigned “a regular corps commander, staff, and trainers, or inspectors … responsible for training these divisions.”

Meanwhile the States’ Adjutant Generals maintained the responsibility for the training and readiness of the National Guard organizations in their state. Corps areas did not command Regular Army units within their assigned area of responsibility, but did command the Regular Army Inspectors attached to the National Guard and they were responsible with coordinating integration of National Guard divisions into Regular Army field exercises. Corps areas were to remain the primary affiliation program until WWII.

After WWII, the Continental Armies (CONUSA) assumed the role of training, readiness, and mobilization of the National Guard divisions, what is currently known as training, readiness, and oversight (TRO). Public pressure to demobilize the armed forces led to a fragmented and disorganized reserve component. No sooner had the ink dried on the appropriations bill, than Congress proposed cuts to the National Guard’s budget. In a 23 March 1947 New Times article, “Friction Upsets Guard” the proposed budget cuts were described as “crippling.”


on the lessons from the mobilizations of the previous two world wars, many policy makers were
determined to make the Army National Guard ready for combat on mobilization (M) day.\textsuperscript{96} They
believed that, in the Atomic Age, the United States could no longer afford the luxury of two years
post-mobilization training for its reserve forces—they would have to be ready to deploy on M-Day.
Moreover, there was a need for these trained reserve forces, because the US would continue its
historical national military policy of relying on a small professional army, augmented in time of
war a large well-trained reserve component.\textsuperscript{97} Detractors of the M-Day policy, felt that in no
possible way would the National Guard ever be ready to deploy to a theater of war on M-Day.

The debate surrounding the readiness of the National Guard increased after the experience of
the activation of the eight National Guard divisions during the Korean War, and specifically
focused on the performance of the two National Guard divisions, that had deployed to Korea. The
debate caused numerous legislative attempts to improve the readiness of the reserve component
such as staged readiness. The Armed Forces Act of 1952 separated reserve units into three
categories of readiness: "A", "B", and "C". Category "A" units were authorized, as in the
National Defense Act of 1916, forty-eight drills and fifteen days of annual training. Category
"B" units were authorized twenty-four drills and category "C"—twelve drills per year. However,
the Armed Forces Act of 1952 was devoid any sort of AC/RC affiliation program.\textsuperscript{98}

The Department of Army established the Selected Reserve Force (SRF) in September 1965 to
improve the readiness of the National Guard and Army Reserve. The idea behind the plan was
that SRF units would be ready for "deployment with little or no post-mobilization training."\textsuperscript{99}
These units were authorized full manning, new equipment, and initially seventy-two then later
fifty-eight paid drills per year. The National Guard divisions selected for the SRF included: the

\begin{footnotesize}\begin{enumerate}
\item Ibid.
\item Ibid, 29.
\end{enumerate}\end{footnotesize}
28th, 38th, and 47th Infantry Divisions. The Army tested the program in 1966 and by September 1969 had dropped the concept, because of the 1968 reorganization of the National Guard, which authorized all guard units approximately 93 percent of wartime (TOE) manning and an equal number of drill periods.

In May 1968, while appearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara quoted a statement, as part of his testimony, which he had made to the committee in 1961:

In light of the present world situation it is essential that these reserve forces be brought as soon as possible to a state of readiness that would permit them to respond on a very short notice to limited war situations which threaten to tax the capacity of the active Army. Moreover, they must be so organized, trained, and equipped as to permit their rapid integration into the active Army. The “One Army” concept must become a reality as well as a slogan.

His statement marked the genesis of the “One Army” concept, which in turn led to the Total Army policy several years later. Of the “One Army” concept, the *Department of the Army Historical Summary, Fiscal Year 1970*, notes: “the Army Staff in particular is to include consideration of Reserve Component requirements in Army plans. Also are plans to insure more active Army participation with Reserve Component units in the field.”

Secretary Of Defense Melvin L. Laird, who in 1970 first coined the rubric-Total Forces Policy - carried forth the call for increased AC/RC associations when he testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee on 15 March 1971. He described a test program that integrated some Guard and Reserve battalions, which would “round out” two NATO-oriented

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104 When Secretary of Defense Laird used the term “Total Force” he meant: US forces, both active and reserve components, “those of our allies, and additional military capabilities of our allies and friends that will be made available through local efforts, or through provision of appropriate security assistance programs.”
105 Term expression “round out” first appeared in AR 11-35, *Army Program: Reserve Components*
divisions. One of the “objectives” of such associations was to allow the Reserve components to train with Active units, so that the RC personnel would become familiar with AC “methods of operations” and the newest equipment. This test initiated the roundout program.

The Mutual Support Program, promulgated 1 September 1971, was designed to improve readiness through the sharing and coordination of support activities between the AC and RC, which in theory would allow for the most efficient use of Army resources. An informal Army program, it relied on decentralized execution, which was addressed in Army Regulation No. 11-22, Mutual Support Program, the objectives of the program were to:

   a. Improve the mission capability of Reserve Component individuals by developing close relationships with Active Army counterparts for enhancing technical proficiencies, sharing current doctrine and techniques, and developing familiarity with equipment items of limited availability.
   b. Assist Active Army units in mission accomplishment through parallel employment of similarly oriented Reserve Component combat support and service support units or in direct mission support of Active combat units.
   c. Enhance the One Army through the sharing of experiences, facilities, and development of common understanding among all of the components.

The Mutual Support program led to many other affiliation programs in the 1970s and beyond. All had the similar aims of increased readiness and a more unified “One Army.”

   In 1973, the Army established Forces Command (FORSCOM), which replaced the Continental Army Command (CONARC). Whereas CONARC was responsible for many missions other than combat readiness, FORSCOM focused solely on combat readiness and was responsible for the round out and augmentation affiliation programs. FORSCOM, through the numbered CONUSA,
was responsible for the readiness of the Army National Guard and was to command all Army Reserve units. Army Readiness Regions (ARR) were formed “to serve as extensions of the CONUSA and to provide dynamic, on-the-spot assistance to the Reserve components.” While FORSCOM was now responsible for the training and evaluation of the National Guard, the States’ governors, through their TAGS, were ultimately for commanding and training the Guard units. The formation of FORSCOM led to an increase in affiliation programs, which was in a better position than CONARC had been, to see that the affiliations were implemented.

By the end of fiscal year (FY) 1974, three types of affiliation programs were in effect: the “roundout”, augmentation, and mutual support. In the “roundout” program, two of the thirteen active Army divisions were “rounded out” by RC battalions. The augmentation program affiliated five brigades with active duty divisions, designed to increase the combat power of those divisions. The mutual support program was an unfunded program designed to associate RC units with AC units to provide “mutual” planning and training support. These programs were designed with a two-fold purpose: improvement in the readiness Guard and Reserve units and to allow the Army to organize three additional active divisions. By FY 1978, two RC brigades and nine separate battalions rounded out the Army’s sixteen AC divisions.

One of the battalions in the affiliation program was the 1st Battalion, 158th Field Artillery (FA), Oklahoma Army National Guard (OKARNG). The 1-158 FA was affiliated with III Corps Artillery, Fort Sill; and teamed with the 4-4 FA battalion. LTC Merrill, former commander of the 1-158 FA wrote, in an article for the Field Artillery Journal, “The relationship has produced positive results and is one of growing mutual respect. In terms of the affiliation program

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113 On 1 September 1987, 1-158 FA became the National Guard FA battalion to organize as a MLRS battalion. The 1-158 FA deployed to Saudi Arabia days before the ground offensive of Desert Storm. The battalion fired 903 rockets in support of VII Corps forces throughout the ground portion of the campaign.
objective of improving Reserve readiness, it has been a resounding success."\textsuperscript{114} At the end of the article, he wrote, "Affiliation has resulted in two units working together, where cooperation and mutual respect have added to the readiness and professionalism of both. Isn’t this what the “one Army” concept is all about?"\textsuperscript{115}

In 1980, the Army had five official programs: Affiliation, Augmentation, CAPSTONE, Mobilization and deployment capability, Mutual Support, and Roundout.\textsuperscript{116} Originally, the purpose of the CAPSTONE Program was to organize AC and RC units into “packages” to meet force requirements for a NATO contingency. As opposed to the Mutual Support Program, CAPSTONE established formal relationships and was executed centrally by FORSCOM.

Three years later, the Army CAPSTONE Program became the overarching “affiliation” program. It incorporated the Affiliation Program; the Active Component/Reserve Component Partnership Program; the Counterpart Program Alignments for Army National Guard attack helicopter units; and the Corps and Division Training Coordination Program (CORTRAIN). CONTRAIN was a program that aligned AC and RC divisions and echelons below division with Corps based in CONUS. The intent of the alignment was to provide commanders and staff the opportunity to gain the experience of working with of a corps. CAPSTONE provided focus for the Army’s, various readiness initiatives. Its purpose was to provide:

- Improved mobilization and wartime planning, mission capability, and deployability throughout the Total Army.
- The basis for unit commanders to enter into cohesive planning and training associations with their designated wartime commands.
- Improved management of the Total Army by focusing the actions taken under other programs on wartime accomplishment; these other programs include mutual support, overseas deployment training, and joint exercises.
- Improved readiness of the Total Army through the alignment of Active Component (AC) and Reserve Component (RC) units to meet wartime requirements and the needs of the continental United States (CONUS) Sustaining Base.

\textsuperscript{115} Ibid.
The supported Commander-in-Chief Time-Phased Force Development Data (CINC TPFDD) Operations Plan (OPLAN) shortfalls will be highlighted so as to provide input to Total Army Analysis (TAA).117

The Army developed CAPSTONE to be flexible enough to meet the current needs of the Army when it was formulated as well as those of the future needs. Therefore, it was designed to be more than a Cold War affiliation program.

In 1994, eleven years from the implementation of CAPSTONE, the Army replaced CAPSTONE with the WARTRACE Program. The shift in the Army’s active force structure from forward deployed to CONUS based appears to have been the impetuous for the development of the WARTRACE Program. Whereas, CAPSTONE focused on fostering stronger AC and RC affiliations, WARTRACE focused on forming planning associations that would support the CINC’s OPLANs and MACOMS wartime requirements. Moreover, while the objectives of WARTRACE were similar to that of CAPSTONE, the sine qua non of how the program works was less than lucid.118

**TRAINING AND EDUCATION**

The experience of past mobilizations of National Guard divisions has shown a trend towards a deficiency in the staff officer military education. However, can the past be an accurate predictor of future readiness in this regard? Since the National Defense Act of 1916 first authorized National Guard officers to attend Army service schools, a complete revolution in officer education and training, via The Army School System119, has occurred.

The US Army’s officer leader development strategy consists of institutional training, operational assignments and self-development. Institutional training encompasses all “school

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119 Formerly known as the Total Army School System.
house training and education leaders receive.”120 The Army’s officer education system (OES) applies to AC and RC officers alike and specifies the knowledge, skills and abilities (KSA) required of all officers. Officer education spans the three aspects of officer leader development, i.e. it occurs in institutional settings, in units, and through self-development.121 Initially all officers regardless of their commissioning source or component are required to attend a resident officer basic course (OBC). The average basic course is about four months long. After completion of OBC, National Guard officers usually return to their states and units. Some become platoon leaders as their active counterparts and some go to other types of organizations, mostly based on the types of units located near their home of record.

The overwhelming majority of National Guard officers take the Captain’s Career Course nonresident through a correspondence course or by the innovative distant learning program with several resident phases, normally of two weeks each. The several resident phases allow for peer interaction and exposure to the active component and the branch schoolhouse. As of the changes in the Reserve Officers Promotion Act in 1994, all National Guard officers must complete the Combined Arms and Services Staff School (CAS3) to be eligible for promotion to major.

NG majors can complete Command and Staff College by attending the resident Command and General Staff College (CGSOC) course, the Navy, Marine, or Air Staff Colleges, the RC-CGSOC course, regional RC schools or correspondence course. Fifty percent of AC majors complete the CGSOC in the same manner as RC officers, i.e. through a regional RC school or by correspondence course. Upon graduation from CGSOC, National Guard majors may apply for entry into the Advanced Military Studies Program, The School of Advanced Military Studies at

121 Ibid, 16-122.
Fort Leavenworth. To be eligible for promotion to lieutenant colonel, NG majors must have completed 50 percent of CGSOC.

Lieutenant Colonels, that are MEL 4 qualified, can complete the Senior Staff School, e.g. the War College in resident, through distant learning or by correspondence course. This is a competitive selection process.

In conclusion, the Army requires National Guard officers and Active Component officers to meet the same OES requirements. NG officers who move change assignments must be branch qualified within one year, if they are not branch qualified at the time. Moreover, the Army has made it more difficult for NG officers become branch qualified, which has prevented the former practice of branch “collecting”. This former practice, while assuring an officer in almost any type of unit often caused the officers to be “a jack of all trades and a master of none.”

The problems of poor or little, NG officer education, which plagued past mobilizations, would appear to be something of the past. During the Civil War, COL Joshua Chamberlain, of the 20th Maine, wrote his wife and requested that she send him his copy of Jomini’s *Summary of the Art of War* (1838), so he could learn about warfighting. Fortunately, today’s citizen-soldier is trained and educated in US Army doctrine and tactics. So in the future, when the Army mobilizes a National Guard division, its staff officers will be able to concentrate on post mobilization training and not on attending Army military schools. Albeit, there will still be isolated situations where some officers may not be branch qualified and therefore will have to be sent to school after mobilization, depending on the length of the alert. However, if the division has enough notice, some of these officers should be sent before the division mobilizes.

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122 National Guard Bureau memo, subject: School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS) Training with Subsequent Active Guard Reserve (AGR) Utilization Tour, Arlington, VA, 10 Sep 01
OPERATIONAL EXPERIENCE

Operational experience through duty assignments augments what has been learned in the formal education process. To the maximum extent possible, RC officers receive operational assignments that allow them to apply the knowledge and leadership skills learned in institutional training. This is especially critical for company grade officers. Every attempt should be made to assign junior officers to troop units. This phase in development is critical to developing leadership competencies and instill the Army values necessary in the officer corps. Experience gained through challenging and varied assignments enhances officer development and provides trained officers able to meet the dynamic needs of the Reserve Components.

DA PAM 600-3\textsuperscript{123}

Reserve officers must complete OBC within two years of commissioning. Therefore, most of these officers have joined a unit and have a duty assignment by the time they attend OBC. However, for the rest, there is no guarantee that they will be assigned as troop unit leaders. In the 21\textsuperscript{st} Century company grade officers are often gaining operational experience, while deployed with their units to places like Bosnia, Kosovo, and the Sinai to mention a few. In these places, their actions at the tactical level can have strategic consequences - an awesome responsibility.\textsuperscript{124} Others may never have critical troop assignments, i.e. platoon leader, company executive officer and company command. Nevertheless, these officers may still by their geographic location, end up as a division staff officer. The offset is that they usually serve within the division for many years and become thoroughly familiar with its operations.

The Army National Guard attempts mirror the assignment process of the AC, but often it is impossible to do, because of geographic dispersion of units. Many officers are willing to commute great distances, by car or even plane, to stay within the prescribed leader development model.\textsuperscript{125} For those officers who are not able to stay within the model, often find it necessary to

\textsuperscript{123} DA PAM 600-3, Commissioned Officer Development and Career Management, 25.
\textsuperscript{124} Jeffrey McCausland and Greg Martin, "Transforming Strategic Leader Education for the 21\textsuperscript{st}-Century Army, Parameters, autumn 2001, 17-33.
\textsuperscript{125} U.S. Department of the Army, FORSCOM Regulation 350-2, Reserve Component Training, (Fort McPherson, GA: GPO, 1999), 9.
branch transfer or join higher headquarters type organizations, i.e. battalion, brigade, and division.

AC officers, who join National Guard divisions after leaving active duty, often have great operational experience at the platoon and sometimes company level, but more often than not have no staff experience above battalion.

So overall, the operational experience of divisional staff officer before he or she arrives at the division is of mixed and varied quality. In any case, their operational experience is certainly shy of the operational experience of their counterparts on AC division staffs. Once assigned to a division staff, officers gain most of their operational experience by participating in the Battle Command Training Program (BCTP).

BCTP is an Army program and one of the US Army's Combat Training Centers (CTC), designed to provide divisions with realistic computer based scenarios. The focus of BCTP training is the commander and his staff. Using a computer-based simulation, known as Corps Battle Simulation (CBS), allows the commander to train his staff with minimum involvement by soldiers in lower echelons. It supports the commander's requirement to train his staff in a stressful, time sensitive environment, to stimulate commander and staff actions required at the corps and division level. BCTP is not a formal evaluation tool, and is not used by the Army to evaluate unit performance.

National Guard divisions participate in the BCTP, once every four years. Within the four-year window, divisions participate in three main training events: the combat refresher course, the Battle Command seminar, and the warfighter exercise.126

The first training event is the combat refresher course (CRC), which assists the division staff in reviewing on the Army's Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP). Divisions typically conduct the CRC training at home station over the course of weekend drill approximately two

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months before the seminar. The combat refresher team (CRT) from Fort Leavenworth facilitates the conduct and execution of the CRC training. The division commander decides what part of the MDMP his staff needs the most training on and works with the CRC team to tailor the CRC training based on his assessment.

The second training event is a five-day Battle Command seminar held, 150 to 180 days before the warfighter exercise (WFX) at the National Guard Leader Development Center (LDC) located at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Operation Group (OPSGRP) A and B assist the commander and his battle staff during the seminar in developing battle focused approach to the (WFX) and with team building.\textsuperscript{127} BCTP conducts the seminars at the LDC to enable the division commander and his staff uninterrupted training time to prepare for the WFX, by isolating against other types of routine home station tasks. Retired US Army general officers add a great deal of value to the seminar process in their role as senior observer (SRO). In addition, BCTP provides subject matter experts (SME) from the OPSGRP for each battlefield operating system (BOS). Most NG divisions aim for having a base operations order with critical annexes completed by the end of the seminar, so their MSCs have time to complete the parallel planning process.\textsuperscript{128}

The third BCTP event is the division's five-day WFX, normally held at a major training area near the division’s home station. The WFX allows the division staff to execute the operations plan (OPLAN) they developed during the seminar in a computer-based environment. The computer simulation incorporates a capabilities based threat force into the scenario. The division commander and his staff are required to execute all the functions required of a division staff during actual operations. The CSA General Shinseki has directed that divisions and brigades will move their command posts at least once during the WFX. This adds complexity by requiring another command post (CP) to take on the responsibilities of the relocating CP. To add to the complexity of the exercise, the CSA has directed that divisions will incorporate deployment-

\textsuperscript{127} Ibid, 13.
\textsuperscript{128} Ibid.
planning exercises into all future WFXs. Never before have National Guard divisions had such a wide array of training tools and simulations available for increasing the readiness of the division commander and his staff.

Lessons learned from the performance of Army National Guard brigade staffs during post-mobilization training for Desert Shield/Desert Storm suggested that the Army needed to provide better training for brigade commanders and staffs. The battle staffs of the ARNG brigades mobilized for the Gulf War completed a two-week tactical instruction course at Fort Leavenworth known as the Tactical Commander’s Development Course (TCDC). The Army’s assessment of this training suggested that the TCDC helped improve and refresh the tactical knowledge of the brigade commanders and staffs.\textsuperscript{129}

Beginning in 1992, The Army tasked BCTP to develop a new program focused on facilitating simulation-based training for National Guard Brigade Staffs.\textsuperscript{130} In response, BCTP developed the Brigade Command and Battle Staff Training (BCBST) program using a computer-based simulation known as the Brigade Battle Simulation (BBS). Brigade staffs previously participated in division “warfighter exercises” primarily as “pucksters”, which meant the primary training audience was the division commander and his staff. The purpose of the participation of the brigades was to exercise the division staff. In contrast, the brigade WFX was targeted at the brigade commander and staff, with subordinate battalion staffs serving in the role of “pucksters”. National Guard Division staffs were tasked with HICON responsibilities for its three ground maneuver brigades. Typically, a brigade WFX occurs two years before a division WFX.

Consequently, since 1993, National Guard division commanders and staff participate in WFXs every two years. The frequency of division BCTP participation has increased; therefore, perishable battle staff skills are maintained in a higher state of readiness than in the past. On the

other hand, increased frequency of participation has led to a correspondingly increased operational tempo (OPTEMPO) and personnel tempo (PERSTEMPO) for National Guard division staffs.

In addition to executing their own division’s BCTP rotation and executing HICON responsibilities during BCBST, National Guard divisions assume higher control (HICON) and exercise director (EXDIR) responsibilities during BCTP rotations for the other National Guard divisions. For example in 2001, the 42d ID was HICON and one of its assistant division commanders (ADC) was the EXDIR for the 38th ID’s WFX.

The implications of assuming HICON are that National Guard divisions will participate in more than one WFX every four years and that National Guard divisions will somehow be able to replicate the activities of a corps. For an AC division, normally its associated corps provides the exercise control (EXCON) structure. The purpose of the EXCON structure is to “portray itself as it would be expected to operate as part of the tactical situation.”

In addition to participating in BCTP as described in the previous paragraph, National Guard divisions often participate in Corps WFXs. For example, in 2000, the 28th ID participated in the V Corps WFX as an embedded division, which means, it was executing the “exercise simultaneously.”

Without the participation of its Reserve Components, it is doubtful the Army would be able to conduct a Corps exercise. However, the primary target audience for the Corps WFX is the corps commander and his staff, so it is important to remain focused on the National Guard division BCTP as a primary means of increasing NG division staff readiness. With the increased tempo from having to provide HICON to participating in Corps WFX, the priority for NG divisions must be their own BCTP rotation and care must be exercised to not overburden M-Day staffs.

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130 Ibid.
131 TRADOC REG 350-50-3, Battle Command Training Program, 16.
The historical background of NG division mobilizations and affiliations, training and education, and operational experience all help to measure the readiness of National Guard division staffs. However, what metrics are available to measure the effectiveness of experiences in preparing division staffs for future operations? In other words, what is it that a good division staff must do in order to be effective in full spectrum operations?

DIVISION GENERAL STAFFS

According to the US Army’s FM 101-5, *Staff Organizations and Operations*, “staffs exist to help the commander make and implement decisions. No command decision is more important, or more difficult to make, than that which risks the lives of soldiers to impose the nation’s will over a resisting enemy.” If the purpose of National Guard division general staffs is to help their division commanders make decisions and implement them, how do they do it and what measurement can the Army use to determine the warfighting readiness of the staff?

NG division staff, not unlike AC division staff must be competent in the common staff duties as outlined in FM 101-5. Of the common tasks required for staff effectiveness some are more critical and some are less critical for staff readiness. The most critical are: “advising and providing information to the commander; preparing, updating, and maintaining staff estimates; making recommendations, preparing plans and orders; monitoring execution of decisions; and identifying and analyzing problems.”

In large measure, these staff assist the commander by absorbing vast amounts of information, culling out the nonessential parts, analyzing what is left and using that to make recommendations to the commander. The staff must provide the commander with information he can use to make a decision and not provide an indeterminable number of mind-numbing PowerPoint slides, which contain every piece of information that the staff has received. Information provided, however

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133 Ibid, 4-3.
must be timely, thereby allowing the commander to make quicker and better decisions than the enemy commander.\textsuperscript{134}

Coordinating staff officers have responsibility for preparing, maintaining, and updating the staff estimate for their respective staff section. The staff prepares estimates as part of the MDMP and the commander considers them when deciding on a course of action (COA). As the situation changes, staff must continually update their estimates to insure that the commander’s COA is still feasible. Updating the staff estimate also allows the staff to maintain current “situational awareness.” \textsuperscript{135}

As the most important byproduct of MDMP, the staff makes recommendations to the commander. The staff carefully develops and evaluates recommendations for feasibility, acceptability, and suitability and other criteria, e.g. the commander’s criteria. The staff continuously generates options for the commander based on his guidance and current situational understanding, which provides the commander flexibility to react to changes in the operation. These options are doctrinally known as branches and sequels.\textsuperscript{136} The staff must be capable of making recommendations in a time constrained environment often without much detailed information or instruction.

Once the commander has decided upon a COA, the staff prepares an operation plan (OPLAN) or operation order (OPORD) to communicate the commander’s decision. PowerPoint slides and e-mails are not doctrinal substitutions for written OPLAN and OPORD. Therefore, staffs must practice producing written orders. Usually the plans officer in the G3 staff section is responsible for assembling and distributing the OPLAN or OPORD.

Divisions are systems, which operate within a wider system, which oppose other systems, i.e., the enemy. A staff assists the division commander in maintaining “situational awareness” of his

\textsuperscript{134} ibid, 1-3.
\textsuperscript{135} ibid, 4-4.
systems, other friendly systems and the enemy’s system, by developing a common operational picture (COP)\textsuperscript{137} and assisting the commander with his battlespace visualization. Part of the situational awareness involves monitoring the execution of the commander’s decisions. In this case, the staff is acting like “the directed telescope”, gathering information on the execution of the commander’s decision from a variety of disparate sources, in a complex operational environment\textsuperscript{138}. The friction in war that Carl von Clausewitz, Prussian military theorist (1781-1831) described in his book On War necessitates this important staff function, because often times reports submitted to the general staff by subordinate command through the normal reporting channels may be inaccurate, untimely or may simply contain too much information. The commander uses his staff as a directed telescope when he wants to gather information outside of the normal reporting channels in order to discover the “ground truth”. In Command in War, Martin Van Creveld wrote, “Ideally, the regular reporting system should tell a commander what questions to ask, and a directed telescope should enable him to answer those questions.”\textsuperscript{139}

Clausewitz posited that things that might ordinarily be simple to execute in peacetime are much more difficult to do in war. Operations become more difficult to control as friction accumulates. It is friction that makes an operation order suspect as soon as a unit crosses the line of departure. If a subordinate commander does not fully understand the commander’s intent or if a unit fails to maintain situational awareness friction develops within the system. Commanders and their staffs lubricate the moving parts of the system to counter the degradation caused by friction. In order to minimize the influence on wartime operations, Clausewitz advised commanders “to plan maneuvers so that some of the elements of friction are involved, which will train officers’

\textsuperscript{137} Ibid., 3-6
\textsuperscript{138} The dimensions of the operational environment includes: Threat, political, unified action, land combat operations, information, and technology. Source FM 3-0, Operations, page 1-8.
\textsuperscript{139} Martin Van Creveld, Command in War, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985), 75.
Director of the ARNG (DARNG) Lieutenant General Roger Shultz envisioned the SAMS initiative as a way to increase the readiness of National Guard divisions, identified for SFOR rotation. The former Director of SAMS Colonel Robin Swan and the former Combined Arms Center Assistant Chief of Staff National Guard Colonel George M. Beshenich\textsuperscript{145} developed the CSA’s and DARNG’s vision by recruiting the first class of five National Guard majors\textsuperscript{146}, one per SAMS seminar, in the Advanced Military Studies Program. The plan envisions the participation of eight National Guard majors in the AMSP, which would generate one SAMS’ graduate for each of the eight ARNG divisions.

As a result of changes in staff officer education and training, technology, the increased opportunities for operational experience, FTUS, the SAMS initiative, ARNG division staffs of 2002 bear little resemblance to their predecessors as far as their state of readiness is concerned.

CONCLUSION

The author’s original research question was: whether or not the concept of “corps packaging” the eight Army National Guard divisions could be an enabler to enhance readiness of Army National Guard division staff officers? The answer to that primary question is a qualified yes, because, currently the “Corps Packaging” concept is just that: a concept plan. Commander, FORSCOM, is the U.S. Army’s executive agent for association programs. He is responsible for developing and implementing policy with regard to “Corps Packaging.”\textsuperscript{147}

Historical mobilizations of National Guard divisions suggest the following areas of opportunity for the improved readiness of National Guard division staff officers: experience, education and training, AC/RC interaction, and operational assignments.

\textsuperscript{145} COL Beshenich is currently assigned to 5\textsuperscript{th} Army as the Deputy Chief of Staff, Training. He kindly assisted as the author’s Monograph Director.

\textsuperscript{146} In May 2000, the first National Guard major graduated from SAMS and was assigned to the 35\textsuperscript{th} Infantry Division Kansas Army National Guard as a G3 planner. The 35\textsuperscript{th} ID KSARNG conducts TOA with the 28\textsuperscript{th} ID PAARNG for SFOR 13 in April 2003.

Since 1916, the experience level of National Guard division staff officers has increased during wartime and waned during peacetime that is until around the mid-1970s. At that time, opportunities for improved experience proliferated under a multitude of new affiliation programs, e.g. “roundout”, CAPSTONE, CORTRAIN, and MUTUAL SUPPORT. These programs built on traditions of preceding programs like the Army maneuvers of the 1920s and the institution of corps area commands. A common denominator amongst those programs was the increased opportunity for ARNG staff officer experience. However, while the experience level of ARNG staff officers has greatly improved, it is unrealistic to suggest that the experience level of ARNG staff officers will ever equal that of AC division staff officers. Nevertheless, what improved experience can do is to insure that future ARNG division mobilizations are conducted more effectively and efficiently.

During the mobilization for WWII, General Pershing established staff schools in France train and educate ARNG staff officers. Can any Army officer in the U.S. Army of 2002 imagine having to do the same thing today? It would be highly unlikely! During WWII, ARNG staff officers were sent en mass to Army service schools for training and education. Many of those officers were sent to Fort Leavenworth for two-month of staff training. Pulling these officers out of their divisions was double-edged sword. The staff officers improved their tactical knowledge and staff skills, while at same time their divisions struggled to become battle ready in their absence.

The last time the President mobilized National Guard divisions, during the Berlin Crisis, a much smaller percentage of ARNG officers had to be removed from their divisions for training. On mobilization day the 32d Infantry Division had assigned officer strength of 87 percent, 777 officers assigned with 884 authorized. Only sixty-nine officers attended short off post orientation courses, approximately 9 percent.\textsuperscript{148} What this suggests is that the Army has really solved one of

\textsuperscript{148} Department of the Army, Headquarters 32d Infantry Division, \textit{After Action Report: Mobilization}, (Fort Lewis, WA, 1962), section IV, G3 summary.
the major mobilization problems for ARNG divisions in WWI, WWII, and the Korean War. In 2002, ARNG officers complete the same officer military education requirements for promotion, as do their peers in the AC.

The main difference is that the majority of ARNG officers, with the exception of OBC, complete their military education requirements via non-resident means: correspondence study, distributed learning and Regional RC schools. These non-resident programs in combination with the Army’s resident schools compose The Army School System (TASS). Since non-resident programs are part of TASS, many AC officers attend RC schools and complete military education requirements by correspondence course. For example as of 31 March 2002, 3,262 AC officers were enrolled in CGSC by correspondence course, 502 officers were taking CGSC through regional RC schools. During the same period, 1,167 National Guard officers were enrolled in CGSC by correspondence course and 1,101 officers were enrolled in the two-year CGSC conducted by regional RC schools. 149

AC/RC interaction has increased because of programs like BCTP, FTGs, division teaming and the missioning of the eight ARNG with SFOR MND (N) rotations. This interaction has helped improve the readiness and operational experience of ARNG division staff officers.

Lieutenant Colonel Wallace, the one-time G3 of the 49th Armored Division believed that staff officers should have experience on subordinate level staffs. This is one problem area that remains difficult to solve. Americans are much more mobile than they were in the past. The number of Americans flying on planes was at record level before the attack on 11 September 2001. Fewer Americans are tied to geographical locations for their working careers. These factors tend to exacerbate the problem of disparate geographical unit headquarters. Therefore, many National Guard do not have the opportunity to serve on subordinate staffs. However, because of technology, e.g. Internet and e-mail, these staffs are closely connected in a virtual sense.

149 Information provided to the author by Rhonda DeMint, Educational Technician, Non-Resident Studies, CGSC, Eisenhower Hall Fort Leavenworth, KS.
After 11 September 2001, homeland security has become an important issue for the American people. Before the attack, the U.S. Army was in the process of developing concepts to address the issue homeland security. Since the attack, some advocate giving the mission of homeland security to the Army National Guard in lieu of its traditional role of supporting the U.S. Army in time of "war, national emergency, or as otherwise needed."\textsuperscript{150} The examples of the 40th Infantry Division during the LA riots and the 42d Infantry Division during the consequence management period of the WTC attack, coupled with the 49th Armored Division and the 29th Infantry Division SFOR rotations clearly demonstrate the responsiveness, agility, versatility and sustainability of National Guard Divisions in military operations other than war. These divisions responded well to these operations, because they were trained with a warfighting focus.\textsuperscript{151} The Army should exercise caution when considering altering the organization of the ARNG Divisions and having them to focus solely on homeland security. If the President and the Secretary of Defense decide to focus the role of the National Guard solely on homeland security, then the U.S. Army must have a plan to train, equip and man these new units. However, before the Army focuses on those issues, it must write the doctrine and TTPs for homeland security missions.

**RECOMMENDATIONS**

Deactivate the Continental United States numbered armies, because they are relics of WWII and the Cold War. They bring nothing of value to the fight. Although FM 3-0 states that, the numbered armies are capable of serving as an ARFOR,\textsuperscript{152} it is highly improbable that 1st or 5th Army would be ready to serve as an ARFOR. When was the last time either headquarters conducted a warfighter exercise? The numbered armies are administrative headquarters and not warfighting headquarters. Flattening the organizational structure below FORSCOM by eliminating the numbered armies would permit the establishment of a new corps headquarters,


\textsuperscript{151} FM 3-0, Operations, 1-3.
VII Corps, which could be located at Fort Drum, New York. Eliminating armies would also free up personnel, which could potentially allow them to be assigned to permanent joint task force staffs – more in keeping with the way the U.S. armed forces will fight in the future.

After VII Corps is established, the Army should associate two Army National Divisions with each of CONUS based corps. For example, VII Corps could have the following divisions associated with it: 10th Mountain Division, 28th Infantry Division PAARNG, and the 42d Infantry Division NYARNG. The Army National Guard divisions could be teamed with the 10th Mountain Division.

The CONUS based corps would be responsible for the evaluation, training and mobilization readiness of the National Guard divisions. This plan is similar to the original concept of corps area commands, which was reviewed in the historical analysis section. The Adjutant General of each state would retain ultimate responsibility for the training and readiness for a division located in his state. The one-time corps area concept could be adapted to modern conditions. Corps are tactical headquarters, which are capable of assuming ARFOR responsibilities with augmentation. The corps could relieve the ARNG divisions of HICON responsibility for other National Guard divisions. This would permit the National Guard divisions to concentrate on their own WFXs and those of their subordinate brigades.

The Training Support Divisions would be associated with each of the CONUS corps. The TSD and TSB roles would remain the same, however now each corps commander would be solely responsible for “Corps Packaging”, division teaming, and AC/RC program within his corps, which would help achieve unity of command and a more focused unity of effort.

If the recommendation of eliminating numbered is not feasible or acceptable, then the current “corps packaging” of the National Guard divisions should be reconsidered. Instead of packaging three National Guard divisions with each of the highest OPTEMPO corps [III Corps and XVIII

152 FM 3.0, Operations.
153 AR 170-10, Corps Areas and Departments.
Corps], consider moving the 34th Infantry Division from III Corps to I Corps. The 42d ID could be “packaged” with V Corps and teamed with the 1st Armored Division. Redistributing the ARNG divisions would provide corps commanders with better span of control for assisting their “Packaged” ARNG divisions. AC Corps could then assume HICON responsibility for ARNG Division BCTP rotations instead of relying on ARNG divisions to “act” as a corps headquarters for other ARNG divisions. This redistribution is logical in view of the fact that it is highly unlikely that I Corps or V Corps could execute a corps WFX without the participation of ARNG divisions; therefore “packaging” a minimum of two ARNG divisions with each of those corps would allow the ARNG divisions to rotate between corps WFXs. The redistribution of ARNG divisions would enhance the readiness of ARNG division staff officers, while at the same time ensuring that their PERSTEMPO is maintained at a acceptable level. An additional benefit of adding an additional ARNG division to V Corps is that 1st Armored Division and 1st Infantry Division would be teamed with the ARNG divisions that “backfill” each division in time of war or other national emergency. Augmenting V Corps with an additional ARNG division would fulfill two of the roles that General Shinseki has assigned to the ARNG divisions: It would augment V Corps and provide backfill for V Corps’ divisions.

Once the “Corps Packaging” alignments have been formalized, a program to provide ARNG with corps level operational experience, similar to the KPUP (Key Personnel Upgrade Program) of the 1980s, should be instituted. KPUP allowed ARNG soldiers to “work side-by-side with their active Army counterpart in a tactical mission.”154 ARNG staff officers could be integrated into the staff of corps and division headquarters, preferably in the same G-section. The new KPUP could help improve the operational experience of ARNG staff officers; while at the same time could improve the readiness of their own division staff.

Building on the intent of KPUP, which is to have AC/RC soldiers working side-by-side, soldiers assigned to the Field Training Groups (FTGs) collocated with the eight ARNG division headquarters should be integrated into the divisions’ staffs. AC soldiers assigned to ARNG division staff should be classified as Full-Time Support and not as advisors. Army Regulation 135-2, *Army National Guard and U.S. Army Reserve: Full-Time Support Program* states, that “AC personnel... assigned to attached to [sic] FTUS [Full-Time Unit Support] positions are not advisors but will be integrated into unit functions and missions.”\(^{155}\) This would eliminate the us/Them mentality and reinforce General Shinseki’s vision of The Army. Instead of two Army organizations, existing in one headquarters the Army would now have a single Army organization with unity of command and unity of effort. AC soldiers assigned to the ARNG divisions would wear the ARNG division patch and not a numbered army patch. In addition, they should be integrated into the divisions rating scheme.

Integrating AC soldiers into the ARNG division staff would enhance the readiness of their peers, the ARNG staff officers, while at the same time it would have a reciprocal effect on the AC soldiers. AC soldiers would gain experience by working on an ARNG division staff through participation in normal staff work and in the division and brigade WFXs.

AC soldiers assigned to ARNG should remain with the ARNG division when it is mobilized and should deploy with the division during the SFOR type missions. The Army should ensure that at a minimum AC majors assigned to ARNG division staffs are CGSOC graduates. AC soldiers assigned to an ARNG division staff should receive Some ARNG divisions have successfully integrated AC soldiers into their division staff on an informal basis, however this type of arrangement is subject to the whims of individual personalities. Institutionalizing the program would ensure that it is understood and applied in a standard manner throughout the Army.

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