FIXING THE RESERVE OFFICER TRAINING CORPS’ RECRUITING PROBLEMS

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General Studies

by

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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)
ABSTRACT

FIXING THE RESERVE OFFICER TRAINING CORPS’ RECRUITING PROBLEMS,
by MAJ Anthony G. Dotson, 96 pages.

The organization charged with producing three quarters of the Army’s officer corps has failed to meet requirements for thirteen years running. In 1989, the Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) produced over 8,000 new lieutenants, today it can’t produce half of that figure. Many reasons have been given for this failure, to include everything from a declining national propensity to inadequate budgets. Whatever the reason, the impact on the Army is clear, and that is a shortage of leadership. If the Army is to meet the challenges of the new millennium, which includes an asymmetric threat, digitization and information overload it must have the required number of officers within its ranks. Until now, the Army has allowed the National Guard and Reserves to pay the bill, while keeping the ranks of the Active Army full. However, with the increased deployment of reserve forces to Iraq, Afghanistan, and Kosovo, that bill will be coming due again, and this time only big Army can pay it. If not, the country could pay the ultimate cost in lives of our leaderless soldiers.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This study would not have been possible had it not been for the tireless efforts of my MMAS committee. I would like to especially thank my Committee Chair, LTC (Ret) Scott Stephenson for pushing me towards a better product. His critical insight forced me to dig deeper, think harder and to look at the problem from more than one angle.

In addition, I wish to thank MG (Ret) and Mrs. Robert E. Wagner for opening their lovely home to me. The General's candid responses to my interview questions were both enlightening and inspirational. His insight was instrumental in identifying problems within the program and offering solutions. His tremendous success as the first commander of Cadet Command is a direct reflection of the type of leader he is. He reinforced my lifelong belief that leadership makes all the difference.
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<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>ACC</td>
<td>Army Accessions Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APMS</td>
<td>Assistant Professor of Military Science</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DODMERB</td>
<td>The Department of Defense Medical Examination Review Board is charged with screening all medical files for ROTC cadets</td>
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<td>JROTC</td>
<td>The Junior Reserve Officers Training Corps is a secondary school program designed to produce better citizens</td>
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<tr>
<td>MS I, II, III, IV</td>
<td>Military Science Level One (Freshman), Two (Sophomore), Three (Junior) and Four (Senior) distinguish each class of cadet.</td>
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<td>NG</td>
<td>National Guard. A reserve component of the Army under the control of the state governor.</td>
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<td>OCS</td>
<td>Officers Candidate School is one of the five commissioning sources. It is the shortest in duration and was designed to be an emergency officer production system.</td>
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<tr>
<td>PMS</td>
<td>Professor of Military Science. Normally an active duty Lieutenant Colonel serving as the senior cadre member in an ROTC detachment.</td>
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<tr>
<td>RA</td>
<td>Regular Army. As opposed to National Guard or Reserve.</td>
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<td>ROO</td>
<td>Recruiting Operations Officer. The cadre member responsible for recruiting cadets for an ROTC detachment.</td>
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<td>ROTC</td>
<td>The Reserve Officer Training Corps. Note: Cadet Command is the organization that oversees the program and is often used interchangeably.</td>
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<tr>
<td>SAL</td>
<td>Scholar, Athlete, Leader</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TRADOC</td>
<td>Training and Doctrine Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>USAREC</td>
<td>United States Army Recruiting Command is charged with the mission of recruiting enlisted soldiers for the Army.</td>
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<td>USMA</td>
<td>United States Military Academy. Also known as West Point is one of the five commissioning sources in the Army producing roughly 17 percent of the officers on active duty.</td>
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

We must train and classify the whole of our male citizens, and make military instruction a regular part of collegiate education.

Thomas Jefferson

Defining the Problem

Our founding fathers understood the importance of educating our military leaders in civil educational institutions. Their motivation was born more out of fear than any potential educational benefits to the officer. The thought of a standing professional army was just as frightening to them as not having an army at all. It was believed that citizen soldiers could rally to oppose nearly any threat that presented itself. Citizen soldiers represented the people’s interests and thus eased the minds of those worried about the military taking over the government. The concept of the citizen soldier has served as the foundation for our country’s defense since its beginnings. Only during times of severe personnel shortages such as war has the country had to institute the drafting of conscripts. Vietnam was the last time that the draft was exercised. Since then we have relied on an all-volunteer service.

Just prior to America’s entry into World War I Congress formalized Thomas Jefferson’s sentiments with the passing of the National Defense Act of 1916. With this act came the establishment of the Reserve Officer’s Training Corps (ROTC). It immediately became the primary source of the United States Army’s officer corps. While it was originally designed to produce Reserve officers as the name might indicate, today it is the source of over half of the army’s Active Duty force. The premise of ROTC
is to train future army officers on college and university campuses nationwide by mixing military and leadership training with an academic curriculum thus producing a well-rounded leader. Although the ROTC program has gone through several evolutionary changes over the years, its fundamental mission has remained the same, which is to produce quality second lieutenants for the army.

ROTC's popularity has also varied throughout its history, from being a two-year, all-male, mandatory program on most campuses to the all-volunteer program that it is today. The needs of the army and public opinion at the time are the driving factors in shaping the face of ROTC. The Vietnam era for example, proved to be the most challenging for ROTC as the need for junior officers increased and the public support for the war decreased. Campus demonstrations against the war often focused on the most visible representative of the government and military on campus, which was ROTC. As a result several programs were closed during that time with many never reopening. Today the popularity of ROTC is based on regional politics or attitudes and socio-economic boundaries. Current enrollment figures indicate that there is a direct inverse correlation with wealth and the propensity to serve one's country. In other words, the higher the tuition costs, the smaller the ROTC program will be. Other factors that impact ROTC's popularity are the strength of the economy and the state of the nation in regards to its foreign policy. If jobs are readily available ROTC is a less attractive option for most college students. While war or pending war may draw or deter students depending upon the public's opinion.

In 1986, Cadet Command was established to take on the job of command and control of nearly 400 ROTC programs across the country.² This had an immediate impact
on the quantity and quality of cadets in the program. It established clear nation-wide standards and established recruiting goals to meet army requirements. In fact ROTC met army requirements in 1989 for the first (and sadly last) time in its history. ROTC has struggled to meet demands since then, even though the requirements have been cut nearly in half due to the fall of the Soviet Union and the subsequent reduction in force. As a result the culture within ROTC and the army as a whole has been impacted. While ROTC still produces around 73 percent of the army’s officers, other commissioning programs have had to step up to fill the gap left by ROTC. For example, the Officers Candidate School at Fort Benning, Georgia, added an additional training company last year. A parade of generals has attempted to get ROTC back on track but each has failed miserably. MG Casey the latest commanding general of Cadet Command has laid out his vision to solve the woes of his organization and to do what only one has done before him—make mission.

Purpose of the Study

The purpose of this program evaluation was to look at current and past marketing and recruiting strategies and methods in an attempt to identify possible flaws that may exist in the program. The study also looked at other factors to include the social context of ROTC, leadership and national trends. The final results are recommendations on how to address the problems identified in the study.

Statement of the Problem

Cadet Command is responsible for producing nearly three-quarters of the army’s leadership through ROTC, yet it has failed to meet annual production requirements since
1989. The “so what” here is that the army, especially the National Guard and Reserves are critically short of junior officers which affects unit readiness, which in turn affects national readiness. In a monthly readiness report by the Department of Defense to the Congress, officer recruiting and retention was highlighted as an army readiness issue.\textsuperscript{4} History has shown us that drafting officers is not the best solution during times of need. A standing professional army requires a standing professional officer corps that has been trained to meet the challenges of leadership.

The Research Objective

The objective of this study was to answer the following primary question (1) and subsequent questions (2-6):

1. Can Cadet Command’s recruiting strategy and methods meet the future leadership requirements of the Army?

2. What are the problems facing ROTC recruiting?

3. Can the problems be solved with money?

4. Are there 270 different markets?

5. What is ROTC’s image?

6. How does training effect recruiting?

Answers to these questions were addressed through the study of primary and secondary data analyzed by the researcher.

Assumptions

Throughout the course of this study the researcher operated under the following assumptions. The first assumption was that ROTC will remain the primary
commissioning source for the Army's officers. This assumption was based on the premise that political and economic restraints will prohibit West Point from increasing its production. Likewise, the Officers Candidate School at Fort Benning, Georgia has limited growth potential due to resources and qualified candidates. The second assumption was that the recent creation of Accessions Command at Fort Monroe, Virginia will not have a significant impact in the near term. The third assumption was that there are a sufficient number of eligible prospects available that are willing to participate in ROTC. Finally, it was assumed that the Army ROTC's recruiting mission can be met given the right strategy. These assumptions set the parameters and helped to focus the research.


2Ibid., 88.


CHAPTER 2
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

Introduction

Before any relevant program analysis or evaluation can take place we must first understand the history of the organization and what factors influenced its current organizational structure and behavior. The purpose of this chapter is to provide a historical and theoretical framework for the topic. Only then can we critically examine the decisions and practices of the organization.

The History of ROTC

Our founding fathers did not envision a large, standing, professional army when they laid out the foundation for this country. In fact, in 1784, Congress made it very clear when they stated “standing armies in time of peace are inconsistent with the principles of republican government, dangerous to the liberties of a free people, and generally converted into destructive engines for establishing despotism.” Their plan for national defense rested squarely upon the shoulders of the Minute Man or citizen soldier. This “self-defense” model was seen as far less threatening to a government of the people. Even today most citizens and lawmakers prefer a smaller standing army in peacetime; however, the motivation is based more on cost, rather than fear of a military coup. The strength of the militia lay not in its tactics and training but rather in its ability to mobilize quickly and relatively cheaply.

Congress did finally establish a formal training facility for officers at The Military Academy at West Point in 1802. Their reluctance was still evident; however, as a tactics
department was not added until 56 years later. After suffering many military blunders in the War of 1812, alternative means of training officers were developed. The most common method was to train officers in military subjects on existing college campuses. This practice grew considerably during the Civil War with the passage of the Morrill Act of 1862. Justin Morrill, a representative of Vermont, proposed that 30,000 acres of public land be sold in each state to generate funds to create public colleges. The only stipulation was that these "land grant" colleges must offer courses in military tactics. By 1900, 42 such colleges were training Army officers on their campuses.

As the country prepared to enter World War I, the need for a more extensive and more organized officer training program was realized. The National Defense Act of 1916 created the three-component army that we know today. It delineated Regular Army, the Army Reserve and the National Guard. It also formally established the Reserve Officer Training Corps to train the officers needed to fill the demand of the reserve and Guard. With that the War Department began developing the necessary control measures along with the required resources to get its new ROTC program rolling. By World War II, they had expanded to 220 institutions.

The program was designed for students entering college with little to no military experience. It was to mix military training with the cadet’s academic curriculum over a four-year period. Much like the academic curriculum it was structured to allow for gradual progression from simple and routine tasks to more complicated leadership challenges. The senior and sometimes junior cadets held the leadership positions while the underclass cadets filled the role of the followers. Between the cadet’s junior and senior years they attend a summer camp designed to accredit their training and evaluate
program performance, not necessarily cadet performance. Upon completion of graduation and commissioning requirements, cadets are commissioned as second lieutenants.

**The History of Cadet Command**

By the early 1960's ROTC was producing 75 percent of the active army lieutenants but despite this impressive figure, it was not meeting the demands of the Army. In 1964, the ROTC Vitalization Act established monetary incentives in an effort to boost enrollment. The incentives included scholarships and a monthly stipend. Unfortunately, it was not enough to overcome the antiwar sentiment that was prevalent during that time. Many programs did not survive the Vietnam era as the more liberal campuses worked tirelessly to have ROTC removed. ROTC continued to struggle throughout the seventies, both from Vietnam backlash and a very decentralized command structure.

By 1980, ROTC was facing an enrollment crisis. Despite increased scholarships and the introduction of an all-volunteer force in the seventies, ROTC still could not meet the officer requirements of the Army. This changed with the establishment of the US Army Cadet Command in 1986, at Fort Monroe, Virginia. The decentralized system that produced officers of varying quality was transformed into a centralized command structure that could produce lieutenants of higher and more uniform quality across the board.

Chosen to lead this new command was Major General Robert E. Wagner. A dynamic cavalry officer with two combat tours in Vietnam, General Wagner took on the challenge with his characteristic aggressiveness. The new command had an immediate
impact on the quality and quantity of ROTC cadets and by 1988 ROTC met its commissioning mission for the first time in its history.

Wagner’s influence was felt instantly and can still be felt today within Cadet Command. Wagner was personally involved in creating the command and everything from its name and its motto to the unit’s flag and shoulder insignia patch had Wagner’s input. These changes and others like them were instrumental in establishing a sense of history and esprit de corps, something long missing from ROTC. Wagner also made significant organizational changes and emphasized command and control. One challenge that he overcame was the quality of officer that instructed within ROTC. Prior to the advent of Cadet Command, ROTC assignments were described as “opportunities to get to know your family better, obtain and advanced degree, improve your golf score, and recover from the rigors of the Regular Army.” The Army’s best officers were not encouraged to seek ROTC jobs, and promotion rates for ROTC cadre were significantly behind the rest of the Army. Wagner changed this by establishing a Professor of Military Science (PMS) Selection Board. Cadet Command then was in a position to hand pick the type of leader they were looking for. A concerted effort was also made to increase the quality of the subordinate officers in each battalion by working directly with the Army Personnel Office to ensure quality officers were assigned. Within two years Wagner’s efforts paid off dramatically as the promotion rate for captains in Cadet Command actually exceeded the army average.

Wagner’s biggest impact, however, came in the form of training. He emphasized challenging and rigorous, active duty oriented training across the board. He also ensured that training was standardized across all programs. He did this by starting at the ROTC
camps. Advanced Camp and Basic Camp were used as the standard model to aim for. With the bar raised, programs and cadets alike were forced to improve. This directly impacted the quality of the lieutenant produced for the Army.

With Wagner's departure in 1990 and the fall of the Soviet Union and subsequent downsizing, Cadet Command began its gradual descent into mediocrity. A series of well-qualified and well-meaning general officers took command but few had the passion or the political connections to influence revolutionary change. Priorities shifted with each commander, usually back and forth from quality to quantity or between centralized or decentralized control. This combined with the drastic fluctuation in army personnel requirements staggered the once steady command.

Major General T.D. Casey, who is a graduate of West Point, leads the command today. General Casey has promised that ROTC will make mission again and has implemented some changes that he feels will facilitate that. Some of these initiatives will be covered in detail later on in this study.

**Cadet Command's Mission**

According to the doctrinal literature, Cadet Command was created to meet three basic needs: first, producing career officers for the Regular Army; second, producing short-service lieutenants for the active forces; and third, providing a pool of trained officers to lead reserve units.\(^\text{10}\) Six major developmental functions were identified to support these needs: recruit; select; motivate; train; retain; and commission.

Once Headquarters, Department of the Army determines the number of lieutenants required, ROTC is given its mission to fill. This figure is around 3,900 officers annually.\(^\text{11}\) The mission of Cadet Command is to produce quality officers for the
active army, reserves and National Guard. Currently it produces just over half of all active army lieutenants and about a quarter of the reserve component officers. Cadet Command's official mission statement: To commission the future officer leadership of the U.S. Army and motivate young people to be better citizens.¹²

Program Inputs and Resources

Cadet Command is comprised of 1739 army personnel and 587 Department of the Army civilians. In addition it employs 205 soldiers from the Army National Guard and Army Reserve and 363 contractors. The contractors must be retired military or members of the reserve component, they must wear an Army uniform and pass the Army's physical fitness test. Over 80 percent of the command's personnel work on campuses with cadets. The other 20 percent work in headquarters assignments.¹³

ROTC's annual budget totals $231.4 million dollars. Of that, $124.5 million is the command's operations budget with which it funds civilian pay, cadet pay, training camps, marketing, and contractor pay. It should be pointed out that the marketing budget is $11.4 million, which is almost half of what the command required.¹⁴

Due to the vast geographic dispersion of its 270 host programs, Cadet Command is faced with a unique command and control dilemma. In order to provide better support and oversight, the span of control is divided into three regions. Each region has its own headquarters with a colonel as commander and a staff. In addition to overseeing the many programs in the region they may also be responsible for executing ROTC-wide training at one of the two ROTC camps. Within each region are four or five brigades. A brigade is also commanded by a colonel and is staffed with 12 people who oversee 20 to 25 programs (see figure 1).
Figure 1. Command Structure. Source: Cadet Command, *The Way Ahead* (Fort Monroe, 4 April 2001), 15.

**Junior ROTC**

One of the additional responsibilities assumed by Cadet Command was the management of the Junior Reserve Officers Training Corps (JROTC) which up to that point had been treated as an unwanted relative to the Army. JROTC like its senior counterpart, came into being with the National Defense Act of 1916, but was focused on secondary schools. JROTC’s popularity has grown nationwide and has inspired the Army to increase the number of programs. Currently JROTC has over 450,000 students enrolled in 2,900 secondary schools with more than 750 schools on a waiting list. Its focus is reflected in its mission statement, “To motivate young people to be better citizens.” The program serves as a stimulus for promoting graduation from high school.
but not necessarily college. Therefore it does not serve as a natural conduit to the senior ROTC program, but does, however, feed the enlisted recruitment program.

**Recruiting Program Activities**

Cadet Command has a marketing and recruiting department made up of five personnel and headed by a colonel. The primary mission of the department is to conduct national advertising. They publish annual command marketing guidance to all brigade and battalion commanders. This guidance includes each unit’s marketing budget allocation for the fiscal year. They also provide recruiting guidance and training to all program recruiters. Each regional and brigade headquarters also has a recruiter on staff who is primarily responsible for recruiting the high school market and scholarship budget oversight. Finally, each ROTC program has at least one officer assigned as a Recruiting Operations Officer (ROO). Depending upon the size of the program this officer may or may not be fully dedicated as the ROO, he may be dual or even triple hatted with other responsibilities. The ROO is responsible for recruiting the necessary number of cadets for the program to meet its mission. In addition, the ROO is responsible for all local marketing and advertising of ROTC. Cadet Command makes every effort to ensure that their Recruiting Operations Officers are trained to handle the monumental task of convincing teenagers that ROTC is right for them. They do this by providing initial and follow on training during the officer’s tour of duty. The initial training is conducted at Cadet Command’s own school (School of Cadet Command) at its headquarters at Fort Monroe, Virginia. Here ROO’s get the intent straight from the commander’s mouth. They are also given the national recruiting strategy along with tips and techniques for face-to-face recruiting. In addition, ROO conferences are hosted at least quarterly to provide a
forum for sharing ideas and receiving additional training. Here ROO's can learn about techniques that are working or not working at other schools.

One of the problems with this, however, is that most officers are only in the ROO position for a year due to its high operational tempo and the stigma associated with the job. Most officers take ROTC assignments to teach cadets not recruit them. One year is barely enough time to learn the processes and meet all of the people required to make one a qualified ROO. This self-inflicted turnover rate hampers ROO performance and program growth.

Lieutenant Production

The US Army commissions officers from five separate sources: the United States Military Academy (USMA); the Federal Officer Candidate School (OCS); the National Guard Officer Candidate School (NGOCS); direct commissions and finally ROTC, which is the largest by far.

USMA provides a free four-year academic and military curriculum to those fortunate to meet the rigorous entrance criteria. The program is steeped in tradition and history and attracts some of the nation's best and brightest. USMA, however, only produces 17 percent of the active component's annual requirement. The estimated cost to produce one lieutenant is nearly $240,000. The size of the facility coupled with the exorbitant cost will prevent USMA from increasing production any time in the foreseeable future.

OCS provides an intensive 3 ½-month training program to exceptional enlisted soldiers that have demonstrated officer potential. Often referred to as the "shake and bake" officer program because of its relatively short duration, OCS provides the Army
with several options. First, it can react quickly to train officers during a large mobilization. Second, it provides options to enlisted soldiers that have completed their college degrees or have nearly completed them. OCS is the only program that produces officers without four-year degrees. The current requirement for application is 90 credit hours. Graduates are given up to three years to complete their degree after commissioning. Finally, OCS can be surged to reduce shortfalls in lieutenant production from other sources.

NGOCS provides a two-year curriculum to qualified enlisted National Guard soldiers. Each state is responsible for the execution of this program, which produces the bulk of the new lieutenants for the National Guard.

Direct commissions provide the Army with the flexibility to obtain officers with specific skills when needed. The bulk of the Army’s medical and legal professionals are commissioned via this program. The downside obviously is the lack of military training and experience that these officers have upon commissioning. Despite this fact, 18 percent of the active component is made up of direct commissionees which puts it ahead of the Military Academy in officer production.²⁰

The Army’s personnel office ensures that the Active Army does not suffer from lack of second lieutenants and prioritizes the accessions policy accordingly. The primary bill payer for ROTC’s inability to produce is the reserve component. As a result the Reserve and Guard have attempted to increase production via other means with limited success. Change must occur within the largest commissioning source if this problem is to be corrected. Figure 2 highlights the need for change graphically.
The Product

ROTC cadets today are older, more likely to be married, less athletic, and more likely to leave the Army than their predecessors of just a few years ago. The Army’s use of the GI Bill as a recruiting incentive has increased the number of veterans on campus dramatically. This combined with the increasing popularity of the Army’s Green to Gold program has more than doubled the portion of cadets with prior service from 9 percent in 1986 to 23 percent in 2000.\textsuperscript{21} Because of the shortage of officers enrollment standards have fallen off over the past few years. For example, the average Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT) score for a scholarship winner has declined from 1327 in 1997 to 1242 in 1999.\textsuperscript{22} The waiver approval rate for medical conditions has also more than doubled since 1993.
Instead of the traditional four-year model, most cadets are now entering ROTC through a process called lateral entry. These are cadets that did not complete the first two years of ROTC but have been given completion credit either for prior service experience or for completion of a six-week camp known as Basic Camp. This circumvents the four-year progression model that ROTC was designed around.

Recruiting Cadets

In 1984, two civilian scholars, Dr. Donald Jugenheimer of the University of Kansas and Dr. Vernon Fryburger of Northwestern University, completed studies of ROTC marketing and recruiting practices. Their findings were critical yet accurate and led to change. They pointed out that the decentralization of recruiting and advertising wasted scant resources and failed to reflect a common theme. The uncoordinated campaign could not create an appropriate image for ROTC or even put out a consistent message. Their recommendations included centralized control to an extent and a common, clearer mission statement regarding marketing and advertising efforts. As a result, an Operations Division was stood up to take on the task of marketing and recruiting. The advertising budget was increased from $6.5 million in 1984 to $9.5 million in 1985, a 46 percent increase. The money would be needed as surveys of high school and college students showed that they knew very little about ROTC.

In 1986, under General Wagner, the Marketing and Advertising Branches were split off from the Operations Division and formed into a new Marketing Division headed by a colonel. Wagner, dismayed at the “used car” approach to selling ROTC, sought a more uniform approach to recruiting. In 1987, Cadet Command published a regulation governing recruiting (Cadet Command Regulation 145-4, Marketing, Advertising, and
Publicity to Support Enrollment.) in an effort to break the localism and regionalism that thwarted recruiting efforts.\textsuperscript{25}

In 1987, the advertising agency Young and Rubicam (Y&R) was hired to get the ROTC message on the streets. In a strategic research study, they discovered that college bound high school students were drawn to personal success and career advancement. As a result their 1987 slogan was “ROTC leads to personal success.” In 1988, it was changed to “Army ROTC, the Smartest College Course You Can Take,” and is still used today.\textsuperscript{26}

Y&R developed various concepts and conducted numerous market surveys for Cadet Command. Their primary media was print and radio though they did produce one television commercial. Television advertising could not be sustained, however, due to budget constraints. Y&R lost their contract in 2000 after a decade of declining enrollment, though no quantitative proof could be adduced to link advertising with enrollment or production.

In addition to advertising, Cadet Command also undertook other recruiting initiatives. The formation of Goldminer Teams in the 1980s was one of the most significant.\textsuperscript{27} Goldminer Teams were three or four-person teams that operated regionally and focused solely on the high school marketplace for the purpose of identifying prospects for ROTC.

High schools were not the only source of cadets. The Army’s enlisted ranks have always had a ready supply of would be officers on hand. In 1987 the Green to Gold program was handed over to Cadet Command to control. Green to Gold allows qualified enlisted soldiers to go to college to complete a degree and receive a commission. These former soldiers bring experience and maturity to ROTC but are non traditional in nature.
and don’t exactly fit the ROTC four-year model. In the 80’s these cadets made up 10 percent of the cadet population, in 1995 that number was 20 percent, and today it is 25 percent.28

Another show of effort to improve recruiting occurred when Cadet Command joined forces with Recruiting Command which is responsible for obtaining the Army’s enlisted force of roughly 75,000 per year. This relationship has run hot and cold since it began but current command philosophy has the two joined at the hip. A formal Memorandum of Agreement was signed in March of 2001 outlining the scope of responsibilities of both institutions.29 The intent is a combined recruiting effort of the high school and college markets. The fact that the missions of the two organizations are different does not appear to be a factor.

The Army has also taken action along the same lines by creating a new organization called Accessions Command (ACC). The command was activated on 25 March 2002 and is comprised of the U.S. Army Recruiting Command at Fort Knox, Kentucky, the U.S. Army Cadet Command, and the U.S. Army Training Center at Fort Jackson, South Carolina. The mission of the new command is to “produce the right soldier, at the right place, at the right time, with the right competencies.”30 ACC’s mandate is to make the total accession process more efficient and effective. Their initial plans include increasing the output of the OCS program and putting a recruiter in every ROTC battalion in America. The command does not, however, include the Military Academy.
Declining Propensity

Despite the best efforts of all involved, ROTC is struggling to produce the required number of officers. There are numerous studies and surveys addressing the issue, each with their own spin as to why young people do not join ROTC. The most popular opinion touted is the declining propensity of America's youth to join the military. "We are faced every day that we get up with fewer and fewer young men and women willing to sign on the dotted line and take up an initial career in the United States military."--Sen John W. Warner (Virginia), Chairman, Senate Armed Services Committee.31

Research through independent national surveys indicates that the propensity for America's youth to join ROTC is down. The study conducted by Teenage Research Unlimited showed an alarming drop in college-bound respondents willingness to join ROTC (see figure 3). The study also concluded that awareness and knowledge of ROTC was also down. One might conclude that if awareness and knowledge were up, more students would be willing to consider ROTC. After all they cannot consider joining something they have never heard of.

To the pessimistic or unwilling recruiting officer the declining propensity theory offers a perfect excuse for not making mission. Should they fail to make mission they are backed by scientific research that says that it is not their fault. As a case in point, during a recruiter training session sponsored by Cadet Command the instructor stated that: "The days of students walking in the door and signing up for God, country, and apple pie are over. You are dealing with the sons and daughters of Viet Nam war protesters out
there.” This, for obvious reasons, did not serve as the battle cry of the recruiters and set many up for failure before they even began their jobs.

![Declining Propensity](chart)

Figure 3. Declining Propensity. Source: Cadet Command, *The Way Ahead* (Fort Monroe, 4 April 2001), 29.

Extensive research has been conducted into trends in society and the generation differences. In Robert Putnam’s book *Bowling Alone*, he illustrates an alarming decline in “social capital.” Social capital refers to the connections among individuals or social networks and the norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness within those networks. The book contains numerous graphs and charts that depict trends in everything from voting and volunteering to reading the newspaper. Several factors are brought out as
contributors to the decline in social capital. First, the family structure has changed with changes in society. After World War II women became an integral part of the work force and now the two-career family is the norm. The pressures of time and money account for at least a 10 percent decline in community involvement. Second, the natural population growth has created suburbanization and sprawl, which often lacks the community atmosphere and adds to the difficulties of getting involved and thus accounting for another 10 percent decline. Third, our leisure time has become more privatized with advancement of technology. Just as the radio brought families inside and away from community gatherings, television and the Internet have bombarded our senses with countless entertainment options. Putnam estimates that this factor alone accounts for at least a 25 percent decline in community involvement. Finally, the slow and steady generational change that is replacing the older civic-minded generation with their less involved children and grandchildren accounts for nearly half of the overall decline (see figure 4).

**Explanation for Civic Disengagement 1965-2000**

![Diagram]

The Army’s Strategic Studies Institute conducted its own study in 2000 of the generational differences within the Army. The study provided evidence that there is a growing gap between the two dominating generations within the officer corps, the Xers born between 1960 and 1980 and the Boomers born between 1943 and 1960. The perception that senior leadership is out of touch with reality on the ground has led to problems with retention and if not addressed could severely impact readiness in the future. To make matters even more challenging Generation Y or the Nintendo Generation is now in the mix, adding their own unique outlook on authority, duty, honor, and country.

Societal Changes

It’s a fundamental principle that armed services can truly serve a democracy only if they are a reflection of that society and are impacted by the same social trend. George Will

The growing gap between the military and society as illustrated by an opinion survey conducted by the Triangle Institute of Security Studies can also be linked to generational differences. The results show that Americans still support the military, but from a distance. With fewer and fewer veterans around, teenagers have fewer relatives that might have served who could influence them to join. John J. Hamre, Deputy Secretary of Defense stated, “The average American knows very little about the military anymore . . . and even more troubling, the average middle and upper middle-class family doesn’t tend to look on the military as a career they want their kids to follow.” Former Secretary of the Army Louis Caldera also acknowledged this problem in an interview with the Los Angeles Times, “Our challenge, at a time when fewer people have served or
have a connection with the military, is to build a strong base of support and appreciation for what soldiers do, and to challenge young people, especially, to think about their obligation to serve.” Secretary of the Navy Richard Danzig summed up the issue with this statement: “Our military cannot live apart from our society. That risk is low for our diverse and fluctuating enlisted ranks. It is high for our much smaller and less representative corps of career officers.”

**Propensity Schmensity**

The other side of the argument is that most of the Army’s recruiting problems are self-inflicted. Proponents of this argument acknowledge that fewer kids are volunteering but offer different perspectives as to why. When it comes to the new generation it is said that they are very much like the previous generations when it comes to the basics of human nature. For example, they claim that the motivation of a young man to seek challenge, to get a car, to test authority, and to explore the opposite sex is the same now as it was for our fathers and grandfathers. The Marine Corps appears to validate this argument. While dismissed by its much larger sister services as an anomaly, the Corps is consistently successful in meeting its recruiting needs. Most discount their success because of their size and say that it is easier to get the numbers when you need fewer numbers. However, if one is to believe that “national” propensity is at an all time low then it has to apply to all services proportionally, not just to those services struggling to meet their recruiting goals.

Others claim that the Marine Corp has a nationally recognized image of challenge and attracts those seeking to take it on. In a Washington Post article, a former Marine officer was quoted as saying, “You can call it macho BS, but until someone comes up
with a better way of getting terrified 18-year-olds to stand up in front of machine guns and take the hill, I’m sticking with it.”\textsuperscript{43} He was referring to the “warrior culture” so aggressively cultivated by the Marine Corps. After all it has a proven track record in combat and may be what pulls many young men into the military. The Army’s goals of achieving gender equality may have had the unintended side effect of creating a less macho image. Though not politically correct the male ego is still alive and well.

This macho image has been especially effective in drawing upon the ever-growing Hispanic market, soon to be the nation’s largest minority. The Army, in sharp contrast, has been unable to capture its portion of that market and the future does not look good. Army population experts say that the Hispanic market is great predictor of the overall market in the decade ahead.\textsuperscript{44} The benefit to the Marines is no accident. They preserve and protect that culture with the same tenacity that they go to battle with.

These culture hawks do acknowledge some of the findings outlined in \textit{Bowling Alone}. They claim, however, that kids are as involved today as they have ever been, just with different things. Instead of clubs they belong to Internet chat groups for example. They also recognize the impact of technology and the amount of distracters and entertainment options that are now available to occupy a young persons time. They conclude that it is obvious that fewer kids will voluntarily join the military when presented with more options and opportunity than there father had.

One of the more popular options is college. Nearly three-quarters of high-school graduates are choosing to go to college as opposed to only half at the beginning of the 1990’s.\textsuperscript{45} Ironically, this increase has not helped ROTC’s recruiting efforts. Without a nationally recognized image most of these students do not learn about ROTC until they
are on campus. The scholarships offered by ROTC are not as enticing to those that already have a financial plan for college.

Other Factors

There are many other self-imposed factors that hinder the recruiting effort. One of the biggest is the length of the military service obligation or how much time a kid owes the Army upon completion of ROTC. Starting in 1994, the military service obligation was increased from six-to-eight years.\textsuperscript{46} Eight years to a seventeen- or eighteen-year old seems like a lifetime and is often the hardest hurdle to overcome.

Another factor is the inability of the cadet to choose his or her job specialty within the Army. This uncertainty is often viewed as a gamble or roll of the dice with their future and is a source of anxiety with prospects and parents alike. The Army does try to place cadets within one of their top three choices but there is no guarantee.

The medical screening process also contributes to the problem. The Department of Defense Medical Examination Review Board (DODMERB) must medically qualify all scholarship applicants and contracted cadets. This process can be as long and cumbersome as their name might indicate. DODMERB was established to screen USMA applicants in order to insure the Army's investment. When scholarships became the primary recruiting incentive for ROTC it seemed only natural to have DODMERB review those files also. The volume of files has proved to be too much and subsequently the process can take up to a year to complete.

Budgeting constraints have only exacerbated the problem. In a time when awareness of ROTC is declining, Cadet Command has had to develop advertising and marketing strategies on a shoestring budget. In 1985, the advertising and marketing
budget was $9.4 million, in 2000 it had only increased to $10.5 million. Taking inflation into account, the real buying power of the 2000 budget was only 45 percent of the 1985 levels (see figure 5). 47

Figure 5. Marketing Budget and Propensity. Source: Cadet Command, The Way Ahead (Fort Monroe: 4 April 2001), page 15.

Another possible factor hampering recruitment is the Army’s pattern of deployments. The Army has been going nonstop since the Gulf War participating in peacekeeping and humanitarian missions. The outcome of some of these operations has been less than glamorous, such as the losses suffered in Somalia. In addition, the capability of the Army to sustain itself often leads to the impression that it simply relieves the Marines and then pulls the very dull, and unappreciated occupation duty.
Conclusion

ROTC has been unable to fulfill its role in the Army since 1989 of providing sufficient numbers of second lieutenants. Many reasons have been given for this failure from inside and outside of the organization. They range from internal issues of decentralized command and control and lack of a national image to the uncontrollable trends in our society and the widening generation gap. The Army has recently created a new organization to take on the challenge of recruiting officers but it is too soon to tell how effective it will be.


2Ibid., 17.

3Ibid., 21.

4Coumbe, 14.


6Coumbe, 26.

7Ibid., 71.

8Ibid., 86.

9Ibid., 87.

10Ibid., 88.


14Ibid.
15 Coumbe, 257.


17 Ibid.

18 See “Memorandum for Region, Brigade and Battalion Commanders, Subject: FY 01 Command Marketing Guidance” (Fort Monroe: Department of Defense, 17 March 2000).

19 The way ahead, 9.

20 Ibid.

21 Ibid., 20.

22 Ibid.

23 Coumbe, 124.

24 Ibid., 125.

25 Ibid., 127.

26 Ibid., 129.

27 Ibid., 137.

28 Ibid., 139.


30 Caldwell, “Army Activates New Accessions Command.”


32 Statement made by instructor during Cadet Command orientation training, Fort Monroe, 15 June 1999.

Ibid., 283.

Ibid.


Triangle Institute


Ibid.

Ibid.

Snider, 33-34.


Ibid., 31.
CHAPTER 3
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Introduction

Choosing the proper research design is imperative to conducting successful research and it is often the most challenging step in the process. The purpose of course, is to provide answers to the objectives offered in chapter 1. The research design for this study began nearly four years ago when the researcher was assigned to ROTC at Syracuse University as the recruiting officer. Three years of recruiting, marketing, advertising and training experience at the battalion level are integrated into this study.

After reading a recent interview with the current commanding general of Cadet Command, Major General T.D. Casey, the over arching methodology began to take shape. The design included an interview with the first, and arguably the most successful commanding general, Major General (Retired) Robert Wagner. The intent was to compare and contrast the leadership’s approach to the same problem. Next, it was determined that the bulk of the data collection and analysis would come from Cadet Command’s own research department. The department has conducted extensive research in recent years on topics closely related to this study including questions concerning marketing and advertising. In addition Cadet Command’s infrastructure, command relationship and access to the target population provided the ideal data collection environment. This study took full advantage of this secondary data in its descriptive research and program evaluation.

Finally, the researcher developed a survey to be issued to ROTC cadre, targeting the recruiting officers and the professors of military science. The survey (see appendix A)
consisted of 40 questions and was designed to add currency to the study. It was to measure the effectiveness of advertising and to gather valuable insight from the recruiters on the ground. Unfortunately, Cadet Command did not support the survey and thus it was never issued. Several reasons were given for the lack of support to include: timing, ROO's were too busy this time of year and could not be distracted; and accuracy, changes are occurring within Cadet Command and thus might skew the answers.¹ The absence of this survey is an obvious weakness to this study.

The research questions were therefore answered through secondary data, primarily in the form of previous surveys conducted by Cadet Command. The interview with retired Major General Wagner was the sole source of primary data; however, it was extremely useful and instrumental to this study.

**Surveys**

The bulk of the data used in this study came from Cadet Command's own research department and spans the period from 1999 to 2001. Multiple cadet surveys were conducted targeting all cadet levels, Military Science level 1 through 4, or freshman through senior. All surveys utilized representative samples of ROTC programs and cadets and were conducted on the Internet. The purpose of the surveys varied and covered a litany of issues; however, the focus of this study drew upon the responses that related to recruiting, marketing, advertising, and any possible trends that might help explain production shortfalls.

In 1999, Cadet Command surveyed over 1,400 cadets on the Internet. Of them, 1,342 of were deemed valid.² The schools selected to participate were notified electronically and by mail. In 2000, a more refined survey was issued this time broken
down by class. Freshman cadets completed 3,333 valid surveys, 1,280 by sophomores, 2,631 by juniors, and 1,206 by senior cadets. Each survey had slightly different purposes based on the cadet’s experience with the ROTC program. The freshmen and sophomores were surveyed to determine what program elements and outside influences impacted on their decision to participate in ROTC. The survey focused heavily on marketing and advertising efforts and how advertising, marking, and influencers played in the decision to enroll in the program. These two surveys made up the bulk of the secondary data research. Another survey was conducted in 2001 but focused mainly on upperclassmen and added little to the study.

Secondary data was selected primarily due to its distinct advantages of timeliness and cost. Because of the size and geographical dispersion of the 270 ROTC programs across the country it would be difficult for me to design a data collection instrument and get it out in a timely manner. In addition due to the diversity of the programs and campuses ranging from small, state schools to very large and very expensive Ivy League Universities it would have difficult to even do a representative sampling. Therefore secondary data was best suited for this study. In addition the reliability of this data is high considering the command itself collected it for very similar reasons. The usual disadvantages associated with secondary data have been nearly negated because of the timeliness and relevance of the data. The normal disadvantages include: relevance to the question, outdated information, variations in the definitions of terms, different units of measurement and lack of information to verify the data’s accuracy. Relevance has already been addressed. Cadet Command asked questions directly related to marketing, recruiting, and advertising in their 2000 survey. The data was not outdated in that the
survey was conducted within the last two years and is still used in Cadet Command’s marketing strategies. Definitions and units of measurements were the same due to the fact that the researcher was recently a member of the organization and very familiar with their definitions and terminology and used it throughout this study. The accuracy also was addressed earlier. Cadet Command validated surveys before including them in their research. The data collected was accurate with any possible biases having been identified and taken into account.

**Interview**

The second part of the data collection included a personal interview with the first commander of Cadet Command, Major General (retired) Robert E. Wagner. The interview is one of the best ways to gather comprehensive and complex data because it allows for feedback and for probing questions that could clarify or elaborate on a given answer. The rationale for this interview was threefold. First, General Wagner was arguably the most successful commander in terms of officer production with numbers over 8,000 per year. Second, his leadership style varied greatly with all subsequent commanders. Lastly, General Wagner is still actively involved with Cadet Command as a consultant and has relevant and current insight. A written request for an interview was submitted to General Wagner outlining the study. He responded with contact information and a dialog was started. The actual interview was conducted in his home in Hampton, Virginia, just minutes away from Fort Monroe. (see appendix B for a complete transcript).
Twenty Questions

A list of twenty questions was designed to probe the unique perspective of the man in charge of the entire organization and who had the ultimate responsibility of producing enough officers to meet the needs of the Army. Having been the only commander to successfully meet the mission, it proved invaluable to gain his insight into the problem. The twenty questions were designed to formalize and organize that insight, in order that it might be compared and contrasted to current policy. They included:

1. To what do you credit your success as CC commander?
2. What was your greatest challenge?
3. What was your greatest success?
4. Opinion as to why ROTC has not made its mission since 89.
5. Opinion on market trends.
6. Opinion on advertising strategy.
7. Opinion on Accessions Command.
8. Opinion on USAREC recruiters on campus.
11. Opinion on personnel selection for PMS.
13. Opinion on local marketing and recruiting
14. Opinion on the Way Ahead--focus on SAL and on campus recruiting.
15. Opinion on recruiter training.
16. Recommendations on how we fix recruiting?
17. Opinion on reputation of ROTC assignment within Army culture.

18. Opinion on cadet training – does it meet cadet expectations?

19. How does the ROTC product compare to West Point or OCS?

20. If you were to take command again what would be your top 3 priorities?

Conclusion

The researcher acknowledges that the methodology was somewhat hampered by the inability to initiate the Recruiting Officer survey. The data potentially obtained could have been very valuable to the study and in fact another attempt to collect this data should be made in the near future. The research methodology used, however, was still able to accomplish the task at hand. The extensive amount of data already collected by Cadet Command served as the foundation, while the interview with MG Wagner built upon that. A leader’s input especially with the advantage of hindsight and nonattribution shed light where no one has dared to look before.

1Email sent to author on 14 April 2003. See Appendix F.


CHAPTER 4
DATA ANALYSIS

Introduction

There is no lack of data on the subject of recruiting, marketing, and advertising within ROTC. Since the creation of the marketing department, and the hiring of civilian advertising agencies, several studies have been conducted in an effort to reverse declining ROTC enrollment. The interpretation of that data has led to many program design changes over the years, culminating with the current vision for Cadet Command. Other data exists outside of Cadet Command, especially in the area of societal, and generational changes and was beneficial to this study. In addition, there is also no lack of opinion on the subject as evidenced by the interviews and the many editorial comments found in a wide variety of military news media. This study examined the problem from many different vantage points in an effort to provide a broader interpretation of the data and possibly a more encompassing solution set.

1999 Cadet Command Survey

Sixty ROTC programs were selected to participate in the survey covering all types of programs from low-cost state schools to high-cost private schools. Of the surveys, 1,413 were completed, 1,342 of which were valid.¹ Cadets represented freshman through senior and contracted and noncontracted.

2000 Cadet Command Survey

The purpose of the 2000 survey of Military Science Level 1 (freshmen) cadets was to determine what program elements and outside influences impacted their decision

37
to join ROTC. The survey focused heavily on marketing and advertising efforts and how they played a role in the cadet’s decision to enroll. In October-November 2000, 3,333 valid surveys were completed. No statistically significant differences existed between the sample and the population; however, mild differences did exist. The sample had more scholarship and contracted cadets and slightly fewer African-American and Hispanic cadets than the population.

2001 Cadet Command Survey

The purpose of the 2001 survey was to determine what program elements and outside influences impacted the Military Science 2 Level cadets to join or stay in ROTC. Between February and May 2001, 1,280 valid surveys were completed. No statistically significant differences existed between the sample and the population; however, a slight undersampling of African Americans and Hispanic cadets did occur.

Advertising and Marketing

The first set of data looked at pertained to advertising and marketing effectiveness in recruiting. The study looked at when cadets saw advertising; where they saw advertising; and the sources of their interest in joining ROTC.

The surveys indicate that 70 percent saw some advertising, including direct mail before enrolling in ROTC (see figure 6). This number is over double that of the remaining college student population. The high school counselor’s office was identified as the place where ROTC advertisement was most noticed by freshmen cadets (see figure 7). This data is thought to be more credible than other class data due to the shorter elapsed time from seeing the advertisement to actually enrolling.
Only 29% of the general 18-19 year old college student population has seen Army ROTC advertising.

The data could be interpreted as a 70 percent success rate for ROTC advertising; however, because it is more than double the norm, it should raise some suspicion. In addition there are other data that are just as unusual. For example, 76 percent of the cadets stated that they had a family member with military experience, and in 39 percent of the cases it was the father. This figure is also twice that of the national average (see figure 7). It would be logical to infer that a military-experienced family member served as the influencer and not the advertisement. Once the prospect’s interest was piqued it only goes to reason that they would seek out more information and the guidance counselor’s office is a good place to start. It is likely that they saw ROTC advertisements because they were looking for them.

**Where Seen?**

**MSLEVEL:** 1

![Bar Chart](image)

Figure 7. Where Seen? Source: Cadet Command, 1999 Cadet Survey Final Report (Fort Monroe: 11 March 2000), 32.
Influencers and Motivation for Joining ROTC

The next set of data examined explored the many different influencers and reasons that cadets join ROTC. The data clearly indicates that parents are a significant influencer in the cadet’s decision to join ROTC (see figures 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, and 13). This data should come as no surprise based upon the preponderance of military experience in these families. What is both surprising and disturbing is the lack of influence by high school guidance counselors (see figures 8 and 9).

Who Influenced to Join ROTC--1999

![Bar chart showing influence on ROTC enrollment in 1999]

Who Influenced to Join ROTC -2000


RELATIVES WHO SERVED IN MILITARY -1999

Figure 11. Family Members with Military Experience. Source: Cadet Command, 1999 Cadet Survey Final Report (Fort Monroe: 11 March 200), 18.
Why They Enrolled in ROTC

Figure 12. Why They Enrolled in ROTC. Source: Cadet Command, *1999 Cadet Survey Final Report* (Fort Monroe: 11 March 200), 38.
Parents Are Significant Influencers of Cadets Remaining to MS4

38 percent of MS4s indicated that parents are most influential in the decision to enroll in Army ROTC. 36 percent of MS1s agree. MS2s and MS3s claim more independence.*

Parents Most Influential in Decision to Enroll

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MS LEVEL</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Mean</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>PARENTS</td>
<td>425</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>PARENTS</td>
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<td>274</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>PARENTS</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

*Difference in reported influence of parents statistically significant by MS level.

Figure 13. Parents are Significant Influencers. Source: Cadet Command, 1999 Cadet Survey Final Report (Fort Monroe: 11 March 200), 40.

The Generals

The rest of the data collected came from two leading figures within Cadet Command. First, was an interview with the very first Commanding General of the organization. The very candid, retired General spoke openly and passionately about Cadet Command’s past, present, and future. That interview in its entirety can be found in
Appendix A of this study. Second, were excerpts of an interview with the current
Commanding General and portions of his visionary plan to get Cadet Command back on
track.

Major General (Retired) Robert E. Wagner

General Wagner recently retired as the Special Assistant to the President of
Norfolk State University. He currently runs Dragoon Ink, a small consulting operation
specializing in leader development and university governance. He has a close volunteer
relationship with the U.S. Army Cadet Command and lectures frequently at the School of
Cadet Command. General Wagner is a Kiwanian and is active in local community affairs
in his hometown of Hampton, particularly those issues dealing with education and
neighborhood organizations. He is an avid “beer can” sailboat racer and is a past
commodore of the Old Point Comfort Yacht Club.

General Wagner was born on 5 December 1934. Upon completion of the Reserve
Officer’s Training Corps curriculum and the educational course of study at Virginia
Military Institute in 1957, he was commissioned a second lieutenant and awarded a
Bachelor of Arts in English. He also holds a Master of Science degree in International
Relations from George Washington University and is a graduate of the National War
College.

General Wagner served two combat tours in Vietnam. His unit command
experience has been in infantry and armor and includes command of a tank battalion, and
armored cavalry squadron, the Second Armored Cavalry Regiment for three years, and
Assistant Division Commander (Maneuver) of a mechanized division. During his tour as
the 60th Colonel of the Regiment, General Wagner returned maneuver warfare to the
46
Regiment. His focus on executing violent combined-arms maneuvers into the flanks or rear of the enemy was eventually adopted by many units across U.S. Army Europe. Known to all at the time as “Dueler 6,” then Colonel Wagner moved the Regiment to the forefront in training and war fighting at the height of the Cold War. General Wagner is still active in cavalry affairs and is the founder of the Lucky 16 Cavalry Association.

General Wagner was the first Commanding General of the U.S. Army Cadet Command. He played a large role in conceptualizing this organization and is responsible for many of the precommissioning policies that remain in effect to this day.

His awards and decorations include the Combat Infantryman’s Badge, the Distinguished Service Medal, the Silver Star, Legion of Merit, Bronze Star with V Device and one Oak Leaf Cluster, Bronze Star for Meritorious Service, Vietnamese Cross of Gallantry (Gold and Bronze). 4

**General Wagner on Advertising**

When asked about Cadet Command’s emphasis on local advertising, General Wagner pointed out the need for both local and national advertising strategies. He added that he felt concerned that existing advertising does not focus on what the Army is really about due to political correctness, “which is directly or indirectly warfighting.” 5 He went on to make a comparison with the Marine Corps popular advertising campaign.

“Here you have this young guy that’s climbing up this complicated girder and at the top there is this monster and a sword. Only he can draw the sword because only he has the guts to do it. He pulls the sword and kills the dragon and then the sword transforms to a cadet saber and you look at that and you think for an instant . . . a shameful instant. . . . I’d love to be a Marine! . . . Why are we [Army] opposed to doing that? . . . [W]e want
gung ho guys but the Marines are beating us.” He also pointed out that the majority of Marine advertisements show officers and not enlisted personnel which is opposite of the Army’s philosophy. “That’s counter culture . . . it’s like we are an Army of enlisted people and we’re not. You’ve never seen a recruiting thing around here that celebrates a combat arms lieutenant.”

General Wagner’s Assessment

General Wagner recommended national advertising focused on the war-fighting mission of the Army in order to strengthen a weakening image. He also strongly recommended revitalizing the Gold Miner Teams that were so successful under his command. General Wagner’s main concern for ROTC, however, was not in advertising and recruiting but in its role as a leadership developer for Army officers. He voiced concerns about organizational changes such as the new Accessions Command and how it removes Cadet Command one step further away from the Department of the Army. He felt strongly that standards in training and quality of cadre needed improving. He also warned against a close relationship with Recruiting Command and was strongly opposed to the plan to place enlisted recruiters within all ROTC battalions.

Major General John T.D. Casey

Major General John T. D. “Rusty” Casey was commissioned a lieutenant of Infantry following his graduation from the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, New York, in 1969. He comes to Cadet Command from the U.S Army in Europe, where he served as the Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations at HQ, USAEUR.
An infantryman, he has served in light, air assault, airborne and mechanized units, spending sixteen years overseas, including a tour in Vietnam and four tours in Germany. His most recent commands range from the 7th Army Training Command, in Grafenwoehr, Germany, responsible for all U.S. Army training activities in Europe, to the First Region (ROTC), U.S. Army Cadet Command, Fort Bragg, North Carolina, to the Battle Command Training Program at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, which trains commanders and their staff in tactical operations from brigade to joint task force level. He also commanded the 2nd Brigade of the 101st Airborne Division at Fort Campbell, Kentucky, and the 1st Battalion, 7th Infantry of the 3rd Division in Germany, as well as infantry companies in Colorado, Vietnam and Germany.

Major General Casey served as a staff officer in the 5th Infantry Division, where he spent two years as the G3 (Training). Other service on staff includes two years as a battalion executive officer in Berlin and one year as a brigade executive officer in the 3rd Infantry Division. Additionally, he served in operations, plans and training positions with the 4th Infantry Division, the 3rd Armored Division, the 82nd Airborne Division, and the Berlin Brigade.

Other assignments include a tour as aide-de-camp to the Deputy Commander in Chief of the U.S. Army, Europe, and as an ROTC Instructor at Kemper Military College in Missouri.

His military education includes the Infantry Officer’s Basic and Advanced Courses, the Foreign Area Officer Course, the Command and General Staff College, and a Fellowship in National Security at Harvard University. In addition to a Bachelor of
Science from the USMA, he holds a Master of Arts in Political Science from the University of Missouri.

Major General Casey's awards and decorations include five awards of the Legion of Merit, the Bronze Star, the Air Medal, the Combat and Expert Infantryman's Badges, the Ranger Tab, and the Air Assault and Parachutist's Badges.7

The Way Ahead

Upon taking command General Casey initiated "The Way Ahead," his blueprint for the design of Cadet Command. The purpose was to study, and resolve issues and problems, and to chart a series of short and long-term actions aimed at meeting ROTC's production mission. The 62-page document addressed everything from cadre and cadet quality of life to training and recruiting initiatives.

General Casey has focused considerable resources to making ROTC cadre better trained to recruit. He has solicited support from Recruiting Command and civilian organizations to do this. It is his belief that more training in recruiting will equate to better recruiting. He used a fishing analogy to describe his concept of recruiting. "We are no longer casting a huge net--catching a lot of fish and then throwing out the ones we don't want. We are now spear fishing--carefully selecting those fish we want to catch, and keep."8 The "fish" that ROTC wants are described as the student, athlete, and leader (SAL). "Cadets who process information, have good grades and a strong academic background; who are mentally and physically tough; have the ability and willingness to lead; have motivation and rises to the occasion to meet the challenges that lie ahead."9

General Casey's focus and priority has been on campus recruiting versus high schools; spear fishing the scholar, athlete and leaders; and working with Recruiting
Command. He has promised the Army that Cadet Command will make mission by 2003 or no later than 2004. This will be quite the feat considering that the command has fallen hundreds short each year since 1989.

**Analysis**

Where “The Way Ahead” falls behind is in its disregard for the data that the command itself collected. The lack of an effective national advertising campaign and subsequent image or what marketing experts refer to as product recognition was vary apparent throughout the study. While General Casey may have little say over the advertising budget he receives he should at least acknowledge what recruiters are up against. Training cannot overcome the lack of a nationally recognized image.

General Casey also makes an assumption that “spear fishing” will work at all schools. Students meeting the SAL criteria are already being recruited by sports teams and various other student groups and organizations. They also are more likely to receive merit-based scholarships thus nullifying the ROTC scholarship incentive. An ROTC recruiter may have access to athletes at a smaller state school but it is unlikely that same access would be granted or wanted at the larger schools where sports equal revenue. Spear fishing also eliminates the large school of fish that have not developed yet. Not every officer in the Army started out as a class leader or athlete. The purpose of a leadership development program is to do just that. ROTC should be as focused on producing SALs as it is recruiting SALs.

One of the more confusing efforts is the switch from high school to on campus recruiting. The surveys conducted by Cadet Command clearly indicated that the earlier students were informed about ROTC the more likely they were to join and complete the
program. By forcing the ROOs to work on campus ROTC will naturally shift from a four year program to a predominantly two year program made up of lateral transfer cadets. Ending existing relationships with local high schools could be devastating to some programs where the college draws its student body primarily from the local area.

**Conclusion**

Analysis of the data has shown why some problems exist but not all. When looking at Cadet Command’s plan for the future it appears that there has been a misinterpretation of the data or there are unexplained ulterior motives at work. Millions of dollars are poured into scholarships yet recruiters are told to sell ROTC on its merits and not the scholarships, when little to no money is being spent on establishing an image for ROTC.

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5Robert E. Wagner, interview by author, tape recording, Virginia Beach, VA, 31 December 2002.

6Ibid.

8"We Want to Select the Right People for ROTC," AUSA News, October 2002, 16.

9Ibid.
CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Introduction

The Reserve Officer Training Corp (ROTC) was established with the National Defense Act in 1916 in an effort to produce leadership for World War I. Since its inception it has been responsible for producing nearly 75 percent of the U.S. Army’s officer corps. The concept based upon the ideas of the founding fathers is to educate military leadership on civilian college campuses. While this model meets the intent of the creators who feared a standing “professional” army, it produces several challenges from the organizational and command and control perspective.

ROTC is comprised of 270 individual programs spread across 1,500 campuses nationwide. The geographic dispersion alone is sufficient enough to cause problems in the standardization of the process and the product. The Army attempted to bring it under control with the creation of Cadet Command in 1986. The programs were divided into four geographic regions and assigned regional commanders who answered directly to the new Cadet Command commander Major General Robert E. Wagner.

General Wagner’s aggressive leadership style revolutionized ROTC and the way it did business. He raised the standards across the board and held leaders responsible. He designed a system to ensure that only quality cadre was assigned to ROTC. He emphasized training yet recruiting was clearly important to him. Under his leadership ROTC made its mission, producing over 8,000 lieutenants in 1989, a phenomenal and unrepeatable achievement.
ROTC has been plagued with problems since the early 1990s and has slowly taken on characteristics of pre-Cadet Command ROTC. Assignments to ROTC jobs are not looked at as career enhancing and thus are not sought out by the Army's best and brightest. In addition due to personnel shortages Army-wide, most ROTC programs lost officers that were replaced by contractors. This internal image combined with the lack of a nationally recognized external image has contributed to ROTC's inability to produce the required number of officers for the Army.

The objective of this study was to answer the question: Can ROTC make its mission via current recruiting and marketing strategies? To do this it had to identify some of the problems within the program that were preventing ROTC from making its mission. The study looked at a significant amount of secondary data that had been collected by Cadet Command's research department, mainly in the form of cadet and cadre surveys. The study also captured primary data in the form of an interview with the first and most successful leader of Cadet Command. In addition the study looked at the current administration's plan for the future and the current commander's philosophy and predictions. Other outside sources were also looked at to include studies on societal trends and generational differences.

Analysis of the data in Chapter IV clearly showed that family members with military experience influenced most current cadets to join ROTC. Therefore, if the number of veterans is declining, then it is a safe assumption that there are fewer family members with military experience and thus fewer cadets. The data also showed that the earlier in high school that prospects were informed of ROTC the more likely they were to join; however, guidance counselors were not factors in their decision to join.
Other factors also were revealed such as the Army's unexplained reluctance to advertise ROTC on television and its trend towards numbers and not leadership development. The latter is indicated by the creation of Accessions Command and the relationship with Recruiting Command.

Conclusions

ROTC is making some progress towards meeting its production goals and Cadet Command's commanding general has promised to do just that by 2003 or 2004. His promise is backed by current and projected enrollment figures. The unanswered question, however, is at what cost?

ROTC suffers from an identity crisis both internal to the organization and external to the market. Internally, it has reverted back to the days of old where ROTC was considered a break from the real Army; a chance to finish a graduate degree and work on family. The Army personnel and promotion system frowns upon officers that are taking a break from the Army. Externally, the bulk of the population, in and out of the market, know little to anything about ROTC. It is not so much a negative propensity as it is a neutral propensity. They cannot join what they have never heard of. Because of the lack of an image ROTC often takes on the image of similar organizations. In the case of the high school market, ROTC is either mistaken for a continuation of JROTC or worse it is lumped into the general army category of Recruiting Command. It is not seen as the nation’s largest scholarship provider or as the premier leadership development institution that it is.

All is not lost, however, because most of the problems identified in this study are correctable. Some are as easy as putting money towards them, like the national
advertising problem. Others, however, are linked to a leadership philosophy and probably will only change with a change in leadership.

**Recommendations**

In order to make recommendations for this program evaluation the researcher had to answer the questions listed in chapter 1, under objective of the study. The purpose of course was to answer whether or not Cadet Command’s recruiting strategy and methods will meet the future leadership requirements of the Army? The study focused on recruiting, but also touched upon several other factors such as quantity versus quality. Current enrollment figures suggest that General Casey’s “Way Ahead” is working; however, this study indicates that the problem may be larger than just recruiting.

Cadet Command’s strategy is still centered around local advertising and local recruiting and not a nationally recognized image or brand name. While the “Way Ahead” does target students with scholar, athlete and leader characteristics, it is not a revolutionary change in the way ROTC does business. As a result, this strategy will likely cause little more than spikes in enrollment as emphasis is placed there and not an overall solution to the problem.

**Recommendations:** First, define the Army’s leadership requirements as a sufficient number of qualified and capable lieutenants to take on the challenge of leadership. While both quantity and quality are important, numbers alone should not be the focus of any recruiting strategy. Second, develop a strategy that links recruiting, retention and training to meet the defined requirement. Third, market that strategy on a national level and create the image that ROTC should have.
The problem facing Cadet Command is uniquely challenging in that it is not just a recruiting problem or an advertising problem that can be solved by civilian subject matter experts, nor is it strictly a military problem that can be solved with good old fashioned leadership. Any solution to the problem will require a mixture of both. The study revealed several problems with recruiting. First, there is no product recognition or nationally recognized image. Therefore, ignorance is the number one obstacle to effective recruiting. This cannot be overcome with local advertising or word of mouth. Third, high school counselors are not players in the decision to join ROTC.

Recommendations: Spend the money necessary to advertise on television and the Internet. An image must be established in the minds of the market. The commercials should emphasize the qualities desired and present a challenge. A less expensive option would be to simply get the message out defining ROTC. The message could be service generic and thus the Air Force and Navy could contribute. A successful spokesman could come on and say I am who I am and where I am because of ROTC, check out ROTC at your college or university. The pool of successful ROTC graduates across the services is wide and includes business, political and sports figures. Colon Powell would be an example of an idea spokesman. Forth, reestablish Gold Miner Teams to aggressively recruit the high school market specifically to educate guidance counselors.

Many leaders in the military and business world do not consider an issue a "problem" if it can be solved with money. It is clear that more money invested into ROTC advertising would solve much of the problem. Television is a very expensive media because it is the most effective and the most demanded by commercial retailers. The Army has spent billions on television advertising to recruit enlisted personnel but
only a fraction of that on recruiting officers. The irony of course is that most enlisted soldiers are a short three to four year investment while officers are a more critical long term investment that the Army seems unwilling to spend up front on. The study revealed that ROTC’s advertising budget has not kept up with rising costs and is only a fraction of the money required.

Other problems are philosophical in nature or political and cannot be solved with any amount of money. For example, one commander may emphasize quality while the next one will emphasize quantity. The current trend is clearly leaning towards the latter.

Recommendations: Allocate a portion of Recruiting Command’s advertising dollars to Cadet Command for ROTC advertising. Every fourth Army commercial seen on television should be ROTC oriented.

A long-standing excuse for the lack of national advertising is that there are 270 different programs and thus 270 different markets. The study did not clearly answer this question; however, it is obvious from the data that different campuses are home to different markets. First, there are at least four geopolitical regions within ROTC. The best market is the South, followed by the Midwest, then the West and finally the Northeast. There are also socioeconomic differences between small and large, state and private universities. Large state schools have large ROTC programs. Large private schools or Ivy League schools have very small ROTC programs.

Recommendations: Close some of the smaller programs that historically fail to produce and focus resources in the stronger markets. Design advertising that appeals to each market (blue collar/state schools, white collar/private schools, parochial schools and minorities) a maximum of ten or so, not 270.
The image of ROTC nationwide is diverse and confused. There is clearly no nationally recognized single image. It runs the gamut from complete ignorance to the somewhat informed. The image that does exist for many is a distorted reflection of JROTC or Recruiting Command. Here again, Cadet Command relies on the individual programs to create an image with their advertising. Of course these range from the ROTC powerhouses like Texas A&M, and Virginia Tech to the smaller and unheard of programs like Morehead State University, in Kentucky.

Recommendation: The U.S. Army must take ownership of the problem and allocate the resources to create an image for ROTC. This problem is beyond that of Cadet Command and the local ROTC programs.

It is clear from the study that training is key to the success of any ROTC program. Retired Major General Wagner feels very strongly that rigorous training was instrumental in the success of ROTC during his command. This study was unable to answer how it effects recruiting directly, due to the inability to launch a ROTC cadre survey. It is known that training was not listed as a motivator for joining or as an influencer by cadets. One might infer that cadets that were attracted to "officership" included officer training in that. It was very clear, however, that training (field training specifically) was by far the most enjoyed event by all cadets (see appendix C). Despite this data, Cadet Command has consistently reduced contact hours, based on exit surveys.

Recommendations: Training and officer development should be priority one. This combined with a positive national image would draw more than enough prospects with the qualities that ROTC is looking for and keep them in the program. Cadet Command
should not be leaning towards reducing training hours and making ROTC less challenging.

Cadet Command was created to bring ROTC on line to meet the needs of the Army. It proved that it could do that through structure, standardization and effective command and control. Emphasis was placed on raising the standards across the board and then enforcing those standards. Recruiting was aggressive yet selective and though it was not the priority sufficient numbers were achieved.

**Recent Developments**

As MG Casey prepares to retire, a new and yet unnamed commander will take on the challenges of ROTC. Despite Casey’s optimism he will leave command having not accomplished his mission. Once again, lieutenant production fell short of requirements for 2003. The exact numbers have not been officially released at the time of this study. The pressure to make mission before his departure is evident by the numbers of fraudulent commissions alone. Though again, exact numbers are not known, several commissions within First Region alone were revoked for various violations. This is seemingly a natural by-product of a numbers driven system.

With numbers projected to surpass requirements in 2004 and budgetary constraints at an all time high, Cadet Command is taking steps to refocus its resources. Scholarships are being withdrawn or revoked for the slightest of reasons due to embarrassing money shortfalls. The decentralization of the scholarship award process coupled with little to no oversight contributed to a gross over extension, or over promise of scholarships. Needless to say, families across the country are scrambling to come up with alternative means to pay for college. Some have involved their congressmen in

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hopes of overturning Cadet Command's decision. Either way, regardless of the outcome, ROTC's weakened image will take yet another blow.

Not all programs have suffered; however, in fact some have benefited. Cadet Command has decided to focus resources on a select group of top producers within the command. Unfortunately, there is little diversity within the group. Most are "military" type campuses and resemble West Point in nature. This of course runs contrary to the idea behind ROTC's creation. The purpose of ROTC is to provide a representative officer population to the Army. This population should be as diverse as the country it represents and include graduates from small state colleges and Ivy League Universities alike. Officer production factories are not the answer to our recruiting problems.

The most disturbing recent event by far, however, occurred in Cadet Command's alternative manning contract. Military Professional Resources, Inc. (MPRI), led by retired General Carl Vuono has held the contract since 1997.\(^1\) The new five-year, $142,395,442 contract was awarded to Communications Technologies, Inc. (COMTek), a small IT and communications technology firm located in Chantilly, Virginia.\(^2\) It is speculated that COMTek underbid MPRI by simply subtracting health care costs and passing them on to the employees. MPRI has protested the award and continues to provide support until a resolution is passed. The end result is that the Army's future leadership is being developed by the lowest bidder.

**Final Thoughts**

This study began as a look into ROTC recruiting from the perspective of a former recruiter. The researcher's vision was painted by experience and insight into the problems
facing Cadet Command. However, as the study progressed it became very clear that recruiting was only a part of a much bigger problem, that of leadership development.

It is clearly evident that Cadet Command is focused on quantity and not quality despite the touted scholar, athlete, leader prospect profile. Events such as the creation of Accessions Command and the close relationship with Recruiting Command de-emphasize the leadership development mission of ROTC. The ongoing trend to reduce cadet contact hours, physical training, and field training also contribute to the erosion of leadership development. The traditional four-year program appears to be moving more towards a two and possibly even one-year (like the Air Force) program. This combined with the possible elimination of Advance Camp would transform ROTC into nothing more than a in-processing program.

Cadet Command must take a look at what worked before not to simply repeat it but to analyze why it worked and then apply it. Cadet Command must understand the significance of its responsibility to the Army and to the nation. Producing quality leaders for our soldiers and our country should be their number one priority. Programs and processes do not capture the essence of leadership development. Cadet Command must first define it, acknowledge it and then package it into a national advertising campaign if they are to reach their market.

You have to have training, you have to have esprit, you have to have eternal pride in the fact that you are producing 70 percent of the officers for the United States Army. You have to understand the enormous relevancy of the Army defending the Constitution of the United States. Officer leaders are the engine that pulls the Army.

MG (Retired) Robert E. Wagner

GLOSSARY

Active Duty. The component of the army which serves full time. Note: Both National Guard and Reserves can be called to active duty.

Accessions. The process of evaluating and selecting cadets for entry into the Army.

Army. The term army applies to all three components; National Guard, Reserves and Active Duty also known as the Regular Army.

Battalion. The normal unit of measure for an ROTC program. Battalions vary in size from 50 to 500 cadets depending upon the program.

Cadet. A cadet is a full-time student that is enrolled in the ROTC program. Note: not all cadets become officers.

Cadre. Cadre are full-time ROTC instructors on campus. They may be active duty, reserve or civilian contractors.

Commission. The official act of congress giving new officers the authority to perform their duties.

Direct Commission. One of the five sources of commission. It involves no formal commissioning program and is similar to a direct hire. The medical and legal fields benefit most from this source.

Prospect. A qualified student interested in ROTC.

Recruiting. The process of attracting and enrolling prospects into ROTC. This process includes marketing, advertising and the face to face act of recruiting.

Reserves. The Reserves are comprised of the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve forces. The Reserves make up over half of the Army.
APPENDIX A

SURVEY

1. Select the position that you currently fill: PMS, APMS, ROO, Admin Tech, GBR, NCO, Other
2. Are you? AD, RES, Contractor, DA Civ, Civ
3. How old are you? 20s, 30s, 40s, 50s, 60s,
4. How long have you been in your current assignment? Less than 1 year, 1-2 years, 2-3 years, 3-4 years, 4-5 years, more than 5 years
5. Did you request an ROTC assignment Y/ N
6. Please rank the following factors in your decision to be assigned to ROTC: location, operational tempo, mission, degree completion, family, other
7. What is your commissioning source? ROTC, USMA, OCS, G2G, direct, not commissioned
8. Are you taking classes while assigned to ROTC? No, don’t plan to, no not yet but plan to, yes
9. Do you feel adequately trained to perform your job? Y/ N
10. Do you feel like a part of the college faculty? Y/N sometimes
11. Rank order the following tasks from most time consuming to least. Recruiting, reports, meetings marketing/advertising, training/teaching, other
12. How long does the ROO normally hold the position? Less than 1 year, 1 year, 1-2 years, 2-3 years, longer than 3 years
13. Select the size that best describes your school? Small to med state, small to med private, large state, large private, mjc
14. What is the annual tuition at your school? Under 10, 10-20, 20-30, 30-40, more
15. How many partnership schools are associated with your program? None, 1-3, 4-6, 7-10, 11 or more
16. What percentage of your cadets are partnership cadets? None, 1-10, 10-20, 20-30, 30-40, 40-50, more than half
17. Do you consider your campus ROTC friendly? Y/N sometimes
18. Can you make mission by recruiting on your home campus alone? Y/N maybe
19. How many scholarships (all types) did you award last cycle? None, 1-5, 6-10 more
20. How important are scholarships to your recruiting efforts? Not, somewhat, important very important
21. Rank order the aspects of your program that you feel your market is attracted to. Scholarships, adventure, challenge, officership, service, reputation, other
22. Does the army adequately resource officer recruiting? Y/N don’t know
23. How would you improve ROTC recruiting?
24. Rank order these attributes of ROTC in general as you see their appeal to the market. Scholarships, service, officership, challenge/adventure, resume builder, team aspects other
25. How do you advertise? Campus radio, campus television, campus paper, local radio, local tv, billboards, internet, fliers, direct mail, other
26. What is your most effective form of advertising?
27. Given no budget constraints, how would you prefer to advertise?
28. Which ROTC function do you feel is most important? Officer Recruiting, Leadership Development, Making better citizens
29. Select all venues where you recruit. College fairs, science fairs, high schools, jrotc summer camp, boys state, on campus, other
30. Is CCs national advertising campaign effective within your market? Y/N don’t know
31. Do you work with local recruiters? Y/N sometimes
32. How many cadets in your program were referred by a local USAREC recruiter?
   None, 1-5, 6-10, more than 10
33. Would having a USAREC recruiter on your staff help you make your mission?
   Y/N don’t know
34. What is the image of ROTC on your campus historically? Very negative, somewhat negative, negative, neutral, positive, somewhat positive, very positive
35. What is the image of ROTC/Military within your region?
36. What do you see as your greatest recruiting challenge?
37. Which recruiting philosophy is closest to your program’s. hard sell, spread the gospel, build it they will come, prospect management, sniper rifle, shotgun
38. When considering contact hours with cadets would you prefer. Fewer, the same or more
39. When considering cadet training do you feel: less training is needed, training is adequate, training is not challenging enough, more training is needed, training needs to be more rigorous, training is less important than recruiting
APPENDIX B

INTERVIEW WITH MAJOR GENERAL (RET) ROBERT E. WAGNER

“Your study can’t be number driven. Look at the whole spectrum, training and leader development is a major part of it. If it is not a fun place to join they won’t join.”

Over 8,000 cadets per year were commissioned under Gen Wagner.

Q1. To what do you credit your success?

MG: First I’ll give you my philosophy, part of its in the Bible. It says that man does not live by bread alone. Which means that to an Army unit, Cadet Command is an Army unit, that a unit does not exist by program alone. You have to have training you have to have esprit, you have to have eternal pride in the fact that you are producing 70% of the officers for the United States Army. You have to understand the enormous relevancy of the Army defending the constitution of the United States. If you believe in that you got to take it seriously that this is the organization that produces the majority of the leaders. And officer leaders are the engine that pulls the Army. This is critical and that point has got to be made and everybody’s got to understand it. The cadet battalion’s got to be fun, its national sport Ranger Challenge has got to be emphasized. Things like dinning ins, officer creed, anything you can do to make that battalion work. The colors and everything else is important. Now when you leave a lot of things happen, they were proud to belong to that organization on campus but when you leave it you remember the esprit you had as a young person and you say and also your PMS and your APMS have been telling you to remember this because when you are a platoon leader or a detachment commander or anything they need to feel that they are special. Man does not live Major by programs alone. And the Army doesn’t understand that and they have forgotten leadership. And that’s hard news and often pungent leadership. If you are afraid to cuss once in a while then goddammit you should have joined the priesthood. You are in the wrong business. We are in the business of killing people.

Q2. What do you think your greatest challenge was as the first commander?

MG: Selling the Army on what I just said. That if you don’t take officer leadership seriously, you don’t take the United States Army seriously. In terms of resources and everything, and I must tell you at the time this argument resonated because I got up . . . we were not part of Accessions Command . . . which I think is a mistake alright because we have moved Cadet Command one important echelon away from DoD that I was ordered on I had to brief the Chief of Staff of the Army four times a year and the TRADOC commander could not say no. That my resources were fenced by DoD . . . you got that money . . . this was not part of it . . . it was part of the TRADOC budget but it was given to TRADOC . . . this is Cadet Command’s special budget . . . don’t touch it. That’s not true anymore and I had a direct line to the DCSPER and the M&RA
department of the Army’s office, so I was hooked up to TRADOC but I very much was
almost an independent operator at the highest levels of the Army. And we also had an
Army advisory panel of big members of industry and university presidents that
overwatched Cadet Command that had tremendous political clout and they were assistant
secretaries and honorary secretaries that talked directly to the Secretary of the Army
about ROTC. So we had a great deal of visibility. And we sat on the Army panel board
for advertising. We played a major . . . Be all you can be . . . not a direct part but we
were a key part . . . Army ROTC, the best college course you can take . . . we came up
with that . . . who’s . . . no one’s come up with anything that good since. And we
adverted all of that, we had a lot of visibility because people bought into our mission.
And that’s not true anymore. The pervasive thing that you have right now with the
institution of West Point . . . and I don’t care . . . that we have a West Point commander.
So, we have a lot of preoccupation with programs but we stay away from eliteness and all
of the esprit stuff that I was just talking about because that attacks West Point directly.
Be proud of what you do because that attacks West Point directly . . . you understand what I
mean? They don’t like that, West Point doesn’t like our quality controls, they don’t like
our camp, they don’t like our check lists, they don’t like our leadership development
program, because they are petrified that we put out a better product than they do . . . And
at the top echelons . . . we do put out a better product than they do. So, I don’t want to say
that they are the enemy but they are damn near the enemy. So, you end up with a
structure where the commanding general is a West Point graduate . . . you got a couple of
strikes against you. That’s why your leadership in Cadet Command . . . not APMS’s or
ROO’s, I don’t mind that . . . training officers . I don’t mind that but PMS’s on up . . .
they should be ROTC products. A West Pointer can’t do it . . . just as my experience
being a VMI graduate was totally alien also. I had to learn that the hard way. I understood
that and I got into it. It was very different.

Q3. Do you have a specific achievement that stands out, one that you are most proud of?

MG: Ah . . . I think . . . they’re all kind of related but establishing Cadet Command. The
name of Cadet Command which has a ring to it . . . which West Point fought right down
to the . . . we were First ROTC Cadet Command . . . that went on after my watch . . . the
next commanding general it became U.S. Army Cadet Command . . . West Point fought
that right to the ground. But I think the fact . . . the greatest achievement was selling the
Army leadership on the creation of a major subordinate command in TRADOC that stood
on its own. Incidentally I need to give you a book before you leave here, its called Cadet
Command the first ten years . . . Do you have that book?

No sir, not yet.

That’s an excellent . . . I did not write that book, in fact there are some things in there
that aren’t particularly complementary to me either, but it points out that before we look
out of the box . . . I’m going to say something important here . . . in fact I was just talking
to a bunch of trainers over at TRADOC this morning . . . [B]efore you work/look out of
the box . . . which is something we say all the time . . . we need to look into the boxy to
make sure you are not learning something that you already knew Major ... you understand what I mean? ... at enormous expense because we have don some very good things and you need to look into the box ... well this is the way we solve that kind of problem. But the creation of that kind of organization that was adequately supported in the sense that a lot of esprit and promotions were commensurate with the other selections ... with the rest of the Army. Which they aren’t now but that’s coming up incidentally. So, that was my best achievement and I had a lot of enemies doing that ... particularly the institution of the Military Academy. They fought it at every turn ... before Congress.

So much for the one team one mission.

Oh bullshit ... this doesn’t shock you does it? ... this is real world baby.

I think that we don’t do a lot of things within Cadet Command because of the relationship to West Point and the political correctness.

They don’t like our Ranger Challenge competition see ... and that was nationals in my day and the Secretary of Defense or Secretary of the Army used to come down to Fort Bragg for a shoot off ... he’d watch that and he was really into this and he would watch the training and we had some top cadets in those days and he would give the prize. Now, what did that do to the West Point guys? Don’t get the idea ... I’m not ... Many of my best friends are West Pointers and certainly they have produced some of the most outstanding officers in the Army but they can not perform, they can not get as many officers as the Army needs because we’ve been large since 1949. We have a large force ... they can’t do that. So the institution of ROTC must work therefore it will continue to produce the majority of active duty officers. Well over half of the serving general officers are ROTC graduates. If that is the case then you better take it seriously.

Comment about MPRI instructors at West Point made.

MG: Well, I fought that to the last drop.

Q4: We talked a little bit about why ROTC has not made its mission since 1989. Is there one theme, reason or issue that you see as to why that is?

MG: I think in the history if you look back you will find the times they told the PMS’s and Brigade commanders and stuff that it wasn’t important to make mission ... then they said a year or two later ... I’m wrong ... we gotta do it now. So you know I’m going to tell you this ... What’s your first name?

Tony

MG: Tony you cannot heat up a recruiting mechanism and suddenly say it doesn’t make any difference ... and say ah hell I made a mistake last year ... you gotta do that. And that tripped up Cadet Command and I don’t think that they’ve ever recovered since. The
other thing that you gotta do is ah... I entered on every PMS’s support form, every ROO’s support for their numbers, that went there. You were held absolutely responsible. That’s not done these days. I borrowed that from Recruiting Command... they still do that. You will do this so many production, so many 4’s, 3’s, 2’s the whole nine yards. You will send so many to camp, you will have this completion rate and that’s it. And I, we were fairly reasonable about that but you had it. I tell you when you have something on your support form... first of all you were very careful with the kind of numbers you initially came up with... sometimes we’d say that’s a little high but why not you know... you’re going to have to do it... you’re going to have to produce it... that discipline for some reason and I don’t understand why that isn’t there... why was that taken out. see?

It’s the feel good solution sir.

MG: Yeah, it’s a feel good... they want nice... see in my day we weren’t nice. You make it or it was going to be your ass. We’re in that kind of business... in money if you do make it you feel better about it. Take these guys like Allen who commanded the Big Red One at Moran through Sicily. You take a lot of guys like Patton, even Eisenhower, these guys, even Bradley were tough sons of bitches... I’m telling you they had a long war and they were going to go the haul and they were going to beat the hell out of the Nazis and that’s all there was to it, and they weren’t going home until they did it. That’s what they had. You had this hard nosed thing and its funny at unit level in the 101’st and the 82nd the 18th airborne corps you can still find that esprit... it’s still there... the Army hasn’t quiet crushed that... though they are trying to. I think we should go back to the old fashioned way... just like I’m telling people here you know you can take a guy who measures out his life in prayer breakfasts if that’s what your going to do, who never cusses, never drinks, never smokes cigars, doesn’t chew tobacco... I do all those five and I can still knock the crap out of most guys half my age... and I’m telling you if that’s the way it is you can have all those qualities and still be a rotten goddamn son of a bitch... because you can mess over young officers and not give them counseling; you can be a coward; there’s all kinds of things... That’s not the measure of a leader and we’ve gone astray... way astray. That’s why I tell people when I teach a class about my profanity. I deliberately cuss in those classes as you probably recall.

I recall sir.

MG: I said if that shocks you, I have a bottle of smelling salts back there you can go back there and take a sniff. Then everybody thinks its funny... a few don’t but the write ups are great. The guys in the class love it. In fact they will respond in kind when they ask a question.

[I relayed a story of a co-worker’s response to his class that was much different from my own.]
[The general shared his personal opinions of the war on terrorism and a perceived lack of success in Afghanistan.] . . . and people see that here and are they going to join up to be a part of that . . . probably not.

Q5: What is your opinion on the market trends? Have you seen or do you perceive a big change in the cadets since you were in command?

MG: Ah . . . I don’t think they are as tough. They’re not as physically fit and some of that is the lack of discipline in the command itself . . . I can’t condemn an entire generation because of that. I go to camp every year as you know and I still do . . . and I run around out there and I just think that they are not tough and they are not treated tough. They are not treated toughly you know . . . Hey mister, do you know that you just lost a whole squad? Why don’t you pull your head out of your ass and figure out what you are doing out here. Losing eight Americans is not good, we are not training you to do that. You forgot everything that you were supposed to know. How do you think they trained the rangers to take Pointe de Hoc? How do you think they did that Tony? Huh . . . you think they cussed? They had to keep those guys out of the bars because they were beating the hell out of the Brits because they were so fired up.

Q6: What is your opinion on Cadet Command’s advertising strategy and local focus vs. national focus?

MG: We do need some national advertising and ah..we need some local advertising and ah..we have to put money in it and we have to get visibility on television . . . the whole spectrum of media. And its gotta reflect what the Army is all about . . . which is directly or indirectly warfighting and we don’t do that. We are very politically correct to the point that we don’t advertise. Let me point this out . . . the Marines . . . they do a good job. Here you have this young guy that’s climbing up this complicated girder and at the top there is this monster at the top and he pull the sword and only he can draw the sword because only he has the guts to do it and he pulls that sword out and he kills the dragon and then he takes that sword and the picture transforms to a cadet saber and you look at that and you think for an instant . . . a shameful instant . . . I’d love to be a Marine! If I feel that you know it’s wrong. What’s wrong with me . . . especially me . . . I love the Army. How in the world . . . what’s wrong with us? Why are we opposed to do that . . . if you bring that up around a table..that is so guosh, that is terrible . . . and they talk themselves out of doing anything.

[I relayed the story of CC dismissing the Marines and SUNY B’s success at the regional ROO conference.]

MG: You are so right Tony . . . they are on the wrong track . . . they’ve been on the wrong track and they are getting more and more on the wrong track and we are not going anywhere but down hill and that’s because of this. See, the funny thing about it is that most guys, young officers agree with this. I don’t know what happens . . . we brain wash
the senior officers. We got all these smooth guys up there... if they are not smooth they
don’t get promoted. That’s right, you can’t make general.

Q7: How do you see Accessions command playing out now that CC falls under it?

MG: I had a personal conversation for sometime with the new commanding general on
that... of Accessions Command... and he is an ROTC graduate and ah...he’s a good
guy... General Gavin’s a good guy. He understands the importance of this. I’m not sure
that arrangements going to continue... the structure there I think is probably dangerous.
It has taken Cadet Command, which is all important, and it put it one more level away
from DA. West Point isn’t that way... we shouldn’t be that way. So, I’m very concerned
about it. I’m also concerned... the new chief of staff of Cadet Command is a guy named
Phillips who was a recruiting brigade commander... you have this transition... these
are profoundly different jobs... you are looking at profoundly different groups of people
and it doesn’t work. He doesn’t get it... I mean he’s a numbers... good guy... but he just
doesn’t get it... it’s all numbers, numbers, numbers.

They think recruiting is recruiting. While by definition we are trying to recruit the future
leaders of their market and they don’t get it.

MG: It’s not. I agree but you are on the right track. You and I agree on a lot of this stuff.
... I don’t know how popular your paper is going to be. You guys... the young officers
got to come up with the idea... and you got to change it. [7th Cav war stories]... I was
weaned on the Patton image... on being tough... now some of that was stupid. Guys of
my vintage look at the world very differently... we love the Army, we believe in
standards... we believe in training, we believe in recruiting, we want gung ho guys... I
don’t want them going to the goddamn Marine Corps... I want them in the United States
Army... this is what I really want. And we’re not getting them... the Marines are
beating us and we can do this but there is nobody in the chain of command... they’re all
smooth... and I know what it’s like to sit around a table like you described and you
come up with this idea... you say... and you are at a disadvantage because I know that
you are a bit emotional about these things... they are not you see... they’re smooth... you
have a passion for it... they’re saying he’s one of those... he’s a man on
horseback... he doesn’t know what he wants... and you’re sitting there and you just
happen to be right.

[Story shared about a question posed to the regional commander at the regional ROO
conference ref. national advertising and image.]

The CG is reluctant to advertise ROTC on the national level.

Q8: USAREC and CC want to put recruiters on campus, how do you feel about that?

MG: I’m dead against it. That is absolutely stupid. The concern of that is... where’s the
image... where’s the difference? That’s the problem see of married up with Cadet
Command . . . and they develop right now this relationship where you’ve got a successful recruiting brigade commander . . . he would be the kind of guy that would come up with that kind of dumb shit . . . I mean that is wrong . . . we they want numbers . . . see they would recruit a guy . . . they’ll recruit a kid that has the ability to be a good 2LT and finish college but they’d rather have him . . . you see? I’ve been down this path . . . you will get nothing out of Recruiting Command . . . they have some techniques . . . like how to make a cold call . . . [TAPE ENDS]

MG: I’m going to tell you something else . . . first of all the prestige of CC would go down because you’re at a good university like UVA or whatever you are . . . you have recruiters that are trying to recruit enlisted soldiers on a university campus . . . come on Tony . . . and that’s exactly . . . you would not go up you’d go down . . . that’s where all you guys are. I hope they’re not going to do that.

[Story of BDE ROO conference, UPS recruiter story.]

MG: You guys are absolutely unique and in fact I don’t even think you should talk to each other . . . there are certain databases . . . propensities . . . Recruiting Command has a lot of high tech stuff that you don’t have . . . you should but you don’t. But I would be very suspicious of any advice you get out of CC . . . (laughter) . . . I mean out of Accessions Command . . . (laughter) . . . that’s true too . . . but out of AC. Now they have one of their best brigade commanders as chief of staff . . . he’s come out . . . which you might not know about this . . . academic disciplinary mix . . . where they’re putting nurses . . . . I don’t mind nurses . . . but they’re putting engineers on a separate career track . . . so that basically you go to camp a year early so you don’t participate in ROTC the last two years of your undergraduate degree. First of all you are going to camp a year early . . . a year to a young man or young woman makes a big difference in maturity. Secondly, if the kid is pretty gung ho you would probably want them as a cadet officer their senior year for leadership . . . I assume that they would want that too.

[Oh, by the way that’s how we develop their leadership.]

MG: Right . . . what this initiative does to me is totally degrade the CC experience in other words CC becomes . . . if you have an initiative like this ADM initiative where you’re going to cut off . . . really what you’re doing is cutting off half of their cadetship . . . that says and this is the CG . . . I really don’t take very seriously . . . and he doesn’t . . . he hates training . . . he never goes and visits training or anything like that . . . and what he’s really saying here is basically I don’t . . . ah . . . I don’t value the leadership development aspects of CC. So, if you sat that you might as well become part of Recruiting Command. This ADM thing . . . and I got a meeting next week to discuss it with these guys. I’ll never get it changed but because when they have something that I don’t agree with . . . . . .[TAPE TURNED OFF]

Q9. What are your thoughts on having contractors teaching ROTC? Is it a temporary fix or are they here to stay?
MG: I think they will stay there because we’ve done it and ah... of course CC is very expensive in officer resources. I don’t know what the numbers are but if you equate this to a TO&E unit, we’ve got about two divisions worth of majors and captains... it is very expensive. The Army... there argument was that they couldn’t continue to support it. So, the ah... so we kept this MPRI input. My intelligence... I’ve talked to a lot of these guys... I fought that to the last drop of blood... but they’ve done fairly well. They’ve got some good retired guys in there that do the job... so I’m not so strong on that right now. I’d rather do that than disband CC... God knows what kind of situation we’d have right now... you’d all go to school and I guess everybody would compete to be an officer in a six week course... like anything... that would just be a disaster... so I think it is a necessity. So, I’m reluctantly... I think we’ve bought into it and I think we’re going to have to continue it. Again we’re going to have to supervise... you don’t do away with regions, you supervise, supervise, supervise... you gotta continue to do that.

[BREAK]

Q10: Should we continue to resource Ivy League schools that do not produce?

MG: That’s another thing... we dropped out of Harvard because they didn’t support us in Vietnam. Then Harvard wanted to come back... on my watch they wanted to come back and I said bullshit you’re not coming back. So, they were an extension program... extension to MIT. In my day you see MIT... I consider MIT an Ivy League school... Princeton were great producers. They were producing... Princeton’s no now... Princeton was really... the Tiger Bn... I went down there... they got... Princeton University’s Tiger Bn has a reputation of producing generals and Congressional Medal of Honor winners. You’d be amazed. There was great tradition and they had great goddamn facilities... better than any academic department... if you’ve ever visited Princeton... that Army... they’ve got a big thing... and if you talk to old guys and my day when that bill was drafted... they remember Princeton, the remember the Tiger Bn... they really were. Right now they might not be... that’s a problem... our lack of national image. You can remember when you were a cadet... God... we were in Time Magazine, we were in Life Magazine, we were in Boy’s Life. Print media... I mean we had... ah... we were all over the place. We made movies, we were in it. Green to Gold was all over Fort Bragg. I’m delighted that you are a Green to Gold cadet because some of our best officers and some of our best cadets came out of that Green to Gold program.

[Green to Gold comments]

MG: We used to have these Goldminer teams all over the country. I mean we had people in Los Angeles, San Francisco... that’s all they did... they had two to three people... and that’s all you did. They developed a reputation... we’d send you to any school in the nation... I will send you to Princeton... I mean that’s what we did... man we got... we stacked them up... we made mission. But those Goldminer teams were all over.
Atlanta, NYC and right here in Norfolk, we had a Goldminer team ... and we don’t have anything like that anymore. You know, I took these kids ... and I didn’t get any resources to do this ... I said this will pay off ... I said I’m going to take a look at your structure and you’re going to have to lose a captain. I would take your best guy ... the payoff ... let’s stick them in Seattle or something ... was enormous. So Goldminer teams ... you might talk about that because they are dead, its gone. Another thing that’s in the box that’s died ... things that worked. [War stories--Afghanistan vs Vietnam--successes and failures.]

Q11. What do you think of the personnel selection process? Are we getting the right people in the PMS jobs?

MG: In my day we came up with a real selection board system similar to being selected for command and we got the good guys. We didn’t get the top flight and we still don’t ... you don’t get ex Bn commanders ... these guys that are PMS aren’t going to command at the Bn level ... so what do you do ... for a lot of guys it is also their last job. But we kind of eliminated that but that has slipped because it is not put on any pedestal...being a PMS is not ... personally I feel that being a PMS should be command credit. I think a recruiting bn commander should get credit ... I think a PMS should get credit. It is a very tough, difficult, responsible job.

Q12. What is your opinion of big Army’s ownership of the problem?

MG: We have got to have a national image ... we’ve talked about that ... and you got to tap into it locally.

Q13: What are your thoughts on the CG’s Way Ahead?

MG: I liked the Way Ahead except if you recall it was programming ... nothing about the organization, nothing about esprit and morale ... that’s a perfect example ... this is a programmatical solution to the problem. This is a guy marching in lock step ... we will try to keep the numbers ... we just ... we don’t want an elite organization down there producing officers ... we just want these programs to work so we can meet our quotas and I’m going to tell you Tony ... you can’t do it. That was the lesson ... that’s why we made mission ... we can’t do it ... we had to produce an elite organization to make that happen. That is going down and that is the reason the numbers are going down.

[Story relayed ref the Way Ahead rebuttal submitted to CC.]

MG: You see, it’s not in the Army culture Tony. People ... they’re not interested in ROTC, they’re not interested in young officer training. [NCO vs. officer importance in combat leadership.] We’re not an officer oriented force ... the Germans were ... I’ve got a lot of respect for the Weremacht and ... The fact is that an elite good, dedicated officer corps can make a CAT-4 soldier function.
[An Army of stags led by a lion.]

That’s right -- you can make it happen therefore you priorities should be really on top flight officers but its always on USAEC. I hear this all the time . . . we’re really giving the Army good soldiers . . . and I say you’re not giving the Army anything . . . you’re giving them bodies . . . if they become good soldiers that is a function of the officer corps and the NCO corps. [War stories.]

Q14: What do you think of the SAL criteria as outlined in the Way Ahead?

MG: The Way Ahead is limited . . . its based on the phony premise that we did not have a recruiting problem in the late 80’s . . . we had a recruiting problem in the late 80’s . . . just as great as we do now . . . this is not the case . . . we were a lot better at it because we targeted combat arms . . . most of them didn’t go combat arms but that was it . . . we talked blood and guts, we talked bayonets and closing with the enemy and everything else . . . everybody had a ranger challenge team and they were good . . . we had ranger challenge teams . . . we had girls on ranger challenge teams and they were good . . . and we used to have shoot offs . . . we got so good at ranger challenge that we challenged the ranger Bns and they would not compete against us. I said you guys don’t think you can beat a bunch of kids . . . a bunch of ROTC cadets. He said you know . . . I’m going to be frank with you . . . the Bn commander said, sir, I think there is a chance we’ll lose and I don’t want to take it. If we win they’ll say you just beat a bunch of cadets, so what . . . if we lose. But we were that good. If you are doing ranger challenge to me that’s the athlete. Major sports athletes is not a market for us. I tell recruiters in the ROO course that we are all soldiers and warriors and all that stuff but I want you to remember on thing, to recruit the minorities . . . and the minorities are male people who will fight the enemy. You can’t forget that . . . and we are. The Marines and everybody else is running away with those people. That’s not politically correct . . . no one is willing to take that kind of heat.

[Comments on TV advertising for ROTC.]

That’s counter culture . . . it’s like we are an Army of enlisted people and we’re not. We have a fear . . . take a look at the Marine Corps’ ads . . . who is it most of the time? A Marine enlisted man? Uh uh . . . it’s a lieutenant . . . a combat arms lieutenant . . . they understand that. You’ve never seen a recruiting thing around here that celebrates a combat arms lieutenant . . . . We are breeding a whole generation of kids that aren’t tough. So what you have to do in a cadet battalion . . . you got to . . . and this is a key point here . . . you got to make up through ranger challenge that athletic shortfall . . . that comes up in your intramurals, and all that stuff that you start in a real active, physical program through the APFT, APFT contests and your ranger challenge . . . you got to be in shape . . . that starts and that produces the athlete.

Q15: If you were to take command again what would be your top three priorities?
MG: It is hard to come out with just three priorities but I would... I would return the elon and the eliteness of CC organization... the way it was back in the late 80's... the patch... the cadet creed, the respect for tradition. I would absolutely insist on physical training... ah... dedication to duty, camp performance... cadre that was out of sight, that really believed in what they were doing. Because we have slipped a long way and that's the problem and we'll never make it... it's adversely effecting the quality of our officers and the reason for that is we will not recognize CC as the organization it must be to give us quality cadets. It is only ROTC and it's all programmatic and that will not work... man cannot live by bread alone... or programs alone.

[Interview ends – advice given.]
APPENDIX C
FIELD TRAINING POPULARITY

ACTIVITIES LIKED THE MOST

All MS Levels

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APPENDIX D

TIMING OF ADVERTISING

Sources of Advertising Not as Critical as Timing

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<sup>a</sup> Predictors: (Constant), Haven't seen, who decided, lettercol, MAGAZINE, LETTER1HS, OINCAMPUS

**ANOVAT**

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Dependent Variable: WILLCONT

**Coefficients**

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<sup>a</sup> Dependent Variable: WILLCONT

**TIMING OF INFORMATION IS MORE CRITICAL THAN MEDIUM - THE EARLIER THE BETTER**

Note: The minus sign on when decided shows that the later the cadet decided to participate in Army ROTC, the less the chance that he will plan to continue. A cadet who decides late (as Freshman or Sophomore) will likely leave early.
APPENDIX E
EARLIER IS BETTER

The Earlier a Cadet Decides to Enroll in ROTC, the Better the Chances of Remaining to Commission Most Evident in Lower Classmen

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MS1s and MS2s who decided as high school juniors or before that they would definitely enroll in ROTC are more likely to say they will stay to commission. Cadets who did not decide to enroll until arriving at college plan to stay until commission at a far lower rate.

Implication is that recruiting cadets on campus who were not sure of participation well prior to enrollment is not as effective as convincing a younger audience of high school students. If ROTC is not part of the high school student’s plans by the senior year, ROTC will not likely commission him.
APPENDIX F

ELECTRONIC MESSAGE FROM CADET COMMAND

From "Gillen, Maura A MAJ" <maura.gillen@monroe.army.mil>
Sent Monday, April 14, 2003 2:54 pm
To "anthony.dotson@us.army.mil" <anthony.dotson@us.army.mil>
Cc "English, Paul L COL" <paul.english@monroe.army.mil>, "Huggins, Bert" <bert.huggins@monroe.army.mil>
Bcc
Subject Unable to support survey

Tony,

Regret to say that we are unable to support your request for access to our ROOs to conduct your planned survey. I don't know what kind of bind this puts you in with regard to your research proposal, but we have a number of concerns that really can't all be overcome.

The first is the issue of timing, which I know you understand from your experience at the battalion level, but we are still turning this ship around. With so much going on, we must keep the field focused, reducing distractions where we can.

You noted that the responses would be voluntary but that actually creates an additional concern -- some of the questions, paired with the speed of change in the command right now, are very likely to result in skewed answers. I will go so far as to note that your questions are somewhat leading, going down an old path that we've not been on for a while, e.g. we actually pulled back some of the dollars that had been tagged to campus advertising (broad media purchases) in order to support retention (specific recognition of commitment milestones for those cadets already contracted). The expected responses to the survey as written would likely be a lot of griping that would in almost no way benefit our organization.

Nor would the format of your survey seem to answer the specific research question: Are ROTC recruiting strategy and methods sufficient to meet the future leadership requirements of the Army? Dr. Huggins and I were each confused by the proposal itself. The research question in the prospectus is very broad (much broader than the scope of the survey questions), and hints at the Officer Accessions Strategy we've been trying to formulate with DA for more than a year. Cadet Command has been on its own to determine the "future leadership requirements of the Army" beyond simple numeric mission. Your comment on sufficient quality (meeting commissioning requirements) doesn't come close to what the command is now attempting to define, having finally achieved numeric mission with this mission set (potentially -- still too close to call) and the immediate future mission sets.

Anyway, we really can't spend the time required to bring you far enough up to speed to make this worthwhile for us or the Army and regret that we cannot do so -- in premise, it would be a subject we'd love to have extra help exploring.

If it is too late to change your research topic but you can proceed without the survey, you might try some of our new guidance documents to help answer your other questions. CC Reg 145-17, Recruiting and Enrollment Planning, provides command guidance on a lot of the topics you list later in your prospectus, e.g. What is the current recruiting strategy? What is the target?
audience and market? What are the current recruiting methods and techniques? What are the competing factors? Additional information is available in CC Pam 145-36, Recruiting TTPs. Both are available on our CC web "Right Site" at http://147.248.153.52

Good luck,
Mo
BIBLIOGRAPHY


Cadet Command. Electronic message sent to author on 14 April 2003. See Appendix F.


———. Statement made by instructor during Cadet Command orientation training, Fort Monroe, 15 June 1999.


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Robert E. Wagner, interview by author, tape recording, Virginia Beach, VA, 31 December 2002.


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