WHAT EFFECT DID GENERAL ORDER NUMBER 1 AND THE FORCE PROTECTION MEASURES HAVE ON TASK FORCE EAGLE OPERATIONS IN BOSNIA DURING IMPLEMENTATION FORCE?

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree

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Strategy

by

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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or
any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)
WHAT EFFECT DID GENERAL ORDER NUMBER 1 AND THE FORCE PROTECTION MEASURES HAVE ON TASK FORCE EAGLE OPERATIONS IN BOSNIA DURING IFOR?, by MAJ William M. Yates, RNZAC, 107 Pages.

This thesis is a historical study to determine the effect General Order Number 1 and the Force Protection Measures had on Task Force Eagle operations during the deployment of the NATO Implementation Force between December 1995 and November 1996. The study examines the effects the measures had in particular on faction liaison and morale during the operation. The study also examines whether the two blanket orders nested with the concept of mission type orders. The study draws heavily on interviews and lessons learned from individuals who took part in the operation, including those who were not subject to the Task Force Eagle measures.

The study concludes that both measures had a noticeable impact on operations resulting in exemptions and exceptions being granted to both orders. Whilst the impact on morale was significant it did not detract from the overall mission accomplishment. The force protection measures, however, had a more noticeable impact and the continuation of such a robust approach potentially undermined the intended effect on the factions. The thesis also concluded that the application of blanket orders did not fit well with mission type orders and recommends a more flexible approach in the future.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

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I would also like to thank the numerous officers (both US and international) who gave so willingly of their valuable free time to be interviewed for this study. The overwhelming response was not anticipated and their candid approach ensured not only a wider view of the subject but also the colorful quotations that captured the essence of the numerous issues.

Finally, I dedicate this work to all the soldiers who endured the privations of TF Eagle but who managed to complete their tasks with good humor and intact spirit. I hope that the legacy of their labors in Bosnia will last for generations and that the findings of their experiences may help in some small way to shape the planning of future operations.
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FP  Force Protection
FLOT  Forward Line Own Troops
FPT  Force Protection Team
FWF  Former Warring Factions
HMMWV  High Mobility, Multipurpose, Wheeled Vehicle
HUMINT  Human Intelligence
G2  Divisional Intelligence Officer
GFAP  General Framework Agreement for Peace
GO-1  General Order Number 1
HQ  Headquarters
IFOR  Implementation Force
ISB  Intermediate Staging Base
JCO  Joint Commission Observer
JMC  Joint Military Commission
JSTARS  Joint Surveillance and Target Acquisition Radar System
JTF  Joint Task Force
LNO  Liaison Officer
LTC  Lieutenant Colonel
M60  Machine Gun
MAJ  Major
METT-T  Mission, Enemy, Terrain and Weather, Troops and Support Available, Time Available
MG  Major General
MLRS  Multiple Launch Rocket System
MND  Multi-National Division
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Mission type orders allow subordinate leaders to exercise independent judgment and exploit hanging situations.¹

U.S. Army, FM 101-5-1

This study is about the effects General Order Number 1 (GO-1) and Force Protection (FP) measures had on American operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina (BH) during the Implementation Force (IFOR) deployment in support of the Dayton Peace process over the period December 1995 to November 1996. In particular it analyzes the effects on operational tasks and troop morale of three specific guidelines for the conduct of US personnel: the ban on the consumption of alcohol, the requirement to constantly wear flak jacket and helmet, and the requirement to travel in four-vehicle convoys.

Outline

This chapter presents the background to the problem and the basis for the measures noted above, conducts a review of available literature, and establishes the framework for analysis of the problems that GO-1 and the FP measures presented American commanders and soldiers. Chapter 2 will analyze the effects the order had on the accomplishment of effective liaison, focusing particularly on the accomplishment of former warring faction liaison. Chapter 3 will analyze the effects the orders had on force morale. The fourth chapter will analyze the appropriateness of the FP measures detailed for Operation Balkan Endeavor with the threat faced and the inter-relationship between the FP measures and mission accomplishment. Chapter 5 will draw conclusions from the analysis.
Background

US Forces played a significant role in the success of IFOR. American land forces primarily supported the operation in three locations. First, the US led Multinational Division, North (MND(N)), Task Force Eagle (TF Eagle), which was, and continues to be, responsible for the northeastern sector of Bosnia (see figure 1). This was the largest concentration of US forces and was based primarily on the US 1st Armored Division (1 AD). Second, US personnel supported the multinational headquarters in Sarajevo. Third, USAREUR and V Corps personnel supported TF Eagle from the intermediate staging base (ISB) in Hungary and from locations in Croatia. US forces also provided smaller detachments in support of the other two multinational divisions.

US forces deployed to Bosnia in support of IFOR from 20 December 1995 and formally transferred authority to the NATO Stabilization Force (SFOR) on 10 November 1996.

GO-1\(^2\) was a detailed order issued by General Joulwan, CINCEUR, for American forces deployed in support of the Operation Balkan Endeavor. The order prescribed limits on certain force and troop behavior and was a continuation of orders issued on previous US operational deployments, most notably during the Gulf War. The order, however, created numerous anomalies when issued to US Forces not directly under American command and outside the TF Eagle Area of Responsibility (AOR). These anomalies resulted in four exceptions being issued in 13 months, all concerned with the consumption of alcohol.

In addition to GO-1, the command prescribed very restrictive FP measures. The FP orders detailed the requirement to travel in a minimum of four vehicle convoys, with two soldiers per vehicle, and that at all times personnel were to wear flak jacket, helmet and carry a weapon. The orders further restricted soldiers to base-camp locations limiting interaction with the local population. On the surface there is no reason to question these measures in what was a politically charged mission in a volatile theatre of operations where a vicious civil war had just come to a close. In fact, at the commencement of the operations, one could easily argue that they were completely appropriate.

Over time, however, the issuance of such prescriptive orders removed the ability for officers to use their judgment, effectively centralizing control for these matters at divisional level. This was done supposedly for the protection of the force in the
accomplishment of the mission. Arguably they may have been issued to achieve the political imperative of avoiding US casualties. This was certainly the perception of other forces within IFOR, who were able to take a more flexible approach to FP measures and the use of alcohol. Of course, one could argue that if avoidance of casualties is essential to preserve domestic support, it may be a necessary price to pay. Another possible motive, however, could be general officers looking after their careers.

Whilst the intent of these orders was admirable, GO-1 removed the flexibility for representatives of IFOR to consume alcohol in accordance with local custom while performing their official functions and this was not fully exempted until the SFOR mandate. To refuse to drink together with people with whom you are trying to build a working relationship could mean the difference between success and failure, or at least limited effectiveness. This undoubtedly restricted certain functions, especially faction liaison, as alcohol is arguably an integral facet of Serb and Croat cultural life. It is also arguably incongruous with the US Army’s professed espousal of mission-type orders.

As the mission progressed and the factions were separated and returned to barracks, the carriage of personal side arms was restricted to very senior faction leaders. The presence of heavily armed, junior officers dressed in flak jacket and helmet in a faction military headquarters on an administrative task may not necessarily reinforce a belief in the secure environment provided by the force implementing the peace. Nor is it likely to engender a great deal of trust in the security provided by the faction, an essential ingredient to fulfill the IFOR mandate. FP measures requiring a minimum of four-vehicle convoys with two soldiers per vehicle for a liaison task were arguably uneconomical and
potentially intimidating. This also had implications for mission command, where FP requirements potentially affected mission needs.

The effectiveness of faction liaison under prescriptive orders such as GO-1 and the FP measures must therefore be a secondary question, as would other forms of civil and military liaison conducted by military personnel of MNDN.

When TF Eagle deployed, it was for twelve months with no provision for leave. Whilst leave was ultimately to be provided, the concept of deploying and restricting personnel to heavily protected installations without providing off duty access to alcohol and requiring all personnel within these environments to constantly don helmets and flak jackets may have had a significant effect over time on both attitude and morale. Cabin fever is a common enough problem, but it was perhaps exacerbated by the inability of some personnel to leave static facilities with no potential diversions. Whilst not a direct result of GO-1, the requirement to form multiple vehicle convoys for simple administrative tasks may also have had an indirect effect on contingent morale. This is particularly interesting given that the current army definition of force protection includes safety and soldier health and morale. At first glance it would appear that the measures designed to provide for soldier safety might also have had a negative effect on morale.

Despite an absence of military action against US soldiers and a successful implementation of the Dayton Peace Accord, FP measures remained largely unaltered well into the SFOR mandate. What did that signal to both allies and to the general population of Bosnia and was this in concert with US FP doctrine? This is of particular interest as FP measures can be used to reflect not only the general progress of a particular mission but the growing confidence in the measures taken by all parties. A contingent
remaining immediately ready for battle in a stable, demilitarized and incident free environment does little to engender the belief in the assertions commanders make. Actions inevitably speak louder than words in a military environment and it would appear that the continuation of severe FP measures unaltered, without incident or threat, is counter-productive.

Thesis Question

In line with the background, the primary thesis statement is: What effect did General Order Number 1 and the Force Protection Measures have on Task Force Eagle operations in Bosnia during IFOR?

In order to address the primary question the following subordinate questions were used as the basis for research and analysis of the primary thesis question:

1. What was the logical justification for these measures?
2. What effect did GO-1 and the FP measures have on liaison, in particular, on liaison with the former warring factions?
3. What effect did GO-1 and the FP measures have on the morale of TF Eagle?
4. How appropriate were the FP measures and what effect did they have on operations?
5. How well did GO-1 and the FP measures nest with a force trained to work under mission type orders?

Significance of Issue

Providing clear guidance without being prescriptive as to how a task is to be done is a requirement of mission type orders. If prescriptive orders are to be provided to commanders in place of guidance on deployment, then an understanding of the possible
consequences is imperative. This is essential where commanders are placed in a dilemma over adhering to a prescriptive, punitive order or achieving the commander’s intent upon which mission success or effectiveness depends. The importance of tailoring appropriate FP measures in MOOTW is essential in ensuring both the protection of soldiers against the assessed threat and in sending an appropriate message to the factions in their transition from hostility to peace. With MOOTW an inevitable part of twenty-first century soldiering, understanding the implications of blanket orders is essential in ensuring both successful missions and the maintenance of morale.

Finally, the effective interaction with the local population at all levels is a force multiplier. An understanding of, and sensitivity to, cultural and social practices helps facilitate acceptance and effectiveness in the achievement of the mission. Understanding the implications of unilaterally banning participation in a social custom and allowing commanders true flexibility in judgment will ensure that leaders are not placed in a dilemma between choosing to obey a punitive order or risk alienating an ally or vital faction. This thesis is therefore of utility to officers planning MOOTW.

Key Definitions

It is vital to this research that a working understanding of FP, morale, liaison and mission-type orders is identified. As this research is looking purely at an US Army example, I intend to provide the current Army definitions in assessing the operation. FM 101-5-1 doctrinally defines FP:

One of the four primary elements that combine to create combat power. It conserves the fighting potential of a force. The four components of force protection are: operational security and deception operations; the soldier’s health and morale; safety; and the avoidance of fratricide.
However, this definition requires further clarification, as it comprises terms that are not defined in FM 100-5-1. FM 101-5-1 does not go on to define “safety” or what is meant by the term “the soldier’s health and morale.”

The JP 1-02 definition is probably of more benefit. It defines FP as:

Security program designed to protect soldiers, civilian employees, family members, facilities, and equipment, in all locations and situations, accomplished through planned and integrated application of combating terrorism, physical security, operations security, personal protective services, and supported by intelligence, counterintelligence and other security programs.

This is more useful as it clearly links the integrated protective measures with intelligence, that is measures to counter an assessed threat. It also leads to a definition of physical security:

That part of security concerned with physical measures designed to safeguard personnel; to prevent unauthorized access to equipment, installations, material, and documents; and to safeguard them against espionage, sabotage, damage and theft.

But it is FM 3-0 that provides another and perhaps the most useful definition. FM 3-0 clearly separates Safety from FP. FM 3-0 elaborates on the JP 1-02 definition and defines FP as consisting of:

Those actions taken to prevent or mitigate hostile actions against DOD personnel (to include family members), resources, facilities, and critical information. These actions conserve the force’s fighting potential so it can be applied at the decisive time and place and incorporates the coordinated and synchronized offensive and defensive measures to enable the effective employment of the joint force while degrading opportunities for the enemy. Force Protection does not include actions to defeat the enemy or protect against accidents, weather, or disease.

Significantly, FP is not further defined or refined in JP3-07.3, the appropriate Joint Peace Operations publication. For the purposes of this thesis, the first part of the
FM 3-0 definition will be used, namely “those actions taken to prevent or mitigate hostile actions against DOD personnel,” noting the close similarity with the definition of “physical security” as provided in JP 1-02, the fact that it is based on intelligence, and that it does not include “safety” as defined in JP 1-02 and the FM 3-0 definition.

The definition of Liaison as given in FM 101-5-1 will be used:

That contact or intercommunication maintained between elements of military forces to ensure mutual understanding and unity of purpose and action.\textsuperscript{12}

There is no better definition of liaison provided in any manual joint or field, dealing with MOOTW.

Despite its effect on operations, FM 101-5-1 does not define morale. Morale is not included in the “Principles of War”\textsuperscript{13} for either conventional operations or MOOTW.

FM 22-100 defines morale in lengthy form as:

The human dimension’s most important intangible element. It’s a measure of how people feel about themselves, their team, and their leaders. High morale comes from good leadership, shared hardship, and mutual respect. It’s an emotional bond that springs from common values of loyalty to fellow soldiers and a belief that the organization will care for families. High morale results in a cohesive team that enthusiastically strives to achieve common goals. Leaders know that morale, the essential human element, holds the team together and keeps it going in the face of terrifying and dispiriting things that occur in war.\textsuperscript{14}

The final definition required at this time, is a definition of mission-type orders. A mission-type order is defined by FM 105-1-1:

Specifies what subordinate commanders are to do without prescribing how they must do it. Mission type orders enable the command to seize and maintain initiative and to set the terms of battle. Mission type orders allow subordinate leaders to exercise independent judgment and exploit hanging situations.\textsuperscript{15}
Review of Literature

The literature available on IFOR can be divided into three main categories: magazine and print media articles relating to Force Protection, the conduct of liaison, GO-1 and morale; US Army after action reviews (AAR) and lessons learned and finally joint publications and Army field manuals for the conduct of operations.

Magazine and Newspaper Articles

Numerous periodical articles exist on the subject of FP and performance of liaison. These are mostly from professional military journals concerning the IFOR period, but also include FP discussions and issues as viewed in various missions in the last decade. Articles comparing FP styles of US and other allied/NATO forces have been located in both magazines and newspaper articles. The inability of soldiers to drink alcohol in BH and the effect on morale drew comment in the media. Most notable was the incident involving the CG of TF Eagle, MG Bill Nash, consuming alcohol whilst his soldiers could not come in for significant media attention. Articles regarding the importance and conduct of liaison on peace operations have been located in military journals. The importance of morale in warfare has been documented since antiquity; the impact of morale on modern operations has been the subject of numerous articles and thesis.

AAR and Lessons Learnted

Despite a number of significant missions during the 1990s during which variations of GO-1 and similar FP measures were implemented, the Lessons Learned and AARs only lightly address the key thesis questions. This appears to be at odds with the
strong sentiment the subject engenders. In some cases, comments appear to be carefully scripted or downgraded. This is clear, for example, in the *Bosnia-Herzegovina After Action Review 1*. This is assessed as a product of AAR/Lessons Learned process that appears to be reluctant to criticize orders issued at a senior level. As a result of this filter, this thesis methodology will include interviews with personnel involved in IFOR either to confirm the conclusions of this source of information or to provide alternative viewpoints, especially from those who have retired since the conclusion of IFOR.

**Joint Publications and Army Field Manuals.**

This source of information provides a range of definitions and understanding of the current military thinking on peace operations. Whilst they were not necessarily extant in 1996 when this operation was being conducted, most were compiled during or relatively shortly after the IFOR mission. Whilst there is a risk in assessing an operation against more recent doctrine and techniques, the central questions this paper will address arguably transcend minor doctrinal difference. The risk is therefore assessed as relatively small, and I would argue in fact that this process errs in favor of the IFOR decisions. This is because the modern manuals should incorporate the lessons learned from this mission and therefore potentially the areas identified should have been remedied. The importance of this issue will be examined during the interviews.

**Research Methodology**

This thesis has used a historical research methodology. Data has been gathered from published sources and analyzed against the subordinate questions. Due to concerns with the adequacy of published works, in particular AAR and Lessons Learned, interviews have been conducted with key personnel involved in IFOR. This group has not
been randomly selected but has been chosen to gain firstly an insight into the rationale for key decision-making within TF Eagle and to gain US and foreign impressions and perceptions of US actions and orders. A random selection of currently serving US CGSC officers who participated in the operation have also been interviewed and their responses analyzed against the subordinate questions.

Summary

In summary, this thesis aims to establish historically what effect GO-1 and the FP measures had upon TF Eagle operations in IFOR in order to provide guidance for future planners of MOOTW. The review of literature provides sufficient material to address some of the subordinate questions. However, concerns with the AAR and Lessons Learned have led to a research methodology that will utilize primary sources. Interviews will be conducted with leaders in positions to influence, and have insight of, key decisions on GO-1 and the IFOR force protection measures. These views will be supplemented by independent foreign observers of the impact of US policies as well as those charged with obeying and working within these prescriptive and punitive orders. Finally conclusions have been drawn based on this methodology that have been summarized in Chapter 5.

2GO-1 is attached as Annex A.
3Exception to GO-1 dated 21 Jan 97.
5Ibid.
6 Ibid.


8 Ibid., 407.


13 Ibid., 1-124.

14 U.S. Army, FM 22-100, *Army Leadership, Be, Know, Do* (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 31 August 1999), 3, 3-3.


CHAPTER 2
THE EFFECTS OF GENERAL ORDER NUMBER 1 AND THE FORCE PROTECTION MEASURES ON LIAISON

Conflict thrives on rumour, uncertainty and prejudice. The timely passage of accurate information based on a trusting relationship is a key method of combating uncertainty and promoting stability in a conflict region. Liaison is therefore a vital tool of a Peace Support Operation force and key to the successful execution of operations. Failure to liaise risks misunderstanding, friction, opposition and escalation of the conflict.\(^1\)

U.K. Army, JWP 3-50, Peace Support Operations

Introduction

Liaison is a key component of MOOTW that requires numerous elements to develop close relationships with various military, community and organizational leaders. GO-1 and the FP measures greatly affected US faction liaison and civil-military missions. From the start of the mission, three amendments to GO-1 were issued in early 1996, thus acknowledging that this blanket order was not fully suitable for the current operation. Dispensation from the FP measures for certain units would also occur, but would be much slower in approval and inconsistent in application. These two blanket orders did not allow US forces to maximize their effectiveness early on. MND(N) was also slow in realizing the benefit of dedicated faction liaison between the TF Eagle commander and the key faction military leaders. This chapter will look at GO-1 and FP policy and analyze the impact it had on the ability of MND(N) to conduct liaison.

GO-1 and FP Policy

GO-1 was a policy issued by General Joulwan, CINCEUR, in December 1995 for US forces operating within the TF Eagle AOR and is included as Appendix A. The policy
was not uniformly applied to all US forces in theatre due to the fact that US forces operated under two separate chains of command, (a point that will be explained in greater detail in Chapter 4). Suffice to say, “US troops were under two different US national chains of command.” Consequently, GO-1 and the FP requirements only applied to soldiers serving in MND(N).

GO-1 was a continuation of a blanket order issued during Operation DESERT SHIELD and is “a roughly two page document outlining prohibited activities deemed harmful to the mission by the commanding general”. It was significantly different from the GO-1 applied in Haiti in 1994, which left the discretion to consume alcohol at the O6 level. The key activities which GO-1 prohibited are; being in possession of captured or private weapons, illegally possessing or touching unexploded ordnance, gambling, currency exchange, unlawfully entering a mosque, possessing or damaging archeological artifacts and, the most contentious item, the “introduction, possession, use, sale, transfer, manufacture or consumption of any alcoholic beverage.” Despite the different requirements of GO-1, nearly everyone interviewed for this thesis identifies GO-1 as being synonymous with a directive not to consume alcohol. It is the impact of the alcohol ban on US forces serving in MND(N), therefore, that this chapter and thesis will focus on, rather than the other measures.

General Joulwan’s ban on alcohol was rooted in a genuine desire to prevent acts of indiscipline as a result of alcohol consumption. This was evidently based on his experiences in South Vietnam where alcohol and drug abuse were widespread and a contributing factor to inappropriate acts of indiscipline and poor morale. It was also consistent with the modern US Army where alcohol consumption is increasingly not part
of formal social life and is certainly not consistent with field deployments. It was also consistent with USAREUR’s last significant operational deployment during the first Gulf War. The mission in Bosnia was politically charged and the policy was undoubtedly devised to safeguard soldier’s lives from their armed colleagues and to prevent potentially politically and mission damaging actions by US forces.

This blanket order seems to have been issued without due regard for what was a totally different cultural situation in Bosnia. Highly appropriate for cultural sensitivity in Saudi Arabia in 1990 it was, nevertheless, highly unpopular among the soldiers. In turn, GO-1 was to be widely unpopular with Americans serving in Bosnia and inappropriate for the Bosnian cultural environment. This restrictive alcohol policy had two main facets. Firstly, there was the Bosnian cultural component and secondly, there was the social component for the TF Eagle soldiers. This chapter will focus on the Bosnian cultural aspect of GO-1. Chapter 3 will focus on the TF Eagle social impact of GO-1.

Two Amendments to GO-1 were issued in January 1996. The first, of special importance to the mission itself, “granted a limited exception to permit US personnel in Bosnia-Herzegovina who are participating in Joint Military Commissions (JMC) or other official ceremonial events involving foreign national officials to consume alcoholic beverages in accordance with the local custom.” Prior to this exemption, American soldiers (including the TF Eagle Commander, MG Bill Nash) were unable to lawfully drink alcohol in any forum including, for example, a toast for peace and stability in the region proposed by a faction leader. On 7 February 1996, this exception was applied to JMCs or official ceremonies in a range of other countries as well.
The second exemption in January 1996 was issued by Special Operations Command EUCOM to permit US Special Operations Command IFOR personnel assigned outside MND(N) “to consume alcohol consistent with coalition personnel guidelines.” All soldiers serving outside the TF Eagle chain of command would largely follow suit and adopt local sector arrangements. However, this was not always the case. One officer reported, “My soldiers and I did not violate GO-1. It was not applied to us, at least not in MND-SW in 1996. That was official. When a new US Commander took over, he changed the policy and we complied with GO-1. But not for long. After a visit to Banja Luka and Sipovo, standing in the bar drinking Coke after Coke, even he felt ridiculous. The ban was lifted and we returned to the way we were before.”

It was not until the SFOR mandate in January 1997 that a waiver to GO-1 was given for US forces:

Who, in the conduct of their official duties with allies, local national officials, former warring faction personnel or other foreign counterparts, deem it advisable to consume alcohol in order to establish and maintain rapport may consume alcohol in moderation, using common sense, self-discipline and good judgment to ensure that any consumption does not limit their ability to perform the mission at hand.

This very sensible exception was undoubtedly the result of the IFOR experience and the difficulties in the performance of duties, particularly faction liaison duties within a very different cultural situation from the first Gulf War. Needless to say, the definition of an official function became somewhat liberal.

FP policy was also multifaceted but this thesis will focus on the main areas of personal protection (flak-jacket and kevlar helmet), the four-vehicle convoy requirement, and the requirement to live on base camps. The FP policies were separate from GO-1, but
similarly devised to safeguard soldier’s lives. FP policies were devised for the operation based on the uncertain and unpredictable situation IFOR presented and were largely consistent with other NATO forces. The policy devised was sound and appropriate initially for operations.

**Faction Liaison**

Liaison in MOOTW is a well developed requirement and was honed through the UNPROFOR years specifically by the British. The US forces who entered Bosnia in December 1995 did so without dedicated faction liaison officers. This resulted in faction liaison being conducted through commanders at all levels and at corps level in TF Eagle through the retention of the British Joint Commission Observers (JCOs), and by General Nash personally at Military Commission meetings. The JCOs were a legacy of the UNPROFOR and were provided by British SF. The JCOs were the UNPROFOR commander’s link with the various military commanders and had been established as a result of General Rose’s dissatisfaction with the United Nations Military Observer (UNMO) mission in UNPROFOR. General Rose had brought into theatre British SF to conduct not only faction liaison, but also to conduct discrete information gathering and targeting information. The JCOs “formed a close working relationship with the factions” and provided a vital conduit between HQ MND(N) and the military (and on occasion civil) faction leaders and were adept at the myriad of coordination tasks, providing regular direct communications and establishing solid rapport.

Operating outside of both GO-1 and the FP requirements, the JCOs were able to wine and dine faction leaders and personalities and use a personal approach to gain an in-depth understanding of faction personalities and gain faction trust. The JCOs in MND(N)
operated in accordance with the guidelines General Walker had established at his first Joint Military Commission (JMC). The JCOs therefore nested with the MC structure established for each MND and, in the absence of dedicated US faction LNOs, served as the commanders “direct telescope regarding FWF activities.”

The key to their mission was the ability to connect with the faction leaders in the AORs and for those purposes they generally lived in houses in close proximity to their charges. On the arrival of IFOR, the JCOs remained in theatre and, unlike the UNMOs, were retained in the IFOR structure by the Commander HQ Allied Command Europe Ready Reaction Corps (COMARRC), LTG Michael Walker. “The JCOs facilitated this transition by introducing, and mentoring, brigade and battalion LNOs to the factions. As the Task Force Eagle became established across the AO and the brigades created a network of brigade and battalion level LNOs with the former warring faction headquarters the JCOs role changed.”

In addition to facilitating and conducting faction liaison for HQ ARRC, the JCOs provided faction liaison for the Commander TF Eagle (COMEAGLE) MG Bill Nash. The mechanism by which they were tasked to conduct this liaison was through a small sector headquarters that worked in conjunction with the TF Eagle JMC cell. Nevertheless the JCOs “received liaison and collection taskings from ARRC and Task Force Eagle.”

This meant that they were not the sole personal envoys of General Nash as the Divisional Liaison Officers (DLOs) were for General Jackson in MND(SW).

The British SF teams operated in two-vehicle patrols mostly, with their own military linguists. They lived on Eagle Base, in Tuzla and were located “in close proximity to the entities,” wherever they could best effect the liaison from and be
accessible to their faction commander. In some cases, for example the 1st Krajina Corps commander General Talic who had his headquarters in the MND(SW) sector, liaison was effected by the British DLOs who had intimate contact with this commander and who worked in close concert with the JCOs. This streamlined system allowed swift communications between the divisional JCO elements and the ARRC. The JCOs were to be used throughout the operation by MND(N) “because they were the most credible source of information on the capabilities and intentions of the FWF.”

This faction liaison mission was ultimately to be passed to US SF personnel who, having observed the British modus operandi, gained exemptions from both GO-1 and the restrictive FP measures. A US JCO commander who served during SFOR stated that had they been required to operate under both regulations, he felt “it would have been a complete waste of time” as the US JCOs would have been “completely alienated and counter productive.”

**Other Liaison Tasks**

The environment IFOR entered was uncertain and required mutual understanding among the factions and between the implementing forces. The potential for misunderstanding was great. Mistranslations, different map reading systems, a lack of understanding of NATO map marking symbols, and a lack of control of forces in a post conflict demobilization period, to name but a few, resulted in significant opportunities for misunderstanding. Mistrust and suspicion were also rife at the mission’s commencement, particularly with the Serbs who had been on the receiving end of NATO air strikes and who had seen the Krajina fall to an American-trained Croatian force. Perhaps more tenuous, however was the federation with significant mistrust between the two
supposed allies. Liaison was therefore essential at all levels, especially with the faction leaders who are arguably the centers of gravity for many MOOTW operations.

An understanding of the cultural environment and the development of a solid rapport were essential to gain the vitally needed trust. This is naturally a personality issue. “Peacetime engagement and conflict prevention is, in large part, a ‘people business,’” but it is also enhanced through cultural understanding. Alcohol was a significant part of the Bosnian makeup. To refuse to drink together was often viewed as more than just bad form, it was often perceived as an offense. GO-1, whilst endeavoring to “prevent conduct prejudicial to good order and discipline,” also inhibited the development of rapport and the ability for officers to use their judgment based on their commander’s intent. As General Nash was to note after IFOR:

The ability of soldiers to communicate clearly and deal effectively with individuals face-to-face will increasingly have a major impact on our peacetime engagement and conflict prevention strategy. We are going to have complex situations on the ground, many of them aimed at restoring a ravaged society. Here we will rely on the interpersonal skills of soldiers to prevent further conflict. These situations often require expeditious, on-the-spot decisions where there’s not time to call back to Washington or even back to division headquarters for help.

Such skills required a high degree of cultural awareness and the ability to make “expeditious, on-the-spot decisions” and for some this included a decision to share an alcoholic beverage with a faction. This often placed junior leaders in a conflict between whether to offend a faction with whom they were developing a good rapport or risk punishment. Officers interviewed commented on situations where they were offered alcohol by allies or factions whilst “establishing a working environment” and did not have the means to call back to higher to say “mother, may I” so they took it upon themselves and “took the hard call.” They very much felt that had they not socialized
and accepted hospitality relationships would have turned out less favorably. One officer of Croatian descent explained that to refuse a drink is considered “from my perspective pretty offensive.”

His opinion as to how that would be interpreted was that the faction would have felt “that I wasn’t really there to communicate with them.”

GO-1, whilst containing “prohibitions aimed at, among other things, avoiding acts which might offend the cultural sensibilities of a host nation” in fact in this case contained a prohibition that itself offended a cultural norm. One officer, reflecting on his experiences believed that if he had been able to drink with the factions, the relationship would have been much warmer.

There were numerous occasions quoted when this punitive order was violated based on an officer’s reading of the situation and overall mission requirements placing junior leaders in a dilemma between complying with GO-1 and the wider mission. This included the TF Eagle military policemen.

FM 101-5 decrees that a “trained, competent, trusted and informed liaison officer is key to effective liaison.” The key to the effectiveness of liaison is trust and being able to understand, and work within, the commander’s intent. Working within this intent is essential to ensure that the message is not lost in translation. LNOs are essential to ensure that mutual trust exists between the IFOR commander, faction commanders, other national forces and other organizations to prevent any misunderstanding.

Various other organizations were involved in liaising with the local population most notably the civil affairs (CA) battalions and intelligence community. Here the restrictive FP measures again severely affected their ability to liaise. Inevitably they “were able to accomplish the mission but we did far less face to face coordination and personal reconnaissance than I would have liked to.”

An example of the difficulties of
liaison under the four-vehicle rule can be seen with the Tuzla CIMIC Center. As opposed to their UK counterparts, who had a house in downtown Banja Luka that accommodated the LNO team, the MND(N) CIMIC center was;

located inside the main gate at Tuzla Main, whereas most of the NGOs were 20 minutes away in downtown Tuzla. With access to the base by non-IFOR personnel strictly limited, the effectiveness of the CIMIC Center as a tool for coordinating NGO and Military activity was greatly reduced. Secondly, FP regulations hampered CIMIC personnel’s ability to perform their CIMIC mission effectively. When CIMIC personnel were able to muster the needed four vehicles to leave the base, they arrived at an NGO site with a heavier military presence than some NGOs desired.\textsuperscript{35}

The FP requirements meant that US forces could not stay off a base camp and this restricted the availability and effect that an embedded LNO has. In many cases, a non-base camp facility can be seen as ‘neutral ground’ and facilitate extraordinary meetings.\textsuperscript{36}

The conduct of liaison tasks was affected by the personal FP measures. “Some soldiers, especially Civil Affairs, FPT,\textsuperscript{37} and PSYOP soldiers who dealt face-to-face with the local community, felt that the enhanced FP requirements may have had a negative psychological impact on the local population.”\textsuperscript{38} This perception was reinforced by officers who felt that the FP measures prevented the development of strong relationships. One officer felt that even though they worked around the FP measures, had they been less severe “we would have gained a lot more specific FP information because we would have had so many more routine contacts,”\textsuperscript{39} but this was not universal. COL Greg Fontenot certainly did not believe that weapons and a flak jacket intimidated the locals as they were well and truly accustomed to both war and equipped soldiers. Yet, he added that he took them off prior to conducting meetings. Some views went further and reflected the
belief that “you can discuss reconstruction and resettlement just fine in a helmet and flak jacket.”

Whilst some found the FP measures were not an impediment to effective liaison, COL Fontenot firmly believed that GO-1 did interfere and “was impossible for officers, so later it was (changed to) officers and people having meetings with the factions.” His view is, however, a liberal interpretation of the January 11 amendment which allowed for those taking part in “Joint Military Commissions or official ceremonies involving national officials” to consume alcohol.

The four-vehicle rule in particular caused significant problems for personnel where duties required flexibility and frequent travel, a situation exacerbated by an inability (in some cases) to be collocated with the supported personnel. The complexity of assembling four vehicles, the required trained personnel and a crew served weapon led to significant problems and often proved both time consuming and very difficult. For personnel conducting PSYOPs tasks, for example, the “four-vehicle convoy rule presented a great challenge to mission accomplishment, particularly when combined with other factors such as personnel shortages and vehicle maintenance problems.”

Dispensations to the policies were granted to some specialist teams. However even when General Nash gave dispensations, Brigade commanders were reluctant to authorize exemptions in accordance with the revised policy. An example of this is the dispensation for the CI and HUMINT teams where they recorded that “travel at night required general officer approval and four vehicles. This made liaison dinners a challenge.” They also went on to note that the process of getting a four-vehicle convoy together “might take 2-4 hours during the evening to organize for the next day.”
The FP rules significantly affected the ability to conduct liaison but did not prevent it. Liaison could still be conducted but not with the subtlety, frequency or flexibility required. The vehicle policy was the most problematic and gave the impression of a significant force rather than a quite social visit. This obviously had impact for HUMINT collectors and other less overt operations requiring liaison with the local community.

Summary

Liaison was affected by both GO-1 and the FP measures. Both orders reduced the effectiveness of liaison. The vital faction liaison between COMEAGLE and his key faction commanders was not conducted by US forces but rather by highly capable, but foreign, SF who were not encumbered by either regulation. When US SF took over the task, dispensation from both regulations was granted.

Interaction with civil, military and international organizations within the MND(N) AOR was inhibited by both the robust FP measures and the inability for US Forces to reside off-post. The requirement for some units to garner the requisite vehicles took valuable time, was uneconomic with resources and reduced the number of contacts for liaison. Liaison with international organizations and civil leaders was similarly affected and placed additional barriers between the LNO and those with whom he perhaps should have been imbedded. The blanket GO-1 further placed many junior officers in a dilemma over whether to cause offense by refusing a cultural norm or risk punitive action.

That GO-1 was ultimately amended to give latitude to personnel conducting liaison missions speaks volumes as to the sensibility and appropriateness of the original order and initial amendments. Whilst soldiers were still prevented from drinking,
personnel during SFOR now have the ability to work within a given intent and weigh the benefits of accepting hospitality in the course of their duties without fear of punishment. Whilst the FP measures were in large part unaltered, the dispensation for US SF ensured that during SFOR key faction leaders were able to remain socially engaged and fully appraised of their commander’s intent.

1UK Army, JWP 3-50, Peace Support Operations (United Kingdom Permanent Joint Headquarters 2001), 7-12.


5General George A. Joulwan, General Order GO-1 Operation Balkan Endeavor (CINCEUR, Germany, 28 December 1995).

6Interestingly there were a number of other restrictions, notably a no fraternization policy that was often quoted as being a part of the Operation Balkan Endeavor GO-1. GO-1 became an order that was often quoted as the source of a restriction when in reality it covered only a limited number of activities.


8Ibid.


10General William W. Crouch, Exception to USEUCOM General Order #1, (CINCEUR Memorandum, AEJA-MC, Germany, 21 January 1997).


14 Wentz, 70.

15 CALL, _Joint Commission Observers_, (Unclassified record no. 10014-65355, Fort Leavenworth, KS), 19.

16 CALL, _Joint Military Commissions_ (Newsletter No. 96-8, Section 3, Part 2)

17 CALL, _Joint Commission Observers_, 19.

18 Wentz, 70.

19 Major Paul Schmitt, interview by author, 6 February 2003, Fort Leavenworth, KS, tape recording.

20 The federation was established between the Bosnian Croatians and Muslims but was a tenuous relationship between the two factions with significant friction over atrocities committed during the war and the status of Mostar.


22 General George A. Joulwan, _General Order GO-1 Operation Balkan Endeavor._


24 Ibid.

25 Major Roy Weidanz, interview by author, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 7 February 2003, tape recording.

26 Ibid.

27 Ibid.


29 Ibid


31 Major Ben Higgenbotham, interview by author, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 10 February 2003, tape recording.
Major Ray Stuhn, interview by author, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 6 February 2003, tape recording.


Major Craig Simonsgaard, electronic mail to author, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 24 February 2003.

Wentz, 134.

This is based on the author’s experiences in IFOR where houses in towns became unofficial meeting locations for people. This could also occur at restaurants/cafes where officers would converse away from their superiors. Most notable was the period when the Serbs withdrew contact with IFOR in February 1996 resulting in meetings in third party locations.

FPT = Force Protection Teams who gained a dispensation to travel in two vehicle packets.

Wentz, 212.

Major Tim Chafos, interview by author, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 7 February 2003, tape recording.

Wentz, 212.

Colonel Greg Fontenot, interview by author, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 18 February 2003, tape recording.

General William Crouch, Exception to USEUCOM General Order 1, (USEUCOM, Memorandum, Germany, 11 January 1996), 1.

Wentz, 222.

Ibid., 243.

Ibid., 242.
CHAPTER 3
THE EFFECTS OF GENERAL ORDER NUMBER 1 AND THE FORCE PROTECTION MEASURES ON MORALE

Most of the soldiers I know who served in Tuzla consider it one of the most frustrating, negative and demoralizing experiences they have ever had in the military.¹

LTC Tom Fernandez

Introduction

The morale of TF Eagle was affected by a number of factors during the IFOR mission. The force deployed into an uncertain environment and had shaped itself for the worst. 1st AD deployed for the duration of the mission (which was expected to be a year) with no leave provisions, very high FP measures and a ban on the consumption of alcohol. The force was also confined to base camps, unless they were on authorized duty, which required a patrol of 16 personnel or a four-vehicle convoy.

Although morale was high at the commencement of the operation, it was felt by many to generally decline after the initial excitement of deployment. This was attributable to a number of factors including the achievement of the most operationally difficult military aspects of the mission, the monotony of the peacekeeping setting, confinement to post, no confirmed leave policy or leaving date and the continued state of FP measures. Whilst morale improved with the introduction of welfare equipment arriving in the beginning of spring, the constant discomfit of the personal FP equipment had a noticeable impact, especially as summer approached. Part of this was the result of the restrictive conditions the soldiers were placed under and part was the result of
discovering a different environment in theatre than had been expected. As operations slowed soldiers naturally questioned the nature and duration of their involvement.

This part of the thesis will focus on what effect GO-1 and the FP measures had on morale. It will also discuss the effects blanket orders have on morale. It should be noted at the outset that morale is an unquantifiable element that can only be subjectively assessed and this study has relied on the professional judgment of those interviewed to assess whether there was an effect and why. As there is a belief in the US Army that morale is a product of the command climate, there has been some reluctance on the part of some officers to admit that morale did fluctuate. Moreover, while certain units undoubtedly maintained very high morale, in some cases the factors discussed here seriously degraded morale in TF Eagle. It should also be noted that whilst there were indeed significant effects, the impact of those effects was lessened as a result of the professionalism of soldiers deployed on IFOR.

The Effects on Morale of GO-1

As was highlighted in Chapter 2, GO-1 was not popularly received by the whole of TF Eagle. GO-1 was a restrictive order that banned a number of inappropriate activities and made the consumption of alcohol illegal. Though not its intent, the order seemed duplicitous to many. Whilst senior officers enjoyed a limited exemption that allowed them to consume alcohol with faction leaders and allied forces, the vast majority of junior officers and enlisted soldiers were unable to do so legally at any time and there was no doubt that “GO-1 was not for negotiation.”

At the commencement of the mission, the inability to consume alcohol was not considered an issue, aside from complicating liaison with the factions. In fact most of TF
Eagle was so consumed in their work that the concept of imbibing was not foremost among soldier’s concerns. This was certainly the case for the first 3 to 4 months of operations. Many who supported the GO-1 ban did so for good reasons. There was a genuine feeling, well grounded in experience, that mixing alcohol with loaded weapons and machinery was not a sound concept. Other specialists also considered that the alcohol ban was not a difficult restriction as it differed little from their normal modus operandi. As one aviator explained, it was “ingrained in our culture that when you’re on a maneuver you don’t do it.” Helicopter pilots and de-miners were two examples of specialists who saw no logical inconsistency with their employment and the non-consumption of alcohol. As one engineer stated “with what we were doing, I don’t think a lot of the guys wanted to do a lot of drinking because we would get up in the morning and go and work in a minefield.” However this view was not universally shared and GO-1 was to eventually generate significant resentment.

Many officers felt that the blanket prohibition for soldiers to drink alcohol was not appropriate. During the mission to Haiti, GO-1 had effectively banned alcohol but had also delegated the discretion to consume at the O6 level. In Bosnia, Colonel Fontenot said that when GO-1 was announced “it surprised us all. I think I heard about it with General Pat O’Neil drinking a beer.” Colonel Fontenot stated that the order came from General Crouch and that the General considered it was the best decision that he had ever made because he believed “that alcohol was the source of nothing but trouble in Vietnam” and that disciplined forces didn’t require alcohol. As an O6, Colonel Fontenot believed that GO-1 “was not a burden but it didn’t contribute;” still he added that he “thought it was unnecessary and I certainly believe it was wrong.” The reason for this
was that the blanket order contradicted the essence of mission orders and perhaps unintentionally implied a lack of trust in subordinates. This had a detrimental effect on morale.

Many officers interviewed for this thesis supported COL Fontenot’s frank summation. Many felt it was symptomatic of a zero defects mentality bent on absolute risk avoidance. One officer, who believed it reflected American puritanical hypocrisy, rephrased COL Fontenot’s thoughts: “Not that we can’t treat people as adults, but we won’t give them the opportunity to not act like adults.”

Another officer summarized a widespread perception, “I expect you [a soldier] to be an adult when on a check point but a child when you’re not on the checkpoint.”

One officer summarized it this way: “we can trust you with a weapon, we’re going to empower you to make decisions of life or death, we’re going to assume you’re going to interpret the ROE intelligently, but we’re going to assume that you’re too stupid to be allowed to drink!”

Most US TF Eagle personnel accepted GO-1 if only grudgingly. For many, however, discovering that their American colleagues in NATO appointments or attachments were able to imbibe became a source of frustration and resentment as it was considered unfair. This was further exacerbated by having foreign LNOs drinking on Tuzla’s Eagle Base as a result of the different policies of America’s allies within TF Eagle and IFOR. This discrepancy was recorded in contemporary media reports, especially after the tumult in March 1996 over General Nash drinking a toast with his Russian commander. The “Viking Club,” the LNO’s bar on Eagle Base, and the other foreign clubs were considered “a double standard.” As the New York Times noted, “General Nash has made it clear he is willing to risk hurting morale by not allowing
soldiers, who will be here as long as a year, to drink or leave their post to mingle amid the unknown dangers of local bars and restaurants." General Nash explained that the “No.1 issue on morale is the security and FP of the soldiers.” Yet the Army definition of FP sees morale as one of its component parts.

Soldiers were reportedly very happy when the “Near-Beer” was introduced and many felt that a small alcohol ration would have been easily acceptable and manageable. They also felt that giving responsible access to alcohol would have prevented the clandestine acquisition and use that did go on including, according to one MP, on one occasion the theft of the chaplain’s sacramental wine!

Most officers felt that the issue of alcohol to off-duty soldiers would have enhanced morale and could easily have been managed without detriment to the “good order and discipline.” Indeed it was pointed out that whilst there were few problems caused by alcohol itself, there were numerous cases of disciplinary action for breaching GO-1. The Lessons Learned for Judge Advocate Generals noted that “GO#1’s prohibition of alcohol was essential to force protection and good order and discipline in an unstable environment. It was also the source of many legal and morale issues.” Cases were also cited where a blind eye was effectively turned to the use of alcohol under “big boys rules” explained as allowing soldiers to partake but self-police.

Those who served outside TF Eagle’s regulations gained a different perspective on the subject and those interviewed certainly did not negatively view the availability of alcohol in a controlled environment. One officer who had JSTARS ground station detachments under different regulations in Bosnia was comfortable leaving the decision up to her platoon commander’s discretion in MND(SW).
LTC Tom Fernandez, who commanded a PSYOPS detachment in MND(SW) during IFOR and MND(N) during SFOR, holds very strong opinions on GO-1. LTC Fernandez believes that the “stringent ban on alcohol is an implied statement that there is little trust in the NCOs, and little confidence that they would be able to handle the situation.” Inconceivably intentional, this perception is an unanticipated secondary effect of GO-1 that undoubtedly adversely affected morale. As one infantry officer surmised, “It was frustrating, like you’re a kid at summer camp.” LTC Fernandez equates the sensible and responsible treatment of access to alcohol in MND(SW) during IFOR as contributing to their success and high esprit-de-corps and noted that: “When my soldiers returned to home station, they were enthused and proud. Many volunteered to deploy again. There was NO attrition from the unit due to the deployment. It was a positive experience and a high point in our individual careers.” This contrasted sharply with his SFOR experience where, due to the FP orders in addition to GO-1: “We experienced a much higher level of malcontent.”

Many officers commented on the role of the “decompression tent” in Taszar, Hungary, on the route home and regaled lavish tales of the excesses soldiers went to when re-introduced to alcohol. This undoubtedly had many contributing factors and was arguably the intent of the facility in the first place. But officers attributed the reaction to both an unnecessary abstinence from alcohol and the release of pressure, in part caused by the many restrictions caused by both GO-1 and the FP regime. However the comment by one IFOR company commander that he suffered 17 divorces from 37 marriages suggests that the social impact of the IFOR experience may have been quite high and worthy of future research.
As many officers noted morale is a product of leadership and many leaders found innovative ways to keep the troops gainfully employed. This particularly involved ensuring that NCOs played a meaningful and valued role and endeavoring to alleviate many of the causes affecting morale. Nevertheless, in the opinion of most, GO-1 was a very frustrating and unnecessary contributor to poor morale that was most revealing to those who served in other sectors and was very much felt to be implicit of a command climate that was both risk-adverse and untrusting of subordinates.

Effects on Morale of the FP Measures

FP measures were another facet of TF Eagle life that had a negative impact on the morale of MND(N). Generally, the perception was that the personal FP measures and confinement to base camps wore down morale and, in particular, “common sense really didn’t seem to apply.” The wearing of the personal FP equipment, the requirement to garner four-vehicles, a minimum of eight personnel and a crew served weapon to perform simple administrative tasks, the inability to eat at local restaurants and the effective confinement to camp over time fostered a defensive bunker mentality that affected TF Eagle morale. As one officer explained, “it made the simple things complicated.”

One of the biggest morale issues was the inability to relate the wearing of the personal FP equipment in protected base camps with a corresponding and apparent threat. “Guys generally are happy if you can explain to them why you’re doing something and the bigger problem was we couldn’t explain why the FP levels weren’t going down . . . they’d wear tutus and feathers in their hair if there was a reason that made sense.” This sense of frustration developed a belief that the TF Eagle commanders were risk-adverse with all the negative implications that this conjures. The restrictive FP measures gave the
impression that the leadership did not want anyone less than an officer in control.\textsuperscript{37} One participant observed, “I think that in many ways, there is a leadership problem with micro-management, and there, maybe . . . have shown a lack of faith in the NCO corps.”\textsuperscript{38}

This was further complicated by the disparity between the NATO allies or amongst the different American contingents. “The disparity in uniforms became so obvious that some US soldiers suffered morale problems, and allies ridiculed their partners.”\textsuperscript{39} Whilst the ribbing of allies is a tolerable evil, the concept that behind every joke is a little truth highlighted disparities to those serving in TF Eagle who naturally began to question the basis of the restrictive measures. This was compounded when the general perception was that, in addition to complicating simple tasks and reducing effectiveness, the on-camp FP measures were not linked to an evident threat.\textsuperscript{40} That these measures affected morale perhaps is best illustrated by one officer’s recollection of the day during SFOR when he was no longer required to wear his helmet and flak jacket around Eagle Base. The simple pleasure of going to a soft cap “was a joyous occasion when that occurred.”\textsuperscript{41}

The confinement to base camps prevented many from mixing with the locals and experiencing the changes forged by IFOR’s presence. The sheer monotony of life for many created the dreaded ‘ground-hog-day’ syndrome, where one day merged into the next. This is not uncommon on operations, but requires attention to ensure that soldiers have appropriate breaks to prevent a decrease in morale. Many leaders interviewed recognized this trend and endeavored to rectify it with internal days off and by rotating personnel to get off base. Unfortunately it was not helped by the absence of an in-theatre
leave policy, an initial out-of-theatre leave policy, and a 12-month deployment with an indefinite end date. As one officer recounted, IFOR colloquially stood for I-FOR-got.\textsuperscript{42}

**Fortress Mentality**

Due to a combination of confinement to camp and the restrictions on vehicle movements, depending on their job, certain soldiers were unable to get off base and see first-hand the positive effects of their IFOR presence. This was significant because many US personnel doubted the purpose of the mission and the US military had been less than enthusiastic to participate. This was of course dependent on the type of unit employed, as units tasked with patrolling obviously gained a wider view of the environment. Having said that, when the soldiers came back to their base-camps there was no opportunity for them to socially interact with the local population, other than local workers, as they remained within the confines of the base camps. This resulted in what has been described as a fortress or siege mentality. Again this was not an issue in the opening phase of the mission; however, it certainly affected certain units over time. As one officer observed, “force protection became an almost parallel operation to a point where we created a siege mentality.”\textsuperscript{43} One officer who served in both TF Eagle and in Sarajevo towards the end of the IFOR mission described it this way. “It was very much institutional, it was like a prison. . . . You’re surrounded by armed guards, you’re surrounded by barbed wire, you’re not allowed to leave, you eat at designated times and you go to work at your designated place, day in and day out.”\textsuperscript{44}

This so-called “fortress mentality” was also a product of considering that all entities were bad and to treat them with friendliness but not befriend them. It prevented in many cases the ability to humanize and connect with the very people the soldiers were
there to help and that coupled with being confined to base camps created in some this
siege or fortress mentality. While ensuring ultimate, nearly risk-free protection for
MND(N) forces, confinement to camp also prevented the TF Eagle AOR being swamped
with 17,000 effective HUMINT gatherers, a perceived weakness of the US sector by both
allies and post IFOR analysis.45

Some officers interviewed recognized this isolation as a problem and endeavored
to get soldiers off camp to alleviate the sensation and reassure them that their contribution
to IFOR was meaningful and real. As Major Baker put it, “I wanted them to have the
opportunity to see the impact that they were having merely by being in theatre and you
didn’t get that sitting in base camps.”46

Relative Deprivation

“US force protection policy was the most extreme among the IFOR
contingents.”47 Those Americans serving under the MND(N) requirements were not
overly concerned whilst the mission was embryonic and uncertain, but became
disgruntled when it was clear that the other nations in TF Eagle were to operate under
different national policy and that Americans outside of TF Eagle were able to apply a
lesser level of protection. This created a feeling of “perceived relative deprivation.”48 that
was to impact morale, and was noted under the discussion of GO-1. Americans became
known as the “Ninja Turtles” who were “prisoners of peace.”49 Historian Walter
Kretchik, noting the impact on morale, commented that the “policy in Sarajevo looked
schizophrenic not only to IFOR, but also to US EUCOM Army soldiers who endured
it.”50 This sense of relative deprivation was even more keenly felt by those who came
from Sarajevo to TF Eagle. The impact of moving from an environment of relative
freedom and personal responsibility to a more restrictive one was noticeable. As one officer commented, “my morale was absolutely higher in Sarajevo and I was more enthusiastic about my job.”

There were some officers who would argue that their morale was enhanced by the wearing of the personal FP equipment, particularly off-post in high threat locations, and some even commented that they felt very comfortable in their four-vehicle patrols. This was particularly the case in Brcko and areas of high threat. But this was far from universal and was predominantly task and threat dependent. Regardless of the perceptions, there is no doubt that in the event of an incident one is pleased to have the requisite protection equipment. However, having it nearby and wearing it constantly regardless of threat have two very different physical and psychological effects for both the wearer and those observing.

**Effects on Morale of Prescriptive Orders**

Perhaps one of the biggest effects on morale, which has already been introduced, was not the restrictive orders themselves but the blanket manner in which they were applied. This approach removed flexibility from commanders to make value judgments that could seriously affect both morale and mission accomplishment. The application of non-negotiable, inflexible orders on the one hand “protects a lot of delinquencies, if you will, that could possibly happen” but on the other hand they reduce the perception of trust between the commander and the commanded. “The message you’re sending to soldiers and leaders is that we don’t trust you. . . to manage this correctly.”
It also had a significant impact on morale. As one officer noted:

Once again, you need only discuss comparative experiences, say, Banja Luka versus Tuzla, to gain an appreciation for the impact on the soldiers. Most of soldiers I know who served in Tuzla consider it one of the most frustrating, negative, and demoralizing experiences they have ever had in the military. On the other hand, my troops’ post MND-SW attitude, as previously discussed, was overwhelmingly positive. Morale and retention was at an all-time high.\(^{55}\)

Certainly these effects were not the anticipated results of those who crafted and reviewed the requirements. As COL Fontenot stated, “I don’t think he [General Crouch] understood the unintended outcomes of his policy.”\(^{56}\) This was a perception that the second and third order effects experienced during IFOR were unintended consequences of the blanket order. But as the military timelines of the Dayton Peace Agreement were reached commanders had more time to reflect on the nature of the order and develop a perception of the intent. One officer spoke for many when he stated that he would have liked the flexibility to work within a given intent and to make the judgment calls. “After all I was responsible for life and death of soldiers, you think I could apply good judgment in those cases as well,”\(^{57}\) he commented. But it was not just the commanders who felt that the faith in their abilities was being devalued. Those who were performing their tasks without the restrictions of GO-1 and the FP measures felt the impact reflected in their work output.\(^{58}\)

The unintended impact of these blanket orders was to demoralize many and cause them to question the basis of the command relationship. Many attributed the reluctance to alter the measures as the situation changed a reflection of the IFOR command climate. Those who served through the transition from IFOR to SFOR in HQ MND(N), confirmed that with the lowering of the FP measures on post, “morale went up.”\(^{59}\)
Conclusion

Undoubtedly GO-1 and the FP measures affected US personnel serving in TF Eagle but they weren’t the only factors. There were many other sources of frustration that eroded morale over time, including a nonexistent leave policy and an undefined end-date. The inability to consume alcohol in a responsible controlled environment added to the general frustration, and in some case dissatisfaction, with life in IFOR. This was coupled with annoyance with the FP measures and “cabin fever” for those confined to base camps to name a few. What really affected morale was the knowledge that not all US soldiers were enduring these circumstances. This was reflected arguably in job-satisfaction and, as LTC Fernandez highlights, retention in the service of returning personnel. One international observer described the mood at Eagle Base in April as “business like and somber.”

Morale is a product of the command climate, and the hierarchy of TF Eagle was often perceived as risk averse and representative of a zero-defects mentality associated with careerism. This was not alleviated due to a reluctance to adjust on-post measures in particular to reflect the stabilizing situation and the development of the base camps. Perhaps the biggest concern was the loss of trust many junior commanders felt. The focus on FP, and by association “zero defects,” manifested itself not just in lower morale but also resulted in a balance in favor of FP at the expense of mission accomplishment. This did little to reinforce the value of the vital mission TF Eagle was on and resulted in questioning of the fundamental basis of the mission. Finally, the nature of these blanket orders was not consistent with mission type orders, with officers keen to exercise their judgment and work within COMEAGLE’s intent. Luckily TF Eagle was equipped with
highly motivated and professional soldiers, however a detailed study on the social impact of the US IFOR experience (eg retention rates and divorce rates) may highlight whether poor IFOR morale was an anomaly or merely reflective of a general US MOOTW operational experience.

1 Lieutenant Colonel Tom Fernandez, electronic message to author, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 6 February 2003.


3 Major Robert Bennett, interview by author, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 10 February 2003, tape recording.

4 Major Kristin Baker, interview by author, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 10 February 2003, tape recording.

5 Major Matt Lewis, interview by author, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 11 February 2003, tape recording.

6 Major Bob Bozic, interview by author, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 11 February 2003, tape recording.

7 Ibid.

8 Student Text 27-1, JTF 190 (Haiti) General Order No.1 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Army Command and General Staff College, July 2002), 6-18.

9 Colonel Greg Fontenot, interview by author, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 18 February 2003, tape recording.

10 Ibid.

11 Ibid.

12 Ibid.

13 Major Jack Haefner, interview by author, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 18 February 2003, tape recording.

14 Ibid.

15 Ibid.
16 Lewis interview.


20 Ibid.

21 Major Tony Berry, interview by author, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 7 February 2003, tape recording.

22 Major Ben Higgenbotham, interview by author, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 10 February 2003, tape recording.

23 Major Joel Rindall, interview by author, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 11 February 2003, tape recording.


25 Higgenbotham interview.

26 Baker interview.

27 Fernandez electronic mail.


29 Fernandez electronic mail.

30 Ibid.

31 Major Roy Weidanz, interview by author, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 07 February 2003, tape recording.

32 Major Tom Boccardi, interview by author, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 11 February 2003, tape recording.

33 Major John Francis, interview by author, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 11 February 2003, tape recording.
34 Ibid.

35 Major Craig Simonsgaard, electronic mail to author, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 24 February 2003.

36 Bennett interview.

37 Boccardi interview.

38 Ibid.


40 Major Tim Chafos, interview by author, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 7 February 2003, tape recording.

41 Major Brian Linvill, interview by author, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 11 February 2003, tape recording.

42 Bennett interview.

43 Rindall interview.

44 Linvill interview.


46 Baker interview.

47 Gentry, 139.


49 Ibid.

50 Kretchik, 77.

51 Linvill interview.

52 Lieutenant Colonel Jody Prescott, interview by author, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 7 February 2003, tape recording.

53 Boccardi interview.

54 Francis interview.
55 Fernandez electronic mail.

56 Fontenot interview.

57 Higgenbotham interview.

58 Linvill interview.

59 Higgenbotham interview.

60 Fay interview.
CHAPTER 4

THE APPROPRIATENESS AND EFFECT OF THE FORCE PROTECTION MEASURES

Our motivation to protect the force was to protect the force.¹

BG Stanley F Cherrie

A good reputation is the best force protection.²

Maj Anthony D. Sinnott

Introduction

The FP measures applied to Americans serving in IFOR were inconsistent, based on perceived rather than real threats and “sharply reduced Task Force Eagle’s ability to understand its immediate environment.”³ These measures did not take into account the dynamic and complex situation encountered in Bosnia and were unresponsive to change. The appropriateness of the constant level of FP was not always clear and it had second and third order effects that were unanticipated by TF Eagle’s commanders.

This chapter will examine firstly why different FP measures were applied to Americans in Bosnia during IFOR and examine what factors influenced the FP rationale for US troops serving in TF Eagle. This chapter will then analyze the effects the FP measures had generally on the conduct of the mission and finally examine how well the FP policy nested with mission type orders.
Appropriateness of the FP Measures for Americans in IFOR

Inconsistency in Application of FP Measures for all Americans in Bosnia

Introduction

All nations in IFOR applied different FP measures in accordance with their national policy and doctrine. The FP measures applied to Americans serving in IFOR were, however, inconsistent. Whilst the soldiers serving under TF Eagle endured particularly rigid FP measures, Americans serving outside of the MND(N) AOR applied the normally less rigid FP measures of the organization to whom they were attached. This caused resentment and tension within the American forces. It also seriously questioned the rationale for the application of the more restrictive FP measures of TF Eagle. How could Americans be experiencing a greater perceived threat under the numerically superior American command in MND N compared to areas where security was provided by their less well-equipped European allies?

US Command and Control Arrangements in IFOR

Part of the answer to this question is to be found in the US command and control arrangements for IFOR. American forces assigned to the Bosnian theatre were in fact assigned under two different national command chains. As historian LTC Walter Kretchik notes:

US NATO troops received their national direction from the NCA to SACEUR to the Commander IFOR (COMIFOR) (US) in his US Navy Europe (USNAVEUR) capacity, then to the COMARRC and TF Eagle, if applicable. US Army Europe (USAREUR), as the EUCOM Army Service Component Command, retained command of US Army forces less NATO Operational Control (OPCON) after transfer of authority (TOA). The 1st AD received its NCA orders through US EUCOM to USAREUR to USAREUR Forward, then to the 1st AD/TF Eagle.4
The result of this was that while COMIFOR through COMARRC determined FP measures for the troops he controlled, CINCUSAREUR who had full command authority for TF Eagle determined the FP measures for the 1st AD. US Forces controlled by TF Eagle therefore adhered to their own FP measures. This resulted in different FP measures for Americans serving in different sectors of IFOR and is illustrated in figure 2.

In the National Defense University *Lessons from Bosnia*, it is suggested that this and other command and control anomalies could have been resolved through the formation of a Joint Task Force.\(^5\)

Potential confusion and conflict between missions may result when national forces (U.S. Title 10) requirements conflict with NATO OPCON direction (force protection for an example).\(^6\)

The other part of the answer is to be found in the rationale for the measures in the first place.

Factors that Influenced the TF Eagle Force Protection Rationale

**Initial Posture**

The definition of FP for the purposes of this thesis is “those actions taken to prevent or mitigate hostile action against DOD personnel”\(^7\) and “supported by intelligence.”\(^8\) General Nash, the TF Eagle commander, was to comment that “while the Dayton Peace Agreement stopped the war in Bosnia, it did not establish peace.”\(^9\) The threat expected as the 1st AD crossed the Sava River on 20 December 1995, was completely unknown. The division accordingly planned for combat operations and fully anticipated that it would be expected to both enforce the peace and compel the former belligerents. As BG Cherrie recalls, “There was no guarantee our deployment into Bosnia would be entirely permissive, we had to do all the minute planning and preparation for a deliberate river crossing.”\(^10\)

This dictated a robust presence and a clear demonstration of resolve that naturally required the highest levels of FP as, in the words of General Nash, “We were ready to fight.”\(^11\) This was entirely appropriate and justifiable for a force entering a non-
permissive environment and determined to send a clear warning to the Dayton signatories that IFOR would be a very different organization than its UNPROFOR predecessor. Nash also believed that “this warfighting focus... contributed to our force protection as well.” This robust warfighting approach was translated into a constant FP posture designed to deliver a message; “don’t mess with us.”

Of course any discussion of the rationale for the FP measures would be incomplete without acknowledging the perceived value of attacking an American soldier over another NATO ally. This perception is perhaps even more relevant today than it was in 1996 that American soldiers are more vulnerable to politically motivated attacks than other nations. This for a combination of reasons including US societal expectations of low casualty rates, US news media sensationalism and the opportunity to influence US foreign policy through politically motivated attacks on US service personnel on MOOTW operations. As COL Fontenot says in his indomitable way, “who you’re going to knock off to make a statement.” The justification for the continuation of robust FP measures and a reluctance to downgrade the measures was undoubtedly influenced by this factor.

**Political Influence**

FP was, however, not just focused on this initial threat. There was an apparent political dimension to minimizing casualties. General Nash alludes to this when he states, “It is critical that military leaders carry a full appreciation not only of the directives of the national command authorities, but of all the political sensitivities at play as well” and for the US there were many. It would have been naive for any planner at headquarters 1st AD, or higher, to fail to acknowledge and implement the clear pronouncements of both the US President, Bill Clinton and his Secretary of Defense, Bill Perry, on the subject of
FP. Both political leaders had clearly enunciated the over-arching importance of FP in
selling this Balkan endeavor to Congress and the American people. Clinton mentioned it
twice in his speech to the nation when he said “I will take every measure possible to
minimize these risks.” It would be improbable, therefore, for the political sensitivities to
not have been factored highly in the initial planning and arguably for the entirety of the
mission. FP was to effectively become the TF Eagle mantra and quite arguably its
mission. As BG Cherrie asserted, “Paramount in everything we planned and
accomplished was a concentration on force protection.”

What might have been an appropriate level of FP for the initial phases of
implementing the military components of the Dayton Peace Accords became
questionable the longer the force remained on this “war fighting” level and the military
timelines were achieved. While IFOR allies relaxed their force posture in the face of clear
entity compliance, the TF Eagle posture was to remain largely unchanged for the
duration of the mission. Despite a sufficiently secure environment for a visit by the US
president on 12 January 1996 (and later his wife and daughter in March of 1996), US
soldiers were unable to remove their flak jackets and helmets within the Tuzla base
compound until late summer.

Bill Clinton was under no illusion that it would be a risk-free environment and
that casualties would occur. This study found no evidence that this was a politically
directed FP policy. Yet it would appear that there is a US military culture that places FP
in OOTW as the dominant factor. This is apparent in many subsequent pronouncements
from military leaders and was essentially enshrined in the last Clinton National Security
Strategy, which states that the humanitarian use of military force “will entail minimal risk
52 to American lives.” 19 One officer interviewed for this thesis recounted a post-Bosnia experience in Kosovo where his new commanding general stated that “my priorities in order are force protection, force protection and force protection.” 20 Not once was it mission accomplishment and he noted that; “it made the staff very cynical.” 21

Contrary to US Doctrine, in Bosnia TF Eagle FP was to be elevated almost to mission status. This was criticized in the After Action Review Conference Report on Bosnia-Herzegovina after the first six months where FP was noted as “actually being part of the stated mission and above the other three battlefield combat dynamics (firepower, leadership, maneuver). Additionally, the perception among participants was that the force protection measures in OJE [Operation Joint Endeavor] were not based on valid risk assessment.” 22 So what were the enduring risks that appear to have shaped the retention of such high levels of personal force security and were they appropriate?

Personal FP Measures and the Influencing Threats

It appears that the threats that required the high levels of FP were mine strikes, mortar attacks, snipers, drive-by shootings and terrorist attacks. FP measures were designed to counter these disparate threats. Whilst the threat of mines was ubiquitous and limited vehicular traffic to the hard surfaces or cleared routes, it could be influenced through training and constant vigilance and was obviously an off-camp requirement. Mine awareness training was extensively covered during buildup training prior to the mission. The requirement for the personal equipment, especially on-camp, was needed for the other threats, which I will focus on. What is unclear is whether the threats were universal (within MND(N) and throughout Bosnia) and to what degree the base camps
could be prepared to counter the threats thus allowing a relaxation of personal protection within them.

NBC Threat

The personal FP measures included for the first few months the requirement to carry a gas mask. Without evidence of a chemical or biological weapon threat in the first 30 days of IFOR, this requirement was eventually reduced to having a gas mask within 15 minutes distance. Finally the requirement was removed altogether. This 15-minute rule came in for some comment during the interviews. The belief was that if a mask was needed then it should be on you and not 15 minutes away.\textsuperscript{23} This is an interesting illustrative point as it highlights firstly a very cautious approach to the reduction of FP measures and secondly demonstrates how soldiers viewed the FP issues. Soldiers easily relate that if a mask was needed to counter a threat then logically it should be on you. If there is not a threat then the mask is not needed and it can be put away. The treatment of the gas mask is therefore illustrative of both a reluctance to change policy to meet the actual situation and the willing acceptance of FP measures by soldiers to meet threats. It is difficult to assess whether this threat was based on real intelligence as I could find no evidence of the use of biological or chemical weapons during what was a very vicious civil war. This leaves us to focus on three main issues: helmet and flak jacket, vehicle policy and confinement to base camps.

Helmet and Flak Jacket Requirement

The requirement for wearing helmet and flak jacket during the initial stages of IFOR and whilst on combat patrols or static security tasks in a peace enforcement mission is readily and universally acknowledged as appropriate. All IFOR contributing
nations adopted this approach and in fact nearly all of those interviewed felt no reason to question the need for these items of FP for US forces for the first 30 to 90 days of the mission. Additionally, as COL Greg Fontenot, commander of the TF Eagle 1st Bde was to note, it is also part of the conventional American military culture. “Whether I was in Kansas or Germany when I left the back gate to go into the field I wear all my stuff. That’s just how we are. Culturally we don’t go to war in berets and kilts.”

But in non-conventional operations perhaps a different approach is required. What caused the continued need for the personal FP measures for MND(N) was perhaps based on three factors; threat, improved base camp protection and task needs.

By April, according to one observer, it was readily apparent that the FP levels had less to do with a real threat and everything to do with “a US paranoia with taking casualties.” It was a “blanket order which bore no resemblance to the situation whatsoever.” This was exacerbated by the more than 2200 Americans for whom the TF Eagle rules did not apply but who were soldiering in other arguably more difficult parts of Bosnia, most notably the “tinderbox” of Sarajevo.

Most officers interviewed for this thesis could not see a link between the threat and FP, describing the measures as being influenced by casualty avoidance and a zero defects mentality within the leadership of MND(N) and higher. Right or wrong, this discrepancy nurtured a variety of interpretations. Whilst describing the measures as “based on a profound concern with unnecessary casualties” in fact many felt “they suggested a reflection of a risk averse mind-frame that was unwilling to take chances and projecting an unnecessarily hostile view to what was going on around.” One officer exclaimed that the US Army is the “greatest army in the world, but so risk averse.”
More than one officer expressed the opinion that the approach was to ensure soldiers continued to qualify for both the special tax breaks and hazardous fire duty allowances and that the FP measures needed to be high to justify both allowances.\(^\text{32}\)

Still many TF Eagle soldiers felt that the flak jacket and helmet was worn as a "badge of honor."\(^\text{33}\) General Cherrie argued that the "very rigid rules became a symbol of pride for most."\(^\text{34}\) However, some came to transition in a matter of months from a position of "it’s just the way it is, I don’t care"\(^\text{35}\) to "it seemed kind of stupid."\(^\text{36}\)

**Threats to US Forces in Base Camps**

Whilst there was the possibility of a rogue mortar, sniper attack or drive-by shooting on US personnel in IFOR, the impact of this was slowly reduced by the development of base camp FP. But this appears to not have been linked to a change of on-camp personal FP measures and was initially fraught with significant inconsistencies. An example of the unlinked on-camp FP measures was the requirement to wear flak jacket and helmet outside the tented sleeping accommodation. As one officer captures, we “had that protection of that 1/16th of an inch of canvass which really helped you out a lot because as soon as you stepped out you then had to put on your Kevlar even when going to take a shower.”\(^\text{37}\)

This maintenance of high personal levels of FP was bearable in the cooler months but became frustrating in the summer as the base camps took on their fortress-like appearance. This included some sandbagging of sleeping tents. Eagle Base, the MND(N) headquarters, is an interesting case study. There the greatest threat appeared to be accidental discharges from American weapons inside Eagle Base. In contrast there was little evidence of a potential mortar or sniper attack on this camp. Furthermore, Eagle
Base was on the terrain of only one entity, the Bosnian Muslims who arguably wanted American presence the most. This did not, of course, eliminate the chance of a rogue threat.

Terrorist Threat

An assessment of the omnipresent, potential terrorist threat to US forces in Bosnia in 1996 was outside the scope of this thesis. However, the need to maintain a flak jacket and helmet at all times inside a base camp to counter this threat raised implicit questions about the nature of the threat and the corresponding logic of the response. Initially it was a real concern, particularly given the large number of mercenaries and foreign fighters in the region, most notably the so called “Mujahadeen” who were to leave Bosnia as part of the Dayton accords. Whilst not questioning that information may indeed have been available to confirm this fear, the reliability and ambiguity of interpretation can lead to differing conclusions. Regardless of the information, considerable resources were provided within Eagle Base, for example, to prevent a repeat of the 1982 Marine barracks incident in Beirut. This included the construction of a road ensuring contractor traffic did not come close to the divisional command post and this “absorbed a tremendous amount of energy to do.” The Khobar Towers bombing that occurred on 25 June 1996, and attributed to Hizballah, suggests that internationally this threat was very real.

Arguably in Tuzla, however, the circumstances were very different from the Khobar Towers and certainly the Beruit Marine barracks. Lebanon had no peace accord, a plethora of known terrorist groups, US forces were engaging combatants and the marines were housed in a multistory accommodation block. These were not the ingredients of Tuzla and Eagle Base, for example, in early 1996. Given the nature of the
mission, and the US position on the Bosnian issue, it seems in hindsight unlikely that
there was a real need to be “more worried about. . . Islamic Fundamentalism” at the
expense of the other threats. However, based on this consideration, the “Task Force Eagle
commander made force protection construction the priority of all units because of the
underlying threat of terrorism.” Without evidence to the contrary, however it is
certainly a legitimate threat requiring concrete measures. However, one intelligence
officer interviewed who commanded the TF Eagle G2 Analysis and Control Element
(ACE) during the later part of IFOR stated that a truck bomb was not a realistic threat,
especially given the construct of the TF Eagle HQ.

It is arguable whether the personal FP requirements needed to counter terrorism
were therefore appropriate. The need to wear flak jacket and helmet at all times outside of
tents within the base camps when they were not worn in the TF Eagle headquarters, the
very target suspected of a Beirut style truck bomb, suggests a flawed logic. The gap in
logic cannot be easily explained but suggests that the measures taken and the threats were
not synchronized between developing camp FP measures and the personal protection
measures worn on-camp to counter terrorism.

Improved Base Camp Measures

FP measures for base camps were originally not within the scope of this thesis.
However the relationship between personal and base camp FP measures is inextricably
linked. The development of base camp FP was a key priority, but one that appears to have
not been well thought through initially. In interviews I was unable to establish a linkage
between the lowering of personal FP measures with the achievement of certain base camp
measures. In the view of many, there was “a disconnect between the force protection
measures on-post and off-post. This was illustrated when certain camps developed a degree of protection that shielded occupants from observation and direct fire yet resulted in no corresponding change to personal measures between going to the showers on camp and conducting a patrol outside camp.

Logically, some base-camps were established in more volatile areas requiring a different level of FP. The blanket approach to personal FP therefore did not differentiate between the diverse locations, conditions, FP measures and threats faced by the numerous camps. As highlighted by COL Fontenot, “the threat wasn’t universal.” The application of METT-T to FP of base camps could well have determined the appropriateness of the measures being taken for the situation encountered. This could also have focused engineer assets and, in some cases, may have determined that some camps were just not tenable.

Three tiers were mandated by TF Eagle to standardize FP measures focused on perimeter defense and protective bunkers. The institution of this systematic approach to “implement and monitor force protection in Bosnia” was the direct result of a change in focus from a FP mindset “to completing missions that supported the peace plan.” In the words of one officer interviewed, however, “there was never a plan to down-grade the [personal] force protection posture.”

At times this command driven standardization of base camp force-protection caused friction between the commanders responsible for ensuring soldier safety and those who determined when the standards had been met. The 1st Brigade commander refused to concur with the assessment of the TF Eagle staff officers regarding whether his base camps met directed requirements. COL Fontenot felt very strongly, for instance, that it
was his decision to make. His criteria were clear for not wearing flak jacket and helmet around base camps. “When we get RPG protection, that level of protection for everybody, then we go for non-armored up.” He felt he could derive a clear linkage for adjusting personal force-protection levels as base camps developed. For many of those interviewed a common expression was that once base camp development had occurred “having to walk around in helmet and flak jacket just didn’t pass the commonsense test.”

**Task Needs**

The needs of the task, or mission, also influence the levels of personal FP. A combat patrol, for example, faces a very different threat than a civil affairs team, yet the personal protection requirements were unaltered and inflexible. The variance of the US approach compared with the rest of IFOR is most clear in this regard and was based on three general tendencies which appeared to constrain situational flexibility: firstly, a requirement for uniformity; secondly, the desire to create at all times a robust impression; and, lastly, a fear of casualties or risk avoidance.

**Uniformity.** The requirement to have everyone at the same level of FP regardless of threat and location was in part the product of uniformity. This is understandable given the strong reaction of those serving under the TF Eagle requirements regarding those who were not. However, it does not take into account the ability of soldiers to calculate the need based on the threat situation. COL Fontenot explained FP uniformity as being partly cultural. “If the troops at the FLOT\textsuperscript{51} are wearing hard hats then we all are.”\textsuperscript{52} It was also consistent with normal practices during field training and has been discussed earlier. One officer commented that he believed there was a cultural mindset that flexibility cannot be
part of the desired “perfect discipline” sought by some US commanders. This mind-set is of concern as in a noncontiguous MOOTW, especially where no two theatres are the same and within a single theatre there may be the whole spectrum of intensity from peace to conflict.

Robust Impression. The policy also reflected the requirement to portray at all times a robust impression to the local populous. This robust approach was designed to send the message, “don’t mess with the American’s,” highly appropriate given the change in mission and UNPROFOR experiences. This approach did have second and third order effects (a matter for separate discussion) that arguably detracted in certain circumstances from this message. One infantry officer commented, “we had a reputation as kind of ‘Robocops’ for our dealings with them [the factions] because we were very impassionate, very cold and methodical about what we did and that helped us to some extent. But there were also times when we didn’t need that hard-nosed relationship.”

Risk Avoidance. The perceived risk avoidance mentality that the personal FP measures reinforced has been discussed earlier. It is sufficient to say that it was felt both by some US service personnel and US allies in IFOR as part of the “zero defect culture.” This was also reinforced by the vehicular FP policy.

Four-Vehicle Policy Rule

Perhaps the most difficult aspect of the FP policy was the requirement that any movement outside of a base camp could only be executed by a minimum of four vehicles with two soldiers per vehicle and at least one crew served weapon. COL Fontenot attributes this FP requirement to an assessment by General Nash that what “we couldn’t
afford to have happen was to have a small unit be overwhelmed and destroyed tactically because that was the kind of defeat that was going to cause an operational outcome. . . he was thinking of Mogadishu.”  

Eight soldiers mounted or sixteen soldiers dismounted, was the “minimum size force that creates acceptable risk in a patrol. That’s what it was all about.”  

An additional benefit of the four-vehicle policy was that if there was a vehicle accident or incident, two vehicles could go for help in the event of a communications failure leaving another vehicle at the scene. This again was not reflective of a specific threat but a general ability to avoid risk and whilst quite appropriate initially, proved both difficult and unnecessary as time went on.

This policy limited the ability for small units to achieve routine administrative tasks. It was at times impossible to get four vehicles together and eight spare personnel. Some amendments were made to this policy during IFOR, for example to the military police who were manned and equipped for three-vehicle patrols. In time, CA battalion tasks during daylight and SF operations were also exempted during the mission. Despite the achievement of all Dayton military time lines by D+180, suggesting the achievement of significant stability goals, this policy was not amended for all forces until well into the SFOR mission.

The four-vehicle policy required some imaginative solutions and created a number of efficiencies through the forward planning of tasks that had a positive effect on operation. It did, perhaps, elevate one threat to the force by placing more vehicles on the road, often for longer periods of time, as multiple tasks were accomplished with the one convoy. As one MP Officer stated: “Anytime you put more vehicles out you increase your risk, obviously, just gross percentages but it made operations difficult for a lot of
units to go anyplace, you had to over-kill. What would have been a two or four man operation becomes an eight-man operation.\textsuperscript{59} It also proved very inefficient for units established with only one person per vehicle, such as heavy engineer construction units, and for tasks requiring a less overt presence than four HMMWVs, eight soldiers and crew served weapons. The time taken to muster the requisite qualified people, equipment and vehicles often proved daunting and slowed down tasks.\textsuperscript{60} In one extreme example, it delayed the medical attention of an injured US soldier during a period of inclement weather resulting in an allied soldier, not constrained by the US requirement, moving him to a US field hospital.\textsuperscript{61}

Meanwhile, US soldiers not constrained to TF Eagle FP measures were able to see the benefits of operating in smaller packets. The sheer size of the “over-width” HMMWV and the mine threat meant that two HMMWV passing each other often required one of the patrols to stop and move over to allow the other to negotiate a way past. This was not without risk and had they been targeted by an enemy would have provided an ideal tactical opportunity. While the dimensions of the US HMMWV are well outside the scope of this thesis, it should be noted that placing additional vehicles on the road, albeit in convoy, was not in itself without risk to the force.

Another irony is the comparison between soft skinned vehicles with armored vehicles. Again for armored vehicles, the four-vehicle rule was applied. This again was done so that if mechanical failure or an accident occurred a pair of vehicles could go for assistance. This provided no flexibility to commanders in the conduct of combat patrols who were forced to send a minimum force packet, equivalent to almost one third of a company’s vehicles. The number of vehicles bore little correlation to the capabilities or
the threat and did not distinguish a patrol in a local AO within an existing communications zone from one moving between unit locations. Again the application of a blanket rule was problematic.

The training cost to qualify personnel on weapons, vehicles and convoy procedures for some units was also difficult. Depending on their equipment and role, some units did not have crew-served weapons or the ammunition to qualify personnel. In one case a unit arrived unaware of the requirements. This presented a unique challenge to a detachment of 30 with only two qualified on the M60.

The training and personnel expense was not the only cost. Bosnian drivers and the road conditions, after the neglect of war, were not at a high standard. Driving in winter is treacherous and the need for four vehicles merely compounded the potential for vehicle accidents. It arguably tied up soldiers who could have been completing other tasks such as training, resting or taking local leave. It put extra miles on vehicles and caused fuel and maintenance supply issues. Whilst I was unable to locate a statistical analysis of US vehicle accidents in IFOR with both other US missions and allied forces to prove claims that the measures in fact resulted in a lower vehicle accident rate, it is difficult to accept that having a minimum four-vehicle patrol provided a significant FP benefit for the additional cost to the force after the initial few months.

**Confinement to Camp**

Another component of the FP policy was to effectively confine soldiers to their base camps unless they were performing a required task. This again was a sensible approach to take at the commencement of the mission but had a perceivable impact on soldier morale that has already been discussed in chapter 3. In addition to the impact on
morale this had two other negative effects. Firstly it prevented financial interaction with the local populous and secondly it created a ‘fortress mentality’ discussed in Chapter 3.

**Financial Impact.** While US forces weren’t in Bosnia to kick-start the local economy, they were there to provide security and stability to allow the resumption of normal activity. The inability for US forces to frequent restaurants and local shops, which were albeit non-existent in some locations, prevented interaction with the locals the forces were there to assist and limited financial interaction within the local economy. Whilst this also prevented any form of financial dependency, it would have provided a significant boost to the numerous local economies surrounding the bases. Despite the diverse ethnic mix of the MND(N) AOR, this was additionally seen as being prejudiced against the Serbs in the MND(N) AOR. Arguably, given the concentration of US forces in the Tuzla valley, those most disadvantaged where probably Muslims. Needless to say the benefits of this interaction would not have been solely financial. The development of good local relations would have developed trust between US forces and the factions providing cooperation and information.

**Summary of the Appropriateness of the FP Measures**

The FP measures applied were inconsistent and are hard to justify as being solely threat based. The measures were influenced by a number of factors, including political considerations outside the commander’s concern. Given that the definition of FP for this thesis requires a clear linkage between the FP measures and a threat it is difficult to determine that the measures were appropriate for the duration of the mission given the changing situation, the lack of hostile action and the development of the base camps. The measures were not without cost and in fact placing greater numbers of troops on roads
may have increased the risk to the force. The inflexibility of the FP measures suggests that they were not responsive enough to the changing situation or the different situations within the AOR. Given the lack of evidence to link the measures with a demonstrable threat, the appropriateness of the measures is therefore questionable.

Effects of the FP Measures

Introduction

Many of the effects of the FP measures have already been discussed above or in previous chapters. The discernable effects on morale and the manpower, training and efficiency costs of the four-vehicle policy have been analyzed. The effects on liaison have also been analyzed. The development of a fortress mentality has also been described and was undoubtedly a product of the FP measures. The effect of relative deprivation of US forces being under different policies when facing the same threats has also been articulated. What has not been discussed, however, is the impression the personal and vehicle FP measures had on approachability and perception of US forces within the Bosnian community and allied armies of IFOR.

Perceptions of US Forces

COL Fontenot presents a strong opinion as a TF Eagle brigade commander on the perceptions of US forces in MND(N). He does not believe that the American FP methodology affected American approachability at all. “Don’t tell me these are people who are going to be intimidated by this when everybody in the country has a Klashnikov assault rifle. So don’t tell me they’re intimidated by a guy with a rifle.”

This belief, together with the cultural legacy of American soldiers going in the field or on operations with all their gear in COL Fontenot’s opinion, lessens the impact of
the American FP look. The population overtime grew accustomed to the US image. Some officers commented that they “thought it was a good thing that we just maintained that look of readiness.” General Joulwan believed that “the mission was accomplished, and the combat uniform did not hinder creating working relationships with the local population.” Whilst there was certainly some support for this approach from a FP perspective, there was a strong feeling both from quite a few US officers and allied forces that it did in fact affect relations with the local populous and, immeasurably, affected their effectiveness.

The American FP posture came in for media comment during IFOR and has in subsequent operations. The difference between US and their European allies’ posture has also been discussed in articles in military journals. It came in for a range of significant comment during the interviews. One officer summarized foreign media comment as “a general perception that they [US] were probably over-reacting in relation to the relative threat.” There is a definite influence on opinion on this subject depending on the job conducted by the officer in question. Broadly speaking, those who were required to interact with the former factions, particularly civil authorities are almost unanimous in their opinion that the personal FP measures and the four-vehicle policy not only hindered their ability to liaise but reduced their effectiveness to interact with the locals. This included in many cases the inability to live in close proximity (off-post) to their responsibilities. The people most affected in this way were the HUMINT gatherers, CA personnel, SF and various liaison officers as discussed in chapter 2. It also affected the ability of commanders conducting combat patrols designed to show presence, to gain the trust and confidence of the people in their AOR. The comments received reflect very
much the “art” side of the military profession and are based on perceptions from various officers and reports. There is no discernable way to precisely measure the relative effectiveness (or lack thereof) between a constant, robust approach with a flexible and softer posture.

Some officers went as far as to suggest that US FP measures were designed to reinforce a “stiff defense”\(^6\) between US troops and the local population. To reinforce an approach of firm, fair and friendly; but not friends. This was at variance with what some viewed as the methodology behind the allied FP approaches which appeared to be “go, mix with the people.”\(^6\)

Allied, and particularly British experience is based on a long tradition of involvement in OOTW and, in the British case, extensive experience with the troubles in Northern Ireland. The Northern Ireland problem places British soldiers in an environment where terrorism is real and soldiers are frequently targeted, yet this very environment has been the basis for developing a flexible approach to FP. “The British posture represents most nations’ approach; the US posture is the exception.”\(^7\) The British aim is “you have got to get up close and personal” rather than walking up the street like “Arnold Schwazanegger.”\(^7\) One British officer commented that the appearance of the Americans in “full battle rattle” was also more severe due to the particular model of flak jacket and helmet used by US forces compared with other NATO allies.\(^7\) The US issue equipment creates a rather intimidating soldier whose features are largely obscured by the World War II German-style Kevlar helmet adopted by US Forces. This may also have contributed unintentionally to the overall impression that the US FP measures had compared to other nations regardless of the intended message being sent.
Local reaction to US FP was noted. While some US officers interviewed for this study experienced no feedback from the Bosnian population on the issue, many noted first hand comments and, on reflection, speculated on how the US approach must have been viewed. Some common Bosnian reactions were related indicating a view that US forces were overly cautious and defensive. This was tempered by a desire to maintain a
combat focused presence. It’s “all about how you look, if you look the business, ready for combat, just the look that at any moment you can turn on a combat switch.”

Unfortunately “the look” had the effect of preventing contact. “Is anyone going to walk up and start talking to us? No. For the most part adults just stayed away from us. You really had to go after them, to engage them, to break down those barriers.”

And, the perception of many of the locals over time as a result of US forces being isolated and defensive was that the US troops were “scared.” As one officer quoted locals reassuring him, “you guys [US] don’t know its safe. Now you’re here nobody’s going to do anything.” This perception was exacerbated by comparisons by locals with allied forces who were no longer wearing their flak jacket and helmet. The perception was also not helped by the fact that many locals had been involved in fighting and had engaged successfully in combat without a flak jacket. Some viewed the US approach as “wimpy.”

Despite endeavoring to provide a robust image designed to aid overall FP and mission accomplishment, the perception of fear caused by an over-zealous approach to FP may in fact have had the complete opposite effect. As the Lessons From Bosnia confirmed: “The lesson learned: in peace operations, as in other politically charged conflicts, perception is reality.” This perception runs the risk of reinforcing the stereotype that American foreign policy commitment is vulnerable to casualties. The Lessons From Bosnia adds:

The force protection measures appear to have been largely a political decision in light of the US experience in Somalia, where US policy took a sharp turn after 18 American soldiers were killed in a single engagement in 1993. Indeed this decision was itself based on the larger belief that the US public no longer expects its soldiers to die in battle.
If the Bosnian and allied\textsuperscript{80} perception is that American soldiers are fearful of any casualties it reinforces the stereotype that the US center of gravity is American commitment and that it is easily influenced through American casualties a la Somalia. The paradox is that one of the effects of this extreme FP posture could in fact be the increased likelihood of attempts to inflict US casualties. An adversary might conclude that this was not only the way to influence the withdrawal of US forces from theatre but could also result in the collapse of the IFOR mission. This theory was explored during the course of the study and met broad agreement amongst those interviewed. One officer even quoted a conversation he had with the Brcko police chief during which this law enforcement official indicated the same causal linkage, even citing Somalia.\textsuperscript{81}

Another effect of significantly different FP standards within a mission (and in this case it really was only US forces in MND(N)) was a perception of a lack of unity within IFOR (and NATO) itself. Despite forces operating under national command with national FP variations, such a visible divergence can suggest a lack of unity. “Many non-US members of the Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA) implementation effort, especially civil agencies, were concerned that this inconsistency was sending mixed signals to the warring factions. These individuals were adamant that this inconsistency reduced the overall NATO, and especially US, credibility throughout the region and world.”\textsuperscript{82}

There is significant evidence that the personal and four-vehicle FP measures did cause great difficulty for some activities. One example is the SF dispensation to operate outside of the FP rules and they “needed the exception to be more approachable to the locals.”\textsuperscript{83} Another example involves the ability of the PIO to interact with media.
representatives. “In MND(N) the force protection rules seriously handicapped the PIO’s ability to coordinate with outside organizations.”\textsuperscript{84} Another area requiring a dispensation from the orders were CI and HUMINT, FP Teams who also received a dispensation for vehicle movement from the TF Eagle commander. “He allowed them to travel in two-vehicle convoys, during daylight hours. Travel required a brigade or battalion commander’s approval. Travel at night required general officer approval and four vehicles. This made liaison dinners a challenge, but they did get approved.”\textsuperscript{85}

Another effect of the orders was on civil-military cooperation. “US force protection measures directly hampered civil-military cooperation and the ability for soldiers to move away from the peace enforcement mission only mind-set.”\textsuperscript{86} “Force protection requirements severely limited CSS availability to support non-military functions.”\textsuperscript{87} One PSYOPS officer, who commanded the detachment with the MND(SW) HQ during IFOR and was later a battalion commander in the American Sector during SFOR, experienced both FP levels first hand in direct command. He commented on the effectiveness in both sectors and contended that FP can still be achieved without compromising the mission or adopting the “Darth Vader” look. He believed:

The mission in MND-N clearly suffered. In my line of work, PSYOP, it is essential that we get out among the populace. We did so in MND-SW. We showed a human face, used the café culture of the region, lunched at pizza restaurants, made friends, and gathered information/intelligence as well as disseminated IFOR information. We brought security elements, had reaction and contingency plans, coordinated with adjacent units, in short took reasonable protective measures. We did not completely sacrifice the mission by bowing to the mantra of ‘Force Pro’ as many US units did. In MND-N, on the other hand, they were rarely allowed outside the wire.\textsuperscript{88}
One of the key consequences of the American FP policy was an inability to “escalate to meet the situation.” The robust American approach in addition to lacking subtlety leaves no room to send subliminal messages. The altering of FP measures is a very real way to indicate a changing position as LTC Fernandez experienced in the British sector:

We organized community 10Ks, and we went for PT runs, in civilian PT clothes, outside the camp. As a returning Sipovo resident put it, he had heard talk about renewed safety and security, but only when he saw British soldiers in twos and threes, on PT runs in town, dressed in spiffy Adidas gear, was he confident that the area really was secure. As an aside, this is a nice PSYOP lesson in the relative effectiveness of words versus action.  

Another officer commented that “there was nothing additional to go to, to convey the seriousness” of a situation if required. Inevitably, in military operations actions do speak louder than words and the more the Americans with IFOR highlighted the increasingly secure and stable environment whilst dressed in flak jacket and Kevlar helmet, arguably the less convincing it sounded. As reported in the NDU Lessons From Bosnia study, “the community must be cognizant of the message a warfighting posture can send to target audiences”. In discussing the effects, one intelligence officer summed it by stating that he felt “there just remained a very big divide between American IFOR and the locals.”

A more disturbing aspect of the FP measures was to create in some cases a belief that FP was more important than mission accomplishment. “Neither British nor US doctrine implies zero-casualty tolerance or places FP above mission accomplishment.” Yet this situation was recorded in both research interviews and in available literature. For example, one article records that “A newly arrived major was told that if the mission interfered with force protection, the mission came second.” Whilst this misconception does little to alleviate a belief in a politically charged, risk-adverse FP policy in IFOR, it does highlight that in this extreme case, the pendulum has swung too far to the point where force-protection, or the fear of non-compliance with the policy, has rendered the
force impotent.\textsuperscript{96} It reinforces the perception that the policy had little to do with the threat or operational imperatives and everything to do with meeting political objectives.


Whether this is true or not becomes immaterial when the perception is present, as perception becomes reality with the belief that “if we got one soldier killed, that would be a slippery slope to the end of the IFOR mission.”\textsuperscript{97}
Finally there is a weight of evidence that despite this perception in some risk adverse or confused individuals, some officers were prepared to breach the requirements to get the job done. In many cases officers broke the letter of the requirements but firmly believe they met the intent.\textsuperscript{98} This suggests an ability to work within Mission Type Orders, arguably a framework under which the FP measures could better have been prescribed.

**Consistency of FP Measures with Mission Type Orders**

The army that deployed to Bosnia had already embraced Mission Type Orders. The key to Mission Type Orders is to “allow subordinate leaders to exercise independent judgment”.\textsuperscript{99} Mission Type Orders tell a subordinate what to do, not how to do it, relying on their professional ability, initiative and judgment to work within the commander’s overall intent to achieve a given task. The key emphasis is on task achievement rather than prescriptive process. Initiative in the IFOR era FM 100-5 was defined as requiring “a willingness and ability to act independently within the framework of the higher commander’s intent. . . . It requires the decentralization of decision authority to the lowest practical level. . . . Decentralization demands well trained subordinates and superiors who are willing to take risks.”\textsuperscript{400} The ability for Mission Type Orders to flourish is dependent on the command climate and trust. It is outside the scope of this thesis to analyze the command climate prevalent in TF Eagle. Needless to say, the key tests for a consistency of the FP measures with Mission Type Orders is the ability the orders provided subordinate leaders to exercise independent judgment when confronted with a choice between mission accomplishment and FP policy. It is reflected in the
degree of trust subordinates felt allowing them to use their initiative to make decisions within their commander’s guidance.

It would be fair to say that the overwhelming majority of those interviewed for this thesis did not believe that the FP policies nested with mission style orders. The orders were incredibly prescriptive and rigidly applied. Despite some officers being prepared in limited ways to bend the rules to accomplish the mission, there was a definite understanding that if it were done, there would not be any top cover. The rigidity is highlighted in the example given earlier in the chapter where an injured soldier was not evacuated due to a lack of the requisite number of specified vehicles prescribed in the FP policy.

Officers interviewed understood fully the political environment of IFOR and American policy. One officer commented that “ostensibly it’s our doctrine to do that (laughter), however I think given the sensitivity of this particular mission and the fact that it wasn’t necessarily well supported by either individuals within the military or the American public at large, that there were those higher up the chain to dictate what was going to be done.” Nearly all officers interviewed expressed the desire to have the flexibility to respond and plan events within the AOR for which they were both responsible and in which they had perhaps the greatest situational awareness.

Perhaps most disturbingly it led to a feeling that there was a need for an officer to be present at all times thus reducing the role of the NCO. One officer commented, “I think in many ways, there is a leadership problem with micromanagement, and there maybe. . . have shown a lack of faith in the NCO corps.” This officer to his credit developed tasks to ensure that his NCOs were both innovative and felt empowered to act.
This theme is supported in one article where “As one USAREUR sergeant put it, ‘our officers don’t trust us and simply want to keep incidents down.’”

Some officers commented that despite having a significant responsibility and considerable combat power the lack of trust to work within FP guidance did not make sense and was a source of frustration. Another officer commented that it was “once more, not trusting junior leaders to make decisions, unwilling to risk career damage in a zero-defect environment [that] the blanket decree for full ‘battle rattle’, everywhere, all the time, was issued.” As COL Matthews bluntly suggests in his article, “The Overcontrolling Leader,” “Overcontrol may be a careerist manifestation by an untrusting leader.” and this was certainly a feeling of the TF Eagle command climate. When posed the question if they would have liked greater flexibility in applying the FP measures a typical answer was “absolutely.” The effect of not having the flexibility to work within an intent was universally “frustrating.” It was felt that risk was not going to be taken and that when it came down to a decision over mission accomplishment versus say the requirement for that fourth vehicle, then the job would be cancelled. It was therefore felt that it did not nest well with mission type orders.

Summary of the Effects and Appropriateness of the FP Measures

The appropriateness of the FP measures proved a lot more complex than anticipated. Initially it is fair to assess that they were entirely appropriate and worked well with both the nature of the early mission and the message being sent to the former warring factions. Over time the appropriateness of the measures became arguably less. They were not felt connected to a realistic threat and “just didn’t pass the commonsense
test.\textsuperscript{109} The measures were inflexible and did not nest well with an army espousing mission type orders.

The measures came with a significant cost that eroded the effectiveness of TF Eagle. Whilst one cannot doubt the overall mission effectiveness of IFOR, it was equally successful for troops employing highly restrictive FP measures as for those who did not. This leaves a subjective assessment of the relative effects. Officers exposed to both conditions are in no doubt as to which was professionally and personally more effective.

The cost of the measures was undoubtedly high affecting training of forces, manning, vehicle maintenance and morale. It instilled in many confined to camp a fortress mentality that had demoralizing consequences. Despite being part of the American military culture, the inability to match the local conditions to the FP requirements was frustrating and resulted in assessments that the measures were not threat based but politically motivated. A reluctance to downgrade the in camp measures once the camp FP measures were heightened caused further suspicion. As one officer commented with due sarcasm, perhaps it's time to lower the FP measures “when they start setting up the Burger Kings on post”\textsuperscript{110}

There are other areas of concern that arose from the analysis of the effects of the FP measures. The paradox identified by the retention of unnecessarily high FP measures resulted in American’s being perceived as scared and reinforcing perceptions that after a few casualties US forces will head home. Of additional concern is the perception the disparate FP measures had with regards unity of effort by NATO.

Undoubtedly, the FP measures did not affect overall mission accomplishment. They did, however, affect the effectiveness of both personnel and the performance of
tasks at a significant cost for US forces. The need to acknowledge that “war, conflict and peace may all exist at once in a theatre”\textsuperscript{111} must drive a flexible FP policy in the future. Additionally it is important “that the military and political leadership understands the effects of such means on the perceptions of the local population.”\textsuperscript{112}

\textsuperscript{1}Brigadier General Stanley Cherrie, interview by Dr Robert Baumann and Dr George Gawrych, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 26 October 2000, video tape recording.


\textsuperscript{3}John A. Gentry, “Knowledge-Based Warfare: Lessons from Bosnia,” \textit{The Officer} (January/February 1999): 139.


\textsuperscript{6}Ibid., 52.

\textsuperscript{7}U.S. Army, FM 3-0, \textit{Operations} (Washington DC: Department of the Army, 14 June 2001), 4-22.

\textsuperscript{8}Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, JP 1-02, \textit{DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms}, (Washington, DC: GPO, 12 April 2001), 207.


\textsuperscript{11}Nash, 40.

\textsuperscript{12}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{13}Major Robert Butts, interview by author, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 4 February 2003, tape recording.

\textsuperscript{14}Colonel Greg Fontenot, interview by author, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 8 February 2003, tape recording.
15 Nash, 39.


17 Cherrie, 65.

18 “There were few overt physical attacks on IFOR facilities and personnel.” Wentz, 56.


20 Major Brian Linvill, interview by author, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 11 February 2003, tape recording.

21 Ibid.


23 Major Bob Bozic, interview by author, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 11 February 2003, tape recording.

24 Fontenot interview.


26 Ibid.

27 US forces in Bosnia were capped to 20,000. Of those approximately 17,750 were in MND North and the remaining 2,250 in the remainder of Bosnia. Dennis Steele, “Bosnia Update,” Army (March 1996): 41.

28 Major Matt Lewis, interview by author, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 11 February 2003, tape recording.

29 Lieutenant Colonel Jody Prescott, interview by author, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 7 February 2003, tape recording.

30 Ibid.

31 Major Joel Rindall, interview by author, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 11 February 2003, tape recording.

33 Major Kenny Mintz, interview by author, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 11 February 2003, tape recording.

34 Cherrie interview.

35 Mintz interview.

36 Ibid.

37 Major Jack Haefner, interview by author, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 18 February 2003, tape recording.

38 Cherrie interview.


40 Cherrie interview.


42 Major Tim Chafos, interview by author, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 7 February 2003, tape recording.

43 Ibid.

44 Fontenot interview.


46 Drummond, 12.

47 Ibid.

48 Butts interview.

49 Fontenot interview.

50 Major Ben Higginbotham, interview by author, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 10 February 2003, tape recording.

51 FLOT – Forward Line of Own Troops.
52 Fontenot interview.

53 Chafos interview.

54 Lewis interview.

55 Higginbotham interview.


57 Fontenot interview.

58 Ibid.

59 Rindall interview.

60 Haefner interview.

61 Major John Francis, interview by author, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 11 February 2003, tape recording.

62 Ibid.

63 Schmitt interview.

64 Fontenot interview.

65 Bozic interview.


67 Fay interview.

68 Butts interview.

69 Ibid.


71 Fay interview.

72 Ibid.

73 Major Tom Boccardi, interview by author, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 11 February 2003, tape recording.

Ibid.

Major Anthony Berry, interview by author, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 7 February 2003, tape recording.

Opinion expressed to author by Colonel Duric, G2, 1st Krajina Corps, May 1996.

Wentz, 266.

Ibid., Endnote 133, 462.

As Kretchik quotes one foreign officer: “I know you Americans wear all that gear because you are afraid, but don’t worry, we’ll protect you.” Walter E. Kretchik, “Force Protection Disparities,” 77.

Mintz interview.


Schmitt interview.

Wentz, 186.


Ibid.

Fernandez electronic mail.


Fernandez electronic mail.

Higginbotham interview.

Wentz, 222.

Chafos interview.

Caniglia, 77.
Ibid., 73.

This has not been isolated to IFOR. A recent article on Kosovo, referred to the “casualty-aversion syndrome” noting that in a recent study it appears that “military leaders are even more casualty averse than the public.” It notes that FP became the primary objective of the US Brigade resulting in the creation of a “fortified camp” and refers to Canadian General Romeo Dallaires concerns “the impact of casualty aversion could have on the military ethos of priorities: ‘the mission, my troops, and then myself.’” Colonel Alain Boyer, “Leadership and the Kosovo Air Campaign,” Canadian Military Journal (autumn 2002): 39.

Higginbotham interview.

Boccardi interview.

FM 101-5-1, 1-103.


Major Robert Bennett, interview by author, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 10 February 2003, tape recording.

Boccardi interview.

Kretchik, 76-77.

Fernandez electronic mail.

Matthews, 34.

Major Robert Bruce Floersheim, interview by author, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 11 February 2003, tape recording.

Haefner interview.

Ibid.

Higginbotham interview.

Major Kristin Baker, interview by author, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 10 February 2003, tape recording.

Wentz, 219.

Ibid., 212.
CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Introduction

GO-1 and the FP measures did have an effect on American operations within IFOR. The aim of this chapter is to estimate what those effects were in order to answer not just the primary and subordinate thesis questions, but, more importantly to offer recommendations to provide guidance for future planners of MOOTW.

Research Conclusions

Based on the research for this thesis, a number of effects on TF Eagle operations have been noted and will be presented as answers to the subordinate thesis questions.

What Was the Logical Justification for These Measures?

GO-1 was designed to specify certain behavior or actions that would be unlawful during IFOR, including a ban on all ranks consuming alcohol. GO-1 was justified by General Crouch as a means of preventing indiscipline attributed to the use and abuse of alcohol that was prevalent during the Vietnam War, and to ensure cultural sensitivity of the force in a politically sensitive mission. GO-1 was a repetition of the order US Troops had been under during the Gulf War, but it did not take into account the logical modifications made during the Operation in Haiti nor the different cultural situation encountered in Bosnia.

The key FP measures were justified based on known threats to soldiers at the commencement of IFOR and fear of an Islamic terrorist attack on US forces. Commanders were slow to modify the FP measures and there was not a holistic approach taken in conjunction with the development of base-camp FP measures. There is a
legitimate concern that they were justified on the basis of perceived political
considerations rather than a continuing threat although this could not be categorically
confirmed. The justification for the measures was not consistent as there was a disparity
in protection measures for US forces in Bosnia and its foundation in logic is therefore
highly questionable.

What Effect did GO-1 and the FP Measures have on Liaison, In Particular, on Liaison
with the Former Warring Factions?

GO-1 and the FP measures had a number of effects on liaison. GO-1 was quickly
amended to remove the key cultural anomaly affecting liaison at a senior level and, in
time, allowed a more comprehensive approach to the Bosnian cultural norm of toasting
with local alcohol. This allowed the requisite rapport with the former warring factions to
be more easily established. Until this final change during SFOR, junior leaders not
undergoing JMC or official ceremonies ran the risk of punitive action if they accepted
hospitality form a former warring faction.

The personal and vehicular FP measures affected the ability to conduct liaison,
particularly in the civil sector and with international organizations. The restrictions of
access to base camps and an inability to reside off base camps prevented both access to
and the flexibility needed for faction liaison in some circumstances. The key faction
liaison was not affected, though, as it was conducted by foreign troops who adhered to
neither orders. Some dispensations for key liaison and HUMINT elements were given
from GO-1 and the FP measures but overall it made the conduct of liaison unnecessarily
difficult reducing the ability and frequency of contact.
What Effect did GO-1 and the FP Measures have on the Morale of TF Eagle?

The effect both restrictive orders had was mixed, but the research produced some conclusions. GO-1 and the FP measures contributed over time to the erosion of morale. To be sure, the decline did not reach critical proportions and did not cause lapses in professional conduct. The greatest effect on morale was not necessarily the inability to drink alcohol or the FP requirements themselves but arguably the inconsistent application to all Americans in theatre and to international troops within TF Eagle. Morale was eroded also by the feeling that these operationally deployed soldiers were not trusted by their leaders and this seemed to have had the biggest morale impact on NCOs and junior officers.

How Appropriate were the FP Measures and what Effect did they have on Operations?

This was a difficult point to assess due to the lack of access to classified sources to confirm the presence of a real terrorist threat. Based on the research conducted, which included interviews of intelligence officers, it is difficult to quantify the appropriateness of the measures. Based on the activity level after the key Dayton military timelines had been met and the inconsistency between base camp and personal FP measures, it is hard to regard them as appropriate for the situation. This is certainly a view and assessment shared widely among other military forces that served in IFOR who did not apply such measures after the initial phase of the operation. There were definitely times and places when these measures were appropriate, but the constant maintenance of such a high level inevitably had an effect on the operation. These effects included a reduction of task accomplishment, erosion of morale, increased risk of traffic accidents, increased logistical and training implications and perhaps of greatest concern, the creation of a
bunker or fortress mentality that reduced further interaction with the former factions and further affected mission accomplishment and morale. The impression over time of US forces alone maintaining such defensive FP measures was a universal impression that American forces were risk averse, if not scared. This thesis draws the conclusion that the very measures designed to protect the force could in fact have the opposite effect by reinforcing a mind-set that American forces are vulnerable to attack and open to manipulation of a casualty adverse US domestic environment. This finding was thoroughly explored during the research and has strategic implications for the future.

How well did GO-1 and the FP Measures Nest with a Force Trained to work under Mission Type Orders?

GO-1 and the FP measures applied to TF Eagle were not representative of mission type orders. There was no latitude in either order for command discretion and they did not provide sufficient guidance for commanders at all levels to exercise independent judgment to exploit potential situations or opportunities.

Recommendations

Based on this research the following guidance for MOOTW planners is provided:

1. Blanket orders such as a GO-1 need to be attuned to each new mission, its operational situation and the cultural environment rather than merely replicating a previous mission order.

2. Blanket orders can have secondary effects and need to be carefully crafted to provide sufficient direction without being unnecessarily prescriptive.

3. FP measures need to be responsive, related to real threats and consistent. They need to be clearly explained and regularly reviewed. They also need to be crafted with an
understanding of how allied forces will approach the situation within the same AOR to present a consistent threat base approach.

4. Faction LNOs are an essential component in MOOTW. Having dedicated, personal LNOs between the commander and the highest faction commanders enhances the peace process, ensures the US Commander’s intent is clearly understood, gains valuable HUMINT and provides direct communications in a crisis. It is a force multiplier.

5. MOOTW provides situations where different parts of the AOR may have different threats. Orders need to be flexible enough to take into account different circumstances simultaneously and can best be achieved by the devolution of authority.

6. FP measures can be used to send signals to a local environment. Conversely, a change in FP measures must be made with an understanding of how it will be perceived by local factions.

7. A decision not to allow controlled access to off-camp facilities reduces contact with the local population and undermines both a vital social outlet during long deployments and a good source of economic and HUMINT information.

8. A decision to not allow limited access to alcohol in a controlled environment can have a demoralizing effect particularly if other forces in a US controlled AOR have different rules.

Relationships to Previous Studies

There is no available comparison to previous studies on the effects of FP measures or restrictive orders on a recent MOOTW operation. The reasons for the different FP measures have been studied and provided invaluable assistance to this research. The value of independent faction liaison teams and the use of multiple liaison
teams during MOOTW has been written on in some detail. Lessons learned from Bosnia have been extensively written on, as have been studies on the impact of morale on operations. This research differs somewhat by looking at the effects of two specific and restrictive orders on an MOOTW operation rather than looking broadly at the operation itself.

**Suggestions for Further Research**

As a result of this research there are a number of areas that would be suitable for further investigation. It became apparent during the research that there was little if any flow of lessons learned from the mission in Haiti to those planning the mission in Bosnia. This could be the focus of a separate study into why this occurred and whether this was the result of a cultural difference between the airborne corps and a heavy corps or, as was also suggested during the research, a product of a cultural inability to learn from a previous commander.

A second area of future research could be the social implications of the deployment by researching available data on US service personnel who served in MDN(N) for different periods of time and analyzing the incidents of releases and divorces to establish if there is a correlation between time served on operations and retention/divorce and whether this was in any way attributable to morale during IFOR or is consistent with usual operational deployment trends.
APPENDIX A

TASK FORCE EAGLE GENERAL ORDER NUMBER 1 AND EXCEPTION

GENERAL ORDER GO-1
OPERATION BALKAN ENDEAVOR

TITLE: Prohibited Activities for US Personnel Serving in Operation Balkan Endeavor

AUTHORITY: Title 10 United States Code Section 164(c)(2)(B) and the Uniform Code of Military Justice (Title 10 United States Code Section 801-940).

APPLICABILITY: this General Order is applicable to all US military personnel and to US personnel serving with or accompanying the armed forces of the United States who are deployed in the USEUCOM Area of Operations in support of Operation Balkan Endeavor. For the purposes of this order, the Area of Operations consists of the territory and the airspace of Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro, Hungary, Austria, Slovakia, Czech Republic, Slovenia.

1. STATEMENT OF MILITARY PURPOSE AND NECESSITY:
Restrictions upon certain activities are essential to maintain the security, health and welfare of the US forces; to prevent conduct prejudicial to good order and discipline or of a nature to bring discredit upon the US armed forces; and to improve US relations with the region. These restrictions are also essential to preserve US relations with host nations and the combined operations of US, NATO, and other friendly forces. Furthermore Operation Balkan Endeavor places US Armed Forces into countries where local laws and customs may prohibit or restrict certain activities. It is the purpose of this General Order to ensure good order and discipline is maintained an host nation laws are respected to the maximum extent consistent with mission accomplishment.

2. PROHIBITED ACTIVITIES:
a. Taking, possessing or shipping for personal use captured weapons.

b. Introduction, possession, use, sale, transfer, manufacture, or consumption of any alcoholic beverage.

c. Possessing, touching, using, or knowingly approaching without legal authority any unexploded munitions or ordnance, or any kind or description whatsoever. "Without legal authority" means any act or activity undertaken by US personnel which is not done at the direction of a commander or as a result of military necessity during the performance of military duties.

d. Purchase possession, sale or introduction of privately owned firearms, ammunition and explosives.

e. Gambling of any kind, including sports pools, lotteries and raffles.

f. Selling, bartering, or exchanging any currency other than at the official host nation exchange rate.

g. Entrance into a mosque or other site of Islamic religious significance by non-Muslims unless directed by military authorities or compelled by military necessity.

h. Removing, possessing, selling, transferring, defacing, or destroying archeological artifacts or national treasures.

3. PUNITIVE ORDER. This order is punitive. Persons subject to the Uniform Code of Military Justice who violate this order may be punished under Article 92, UCMJ, for violating a lawful general order. Civilians accompanying the US Armed Forces may face adverse administrative action.

4. INDIVIDUAL DUTY. All persons subject to this General Order are charged with the individual duty to become familiar with and respect the laws, regulations, and customs of the host nations insofar as they to not interfere with the execution of their official duties. Individual acts of disrespect or flagrant violations of host nations laws, regulations, and customs may be punished as a violation of the Uniform Code of Military Justice. Civilians accompanying the US Armed Forces may face adverse administrative action.
5. UNIT COMMANDER RESPONSIBILITY: Unit commander and supervisors are charged to ensure all, repeat all, personnel are briefed about the prohibited activities.

6. CONTRABAND: Items which are determined to violate this General Order may be considered contraband and may be confiscated. Before the destruction of the contraband, commanders or law enforcement personnel should coordinate with their servicing staff judge advocates.

7. EFFECTIVE DATE: This General Order is effective immediately. Except for alcoholic beverages, an amnesty period of 72 hours is granted, from the effective date of this General Order, for personnel to surrender or dispose of items which violate this General Order. Individuals or commanders may arrange for safekeeping of personal firearms with their unit military law enforcement activity.

8. EXPIRATION: This General Order will expire upon the completion of Operation Balkan Endeavor unless rescinded, waived or modified.

9. WAIVER AUTHORITY: Because mission requirements may permit and host nation tolerance may allow for the consumption of alcohol in portions of the USEUCOM Area of Operations authority to waive or modify the prohibitions of this order relative to alcoholic beverages is delegated to the EUCOM Component Commanders. Before granting a waiver to a geographical area where personnel from more than one service are deployed, each component commander with personnel who will be affected by the waiver must agree to the terms of the waiver. In situations where a consensus cannot be reached, the request will be forwarded to the DCINC, USEUCOM for resolution.

10. Staff Judge Advocates for the waiver authorities will provide the USEUCOM Legal Advisor with copies of all waivers granted to this order.

GEORGE A. JOULWAN
General, US Army
CINCEUR
MEMORANDUM FOR HQ USEUCOM, ATTN: USEUCOM Legal Adviser,
Unit 30400, Box 1000, ADO AR 091284209

SUBJECT: Exception to USEUCOM General Order 1


2. According to the waiver authority granted in GO-I, paragraph 9, the following exception to GO-I, paragraph 2b, is granted:

Members of the U.S. Forces and U.S. personnel accompanying the U.S. Forces in Austria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Montenegro, Serbia, Slovakia and Slovenia who are taking part in Joint Military Commissions or official ceremonies involving foreign national officials may consume alcoholic beverages according to local custom.

3. This exception applies to USAREUR, USNAVEUR, and USAFE.

WILLIAM W. CROUCH
General, USA
Commander in Chief
Dayton Peace Accords. The peace agreement ending the conflict in Bosnia was brokered by the US and was initialed by representatives the Presidents of Bosnia, Croatia and Serbia on November 21, 1995 in Dayton Ohio and was known colloquially as the Dayton Peace Accords. The General Framework Agreement for Peace (GFAP) was formally signed in Paris on December 14, 1995 and the following day the UN Security Council passed UNSCR 1031 giving NATO the mandate under Chapter VII of the UN Charter to enforce the peace plan. GFAP is the official name for the DPA.

Implementation Force. IFOR was the name given to the NATO force responsible for implementing the military components of the Dayton Peace Accords. It was commanded by COMIFOR. It was succeeded by the Stabilization Force (SFOR), which remains in Bosnia to this day. The IFOR Operations in the Balkans were known as Operation Joint Endeavor.

Task Force Eagle. TF Eagle was the name given to the US Forces who deployed into Bosnia in December 1995. It was a US Task Force built around the 1st (US) Armored Division. TF Eagle was responsible for the Multi-National Division (North) sector, one of the three divisional sectors of IFOR and was augmented with a Russian, Turkish and NORD/POL Brigades. The TF Eagle AOR and the MND(N) sector are therefore the same. MG Bill Nash, The Commander of MND(N) referred to himself as COMEAGLE. He was the CG of 1 AD.
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