AN ANALYSIS OF UNIT COHESION IN THE 42ND ALABAMA INFANTRY

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE
Military History

by

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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)
ABSTRACT

AN ANALYSIS OF UNIT COHESION IN THE 42nd ALABAMA INFANTRY by Samuel L. Askew III, 132 pages.

On 16 May 1862, 904 soldiers formed ranks for the first time and unfurled the virgin colors of the 42nd Alabama Infantry Regiment. These 904 soldiers were a mixture of veterans, volunteers, conscripts, and substitutes. The regiment participated in nine western theater battles and their associated campaigns. These campaigns included Corinth, Vicksburg, Lookout Mountain, Atlanta, and Bentonville. Not one battle was a victory but the heat of battle forged a band of brothers tempered with time. The regiment cased its colors for the last time on 9 April 1865 in a desolate North Carolina field; only ninety-eight soldiers remained at the end of this bloody national struggle. This thesis will identify the timeless factors of cohesion within the 42nd Alabama. This thesis will further determine the most prominent of these factors, specifically within the remaining ninety-eight soldiers. Finally, this thesis will explore the value of cohesion to the current military force. This thesis incorporated sources from the The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Confederate Veteran, The Southern Historical Papers, personal diaries and letters, census records, compiled service records, sources from the Alabama State Archives and the National Park Service. After the examination of numerous factors, to include discipline, leadership, and morale, the common factor that held the core members of the unit together until the end was the “original volunteer” soldiers of 1861. These soldiers formed the cohesive bond of the unit by instilling a common conviction and devotion to duty within the 42nd Alabama. The final analysis reinforces the value of the volunteer soldier and the worth of an “all-volunteer” force.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I wish to acknowledge the advice and guidance of my committee chair, Dr. Glenn Robertson, for guiding me through this process. Committee Member, Major Kevin Wilson, for providing his editorial skills and technical guidance. In addition, I wish to acknowledge the staff of the Combined Arms Research Library for their helpful assistance in the acquisition of resource material and the National Military Park historians: James Ogdon, Chickamauga and Chattanooga, Terry Winchel, Vicksburg, and Stacey Allen, Shiloh for their advice and sources. My wife Sarah for tolerating my long hours of research, my daughter Katherine for allowing Dad to use her computer time, and my father Samuel L. Askew Jr. for providing research assistance.

This thesis is dedicated to the soldiers of the American Civil War. These soldiers include my ancestors; Joseph H. Askew who at the age of eighteen was a member of Forrest’s Escort, and Sergeant Samuel N. Snow of the 8th Mississippi, who at the age of twenty-five gave the Last Full Measure at Resaca. Lastly, I must mention my primary inspiration for this study, George Washington Askew, my great, great grandfather, who served as a 1st Lieutenant in F Company, 42nd Alabama Infantry. During George’s last years in this world, in a 1912 letter to a friend George wrote of looking forward “to the reunion at Mobile.” George certainly never forgot the sacrifices of this terrible ordeal and remembered his comrades in the 42nd Alabama. The service and sacrifice of the soldiers the 42nd Alabama should always be remembered and the lessons learned from this bloody struggle should never be forgotten.
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We were then sent to Columbus, Miss., to be formed into a regiment, and thence into a brigade. The letter of our company was A, as it happened to be the first to arrive, and our regiment was the 42nd Alabama, with John W. Portis of Suggsville, Clark County, Ala., in command.¹

R. A. Lambert, *Confederate Veteran*

Introduction

On 16 May 1862, 904 soldiers formed ranks for the first time and unfurled the virgin colors of the 42nd Alabama Infantry Regiment. These 904 soldiers were a mixture of veterans, volunteers, conscripts, and substitutes. The one commonality of these soldiers at their first formation at Camp Hardee, Mississippi was their obligation to serve the Confederate States of America (CSA). Throughout the war, the regiment participated in nine western theater battles and their associated campaigns.² Not one battle was a victory but the heat of battle forged a band of brothers tempered and galvanized by a common bond which survived the war. The regiment cased its colors for the last time on 9 April 1865 in a desolate North Carolina field; only ninety-eight soldiers remained.

The 19th Century military theorist, Carl von Clausewitz, wrote in his analytical study of war *On War*:

Whatever may be done to nationalize Wars, and however much we may imagine times have changed . . . never will it be possible to do away with the individuality of the business; and if that cannot be done, then those who belong to it, as long as they belong to it, will always look upon themselves as a kind of guild . . . . This corporate spirit forms the bond of union between the natural forces which are active in that which we have called military virtue. The crystals of military virtue have a greater affinity for the spirit of a corporate body than for anything else.³
This thesis will identify these timeless factors of cohesion that Clausewitz referred to as the “crystals of military virtue” within the 42nd Alabama. William Darryl Henderson’s work *Cohesion, The Human Element in Combat* defines cohesion as “the bonding together of members of an organization/unit in such a way as to sustain their will and commitment to each other, their unit, and the mission.” Who were these ninety-eight soldiers and what factors bound them together until the end of this bloody national war? What lessons can be applied to today’s U.S. Army (figure 1).

The Road to Muster

On 11 January 1861, Alabama became the fourth state to secede from the Union. With the division of the Union, war was inevitable. The Governor of Alabama requested volunteers to answer the call to arms. These volunteers formed the Army of Alabama, which consisted of the 1st Alabama Infantry Regiment, the 2nd Alabama Infantry Regiment, and the 1st Alabama Artillery Battalion. Anticipating a short war, these volunteers enlisted for a period of one year and all enlisted during the national fervor of defending their new country.

The 2nd Alabama Infantry Regiment was organized at Mobile, where the regiment served at Fort Morgan as part of the defenses of Mobile Bay. In March 1862, the unit transferred to Fort Pillow, Tennessee, where it disbanded upon the expiration of the one-year enlistments. In April 1862, realizing the war would last longer and exact a greater toll than first anticipated, the Confederacy requested more regiments from its states. Many of the veteran soldiers and leaders of the 2nd Alabama formed the core of a new regiment, the 42nd Alabama Infantry Regiment.
Camp Hardee and First Muster

The 42nd Alabama mustered into Confederate service as a regiment on 16 May 1862 at Camp Hardee near Columbus, Mississippi. Of the 904 members of the regiment, 202 members were veterans of the 2nd Alabama. These 2nd Alabama veterans primarily formed the regimental leadership and Companies A, B, and D of the 42nd Alabama. These soldiers were from all regions of Alabama (figure 2). Most of the soldiers were farmers; some were wage earners such as clerks. Most of the officers were college graduates and were professional lawyers or planters at the outbreak of the war. The youngest soldier was sixteen and the oldest soldier was fifty. The average age of the soldiers within the 42nd Alabama was twenty-seven years of age. Corporal Robert A. Lambert was typical of the 2nd Alabama veterans that formed the 42nd Alabama. He was a twenty-nine-year-old general store clerk from Claiborne, Alabama. Upon the expiration of his one-year enlistment, Lambert accepted a $50 bonus and a thirty-day furlough for reenlistment into the 42nd Alabama. Lambert described the formation of the regiment and activities at Camp Hardee:

We were then sent to Columbus, Miss., to be formed into a regiment, and thence into a brigade. The letter of our company was A, as it happened to be the first to arrive, and our regiment was the 42nd Alabama, with John W. Portis of Suggsville, Clark County, Ala., in command. At the very beginning of our encampment at Columbus, Miss., I took pneumonia and was placed in a hospital, where I remained for six weeks, near death’s door a considerable portion of the time. We were there through the summer of 1862, drilling and being trained for active service.  

The regiment was formed with ten subordinate companies each varying in size from sixty-three to ninety-nine soldiers. Generally, each company consisted of four officers, four sergeants, four corporals, and the remainder privates. The soldiers elected
their company grade officers. Upon formation of the regiment, Colonel John W. Portis was appointed by the Governor of Alabama as the 42nd Alabama’s first regimental commander.

The regiment comprised a mixture of “generally good,” and “raw recruits—undisciplined but with a capacity for learning” and veteran soldiers. Each soldier enlisted to serve for either two or three years. Without exception, every company “had no arms, no accoutrements” and “very little, inferior” clothing. The 42nd Alabama Infantry Regiment was distinctly a new unit without arms, standard uniforms, or equipment, and certainly not a cohesive fighting unit.

After the initial muster, the regiment remained at Camp Hardee through August 1862 assigned to the Department of Mississippi and East Louisiana. The regiment drilled, trained, and received new recruits and equipment. This equipment included cartridge boxes, cap boxes, waist belts, shoulder straps, bayonets, and knapsacks. The regiment eventually armed themselves with a mixture of Enfield and Mississippi Rifles.

The fledgling regiment was not familiar with sanitation and disease prevention resulting in the hospitalization of over seventy-eight soldiers due to illness. During the regiment’s time at Camp Hardee, at least forty-one soldiers died of disease. Poor ration supply was an additional problem that plagued camp life at Hardee. Thirty seven-year-old Private James A. Fergusan of F Company wrote to his wife on 7 June 1862, “We are living very bad at this time . . . times is hard we don’t git very plenty to eat.”

Of the 904 soldiers that mustered in the regiment, 702 soldiers were new recruits each with their own reason for serving. Many of the 42nd Alabama recruits were of the 1862 ‘reluctant volunteer’ variety that joined simply to avoid conscription. In 1862, the
Confederate Congress passed the Conscription Act, which authorized conscription of white males between the ages of eighteen and forty-five. The exact number of conscripts within the 42nd Alabama cannot be determined from the records but, of the approximately 66,400 soldiers that Alabama provided for Confederate service, 14,875 or 22 percent were conscripts.\textsuperscript{10} We can assume that approximately 22 percent of the 42nd Alabama soldiers were conscripts. Many soldiers in 1862 ‘volunteered’ after the passing of the Conscription Act; these volunteers were not ‘true volunteers’ as were the volunteers of 1861. These volunteers were merely avoiding the label of conscript. Their motives were not as idealistic and nationalistic as the volunteers of 1861. A Confederate citizen could fulfill his obligation to the Confederacy by hiring a substitute to serve in his place. The Confederate States of America allowed the practice of substitution, in which one person pays another to serve his enlistment. At least nine substitutes served in the 42nd Alabama. If a soldier could not afford a substitute, many of these ‘volunteers’ would attempt to receive a discharge shortly after muster. Typical of these soldiers was Private George F. Capps, a thirty one year old farmer from Pike County, Alabama, who joined Company H on 25 August 1862. In a letter to his wife Sarah, he states that he is attempting to receive an exemption from service in the Confederate army. He wrote:

\begin{quote}
I am compelled to stay in military service because of the necessary documents to show my exemption from military duty. I got a recommendation to the Provost Marshall at Montgomery and there got a passport to Columbus Miss, and service.\textsuperscript{11}
\end{quote}

During this three-month period at Camp Hardee, at least thirty-eight soldiers, four percent of the regiment, received a discharge from service for a variety of reasons.
If a ‘reluctant volunteer’ or ‘conscript’ could not obtain a separation, the remaining options were to serve honorably, resort to absent without leave (AWOL), or worse desertion. Desertion was the act of leaving military service without permission and without the intention to return. The Confederacy considered desertion one of the highest crimes a soldier could commit and was punishable by death within its Rules and Articles of War. The Rules and Articles of War considered AWOL a lesser crime and defined it as the act of departing your command without authorization but with the intention to return. AWOL was punishable by temporary confinement and hard labor. Most soldiers were guilty of AWOL, with only a few actually found guilty of desertion. The reasons for desertion and AWOL are the same and provide an indicator into the morale of a unit. Since the general reasons were the same, this thesis will treat the terms as synonymous in providing an indicator as to the morale within the 42nd Alabama.

A typical example was Private J. B. Banister, Company F, who enlisted on 10 May 1862. He departed his unit without proper authorization on 7 August 1862. Captain James B. Perkins, F Company Commander, charged Banister with desertion. Banister appeared before a Court Martial in which Colonel John W. Portis was the president. After hearing the testimony of several officers and the company first sergeant, Colonel Portis found Banister not guilty of the charge of desertion. However, he subsequently found him guilty of AWOL and sentenced him to thirty days of hard labor and confinement. Colonel Portis ordered him to stand on a barrelhead in front of the entire regiment to serve as an example to others that may decide to attempt AWOL. Portis found Banister had departed his company in August after learning the company had received marching orders. He
departed to visit his parents, stating that he felt it would be his last chance. Banister had ultimately returned of his own free will.\textsuperscript{12}

The reasons for desertion included the belief of a short war and the belief that a recruit would only serve for defense of the state. The hardships of camp life often contributed to desertion. These hardships included infrequent furloughs, no pay, poor food supplies, inadequate clothing and blankets, and frequent disease. The estimated number of total deserters from Alabama was 19,000.\textsuperscript{13} Of these, 4,000 joined the services of the United States Army or Navy.\textsuperscript{14} Considering Alabama provided 66,400 soldiers, approximately 28.6 percent of Alabama’s soldiers deserted from their commands and six percent of these deserters joined the Union Army or Navy. A comparison of the 42nd Alabama desertion rates, both internally between companies and to the average for all Alabama soldiers will provide an indication of morale within the regiment. While at Camp Hardee, the 42nd Alabama recorded at least forty-two counts of AWOL and twenty-one counts of desertion, a total regimental attrition of seven percent. Although desertion was a factor during this initial period at Camp Hardee, these rates indicate that it was not as significant as the average rate for Alabama units during the Civil War.

This initial three-month period at Camp Hardee was a time of forging a unit from a conglomeration of individuals into a regiment trained for battle. The initial crystals of cohesion were beginning to form. Private James A. Ferguson, a thirty-five year old farmer and member of F Company wrote to his wife on 6 August, “Captain Perkins says he is going to carry all of his men with him when he starts. Their is 3 or 4 that is not able to go but they will have to go.”\textsuperscript{15} On 7 August, the regiment departed Camp Hardee for Tupelo, Mississippi. The 42nd Alabama was very much a ‘green’ unit with a mix of
veterans and new recruits, volunteers and conscripts, untested leadership and resolve.

Each soldier marched from Camp Hardee as an individual member of the regiment. Each individual soldier was serving the Confederacy for his own reasons. Each step will bring them closer to the brutality of first combat and closer to each other as a cohesive unit.

Effective Strength

Figure 2. County Muster Locations of 42nd Alabama Companies. Data Source: 42nd Alabama Infantry Regiment Website. http://www.rootsweb.com/~al42inf/ Map Source: Alabama County Map Website. http://www.ag.auburn.edu/grassroots/map/


7Muster Rolls of the 42nd Alabama Regiment Commanded by Colonel John W. Portis, 42nd Alabama Infantry Records, Records Collection, Alabama State Archives, Montgomery, AL, 16 May 1862, Photocopied.

8NARA Microfilm Collection M861, Record Group 109, Complied Records Showing Service of Military Units in Confederate Organization, rolls 398-401.

9James A. Ferguson, to his wife, 7 June and 4 August 1862, provided by the Harris Family of Mississippi. Website: http://www.rootsweb.com/~allamar/CWletters.html


11George F. Capps to wife, Martha, 25 August 1862, Special Collections, University Libraries, Mississippi State University, Starkville.

12NARA Microfilm Collection M861, Record Group 109, Complied Records Showing Service of Military Units in Confederate Organization, rolls 398-401.


14Ibid., 237.

15James A. Ferguson, to his wife, 6 August 1862, provided by the Harris Family of Mississippi. Website: http://www.rootsweb.com/~allamar/CWletters.html.
CHAPTER 2

CORINTH AND FIRST COMBAT

No army ever marched to battle with prouder steps, more hopeful countenances, or with more courage than marched the Army of West Tennessee out of Ripley on the morning of September 29th, on its way to Corinth.¹

Earl Van Dorn, Report dated 23 October 1862

Introduction

The time the 42nd Alabama spent in Tupelo, Mississippi was minimal. On 11 September 1862, Colonel Portis received orders directing him to move his regiment “on the morning of the 13th instant,” and “report your command to General Maury, who will assign it in Moore’s brigade.”² On 13 September 1862, the regiment sent their baggage wagons forward and boarded trains for Saltillo, Mississippi. The 42nd Alabama with 700 soldiers had taken its first step on the road to combat at Corinth.

The Road to Corinth

The Confederate defeat at Shiloh and subsequent evacuation of Corinth, Mississippi set the stage for the Confederate Campaign to regain the critical North Mississippi railroad junction.

During mid-July 1862, General Ulysses S. Grant became the commander of the Union’s western forces and had a total force of 37,000 soldiers either at or within supporting distance of Corinth. Grant assigned Major General William S. Rosecrans, commander of the Army of the Mississippi, the mission to protect the occupied territory in northeast Mississippi. Rosecrans’ force numbered approximately 15,000 federal soldiers at Corinth and another 10,000 soldiers at several outposts throughout Northeast
Mississippi. Additionally, Grant had a force of 8,000 soldiers under General Stephan A. Hurlbut less than fifty miles from Corinth at Bolivar, Tennessee.\(^3\)

Surrounded on three sides by low ground and waterways, which turned into impenetrable swamps during the summer, Corinth’s primary avenue of approach was from the northwest. Rosecrans’ force stationed at Corinth was not large enough to defend the former perimeter of the old Confederate earthworks known as the Beauregard Line. Instead, Rosecrans’ engineers developed a tighter perimeter directly around the town of Corinth. Rosecrans built this new inner perimeter around four artillery redans; Battery Phillips, Battery Williams, Battery Robinett, and Battery Powell. Infantry, positioned in connected breastworks, supported the redans. Additionally, Rosecrans’ constructed a series of battery emplacements in-between the old Beauregard Line and the new inner perimeter of works. These batteries provided supporting fields of fire with adjoining batteries. He reinforced the Beauregard Line with cleared fields of fire and numerous obstructions. If threatened, Rosecrans’ planned to “hold the enemy at arm’s-length” at the Beauregard Line and if necessary fall back into the inner works.\(^4\)

The strategy of retaking Corinth was the vision of Confederate General Earl Van Dorn, Commander of the District of the Mississippi. Van Dorn planned to retake Corinth in a grand offensive in conjunction with General Braxton Bragg’s Kentucky Campaign. Van Dorn commanded a force of 8,000 soldiers stationed near Holly Springs, Mississippi. He convinced General Sterling Price, Commander of the Army of the West, with a force of 14,000 soldiers at Iuka, Mississippi to join forces for the offensive against Corinth. This consolidated force of 22,000 was assembled at Ripley, Mississippi and placed under Van Dorn’s command as the Army of West Tennessee. Van Dorn planned
to feint north toward Bolivar, Tennessee, to give Rosecrans the impression that he intended to attack Grant’s forces at Bolivar. He would then turn east and attack Rosecrans at Corinth before Grant could reinforce him.\(^5\)

On 26 September, Price’s corps departed Baldwyn, Mississippi and marched northwest toward Dumas. On 30 September, Price’s corps reached Ripley, Mississippi joining Van Dorn’s Army of West Tennessee. Van Dorn’s now consolidated force then marched north and reached Pocahontas, Tennessee on 1 October, where it turned east crossed the Hatchie River at Davis Bridge in the early dawn hours of 2 October. That night, after twenty days of mostly foot movement, the 42nd Alabama was “camped about five miles of the outside breastworks”\(^6\) of the Beauregard Line. The weather was unseasonably hot and dry with temperatures averaging in the mid-90s. Compounding the situation for the soldiers was the scarcity of water (figure 3).

The Battle of Corinth

On 2 October, Rosecrans’ detected Van Dorn’s approach and dispatched the divisions of General’s Thomas McKean, Thomas A. Davies, and Charles S. Hamilton to secure the outer defenses along the Beauregard Line. General McKean dispatched Colonel J. M. Oliver’s Brigade further north up the Chewalla road beyond the outer works to serve as an advanced picket force.

On 3 October at approximately one hour before dawn, the 42nd Alabama formed and began movement. Just outside of the former Confederate breastworks, Van Dorn’s army formed in line of battle. Van Dorn’s array of forces consisted of Major General Mansfield Lovell’s Division occupying the right flank, Major General Dabney Maury’s division in the center, and Brigadier General Louis Hebert’s division on the left flank.
Moore’s Brigade had an effective strength of 1,892 and formed the extreme right of General Maury’s division. Moore’s Brigade moved south with his right flank on the Memphis and Charleston Railroad. The 42nd Alabama Regiment was on the left flank of Moore’s Brigade (figure 4). At 7:30 A.M., General Lovell’s Confederate division approached Colonel Oliver’s advanced position. Oliver’s Brigade retired slowly and established a line of defense with McKean’s division within the exterior works on Rosecrans’ left flank. Oliver’s Brigade now commanded both the Chewalla road and the Memphis and Charleston Railroad. At approximately 10:00 A.M., Brigadier General J. McArthur assumed command of this portion of the Union defense and temporarily checked Lovell’s advance.

As Davies’ division occupied the entrenchments west of McArthur’s force, a gap formed between the two units. Maury’s Confederate division approached the center of the Union defense and Moore’s Brigade struck this gap. Moore had arrayed his brigade with the 2nd Texas, 35th Mississippi, and 42nd Alabama in the lead, three regiments abreast, and the 15th and 23rd Arkansas in trail, two regiments abreast. Lieutenant Jefferson R. Stockdale of Company G, 42nd Alabama, a twenty-five year old overseer and son of an Irish immigrant farmer from Talladega, Alabama, described the initial engagement, “our boys charged them over fallen timbers, and every conceivable obstruction that could be thrown in our way, but on we went under heavy fire of shell, grape, canister, and musketery” (figure 5). Moore’s Brigade struck the 7th Illinois Infantry and Battery I, 1st Missouri Artillery, and collapsed the right flank of McArthur’s brigade. Battery I
withdrew in disorder abandoning two of its caissons. Colonel Andrew J. Babcock of the 7th Illinois reported:

At this time, I discovered a large force of rebels breaking through the timber in solid column about 40 rods from my right and moving directly toward and across the earthworks. I turned the fire of my right wing oblique and checked them for a few minutes. They rallied and succeeded in turning the right flank . . . receiving my fire with remarkable steadiness . . . Being nearly surrounded . . . I ordered my command to fall back.  

After the 42nd Alabama had taken the outer works, they mistakenly fired upon the brigade skirmishers of Company K, 2nd Texas Regiment, killing a lieutenant and six privates as they returned to the Confederate line. This unfortunate friendly fire incident demonstrates the inexperience of the regiment as it continued to form into a cohesive unit. Overall, the 42nd Alabama reacted well to its baptism of fire, suffering less than ten wounded.  

As McArthur’s brigade fell back, Davies withdrew his division to the inner works. Moore’s brigade continued southeast, crossed the Chewalla Road, and entered the former Union encampment of the 21st Missouri at approximately 2:00 P.M. McArthur’s brigade retreated approximately 1,000 yards to a position just north of Battery F, forming a new defensive line with General Crocker’s brigade.  

With the withdrawal of Davies’ division, McArthur’s brigade was now well forward of any other Union forces and stood alone against the entire assault of Price’s corps. As Moore’s brigade pushed forward across the Chewalla Road and past the former Union camps, General McArthur ordered his regiments to attack. The 42nd Alabama, on the left flank of Moore’s brigade, was met by the 17th Wisconsin. Colonel John L. Doran reported, “the enemy in force was driven back full three-quarters of a mile without any
support in the first instance.” The 7th and 57th Illinois then came up and supported the 17th Wisconsin in driving back Moore’s brigade. This counterattack created a salient within the advancing divisions of Lovell and Maury. Realizing his flanks were now threatened, McArthur ordered a withdrawal. Private William W. Cluett of the 57th Illinois commented his regiment “made a charge upon the enemy, but not having sufficient force to protect our flanks we were again compelled to fall back, forming with our brigade.” McArthur’s brigade retreated to the inner works of Corinth. McArthur’s withdrawal was covered by Crocker’s Iowa brigade stationed near Battery F (figure 6).

Requesting assistance from Price, General Lovell remarked:

> On our right front was a strong redoubt, well flanked with infantry and with an abatis of felled timber half a mile in width extending around it in one direction but with no obstructions to the north in the direction of Price's right. This fact I communicated to the major-general commanding, and shortly afterward the works was attacked and gallantry carried from its right rear by Moore's brigade.

At 3:30 P.M., finding the enemy entrenched on the south side of Battery F, Maury reinforced Moore’s brigade with two regiments from Cabell’s brigade. Moore turned his brigade southwest and approached the Memphis and Charleston Railroad where they met the 15th and 18th Iowa just south of Battery F. Moore moved his two trailing Arkansas regiments in line as a brigade and advanced with five regiments in line. The brigade crossed the Memphis and Charleston railroad and attacked the two Iowa regiments.

General Moore described the work of his brigade below Battery F:

> We soon reached the railroad, having our line of battle nearly parallel to it, and on crossing the enemy opened on us a most terrific fire from the brow of a hill not more than 75 yards distant. The enemy opposed us with a heavy force, being formed in two lines, the fire staggered us but for a moment, and as soon as our line was steadied a little we charged, drove them from the position, and carried their works, capturing a few prisoners, and taking a large camp, with their supplies of commissary and quartermaster's stores.
During this attack, the 42nd Alabama attacked into the 15th Iowa Infantry. Lieutenant Colonel William W. Belknap reported:

the enemy came regularly on in line of battle, their left appearing through the thick underbrush to be nearly opposite the right of the Fifteenth and the left of the Sixteenth. . . . Both fired at the same instant and both in full volleys, ours being promptly given and that of the enemy with less regularity. Our men fell back a few steps for an instant, reloaded, and from the first fought like veterans. For three-quarters of an hour they contended with an immensely superior force.\textsuperscript{16}

After driving back the enemy, the brigade crossed to the north of the railroad and resumed its position in the line of Maury's division. After a day of fighting, the 42nd Alabama slept on their arms in line of battle within the outer works of the Corinth defenses.

Overall, 3 October was a day of success for the Army of West Tennessee. Moore’s brigade and the 42nd Alabama deserved much of the credit. Maury complimented the unit stating, ‘Moore's brigade did the heavy business, carrying three camps and turning a strong redoubt in Lovell's front, saving him the trouble of carrying it.’\textsuperscript{17} Van Dorn desired to continue the success of the day with an assault late in the evening. He later recanted under the protest of Price, who felt that the soldiers were in no condition to continue the assault. Van Dorn ordered the assault for 4:00 A.M. the next day. General Maury agreed with the decision to delay the assault:

They had been marching and fighting since dawn; the day had been one of the hottest of the year; our men had been without water since morning, and were almost famished; while we were pursuing the enemy from his outer works that morning several of our men fell from sunstroke, and it was with good reason that General Price opposed further action that evening.\textsuperscript{18}

Van Dorn made his final adjustments for the attack. His line of battle was just outside Rosecran’s interior positions. Lovell’s division was on the right flank, with
Maury in the center, and Hebert on the left flank. At 1:00 A.M. of 4 October, the 42nd Alabama shifted east approximately a quarter mile in preparation for the assault. The attack was to begin at 4:00 A.M. with the advance of General Hebert’s division, signaling the general assault. Skirmishers from both sides pushed out and probed in the pre-dawn darkness. The artillery began promptly at 4:00 A.M.; however, the infantry attack did not begin until 10:00 A.M., due to the illness of General Hebert. He was relieved of command and replaced by General Green, the division’s senior brigade commander. At 10:30 A.M., Maury’s division advanced in the center. Moore’s brigade was on the right flank of the division. Phifer’s Texas cavalry was dismounted and on Moore’s left flank. Lovell’s division would advance on Moore’s right. However, Lovell’s division did not participate in Van Dorn’s general assault for unknown reasons.

Moore’s brigade advanced with regiments in column by company. Within Moore’s brigade, the 42nd Alabama was on the extreme right, the 2nd Texas was in the center, and the 35th Mississippi was on the left. The 15th and 23rd Arkansas trailed the brigade. After marching 250 yards, the regiment reached the crest of a hill and could view the town of Corinth behind the Union defenses. The Union defenses were very formidable, with cleared fields of fire and abatis positioned in front of the defender’s ramparts. Captain Oscar L. Jackson, commander of Company H, 63rd Ohio Regiment, defended the immediate right of battery Robinett. He described the advance of Moore’s Brigade:

The rebels began pouring out of the timber and forming storming columns. All the firing ceased and everything was silent as the grave. They formed one column . . . then another, and crowding out of the woods another, and so on. I thought they would never stop coming out of the timber. While they were forming, the men
were considerable distance from us but in plain sight and as soon as they were ready they started at us with a firm, slow, steady step.¹⁹

The 42nd Alabama attacked between the Memphis Road and the Memphis and Charleston Railroad toward Battery Robinett. The 37th, 39th, 43rd, and 63rd Ohio and the 11th Missouri regiments supported the battery, which consisted of a three-gun redan under the command of Lt. Henry C. Robinett. The Robinett redan was thirty-five yards wide, triangular in shape with an open rear, and included seven-foot high parapets with a ditch in front (figure 7).²⁰

Captain George Foster, commander of Company A, led the regimental assault column toward the western portion of Battery Robinett. The 2nd Texas attacked directly toward Robinett along the Memphis Road. The 35th Mississippi attacked east of the Memphis Road. The 15th and 23rd Arkansas followed in trail. At 10:30 A.M., Captain Foster shouted, “They shan’t beat us to those breastworks. . . . Forward Alabamians!” and challenged his column to be the first soldiers to the enemy works.²¹ The 42nd Alabama moved forward toward Battery Robinett with the entirety of Moore’s brigade. Brigadier General David S. Stanley, commanding the Second Division, described the attack, “Three deep columns burst simultaneously from the wood . . . and pushed rapidly for the position of the batteries.”²²

The artillery of Battery Robinett, supported by Battery Williams and the musketry of the infantry, opened on Moore’s brigade with terrible effect. Union accounts reported, “great gaps were cut through their ranks. . . . Dozens were slaughtered.”²³ Private James A. McKinstry, a 16-year-old member of D Company, described the initial assault, “We raised the rebel yell, and made a rush for the opening.” The 42nd Alabama was “met by a
deadly volley of shrapnel shells” and their “men fell dead and wounded all along the line.”24 As the regiment continued toward Robinett, Lieutenant Charles R. Labruzan, acting commander of F Company, a former Mobile Merchant, husband and father of four, described the scene:

We were met by a perfect storm of grape, canister, cannon balls and minnie balls. Oh God! I have never seen the like! The men fell like grass even here. Giving one tremendous cheer, we dashed to the brow of the hill on which the fortifications are situated. . . . I saw men, running at full speed, stop suddenly and fall upon their faces, with their brains scattered all around; others, with legs and arms cut off, shrieking with agony. They fell behind, beside, and within a few feet of me.25 Labruzan described the air as full of “hissing” minie balls, canister, and grape shot and “the ground literally strewn with mangled corpses.”26

Captain Foster died while leading his company during this attack on Battery Robinett. Lieutenant Labruzan remarked, “I saw poor Foster throw up his hands. . . . The top of his head seemed to cave in, and the blood spouted straight up several feet.”27 Captain George A. Williams, First U. S. Infantry, provided a detailed account of the attack of the 42nd Alabama. He had an exceptional vantage point from Battery Williams, southwest of Battery Robinett:

My attention was drawn to the left side of the battery by the firing from Battery Robinett, where I saw a column advancing to storm it. After advancing a short distance they were repulsed, but immediately reformed, and, storming the work, gained the ditch, but were repulsed. During this charge 8 of the enemy, having placed a handkerchief on a bayonet and calling to the men in the battery not to shoot them, surrendered, and were allowed to come into the fort. They then reformed, and, restoring, carried the ditch and outside of the work.28

The 42nd Alabama assaulted the western portion of Battery Robinett defended by the 43rd Ohio. Lieutenant Colonel Swane, “The enemy advanced in great force . . . until
the head of his column had gained the parapet and opened fire on our rear from the opposite side of the earthwork.”

Elements of the 42nd Alabama and the 2nd Texas drove the Union forces from Robinett and momentarily gained the ditch and ramparts of the redan. Deadly close quarters combat occurred on Robinett, “A terrific hand-to-hand combat ensued. . . . The carnage was dreadful. Bayonets were used, muskets clubbed, and men were felled with brawny fists.” Private McKinstry described the carnage on Robinett, “I looked and, lo! Every one of the fifteen men who were standing with me had fallen in a heap.” Corporal J. A. Going, an 18-year-old, carried the 42nd Alabama regimental colors until he was wounded-in-action in the assault. He then passed the colors to Private Crawford, who was also wounded-in-action on the ramparts of Robinett. General Moore remarked that the 42nd Alabama “mounted the parapet and planted their flag on the walls (figure 8).”

The 11th Missouri, positioned in reserve behind Robinett, counterattacked and regained Robinett. Major Andrew J. Weber of the 11th Missouri reported:

The enemy took possession of the fort and were within 30 paces of my little line, when we arose with a yell and charged them. Though the enemy had thus far been successful, when met at the bayonet point he turned and fled ignominiously. We retook the fort and then fired our first shot, and having every advantage of the confusion of the enemy, piled the ground with his killed and wounded.

Brigadier General David S. Stanley described the repulse of Moore’s brigade, “The hill was cleared in an instant, the enemy leaving the ditch and grounds covered with his dead and wounded. Many threw down their arms and called for quarter (figure 9).”

The casualties of the 42nd Alabama were heavy near Robinett. Large portions of the regiment choose to surrender as opposed to the certain death by fleeing in front of the formidable Union guns (figure 10). As Moore’s lead regiments were repulsed at Robinett,
Moore’s two Arkansas regiments and the trail companies of the 42nd Alabama followed Phifer’s brigade into Corinth as far as the Tishomingo Hotel (figure 11) General Moore described the actions of his brigade east of Robinett and in the city of Corinth:

On reaching this point we charged and carried the enemy's works . . . penetrated to the very heart of Corinth, driving the enemy from house to house and frequently firing in at the windows and driving them out. The enemy was driven from the breastworks in great confusion, leaving their guns, some with teams still hitched, while others had their horses cut loose and ran off.  

Lieutenant Jefferson R. Stockdale described the actions of G company, “We went over the breastworks into Corinth and fought in the streets, grappling with the foe, in many instances hand to hand but overwhelming numbers forced us to retire, the killed and wounded on both sides was very great.” Moore’s brigade culminated in the town of Corinth at the railroad junction near the Tishomingo Hotel. They were “overwhelmed” by “massive reserves” and “melted under their fire like snow in thaw.”

By 2:30 P.M., Van Dorn found the situation desperate and extracted his forces from Corinth. On the evening of 4 October, Van Dorn’s Army of West Tennessee fell back toward Pocahontas, Tennessee, along the same route in which they had advanced. Van Dorn’s challenge was to extricate his force in the face of the enemy while maintaining as much of his force as possible. Grant challenged Rosecrans to trap the retreating Army of West Tennessee and follow-up his victory.

Battle at Davis Bridge

On 4 October, Grant dispatched 8,000 union soldiers under Major General Edward O. C. Ord from Bolivar, Tennessee to cut off Van Dorn’s retreat. The Army of West Tennessee retired northwest along the State Line Road toward Pocahontas and planned to cross the Hatchie River at Davis Bridge, near Metamora, Tennessee. The
terrain near the Hatchie River is swampy and thick with small trees, under-brush, and briars. Van Dorn dispatched Colonel Wirt Adams’ Mississippi Cavalry to protect his line of retreat. Adam’s cavalry intercepted Hurlbut’s Division. Hurlbut’s force quickly repulsed Adam’s cavalry and moved toward Davis Bridge on 5 October to intercept the main Confederate force. Van Dorn recognized the importance of Davis Bridge as a crossing site on the Hatchie River and dispatched 360 soldiers from the 1st Texas Legion to secure it (figure 12). At 8:30 A.M., the 1st Texas Legion formed a line of battle on the west side of Davis Bridge, on Burr’s Branch of the Hatchie River. Additionally, General Maury pushed Moore’s brigade forward to assist the Texas Legion in securing the crossing. Moore’s brigade crossed Davis Bridge and formed to the right of the 1st Texas. Maury remarked, “Moore’s brigade . . . marched across the bridge and formed with the view of storming the heights of Metamora, but they were too few and too late.”

The remnants of Moore’s Brigade consisted of the 42nd Alabama, the 35th Mississippi, and the 15th and 23rd Arkansas. Moore’s force now consisted of only 300 soldiers and was “greatly exhausted and weak for want of food . . . and hard service.”

Hurlbut’s force had reached Metamora just ahead of Moore’s brigade. They established two four-gun battery positions and deployed seven regiments along a ridge just to the west of the Confederate battle line (figure 13). The Union batteries of the 2nd Illinois opened the fight. Captain William H. Bolton stated, “I opened fire upon two rebel batteries, one of 12-pounder howitzers and the other of rifled pieces.” General Moore reported, “As we were filing off to the right the enemy’s batteries opened on us . . . we not only could not advance successfully, but we thought we could not hold our present
position long without assistance."\textsuperscript{41} The Confederate batteries stationed with Moore’s brigade on the west side of the river returned the fire.

At approximately 9:30 A.M., General James C. Veatch’s Union brigade advanced toward Davis Bridge. Veatch remarked:

The action became very hot, but our men pressed them steadily, and in a short time they gave way and took shelter behind houses and fences, abandoning four pieces of artillery which had been silenced by our batteries. . . . The enemy was driven from his strong positions and the fight became general along the whole line, the rebels fighting behind fences and houses and our forces advancing over and around these obstacles.\textsuperscript{42}

The 14th and 15th Illinois of Veatch’s Brigade moved directly against Moore’s Brigade. Colonel Cyrus Hall, Commander of the 14th Regiment Illinois Volunteers, reported the assault of his regiment against Moore’s Brigade, “he poured a murderous and continuous fire into our ranks until we had advanced to within a few paces of the river bank. Here we captured several hundred prisoners and a number of small-arms.”\textsuperscript{43}

The 15th Illinois was able to steal the right flank of the Confederate line, causing the line to break and retreat in confusion across the Hatchie River. The Davis Bridge, swept by fire, was a death trap to any Confederate soldier attempting to cross it. Many soldiers chose to cross the river wherever they could; “many of the rebels jumped into the river . . . not a small portion of them were drowned.”\textsuperscript{44} Lieutenant Colonel Thomas C. Lanier, deputy commander of the 42nd Alabama, reported, “our forces being greatly outnumbered, we had to fall back, many of our men being captured in the bend of the river.”\textsuperscript{45}

Confederate reinforcements arrived, which included the 2nd Texas of Moore’s brigade, Phifer’s brigade, and Cabell’s brigade. They formed a second line along a low
ridge east of Davis Bridge. Hurlbut’s force pursued Moore’s brigade and crossed the
Davis Bridge at the “double-quick.” The Union soldiers were forced into a small area and
“massed six regiments of men in a triangular space of ground which would have been
abundantly occupied by one.”46 Maury’s force took advantage of the situation and poured
volley after volley into the confused blue mass. Confederate cannons added canister to
the effect. Veatch described the confusion:

The Fifty-third had scarcely cleared the bridge when it met a most deadly fire, and
in attempting to form in line it was thrown into confusion, the ground rendering it
impossible to execute the order. As the river bent sharply to the east at the bridge
and the road ran for some distance close to the river bank, leaving scarcely room
for a company instead of two regiments. . . . The galling fire of the enemy and the
nature of the ground rendered it impossible to form in line.47

Maury’s division checked Hurlbut’s force on the east side of the river and
maintained their position for the remainder of the day. Meanwhile, Confederate cavalry
discovered another crossing site at Crum’s Mill, south of Davis Bridge, along the
Boneyard Road (figure 14). At 3:00 P.M., Van Dorn redirected his Army of West
Tennessee via this route toward Ripley. At approximately 4:00 P.M., Maury’s division
began to retire from the Davis Bridge area and formed a rear guard for Van Dorn’s
army.48

General Hurlbut’s force did not pursue the Confederate forces. He described the
conclusion of the engagement as follows:

The battle virtually ceased about 3:30 p.m., the enemy making a strong
demonstration at that hour on General Lauman’s right, which was met by a charge
of front by that brigade. Under cover of this movement they hauled off their
crippled battery, leaving the caissons, and retreated southward, crossing the
Hatchie that night at Crum’s Mill.49
The engagement at Davis Bridge cost Grant his opportunity to capture Van Dorn’s army in total.

**Holly Springs**

Van Dorn’s defeated Army of West Tennessee retired southwest across North Mississippi. They entered the town of Holly Springs, Mississippi and went into camp during mid-October 1862. Records indicate that the 42nd Alabama consisted of approximately 304 effectives by Fall 1862. Lieutenant Stockdale of F Company reported:

> The Army is now lying in camps, in and around Holly Springs, we have almost 30 men in our company, the remainder killed, wounded, and missing. The officer sent under a flag of truce has not yet returned hence we don’t know our full casualties.\(^50\)

On 13 October, the Union forces at Bolivar, Tennessee paroled many of the members of the 42nd Alabama captured during the battles at Corinth and Davis Bridge. These soldiers eventually rejoined the 42nd Alabama at Holly Springs. The 42nd Alabama used the time in camp to recover and refit. Private Fergusan wrote to his wife and described conditions in camp, “we don’t get much to eat and what we get (ant fit) to eat. There is . . . about 4 dethes a day.”\(^51\) The Acting Inspector-General of the Confederate forces at Holly Springs reported, “After all that has happened I am happy to say that the morale of the army, or what is left of it, is astonishingly good.”\(^52\)

**Effect of Corinth**

Corinth was the first experience of combat for the 42nd Alabama. The 20th Century military historian S. L. A. Marshall discussed the impact of first combat on soldiers and its affect on unit cohesion:

> Their losses will become their great teacher. The weaker ones will be shaken out of the company by this first numbing experience. . . . A majority of the strong will
survive. In the next round with the enemy they will begin to accustom themselves to the nature of the field and they will learn by trail and error those things which need doing to make the most of their united strength.\textsuperscript{53}

Casualties were severe, General Sterling Price stated, “The history of this war contains no bloodier page perhaps than that which will record this fiercely contested battle.”\textsuperscript{54} Of Van Dorn’s total effective force of 22,000 soldiers, the Army of West Tennessee suffered 22 percent casualties. These total casualties by category are as follows: 2.2 percent killed-in-action, 9.7 percent wounded-in-action, and 9.9 percent captured and missing (table 1) A Union correspondent described the aftermath of the violence:

Approaching Corinth from the north . . . you scent the battlefield from afar. Sickening exhalations from the carcasses of horses and men half stifle you. The battle of Corinth--a dreadful carnage . . . History will record that so many lives went out here; that so many splendid deeds of manlike gallantry were done.\textsuperscript{55}

The 42nd Alabama participated in the heaviest portions of the fight on 3 and 4 October at Corinth and again on 5 October at Davis Bridge. The regiment suffered horrendous casualties over the course of the three days of constant fighting. The severest KIA rates occurred in companies A, B, and D (figure 15). Overall, the 42nd Alabama suffered 57 percent casualties over the course of three days, reducing them from 700 to approximately 304 effectives. The 42nd Alabama suffered the second highest casualty rate within the Brigade. The 42nd Alabama incurred rates of 5.8 percent killed-in-action rate, 9.6 percent wounded-in-action, and 41 percent missing-in-action or capture (table 2). These rates double the average casualty rates for Van Dorn’s army.

Many of the leaders were wounded-in-action, including both Colonel Portis and Lieutenant Colonel Lanier. Of the ten company commanders, Captain Foster was killed-
in-action and Captain Knox died of wounds, this equated to a 20 percent killed in action rate for company commanders. One other company commander, Captain Condry, was wounded-in-action and later recovered. One First Sergeant was killed-in-action and two of ten First Sergeants were wounded-in-action. In addition, one lieutenant was killed-in-action and six were wounded-in-action. Many of the 47 percent missing-in-action fell into Union hands as prisoners of war. These prisoners were described as “a miserable, squalid, starved set.”56 More importantly, almost every soldier paroled returned to the unit and continued with the 42nd Alabama, even after this first severe taste of combat. By January 1863, the 42nd Alabama can account for an effective strength of 592.57

Discipline and Unit Cohesion

These casualty rates among the soldiers and leaders serve as evidence to the level of combat endured by the 42nd Alabama. One of the key factors of unit cohesion and performance in combat is discipline. This first combat was a true test of discipline for the regiment. Discipline, as defined by FM 22-100, Army Leadership, is the moral, mental, and physical state in which all ranks respond to the leader’s will. True discipline demands habitual and reasoned obedience that preserves initiative, even when the leader is not around.58 Clausewitz stated, “there is nothing in War which is of greater importance than obedience.”59

Although this was the first engagement for the 42nd Alabama, the performance of the unit was excellent as reported by leaders and soldiers on both sides. General Moore described the 42nd Alabama as remaining steady under their first combat, “This regiment advanced with remarkable steadiness, this being their first engagement.”60 Lieutenant Stockdale summed up the performance, “The Dixie Rebels fought with coolness and
determination of veteran troops was in the front from beginning to end, with deepest regret we mourn the loss of our brave boys who have fallen." Although a ‘green’ unit, the 42nd Alabama performed well during this first combat. Marshall described the impact of combat on green troops:

Green troops are more likely to flee the field than others only because they have not learned to think and act together. Individually, they may be brave and willing then as during any subsequent period, but individual bravery and willingness will not stand against organized shock. With the growth of experience, troops learn to apply the lessons of contact and communicating, and out of these things comes the tactical cohesion which enables a group of individuals to make the most of their united strength and stand steady in the face of sudden emergency.

The heat of combat of these battles served to forge the 42nd Alabama into a cohesive unit for the remainder of the war. As testimony to this fact, of the remaining ninety-eight 42nd Alabama soldiers at the end of war fifty-nine were members of the unit and participated in the battles of Corinth and Davis Bridge. This constituted 60 percent of the final war survivors. The regiment had faced a bloody first trial and the veterans of this engagement were becoming an experienced and cohesive unit. This core of combat veterans would maintain the unit until the end.
Figure 7. Actions at Battery Robinett 04 October 1862. Source: Stacy D. Allen, “Crossroads of the Western Confederacy,” *Blue & Gray*, vol. 19, issue 6 (Columbus, Ohio: Blue & Gray Enterprises, Inc., 2002) 61.


Figure 13. Initial deployment at Davis Bridge 05 October 1862. Source: Stacy D. Allen, “Crossroads of the Western Confederacy,” Blue & Gray, vol. 19, issue 6 (Columbus, Ohio: Blue & Gray Enterprises, Inc., 2002) 18.
Figure 14. The Confederate Line Holds 05 October 1862  
Source: Stacy D. Allen
Corinth Casualties by Company

Figure 15. 42nd Alabama Corinth Casualties by Company  

Table 1. Total Confederate Losses during the Corinth Campaign October 3-5, 1862

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<th>DATE</th>
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<th>KILLED</th>
<th>WIA</th>
<th>CAPTURED AND MISSING</th>
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<td>Oct. 3-5</td>
<td>*22,000</td>
<td>505 (2.2%)</td>
<td>2,150 (9.7%)</td>
<td>2,183 (9.9%)</td>
<td>4,838 (22%)</td>
</tr>
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Table 2. Casualties within Moore’s Brigade during the Battles of Corinth and Davis Bridge, 3-5 October 1862.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>MIA TOTAL</th>
<th>KIA TOTAL</th>
<th>WIA TOTAL</th>
<th>KIA/WIA TOTAL</th>
<th>KIA/WIA/MIA TOTAL</th>
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<tr>
<td>*42nd AL</td>
<td>288</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>396</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lyles’s ARK REGT</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>144</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35th MS</td>
<td>347</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>489</td>
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<tr>
<td>Boone’s ARK REGT</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd TX</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>166</td>
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<tr>
<td>Brigade Total</td>
<td>984</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>229</td>
<td>282</td>
<td>1293</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Note – 42nd Alabama data derived from NARA records

2 Ibid., 17.1, 700–701.
5 Ibid., 378.
8 The Democratic Watchtower vol. 23, no. 40 October 28, 1862.
10 Ibid., 292–293.


15 Ibid., 398.

16 Ibid., 364.

17 Ibid., 396.

18 Dabney Maury, “Campaign Against Grant in North Mississippi,” *Southern Historical Society*, vol. 13 (1885) 295.

19 Oscar L. Jackson, *The Colonel’s Diary*, (Sharon, PA, 1922), 71.


26 Ibid., 71.

27 Ibid., 87.

29 Ibid., 190-191.


33 Ibid., 202.

34 Ibid., 181.

35 Ibid., 399.

36 The Democratic Watchtower vol. 23, no. 40 October 28, 1862.


38 Ibid., 394.

39 Ibid., 399.

40 Ibid., 332.

41 Ibid., 399.

42 Ibid., 322-323.

43 Ibid., 325.


47 Ibid. 323.


50The Democratic Watchtower vol. 23, no. 40 October 28, 1862.

51James A. Ferguson, to his wife, 1862, provided by the Harris Family of Mississippi. Website: http://www.rootsweb.com/~allamar/CWletters.html.


58Field Manual 22-100. Army Leadership, Be, Know, Do, (Washington, D.C: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 1999), 3-2, para 3-8 and 3-9.


61The Democratic Watchtower Vol 23, No. 40 October 28, 1862.

CHAPTER 3
VICKSBURG IS THE KEY

See what a lot of land these fellows hold, of which Vicksburg is the key! The war can never be brought to a close until that key is in our pocket. We can take all the northern ports of the Confederacy, and they can defy us from Vicksburg.

Abraham Lincoln, *Incidents and Anecdotes of the Civil War*

Introduction

The 42nd Alabama spent October through November 1862 in camp at Lumpkin’s Mill, near Holly Springs, Mississippi assigned to Lieutenant General John C. Pemberton’s Department of Mississippi and East Louisiana. Pemberton’s department was responsible for protecting the remaining Confederate territory and railroad lines in North Mississippi.

Central Mississippi Campaign

After the repulse of Van Dorn’s force at Corinth, Grant focused on the capture of Vicksburg and the control of the Mississippi River. He planned to take Vicksburg in a two-pronged attack. Grant would accompany one force through Central Mississippi and Major General William T. Sherman, commanding the second force from Memphis, Tennessee would move by transport ships directly toward Vicksburg. Grant consolidated approximately 31,000 soldiers at Grand Junction, Tennessee and began his movement toward Holly Springs. On 9 November, Pemberton wired Richmond, “I deemed it advisable to withdraw from the indefensible position at Holly Springs.” The Confederate forces evacuated Holly Springs in the face of the advancing Federals and took up positions north of Oxford, Mississippi along the Tallahatchie River. Grant outflanked the
Confederate positions along the Tallahatchie, forcing Pemberton to withdraw further south.

On 2 December, Grant’s force entered Oxford Mississippi skirmishing with the Confederate rearguard and captured thirty four soldiers of the 42nd Alabama at the Confederate Hospital at Oxford. These soldiers suffered from wounds received at Corinth or illness from poor sanitary conditions in camp, six of these soldiers died while in Union custody. Grant eventually paroled and exchanged the remaining soldiers on 9 May 1863.\(^3\)

From Oxford, Grant sent his intentions to General Henry C. Halleck, the General in Chief, “Sherman will command the expedition down the Mississippi. He will have a force of about 40,000 men. Will land above Vicksburg up the Yazoo, if practicable, and cut the Mississippi Central Railroad.”\(^4\) As Grant continued his advance in Central Mississippi, the Confederate force fell back fifty miles to the Yalobusha River near Grenada and occupied this line on 6 December.

Grant would fix the Confederate force at Grenada, while Sherman landed his force above Vicksburg. On 20 December, Sherman’s force boarded steamers at Memphis and moved down the Mississippi River toward Vicksburg. On the same day, Van Dorn’s cavalry surprised Grant by striking his depot at Holly Springs. Van Dorn then moved north, destroying Grant’s line of supply from Holly Springs to Bolivar, Tennessee. With his supply lines cut, Grant abandoned his approach toward Grenada and fell back.

On 27 December, General Sherman’s forces landed north of Vicksburg and attacked Confederate forces at Chickasaw Bluffs on the 29th. Maury’s division began movement from Grenada toward Vicksburg via train to meet Sherman’s threat. As the 42nd Alabama prepared to move from Grenada to Vicksburg, Private Ferguson wrote:
We are moving to Vicksburg they are fighting at Vicksburg and the day before yesterday that our Army was [falling] back. There will be a big fight before many days . . . if we get whipped at Vicksburg Mississippi is gone without a doubt. We have got a strong force there and the advantage. I rather think we will hold the place.  

As Moore’s regiments arrived, they were rushed forward to reinforce Brigadier General Stephen D. Lee’s forces who were engaged with Sherman’s forces at Chickasaw bluffs. Moore’s brigade now consisted of the 42nd, 40th, 37th Alabama, 35th, 40th Mississippi, and 2nd Texas.

On 2 January 1863, Moore’s brigade arrived at Chickasaw Bluffs as Sherman’s defeated force was boarding steam transports to withdraw. The 42nd Alabama was one of the last regiments to arrive. The 42nd Alabama encamped at Camp Timmons on Haynes Bluff. On 18 January, the 42nd Alabama reported an effective strength of 556 soldiers present for duty. On 31 January, Private Ferguson wrote:

The health of our company is tolerable good. We have got a good large company. We have got 34 conscripts sent here from Talladega. The Yankees is in sight of us on the other side of the River . . . we are living in a very low wet swampy place is very disagreeable when it Rains and wood is very unhandy.

The regiment remained at Camp Timmons until March 1863 and used the time to receive replacements and replenish supplies.

Yazoo and Steele’s Bayou Expeditions

With the failure of the Central Mississippi Campaign and Sherman’s assault at Chickasaw Bluffs, General Grant began his next major campaign to capture Vicksburg. One force would move through the Yazoo Pass into the Yazoo River while another force moved through Steele’s Bayou toward the Yazoo River. Both approaches utilized backwater channels in an attempt to move troops to the rear of the Vicksburg defenses.
Grant cut the Mississippi River levee, flooding the various bayous between the Mississippi and Tallahatchie Rivers. On 3 February 1862, an Army-Navy flotilla moved through the Yazoo Pass, north of Vicksburg, and proceeded via the Coldwater, Tallahatchie, and Yazoo Rivers to reach high ground east of Vicksburg. It took several weeks for the Union flotilla to make the 200-mile trip through the bayous and narrow canals. The Navy provided two iron-clads, six tin-clads, and two rams. The Army provided a division of 5,000 men transported in twenty-two vessels under the command of General L. F. Ross. Grant described his plan for the expedition:

By the Yazoo Pass route I only expected at first to get into the Yazoo by way of Coldwater and Tallahatchie with some lighter gunboats and a few troops, and destroy the enemy's transports in that stream and some gunboats which I knew he was building. The navigation, however, proved so much better than had been expected that I thought for a time of the possibility of making this the route for obtaining a foothold on high land above Haynes' Bluff, Mississippi, and small-class steamers were accordingly ordered for transporting an army that way.

The Confederate forces delayed the Union movement by creating obstructions and harassing the flotilla as it attempted to move through the bayous. Additionally, Pemberton ordered the construction of a fort near Greenwood, Mississippi to block the flotilla’s northern approach. He selected a location where the fort could monitor both the Yazoo and Tallahatchie Rivers. Fort Pemberton was constructed of cotton bales covered with earth and General William W. Loring assumed command. As the flotilla moved closer to Fort Pemberton, Loring requested additional infantry support (figure 17).

The Union flotilla attacked the fort on 11 March. Confederate guns damaged two ironclads, forcing their withdrawal from the engagement. During the day, Union transports landed Ross’ troops who moved toward Fort Pemberton by land. Loring sent his force of infantry and repulsed the Union landing. On 12 March, Moore’s brigade
received orders to move by steamers from Haynes’ Bluff to Greenwood in support of Fort Pemberton. Private R. A. Lambert described the movement of the regiment:

Grant undertook to get behind Vicksburg, Moore’s Brigade, of which the 42nd was a unit, was ordered up the Yazoo River by boat to it’s head, opposite the little town of Greenwood; but before we reached our objective, Grant had been driven back to the Mississippi River, from where he had come by the use of small boats through Yazoo Pass. We camped there a few days in the swamp, harassed by swarms of buffalo gnats

The flotilla abandoned its efforts against Fort Pemberton and withdrew prior to the arrival of Moore’s Brigade.

On 20 March, Union Forces retired north away from Fort Pemberton area. With the withdrawal of Ross’ force, Loring ordered Moore’s brigade back to Yazoo City. The purpose was to continue as a reserve and “return here in case of necessity, or to act in the direction of Deer Creek.”

On 16 March, Grant sent Sherman the following instructions:

You will proceed as early as practicable up Steele’s Bayou and through Black Bayou to Deer Creek, and thence with the gunboats now there, by any route they may take to get into the Yazoo River, for the purpose of determining the feasibility of getting an army through that route to the east bank of that river, and at a point from which they can act advantageously against Vicksburg.

Pemberton dispatched expeditions under the command of General Winfield S. Featherston and Lee to counter Sherman’s and Admiral David D. Porter’s flotilla movement down Deer Creek. These forces effectively checked Sherman’s advance and forced his withdrawal. The 42nd Alabama remained as a reserve at Yazoo City.

While stationed at Yazoo City, Moore’s brigade emplaced one 8-inch Columbiad and two 20-pound Parrotts to command the Yazoo River. The 8-inch Columbiad was manned by two officers and twenty men of the 42nd Alabama. These
soldiers had artillery experience from Fort Morgan as members of the 2nd Alabama during the first year of the war.\textsuperscript{11}

Grant provided Ross additional reinforcements and made one more attempt to move through the Yazoo Pass on 1 April. The Ironclads shelled Fort Pemberton and the transports landed another ground force near Pemberton. After several days of artillery exchange, the Union force withdrew on 4 April 1863. This withdrawal ended Grant’s Yazoo Pass and Steele’s Bayou expeditions.

The Final Campaign for Vicksburg

With the failure of the Yazoo Pass and Steele’s Bayou Expeditions, Grant contemplated another approach to take Vicksburg. This time he planned to march his Army down the west side of the Mississippi River. Porter’s transports would run the gauntlet of batteries at Vicksburg, link up with Grant’s force south of Vicksburg, and ferry it across the river. Grant would then move against Vicksburg from the landward side.

Pemberton detected the Union movement and consolidated his troops. On 15 April, Moore’s brigade began movement from Yazoo City back to Haynes’ Bluff. Major Maurice K. Simons of Moore’s staff described the scene, “All is a bussell & confusion this morning such as always preceeds a move. We have now been one month & two days in Yazoo City. Have found it a very pleasant place.”\textsuperscript{12} Private Fergusan wrote from Yazoo City just prior to the regiment’s departure:

Eliza, I will now tel you something about the times and how we are living. We are giting tolerable planty to eat--we are giting Bacon and soon very good Beef! Molasses and sugar we have bin living very well ever since we left Vicksburg. We are now expecting to leave here but I dont no where we will go.\textsuperscript{13}
The brigade returned to Camp Timmons on Haynes’ Bluff and encamped on the evening of 16 April.

Admiral Porter moved his fleet past the batteries of Vicksburg on the nights of 16 and 23 April 1863 (figure 18). While at Haynes’ Bluff, Major Simons described the event in his diary:

We were aroused from our beds about 11 or 12 O’clock last night by the booming of Cannon. Such a grabbing for Boots Pants & you never did see. In a few moments as were all out doors & in full view we could distinctly see a steamer making her way down the River. Our Batteries continued to send forth their great missiles of death . . . . No doubt, the Enemy intends crossing a force below the City to try & flank us or they may try to take Port Hudson first & if they succeed in that they will then bring all their strength to bear against this point. A few days will tell what they intend.14

On 30 April and 1 May, Grant’s army is ferried across the Mississippi River at Bruinsburg, simultaneously Sherman conducted a diversion toward Haynes’ Bluff.

General Maury reported:

The enemy, after a heavy cannonade of our works as Snyder's Bluff for a part of two days, and landing several battalions of infantry-re-embarked the latter and returned down the river. From the strength and manner of his, attack, it was manifestly a false one, and designed to cover some other movement.15

Moore’s brigade reacted to the diversion and prepared for an attack that never came. On 1 May, Private Ferguson wrote, “In Camps near Vicksburg . . . We are lying behind the Brest Works--about 3 miles above our camp waiting for the approach of the Yankees.”16 The next day he writes, “We have got back to our camps without a fight so far. . . . I have been on picket yesterday morning till this morning and nothing to eat but a little no bread.”17

During April 1863, Major General J. H. Forney replaced Maury as the division commander. Grant defeated the Confederate Forces under General John S. Bowen at Port
Gibson on 1 May 1863 and began his advance toward Jackson, Mississippi to cut the supply routes to Vicksburg. On 2 May, Moore’s brigade “received orders to issue three days rations” and march from Haynes’ Bluff to Warrenton, Mississippi, to cover the southern approaches to Vicksburg. Colonel Smith of the 2nd Texas described the events of Moore’s brigade at Warrenton:

The regiment took its turn in manning a redoubt in the town, near the river, and in picketing the banks of the river above and below the town. The redoubt was regularly cannonaded every evening by a gunboat, whose business appeared to be to patrol the river and cover the movements of troop on the opposite side. No one in the redoubt was seriously wounded.\textsuperscript{18}

On 15 May, after only two weeks, Moore’s brigade departed Warrenton and moved to within three miles of Vicksburg.

Grant’s army had turned west and was advancing toward the Vicksburg defenses. General Pemberton consolidated a force and moved out of Vicksburg to meet Grant’s army. Pemberton was severely defeated on 16 May at Champion’s Hill. He subsequently fell back into the defenses surrounding Vicksburg and prepared for the impending siege. On 17 May, Moore’s brigade moved into the Vicksburg defenses to meet Grant’s threat from the east. On the same day, Grant’s force met Pemberton’s rearguard holding the Big Black River Bridge. Moore’s soldiers heard the artillery fire as they entered the defensive positions of Vicksburg. Major Simons recorded in his diary on 17 May, “This morning we were ordered to move to Vicksburg. We hear firing of artillery in the direction of the Big Black.”\textsuperscript{19}
The Siege of Vicksburg

The 42nd Alabama assumed positions in the defenses of Vicksburg. At this time, Moore’s brigade consisted of the 42nd, 37th, and 40th Alabama, 2nd Texas, 35th and 40th Mississippi, and Bledsoe’s Missouri Battery.

The brigade’s right flank was positioned on the Southern Railroad and the left flank on the Great Redoubt. Initially, Moore placed the 42nd Alabama along Baldwin’s Ferry Road. During the night of 17 May, the 42nd Alabama changed positions with the 2nd Texas. This movement placed the 42nd Alabama on Moore’s extreme right. The 42nd Alabama’s right flank rested on the Southern Railroad of Mississippi and the left flank was secured by the 2nd Texas, just to the north on the Baldwin’s Ferry Road (figure 19). Colonel Smith of the 2nd Texas described the switch:

Subsequently, the same night, and hour or two after midnight, the men were roused from their bivouac on the ground, and moved out of their brigade position, and changed places with the Forty-Second Alabama a gallant regiment, in order that the Second Texas Infantry might man the fort which commanded the Baldwin's Ferry road at the very point where the road traversed the lines to enter the city.20

The regiment discovered this portion of the defenses in a state of disrepair and the trenches too shallow and thin. They worked continuously to repair these works and improve their position.

Grant’s forces approached Vicksburg from the east and made an immediate assault to take the works. On the morning of 19 May, Union skirmishers engaged Moore’s pickets and fired artillery into his positions. Colonel Smith of the 2nd Texas described the actions along the brigade’s front, “Soon clouds of the enemy's skirmishers were deploying to the right and left. . . . The skirmishing was heavy.”21 The Confederate
works on Forney’s front easily repulsed the attempt. The main assault occurred north of
Moore’s Brigade and proved a failure for Grant.

On 22 May, Grant made two more assaults against Pemberton’s defenses.
Artillery preparation fires preceded each assault. Major Simons of Moore’s staff

described the fires along the brigade’s sector:

> At daylight this morning, the cannon opened their fire with unusual fierceness... roaring all round us. I have just been counting the number per minute & find it to average from ten to forty per minute... There has been hundreds of shot & shell fallen all round us.²²

The 42nd Alabama was stationed in the trenches and rifle pits covering the right
flank of the 2nd Texas. The 99th Illinois Regiment, supported by the 33rd Illinois of
Brigadier General Benton’s 1st Brigade, General Eugene A. Carr’s division assaulted this
portion of the line. General Moore reported, “Their greatest efforts were made against
that portion of the line occupied by... the Second Texas. This regiment was nobly
supported by the Forty-second Alabama, occupying the trenches on their right.”²³ The
commander of the 2nd Texas reported, “Instantaneously the enemy earth was black with
their close columns... Dashing forward in good order, they were hurled against our
works with the utmost fury and determination.”²⁴

General Forney described the aftermath of the assault against the Texas Lunette,
“The road in front of this position was left covered with the dead bodies of the enemy.
This position was most vigorously assailed” (figure 20).²⁵ General John A. McClernand
requested reinforcements from Grant late in the evening to exploit his perceived success.
These reinforcements, which included Bommer’s Third Brigade, moved forward to
support General Carr’s division. These additional forces were repulsed prior to reaching
Forney’s line. Moore reported, “They were easily repulsed in the morning, but in the afternoon charge they were more determined, coming up and even into the outer ditch of the Second Texas redoubt. . . . Having failed to carry our works by assault, the enemy now appeared to determine not to attempt it again.” Unable to effect a penetration of Forney’s line, the assault was discontinued. The assault of 22 May was another failure. Grant regretted the unnecessary loss of life and McClearnard was relieved of command.

Three days after the assault, a soldier of Moore’s Brigade recorded:

At 2 o’clock P.M. on the 25th, a flag of truce was sent in by the enemy, asking permission to bury their dead and remove their wounded, some of whom had lain on the field, where they had fallen, for several days. During the time they were engaged in this the soldiers on the opposing sides met, talked kindly with each other, exchanging different articles and when the time was out retired to their respective lines, and again began the work of destruction.

Corporal Robert H. Bunn, a 17-year-old member of B Company, 42nd Alabama described the scene:

It was no doubt the most daring assaults that was made on our line. Their loss was very heavy. The day the dead were removed and we allowed to mingle with the survivors of the regiment and it was sad to see brothers and friends searching for their own among heaps of fallen heroes.

With the failure of these assaults, Grant decided upon siege operations. His engineers began construction of deliberate approaches toward Pemberton’s position, slowly strangling the Confederates. As early as 27 May, the affects of the siege took hold. A soldier within Moore’s brigade recorded, “rations began to fail. The corn was exhausted and peas were ground up for meal. The meat also was exhausted and mules were killed and eaten.” The conditions became much worse for the Confederate soldiers as the siege progressed. General Moore described the worsening conditions:
From this time to the close of the siege (forty-seven days) our men were confined to the trenches night and day under a fire of musketry and artillery, which was often kept up during the whole night as well as the day. Only those who were a near witness of the siege of Vicksburg will ever have a true conception of the endurance and suffering of these men, who stood at their post until overpowered, not by the enemy, but by the wants of nature. Those who only think and read of the siege, and those who witnessed and shared its trials, may perhaps form widely different conceptions of its nature. Some idea may be formed of the artillery fire to which we were exposed, when I state that a small party sent out for that purpose collected some two thousand shells near and in rear of the trenches occupied by our brigade.30

On 18 June, Major Simons recorded in his diary, “Our men are nearly worn out. . . . Never have a set of men exhibited more fortitude & endurance than has those that now defend the City of Vicksburg.”31 By 24 June, the soldiers were on one fourth rations.32 On 25 June and 1 July, Union forces exploded mines under the 3rd Louisiana redan. The follow-on assaults were not able to penetrate the defenses in that sector. Major Simons continued in his diary:

The men have been in the trenches for so long a time on short rations & having taken no exercise all the time that I do not think they could now march five miles. And I think it would worse than folly for us attempt it. Some think there will be an effort made to get out but I do not much think so. Yet I would be more than willing to make the effort for there is nothing pleasant in the thought of being a prisoner. . . . All have long faces & all despair of our holding this place beyond a few days. I feel truly sad. All looks dark & gloomy ahead. This will be the hardest blow that they have yet given us.33

General Joe Johnston was moving west in an attempt to relieve Pemberton’s force at Vicksburg. This effort constituted the last hope for the beleaguered Confederate garrison at Vicksburg. Johnston’s force reached the Big Black River. Pemberton considered an assault out of Vicksburg in order to link up with Johnston and save his army. He queried his commanders about the condition of their soldiers. General Moore’s reply was:
In our opinion, the physical condition and general health and strength of our men are not such as to enable them to make the marches and undergo the fatigues necessary to accomplish the successful evacuation of Vicksburg... to their long confinement and cramped inaction in the trenches, the state of almost incessant alert, night and day, in which the men have been since the commencement of the siege, together with other various fatigues, privations, and exposures to which they have been unavoidably subjected.\(^3^4\)

On 4 July, Pemberton surrendered Vicksburg and approximately 32,000 Confederate soldiers. General Forney stated, “my troops were marched by regiments over the intrenchments, their arms stacked and left in possession of the enemy, while they returned to bivouac in rear of the trenches.”\(^3^5\) The soldiers of the 42nd Alabama filed from their trenches and stacked arms in accordance to the terms of surrender. Private Joseph. T. Harris of K Company, 42nd Alabama stated, “We fought like lions, but surrendered like lambs.”\(^3^6\) Immediately following the surrender, Private Bunn described the actions of the 42nd Alabama:

After the surrender, our regiment occupied a building on the Bawldwin ferry road under the hill near where they are building a new bridge. It was used during the siege as an arsenal. Some of the troops that met us at Corinth and not camp inside of the Confederate line for I will remember they came and I told our boys out and can said there away to feast for a day and night at a time.\(^3^7\)

On 10 July, the Union soldiers issued 566 parole certificates to the remaining 42nd Alabama soldiers and they began the long journey toward the parole camp at Demopolis, Alabama. Many parolees were granted a thirty day furlough with the requirement to report to the Parole Camp at Demopolis, Alabama at the expiration of furlough. Most parolees had reported to Demopolis by 25 July. Moore’s brigade was exchanged on 12 September 1863.\(^3^8\) In October 1863, Moore’s brigade was ordered to join the Army of Tennessee under General Braxton Bragg at Chattanooga, Tennessee.
Effect of Vicksburg Campaign

The 42nd Alabama did not see the intense combat of Corinth during the Vicksburg Campaign. Casualties were light within the 42nd Alabama when compared to the casualties of the brigade (table 3). However, it did suffer tremendously from continued attrition over a period of six months, culminating in forty-seven days of siege warfare under extremely harsh conditions. Severely reduced rations, constant shelling, and unsanitary conditions took their toll upon the morale of the regiment. At least thirty-five soldiers were hospitalized at the time of parole. Moore was proud of his soldiers and their conduct under such harsh conditions:

I cannot speak too highly of the conduct of the officers and men. None ever endured such hardships with more cheerfulness. . . . By this time their minds and bodies seemed exhausted, and many remained at their post in the trenches who were fit subjects for the hospitals. Only those who have tried it can tell the effects produced on men by keeping them forty-seven days and nights in a narrow ditch, exposed to the scorching heat during the day and the often chilly air and dews of night.39

Leadership and Unit Cohesion

During the siege of Vicksburg, Colonel Portis relinquished his command of the Regiment to his deputy commander, Lieutenant Colonel Lanier. Portis had served as the regimental commander since its formation over one year prior. The leadership within a unit is a proven cohesive factor. S. L. A. Marshall discussed the importance of leadership to unit cohesion:

The need that a commander be seen by his men in all of the circumstances of war may therefore be considered irreducible. Not to exercise that privilege is to deny his command an additional measure of moral strength which may not be gained in any other way.40
Leadership, as defined within FM (Field Manual) 22-100, *Army Leadership*, is influencing people by providing purpose, direction, and motivation while operating to accomplish the mission and improving the organization. Daniel T. Reeve’s thesis *Combat Motivation: The Human Dimension Correlates* adds, “the direct product of leadership is a soldier’s trust and confidence in their leaders. Good leaders exhibit characteristics that directly enhance combat performance.”

The 42nd Alabama served under several regimental commanders over the course of the war. All were veterans and had volunteered during the initial 1861 call for volunteers. They all had the minimum of at least one year of prior command at lower levels prior to serving as the regimental commander.

The first regimental commander of the 42nd Alabama Infantry Regiment was Colonel John Wesley Portis. He was born 9 September 1818 in Nash County, North Carolina. Portis attended law school at the University of Virginia and established his own law partnership with his brother prior to the war. In addition, he served as a representative for Clarke County in the Alabama legislature and a trustee for the University of Alabama.

When the Civil War began, Portis disbanded his law practice in Clarke County, Alabama, and mustered with the “Suggsville Grays” as a private. Eventually, Portis became the second lieutenant of Company D, 2nd Alabama Infantry Regiment. Upon his promotion to colonel and at the age of forty-two, Portis organized and assumed command of the 42nd Alabama Infantry Regiment. Portis was a commanding presence at six feet tall, steel gray eyes, and snowy white hair. On 3 October 1862, during the Battle of
Corinth, Portis was wounded-in-action. This wound impaired Portis for the remainder of his command. He relinquished command of the regiment during the Siege of Vicksburg. After the surrender of Vicksburg, Portis returned home and resumed his law practice in Clarke County, Alabama. On 18 September 1863, Colonel Portis applied for a medical discharge from the CSA. The United States Army granted Colonel Portis his final parole on 2 June 1865 at Mobile, Alabama. Portis died on 1 April 1902 at the age of eighty-three in Suggsville, Alabama where he had lived a very quiet life as a postmaster.\textsuperscript{33}

During the Vicksburg Campaign Lieutenant Colonel Thomas C. Lanier assumed command of the regiment. Originally, from South Carolina, Lanier was a farmer from Pickens County, Alabama prior to the war. He was married with three sons and two daughters. Lanier was a veteran of the 2nd Alabama Regiment where he had served as a captain and B Company Commander. On 21 May 1862, at the age of thirty-nine, Lanier received a promotion to lieutenant colonel and served as the Deputy Commander of the 42nd Alabama Infantry Regiment. He was wounded-in-action during the battle of Corinth. Lanier continued as the commander until he suffered a severe leg wound at the Battle of New Hope Church on 26 May 1864 during the Atlanta campaign. General Baker referenced the wounding of Lanier as a severe loss to his brigade and referred to Lanier as “the gallant commander of the Forty-second Alabama Regiment.”\textsuperscript{44} Lanier never recovered from his wounds at New Hope Church and applied for medical separation in August 1864, effectively ending his tenure as the regimental commander.

Regimental command deferred to Captain Robert K. Wells. Captain Wells was the commander of Company B and the senior company commander of the regiment.
Wells was a husband and Alabama farmer, prior to the war. Similar to both Portis and Lanier, he was a veteran of the 2nd Alabama, where he had served as a second lieutenant. On 25 June 1862, he became captain and commander of Company B. Wells became regimental commander upon Lanier’s incapacitation on 26 May 1864. Wells service as Regimental Commander was short lived, at the age of twenty-three; he was killed-in-action on 28 July 1864 at the battle of Ezra Church.

Following Wells’ death, Captain William D. McNeill, commander of Company C, assumed command of the regiment. He served as the regimental commander until the consolidation of the regiment with the 37th Alabama in April of 1865. During the consolidation, McNeill became lieutenant colonel and served as deputy commander of the 37th Alabama regiment.

Company leadership was determined by election, by this point in the war, the best leaders were chosen based on experience and proven performance as opposed to the first elected leaders of the war. During the Vicksburg Campaign, soldiers recognized the importance of discipline and leadership in combat, they chose leaders that were more competent, and combat experienced.

The 19th Century Military theorist, Jomini, in his work *The Art of War*, stated of leadership, “The most essential qualities . . . will always be. . . . First, A high moral courage, capable of great resolutions; Secondly, A physical courage which takes no account of danger.”45 The leadership of the 42nd Alabama certainly exhibited these ‘essential qualities’ as seen by the loss rates of company and regimental leadership throughout the war. Table 4 depicts the company commanders and their turnover rate within the regiment. The company commanders that remained with their units throughout
the war formed the basis of cohesion within the unit. Note the commanders in A, B, C, and D companies all died while in command, with only one exception and the commanders of A, B, and D were veteran officers of the 2nd Alabama. Captain McNeill of C Company was a one-year veteran of the 1st Alabama prior to mustering with the 42nd Alabama. Within the remaining companies, the commanders were not veteran officers from the first year of the war.

Utilizing AWOL rates as an indicator of morale during the Vicksburg Campaign, we find the overall AWOL rate for the regiment was 27 percent which is on par with the overall rate of Alabama soldiers during the war at 28.6 percent. The effectiveness of leadership can be evaluated by examining the AWOL rates by company during the Vicksburg Campaign. The 42nd Alabama Morning Report dated 18 January 1863 revealed a snapshot AWOL rates by company. The lowest AWOL rate was 6 percent in Company E and the highest was 65 percent in Company F. A, B, and C only had a 20 percent AWOL rate, lower rates than the other companies with the exception of Company E (figure 6).

The war was beginning to extract its cost on the 42nd Alabama. Vicksburg is often recognized as a turning point for the Confederacy. The same may be said of the regiment. Although severely reduced from the original 904, these remaining soldiers were now experienced veterans with proven leaders. Of the 566 soldiers of the 42nd Alabama paroled at Vicksburg, only 374 soldiers rejoined the regiment at the parole camp. Of the 98 survivors at the end of the war, 82 participated in the campaign and siege of Vicksburg. The number of Vicksburg veterans at the end of the war provides evidence that this ordeal bound these veterans together.
Figure 16. 18 JAN 63 42nd Alabama AWOL Snapshot by company. Source: Morning Report of the 42nd Alabama Regiment Commanded by Colonel John W. Portis, 42nd Alabama Infantry Records, Records Collection, Alabama State Archives, Montgomery, AL., 18 January 1863, Photocopied.
Figure 20. Lithograph Portraying the Union assault on May 22 (Frank Leslie’s *The American Soldier in the Civil War*) Source: Leonard Fullenkamp, Stephen Bowman, and Jay Luvaas, *Guide to the Vicksburg Campaign.* (Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 1998), 300.
Table 3. Casualties within Moore’s Brigade during the Siege of Vicksburg.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>KIA TOTAL</th>
<th>WIA TOTAL</th>
<th>KIA/WIA TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>42nd AL</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40th AL</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35th MS</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37th AL</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40th MS</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd TX</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brigade Total</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>281</td>
<td>394</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4. Turnover of Company Commanders.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Co</th>
<th>Commander</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
<th>Commander</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>George W. Foster</td>
<td>Veteran of 2nd AL, KIA at Corinth on 4 October 1862</td>
<td>S. S. Gaillard</td>
<td>Resigned and D.W. Rankin assumed command through remainder of War</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>Robert T. Best</td>
<td>Veteran of 2nd AL, died on 25 June 1862 from disease at Camp Hardee</td>
<td>Robert K. Wells</td>
<td>Assumed Command of the regiment in June 1864 upon the wounding of LTC Lanier. Wells was KIA on 28 July 1864. Burt Upchurch assumed command through the remainder of the war.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>William D. McNeill</td>
<td>Assumed Command of the regiment in July 1864 upon the death of CPT Wells. Promoted to LTC and became the Deputy Commander of the consolidated 37th AL during April 1865.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>T. C. Mitchell</td>
<td>Veteran of 2nd AL, was at New Hope Church</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E</td>
<td>James T. Brady</td>
<td>Wounded in the face at Lookout Mountain, medically discharged on 6 April 1864</td>
<td>William B. Kendrick</td>
<td>Appt APR 6, 64 consolidated into 37th AL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>J. B. Perkins</td>
<td>Resigned 27 January 1863.</td>
<td>Charles R. Labuzan</td>
<td>Commanded until consolidation with 37th AL April 1865</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G</td>
<td>Alexander B. Knox</td>
<td>Died 23 January 1863</td>
<td>J. R. Stockdale</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H</td>
<td>William B. Kemp</td>
<td>Resigned 28 July 1862</td>
<td>E. G. Riley July 1862 - August 1863</td>
<td>Died 24 August 1863 replaced with George H. Gray and served for the remainder of the War.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>Charles Briggs</td>
<td>Resigned 5 January 1863</td>
<td>Richmond C. Reeder</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K</td>
<td>C. F. Condy</td>
<td>Resigned 2 May 1863</td>
<td>LT Thomas Conarey</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


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3. *The Democratic Watchtower*, vol. 21, Number 21 July 8, 1863.


5. James A. Ferguson, to his wife, 31 December 1862, provided by the Harris Family of Mississippi. Website: http://www.rootsweb.com/~allamar/CWletters.html.

6. Ibid., 31 January 1863.


10 Ibid., 112.

11 Ibid., 721.


13 James A. Ferguson, to his wife, 1 May 1863, provided by the Harris Family of Mississippi. Website: http://www.rootsweb.com/~allamar/CWletters.html.


16 James A. Ferguson, to his wife, 1 May 1863, provided by the Harris Family of Mississippi. Website: http://www.rootsweb.com/~allamar/CWletters.html

17 Ibid. 2 May 1863.


21 Ibid., 387.


24 Ibid., 387.

25 Ibid., 361.

26 Ibid, 382.


32 Ibid., 117.

33 Ibid., 122.


35 Ibid., 368.

36 J. T. Harris, Marion County Newspaper dated February 14, 1907


38 “Exchange Notice No. 6,” *The Democratic Watchtower,* vol. 24 no. 35 September 23, 1863.


41 Field Manual 22-100. *Army Leadership, Be, Know, Do*, (Washington, D.C: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 1999), 1-4.

42 Daniel T. Reeves, *Combat Motivation: The Human Dimension Correlates*, (Ottawa, Ontario: Carleton University, 1990), 11.

43 42nd Alabama Infantry Regiment Website: http://www.rootsweb.com/~al42inf/


CHAPTER 4
FROM CHATTANOOGA TO ATLANTA

These natural defenses were manned by a brave and vigilant force of veteran soldiers, ably commanded, quick to take advantage of any sign of wavering on the part of their assailants and who contested stubbornly each step from base to summit.¹

LTC Gilbert C. Kniffin USV, The Battle Above the Clouds

Introduction

After the Confederate victory at Chickamauga, General Braxton Bragg and the Confederate Army of Tennessee pursued the Federal forces into Chattanooga and began the Siege of Chattanooga on 23 September 1863. Bragg positioned his forces on the surrounding heights of Missionary Ridge, Lookout Mountain, Orchard Knob, and Raccoon Mountain. Lookout Mountain towered 2500 feet above the Tennessee River Valley and covered the left flank of Bragg’s siege line (figure 22). Lookout Mountain was bordered on the west by Lookout Creek and on the east by Chattanooga Creek. On October 19, Grant moved his headquarters to Chattanooga and replaced Rosecrans with General George H. Thomas. Grant was determined to take the offense and break the siege of Chattanooga (figure 21).

Road to Chattanooga

On 1 October 1863, the 42nd Alabama, along with Moore’s brigade, was ordered to join the Army of Tennessee at Chattanooga. Upon release from parole, the regiment prepared for the move and was refitted with whatever the government could provide, which proved to be very poor equipment or nothing at all. General Moore protested, “My Brigade was supplied with a lot of arms and accouterments that had been condemned as
unfit for service and piled up in an outhouse near the railroad depot. . . . These arms were of many different calibers.”

On 29 October, armed with inferior weapons, the 42nd Alabama boarded railcars at Demopolis and moved to Selma, Alabama. After eight days of movement by rail, boat, and foot, the regiment arrived at Chickamauga Station on a cold and rainy 5 November 1863. Moore’s brigade consisted of the 42nd, 40th, and 37th Alabama Regiments. Moore’s, Edward C. Walthall’s, and John K. Jackson’s Brigades were assigned to the defenses on Lookout Mountain.

Siege of Chattanooga

General Moore described his ill-equipped soldiers, “We were without tents . . . Many of the men were but scantily supplied with blankets as well as provisions . . . the men were frequently exposed to a cold north wind, the ground being sometimes covered with snow.” First Lieutenant J. M. Huey of Company G, 42nd Alabama wrote a letter to The Democratic Watchtower, the local newspaper from Talladega County, requesting donated supplies for his poorly equipped company, “many of the men are entirely without blankets or any covering at night, many of them have no overcoats.”

On 12 November, General Jackson, the senior brigade commander, assumed temporary command of the three brigades. These troops occupied defenses near the Cravens house plateau and from the base of Lookout Mountain east to Chattanooga creek. On 15 November, Jackson established his headquarters at the junction of the Summertown road and the Mountain-side road, above the Craven’s House. In a 15 November letter, Corporal Robert J. Boyd Thigpin of Company C, 42nd Alabama described the conditions on Lookout Mountain, “You have heard of up hill business, but we have up hill business when we start up the side of this mountain. It is one eternal
up. . . . The prospects for rations are not flattering . . . I hope we will be fed for this is 
cold country and we will want all the flesh we can get on our bones to keep us warm. 6

On 23 November, General Stevenson assumed command of Bragg’s left flank, 
which included the defenses on Lookout Mountain. Moore’s brigade was stationed near 
the Craven’s House in a position to support Walthall’s Brigade in Lookout Valley. Major 
General Carter Stevenson placed his division headquarters near the summit of Lookout 
Mountain along with General Edmund W. Pettus’ Alabama Brigade and a portion of 
General John Brown’s brigade in reserve.

The Battle of Lookout Mountain

On 22 November, Private Taylor of the 40th Alabama wrote to his wife:

There is considerable cannonading this morning. This evening . . . there was a 
detail of men from our Regt and the 42nd Ala sent on picket. When they got near 
enough the Yanks threw a shell among them and wounded 11 from the effects of 
which one died that night and another had his leg cut off. They were all from the 
42nd. 7

On 24 November, Grant directed General Joe Hooker to assault Lookout 
Mountain with three divisions of approximately 10,000 soldiers. General Geary’s 
division crossed Lookout Creek at Light’s Mill at 8:00 A.M. and moved north along the 
base of Lookout Mountain toward the Confederate flank. A “dense fog enveloped” the 
base of Lookout Mountain and effectively concealed the approach of Hooker’s units. 
Osterhaus and Cruft’s Division crossed further north up Lookout Creek and moved east 
directly toward Walthall’s pickets. Walthall’s and Moore’s pickets were stationed along 
Lookout Creek. Anticipating the advance, General Walthall placed a small patrol 
covering the crossings at Lookout Creek to provide advanced warning of any Union 
approach. Walthall’s small party was captured and Moore lost 225 pickets captured by
the advancing Union Forces. The surprise was so complete the pickets were unable to warn of the impending attack. Geary’s division made contact with Walthall’s brigade at 10:00 A.M. The brigade was on the west side of Lookout Mountain, above Lookout Creek. Walthall’s soldiers were spread extremely thin in poorly prepared positions. The fog had completely concealed Geary’s approach, “Drifting clouds enveloped the mountain-top, and heavy mists and fogs obscured the slope. . . . So impenetrable was this gloom around the enemy’s locality that the movement became a complete surprise to him” (figure 23). Geary’s division moved on the flank and rear of Walthall’s brigade, forcing him to fall back. Moore had established his headquarters at the Craven’s House (figure 24). Moore advanced his brigade to reinforce Walthall’s brigade below the Craven’s House. Walthall’s brigade fell back and attempted to form on Moore’s left. Unfortunately, Walthall’s brigade was in full retreat when the two units met. General Moore described the scene, “Just as our files turned out of the bench road near the Craven house we met the remnant of Walthall’s brigade rushing to the rear in inextricable disorder. The officers seemed to be using every effort to arrest their flight, but the men rushed past them in spite of threats and even blow.” General Jackson remarked, “Passing a great many stragglers - officers and men - along the road, I was met at some short distance from the Cravens house by an officer from General Walthall, who brought the information that his brigade had been driven back in considerable confusion.” At about 12:30 P.M., Moore’s brigade reached the rifle pits near the Craven’s House, they held this position until approximately 3:00 P.M., when their left flank was turned. Moore reported:
I have never before seen them fight with such daring and desperation . . . We had now been engaged nearly three hours. We had but 30 rounds of ammunition . . . this supply was now nearly exhausted. . . . The enemy gradually pressed around my left with an increasing force; I reluctantly gave the order to fall back.\textsuperscript{11}

General Jackson committed Pettus’ brigade to reinforce Moore, ‘I rode back to the junction of the roads and there met General Pettus with three regiments of his brigade. He informed me that he had been ordered by General Stevenson to report to me. I directed him to proceed on the road and form line to reinforce General Moore and Walthall.’\textsuperscript{12}

Moore’s brigade, reinforced with Pettus’ brigade and remnants of Walthall’s brigade, formed a line approximately 300 yards above the Craven’s House. This line covered their line of retreat on the Summertown Road.

On the evening of 24 November, Bragg arrived at Lookout Mountain to assess the situation. He realized holding Lookout Mountain against such odds was impossible. Bragg remarked, “I found we had lost all the advantages of the position. Orders were immediately issued to withdraw our forces across Chattanooga Creek”\textsuperscript{13} Bragg ordered General Stevenson to withdraw the remnants of his forces under cover of darkness to positions on Missionary Ridge. At 2:00 A.M. on 25 November, the 42nd Alabama retired from Lookout Mountain. A cold drizzle fell, leaving the soldiers miserable and cold.

Missionary Ridge

During the early morning hours of 25 November, Moore’s brigade moved down Lookout Mountain and crossed Chattanooga Valley toward Missionary Ridge. Sergeant Major Joshua E. Preston, a twenty-one year old lawyer, described the 42nd Alabama’s arrival at Rossville near Missionary Ridge, “At sunrise we reached the base of
Missionary Ridge, and were halted to partake of an elaborate breakfast of corn bread and raw, fat bacon. The bread was three days old and the bacon of uncertain age." After an hour, the brigade moved to a position along Missionary Ridge and placed in the center of General Frank Cheatham’s division with Walthall’s brigade on Moore’s right and Jackson’s brigade on Moore’s left.

At 3:30 P.M., Union Forces under General Thomas advanced against the center of the Confederate Forces on Missionary Ridge. One of Moore’s soldiers stated, “they came forward in fine style—great black masses, rolling forward like ocean waves.” Bragg’s center broke under the weight of Thomas’ assault. Bragg described the situation, “A panic which I had never before witnessed seemed to have seized upon officers and men, and each seemed to be struggling for his personal safety, regardless of his duty or his character.” The Confederate center then crumbled and “disappeared like frost before the morning sun.”

General Moore commented, “we did not feel as frisky as a lot of schoolboy’s the following day, not even when the Federals decided to pay us another visit.” Despite the desperation presented, Moore, anticipated the collapse on the crest of the ridge, and adjusted his remaining elements perpendicular to Missionary Ridge to cover Cheatham’s left flank. Thomas’ troops moved across Missionary Ridge toward Moore’s brigade. A soldier of Moore’s brigade recalled:

The whole brigade-37th, 40th, and 42nd Alabama regiments-made a gallant charge driving the enemy back until a part of the works that had been abandoned were recaptured, but were finally compelled to fall back to the point from which they started, where they immediately reformd and charged again over the same ground, already strewn with our dead and wounded. We succeeded in checking the enemy and holding them in check until after dark when the army retired across Chickamauga Creek. Our brigade suffered heavily in these two charges.”
Elements of the 42nd Alabama were captured on the crest of Missionary Ridge, possibly during these counter-attacks. The commander of the 25th Illinois remarked, “The battle-flag of the Forty-Second Alabama Regiment, and a number of prisoners captured.”

Moore reported:

> The enemy made great efforts to drive us from the position, but failed. We determined to hold it at all hazards, believing that the safety of the right wing . . . depended on our holding this position . . . We held until nearly dark . . . informed that an order had been passed down the line from Lieutenant-General Hardee to fall back.

Afterwards General Cheatham stated, “Boys, Moore’s brigade saved the Army of Tennessee tonight.”

The action on Missionary Ridge resulted in a complete route of the Army of Tennessee. Beatty’s brigade captured 176 soldiers, many of these from the 42nd Alabama. One of these prisoners was twenty-three year old Major Washington C. Fergus, the Regimental Major of the 42nd Alabama. Washington would spend the remainder of the war at Johnson Island Prison. Under the cover of darkness, Bragg collected the remnants of his shattered Army and retreated south toward the railhead at Chickamauga. This ended the long siege at Chattanooga. Casualties for the regiment during the fighting at Chattanooga were the lightest in the brigade but, at 14.8 percent total casualties the 42nd Alabama suffered the average level of casualties as the entire Army of Tennessee (tables 5 and 6). Late on the night of 25 November, the 42nd Alabama reached Chickamauga Station. Overall Moore was pleased with the performance of his ill-equipped brigade at Chattanooga. He remarked, “My own command acted much better than might have been expected under the circumstances, as they fought during the engagements of the two days with arms that had been condemned as unfit for service, and
which were received while at Demopolis, Ala., to be used only for drill and guard duty.”

Winter Camp at Dalton

The Army of Tennessee moved to Dalton, Georgia for winter camp and reconstitution. Bragg resigned as the commander of the Army of Tennessee following his defeat at Missionary Ridge. The Army of Tennessee was shattered and demoralized. One soldier of Moore’s brigade described desertions at a rate from six to thirty every day. On 14 December, the 42nd Alabama had a total effective force of 311. In a letter to his wife, Private R. B. Ledbetter of Moore’s brigade described the demoralization of the soldiers within the Army of Tennessee:

Old Jeff don’t feed his servants well. I am of the opinion that a great many of them will run away from him. . . . I think the men of this army intend to run out of every battle not because they are afraid but because they have lost confidence in the cause . . . I think this Confederacy is about played out . . . I consider this army perfectly demoralized.

On 27 December, General Joseph E. Johnston assumed command of the Army of Tennessee. Johnston was not pleased with the condition and shortage of supplies within his units, “Instead of a reserve of muskets there was a deficiency of six thousand and as great a one of blankets, while the number of bare feet was painful to see. The artillery horses were too feeble to draw the guns in fields.” He immediately began to put this army back together and prepare for the upcoming spring campaign.

During this period, most 42nd Alabama soldiers participated in religious revivals, a common occurrence within the Army of Tennessee. Reverend J. P. McMullen, a minister and acquaintance of Lieutenant Colonel Lanier, served as a volunteer chaplain for the brigade and conducted several revivals for the soldiers of the regiment.
McMullen’s son was a soldier of Moore’s brigade. On 5 March, Alpheus Baker was promoted to Brigadier General and assumed brigade command over the 37th, 40th, and 42nd Alabama. Baker’s brigade was assigned to Alexander P. Stewart’s division, John B. Hood’s corps. By spring, Johnston was better prepared stating, “The instruction, discipline, and spirit of the army were much improved . . . its numbers were increased.”

**Atlanta Campaign**

Sherman assumed command of the Western Department upon General Grant’s selection as General-in-Chief of all Union Forces. On 24 April, Sherman began his campaign to move against Johnston’s army and “break it up.” On 4 May, Sherman’s army approached Rocky Face Ridge. General Alexander P. Stewart’s division was placed in the Mill Creek Gap to block Sherman’s approach. During the engagement at Rocky Face Ridge, the 42nd Alabama assumed position on Mill Creek Gap, remaining there until 12 May. On 8 May, Union forces moved through Snake Creek Gap and flanked Johnston’s army out of position forcing Johnston to retire south toward Resaca (figure 24).

**Battle of Resaca**

On the evening of 13 May, the 42nd Alabama arrived at Resaca and took a position north of the town. Lieutenant Leonidas Polk’s corps covered the southern flank which rested on the Oostanaula River. General William J. Hardee’s corps was in the center and Hood’s corps held the northern flank secured by the Connesaugua River (figure 26).

Sherman positioned his forces across Johnston’s front. Sherman’s initial 14 May assault was focused against Johnston’s center. The attack was not coordinated and failed;
Johnston attempted to gain the initiative by turning the Union northern flank. At 5:00 P.M. on 14 May, Hood’s corps engaged the Union flank. Stewart’s division became disorganized as it advanced in the difficult terrain. Captain William D. McNeill of the 42nd Alabama reported:

> About 4:30 o’clock on the evening of the 14th of May the command moved forward and a line of battle formed on the railroad . . . the brigade was ordered to advance. . . . The undergrowth through which the regiment marched in line of battle was so thick that it was utterly impossible to keep a perfect line. . . . A battery of the enemy on the opposite hill opened on our column advancing; but pressing forward again with vigor, the enemy was forced to retire and the hill was gained. We pushed on some distance farther, when a halt was ordered, and here again, we were exposed to tolerably heavy fire. Night coming on, the men rested on their arms until about 12 o’clock, when we again returned to our position near the railroad. In this charge, only 3 were missing and 2 slightly wounded.\(^{30}\)

The 5th Indiana Battery delayed the two Confederate divisions, while Hooker’s XX Corps reinforced Sherman’s flank. At 5:30 P.M., Sherman ordered McPherson to attack the Confederate center to prevent Polk from sending reinforcements to support Hood’s attack. The actions of 14 May ended without any significant gains for either side.

On 15 May, Sherman launched an attack at 1 PM with Hooker’s XX corps and Howard’s IV corps against Hood’s corps, while McPherson and Thomas fixed the Confederate center. The Union attack culminated in failure at 3:00 P.M. Johnston took advantage of the moment and at 4:00 P.M. attacked with Hood’s Corps. Stewart formed his division with Baker’s brigade supporting Marcellus Augustus Stovall’s brigade on the right flank. The brigades advanced, Baker’s brigade followed Stovall’s through heavy thickets that made it “impossible to see more than ten paces ahead,” and the advance was “not made in good order.” Passing through Stovall’s brigade, Baker’s brigade departed

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the woods and came under “a severe fire.” Reverend J. P. McMullen, accompanied the brigade during the advance. One of Moore’s soldiers recalled the event:

It was an inspiring sight. Rev. J. P. McMullen . . . was following the regiment riding a little mule. When the 42nd moved out quite a number of the men threw their blankets in front of him on his mule so that he had quite a pile. When we were moving across the old field and were driving the enemy before us like a flock of sheep, the old gentleman became so excited that he rushed out in front on his little mule with his pile of blankets in front of him and taking off his hat led the charge. His long grey beard gave him a venerable appearance, and rushing out as he did, when the men were already full of excitement and enthusiasm, Gen. Johnston himself leading a charge would not have been more heartily cheered. The Reverend McMullen was killed during the attack. The 42nd Alabama made it to within thirty yards of the defending Federals, but the charge was broken. Captain McNeill described the actions of the regiment:

The command pressed forward until they got within fifty yards of the enemy, who were in position in a peach orchard. Here we were exposed to a tremendous fire of musketry. We were fighting at a great disadvantage, and this soon becoming evident to the men, they fell back without greater confusion than could be expected under such circumstances. . . . About 12 o'clock on the night of the 15th we left the breastworks and commenced retreating.

After initiating the attack, Johnston learned that Union forces were crossing the Oostanaula River to cut off his line of retreat. As a result, Johnston aborted the assault, Stewart’s division withdrew under fire “at a great loss in life” but, “saved the breaking of the center part of the line.” The 42nd Alabama suffered a 20 percent total casualty rate at Resaca. When considering only KIA/WIA the rate is 5 percent which compares to the KIA/WIA casualty rate for the Army of Tennessee at 5.3 percent (tables 8 and 9), compared to the average With his position flanked, Johnston began withdrawing the Army of Tennessee.
After the Battle of Resaca, Johnston repositioned his forces to Allatoona Pass to block Sherman’s route to Atlanta. Sherman detected Johnston’s move and attempted to maneuver around his force. Johnston discovered Sherman’s movement and checked him at New Hope Church. On 25 May, Hood’s corps was located at New Hope Church with Polk on his left and Hardee on the right. The next day, Hooker’s XX Corps attacked. The assault lasted two hours and was severely repulsed. General Stewart reported:

Being in line of battle near New Hope Church-Baker's brigade on the right . . . the enemy, after firing a few shells, advanced and attacked along my entire front. Baker's and Clayton's men had piled up a few logs. . . . The entire line received the attack with great steadiness and firmness, every man standing at his post. The fight began toward 5 o'clock and continued with great fury until after night. The enemy were repulsed at all points, and it is believed with heavy loss.  

Light skirmishing occurred on the 26th and another attempt by Sherman was repulsed on the 27th. Lambert described the action at New Hope Church as a “sure-enough fight”. Lieutenant-Colonel Lanier was severely wounded in the leg on 26 May. General Baker described the Union assault as “handsomely repulsed” but regretted the loss of “the gallant commander of the Forty-second Alabama Regiment.” Captain McNeill summed up the actions of the 42nd Alabama:

The command arrived at New Hope Church on the 25th of May and formed in line of battle. The men soon erected breastworks out of logs, which protected them from the fire of the sharpshooters. On the 26th Lieutenant-Colonel Lanier was severely wounded in the leg and disabled. I then assumed command of the regiment. On the 27th the enemy commenced a very heavy fire upon the part of the line occupied by the Thirty-Seventh Alabama. Two companies of my regiment were sent to reinforce Colonel Greene. Only 2 men were disabled out of Company D. 

Private James Sprott was one of the two soldiers of Company D that were disabled. He eventually died in a Georgia hospital on 10 June 1864. He remarked just before death, “I
have tried to do my duty.” On 4 June, the Union army reached the railroad between Ackworth and Allatoona and flanked Johnston out of his position near New Hope Church (figure 27). Baker’s Brigade KIA/WIA casualty rate was 8.7 percent, more than double the same rate for the Army of Tennessee at 3.4 percent (tables 8 and 9).

**Kennesaw Mountain**

Johnston fell back to Kennesaw Mountain with plans to block Sherman’s advance. Loring’s corps occupied the Kenesaw Mountain Crest with Hood’s corp on the right and Hardee’s corps on the left. The Battle of Kenesaw Mountain occurred on 27 June, when Sherman ordered a general assault against the Confederate positions which ended in failure within a few hours. Sherman again maneuvered around Johnston and crossed the Chattahoochee on 9 July. Lambert described Sherman’s flanking maneuvers:

> We held our line some two weeks or more, as best I remember now, without any further desperate attempts on General Sherman’s part, but he finally started getting around in our rear again, causing us to again fall back to a defensible position, which was Kenesaw mountain, Marietta, and Powder Springs, where we locked horns, more or less, for a number of days; and the same performance was again forced on us. This time we fell back across the Chattahoochee River to Atlanta, but Sherman dropped down the river, and his army crossed on pontoon bridges.

Confederate President Jefferson Davis, displeased with Johnston, replaced him with General Hood on 18 July. Lambert described the affect on the 42nd Alabama soldiers upon hearing the news of Hood replacing Johnston, “The effect of this change . . . can best be compared to a very warm man wearing a suit of thin underclothing and having a very cold, wet blanket thrown over him.” Hood gathered his Army of Tennessee around Atlanta and prepared to defend it at all cost.
Ezra Church

Sherman attempted to approach Atlanta from the west. He sent Major General O. O. Howard’s Army of the Tennessee west of Atlanta and cut Hood’s only railroad line into the city. Hood detected the movement and sent forces to intercept the Union threat. Hood’s force intercepted and attacked Howard’s army on the afternoon of 28 July near Ezra Church. Howard had just enough time to prepare for the Confederate attack and entrenched his force.

Baker’s brigade was “driven back in confusion” during the assault. Clayton suspended the assault and withdrew the brigades into defensive positions. General Stephen D. Lee made several additional unsuccessful attempts to dislodge Howard’s force, during one attempt Lee during was wounded. General Walthall assumed command, discontinued any further attempts, and ordered the Confederate troops back toward the defenses of Atlanta. This ended the engagement at Ezra Church (figure 28).

On 5 August, Admiral David Glasgow Farragut maneuvered his fleet past the shore batteries and obstacles into Mobile Bay. His success combined with Sherman’s stalemate around Atlanta, forced the movement of Baker’s brigade to bolster the defenses of Mobile. This effectively ended the 42nd Alabama’s participation in the Atlanta Campaign.

Morale and Unit Cohesion

The 19th Century military theorist Baron Antoine-Henri de Jomini wrote of the importance of morale, “It is the morale of armies, as well as of nations, more than anything else, which makes victories and their results decisive.” Jomini continued emphasizing the impact of morale a combat multiplier such as morale:
The morale of an army and its chief officers has an influence upon the fate of a war; and this seems to be due to a certain physical effect produced by the moral cause. For example, the impetuous attack upon a hostile line of twenty thousand brave men whose feelings are thoroughly enlisted in their cause will produce a much more powerful effect than the attack of forty thousand demoralized or apathetic men upon the same point.  

Reeve’s defines morale as the psychological state of mind, characterized by a sense of well being, eagerness, and willingness to sacrifice. It is a measure of how people feel about themselves, their team, and their leaders. High morale comes from good leadership, shared hardship, and mutual respect. It is an emotional bond derived from common values such as loyalty to fellow soldiers and a belief in the organization. High morale results in a cohesive team that enthusiastically strives to achieve common goals. Effective leaders know that morale is the essential human element, which holds the team together and keeps it going in the face of the terrifying and dispiriting events that occur in war. Morale can provide a general measurement of cohesion. As seen in chapter 1, a general relationship can be derived between AWOL rates and the moral of the unit. Generally speaking AWOL and desertion rates were considered to peak for the Confederacy during the Atlanta Campaign.

Effect of Chattanooga and Atlanta Campaigns

At this point of the war, Confederate confidence was waning particularly with the impact of constant personnel attrition and no replacements available within the Confederacy, the manpower source was depleted. During the Chattanooga and Atlanta Campaigns, many of the 42nd Alabama soldiers were captured, either during battle or through desertion. Grant discontinued the policy of parole and exchange. The Union prison system began to fill with Confederate soldiers. Grant knew the manpower of the
south was limited, by abolishing the former parole policy; he could effectively end the
war sooner. During these campaigns, the 42nd Alabama lost 132 soldiers to capture,
becoming prisoners of war. An additional five killed-in-action and fifty-nine wounded-in-
action can be included in the attrition rate for both campaigns (tables 5 and 9). The
effects of capture and desertion rates produced a significant toll on the 42nd Alabama.
Few replacements were now available. The combination of these factors stressed the
strength and morale of the 42nd Alabama. By the end of the Atlanta campaign, the
regiment was severely reduced and the hopes of the Confederacy were quickly
diminishing. After months of continuous campaigning and combat, one of Baker’s
veterans summed up the probable feeling of the many when he wrote to his wife
following the Atlanta Campaign and stated, “This war is a shame, a disgrace to
civilization. Oh! Would to God it would end.”45

Table 5. Casualties within Moore’s Brigade during the Chattanooga Campaign.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>KIA TOTAL</th>
<th>WIA TOTAL</th>
<th>MIA TOTAL</th>
<th>KIA/WIA/MIA TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>42nd AL</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40th AL</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37th AL</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brigade Total</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>253</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 6. Total Confederate Casualties during the Chattanooga Campaign.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TOTAL CONFEDERATE FORCE</th>
<th>KIA TOTAL</th>
<th>WIA TOTAL</th>
<th>MIA TOTAL</th>
<th>KIA/WIA/MIA TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>44,010</td>
<td>361 (0.8%)</td>
<td>2,160 (4.9%)</td>
<td>4,146 (9.5%)</td>
<td>6,667 (15%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7. Baker’s Brigade 22 July casualty report

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>KIA TOTAL</th>
<th>WIA TOTAL</th>
<th>MIA TOTAL</th>
<th>KIA/WIA/MIA TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>42nd AL</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>44th AL</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37th AL</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brigade Total</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 8. Total Confederate Losses during the Atlanta Campaign.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>STRENGTH</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><em>May 7-20</em></td>
<td><em>66,089</em></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ENGAGEMENTS</th>
<th>KIA</th>
<th>WIA</th>
<th>MIA</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rocky Face Ridge Resaca</td>
<td>444</td>
<td>2,828</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3,272</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.7%)</td>
<td>(4.3%)</td>
<td>(5%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>May 20</em></td>
<td><em>66,089</em></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ENGAGEMENTS</th>
<th>KIA</th>
<th>WIA</th>
<th>MIA</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>New Hope Church Dallas</td>
<td>309</td>
<td>1,921</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2,230</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.5%)</td>
<td>(2.9%)</td>
<td>(3.4%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>June 4</em></td>
<td><em>66,089</em></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ENGAGEMENTS</th>
<th>KIA</th>
<th>WIA</th>
<th>MIA</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kennesaw Mountain</td>
<td>468</td>
<td>3,480</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3,948</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.7%)</td>
<td>(5.3%)</td>
<td>(6%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>July 4-31</em></td>
<td><em>66,089</em></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ENGAGEMENTS</th>
<th>KIA</th>
<th>WIA</th>
<th>MIA</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Atlanta</td>
<td>1,341</td>
<td>7,500</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>8,841</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2%)</td>
<td>(11.3%)</td>
<td>(13%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td><em>66,089</em></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>12,983</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>(19.6%)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 9. Casualty reports during the Atlanta Campaign

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>Effective Strength</th>
<th>KIA TOTAL</th>
<th>WIA TOTAL</th>
<th>MIA TOTAL</th>
<th>KIA/WIA/MIA TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. 42nd AL Resaca</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(19.6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Baker’s BDE New Hope Church</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(8.7%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Stewart’s Division New Hope Church</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>409</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td>466</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Baker’s Brigade May 6 – July 9</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>141</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Stewart’s Division May 6 – July 9</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>689</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>779</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


6Personal Letter of Robert J. Boyd Thigpen dated 15 November 1863.

7Robert A. Taylor, This Cruel War, (Macon, GA: Mercer University Press, 2000) 90.


11Ibid., 705.
12Ibid, 689.
13Ibid., 664.
15Samuel H. Sprott, Cush; A Civil War Memoir, (University of West Alabama: Livingston Press, 1999), 71.
19Samuel H. Sprott, Cush; A Civil War Memoir, (University of West Alabama: Livingston Press, 1999), 72.
21Ibid., 706.
22Samuel H. Sprott, Cush; A Civil War Memoir, (University of West Alabama: Livingston Press, 1999), 74.
24Ibid., 706.
28Joseph E. Johnston, “Opposing Sherman’s Advance to Atlanta,” Battles and
Leaders of the Civil War, (Century, 1889), 260.

29 Ibid, 261.


31 Samuel H. Sprott, Cush; A Civil War Memoir, (University of West Alabama: Livingston Press, 1999), 93.


37 Ibid., 851-852.

38 Samuel H. Sprott, Cush; A Civil War Memoir, (University of West Alabama: Livingston Press, 1999), 106.


40 Ibid., 21.


42 Ibid., 322.

43 Daniel T. Reeves, Combat Motivation: The Human Dimension Correlates. (Ottawa, Ontario: Carleton University, 1990), 11.

44 Field Manual 22-100. Army Leadership, Be, Know, Do, (Washington, D.C: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 1999), 3-3, para. 3-15.

45 Robert A. Taylor, This Cruel War, (Macon, GA: Mercer University Press, 2000) 310.
A majority of the strong will survive . . . they will learn by trial and error those things which need doing to make the most of their united strength.\(^1\)

S. L. A. Marshall, *Men Against Fire*

**Introduction**

By late 1864, after four years of a bloody national civil war, the Confederacy was crumbling and quickly losing territory. Many of its soldiers had become incapacitated, deserted, or prisoners-of-war. The supply of southern manpower was exhausted. Europe remained neutral and did not intervene in favor of the Confederacy. Lincoln was reelected, consummating the resolve of the Northern populace to continue the war to its end. Richard E. Beringer best described this period in his work, *Why the South Lost the Civil War:*

The resulting decline to the struggle did not begin to affect the war effort very seriously until after the middle of 1864. Then soldiers began to leave the army in increasing numbers. The fall of Atlanta in early September . . . victories that significantly improved Lincoln’s chances of reelection, also signaled the beginning of a marked rise in desertion from the Confederate army. . . . The soldiers were voting for peace with their feet.\(^2\)

By this point in the war, Baker’s entire brigade consisted of approximately 700 soldiers. The 42nd Alabama could muster little more than 200 soldiers, yet these remaining soldiers continued through another seven months of grueling conditions for the ‘Lost Cause’. One of Baker’s soldiers wrote to his wife on 18 November 1864, “I suppose old Abe Lincoln is elected again. You need not build any hopes of peace soon for there will be none.”\(^3\)
General Dabney Maury commanded the defenses around Mobile. His command consisted of state troops and home guard of old men and young boys unfit for regular service. Anticipating an assault, he requested more troops from Alabama Governor Thomas H. Watts. Without any additional troops to spare, Watts petitioned Hood to release an Alabama Brigade from the Army of Tennessee. Hood succumbed and Baker’s Brigade arrived in Mobile on 28 August, becoming the only veteran brigade at Mobile.\footnote{4} One of Baker’s soldiers recalled the reaction of the brigade once informed that their destination was Mobile, “There was never was a happier, jollier lot of fellows. . . . The trails, hardships and dangers of the campaign through which they had just passed were all forgotten, and on all sides could be heard songs, laughter and cheers.”\footnote{5}

Baker’s Brigade consisted of the 42nd, 37th, 54th, and 40th Alabama. In addition, General Maury attached the 3rd and 4th Alabama Battalion Reserves to Baker. Baker’s Brigade was assigned to the Spanish Fort on the Northeast side of Mobile bay (figure 29). The brigade was part of Liddell’s Division, District of the Gulf which numbered approximately 6,600 soldiers.\footnote{6} On 22 September, General Hood requested Baker’s Brigade rejoin the Army of Tennessee for the Nashville Campaign. General Maury deemed Baker’s Brigade vital to his defense of Mobile and denied Hood’s request. These soldiers, along with slave labor, continued to construct and improve the eastern defenses of Mobile, including the Spanish Fort and Fort Blakely. On 16 December, a small Federal force of 800 soldiers, from Pensacola raided the Confederate Railroad at Pollard and destroyed the track. Baker’s Brigade responded and pursued the federal force capturing ten wagons and inflicting eighty-one casualties on the Union Force. The railroad at
Pollard was back in full operation by 24 December. This was a small and relatively insignificant raid but proved to Maury that the Union would eventually attempt an offensive operation against Mobile.

During January 1865, after the Confederate failure at Nashville, General Maury was afraid the Union would now focus its efforts on Mobile. Maury requested more troops from the Army of Tennessee to reinforce Mobile. He eventually received an additional 3,000 soldiers. One of the brigades ordered from the Army of Tennessee to Mobile was Holtzclaw’s brigade. This brigade was ordered to replace Baker’s Brigade within the Mobile defenses. Baker’s brigade would rejoin the Army of Tennessee. On 20 January Holtzclaw’s brigade arrived at Mobile and replaced Baker’s Brigade at Spanish Fort and Fort Blakely. Baker’s Brigade, now consisting of approximately 600 soldiers, was ordered to join the assembling Confederate forces in the Carolinas.

Although not on the constant march and little threat of severe combat, the time at Mobile was one of hard labor, monotony of picket duty, no pay, poor food, and severe disease. Mobile proved to be a very inhospitable place. A veteran soldier of Baker’s Brigade described the duty at Mobile, “The monotony of picket duty was unbroken; day after day and week after week the same round of duty.” Another soldier of the brigade wrote home, “I am not well this morning. . . . There is no chance to get a furlough . . . The government owes me over $300.” During the winter, fever, sickness, and disease were the major battle. Many of the soldiers of the 42nd Alabama were hospitalized, further depleting the emaciated unit. In a letter home, a soldier remarked, “It is said the 42nd Regt are nearly all sick.” At least ninety-seven soldiers, approximately half of the regiment, were hospitalized while at Mobile. At least seven of the ninety-seven died of
disease at Mobile, a 3.5 percent mortality rate from disease for the entire regiment. The Union blockade resulted in severely depleted food resources. Rations were severely reduced, one of Baker’s soldiers remarked:

We were not very comfortable here . . . the weather very cold for that latitude, and with but little wood to cook with, or warm by in the open air. . . . Another cause of complaint was the short rations. Our meat was a very scanty supply of very poor beef, and a little corn meal.

On 24 January, a Baker Brigade veteran wrote home:

It is said we are ordered to Montgomery but all the men believe we are going to South Carolina. We are very low spirited and a great many say they are going home . . . But I do not see any chance to avoid going. I feel like all hope of getting home till the end of the war is at an end.

Road to Bentonville

On 28 January, Baker’s Brigade boarded transports and moved north up the Alabama River toward Montgomery. From Montgomery Baker’s Brigade boarded trains and proceeded to Augusta, Georgia. During the trip, the brigade had to march several legs of the journey since the railroad had been destroyed in several areas due to Sherman’s advance. On 27 February 1865, Baker’s brigade joined with General Cheatham’s Corps at Hamburg, South Carolina and marched toward North Carolina to link up with the remaining remnants of the Army of Tennessee. One of Baker’s veterans described the march through South Carolina, “The character of the country over which we passed had changed from sand to red clay hills. With the drenching rains of February falling upon us every day, and the roads terribly cut up by so much travel, made it anything but pleasant traveling.” After over a month of travel, the brigade arrived at Raleigh, North Carolina. From Raleigh the brigade traveled to Smithfield, North
Carolina, and was assigned to Clayton’s division, Lee’s Corps, General A. P. Stewart’s Army of Tennessee.

At Smithfield, North Carolina, General Joseph Johnston had assembled a Confederate force of approximately 30,000 soldiers to counter General Sherman’s march through the Carolinas. General Johnston had a force under General Hardee to block and delay General Slocum’s wing of Sherman’s army at Averasboro on 16 March 1865. This engagement separated the two wings and allowed Johnston an opportunity to attack one wing before the other could arrive in support. Baker’s Brigade consisted of the 37th, 40th, 54th and 42nd Alabama with a total effective strength of only 605 soldiers. A Baker’s Brigade veteran described the effect of the soldiers rejoining the Army of Tennessee:

Here we had the first glimpse of General Joe Johnston since he had been restored to command by General Lee. The men were wild with delight at seeing their beloved Commander again, and such love and devotion as they exhibited would have affected a much colder and less sympathetic man than General Johnston. He was visibly affected as he looked upon the remnants of worn and battle scarred veterans all that remained of that magnificent body of men he had left, but a few months before. Divisions were reduced to brigades, brigades to regiments and regiments to companies, their torn and tattered flags told of the strife through which they had passed. Though few in number they were prepared to give a good account of themselves. To many a poor fellow, this was the last night on earth; many an eye gazed at the stars overhead for the last time. Tomorrow was to witness the last struggle of any importance between the contending forces.¹⁶

**Battle of Bentonville**

On 18 March, the 42nd Alabama marched from Smithfield, with the Army of Tennessee and encamped near the small village of Bentonville. Bakers Brigade along with the entire Army of Tennessee prepared their positions along the Goldsboro road and awaited the advancing Federal force. On 19 March, Slocum’s wing advanced toward
Bentonville on the Goldsboro Road, General Carlin’s division was in the advance. Carlin’s soldiers were allowed to advance to within fifty yards of the positioned Army of Tennessee, when the Confederate soldiers opened the engagement from their concealed positions at 2:00 P.M. A veteran of Baker’s Brigade described the carnage, “The slaughter was fearful; the ground was literally covered with the dead and wounded enemy.” At approximately 3:00 P.M. a lone signal gun announced the last desperate charge of the Army of Tennessee, Baker’s Brigade “swept forward” and “captured a strong line of works, some prisoners and two or three pieces of artillery.” Johnston attacked the Union left wing under General Slocum as it moved on the Goldsboro road toward Bentonville. The initial assault was lead by the Army of Tennessee. The assault occurred north of the Goldsboro Road with Clayton’s Division on the extreme right of the Army of Tennessee (figure 30). This assault achieved initial success and pushed back Slocum’s lead elements. Baker’s Brigade and the 42nd Alabama struck elements of Carlin’s First Brigade. The First Brigade Commander, Brevet Brigadier General H. C. Hobart, reported:

My line having arrived within a short distance of the enemy's works it received a very heavy fire, and the left at this moment giving way the whole line returned to the works in our former position. Having discovered the enemy in force I immediately ordered my line to be strengthened as much as possible. About 2 p.m. the rebels in great force advanced on my line, and, driving my skirmishers in rapidly, they came down on our works in such overwhelming numbers that my line was compelled to give way, not, however, until the enemy had gained our right and rear, which threatened the capture or the annihilation of our whole force.

The union soldiers were “panic stricken, and the field was covered with dead and wounded, discarded guns, blankets, knapsacks.” R. A. Lambert remarked, “The only
commonsense thing for us . . . was to charge pell-mell, and with a yell. . . . The blue-coats fled, leaving a line of knapsacks and general plunder.  

The regiment continued to push the federals southeast of the Goldsboro Road and found themselves “in a hornets’ nest of bullets.” The 42nd Alabama encountered elements of Morgan’s Division in thick, swampy underbrush. These troops were located behind a line of breastworks in an area known as the “Bull Pen.” This area was a swampy low-land, knee to waist deep in water at places, and very thick with small trees and scrub-brush. Here Baker’s Brigade and the 42nd Alabama faced an advance from the 20th Connecticut and the 136th New York (figure 31). Colonel Philo B. Buckingham of the 20th Connecticut Infantry reported the engagement with Baker’s Brigade:

The regiment advanced with the brigade line through the woods for twenty or thirty rods, then across a swamp, when we emerged into an open wood of heavy pine timber and some twenty rods from the swamp was a thick growth of underbrush directly in our front. After advancing nearly to the edge of the heavy pine forest we received a tremendous volley from the enemy, whose lines were concealed not more than a dozen rods from us, behind the underbrush, which was immediately returned. Our line was established and held till after dark without assistance, although the enemy brought up another line of battle against us, and made the most determined efforts to drive us from the field. . . . Soon after dark the enemy retired, leaving his dead and many of his wounded in our hands.

Captain George H. Eldridge of the 136th New York Infantry reported his regiment’s contact with Baker’s Brigade and the 42nd Alabama:

At or about 6 p. m. the regiment, as part of the brigade, was ordered to advance and make a feint attack, in conjunction with Morgan's division of the Fourteenth Army Corps. . . . The ground in front of this regiment was swampy and filled with water knee-deep. . . . this regiment advanced with the brigade into and nearly through the swamp, when, encountering a heavy fire from the enemy, who were in our front in force, the line halted and commenced firing, which was kept up until nearly 9 p. m.
With Morgan’s Division to the front and the two Union regiments advancing on the brigade’s rear, Bakers Brigade withdrew. Lambert described the departure of the regiment under pressure:

I saw that our entire line was doomed to go, so I debated in a hurry whether or not to remain and be captured, or to take my chances of being shot in the back by fleeing from an enemy so very close. Having a horror of being taken prisoner, I took my chances, as all others seemed to be doing. In hurrying back as fast as my feet and legs would take me, I finally saw through the big pine timber in front of me a line of Yanks—the woods looked blue with them—but they were standing still and not firing a gun, which they could not do without endangering the line we had just left in front of us, hence we found ourselves...in a hollow square, the enemy on four sides of us in heavy timber, and each line close by at that! Our men who got out were either those who hid themselves in the thick gallberry bushes until after dark or those fleet of foot. I was in the latter class, and I am not ashamed to own up to such on that particular occasion.25

On the night of 19 March, the 42nd Alabama returned to their original positions prior to the assault and passed the night under a full moon in line of battle.

The next day proved a quiet one for the 42nd Alabama, only minor skirmishing. Johnston maneuvered his forces into a horseshoe formation and assumed a defensive posture. Clayton’s division was positioned in the southern end of the horseshoe. On 21 March, Sherman advanced his force against Johnston’s left, nearly cutting Johnston’s route of retreat. Baker’s Brigade was moved at the double-quick from the extreme right to the left where Union General “Fighting Joe” Mower was attempting to cut the Confederate’s rout of retreat at the Mill Creek Bridge. Johnston was able to thwart the attempt and repeal Mower’s force. Johnston was able to extricate his force on the night of 21 March 1865. Baker’s Brigade and the remnants of the 42nd Alabama escaped with Johnston’s force. At least eighteen 42nd Alabama soldiers were captured during the battle of Bentonville.26 A veteran of Baker’s
Brigade summed up the Confederate effort at Bentonville, “There was no more
gallant and desperate fighting during the war than was done by this little army of
Confederates at the Battle of Bentonville . . . Although almost every man in the ranks
knew that the end was near.” Total casualties within the Confederate Force was 15
percent, not as dramatic as previous engagements during the war but, still significant
when considering most Confederate soldiers knew the end was near prior to the battle
ever beginning (table 10). Johnston’s force retired to Smithfield, North Carolina
where he consolidated his remaining forces and planned to join with General’s Robert
E. Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia.

Consolidation and Surrender

By 3 April, General Stewart reported the Army of Tennessee as only 7,000
effectives. On 9 April, at Smithfield, North Carolina, General Joseph E. Johnston
reorganized his depleted units. The 42nd, 37th, and 44th Alabama merged to form the
37th Alabama Infantry Regiment Consolidated. This consolidated regiment was placed in
Brantley’s Brigade, D. H. Hill’s Division. Ninety-eight soldiers were all that remained of
the 42nd Alabama. This consolidation effectively ended the 42nd Alabama as an active
Infantry Regiment and the remaining soldiers cased their ragged, battle-worn colors for
the last time.

Johnston learned of Lee’s Surrender at Appomattox and his last opportunity to
continue the fight evaporated. General Johnston surrendered the remnants of his Army to
General Sherman on 26 April 1865 at Bennett House in Durham Station, North Carolina.
Conclusion

The Army of Tennessee is often described as a ‘hard luck’ army, it may be said that the 42nd Alabama was a ‘hard luck’ regiment. Although performing well in the face of combat and enduring horrendous conditions, the regiment never celebrated not one victory but, these soldiers continued to give it their all through out the war. Jomini wrote, “firmness amid reverses is more honorable than enthusiasm in success.” The fact that the 42nd Alabama maintained its cohesion despite not one victory is testimony to the nearly unbreakable cohesive bonds that maintained the regiment as an effective fighting unit until the end of the war. Clausewitz stated:

An Army which preserves its usual formations under the heaviest fire, which is never shaken by imaginary fears, and in the face of real danger disputes the ground inch by inch . . . never loses its sense of obedience, its respect for and confidence in its leaders, even under the depressing effects of defeat. . . . Such an Army is imbued with the true military spirit.

The 42nd Alabama possessed this “true military spirit” of which Clausewitz wrote.

Keegan best summed the timeless nature of warfare and the purpose for the study of warfare, “What battles have in common is human: the behavior of men struggling to reconcile their instinct for self preservation, their sense of honour, and the achievement of some aim over which other men are ready to kill them.” The nature of man at war has not changed and the elements that combine them as an effective unit can be applied to today’s force. This thesis has attempted to examine the cohesive factors that are essential to unit cohesion and how these factors can be applied for today’s military. Each chapter examined a specific aspect of cohesion and examined how it impacted the unit. These factors included discipline, leadership, morale, and its effect upon cohesion within the
42nd Alabama. Each chapter brings its own lessons learned and the influence of cohesive factors within the 42nd Alabama.

S. L. A. Marshall in his work *Men Against Fire*, “The heart of the matter is to relate the man to his fellow soldier. . . . Only when the human . . . aspects of operation are put uppermost can tactical bodies be conditioned to make the most of their potential unity.” Each soldier began the war fighting for an individual cause in which each believed but, as the cohesiveness of the unit began developing a team, particularly after the bloody ordeal at Corinth, the soldiers of the regiment fought for each other and their survival as a team. As the thesis examined several factors that maintained the unit throughout the conflict, in the final days of the war only ninety-eight soldiers remained as the final representatives of the 42nd Alabama. What common factor linked the remaining ninety-eight soldiers of the 42nd Alabama?

**The Final Ninety-Eight**

On 9 April 1865, when the 42nd Alabama cased its colors for the final time and the remaining elements of the 42nd Alabama were consolidated with the 37th and 54th Alabama, only ninety-eight soldiers remained. The examination of these ninety-eight survivors reveals that 85 percent were veterans of Vicksburg, 57 percent were present during the muster of the regiment, and most importantly, 36 percent were 1861 volunteers from the original 2nd Alabama Infantry Regiment (figure 31). When the 42nd Alabama was formed from the remnants of the 2nd Alabama, only 22 percent of the newly formed 42nd Alabama were 2nd Alabama one-year veterans. This is an extraordinary trait. These soldiers volunteered for the national cause. These were the true volunteer soldiers before the conscription act of 1862. This fact is even further reinforced
as the thesis examined these factors by breaking out statistics at the company level. Chapter 2 which examined the discipline determined that the majority of casualties within the regiment were sustained by Companies A through D which lead the assault on Battery Robinett. These companies performed well despite the high casualty rates. This demonstrated discipline from a conviction to duty. Jomini remarked of discipline, “A strict but not humiliating discipline, and a spirit of subordination and punctuality, based on conviction rather than on the formalities of the service.” These soldiers believed in their cause and that their actions were just. Chapter 3 examined leadership; companies A through D maintained the most stable company leadership during the war. Chapter 4 examined AWOL and desertion rates as indicators of morale as a factor of cohesion, the snapshot of 18 January 1863, revealed reduced rates in companies A through D. When examining this same indicator for the entire war the same holds true, A through D maintained the lowest AWOL and desertion rates. A total of 100 soldiers were counted as AWOL or desertion during the entire period of the war, this results in a 11 percent AWOL/desertion rate which compares favorably to the overall rate of Alabama soldiers at 28.6 percent as discussed in chapter 1 (figure 34). The importance of these facts is that the majority of the 1861 veterans and the 2nd Alabama veterans comprised the soldiers and leadership of companies A through D. These companies performed better due to the cohesiveness of the units developed early in the war and sustained these soldiers until the end. These facts reinforce the value of the volunteer soldier, these 1861 volunteers were ‘true volunteers’ that joined for nationalistic causes prior to the 1862 conscription act. The American Civil War was the first war in which Americans were
drafted or conscripted. Conscripts were utilized on both sides during the American Civil War. The best soldiers proved to be the volunteer soldier that enlisted due to nationalistic and moral reasons and survived the initial experience of combat. These soldiers were the core of the leadership and cohesion within a unit. As seen through the war the cohesion within the 42nd Alabama can be attributed to these true volunteers of 1861 from the 2nd Alabama that formed the cohesive core of veteran soldiers and leaders within the regiment. The combination of willing volunteer soldiers, led by experienced leaders, is the characteristic that formed the greatest cohesion within the regiment. This thesis supports the value of the volunteer soldier to the cohesiveness and performance of a unit during the most arduous conditions.

After the experience of Vietnam, in 1973, the United States adopted a policy of an All-Volunteer Army. On occasion, the idea of drafting soldiers into US Army service enters the social conscience of the United States. Even on the verge of the 2003 Operation Iraqi Freedom, two bills were before Congress to reinstate the draft. If any lesson should be brought forward from this analytical study is the value of volunteer soldiers and leaders. These volunteer soldiers provide a willingness to serve for a national cause that provides an unequalled conviction to soldierly duty. The work How to Make War emphasizes the importance of conviction, “Conviction comes when the soldier believes he should be fighting. Too often men are simply put into uniform and called a military force. Conviction is a powerful motive and includes what is usually termed “morale.” As Napoleon said, “The moral is to the physical as three is to one.” These human qualities are what truly differentiate the volunteer soldier from the draftee. Jomini spoke of this phenomenon, “The impetuous attack upon a hostile line of twenty thousand
brave men whose feelings are thoroughly enlisted in their cause will produce a much more powerful effect than the attack of forty thousand demoralized or apathetic men upon the same point.**37 These volunteer soldiers willfully execute the nation’s will when called upon and have proven that they will see that mission to its end, as demonstrated by the volunteer soldiers of the 42nd Alabama.
Figure 29. Defenses of Mobile *Source:* Mobile Defenses 1865, Alabama Department of Archives and History, Montgomery Alabama.
Table 10. Total Confederate Losses during the Battle of Bentonville.

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<th>DATE</th>
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<th>WIA</th>
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<td>239</td>
<td>1,694</td>
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(1.4%) (10%) (4%) (15%)

Remaining Soldiers

Figure 32. 42nd Alabama Remaining Soldiers at Surrender (1865). Source: NARA Microfilm Collection M861, Record Group 109, Complied Records Showing Service of Military Units in Confederate Organization, rolls 398-401.
Remaining by Company

Figure 33. 42nd Alabama Remaining Soldiers at Surrender (1865) by Company. Source: NARA Microfilm Collection M861, Record Group 109, Complied Records Showing Service of Military Units in Confederate Organization, rolls 398-401.
Figure 34. 42nd Alabama AWOL/Desertion Numbers by Company (1862-1865). *Source:* NARA Microfilm Collection M861, Record Group 109, Complied Records Showing Service of Military Units in Confederate Organization, rolls 398-401.


7 Ibid., 165.


10 Ibid., 297.

11 NARA Microfilm Collection M861, Record Group 109, Complied Records Showing Service of Military Units in Confederate Organization, rolls 398-401.


14 Ibid., 131.


16 Ibid., 136-137.

17 Ibid., 138.

18 Ibid., 138


20 Ibid., 138.


22 Ibid., 221.


24 Ibid., 840.

26 NARA Microfilm Collection M861, Record Group 109, Complied Records Showing Service of Military Units in Confederate Organization rolls 398-401.


29 Muster Rolls of the Consolidated 37th Alabama Infantry, NARA Microfilm Number 0145 Rolls 2, List 61-71.


34 Muster Rolls of the Consolidated 37th Alabama Infantry, NARA Microfilm Number 0145 Rolls 2, List 61-71.


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