**Title**: MULTINATIONAL LOGISTICS: CAN U.S. COMMANDERS CONTINUE TO FUNCTION EFFICIENTLY WITHOUT IT? (U)

**Personal Authors**: DARRELL LEE MATHIS, LCDR, SC, USN

**Office Symbol**: C

**Address**: NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
686 CUSHING ROAD
NEWPORT, RI 02841-1207

**Date of Report**: 03 Feb 2003

**Page Count**: 28

**Paper Advisor**: CAPT ROBIN BABB, USN

**Supplementary Notation**: A paper submitted to the Faculty of the NWC in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the JMO Department. The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the NWC or the Department of the Navy.

**Abstract**: In today's world of terrorism, failing states, and standing possibilities of simultaneous multiple-front confrontations and peacekeeping operations, combatant commanders have not sufficiently ensured effective measures for incorporating multinational logistics concepts into operational planning. A case study of Operation Joint Endeavor logistical planning measures provides an illustrative example to examine those facets of an operation that may have been enhanced through the use of multinational "support enablers" and "support options" and advances the idea that continued reliance on ad hoc logistics will ultimately result in major losses of efficiency and effectiveness.

Multinational logistics is a perplexing problem, but if detached from its usual role in combined warfare, can be an effective force multiplier. Combatant commanders who refine their application of operational art to employ available force multipliers to affect more efficient deployment and sustainment methods will effectively reduce the manning requirements for logistical support forces, leverage national transportation assets, and enhance operational reach and flexibility. Therefore, a combatant commander must become more focused on the multinational logistic elements of operational planning to include multinational concerns in military exercises, concept planning, and theater security cooperation plans.

**Distribution / Availability of Abstract**: Unclassified

**Abstract Security Classification**: UNCLASSIFIED

**Name of Responsible Individual**: CHAIRMAN, JOINT MILITARY OPERATIONS DEPARTMENT

**Telephone**: 841-3556

**Office Symbol**: C

Security Classification of This Page: Unclassified
MULTINATIONAL LOGISTICS: CAN U.S. COMMANDERS CONTINUE TO FUNCTION EFFICIENTLY WITHOUT IT?

by

Darrell L. Mathis
Lieutenant Commander, USN

A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

Signature: ______________________

03 Feb 2003

CAPT Robin Babb
Faculty, JMO Department
Abstract of

MULTINATIONAL LOGISTICS: CAN U.S. COMMANDERS CONTINUE TO FUNCTION EFFICIENTLY WITHOUT IT?

In today’s world of terrorism, failing states, and standing possibilities of simultaneous multiple-front confrontations and peacekeeping operations, combatant commanders have not sufficiently ensured effective measures for incorporating multinational logistics concepts into operational planning. A case study of Operation Joint Endeavor logistical planning measures provides an illustrative example to examine those facets of an operation that may have been enhanced through the use of multinational “support enablers” and “support options” and advances the idea that continued reliance on ad hoc logistics will ultimately result in major losses of efficiency and effectiveness.

Multinational logistics is a perplexing problem, but if detached from its usual role in combined warfare, can be an effective force multiplier. Combatant commanders who refine their application of operational art to employ available force multipliers to affect more efficient deployment and sustainment methods will effectively reduce the manning requirements for logistical support forces, leverage national transportation assets, and enhance operational reach and flexibility. Therefore, a combatant commander must become more focused on the multinational logistic elements of operational planning to include multinational concerns in military exercises, concept planning, and theater security cooperation plans.
Logistic economy is achieved when effective support is provided using the fewest resources at the least cost, and within acceptable levels of risk.

Joint Publication 4-0

Introduction

In today’s world of terrorism, failing states, and standing possibilities of simultaneous multiple-front confrontations and peacekeeping operations, combatant commanders have not sufficiently ensured effective measures for incorporating multinational logistics concepts into operational planning. Diminished logistics infrastructure and reduced numbers of operating bases available to U.S. forces have dictated that military leaders must refine their application of operational art to employ available force multipliers to affect more efficient deployment and sustainment methods. The thesis of this paper is a combatant commander must become more focused on the multinational logistic elements of operational planning to include multinational concerns in military exercises, concept planning, and theater security cooperation plans (TSCP). This paper will analyze this topic by using a case study of Operation Joint Endeavor (OJE) (Bosnia) logistical planning measures as an illustrative example to examine those facets of an operation that may have been enhanced through the use of multinational “support enablers” and “support options.” This will include examining the OJE military establishment multinational planning considerations or non-considerations and determining how the operational commander could have more effectively discharged his duties to affect movement and logistical preparation of the operational area. This paper does not intend to cover all instances in which support instruments may be utilized, but is intended to serve as a point of departure for discussing integrated and coordinated multinational support in future concepts and doctrine.
The Significance of This Paper

B.H. Liddell Hart succinctly wrote, "History...provides us the opportunity to profit by the stumbles and tumbles of our forerunners."¹ We should study history and learn from our mistakes. Multinational logistics is a perplexing problem, but if detached from its usual limited role in combined warfare, can be an effective force multiplier. This paper advances the idea that continued reliance on traditional, ad hoc logistics will ultimately result in major losses of efficiency and effectiveness, and will deliver new insight into the various factors confronting a combatant commander preparing for rapid deployment. Operation Joint Endeavor after action reports noted many traditional planning similarities between Operations Desert Shield and Joint Endeavor—traditional planning procedures that have been found wanting.² In these operations, U.S. command and control was not responsive or flexible enough to support the theater portion of a rapid, short notice, crisis action deployment.³ Operations were noted as successful, but “…it took longer and cost more than originally planned...."⁴ As future concepts are developed to increase U.S. forces combat capability, so too must we address logistical support. Why has innovation in multinational logistics employment lagged other concepts for change?⁵

In previous conflicts, the U.S. military enjoyed the luxury of deploying to areas amicable to their cause and easily influenced through the exercise of political leverage. This afforded the United States the ability to establish easily a forward presence, acquire logistic support, and establish transit rights and host nation agreements. This has relaxed commanders into mistakenly relying on overpowering military might in exchange for increases in efficiency (i.e., more combat troops, less combat and combat service support). However, the changing geo-political landscape and the increasing chance of deploying to hostile areas dictate a requirement for change.
To add further reinforcement to why this topic should be pondered, Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld stated, “the U.S. military could win war on the Korean peninsula even while battling Iraq...capable of winning decisively in one and swiftly defeating in the other case.” If this ability is critically degraded, the consequences could threaten the U.S. military’s ability to conduct major operations in support of the National Security Strategy—a disastrous possibility.

In Command and Control: The Logistics Base, Rear Admiral Henry E. Eccles, USN (Ret) wrote, “Since logistics flexibility is the primary physical base of strategic flexibility, the command and control system must include adequate means for the integration of critical logistic considerations throughout its entire structure and operation.” The combatant commanders who thoroughly consider this statement will effectively reduce the manning requirements for logistical support forces, leverage national transportation assets, maintain an adequate contingency plan, and enhance operational reach and flexibility. The issue is determination of the level of multinational logistics support the commander should include in his theater level planning and how it directly augments combat support.

Support Options

Milan Vego wrote, “Rapid and timely deployment of U.S. combat forces and their subsequent support and sustainment are key prerequisites for the successful execution of the U.S. National Security and Military Strategies.” Employing concepts grounded in cooperation with other nations, planners may use multinational logistics to enhance efficiency, reduce redundant efforts and decrease the overall logistics footprint in theater. Before proceeding any further, this paper will provide a short description of the different types of support options and support enablers available to the planner considering multinational logistics support.

- Role Specialization (RS). Employing RS entails a nation accepting the
responsibility for providing a particular class of supply or service for all or most of the coalition force.\textsuperscript{10} This may be extremely useful when one nation has demonstrated the capability to efficiently procure common supplies and services in the quantities necessary to effect operations. In OJE, the United States was responsible for bulk POL acquisition, allowing participating nations to receive one low price and avoid competing for scarce resources.\textsuperscript{11} Theater level management of POL and the associated supply infrastructure may, however, hinder operational maneuverability and LOC protection when considering sustainment requirements for other nations. Other negative aspects associated with this option are: voluntary participation, compensation procedures, and national laws governing the transfer of military goods and services.

- **Lead Nation (LN).** As stated in Allied Joint Logistics Doctrine AJP-4, a LN accepts the responsibility for providing the framework for one or more logistic functions in support of a coalition force such as air/sea/rail port operations, movement control, route maintenance, etc. LN support is similar to RS, but wider in scope.\textsuperscript{12} During OJE, ground and air transportation units and engineering support were provided to NATO's operational control free of charge.\textsuperscript{13} Impediments to this concept include: assigning OPCON of assets, lack of interoperability, and national laws governing the transfer of military goods and services. If this concept had been fully employed during OJE, it appears that assets under NATO or contributing nation control may have been able to alleviate the Time Phased Force and Deployment Data (TPFDD) problems that surfaced from having to deploy Army engineer units to perform construction services until Brown and Root Service Cooperation (BRSC) could be inserted into the operation.\textsuperscript{14} Furthermore, the taxes and tariffs associated with BRSC not being covered by a Status of Forces Agreement and the requirement for more site preparation may have been
mitigated or avoided through a lead nation or common contracting arrangement. This raises the question whether BRSC can be employed by NATO, thereby alleviating the problems associated with the United States employing civilians in military operations.

- National Logistics. National logistics support flows from national sources, usually based in the home nation, forward to the deployed national units. An advantage of national logistics is that it provides complete autonomy of operations. A clear disadvantage of this support concept is that the nation assumes the total mission of providing for and transporting supplies and services to their individual units. For the purpose of this paper, national logistics and national support elements (NSE) will be considered interchangeable.

Support Enablers

- Host Nation Support (HNS). HNS may be negotiated for a specific operation and is a part of the deliberate planning process. Commanders must analyze the physical infrastructure in the HN to determine what facilities and services are available to support the command, determine priority of assets, and reflect this support in the logistics concept plan. HNS can effectively reduce the logistics footprint. However, a functioning government must be available and local procurement efforts may have political ramifications. Additionally, authorization must be obtained from national authorities to negotiate for HN support—a timely process.

- Mutual Support Agreements (MSA). MSAs are arrangements developed bilaterally with other nations to ensure provision for their forces. MSAs are usually employed when small force contingents are collocated with forces of another nation that have the capacity to support them. Major benefits of this enabler are the overall reduction of redundant deploying forces and LOCs, all requiring their own support during deployment and employment.
• Acquisition Cross Service Agreement (ACSA). An ACSA is an agreement for the transfer of defense goods and services between nations that must be accomplished at the national level. ACSAs are on a reimbursable, replacement-in-kind, or exchange for equal value basis and may be negotiated for a specific operation or acquired from any nation with which the U.S. has an agreement. However, they are cumbersome and time consuming. Of particular interest in examining OJE planning is that this agreement may have served to facilitate base operations support and construction, transportation, and airport and seaport services; alleviating the substandard materiel conditions and subsequent time delays noted during the standup of the Taszar and Tuzla airfields.

An Operational Commander’s Responsibilities

Operations and logistics are inseparable facets of war. In a multinational environment, commanders and planners must take into consideration the broad range of options available to overcome the operations-logistics gap and maximize resources to successfully discharge the duties as outlined in the Universal Joint Task List (UJTL). The UJTL is “the basic language for development of a joint mission essential task list or agency mission essential task list that identifies required capabilities for mission success.” Specifically, commanders must delineate how lines of communication will be developed, maintained and operated, as well as which support should be provided by each allied nation. How and when a commander chooses to employ theater logistics capabilities may impose constraints strategically, operationally, and tactically. If executed properly, multinational logistics may provide an economy of assets and system efficiency.

Commanders must carefully review their responsibilities and evaluate the logistic plan to determine if preferred logistics options are truly feasible and responsive. An OJE overview is
necessary to identify an operational environment that was particularly suited for multinational logistics.

**Operation Joint Endeavor Background**

Operation Joint Endeavor essentially began with the signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement and culminated in the General Framework Agreement for Peace (GFAP) which authorized the establishment of a NATO Implementation Force (IFOR) in Bosnia to execute the GFAP provisions. The coalition force deployed into the Balkans was an effort supported by 32 nations, including 16 NATO nations, 13 Partnership for Peace nations (PfP), and four others. By 1 July 1996, 83 percent of the approximately 53,500 troops were from NATO countries; the other 17 percent were from non-NATO countries.\(^{24}\)

IFOR was comprised of three sectors in Bosnia; each managed by one of three framework multinational divisions (MND). These divisions consisted of a U.S.-led northern division, MND (N), a French-led southeastern division, MND (SE), and a UK-led southwestern division, MND (SW). All three divisions reported to the Commander, Allied Command Europe (ACE) Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC), a framework corps, with its main headquarters located in Sarajevo and its rear headquarters in Kiseljak. Additionally, NATO and United Nations Protection Forces (UNPROFOR) units were still operating in the area.

The U.S. and other MNDs established national logistical support elements (NSE). USAREUR decided in favor of an Army-led support element as the NSE for Task Force Eagle, disregarding the fact that there were already two JTFs in the European theater for ongoing operations. The established JTFs might have assisted in coordination efforts with the host nation and PfP nations to mitigate the logistic ramifications of an anticipated force entry.\(^{25}\)  

Magnifying
this complex operation, the three distinct NSEs lacked: precedent, an established NATO logistics planning organization, Alliance doctrine, policies and regulations.

This sector arrangement prominently displayed the U.S. intention not to engage in multinational logistic operations and "was not a real test of the ability of the U.S. and allies to wage intense coalition warfare against a determined and dangerous enemy far from Europe." Without adequate coordination, simultaneous planning was being conducted at the expense of unity of effort. United States European Command (USEUCOM) faced a multitude of issues—contracting, cost of operations, and transportation—in establishing and sustaining a forward deployed presence that may have been avoided by recognizing the synergies offered by the three framework divisions.

At this point in OJE planning, a disciplined approach to utilize the in-place logistical assets to assist in accomplishing the operational commander's responsibilities would have greatly benefited U.S. forces.

Planning Environment

An operational commander's tasks are explicitly stated in the UJTL. However, in discharging these duties, commanders have traditionally chosen not to relinquish authority over their logistics assets or personnel in determining the logistics areas that would come under coalition control versus national support. Consequently, U.S. forces employed in OJE stopped short of the goal of "increasing the timeliness and endurance of the force." As viewed through the combatant commander's vision, multinational logistics appears to encompass nothing past host nation support. However, this view should include the entire spectrum of resources. Furthermore, "...to the extent allies can contribute a sizable fraction of capabilities required for
one or another major theater war, the United States will find it easier and more affordable to be ready to respond to the myriad other contingencies that could arise....”

In 1992, NATO issued a policy document, MC 319, which called for “collective responsibility” and “cooperative arrangements” for the logistic support of NATO’s multinational operations. Nevertheless, during pre-OJE operations in Bosnia, allied nations refused to support the MC 319 call for multinational logistics.

Research indicates that the U.S. non-participation in MC 319 occurred for one primary reason: “USAREUR considered OJE as primarily an Army evolution having little need for outside support. Rather than being viewed as a strategic movement, the deployment was seen as little more than another operational move to the training area at Grafenwoehr, one with which the deploying brigades were very familiar.” Because USEUCOM thought that U.S. ground troops would never be deployed into Bosnia, consent was given to USAREUR’s logistical support plan. As a result, attention to potential deployment problems was minimal and deficiencies in the deployment planning occurred which may have been avoided if theater level planning had been identified and employed to leverage coalition assets.

In the initial planning stages of OJE, NATO exercised logistics coordinating authority vice control. In a theater without a controlling logistics authority, contributing nations were presented the “option” of considering and subsequently utilizing theater assets. This may have inadvertently hindered the efficiency of the deployment operations and minimized the maximum capability of U.S. forces and coalition partners.

In the preceding paragraphs, this paper has illustrated that the concept of operations did not envision impediments to U.S. deployment capability. One observation sums it up: A
deployment originally slated to be conducted primarily by rail required 593 military convoys, 1,811 buses, 1,569 commercial trucks, 378 trains, and 3,494 airlift sorties.\textsuperscript{34}

In this situation, research indicates that operational reach and the ability to mass forces may have been directly affected if not for the commander's advantages in the factors of time, space and force.

\textit{Time}. USAREUR began planning for a possible IFOR operation in June 1995 and developed, in coordination with USEUCOM, a generic mission, initial concept, and potential structure for a U.S. ground division deployment in Bosnia.\textsuperscript{12} Additionally, short lines of communication provided valuable time to recover from having chosen logistic options overcome by the unanticipated sequence of events.

\textit{Space}. The availability of operating bases in Europe created relatively short lines of communication and movement by rail and/or air were available. Infrastructure and transportation required upgrades, but were available, which allowed several transportation options.

\textit{Force}. Army V Corps, 1\textsuperscript{st} Armored Division was positioned in Europe and was trained and accustomed to deploying throughout the theater. For rapid deployment and sustainment, the 1\textsuperscript{st} AD--a heavy, tank unit requiring a substantial logistics base--may not have been the optimal force for the situation.

How could the combatant commander have been more focused on an efficient deployment of forces to uphold the transfer of authority between the United Nations Protection Forces and NATO Implementation forces?

\textbf{Optimizing Multinational Support}

Commander for Support (C-SPT) was the logistics organization established to design, plan and implement NATO logistics for Operation Joint Endeavor. In the command structure, C-
SPT was designated as commander of forces in Croatia and enjoyed the same access to the regional combatant commander as the other component and combatant commanders.

Furthermore, C-SPT was the single point of contact among the Alliance and the Croatian government, and the NATO negotiator for a status of forces agreement. C-SPT HQ negotiated logistical contracts and technical agreements on behalf of NATO and most other nations. This facet enhanced the contracting capabilities of less sophisticated countries and facilitated transport, movement, and procurement of common supplies throughout the AOR. For example, U.S. forces may have benefited from using a C-SPT basic ordering agreement for Class I rations with a cost realization of $5.89 versus $13.75 per soldier per day.

In contrast, Task Force Eagle (TFE)--the U.S. element of the NATO Implementation Forces designated to enforce the provisions of the Dayton Peace Agreement--was supported by a major logistical force in Hungary that served as a rail, road, and airlift hub, and also maintained the required logistics stocks. This was of particular interest to the U.S. commanders because it assured a robust logistical support structure not under the auspices of NATO control. Furthermore, because the NSE was located outside of the IFOR AOR and was not subjected to IFOR control, the 6,900 troops stationed there did not count against the force cap.

Given the time delays and political constraints placed on U.S. deployment planning considerations, if proper U.S. resources--staff assets--had been allocated during the deliberate planning phase, C-SPT may have been the optimal organization to negotiate deployment requirements, Status of Forces Agreements, national command responsibilities, and manage service and commodity contracts, ports, and facilities. This would have significantly reduced the number of NSE personnel who were only deployed to support U.S. forces. However, Title 10 considerations and the desire to have this operation remain primarily "Army" clouded the theater
commander's responsibilities as outlined above. A formal planning structure was never formed, effectively making it a contingency operation which did not give due consideration to transportation and deployment requirements. Theater logistic synergies might have been optimized by centralized, instead of national, control of certain funds, services, contracts, and assets.\textsuperscript{38}

A key area in which U.S. forces might have benefited from C-SPT having total responsibility of logistics is the area of movement.

\textit{Movement.} Task Force Eagle was responsible for establishing a military presence in the AOR to coincide with transfer of authority from United Nations Protection Forces to NATO Implementation Forces. The Task Force Eagle Deployment plan was built on seven deployment packages that would flow in the following sequence:

- National Support Element
- LOC Opening forces, Aviation Strike Package
- Task Force Eagle (FWD)
- 1\textsuperscript{ST} Brigade Combat Team, 1/1 Cav
- 2\textsuperscript{nd} Brigade Combat Team, 3\textsuperscript{rd} Cav, Division Main
- TF Infrastructure (Division rear)
- On-call package, including TF 2-15 Infantry\textsuperscript{39}

The plan called for the deployment of the NATO Enabling Force and the Reception, Staging, Onward Movement and Integration (RSOI) forces two weeks ahead of the main body.\textsuperscript{40} RSOI forces include the personnel assigned to open air and sea ports and offload aircraft, railcars, and ships.

In the late Pre-Deployment stage, several U.S. political considerations (close-hold guidance, pressure to keep force levels low, and the implied guidance to minimize casualties) began to unravel a once solid deployment plan. The close-hold guidance limited U.S. ability to
reconnoiter the transit routes and operation areas in Bosnia, Croatia, and Hungary. As a result of this same guidance, U.S. troops were limited in their ability to exchange information with Allies, who had gained more familiarity with the AOR and LOCs and were able to correctly identify intended transit routes, bridges, and rail facilities. For example, “the Allied movement plan used all modes of transportation—rail, road, sea and air—to deploy ground forces into the AOR, whereas the initial U.S. ground deployment concept was to go mostly by surface modes, primarily rail.”

This ultimately produced a rail system unable to handle the flow of incoming personnel and materiel.

The pressure to limit the number of U.S. personnel on the ground resulted in reducing the U.S. RSOI forces by more than 50 percent, and, complicating matters more, the remaining RSOI units were delayed to allow earlier deployment of the combat forces required to secure the zone of separation. Because of this restriction, the U.S. was forced to delicately balance the requirements of force protection and logistics. Of note, the U.S. had no forces in Bosnia or Croatia at the commencement of the deployment to perform RSOI functions and the UNPROFOR was preparing to terminate operations and transfer authority to IFOR.

At the time, “the lack of recognition by senior civilian and military leaders of the importance of U.S. RSOI forces degraded the ability of the U.S. to deploy the 1st AD rapidly into the AOR.” Only the Minimum Essential Force was deployed which resulted in less than half of the total scheduled to be in place in Hungary on 5 December. On 15 December, one day prior to G-Day, the day that the main forces would deploy into Bosnia, only 186 of the 735 personnel planned for Bosnia had arrived, while in Croatia, 522 of the 728 personnel were in place. Trains which were to be unloaded by RSOI forces were rerouted from Slavonski Brod and Zupanja back to the intermediate staging base at Hungary. Furthermore, the first combat unit of
the minimum essential force was forced immediately to receive and unload upon arrival 16 December.\textsuperscript{46} It became readily apparent that the rail transportation system originally devised would be overcome by events. Planners were forced to reduce capabilities and did not consider sector member capabilities to fill the operational-logistics gap. With the build up of materiel at Zupanja and the congested railways, the commander effectively created a critical vulnerability. Had enemy forces initiated a strike against the LOCs and into the Intermediate Staging Base (ISB), U.S. forces may have reached their logistic culminating point.\textsuperscript{47}

According to Joint Pub 4-0, "...limited unloading capacities at ports and airfields, lack of asset visibility, and limited inland transportation have constrained the operational reach of combat forces".\textsuperscript{48} The OEF logistics environment required extreme flexibility. The designed movement plan placed a tremendous burden on the planners to achieve the ends--rapid deployment--with limited means--a stove-piped national logistics system. Bearing in mind the political considerations, an attempt to incorporate multinational logistics would have increased the responsiveness of the operational plan.

A combatant commander must examine all support options when determining a viable logistics support concept. Lack of political stability and devastation to theater infrastructure produced an immature logistical environment for OEF operations. Air Ports of Debarkation and base camp infrastructures required extensive upgrades and repair. It was imperative that the logistics planners engage, either strategically or operationally, in a cooperative fashion with the contributing nations in their sector or the other multinational framework divisions, MND(SE) and MND(SW).

Challenged with the daunting task of balancing the number of logistics support personnel and combat forces on ground, proper utilization of the C-SPT organization or a Mutual Support
Agreement (MSA) would have increased efficiency in logistics operations and reduced the logistics footprint. Specifically, the C-SPT organization possessed the capability to negotiate:

- Transit Agreements
- Terms of trains permitted on the in-country rail system per day
- Maximum number of trains that could stage in country
- Limits on the number of troops permitted on any one train

An MSA would have facilitated:

- Obtaining valuable APOD condition status
- Replacing or augmenting the RSOI forces and Materiel Handling Equipment
- Obtaining base camp and transit routes conditions
- Receiving information on the impending rail strike in France

The advantages of such arrangements are numerous and all have potential political and diplomatic elements. A key consideration for this operation should have been that an MSA would have substantially reduced the size and complexity of the theater logistics operations; and consequently met the political goal of capping the number of U.S. ground forces without the resulting loss in efficiency. An Acquisition Cross Servicing Agreement (ACSA) may have been comparatively useful, but coordination required at the national level may have rendered this option unacceptable due to timeliness. This paper does not take the stance that U.S. forces did not participate in multinational logistics on some level, but does reinforce the fact that the cooperative arrangements should have been created much earlier and encompassed a much broader scope of activity. Sparingly, U.S. forces did provide and receive support when clearly in their best interests.49

The disadvantages in utilizing such agreements lie in the inherent political machinery of such conflicts. Tying national support to allies entails certain levels of risk, which national leaders or operational commanders may not wish to bear. Disproportionate cost sharing and providing assets to a non U.S. coalition commander will continue to weigh heavily in political
and diplomatic considerations when balancing military operational security and our ability to rapidly deploy and sustain operations. Compounding this matter, other coalition nations may wish not to disclose their exact level of deployment support and detailed logistics operations unless absolutely necessary. It has been demonstrated how operational close-hold guidance, with its inability to disclose operational plans to coalition nations until commencement, precluded the ability of U.S. forces to ascertain infrastructure and installation conditions. Another factor to consider, but much too broad in scope to examine in this paper, is the gap between U.S. military strategy, capabilities, and technology and those of its military allies.50

Proposed Solutions

In accordance with Joint Pub 4-0, “It is incumbent upon CINCs to aggressively seek approval to negotiate and conclude, in coordination with the Department of State, appropriate international support agreements.”51 Combatant commanders must engage with the Department of State through the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Secretary of Defense to enter into agreements which augment his theater strategy and engagement plan through the addition of multinational “Allied Total Force Lists” and subsequently, “Allied Force Modules” in the concept planning phase of deliberate planning.

A proper view of resources is highly important for a combatant commander. When planning for operations, the combatant commander determines the required forces which may or may not be available. During capabilities planning, regressive analysis is used to match the available resources (including forces, equipment and supplies) with an appropriate course of action. This process forces combatant commanders to plan using combat forces that have been apportioned to more than one combatant commander in anticipation of multiple contingencies. How resources will be actually allocated depends on national priorities, the sequence in which
regional contingencies develop, and the availability of flexible deterrent options. However, the theory of “multi-apportionment” is inherently flawed. Multi-apportionment anticipates the “need to respond to multiple, sequentially developing regional contingencies...”

Although the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) “deconflicts planned employment of forces that are apportioned to more than one CINC...,” the JSCP still does not give proper credence that the possibility of simultaneously occurring major theater wars, smaller scale contingencies, and peace keeping operations. Another flaw is that it assumes that global mobility and the resources will be there based on a prioritization scheme that has never been truly tested. The efficiencies that could be experienced—as a result of using multinational forces in the planning process—would produce more executable, manageable, robust operation plans. The extent to which the identified multinational forces required for training, combined exercises, and operations are made available will greatly impact this concept.

It has been noted that:

One characteristic constrains national military strategy above all others: TRANSCOM force structure is sized to support one major theater war (MTW). It can support two only by rolling from the first to the second in succession. That ability depends on the agility inherent in mobility forces, leveraging the close TRANSCOM partnership with the transportation industry, and tightly coordinated planning among the Joint Staff, the geographic unified commands, and TRANSCOM. This third element-smart planning and execution—is the most important.

Strategic lift assets are also apportioned for the building of OPLANs and related TPFDDs except for contingency and humanitarian missions. The ensuing planning requires multiple levels of coordination and is extremely time consuming. In determining an operation plan, concept plan, or a theater security cooperation plan, consideration should be given to
implementing a system to provide a combatant commander the tools available to match his
mission requirements with actual assets to be supplied through national or theater alliances.

Just as TRANSCOM has limited lift capability, the RSOI and combat support personnel
available to support two MTWs are limited. If the combatant commander had the ability to
coordinate with our allies and PfP nations to assimilate Allied Total Force Lists and Allied Force
Modules force data (similar to total force lists and Service Force Modules) that would be
available during a contingency, it would reduce the number of U.S. required forces and
significantly reduce costs. Total force lists and service force modules have improved the current
plan development phase, but are still restricted by limited transportation assets.\textsuperscript{56} Using
multinational forces may serve to fill the gap.

Will future warning orders contain multinational assets as part of the list of resources?

The following recommendations serve to supplement this concept.

1) Through their Theater Security Cooperation Plan, the combatant commander must
coordinate with anticipated future coalition members to conduct exercises that utilize PfP
nations and coalition allies in scenarios that will flex U.S. capabilities to receive and
support forces. This will facilitate combined education and assist in standardizing
multinational logistic operations and ultimately doctrine.

2) Expand war gaming to include multinational logistics.

3) Explore use of MN logistics in peacetime and humanitarian operations.

4) MN logistics planning should be included in the concept development phase. We should
be engaged with HNs to establish agreements which would be activated in the event of a
crisis. All Concept Plans should be required to include an expanded Annex P (Host
Nation Support) which includes other additional items such as multinational support
available in an AOR, not just HN support.

5) Conduct combined training and joint exercises and contingency planning that focuses on
logistics and multinational logistics as a force multiplier.
Conclusion

This paper has demonstrated how lack of multinational logistics awareness allowed movement inhibition of U.S. troops. Operational art demands creativity of the commander and his staff in actively planning to mitigate resource constraints. In future operations, multinational logistics will be required to properly use forces and resources in order to make the required sequence of events happen—a basic tenet of operational art. Combined and multinational operations will increase in complexity, number, and duration, continuously straining the resources and leaders of a nation determined to “go it alone.” The U.S. military must now embrace multinational forces and multinational concepts, as much for political as for military rationale, and commanders must incorporate this idea into theater level planning. Success requires the commander to anticipate and recognize the opportunity, to assess the risks of doing so, and minimize those risks. Minimizing risks will require the commander to realize that strategic lift, personnel, and materiel are finite. The next war or the members involved cannot be predicted with any reasonable accuracy but in order for multinational support options to be successful there must be formal collaboration and agreement. This demands that current doctrine and practice be sufficiently flexible to allow and encourage commanders the freedom to actively participate in multinational logistics.
ENDNOTES


3 Ibid., 9.

4 Ibid., 8.


12 NATO, *AJP 4*, 1-16.


16 NATO, *AJP 4*, 1-16.
17 Ibid., 1-17.


19 Institute for Defense Analysis, Planning and Deployment Phases, V-15.


21 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Universal Joint Task List, CJCSM 3500.04B (Washington, DC: 1999), 1-3.

22 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub 4-0, IV-4.

23 ABCA, 5-1.

24 Institute for Defense Analysis, Implementation, Transition, and Redeployment Phases, 1-1.


27 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub 4-0, IV-6.

28 Gompert, 6.

29 Institute for Defense Analysis, Implementation, Transition, and Redeployment Phases, 6.

30 Ibid.

31 Institute for Defense Analysis, Planning and Deployment Phases, III-23.

32 Ibid., III-10.

33 Institute for Defense Analysis, Implementation, Transition, and Redeployment Phases, V-16.

34 Ibid., V-1.


38 Farmen, 42.


40 Ibid., III-20.

41 Ibid., III-18.

42 Ibid., IV-8.

43 Ibid., IV-4 – IV-6.

44 Ibid., III-18.


46 Ibid., IV-6.


48 Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Pub 4-0*, III-5.


50 Gompert, 3.

51 Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Pub 4-0*, I-5.

53 Ibid.


55 Ibid., 59.

56 Vego, Plans and orders, 34.

57 Joint Forces Staff College, 3-5.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


