PROVIDING FOR THE COMMON DEFENSE? THE EFFECTS OF RECENT ARMS TRADE REFORM ON THE ARMY PROFESSION

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE
Strategy

by

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Three administrative reforms within the Department of Defense--the President’s Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense (The Packard Commission of 1985), the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act (1986) and the Foreign Military Sales, Reinvention Initiatives (1996 to present)--have had a detrimental effect on the U.S. Army as a profession. Reforms that focused on streamlining bureaucratic processes for DOD weapons acquisition and arms exports have inadvertently compromised affective-based attributes that define the Army as a profession. This study employs concepts from sociological analysis to define ‘profession’ and the functions unique to a profession in modern society. In light of these definitional and functional attributes, the study concludes that reforms in arms acquisition and exporting are actually contributing to a trend toward de-professionalization in the US Army.
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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)
ABSTRACT


Three administrative reforms within the Department of Defense--the President’s Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense (The Packard Commission of 1985), the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act (1986) and the Foreign Military Sales, Reinvention Initiatives (1996 to present)--have had a detrimental effect on the U.S. Army as a profession. Reforms that focused on streamlining bureaucratic processes for DOD weapons acquisition and arms exports have inadvertently compromised affective-based attributes that define the Army as a profession. This study employs concepts from sociological analysis to define “profession” and the functions unique to a profession in modern society. In light of these definitional and functional attributes, the study concludes that reforms in arms acquisition and exporting are actually contributing to a trend toward de-professionalization in the US Army.
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A final thanks goes to my wonderful wife, Lauren Ann Lee, and our three kids—David, Spenser, and Mae. Their patience throughout this long and arduous project made its successful completion possible.
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<td>Arms Export Control Act</td>
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<tr>
<td>AIA</td>
<td>Aerospace Industries Association</td>
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<td>DCS</td>
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<td>DISAM</td>
<td>Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management</td>
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<td>DoD</td>
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<td>DSCA</td>
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<td>D/State</td>
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<td>DTRA</td>
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<td>DUSA-IA</td>
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<td>ENDP</td>
<td>Exception to National Defense Policy</td>
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<td>FDO</td>
<td>Foreign Disclosure Officer</td>
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<td>FMF</td>
<td>Foreign Military Financing</td>
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<td>FMS</td>
<td>Foreign Military Sale(s)</td>
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<td>HCIR</td>
<td>House Committee on International Relations</td>
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<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
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<td>ITAR</td>
<td>International Trafficking of Arms Regulations</td>
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<td>JSF</td>
<td>Joint Strike Fighter</td>
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<td>LNO</td>
<td>Liaison Officer</td>
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<td>Letter of Offer and Acceptance</td>
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<td>LockMartin</td>
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<td>NDP</td>
<td>National Defense Policy</td>
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<th>Acronym</th>
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<td>P &amp; E</td>
<td>Pricing and Evaluation</td>
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<td>PM</td>
<td>Project Manager/Program Manager</td>
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<td>PAO</td>
<td>Public Affairs Officer</td>
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<td>SAC</td>
<td>Security Assistance Community</td>
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<td>Security Assistance Officer</td>
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

Introduction

In the councils of government, we must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought of unsought, by the military-industrial complex. The potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced power exists and will persist. We must never let the weight of this combination endanger our liberties or democratic processes. We should take nothing for granted. Only an alert and knowledgeable citizenry can compel the proper meshing of the huge industrial and military machinery of defense without peaceful methods and goals, so that security and liberty may prosper together.

Eisenhower, “Farewell Address”

Eisenhower’s warning about the military industrial complex demonstrated his recognition of the external system changes to defense and security issues brought on by the rise of the cold war nuclear arms race and the concomitant advance of defense technology. His warning focused specifically on the rise of the military-industrial complex—an example both of internal system changes within the US defense and security regime and of the increasingly complex evolution of US defense and security.

Eisenhower warned against the improper meshing of industrial (organizational) and military (professional) machinery of defense that occurs today within the Department of Defense (DoD) security assistance regime and within the institutions of the armed forces. This is a circumstance that has a telling effect on the professionalism of the US military officer corps itself.

Eisenhower warned what could happen if that meshing of the organizational with the professional was improper. His worst case was a US defense and security policy and
policy regime dominated by commercial imperatives. He explicitly worried about the potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced power.

The Concept of Profession and the Military as a Profession

At its core, this thesis is a study of contemporary American civil-military affairs, with particular emphasis on management of violence and the management of arms. The intent is to examine the current role of the military in pursuit of its duties to society (providing for the common defense). From this examination, the thesis questions whether some of the modern practices of the military regarding the production and sale of weapons and related technology are consistent with a healthy and proper role between the military and society, or an anathema to that prescribed relationship.

The peculiar relationship between the American military and American society is prescribed in a particular way, as is the notion of what is “proper” in terms of that relationship. This is defined in the concept of profession and the military as a profession. A section is devoted to explaining that concept; the concept is used as the base metric against which modern military behaviors in arms acquisition and export will be measured throughout the study.

The dominant conception of profession as it relates to the American military is summarized in the work of Samuel P. Huntington. In *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations*, Huntington enumerates a theory of what the military is as a profession (and what that military professional ethic is). This Huntington-style definition is the governing influence for this study.

For Huntington, the modern military officer corps is a professional body, a profession being a “peculiar type of functional group with highly specialized
Succinctly stated, a profession (the military as a profession) is defined not in sense of professional versus amateur, but rather in the sense of profession versus a trade or a craft. Huntington defines three unique and distinguishing characteristics of a profession: expertise, responsibility, and corporateness.

**Expertise.** Huntington defines professional expertise in the following manner:

The professional man is an expert with specialized knowledge and skill in a significant field of human endeavor. His expertise is acquired only by prolonged education and experience. It is the basis of objective standards of professional competence for separating the profession from laymen and measuring the relative competence of members of the profession.

The key here is in the nature of professional knowledge. That nature is one of universality. The knowledge of the military profession has a history, a history that defines that profession’s role in society (its competence and relevancy). Professional knowledge is also unique and specialized to the military profession. It derives from a unique task and purpose, a peculiar public good demanded by society, but a good that society, in itself, cannot provide. This understanding leads to the broad delegation of societal authority to the profession to self-regulate and self-educate. This authority is the basis of the unique relationship professions enjoy with society—a relationship of trust.

**Responsibility.** Huntington defines professional responsibility in the following manner:

The professional man is a practicing expert, working in a social context, and performing a service, such as the promotion of health, education, or justice, which is essential to the functioning of society. The client of every profession is society, individually or collectively. The essential and general character of his service and his monopoly of his skill impose upon the professional man the responsibility to perform the service when required by society. This social responsibility distinguishes the professional man from other experts with only intellectual skills. The responsibility to serve and devotion to his skill furnish the professional motive. Financial remuneration cannot be the primary aim of the professional man.

While all of this is relevant, there are certain points most relevant to the issue at hand. Not only is there an inherent responsibility related to when to perform the special function imposed by society, but also a responsibility related to the prescribed manner and way of performing those tasks. In this sense, the profession is a moral unit positing certain values and ideals which guide its members in their dealings with laymen. The current thesis transfers these responsibilities of the professional man to the profession
itself, positing that there is a peculiar moral ethic of behavior levied onto the military profession by its parent society. The peculiar moral ethic in contemporary arms trade behavior is the subject of scrutiny for this study.

**Corporateness.** Derived from the first two defining elements of the profession, corporateness is defined by Huntington in the following manner:

> The members of a profession share a sense of organic unity and consciousness of themselves as a group apart from laymen. This collective sense has its origins in the lengthy discipline and training necessary for professional competence, the common bond of work, and the sharing of a unique social responsibility. . . . the interests of the profession requires it to bar its members from capitalizing upon professional competence in areas where that competence has no relevance [and likewise to protect itself against outsiders who would claim professional competence because of achievements or attributes in other fields].

Of importance here is the idea of a profession’s collective sense of self, inclusive of, yet beyond the performance of the special function of the particular societal service. At the center of this notion of professional corporateness is the idea of the self-policing function. Professions are expected to ethically regulate the behavior of their member professionals-to stay focused on the primary tasks, and perhaps more importantly, to preserve their jurisdiction over the professions’ societal function and mandate. This study, subjects to questioning this latter point in its examination of the military’s performance in today’s arms market. Within the sphere of arms acquisition and exporting, evidence supports the claim that interests and motives beyond the traditional have staked a dominant claim to the arms control process itself. The military profession is ultimately to blame for this unwarranted encroachment.

**The Argument or Thesis**

Huntington’s concept of military professionalism prescribes a very specific and unique relationship to exist between the soldier and the state. That relationship is formed around the unique service demanded by society, the inability of society to provide that service for itself, and, therefore, the delegation of trust and authority to the profession to serve as the body of expertise for that peculiar service and as the provider of that service. The relationship survives because the profession feels responsibility to the society for which it is designed and commissioned (empowered) to serve. The soldier-state social contract is the moral fiber that binds the profession to its society, gives it motive and
purpose, and defines its professional self. The profession’s corporate togetherness derives from this social contract.

When this theoretical concept of the military profession is tested against practical, real-world behavior of the profession as it works to serve the public defense, the degree to which the military service is still a profession is also being tested. This study tests the concept of professionalism as the military approaches one critical aspect of its expert jurisdiction—the provisioning of the means of warfare: arms acquisition and arms exporting.

Prior studies, such as those conducted by Professor William Keller and this author provide convincing evidence that, at least in terms of the military-technological aspects of the soldier-state relationship, short-term commercial incentives dominate the activities of the military profession in arms trade reform and foreign military sales (see chapter 2). The growing significance of the raw technical aspects of the societal-profession relationship is indicative of a broader, more disconcerting compromise within the military as a profession. As the remainder of chapter 1 shows, changes in the global arms marketplace, changes in the type, number of and incentives of the various stakeholders involved in the arms trade, and changes in the governing premise behind arms trading have all combined in a way that alters the very relationship between the American military and the American public it was originally designed to serve. Current arms trade practices and policies are reflective of a new reality in twenty-first century arms trading: needs of the producing firm and the buyer (now, more foreign than domestic) must be served first, in order that the American public can be served later in the provisioning for the common defense. This development leads directly to a
compromise of the military profession according to the conceptual terms that Huntington prescribes.

**Associational Professions versus Bureaucratic Professions**

According to Huntington, professional organizations are divided into two distinct types: associations or bureaucracies. In the associational professions, the practitioner (the professional) typically functions independently and has a direct relationship with the individual client. The bureaucratic professions, in contrast, possess a high degree of specialization of labor and responsibilities within the profession, and the profession as a whole renders a collective service to society as a whole.\(^7\)

For the purpose here, this distinction is an important one. It does not fit the military profession as a profession. Huntington fails to mention the fact that the military institution is neither associational nor bureaucratic as a profession, but rather is a combination of both. The military profession is a complex, hybridized profession—both personally associative and bureaucratically removed from the individual public. The commissioning of an officer is symbolic of the personal, associative bond an individual officer has to his or her society. The officer’s institutionalization into a particular service, branch, or area of specialized expertise is indicative of a bureaucratic relationship.

Key to this distinction is the manner in which each type of profession (or in the case of the military profession, how each half of the same profession) is regulated and governed. The associational aspects of the profession are usually governed by the written codes and ethics of the process (legal statutes and codes). The bureaucratic aspects of the profession tend to be unwritten and more generally conventional on how the profession should behave and the proper role of the profession in society. For Huntington (albeit,
not explicitly explained) the bridge between this formal code of behavior and this bureaucratic norm of behavior is found in the professional officer. This author goes one critical step further. He argues that the associative rules and regulations governing the profession (in fact, defining its function, relevancy, and legitimacy to society) must reflect the very unwritten (but mutually understood) contract that should exist between the military profession and the society it serves.

Reform of Department of Defense’s Associative Regulations Governing Foreign Arms Sales

DoD initiated an organizational reform of its arms acquisition and arms export policies in 1994, as part of the wider National Partnership for Reinventing Government during the Clinton Administration. Ten years earlier, the Packard Commission had also initiated defense-wide reforms. Both reform initiatives were intended to streamline the acquisition and export processes, in hopes of building greater efficiency into the system, cutting bureaucratic red tape (regulations) and better serving the customer. Both reforms have resulted in some unintended consequences for the military professions. Of consequence for this study is the degree to which the professionalism of the armed service professions has been degraded because of acquisition and export policy reforms. These reforms were ultimately designed to streamline the processes to accommodate defense firm interests in lowering production cost and securing foreign markets for their wares, and to accommodate foreign buyers’ interests in acquiring more US weapons, more quickly and cheaply than in the past. For motives behind the profession’s parent society (the American public), the reforms focused on changing the associative regulations that had previously defined the military profession’s modus operandi in the production and sale of arms abroad (defined by society). Consequently, the changes in
the associative aspects of the profession are no longer consistent with the bureaucratic aspects of the profession. The results may prove sinister to the profession itself--the death of the profession from internal conflict of interests. On the one hand, there are incentives driving the profession to sell more abroad quickly to accommodate commercial and foreign interests, and, on the other hand there is the original bond of the profession to society restricting foreign sales on behalf of public security.

The demands placed on the modern military to provision for the common defense are in direct conflict with the manner in which the public regulates the profession in its role as the provider of the common defense.

**The Pressures on the Military Profession to Change**

How America’s armed forces decide which technological advancements to exploit in the production of weapons, how the services resource (i.e. fund through dollars and through political will and support from congress) those adaptations and innovations, and how and with whom the armed services share that technology (friends and allies abroad)--have changed since the end of the Cold War (circa 1990). The pressures behind US defense R&D, acquisition, production, and export have changed over the past ten to fifteen years, with the most profound changes occurring in the last six years. The economics of defense trade have gained parity with the security issues related to defense trade policy. In certain cases, economic incentives promoting the sale and transfer of US weapons abroad have outpaced security concerns traditionally restricting those sales in the past.\(^8\)

Defense trade policy in the post-Cold War era is a complex and hazardous endeavor. As issues of economics and security have again reemerged under altered
Circumstances after the end of the Cold War, so have the economic and security aspects of defense trade policy. The post-Cold War security environment and global market environment demand that in the short run, some transfer of weapons and related technology (even defense production capacity) be sold abroad in order to provide adequate product demand at home and to make the acquisition and production of weapons more affordable for the US soldiers in the longer run. The issue becomes more complex with the understanding that tomorrow’s security dilemmas will be addressed more by coalitions of nations and other actors rather than through unilateral actions. In this context, the sale of US-made weapons is necessary to ensure greater interoperability of the armed forces with those of the future coalition partners and allies. Just as vital to future force interoperability is an increase in cooperative ventures with US foreign friends and allies in base research and development, acquisition, and production of future fighting forces.

But some of the most virulent aspects of traditional defense trade politics still persist. Arms are not benign commodities. The sale of the wares of war still contributes to global and regional instability. Arms exports still feed regional arms races. The import and export of arms on a global scale still robs fledgling nations of much of their scarce “butter” resources, potentially leading to state and or regime collapse.

Specific questions arise for the military services (specifically in this study, the US Army) as they engage in these reformed arms export and acquisition processes as arms marketers with multiple agent status (seller’s agent; foreign buyers’ agent; purchaser). By engaging in a commercially dominated process, are America’s armed force professionals forced to compromise their professional ethics in preserving long-term
security for the short-term economic gains that can be had in the liberal promotion of arms sales abroad? And what might the ramifications in even longer terms be for overall security if the armed services opt out of the acquisition and export business as a means of preserving their professional identity? Might civilian and commercial entities left alone to decide on weapons acquisitions and sales lack the adequate operational (practitioner’s) expertise to ensure that the right weapons are procured to effectively meet the nation’s security needs? These are the issues that lie at the center of this study.

The new global arms market underpinning US defense trade policy calls for a new strategy of defense trade, a strategy that provides balance and direction behind US arms production and export policies. The post-Cold War environment calls for a strategy which ensures that economic imperatives are met, but not at the expense of security itself. The preservation of the security imperative is the basis of the US military’s professional jurisdiction--preserving that imperative, is imperative for the protection of the military services as professions.

Plan of the Study

This study’s cautionary tale demands the proper historical perspective. One cannot begin to ask the questions posed in this study without a detailed review either of the changes that have taken place in the global arms market since the late 1980s or of globalization’s impact on domestic policies and processes related to the conventional arms trade.

The remainder of chapter one establishes historical context for current arms transfer practices and their effects on the military profession. To this end, two seminal issues are discussed: economic changes that have taken place in the conventional arms...
market since the end of the Cold War, and the evolution of a globalized military-industrial-foreign customer complex replacing the more traditional iron-triangle relationship typical of the Cold War arms trade. These developments in combination have led to radical changes in the norms, principles, rules, and decision-making procedures underpinning the contemporary arms market. Further, these developments have altered the motivations and incentives of domestic stakeholders, including the armed services themselves.

Chapter 2 provides a detailed and comprehensive summary and evaluation of the existing literature on the question of arms acquisition and export reform and the latter’s effect on service professionalism. Much of the significance of this thesis lies in the fact that it fills a void in the existing literature. The study of professions took a second seat to the politics and sociology of institutions and organizations of the 1970s and 1980s. The refocus on professions is a relatively new initiative; a focus on the military as a profession is an even fresher notion. This chapter will detail what is new with respect to the literature and the study of professions.

Chapter 3 focuses on the chosen research methodology and theoretical apparatus. Underpinning the study is empirical data and primary source information collected through case methodology and first-hand (key actor) interviews. Two policy reform case studies (the Packard Commission reforms and the Reinventing Government reforms) are discussed and examined to identify the alterations that have taken place under the rubric of change to the associative rules, regulations, and motives of the military profession. Three foreign military sales cases are then examined for implementation-level effects of
these reforms on the military profession as it develops arms acquisition and export policy in the twenty-first century.

Chapter 4 is the analytical portion of the study. Here, what is known and understood about the commercial nature of US Arms Transfer Policy Reform will be applied to the US Army, one of the key stakeholders in the reform process. Application (transposition) of the Systems of Professions approach to the issue of professionalism in arms transfer policy and practice is the theoretical apparatus of choice for this aspect of the study. It finds application in chapter 4. This perspective provides a point of departure for an analysis and assessment of the current state of the US Army as a profession.

Chapter 5 affords conclusions, implications, and recommendations.

Limitations of the Study

There are two key limitations to this study. First, the focus is on the conventional arms market and practices associated with that market. While inferences could probably be drawn for the weapons of mass destruction (WMD) arena, this author will not do so here. Second, though some attention will be devoted to the Air Force and Navy, the study will focus primarily on the effects of a commercially-driven policy reform effort on the US Army as a profession and on the officers who engage in the arms acquisition and export practice.

Arms Trade Policy Reform and the Army Profession

This author embarked two years ago on an examination of the reform of US arms export policy (FMS reinvention) in order to gain a better understanding of the reform itself--what it is and what it strives to accomplish--as well as to determine what
motivations are driving reform and what expectations lie in the resulting reinvention. The intent was to learn how the armed services of the United States were interpreting foreign military sales reinvention and therefore, how they were championing or challenging the notion of export reform in their specific implementations of reform policy.\(^9\)

Analysis revealed some severe structural (institutional and process) barriers to change. Indeed, analysis demonstrated how structural inhibitors to reform were reflective of a more elusive, underlying cultural barrier to necessary change.

The study of ongoing US arms export policy reform showed that the reform finds its driving motivation in short-term, commercial interests of defense company and foreign customers. These interests reflected expectations of greater efficiencies in the processes that allow stakeholders to benefit from US foreign sales of arms and related technologies. Following this understanding, attention shifted to questions of if and how such commercial and efficiency based motivations behind arms export reform might perhaps compromise the longer-run professional capacity of the armed services to maintain its effectiveness in providing for the common defense. In following DoD mandates to accommodate drives for improved organizational efficiency in arms export practices, might the armed services be selling-away the foundational tenets of their professionalism--the capacity to adapt and to innovate to provide for the national security of the United States and its interests abroad?

This project, then, is not only a study of bureaucratic politics and organizational process as they relate to arms control and transfer policy; it is a study of military professionalism. Focusing on the US Army, the study becomes an examination of
ongoing reform of US Army export policy, the policymaking system, and their implications for Army professionalism and military preparedness.

**What is Foreign Military Sales (FMS)?**
**Why a Focus on FMS Reform?**

As amended (most recently, in 1999) the Arms Export Control Act (AECA) provides the statutory basis for the conduct of the FMS program with any eligible country or international organization. Section 21 of the AECA authorizes the sale of defense articles and defense services from stocks of the DoD. Section 22, AECA, authorizes the US Government (USG) to enter into contracts for the procurement of defense articles and defense services for subsequent sale of design and construction services to eligible countries and international organizations.¹⁰

The foreign military sales program is defined within defense circles as an enabler for the national military strategy and a crucial bridging mechanism between that military strategy (NMS) and the national security strategy (NSS). There are three elements of the NMS, among which foreign military sales are touted as a critical link.¹¹ Foreign military sales enhance security by enabling the respond element of the national military strategy. FMS enables the training and equipping of foreign forces enhancing the interoperability of those forces with the US in coalition operations. Foreign military sales also enables the prepare element of the NMS, bolstering US prosperity by supplementing federal and US Army accounts, reinforcing the US industrial base, and supporting the US jobs market. Every 1 billion dollars in foreign military sales accounts for 22,000 US defense sector jobs.¹² The total program value of the US Army FMS program alone from 1994 to 1999 was $49.8 billion, with $3.2 billion in Fiscal Year 2000 sales alone. In 1999, total major conventional weapons exports for the US stood at $10.4 billion. Finally, foreign
military sales enable the shape element of the national military strategy by promoting peace. FMS has always been, and continues to be, a key foreign policy tool. It is a means for promoting American values and ideals. FMS is a mechanism for assisting in nation building. At present, the US foreign military sales program links the US government, industry, and armed forces to 140 different armies, 47 different air forces, 26 different navies, and 26 other country entities.¹³

The FMS program is one of only two processes foreign countries have at their disposal to purchase US weapons; the other is the direct commercial sales program. The foreign military sales program has been the subject of governmental reinvention since 1993. Reinvention has introduced radical changes, the results of which have to date gone unstudied. This author can find no in depth analyses of the FMS process itself since the mid-1980s.¹⁴ Foreign military sales have recently become an important contributor to the sustainment and maintenance budgets of the US aging forces. The importance of foreign military sales as a means of satisfying the US defense needs, however, is not recognized in defense circles. This is particularly true in military circles. While the regional commanders-in-chief (CINCs) implement the FMS program, they are hard-pressed to describe the importance of the program as a payment mechanism for the national military strategy.¹⁵

**What Foreign Military Sales Reinvention Should Be**

While industrial policy concerns—both America’s and those of the potential foreign buyer—should drive to some degree US export policy reform, military security concerns of the United States and the foreign country buyers should also inform ideas on export reform. This author posits the idea that a proper approach to export policy reform
would, while taking both the economic and security interest behind the sale of weapons abroad into account, give more credence to national, regional, and global security concerns. In the language of *Systems of Professions* literature, this understanding would translate to reform efforts at enhancing the professional effectiveness of the armed services. They would then lead all efforts at improving the organizational efficiency of arms export practices. A proper and sound reform of American arms export policy would be based on a strategy that balances the commercial and security concerns of all stakeholders in arms exporting. These stakeholders include the buyer nation, the producing firm, and the United States government as host to the producer firm, and itself, as a buyer for its armed services. A balance of concerns among the three stakeholders mentioned would, in turn, help produce a balance in regional and global economic-security. Reform should enable the national military strategy, and hence, military (Army) professionalism, not detract from it.

What drove the US government to accept the FMS reinvention? Between 1997 and 2000, there was a steady decline in FMS-requisitions--a fifty percent decline in just three years. FMS customers perceived DoD logistics (the sustainment side of FMS) as non-responsive because of slow service; FMS backorders reached 39,000 case line items in 1998. Moreover, by 1997 the foreign customer had become more sophisticated in his dealings with the USG on defense item purchases and with the DCS-FMS processes themselves. This improvement in foreign buyer expertise derived largely from the “school of hard knocks”--experiences with cost overages and delays (meaning more cost to the recipient) in past dealings with the US government.\(^{16}\)
The New Iron Triangle of Arms Export Policymaking

The end of the Cold War now affords a foreign country the freedom to press for its own security and economic concerns in all trade endeavors. No longer completely reliant on the security umbrella provided by the United States, the foreign country buyer has become a more sophisticated purchaser. Foreign countries are now adept at negotiating their claims and interests in the complex US arms export policymaking process. As in the United States, foreign governments are increasingly hard pressed to justify increases in demand for defense resources with its publics and legislatures. Efficiency-based government reinvention is driving the actions of foreign buyers in their dealings on arms exports with the US government and US defense firms. Future participation in multinational (coalition) peace operations is contingent on the degree of foreign compatibility and interoperability of equipment with the US and US-led security organizations. This reality imposes harsh financial and security demands on the foreign arms buyer, as he must constantly consider tradeoffs in loss of interoperability with the US (and the degradation in his relationship with the US) by going other than US in force modernization decisions.

The concept of the iron triangle at one time adequately defined the ironclad (impenetrable) three-way relationship that existed between Congress, federal executive agencies, and special interest groups, all having a stake in a particular policy issue. The old definition implied the notion of a closed US defense trade policy system. This is no longer the case.

Changes in the global marketplace for arms have created a new iron triangle of arms export policy. Forming the triangle are three stakeholders: (1) the foreign country
buyer; (2) the defense industrial firms; and (3) the US government (an aggregate of the executive agents, congressional committees, and the armed services). All three stakeholders have been altered by the changes that have taken place since the late-80s within the global arms market. Meanwhile, the relationships among the players have also changed. Understanding these new stakeholders and how the changing relationships among them are necessary to understand the interests that now dominate US arms export policy reform. Understanding the incentives that drive ongoing export policy reform is vital to determining reform direction and perceiving whether reform is enabling or detracting from US national security.

**The Defense Firms**

Three new realities face the defense firms that survived the 1990s global drawdown:

1. Consolidate, specialize, become more transnational or risk death. This is a lesson all survivors of William Perry’s “Last Supper” have learned well.

2. Secure foreign markets at all cost. Domestic demand for arms and related technologies is not adequate to meet the firms’ marginal production cost. The competition for scarce foreign demand perhaps nears zero-sum; moreover, a loss to a foreign competitor may mean that the US firm will choose not to produce the defense article at all, making the article unavailable to the armed services.

3. Secure aid from the government in winning the competition for scarce export markets. It is common today for defense producers to secure the help of the US government (i.e., armed services) to assist in efforts to acquire scarce foreign arms orders. The fact that a firm is increasingly reliant on foreign demand gives the firm its greatest
power over the armed services--promote foreign sales or risk higher cost for your own
force modernization.

Today’s tight market for defense firms complicates traditional relationships
between the US government and the foreign buyer. Firms need the US government, and
more specifically, the armed services pushing on their side to seal arms deals. Such
negotiations often place the US government in conflict with the foreign country on
matters of price, cost, and access to proprietary information. Such deals also compromise
the armed services’ professional obligations to prohibit certain sales to certain clients in
recognition of security concerns. The services are reliant on the commercial desires of
national defense firms for sustainment of the services’ own future military preparedness.

The Foreign Buyer

Today’s foreign military sales recipient can be divided into four distinct
classifications of buyers. Countries fall into a particular classification based on their
level of expertise with the FMS process and their degree of sophistication in traversing
the US arms export policy process.
TABLE 1

THE NEW FOREIGN MILITARY SALES CUSTOMER

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Classification</th>
<th>Degree of Sophistication in FMS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>“Sophisticated”</td>
<td>Requires little help in FMS procedures. Mature logistics; modern processes and systems. Examples: UK, Netherlands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Middle”</td>
<td>Still needs Total Package Support. No professional Logistics Corps. Typically demand greater “offsets” (co-production; disclosure; more participatory role in the process). Examples: Egypt, Saudi Arabia; Singapore; Taiwan; UAE; Turkey.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Traditional”</td>
<td>Not much money. Competing economic and social needs. Requires more US involvement in management of the FMS program processes. Examples: Most African countries; South America</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Emerging”</td>
<td>Desires strong links to the US/West. Foreign Military Financing (FMF) dependent. Needs extend beyond normal FMS. Examples: Former Soviet Union states; Growing democracies</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Though all four categories of FMS recipients affect FMS reform and the character of the relationships that define US arms export policy, the first two categories are the most important for the story told here. Actions and incentives of the sophisticated and middle recipient states are having a profound effect on the very nature of US arms export policy reform. One particular sophisticated recipient--the Netherlands--is credited with giving birth to the idea of foreign military sales reform. The Dutch purchase of the AH-4A Apache attack helicopter in the mid-1990s revealed much inefficiency in the FMS program. The Dutch paid handsomely for those inefficiencies. But the education earned in this sale has contributed to the Dutch being considered now as one of, if not the most, sophisticated of FMS participants. The Dutch are adept at negotiating the complexities of the US arm trade policymaking processes. They know what questions to ask and where in the system to ask them. The Dutch now lead a semi-formal consortium of twenty-one countries that deal in FMS with the United States. From this leadership position, the
Dutch have been successful in ensuring that the US government and US defense firms hear the same complaints and list of desired changes from everyone: total ownership cost information; more direct input to the FMS system; tailored letters of offer and acceptance (LOAs); not-to-exceed (NOE) pricing; the capability to monitor cases; and opportunity to provide feedback into case development and management.¹⁸

The Dutch Apache (Longbow) Case has become the model for FMS reinvention. In this case, the first use of not-to-exceed (NTE) pricing, the first opportunity for FMS customers to have direct observation of FMS contract negotiations is seen (in the past, prohibited by law, but now waiver able under FMS reinvention). This case also witnessed Dutch wins in the approval of waivers of numerous FMS standard terms and conditions, as well as the inclusion of unique interim capability items in their FMS package, to include unit training by US aviation personnel (Twenty-first Cavalry Squadron at Fort Hood, Texas.)¹⁹ Other countries are requesting and gaining similar benefits from their FMS dealings with the United States. An overall verdict of whether this is good or bad for US security and economic interests must be withheld until the full nature of the FMS reform itself (security-driven or commercially driven) is determined. What can be said at this point is that the foreign recipients are pressing the US export system for more, and the system is accommodating.

The United States Armed Forces

The armed services have always played a complex role in foreign military sales. Under FMS reform, that role has become even more complicated. The US armed forces may actually be witnessing some uncommon and highly questionable practices on the part of the armed services to seal the deal in the acquisition of scarce foreign markets for
defense industry arms sales. These uncommon practices in the long run may be 
damaging the common defense needs of the US

In effect, the armed services are an agent for the foreign recipient. This has 
always been the nature of the US military-foreign country relationship that underpins the 
foreign military sales program. However, the demands placed on the US armed forces as 
action agents for foreign FMS recipients have increased exponentially, particularly by 
those middle-countries that demand greater co-production arrangements as part of the 
FMS deal. At the same time, the armed services are responsible for assisting US Army 
defense firms in the sale of US-made weapons systems to foreign buyers. This role has 
increased in importance since the mid-90s, as domestic demand for arms has shriveled 
and consequently, the demand to replace that lost domestic demand with foreign demand 
has increased. And lest it be forgotten, there is still a third role the armed services play in 
FMS. The services act on their own behalf to provide for their own force modernization.

For the US armed services, then, these complex roles present three new security 
dilemmas.20 First, the US armed forces are faced with having to design and equip a 
national military strategy that meets a broadened security strategy--to fight and win 
America’s wars and participate in smaller-scale operations. This realization means 
financing R&D and procurement of a future force capable of meeting the peace operation 
role, while simultaneously finding the funds for maintaining America’s legacy force (the 
old Cold War heavy force of heavy tanks, artillery, and mechanized infantry). Foreign 
exports of the legacy force and co-production of the future force have become major 
means for the US armed forces to afford this military strategy. Co-production--the 
foreign manufacture of US defense equipment--has become a popular offset requested by
foreign recipients and an offset increasingly accommodated by the armed services as a necessary evil for the US forces to afford their own force modernization. At present, the US Army alone has twenty-nine active co-production programs underway with thirteen countries plus NATO, with a total program value of twenty-six billion dollars. Many of those dollars go to lowering its own R&D and the production cost of future forces by increasing economy of scale.\textsuperscript{21}

Second, it must be understood that there are fewer firms in the US defense industry today. There are, consequently, less choices of producers from which the US armed forces can chose to meet their force development needs. These fewer firms may be less the national champions they used to be.\textsuperscript{22} US armed services are dependent on these fewer, more economically motivated firms than ever before. Third, the new security environment facing US forces calls for continuing adaptation to a Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA). However, the ability to afford this revolution is tied to two critical issues: (1) foreign purchases of the defense items, in order to lower the production cost and (2) the willingness and capability of the foreign partner to modernize at the same time and in the same directions as the US. The US armed forces’ ability to innovate and to realize this RMA is critically limited by its ties to defense firms and foreign buyers to preserve market demand over time. The need for greater interoperability to contend with a revolution in military affairs demands a coordinated leap-forward in force modernization by producer, buyer, and sales agent alike; the complex nature of the relationships among these three players may prevent a realization of that revolution in military affairs.
Background and Historical Context

Changes in the Global Arms Marketplace, circa 1990

The prime rationale for national state production and sale of arms and related technologies during the Cold War was to counter military threats posed by adversaries. Cold War bipolarity helped “stabilize” the global arms trade. Bipolarity allowed for a two-tiered global arms trade process. The first tier consisted of the two superpowers, competing in a zero-sum, relative gain fashion. From this standpoint, arms transfers and trading was highly regulated by the two great powers. This security umbrella at the first tier set the stage for more absolute gains competition and trade at the second, lower tier. Here, trade and transfer could thrive in absolute terms, but were relegated by the superpowers to intra-pole and or peripheral (third world) marketeering. By the 1960s, the global market witnessed positive rates of technological growth and internalization, leading to the forging of close military-industrial ties (military-industrial complexes), characterized by complex arms procurement regulations, and specialization of accounting and procurement techniques. The US government was thereby able to both restrict entry of defense firms (unknown entities) and confine those firms that were allowed to engage in arms production and procurement within the arms market by creating a high cost for exit. In short, the 1960s and 70s saw a US arms market characterized by closely-linked military and industrial R&D complexes, which were funded and regulated by DoD, predominately through its foreign military sales and foreign military financing programs.

The 1980s and the Gulf War “Spike”

The Reagan-Bush years (Fiscal Year 1981 to Fiscal Year 1991) witnessed large-scale, across-the-board budgeting increases in defense spending. The US defense budget
grew by fifty-four percent during this decade, with R&D funding doubling. Near-term, “specific” weapon system R&D budget grew by sixty-five percent.25

The 1990s Market

The 1990s market was best characterized as a market in decline. This decline in both the global arms market and the domestic US market was largely the result of reduced domestic demand for weapons (result of the end of the Cold War), overcapacities brought on--again--by the end of the Cold War, the 1980s buildups and the Gulf War production spike, and the rise in production autarky among former buyers, such as India.26

The 1990s were defined by a myriad of market changes. As indicated by much of the literature on this subject, three structural changes produced primacy of effect.

Decline in the Number of Prime Contractors

National firms were forced in the early 1990s to choose among three survival strategies: (1) conversion of some or all of their production capital to civilian purposes; (2) abandonment of such civilian subsidiaries and specialization only in defense-related production; (3) complete (forced) exit from the industry to preserve shareholder value (NATO Conference 1997). Those firms that were able to remain in the game, developed niche strategies, such as McDonnell Douglas’ focus on naval aircraft, General Dynamics’ concentration in the US Air Force market; Lockheed’s focus on its “skunk works” (black technologies), and Northrop’s move to subcontractor roles for other prime contractors.27 What resulted, and what still largely drives the nature, scope, and scale of today’s US arms transfer policy process is a leaner, hungrier US defense industry, composed of fewer players, playing for higher shares, albeit at higher risks to themselves. However, they are
better positioned to vie for and win governmental support for their efforts, as government has much to lose (and to gain) in today’s market processes.

Declines in Domestic Procurement Rates and Increases in Firm and State Entry into Export Markets

Fiscal Year 1991 marked the termination of several current-generation procurement programs, including the F-15E fighter, the AH-64A Apache Helicopter, the F-14D fighter, and the M1A1 Abrams Tank. To offset these and similar domestic declines, the market in general shifted more from domestic demand-based production to international supply-based production. Survival of domestic production rests upon attainment of foreign export markets. According to a report by the now defunct US Office of Technology Assessment (OTA), General Dynamics showed overseas sales had increased from seventeen percent in the mid-1980s to almost fifty percent by the mid-1990s, while Martin Marietta moved from eight percent in foreign sales in 1991 to over twenty percent in 1994. To date, these trends have reached a critical mass. Many staple US weapons programs are almost completely reliant on foreign demand. The Army’s M1A1/2 tank supply and sustainment are easily over sixty percent reliant on foreign customer purchases. Continued production of the Air Force’s F-16 requirement is near-100 percent reliant on foreign demand.

These developments signify a radical change in the balance of power between the producing firms, the foreign country buyers, and the military service users characterized historically as the “iron triangle” of the defense trade. This triangular relationship has been altered dramatically due to a combination of all the factors mentioned earlier. Foreign buyers and transnational producing companies have gained in power in this
relationship. The armed services have become more dependent on the other two stakeholders for preservation of its long term force modernization and development needs. As a result, the military professions have been forced out of short term necessity of keeping foreign customers buying and defense firms producing to take part in practices damaging to their professional mandates and ethos.

**Significance of the Study**

To state it baldly, the commercial pressures placed upon the military services and their professional officers to promote the sale and even affect the research and development and acquisition of certain weapons systems for today’s profit is leading to the de-professionalization of the armed services. Such a compromise of the public trust, intended or otherwise, could result in a loss of professional autonomy and a narrowing of the profession’s jurisdictional boundaries by the same public. If the trend is not averted, the military services could risk serious compromise of their status as a public institution and unique profession.

There are other and broader implications that add to this study’s significance. The perpetuation of a commercially motivated arms trade policy reform by the US armed services could lead to the unintended sale of American, regional, and global security. Today’s profits could lead to tomorrow’s losses. Evidence gleaned from the case studies examined in this project indicates that this trend is already well underway.

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2 Ibid., 8

3 Ibid., 9
6. Studies conducted by the now defunct Office of Technology Assessment, US Department of State.


9. Ibid.


11. The recent draft NMS (version as of 27 March 2002) uses different terminology in its articulation of national military objectives (assure allies and friends; dissuade adversaries; deter aggression, and defeat aggressors at home and abroad) than its predecessor NMS (1997 version). This thesis builds upon the 1997 NMS and 2000 NSS terminology for two main reasons. First, the 1997 NMS and 2000 NSS underpinned the period of acquisition and export policy reform under study in this thesis. Second, though the 2002 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) has served as a proxy for development of the draft 2002 NMS, until the next NSS is published, the official White House policy remains the December 2000 national security strategy.


14. Other than recent congressional inquiries solicited through the Governmental Accounting Office (GAO), there have been no in-depth studies of the foreign military sales process since the mid-1980s. Those mid-1980s studies were conducted by the US Army War College, none of which provided a complete process tracing of the program.

15. Fletcher Conference, National Security Capabilities (Discussions with four of the nine unified commanders, Crystal City, VA, 14-16 February 2001).

The aggregation of the United States agents and agencies under the rubric, USG, is required due to the limits of this paper. Clearly, this is a simplification of reality. What really exists, when you open up the black box of USG, is an iron triangle of federal agency-congressional committee-defense company. However, the relationship between those entities has radically changed. Players from the external triangle have penetrated the inner triangle, perhaps compromising the closed system that once defined the US arms export policy regime.


There is a fourth concern relating to the new roles the armed forces professional performs under FMS today that bears mention here. As commercial business is playing a larger and larger role in the arms trade, the tension for the professional military officer can be portrayed as private deal making versus public professional military service. From my perspective of what is happening under a commercially motivated FMS reform, military officers in the security assistance and acquisition business are increasingly being coopted to serve as shills for the arms trade.

Data obtained from the US Army Security Assistance Command (USASAC), February 2001.

A counterargument is that with fewer firms needing more help from the government to secure foreign markets for their arms. Today’s defense firms are more the national champions than they were in the past. I argue that this is true, only if (1) the focus is on short term relationships between the firm and the government and (2) the government in those relations with the firms, continues to accommodate the commercial interests of the firms. I argue that in such a relationship, the government is subject to take much more risk in the denial of a defense firm’s desires for higher profits or for the production of a certain system on behalf of its own force modernization desires or those of the foreign country partner.

“Stable” is defined here in terms of (1) minimal adjustments or fluctuations in the number of firms in the market and (2) minimal to zero fluctuations in the hierarchy of advanced industrial producing countries and purchasing countries in the market.

Positive rates of internalization, as defined by the Defense Science Board (DSB) means growth of domestic capacity.
25 Wulf.


29 Secretary of the Air Force, International Affairs (Interview by author, SAF/IA Headquarters, Rosslyn, VA, 11 July 2000).
CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW

While the literature on arms control and defense export policy is vast, there is little in the existing body of literature (military, scholarly, or otherwise) that focuses on the specific subject of foreign military sales reform (“reinvention”). Nor is there a substantial list of works on the subject under inquiry in this particular study: the potential effect of export reform on military service professionalism and effectiveness. This chapter provides only a cursory review of the defense industrial and trade literature. This literature also supports an analysis of the implications of commercialism on US arms trade policy reform in the 1990s. This specific body of literature has been well detailed in this author’s previous work.1

The following treatment reviews existent literature on Professions, in general, and specifically the literature emerging on the subject of Military Professionalism.

The Post-Cold War Arms Trade

The edited volume by Anthony Pierre, *Cascade of Arms* is a seminal work delineating the Cold War and post-Cold War body of literature covering arms control and the global arms trade. Herbur Wulf’s earlier and similar anthology, *Arms Watch* is a key work in the post-Cold War body of literature on defense industrial policy. William Keller’s work, *Arm in Arm* is a critical bridge between the Wulf collaboration of the early 1990s and Pierre’s synthesis of the new, yet still amorphous body of works on twenty-first century arms control and arms trade. With regard to this recently expanding collection of experimental works-in-progress, this author would like to note the significance of the Council on Foreign Relations as the seedbed for many of the works
that are just now beginning to enrich the traditional literature. Much of recent success is owed to the efforts and individual contributions of Professor Ann Markusen and her chairpersonship of two key CFR study groups--the Transnationalization of the Defense Industries study group and the Geo-Economics of Military Preparedness study group. Both are were two-year study groups devoted to promoting the exploratory research into new developing areas related to defense industrial studies, arms control, and defense policy. The Council recently published an anthology derived from these efforts, entitled *Arming for the Future* that showcases some of the more recent, yet still maturing works in the evolving field of defense industrial and arms control policy.

This author’s own work in this field forms a critical baseline for this proposed study. Both his MPA thesis and dissertation research provide the primary source and preliminary background context for this follow-on study that explores the ill-effects that a changed and commercialized arms trade policy poses for the US Army as a profession.

**Professions, Military Professionalism, and the Systems of Professions Literature**

The early 1930s saw the genesis of the study of professions in the United States and Europe. The importance of this early body of literature on the subject was in the distinction the literature drew between the unique means of organizing and controlling work in the professions from the division and definition of work more common in formal organizations and labor unions. Early study of professions derived from case study analyses. This study progressed through the identification of professions and the characteristics that distinguished them as unique institutions and collective bodies of organized work. By the 1960s, the literature focused on studies that modeled the professionalization process by which occupations were converted into professions.
The foundational characteristics that separated professions from occupations identified by this early work were the extensive education of its members and the service to society and shared ethics. This early genre saw professions as static; something to be maintained over time through their unique characteristics.

Classical writings on the military profession include the works of Vagts, Huntington, Janowitz, and Abrahamsson. Where this body of literature stands out and apart from the prior studies on professionalism is in their collective contributions to the building of a core set of characteristics endemic to military professions, or according to author Allan Millet, “the attributes and character of the military occupation which caused society to give it professional status.” These unique attributes are aptly summarized in the following description offered by Millet:

The occupation was full-time and stable, serving society’s continuing needs; it was regarded as a life-long calling by the practitioners, who identified themselves personally with their vocational sub-culture; it was organized to control performance standards and recruitment; it required formal, theoretical education; it had a service orientation in which loyalty to standards of competence and loyalty to clients’ needs were paramount; [it] was granted a great deal of autonomy by the society it served, presumably because the practitioners had proven their high ethical standards and trustworthiness; and, overall, the profession’s work was the systemic exploitation of specialized knowledge applied to specialized problems.

From this traditional conception derives a similar and complementary conception of the professional military officer:

[The officer’s] identity is partly inherited, partly self-developed. He inherits the broadly defined characteristics of his career and the specialized institutional setting within which he finds himself. He must develop stable and lasting concepts of self that are compatible with his profession. This transformation or “professional socialization” is not taken lightly by the other practitioners with whom he begins his career.
Within these two succinct descriptions of the military as profession, and the officer as a military professional, one can finally see a clearly established set of boundaries that begin to define and delimit the legitimate jurisdictional boundaries that the American society and the military profession, collectively, have agreed upon for the military profession and that profession’s members.

Defining the Jurisdictional Boundaries of the Military Profession

The existing body of literature, up to this point, distinctively identifies at least three interrelated jurisdictions: (1) the political-societal jurisdiction; (2) the moral-ethical jurisdiction; and (3) the military-technical jurisdiction. The works of Huntington, Vagts, and Abrahamsson (what some could call the traditional school) identified these jurisdictional divisions as statically defined by society itself. Perhaps the most easily identifiable way to recognize these divisions in the American context lies in the following criteria: the traditional subjugation of the military to civilian control (the political-societal dimension); the concept of the officer and the gentleman and the authority of the military to self-adjudicate matters of legal, ethical, and moral questions (the moral-ethical dimension); and finally, in the autonomy given to the military profession to determine the appropriate ways and means of warfare, as the keepers of the technical and doctrinal expert knowledge on the art and science of war (the military-technical dimension). These three jurisdictions, as a result, can be viewed from two separate perspectives: the client’s perspective (political-societal) and the institution’s (moral-ethical and military technical).

A New Understanding of Professions

Theorists have begun to move beyond the static description of individual professions toward a more dynamic conception of the professional world. Dramatic
changes taking place within society, in terms of civil-military relations, and in relation to advancements in technology and the technical aspects of modern warfare (post-Cold War warfare) made a reconception of the military profession necessary. For example civil society’s perspective on the military professions changed drastically after the Vietnam experience. That experience, for the most part, helped to shatter the illusions of the Crowe-Powell generation of officers in terms of the proper role of the military officer as it related to the political. As part of evolution that began in the early 1970s, today’s’ professional military officer is a manifestation of dynamic military professionalism, in contrast with the traditional static definition offered by Huntington. Today’s professional officer is more political than past generations, a fact that serves as proof that the political-military jurisdictions have shifted in some significant way. This understanding confirms what, by intuition, theorists knew to be true—that just like institutions, there is a dynamic element to professions. Professions, like institutions, persist and evolve. Contemporary debates over the proper use of military force, as seen in the contention over the Weinberger-Powell doctrine, as well as the debate over General Colin Powell’s role as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff are further examples of the changing jurisdictional boundaries of the modern American military.

The modern literature on professions sees professions as competitors—for members, resources, and, most important, jurisdiction—within a system of professions. This system includes other professions, professionalizing occupations, and organizations, each of which vies for jurisdiction, the legitimate claim to apply its expertise to specific situations. It is from this jurisdiction that strategic leaders of any profession must develop the detailed requirements for professional systems, such as education, ethics,
oversight, and credentialing. Key to this new conception of a system of professions competing among themselves for jurisdiction (and therefore legitimacy and relevance) is the following: professional systems that are decoupled from jurisdiction (lose jurisdiction to other encroaching professions) will hinder the profession’s effectiveness and weaken its claim over its tasks. A perfect example of this critical aspect of the new professions literature is found in the concept of a potentially rising “tactical knowledge gap” existent in junior officers, and how, if this gap truly does exist and persist, that it will weaken the Army’s claim over future war fighting jurisdictions. Still another example makes the issue even more clear--the current debate within the Army between legacy (heavy) versus “transformation” (the lighter, more mobile objective future force). Whichever sub-culture within the Army profession that wins this debate will ultimately re-define the entire jurisdiction of the Army itself. The debate could even prove to re-define the relevance of the Army as the nation’s premier profession in the conduct of modern land warfare. Such a re-definition could reinforce the traditional Army jurisdiction, or it could find the Army losing critical ground to other services.

This new look at professions sees professions attempting to claim new jurisdictions. By gaining new jurisdictions, professions can gain additional autonomy and respect from the society which they serve. In more pragmatic terms, expanding jurisdictional responsibilities often means the acquisition of additional scarce resources to accomplish those things that must be done to fortify the new boundaries and to fulfill the new missions and mandates. However, there is a downside to this new malleability of professions: the malleability of a profession’s abstract knowledge also makes it vulnerable to change in the objective and subjective character of its professional tasks.
The most recent work of Doctor Don M. Snider and Colonel Gayle Watkins on the Army Profession describes this “down-side” in a profession’s malleable jurisdictional boundaries:

Objective changes in a profession’s tasks arise from sources outside the system that open new jurisdictional opportunities or do away with the old ones, that introduce new competitors into the system or cause others to disappear. These external changes are usually caused by technical, organizational, natural, or cultural shifts. Subjective changes in tasks originate from the actions or other players within the system and are usually more gradual in nature. In this case, subjective characteristics of the profession’s work are redefined as others--professions or organizations grapple for jurisdiction over it.

For a profession, the key to protecting one’s body of expert knowledge and one’s jurisdiction over that knowledge or work is to establish legitimate control over jurisdictions though a variety of channels. The most binding and legitimate of channels in the United States are the court of law and the court of public opinion.

Modern Challenges to the Army Profession

Today’s military services are facing both qualitative and quantitative challenges to their jurisdictions. The amount of work has increased dramatically (more deployments and the expansion of roles in operations other than war). Other changes (expansions and blurring of traditional roles) have resulted from objective and subjective changes in the nature of modern war and from changes in military-societal relations in the post-Cold War environment. With the end of the Cold War, the military services have had to deal with dramatic downsizing issues, namely budgets--an objective change that has forced the military services (the Army, in particular, for this study) to redefine their own jurisdictions. Other, more subtle and subjective changes, such as the blurring of the
economic and military notions of defense and security, has spurred changes in Service jurisdictions.

Such significant changes are particularly critical to the military professions because, unlike most other professions, military professions do not independently select their jurisdiction. Instead, selection results from negotiation with their clients, the American government and people.

The end of the Cold War (circa 1990) marked the beginning of a period of potential renewal for the military services. The Army in particular could re-exert its legitimate claim to areas of war fighting and operations other than war fighting where it has traditionally been the expert. However, during this post-Cold War period of change, the Army (like the other services) has done little to negotiate a redefinition of its jurisdiction. The services have passively accepted expansion of their jurisdictions (amid force downsizing) in some areas and have stood idle as other areas of their original jurisdictions have either been partially encroached upon or outright stolen by other emerging organizations (other services and or other private entities). The Army has been more passive in these encroachments than the other military services. All these developments have engendered negative implications for the Army, in particular, and the military services in general. Two of the more prominent and worrisome are: (1) the unintended and unrecognized decoupling of the services’ actions from their professional tasks and mandates (a decoupling of the professions from their professional identities), and (2) the rise in uncertainty among individual members of the military profession regarding their individual identities in their profession (roles)—an uncertainty most recently identified as a key determinant in declines in commitment and retention.
Change in the Mil-Tech Component and the State of the Military Profession.

This study focuses on the question, are current reforms of DoD weapons acquisition and arms transfer practices (policy) leading toward a de-professionalization of America’s armed forces? Translating this question into the language and context of the *Systems of Professions* literature, what this study seeks to address is the issue of changed and altered jurisdiction, of the military professions (the US Army in particular) with regard to newly emerging roles in the development, acquisition, sale, and purchase of weapon and related technologies. This peculiar focus falls squarely into what Abbott, Snider, and Watkins appropriately define as the military-technical component of the Army Profession’s Expert Knowledge. This peculiar application of the professions literature, however, brings glaringly to light new and otherwise unasked questions relating to the implications of changes to the military profession that the current body of literature fails to explore. These previously unexplored areas are:

1. **Changes in How The Client Is Defined, Raising the Question of Who is Altering the Roles of the Military Services in Arms Acquisition and Foreign Sales?** The contemporary literature on the professions rightly identifies the final arbitrator on issues of change in military profession jurisdiction as being the societal client that the military profession serves. The *Systems of Profession* literature, however, wrongly defines the relevant client as the American government and people. The rise of the new military-industrial-foreign buyer complex changes in a radical way the motives and intentions of the traditional clients with stakes in issues of military acquisition and foreign military sales; new players have been added to the game--new clients the American military is forced to accommodate. These new clients (foreign and industrial by nature) may have
acquired a more powerful role in the alteration of military profession jurisdiction than those traditional (and constitutionally mandated) clients--the American government and its people.

2. The Competition for Jurisdiction is as Much an Internal Struggle as it is an External one. The current literature on military professions looks at jurisdictional competition outside the system--competitions between separate professions for the same ground or body of expertise. In the case of modern acquisition reform practices and FMS reinvention, there are at least two internal struggles taking place: one within DoD and one within each of the military services themselves. Within DoD, the professionals are witnessing a struggle and competition between the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the organizational (business and administrative) side of DoD, and the military professions within DoD, defined more by their status and role as professions rather than by their business (organizational) roles. FMS reform (reinvention) shows the dominance of business (efficiency) concerns over the concerns of the profession (military effectiveness, for example, security). The second internal competition is one that the Systems Approach literature fails to identify: the competition that persists within a specific single-service profession between the majority service and any sub-professions identified through congressional mandate within that service. In this case, it is seen unique to the US Army, the existence of a sub-profession, the Acquisition Corps, designated by law as a separate branch, unique to the Army profession in its specialized expertise in weapons acquisition. As a result, the existence of a sub-profession within a larger profession (the Army) is seen. The potential for internal jurisdictional competition is more than potential; it is self-evident in today’s arms acquisition and trade practices.
3. Service Profession versus Joint Profession Competition. The Goldwater-Nichols Reorganization Act of 1986 set the stage for future competition for jurisdictional claims to expert knowledge between the four separate services and the joint community. By mandating joint experience and focus by law, Congress essentially sowed the seed corn for a new military profession: the Joint Service. Admittedly this is a newly emerging area of contention, as the Joint Service has not (yet!) evolved beyond a community conception into a full profession of its own right. However, the military profession is already feeling the pull of what will surely become a full-scale fight between joint jurisdictional interests in the acquisition and foreign sale of certain weapons and weapons systems, on the one hand, and the interest in separate purchase (and restricted sale and transfer) of service-specific systems with unique service-specific capabilities, on the other hand. The question of whether to sacrifice single-service overmatch gained by the acquisition and production of a particular system for added interoperability (joint and multinational) gained from two or more services buying in on one (the same) system variant is an issue that is already taking a toll on military effectiveness and on the stability of the military profession itself.

Neither the traditional (classical) literature on professions, nor the contemporary Systems of Professions literature accounts for the above issues. This is the gap that this study endeavors to fill. It is here that this study gains its relevance and significance, in terms of adding both to the body of scholarly knowledge on the subject of military professions and professionalism, and to the state of the Army as a profession.


3Allen R. Millet, Military Professional and Officership in America (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1977), 2


5Abbott, 17.


8Wilson, 98.
CHAPTER 3
RESEARCH DESIGN, METHODOLOGY, AND THEORETICAL APPARATUS

Introduction

As already mentioned, the study builds upon an earlier analysis of the implications of a commercially motivated and promoted reform of existing US conventional arms trade policy. As such, the research methodology and design used here, in part, build upon the prior study’s research design.

On design. The design is simple and follows a three-part format: (1) a historical review of change in the global arms market; (2) an examination and summary of previous analysis on the effect of historical change on domestic defense practices and policy in the United States; (3) an exploration of the effect of (1) and (2) above, on the Army as a profession. The study concludes with policy recommendations.

On methodology. This study, like its predecessor, employs the techniques of process tracing, case study methodology, and principal-agent interview. In combination, these methods provided the best means of illustrating the effects of on-going reform and change in otherwise static organizations and organizational processes within DoD and the military services, and more specifically (within the U.S. Army).

The Process Trace

In process tracing, the investigator “traces backward the causal process that produces the case outcome, at each stage inferring from the context what caused each cause.” The idea here is to track the process in question backward, thereby enabling the investigator to identify and isolate subsequent-level causes, with the intent of finally
identifying the prime cause. The process trace methodology was employed in the previous study to identify the prime motivation and dominant cause driving reform of the US arms trade policy process. That prime driver was, and remains, the commercial interests of foreign buyer states and transnational defense firms in their quests to economize and make more efficient the acquisition-for-sale of US weaponry and related technology abroad. Process tracing directly reveals the dilemma under study: how commercialism is leading to a de-professionalization of the US Army and the military profession in general. In this context, the process trace methodology plays a vital role in this sequel study of the Army profession.

**Tracing the Processes of Arms Policy Reform**

The issue of reform is a most interesting and “telling” notion to consider, particularly in a study on the military as a profession. The *Systems of Professions* literature looks at professions in a dynamic manner. Unique expertise defines the relationship between the profession and the public that it serves. A profession’s jurisdiction is thus defined and can (often does) change as the relationship between master and servant changes. The key to understanding modern professions, then, is in identifying (and putting into measurable form) the key indicator (variable) that defines that changed relationship. From this analysis it is possible to prove net gain or loss in professionalism.

This study focuses specifically on reform of US conventional arms trade (acquisition and export) policies. The foreign military sales program is the proxy for this analysis, as it aptly represents all aspects of the broader US arms trade policy. Two specific rounds of reform, the Packard Commission reforms of 1980 and the Reinventing
Government reforms (reinvention) of the 1990s are the focus of intense process tracing for this study. Studying the profession in the context of reform is most appropriate, as the concept of reform by definition implies that there is some rationale for change in the relationship between principal and agent (master and servant profession) over a given area of professional jurisdiction. The very issue of arms trade reform indicates fluctuating jurisdictional boundaries within the policy issue area; reform indicates the rising potential for inter and intra-competition between professions and other organizations over expanding (or retracting) jurisdictions.

The Packard Commission

In July 1985, President Ronald Reagan established the Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense. This commission became popularly known as the Packard Commission, named after the Commission’s chairman, Senator David Packard. The Commission was charged, under Executive Order 12526, to conduct a defense management study of important dimensions, including: (1) The budget process; (2) The procurement system; (3) Legislative oversight; and (4) The organizational and operational arrangements, formal and informal, among the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Unified and Specified Command systems, the Military Departments, and Congress.

According to the official record of the Packard Commission, the President established the Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management, in part, because “public confidence in the effectiveness of the defense acquisition system has been shaken by a spate of ‘horror stories’--overpriced spare parts, test deficiencies, and cost and schedule overruns.” The stories of $200 hammers and $400 toilet seats (spare parts...
overpricing as well) were especially unwelcome in the mid-1980s, a time of record budget deficits. As a result, the Commission was tasked to evaluate the defense acquisition system, to determine how it might be improved, and to recommend changes that could possibly lead to the acquisition of military equipment with equal or greater performance but at lower cost and with less delay. An acquisition task force was established, specifically, to accomplish this purpose. Radical changes in the global arms market (already discussed in chapter 1) also led to concerns that spurred reform. One of the most significant changes since the end of the Cold War is the fact now that DoD makes only a small percentage of its own equipment.\(^5\) This development, coupled with the shrinkage in the number of US national champion defense firms, changes the power relationships between the defense firms and DoD with its component services. The services have become dependent primarily on the nation’s industrial companies to develop their weapons and to manufacture everything from belt buckles to aircraft carriers. Dwindling domestic demand for weapons today has driven today’s fewer firms to move more toward their commercial production interests than in the past. The Packard Commission saw these new realities and sought simultaneously to: (1) mitigate against the inherent inefficiencies of DoD acquisition practices and (2) apply the technology base developed for commercial products to military products. The Packard Commission, correspondingly, recommended several sweeping reforms throughout the DoD. Two of the major reforms enjoying legislative implementation were: (1) the creation of a new position of Undersecretary of Defense (Acquisition) and comparable Service positions, and (2) the establishment of a separate and alternate personnel management system, to include senior acquisition personnel and contracting officers as well as scientists and
engineers. This latter recommendation resulted in the establishment of the Acquisition Corps, further stipulating that, “[F]ederal regulations should establish business-related education and experience criteria for civilian [and military] contracting personnel, which will provide a basis for the professionalization of their career paths.”

It must be noted that there were (and still are) many things “wrong” with the ways and means that DoD participates in arms acquisitions and exporting. Many of these wrongs come from an increasingly bureaucratic and overregulated process, that all too often results in weapons systems that cost too much, take too long to develop, and are obsolete by the time of fielding. DoD and the military services, themselves, noticed these deficiencies and included them in the reform agenda. The “fixes” identified by the Commission, however, can in hindsight be seen as diminishing the role and power of the Services, as much as the reforms can be seen as enhancing the DoD stake in the issue. The commercial and business concerns really dominated the Packard Commission agenda. As a result, the autonomy and authority generally granted to the individual Services were removed from the military services and placed with the Office of the Secretary of Defense. The results of the reforms, therefore, have had two critical effects: the military’s jurisdictional expertise was lessened, with a resulting decline in professionalism. Modeling the reforms too much along business lines and in accordance with commercial interests undermines the uniquely special mission requirements and aspects of the military profession. The military profession is a governmental organization; therefore, it is accountable to the public and the body politic, not to shareholders and to particular pressure groups. However, since the Packard Commission’s changes, traditional motivations have been outpaced by business and
commercial concerns over improved on order-to-delivery times, streamlined processes, emphasis on firm-fixed pricing, lower time and cost of production, and enhanced customer satisfaction. Defense firm interests and foreign state interests are winning in the modern game of defense acquisition, in which government agents (the Services) are forced at least to accommodate business concerns before meeting their own effectiveness-based needs. The Packard Commission Reforms led directly to some declines in military jurisdiction over arms sales and acquisitions (declines in professionalism) that dovetailed indirectly with problems in acquisition and export policy reinvention of the late-1980s.

Reinventing Government and FMS Reform

On 3 March 1993, President Clinton gave Vice President Al Gore the mission of leading a six-month review of the federal government. This review resulted in the National Performance Review (NPR). Under NPR auspices, teams of federal employees made recommendations for reinventing government that marked a continuing commitment to change and a ten-year process of reinvention. The President asked all cabinet members to lead department transformations and to encourage the creation of reinvention laboratories, dedicated and empowered to finding new ways of doing business.

The NPR and its recommendations focus principally on budget and performance deficits (same as the Packard Commission). These deficits were and still are addressed through personnel streamlining, procurement process reform, infrastructure consolidation and modernization, and reduced administrative procedures and costs. Savings and
performance improvements are the “bottom-line,” to be realized by following four key principles:

1. **Cut Red Tape.** Make people accountable for results; strip away unnecessary, innovation-stifling layers of regulations.

2. **Put Customers First.** Insist on customer satisfaction; use market dynamics such as competition and customer choice to create incentives to put customers first.

3. **Empower Employees to Get Results.** Decentralize authority and empower frontline employees to make decisions and solve problems.

4. **Cut Back to Basics.** Produce better government for less--reengineer processes, abandon the obsolete, eliminate duplication.

There were and still are two phases to Reinventing Government. Phase I (REGO I) was the initial phase and focused on looking at how the US does what they do. The guiding question in Phase I is “can we eliminate some steps? (can we do it differently/more efficiently . . . what processes need to be changed)?” Phase II (REGO II) was kicked off by Vice President Gore in his 3 January 1995, memorandum to agency and department heads. REGO II focused on what is done. According to the Vice President, “[REGO II] . . . will examine the basic missions of government . . . to find and eliminate things that don’t need to be done by the federal government.” Phase II also included a review of all federal regulatory processes, in the vein of “striving for better results and less interference in the lives of our customers--[the American taxpayers].” Reinvention alternatives would include, but not be limited to, the following: continuation of a federal function, consolidation and or merging of functions within the federal
government, transfer of functions to lower levels of government, privatization of functions, franchising, contracting-out of functions, and elimination of functions.

Like the Packard Commission-driven reforms before it, reinvention was warranted in many respects. The new market demanded that something be done to help keep national defense firms still “in the game” viable (warm), and to maintain a cost-effective flow of modern weapons to the military services. Customer satisfaction was, in fact, the key concern and the key point of contention. However, as reinvention hit DoD and eventually trickled down to the Services, the definition of customer assumed a different emphasis, greatly affecting the professional jurisdictions of the military services. The customers complaining the loudest, and therefore getting the most out of foreign military sales and acquisition policy reform, were the foreign customers--foreign countries with long-standing interests in US arms and related technologies. The foreign customer concerns were mainly over cost, price, and speed of delivery. Driven by these more commercial-based interests (and without a clear and coherent overarching security strategy guiding its progression) reinvention has resulted in large differences between force development needs and forces available. In the middle of the divide are the military professions--increasingly forced to compromise short-run interests in effectiveness in force development to accommodate longer-term concerns over manning the force. The short-range economic interests of commercial firms and foreign recipients drive reinvention and are, unintentionally, driving the Services out of their traditional business of force management. As the Army’s (or other services’) jurisdictions dwindle, and as the services are less able to dominate their own acquisition and arms trade processes, the services continue to suffer professional degradation. If this is the case, where does this
development leave the public in terms of recourse providing effectively for defense and security?

The Case Studies

One of the best ways to explore the effects of US arms trade policy reform on the Army as a profession is through employment of the case study methodology. There is a plethora of literature on this methodology. The case-study methodology is an appropriate choice because it is an observational test research methodology. It provides an effective means of examining and analyzing changes (and their effects) within an on-going and dynamic change process (arms policy reform). Four case studies (foreign military sales reinvention pilot cases) are examined and analyzed: the U.S.-JAVELIN Anti-Tank Missile Case; the U.S.-Apache Attack Helicopter Case(s); the Turkey-M1 Tank Case; and the U.S.-Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) Case.

Why these cases? The thorn-in-the-side of qualitative analysis, particularly case study analysis, has always been the issue of rigor. The “unquantifiable” nature inherent in qualitative approaches has frequently vitiated the scientific impact of case study methods. The case study approach is questioned for its inherent small-N focus (the notion that only from large, randomly sampled data sets, can inferences be made from the sample analyzed to the population studied). Moreover, the case study methodology is frequently criticized on the basis of the case selection process itself. Researchers employing case methodology must be vigilant of the rationale behind case selection. Were the cases selected to test initial propositions? Were the cases selected to promote particular propositions over others? Answering yes to the first question spells scientific
success for the researcher. Answering yes to the second question reveals research bias and a failed research agenda.

For this researcher, intuitive understanding led to the initial inquiry of how does the US arms trade policy system work? That initial inquiry led naturally to the process trace of the policy system--to understand the system in-total, to identify key decision nodes and key actors and agencies within the system, as well as to identify critical junctures where external processes and systems interface with the arms trade policy system. The process trace led to the issue of foreign military sales: the program itself and the reform of that program underway at the time, both of which focused on “rightsizing” the system for greater efficiency and improved customer service. The four cases selected for this study (and the one prior) were and still are the four DoD-designated FMS reinvention pilot cases. These cases are representative of foreign military sales reform. They were designated not by this researcher, but by the policy decision makers themselves. One cannot study FMS reinvention without studying these four cases. At the same time, this is a study of military professionalism with specific focus on the US Army. As such, it logically follows to focus the majority of case-type analysis on actual US Army acquisition and arms export cases.

The Apache-FMS Case(s)

The Netherlands, Singapore, Israel, the United Kingdom, and perhaps even the United Arab Emirates and Kuwait, will have had the Longbow version of the AH-64 attack helicopter long before the system is fully fielded in the US Army. To some degree this circumstance stems from the fact that the Army has only recently developed an operational need for an upgrade. But to a large degree, the reason why the US armed
forces wait while foreign governments take is because only through foreign-first sales can the US Army afford to purchase the upgrade.

New developments in the Dutch Apache case illustrate another point: foreign military sales have become integral to manning, training, and equipping the future forces of multinational forces. In October 2000, the Royal Netherlands Air Force received orders to prepare for deployment to the state of Eritrea as part of a United Nations peace enforcement operation (UNMEE mission). This mission forced the Dutch to execute the first ever AH-64D operational deployment. The force is now in Africa (as of February 2001), preparing for operations with five AH-64D Longbow Apaches. There are several lessons.

First, though a very sophisticated FMS recipient, the Dutch were still neophytes in the use and deployment of FMS-provided systems and support equipment. Therefore, the United States had to be prepared to provide wide-ranging logistical support (specialized training; airland and sealand assets and expertise; equipment leases) as new “offset” arrangements in ensuring FMS contracts.

Second, FMS recipients are beginning to be the first to use US-made equipment in actual combat and peace operations. Again, this realization changes the relationships between buyer, producer, and the US armed forces. As the Dutch deployment illustrates, Lockheed Martin is counting on a successful Dutch deployment of the Apache for the future of their Longbow system—the program will live or die based on the success or failure of the Africa deployment. For the US Army, a Dutch failure may spell disaster for the Army’s future attack helicopter force. In short, a Dutch failure could be a US failure. This is the true meaning of interoperability.
Third, with deployment and through-operations support being added as additional case management lines to open FMS cases, the US with every major weapons system sale is committing to long-term security relationships, the conditions of which may be determined more by the UN or individual buyer nations than by the national security strategy, or indeed by the US armed forces. This is a particularly stark reality given the relook at US forward presence underpinning the current Administration’s foreign and security policy.

The Javelin Missile System-FMS Case

With no clear strategic model for monitoring the reinvention of the foreign military sales program could actually limit the United States’ ability to clearly and autonomously assess its own national security strategy and design a military strategy to realize it. If the foreign customer has gained a position of relative parity (if not dominance) in FMS negotiations--even FMS reinvention itself--might the US armed services be similarly dependent on foreign buyers in determining what systems to develop and to purchase? Might this, in turn, limit the types of missions the armed services politically and operationally support? All developments could negatively affect the armed services’ ability to innovate, to leapfrog to the Army-After-Next or to Transform to meet new missions that require greater flexibility and responsiveness. This situation may be particularly true if the ability to pay for and to garner domestic (i.e., congressional) support for such innovations and transformations depends increasingly on foreign purchasing countries because of their need and willingness to offset these US domestic costs.
The Dutch-Javelin FMS case is a most appropriate case in point. 13 The Javelin is the latest antiarmor, shoulder- and vehicle-mountable guided-missile system in the Army inventory. It is designed to replace the Dragon missile system, adding lethality to the armament of the American light and mechanized infantry soldier. A joint venture group, comprised of Raytheon and Lockheed-Martin, is the sole-source producer of the Javelin. They are the only source of supply for the US Army. When the Army approached the House Committee on International Affairs and the Senate Armed Services Committees to justify the need for funding and authorization of the Javelin system, the Army was only able to muster enough political and budgetary support to resource just over 13,000 systems—not enough to meet Total Force operational needs. 14 To exacerbate the problem, a 13,000-missile production run was insufficient for Raytheon-LockMartin to accept a long-term production contract for the Army at an acceptable price. The answer to the dilemma was foreign military sales. Securing foreign buyers would increase the numbers of systems required, thereby lower the production cost and the cost-per-unit to the buyers (foreign and domestic). Moreover, foreign buyers through the two and one-half percent administrative fee charged by the FMS program would shoulder more of the overall cost of the program. There is even the implication that the US government under a reformed FMS can make a de facto profit. Prior to reinvention, profits for US government agents from FMS were strictly prohibited.

So, there is lower cost overall, and of this cost, less is paid directly by the US Army. The result is a seemingly perfect solution for all concerned, but also a cautionary tale particularly for the United States and its armed services. Cases like the Javelin are more “the rule” than “the exception” these days. The Javelin is a major weapon system
needed by one or more of the US armed services, but its sole-source production demands foreign purchases to offset the cost. Caution should reign within these relationships among the USG, defense firms and foreign buyers. In such scenarios, the defense firm still has the flexibility (the option) to opt-out of the business; meanwhile, the foreign customer has the most flexibility of all. He can either go with another system and another exporter (as the Finns and New Zealanders did when they opted for the Israeli Spike system over the US Javelin), or he can simply choose to buy nothing. The US armed services are the stakeholders with the least options available. Within the joint venture, the sole-source situation places the US government at a disadvantage. The armed forces sales agent must make extraordinary efforts, even maneuvers, around existing regulations to make the sale for Raytheon-LockMartin. The idea is to retain the vendor for the long haul. Meanwhile, the foreign country realizes that the USG needs foreign purchase to lower the overall price. This situation places the US armed services--the Army in this case--in a potentially dependent relationship with the foreign buyer.

The accommodations and compromises that the government (military service) agents must make to meet the competing demands of the firm and the buyer imposes limits on the services in at least two ways. First, the services are potentially locked into only a few systems options due to the limited number of defense firms (in this case, the Army’s options are limited to one short-term option). Second, the services are to a large degree limited in their choice of current and future systems by what the foreign buyer is interested in and willing to purchase. In this case, the Army’s ability to secure the Javelin system at acceptable cost to congress hinged on the availability of interested foreign
buyers. This last point dovetails with concerns over the implications of multi-service ("joint") and multinational force modernization.

The M1A1 Tank Sale to Turkey Case

A critical assumption underlying the Army’s concept of transformation from the heavy-armor force of today to the lighter, more nimble objective force of tomorrow is the notion that the Army has the strategic and budgetary flexibility to complete the transformation autonomously. The case of the Turkey-M1A1 tank sale illustrates the strategic dilemmas inherent in contemporary innovation. In late 1999, Turkey publicly announced plans to upgrade its M60 tank fleet. As a result, Turkey entered into a $7 billion program for the co-production of 1,000 M1A2 main battle tanks with the US and General Dynamics. The contract would boost chances for General Dynamics’ Land Systems unit, maker of the M1 Abrams series, to win Turkey’s largest ever single defense buy. General Dynamics’ Land Systems was the only US contender short-listed in the main co-production program. However, in April 2000, Turkey suspended the contract with General Dynamics, opening negotiations with Israeli Military Industries (IMI) for the modernization of its US-made M60A1 battle tanks. In addition, Turkey opened the program to such competitors as Satory, France-based Giat Industries (maker of the Leclerc), Munich-based Krauss-Maffei Wegmann GmbH (maker of the Leopard 2), and Ukraine’s Kiev-based Ukrspetsex (maker of the T-84). The suspension came about largely because of the financial difficulties Ankara faced at the time.

The immediate response from the USG and General Dynamics was to “sweeten the deal.” The Turkish Land Forces Command (TLFC) was urged to consider a US government offer to lease ninety-six General Dynamics Land Systems (GDLS) M1A1s.
The lease would offer training and logistics benefits through the foreign military sales program. In reality the lease was to be largely paid by General Dynamics itself. M60 modernization, coupled with the lease deal, would have met Turkey’s tank requirements in the short run. This solution would also have given American industry a “win” over European and Israeli rivals.

This case raises several questions. First, where would the one-hundred or so M1A1s in the lease deal come from? During negotiations, the lease numbers actually reached 200 M1A1s at the expense of a two-year delay in National Guard force modernization. Second, what would a US “win” do to European-Israeli-US firm relations? Quite simply, the competition over scarce export market resources critically strains US-ally relations worldwide. Third, what impact does pressing such a sale on the Turkish government have on Turkey’s political, economic, and strategic situation? The sale places perhaps undo strain on the country—a NATO ally. The question of “can Ankara afford” such a modernization rarely if ever came into the discussions. The December 2000 request by Turkey for $18 billion in IMF funds speaks directly to the country’s strained financial situation. Fourth, and more relevant to the case made here, is the question of how do such deals constrain the US in its future modernization capability?

It is clear that America’s current and future heavy-armor force will largely be supported and sustained through foreign sales. Countries like Turkey and Egypt stake the future of their land force squarely on the M1 series main battle tank. In turn, their needs continue to sustain production and sustainment (maintenance and logistics) of the US Army legacy armor force. These countries keep General Dynamic Land Systems in the game. But what of the Army’s desire at least to some degree to look beyond the heavy-
armor legacy force? The Army’s legacy force is the future armor force for many of the countries whose assistance is needed to defer the cost of the US Army’s modernization program. If these countries either will not, financially cannot, and or strategically should not “leap-frog” with the US to the Army-After Next programs, then what might that say about the Army’s ability to leap-ahead at all? Interoperability is a key issue here. Meanwhile, modernization schemes leveraged through foreign military sales tie the United States tied to the current and past simply because FMS helps pay for sustainment and modernization.

The Joint Strike Fighter Case

This program poses perhaps the biggest potential gain as well as the biggest potential roadblock to transformation. The latest budget plans see more than 2,800 Joint Strike Fighters (JSFs) for the Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps, at a cost estimated by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) to be as much as $223 billion. This is big money even by Pentagon standards. However, large questions loom over the warfighting suitability of JSF to the future needs of the three services. Short-range versions of the fighter for the Air Force will make it dependent on foreign bases that may not be available in the future. The limited carrying capacity of the JSF will make it less capable of attaining the same air superiority as the F-22. And the JSF may not suit the Navy’s next generation of aircraft carriers, the “CVX program.” All of these issues spell problems for joint transformation efforts.

And what of combined transformation? To offset the procurement cost of JSF, the US government has opened the program to co-production. The JSF is now a combined, multinational venture, in which countries place a bid and commit to the
production and procurement of a certain number of joint strike fighters for the future. The potential benefit is obvious: lower production cost through burden sharing and increased interoperability. The pitfalls are not so obvious, but more probable: delayed fielding due to added complexities in mustering multinational political will; and the unavoidable drive by individual stakeholders to nationalize their own variants (potentially working against the aims of combinedness). The most important pitfall to consider from a US-perspective is the potential loss of autonomy (much less, autarky) in the force modernization decision-making. Tying the US acquisition and R&D processes to foreign country processes makes us all the more dependent on foreign partners. Combined endeavors limit flexibility of the service professionals to adapt and to innovate freely.

If the acquisition processes are to follow a JSF-like model in the future, it is vital that service professionals take into consideration joint and combined needs and limiters to force modernization, along with military revolution and reform initiatives. This fact alone spells a dramatic loss of jurisdiction on part of the military services in determining what acquisition paths are “best” for meeting what the services themselves see as more effective ways and means of providing for the common defense. In *Systems of Professions* language, this circumstance means that the military services are losing much of their autonomy over acquisition choices. A decline in the services’ unique expertise also rings—in a decline in the status of military service professionals.

The Systems of Professions Framework

The professional dimension of this study is heavily informed by the *Systems of Professions* sociological approach. This approach to understanding what professions are and how they differ from other organizations (which may operate professionally, but are
by definition, not themselves professions) is the latest version of more classical organizational approaches to professions, typified by Samuel Huntington, *The Soldier and the State*. The classical understanding sees Army professionals focused on organizational patterns. In this view, a profession is an organized body of experts who apply esoteric knowledge to particular cases. They have elaborate systems of instruction and training, are allowed autonomy to establish standards as well as other formal prerequisites for entry and continued service, and normally possess and enforce a unique code of ethics or behavior. Abbott’s evolution goes beyond this ideal-type comparative approach. For Abbott, a profession is an occupational group that controls the acquisition and application of various types of knowledge. The defining quality of a profession’s “health,” is found in that profession’s ability to compete and win in disputes with other entities vying for dominance over the same body of knowledge. In Abbott’s words: “jurisdictional boundaries are perpetually in dispute, both in local practice and in national claims. It is the history of jurisdictional disputes that is the real, determining history of the professions.”

This approach lends itself well to the subject proposed here. Previous research demonstrates the increased dominance of short-term, commercially-motivated concerns on the part of civilian defense contracting firms and the foreign countries over longer-term (and more traditional) professional concerns over the insecurity (national, regional, and global) that can come from arms proliferation. DoD participation in economically centered reforms and the effect of reforms on the Army raises peculiar questions with regard to the Army as a profession. DoD is a composite or “hybrid” institution--part bureaucratic and part professional that deals with the same “bottom-line” as any other
business organization: profits and cost. However, the part of DoD composed of professions (the military services) is charged not with the goal of ensuring that costs are low and profits are high, but rather with the mission of ensuring that the nation is secure physically as well as secure in the promotion of its interests abroad. This latter concern ties the security of allies and foreign “friends” to the US security concerns.

When Abbott’s three principal components of the Army Profession’s expert knowledge (jurisdictions) is viewed within the context of the three relevant levels of analysis (societal, institutional, and individual), the following three-by-three typology results.

![Fig. 1. Systems of Professions Typology. Source: Parameters 2000](image-url)
From a *Systems of Professions* approach perspective, the struggle for dominance over expert knowledge in arms acquisition and export practices exist within an institution itself can clearly be seen. The struggle persists between the professional services (geared to greater effectiveness, damn the cost and profit margins) and OSD itself (the bureaucratic side of the institution, having to deal with cost, budgets, and profitability).

The circles superimposed on the framework are intended to direct attention to the more relevant aspects (components) of the model as it relates to the Army profession’s participation in modern arms acquisition and export (collectively referred to here as trade) practices.

At the societal level of analysis, the focus is on the political-social component. What this component accounts for (acknowledges) is the fact that the national and global context in which the military (US Army) exists has radically changed during the post-Cold War period. This level of analysis validates all of the globalization-based changes that have influenced the US military and its participation in arms production and trading within the market. This level reinforces a key argument underpinning this study: that the clear distinctions traditionally made between economic and military notions of security have blurred and even become nonsensical. Moreover, the new national and global context in which the Army now exists places the economic concerns of national and global security on par with (in many ways ahead of) politico-military security concerns. This being the case, the effect on the military profession is serious: the price for participating in an arms trade process that emphasizes getting more product to the customer (more foreign than domestic) quicker and at a lower cost is reflected in increased deficiencies in the ability of the profession to manage violence and prosecute
war. As a profession, the American military, is constitutionally bound to serve two masters (public and market forces), but there has always been an established hierarchy within that dual service, with service to the public being paramount. Under today’s market realities, this may no longer be the case.

At the institutional level of analysis, the focus of study is typically on intra-institutional context and systems (processes and decision-making procedures). Here, the ultimate question is what effect are changes in the internal systems of the institution having on civil-military relations (as they relate to the Army’s professional jurisdictions? Consequently, this study focuses on two specific realms: again, the political-societal and the military-technical. It is in these realms where the greatest threats to Army professionalism are revealed.

The Military-Technical Component

The difficulties the US Army has had in the post-Cold War environment in correctly sizing and designing the force to best meet the newly emerging and ever-changing strategic (threat) environment raises critical questions. These relate to the Army’s traditional expertise and jurisdictional authorities relating to force modernization. The Army has clearly lost ground to transnational defense firms and foreign buyers in the acquisition and sale of weapons. This loss of jurisdiction to the commercial interests of these stakeholders has, in turn, forced the Army and Army professionals engaged in day-to-day acquisition and arms export activities increasingly to make compromises in their (its) force development and modernization plans. These compromises diminish the Army’s ability to effectively provide for security and the common defense, and therefore, diminish the Army’s relevance and status as a profession. As the US moves more toward
multinational weapon system acquisitions, the Army (like the other services) may find itself constrained in what systems (and more importantly, what capabilities) are available (even possible!) in the future.

The Political-Social Component

This component sums up the dilemmas the Army and the other military service professions face amid the commercial-based changes affecting the reform of arms trade policy and practices. The compromises that the military makes to take part in the acquisition and export of weapons today and in the future puts America’s security interests at risk. The armed forces are by no means consciously selling away long-term security for short-term commercial gains. Nevertheless, the public will undoubtedly hold the armed forces responsible for any and all compromises, since providing for the defense and security of the Nation and its interests is constitutionally within the jurisdiction of the military professions. Even though defense firms and foreign buyer-states may be more culpable selling away of US security, in the end it is the military’s professional autonomy, reputation, relevance as a profession that will bear the full brunt of the American public’s justified disapproval. If the Army is to retain the preponderance of jurisdictional responsibility over weapons acquisition and arms exportation, then the military as a profession must take action to re-establish its legitimate jurisdictional claims.

It is clear to see that Abbott’s approach raises questions that lie at the very center of this study. In today’s global arms market and amid the realities that market poses on defense planners, where are the proper dividing lines between the military service professions and the civilian offices and agencies with reference to defense acquisitions?
Should the military services (the Army as the focus in this study) continue to engage in the weapons acquisition process, when this process clearly accommodates commercial (efficiency-based) interests first, and security (effectiveness-centered) concerns last? Much of the future of the Army as a profession lies in answers to these questions.

The remainder of this study will apply Abbott’s *Systems of Analysis* typology to the issue of weapons acquisition and arms export policy reform and the consequent effect on the Army (service) profession. The issues raised and identified through process tracing of the policy system itself, and further defined in (illustrated by) the four FMS reform pilot cases examined will be examined as part of a holistic analysis of the acquisition and export policy reform process in light of the Systems of Professions framework. The result places these effects in a new light, in the larger context of the military profession.

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4. Ibid., 1.

5. Ibid., 27.

6. Ibid., 27.

7. Later renamed the National Partnership for Reinventing Government.

8. Ibid.
9 Ibid.

10 Ibid.


13 Interviews with members of the Raytheon-Lockheed Martin Joint Ventures Group, and members from the Javelin Program Management (PM) Office and Security Assistance Directorate (AMMCOM, Redstone Arsenal, Huntsville, Alabama), 27 June 2000. Data on the Javelin case also obtained through video-teleconferencing on the case, held between the Joint Ventures Group and MG Bruce K. Scott, Commanding General, US Army Security Assistance Command, June 2000, at Redstone Arsenal.


16 “US Proposes to Lease 100 Tanks To Turkey” Defense News, 3 July 2000, 1

17 “USAF Puts Upgrades Before Platforms” (Jane’s Defence Weekly, 7 June 2000, 24).


CHAPTER 4
SYSTEM FAILURE IN US ARMS EXPORT AND ACQUISITION POLICY REFORM

Introduction

This chapter applies the Abbott System of Professions components of the Army profession’s expert knowledge to specific cases. This taxonomic analysis addresses three research goals. First and foremost, this chapter applies the typology to the two policy reform cases (the Packard Commission of 1983 and the FMS Reinvention of 1996) and the three foreign military sales implementation cases (US Army pilot reform cases). In doing so, the intent is to seek a fuller understanding of the cases in light of the primary question posed in this study: have these reforms led to (result in either intentionally or unintentionally) a de-professionalization of the US Army, as a profession? The analysis focuses on two levels (and two categories) in the application of the Abbott scheme: the societal and institutional levels of analysis and the military-technical and political-societal components. Second, this taxonomic exercise points to more distinct categories of the Abbott schema that can be deciphered and fleshed-out, thus making the device more accurate (as a tool for understanding the peculiar military profession) and more powerful as an analytical framework. Third and finally, this chapter attempts to shed new light on military issues (administrative reform) and the inherent conflicts of interests that stem from recent and current (ongoing) efforts at reform of the US Army (military in general) arms export and acquisition policy and practices. This result provides grounds for implications and policy recommendations (chapter 5).
The Political-Societal Analysis (Societal Level of Analysis)

The following graphic summarizes the findings of the first-stage analysis:

Fig. 2. The Political-Societal Analysis

**Analysis.** This level of the analysis focuses on the critical questions of how arms export policy reform became an issue and why (and to a lesser degree, by whom) it was placed on the policy and political agenda. Changes in global realities governing national state participation in the arms market (what players engaged in the market as full-time players, and changes in why and how they played the game) had a marked influence on the US policy reform agenda. Distinct trends, including less domestic demand for arms,
fewer firms for the US armed services to rely upon for provisioning the force, yet no
foreseeable peace dividend in sight that would allow the armed forces to stand down, all
played a role. They all had contributed to a radical shift in the balance of power
governing and regulating US policy toward arms control and arms proliferation during
the Cold War era. The end of the Cold War meant an end to politics as usual in the
global arms trade.

The 1990s were reminiscent of a pre-twentieth century conception of security,
more mercantilist in tone, with the economic and commercial aspects of security reaching
parity with the more traditional physical (military) conceptions of security that had
dominated defense and security policy and practice throughout the Cold War. Under the
Clinton Administration, this parity between military and economic aspects of security
made a full reversal, with the goals (ends) of security strategy being defined
economically, with the military connotations of security being subordinated to those
economic interests. Moreover, the Clinton security paradigm now saw the military as a
means to its clearly articulated economic and commercial-driven security ends.¹

These global-level realities permeated the bureaucratic and institutional outlook
of nearly all national states, especially the United States. The effects have been telling.
The long expected peace dividend (the reward for fighting and winning forty years of
Cold War) never fully materialized. In fact, world crises seemed to explode
exponentially, compelling the United States, by now, the sole superpower, to face more
(not the expected less) crisis actions in the 1990s. The list of US interventions in the
1990s is long and well recognized. While mission requirements for the US military
(especially the US Army, given the peculiarities of the new types of missions of the
1990s) expanded, the threats were less clear, making it difficult if not impossible for the
armed services to argue effectively for more in defense appropriations and authorizations.
Domestic demand for high-tech arms dwindled, as did the number of prime contracting
firms. This development alone produced a telling and profound effect on relations among
the US government (the armed services), the defense-producing firms, and the foreign
export purchasing nations. These latter became new and vital players in the game.
Heavy reliance on foreign customers and fewer contractors for arms and weapons
systems meant that the armed services (the US Army specifically) now found themselves
in a much more dependent position. This increased dependency has negatively affected
the services (Army) as professions. Financial remuneration from arms exports vital to
force modernization has become a vital aspect to the profession’s capacity to continue to
man and equip the force. Yet, financial remuneration, as indicated earlier, is a detriment
to a profession, because remuneration dilutes the profession’s obligations to the public
interests (in arms control) with concerns over short-term commercial necessities. Despite
the fact that the Army profession does what it does in the short-term to serve the interests
of future public control and physical security, the process is leading to a dramatic decline
in the professional status of the service.
The Military-Technical Analysis (Institutional Level of Analysis)

![Fig. 3. Military-Technical Analysis](image)

United States military force modernization increasingly interdependent on foreign-first sales (Case #1: Apache Helicopter)

Foreign sales-based interdependency contributes to unintended, entangling US commitments to foreign buyers (and selling firms) for long-term sustainment (logistical) operations (Case #1: Apache helicopter)

US force modernization (adaptability & innovation) constrained by dependencies on foreign-first sales (Case #2: Javelin Missile System)

New geo-economic realities facing the US Army (military) may compromise future US national security strategy intentions: (1) may limit US Army’s ability to leap-ahead of allies and coalition partners, and (2) may place undue pressures on politico-economic stability of foreign partners (Case #3: Turkey-Tank)

**Analysis.** This level of the analysis promises the greatest insight, both into the Army profession and into the *Systems of Professions* framework and literature. The application of the Abbott typology to an actual case of a military profession reveals new and important insights into the scheme, while also arguing strongly for revision and modification of the framework itself.
Case study No. 1: Apache Helicopter. The Royal Netherlands Air Force purchase of the Apache Longbow Helicopter marked the first US Army pilot case for the newly reformed (reinvented) foreign military sales program. In fact, Dutch complaints in the early 1990s over price and cost disparities (over-pricing concerns) greatly influenced the eventual reinvention of the FMS program. Reinvention grew to encompass the US arms export and acquisition policy and practice in general. The fact that a foreign country, and a small one at that, could have such a profound effect on the US decision-making process was ample testimony to the changed relationships among players in the global arms market. The Apache case reveals that there is significant dependence on foreign-first sales as a necessary and sufficient means for the US Army to provision (modernize) its own future force(s). Without Dutch purchases, and subsequent additional foreign country arrangements, the US Army would have found itself without the Longbow version upgrade longer than anticipated. Meanwhile unexpected obligations stemming from US Army (US government) support of the Dutch deployment to Eritrea in February 2001 (as part of a United Nation’s peace enforcement operation--UNMEE), levied unintended consequences. Short-range commercial requirements suddenly raised the prospect that the US might expect additional, operational-support requirements from foreign customers as they participated in regional interventions. Such interventions may, in fact, not be interests of the United States. But the US was involved unintentionally, because of the need of the foreign customer, the need of the US defense firm to keep that customer, and the necessity of the US government to keep the producing firm happy. Meanwhile, the US services need the same product over the long run. The UNMEE
mission, would be the first operational test of the Apache Longbow. As such, neither Lockheed Martin nor the US Army could accept Dutch mission failure.

The Javelin Anti-Tank Missile System Case. With regard to the military-technical aspects of the Abbott professions framework this case reveals that the US Army may find itself highly constrained in its capacity to adapt and to innovate in its force modernization practices. Constraint stems from the increased service dependency on foreign buyers and fewer producing firms. With Raytheon-Lockmartin Joint Venture Group as the sole producer of the highly-anticipated (and much needed) Javelin system (a replacement for the Army’s antiquated Dragon system), the US Army had no options in how it would proceed with fielding a replacement system for the Dragon. Raytheon-Lockmartin was the “only game in town,” and as such, had to be coddled to a significant degree. The Army had to convince the Joint Venture Group that staying in the business of producing the Javelin was still “good business” for them. For Raytheon-Lockmartin, the incentive “to stay in the game” was contingent upon the US Army’s ability and willingness to seek out and lock-in foreign sales. These sales increased the demand to a point at which firm production costs could be met (and adequate profits ensured). The US Army’s role as “pointman” in the hunt for foreign buyers was significant in garnering arrangements with the Netherlands, and later Australia, Finland, and New Zealand. In return for these services, the US Army would receive, free of charge, one system for every sixteen sold abroad.²

With no force development choice but the Javelin, and with no choice other than Raytheon-Lockmartin for production of the system, the US Army was greatly limited in its capacity to adapt to new situations and changes in the security environment. This
limitation on adaptation and innovation compromises one of those key tenets of the military profession’s peculiar autonomy and status as a profession: expert knowledge and capacity for adaptation. Moreover, the US Army’s financial entanglements with firm and buyer (the turning of profit for the Army in FMS, a violation of the Arms Export Control Act of 1976) also compromises the Army’s status as a profession.

The Turkey-M1A1 Tank Case. This case also spells out certain dilemmas facing the US Army in preserving its capacity to adapt and to innovate in force development and force modernization. The latest national security strategic priorities, as outlined in the Quadrennial Defense Review of 2002, stipulates that the US Army must maintain a force capable of fighting and winning at least one-major theater war (MTW), while holding in a second theater (for a subsequent win). Moreover, the Army must be prepared to engage in multiple smaller-scale contingencies of various types and duration. For all these missions, the Army must simultaneously retain at least some portion of its heavy, land-war (force-on-force) force—the legacy force—while developing and fielding a future force—lighter, more high-tech, and rapidly deployable to a myriad of different environments and strategic and operational situations. Doing both well in light of budgetary austerity finds the US Army—again—looking toward foreign customers for leveraging options. The Turkey-Tank is a case-in-point. As detailed in chapter 3, the US Army has initiated a full-court press on the Ministries of Finance and Defense in Ankara to purchase the M1A1 Abrams as Turkey’s next generation main battle tank. General Dynamic Land Systems (again, the sole producer for the M1 tank, the staple of the US Army heavy force) adroitly used the US Army to oust various European and other foreign competitors from the market. The US Army-GDLS collective was also successful in

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keeping the sale on Ankara’s agenda, despite Turkey’s recent dire economic straits. Such arms-based pressures have not boded well for Ankara’s stability. They have also heralded a new arms race between Turkey and Greece, two NATO partners, as Greece does not want to see Turkish security gain at its own security expense. This realization alone compromises one aspect of the oath and bond between the Army profession and the US citizenry: securing of alliances and coalitions for the continued security of the United States. The case also finds the US Army potentially compromising another aspect of America’s strategy for engagement through coalition and foreign partnerships (QDR 2002). The United States wants to leap ahead a generation or two in its own force development by paying for that leap in part through foreign sales of its legacy forces as well as in sales of shares in the R&D and production of future forces (co-production and joint ventures). This US force modernization strategy places foreign friends and allies in a very precarious position. The M1 tank (the legacy force) purchase by Turkey will be Turkey’s future force. Any attempt or intention by the United States to leap ahead (or leap-away from) the M1-based heavy force will come at the expense of potential interoperability with Turkey (and other foreign partners), given the reality that future intervention will demand coalitional co-operations. Compromising long-term economic and military stability of foreign country buyers (friends, allies, and potential coalition partners) in the name of short-term US economic needs in fact compromises the US Army’s ability to effectively operate within future coalitions and alliances for the promotion of regional and national interests of the US public and the preservation of US national security.
The Political-Social Analysis (Revisited)--The Institutional Level of Analysis

Analysis. Reexamining the political-social component of the Army professions expert knowledge from the institutional perspective establishes context for many of the findings unearthed in the subsequent analyses. Re-examination also sheds important light on the policy-based reform cases.

Intra-Service (US Army) competition over jurisdiction over security (physical versus commercial) interests in arms exporting.

Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) lead and incentivize the reform(s), placing short-term commercial concerns of civilian-led OSD over the longer-term arms control interests of the military services (DoD). Civilian “over-control” of the military (?)

New realities of the global arms market compel the US Army profession to compromise professional obligations at

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### Components of the Army Profession

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of Analysis</th>
<th>Components of the Army Profession</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intra-Service</td>
<td>Internal Army systems supporting national military capability, readiness, and military technology development.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil-Military</td>
<td>Internal Army systems that support national security and military operations, with a focus on jointness, interoperability, and integration.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual</td>
<td>Institutional knowledge and skills required to perform effectively in the Army.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Fig. 4. The Political-Social Analysis (Revisited)**
The Packard Commission of 1985

Among other changes to standing US arms control and acquisition policy, created the Undersecretariat of Defense for Acquisition (later to evolve to the Undersecretariat of Defense, Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics). The Commission’s finding also provided grounds for establishing separate and alternate personnel management system, the acquisition corps. These two policy changes have had a revolutionary effect on the arms export system and on the Army profession. The establishment of a new, congressionally mandated (and supervised) acquisition corps within the US Army has inadvertently created a sub-culture within the Army profession. This sub-culture is not a profession in the theoretical sense of the term, but nonetheless the acquisition corps now competes with its parent profession for relevance, resources, power, and professional recognition (professional survival). The trade motives and efficiency-based incentives of the acquisition corps within the Army compete with the US Army in general, and with the Army’s interests in the control of arms proliferation on behalf of effective security, nationally, regionally, and globally. Efficiency-based motives have defined two of the last three major DoD reform movements (Packard-1 and FMS Reinvention).

Unfortunately, these two reforms may have produced unintended compromises in service effectiveness.

The structural and procedural changes inherent in the Packard reforms (and Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986, to a lesser degree) have significantly affected the way in which foreign military sales reinvention wound its course within DoD. Three of the four reforms under FMS reinvention (the Four Hamre White Papers of 1996) entailed acquisition, logistics, and technology-based streamlining initiatives. Only one minor
reform spoke to policy (effective-based) reform. The structural and organizational
designs of the US arms export policy system, modified by Packard-1 and Goldwater-
Nichols, caused FMS reinvention to pursue a peculiar and damaging efficiency-centric
and commercial-motivated purpose. The Packard commission reforms had separated the
AT&L channels of the organization (OSD) from the Policy channel (of which the DoD
military service professions are a part). With three of the four initiatives channeled along
AT&L lines, the reform itself mutated into a commercial venture, imposing great cost on
the military professions in implementation of the policy reforms. With congressional
interests and oversight legislated into the acquisition side of the organization, AT&L
issues (streamlining and efficiency-based concerns under FMS reinvention) gained still
greater support. FMS reinvention, as a result, became a short-term, commercially-
motivated reform effort, designed to accommodate defense firm and foreign buyer
interests ahead of US service professions’ interests in arms control for the sake of more
effective security.

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1 See Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 34 as well as Clinton’s “Circle of

2 US Army Security Assistance Command (USASAC) (Interview with author
Alexandria, VA, July 2000).
CHAPTER 5

IMPLICATIONS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

Introduction

This story should perhaps end as it began, with President Eisenhower’s Farewell Address—and warning—of 17 January, 1961:

In the councils of government, we must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military-industrial complex. The potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced power exists and will persist. We must never let the weight of this combination endanger our liberties or democratic processes. We should take nothing for granted. Only an alert and knowledgeable citizenry can compel the proper meshing of the huge industrial and military machinery of defense without peaceful methods and goals, so that security and liberty may prosper together.

This chapter is not a conclusion, since by this time the conclusions should be evident: that the changes over the past twenty years affecting US arms export policy and practices have had a significant degrading effect on the Army as a profession. This chapter focuses on the implications this conclusion has for the Army profession, Army professional(s), and future national-regional-global security. This chapter also seeks to offer recommendations for change. Attention shifts to retention and enhancement of those tenets and aspects of the Army service that have defined it as a profession. Finally, the chapter presents theoretical insights into the systems of profession paradigm, with the intention of making the analytical framework more useful and applicable to peculiar types of professions, including the military.

Implications

Although this study has dealt earlier with the professional implications of changes in arms export policy and practices, extended implications, or “extrapolations” merit
special consideration. These extrapolations derive from previous analysis and rely on Abbott’s “new professionalism” typology:

Fig. 5. New Professionalism. Source: *The Systems of Professions: An Essay on the Division of Expert Labor.*

System of professions in which the Army exists. The Army professions current commercial focus has changed the limits of the profession’s jurisdictional territory,
making it vulnerable to trespass by other professions and organizations. This realization is particularly true with reference to the US Army’s expertise and jurisdiction over its own force development and force modernization. If Army professional and unique expert knowledge is now defined narrowly, in terms of the efficiency by which arms and weapon systems can be acquired, procured, and exported, then to a certain extent, the limits of the Army’s professional jurisdiction should be redefined. Perhaps the Army’s “territory” should be open to competition with those organizations (perhaps even other professions) that can compete and produce a better product (better being defined by more efficient). If efficiency is the sole measure of the Army’s professional expert knowledge in arms acquisition and exporting, then perhaps the Army should no longer pretend to have a monopoly over the business of acquiring and producing and exporting its own wares.

Here the Abbott framework provides some assistance. It reflects the fact that a rediscovery of the theory of the professions is underway, especially as applied to the military service professions. A recent anthology focuses on an application of Abbott’s framework to various cases of decay within the Army profession.¹

While this work does not address the military-technical issues raised in the current study, it does question whether the Army should emphasize traditional jurisdiction and engage in practices no longer compatible with the more defining areas of its expert knowledge. Intra-profession competition between command obligations and the growing legal profession within the overall Army profession raises concerns whether the concept of command has not in some significant way been subordinated to legal management. Emphasis on force protection has increased during US engagement in peace operations in
the 1990s, often placing casualty aversion ahead of mission accomplishment (even mission participation). This and similar trends in other areas of expertise have introduced non-professional competitors into the peace enforcement and even the war fighting jurisdiction of the US Army. Other changes have witnessed the rise of privatized militaries and increased reversion to contracting-out roles and missions that once defined the Army profession’s unique expert knowledge.

Analyses other than Abbott have focused more directly on the vital connection between the profession and its parent civil society. Increased participation of the military professional in partisan politics raises a fundamental question: given the formality of the two-party system in contemporary American politics, is it still proper for the service professional to vote?

While the idea of “ousting” the military officer from traditional presence, including the design of force structure and equipment, unchallenged sway over operational command and even political enfranchisement, may be shocking to many, the shock is intentional. It is indicative of just how “out-of-sync” some of the roles and missions of the Army profession have become. To save the profession as a profession, one option is to abandon functions damaging to the profession and the professional. The time may have arrived for drastic surgery.

State of the Profession

The above issues raise other issues that speak to the actual state of the profession in today’s civil society. Rivalries are on the rise between the US Army and other professions and non-professions over jurisdictions that once defined the Army profession. At the same time, competitions within the Army profession--between sub-professions and
non-profession sub-organizations--are eating away at traditional authorities, autonomy, and jurisdictions of the parent profession. These competitions call into question other parent profession’s continued relevance.

Institutional and professional identities, as a result of such conflicts, become confused and complicated, contributing to a de-professionalization spiral. How do Army acquisition officers and or security assistance officers see themselves within the larger profession? For professions, the unique nature of the expert work defines (to a large degree) the profession itself. The same holds true for the professional. It follows, then, that the acquisition corps officer’s expert knowledge and work in systems acquisition, program, and project management must define at least some significant portion of the officer’s institutional identity. For the security assistance sub-profession, the mandate is to regulate and often to curtail arms exports on behalf of military security. Security assistance officers are trained and mandated to say no (more often than not), while acquisition officers are triggered to say yes (rightfully so, for trade reasons). This understanding alone alludes to the inherent conflict between profession versus commerce within the Army profession. Conflict not only manifests itself at the implementation level, but also permeates the entire profession, placing the entire profession in precarious internal conflict. The clash of organizational and professional cultures that persists within the Army profession, with special reference to the military-technical aspects of its expert knowledge in arms acquisition and exporting, presents the risk of destroying the Army profession from within.
So What?

The following is a list of some of the more critical implications that this author identifies with the “so what?” question:

1. Civil-military tensions will rise between the Army profession and the American public it serves as the citizenry becomes more aware of the military’s role in the proliferation of arms abroad and the contribution of the US Army to regional arms races (Greece-Turkey; India-Pakistan; the Middle East conundrum; China-Taiwan).

2. The generational gap within the Army between senior and junior (mid-level) officers and between officers and soldiers will widen, as more senior officers (trained and acculturated in accordance with the more traditional tenets of the profession) come increasingly in conflict with junior officers who have developed as professionals during a time when the Army as a profession has come increasingly under attack.

3. The mismatch between the national security strategy (NSS) and the national military strategy (NMS) will potentially worsen, as arms acquisitions and exports will all the more serve the short-term commercial concerns of the firm and the foreign buyer. The cost to the US citizenry might be a longer-term decline in national security.

4. The Army profession’s capacity effectively to enable the national military strategy (through effective coalitional interoperability) may be degraded by what the profession increasingly has to do, in the short-term, in order to afford (literally) the weapons it needs to field the force.

5. More of the Army profession’s expertise will be farmed out to competitors, many of which are businesses (not professions), even as the Army continues to fight within itself for a collective professional ‘sense of self.’ The Army will lose its
All of these implications speak to the decline (and possible mortal wounding) of the Army profession. The profession’s contract with the American public and the professional officer’s oath (the commission) to that public, “to support and defend the Constitution of the United States, against all enemies, foreign and domestic” define the professional officer and the Army profession. With reference to arms export and acquisition policy and practice, this study has shown that there are external enemies (foreign buyers and transnationalized defense firms) as well as internal enemies that threaten to weaken, if not completely sever, the bond between the American citizenry and the Army as a profession. The presence of these enemies, foreign and domestic, demands a return to the most basic elements and aspects of the Army profession’s jurisdictional mandates, only a return to basics can save the profession from its current trend toward de-professionalization and illegitimacy. The profession, and the professionals within it, must defend themselves against those forces of misplaced power that Eisenhower warned of over forty years ago.

**Policy Recommendations**

While admittedly not exhaustive, the following list of recommendations focuses on some of the more systemic remedies available (and feasible) that might be applied to the ailing Army profession.

1. Increase the Army leadership’s awareness of professional decline (in the military-technical area). Awareness is the first step toward understanding; understanding can lead to denial, anger, depression, and eventually to acceptance and solution. Many of
the ill effects explained earlier are occurring without the full-understanding of either the military leadership or the civilian decision makers. This study hopes to open eyes in both camps to the ethical dilemmas inherent in some of the recent arms acquisition and export policy reforms. Lack of knowledge should never an excuse for inaction on the part of professionals.

2. Introduce, initiate, and properly supervise (top-down; bottom-up) a new round of policy reform(s) regarding arms trade policy and practice and military force development (defense reform). The last three DoD reforms (Packard-1; Goldwater-Nichols; Reinvention), though justified to a certain degree, were flawed by original intention and original design. These three reforms focused on revising the organization for reasons of efficiency, more so than for effect-based rationales (Goldwater-Nichols to a lesser degree). “Fixes” on the bureaucratic, efficiency side of the organization has broken the organization along internal professional fault lines.

A new round of reform, perhaps a Goldwater-Nichols ’06, needs to be initiated. But this round of reform must be more systemically oriented. It must be initiated and conceived in visionary terms first and not in process terms. Strategic goals (ends) must be the driver (effectiveness and efficiency focused, or what this author would call cost-effectiveness or even effective cost-based design).

3. Halt the ongoing foreign military sales reinvention process. Recast this initiative in accordance with the more holistic and system-wide reform process suggested above.

4. Alter the role and mission of the US Army profession in regards to force development, acquisition, production, sale, and transfer of arms, weapons systems, and
related technologies. The inherent conflict of professional interests in this arena and among the professionals engaged in the practice of deciding what to buy, how much to buy, and how much and to whom to sell must be designed-out of the organization for the sake of the profession’s survival. The role and mission of the Army should be re-defined to one of advice and consent. This narrowing of jurisdictional boundaries would more appropriately place business professionals in the role of “acquiring and selling,” thereby repositioning the military professional into a quality assurance role, one based on effect-based qualification, rather than commercial qualification. This structural change would return the business aspects of the Army profession rightly to business and preserve that which is rightly and ethically the jurisdictional purview of the professional military officer corps.

5. Institute greater public controls (accountability) over congresspersons, in terms of their constituent responsibilities to (1) their citizenry and (2) the corporate constituents. A re-professionalization of the officer corps in arms exporting and acquisitions will still fail if re-professionalized officers have no honest and unbiased brokers to turn for guidance, mandates, and advice and consent. Today’s congressperson is held captive to the commercial concerns of defense firms within their districts and states, and held hostage by foreign concerns that have increasingly formed single-issue interests groups (powerful ones at that!) within this country. The traditional security concerns of the average citizen is dwarfed or subordinated to powerful corporate and collective interests in the arms trade.

The congressperson’s responsibilities to the general citizenry--as citizen’s advocate--must be returned to dominance. Until this occurs, the Army professional may
have no ethical recourse other than citizens advocacy (consumer advocacy groups), such as Ralph Nader’s organization, for adequate and appropriate redress. This resource is not an optimal solution, nor is it the more constitutionally-mandated solution. However, with a culpable and corrupted congress (again, unintentionally flawed by design), the Army profession(al) has few choices.

6. Place all supervisory and regulatory control over this next round of ‘reform’ (mentioned above) in an accounting body outside of the Department of Defense. This author is of the opinion (supported by past administrative and military reform efforts) that true reform cannot be realized from within, particularly not by those within. The US armed services established the Inspector Generals Corps for this very purpose. Something similar to an IG-run reform process must be initiated. Perhaps this outside agent or agency should be completely outside government. All governmental stakeholders are touchable to some degree. The mere fact that they can be termed stakeholders amply designs the out of any sort of unbiased review process. Perhaps a review by a citizens-advocacy group is the solution. Or perhaps a review board composed of former (distantly retired) governmental and senior military personnel is another viable answer. There are no easy solutions. But the issue is an important one to consider before another round of reform is initiated.

These recommendations (and others like them) are hostile to the government or the Army profession. On the contrary, they are offered in hope of saving both from eventual compromise, decline, and possible death of public service-oriented professions. Some of the recommendations will spell the death of sub-organizations within the government and the military profession. The survival of the parent profession is
paramount. Some sub-professions (e.g., the acquisition corps) within the parent profession may find themselves losing jurisdiction. For both the parent and the child to survive, sacrifices are in order.

The cost of doing nothing makes the stark recommendations offered above more palatable. A failure on the part of the profession to stop the spiral of de-professionalization in arms acquisition and arms exporting will seriously erode the Army profession, further transforming it into a mercenary force in service of the private sector.

Revising the Systems of Profession Framework and Literature

Application of the professions’ literature and the Abbott schema to the military profession reveals gaps in both. These gaps can be filled both to facilitate paradigm evolution and to make it a relevant and useful approach to contemporary issues of professions and professionalization. Three specific areas of the military profession that the current literature fails to explore and analyze were mentioned earlier in chapter two. They are offered again here in more general terms:

1. Changes in how the “client” is defined raises the question of who governs the profession in general and in its response to change. The current approach fails adequately to address this question. Huntington et al., defined the client as society, but this definition is no longer adequate (what aspect or element of society? Domestic society or regional society? What about international society? and others.)

2. The competition for jurisdiction and expertise is as much an internal as an external struggle. A look at DoD reveals the composite organization that DoD is--part bureaucratic organization and part professional. The inherent conflict between these two elements of the same body is similar to a body’s reaction to a transplanted organ. The
body fights to reject what it needs to survive that which is still not a rightful part of its self, with both the transplant and the whole dying in the end. Also rivalries within the professions its self (sub-profession conflicts, based along branch and or function lines) contribute to the demise of the parent profession. Abbott does not address this issue.

3. Separate service professions versus the rise of the joint profession. The Packard Commission of 1985 raised the idea of an eventual need to consolidate acquisition efforts and procurement efforts (and budgets!) across the separate services. Goldwater-Nichols 1986 institutionalized this joint concept. Much has been gained by all service professions since then because of these efforts, both in terms of improved efficiency and improved effectiveness. Nevertheless, these efforts have wrought some unintended consequences for the services and the general public. First, the verdict on joint is still out, causing internal conflict between obligations of professional officers to serve in a joint capacity and the cost this service still may levy on the officer in service away from the parent service. Second, the added joint competitor may in fact draw more attention from the single services than is warranted, thus adding to the demise of the separate service professions (perhaps this is a good thing, so long as the public citizenry identifies it as such). Third, “going joint” may not be all that it is touted to be. Effectiveness may still demand four separate and unique service professions, despite the fact that concerns with improved efficiency may argue otherwise. Compromise by three separate air-arms of the services for a single system--the joint strike fighter--may deny the overall military force the combat multipliers and operational flexibility that the public and the strategic environment demand for the prosecution of an effective security strategy and security posture. In this sense, the separate service professions may be professionally
correct in their advice and consent against an all-joint force. There is no possible way the systems of profession literature could have foreseen this issue, as it does not (until now) address the issue of the professions within the military profession.

Summary

James Madison wrote:

In framing a government which is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this; you must first enable the government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself. A dependence on the people is, no doubt, the primary control on the government; but experience has taught mankind the necessity of auxiliary precautions.

James Madison had checks and balances and separation of power in mind when he made this statement. The statement remains relevant. Reference to the Army profession makes the lesson even starker in its relevance and importance. The Army, as profession, is one of those “auxiliary precautions” of which Madison spoke. The sanctity of the Army profession, as an auxiliary balance within government and within the service-based relationship of government to citizenry depends on the willingness and capacity of the Army profession to control itself. The defense reinvention story told here indicates an unwillingness or inability for the Army profession to self-regulate its roles and actions in arms acquisition and arms exporting. If this detractor from the profession’s professional obligations is not curtailed and contained, the citizenry might enact its own auxiliary precautions against the US Army. Consequent removal of public trust and authority from the Army could result in a decline (perhaps even death) of the Army as profession.

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