

ARMY DOWNSIZING FOLLOWING WORLD WAR I, WORLD
WAR II, VIETNAM, AND A COMPARISON
TO RECENT ARMY DOWNSIZING

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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

ABSTRACT

ARMY DOWNSIZING FOLLOWING WORLD WAR I, WORLD WAR II, VIETNAM, AND A COMPARISON TO RECENT ARMY DOWNSIZING by MAJ Garry L. Thompson, USA 102 pages.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Resolved, that the commanding officer be and he is hereby directed to discharge the troops now in the service of the United States, except twenty-five privates, to guard the stores at Fort Pitt, and fifty-five to guard the stores at West Point and other magazines, with a proportionate number of officers; no officer to remain in service above the rank of captain.¹

Continental Congress

Demobilization or downsizing the U.S. Army following past conflicts has illuminated some simple truths consistent with all modern conflicts. At the cessation of hostilities, the Army experiences great pressure from Congress, families of mobilized soldiers, industry, and the general public to return mobilized soldiers to their premobilization status.²

Eighty privates and a “proportionate number of officers,” none above the rank of captain, to guard a new nation? It is safe to say that downsizing efforts following other conflicts have never been as drastic as they were following the Revolutionary War, nevertheless the Army has dedicated a chapter in Field Manual (FM) 100-17 to demobilization. This manual assigns responsibilities and provides guidance for demobilization of individuals mobilized for federal military service.³ What regulation or FM governs the demobilization or downsizing of those individuals who wish to stay in the Army? What FM governs advice that military leadership should give to Congress concerning downsizing? Can strong, competent, and effective leadership alone overcome the effects of downsizing on training, morale, and readiness? The answer to the first two

questions is “none” and it seems the Army continues to struggle with the answer to the third question.

Although Army downsizing has never been so drastic in pure numbers since the post Revolutionary War period, the adverse affects on training, morale, and readiness have been consistent. History has proven that downsizing after major conflicts has at least in part contributed to many bloody first battles. Public reaction to their bloody first battles has served as a catalyst for repairing the state of the Army.

Since the birth of the United States the Army has repeatedly downsized its force following major conflicts. The Army’s success in subsequent first battles has been greatly hindered due to the public’s appetite for downsizing the force. The goal of this thesis is to look at three distinct periods of Army downsizing in history that are similar in ways and distinctly different in others and to compare these distinctly different yet similar eras to the present day force reductions, to gain insight into why we continue to repeat this cycle. Downsizing the Army has farther-reaching implications on the force than simply having fewer servicemen and women in uniform. How does downsizing affect those who remain in the Army? What does it do to morale? What does it do to training and retention programs? How does downsizing affect preparedness?

Downsizing the Army is not a simple task, as arbitrary as picking a number and then handing out pink slips. Military leaders, politicians, civilian public opinion, threat, budget, and economy are all involved. Ultimately force reduction has occurred for one, a combination, or for all these reasons. Consequently, the military has failed in many first battles, most notably at the Kasserine Pass, Tunisia, in 1943, Task Force Smith, Korea, in 1950, and the Ia Drang, South Vietnam, in 1965.

Following World War I the military was anxious to demobilize its forces rapidly as they had done after every war in the past. Politicians were also weary and carried their constituent's sentiments to the House floor. On February 1, 1920, William E. Borah of Idaho declared, "universal military training and conscription in time of peace are the taproots of militarism."³ The Bolshevik Revolution continued in Russia and threatened to spread into Western Europe, and at home a wave of strikes and terrorist bombings indicated that the revolution might reach the United States. Additionally, cynicism, weariness of the "Last Great War," and the Treaty of Versailles failed to sustain a more positive reform of the military. By 1920, many Americans clearly sought a return to quieter times and more traditional values. When applied to the United States Army this meant a small and inexpensive force composed of volunteers; far from the sight and mind of the general public.⁴

The goal of military reformers within the Army and civilian supporters was to create a new kind of Army for the United States following World War I. In their view, this new kind of Army would serve both the social and the military needs of the nation. Their vision was a relatively small standing professional Army that would work closely with larger citizen forces. Their goal was to ensure that the United States would have a well-trained and equipped military establishment in peacetime and thus be prepared for all future contingencies. Compulsory military training for all American males was the formula to make them better citizens and to equip them to be more productive, efficient members of society.⁵

There were many opposing views to the proposed reform of the Army. Most professional soldiers harbored a long-standing dislike of citizen soldiers, referring to

them simply as the militia under the control of the states: irregularly equipped and badly trained. Additionally, the Army was largely conservative in its hierarchy and showed little inclination to change in general. Congress determined that a half-million man Army would do the job while the nation determined the postwar environment. In 1919, a bill was presented in Congress requesting a 500,000 man Army.⁶ Leading the dissenters was Representative Percy Quin of Mississippi.

Across the seas are still two millions of men. We may need some there, but the greater part of that great number. . . should be transported back across the Atlantic Ocean and put out into the fields. Old Bossy and old Muley are calling for them. The bobwhites out in the cornfield are calling for the boys back on the farm, and here we are proposing to keep two millions of men standing about in idleness, drawing salaries, and wasting money, and to have 500,000 more in this country. What are the people going to think about it? I will tell you what they are going to think. They are going to talk in 1920. They are going to talk at the ballot box.⁷

Eventually Congress reached a compromise strength of 280,000 in the National Defense Act of 1920. This legislation was significant in that it marked the first time after a war that Congress debated at length the peacetime role and organization of the Army. Additionally, for the first time the peacetime Army was organized into tactical formations capable of a logically planned response to an emergency. Although reformers were disappointed in the failure of establishing a 500,000-man force and a Uniform Military Training (UMT) system, most felt it was the beginning of a positive new era of defense policy.

The feeling of a positive new era would not last long. By 1921, Congressional appropriations had cut the Regular Army strength from 280,000 to 125,000 due to public pressure and economics. The Army leadership's misunderstanding of the supply rate, the

recruitment rate, and the organization and training rate led to problems that plagued the Army over the next 20 years.⁸

What difficulties faced the Army from the Defense Act of 1920 to 1940? How did the Army fare in maintaining its desired end strength with regards to recruitment and retention? What effects did the National Defense Act of 1920 have on training and morale?

We have gone overboard to demobilize the Army under a system which to me is not only unsound but positively dangerous.⁴

Major General Clair Street

At the end of World War II the Army and Army air corps had a total end strength of roughly 8.2 million men. From June 1945 to the end of 1948 the force was downsized to roughly one-sixteenth of its earlier size, 554,000 strong. The pace of demobilization was determined largely by the availability of transportation and administrative personnel to “bring the boys home” rather than by a decision about the size or shape of the future Army. Civilian leaders also failed to give firm guidance concerning the Army’s role in occupation of postwar Europe. Occupation issues and other postwar requirements made it impossible for the Army leadership to control force reduction.⁹

As in post-World War I a majority of the Army personnel targeted for downsizing were conscripts. The Army designed the force reduction process around an individual point system that reduced officer demobilization at a slower rate than enlisted ranks, making it possible to keep the number needed. The majority of reserve officers were released from active duty while an attempt was made to keep the strongest performers. Congress provided unemployment insurance, education benefits, and separation pay to

most service members to assist in transition. However, force reduction plans continually changed and Army leadership failed to keep personnel informed contributing to morale and discipline problems.¹⁰ Selective service continued after World War II and the universal military training debate began again. The Selective Service and Training Act expired in March 1947, but by 1948, due to the developing Cold War, Congress reinstated the draft. The post World War II drawdown was done quickly and with less forethought and planning than the force reduction following World War I.

How did the Cold War draft effective training, readiness and morale? What readiness levels was Army leadership briefing to Congress? What requirements were other branches of the service briefing to Congress based on threat? What was general public opinion and how did it effect the political leadership and the morale of the professional soldiers staying in the Army?

The primary emphasis of this thesis is the study of drawdowns following World War I, World War II, and Vietnam. However, to better understand the history of downsizing it is worth taking a look at the post Korean War downsizing. There are numerous reports of substantial problems within the Army following the Korean War. Morale during this period was reportedly low due to the unpopularity of the Korean War at home. Poor recruitment rates and low retention after the war were indications that a military career was quickly losing popularity. Interestingly, the Army sought to address these problems by raising pay, introducing new uniforms, increasing educational opportunities, and instituting a reenlistment bonus. These efforts, however, produced only limited success.¹¹

The principal legacy of Vietnam for the Army was a breakdown in discipline, morale, and capability. The 1970s was a decade of negatives and low points. Few realize how bad things were in the Hollow Army of the 1970s. It was very bad, and the desire to get away from the Hollow Army was one of the principal issues driving the Army reforms of the 1980s.¹²

In 1969 the Nixon administration and military leadership called for a change in national military strategy. The previous strategy was founded on the ability to fight two and a half wars simultaneously. The new strategy required the ability to fight one and a half wars. The “half war” is best described as a small, contingency war. This change in strategy coupled with planned troop reductions in Vietnam set the stage for dramatic personnel cuts in the Army between 1969 and 1975. The Army’s end strength was reduced from roughly 1.5 million to 780,000 soldiers during these years.¹³

By the middle of the 1970s the United States Army was not a nice place to be. Throughout the later Vietnam War years discipline began to decline coupled with rises in drug use and racial tensions within the ranks. Retention in the all volunteer Army also suffered due to the sometimes dangerous conditions in the ranks and the overall sense of decline. The Army was quickly headed toward a “hollow” (poorly disciplined and ill-equipped) status and recovery would be difficult.

Although the nation was embroiled in a Cold War, the Army’s budget was cut to levels below what it had been before going into Vietnam. Congress appropriated the Army enough money to offer competitive pay to new recruits but there were fewer dollars to spend on replacement equipment, research and development, and training. Due to the lack of money for training, soldiers spent more time in garrison thus providing ample opportunities to get into trouble.¹⁴ Discipline became so bad that company commander’s were often accompanied by baseball-bat wielding guards as they inspected

barracks late at night. Did the Army leadership understand the “hollowness?” Did they understand the impact on the professional soldiers who decided to stay in the Army? What messages did the Army give to political leaders in reference to emerging threats and readiness? How was this message compared to other service leadership? Did other services suffer the same problems as the Army? If so, how did they deal with the issues or prevent them?

It seems that the downsizing trend following conflict will never end. The Army endured massive reductions, losing one-third of its active force between 1990 and 1996, and further cuts loomed in the near future. Following the end of the Cold War and the massive Reagan era military buildup of the 1980s, Congress felt that such a large force was no longer needed due to the Soviet Union’s collapse. Technology, training, and troop strength created during the 1980s was the basis of success in the Persian Gulf. With the Gulf War success and the collapse of the Soviet Union it was time to cut forces yet again.

Are forces enroute to another hollow era similar to the 1970s? Will the nation and the Army ever face another Kasesrine Pass, Task Force Smith, or Ia Drang? Have we already faced another “bloody first battle” with the recent terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon? The media has incessantly referenced the similarities in “intelligence breakdown” between the attack on Pearl Harbor and the terrorist attacks in New York City and Washington, D.C. In the midst of the current political debate on further defense cuts, it is apparent that the military is on the brink of another conflict.

Although it is unlikely that the Army will face another 100-hour Desert Storm scenario, it is quite possible that a quick decisive victory could be achieved in the next first battle. Following the Gulf War, Senator Daniel K. Inouye, Chairman of the Subcommittee for Military Appropriations, remarked:

It is somehow both ironic and disturbing that as soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines return from their trial by ordeal in the desert, we have already embarked on a venture to drastically reduce the size of our armed services . . . I feel it would be disgraceful to welcome these members of an all-volunteer force home and then hand them a pink slip--well done, welcome home, and good-bye.¹⁵

Could the Army face these same circumstances 10 years later? What message is the Army leadership sending to political leaders? It is the overall goal of this thesis to contribute to the illumination of the similarities and differences between these periods of force drawdown and perhaps gain insight into what the Army's future may have in store.

The interwar periods following World War I, World War II, and Vietnam have had varied levels of writing on U.S. Army drawdown. Conversely there has been a very large amount written about the Army and overall military drawdown effects and policy following the Cold War. There are books, however, such as *This Kind of War: A Study in Unpreparedness* by T. R. Fehrenbach that have alluded to drawdown effects on training and readiness. David McCormick, author of *The Downsized Warrior*, believes that there is no utility in comparing past drawdowns to the present. McCormick feels that the current downsizing is distinctly different because past downsizing dealt with conscript forces, whereas today's Army is an all-volunteer force.¹⁶ However, there is utility in comparing past downsizing with the present.

There have always been professional, career-minded soldiers in the U.S. Army. The values of these soldiers have remained unchanged throughout history, and it is

believed that morale and training have always been adversely affected by downsizing. It is also worth exploring similarities in messages the Army leadership has sent to political leaders prior to downsizing. Effects of budget, technology, and expectations of coalition warfare will also be explored. This research will investigate the drawdown following World War I, World War II, and Vietnam, and explore similarities and differences with the Army's ongoing drawdown.

¹ U. S. Army Field Manual 100-17 (*Mobilization, Deployment, Redeployment, Demobilization*) 1992, Chapter 6, 6-0.

²Ibid.

³Ibid.

³Robert K. Griffith Jr., *Men Wanted for the U.S. Army: America's Experience With an All-Volunteer Army Between the World Wars* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1982), 20.

⁴Ibid., 1.

⁵Ibid., 3.

⁶Ibid.

⁷Ibid., 10.

⁸LTC Marvin A. Kreidberg and 1LT Merton G. Henry, Department of the Army Pamphlet 20-212, *History of Military Mobilization in the United States Army, 1775-1945* (Washington, DC: GPO, 1955), 391.

⁹David McCormick, *The Downsized Warrior* (New York: New York University Press, 1998), 7-9.

¹⁰Robert Coakley, Ernest Fisher, Karl Cocke, and Daniel Griffen, *Resume of Army Roll-Up Following World War II* (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center for Military History 1968), 26.

¹¹McCormick, 10-1.

¹²James F. Dunnigan and Raymond M. Macedonia, *Getting It Right: American Military Reforms After Vietnam to the Gulf War and Beyond* (New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc., 1993), 96.

¹³McCormick, 11.

¹⁴Dunnigen and Macedonia, 106.

¹⁵Hearings of the Senate Appropriations Committee, *Department of Defense Appropriations for DY 1992*, 19 March 1991.

¹⁶McCormick, 6-7.

CHAPTER 2

BRING THE BOYS HOME, 1919-1939

By all odds the greatest provision for the efficient control of war ever enacted by Congress.¹

William A. Ganoe

These are the confident words of by William A. Ganoe, professor of military history at West Point, regarding the National Defense Act of 1920; an act which became the framework for the military between 1920 and 1940. Several revisions of the act followed as the general staff, politicians, and civilians grappled with the many issues of a peacetime Army.

The armistice of 11 November 1918 ended World War I; however, mobilization for the war effort was still in full progress. The early armistice caught the War Department off guard. Due to popular pressure from the civilian populace and political leaders to “bring the boys home,” the War Department was not immediately concerned with legislation to keep the Army in existence. The Army had made no plans for what the Army should look like following the war and hastily recommended a permanent strength of 500,000 men.²

The Army leadership had difficulty justifying the somewhat arbitrary number of 500,000 to Congress. They simply were not prepared for the argument. At the time, justifying postwar strength was the least of their worries. The unpredictable early end of the war required the leadership of the Army to shift to demobilization when mobilization was still in progress.³ Wartime legislation also made almost everyone eligible for discharge at the end of the war.⁴ These problems provided difficulties for Army

leadership when Congress began hearings on demobilization and the future size of the Army.

The House Military Affairs Committee met in February 1919 to hear testimony on the War Department bill requesting a 500,000-man force. Neither Secretary of War Newton D. Baker nor Army Chief of Staff General Peyton C. March was able to justify the bill to the satisfaction of the committee. The committee felt that the proposed legislation was only a stopgap measure, not integrated with any provisions for a National Guard or for universal military training. At the conclusion of the hearings the only Army-initiated legislation passed was the act of 28 February 1919, which merely authorized the resumption of enlistments in the Regular Army.⁵ The post-World War I Army leadership was unprepared or perhaps reluctant to debate intelligently and provide a clear vision.

Congressional military affairs committees continued hearings on national defense proposals throughout 1919 and 1920. Brigadier General John Palmer, Chief, War Plans Branch, testified before a Senate subcommittee on military affairs 9-10 October 1919. Brigadier General Palmer believed the War Department bill was based on a large standing Army backed up by the draft or universal military service. He disagreed and argued for a small standing Army and a large militia of citizen soldiers. Testifying before the same committee, General Pershing made a strong plea for some kind of universal military training. He further emphasized this approach, pointing out the physical fitness and educational advantages. In response, one Congressman cautioned, "We are in danger of having many beautiful schemes for popular education thrust upon us which, if adopted, would make the Army a college rather than a fighting unit."⁶

General Pershing continued his fight for universal military service and the need for a large standing Army. He was fighting a losing battle. There was a postwar surge of pacifism in American society and citizens continued the cry “bring the boys home.” In General Pershing’s personal correspondence, magazine articles, testimony before Congressional committees, and in speeches to private groups, he labored, “to keep the Army’s body and soul together and to stave off further manpower cuts.” He also asserted that no “blind belief in the benevolence of peoples will prevent wars,” he called for “reasonable preparedness.” Further justifying his beliefs he pointed out that the Army had been engaged in some kind of military operation every eighteen months of its existence, and in a major war every twenty or thirty years. “Is human nature going to change?” he asked, “Are conditions in the world any different from what they have been in the last fifteen or twenty centuries? Are wars becoming less frequent or any less severe?”⁷

The world was perceived as safe for democracy after “the war to end all wars” and many Congressmen thought the Army superfluous, except for riot duty. However, the Army leadership continued the argument. William M. Wright, the former commander of the 89th Division said, “The Army is like a yellow dog running down the street with a tin can tied on it, and everybody on the sidewalk throwing rocks.” George C. Marshall Jr. noted, “I saw the Army . . . start rapidly on the downgrade to almost extinction. His views [General Pershing’s] didn’t count at all.”⁸

Bending to public mood, an economically minded Congress voted cut after cut to the Army. The National Defense Act of 1920, which emerged from the debates of 1919-1920, authorized an end strength of 280,000, one-half of what was originally requested

by the Army.⁹ It was in the form of a series of amendments to the National Defense Act of 1916. The amendments were so comprehensive that an almost entirely new act was written:

1. That the Army of the United States shall consist of the Regular Army, the National Guard while in the service of the United States, and the organized Reserves, including the Officer's Reserve Corps and the Enlisted Reserve Corps.
2. The Regular Army including the Philippine scouts was not to exceed 280,000 enlisted men in peacetime.
3. The organization of the Army into brigades, divisions, corps, and armies was left to the discretion of the President.
4. The War Department General Staff, consisting of the Chief of Staff, 4 assistants, and 88 other officers not below the rank of captain.
5. Comprehensive provisions were enacted providing for the Officer's Reserve Corps, Reserve Officer's Training Corps, Enlisted Reserve Corps, and the National Guard.¹⁰

Carrying out the provisions of the National Defense Act of 1920 was clearly impossible due to the drastic manpower cuts. There were two conflicting ideas about solving this problem. Brigadier General Palmer advocated cutting down the number of Regular Army divisions, keeping them at full strength and ready for immediate service in an emergency. He also advised keeping training centers open. The advantage of Palmer's plan provided for a better trained force through the national training centers. It was disadvantaged, however, through the loss of two complete divisions. General James G. Harbord, Deputy Chief of Staff, suggested cutting the manpower in the nine divisions and abolishing the training centers. Harbord's plan kept all the divisions operating thus making it easier to mobilize to 100 percent in the event of a crisis. Cutting the training centers, however, would ultimately affect readiness. Pershing sided with Harbord in the end thus paving the way for a small skeletonized force throughout the 1920s and 1930s.¹¹

The leadership of the Army was not the only voice advocating keeping the Army at an acceptable strength. Hudson Maxim wrote in *Defenseless America* that the citizenry of the United States believed that the country as a whole was big enough and prosperous enough to be safe. He felt the general population knew little or nothing about national defense and believed a large standing Army was a menace to liberty.¹² His thoughts on our preparations for war at the time was prophetic to say the least:

This country must first be whipped in order to prepare sufficiently to prevent being whipped. Therefore, our business at the present time is to pick our conquerors. . . . If England does not give us a good, timely whipping, we are going to be whipped by Germany or Japan, and the humiliation will be more than is really needed to stimulate us for adequate preparation.¹³

The Army leadership and a few civilian pundits were unsuccessful in convincing Congress to keep an adequate standing Army. Again, the War Department, in 1919, argued for a force of 500,000. Instead, Congress steadily reduced the Army from 175,000 to 125,000, and by 1924 to 111,000--only 11,000 more than the Treaty of Versailles allowed a conquered and disarmed Germany.¹⁴ The effects of such a “skeletonized” force must now be considered.

In response to morale problems within the ranks and a complicated bureaucracy at the Pentagon, the newly appointed Chief of Staff, General Pershing, made some immediate changes in 1921. Within one week of his appointment he changed the Army uniform in hopes of improving morale. He ordered all officers to wear the Sam Browne belt, heretofore the symbol of the overseas officer. In addition, he abolished the current general staff organization and replaced it with the AEF system: G1 (Personnel), G-2 (Intelligence), G-3 (Operations), and G-4 (Training).¹⁵ On the surface these changes appeared to be constructive, however, problems with recruitment, reenlistment, and

morale in the Army were just beginning. As the 1920s unfolded the Army continued to struggle month to month in preserving the National Defense Act of 1920. Reductions in funds and personnel affected morale and, as a result, both recruiting and reenlistments suffered. The Army's efforts to overcome these problems and maintain authorized strength fell into two broad categories, procurement and retention.¹⁶

Throughout 1920 the Army had few problems with recruitment. Recruiters had little difficulty enlisting men using educational and vocational opportunities as attractions. The recruitment success, however, was short lived. Congress ordered the reduction of the Army from 213,000 to 175,000 in February 1921, forcing the Army to temporarily cease all recruiting. When Congress began talking about a reduction to 150,000, Army planners halted all recruiting through 1922. Since the General Recruiting Service now appeared to be obsolete, it was disbanded as an economy measure.¹⁷

Opponents of the 175,000-man Army based their arguments on traditional fears of large standing armies during times of peace. Senator William E. Borah of Idaho insisted that the reduction was necessary for the "morale of the country," and that citizenship was the best protection against unknown foes. Senator John Williams of Mississippi called "an Army of 175,000 men at this time . . . a form of insanity, if not idiocy. . . . In some of the finest years of our history the United States progressed most satisfactorily with an Army of 25,000 men."¹⁸

Supporters of the 175,000-man Army continued to protest against the cuts. Secretary of War John W. Meeks argued the force was essential for the additional missions outlined by the National Defense Act. He promised to practice strict economy in other areas in order to pay for the additional soldiers.¹⁹ General Pershing testifying

before the Senate said, "A reduction to 150,000 will compel the War Department to put an end to many combat organizations, or reduce them to a strength which will destroy their value as a nucleus around which to build fighting organizations in an emergency."

The Army's educational and vocational training programs also came under attack during the appropriations battles. The program, which received broad support in 1919, seemed irrelevant to many by 1921. During House hearings on the appropriations bill, Frank Green of Vermont, in questioning the educational program, said, "the Army is organized for fighting, not for going to school." Joseph Walsh of Massachusetts felt that the program hurt the Army because, by teaching soldiers a trade, it encouraged them to leave the Army for civilian jobs. Educational and vocational training programs were subsequently cut to \$1.2 million, down \$3 million from the previous year.²⁰

Sudden reductions in strength affected those who remained in the Army more than those who left. The result of the cuts left the Army with a top-heavy rank structure since most who left were from the lower ranks. Additionally, the National Defense Act of 1920 set limits on the number of men in each grade based on the total enlisted strength of the Army. Reductions in strength dictated reductions in grade. The Army believed that simply freezing promotions would solve the problem. Army leadership assumed that retirements and discharges would eliminate the excess soldiers in the higher grades, but the forced reduction to 150,000 necessitated demoting some soldiers if they wanted to remain in the Army. Reductions in strength also affected officers. Many older officers chose to retire early when offered special annuities, but over 1,000 regular Army officers had to be forcibly discharged.²¹

Economy measures cut deeper into the Army than reducing numbers of soldiers. The Army eliminated nearly 21,000 civilian jobs, a reduction of about 25 percent. Overseas tours of duty were increased (normally two to three years in length) by one year to save the costs of transfers. Allowances for travel, transportation of goods, telephone and telegraph services, and fuel were also cut. During the winter of 1921-1922 the War Department ordered units to ration coal in order to conserve fuel and electricity. Services traditionally free to enlisted men, such as laundry, repair of shoes, hats, and clothing, and dry cleaning were eliminated.²²

Disbanding the General Recruiting Service proved to be a very bad decision. By July 1921 the Army realized that the reduction to 150,000 men would be accomplished ahead of schedule. Virtually every soldier who wanted to get out was permitted, even before his three-year term was up. Most were first-term enlistees who had been drawn into the Army by the educational and vocational training offers and simply found the Army not to their liking.²³ The Army leadership realized strength was below authorized levels and the apparatus to procure new recruits had been disbanded.

The General Recruiting Service was reestablished in December 1921 but without any formally appropriated funds. Recruiters were able to bring in just enough men monthly to balance losses, but the overall strength remained below the 150,000 men authorized. By January 1922, Congress was again debating a further reduction in strength. Army leadership again debated halting recruiting until the outcome of the Congressional debates was known. The Army recruiting chief, Colonel Charles Martin, argued that it had taken ninety days to resume effective recruiting in September 1921. "It is very easy to stop the recruiting machine, but most difficult to start it up again"²⁴ The

General Recruiting Service remained intact and recruiting continued but only at a level designed to keep pace with monthly losses.

Congress again cut the Army's authorized strength and by October 1922 the Army was 7,000 men below its new authorized strength of 125,000. Several factors combined to frustrate recruiting efforts. The Pay Reorganization Act of June 10, 1922 reduced pay of privates from \$30 to \$21 a month. The country began postwar recession recovery, which improved employment opportunities in the civilian sector. In reporting on the recruiting situation at the end of the Fiscal Year, the adjutant general blamed "The small pay of the recruit and the remarkably high wages paid for labor of all kinds throughout the United States . . . [for] greatly discouraged enlistments."²⁵

The Army withstood the problems of recruitment and sought innovative ways to entice men to enlist. Army leadership began to recognize the potential for paid advertising. In a memo to the adjutant general, Colonel J. T. Conrad, chief of the Recruiting Policy Bureau, wrote, "The general public is not informed regarding terms of enlistment . . . advertising of the kind used by big business concerns has never been tried by the Army." Conrad requested \$250,000 for the advertising campaign. The request was so unprecedented that it went all the way to the Secretary of War. The request was eventually approved but was cut to \$185,000. A typical ad, run in the "help wanted" section of major newspapers, read:

Men Wanted for Enlistment in the U.S. Army from 18-40 yrs. of age for a 3 yr. Period with every Opportunity to Earn, Learn, & Travel.²⁶

The Army also began local recruiting drives and cash incentives. In January 1923, for example, the entire Sixteenth Infantry Regiment moved into New York City for a week

of recruiting. The *U.S. Army Recruiting News* offered cash prizes to the recruiters who brought in the most men.²⁷ By the summer of 1924 the Army accomplished the task of maintaining authorized strengths and again put a temporary halt to recruiting. The *New York Times* suggested that the downturn in employment during the year contributed to the recruiting success.²⁸ With the problem of enlistments seemingly settled the Army turned its attention to reenlistment.

Desertions in the Army rose dramatically during the first half of the 1920s, reaching a peak of 7.39 percent of total enlisted strength in 1925. The number of honorably discharged men declining to reenlist was also high.²⁹ *The Army and Navy Journal* considered the Army's unacceptable desertion rate and low percentage of reenlistments as indicators of poor service morale. *The Army and Navy Journal* blamed "poor quarters and the reduction in pay, with better prospects in civil life . . . for the numerous desertions and the alarming lack of reenlistments." Other causes of low morale included excessive fatigue duty involved in the maintenance of posts and long summer training periods.³⁰

Enlisted life in the Army during the 1920s could be exceedingly routine and dull but the Army did little to alter the routine to make it more interesting or exciting for soldiers. The Army equated service attractiveness with creature comforts and focused its attention on improving the living standards of soldiers. Army leaders viewed the problem of enlisted losses solely on economics. They believed that better barracks and more pay would reverse trends of rising desertions and declining reenlistments. Reenlistment problems continued throughout the 1920s and did not ease until the beginning of the Great Depression in 1929.³¹

The Great Depression boosted Army enlistments and reenlistments but hurt the married enlisted man and prompted some to question the ability of the Army to allow enlisted men to be married. In March 1931, Brigadier General William P. Jackson, Commanding General of Madison Barracks at Sackett Harbor, New York, in a report on married enlisted men complained:

They exist in squalid surroundings, in dingy dark, overcrowded rooms where the simplest rules of sanitation and hygiene are difficult if not impossible of accomplishment. Their health, morale, vitality, and efficiency is [sic] bound to suffer. Undernourishment is frequently observed, resulting in at least one instance at this station in hospitalization due to weakness. . . . Some become objects of charity-an unjust liability on the garrison. Recently a donation of nineteen dollars was made by officers to provide fuel and milk for a new mother and her baby.³²

Married enlisted men constituted a class of soldier that always lived on the edge of poverty. The War Department officially discouraged the practice of married enlisted men but ultimately left the decision to the local commander. One retired soldier was quoted, “When I got married I had no trouble getting permission; the catch was you had to live within your means. If the company commander got one letter from a collection agency that was it; you couldn’t reenlist.”³³ The Army’s problems with recruitment and retention continued until the depression years. A steady income, food, clothing, and shelter were more appealing to a young man facing the dustbowl of the southwest or the bread lines of the northeast. The changes that did occur, however, dealt with training.

Training during the depression years was decentralized. The War Department issued broad training directives to be followed by commanders. The directives typically concentrated on marksmanship and battle drill for combat arms units if resources were available. The training directive for Fiscal Year 1935 is a typical example:

Infantry and cavalry units were told to stress machine-gun training within the limits of ammunition authorized. All units had to conduct a two-week march every year and, funds permitting, the mobile troops of each Corps Area . . . will be assembled once during the year in one or more concentration camps for a period of not less than two weeks for combined field exercises. The War Department specifically enjoined commanders to reduce the demands of routine administration and . . . emphasize the importance of training.³⁴

The depression years were essentially the same with regard to initial entry training. After new recruits were sworn in they went straight to their assigned units. The recruit training depots, equivalent to today's basic training and advanced individual training centers, had been abolished in 1922 as an economy measure. Noncommissioned officers conducted recruit training at the unit level. One noncommissioned officer was responsible for training three to four new recruits in basic military skills and customs. The length of this "basic training" depended on the motivation of the instructor and the needs of the unit. Typically, however, new recruits were integrated into units quickly and were soon performing housekeeping chores, such as post police and barracks repairs, as well as guard duty. Most new recruits acquired their military skills "on the job."³⁵

On-the-job training for new recruits required equipment with which to train; however, the Army of the interwar years was deficient in terms of material readiness. The infantry continued to train with the 1903 Springfield rifle. Field artillerymen continued to train with the "French 75 millimeters" even though a more accurate weapon existed (the 105-millimeter howitzer). By 1933, the Army had only purchased fourteen of the more accurate 105-millimeter howitzers. The Army's trucks and motors were still of World War I vintage. Additionally, the Army had only built twelve tanks since the war.³⁶

Congressional appropriations of 1936 and 1937 provided modest improvements in men and material. Although he had been fighting for a larger Army for nearly three years, General MacArthur felt his arguments had finally been heard on Capitol Hill. Upon observing in 1934 that the entire Regular Army could be crowded into Yankee Stadium he said,

With our present little Regular Army we would be relatively helpless in the event of an invasion by a major power. . . . [T]he difference between what we have now and what is proposed in this bill marks the difference between relative helplessness and a chance to accomplish our mission of defense. . . . Pass this bill, Mr. Chairman, I beg you, as an old soldier who has probably seen his last battlefield. Pass this bill and give the American Army a chance in the next battle it fights for the life of the country.³⁷

MacArthur's wishes were finally granted when in 1936 Congress authorized a new strength level of 165,000. The public began to fear German and Japanese militarism abroad. This coupled with a decline in the idea that economy in government and a balanced budget were necessary to promote general recovery contributed more to congressional willingness to increase defense spending than the pleas of MacArthur.³⁸

The new authorized strength of 165,000 prompted the adjutant general to increase quotas for each corps recruiting area. The new quotas required an additional 1,500 new recruits a month. On average each corps area was required to enlist an additional seventy-five men per month. For the first time since the depression began, recruiters resisted the order.³⁹ The overworked recruiters simply knew they could not meet the new demands. The depression no longer assisted recruiting after 1936. Despite widespread unemployment, competition from New Deal relief program and a moderately improved economy kept potential recruits away from the Army.⁴⁰

The policy of remilitarization by Germany, and Japan's undeclared war on China began to intrude on the public's preoccupation with problems at home. On 28 January 1938, President Roosevelt told Congress, "As Commander in Chief . . . it is my constitutional duty to report . . . that our national defense is, in the light of the increasing armaments in other nations, inadequate for purposes of national security and requires increase for that reason."⁴¹ Still, it would take nearly two years of bitter arguing before the draft was approved in September of 1940.

By July 1941 the Army was swelled with draftees who were training at full strength and with new equipment. The Army bore little resemblance to the skeletonized force that had existed between 1921 and 1939. The massive mobilization that followed and the ultimate total victory obscured the interwar turmoil the Army faced. However, by 1945 the Army failed to learn the lessons of the early 1920s downsizing and began making the same mistakes all over again.

¹William A. Ganoe, *The History of the United States Army*, rev. ed. (Ashton, MD: Eric Lundberg, 1964), 464.

²H. R. 14560, 65th Cong., 3rd Session.

³Kriedberg and Henry, 377.

⁴DA Pamphlet No. 20-10, *History of Personnel Demobilization in the United States Army* (Washington, DC) July 1952, 21.

⁵Kriedberg, 378.

⁶Kriedberg, 36.

⁷Donald Smythe, *Pershing, General of the Armies* (Indianapolis, IN: Indiana University Press, 1986), 278.

⁸*Ibid.*, 279.

⁹Ibid.

¹⁰Kriedberg, 379-380.

¹¹Smythe, 279.

¹²Hudson Maxim, *Defenseless America* (New York: Hearst's International Library Co., 1927), 134.

¹³Ibid., 128.

¹⁴Smythe, 279.

¹⁵Ibid., 275.

¹⁶Griffith, 85.

¹⁷Ibid., et al., 86.

¹⁸Ibid., et al., 87-88.

¹⁹Ibid., et al., 88.

²⁰Ibid., et al.

²¹Griffith, 61.

²²Griffith, 62.

²³Ibid., 88.

²⁴Ibid., 91.

²⁵Ibid., et al., 92.

²⁶Griffith, 31.

²⁷*Recruiting News* #5, 1 February 1923, back cover.

²⁸Ibid., et al., 32.

²⁹Griffith, 94.

³⁰Ibid., et al.

³¹Griffith, 94-95.

³²*Ibid.*, 155.

³³*Ibid.*

³⁴*Ibid.*, 165.

³⁵Major LeRoy Lutes, "The New Recruit Class," *Infantry Journal* 42, no. 3 (May-June 1935): 264-5.

³⁶Russell F. Weigley, *History of the United States Army* (New York: Macmillan, 1984), 413-15.

³⁷Griffith, 135.

³⁸*Ibid.*, 143.

³⁹*Ibid.*, 167.

⁴⁰*Ibid.*, 169.

⁴¹*Ibid.*, 175.

CHAPTER 3

VICTORY AGAIN, 1945-1950

The war is over Congress
That I shall repeat
Grab the reins from the brass
Climb in the driver's seat

Ship the millions home, judge
Ship the millions home
Order the chairborne divisions
To ship the millions home¹

Representative Frank Chelf

The signing of a surrender document, between the United States and Japan on 2 September 1945, marked the end of World War II. At this time the United States armed services were over twelve million men and women strong. The Army ground and air forces began partial demobilization of its approximately 8,290,000 soldiers on 12 May 1945² and by the end of 1948 had pruned the Army to 554,000, approximately one-sixteenth of its earlier size.³

Much like the post-World War I demobilization, there was considerable unpreparedness and confusion following World War II. In August 1945, President Harry S. Truman promised that within twelve to eighteen months the Army would release 5,000,000 to 5,500,000 men. However, later that same month Major General Stephen Henry, Army Deputy Chief of Staff, testified to the House that the Army would release 6,500,000 within one year. During these hearings he also stated that the Army would need 900,000 men to occupy the Pacific.⁴ On 18 September 1945, General Douglas MacArthur stated that 200,000 men would be adequate to occupy Japan.⁵ Further adding to the confusion, Representative Al Miller of Nebraska said that General George

Marshall had made the statement that 500,000 men would be sufficient to meet the United States' occupation needs.⁶

General MacArthur's statement caught everyone off guard, including the Army, the office of the President, and the State Department. MacArthur had originally stated that 500,000 men would be needed to occupy Japan. Truman privately boiled over the statement and confided to the Director of the Budget, Harold Smith, that MacArthur's move was political and that the purpose of the Army was to implement policy not determine it.⁷

As Truman and MacArthur argued there were others protesting the plans of rapid demobilization. Major General Clair Street wrote to General Hap Arnold, the commanding general of the Army Air Force in 1945:

We have gone overboard to demobilize the Army under a system which to me is not only unsound but positively dangerous, we are not coppering our bets. It is perfectly apparent that when the present point system . . . [has] taken its toll, the Army Air Force will be left with . . . nothing but a potpourri of warm bodies inadequately seasoned by too few regular Army officers and enlisted men. The basic structure of what has been our Air Force will have been dissipated.⁸

While the Army general staff and politicians bickered over demobilization, unrest became a problem within the ranks. Protest and unrest was most prevalent in the Philippine Islands. Meetings to organize protests were held in tents, barracks, day rooms, and mess halls. Mimeograph machines churned out copies of form letters that were handed out to every serviceman who would take one. These form letters were sent to the President and to their Congressmen protesting the slowing down and confusion of demobilization.⁹

The public desire “to see the boys brought home” only enticed politicians to issue more explanations and promises. President Truman explained that soldiers were being processed out at a rate of 650 men per hour, and that the rate would climb to 25,000 per day by January 1946. Truman’s explanation only seemed to feed the public’s impatience. Organized labor also got into the act and passed out cards to be signed and sent to the President. On 14 December 1945, 78,295 cards were received by the War Department. The following message was printed on the cards:

Dear Mr. President:

I urge you as Commander-in-Chief to press into service every ship flying our flag to bring back our troops by Christmas.

Ships for private commerce, ships laid up in U.S. ports and U.S. meddling in China are keeping GIs from being reunited with their families.

I urge every ship to be made a troop ship.

Sincerely yours,¹⁰

Protests nearly turned violent in the Philippines. In late September 1945, a group of protesting soldiers were turned back at the Manuel Quezon Bridge at bayonet point. Later on the same day, a group of 2,500 men marched on the headquarters of Lieutenant General Richard Styer, Commander of Army Forces in the Western Pacific. Again, they were turned away but the discontent spread rapidly. Military Police broke up large protests in Yokohama and one in Calcutta that was attended by over 5,000 soldiers.¹¹

The protests and discontent were in the words of the Supreme Commander of the United Nations forces in the Pacific, Douglas MacArthur, “The result of the War Department’s announcement of the slowing down of demobilization and the work of

communists and discontents in service newspapers.¹² When Secretary of War Robert Patterson met with servicemen in the Philippines he was pressed with demanding questions: Was the State Department attempting to influence military policy or political policy in the Philippines? Was the 86th Division meant to police the Philippines? How many men would be needed in the Philippines, and what were the intentions of the War Department in this regard? Why were men being given combat training? Following the meeting the Philippines grew quiet. One soldier who met with Patterson said that it was the most complete description of War Department policy that he had heard since he had been in the Army.¹³ Mimeographed petitions from the Philippines summed up their feelings. The petitions were addressed to Congress and were simply titled “No Boats, No Votes.”¹⁴ An interview with eighty-one-year-old Dow Summers, who was a sergeant in the 86th Division, revealed a different perspective of life in the Philippines in late 1945.

Most of the boys I knew, including myself, were just happy that the whole ordeal was over. We were all thankful to be alive and thanked the good Lord every day that we were alive. In my opinion, the rabble rousers were the ones who had only been overseas a year or less. Those of us who had been fighting for four years had the most right to protest but we didn't. We were old enough and smart enough to know that getting home overnight would be difficult for the generals to accomplish quickly. Again, those of us who had suffered for four years were willing to wait for as long as needed. We were fed, warm, and most importantly alive.¹⁵

Although obvious that not all soldiers participated in protests, the demonstrations in the Pacific found their way to Europe and in France they moved to a different level. Enlisted men wanted the abolition of officer's quarters, the opening of officer's clubs to enlisted men, and the abolition of the officer's mess. Additionally, they wanted Secretary of War Patterson fired.¹⁶ Problems in France eventually found their way to Germany where demonstrations required a contingent of armed paratroopers to break up a mob of

five thousand men. On 15 January 1946, General Eisenhower addressed members of Congress in reference to the protests. Eisenhower said the Army had no “hidden ball plays.”

Men were kept in service to police occupied territories, to rid them of the vestiges of fascism, programs such as denaziification; to guard and maintain surplus property; to maintain lines of supply and communication; to service Army installations; to maintain a PX and postal service system, as well as countless other tasks . . . if demobilization schedules are maintained the United States will run out of Army.¹⁷

The real problem with the Army at the time was recruitment. The Army had fallen well below the 50,000 men a month they expected to receive.¹⁸ The Director of Selective Service General Lewis Hershey was called to testify before Congress. General Hershey testified that Selective Service had fallen short of the number of men requested by the Army, but he also stated there were reasons for the decline. The Army was no longer accepting illiterates, which cost the Army 6,000 men. Medical school students and some graduate students were also now exempt. President Truman had also ordered that men between the ages of eighteen through twenty-six were exempt from the draft. Additionally, draft boards were reluctant to draft fathers. Hershey requested a renewal of the Selective Service Act that was due to expire on 15 May 1946. He stated that local draft boards were reluctant to draft anyone if they thought the draft would end within a few months. The subcommittee was reluctant to act on Hershey’s recommendation¹⁹ but relented and extended the act in June.²⁰

President Truman originally announced that the Army would be reduced to 1,950,000 men by June 1946²¹ only 50,000 short of the original number decided upon in October 1945.²² However, by the spring of 1946 the announced goal was an Army,

including the Army air corps, cut to 1,070,000 men by 1 July 1947. Congress decided upon an ultimate Army end strength of 600,000 men, the largest peacetime Army in U.S. history.²³ This size did not prevent trouble within the Army. There were those that felt such a large and fast demobilization decimated the ranks. In referring to demobilization at the end of World War II, General George C. Marshall said, "It was not demobilization, it was a rout."²⁴

The Army originally planned discharges according to a point system. The point system gave credit for time served, combat decorations, battle stars, and parenthood. Although this system was meant to insure fairness, it only resulted in complaints. Congress mandated that surplus personnel be released regardless of points primarily as a result of pressure from industry. Also, there were instances of men being discharged who were not eligible. Movie stars, football players, and sons of prominent politicians were discharged with no regard to the point system.²⁵

Most of the junior officers and noncommissioned officers who stayed in the Army following World War II were rich in combat experience. However, the junior enlisted were mostly inexperienced, young, and had been lured into the Army by the generous GI Bill. The motivation of these young men had much to do with post service education and low-interest loans and had little to do with being prepared for battle. The Army had also attracted some "hard cases" who frequently moved in and out of the stockade.²⁶

Heavy drinking and boredom plagued all units and all ranks. To combat these problems most units instituted a wide variety of sports programs. Units fielded football, basketball, baseball, track, and boxing teams that became the focal point of regimental life.²⁷ First Sergeant (retired) Robert S. Turner enlisted in the Army at Fort Knox,

Kentucky, in 1949. His recollection of the Army of the late 1940s at Fort Knox was one of alcoholism, bad food, boredom, and pay problems.

I came from a very poor family and was accustomed to poor chow. However, the food in those days was absolutely terrible. Also, we all constantly had pay problems. It took me over a year to see my enlistment bonus. Consequently, most soldiers refused to reenlist. . . . [T]here are two things you don't do to a soldier-mess with his food or his pay.²⁸

First Sergeant Turner also remembered that heavy drinking plagued the ranks. In his opinion, the heavy drinking was a result of boredom and post traumatic stress disorder. "In those days folks didn't understand post-traumatic stress disorder." He added "There was no help for them and they went straight to the bottle. . . . I watched more than one good man get kicked out of the Army because of the nightmares of World War II."²⁹

By 1949 the Army was reduced to ten active divisions and eleven separate regiments--a reduction of seventy-nine divisions in four years. When the Korean War broke out, four infantry divisions were assigned to the Eighth Army in Japan on occupation duty, Two infantry divisions and two infantry regiments comprised the European force, and one regiment each was stationed in Hawaii, Okinawa, and the Caribbean. The remaining forces were concentrated in the United States.³⁰

The Army maintained its authorized ten-division structure; however, most of these divisions were "hollow." For instance, three of the four divisions in Japan were below the authorized peacetime strength of 12,500. The 24th, 1st Cavalry, and 7th Divisions averaged 10,800 men, 8,100 men below the authorized wartime strength of a division.³¹ Due to additional budget cuts in 1949, Army Chief of Staff General Joe Collins was forced to deactivate one battalion of three in each divisions three infantry regiments, and one of three firing batteries in each of the four divisional artillery

battalions. “The deactivation gravely impaired--even crippled--the combat capability and readiness of the divisions”³² Combat support units were dangerously cut within the Army as well. The goal was minimum reduction of combat units and maximum elimination of the “fat.” The fat provided by support units and the loss of entire infantry and artillery battalions turned the Army into a hollow force.

Army strength reductions in the late 1940s and early 1950s began as a course of increased spending and armament versus disarmament. In 1948 when the Soviet Union overthrew Czechoslovakia and sealed off Berlin, General Bradley persuaded Truman to reinstate the draft and build the Army to 850,000 men. However, by the end of the year, the Berlin crisis had been countered by the Berlin airlift. Truman decided to cut the Army back to 677,000 men comprising ten divisions. He also “passed the word that even deeper cuts lay in store.”³³ By March 1948 the Army had dwindled to 530,000 men and was as General Bradley wrote, “in a shockingly deplorable state.” It had “almost no combat effectiveness and could not fight its way out of a paper bag.”³⁴

When the Soviet Union exploded the atomic bomb, Secretary of State Dean Acheson wrote that a “different world” had arrived and was convinced that America must change course and arm rather than disarm. Acheson subsequently initiated the National Security Council policy paper No. 68 (NSC-68) that was designed to persuade Truman and Secretary of Defense Louis A. Johnson that the U.S. must commence a dramatic rearmament program.³⁵ The rearmament program would cost roughly \$40 billion a year. In the end the administration settled for \$13 billion a year as Secretary of Defense Johnson boasted to Congress that his austerity program was providing “significantly more powerful military forces within the same dollar requirements.”³⁶ General Bradley

testified, “Frankly, considering the intelligence estimates that we have available and realizing the amount of money which our economy can stand for defense is a presidential responsibility, I am in complete agreement with that ceiling.” Bradley went on to say that the strength of the military depended upon the economy , “We must not destroy that [the economy] by spending too much [on the military] from year to year . . . we must not spend the country into economic collapse.”³⁷ In his autobiography Bradley wrote that the president’s military budget cutting “was a mistake, perhaps the greatest of Truman’s presidency . . . my support of this decision--my belief that significantly higher defense spending would probably wreck the economy--was a mistake, perhaps the greatest mistake I made in my postwar years in Washington.”³⁸

The Army also suffered in areas of training and material readiness between 1945 and 1950. In 1948, due to budget cuts, basic training was cut from fourteen to eight weeks.³⁹ The Army War College closed during World War II and remained closed from 1945 to 1950. During the Korean War the War College was reopened, but the damage had already been done. The generals of the 1950s and 1960s would assume their positions without adequate preparation.⁴⁰ The Army’s Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) also faced problems of its own.

ROTC administrators faced many obstacles in the post-war period. One of these was quality. Army personnel managers were reluctant to assign the ablest officers to professional backwater like ROTC duty. The best leaders, it was felt, were for more critical positions (in troop units, high level staff positions, etc.) ROTC got the leftovers.⁴¹

Much like the post-World War I Army the post-World War II Army relied on stockpiles of material and equipment from the previous war. Budget cuts retarded the procurement of new equipment and research and development for better equipment.

General Ridgeway later put it this way: “We were, in short, in a state of shameful unreadiness.”⁴² The Army had not learned from the downsizing affects of World War I and would soon embark to the shores of the Korean peninsula to learn the lesson once again the hard way, in what later became known as Task Force Smith.

¹U.S., Congress, House, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., September 19, 1945, Cong.Rec., 8797.

²John C. Sparrow, *History of Personnel Demobilization in the United States Army* (New York: The Free Press, 1984), 21.

³David McCormick, *The Downsized Warrior* (New York: New York University Press 1998), 10.

⁴*New York Times*, August 15, 1945, 1.

⁵Bert Marvin Sharp, “Bring The Boys Home: Demobilization of the United States Armed Forces after World War II” (Ph.D. diss., Michigan State University, 1977), 22.

⁶US Congress, House, Committee on Military Affairs, Hearings on Demobilization of the U.S. Army, 79th Cong., 1st sess., 28 August 1945, 22.

⁷Sharp, 122.

⁸McCormick, 9.

⁹Sharp, 192.

¹⁰D. M. Giangreco and Kathryn Moore, *Dear Harry. . . . Truman’s Mailroom, 1945-1953* (Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1999), 84.

¹¹Sharp, 194.

¹²*Ibid.*, 196-197.

¹³*Ibid.*, 198.

¹⁴*Ibid.*, 205.

¹⁵Sergeant Dow Summers, telephone interview with author, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 3 December 2001.

¹⁶Sharp, et al., 201.

¹⁷Ibid., 216.

¹⁸Ibid., 218.

¹⁹Ibid., 219.

²⁰James F. Schnabel, *History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff*, vol. 1, *The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, 1945-1947* (Washington DC: Office of Joint History, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1996), 109.

²¹Weigley, 486.

²²Sharp, 267.

²³Weigley, 486.

²⁴FM 100-17, 6-0.

²⁵Sharp, 2.

²⁶Clay Blair, *The Forgotten War: America in Korea, 1950-1953* (New York: First Anchor Books, 1989), 271.

²⁷Ibid., 272.

²⁸First Sergeant Robert S. Turner, telephone interview with author, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 10 December 2001.

²⁹Ibid.

³⁰Roy K. Flint, *Task Force Smith and the 24th Division: Delay and Withdrawal, 5-19 July 1950* (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1986), 269.

³¹Ibid.

³²Blair, 28.

³³Ibid., 81.

³⁴Ibid.

³⁵Ibid., 25.

³⁶Ibid.

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸Ibid., 27.

³⁹Ibid., 28.

⁴⁰James F. Dunnigan and Raymond M. Macedonia, *Getting It Right: American Military Reforms After Vietnam to the Gulf War and Beyond* (New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc., 1993), 134-135.

⁴¹Vic Sylvester, "ROTC, World War II" [article on-line] (Utah Valley State College, 2001, accessed 3 December 2001); available from <http://www.uvsc.edu/rotc/history6.html>; Internet.

⁴²Blair, 28.

CHAPTER 4

THE HOLLOW FORCE, 1970-1980

The principal legacy of Vietnam for the Army was a breakdown in discipline, morale, and capability. The 1970s was a decade of negatives and low points. Few realize how bad things were in the Hollow Army of the 1970s. It was very bad, and the desire to get away from the Hollow Army was one of the principal issues driving the Army reforms of the 1980s.¹

James Dunnigan and Raymond Macedonia

The Army was reduced by 33 percent between 1953 and 1957. Army Chief of Staff, General Matthew Ridgway, viewed these cuts as an attempt “to reduce [the Army] to a subordinate place among the three great services that make up the country’s shield.”² Ridgway’s dissent centered on President Eisenhower’s increased reliance on nuclear deterrence, dubbed the “New Look.” His disagreement with the administration’s policy put him at odds with the President and Secretary of Defense, which led to his resignation in 1955 after serving less than two years as the Army Chief.³

As a result of personnel and budget cuts, numerous problems plagued the Army following the war. The Army instituted early release programs for officers between 1953 and 1955. However, eligibility was restricted to officers in branches with shortages. “Performance” was the intended criteria for separating officers but the Army lost many of its most capable “warriors.” A college degree seemed to carry more weight than performance in combat.⁴ Enlisted recruitment, retention, and morale also suffered. In an effort to reduce these problems the Army raised pay, introduced new uniforms, increased educational opportunities, instituted a reenlistment bonus, and ensured that officer promotion opportunities remained at or close to the rates during the Korean War. The

success of these programs was limited and did not improve substantially until the Kennedy administration embraced JCS Chairman General Maxwell Taylor's flexible response strategy in 1961.⁵

Although Taylor's flexible response strategy increased the size of the Army the Vietnam War required the Army to cannibalize other theaters to fill units in Vietnam. Army research and development, procurement, and maintenance accounts also suffered due to the war. President Nixon's Vietnamization Program transferred substantial Continental United States (CONUS)-based material to the South Vietnamese Army. The Army was never compensated for its lost modernization funds or transferred equipment. Further exasperating the problem more weapons and equipment were transferred to the Israelis during the 1973 Yom Kippur War.⁶

The Army's active component strength was reduced by almost 50 percent between 1969 and 1972 (more than 700,000 soldiers). Shortcomings in manpower, training, and equipment debilitated the Army's ability to fulfill its primary role of deterrence in Europe. Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger recognized that the Army in Europe was in dreadful shape. John F. Shortal notes in *20th Century Demobilization Lessons* that: "Europeans had given up on American forces. Because of the drawdown of our forces in Europe to support Vietnam, the Europeans had concluded that our Army in Europe lacked credibility."⁷ American forces in Europe facing the Soviets were at their lowest level of readiness since the end of World War II.⁸

During the 1960s the Department of Defense shaped the armed forces for readiness to fight 2 1/2 wars simultaneously. The two major theater wars (MTWs) were predicted as one in Europe and one in Asia. The "half war" would be any small-scale

contingency operation or “brush-fire” war.⁹ In response to the 2 1/2 war policy the Army consistently numbered over 950,000 through the middle of the 1960s and at the height of the Vietnam War in mid-1968, the Army grew to 1,570,343 men and women.¹⁰

The conscripted Army of the Vietnam War was predominantly an Army of relatively poor, undereducated racial, and ethnic minorities.¹¹ Middle and upper class men were able to get student deferments by attending college. The college degrees they received often led to occupational deferments when they took jobs as teachers, doctors, and chemists. The unfairness of the draft and the protracted involvement in Vietnam led to a public outcry to end both.

In response to public pressure presidential candidate Richard Nixon gave his policy statement on ending the draft in October 1968. Prior to this announcement, newly appointed Army Chief of Staff General William C. Westmoreland ordered the issue studied. The Army’s official policy at the time was one of reliance on volunteers to meet manpower needs and of using selective service only to make up shortages. It was more than policy for the Army--it was survival. However, General Westmoreland foresaw the inevitable and became convinced of the necessity to review the Army’s personnel requirements as well as its position on the draft.¹² General Westmoreland directed Lieutenant Colonel Jack R. Butler, an action officer in the Personnel Studies and Research Directorate of the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, to conduct a personnel requirements study from September to December 1968. The initial report was completed within thirty days and found that the “prospects for the Army in an all-volunteer environment were gloomy, but not hopeless.”¹³

The study examined four broad issues related to military manpower procurement and retention on a voluntary basis: quantity, quality, cost, and social implications. With respect to quantity, the study concluded that the Army's dependency on the draft had grown during the Vietnam War. In 1968, 52 percent of all enlistees were drafted. The study also concluded that quality in an all-volunteer Army would drop. The Army needed soldiers with high school diplomas and average to above average mental ability. Roughly 70 percent of the enlisted Military Occupational Specialties (MOS) were classified "high skill" in 1968. These high skill MOSs required Mental Category I and II soldiers (those with above average or average abilities). The study concluded, "Without the draft and draft-induced enlistments, Mental Category I and II enlistments can be expected to drop by nearly fifty percent."¹⁴ With respect to cost, Lieutenant Colonel Butler reported to Westmoreland that higher pay and improved in service education benefits could offset most of the quantitative decline. He also recommended that the Army investigate substituting more civilians for military personnel. Butler chose a force of 950,000 active and 700,000 reserves based on the approximate strength prior to the Vietnam War. The study estimated that the Army would require an additional \$3 billion on the assumption that a reduction in the quality of volunteers would dictate longer periods of basic training.¹⁵

The study critically questioned the social implications of abandoning the draft. Most of the Army's senior officers and their civilian counterparts shared strong beliefs that citizenship carried an obligation to perform military service. They felt that continuation of the draft was essential to preserving the tie between the American citizenry and its Army. In an interview with the Chief of Staff, senior Army leaders said

that the draft served as a vehicle for identifying the military with the society it seeks to defend, and without it, the citizens might tend to no longer feel responsible for the defense of the country.¹⁶ Despite these reservations Butler recommended that the Army “take a positive approach and support a post [Vietnam] reduction in draft calls contingent upon the Army’s ability to attract by voluntary means the numbers and quality of personnel needed.”¹⁷ Westmoreland and other senior Army leaders agreed but felt the outright end of the draft was near. On 29 January 1969, President Nixon wrote to Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird of his intention to establish an all-volunteer force.¹⁸

The Army’s next detailed study was known as Project Volunteer in Defense of the Nation (PROVIDE). Butler, now a Colonel, headed this study as well. Westmoreland did not want the Army to publicize the fact that it was conducting the study. Since the Army remained dependant on the draft, a public announcement of the study would fuel press speculation and possibly force the administration to end the draft before the Army was prepared.¹⁹ The PROVIDE study groups preliminary report of June 1969 concluded that the Army’s public image had seriously declined. It found that veterans rated the Navy and Air Force ahead of the Army as the service of preferred enlistment and that the general public ranked the Army last. In addition, seventy percent of Army veterans advised prospective volunteers to join services other than the Army. The PROVIDE study group concluded that rebuilding the Army’s public image was a prerequisite to achieving an all-volunteer force. In addition, the group said, “Among the significant areas needing improvement are pay, educational benefits, career management, job satisfaction, housing, and medical benefits.”²⁰

The PROVIDE study determined that the actual number of volunteers needed to maintain the strength of the Army following Vietnam remained unclear. At the height of U.S. involvement in the war, the Army required nearly 1.6 million active duty troops sustaining nineteen divisions. It was not until June 1971, that the Army concluded that thirteen active divisions were necessary, requiring 950,000 soldiers.²¹

General Westmoreland's successor, General Creighton W. Abrams, believed that a thirteen division active Army was not enough to meet the global requirements and responsibilities of the United States.²² Lieutenant General Don Starry, Director of Army Manpower and Forces briefed Abrams that the number of soldiers simply did not add up to the number of divisions the Army was claiming on paper. The thirteen divisions "on paper" made the Army the smallest force since before the Korean War. Starry also briefed Abrams that the Army could actually field just twelve divisions with only four rated as combat ready. "The Army was simply less than the sum of its parts."²³

Amid nagging fears of the shape of the Army, General Abrams developed a revolutionary new policy in the spring of 1973. The policy change was developed with the full support of Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger, with whom Abrams had a close relationship.²⁴ This strong relationship provided extraordinary power and influence for Abrams reminiscent of the relationship between Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) Chairman General Maxwell Taylor and Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara just ten years prior.²⁵ Schlesinger and Abrams had regular one-on-one meetings (the subject of considerable speculation within Pentagon circles). It was after one of these meetings that Abrams called General Starry on the phone and outlined what would later be known as the Golden Handshake agreement.²⁶

The agreement provided an increase of three Army divisions--from thirteen to sixteen. However, the agreement stipulated that the Army would fill the “extra” divisions and necessary support units from its present manning pool of 765,000 soldiers. Abram’s solution was to transfer support missions into the reserves and integrate reserve combat units into active divisions. The result would be a total fighting force more reliant on reserves than at any other period in modern times. The official name given to the policy was Total Force.²⁷

The Total Force concept would shift nearly seventy percent of the active Army’s combat service support into the reserves.²⁸ There were several potential problems with the Total Force concept. Filling the additional three divisions from the Army’s present manning pool would stretch Army manpower impossibly thin. Additionally, the relationship between the active Army and the reserves was very poor. Active duty commanders viewed their reserve counterparts as “weekend warriors” and questioned their combat readiness. Additionally, such a heavy reliance on the reserves meant the active forces would not be able to function without them even in the early days of a major crisis. Abram’s felt that reliance on the reserves would help gain the support of the American people in the next major conflict and avoid the dissent felt during the Vietnam War. He told any officer who cared to listen: “They’re never going to take us to war again without calling up the reserves.”²⁹

In the middle of this major policy change the Army was also going through a reduction in force (RIF). When the RIF began in 1970, the Army felt it had an opportunity to get rid of undesirable soldiers accumulated during Vietnam. However, a lot of good people were let go and a lot of deadwood was retained.³⁰ The seeds were

sewn for the “hollow force” of the 1970s. Public distrust due to the killing of antiwar demonstrators at Kent State in 1970, racial conflicts, and the 1971 My Lai investigation had eroded the public’s confidence in the Army. The RIF, anarchy in the ranks, and shrinking budgets plagued the Army over the next decade.

By the mid-1970s the Army was not a pleasant place to be. Drug use, racial tensions, low quality troops, and inexperienced NCOs left the Army in a state of disarray. Officers and NCOs were occasionally mugged by their own troops and some were even murdered. Many officers and NCOs were reluctant to enter barracks alone, or without a pistol on their hip. Troubles were made worse by the efforts of many senior officers to cover up or play down the incidents. Thus many guilty soldiers were not court-martialed and were often quietly let out of the service (and sometimes not). One battalion commander stated, “If they didn’t like being in the Army, all they had to do was bad-mouth an officer (or worse) and then be rewarded with their walking papers.”³¹

There were a few officers who refused to turn a blind eye and chose to deal with the issues head on. Racial tensions were so high in South Korea in 1973 that bars frequented by black enlistees were considered too dangerous for officers and were de facto off-limits. Confrontations over insubordination, drug use, and racial slights erupted into a full-blown race riot in late 1973. A group of black soldiers tried to kill a base provost marshal. The 32nd Division Commander, Major General Hank Emerson assembled his brigade and battalion commanders and told them they were going to take back the division. He further relayed to his officers that they were going to take it back the old-fashioned way.³²

The division commander decreed that “touchy feely” counseling sessions were over. Counseling sessions where privates advised their officers how they should be treated were suspended. He ordered commanders to awaken their men at 0400 and run them so hard that they would be too tired to make trouble. He ordered that discrimination or racial problems of any kind would no longer be tolerated and he abolished segregated areas on and off post. His final instruction to his commanders referred to the “absolute bums of the 32nd that no amount of leadership would turn around. If you’ve got any of these bums in your unit, throw them out. I don’t care what kind of discharge you give them, but put them on a plane and get them out of here.”³³ Emerson’s program improved discipline and morale in the 32nd especially among the officers of which future JCS Chairman Colin Powell was one.

The problems within the ranks led to continued departures of qualified soldiers and NCOs. Additionally, the sometimes-dangerous conditions led good troops to decide not to reenlist.³⁴ Master Sergeant (retired) Richard C. Cox recalled the conditions of the Army in 1976 and 1977.

The only reason I stayed in the Army was the fact that I knew it couldn’t get any worse. As crazy as it sounds I had a high school diploma and a few college credits so I was one of the smart ones. I knew that I would be promoted. The only thing that nearly drove me out was the inconsistent disciplinary practices. Receiving a DUI was almost a right of passage in some units. In others you were kicked out right away. I also remember seeing a platoon leader stuffed in a wall locker and thrown down a flight of stairs. I wasn’t particularly proud to wear the uniform back then.³⁵

Reenlistment rates fell to all time lows in the mid-1970s. The first term attrition rate was 26 percent in 1971 and rose steadily to its peak of 38 percent in 1974.

Throughout the rest of the decade it hovered between 30 and 35 percent.³⁶ The Army

was also unable to meet its recruiting goals. Senior Army leaders knew that if they could not keep the force at authorized levels then Congress would be tempted to adjust manpower levels downward to a rate that could be maintained. Consequently there was great pressure on unit commanders to not discharge soldiers with disciplinary problems unless they felt it was absolutely necessary. This ultimately led to problem soldiers being allowed to stay in the Army, which did not do anything to help unit effectiveness or morale.³⁷

Shrinking budgets of the 1970s added to the disharmony within the ranks. The Army spent most of its budget to offer competitive (with civilian jobs) pay to new recruits. The result was not enough money to buy new or replacement equipment. Budgets were so low that training with existing equipment was difficult and there was not enough money in most major commands to even maintain the equipment properly. Most leaders felt the solution for dealing with troublesome troops was to conduct field training exercises (FTX). But due to the expense the Army could not afford routine FTXs and troops spent a lot of time in their barracks getting into trouble.³⁸ Master Sergeant Cox remembers, “cost cutting” FTXs in the 82nd Airborne Division in 1977.

In an attempt to keep everyone in line and out of the bars and whore houses on Hay Street the leadership decided we were going to the field. We were an airborne unit and we were required a certain number of jumps to maintain our jump pay. However, the cost of airborne drops from C-130s was so high the unit couldn't afford the frequency needed to maintain our pay let alone our readiness standards. The solution was to make tactical jumps from 2 1/2 and 5-ton trucks on Sicily drop zone. We had more twisted and broken ankles on that exercise than on any other real airborne operation that I was ever on.³⁹

Army leaders were not the only people who offered possible solutions to the difficulties within the ranks. Richard A. Gabriel and Paul L. Savage suggested in *Crisis*

in Command in 1978 that uniform standardization in the Army be abolished to improve morale. They felt that such items as berets, special unit insignia, and perhaps even dress uniforms signifying unit history and experience would encourage soldiers to stay in the Army. They felt there was no reason why armored troops should not be allowed to wear black berets or that armored cavalry regiments should not be permitted to wear the older cavalry broad-brimmed hat. They also called for division level rotations overseas, a decrease in the inordinate number of awards given, a revamp of the officer school system, and a reduction of the number of general officers in the Army.⁴⁰

Some of the problems the Army faced from 1975 to 1980 can also be traced back to the Volunteer Army Field Experiment (VOLAR) of 1971. Based on the findings of the PROVIDE study some Army leaders were interested in the possibility of eliminating the “irritants” of service life. These irritants included such things as reveille, kitchen patrol (KP), window washing, and grass cutting. The VOLAR experiment began in January 1971 at three posts in the United States (Fort Carson, Benning, and Bragg).⁴¹

Bill Mauldin, the artist who created “Willie and Joe” in World War II, profiled units at Fort Carson for *Life* magazine. Mauldin found troops in one infantry company that proclaimed itself “the most liberated unit in all of Fort Carson.”⁴² Although Mauldin found soldiers drinking beer in the barracks, enjoying topless dancers in the enlisted men’s club, and “rapping” with the assistant division commander in the post coffee shop, he concluded “The Army at Fort Carson is way ahead of the rest of the country.”⁴³

Other VOLAR initiatives eventually included in the program were an eight-hours-a-day, five-days-a-week work schedule; elimination of Saturday morning inspections; allowing longer hair for male soldiers; turning KP duty over to civilian workers; dividing

open barracks into more private two-men rooms; putting beer machines in barracks; abolishing 0500 reveille as well as weekend bed checks and curfews; and creating enlisted men's and racial harmony councils. Prior to kicking off the VOLAR experiment the Army launched a radio and television advertising campaign proclaiming, "The Army Wants to Join You."⁴⁴ In the end the Army vetoed the VOLAR experiment beyond Forts Carson, Benning, and Bragg. Many in the Army felt that an embarrassment of staggering proportions had been averted.⁴⁵ However, the fact that the VOLAR experiment was even considered shows that the Army was struggling with its image like never before. It would continue to struggle for the remainder of the decade.

¹Dunnigan and Macedonia, 96.

² David McCormick, *The Downsized Warrior* (New York: New York University Press, 1998), 10.

³Ibid.

⁴Dunnigan and Macedonia, 56.

⁵Ibid., 59. Flexible Response was a concept based on the capability to react across the entire spectrum of possible threats—that is, to be able to respond anywhere, anytime, with weapons and forces appropriate to the situation. This was a sharp break with the then current reliance on massive retaliation. Taylor pointed out that not all situations were solvable by a hail of nuclear warheads. The Flexible Response strategy which later led to the national strategy was based on three basic concepts:

1. Deterrence. Persuading enemies by diplomatic and military means to refrain from starting anything damaging to American interests. The threat of nuclear retaliation was still there, but conventional military forces and economic pressure could also be put on the table during discussions with American adversaries.
2. Collective security. Getting all our allies to participate in the deterrence.
3. Flexibility in action. This was Taylor's Flexible Response. In other words, being ready for anything.

⁶John F. Shortal, *20th Century Demobilization Lessons* (Washington DC: Military Review, September--November 1998), 66.

⁷Ibid.

⁸Dunnigan and Macedonia, 96.

⁹Weigley, Russell F., *History of the United States Army*, Enlarged Ed. (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1984), 568. In 1972 the Nixon administration refashioned the two and one-half war policy to one and one-half wars simultaneously. This coincided with Congressional termination of the draft in late 1972.

¹⁰Ibid.

¹¹Dunnigan and Macedonia, 49.

¹²Griffith, 17.

¹³Ibid.

¹⁴Ibid., 18.

¹⁵Ibid.

¹⁶Ibid., 18-19.

¹⁷Ibid., 19.

¹⁸Ibid., 20.

¹⁹Ibid., 22.

²⁰Ibid., et al, 23.

²¹Ibid.

²²Weigley, 573.

²³James Kitfield, *Prodigal Soldiers* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1995), 148.

²⁴Ibid., 149.

²⁵H. R. McMaster, *Dereliction of Duty* (New York: Harper Collins, 1997), 22.

²⁶Kitfield, 149.

²⁷Ibid., 150.

²⁸Ibid.

²⁹Ibid., 150-151.

³⁰Dunnigan and Macedonia, 97.

³¹Ibid., 106.

³²Kitfield, 125.

³³Ibid., 126.

³⁴Dunnigan and Macedonia, 106.

³⁵MSG (retired) Richard C. Cox, telephone interview with author, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 18 December 2001.

³⁶Dunnigan and Macedonia, 107. First term attrition rates refer to soldiers who did not make it through their first term of enlistment (usually 3 years).

³⁷Ibid.

³⁸Ibid., 108.

³⁹Cox, 18 December 2001.

⁴⁰Richard A. Gabriel and Paul L. Savage, *Crisis in Command: Mismanagement in the Army* (Toronto: McGraw-Hill, 1977), 133.

⁴¹Griffith, 101.

⁴²Ibid.

⁴³Ibid.

⁴⁴Kitfield, 136.

⁴⁵Ibid., 137.

CHAPTER 5

1987-TO THE PRESENT

After the Civil War, the U.S. Army demobilized at a high rate and soon found itself gutted. A captain testified before Congress in 1876 that his unit was so few in number that he frequently performed drill with only four men. He said he once saw a parade carried out in which one company was represented by a lone sergeant forming its front line and its captain occupying the rear line. They were their unit's only participants.¹

Bart Brasher

Fortunately the Army downsizing, which began in 1987 and continued throughout much of the 1990s was not as severe as downsizing following the Civil War. However, much like previous downsizing, turmoil and uncertainty has plagued the Army. The “hollow” force of the 1970s and early 1980s recovered largely due to the Reagan era massive defense buildup designed to defend against the former Soviet Union. By 1987 the Soviet Union's collapse was inevitable and another round of military downsizing loomed on the horizon. A little more than ten years later the Army was again arguably in dire straits. Uncertainty in the future of the Army is indicated by remarks from a lieutenant colonel at the Army War College:

I truly love the Army. . . . It's been very good to me. I would be very hard pressed, though, to say to my son and daughter, Go into the Army. . . . It is a great life, but understand that at the end of however many years you don't know what's going to be there. It truly depends upon the political situation and Congress. So you have no idea.²

The political situation and subsequent congressional cutbacks led to downsizing measures viewed by some as drastic and overboard as evidenced by the feelings of a major from Fort Sill:

I think what you saw initially was a lot of sharp people getting out. Then the fellas that probably needed to get out left in the following years. Now we're at the point where any time someone gets forced out, you can't believe that guy got forced out. . . . This reinforces the idea in our minds that the fats been cut and now we're cutting into the meat.³

How did the Army recover from the hollow era of the 1970s and early 1980s only to find itself in a similar condition barely fifteen years later? As mentioned previously, the massive Reagan era military buildup designed to counter and defend against the former Soviet Union provided the framework for the Army's recovery. By 1987 the Army consisted of 780,815 personnel making up eighteen active divisions. Two of the eighteen divisions were still forming and not fully manned. One was the 6th Infantry Division (Light), based in Alaska, which was less than 50 percent strength, and the other was the 10th Mountain Division (Light Infantry) also less than 50 percent strength. Although two of the eighteen divisions were severely under strength the Army's Fiscal Year 88 budget request to Congress asked for no increase in active duty manning.⁴

By 1988, however, the world and former enemies were beginning to take on a new look. The Soviet war in Afghanistan and the Iran-Iraq war both ended. The Hungarians were demolishing security fences along the Austrian border and the Solidarity Union was made legal in Poland both without a military response from the Soviet Union. By the end of the year the communist regimes in Hungary, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Rumania had fallen. In December Gorbachev announced that the Soviet Union intended to make a unilateral cut in military personnel. The plan called for five hundred thousand soldiers to leave the Soviet armed services by 1991 and to slash the number of tanks by 10,000. The U.S. government's response to these changes would soon follow. In an address to NATO on 29 May 1988 President Bush proposed trimming

U.S. forces in Europe from 305,000 to 275,000 no later than 1993. In response to this speech the Army felt reluctant to request new troops for the two divisions that were below 50 percent strength.⁵ The seeds for U.S. military downsizing had been sown.

In May 1989 General Colin Powell suggested publicly that a “dramatic reduction and restructuring of the Army was inevitable.”⁶ Six months later General Powell was appointed Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and together with other senior leaders developed the Base Force concept. Powell’s initiation of the debate that would lead to dramatic force reductions appeared on the surface as contradictory. However, he felt that a “preemptive strike was necessary, or cuts would be even more severe.”⁷

Powell had additional reasons for the preemptive strike, which ultimately led to the Base Force. First, he wanted the senior military leaders to play an important role in developing military strategy. Second, he was convinced that dramatic changes in the Soviet Union would require a fundamental rethinking of U.S. defense policy. Third, he felt that the traditional Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS) was too slow a process to generate the dramatic changes he was proposing. He also believed that if the Department of Defense did not pursue reductions in a timely manner that Congress would do it for them. Although the Base Force concept was a tough sell to the hawkish Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney and the Joint Chiefs, a 25 percent reduction in forces by 1996 was finally agreed upon.⁸

General Powell was not the only senior military leader who anticipated reductions. In the fall of 1987, Army Chief of Staff Carl Vuono decided to review the Army’s force structure due to the declining Soviet threat. The resulting study recommended a smaller, more flexible force structure reducing eighteen divisions

(771,000 soldiers) to fifteen divisions (640,000 soldiers). Vuono disagreed with Powell's Base Force concept, believing that it would lead to an Army incapable of supporting a force-projection strategy. He also argued that the Army, unlike the other services, had the diverse capabilities needed for the non-traditional operations emerging in the post-Cold War era. Finally, he believed that the Base Force "floor" would eventually become a "ceiling."⁹

Vuono also put a limit on the number of troops to be eliminated annually. He asserted that if the Army was downsized by more than thirty-five thousand soldiers per year, readiness would be jeopardized. He did not want a return to the hollow Army of the 1970s. There is little evidence, however, "that the number was derived by anything other than subjective analysis."¹⁰ Former Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel Lieutenant General (retired) William Reno recalls: "There simply was not a good analytical basis for 35,000."¹¹ Even if the number was arbitrarily picked from a hat the emotions surrounding it were intense as evidenced by a contentious exchange between Vuono and Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee Les Aspin on 5 March 1990.

Vuono: I am talking about a devastating act on the Army if we were forced to [downsize as much and as quickly as you suggest], and I am using pretty strong terms . . . because of the significance of what we are talking about.

Aspin: You ought to look at this in terms of minimizing the damage, [rather] than by asking yourselves how we can bring this force down with the "least" amount of damage. I take it that is the way you came up with your 35,000 number. . . . That number is not going to make it here. At the end of the next five years . . . the Army is going to be smaller.

Vuono: I hope we are prepared for the consequences.¹²

Senator John Glenn, democrat from Ohio, was one of the few politicians who feared deep personnel cuts, but for different reasons. As Chairman of the Armed

Services Subcommittee on Manpower and Personnel, Glenn complained that “There is a tendency to cut personnel accounts. . . . There is a tendency to want to do that because it is more immediate than the longer-term procurement accounts. Also once a [procurement] contract is put in place, people hate to disturb that.”¹³

Most realized that troop reductions would have to be deeper than Vuono’s plan of thirty-five thousand a year. Congressional military manpower experts concluded that troop reductions would have to be eighty thousand to one hundred thousand in fiscal 1991--or more than twice the planned cut. One expert noted “If you want bottom-line troop strength in 1995 . . . my guess is that we would average about eighty thousand [troops cut] a year for five years.”¹⁴ It also became apparent that cuts of this magnitude could not happen through normal attrition or reduced recruiting. The impersonal methods of the 1970s began to haunt those in the military who could remember and who had survived in the aftermath. Reductions in force and involuntary early retirements would be required to ensure troop reductions were met by 1995. Brigadier General Theodore G. Stroup Jr., the Army’s personnel management director said, “That is when you run into situations where you become impersonal. . . . You’re not able to control keeping the absolute best people in, and you have to do involuntary separations just on a quantitative basis.”¹⁵ In the final outcome the Army agreed to a force of 535,000, which was more than 30 percent cut, equating to the smallest Army since 1939.

The debates temporarily subsided by the autumn of 1990 when it became clear that the escalating crisis in the Middle East might soon lead to war for the United States. In the aftermath of Operation Desert Storm the tone and content of the debate changed notably. David McCormick suggests in *Downsized Warrior*: “Many viewed the Gulf

War as validation of the conceptual underpinnings of the high-tech, force projection strategy that lay behind the Base Force.”¹⁶ The focus of policymakers began to shift from the rate and number to be downsized to the overall mechanics of the process. Human costs now became the centerpiece of the debate. The appearance of regret and shame began to emerge as a result of the overwhelming victory attained by the military in the Gulf War. Senator Daniel K. Inouye, Chairman of the Subcommittee for Military Appropriations, remarked in March 1991:

It is somehow both ironic and disturbing that as soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines return from their trial by ordeal in the desert, we have already embarked on a venture to drastically reduce the size of our armed services. . . . I feel it would be disgraceful to welcome these members of an all volunteer force home and then hand them a pink slip--well done, welcome home, and good bye.¹⁷

These concerns provoked the Department of Defense and Congress to set up programs to minimize the personal effects of downsizing. The Fiscal Year 1991 National Defense Authorization Act increased transition benefits and separation pay and gave the service temporary permission to offer monetary incentives. The voluntary separation incentive (VSI) and the special separation benefit were enacted for Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993 and were intended to encourage voluntary separation of uniformed personnel.¹⁸

The personal side of the downsizing debate proved to be short lived. The Gulf War victory parades had barely subsided when the debate again heated up and Base Force plans again became an issue. Events that specifically led to renewed debate included: The August 1991 failed coup attempt against Soviet president Michail Gorbachev, the collapse of the Soviet Union in December, and the presidential election in November 1992. All of these events strengthened support for further reductions and challenged the Base Force. The Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee Les Aspin, argued

that in light of dramatic changes in the international environment the Bush Administration should rethink the Base Force and increase the rate of force reductions. Aspin further argued that the Base Force was a capabilities versus a threat based concept. He felt this concept was politically unsalable and unaffordable in the wake of the Cold War.¹⁹

In a white paper published in February 1992 Aspin proposed a force structure significantly smaller than the previously agreed upon Base Force of 535,000. The proposal called for a cut from twelve to nine active Army divisions and the reduction of an additional 217,000 active duty military personnel.²⁰ In the end the reductions were based on dollars. The savings in Aspin's plan were \$60 billion over Bush's 1993 budget request.²¹ Ironically, the smaller force structure was also based on a force capable of conducting two simultaneous major theatre wars (MTWs) or Desert Storm equivalents. Cheney and Powell continued to defend the Base Force concept and disagree with Aspin. Powell went as far to say that Aspin's option was "fundamentally flawed. . . . Its methodology is unsound, its strategy unwise, and the forces and capabilities it proposes unbalanced."²²

Following the presidential inauguration in 1993, the 1994-1999 Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) came under heavy scrutiny by Congress and the new president. The 1994-1999 DPG pointed to specific threats as a basis for planning and for further justification of the Base Force. The DPG outlined seven contingencies as a guide for long range planning: Desert Storm II against Iraq; North Korea; an "expansionist authoritarian government" in Moscow that leads to a Russian attack on the Baltic republics; a Philippine coup threatening Americans; a narco-terrorist threat in the Panama

Canal; and “the emergence of a new expansionist superpower that would adopt an adversarial security strategy and develop a military capability to threaten U.S. interests through global military competition.”²³ Many in Congress felt that some of the scenarios were extremely unlikely and the *New York Times* urged Congress to “greet these claims with healthy skepticism.”²⁴ An unidentified ranking military officer summed up his frustration:

You’re damned if you do and damned if you don’t. . . . Everybody on the Hill is demanding that we do a threat-based analysis of the force we need. But you immediately see the danger of being threat based . . . everybody gets to be an instant expert if they like the threat, and if they want to cut the budget they won’t like the threat.²⁵

In February 1993, President Clinton announced that he would reduce Bush’s projected defense budget for fiscal 1994-1997 by at least \$88 billion. Clinton also appointed Aspin as Secretary of Defense, thus placing the “most powerful proponent of additional force reductions” at the Pentagon.²⁶ Aspin immediately proposed a Bottom Up Review of defense forces. The Bottom Up Review was designed to match potential national security threats with the defense capabilities needed to overcome them. This approach placed added emphasis on air power and reduced the Army’s end-strength to 495,000. The requirement to fight two MTWs simultaneously had not changed.

The Bottom Up Review was poised to cut defense dollars and manpower further than the Base Force concept. As General Vuono predicted the Base Force had become the ceiling, rather than the floor. As early as February 1992 Army leaders testified that even Base Force strengths were not capable of handling the two simultaneous MTW scenario. In testimony before the Senate and House Armed Services Committees the Army Chief of Staff General Gordon Sullivan described the Army’s role in determining

the Base Force and argued that if the Army cut below twelve divisions, it would be incapable of achieving victory in a two simultaneous MTW scenario. Excerpts from the testimony follow:

Senator Eiken (D-NE): How did your services arrive at the numbers you did? . . . Did you have impact into what the numbers would be? Or were you . . . suddenly presented with a number from the Secretary of Defense?

General Sullivan: We took a look at the world in which we are living. We looked at threats. We bumped them up against the National Military Strategy and . . . came up with a Base Force after looking at all that. . . . We were not given a number.²⁷

Testimony the following day before the House Armed Services Committee:

General Sullivan: Our analysis is that below 12 divisions we run the risk of not being able to achieve decisive victory. Once you start going below 12 divisions then you start having serious problems in terms of being able to overcome the enemy.

Representative Skelton (D-MO): There has been much discussion about a 10-division active duty Army. . . . If that were the case, assuming everything was--doctrine, morale, training, equipment and all that goes with it--could you carry on a successful Desert Storm campaign . . . and concurrently a successful defense of South Korea?

General Sullivan: No Sir, I couldn't.²⁸

By March 1994 the Bottom Up Review had taken effect, and the Army accepted the loss of two of twelve divisions with an end-strength target of 495,000. However, the "Army's new bottom line was again under siege."²⁹ Many began to feel that the Bottom Up Review was just a transitional point en route to further cuts in defense. After only thirteen months since testimony before the House and Senate Armed Services Committees General Sullivan reversed his support for the Bottom Up Review. Sullivan's March 1994 remarks to Senator Strom Thurmond follow:

During . . . the development of the Bottom Up review . . . I initially recommended consideration of higher Army force levels to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and later to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy Requirements and Assessments. However, during the course of our deliberations, I came to the position that the Army could execute the two near-simultaneous MTW strategy with a moderate degree of risk [with ten active divisions] provided that they are fully resourced, that all force enhancements and enablers are fully executed in accordance with the Bottom Up Review.³⁰

The years between 1990 and 1995 comprised the first two waves of post-Cold War downsizing. Throughout this time the budgetary and political influence continued to dominate decisions regarding Army force structure. Following the fall of the Berlin Wall and the warming of U.S.-Soviet relations, changes in the strategic environment were minimal and additional cuts in the Army continued. This period also saw a presidential election and a shift in parties in the White House. Again, the strategic situation remained the same (or it wasn't argued that it had changed) and additional cuts continued.³¹ In a little under eight years over 300,000 people--roughly three medium sized U.S. cities--exited the Army.

From 1992 to 1995 the Army used six major personnel reduction programs to get down to the new ceilings mandated by Congress: Voluntary Early Release/Retirement Program (VERRP), Voluntary Separation Incentive/Special Separation Bonus Program (VSI/SSB), Temporary Early Retirement Authority (TERA), Reduction In Force (RIF), and Selective Early Retirement Boards (SERBs).³² During this same period the total number of Army personnel that opted for the SSB was 42,243 and 6,299 for VSI. TERA reductions netted 12,076,244 majors were cut by a 1992 RIF, and 3,840 personnel were SERBed. These programs only accounted for roughly 30 percent of the overall personnel cut during the same period. The remainder came from the lowering of enlistment and

ROTC commissioning requirements and early release programs which allowed enlisted soldiers and officers to leave prior to their active duty service obligation.³³

The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) of 1997 called for cutting 15,000 more Army active duty personnel while still maintaining ten active divisions and the simultaneous MTW policy. By this time the Army had the lowest number of uniformed personnel since 1950 at the start of the Korean War, and more cuts loomed on the horizon. Author Bart Brasher described the military of 1997: “The services have declined in size to roughly that of single American companies, but those commercial organizations have no global security commitments to spread their ranks thin.”³⁴ Although the QDR of 1997 called for a further reduction of 15,000, the Army’s number of commitments and ten-division structure did not change. Changes in unit MTOEs were expected to offset the reductions, however, since mission requirements remained the same units began doing more with less. The Army began to resemble the hollow force of the 1970s.

Army recruiters began to feel the pinch of the rapid downsizing effort. In 1999 Army recruiters were tasked with recruiting 90,000 new soldiers. The total was 20,000 more than the previous year, an overall increase of 28.6 percent.³⁵ However, the Army fell nearly 1,000 recruits short of its goal in Fiscal Year 1998 and over 6,000 short in Fiscal Year 1999. What factors contributed to the recruitment failure?

Senator John McCain of the Senate Armed Services Committee determined that the disconnect between today’s armed forces and society may be a matter of apathy. In a summer 2001 *Parameters* article Senator McCain remarked, “Most Americans don’t care that much about national security and defense issues anymore, and elected officials

obviously take a greater interest in those issues their constituents believe are important.”³⁶ Others speculated that recruitment problems were of a purely economic nature. Don Shider wrote in *The Wall Street Journal* in January 2000 “that recruiting will continue to struggle and be dependent on economic fluctuations in the coming years.”³⁷ General John Shalikashvili former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff expressed similar concerns: “I share deeply the concern that we are living through a period when the gap between the American people and the military is getting wider.”³⁸ Writer John J. Morgan blames the “civil-military problem” affecting recruiting on the relevance of the military to society, public opinion, a disparity of values, isolation of the military, and conflicting social needs. Morgan cites the closing of many college ROTC units across the country and bans on recruiters from campuses as proof of divisions that are taking place between society and the military.³⁹ Dr. Richard Kohn of *The National Interest* stated, “Our best colleges and universities . . . neglect the study of war and the military, and abhor ROTC.”⁴⁰

Congressman Ike Skelton (D-MO) advocated the adoption of mandatory national service to limit the separation between military and civilian America.⁴¹ In response to the growing recruiting difficulties the Army increased its number of recruiters from 4,368 to 6,331 between Fiscal Year 1993 and 1998. Advertising expenditures were increased from \$34.3 million in Fiscal Year 1993 to \$112.9 million in Fiscal Year 1999. Enlistment bonuses up to \$12,000, as much as \$50,000 for college expenses, or up to \$65,000 to pay back college loans were also offered to potential recruits.⁴² In a March 1999 interview on the *Lehrer News Hour* an exchange among Lawrence Korb of the Council on Foreign Relations; Charles Moskos, military sociologist at Northwestern

University; and commentator Elizabeth Farnsworth, Korb and Moskos offered views on recruitment problems and possible solutions:

Lawrence Korb: I think what's happened is since the Cold War ended, the military and the country hasn't come up with a coherent message for what the military is all about. The problem was masked for the past several years because the military was downsizing and didn't need to bring in as many people. And they cut back on their advertising, cut back on their number of recruiters.

Elizabeth Farnsworth: So, Mr. Korb, do you agree with Secretary Caldera, that more people who have a GED but not a high school diploma should be able to be in the military? I think its 10 percent now in the Army right, only can be in if you have a GED, no more than 10 percent. Should that percentage be raised?

Lawrence Korb: Yes, I think Secretary Caldera is on the right track when he says, let's not just look at the high school diploma; lets look at a lot of other factors. I mean, we got ourselves into this bind in the early 80s when Congress first passed a law saying how many high school graduates you had to take and then as we got more and more college graduates, the services on their own raised the standards. There is no reason why you have to get 95 percent or 90 percent high school graduates.

Elizabeth Farnsworth: What do you think about that?

Charles Moskos: I think we're beginning to hear the rationalization for lowering quality.⁴³

As the debate continued over recruitment woes, retention of enlisted soldiers and mid-level officers also became an issue. As early as March 1990 Army leaders were predicting reenlistment shortfalls. Brigadier General Theodore G. Stroup Jr., the Army's military personnel management director said, "There is a lot of anxiety and concern in both the officer and enlisted force, however we have not seen any decrease in reenlistment rates, or [an increase in] young officers wanting to get out. The reason being, I think, it's a little bit early."⁴⁴ By the late 1990s unit reenlistment NCOs became some of the hardest worked soldiers in the Army. As a company commander in 1995 and 1996 reenlistment concerns were rarely an issue for fellow commanders or myself.

However, in my second company command three years later reenlistment became a daily issue for contemporaries and myself. The reenlistment problems were not based on issues that happened in a day, week, or month but rather as a result of years of extremely high optempo, low pay, and leaders working in a zero defects environment.

Budgetary constraints and personnel shortfalls began to affect readiness and training by the mid 1990s. Numerous large-scale Army deployments were also beginning to affect morale and retention. A brigade commander days away from taking his unit to the National Training Center (NTC) in 1992 remarked that one of his lieutenants was deploying his tank platoon with only sixteen soldiers--seven of whom had never been in the field with him. He further said that by MTOE a tank gunner was a sergeant but most of the seats were filled with privates first-class instead. One of his company commanders who should have had fifty-four infantrymen but only had forty stated, "We borrow people, If I could steal them I would."⁴⁵ Army Chief of Staff Sullivan stated, "If dollars get tighter, I will have to turn to where I get the money quickest. That's training, and it starts to get at people."⁴⁶ Former Army captain Chris Thompson cited training as one of the following reasons for leaving the ranks as a newly promoted captain in 1998:

I loved [sic] the Army and still do; however, I joined the Army to be a tanker. I was the top cadet in my ROTC class and anticipated I would go to a unit with tanks. Instead I ended up being a HUMVEE platoon leader at Fort Polk, LA. I probably could have handled it if we had decent equipment but our vehicles were literally falling apart. I honestly could not understand how the most powerful Army in the world could be expected to go to combat with such inadequate equipment. This of course affected training. When you can only go train with half your vehicles it's demoralizing. Soldiers start to wonder what they are doing and eventually it affects morale. Getting out was one of the hardest decisions in my life but I saw the writing on the wall with potential cutbacks in the future. Honestly I knew a 20 year career was no where near a guarantee and I didn't want

to end up being a divorced major working 16 hours a day fearing that someone would make a mistake and ruin my chances for promotion. The picture of the future was anything but rosy at the time.⁴⁷

Author David McCormick conducted a series of interviews with Army officers in 1997 and 1998 to get their perspective on morale, readiness, the drawdown, zero defects, and education. The morale problems were linked to a lack of confidence in career opportunities (retirement), the ability (or lack thereof) of the Army to accomplish its mission, and disillusionment with civilian leadership. This linkage is evidenced by remarks made by a major at Fort Sill:

I don't see the positiveness, I don't see that esprit that was there even twelve years ago when I came into the service. I come from a military family, a long line of service. The things that I saw as a kid--the closeness, the officer corps working together--I don't see as much now. I've seen that change every year from the impact of downsizing. . . . I can tell you that having discussed this with many of my contemporaries, there is not a positive view.⁴⁸

Many viewed morale problems as a readiness issue and a result of doing more with less. The size of the Army was reduced too much and too fast. This rapid over reduction lessened the Army's chances of successfully carrying out the two simultaneous MTW strategy. Examples of these views follow:

I left my unit in 1989 and disappeared into academe for five years, so I can compare then and now. It's like night and day. I was in the 82nd Airborne Division, which is a fast-paced animal, but the pace here in the 25th Infantry five years later is approximately twice as fast. . . . Officers are working like dogs. I sleep in my office at least twice a week. There's just too much to do. All the units went away, but the exercises, the post details, and other stuff didn't. You can burn out real fast.⁴⁹

They talk about us being able to fight two major regional conflicts at one time, and I don't believe for a second we can do that. And, they are now talking about cutting another twenty thousand.⁵⁰

If we are going to fight two regional contingencies, I sure as hell want to be on the first one.⁵¹

No way can we do it with ten divisions, but that is the official policy.⁵²

Competitiveness and zero defects led to soldiers redefining success in the 1990s. Many believed just making it to retirement was the definition of success as opposed to being a battalion commander or command sergeant major. Competitiveness resulted from the zero defects mentality that was so prevalent during the drawdown. This mentality would be negligible in an environment where ones livelihood and retirement opportunity did not rest solely on a piece of paper (officer evaluation report/noncommissioned officer evaluation report). Certainly competitiveness will always be a part of the military culture due to the nature of the people who join the service; however, a zero defects mentality stifles initiative, decreases morale, and undermines teamwork through unhealthy competitiveness. If the “up-or-out” system in the military were modified to allow captains and majors to retire with fifteen or twenty years of service the zero-defects mentality among officers would decrease. Following are comments on success, competitiveness, and zero defects:

I told my guys that we have to redefine success. Success now is making it to lieutenant colonel so you can be around long enough to retire.⁵³

I see a lot more competitiveness among majors and a lot less cooperation.⁵⁴

You’re going to drop the ball every once in a while. But it’s not being allowed. If you take a risk, that ball might slip by your fingers, and it might drop. And if every ball is a glass ball . . . it’s killing initiative, it’s killing the risk taker.⁵⁵

Things that people would overlook before are sacred now, like maybe reenlistments in your company. . . . It doesn’t matter if your company or platoon can perform. It is, “Well, you only had a 20 percent reenlistment rate.”⁵⁶

The military also began discouraging higher education through the fear of officers not wanting to take time out of the “correct career path” or “perfect timeline” to get an

advanced degree. Additionally, this fear discouraged many from seeking teaching opportunities at ROTC and West Point. Increasing and encouraging education within the Army will only strengthen it in the long run. Feelings on Army educational opportunities follow:

The problem you're going to have at West Point is you're not going to get Ph.D.s anymore in the Army because they know if they go to West Point they're not going to get promoted. They're going to get kicked out.⁵⁷

As we've gone down from 780,000 to 495,000, people are asking themselves, can I afford to be that maverick [when it comes to career choices]. If I am a maverick that goes out and does what he thinks is best for the service, will the service think it's best for me?⁵⁸

Uncertainty continued to plague the Army until the QDR of 2001. Rumors were rampant that the Army would lose another two divisions and continue commitments throughout the world at the same pace as the 1990s. However, the unfortunate events of 11 September 2001 appeared to at least temporarily save the Army from further cuts. Certainly the current "war" on terrorism will require the full support of the Army's active force for several months or perhaps even years to come. But when the war on terrorism is finally over and victory is achieved will soldiers again be handed pink slips? Only time will tell.

¹Bart Brasher, *Implosion: Downsizing the U.S. Military* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2000), i.

²*Ibid.*, 135.

³David McCormick, *The Downsized Warrior* (New York: New York University Press, 1998), 131.

⁴Brasher, 23.

⁵*Ibid.*, 15.

⁶McCormick et al., 30.

⁷Ibid., 31.

⁸Ibid. The Base Force concept was designed under the premise that a threat oriented force structure was no longer appropriate. Powell believed that the focus of planning should be on the minimal forces, the Base Force, necessary to carry out military responsibilities.

⁹Ibid., et al., 35.

¹⁰Ibid.

¹¹Ibid.

¹²Ibid., 35-36.

¹³David C. Morrison, "Painful Separation," (*National Journal*, March 31, 1990), 769.

¹⁴Ibid., 769.

¹⁵Ibid.

¹⁶McCormick, et al., 37. The Gulf War was not an officially declared war by Congress. Although many civilians determined that the undeclared war in the Gulf was a success based on high technology weaponry, many in the military were careful in embracing this view due to the overall weakness of the Iraqi military the U.S. forces faced.

¹⁷Ibid.

¹⁸Ibid.

¹⁹Ibid., 38.

²⁰Ibid., 39.

²¹Ibid.

²²Ibid.

²³Kapstein, 46.

²⁴Ibid., et al, 46-47.

²⁵Ibid., 47.

²⁶McCormick, 40.

²⁷Ibid., 44-45.

²⁸Ibid.

²⁹Ibid., 46.

³⁰Ibid., 47.

³¹Ibid., 51.

³²Ibid., 113-114. VSI: Provided annual payments for a period twice the length of time served at the time of separation. SSB: Lump-sum separation incentive. TERA: Provided an early retirement opportunity for captains and majors who had already been passed over for promotion once, majors in overstrength year groups (RIF eligible) prior to consideration for lieutenant colonel, and captains with more than fifteen years of service in excess specialties. SERBs: Boards conducted to force early retirement on selected colonels with two or more years in grade and all lieutenant colonels with eighteen or more years of active service (later extended to NCOs).

³³Brasher, 161. Voluntary Early Release/Retirement Program (VERRP). Allowed company grade officers to resign within one year of their active duty service obligation (ADSO) (later offered to NCOs). The program also waived one year of the three-year requirement before being permitted to retire in a certain grade.

³⁴Ibid., 178.

³⁵Ibid., 194.

³⁶Matthew J. Morgan, *Army Recruiting and the Civil-Military Gap*, (Parameters, Summer 2001), 77.

³⁷Ibid., 102.

³⁸Ibid., 114.

³⁹Ibid., 105.

⁴⁰Richard Kohn, "An Exchange on Civil-Military Relations," (*The National Interest*, Summer 1994), 29-31.

⁴¹Morgan, 109.

⁴²Ibid.

⁴³Jim Lehrer, *News Hour: Army Recruiting*. (News Hour with Jim Lehrer Transcript, March 1999), <http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/military/jan-june> 99/Army (30 January 2002), 2.

⁴⁴David C. Morrison, "Painful Separation," (*National Journal*, March 31, 1990), 773.

⁴⁵Bruce B. Auster, Joseph L. Galloway and Douglas Pasternik, "Company Dismissed!" (*U.S. News and World Report*, July 6, 1992), 30-31.

⁴⁶Ibid., 31.

⁴⁷Christopher N. Thompson, telephone interview with author, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 28 January 2002.

⁴⁸McCormick, 125.

⁴⁹Ibid., 126.

⁵⁰Ibid., 127.

⁵¹Ibid., 27.

⁵²Ibid., 141-144.

⁵³Ibid., 132.

⁵⁴Ibid., 141.

⁵⁵Ibid., 146.

⁵⁶Ibid., 141-144.

⁵⁷Ibid., 155.

⁵⁸Ibid., 151.

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION

1. Budgets and Ballot Boxes

During the post-World War I debate on the size of the Army General Pershing noted that the United States military had been involved in some kind of military operation every eighteen months of its existence and a major war every twenty or thirty years.¹ He concluded his argument before Congress with the following question: “Are wars becoming less frequent or any less severe?”² Throughout the remainder of the century and into the next the argument from Army leaders and civilian proponents of a strong Army essentially remained the same. The counter argument supporting a smaller Army also remained the same. Proponents of a strong force based arguments on threat whereas others supporting a smaller Army relied on the world of public opinion to determine the size of the force. Budgets and ballot boxes have continually been the decisive determiners in the debate regardless of the side chosen in the argument.

Over the last eighty years political leaders have ultimately decided the strength of the Army based upon the health of the economy and the public mood as reflected in polls and elections. The fact that dollars and votes have essentially always decided the fate of the size of the Army was not the sole purpose of this thesis. The purpose was to compare the post-Cold War drawdown to those of the past while concentrating on the Army’s message to political leaders and the affects of downsizing on those who remained. Most importantly this study provides the opportunity to show that whether it is called demobilization or downsizing the lasting affects on the soldiers who remain in the Army are no different.

2. World War I

In 1922, Secretary of War John W. Meeks argued for a larger force due to additional missions outlined in the National Defense Act of 1920.³ Similarly the 1994-1999 Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) pointed to specific threats for planning purposes and for further justification of the Base Force.⁴ In both cases the Army was desperately attempting to hang on to an already dwindling force structure. In both cases the Army failed.

The “hollow” Army is generally a moniker placed on the Army of the 1970s. However, the same conditions existed during the 1920s and 1930s and threatened to plague the force of the 1990s. General James G. Harbord, the Army Deputy Chief of Staff during the early 1920s, suggested cutting manpower in the nine divisions. Ultimately manpower was reduced which led to a small skeltonized force.⁵ The QDR of 1997 called for a reduction of 15,000 soldiers from a ten-division structure without lowering the number of divisions.⁶ The result of the reductions left the Army of the interwar period and the Army of the 1990s gutted.

Soldiers in the 1920s and 1930s also experienced the possibility of being involuntarily separated. When Congress decided to cut the Army from 175,000 to 150,000, over 1,000 soldiers had to be involuntarily separated even though a large number chose early retirement when offered special annuities.⁷ The personnel reduction programs of the early 1990s enticed many soldiers to leave the Army voluntarily, however, these programs only accounted for thirty percent of the soldiers who were separated. The remainder of the cuts was a result of normal attrition and involuntary separation.

Retention and recruitment woes plagued Army leaders throughout the inter-war years. The economy of the roaring 20s greatly discouraged enlistments and reenlistments.⁸ In 1922 the Army fell 7,000 men short of recruitment goals designed to maintain an authorized strength of 125,000. The Army, for the first time, resorted to advertising to entice young men to enlist.⁹ In 1999, the Army was in a similar situation falling 6,000 recruits short of the Fiscal Year goal.¹⁰ Another response to recruitment/retention difficulties during the interwar years was a proposal by General Pershing to implement a form of universal military training.¹¹ Likewise there were movements in the 1990s to adopt a mandatory national service.¹² Recruiting and retention problems during both periods ultimately were a result of a strong economy and abundant job opportunities that dissuaded young men and women to enlist. During the interwar period Army leaders viewed the problem of enlisted losses solely on economics and believed that better pay would reverse the trends of declining reenlistments. However, recruitment and reenlistment problems continued throughout the 1920s and did not ease until the beginning of the Great Depression in 1929.¹³ As late as 2000, social scientists were speculating that recruitment and retention problems would continue to struggle and be dependant on economic fluctuations in the coming years.¹⁴ Both periods provide evidence that recruitment and retention is largely dependant upon economics, however, problems also arose from training and equipment shortfalls. Low morale caused by units doing more with less only exasperated the problem. Neglect in training, maintenance, and the proper manning of units will cause recruitment and retention problems regardless of the state of the economy.

Budgetary constraints on training during the interwar years are best exemplified by the Army training directive for Fiscal Year 1935. This document directed in part that, “Infantry and cavalry units were to stress machine-gun training within the limits of ammunition authorized which was far less than needed to conduct appropriate training.”¹⁵ It went on to direct that “Funds permitting, the mobile troops of each corps area . . . will be assembled once during the year . . . for a period of not less than two weeks for combined field exercises.”¹⁶ The lack of adequate budgets in some units during the 1990s also affected training, which, in turn, had a negative impact on morale and retention. Former Army captain Chris Thompson stated, “ I honestly could not understand how the most powerful Army in the world could be expected to go to combat with such inadequate equipment.”¹⁷ He added that inadequate equipment and training deficiencies eventually affect morale. “When you can only train with half your vehicles it’s demoralizing. Soldiers start to wonder what they are doing and eventually it affects morale.”¹⁸

The final comparison of the interwar Army and the post-Cold War Army deals with inconsistencies in the Army leadership’s messages to Congress. Although this study does not reveal inconsistent messages during the interwar years, it does provide examples of an inability to clearly articulate requirements. During House Military Affairs Committee hearings in February 1919, neither Secretary of War Newton D. Baker nor Army Chief of Staff Peyton C. Marsh was able to justify a War Department bill requesting a 500,000-man force.¹⁹ In testimony before the House Armed Services Committee in March 1990, Army Chief of Staff General Carl Vuono had similar problems. During the hearing an exchange between Vuono and the Chairman of the

House Armed Services Committee Les Aspin, Vuono argued that a reduction of more than 35,000 soldiers a year would be a “devastating act on the Army.”²⁰ Vuono’s argument, or lack thereof, failed to persuade Aspin and the rest of the committee. Former Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel Lieutenant General William Reno stated: “There simply was not a good analytical basis for 35,000.”²¹

3. World War II

During the first months of the debate on the size of the Army following World War II, senior Army leaders found it difficult to agree on exact numbers. The pace and manner in which demobilization occurred following World War II was strikingly similar to that of World War I. Although the pace in which the post-Cold War drawdown occurred was much less severe, the manner in which it occurred mirrored both World War drawdowns in many ways. During Congressional testimony in August 1945, Major General Stephen Henry, Army Deputy Chief of Staff, testified that the Army needed 900,000 men to occupy the Pacific.²² Barely a month later General Douglas MacArthur stated that 200,000 men would be adequate to occupy Japan, which was no where near the number of 500,000 that he wanted when the debates began.²³ Further adding to the confusion General George Marshall stated that 500,000 men would be sufficient.²⁴ Although the Army leadership of the early 1990s did not outwardly disagree on the future size of the force, their lack of persuasive argument provided justification for Congress to literally cut the Army at will. During each period a unified approach by the Army leadership to Congress would have clearly provided less justification for the cuts that followed. Certainly downsizing and demobilization would have occurred regardless of

the Army leadership position; however, a unified approach would have reduced the severity and speed in which it was performed.

Although the military draft was still in effect following World War II, the Army still relied heavily upon recruitment to maintain authorized strengths. Much like the Army of the late 1990s, the Army of 1946 fell well below the number of recruits they were expected to receive.²⁵ In both cases at least part of the blame was put upon the standards being too high for enlistees. The Army was no longer allowing illiterates to enlist, which provoked many to recommend lowering standards.²⁶ A little over fifty years later Secretary of the Army Caldera hinted that recruitment goals might be achieved easier if the requirements for recruits with high school diplomas were not so high.²⁷ “Dumbing down the military” were the buzzwords used to describe these policies and their potential aftermath. In the Army of the twenty-first century that is becoming more and more reliant upon sophisticated weaponry and equipment such a policy is unwise.

Vietnam

Although this study does not devote a specific chapter to the examination of the Army following the Korean War, a comparison of a few issues is relevant. Much like the Army of the 1990s the post-Korean War Army suffered from recruitment, retention, and morale problems and in an attempt to reduce these problems similar solutions were tried. The Army of the 1990s mirrored the Army of the 1950s by raising pay, introducing new uniforms, and instituting special enlistment or reenlistment incentives to combat these issues.²⁸ The success of these programs were limited during the 1950s and did not improve substantially until Taylor’s Flexible Response strategy increased the size of the Army and its budget.²⁹ The success of such programs initiated in the 1990s may be to

difficult to ascertain given the short amount of time that has elapsed however, authors in the future may draw comparisons to Taylor's Flexible Response, which greatly increased the size of the military budget, and President Bush's 2002 military budget increase.

In 1969, General Westmoreland initiated the PROVIDE study group in anticipation of the Nixon Administration policy shift to an all-volunteer force.³⁰ Nearly twenty years later General Vuono and General Powell also ordered studies in anticipation of force reductions.³¹ While there is no evidence in either case to suggest these preemptive strikes caused less severe cuts, the fact that Westmoreland kept his study secret reflected the overall mistrust felt toward the political establishment. There is no evidence this mistrust was still there twenty years later however, contentious exchanges between Army leaders and Congress in the 1990s reveal that the relationships were not particularly harmonious.

Westmoreland's PROVIDE study failed to clearly articulate the Army's vision and desired strength following the Vietnam War.³² During the post-Cold War downsizing the Army failed in many of the same areas. The Air Force and Navy had no problems articulating vision. The white papers *Global Reach-Global Power*, 1990, and *Power from the Sea*, 1993, laid out their respective service visions for the post-Cold War era. The papers emphasized their unique war fighting capabilities and provided a framework for justifying future resources. In contrast, the Army did not publish a white paper until 1994. *Decisive Victory: America's Power Projection Army* described the changing strategic landscape but did little to explain the Army vision or justify resources needed to support that vision. Additionally, the Army's white paper was a more complex

document than the other services.³³ Timely and more simplistic visions may be a more effective approach.

Army leaders in the 1970s and 1990s both argued that total number of divisions were not enough to meet global requirements and responsibilities of the United States. General Abrams was successful in his argument for an increase in divisions however, it was only a small victory. The Army eventually increased from thirteen to sixteen divisions, but there was no increase in personnel.³⁴ Twenty years later Army leaders failed in their attempt to maintain a twelve-division structure losing two divisions. Although arguments ultimately failed in both cases, it is better to have fully manned divisions versus units only at partial strength.

The post-Vietnam War Army's lack of soldiers to properly man divisions was compounded with recruiting and retention problems. The Army spent most of its budget to offer competitive (with civilian jobs) pay to new recruits. The result was a lack of money to buy new or replacement equipment.³⁵ Enlistment bonuses and higher pay were also attempted to curb shortfalls in both recruitment and retention in the 1990s. Consequently, budgets became tighter and training and maintenance suffered. Higher pay and bonuses only provide a band-aid. Money spent on realistic training, new equipment, and maintenance is the answer in combating these issues.

Finally, a brief comparison of post-Cold War programs to the 1971 VOLAR experiment must be made. VOLAR initiatives such as abolishing 0500 reveille, weekend bed checks, harmony councils, and rap sessions with the division commander are eerily similar to policies and programs initiated in the 1990s.³⁶ The 1990s initiatives included such programs as consideration of others training and stress cards at basic training. In

both cases retention and recruitment percentages plummeted while morale also continued to decline. During the 1990s the Marine Corps was the only branch of the service that did not experience recruitment or retention problems. Conversely their introduction of tougher standards during boot camp is evidence that discipline and challenge are what potential recruits are seeking.

Throughout this study numerous similarities have been made between the post-Cold War drawdown and the periods following World War I, World War II, and Vietnam. Reenlistment, retention, training, and morale became serious issues during every downsizing effort. These issues become more difficult once initial downsizing has been completed and the remaining personnel are forced to deal with uncertainty and limited budgets. The manner in which Army leaders deliver messages to Congress has remained consistent since 1919. Inconsistency in the numbers of soldiers and divisions requested by Army leaders, as well as differences in opinion in those numbers have consistently troubled the Army message to Congress. Congressional budget allocations driven by the state of the economy and public opinion as reflected at the ballot boxes have consistently been the driving force behind the size of the Army. Downsizing or demobilization is a certainty following any “hot” or “cold” war however, the manner in which it is done must be carefully undertaken. During these periods of inevitable drawdown Army and civilian leaders should not cut forces too quickly or by too much. Studying past mistakes and successes before acting is a requirement. The Army must be a trained and equipped force, which is proportional to the threat--not to the world of public opinion. Additionally, Congress has a responsibility to ensure the military is budgeted and manned properly to deal with possible threats. The global environment

faced by the United States in the 21st century demands a strong and well-prepared Army. A consistent panacea for dwindling recruitment, retention, and morale has been to simply increase pay for service members. Military pay must be commensurate with similar civilian positions however, young men and women join and stay in the Army to belong to properly trained, well equipped, disciplined units. Shortfalls in training, equipment, and discipline hinder efforts to improve morale and readiness.

The Army has endured for over 225 years and during this time those who have served experienced reductions in force after every major conflict. Whether demobilization following a hot war or downsizing following a cold war the affects on those who remain are the same. The Army has the unique mission of fighting major land wars and is the only branch of the service equipped to fight such a war. Due to this unique mission the Army must be properly trained, equipped, and manned to win the next big land war--a war of national survival. Much has been written on the study of America's failures in the first battles of major wars. Neglect and failure to prepare for our next "first battle" will only translate into flag-draped coffins. Past great civilizations have followed such a formula to their regret. The Army must continue to examine its past mistakes and successes in order to maintain its great civilization and Army for many years to come.

¹Donald Smythe, *Pershing, General of the Armies* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1986), 278.

²Ibid.

³Ethan B. Kapstein, *Downsizing Defense* (Harvard University: John M. Olin Institute for Strategic Studies Harvard University, 1994) 46.

⁴Ibid.

⁵Smythe, 279.

⁶Brasher, 161.

⁷Griffith, 161.

⁸Recruiting News #5 *Extracts from Adjutant General's Report*, (November 15, 1923), 3.

⁹Ibid.

¹⁰Brasher, 194.

¹¹LTC Marvin A. Kreidberg and 1LT Merton G. Henry, *History of Military Mobilization in the United States Army*. Department of the Army Pamphlet no. 20-212.

¹²Morgan, 109.

¹³Griffith, 94-95.

¹⁴Morgan, 102.

¹⁵Griffith, 165.

¹⁶Ibid.

¹⁷Christopher N. Thompson, telephone interview with author, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 28 January 2002.

¹⁸Ibid.

¹⁹Kriedberg, 378.

²⁰McCormick, 35-36.

²¹Ibid., 35.

²²*New York Times*, August 15, 1945, 1.

²³Sharp, 122.

²⁴Congress, House, Committee on Military Affairs, Hearings on Demobilization of the U.S. Army, 79th Cong., 1st sess., August 28, 1945. 22.

- ²⁵Sharp, 218.
- ²⁶Schnabel, 109.
- ²⁷Lehrer, 2.
- ²⁸Shortal, 66.
- ²⁹Ibid., 66.
- ³⁰Griffith, 17.
- ³¹McCormick, et al, 35.
- ³²Griffith, et al, 23.
- ³³McCormick, 58.
- ³⁴Kitfield, 150.
- ³⁵Dunnigan and Macedonia, 108.
- ³⁶Gabriel and Savage, 133.

Dear Mr. President:

I urge you as Commander-in-Chief to press
Into service every ship flying our flag to bring
Back our troops by Christmas.

Ships for private commerce, ships laid up in
U.S. ports and U.S. meddling in China are keeping
GIs from being reunited with their families.

I urge every ship be made a troopship.

Sincerely yours,

Figure 1. Example of mimeographed letter sent to President Truman. 78,295 of these were sent to the War Department on 14 December 1946. Source: Giangreggo, D.M. and Moore, Kathryn. *Dear Harry: Truman's Mailroom, 1945-1953*. Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1999, 84.

1987	1997
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 1st Armored, West Germany • 1st Cavalry (Armored), Fort Hood, Texas • 1st Infantry (Mechanized), Fort Carson, Colorado • 2nd Armored, Fort Hood, Texas • 2nd Infantry, South Korea • 3rd Armored, West Germany • 3rd Infantry, West Germany • 4th Infantry (Mechanized), Fort Carson, Colorado • 5th Infantry, Fort Polk, Louisiana • 6th Infantry (Light), Alaska • 7th Infantry (Light), Fort Ord, California • 8th Infantry (Mechanized), West Germany • 9th Infantry (Motorized), Fort Lewis, Washington • 10th Mountain (Light), Fort Drum, New York • 24th Infantry (Mechanized), Fort Stewart, Georgia • 25th Infantry (Light), Schofield Barracks, Hawaii • 82nd Airborne, Fort Bragg, North Carolina • 101st Air Assault, Fort Campbell, Kentucky 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 1st Armored, Germany • 1st Cavalry (Armored), Fort Hood, Texas • 1st Infantry (Mechanized), Germany • 2nd Infantry (Mechanized), South Korea • 3rd Infantry (Mechanized), Fort Stewart, Georgia • 4th Infantry (Mechanized), Fort Hood, Texas • 10th Mountain (Light), Fort Drum, New York • 25th Infantry (Light), Schofield Barracks, Hawaii • 82nd Airborne, Fort Bragg, North Carolina • 101st Air Assault, Fort Campbell, Kentucky

Figure 2. Army Active Divisions, before and after the post-Cold War drawdown.
Source: Brasher, Bart *Implosion. Downsizing the U.S. Military, 1987-2015*. Greenwood Press, 2000. 219.

Past Chairmen of the JCS

- General of the Army, Omar N. Bradley, 1949-1953
- Adm. Arthur W. Radford, U.S. Navy, 1953-1957
- Gen. Nathan F. Twining, U.S. Air Force, 1957-1960
- Gen. Lyman L. Lemnitzer, U.S. Army, 1960-1962
- Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, U.S. Army, 1962-1964
- Gen. Earle G. Wheeler, U.S. Army, 1964-1970
- Adm. Thomas H. Moorer, U.S. Navy, 1970-1974
- Gen. George S. Brown, U.S. Air Force, 1974-1978
- Gen. David C. Jones, U.S. Air Force, 1978-1982
- Gen. John W. Vessey, Jr., U.S. Army, 1982-1985
- Adm. William J. Crowe, U.S. Navy, 1985-1989
- Gen. Colin L. Powell, U.S. Army, 1989-1993
- Gen. John M. Shalikashvili, U.S. Army, 1993-1997
- Gen. Henry H. Shelton, U.S. Army, 1997-2001
- Gen. Richard B. Myers, U.S. Air Force, 2001-

Figure 3. Past Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.. Source: Learning Network. Infoplease.com. *Past Chairmen of the JCS*. <http://www.infoplease.com/ipg/a0004630.html>.

President	Secretary of the Army	Chief of Staff
Warren G. Harding 4 Mar 1921–2 Aug 1923	John W. Weeks 5 Mar 1921–	Peyton C. March –30 Jun 1921
		John J. Pershing 1 Jul 1921–
Calvin Coolidge 3 Aug 1923–3 Mar 1929	John W. Weeks –13 Oct 1925	John J. Pershing –13 Sep 1924
	Dwight F. Davis 14 Oct 1925–	John L. Hines 14 Sep 1924–20 Nov 1926
		Charles P. Summerall 21 Nov 1926–
Herbert C. Hoover 4 Mar 1929–3 Mar 1933	Dwight F. Davis –5 Mar 1929	Charles P. Summerall
	James W. Good 6 Mar 1929–18 Nov 1929	Charles P. Summerall
	Patrick J. Hurley 9 Dec 1929–3 Mar 1933	Charles P. Summerall –20 Nov 1930
		Douglas MacArthur 21 Nov 1930–
Franklin D. Roosevelt 4 Mar 1933–12 Apr 1945	George H. Dern 4 Mar 1933–27 Aug 1936	Douglas MacArthur –1 Oct 1935
	Harry H. Woodring 25 Sep 1936–20 Jun 1940	Malin Craig 2 Oct 1935–31 Aug 1939
	Henry L. Stimson 10 Jul 1940–	George C. Marshall 1 Sep 1939–
Harry S. Truman 12 Apr 1945–20 Jan 1953	Henry L. Stimson –21 Sep 1945	George C. Marshall –18 Nov 1945
	Robert P. Patterson 27 Sep 1945–18 Jul 1947	Dwight D. Eisenhower 19 Nov 1945–
	Kenneth C. Royall 19 Jul 1947–	Dwight D. Eisenhower
	Kenneth C. Royall –27 Apr 1949	Dwight D. Eisenhower –7 Feb 1948
	Gordon Gray 20 Jun 1949–12 Apr 1950	Omar N. Bradley 7 Feb 1948–16 Aug 1949
	Frank Pace, Jr. 12 Apr 1950–20 Jan 1953	J. Lawton Collins 16 Aug 1949–

Figure 4. Presidents of the United States, Secretaries of the Army, and Army Chiefs of Staff 1921-1953. Sources: The Secretary of the Army home page. <http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg/books/sw-sa/App-b.htm>
Commanding Generals and Chiefs of Staff. William Garner Bell. <http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg/books/sw-sa/App-b.htm>

President	Secretary of the Army	Chief of Staff
Dwight D. Eisenhower 20 Jan 1953–20 Jan 1961	Robert T. Stevens 4 Feb 1953–21 Jul 1955	J. Lawton Collins –5 Aug 1953
		Matthew B. Ridgway 16 Aug 1953–30 Jun 1955
	Wilber M. Brucker 21 Jul 1955–19 Jan 1961	Maxwell D. Taylor 30 Jun 1955–30 Jun 1959
		Lyman L. Lemnitzer 1 Jul 1959–30 Sep 1960
		George H. Decker 1 Oct 1960–
John F. Kennedy 20 Jan 1961–22 Nov 1963	Elvis J. Stahr, Jr. 24 Jan 1961–30 Jun 1962	George H. Decker
	Cyrus R. Vance 5 Jul 1962–	George H. Decker –30 Sep 1962
		Earle G. Wheeler 1 Oct 1962–
Lyndon B. Johnson 22 Nov 1963–20 Jan 1969	Cyrus R. Vance –21 Jan 1964	Earle G. Wheeler –2 Jul 1964
	Stephen Ailes 28 Jan 1964–1 Jul 1965	Harold K. Johnson 3 Jul 1964–
	Stanley R. Resor 2 Jul 1965–	Harold K. Johnson –2 Jul 1968
		William C. Westmoreland 3 Jul 1968–
Richard M. Nixon 20 Jan 1969–9 Aug 1974	Stanley R. Resor –30 Jun 1971	William C. Westmoreland
	Robert F. Froehlke 1 Jul 1971–14 May 1973	William C. Westmoreland –30 Jun 1972
		Bruce Palmer, Jr. 1 Jul 1972–11 Oct 1972
		Creighton W. Abrams, Jr. 12 Oct 1972–
	Howard H. Callaway 15 May 1973–	Creighton W. Abrams, Jr. –4 Sep 1974
Gerald R. Ford 9 Aug 1974–20 Jan 1977	Howard H. Callaway –3 Jul 1975	Fred C. Weyand 3 Oct 1974–
	Martin R. Hoffmann 5 Aug 1975–	Fred C. Weyand –30 Sep 1976
		Bernard W. Rogers Oct 1976

Figure 5. Presidents of the United States, Secretaries of the Army, and Army Chiefs of Staff 1953-1976. Sources: The Secretary of the Army home page. <http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg/books/sw-sa/App-b.htm>. Commanding Generals and Chiefs of Staff. William Garner Bell. <http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg/books/cg&csa/cg-toc.htm>

President	Secretary of the Army	Chief of Staff
Jimmy (James E.) Carter 20 Jan 1977–20 Jan 1981	Martin R. Hoffmann –13 Feb 1977	Bernard W. Rogers –21 Jun 1979
	Clifford L. Alexander, Jr. 14 Feb 1977–20 Jan 1981	Edward C. Meyer 22 Jun 1979–
Ronald W. Reagan 20 Jan 1981–20 Jan 1989	John O. Marsh, Jr. 21 Jan 1981–	Edward C. Meyer –21 Jun 1983
		John A. Wickham, Jr. 23 Jun 1983–23 Jun 1987
		Carl E. Vuono 23 Jun 1987–
George Bush 20 Jan 1989–20 Jan 1993	John O. Marsh, Jr. –13 Aug 1989	Carl E. Vuono
	Michael P. W. Stone 14 Aug 1989–19 Jan 1993	Carl E. Vuono –21 Jun 1991
		Gordon R. Sullivan 21 Jun 1991–
William J. Clinton 20 Jan 1993–20 Jan 2001	Togo D. West, Jr. 22 Nov 1993–5 May 1998	Gordon R. Sullivan –20 Jun 1995
	Louis E. Caldera 2 Jul 1998–	Dennis J. Reimer 20 Jun 1995–22 Jun 1999
	Louis E. Caldera 2 Jul 1998–19 Jan 2001	Eric K. Shinseki 22 Jun 1999–
George W. Bush 20 Jan 2001–	Thomas E. White 31 May 2001–	Eric K. Shinseki 22 Jun 1999–

Figure 6. Presidents of the United States, Secretaries of the Army, and Army Chiefs of Staff 1977-Present. Sources: The Secretary of the Army home page. <http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg/books/sw-sa/App-b.htm>. Commanding Generals and Chiefs of Staff. William Garner Bell. <http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg/books/cg&csa/cg-toc.htm>.

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U.S. Military Spending, 1945-1996

Annual Military Spending

(Billions of 1996 Dollars in Outlays)

Year	Spending	Year	Spending
1945	962.7	1971	311.7
1946	500.6	1972	289.1
1947	133.7	1973	259.5
1948	94.7	1974	243.8
1949	127.8	1975	242.0
1950	133.0	1976	234.0
1951	225.7	1977	232.7
1952	408.5	1978	233.2
1953	437.0	1979	237.4
1954	402.1	1980	246.2
1955	344.5	1981	260.8
1956	320.7	1982	282.0
1957	322.4	1983	303.2
1958	317.9	1984	318.1
1959	306.9	1985	343.7
1960	289.6	1986	363.7
1961	291.1	1987	371.1
1962	300.0	1988	372.8
1963	293.3	1989	376.2
1964	294.8	1990	358.7
1965	268.3	1991	316.5
1966	297.3	1992	328.6
1967	354.1	1993	312.1
1968	388.9	1994	290.3
1969	371.8	1995	272.1
1970	346.0	1996	265.6 (est.)

Figure 7. U.S. Military Spending 1945-1996. Source: Learning Network. Infoplease.com. *Past Chairmen of the JCS*. <http://www.infoplease.com/ipg/a0004630.html>.

Active Army Strengths 1919-2000

Year	Total Strength	Year	Total Strength
1919	851,624	1961	858,622
1920	204,292	1962	1,066,404
1921	230,725	1963	975,916
1922	148,763	1964	973,238
1923	133,243	1965	969,066
1924	142,673	1966	1,199,784
1925	137,048	1967	1,442,498
1926	134,938	1968	1,570,343
1927	134,829	1969	1,512,169
1928	136,084	1970	1,322,548
1929	139,118	1971	1,120,822
1930	139,378	1972	807,985
1931	140,516	1973	788,177
1932	134,597	1974	780,464
1933	136,547	1975	781,316
1934	138,464	1976	766,979
1935	139,486	1977	774,664
1936	167,816	1978	772,202
1937	179,968	1979	757,822
1938	185,488	1980	762,739
1939	189,839	1981	769,673
1940	269,023	1982	788,026
1941	1,462,315	1983	779,643
1942	3,075,608	1984	780,180
1943	6,994,472	1985	780,787
1944	7,994,750	1986	780,980
1945	8,267,958	1987	780,815
1946	1,891,011	1988	771,847
1947	991,285	1989	769,741
1948	554,030	1990	732,403
1949	660,473	1991	710,821
1950	593,167	1992	610,450
1951	1,553,774	1993	572,423
1952	1,596,419	1994	541,343
1953	1,533,815	1995	508,559
1954	1,404,598	1996	491,103
1955	1,109,296	1997	491,707
1956	1,025,778	1998	483,830
1957	997,994	1999	479,726
1958	898,925	2000	482,170
1959	861,964	2001	483,701
1960	873,078	2002	486,902

Figure 8. Army active duty totals 1919-2000. Bold=greatest highs and lows.
Source: Weigley, 596-597.

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