

USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

**CALL OUT THE RESERVES: A CHANGE IN PARADIGM FOR THE ARMY'S RESERVE  
COMPONENTS**

by

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## ABSTRACT

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The Secretary of the Army initiated a study of the Army's employment of active and reserve components. Simultaneously, the Undersecretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness announced an investigation that is evaluating the missions of the reserve components with the objective of overhauling their structure and missions. The purpose of this paper is to present a tool that can facilitate the decision-making process for assigning Army units, both active and reserve, to a particular mission, specifically Military Operations Other Than War. The paper also examines the history of the current force structure and how the Army, with its active and reserve components, can best provide a seamless force capable of meeting the needs of the nation. It concludes with the proposal of an algorithm for use in decision-making, examples of its application, and suggestions for future research.



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## CALL OUT THE RESERVES: A CHANGE IN PARADIGM FOR THE ARMY'S RESERVE COMPONENTS

Reserve – a military force withheld from action for later decisive use.  
—Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary

Today's Army reserve component (RC) is truly a committed force. In 2002, over 180,000 soldiers were deployed in over 80 countries; of those more than 25,000 were citizen-soldiers on active duty.<sup>1,2,3</sup> In the Army, where approximately 54 percent of the force structure resides within the RC, members of the Army National Guard (ARNG) and the US Army Reserve (USAR) realize that they are no longer the part-timers they envisioned when they signed up for one weekend a month and two weeks a year.<sup>4,5,6</sup> Indeed, RC annual duty days increased thirteen fold since 1989, and this phenomenon occurred as the active army decreased in size and the overall personnel tempo (PERSTEMPO) increased significantly.<sup>7,8,9,10</sup>

This increased tempo has been cause for concern. While some leaders, such as Major General George Keefe, Adjutant General, Massachusetts National Guard, recognized that the active component (AC) cannot "keep up," others such as Senator Max Cleland (D-GA), chairman of the Senate armed services personnel subcommittee, warned, "It's not wise to commit the reserves in a wartime capacity for a long period of time."<sup>11,12</sup> The reason for this concern is not that citizen-soldiers are being deployed, it is the fact that they are being deployed for non-combat and open-ended missions.<sup>13</sup> Traditionally, Americans joined the RC in the belief that they would mobilize for "World War III," or other national emergency.<sup>14</sup> In the past decade the nature of war has changed, military operations other than war (MOOTW) have routinely necessitated the deployment of thousands of citizen-soldiers around the world for extended periods of time.<sup>15,16</sup> None of these deployments, with the possible exception of the Gulf War, met the expectation of a "World War III."<sup>17</sup> Even the war on terrorism fails to meet those expectations, as no one knows what victory will look like or when it might occur.

The apprehension that many express covers a range of issues. First, many reservists believe they belong to a reserve force, that is, one "withheld from action for later decisive use."<sup>18</sup> Few understand what is decisive about, for example, standing in the Sinai desert as part of the Multinational Force and Observer element. A quick review of the missions that the RC has been called to perform in recent years shows this trend of using the RC to provide relief for the AC, which is on the verge of being overextended and would therefore be unable to perform its primary mission of warfighting.<sup>19</sup> Declining morale is another issue facing the AC. Back-to-back deployments are adversely affecting morale and retention in the active force.<sup>20</sup>

Second, several observers have pointed to the existing and potential morale problems that face an overused RC force.<sup>21</sup> Potential losses in income, family separation, and unemployment are significant concerns that face many mobilized citizen-soldiers.<sup>22</sup> Additionally, many former members of the AC joined the RC because they wanted to pursue other interests full-time, but still be part of the Army. Repetitious mobilizations defeat those goals and result in them allowing their term of service to expire.<sup>23</sup>

Third is the concern that these morale problems will result in “breaking” the force, that is, citizen-soldiers will not seek to extend their terms of service and recruiting will not keep up with the losses.<sup>24,25,26</sup> Although this has not yet occurred, most experts agree that it is only a matter of time.<sup>27,28</sup>

Fourth, many worry that the AC is not big enough to accomplish all of its assigned missions and there exists the potential for overextension. If the AC were involved in too many MOOTW when a regional conflict erupted, units would have to redeploy to the conflict, leaving contingency operations unfinished.<sup>29</sup>

The issue then, and the purpose of this paper, is to suggest a way for the Army to best provide a seamless force capable of meeting the needs of the nation.

## **BACKGROUND**

In 1970, Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird announced the “Total Force” policy, which directed the armed services to rely more heavily upon the RC.<sup>30</sup> Shortly after the end of the Vietnam War, then Chief of Staff of the Army General Creighton Abrams directed that a significant portion of the Army’s force structure be moved out of the AC and into the RC.<sup>31</sup> This was done primarily to ensure that the Army never again went to war without calling upon “the spirit of the American people.”<sup>32</sup> The result was a force with a RC that focused on providing a strategic capability consisting primarily of heavy forces (i.e., armor and mechanized infantry).<sup>33</sup>

Since that time the RC has participated in virtually every major military operation to include Grenada, Panama, the Gulf War, Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo. While the RC’s performance has written a new chapter in the innovative employment of RC forces, there has been a crosscurrent of antagonism between the AC and RC. This culminated with the 48<sup>th</sup> Brigade’s infamous rotation to the National Training Center (NTC) in 1991.<sup>34</sup> The rotation was ordered as part of the 48<sup>th</sup> Brigade’s post-mobilization training prior to deployment for the Gulf War, this despite the brigade’s “passing marks” during a similar rotation only four months earlier.<sup>35</sup> In what became the longest training cycle ever conducted at the NTC, the 48<sup>th</sup> became “certified” for deployment on 28 February 1991, 91 days after mobilization and one day

after the ground war ended. The result of this experience exacerbated the lack of trust between the two components, in particular the AC and the ARNG.<sup>36,37</sup> The AC leaders believed that the train-up was an example of how the ARNG could not live up to its responsibilities, while ARNG officers accused the AC of changing the standards. This continued lack of trust casts a pall over the relationship between AC and RC leaders.<sup>38</sup> After observing both AC and RC officers it is relatively apparent that many AC officers have a better understanding and higher level of acceptance of working in the joint operational arena than with “The Army.”<sup>39</sup> Likewise, RC officers are so concerned about maintaining the relevance of their organization that they often try to force their component to be “more like the AC than the AC.” Because of a lack of understanding, many AC officers do not believe that the RC is up to the task of fighting and winning the nation’s wars, and many RC officers believe that their AC counterparts want to eliminate their component at the earliest opportunity.<sup>40,41</sup>

Despite this friction, after the Gulf War, the Department of Defense (DoD) continued the migration of force structure to the RC. This included significant numbers of combat support and service support units.<sup>42</sup> The motivation for this transfer of force structure had changed. In addition to ensuring public support should we go to war again, the new impetus was on saving money.<sup>43</sup> Because the RC consumes resources only for part-time training or when mobilized, they use about 8 percent of the DoD budget.<sup>44</sup> As a result of attempting to realize a “peace dividend” the AC saw its structure reduced by more than 36 percent and the Army was forced to increase its reliance on the RC.<sup>45</sup> Even with the RC’s increased PERSTEMPO, the costs of being mobilized on active duty were considerably less than that of maintaining those same units in the AC force structure full-time.<sup>46</sup> In fact the RC is currently providing 12 to 13 million mandays per year, equivalent to the addition of two AC divisions.<sup>47</sup>

To fully appreciate the changes that took place in the force between the end of the Cold War and the present one should look at the change in the number of divisions and separate brigades. In 1989, shortly before the Gulf War, the Army consisted of 18 AC divisions, 10 RC divisions, 4 AC separate brigades, and 23 RC separate brigades.<sup>48</sup> Nine of those AC divisions were deployed for the Gulf War, including all three armor divisions. The remaining 9 AC divisions were a force that could either respond to a crisis in another part of the world, or reinforce the efforts in Southwest Asia. Today’s Army consists of 10 AC divisions, 8 RC divisions, and 15 RC enhanced brigades.<sup>49</sup> Some combatant commanders have said they lack sufficient AC forces to accomplish the tasks required by the Secretary of Defense.<sup>50</sup> An example is the recent mobilization of 9,000 ARNG soldiers to augment the air base security at

163 installations throughout the US. The Air Force reported that it was overextended and unable to secure its installations and the Army's RC was called upon to meet that requirement.<sup>51</sup> Today's Army is indeed busy. With forces deployed to over 80 countries it is apparent that there is more to the Army than warfighting.<sup>52</sup> Peacekeeping, de-mining, and training foreign military forces are just a few of the responsibilities that keep the PERSTEMPO high. These missions known as MOOTW comprise the vast majority of the tasks that the United States will call upon its Army to accomplish.

This increased reliance on the RC also comes at a price that cannot necessarily be measured in federal dollars and cents. As one reservist put it, "My employer says he will not support more than one year on active duty and will eliminate my job 'due to the economy' if I am called back."<sup>53</sup> Some pundits have suggested the increased reliance on the RC has resulted in morale problems for as much as 70 percent of the mobilized force.<sup>54</sup> This number is controversial as still other experts argue that citizen-soldiers' morale is high and few complaints have been heard.<sup>55,56</sup> Most agree that the rules have changed and the Army has not addressed the new paradigm required to fight a global war with no end in sight.<sup>57</sup> Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs (ASD/RA) Craig Duehring suggested, "Maybe we need to change the way that we're doing things, instead of reaching out and grabbing more and more [RC]."<sup>58</sup> Even the former Chief of the National Guard Bureau, Lieutenant General Russell Davis has suggested that the changes we are going through, particularly as a result of 11 September 2001, are "a seismic upheaval in the way we think about defense."<sup>59</sup>

#### **CRITERIA FOR EVALUATING CHANGE**

There are a number of concepts to consider before looking for ways to change the Army and the way its components are structured and utilized. Obviously the first consideration is to reflect on whether change is in fact required. Will doing it "the way we've always done it before" accomplish the mission? Second, what exactly needs to be done, what goals and objectives must the Army achieve? Third, are there any criteria that could be used to identify the force of choice (AC or RC)? Could these criteria assist with the design of the total force? Fourth, what are the consequences of realigning or restructuring the force? Fifth, and probably most critical, how can the Army fix the rift that exists between the components to provide the nation with a truly seamless Army?

## IS THERE A NEED FOR CHANGE?

Does the Army's use of the RC need to change? Many think so. "Once upon a time, the reserve forces of the US military were exactly that: reserve forces. Our country held them back like fire extinguishers in the basement, hoping we wouldn't have to use them but knowing where to find them in an emergency. Today, however, the reserves are more like an air conditioner, turned on whenever the temperature hits a certain point.<sup>60</sup> The term "reserve" in fact may be inappropriate in today's world. Today's RC acts more as an augmentation element than a force held for decisive use. The current tasks assigned to the RC suggests that their new role is "to make greater, more numerous, larger, or more intense."<sup>61</sup> An augmentation force may be a more applicable term in this age of transformation.

This mismatch with reality, between RC employment philosophy and actual service, causes confusion and apprehension within the Army's family of soldiers, citizen-soldiers, family members, and employers.<sup>62,63,64</sup> Given this new reality, that of augmentation vice reserve, one can conclude that a change is needed, not only in the paradigm of RC employment but also in the mindset of the nation's leadership, the Army, and those Americans whose lives are touched by soldiers.

## WHAT MUST THE ARMY BE ABLE TO DO?

Before examining ways to change how the RC is employed, it seems appropriate to examine exactly what is trying to be accomplished. The overall vision of the Army is to fight and win the nation's wars, but this vision is too restrictive. At worst it is focused at the tactical level and at best the vision rises to the operational art. In either case it ignores the strategic application of military force, that is, "the continuation of policy by other means."<sup>65</sup> With the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the events that led to the creation of Northern Command the Secretary of Defense directed that the United States military be capable of --

- Defending the United States.
- Deterring aggression and coercion forward in critical regions.
- Swiftly defeating aggression in overlapping major conflicts while preserving for the President the option to call for a decisive victory in one of those conflicts.
- Conducting a limited number of small-scale contingency operations.<sup>66</sup>

As can be seen from this list of tasks, only one meets the common definition of warfighting. The remaining could, in theory, be accomplished without firing a shot. These MOOTW have become a central focus of the Army in recent years.<sup>67</sup>

Prior to 1990 the Army was a force designed to fight against the Soviet Union. Although the Soviet Union no longer exists, the Army must remain prepared to fight a “world class” opponent in a global conventional war scenario. More likely though is the need for the application of military force at lower levels of intensity, as described by the spectrum of military operations (see Figure 1). So the question becomes, if we must have a campaign quality force capable of fighting and winning the nation’s wars in a global sense, can that same force accomplish the other missions in the spectrum? In other words, if we are training and preparing for a global war, are we also preparing for lower intensity responsibilities? Once the answer to these questions is determined the subsequent thought is for the mixture of force structure between the AC and RC. While the answer to the first question will not be forthcoming in this paper, a way to determine a response to the second issue will be offered.




FIGURE 1. THE SPECTRUM OF MILITARY OPERATIONS<sup>68</sup>

With the four tasks in mind, that is, knowing what the Army must be capable of doing, it would be useful to have a list of conditions that could be applied in order to determine which component is most appropriate for a particular mission. Similarly, such a list would provide information as to what a unit should look like and therefore influence force structure decisions. The ASD/RA has created such a list.

ARE THERE ANY CRITERIA THAT COULD BE USED TO IDENTIFY THE FORCE OF CHOICE (AC OR RC)? COULD THESE CRITERIA ASSIST WITH THE DESIGN OF THE TOTAL FORCE?

The ASD/RA identified four criteria for evaluating the choice of component for a particular mission. These conditions were tempo, predictability, timing, and availability. These criteria are not in any particular order, nor does one condition trump any of the others. The selection of a component is based upon the mission at hand and the circumstances that surround the accomplishment of that mission.

- Tempo – recognizes the frequency and duration of a mission. As might be expected, the AC is probably best suited for missions that are performed 365 days a year, while RC forces can support missions that are less than “full-time”.
- Predictability – acknowledges that the more certain one is about a mission, the easier it is to plan and train for. Short-notice crises do not allow sufficient time for the mobilization and training of RC forces, while those actions that are more long-term might allow for the AC to transfer command and control to the RC.
- Timing – identifies when forces are required in an area of operations. If an immediate response is required the AC is usually the force of choice, but sporadic or irregular missions may be more appropriate for the RC.
- Availability – recognizes when a unit, or individual, can be ready to perform a mission. Those missions requiring a high state of readiness may be best suited for the AC. In some situations the RC may be more suitable because experience, training, and time available until deployment.<sup>69</sup>

Given these conditions it is possible to evaluate each component by comparing them to the various missions that the Army is asked to perform. Today’s strategic environment has added new dimensions to the concept of fighting and winning the nation’s wars. An examination of this new environment resulted in the continuum shown in Figure 1. This range of missions reflects that the Army performs missions that require varying degrees of force and capabilities. The majority of these missions are at intensities less than what most people would consider as war. Using the conditions identified above, and by examining the environment surrounding each MOOTW mission, should clarify the capabilities required of the assigned force.

Before considering the design of the total force, thought should be given to the geopolitical environment. Since there are never enough assets, the national leadership must speculate and indeed predict the types and numbers of missions that must be conducted so that the Army can focus it’s training and resources to ensure success.



These predictions along with assignment of lead responsibility make it possible to design a total force. By evaluating each mission's conditions the size and number of forces required should become obvious. Comparing these results to the national leadership's predictions provides a total force package to meet the needs of the nation.

#### WHAT ARE THE CONSEQUENCES OF CHANGE?

There are many consequences to restructuring the force. These range from the subjective "hurt feelings" when colors are cased and units inactivated to the objective, such as mission failure should the wrong decisions be made. Additionally, there are legislative constraints and restraints that must be addressed under any course of action that might be adopted. More specifically there are several areas of disquiet. These concerns include resourcing, personnel caps, retraining time required when converting units, and the sensitivities of Army leaders to the "tinkering" that would go on within the their component. Of overriding concern is the ability of the Army to meet the needs of the nation. If it cannot, it is irrelevant whose feelings are hurt, as the nation as a whole would suffer.

#### CAN WE MAKE A SEAMLESS ARMY?

The final consideration is the goal of a seamless Army. This worthwhile aim would ensure that all soldiers, no matter the component, would be trained to accomplish their mission, would know and understand their responsibilities, and would be trusted to complete their assigned tasks. The major issue is trust. Although both components consist of professionals who truly want to provide the best Army possible, without trust a true "seamless" Army will never happen. Any restructuring proposals must take this environment into account and seek ways to establish trust and build camaraderie.

#### DISCUSSION

Based upon the information cited above, it is not surprising that there have been numerous suggestions as to how to change the Army to meet the requirements of a new century. These suggestions seek to solve the problems in a number of unique ways and have included such ideas as assigning the ARNG with the primary responsibility for homeland security;<sup>70,71</sup> creating new RC organizations for specific homeland security missions, such as information operations battalions to conduct cyber warfare;<sup>72</sup> retaining only three AC divisions, converting the remaining AC combat units into combined arms groups, and increasing the number of RC divisions by two;<sup>73</sup> eliminating RC divisions to provide the resources to increase the number of AC divisions;<sup>74</sup> folding the USAR into the ARNG;<sup>75,76</sup> creating all-component

peacekeeping battalions;<sup>77</sup> moving certain units or capabilities from the RC to the AC;<sup>78</sup> expanding the Reserve Association Support Program, which recruits citizen-soldiers for a 24-month tour of active-duty, followed by service as a traditional citizen-soldier;<sup>79</sup> expanding and modifying the AC/RC division program by integrating the headquarters with RC officers, to include the commanding general, and adding USAR units;<sup>80</sup> and developing a “battalion round-out” program.<sup>81</sup> All of these suggestions are feasible and suitable, although affected leaders may not find them acceptable. The real issue is to discover how the Army can best organize itself for the future. Before attempting to discuss a method for optimizing the Army’s structure some facts and assumptions should be established as a starting point.

#### FACTS

- The AC does not have the force structure to accomplish all of the tasks assigned to the Army.<sup>82,83,84</sup>
- Past history between the AC and the RC, coupled with the Cold War experience, affects the decision-making process regarding force structure, roles, and missions assigned to each component.<sup>85,86</sup>

#### ASSUMPTIONS

- The American people are unable, and unwilling, to resource an AC large enough to accomplish all the tasks that could potentially be assigned to the Army.<sup>87</sup>
- The ARNG will maintain its political base and remain a major component of the Army.<sup>88,89</sup>
- Many RC leaders do not believe that AC leaders consider the RC a viable and useful part of the Army.<sup>90</sup>
- While the RC does not maintain the same level of day-to-day readiness as the AC, it can achieve those identical levels within a relatively short time given the proper resources.<sup>91</sup>
- Reserve Component citizen-soldiers and officers are dedicated to their units, the Army, and the nation to the same degree as AC soldiers and officers.<sup>92</sup>
- Governors will want to retain the ability to use their ARNG to meet the requirements for disasters, civil disturbance, and homeland security.<sup>93</sup>

Coupled with the conditions identified above (i.e., Army responsibilities and ASD/RA criteria) these facts and assumptions can be used to establish an outline for assessing the Army’s organization. This assessment’s goals would be to ensure that not only can the Army

fight and win the nation's wars, but also meet the requirements for those events that are something less than war, that is, MOOTW.

To determine the required force, and ultimately determine the structure of the Army, one must evaluate each mission on the spectrum of military operations. However, following the ASD/RA suggested conditions leads to some unusual conclusions. For example, the ASD/RA recommended that those missions performed 365 days a year might best be suited for the AC based upon tempo, defined as frequency and duration. This would lead one to conclude that noncombatant evacuation operations (NEO), raids, and strikes would be prime candidates for assignment to the RC, since they are not events that last over an extended period of time and occur infrequently. However, given the political implications of using the RC and the readiness requirements for missions such as these, few would support the assignment of a NEO mission to the RC. The evaluation of required force should go much deeper and be more comprehensive than the conditions suggested by the ASD/RA. The assessment therefore, should include a prediction of how quickly forces must arrive in the area of operations, the period of time those forces will perform their mission, the likelihood of combat operations, the strategic consequences of US military force involvement, the level of readiness required of those forces, and the risk to those forces during deployment and while performing their assigned mission.

What follows is offered as a more inclusive way of evaluating the conditions of a mission to ensure the assignment of the best force for the job. This tool, the AC/RC algorithm, allows the decision maker to compare and contrast seven conditions that define a mission's environment, availability, duration, intensity, political implications, predictability, readiness, and risk.

## NEW CRITERIA FOR CONSIDERATION

### **Availability**

This term defines the time required before a unit, or individual, is available in the area of operations.<sup>94</sup> Availability takes into account the time required for mobilization and training (if required) and deployment. Missions that require immediate availability, such as a NEO, raid, or strike, would probably lead one to select the AC as the force of choice. Similarly, missions such as peacekeeping operations or security assistance, which might allow some lead-time for mobilization and deployment, suggest the employment of RC forces.

The immediate requirement for forces to accomplish what will eventually become a long-term involvement requires an analysis of the situation. It may be necessary to employ the AC

for the initial stages of an operation, allowing for the mobilization of the RC. The condition of availability must be compared to the duration of the mission in order to provide an accurate assessment.

### **Duration**

The anticipated length of an operation is critical to the determination of the force of choice. The longer a mission the more probable it will become routine or cyclical, allowing for the rotation of forces. While it is not always possible, or desired, to announce the length of a mission, it is necessary to forecast its duration for a number of reasons. These include readiness concerns, logistical issues, and the morale and esprit of the deployed forces. If the mission is of sufficient duration to allow for the rotation of forces, it becomes a candidate for employment of the RC, however sufficient time must be allowed for mobilization and any training requirements that must be completed. An example of this transition has taken place in Bosnia and Kosovo as AC forces have yielded responsibility for command and the provision of soldiers to the RC.<sup>95,96</sup>

The duration of a mission is of concern for AC forces as their readiness for combat operations can be adversely affected. Most MOOTW missions do not allow assigned units to maintain their proficiency in critical warfighting tasks.<sup>97,98,99</sup> Assignment of RC forces to these long-term operations allows the AC to retrain, refit, and retain the ability to wage war.

### **Intensity**

Intensity is the probability of the conduct of military maneuvers usually associated with conventional war. The higher the intensity the higher the required state of readiness for deployed units. Those operations, in which high intensity operations are expected, such as raids and strikes would generally be assigned to AC forces, particularly after considering the other variables. Likewise, low intensity operations, such as humanitarian assistance or military-to-military contact could be considered for assignment to the RC.

The analysis of intensity is one of accepting risk. In an operation such as humanitarian assistance the expectation of high intensity conflict is low. However, as the events of 1993 in Mogadishu, Somalia show, the situation can change rapidly.<sup>100</sup> It is important to note that changes in an operation's parameters can occur at home as well as within the area of operations. The loss of the Marine Corps barracks in Beirut, Lebanon in 1983 and the withdrawal from Somalia are cases in point. The political fallout from these events resulted in an almost complete reversal of US policy in those nations.<sup>101,102,103,104,105</sup>

## **Political Implications**

The affect of political issues and concerns cannot be underestimated when considering the employment of the RC. First, there is the issue of employing the RC to call up “the spirit of the American people.” In the past, when the United States mobilized it’s RC it was a signal to the American people as well as other nations that America was going to war. This may no longer be the case.

Second, while calling up the reserves may not carry the “go to war” message any longer, it can still be interpreted as an indication of the anticipated seriousness and duration of an operation. The nation’s political leadership might want to portray a deployment as a short-term event, but mobilizing the RC would send a contradictory signal. This proved true at the beginning of the Bosnian peace operation when the American public was told that the troops would be home within a year.<sup>106</sup> Mobilization of the RC would have challenged that message.

Third, the size of the Army is a political football that has been argued over on a recurring basis.<sup>107</sup> Many would argue that the AC should be expanded to account for the increased PERSTEMPO, others would point to the cost savings of the RC.<sup>108</sup> The bottom-line of this argument is that the current political climate is such that an increase in the size of the AC is doubtful.<sup>109,110</sup> Unless a global crisis occurs, the political will is unlikely to support an increase in the size of the AC. The ability to predict what will happen on the world stage then becomes significant.

## **Predictability**

Understanding how the environment will affect the mission is the key reason for predictability’s addition to the list of evaluation criteria. Issues such as the threat, duration, or political implications can have significant consequences on the decision-making process for determining the assignment of forces. The more routine an operation, the more flexibility there is for scheduling units on a rotational basis. The more predictable, the more likely it is that citizen-soldiers can perform that mission. Predictability can be inserted into most long-term MOOTW by establishing a schedule so that RC units rotate into and out of the area of operations. This would require sufficient units within the RC to ensure that citizen-soldiers would not be mobilized again for at least three to four years.<sup>111</sup>

Simply knowing when or where a crisis might occur is only part of the solution. Rotating soldiers and units might fulfill the need to return citizen-soldiers to their civilian employers, but the risk associated with their short time on station may have other, more devastating

consequences. The force sent to address the situation must be trained and able to accomplish the mission.

### **Readiness**

Typically readiness is a measure of a unit's ability to perform wartime tasks. But proficiency at such missions as attack and defend may not be the critical skill sets required for MOOTW. But, what must be remembered is that MOOTW are highly volatile missions with the situation changing from one minute to the next.<sup>112</sup> The deployed force must have the capability to accomplish the assigned mission and be prepared to conduct operations that verge on, or become, conventional warfare.

While an initial assessment of a mission might lead one to recommend that the RC be assigned, it may be necessary to send the AC initially, as they have a higher level of readiness. The RC can then mobilize, train, and eventually replace the AC forces. As an example, this is already being done in Bosnia.<sup>113,114</sup>

### **Risk**

Risk is an assessment of the dangers involved when undertaking a mission. Risk is always present, but leaders attempt to minimize it as much as possible through careful planning.

The application of these criteria - availability, duration, intensity, predictability, political implications, and readiness introduce a level of risk that must be guarded against. Specifically, the risk is that of assigning the wrong force to a mission. This risk is double-edged in that over reliance on the AC may result in a situation where either they are not available when needed for a major conflict, or their readiness has been degraded, due to continuous MOOTW.<sup>115</sup> Likewise, assignment of an inadequately trained RC force to a MOOTW that suddenly becomes high intensity conflict could prove disastrous.

### **Analysis**

The conditions listed above are by no means exhaustive, and undoubtedly others could justify the addition of different criteria. What is important is the provision of a framework for the analysis and determination of forces for assignment to various missions that occur along the spectrum of military operations. There are other criteria that could be applied to the decision-making process, such as budgetary limitations, manpower caps, and other legislative constraints, however an in depth analysis of their impact is beyond the scope of this paper.

It is important that none of these conditions be considered in a vacuum. They interrelate with each other to form a complete picture of the situation. A simple algorithm, such as that

shown in Figure 2 could be used to assess a mission and assign responsibility. By comparing each condition to the mission and expected environment a determination of the component of choice becomes apparent.

<b>Condition</b>	<b>Component</b>
Availability	AC RC
Duration	AC RC
Intensity	AC RC
Predictability	AC RC
Political Implications	AC RC
Readiness	AC RC
Risk	AC RC

FIGURE 2. THE AC/RC ALGORITHM.

A few examples can demonstrate the utility of this process. Suppose a mission requires the urgent presence (immediate availability) of well-trained (high readiness) military forces, such as a strike or raid. This situation could result in the assignment of an AC force. Similarly, if the mission required only the presence of forces (low intensity), and was of long duration, such as a peacekeeping operation, the RC might be the component of choice. These are simplistic examples that serve to demonstrate the concept of applying the algorithm. Another useful illustration is the current situation in Bosnia and Kosovo. A decision was made that led to the replacement of AC forces by the RC.<sup>116,117</sup> The RC has assumed responsibility for missions that do not require immediate availability and are of long duration and low intensity. Likewise, AC forces previously performing these peacekeeping duties have been released to prepare for other missions requiring immediate availability, shorter duration, and higher intensity. Once

again, though some would criticize the simplicity of this approach, the process provides another tool for the decision maker, who ultimately must apply his or her knowledge and experience in making the determination of which component to assign a particular mission.

## **SUMMARY**

Using these new criteria and the facts and assumptions presented earlier, a number of venues become available for the better integration of the Army's components. By establishing a tool that everyone uses and understands a line of communication is opened that permits the professional discussion of the issues surrounding the roles of the RC, and ultimately how they are organized.

## **RECOMMENDATIONS**

The identification of forces for assignment to a particular mission can be viewed as a puzzle. There are a number of variables that go into the solution of this puzzle, type of mission, political environment, required resources, and the conditions identified above. A comparison of these criteria with the information available about a proposed mission provides the decision maker with a tool that facilitates a structured decision-making process.

An earlier discussion identified five criteria for change. The purpose of this research, and the development of the AC/RC algorithm, was to address those questions. An evaluation of those criteria, with respect to the algorithm is appropriate.

First, is there a need for change? The implementation of the AC/RC algorithm provides a visible means of communicating between decision makers, soldiers, families, and employers the reasons why RC soldiers are being deployed for MOOTW. This communication is critical to changing the paradigm that the RC is a reserve force waiting for World War III. While this change in paradigm will not occur overnight, communicating the message can act as a catalyst that will gradually lead to the acceptance of the new notion that the RC are in fact an augmentation force.

Second, what must the Army be able to do? The use of the algorithm provides a means for a conscientious decision-making process that takes into account seven variables that impact on the Army's ability to accomplish its assigned missions. While risk is always a significant factor in the assignment of forces, the algorithm is a way to minimize that risk. The concerns of overextending the AC and underutilizing the RC are real, and the impact on readiness of either of these two mistakes is immeasurable. By carefully considering the options available and the long-term impact on the force, the algorithm provides a method for minimizing risk and ensuring that the Army can accomplish the tasks set forth by the Secretary of Defense.



Third, are there any criteria that could be used to identify the force of choice (AC or RC)? Could these criteria assist with the design of the total force? The AC/RC algorithm lays the groundwork for an analysis of the force based upon the considerations and decisions of the senior leadership of the Army. Using the criteria availability, duration, intensity, predictability, political implications, readiness, and risk suggests a method for calculating the size and structure of the force. For example, let us suppose that the national leadership has decided that, for planning purposes, the Army must be capable of performing two long-term peacekeeping missions. By establishing predictability, each mission requires a six-month deployment, plus two months of training prior to deployment. Assume also that these missions would require a brigade size element. This would result in a requirement for seven brigade size elements to accomplish each mission, assuming that a brigade would not be recalled for the same mission within four years. The variables of duration, availability, and force size can be adjusted based upon intensity, predictability, political implications, and risk. The readiness level is determined based upon the decision as to when the force is required in the area of operations (availability). While these figures may not reflect an actual situation, they provide an example of how the variables can be manipulated to determine the size and structure of the Army.

Fourth, what are the consequences of change? The algorithm does not directly answer this question. However, it does suggest an open dialog on how forces are assigned to particular missions. This dialog allows for an exchange of ideas and concepts that will educate leaders of all three components as well as the Army's family of soldiers, citizen-soldiers, family members, and employers. Additionally, the algorithm could result in the assignment of lead responsibilities to a particular component. This assignment would allow that component to focus its training resources to ensure a high level of readiness for the assigned missions.

Fifth, can we make a seamless Army? This is probably the hardest question to answer. Obviously the application of a decision-making tool such as the AC/RC algorithm does not build trust and confidence between individuals and institutions. But, use of the method does provide a concrete and viable process that is open to discussion, and understanding. The variables of the algorithm also provide a vehicle for conversation about the realities and capabilities of each component and how that component can contribute to the team's effort of fighting and winning the nation's wars.

## **SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH**

The process of researching this paper generated a number of possible directions for further investigation. First would be a study of the composition of the RC. Why does the ARNG

contain all of the RC's divisions? The USAR was originally created as a pool of individuals, why does it now have units? Should the ARNG comprise the units of the RC and the USAR the individuals? Should there be only one RC? Is there a way to modify the RC force structure to accommodate the initial training of new recruits without assigning them to company commanders who already have their hands full with training their companies?

Second, it would be interesting to investigate the roles of the Army's components. Should the AC only train for war, while the RC handles all MOOTW? Should the RC train for war and the AC conduct all MOOTW? Should the RC become a constabulary force? What if Posse Comitatus were repealed, would there still be a need for the ARNG?

Third, develop alternatives to the current method of citizen-soldier service. Is there a way to redefine the force caps that limit the size of each of the components? Could soldiers and citizen-soldiers transition between active and reserve service based upon civilian work, family considerations, or national requirements? How can officers, both active and reserve, continue their service to the nation beyond their mandatory removal dates? Could a medical benefits package be provided to citizen-soldiers, and would it encourage retention?

Fourth, state governors currently rely on the ARNG during disasters and civil disturbances. What is the impact of mobilizing a state's ARNG on the governor's ability to safeguard public property? What alternatives does a governor have if he or she needs military assistance and the ARNG is deployed? If there were only one RC, the USAR, how would governors get assistance during disasters and civil disturbances?

Fifth, currently ARNG citizen-soldiers' careers are managed by each state. Would there be any benefit to retention by centralizing career management? Would promotion prospects be increased if guardsmen were allowed to "shop around" different states for assignment opportunities?

## **CONCLUSIONS**

Times have changed. The RC is no longer a reserve and most people, including the nation's leadership, have acknowledged but not internalized this significant change in role. We must recognize the change, talk about it, and use it to our advantage. Attempting to avoid the issue will only create problems and mistrust between soldiers and citizen-soldiers, soldiers and civilians, employers and employees, family members and their uniformed relatives, and citizens and their government.

The decisions of the 1970's, to move force structure into the RC, are as valid today as they were then. The key component of implementing those decisions however is trust, trust

between all of the various constituencies that make up the nation's will to defend itself and its interests. The only way to address trust is to have a means of communicating a level of confidence in the Army and its ability to defend the nation, deter and defeat aggression, and conduct military operations around the globe.

An open and logical process for identifying and assigning forces for the accomplishment of directed tasks is one means of establishing this trust. A process such as this would allow for open and frank discussion about capabilities, resource requirements, readiness, and political considerations. Most importantly it would generate discussion. The best way to build trust is to talk.

WORD COUNT = 7,007

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## GLOSSARY

The Army – a “total force” consisting of the active Army, the Army National Guard (ARNG), the US Army Reserve (USAR), and Department of the Army civilians. The ARNG and the USAR are also elements of the reserve components (RC) of the Army (see below).

Citizen-soldier – a term for reservists that emphasizes the fact that they are part-time soldiers prepared to serve in time of national emergency or disaster. Citizen-soldiers, also known as M-day soldiers, typically perform military training one weekend a month and two weeks a year.

Deployed – for the purpose of this paper deployed and mobilized imply that citizen-soldiers have been called to duty, either state or federal active duty, and sent to conduct a mission. While deployed and mobilized are not synonymous, for the purposes of this paper they were used to convey the concept of “calling out the Guard.”

Homeland Security (HLS) – “covers all actions taken to safeguard American lives and property at home.”<sup>118</sup>

Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) – “MOOTW encompass the use of military capabilities across the range of military operations short of war.” They include “deterring war, resolving conflict, promoting peace, and supporting civil authorities.”<sup>119</sup>

Mobilization – the activation of citizen-soldiers for the purpose of accomplishing a mission. Mobilization generally results in deployment, unless the mission is cancelled.

Operational Tempo (OPTEMPO) – “a measure of the pace of an operation...in terms of equipment usage—aircraft ‘flying hours,’ ship ‘steaming days’ or ‘tank [driving] miles.’”<sup>120</sup>

Personnel Tempo (PERSTEMPO) – “the time an individual spends away from home station.”<sup>121</sup>

Reserve Component (RC) – that part of the Army consisting of the Ready Reserve, the Standby Reserve, and the Retired Reserve.<sup>122</sup>

Ready Reserve - “is comprised of military members of the Reserve and National Guard, organized in units, or as individuals, liable for recall to active duty to augment the active components in time of war or national emergency.”<sup>123</sup>

Reservist – anyone who is a member of the Ready Reserve, Standby Reserve, or Retired Reserve. See also citizen-soldier (above).

Retired Reserve – “is comprised of all Reserve officers and enlisted personnel who receive retired pay on the basis of active duty and/or reserve service; all Reserve officers and enlisted personnel who are otherwise eligible for retired pay but have not reached age 60 and

who have not elected discharge and are not voluntary members of the Ready or Standby Reserve.”<sup>123</sup>

Roundout – a program first instituted in 1973 that paired a RC brigade with an under strength AC division for the purpose of training and deployment.<sup>124</sup>

Standby Reserve – “consists of personnel who maintain their affiliation without being in the Ready Reserve, who have been designated key civilian employees, or who have a temporary hardship or disability.”<sup>125</sup>

Title 10, US Code – for the purposes of this paper Title 10 refers to citizen-soldiers under the command and control of the President of the United States. When this occurs citizen-soldiers are considered to be “federalized.” While acting under Title 10 citizen-soldiers cannot, in accordance with the provisions of Posse Comitatus, assist with or perform any law enforcement duties.<sup>126</sup>

Title 32, US Code – for the purposes of this paper Title 32 refers citizen-soldiers under the command and control of their governor. Unlike Title 10, Title 32 allows citizen-soldiers to protect state and local facilities as well as federal property. The Posse Comitatus law is not applicable, allowing citizen-soldiers to assist law enforcement officers in the performance of their duties, and carry weapons if necessary.<sup>127</sup>

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