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An Objective Force Leader Development Plan

by

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The views expressed in this academic research paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Government, the Department of Defense, or any of its agencies.

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The Objective Force (OF) is the primary focus of the Army’s current transformation journey. The final organization and structure of the OF is not yet known; however, the principles guiding its development are: agility, versatility, survivability, and sustainability. The OF is required to ensure the Army’s success in future operations in a complex, volatile and uncertain environment. This Strategy Research Project examines the Army’s leader development plan to train effective OF officers. It evaluates the efficacy of the enduring leader competencies as identified by the Army Training and Leader Development Panel and used in evolving leader development doctrine. The current Army plans for transforming the institutional domain of officer leader development are analyzed and evaluated with respect to the desired OF leader competencies. This paper then makes recommendations to improve the Army’s leader development transformation as well as recommendations for further study.
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PREFACE

I acknowledge the assistance received by COL George Woods in preparing this paper. I sincerely appreciate his willingness to serve as my project advisor and have benefited greatly by his cogent recommendations for improving this work.
AN OBJECTIVE FORCE LEADER DEVELOPMENT PLAN

The Army's journey on the transformation path is intended to enable us to develop the Objective Force (OF). In order for the OF to be effective we must have leaders imbued with the skills, knowledge and ability to command and control it successfully in combat in order to accomplish the Army's assigned mission of protecting the nation. The guiding principle of the OF is to be more agile, versatile, lethal, survivable, and sustainable across the full spectrum of potential future missions. Regardless of the final structure and organization of the OF, its enduring hallmark and the catalyst for its success will be its soldiers and leaders. If we desire to have leaders prepared to operate effectively as part of the OF, we must begin training our future leaders now with a focused effort in the Officer Education System. The company and battalion level commanders of the 2015 OF are the lieutenants and captains of the Army today.

The Army is currently in the process of developing the leader development plan that is intended to satisfy the requirements of the future force. The Army is also currently working on determining the direction the force should take in its over-arching leader development program. It is taking a holistic approach to its effort. The Army’s OF azimuth will ensure its transformation plan is coordinated across all elements of the Doctrine, Training, Leader Development, Organization, Materiel, and Soldiers (DTLOMS) system. This Strategic Research Paper focuses on the Leader Development portion of the transformation effort.

The Army envisions the OF being able to operate decisively in ambiguous situations. Its leaders will have to be able to make proper decisions rapidly and foster teamwork that emphasizes and draws on the power that decentralized units possess. The Army Training and Leader Development Panel (ATLDP) Officer Study Report to The Army identified the characteristics and skills required for OF leaders. The panel’s conclusion was the Army should “focus on developing the ‘enduring competencies’ of self-awareness and adaptability.” This paper examines these enduring leader competencies and identifies strengths and weaknesses of the Army’s OF officer leader development plan. Analysis is focused on determining what specific leader traits or actions are comprised in the meta-competencies of self-awareness and adaptation, identifying additional competencies, and determining if the current Army leader development plan achieves the goal of enhancing these competencies.

As recently as December 2002 the Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) hosted a conference to determine definitions for emerging concepts that the Army plans to use as the foundation upon which the leader development program will rest. During the writing of this paper, the Army leadership made decisions to modify the institutional training plan for
officers. These decisions will be examined in this paper and compared to the projected requirements we will expect of leaders in the future. The purpose of this analysis is to identify potential strengths and weaknesses of the Army leader development plan for the OF and recommend potential solutions to remedy the weaknesses. Due to the scope of this research effort, recommendations for policy implementation are limited to the institutional training pillar of the Army’s officer leader development program.

THE NEED FOR TRANSFORMATION

The Army, as well as the entire Armed Forces, is undergoing a transformation. The need to transform the way our military forces train, deploy and prosecute warfare is a direct reflection of the recognition that the world has changed and that new military capability must be brought to bear in order to defend our nation. The past 14 years since the fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the Cold War, the security environment has been largely characterized by previously unforeseen threats. "The emerging security challenges of the 21st century and the need to respond more rapidly and decisively across the full spectrum of operations requires that The Army transform itself."\(^3\) A sample of these threats include regional instability caused by would-be regional hegemonies no longer constrained by the bipolar world as seen in Iraq’s actions in 1990; ethnic cleansing involving tremendous amounts of noncombatants as seen in sub-Saharan Africa and the Balkans; terrorism and other asymmetric actions such as the attacks of 11 September 2001 and narco-terrorism in Colombia. The purpose of Army transformation is to change “the way we deploy, fight, sustain, and use information that will make [it] more strategically responsive and dominant across the spectrum of operations.”\(^4\)

When President George W. Bush spoke to the United States Military Academy graduating Class of 2002 he emphasized the importance of transformation to the soon to become Army Lieutenants with the following statement:

> Our security will require transforming the military you will lead – a military that must be ready to strike at a moment’s notice in any dark corner of the world. And our security will require all Americans to be forward-looking and resolute, to be ready for preemptive action when necessary to defend our liberty and to defend our lives.\(^5\)

The military force that is transforming to conduct the bidding of the Commander-in-Chief will require new ways of conducting warfare and thinking about national security. This
transformation will likely entail numerous changes in weapons systems as well as changes in doctrine and force development to meet the challenges of a new operational environment.

The Army’s plan for transforming itself hinges in large part on successful fielding of the OF. The OF will have the following characteristics:

The Objective Force is organized, manned, equipped, and trained to be more strategically responsive, deployable, agile, versatile, lethal, survivable, and sustainable across the full spectrum of military operations. The Objective Force is comprised of modular, scalable, flexible organizations for prompt and sustained land operations. It is able to transition quickly between changes in task, purpose, and directions, maneuvering into and out of contact without sapping operational momentum. Trained and equipped leaders and Soldiers at the lowest levels make decisions.

While the hardware aspect of transformation is routinely scrutinized and garners a great degree of emphasis due to its impact on the defense budget, we must ensure the people side of the effort receives its requisite amount of attention. The transformation of the Army is “a cultural, intellectual, physical change – a complete alteration of the Army as we know it today.” The Chief of Staff of the Army, General Erik K. Shenseki reinforced the need to focus on people when he stated at the 2002 Investment in America Forum Conference at West Point:

The new Army vision includes three key elements: People, Readiness, and Transformation. Of these three, “people” tops the list. The Army must do several things well. It must train its soldiers and provide outlets for personal growth and it must develop leaders. The latter is the key factor in making the Army a strong institution. Leadership is at the core of everything the Army does, yet at times the Army is “half a step” behind in the development of leaders.

Clearly, the Army must actively transform its systems and programs for the development of leaders to meet its vision.

LEADERSHIP AS A TRANSFORMATIONAL IMPERATIVE

FM 3-0, Operations, “establishes the Army’s keystone doctrine for full spectrum operations.” It describes the requirement to integrate the elements of combat power in order to achieve success on the battlefield. In describing the leadership element of combat power it states, “Leadership is key, and the actions of leaders often make the difference between success and failure, particularly in small units.” The emphasis placed on the importance of
leadership to ensure successful operations holds true not just for present day operations, but also for the future military force.

Changing technologies, particularly information related technologies, increasingly impacts the Army and how it fights. Information technology has the effect of flattening an organization to enable it to maximize the potential of networking capabilities. This organizational evolution is characterized by decentralized operations and role ambiguity for leaders attempting to control a changing environment. There is a greater need for leaders and leadership skills to enable an organization to make these transformational changes. When viewing the future through the looking glass of transformation, the Army must ensure it can satisfactorily meet the requirements of the basic elements of combat power. “Leadership remains the most essential dynamic of its combat power.”

While we cannot fully anticipate all forms of conflict in the future or possibly even design a force that will meet all the challenges of a future conflict, we can reasonably postulate that an enduring characteristic of future successful military operations will be successful leadership. The issue at hand then is how best to prepare the Army’s leaders for the challenges they will face as members of the OF. By examining the requisite skills needed to effectively lead the OF and evaluating plans to achieve these skills, we can then determine if the plan will adequately satisfy the transformation leader development goals.

The future battlefield that the OF is envisioned to encounter is frequently characterized by widely dispersed troops, volatile and complex in its impact on multiple aspects of warfare.

“Dispersion, combined with multinational operations and incessant media attention, will continue to put added pressure on the tactical leader to maintain a broader perspective and to be attuned to the strategic implications of tactical decisions. This environment creates specific leadership requirements for tactical leaders that must be developed at an early stage so that they are prepared to lead soldiers in the complex and ambiguous operations they will inevitably encounter.”

“The increased dispersion of troops across the battlefield creates a demanding situation for the leader… [and]… adds greater emphasis on the ability of the junior leader to make on-the-spot decisions with potentially significant implications for the overall operation.” It is this environment that will have to be addressed in the Army’s leader development program to ensure leader success. This developmental requirement is necessary at the lowest levels in order for those junior leaders to have the requisite skills to operate effectively.
LEADER DEVELOPMENT AND TRANSFORMING THE INSTITUTIONAL DOMAIN

“Leader Development is the deliberate, continuous, sequential and progressive process, based on Army values, that develops soldiers and civilians into competent and confident leaders capable of decisive action.”\textsuperscript{15}

The Training and Doctrine Command manual 350-10 prescribes institutional leader training and development. It defines Leader Development as ‘the process of developing or promoting the growth of confident, competent military and civilian leaders who understand and are able to exploit the full potential of present and future doctrine, organizations, technology, and equipment.’\textsuperscript{16}

The Army’s leader development program is based on the interaction of three pillars or developmental domains. “The three core domains that shape the critical learning experiences throughout a soldier’s and leader’s career are the operational, institutional, and self-development domains.”\textsuperscript{17} The operational domain is primarily centered on the experiences leaders receive during unit training and operational activities. The self-development domain is a much less structured training regimen that focuses on actions individual leaders take to enhance their skills and professional knowledge. The institutional domain focuses on training and preparing leaders to assume leadership roles in future assignments. The method of conducting institutional training is through formal schooling designed and programmed by the Army or Joint Services.\textsuperscript{18} Due to its limited scope, this examination of the OF leader development plan will primarily focus on the elements of the institutional domain for officer leader development. While the interaction of all domains provides the power and effectiveness of the leader development process, the institutional domain provides a clear direct linkage between the Army’s training strategies and desired leader attributes.

The institutional leader development domain is executed based on learning objectives determined by the leadership level or duties the officer is expected to undertake. As defined by TRADOC, the goal of the institutional domain is to produce leaders who can execute doctrine and strategy in a wide range of operational environments. In achieving the goal, the leader must be trained to develop flexible plans within the commander’s intent, provide direction and build cohesive teams all while integrating enablers provided by advanced technology. The institutional domain will also provide training products that enable leaders to continue their development while executing unit training or during self-development.\textsuperscript{19}

A basic essential assumption when evaluating the institutional pillar of the Army’s leader development process is the belief that leadership can be learned.\textsuperscript{20} Given this assumption, it
can be seen that if the leader training and education goals for developing the OF leader are valid, then the Army’s success in achieving its transformation objectives will be enhanced.

The Officer Education System (OES) provides branch specific and branch immaterial training for officers. OES training is conducted in multiple courses corresponding to an officer’s career timeline. The phases are: Precommission training, Officer Basic Course, Captains Career Course, Command and General Staff Officer Course, Advanced Military Studies Program, Army War College, and Pre-Command Courses. The purpose of these courses is to ensure an officer’s development throughout a career is continuous and sequential. Experiencing the OES process provides the officer the skills, knowledge, and ability to perform at each successive level of leadership.\textsuperscript{21}

The Army has made numerous post-cold war incremental improvements to OES. These changes include: modifying and shortening the Combined Arms Services Staff School and combining with the Officer Advanced Course to form the Captains Career Course; modifying the Command and General Staff Officers Course and School for Advanced Military Studies program; instituting the Basic Officer Leader Course on a pilot basis; improving TRADOC common core distance learning capabilities; and adopting the Contemporary Operational Environment\textsuperscript{22} into the curriculum at multiple levels. It has realized however, that a more comprehensive transformation of OES is required now.\textsuperscript{23}

Decisions on transforming OES are currently being developed by the Army. In May 2002 the Army Chief of Staff and other senior leaders were briefed on proposed changes to the institutional pillar of the leader development process. “TRADOC’s OES proposals are the transformation of the Officer Basic Course to a two-phased Basic Officer Leader Course (BOLC), the Captain’s Career Course to the Combined Arms Leader Course and Combined Arms Battle Command Course, and Command and General Staff Officer Course to Intermediate Level Education (ILE).”\textsuperscript{24} The Army subsequently announced the approval of the TRADOC recommendations in January 2003. The genesis of this decision was the May 2001 Army Training and Leader Development Panel (ATLDP) Officer Study that identified two major formative periods in an officer’s career development. These periods are the initial entry period, defined as pre-commissioning training through initial duty assignment, and training to prepare for field grade officer duties. The net effect of the change in OES is to produce more effectively prepared junior officers and to enable all field grade officers to benefit from a formal institutional training program.\textsuperscript{25}
COMPETENCIES NEEDED FOR OBJECTIVE FORCE LEADERS

“Leader Development and Soldiers are inextricably linked on our path to The Objective Force. Adaptive and self-aware leaders are essential to the employment of the Objective Force.”

—ATLDP Officer Study Report

In order to effectively evaluate the leader development process plan for the OF, the desired competencies that need to be trained in the institutional domain must be identified. The OF is envisioned to provide the ability to dominate “evolving, sophisticated threats with asymmetric capabilities maximizing the effectiveness of standoff while maneuvering on a non-contiguous distributed battlefield against an adaptive enemy.”

Future officers “must thrive in a complex environment marked by the challenge of high-intensity combat and the ambiguities inherent in stability operations and support operations.”

The complexity facing the OF leader will likely be a reflection of new circumstances and roles characterizing his mission. These will be manifested in changing tasks assigned to the military, difficult environments with varying degrees of legitimacy, changing organizational frameworks for military units, and increased diversity in the composition of the force.

The OF officer will, by necessity, require certain attributes or competencies in order to function effectively in the future environment.

Cognitive skills are essential to OF leaders. “Critical thinking and systems understanding allow the leader to examine elements in totality versus one at a time and remap the cognitive operational space. Cognitively complex leaders are future thinkers who can see second and third order effects in the midst of ambiguity.”

An officer must have the cognitive skills to enable him to be adaptive in a complex environment. Additional skills needed to succeed in an ambiguous, dynamic and complex environment are: anticipating, generating alternatives, and implementing new plans rapidly and efficiently.

The ATLDP report identified self-awareness and adaptability as “enduring competencies.”

“Adaptability is the ability to recognize changes to the environment, to determine what is new, what must be learned to be effective, and includes the learning process that follows that determination.”

“Self-awareness is the ability to assess abilities, determine strengths in the environment, and learn how to sustain strengths and correct weaknesses.”

These competencies are consistently used as guidelines for determining the type of leader needed for the OF. To enable an analysis of what training plan or methodology is best used to develop leaders with these competencies, it is necessary to identify their component parts.
Adaptability can also be viewed as the ability to synthesize ongoing activities in a way that facilitates action. The need to adapt to changing situations places a premium on “continually testing the environment and adapting accordingly. Learning is therefore shifted toward skills of rapid adaptation and away from skills of acting correctly within an expected environment. Therefore decision-makers move away from managing or minimizing recurring surprises, and toward the skills of investigating an unfolding mystery.” FM 7-0, Training the Force, states that adaptive leaders are “capable of sensing their environment, adjusting the plan when appropriate, and properly applying the proficiency acquired through training.”

Another view of adaptive leadership is that the leader characteristics include flexibility, creativity, political astuteness, and an ability to network with external contacts. This type of leader is seen to be able to facilitate organizational adaptation. This view of adaptive leaders is similar to the definition espoused by TRADOC. While discussing training goals to develop adaptive leaders, TRADOC defines adaptability as the “leader’s ability to succeed in situations of uncertainty, quickly make sense of complex environments, provide creative solutions in ambiguous situations and help others as well.”

As has been demonstrated with the leader competency of adaptability, there are many aspects to the competency of self-awareness. Self-aware leaders are “able to assess their abilities and identify strengths and weaknesses in an operational setting and to correct the latter.” This characteristic places a premium on the leader’s ability to recognize the situation at hand and make a relative evaluation of himself or his unit with respect to an ideal situation. It also implies that he has the wherewithal to act in order to remedy a deficiency.

TRADOC adopts a similar view by stating the OF self aware leader is able to make informed choices because he is “conscious of his identity, understands his emotions, strengths, weaknesses, needs, drives, as well as understands how these affect others.” This definition is somewhat limited to the leader and his view of himself. A more appropriate and functional definition for an officer should include awareness or focus on the status of the unit and its situation as well as himself. This broader definition would enable the officer to best evaluate risk during mission planning or execution as well as facilitate his placing the unit in the most favorable position possible based on the situation.

At the strategic level, a leader should be globally astute in order to understand how his actions or the actions of his unit will impact potentially worldwide issues. “This leader must have the knowledge and experience that will allow him/her to see beyond the organization.” While this view was developed while examining strategic level leaders, it should hold true for more junior leaders of the future given the changing dynamics of military involvement in complex
environments. These skill sets can be developed in the institutional pillar of leader development through study in such subjects as foreign languages, international relations, regional studies and culture. If the ability to recognize the importance of these competencies is developed early on in an officer’s career, it can more easily be continued in a process of lifelong learning.\textsuperscript{42}

Development of self-awareness can be enhanced, and should be pursued by the institutional pillar of leader development. “Lifelong learning and remediation must be seen by the leader as a normal necessity, not as an embarrassment. Absolutely key to this skill is the use of self-assessment tools, including 360-degree feedback surveys. If we have imbedded lifelong learning into our culture, self assessment will be continuous, and will require some portability of self assessment tools throughout the officer’s career.”\textsuperscript{43} It will be incumbent on the institutional domain of the leader development process to ensure officers are proficient in the skills of self-assessment to enable them to conduct accurate assessments of their units as well. The ultimate goal is to produce “culturally sensitive leaders capable of working in teams, grappling with moral quandaries, constantly adapting to shifting tasks, circumstances and organizational frameworks.”\textsuperscript{44}

THE OBJECTIVE FORCE INSTITUTIONAL TRAINING PLAN

The institution is a key enabler for unit readiness. It develops competent, confident, disciplined, and adaptive leaders and soldiers able to succeed in situations of great uncertainty. The institution provides the framework to develop future leadership characteristics that produce critical thinkers capable of full spectrum visualization, systems understanding, and mental agility.\textsuperscript{45}

—FM 7-0, Training the Force

The 22 November 2002 Pre-decisional Draft of TRADOC Pamphlet 350-7-0, Objective Force Doctrine, Training, and Leader Development, provides the blueprint for how the Army will transform itself into the OF. It describes the integration of developing doctrine, conducting training and developing OF soldiers and leaders.\textsuperscript{46} As of this writing, the document is not yet approved. However, it provides a valuable insight into how the Army intends to organize its future leader development process.

The projected OF officer will clearly need a greater skill set than the legacy force leader. Therefore, “the Army’s leader development process will require a greater level of depth, breadth and complexity to adequately prepare leaders to successfully function in increasingly challenging environments.”\textsuperscript{47} The Objective Force Task Force identified the need to transform the Army’s leader development process to emphasize “self-awareness, adaptability, and
interpersonal, conceptual, technical, tactical, mental, physical, and emotional competencies.\textsuperscript{48} To this end, the Army has correctly identified that it “must focus on building leader mental agility to recognize and resolve complex tactical dilemmas found in full spectrum operations with an adaptive, complex enemy in all terrain and all weather.”\textsuperscript{49}

This paper’s evaluation of the institutional domain of OF officer leader development focuses on OES. In accordance with TRADOC Regulation 350-10, OES course content will ensure officers are required to meet standards that include rapidly grasping changes in situation and conditions and demonstrating initiative.\textsuperscript{50} This set of standards for officer training is in synch with the need to train the competencies required of the OF leader, particularly that of adaptability. FM 7-0 reinforces the need for institutional leader development by stating, “OES develops officers who are self aware and adaptive to lead Army units to mission success.”\textsuperscript{61} It further complements the need to train OF leader competencies by describing the institutional Army as the element that “provides the framework to develop future leadership characteristics that produce critical thinkers capable of full spectrum visualization, systems understanding, and mental agility.”\textsuperscript{62}

Draft TRADOC PAM 350-7-0 discusses the two future scenarios that were used to develop the integrating concepts for the OF.\textsuperscript{53} The first scenario was Baku City, a combined arms urban operation. The second was Kura-Araks Valley, a scenario that involves a mounted formation conducting pursuit and exploitation operations in relatively open terrain. In both scenarios the leader development requirements mirrored the transformational leadership competencies discussed previously.\textsuperscript{54} The usefulness of using a scenario for analyzing future requirements lies in its ability to validate theory. Leader competencies such as adaptability and self-awareness are merely theoretical concepts until the Army can define, as it does in the aforementioned scenarios, how they are manifested into actions and how they interact with other operational aspects.

TRADOC PAM 350-7-0 indicates the need to teach what was previously thought of as senior leader competencies earlier in an officer’s career.\textsuperscript{55} This is driven by the recognition that on the complex decentralized battlefield of the future, junior leaders will likely face the situations, and require the skill sets, that current senior leaders face. “Objective Force small unit leaders must be proficient in operating in widely dispersed areas in integrated Combined Arms Teams.”\textsuperscript{66} COL William G. Kidd reinforces the thought that education must begin early and often in an officer’s career by recommending more emphasis on graduate degree programs and instructor assignments to help develop the strategic OF leader.\textsuperscript{57}
Recent decisions to modify OES reflect the need to modify an officer’s institutional training experience in order to develop the OF small unit leader. The Basic Officer Leader Course (BOLC) will replace the current Officer Basic Course (OBC) training model. BOLC will consist of three phases. Phase I is pre-commissioning training received in the commissioning source programs. Phase II is a leader lab that emphasizes common Army standards for small unit leadership. It directly enhances the OF combined arms employment concept by combining lieutenants of all branches into the same school. This phase also enhances the OF leader competencies of adaptability and self-awareness by integrating leadership situational training exercises and 270-degree leader assessments. Phase III will consist of branch specific training and will last between six to fourteen weeks depending on the officer’s branch assignment. The time an officer will spend in pre-assignment OES training will be nearly the same as in the current system. The intended benefit of the BOLC Model is to produce an officer that is more ready to lead small units upon arrival at his initial assignment.

The transformation of small unit leader officer development includes changing the captain level OES. The current program requires an officer to attend the Captain Career Course prior to taking an assignment that will enable him to command a company. The transformed captain OES program will be conducted in two parts, the Combined Arms Staff Course (CASC) and the Combined Arms Battle Command Course (CABCC).

CASC will consist of three weeks of training conducted at home station via Advanced Distributive Learning (ADL) using internet technology and two weeks of resident schooling. CASC is intended to provide specific staff skills tailored to a projected staff assignment and the unit commander will control officer attendance.

The purpose of CABCC is to prepare an officer to effectively command a company-sized unit. It will consist of four weeks of common core and branch specific training via ADL and four weeks of resident combined arms training at a branch school. The officer will then spend two weeks training under an Observer/Controller (O/C) at a Combat Training Center (CTC) to enhance his ability to plan and conduct training.

This new captain OES plan reduces the amount of time an officer is on temporary duty in a branch schoolhouse from 24 weeks to 6 weeks. The modular nature of CASC and CABCC due to use of a combination of ADL and resident training enables commanders to tailor the development process of their captains based on unit needs.

The second major phase of officer development is the preparation to assume field grade officer duties. The current field grade officer training program will change from the Command and General Staff Officers Course (CGSOC) model to the Intermediate Level Education (ILE)
model. ILE eliminates the CGSOC selection discrimination factor and enables all officers preparing to assume field grade level duties the ability to attend resident training structured to meet their particular career field needs. The ILE model incorporates ADL and resident training programs and provides the opportunity for all officers to be grounded in a common war-fighting doctrine. ILE will enhance OF operations by instituting a common high-level quality education program for all field grade officers.

**INSTITUTIONAL TRAINING PLAN CHALLENGES AND SHORTFALLS**

The current plan to transform the officer leader development process appears to be aggressive and synchronized with the development of the OF. However, it is not without several challenges and shortfalls that may prove problematic if not addressed. Issues with the implementation of the Officer Education System due to resource shortfalls, implications of reducing time spent in the institutional school system, determining which skills need to be taught by rank level, and identification of all necessary officer competencies will be discussed in this section.

TRADOC PAM 350-7-0 points out the inherent problem of integrating multiple concepts simultaneously. It clearly outlines those tasks that are not funded and describes the actions required to fully implement the OF development plan. Its identification of training enablers serves to demonstrate the magnitude of the task as well as provide decision makers and action staffs with a checklist of sorts to keep them on track. The importance of implementing resource decisions is clearly demonstrated when discussed in conjunction with the program requirements list. “Failure to fulfill these requirements will significantly degrade the ability to train the Objective Force to standard.” At the time of this writing, “none of the Force Operating Capabilities, or the DTLD strategic capabilities they represent, are adequately supported by ongoing, or planned Army Science and Technology research.” While the detailed planning effort found in TRADOC PAM 350-7-0 is commendable, the lack of resources is indicative of the difficulty the Army will encounter in traveling the Transformation Road to the OF.

The transformation of OES as discussed above does not specifically emphasize decision making as a critical OF competency. The role of the Army officer has always been largely defined by his duty to make proper decisions. It is highly likely that this duty will be retained in the OF. The fluid environment of the future “requires leaders at all levels … to place a premium on learning flexible and adaptable modes for processing decisions.” In summing up the direction the Joint Force must take to improve war-fighting capabilities, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, GEN Richard B. Myers, stated: “Finally, a faster decision-making process
must be fully realized based on …[the initiatives made by the Armed Forces to eliminate seams in its organizations and improvements in data sharing]. The result will be a decision-superior-force – one that makes the right battlefield decision faster than any enemy.\textsuperscript{65}

As exemplified in its operational scenario analysis, TRADOC PAM 350-7-0 repeatedly states that the purpose of OES is to teach officers “how to think” verses “what to think” and that we must develop leaders who can “rapidly transform information into decisive action.”\textsuperscript{66} However, decision-making is generally treated as an outcome of the combination of desirable leader attributes rather than a competency of its own. The complex environment facing the OF will require proficiency in action-based decision-making and should be a major training focus of OES. “Action-based decision-making moves away from resolving ambiguity and toward imposing clearer meaning on the situation.”\textsuperscript{67}

Training officers in action-based decision-making places emphasis “not on how to gather, analyze, and process information, but on how to actively make, change, interpret, and communicate information.”\textsuperscript{68} By not specifically emphasizing decision-making, there may be a tendency for the officer to focus on the technological enhancements provided to the OF as a means to achieve the competency of adaptability in ambiguous situations rather than as an enabler to allow him to make critical decisions. The volume of information available to OF leaders is projected to greatly exceed that of the current legacy force. Digital information systems will require extensive training on how to synthesize information and make proper tactical decisions. The OF officer must be trained to integrate systems generated information awareness into the military decision making process in order to fully realize the benefits of the OF’s information overmatch capabilities.

As discussed earlier, the need to produce junior officers capable of operating in the complex environment envisioned for the OF has caused the Army desire to enable younger officers to possess what were considered senior leader skills. TRADOC PAM 350-7-0 explicitly acknowledges this intent by stating, “The institutional training and education domain of leader development must educate Objective Force leaders in creative thinking and critical and reflective reasoning early on in their careers.”\textsuperscript{69} However, implementation of this objective within OES will be difficult given that the time officers spend in the institutional domain is finite. The Army’s challenge will be to balance the junior officer’s requirement to be proficient at complex technical tasks with the physical leadership attributes necessary to actually lead, motivate and inspire soldiers to perform on a dynamic and dangerous battlefield.

Given that OES time is finite, to significantly enhance or train officers with higher level skills “earlier”, we will either require longer time in OES or make up the difference in distributive
learning or other venues. Placing a greater amount of tasks into the operational domain of leader development will likely place a large burden on a unit’s collective training efforts. One purpose for distributed learning is to allow a soldier “to train for their next assignment while in their current unit.” This time requirement can easily take away from the officer’s ability to actually lead or command his unit. The officer’s commander, having not experienced this method of leader development himself, may not be willing to support this training if he perceives it will cause a potential shortfall in unit effectiveness or readiness.

One result of implementing CASC and CABCC is a significant reduction in the amount of time an officer will spend in branch schools. Shortening time in the institution is one of the intended outcomes of TRADOC’s education and training program transformation. While the intended benefits such as increasing stability by reducing time spent in the intuitional domain is desirable, there is a potential downside. The time spent in formal OES schooling provided the author with sufficient time to reinvigorate a physical fitness program that enabled him to surpass the standards normally maintained in a unit. Another significant benefit of attending formal schooling is the cross-fertilization, situational awareness, and familiarization of the Army that is gained by interacting with other officers for an extended period of time. These benefits will likely be eroded with the two-third reduction in face-to-face institutional training.

Another potential unintended effect of reducing over-all time spent in Institutional training is erosion of unit command climate related factors. The US Army War College Leadership and Climate Study Group, Class of 2003, conducted a study on improving Climate in the Army. In conducting the research for this project, it determined that unit climate had a profound impact on unit combat readiness. The relationship between unit climate and unit effectiveness will remain true for the Objective Force. The Objective Force White Paper recognizes this relationship by pointing out, “Leaders provide a command climate that supports initiative, innovation and risk-taking.” Teaching officers how to build good command climate should be a desired outcome of the institutional domain.

The climate study group found there are numerous methods to enhance the potential for a unit to have good command climate through the leader development process. The systemic leader development recommendations were focused on teaching climate measuring skills, analyzing results of climate related indicators, developing methods of improving climate, use of 360 degree evaluations and use of unit climate surveys. The overwhelming majority of the recommendations required face-to-face interaction with instructors or training facilitators within the institutional training base. Leadership practices impacting on climate are highly interpersonal in nature and require the ability to interact effectively with others. It was difficult
for the Leadership and Climate Study Group to envision training the critical interpersonal skills
needed for good command climate through a distributive learning environment. It did see,
however, the usefulness of using the Warrior Knowledge Network as a tool to provide resources
to leaders to help interpret climate related issues and suggest solutions. The user of the
information would necessarily have to possess a baseline level of knowledge of the subject
matter in order to effectively use the site. This knowledge base is likely best gained while
attending formal OES schooling.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE STUDY

The Army has taken great steps in ensuring the transformation to the OF will succeed.
The Objective Force Task Force was created as the action agency with responsibility to
orchestrate the Army’s efforts to develop and implement the OF. It executes the vital role of
synchronizing the major activities associated with the Objective Force Development. This effort
includes ensuring the Army Leader Development action plans meet OF requirements. The
Army’s effort to resource an element that can remain forward looking is vital to achieving a fully
integrated planning effort and must be continued in order to continue improving the OF long
after initial implementation.

The detailed analysis and thought put into TRADOC PAM 350-7-0 is readily apparent. It
represents an attempt to place in one comprehensive document all aspects of developing the
OF. Doctrine, Training, Organization and Leader Development are integrated in a manner that
is intended to produce the force as envisioned by the Objective Force Task Force. It is
particularly remarkable given the emerging concepts nature of the enterprise. The work put into
ensuring supporting documents truly do support over-all concepts that are constantly being
refined is daunting, but necessary. The Army must ensure the critical elements of the plan are
funded. It should continue to recognize the need for leader development to be fully integrated
as an equal to doctrine, unit training and organizational development.

The identification of adaptability and self-awareness is appropriate for the OF leader’s
required attributes. However, jumping exclusively on the ‘adaptability and self-awareness’
bandwagon to define the principle OF leader competency requirement will be shortsighted. A
great deal of the technological advances currently employed as well as those envisioned and
being developed for the future are intended to enhance the speed and accuracy of decision
making. The skills officers require when using these decision-making aids should be trained in
the institutional domain of OES. These skills will complement the desire to teach officers how to
analyze the situation and his unit. The leader competency of decision-making should also be elevated to the same level as adaptability and self-awareness.

The Army should avoid using catch or buzzword phrases such as “how to think verses what to think” when describing its leader development program objective. We should use more descriptive and concrete language such as: quickly evaluate a complex situation from multiple points of view and determine proper actions, then take appropriate action through instructions to subordinates, recommendations to superiors, and/or personal action. The OF leader will need to possess the qualities of adaptability, self-awareness and translate these qualities into making proper decisions based on the situation at hand. The analysis of a complex environment will necessitate adaptability on the leader’s part. His ability to examine the problem from multiple points of view with a view towards an accurate assessment of his unit demonstrates his need for self-awareness. The ability to make proper decisions, particularly in a compressed time frame, places a premium on decision-making competencies.

Enabling systems will allow the OF to increase tempo in a flatter organization. This change will impact the leader function of decision-making. While the systems will enhance the speed by which a leader can access the information required to facilitate making a decision, it will not necessarily enhance the leader’s ability to make a sound decision. Even though the systems will not be available to conduct hands-on training and familiarization of the manipulation methods will suffer, we must begin training our future leaders on how to make quality decisions in an environment that is envisioned for the OF.

Web-based situational awareness systems and network centric command and control systems will be integral to the OF operational framework. Proficient manipulation of these systems will enable leader and OF unit success. The DTLD plan recognizes this tie to technology and generally targets 2010 for implementation of training systems. The OF has a developmental target date of 2009. We cannot wait until the enabling systems are available to start training the skills, knowledge and abilities required of the OF officer. We need to begin training the lieutenants of today so that they, as OF company commanders, will be able to function effectively on time.

The problem with adding more educational goals and experiences to the career progression path of officers is that each program takes time. In order to realize the benefits of increased educational opportunities, the Army may need to extend the career timelines for officers. By extending the amount of time an officer can expect to spend in each rank or grade, we can easily increase his relative knowledge base. A more seasoned captain who has
experienced increased educational and experiential opportunities will likely be a more effective company level OF leader than one who is junior.

Another solution may be to increase the rank structure for OF leaders vice those associated with legacy force leadership levels. For example, the OF company sized element could be commanded by a major instead of a captain, a colonel could command the battalion. Numerous recent unit deployments require a separate command and control node headed by a more experienced leader. This senior leader and staff are responsible for coordinating with external elements in order to free up the executing unit leader. This results in rapid execution and decision-making at the tip of the spear. If the OF command and control enablers can streamline this function, then it is reasonable to conclude the same senior leader’s focus could shift and his experience could significantly enhance the unit performance at the tip of the spear.

The Army should develop an assessment process to specially select officers for training and eventual assignment to an OF unit. Officers already possessing the characteristic traits needed for the OF will require less training than those who need to develop the traits either in the institutional domain or later in the organizational domain. TRADOC Pam 350-7-0’s discussion of assessment centers primarily on enhancing the feedback process through counseling and coaching in order to enhance a leader’s self-awareness. It does not integrate a pre-screening type of assessment process to assist in the placement of specially qualified officers into OF assignment preparation training. To facilitate an assessment process, the Army will need to develop metrics to measure the desired characteristics. Potential OF officers could be measured for appropriate levels of mental capacity, emotional stability, physical fitness and psychological compatibility. The Ranger Regiment currently uses a similar assessment program involving psychological, intelligence and physical testing followed by a stressful appearance before a board of senior rangers who make the final assessment determination. A similar assessment program for OF officer placement may create a sense of favoritism within the Army; however, if the standards and metrics are well understood and fairly implemented, the benefits gained will greatly outweigh any appearance of favoritism.

Further research needs to be conducted to determine appropriate personnel policies to complement the new OES and leader development processes. The personnel system requirements and career pattern expectations should be adjusted to enable the OF leader development plan to be successful. The full integration of leader development with the other organizational aspects of transformation is important enough to subordinate any artificial personnel policies.
The need for a comprehensive leader development program that teaches Army officers the skills necessary to the OF success is accentuated by the fact these skills will have to be taught in conjunction with the skills necessary to operate in the current environment as well. Learning these essential skills needs to be a part of Army officer culture.

“Military transformation depends on cultural acceptance – convincing an institution to accept new ways of doing business. Harnessing innovative organizational and cultural changes is a stumbling block in corporate America and even more so within DOD. Sometimes it has required a generation to make improvements, even when they are recognized as being in the best interests of the Armed Forces. Technology advances faster than the ability of the human mind to accept it. … The challenge of military transformation is more cultural than technological.”

The institutional pillar of the leader development program can provide the link to enable the Army culture to adapt and accept transformation efforts. In order to do so, we must begin training our future OF leaders now to develop the necessary skills, as well as the culture, that will embrace technological innovations designed to enhance war-fighting capability.

The power of information systems and the potential of distributive learning are seemingly limitless given the speed of technological advances in the past few years. However, we must be careful not to become too enamored with technological solutions to all military programs. The face-to-face interaction of experienced leaders and aspiring leaders within the Army institutional training base is invaluable. We may not know the full value of the interaction until we reduce it too far. When discussing this aspect of proposed changes to the leader development system, GEN Shenseki “emphasized the importance of the talking and interaction with others that occurs in resident training [and stated] we can’t lose that.”

The Army will need to conduct extensive preparation to ensure successful implementation of distributed learning. Success of distributed learning is largely a function of students’ ability to adapt to interaction via media and courseware design and monitoring. “Trainers must address barriers inherent in distance learning by incorporating the following into at-distance instruction: increased student-to-instructor feedback, more interactivity, highly structured learning activities to ensure distance learners do not lose track of where they are, and highly visual presentations.” Additionally, assuming OES largely based on distributed learning can cover the same amount of information in less time may be faulty. Classes conducted in a distributed fashion have been found to "require approximately two to four times as much facilitative interaction as a more traditionally delivered lecture course." Officers, both students and
instructors, will need to become familiar and comfortable with distributed learning vice classroom instruction. Commanders will likewise need to become knowledgeable with distributed learning concepts in order to facilitate the institutional domain of leader development and to fully support OES.

Additional study should be undertaken to determine the potential impact of relying on extensive distributed learning venues. Over-reliance on distributive learning may result in uneven achievement of standards given the lack of personal supervision by a qualified instructor. Implementation of the program may be uneven across the force if all leaders are not fully supportive. Mechanisms must be designed and emplaced to standardize the distributed learning portion of OES.

Any substantive changes to the leader development system should be accompanied with an education element that strives to inform the battalion and brigade level commanders. These commanders have tremendous influence over the majority of leaders in the Army. The senior leadership of the Army charges these commanders with the responsibility of mentoring and nurturing junior officers. They must be attuned to changing paradigms in the leader development process so that they can better advise and prepare their subordinates.

All leaders must understand changes in standards of selection and attendance to Army schools as well as changing expectations of developmental goals within the operational assignments domain of leader development. Only by understanding the leader development process can an officer effectively manage his development. The Army has made tremendous strides in educating the force on transformation through the messages from the Objective Force Task Force. It needs to ensure the message describing the accompanying leader development process implementation plan is also transmitted and understood by its commanders.
ENDNOTES


10 Ibid, 4-7.


16 Department of the Army, Institutional Leader Training and Education TRADOC Regulation 350-10 (Fort Monroe, VA: U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, 12 August 2002), 14.

17 FM 7.0, 1-5.

18 Explanation of the Army Leader Development program is paraphrased from FM 7-0, 1-5.

19 Summarized goals of Institutional Training taken from TRADOC Regulation 350-10, 16-17.


21 Officer Education System is summarized from TRADOC Regulation 350-10, 33-42.

22 The Contemporary Operational Environment (COE) is the Army’s common depiction of the threats that exist today and into the near future, to the year 2020. Establishment of the COE provides a common reference to enable Combat Training Centers and institutional training bases to evolve in order to better replicate current and future threats.


26 Riggs, 3.


28 ATLDP, OS-3.


32 ATLDP, OS-3
34 Ibid, 6.
35 dt ogilvie and Frances Hauge Fabian, 74.
36 FM 7-0, 1-7.
38 Department of the Army, Objective Force Doctrine, Training and Leader Development Plan (Pre-Decisional Draft), TRADOC Pamphlet 350-7-0 (Fort Monroe, VA: U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, 22 November 2002), C-4.
40 TRADOC PAM 350-7-0, C-4.
41 Kidd, 14.
42 The linkage of early liberal arts education to developing competencies needed by senior leaders is discussed in Kidd, 15.
43 Ibid, 12.
44 Boas Shamir and Eyal Ben-Ari, 38.
45 FM 7-0, 1-7.
46 TRADOC PAM 350-7-0, i-ii.
47 Horner, 84.
49 TRADOC PAM 350-7-0, 2-7.
50 TRADOC Regulation 350-10, 17.
51 FM 7-0, 1-8.
TRADOC developed two tactical scenarios with distinctive operational environments in order to test potential OF employment concepts and determine the impact of operational dilemmas on doctrine, training or leader development requirements. The Baku City scenario involves OF elements operating with special operations forces and requiring joint, interagency and multinational coordination in a complex urban environment. The Kura-Araks Valley scenario enabled the OF to fight a mounted exploitation and pursuit operation requiring it to rapidly develop a dynamic situation against an asymmetric threat. These two operations while similar in complexity were significantly different enough to enable TRADOC to identify specific OF characteristics needed to operate successfully. A complete explanation of these scenarios and the resulting analysis can be found in: TRADOC Pamphlet 350-7-0, 2-12 to 2-15.

TRADOC PAM 350-7-0, 2-15.

Ibid, 3-8.

Ibid, 3-8.


270-degree assessments are defined as assessments involving input from superiors, peers and self. Due to the fact BOLC students do not have subordinates, the subordinate input associated with 360-degree assessments is not available.


Ibid, Slides 8-11.


TRADOC PAM 350-7-0, 4-1.

Ibid, H-5.


TRADOC PAM 350-7-0, 2-15.

dt ogilvie and Frances Hauge Fabian, 71.

Ibid, 76.

TRADOC PAM 350-7-0, C-4.
The author, while performing the duties as the Ranger Regiment Deputy Commander, was responsible for implementing the Ranger Assessment and Selection Program for all company grade officers and all non-commissioned officers of the grade staff sergeant and above.


Elliot Rosner <elliot.rosner@hqda.army.mil>, “OES Brief to CSA,” electronic mail message to James B. Gunlicks <james.gunlicks@hqda.army.mil>, 6 Feb 2002.


Kochtanek, 287.
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