THE ITALIAN ARMY’S ROLE IN HOMELAND SECURITY

by

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ITALIAN ARMY

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The views expressed in this academic research paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Government, the Department of Defense, or any of its agencies.

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### The Italian Army's Role in Homeland Security

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Since the unification of the peninsula, the Italian Army has been actively involved in homeland security operations. In particular, the Army’s role dramatically increased in 1992, when the Italian Government decided to employ some thousands of soldiers in Sicily, to cooperate with the State police and the “Carabinieri” in opposing the local organized crime. The purpose of this research is to analyze the different homeland security operations carried on by the Italian Army, drawing out from them the lessons learned and to find how these experiences could be utilized to face the threats posed by the new international strategic environment of international terrorism, failed states and rogue states.
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PREFACE

During the second half of the thirteenth century, the Italian island of Sicily was under the
domination of the French prince Charles the 1st of Angio‘. The 31st of March 1282, in front of
the Holy Spirit church, in Palermo, at the end of the evening “Vespri” celebration, a group of
French soldiers pretended to search the people, looking for weapons. In particular, one of these
soldiers was very nasty with a woman and as a result a brawl started and the French soldiers
were killed. Afterward, the whole people of Palermo rose against the French and Charles the 1st
was forced to abandon the city and, by mid April of the same year, the whole island. Since that
time, “Vespri Siciliani” has represented the Italian people’s will to fight against tyranny and the
injustice. For these reasons, in 1992, launching the largest Army homeland security operation
since the end of the II World War – with the initial deployment of 9,000 soldiers – to cooperate
with the Police Forces in the fight against the organized crime in Sicily, the Italian Army General
Staff decided to give it the name of “Vespri Siciliani.” Operation “Vespri Siciliani” – which ended
after six years and with more than 150,000 officers, non-commissioned officers and soldiers
deployed in Sicily – has given to the Italian Army a large experience about how to operate in
homeland defense, to assure, in cooperation with the Police Forces, the citizens’ security. This
is a capability that is certainly helpful in the fight against the dangerous threats of the twenty-first
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THE ITALIAN ARMY’S ROLE IN HOMELAND SECURITY

“The difference between the internal security and the external security are today almost inexistent. The distinction between combat operations and crisis response operations, between peace support operations and war and, not last, the differences between the threats to the internal security and the threats to the national vital interests, are so feeble that we are required to think and to organize our Armed Forces in a different way.”

—Gen. Goffredo Canino
former Chief of Staff of the Italian Army

“The Army intervention in a situation of internal crisis is completely adequate to the fundamental role of the Democratic Countries’ Armies, as the case of Italy, which are the expression of the national community and have been established to assure, as a primary task, the people’s security.”

—Gen. Bonifazio Incisa di Camerana
former Chief of Staff of the Italian Army

INTRODUCTION

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The employment of the Army for homeland security started soon after the unification of Italy, when the Italian Army was employed from 1860 to 1870 in the South of the peninsula to eradicate the “brigandage”, a phenomenon which started as a particular kind of resistance against laws and rules imposed by the new Italian Government. Other times, in the nineteenth century, the Italian Army was employed as a police force, in order to maintain internal order; in some occasions, regrettably, it clashed with the protesters, as happened in Milan on May 7, 1898, when General Fava-Beccaris ordered Army units to open fire against the population.

Looking at the recent history of Italy, since the end of World War II the Army has been employed several times in homeland security operations (see on Table 1: Italian Army Homeland Security operations since 1945). This role was made official by law in 1978, when Law 382, “Major regulations about military discipline,” stated in article 1 that the Armed Forces “have to contribute to the defense of the free national institutions.” It was a particular moment in the history of the Italian Republic, menaced by the “Red Brigades,” an internal, political left-oriented, terrorist organization, which operated with the scope to establish, through a people’s revolution, a communist regime in Italy. The “Red Brigades” were defeated in the mid eighties,
mainly by infiltrating police officers into the organization itself, while the use of the Army was limited to a cooperation with the Police Forces during the kidnapping of Aldo Moro, the political secretary of the Christian Democratic Party.\(^7\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mission</th>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Area of operation</th>
<th>Operation’s Typology</th>
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<tr>
<td>Area control</td>
<td>1945-1950</td>
<td>Sicily</td>
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<td>Counter-terrorism</td>
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<td>Infrastructure control</td>
<td>1975-1976, 1978-1979</td>
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<td>Infrastructure control</td>
<td>1991</td>
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<td>Immigration control</td>
<td>1991</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Area control (operation</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>Sardinia</td>
<td>Indirect support to Police Forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>“Forza Paris”)</td>
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<td>Area control (operation</td>
<td>1992-1998</td>
<td>Sicily</td>
<td>As auxiliary Police Force</td>
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<td>“Vespri Siciliani”)</td>
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<td>Infrastructure control</td>
<td>1993-1995</td>
<td>Marche</td>
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<td>Italian-Slovenian border</td>
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<td>1998-1999</td>
<td>Southern regions</td>
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<td>2000</td>
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<td>Infrastructure control</td>
<td>2001-ongoing</td>
<td>Whole Italian territory</td>
<td>Direct support to Police Forces</td>
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**TABLE 1. ITALIAN ARMY HOMELAND SECURITY OPERATIONS SINCE 1945**

Until the eighties, the Italian Army contributed to the nation’s internal security by acting as a limited, supporting force, while the active roles and the contact with the population were
exclusively a police force responsibility. It was only in 1992 that the Army was directly involved, with a large number of soldiers, to guarantee the Italian people’s internal security.

THE TURNING POINT

The “mafia,” was born as a criminal organization at the beginning of the nineteenth century, taking advantage of the particular social condition of the Sicily, whose population was divided between rich, noble landlords and poor, illiterate farm-workers. Between these, a number of brutal people, organized into groups, whose activity took advantage of the situation through extortions. The first judicial document which refers to “mafia” is dated 1837. In the seventies, the “mafia” started to be involved in the international drug traffic and utilized the international bank system for making available its financial resources. In the same period, the “mafia” started to kill anyone who represented an obstacle for its criminal activities: judges, police officers, politicians and even journalists who wanted to inform public opinion. In summer 1992, the “mafia” killed two judges (Giovanni Falcone on May 23, and Paolo Borsellino on July 19), who had started to fight this criminal organization through a new investigative approach, directed against their illegal monetary flows. Because of their success in fighting the “mafia,” they represented, and still represent, a symbol of the national will to defeat this criminal organization.

These brutal events, which caused the death of the two judges, Falcone’s wife and eight police officers (see Figure 1), forced the Italian Government to assume the initiative and show the will to oppose organized crime by using any available means. In a ministerial meeting, on July 24, 1992, the Italian Prime Minister Giuliano Amato decided to deploy in Sicily 9,000
soldiers, in order to increase dramatically the number of police officers available to fight the “mafia.” On July 25, while the first Army unit – from the airborne Brigade “Folgore” – was arriving in Palermo, the Government approved decree-law 349,\textsuperscript{12} giving to the soldiers a particular status which allowed them to act independently, as police officers.

That solution, something absolutely new for Italy, was proposed by Gen. Goffredo Canino, the Italian Army Chief of Staff of the time, and supported by the Police Chief, the Prefect Giuseppe Parisi, in order to give to the Army units more autonomy, the possibility to operate according to their own training and, in general, in order to grant more efficacy to the Army intervention. The operation’s coordination would have been maintained, in any case, by the local government authority.\textsuperscript{13}

**TYPES OF HOMELAND SECURITY OPERATIONS**

**Classification**

As a first step, it is important to clarify words (see Figure 2). Referring to the Italian Army doctrine\textsuperscript{14} and to the U.S. Joint doctrine,\textsuperscript{15} the U.S. concept of homeland security has its equivalent in the so called Italian Army “presence and surveillance” mission. Inside the presence and surveillance we can find:

- “Territorial defense,” the equivalent of homeland defense.
“Territorial control,” the equivalent of civil support, and in particular, military support to civilian law enforcement agencies, military assistance to civil disturbances and some of that is military assistance to civil authorities.16

As stated, the operation “Vespri Siciliani” was the first territorial control operation in which the Italian Army personnel operated as police officers. In previous occasions, the Army operated as a supporting force, with soldiers working under direct and strict control of police officers, who were, actually, responsible for the operation’s conduct. A further kind of support is to employ Army units to control, by developing military exercises, particular areas of the country which are uninhabited and very difficult to access.

According to that, it is possible to identify three different categories of territorial control operations carried out by the Italian Army:

- Operations as an auxiliary police force.
- Direct support to the national police forces.
- Indirect contribution to assure a secure environment.

Operations as an Auxiliary Police Force

This is the case in which Italian Army personnel operate as police officers. The decision is taken by the national Government, which confers to the military – with a specific law – this particular status for a definite area and time.

This status consents the military to operate independently, as an auxiliary police force. They are allowed to identify people and, if required by the situation, to search persons and vehicles for weapons and explosives. The same status allows the soldiers who are witnesses to a crime or an attempt to commit a crime which put at risk the people’s safety and/or the security of the infrastructures under police’s vigilance, to arrest the criminals and put them under the control of the police forces in the shortest possible time.17

The responsibility to conceive, organize and carry out the operations belongs to the Army chain of command, and the units are employed according to Army tactical procedures. The coordination with the police forces is obtained in a particular board: the local District Joint Committee for internal security, directed by the District Prefect (national Government representative). The District Prefect is the authority in charge of validating of the rules of engagement.18

Direct Support to the National Police Forces

This is the case in which Italian Army personnel operate as supporting force, in direct conjunction with the police forces. The decision to employ Army units is taken by both the
Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of the Interior, according with standard cooperation procedures.19

Because military personnel do not have police officer status, every single Army unit or element operating independently must include a police officer. The responsibility to conceive and organize the operations belongs to the police chain of command. Army commanders could only integrate these orders with additional, detailed rules of engagement. These additional rules have the aim to avoid that Army units carry out tasks not suitable to their capabilities and training. Normally, Army units do not have to be employed below platoon level, to ensure the presence on the ground of an Army commander with adequate experience and professional skills. The rules of engagement are validated by the police authority, which in fact is the only responsible authority, in this particular situation, of the operations.20

**Indirect contribution to assure a secure environment**

This is the case in which the Italian Army contributes to assure a secure environment by carrying out training and exercises in areas which are utilized by organized crime as sanctuaries. Exercises of area-interdiction and counter-area-interdiction, with large number of soldiers deployed on the ground, could reduce the freedom-of-action of criminals involved in kidnapping, livestock theft and arson.

The decision to employ Army units, as in the previous case, is taken by both the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of the Interior, but because the Army units do not have to carry out police operations, the responsibility to conceive and organize the activities belongs to the Army chain of command. Sometimes, in order to face particular situations, the trained units could include soldiers from the “Arma dei Carabinieri,” a unique Italian force, which is both military police and civilian police force.21

**INSIDE THE OPERATIONS**

**OPERATION “VESPRI SICILIANI,” JULY 19, 1992 TO JULY 8, 1998**22

**Mission**

Operation “Vespri Siciliani” was the first and major example of the employment of the Army as auxiliary police force. The mission started the night between July 19 and 20, 1992, when 170 men and 7 CH-47 Army helicopters operated with the police forces to move 63 high-profile detainees from the Palermo’s prison (Sicily) to the more secure Pianosa Island prison, in the middle of the Tyrrhenian Sea. During the coming week, more than 400 soldiers were used
to reinforce the external security of some Sicilian prisons and the Justice Palace of Palermo. On July 25, the Italian Government decided to deploy additional troops to Sicily, in order to give to the Sicily Military Headquarters Commanding General a total availability of 9,000 men.

The soldiers, after receiving police officer status, got the mission to guarantee in cooperation with the police forces:

- An in-depth territorial control.
- The security of specific buildings and infrastructures.

The units operated under the responsibility of their own commanders and acted according to their particular tactical procedures.

**Participants**

The operation “Vespri Siciliani” started with three brigade headquarters – one of which is home-based in Sicily – and 9,000 men from four different brigades. After a while, the Army presence settled at about 6,000 soldiers and, from July 1997 to the mission’s end at about 4,000 men. In six years, the Army employed in Sicily a total of 150,500 men:\(^{23}\)

- 12,050 officers.
- 12,400 non-commissioned officers.
- 126,050 enlisted.

All the nineteen brigades, at that time on the Italian Army’s Order of Battle, and their units were employed in the operation, on a 60-day tour based cycle. These numbers look very impressive when compared with the 20,000 men who are served in seven years of operation “Stabilization Force/Implementation Force” (SFOR/IFOR) in the Balkans.\(^{24}\)

**Command and control organization**

The Army units participating in operation “Vespri Siciliani” were under the operational command of the Sicily Military Headquarters Commanding General. On the ground, the area of operation was divided into three sectors (Eastern, Central and Western; see Figure 3), with brigade headquarters in charge of each of them. During the last year of operation (from July 1997 to July 1998) the sectors were reduced to two, by unifying the Central and the Western sectors (see Figure 4).

The operational link with the regular police forces was established at Sector Headquarters level with the Districts of Palermo (Western sector) and Catania (Central and Eastern sectors), which acted as coordinating authority toward the other sectors Districts (see Figure 5). An Army Commander representative was included in the Joint Committee for internal security of the mentioned two districts.
Activities

The activities carried out by Army units were a series of actions, later standardized by specific regulations.\textsuperscript{25} In particular (see Table 2 for detailed data),\textsuperscript{26} we had:

- Surveillance of specific infrastructures and buildings.
- Area and road patrols.
- Mop up of rural areas.
- Checkpoints.
- Area security, to facilitate police operations.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activities</th>
<th>#</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
<td># of buildings under surveillance</td>
<td>153</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infrastructures inspected</td>
<td>5,121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Area patrols</td>
<td>21,514</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Road controls</td>
<td>24,456</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mop up</td>
<td>1,588</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Checkpoints</td>
<td>14,609</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Area security operations</td>
<td>786</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Helicopter hours flown</td>
<td>2,966</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE 2. OPERATION “VESPRI SICILIANI”: ACTIVITIES
As a result, in six years of activity, Army units:

- Checked 813,390 persons and 665,426 vehicles.
- Inspected 62,975 edifices and infrastructures.
- Arrested 1,225 persons.
- Confiscated 168 weapons and 3,113 kilos of explosives and ammunitions.

Other aspects

If the operation “Forza Paris,” as will be described later, was the first massive deployment of Army units in a different area from the Cold War traditional one (Italian Eastern border), the
“Vespri Siciliani” gave the Army units the opportunity to experience the deployment and the re-deployment phase of a military operation. These experiences were very important to later carry out peace support operations in Africa and in the Balkans.

But, more important, the operation “Vespri Siciliani” gave the whole Army an opportunity to experience how to operate in an urban environment characterized by a large presence of civilians, and how to develop an interagency attitude, working together with local government and political authorities, and civilian police forces.

OPERATION “DOMINO,” 13 NOVEMBER 2001-ONGOING

Mission

Operation “Domino” is both the last example of the employment of the Army in direct support to the police forces and how the Army is currently contributing to the War on Terrorism on the Homeland, enhancing the people’s security and giving to the police the opportunity to focus on investigation activities. The mission was approved by the Government on October 2001, according to the Law 128 (March 26, 2001). The operation started on November 13, 2001 and continues.

Participants

Initially, the Government authorized the employment of 4,000 soldiers, reduced to about 2,000 by April 2002. The units involved in the operation are mainly manned with short-term volunteers (one year), in order to maintain the units manned with long-term volunteers and regular soldiers available for NATO (Balkans) and Coalition (Afghanistan) commitments.

Command and control organization

Because the operation involved the whole Italian territory (40 districts currently), no specific command and control organization has been established. The units are under the authority of their ordinary commanders. Responsible for the operation is the Operational Land Forces Commanding General. The contacts with the District Prefects are carried out under the authority of both the Northern and the Southern Military Headquarters (which can act directly or delegate the coordinating activity to subordinate Commands), the two Army Command responsible for all the Army operations conducted on Homeland.

Activities
The Army units involved in operation “Domino” have the responsibility to guarantee the security of civilian airports, and both NATO and United States Armed Forces installations. The surveillance is conducted by patrols and checkpoints. According to the rules of engagement, the military are allowed to use the minimum necessary force to accomplish their mission. Because they do not have a police force status, they can not search people and vehicles.

OPERATION “FORZA PARIS,” JULY 15 TO SEPTEMBER 22, 1992

Mission

Operation “Forza Paris” is the classic example of the Army’s employment to support indirectly the police forces, by contributing to the establishment of a secure environment. The operation was decided after the kidnapping and the crippling of an adolescent in Sardinia. Farouk Kassam, aged four and son of an Arab entrepreneur living and working in Sardinia, was the last of a large number of persons kidnapped by a Sardinian criminal organization. The boy was hidden for more than six months in the “Barbagia”, a complex and difficult area, both on geographic and social aspects, near the city of Nuoro.

What pushed the Government to act was the public indignation caused by the child’s mutilation, which was designed to force his family to pay the ransom. The mission given to the Army was to:

- Reduce the freedom-of-action of the local criminals.
- Socialize with the local people, who were not really used to the military presence.
- Show the government’s will to maintain control over the Homeland, by conducting counter-area-interdiction training into an area of about 1,400 square miles, and developing social and public utility activities for a two month period.

Participants

The operation “Forza Paris” involved Army units from five different brigades, with 8,000 men, 2,000 tactical vehicles and 3,000 tons of material totally deployed. The daily presence on the ground was of about 5,000 soldiers.

Command and control organization

As already underlined, in this operational situation – indirect support to the police forces – the command and control authority belongs to the Army chain of command. For the operation “Forza Paris,” the units were under the operational command of the Sardinia Military Headquarters Commanding General, who availed himself of an operational center directed by
his Deputy. The area of operations was divided into two sectors, at brigade level (sector headquarters). Each sector headquarters was allowed to employ a Carabinieri company, to ensure the presence of a police officer at platoon level. An information link with the civilian authorities was established by the Sardinia Military Headquarters Operational Center.

Activities

During the two months of the operation “Forza Paris,” the Army units were involved in both military training and public utility activities. The military training included:

- Counter-area-interdiction exercises at company level.
- Reconnaissance patrols and deployment marches.
- Live-fire exercises at platoon level.

According to an U.S. Army officer who participated to the mission, as a result of the operation “Forza Paris,” violent crime in the area dropped 88%, arson 53% and the illegal use of explosives 76%, when compared with the same period of the previous year. During this period, the Geographic Military Institute conducted in the area a mapping campaign, in order to update the area’s maps.

As public utility activities, the engineer and the combat service support units carried out:

- Road repairs.
- Water delivery.
- Medical assistance and disinfestation activities.

In 45 days, the Army employed in public utility activities a total of 3,230 men and 53 vehicles. A unique activity was the more than 2,000 blood-donations from the soldiers.

Other aspects

As already mentioned, a particular aspect of the operation “Forza Paris” was the deployment phase, which tested the Army’s ability to rapidly deploy large units. The time between the activation order and the units’ arrival in Sardinia was no longer than a week. One has to think that at that time, the Army was mainly home-based near the Eastern border, on a Cold War posture, where the major training areas were. So, the Army had no reason to organize and train for large deployments. To deploy to Sardinia the units participating in the operation “Forza Paris” 65 used both military and civilian flights and 16 ferryboat trips.

BORDER CONTROL OPERATIONS

Between 1993 and 1995, during the civil war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Italian Army conducted two border control operations, one on the Italian-Slovenian border (Operation
“Testuggine”) and the other on the Adriatic coastline, facing Albania (Operation “Salento”). The purpose of the operations was to control the illegal immigration flow from the former Yugoslavia area (see Figure 6).

These operations are important, in order to secure borders against the threats of international terrorism and to protect the Homeland from the problems that mass illegal migration could bring.

FIGURE 6. BORDER CONTROL OPERATIONS

**Operation “Testuggine,” August 16, 1993 to February 28, 1995**

Operation “Testuggine” started in the Summer of 1993, to intensify the actions against the illegal cross-border of people and weapons from the former Yugoslavia. The mission was conducted by patrolling the border and establishing checkpoints on the main access paths. The soldiers operated with a police force status.

A total of 6,400 soldiers participated in the operation, with a daily presence on the ground of about 400 men. The units operated under their usual commands. The coordination with the police forces occurred at District Joint Committee for internal security level. In eighteen months of activity, the Army units:

- Checked 45,113 persons and 38,748 vehicles.
- Arrested 1 person.
Confiscated 1 weapon and 1 vehicle.

**Operation “Salento,” May 10 to November 3, 1995**

The second operation that we want to examine is operation “Salento,” conducted during the Summer of 1995 in Puglia – the Italian region which faces Albania – to stop the illegal entry of Albanians. The mission, like operation “Testuggine”, was conducted by patrolling the coastline and establishing checkpoints on the main roads which move from the coast to the interior. The soldiers operated with a police force status.

On the ground, the Army deployed daily 650 soldiers. During the six months of operation “Salento” the following were utilized:
- 208 officers.
- 466 non-commissioned officers.
- 1,552 enlisted.

For the first time, ground surveillance radars were utilized in territorial control operations, to detect people and vehicles. The command and control and the operation was held by the commander of the Army brigade home-based in Puglia, who was in charge of coordinating activity with the local district joint committees for internal security.

As a result of the activities listed in Table 3, the Army:
- Stopped 3,398 illegal immigrants.
- Checked 2,752 persons and 865 vehicles.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activities</th>
<th>#</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Area patrols</td>
<td>523</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mop up</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Checkpoints</td>
<td>1,852</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TABLE 3. OPERATION “SALENTO”: ACTIVITIES**

**THE ITALIAN ARMY DOCTRINE FOR HOMELAND SECURITY**

**THE NATIONAL LEGISLATION**

It is interesting, before examining the Army regulations on Homeland Security, to describe how the Italian Republic is organized to assure its internal security. The Ministry of the Interior is the national authority for internal security. Its responsibility is to:
- Guarantee internal security.
- Direct internal security activities.
- Coordinate the different police forces.\(^{47}\)

To coordinate the police forces, the Ministry leads the National Joint Committee for internal Security, which is composed of the Vice-Ministry for Internal Security, the chiefs of the police forces and, when necessary, of a representative of the military.\(^{38}\)

At local level (District), the prefect is the authority for internal security as local representative of the national government. On internal security matters, the prefect exerts at local level the same responsibility of the Ministry of the Interior. For this purpose, as previously mentioned, he leads the District Joint Committee for internal security, which is composed of the local police force commanders and, when necessary, of a representative of the military.\(^{49}\)

According to the laws, the prefects could ask for military personnel if they do not have an adequate number of police officers to guarantee the local security.

The authorization is the government’s responsibility, which decides according to the advice of both the Ministries of Defense and Interior. If the mission’s characteristics suggest to give the military a police officer status, a parliamentary decision is needed. The consequent law must state the nation’s area and the period in which the status applies.

On Table 4 are listed the main Italian laws applicable to territorial control operations.\(^{50}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Law</th>
<th>Main aspects</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Unified text on Police Officer regulations. Decree-Law 690 (August 31, 1907).</td>
<td>Art. 39: in order to guarantee the internal security, Prefects are authorized to ask for military personnel when police officers are not available or inadequate in number. Art. 40: when employed to guarantee the internal security, the military units remain under the command of their military commanders, who receive directions from the police authority.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Directions to guarantee the internal order. Law 152 (May 22, 1975).</td>
<td>Art. 4: the police officers are allowed to identify people and, if required by the situation, to search persons and vehicles for weapons and explosives.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministerial-Decree February 20, 1977</td>
<td>The police officers could use “nail-strips” to determine the stopping of vehicles who try to avoid a control.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major regulations about military discipline. Law 382 (July 11, 1978)</td>
<td>Art. 1: the Armed Forces have to contribute to the defense of the free national institutions.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Internal Security Administration’s New organization, Law 121 (April 1, 1981) | Art. 13: the Prefect has the authority to employ the police forces and other forces which are placed under his control.  
Art. 18: when necessary, representative of the military participate in the National Joint Committee for internal security meetings.  
Art. 20: when necessary, representative of the military participate to the District Joint Committee for internal security meetings. |
| Urgent measures to oppose the organized crime in Sicily. Decree-law 349 (July 25, 1992) | Art. 2: during the operation (“Vespri Siciliani”), the military act as police officers, according with the art. 4 of the Law 152 (May 22, 1975). |
| Measures to guarantee the people’s security. Law 128 (March 26, 2001) | Art. 18: the Government is authorized to employ, for specific and extraordinary situations, military personnel to guarantee the security of public buildings and infrastructures. This personnel is under the control of the District Prefects, according to the art. 13 of the Law 121 (April 1, 1981). |

**TABLE 4. MAIN ITALIAN LAWS APPLICABLE TO TERRITORIAL CONTROL OPERATIONS**

**ARMY DOCTRINE**

As mentioned, the Italian Army has carried out Homeland Security activities, and in particular territorial control operations, since the eighteenth century, but looking at the period after World War II, it was only after the conclusion of “Forza Paris” and the start of operation “Vespri Siciliani” that the Army General Staff focused on the need for a specific doctrine (see Table 5). Actually, at joint level, the publication “SMD-G-006 Instructions for military support of civil authorities in peacetime” – published in 1991 – already indicated how the military could have been employed, as a part of the internal security effort, to secure public infrastructures and buildings, and cooperate with the police forces to ensure the territorial control.51
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Publication</th>
<th>Year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Italian Army General Staff – Infantry and Cavalry Inspectorate. Instructions on area-interdiction and counter-area interdiction operations.</td>
<td>1990</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defense General Staff. SMD-G-006 Instructions for military support of civil authorities in peacetime.</td>
<td>1991</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italian Army General Staff – Infantry and Cavalry Inspectorate. Manual for the employment of maneuver units in support of the Police Forces.</td>
<td>1995</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italian Army General Staff. The Operational Capability Packages.</td>
<td>1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italian Army General Staff. Military Land Operations.</td>
<td>1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italian Army General Staff. Command and Control</td>
<td>1999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italian Army General Staff. S3/G3 manual.</td>
<td>2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italian Army General Staff. Manual on crowd-control techniques in peace support operations.</td>
<td>2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italian Army General Staff. The Army Logistic doctrine.</td>
<td>2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italian Army General Staff. Army operational outlines in Territorial Control.</td>
<td>2000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TABLE 5. THE JOINT AND ARMY DOCTRINE APPLICABLE TO TERRITORIAL CONTROL OPERATIONS**

The first Army step was the publication in 1995 of the “Manual for the Employment of Maneuver Units in Support of the Police Forces,” a tactical manual at company and platoon level, written by the Infantry and Cavalry Inspectorate. The manual focus both on tactical procedures and legal aspects, referring to the different situation – with or without the police officer status – in which the military could operate.\(^5\)

On tactical procedures, the manual describes how company and platoon commanders have to conceive, organize and execute:

- Building and infrastructure surveillance.
- Road and railway surveillance.
- Border and coastline surveillance, to deal with illegal immigration.
- Crowd control.
- Logistic support to refugees and homeless.

For area control and area surveillance, the reference tactical manual is the one on area and counter-area interdiction.\(^5\)

The second step was the inclusion in the new Army doctrine capstone document, published in 1998, of the “Presence and Surveillance” mission among the main Army tasks.\(^5\)

That mission, which is the equivalent of the U.S. Homeland Security, was given as a major focus for the units manned with draft-soldiers. As a consequence, all the new Army doctrine
publications include one or more paragraphs on related to Homeland Security operation aspects.

The last specific publication on homeland security is the “Army Operational Outlines in Territorial Control,” published by the Army General Staff on 2000. The manual examines these particular operations at both operational and tactical level. After describing the general context and the legislation applicable to territorial control operations, the publication illustrates:

- Main principles with respect to when Army units and personnel are employed in territorial control operations, that are really similar to the ones mentioned in the U.S. joint doctrine on Civil Support (see Table 6).
- Commanders’ responsibilities and command and control arrangements (see Figure 7).
- Major principles referring to rules of engagement, public affairs, and relationship with civilian authorities.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Italian doctrine</th>
<th>U.S. doctrine</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

FIGURE 7. TERRITORIAL CONTROL OPERATIONS: C2 ORGANIZATION
The Army employment must be considered as an extraordinary measure, to integrate the police forces in situations in which internal security is in serious danger. The rules of engagement must be approved by civilian authorities. Except in the case of immediate response and crisis and consequent management planning, DOD resources are provided only when response or recovery requirements are beyond the capabilities of civil authorities. DOD components do not perform any function of civil government unless authorized.

Tasks assigned to the units must be in compliance with their own operational capabilities and the units must remain under the authority of their military commanders. The military units must be employed according with their own tactical procedures. DOD specialized capabilities are used efficiently. Military forces shall remain under military command and control and authority of the DOD executive agents at all times.

Military resources are provided only after institutional tasks are satisfied.\textsuperscript{58} Unless otherwise directed by the Secretary of Defense, or where provided for by law, military operations will have priority over civil support missions.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE 6. ITALIAN AND U.S. MAIN PRINCIPLES ON TERRITORIAL CONTROL/CIVIL SUPPORT OPERATIONS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>▪ G2’s activity and responsibilities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ Development of the execution phase.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ Coordination arrangements with the police forces.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ Logistic.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ Training.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The manual, which takes advantage of all the experiences developed by the Army in eight years of Homeland Security Operations, has been applied to plan and execute the operation “Domino.”

CONSIDERATIONS

RESULTS AND LESSONS LEARNED\textsuperscript{59}

The most important result the Italian Army has obtained through the territorial control operation, and in particular “Forza Paris” and “Vespri Siciliani”, was to experience on the ground the main aspects of the military operations other than war (MOOTW). This knowledge was spread to a large number of personnel, in particular officers and NCOs, who were
later deployed in Africa and in the Balkans, to accomplish UN and NATO operations, as recently underlined by the Deputy Chief of Staff of the Italian Army. In addition, the Army has driven some important lessons learned, which have been utilized in the doctrinal, organizational and acquisition fields.

**Operational aspects**

On the operational aspect, the main lessons were:

- Units and soldiers employed in low intensity operations and routine activities are inclined to decrease their level of attention after about 40-60 days. That affects directly the force protection issue, so that a two-month tour cycle for territorial control operations has been determined to be appropriate.

- Classic offensive and defensive military operations do not cover all the spectrum of modern military engagements. Consequently, there was a need for specific doctrine and standard operational procedures (SOPs), which in many cases, have turned out to be applicable to both to territorial control and peace support operations.

- To operate in conjunction with other agencies, like the police forces, asks for reciprocal understanding and strong coordination links. The inclusion of a military representative in the joint committees for internal security has proved effective only if his participation is on a continuing basis.

- A successful interaction with local inhabitants demands a specific knowledge, that soldiers have to acquire before being employed.

- In territorial control operations, but the same rule applies to peace support operations, the more valuable information gathering system is personnel. Therefore, it has been necessary to focus back on HUMINT, a branch of Intelligence that was considered out-of-date.

**Logistical aspects and equipments**

Moving to logistics and equipment, the experiences acquired on the ground were about:

- Expeditionary equipments, which proved to be qualitatively acceptable but not available in adequate numbers for large deployments.

- Standard military rifles, which were evidently not easy to manage in buildings and, generally, in urban areas. Now, each infantry unit has available a number of machine-pistols to face particular operational situations.
The inadequacy of standard military portable radios, when utilized in urban areas. After the first negative experiences, the Army acquired specific radio systems.\textsuperscript{69}

- The necessity to improve training and procedures on transportation.\textsuperscript{70}

**Training aspects**

On training, the Army took advantage of experience acquired in territorial control operations, to develop a two-week training module (ten working days), which soldiers go through during the basic training (first five months of duty).\textsuperscript{71}

The module is composed of three parts:

- Lessons on specific laws and regulations: one day.
- Tactical procedures and live-exercises: 7 days.
- Weapons drill: 2 days.

**LOOKING AT THE NEW THREATS**

The National Security Strategy of the United States of America lists the capability to defend the Homeland as one of the means to defeat the international terrorism.\textsuperscript{72} That the military must play an important role in Homeland Security – by maintaining enough forces to provide for both Homeland Defense and Civil Support – is stated by the Quadrennial Defense Review Report.\textsuperscript{73} Furthermore, the Report by the National War College Student Task Force on Combating Terrorism highlights how Homeland Defense not only provides security for the American people, but also could support the main goal: defeating terrorism abroad.\textsuperscript{74}

The same Report articulates a 3-D Strategy to defeat the terrorism – defeating, deterring and diminishing – in which each phase is simultaneous and connected with the others.\textsuperscript{75} Some of the elements of these phases ask for capabilities which are shared with the Homeland Security operations and, in particular, with the civil support. I refer to the capacity to:

- Support the establishment of a democratic government, after a regime-change in a country that was supporting international terrorism or tolerating a terrorist presence on its own territory (nation building).
- Prevent crises, or potential crises, from giving terrorists the opportunity to justify their actions and encourage recruitments (peace support operations, during the stabilization phase).
If, as examples, we look at the ongoing operations “International Security Allied Force” (ISAF) in Afghanistan and NATO in the Balkans, most of the actions at the tactical level which the military are carrying out are the same as those requested for support of law enforcement, counter illegal immigration, and security for critical infrastructures in the Homeland, together with the ability to interact and cooperate with civilian authorities and agencies. Pictures in Figure 8 and 9, taken during operations “Forza Paris” and “Vespi Siciliani” could have been taken in the mountain of Kosovo and in Sarajevo.

Units and soldiers which have experienced civil support operations are better prepared to accomplish peace support missions, which are normally conducted in a less safe environment. Therefore, by contributing to the Homeland Security, the Army achieves two results:

- Directly helps in defeating international terrorism.
- Trains its own soldiers and units to carry out other operations related with the War on Terrorism.

In addition, the Italian circumstance, having experienced the need for civil support operations against a different and previous threat from the international terrorism, has given the nation the opportunity to develop a full set of laws and regulations on how to effectively employ the Army in such an environment.
CONCLUSION

Still on the Italian Army, the end of the Cold War and the non participation in the Gulf War at the beginning of the nineties, engendered, both internal and external to the Army, a sense of uselessness and frustration, coupled with a general public dissatisfaction toward the military, which dated from the disastrous conclusion of World War II. The operation “Vespri Siciliani”, and the just one week older “Forza Paris”, gave the Army an opportunity to feel itself important for the Country and for the Italian people to revalue the importance of the military, as mentioned by the General Incisa de Camerana, in his presentation of the book Operazione Vespri Siciliani. 76

When later, the Army was involved in UN and NATO operations in Africa and in the Balkans, the military, and in particular the young officers, started to look at the territorial control missions as something that was absorbing significant resources and energies, and reducing their opportunity to be employed abroad. They did not realize that the tactics the Army units were applying in peace support operations were learned, tested and upgraded working in the Homeland, side by side with the local authorities and the police forces, 77 and more important, they did not realize that security in the new strategic environment is a wider concept, which involves the protection of our cities and our people from any kind of threat.

FIGURE 9. OPERATION “VESPRI SICILIANI:”
OBSERVATION POST IN PALERMO

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When the September 11, 2001 attack against the United States of America and the whole world, remind us how fragile is our safety, the Italian Army was able on short notice to contribute to the War on Terrorism not only abroad but at home, taking advantage of laws, doctrine, procedures and experiences developed in ten years of territorial control operations. But overall, people look today as normal that their soldiers are in the streets, taking care of their own security.

I like to conclude this research project with the words that Claudio Graziano has written in the book Operazione Vespri Siciliani on his experience in the operation “Forza Paris” as battalion commander:

“I was there, and I do not the reason why, I have always thought that “Forza Paris” has been the beginning of what happen later; after we had the operations in Sicily, in Calabria, in Naples and in Salento, and abroad, in Somalia, in Mozambique and in Rwanda. But only after “Forza Paris”. Some months later I was in Mozambique, and it was a good thing that all officers and NCOs of the “Susa” battalion and many volunteers had previously spent hours patrolling the “Barbagia”. It was good for all, and overall it was good for Italy.”

WORD COUNT = 6,690
ENDNOTES


2 Ibid., 5.


16 The Italian Army doctrine considers the disaster relief as a third component of the “Presence and surveillance” mission.
Disposizioni a tutela dell’ordine pubblico, Legge 152, art. 4 (22 Maggio 1975).


“L’Esercito in ordine pubblico,” 82-83.

Norme in materia di riordino dell’Arma dei Carabinieri, a norma dell’articolo 1 della legge 31 Marzo 2000, 78, Decreto legge 297, art. 3 (5 Ottobre 2000).


Stato Maggiore dell’Esercito, Operazione “Vespri Siciliani”. Scheda.


Stato Maggiore dell’Esercito, Manuale per l’impiego delle minori unita` in attivita` di concorso alle forze di pubblica sicurezza (Roma: Stato Maggiore dell’Esercito – Ispettorato delle Armi di Fanteria e Cavalleria, 1995).

Stato Maggiore dell’Esercito, Operazione “Vespri Siciliani”. Scheda.

Ibid.


Ibid.


Stato Maggiore dell’Esercito, Operazione “Domino”. Scheda, 1.

Ibid.


Stato Maggiore dell’Esercito, “Operazione Forza Paris.”

A piece of the kid’s ear was cut and sent to his parents.
35 Stato Maggiore dell’Esercito, “Operazione Forza Paris.”

36 Stato Maggiore dell’Esercito, Operazione “Forza Paris”. Scheda.


38 Ibid.


41 Stato Maggiore dell’Esercito, “Operazione Testuggine.”

42 Stato Maggiore dell’Esercito, Operazione “Testuggine”. Scheda.


44 Stato Maggiore dell’Esercito, Operazione “Salento”. Scheda, 1.

45 Ibid., 2.

46 Legge 121, art. 1.

47 According to the Legge 121, art. 16, the State Police, the Carabinieri, the Financial Police, the Prisons warder’s Corps and the Forests Guard’s Corps, are considered Police Forces.

48 Legge 121, art. 18.

49 Ibid., art. 20.

50 Stato Maggiore dell’Esercito, Lineamenti d’impiego dell’Esercito nelle operazioni di controllo del territorio, C/1-3.

51 Stato Maggiore della Difesa, SMD-G-006 Direttive per i concorsi militari in tempo di pace art. 8.

52 Stato Maggiore dell’Esercito, Manuale per l’impiego delle minori unità in attività di concorso alle forze di pubblica sicurezza.

54 Stato Maggiore dell’Esercito, I pacchetti di capacità.

55 Stato Maggiore dell’Esercito, Lineamenti d’impiego dell’Esercito nelle operazioni di controllo del territorio.

56 Ibid., 12.


58 Stato Maggiore della Difesa, SMD-G-006 Direttive per i concorsi militari in tempo di pace art. 1


62 Ibid., 3.

63 The Italian Army publication “Army operational outlines in Territorial Control” suggests many manuals concerning Peace Support operations as references. See Stato Maggiore dell’Esercito, Lineamenti d’impiego dell’Esercito nelle operazioni di controllo del territorio, A/1-A/2.

64 Scuola di Guerra, Operazione “Vespri Siciliani”, Ciclo delle lezioni apprese C-13.


66 Scuola di Guerra, Operazione “Vespri Siciliani”, Ciclo delle lezioni apprese B-6

67 Ibid., A-8

68 Ibid.

69 Ibid., D-2

70 Ibid., A-4


75 Ibid., xx.

76 Pietro Gianvanni and Claudio Graziano, 9.

77 Davis jr. B. Gordon, 74.

78 Claudio Graziano (Brigadier General Italian Army) is currently the Army Attache’ at the Italian Embassy, Washington D.C.. He commanded the Alpine “Susa” battalion during Operation “Forza Paris” and Operation “Albatross” (UNOMOZ, Mozambique). He graduated from the U.S. Army War College, Class 1997.

79 Pietro Gianvanni and Claudio Graziano, 133.
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