Army Public Affairs Objective Force

by

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ABSTRACT

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The greatest inhibitor of successfully conducting Army Public Affairs is not expertise, for Public Affairs has the best assemblage of experts ever. Nor is it equipment, for even the most starkly equipped office bristles with computers, phones and faxes. No, to paraphrase Pogo, “We have met the enemy and he is Force Structure.” Even though OPMS XXI allows for a competitive career path for PA professionals, Information Operations is a proven combat multiplier and more PA units will be added to the Total Army force structure over the coming years, PA remains ineffective. Non-existent central command and control, diffuse staffing and non-standard/linked equipment are but some of the reasons Army Public Affairs is unable to perform to maximum potential. Army Public Affairs must transform along with the rest of the Army into the Objective Force envisioned by the Army Chief of Staff, General Eric Shinseki, or become irrelevant.

This paper looks at transforming Army Public Affairs along three congruent axes. First, transition Army Public Affairs into a capabilities-based force by moving Army PA from a service function to a command and control function. Second, designate the Chief Public Affairs as an operational commander. Third, transform Army PA into a MACOM by re-aligning services along a regional concept with surge capability to the Combatant Commanders using Criminal Investigation Command and Transformation of Installation Management concepts as models.
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“Two roads diverged in a wood, and I—I took the one less traveled by, And that has made all the difference.”

—Robert Frost, “The Road Not Taken”

At its most basic, Army Public Affairs mission is to inform the American public about its Army and to create the conditions necessary to build confidence in the Army’s ability to successfully conduct peacetime operations, operations other than war and ultimately war itself. As in Robert Frost’s poem “The Road Not Taken,” Army Public Affairs (PA) stands at a crossroad in this age of transformation. One road, the worn road, leads to the Third Wave of PA asset privatization, ineffective command and control and irrelevance. Army PA knows what is down this “do nothing” road—slow, eventual extinction. The other, the grassy less worn road, is full of unknown dangers yes, but potential wonders as well. Taking the road less traveled will make all the difference in operational command and control of PA assets, linked systems and integrated Joint Force support. Down the road less traveled lies transformation of the PA corps, relevance—and the future. The path taken will determine the fate of Army PA and ultimately decide if indeed the pen is mightier than the sword.

In order to take the right road and transform Army PA into the PA Objective Force, the current force structure needs to be radically overhauled. The Army Chief Public Affairs (CPA) currently has the responsibility for preparing, coordinating and monitoring the worldwide implementation of Army Public Affairs—but not the authority. Case in point, by regulation the CPA “manages” the Office Secretary of the Army and Army Staff PA program. However, only “…Commanders will—develop PA guidance, strategies, plans, and operations.” Instead of the CPA formulating, managing, and evaluating public affairs policies, plans and programs for the active and reserve components the Objective Force CPA would command his PA assets. Instead of the local commander executing PA programs, as is the case now, the Objective Force CPA would command, control and allocate them to the commanders as required in order to facilitate unity of effort and effective use of assets.

With more than 65 percent of the total public affairs force and 85 percent of the deployable Table of Organization and Equipment (TOE) unit structure positioned in the U.S. Army Reserve and Army National Guard, this new structure would need to apply to the our non-active components as well. The current Army PA force structure is not responsive to the CPA. It is poorly organized, and will not adequately support the Objective Force or Joint Force Operations. It need not be that way. With practically no increase in current expenditures or
manpower, Army PA could become a Major Command (MACOM) providing superior support to the current force and the Objective Force of the future. Since significant PA TOE assets already exist, and Table of Distribution and Allowances (TDA) units show a healthy need for PA expertise, reorganization into regional support units is not only possible, but also probable.

To understand how the Army builds force structure, the difference between TOE (deployable) and TDA (non-deployable) bears some explaining. Army units are divided between TOE units that are doctrinally defined operational Army field units, and TDA non-tactical, non-doctrinal units such as fixed facilities, command and control headquarters, and other Army/Joint organizations, both in Continental United States and overseas. At least since 1996, the Army has sought, where possible, to convert TDA units to TOE status. TDAs form the infrastructure of the Army. They are generally non-combat, non-deployable workload based units. AUGTDAs are augmentation table of distribution and allowances that supplement MTOE units for specific functions. MTOEs form the “go to war” units of the Army, whether those units are direct combat (infantry, armor, artillery), CS (engineer, signal, military police) or CSS (quartermaster, maintenance, medical) units. There are approximately 8,500 units of all types in the total Army.7

However, more and more Army Public Affairs operations blur the lines between deployable and non-deployable positions. As such, the distinction is almost non-existent. Joint Information units are cobbled together through the use of Temporary Change of Station orders for periods of six months to a year, using TOE and TDA personnel in the Army. Essentially, there are no non-deployable PA assets anymore in the traditional sense. For the purpose of this paper TOE and TDA PA assets will be referred to as PA assets.

This paper looks at transforming Army PA from a resource manager into a commander with execution authority by comparing the current state of Army PA, command and control functions, “rule” application, alternative models, and analysis and implementation steps.

HISTORY OF DECENTRALIZED CONTROL

“Without orders to the contrary, I considered the media in the ‘nice to do’ department.”

—An Army division commander in Operation Desert Storm

At best, Army Public Affairs has performed marginally during wartime in recent history. In the 1983 Operation Urgent Fury Granada invasion, the 600 journalists who flocked to Barbados to cover the invasion were stranded there for the operation’s duration. Only 15 journalists received a tour of Grenada’s airfield, but they refused to share their material. A U.S. victory went largely unreported inspiring the Sidle Panel recommending establishment of a
National Media Pool.\textsuperscript{8} During Operation Just Cause in Panama, national media were notified late, deployed late and kept at Howard Air Force Base, Panama, missing the conflict.\textsuperscript{9} During Desert Storm the Army arguably fared worse that all the other services in cooperating with the media. Wall Street Journal reporter John Fialka commented that, “If Ernie Pyle, the talented word-portrait painter of life in the foxholes during World War II, had managed to get in a Gulf War Marine pool he would have risked being mobbed by officers vying to get him to cover their units. If he had been assigned (to an Army unit), however, he would have found a substantial risk of: 1. Getting lost; 2. Becoming unable to communicate; or 3. Being ejected or isolated by Vietnam-addled field commanders who worried that journalists might get too close to their troops.”\textsuperscript{10}

A thorough two-week fact finding mission in November 1990 by the then Deputy Chief of Public Affairs Colonel David Fabien, “found an unplanned and uncoordinated public affairs effort that had, without doubt, contributed to the Army’s vexatious relationship with the press.”\textsuperscript{11} Fabien went on to emphasize other problems noted during his visit: unilateral, unfocused, and uncoordinated efforts stemming from “erratic” policy guidance; equipment shortages; insufficient transportation and communication; burned-out Joint Information Bureau staff and the fact that public affairs units in the country were being misused. Of note was the fact that a press camp headquarters, complete with escort officers and transportation, was located in Riyadh, where there were few media, and not in Dhahran where most of the media was located.

Despite harmony between the military and media during operations in Somalia and Haiti, Operation Allied Force in the Balkans revealed a continued division. The campaign in Kosovo had tighter news restrictions than ever, so tight that for the first few weeks the size and scope of the air campaign was misrepresented as a massive air attack. The clampdown was so great that the “sterile war,” fought by nameless, out-of-sight pilots, led to the American public's apparent lack of engagement in the conflict effort.\textsuperscript{12}

**CURRENT STATE OF PA**

The current organizational structure of Army PA is designed to support the Army of the 1970’s, not the Objective Force Army of the 21st Century. Just as in the Gulf War, today’s PA staffs organic to Brigade and above are augmented with PA assets. Just as during the Gulf War, today’s Joint Information Bureaus are an ad hoc arrangement of equipment and personnel.\textsuperscript{13} Just as during the Gulf War, Army Public Affairs operations will receive vehement criticism from the media, the public and the Army if it fails to reorganize to become the Army
Public Affairs Objective Force. Army PA operations did not work then—and it will not work now unless the force structure is changed.

Under Title 10, United States Code, section 3014, the Chief Public Affairs (CPA) is responsible for the conduct of PA operations across the United States Army. He or she is responsible to the Secretary of the Army and responsive to the Chief of Staff, Army. The CPA has Department of the Army responsibility for preparing coordinating and monitoring the worldwide implementation of Army PA strategies, plans, policies and programs.14

Although the active Army has approximately 1,800 PA personnel,15 they are scattered to more than 120 organizations.16 Allocation rules set by the Total Army Analysis (TAA) drive the number and location of PA assets.17 PA force structure is based on “allocation” rules that give a set number of PA personnel per organization and PA organizations per larger formations, with little regard to capabilities. Even worse, it appears there is no rhyme or reason whatsoever to the allocation rules for “non-deployable” PA assets. For example, proposed TAA-11 Allocation Rules for Standard Requirement Codes (SRC) 45413L000, PA Detachment (Mobile), a deployable PA asset, are .33 per Separate Brigade or 3 per Corps or 1 per HHC, Corps Support Command.18 On the other hand, non-deployable PA asset requirements do not have allocation rules. Whatever non-deployable assets commands have they have created over time. There used to be a Staffing Guide to Army Garrison and then a Manpower Staffing Guidance Three that provided an allocation model, according to Mr. Larry Spruill, the Organization Integrator for SRC 45, Public Affairs. However, there currently are no allocation guides for non-deployable units in the Army. “Whatever they (non-deployable units) have they created over time…we are still working on manning requirements from 20 years ago,” Spruill said.19

Lieutenant Colonel Paul Hilton, Chief, Programs Branch, HQDA G3 Force Management Division confirms this. During a telephone interview Hilton said that non-deployable assets are “unconstrained by reality, but constrained by budget.” In other words, if the command can afford the spaces, they can have them. Right now over half of the Army is TDA, to include contractors. Upward of 230,000 military positions (active duty and civilian) are TDA.

According to Hilton, more than a year ago General Shinseki took away the ability of a MACOM to approve its own TDA. Present TDA requirements are approved at HQDA and must support the war fighter or face consideration for contracting or other methods of performing the function, otherwise known as the Third Wave.20 PA has the distinction of being one of only two functional areas out of 18 in the Army with an structure of enlisted, officer, civilian workforce, in both TOE and TDA.21 PA sections are embedded in the headquarters of separate brigades, divisions and echelons above division.
These sections provide PA support to the command and serve as the commander’s principal advisor on PA issues. Ranging from a single senior noncommissioned officer, to a Colonel with a small staff, these sections conduct PA limited planning and operations until augmented with deployable assets. Organic PA assets are usually inadequate to support a high level of media interest or a large media presence in the area of operations and require augmentation by PA TOE units and individual soldiers positioned in the U.S. Army Reserve and Army National Guard. On the active duty side, there is one Mobile Public Affairs Detachment (MPAD) of approximately 20 personnel and 12 Public Affairs Detachments (PAD) of approximately five personnel each. The MPAD and 10 of the 12 PADs are assigned to FORSCOM while the remaining two PADs are assigned to control of U.S. Army Pacific. In addition to TOE structure, there is a large TDA Army PA contingent. For example, out of approximately 211 PA officer positions in the Army, approximately 30 officers reside in Office Chief Public Affairs (OCPA) elements, and another 50 in TOE units. The remainder resides in TDA or Joint billets.

Put another way, more than 60 percent of Army PA billets are scattered across the Army and DOD in a largely uncoordinated PA effort. I say uncoordinated effort because while the CPA can suggest messages and programs the local commander executes the actual messages and programs his/her PA assets will pursue. Again, the only PA assets under CPA control are those assets directly under OCPA. The CPA controls his immediate staff of approximately 70 personnel and has operational control of six-Field Operating Agencies (FOA) including Soldiers Radio and Television, Hometown News Service and the Army Broadcasting Service.

TOWARD CENTRALIZED CONTROL

Although the CPA is responsible for the dissemination of PA strategies and operations worldwide, it is without direct operational control of the PA elements within those various commands. However, the CPA does exercise operational control over the Army Broadcasting Service and other FOAs. Why? Simply put, the Army realizes the need for centralized command and control in special purpose units. The Army sees Army Broadcasting Service and four other OCPA agencies as service producing organizations that need to report directly to HQDA. In general, FOA units have tasks that do not require field units (deployable units) to produce the service so it does not fall into the functional command category. In other words, FOAs are self-contained entities. For example, Army Broadcasting is an FOA organization with approximately 334 civilian and military personnel providing stateside programming to commands worldwide by way of radio and television networks. With an annual budget of $25.7 million this organization purchases state of the art equipment, develops tactical
broadcast vehicles to support deployed troops, and conducts training to disseminate command information.\textsuperscript{31} As a matter of fact, ABS is currently in the process of consolidating two smaller offices, Soldiers Radio and Television and Hometown News service, into an Army Media Center.\textsuperscript{32}

**UNITY OF EFFORT**

Altogether, the CPA has actual control of approximately 25 percent (or 250) of the active duty Army PA forces. All other PAs in the active Army, TOE or TDA, are not under direct control of the CPA.\textsuperscript{33} MACOM PAs, such as Training and Doctrine Command, Forces Command, the U.S. Army Europe PA personnel and all TOE PA assets work for their respective commanders, not the CPA. The same is true with garrison or TDA positions. At first glance, PA personnel not working for the CPA may seem a matter of semantics, but it is not. While the CPA may try to have the Army speak with one voice, he has little direct control over getting other PAs to follow his lead. While the CPA can ask a MACOM, or any other PA office to perform a certain duty, without the concurrence of the commander it will not happen. Quite simply, PAs outside of the Army staff do not work directly for the CPA and must follow the desires, or whims, of their commander. If the request fits within the framework of what the PA is already doing, more than likely the PA will incorporate the request. However, the local commander must approve new projects or taskers.\textsuperscript{34}

**PLAYING BY THE “RULES”**

“Only those functions that must be performed by DOD should be kept by DOD. Any function that can be provided by the private sector is not a core government function.”

\textsuperscript{—QDR 2001}

The rules for force asset allocation and force design benefit the “operational”, not “support” staff functions. Attempting to change PA force structure using existing rules will at best work at the margins, affect small changes and accomplish modest gains. Using existing force structure rules Army PA will never become a significant enabler of the Objective Force. To become a functional part of the Objective Force, Army PA needs to make a bold step, to think outside the box and become a MACOM. As mentioned earlier, there are methods for creating organizational structures such as FOAs to meet unique needs. However, while FOAs may act as a mini-MACOM they are not MACOMs. They do not sit at The Army Analysis (TAA) table for resources in the same manner as MACOMs do.\textsuperscript{35} FOAs are special purpose
commands that do not require field units to perform a task so they do not fall into the functional command category. Because FOAs do not sit at the TAA table for resources, they must rely on a sponsoring MACOM or equivalent (OCPA in the case of PA) to secure necessary resources—but they cannot do it themselves.

Another problem with playing by the rules is that PA does not have supportable rules for what constitutes a PA force. There are no workload standards tying unit requirements to a measurable logistical workload thereby making manning justification difficult. That is why non-deployable staffs are largely ad hoc.

Additionally, although PA is listed in the Universal Task List (UTL) as a command and control function (C² Battle Operation System), the Army treats it as a combat service support function. Consequently, Army PA functions appear as not being inherently governmental and thus vulnerable to commercial contracting under the Federal Activities Inventory Reform Act (FAIR Act) of 1998.

TOWARD THE ARMY PA OBJECTIVE FORCE

“Creative ideas, coupled with technological improvements, must be fostered to develop lighter, smaller, more deployable systems. The Army must rethink organizations and doctrine to capitalize on these multipliers”

—TRADOC Mission Needs Analysis

In 1999, Army Chief of Staff Eric J. Shinseki set goals for the Army to transition from the current legacy force of heavy tanks, to a yet-to-be-determined force called the Objective Force. This future force will “see first, understand first and act first.” This future force will have seven vital characteristics as described in the Vision statement: Responsive, Deployable, Agile, Versatile, Lethal, Survivable and Sustainable. Yet, as mentioned previously current Army PA force structure does not lend itself to support the seven tenets set out by Chief of Staff for the Objective Force.

As the above information clearly illustrates, Army PA is a hodgepodge of organizational structures ill suited to shape the information battle the Objective Force will face in the future. Army PA needs the ability to quickly move assets where and when necessary to support real-world contingencies. Army PA needs integrated information systems, centrally funded, that can operate as a stand-alone system, or when combined with other assets, become a Joint Information Bureau. Manpower would be centrally managed and not tied to allocation rules for Brigades and above. There would still be rules, but they would be different (e.g., PA requirements in combatant command, war plans, etc.). Essentially, Army PA needs to be
structured on another model, as an operational organization, not a support asset, to support the Objective Force.

Other force structure models exist that incorporate a mixture of far-flung commands, TOE and TDA assets not under the control of the local commander. One of these is the United States Army Criminal Investigation Command (USACIDC). On September 17, 1971, the USACIDC (figure 1) was established as a major Army command. The CID command was vested with command and control of all Army criminal investigation activities and resources worldwide. Granting major command status to the CID facilitated CID communications with all levels of the military and civilian governments while providing a centralized controlling authority over the Army’s investigative resources and activities. The Commander, USACIDC is directly responsible to the Chief of Staff of the Army and the Secretary of the Army. The organization of the CID command brought to an end the 50-year-old problem of how to administer the CID.40

Like Army PA, USACIDC has single-man offices, TOE and TDA organizations. Unlike Army PA, USACIDC has operational command over all of its units, central funding and manpower authority as a MACOM. USACIDC organizes assets along capability lines based on requirements drawn up in The Army Plan (TAP). USACIDC distributes elements throughout the Army by way of Criminal Investigation Detachments. These independent units range in size from one agent to a complete laboratory of 50 personnel. Instead of supported unit structure deciding how many and where USACIDC assets are located, as in the case of Army PA, the location of each detachment is based upon an allocation of resources by CIC to the largest concentration of soldiers (thereby necessitating more investigations). Equally important, each USACIDC element, to include laboratories, CIDs and special protection services, is centrally...
funded. This ensures that each component has the resources necessary to conduct its mission and not subject to the budget constrains of the supported unit.

Imagine if you will a CID office without adequate computers, vehicles, radios, cameras or the travel budget to conduct operations. Absurd you say? According to the Army Public Affairs Center (Army PA Proponency) the last centrally funded item for Army PA was the KS-99, 35-mm camera kit. There has not been a centrally funded item since. Army PA does not receive computers, vehicles, or even go TDY unless authorized by the local commander. The local commander purchases everything. FM 46-1, Public Affairs Operations, mentions that the PAO must have tactical and strategic communications support, GPS, tactical internet and “…capabilities tailored to mission requirements,” but stops short of saying what they are or who will pay for them. For TOE units there are equipment lists but the vast majority of Army PA elements are at the mercy of the commander for what they really need to do their job. If the commander does not value Army PA then the PA will not get proper assets. If the commander does value PA, the office may receive assets, but may not be compatible or interoperate with other unit’s equipment. Local commanders do not “cross walk” integration issues. One office may purchase a MAC computer, another a Dell with Windows 2000. When asked to deploy and support a Public Affairs Operations Center (PAOC) per FM 46-1 the incompatibility of systems exacerbates the problem. True, current PA policy calls for one MPAD to support the PAOC along with one MPAD for every three brigade-size units in the operation when those units do not have separate PA support. The separate support alluded to is the same under-resourced, non-integrated PA sections mentioned above. Their ability to contribute to the main effort is severely handicapped through lack of central planning, funding and vision. While local commanders have authority to execute PA policy, they do not have the grand perspective the CPA might enjoy. Taking care of local issues and priorities does not ensure that overall U.S. Army concerns are addressed. That holistic view could only come about from a higher, more comprehensive view a single purpose MACOM commander might have, such as the CPA of the Army.

Another MACOM structure that Army PA could emulate is the United States Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM). On Jan. 1, 1977, INSCOM was organized at Arlington Hall Station, Virginia. INSCOM is a global command with four brigades that tailor their support to the specific needs of different theaters. Eight other groups or activities located worldwide focus primarily on a single intelligence discipline or function. They are available in a reinforcing role, enabling any combat commander to use INSCOM's full range of unique capabilities with brigades and groups that tailor their support to the specific needs of different
theaters. Altogether, INSCOM has 14 major subordinate commands and a variety of smaller units with personnel dispersed at over 180 locations worldwide.  

Finally, a third model for Army PA is Transformation of Installation Management (TIM). While not an independent MACOM, TIM is an example of a consolidation of like functions under a single organization previously provided to various MACOMS, much like Army PA. TIM is responsible for base support and maintaining installations (figure 2), with the responsibility of the land and facilities passing to the Installation Management Activity (IMA). The IMA is the parent command for the seven TIM regions, but training centers, schools and TOE forces are tenant units. The IMA is subordinate to the Assistant Chief of Staff for Installation Management that falls under the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Installation & Environment. All personnel on a given installation not assigned to a MACOM structure essentially work for the installation commander who works for the Regional commander, not the senior tenant commander.

\[\text{FIGURE 2. TIM REGIONS}\]

**ALTERNATIVE ANALYSIS**

All alternative force structures mentioned share the need for centralized command and control in an effort to provide better service—exactly what Army PA needs to do. Each MACOM and activity mentioned state their goal is to consolidate command and control so as to merge decentralized assets into a new, more responsive organization. For example, according to INSCOM, its formation as a MACOM provided the Army with a single instrument to conduct multi-discipline intelligence and security operations and electronic warfare at the level above corps and to produce finished intelligence tailored to the Army’s needs. Granting the USACIDC major Army command status provided it with command and control of all Army criminal investigation activities and resources worldwide. Granting major command status to the USACIDC facilitated CID communications with all levels of the military and civilian governments while providing a centralized controlling authority over the Army's investigative resources and activities. The new
major command merged divergent intelligence disciplines and traditions in a way that was unique to the Army. Its creation marked the most radical realignment of Army intelligence assets in a generation.  

Finally, installation reorganization under TIM was initiated to consolidate like functions, better control resources and centralize command and control. "Our intent is to streamline headquarters, create more agile and responsive staffs, reduce layers of review and approval, and allow commanders to focus on their mission," Secretary White said, speaking before a group of Army garrison commanders at a conference in Nashville, Tennessee. Centralized control allows organizations to fully fund required capabilities and not rely on host units. In the case of TIM, protected funding flow is a priority. Active and Reserve Component garrisons and Regional Support Commands will receive their funding directly from the HQ IMA. Mission unit commanders will continue to receive their funding through the mission chain of command (MACOMs), eliminating the opportunity to migrate funds between mission and base support. For FY03, Active Component, CONUS garrisons will receive funding through their previous MACOM. The funding processes will include a system, such as a small withhold at the HQ IMA for resolution of unforeseen and/or emergency requirements that arise during the year of execution.

A final point, TIM actually provides CPA with more control over field PA assets than ever before. Because TIM consolidates base support TDA staff elements under the region concept, all the PAs associated with those regions no longer report to the MACOM. Because TIM did not build any Army PAs into their regional structure, the installation PAs, without a regional point of contact, go directly to OCPA for guidance. Also, under TIM, OCPA has overall authority over the Army PA base support positions. With the creation of TIM, the CPA oversees the single biggest “chunk” of PAs ever. In spite of this, without command authority the CPA cannot achieve the PA Objective Force.

PROPOSED PA OBJECTIVE FORCE STRUCTURE

Army Transformation causes changes to mission that require swift response and deft balancing of priorities. As a MACOM, Army PA could organize into regions much like TIM. In CONUS Army PA assets would consolidate into regional PA offices with small outreach offices at major bases such as Ft. Hood, Ft. Drum, Ft. Bragg and Ft. Lewis. The same is true in OCONUS regions (Europe, Korea and Hawaii). Outreach offices supporting combatant commands could resemble the CID employment concept with a small operational element responsible, within a limited geographical AOR, for operations and preparation of reports. A
CID branch office is authorized between one and three special agents, has no administrative capability and is completely dependent upon its parent unit for all clerical, administrative and logistical support provided either directly or by support agreements with host installations. Smaller installations currently authorized a PA section would refer media queries to the regional PA center where an account officer would provide the necessary information.

Like TIM, the regional alignment creates a corporate structure with a sole focus on efficient and effective PA support. Region boundaries would mirror those established by TIM. Also, the regions would take advantage of facilities and skilled personnel available in the Major Army Command elements stationed at these locations and ensure an equitable coverage of Army installations per region. Again, since the vast majority of PA assets are aligned along the TIM model, Army PA should reflect the same four regions for the Continental United States. Unlike TIM and USACIDC however, regions would also habitually align themselves with the unified Combatant Commands for operational deployment and training (figure 3). Deployable PA elements within each region would train; not necessarily with a specified MACOM or TOE unit, but with whatever Army assets were aligned with the unified combatant commander. This alignment is critical not only because it supports joint warfare, but because it steps away from the current system of apportioning assets by unit structure vice capability required. However, this “centralized” system only works if the Army PA recognizes not all media are equal and not every installation requires a PA. Army PA would need to perform an analysis to research which media has the greatest impact on issues important to the Army and place PA forces accordingly. The region approach would also call for redefining the type of support Army commands and installations receive and institute an account “team” approach. Installation commanders would no longer have their dedicated PA staffs. At most, an installation would have a single representative as a liaison to
the region. Regions would be resourced to provide support to the programs most important to
the Army leadership and to the commands and installations of highest precedence
synchronizing messages with the Office of Congressional Liaison’s integrated priority list.
Bases with organic assets would handle the issues they could and refer issues beyond their
capability to the nearest region. The region team with that account would provide support as
necessary. To allow flexibility, PA offices at both local and region level would need the authority
and ability to contract for “spot” PA support from vendors to assist in media relations at open
houses, Armed Forces Day ceremonies and other Community Relation-type events. Otherwise,
the regions could provide a “surge” capability to support bases. Like TIM, if an installation
wanted more staffing, it would come out of their operational funding and be under the control of
OCPA.

TOE PA assets currently allocated to MACOMs and habitually associated with Corps
and Divisions would be retained at the region level. In conjunction with manning the region,
these elements would train and deploy routinely with Joint forces worldwide. While one element
was training, another would be recovering or performing duties at one of the four regional
centers. With integrated “fly-away” kits containing state of the art communications, word
processing computers and tactical vehicles Army PA could support Objective Forces anywhere
in the world.

Other regional PA commands in Europe, South West Asia, Hawaii and Korea (again, like
TIM) would establish necessary forward presence and assist follow-on elements into theater as
necessary. All PA offices would have integrated, standardized automated systems giving the
CPA the ability to “push” information initiatives to the field directly from the Pentagon.
Additionally, systems would contain library functions to assist in development of operation plans;
media contact database; PA guidance on critical issues and file sharing. Private public relations
firms such as Fleishman-Hillard run computer systems like this to allow all members to benefit
from plans and research developed by one office to be shared by another. This system keeps
an office from having to start from scratch on every initiative, benefit from the experience of
others and land the big client.\textsuperscript{5}\textsuperscript{4} File share would allow one office to initiate an action and
another to finish it. Two distant offices could collaborate on a time sensitive project. Army
Knowledge Online offers such a service now for the whole Army.\textsuperscript{5}\textsuperscript{5} Additionally, TOE units
would have allocated bandwidth for connection with CPA during all deployments.
IMPLIMENTATION HURDLES AND SOLUTIONS

Ideally, Army PA could re-organize as a separate MACOM tomorrow upon order of HQDA, receive central funding and direct manpower to field operating agencies around the world in support of the Objective Force. Of course, that is not going to happen mainly because of misunderstandings and half-truths. Also, nothing happens immediately. Given the defense resource process, the TAA and the transition to the Objective Force, it would take a minimum of two years. Once the decision is made to make Army PA a MACOM, there would still be the matter of generating new TOEs/TDAs, identifying existing positions to transfer, creating Modified TOEs and moving money to new accounts.

The biggest misunderstanding is that Army PA cannot be a MACOM. Wrong! The Chief of Staff and Secretary of the Army could make a photocopier Corps, if they wished. The first step in Army PA becoming a MACOM is simply raising the initiative to the level of the Army Chief of Staff or the Secretary of the Army as an issue, the issue being that Army PA can better support the Army and the Joint team by making Army PA a MACOM. This necessitates creating a mission needs analysis articulating why Army PA would function better as a MACOM and presenting it to the CSA. According to Hilton presenting a concept plan to the senior leadership showing how PA is a function that lends itself to centralization, applies best business practices, offers more utility and no or minimal cost might have a chance. For example, if Army PA can show that by reducing the 120 plus locations where PA currently operates and pooling into one command, might cost a general but save three colonels, then the proposal has savings and stands a very good chance. As mentioned earlier, there are really no rules for how to create a MACOM. Actually, either the CSA or the SA could direct the establishment of the Army PA MACOM.

The most recent example of establishing a new MACOM out of whole cloth is the creation of NETCOM/9th ASC or U.S. Army Network Enterprise Technology Command/9th Army Signal Command. Located at Fort Huachuca, Arizona NETCOM/9th ASC is a worldwide, service-based organization, delivering seamless enterprise-level Command, Control, Communications, Computers and Information Technology common-user services and war fighting forces in support of the Army, its service component commanders and combatant commanders. Instead of years this MACOM was created in just eight months to address operational requirements in the Middle East according to Hilton.

Converting all PA assets to TOE, as suggested by many, is only half the answer. While it might establish PA as an inherently governmental function and thus protect it from the Third Wave, it does not guarantee CPA command and control unless all PA units are assigned to the
PA MACOM. An attempt several years ago by Sen. Ike Skelton (D-Mo.) to convert Army PA assets to TOE units was an effort in the right direction, but never materialized.\textsuperscript{62} The intent, to have well-equipped and trained PA professionals organized into operational units falls short, however, of the desired solution in that the force structure would still be tied to a non-PA organization under current allocation rules. Additionally, even though a full TOE PA structure would somewhat mitigate the central budget issue and to a larger degree the personnel problem, it would not resolve the decentralized command and control problem. TOE units would still work for the local commander and not the CPA.

The issues of money and manpower scarcity will invariably raise its head, but in this case it is a huge half-truth and not a valid argument for not making Army PA a MACOM. First, there is plenty of money; it is just spread across many accounts. OCPA and its various FOAs already run a POM process and receive $38 million dollars annually.\textsuperscript{63} This does not include the money that MACOMs spend on their Army PA assets not to mention the O&M funds for real-world missions. Neither does it include the various 180 commands already spending money to maintain their current PA operations. Additionally, OCPA has garnered another $13 million dollars from the Army Budget Office in the form of Unfunded Requirement (UFR) monies to fund projects with valid requirements benefiting a specific command or the Army as a whole.\textsuperscript{64} In light of a $90 billion Army budget for FY '03, funding Army PA as a MACOM seems possible.

Like money, the personnel already exist in the force structure as well. Allocation rules already exist for PAO structure. TOE units and TDA organizations routinely carve out positions for this vital function. The Army PA MACOM would not need additional people than what the Army already allocates for PA functions, it would merely organize more effectively. If in the future Army PA has success in inserting more Army PA requirements into strategic documents such as TAP, then more forces could be raised to meet valid requirements.

The final half-truth is that working within the current system will eventually yield results. Fact is that tweaking existing rules to get more money or personnel for isolated PA assets only plays at the margins. Without central command and control from CPA, you are still left with isolated PA assets, albeit better organized and better funded, without the flexibility, integration and centralized command of a separate MACOM. Another problem PA needs to overcome in the battle to become a MACOM and to operationally control its own forces, is how the Army views PA. Currently, Army PA doctrine is managed by TRADOC as a Combat Support function. As a service, Army PA is subject to every imaginable threat related to outsourcing such as the FAIRS Act of 1998 that inventoried jobs that are contractible and jobs that were inherently governmental.\textsuperscript{65} However, as previously mentioned the UTL and the Army Universal Task List
identify PA functions as a command and control task not combat support. The major difference in the two is that as a command and control function Army PA could not be readily outsourced because it would be viewed as inherently governmental. Additionally, treating PA as a command and control function would support the contention that Army PA is a critical operational asset and as such should be its own organization. Add to that the funding and personnel security of a TOE organization and the Army Public Affairs Objective Force is born.

At the end of the day, however, it is not the rules, money, people nor TOE status. No, all force structure issues eventually boil down to one thing—capabilities required by combatant commanders. The genesis for all force structure is derived from the National Security Strategy (NSS) signed by the President. The NSS articulates eight objectives the U.S. will use to achieve its goals. These objectives provide the foundation for subordinate guidance such as the Defense Planning Guide (DPG) and The Army Plan (TAP). Linkage of particular requirements to any of the eight “core competencies” (Figure 4) derived from TAP form the basis for force structure. To date the inability of Army PA to construct any real supportable rules as to what constitutes a PA force, as well as the lack of workload standards, has inhibited the creation of a proper force structure. With the publication of the 2002 TAP, all that is about to change. Of the eight core competencies spelled out in TAP, Army PA figures prominently in three of them: Prompt Response, Forcible Entry Operations and Shape the Security Environment. According to COL Hovatter, this is the first time that Army PA has been mentioned in TAP. Because PA is mentioned in TAP, requirements for PA can be validated and from this future force structure to support the required capability will flow. For there to be an Army PA Objective Force, this monumental first step in articulating requirements needs to be greatly expanded upon. It is possible that, if Army PA were reorganized as a MACOM, more requirements would flow from TAP because PA missions are tied to Army requirements. Combatant commanders would see Army PA as an integral part of combat power instead of a distraction.
CONCLUSION

The Army’s failure to recognize the relationship between PA and war fighting will facilitate PA’s slide down the slippery slope toward irrelevance. To be relevant, to support the Objective Force and future Joint operations, Army PA needs to be designated as a functional MACOM along the lines of USACIDC, and organized much like TIM, in order to effectively command and control PA operations around the world. Much like USACIDC directs all criminal investigators, Army PA is an enabling function that can stand apart from the major mission of the installation base support. The future PA Objective Force should be an integrated PA MACOM structure commanded by the CPA with centrally funded field offices located in worldwide mission regions. Capable of force projection, its priorities will be aligned with TAP. While able to service local PA needs, equipment and personnel would be able to quickly mobilize in a surge capacity to assist in theaters needing increased PA support.

Gone will be the “parceling out” of personnel via allocation rules. Gone are isolated pockets of unconnected PA assets working for separate commands with uncoordinated objectives. Finally, gone are under-funded PA offices, insufficient personnel and non-standard equipment. In its place will rise a well equipped, organized, mission focused Objective PA force able to serve the needs of both the war fighters, and the American publics right to know.

The Army PA Objective Force is possible—with only the stroke of a pen.

WORD COUNT=6,929
ENDNOTES


6 Field Manual 46-1, 45.


9 Ibid.


12 Holm.

13 Field Manual 46-1, 56.

14 Ibid, 46.

15 Gary Hovatter, Colonel, Director Army Public Affairs Proponency, interviewed by author, 11 December 2002, Ft. Meade, MD. Actual Active Duty PA numbers are 179 Officer and 747 enlisted for total active duty strength of 926 military and an additional 904 civilians.


22 Field Manuel 46-1, 49.

23 Ibid, 56.


27 Marcia Perryman, Budget Analyst, Office Chief Public Affairs, telephone interview by author, 16 December 2002. Conversation laid out the six FOAs OCPA controls: Army Broadcasting, Soldiers Radio and Television, Hometown News Service, OCPA Los Angeles, OCPA New York and the Army Field Band. According to COL Gary Hovatter, Director Army Public Affairs Proponency, the Army Field Band is subordinate to the Department of the Army G1, but under the operational control of OCPA.

28 How the Army Runs, 3-6.

29 Gary Hovatter, Colonel, Director Army Public Affairs Proponency, telephone interview by author, 30 January 2003. Actual Army Broadcasting Service personnel numbers are 7 officers, 177 enlisted and 150 civilians.

30 Perryman.

31 Ibid.
32 Hovatter, telephone interview, December 6, 2002.

33 Field Manuel 46-1, 50. “The Corps PAO exercises operational control of organic PA units as authorized by the corps commander.

34 Lewis M. Boone, Colonel, interviewed by author, 17 December 2002. COL Boone has worked as the 82d Airborne Division PAO, EUCOM PA planner and most recently served as the Chief of Staff of the Army’s PAO.

35 How the Army Runs, 5-21.

36 Ibid, 3-6.

37 George Povich, Deputy Director, Army Public Affairs Activity, telephone interview by author, October 2002.


41 Hovatter telephone interview.

42 FM 46-1, 60

43 Ibid, 46.


46 The INSCOM Story, history fact sheet.


Gary Hovatter, Colonel, Director, Public Affair Proponency Activity, interview 11 December 2002. TIM did not establish Army PA positions at the region HQs because the model they used in which services to retain focused on resource production, not function. It is being corrected.

Interim Implementation Plan (TIM).


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TAA-09 Army Structure Message (ARSTRUC), 35.


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Perryman, interview.

Ibid.

Office of Management and Budget.


68 Polich, telephone interview October 2002.

69 The Army Plan, Annex C-2,3,6.

70 Hovatter, interview.

71 How the Army Runs, 3-5.
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Bell, Hiram (Colonel), Commandant Defense Information School and former Chief, Army Public Affairs Proponency. Telephone interview by author, 17 December 2002.

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