Think Like a Commander Prototype:
Instructor’s Guide to Adaptive Thinking

March 2003

Armored Forces Research Unit
U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences

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This report is the second of two research products presenting the methods and software for training adaptive battlefield thinking. The first research product presented the prototype software training application. This report is an instructor’s guide that provides an overview of adaptive battlefield thinking skills and documents the methods for employing the software application and administering the training. The report provides an introduction to adaptive thinking and the Adaptive Thinking Training Methodology and details the use of deliberate practice in training cognitive skills. Detailed information about the prototype vignettes are presented with comprehensive instructor materials needed to implement the training.

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Personnel Performance and Training Technology
FOREWORD

As the Army systematically transforms itself into a fast-deploying, highly adaptable force that can respond to a wide variety of threats in virtually any environment, it must also prepare for the leader training and leader development challenges that will accompany the transition to the Objective Force. The U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences (ARI) as part of its Science and Technology Objective: IV.SP.2002.02, Methods and Measures of Commander-Centric Training, is developing a variety of new training methods to enhance the U.S. Army’s ability to produce the capable leaders required for future missions.

Decision-making in the complex future battlefield requires a broader yet more focused vision of the myriad of battle command tasks and their associated conditions. An evolving training methodology tailored to address the new and complex conditions is focused on leaders and soldiers capable of performing against an unpredictable enemy across the full spectrum of conflict. Success will depend on the ability to think creatively, decide promptly, exploit technology, adapt easily, and act as a team; a partnership of Army leaders, scientists, and trainers must create and employ effective methods and techniques to ensure that future leaders, soldiers, and teams possess those qualities. The Adaptive Thinking Training Methodology and Think Like A Commander represent a method and a tool for training adaptive leaders. The training was adapted from training used at the Command and General Staff College’s Tactical Commander Development Program and has been incorporated into both the active and reserve components Armor Captains Career Course and will be piloted in the Combined Arms Battle Command Course. The goal of the training is to improve performance in tactical thinking under the challenging conditions of operations.

This report is the second of two research products presenting the methods and software for training adaptive battlefield thinking. The first research product presented the prototype software training application. This report is an instructor’s guide that provides an overview of adaptive battlefield thinking skills and documents the methods for employing the software application and administering the training.

The research product was briefed to the Commander of 16th Cavalry Regiment, Commander of 3rd Squadron/16th Regiment, and to the 3/16 cadre who are instructors at the Armored Captains Career Course.

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THINK LIKE A COMMANDER PROTOTYPE: INSTRUCTOR’S GUIDE TO ADAPTIVE THINKING

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THINK LIKE A COMMANDER PROTOTYPE:
INSTRUCTOR’S GUIDE TO ADAPTIVE THINKING

Introduction

... [It is] essential that all leaders – from subaltern to commanding general –
familiarize themselves with the art of clear, logical thinking. It is more valuable
to be able to analyze one battle situation correctly, recognize its decisive elements
and devise a simple, workable solution for it, than to memorize all the erudition
ever written of war. – Infantry in Battle, 1939.

On the future battlefield, the demands placed on soldiers and leaders will be of
unprecedented complexity, diversity, and scope. Our leaders and soldiers must be able to
think quickly and accurately and act decisively in a variety of challenging situations. To
prepare soldiers for that environment, we must use every training opportunity to improve
the skills associated with soldier and leader performance.

The term Adaptive Thinking has been used to describe the cognitive behavior of an
officer who is confronted by unanticipated circumstances during the execution of a planned
military operation (Lussier, Ross, & Mayes, 2000). It refers to the thinking the leader must do
to adapt operations to the requirements of unfolding events and is thus a key component of
competency in battle command. Adaptive thinking is a behavior. It involves the skilled
application of knowledge under challenging performance conditions; it is not the knowledge
itself. For most U.S. Army officers, the accumulation of the necessary tactical knowledge is not
the problem. After years of study and reading soldiers develop a solid understanding of the
elements of tactical decision-making. The ability to apply this knowledge expertly under battle
conditions, however, demands rigorous and extensive training and practice, until the framework
of thinking becomes automatic. Traditional training methods that rely on classrooms instruction,
field exercises, and actual war fighting experience are not practical methods for providing the
sufficient amounts of experience needed to develop adaptive leaders. To address the requirement
a training method called The Adaptive Thinking Training Methodology (ATTM) was developed
and a training program, Think Like A Commander, was created based on that method. This
report is an instructor’s guide that provides an overview of adaptive battlefield thinking skills
and documents the methods for employing the software application and administering the
training.

Organization of the Report

This report is organized in six sections:

- **Introduction**, describes the background, defines the problem of interest, and states the
  objectives of the report.
- **Adaptive Thinking**, provides an introduction to adaptive thinking.
- *The Adaptive Thinking Training Methodology,* describes the Adaptive Thinking Training Methodology.
- *Deliberate Practice,* discusses the elements of deliberate practice for thinking and reasoning tasks.
- *Think Like A Commander,* describes the Think Like A Commander training application and provides an overview of its use.
- *Using Think Like A Commander,* describes methods for implementing the Think Like A Commander training application.

Related software materials for the project are provided in a companion research product (Shadrick & Lussier, 2002)

**Background**

Through the Objective Force initiative, the Army is systematically transforming itself into a fast-deploying, highly adaptable force that can respond to a wide variety of threats in virtually any environment (Shinseki, 2000). The Army must prepare now for the leader training and leader development challenges that will accompany the transition to the Objective Force.

This project explored the training required to develop warfighters who are adaptable, allowing them to make the decisions to win on future battlefields.

The Army’s capstone document for the Objective Force (U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, 2000) sets the tone for the challenges that lie ahead:

The demands of operating in the future distributed and non-linear battlespace will place greater responsibility on leaders and soldiers at all levels. Success will demand leaders with mature judgment who can operate in an environment of uncertainty with courage, initiative, and aggressive resolve. Requirements for soldier proficiency will increase in many areas. The Objective Force soldier will perform many more varied and complex tasks, and units will function more autonomously, necessitating individuals who are not only multi-skilled but also multifunctional thus providing operational redundancy across the Force. Leaders and soldiers at all levels must become highly adaptive, mastering change rapidly, while competently employing a wide range of new technologies, particularly in the arena of Information Operations (IO). Comprehensive training requirements for a full spectrum Objective Force will be greater than the already heavy burden that exists today. The Objective Force requires training capabilities, resources, and effective management that will ensure dominance across the full spectrum of conflict. (p. 37)

Because success will depend on the ability to think creatively, decide promptly, exploit technology, adapt easily, and act as a team, there is a need to create effective methods and techniques to ensure that future leaders, soldiers, and teams possess these qualities. The ATTM and the Think Like A Commander (TLAC) represent a method and tool for training adaptive leaders.
Product Objectives

The overall goal of the work reported here was to establish an initial knowledge base regarding use and implementation of the Think Like A Commander: Prototype version 1.0 software application. The project's technical objectives were to:

- Provide an overview of the Adaptive Thinking Training Methodology.
- Introduce the Think Like A Commander software package.
- Discuss effective training techniques and methods for implementing TLAC training.
- Provide instructor materials and resource to facilitate the use of the ATTM and TLAC.
Adaptive Thinking

The purpose of this section is to describe a training methodology called the Adaptive Thinking Training Methodology (ATTM) so that leaders and trainers can incorporate the methodology into their training activities.

Adaptive Thinking – What is it and why is it so hard?

Both the Army Training and Leader Development Panel Officer Study (2001) and the Future Combat Systems Statement of Required Capabilities (2001) highlight the need for adaptive leaders. In 1999, General Abrams, commander of the Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) challenged the behavioral scientists who were participating in the TRADOC sponsored Army Experiment 6 (AE6) program: Find a method to train commanders and staff officers how to think rather than what to think and thereby increase their ability to think adaptively.

In AE6, the meaning of the term adaptive thinking was illustrated as follows: A unit has crossed the Line of Departure and is engaged in executing a planned military operation. Unanticipated events occur. The skillful commander will, performing adaptively, make adjustments within the context of the plan to either exploit the advantage or minimize the harm of the unanticipated event, in short, will adapt to conditions for a more successful outcome.

Adaptive thinking, as defined above, can be thought of as thinking on one’s feet framed in terms of the battlefield. In this viewpoint adaptive thinking is not so much a type of thinking like, for example, creative, lateral, or out-of-the-box thinking but rather it is defined by the conditions under which it occurs. They are the conditions of military operations, conditions under which clear insightful thinking is very challenging.

The decision-making environment facing the military commander is challenging. He begins with a detailed plan but as he executes, he must constantly make adjustments, altering timing, taking advantage of unforeseen opportunities, and overcoming unexpected difficulties, in short, adjusting or adapting the plan. The thinking that underlies these decisions is not made in isolation or in a calm reflective environment. He must do this thinking while performing as commander: assessing the situation, scanning for new information, dealing with individuals under stress, monitoring progress of multiple activities of a complex plan. Multitudes of events compete for his attention. No easy guidelines can be applied. For example, mistakenly changing a plan midcourse is as common as stubbornly pursuing a failing plan. And typically there is the pressure of time, as all options become less prospective with delay.

Consider the following vignette.

At the National Training Center a battalion level breach is underway. The operation is progressing typically; the unit is at the obstacle, making progress towards accomplishing the task, but has been slowed and is taking heavy casualties, from artillery. The commander is at the breach site. Suddenly he receives word on the radio. A reconnaissance section has reported a
bypass. The commander orders his companies to maneuver through the bypass. One, two, three, companies maneuver into the supposed bypass, in reality an enemy kill zone, and are destroyed.

Experts, in various fields, are those who can perform well under such conditions. The determining factor is usually not knowledge alone. The commander in the example above had no lack of understanding about the nature of obstacles and kill zones. Only two days earlier, he had planned a deliberate defense on the same terrain in which he had constructed an obstacle with the express intent of inducing the enemy into his engagement area. Tactical knowledge was not the problem; the difficulty lies in applying one’s knowledge in complex situations, which can overwhelm one’s limited ability to attend to events and to think through decisions while under extreme pressure or stress. Most intermediate level officers have considerable knowledge about their field, but applying the knowledge during a real or simulated military operation requires great conscious attention and is often done poorly.
The Adaptive Thinking Training Methodology

The solution reached by the AE6 adaptive thinking team (Ross & Lussier, 1999) is called the Adaptive Thinking Training Methodology (ATTM). Deliberate practice exercises are used to develop battlefield thinking habits characteristic of experts, for example, to model a thinking enemy, to see the battlefield from a larger perspective, and to visualize accurately, dynamically, and proactively. Thus the ATTM does not train adaptive thinking per se but focuses on creating the automatic habits that form the framework in which battlefield thinking is done and thereby enables adaptive thinking during execution of military operations to flourish.

The value of the methodology can be seen from the follow progression:

1. After years of study, reading, and consideration of problems military officers typically develop a good understanding of the basic elements of the domain. But knowledge alone is not sufficient for expert-level performance.

2. Repetitive performance causes thinking processes to become automatic so that they can be performed quickly and accurately with less mental effort.

3. As more and more basic elements become automatic, more complex models can be manipulated without a proportionate increase in mental effort. This enables experts to use their knowledge flexibly and creatively in complex situations.

An important point about automaticity is that it does not mean mindlessness. When more functions can be performed automatically, the soldier can think at a higher level. In a complex activity like battle command, expert performance levels cannot be attained without relying on the automaticity resulting from past performance.

Repetitive performance causes behavior to become automatic. But it is important that the behaviors that become ingrained conform to those of an expert - that they are the right behaviors. It is a well-known phenomenon that novices, through play alone, will improve rapidly for a short time but then may continue performing for decades without further improvement.

Practice, by itself, does not make perfect, however, to become an expert it takes perfect practice. The cornerstone of developing expertise is the use of deliberate practice. Studies of world class experts show that almost invariably the expert performance reflects extended periods of intense training and preparation (Ericsson, Krampe, & Tesch-Roemer, 1993). Describing deliberate practice, Ericsson writes:

...subjects ideally should be given explicit instructions about the best method and be supervised by a teacher to allow individualized diagnosis of errors, informative feedback, and remedial training... Deliberate practice is a highly structured aim; the specific goal of which is to improve performance. Specific tasks are invented to overcome weaknesses, and performance is carefully monitored to provide cues for ways to improve it further... Individuals are motivated to practice because practice improves performance.
In addition, engaging in deliberate practice generates no immediate monetary rewards and generates costs associated with access to teachers and training environments.

When more cognitive functions are performed automatically, we can think at a higher level.

The elevation lines are close. This is a steep gradient.

If I concentrate I can mentally construct a good picture of this terrain.

The enemy will view this as restrictive, avoid it and go left or right.

Let me remember. What does that symbol mean?

I can use this terrain to turn him and expose his flank.

Automaticity does not mean mindlessness - instead one sees with clarity and ease.

Figure 1. Automaticity of cognitive behaviors.

As can be seen by the above description, a key component of ATTM is coaching, as subject matter experts (SMEs) observe and guide the students with regard to the expert habits.

The ATTM follows the pattern of deliberate practice exercises. The student performs the task, battle command thinking, under the observation of a coach or mentor. The coach is ready to note the occurrence or an element of expert form during student performance and mentor the student. Thus, the coach or mentor is a crucial part of the training methodology.

Since its development, ATTM has been widely used at Fort Leavenworth: in 1999 in the Advanced Tactics course, in 2000 in the Medium Brigade course, in the Senior Leader’s Course for the Initial Brigade Combat Team, and at the School for Command Preparation’s Brigade and Battalion Commander Courses, and at Fort Knox starting in 2001 in the Armor Captain’s Career Course, and in the resident phase of the Reserve Component Armor Captain’s Career Course – Distance Learning.
Train As You Fight versus Deliberate Practice

The maxim “train as you fight” has risen to such a level of familiarity in the U.S. Army that the value of the notion goes almost unquestioned. Yet studies of the development of expertise clearly indicate that “as you fight” meaning performing in fully realistic simulated battles is neither the most effective nor efficient method of developing expertise. Such “performances” can help a novice become acquainted with applying military knowledge, and can reinforce existing knowledge in an experienced person, but will not in and of themselves lead to the development of expertise. In many fields where expertise has been systematically studied, including chess, music and sports, development beyond advanced novice level requires large amounts of deliberate practice (Ericsson, Krampe & Tesch-Roemer, 1993) and good coaching (Ericsson, 1996; Charness, Krampe & Mayr, 1996). The combination of long periods of study, relatively few chances to practice, and little or no deliberate practice with quality coaching has led to a situation in the army where most officers can talk an excellent battle command game, but reveal only an amateurish effort in actual performance.

How does deliberate practice differ from performance or from casual exercise? Here are some characteristics that distinguish deliberate practice.

1. Repetition. Task performance occurs repetitively rather than at its naturally occurring frequency. A goal of deliberate practice is to develop habits that operate expertly and automatically. If appropriate situations occur relatively infrequently or widely spaced apart while performing “as you fight” they will not become habitual as readily.

2. Focused feedback. Task performance is evaluated by the coach or learner during performance. There is a focus on elements of form, critical parts of how one does the task. During an “as you fight” performance these elements appear in a more holistic fashion.

3. Immediacy of performance. After corrective feedback on task performance there is an immediate repetition so that the task can be performed more in accordance with expert norms. When there is feedback during “train as you fight” performance, it is often presented during an after-action review (AAR) and there is usually not an opportunity to perform in accordance with the feedback for some time.

4. Stop and start. Because of the repetition and feedback, deliberate practice is typically seen as a series of short performances rather than a continuous flow.

5. Emphasis on difficult aspects. Deliberate practice will focus on more difficult aspects. For example, when flying an airplane normally only a small percentage of one’s flight time is consumed by takeoffs and landings. In deliberate practice simulators, however, a large portion of the time will be involved in landings and takeoffs and relatively little in steady level flight. Similarly, rarely occurring emergencies can be exercised very frequently in deliberate practice.
6. **Focus on areas of weakness.** Deliberate practice can be tailored to the individual and focused on areas of weakness. During “train as you fight” performances the individual will avoid situations in which he knows he is weak, and rightly so as there is a desire to do one’s best.

7. **Conscious focus.** Expert behavior is characterized by many aspects being performed with little conscious effort. Such automatic elements have been built from past performances and constitute skilled behavior. In fact, normally, when the expert consciously attends to the elements, performance is degraded. In deliberate practice the learner may consciously attend to the element because improving performance at the task is more important in this situation than performing one’s best. After a number of repetitions attending to the element to assure that it is performed as desired, the learner resumes performing without consciously attending to the element.

8. **Work vs. play.** Characteristically, deliberate practice feels more like work and is more effortful than casual performance. The motivation to engage in deliberate practice generally comes from a sense that one is improving in skill.

9. **Active coaching.** Typically a coach must be very active during deliberate practice, monitoring performance, assessing adequacy, and controlling the structure of training. Typically in “train as you fight” performances there are no coaches. Instead there are observers/controllers who attempt to interfere as little as possible in the performance.
Deliberate Practice

Structure for Deliberate Practice of Battle Command

As can be seen from the above considerations, development of a trainer for deliberate practice in battle command entails construction of a specialized technology to provide the training and support the coaching. Such a development effort was undertaken by the Center for Army Tactics of the Command and General Staff College, with the support of TRADOC Army Experiment 5 and 6 programs and the Army Transformation Program. The system, called the Digital Leader Reaction Course (DLRC), comprises a low overhead brigade level tactical simulator, which is capable of rapid stop and restart with some rewind capability into which probes can be inserted “on-the-fly.” Lessons learned from AE6 and the DLRC were used to develop the ATTM and the Think Like A Commander training application.

Themes

Three key elements of the ATTM facilitate the interaction between the coaches and the learners. The first of these are what are called the themes. These are thinking behaviors (the “how to think” element) that are characteristic of high-level tactical experts. They are the elements of expert tactical thinking form that the coaches are observing and the students are modeling. While well known to most officers and understood at a conceptual level, these behaviors are often not exhibited by the officers during actual exercises. They have not become automatic and thus, when the officers’ attention is focused, as it should be, on the specific situation confronting them, the behaviors are omitted. The themes for tactical decision-making are:

- Keep a focus on mission and higher commander’s intent.
- Model a thinking enemy.
- Consider effects of terrain.
- Use all assets available.
- Include considerations of timing.
- Consider where your fight fits into the bigger picture of what is happening/should happen both from friendly and enemy perspectives.
- Exhibit visualizations that are dynamic, proactive and flexible.
- Show rich contingency thinking.

This is a good set for a tactical exercise for the following reasons. First, the behaviors are characteristic of high-level expert tactical decision-makers. Observing acknowledged experts, these elements can clearly be seen guiding their actions. Second, the concepts are familiar to most officers. They have been taught to do these things and generally are able to do them with some degree of proficiency. Third, observations of officers in realistic tactical performances indicate that they typically do not perform according to these norms; the more intense the exercise, the less likely the officers to exhibit these behaviors. Fourth, the set describes thinking actions that can be characterized as “how to think” or “what to think about” rather than “what to think.” Fifth, and very importantly, the themes represent thinking behaviors that are relatively consistent over a wide range of tactical situations. Because of that consistency, the
formation of automatic thought habits will occur more quickly at this general level than it will for the unique and specific aspects of each situation, that is, the inconsistencies of tactical thinking.

Probes

Another important structural element that facilitates coaching of battle command thinking skills is the probe. Since thinking is unobservable it is not so simple for the coach to watch the learner and assess the extent to which the themes are part of his or her thinking. A probe is a specific event inserted in the exercise and carefully designed to elicit a reaction that reveals the extent to which the themes are considerations in the student’s thinking.

Developing Habits

Habits develop only through performance. The more you repeat a behavior the more habitual it becomes, whether you want it to or not. This is true of sensorimotor behaviors such as driving a car as well as cognitive behaviors. When one is first learning how to read, for example, one’s attention is focused on the shape of the letters and sounding out the words. When the sounding of the words has become automatic, one must focus attention to understand the meaning of the passage. With practice that too will become automatic. One can read, understand the story, and think about what the writer is saying and whether one agrees with it. Most U.S. Army officers do not rise to that level of automaticity in battlefield thinking. It takes all their conscious attention to operate on the battlefield and to grasp the nature of what is happening; there are few resources left to think adaptively about the events.

Strong habits are such a critical component of expertise, in fact, that after one has attained some expertise, consciously thinking about habitual elements will usually degrade skilled performance. You cannot consciously control either thought or action with the same level of skill and complexity that you can learn to do them through repetition. Further, stress narrows focus. Habits predominate in times of stress, fatigue, and competing demands for attention. Under such conditions people do what they have done most often; they do what comes automatically.

Elements of Form in Tactical Thinking

Deliberate practice is at the heart of the ATTM. In order to conduct the training the coaches must identify specific elements of form modeled by SMEs. For the Combined Arms Battle Command Course, the elements are called Themes of Battlefield Thinking.

Deliberate Practice

Based on classic Behaviorist learning theory, deliberate practice involves performing while focusing on selected elements of form. The elements are compared against an expert standard, and consciously controlled so that they conform to the standard. The behavior is repeated until it is performed automatically with improved form. Deliberate practice can be applied to thinking behavior as well. The themes discussed earlier represent patterns of thought
characteristic of good decision makers that are typically lacking at the student’s level, particularly when they are performing in a stressful environment.

Leaders must have both extensive knowledge and have learned to apply that knowledge skillfully through practice. But study and practice alone do not ensure expertise. Repetitious performance alone only ingrains habits; it does not necessarily lead to the improvement of performance. Deliberate practice involves the performance of exercises specifically designed to improve performance. Deliberate practice is the basis of most coaching.

The steps of deliberate practice are familiar and adapt well to the U.S. Army's training methodology of Task – Conditions - Standards:

1. **Identify the elements of expert form.** One must first know how experts perform the tasks and select elements to model. The goal is to model task performance after experts. Otherwise you are just performing the task in your usual fashion and will not necessarily improve.

2. **Coach/Mentor notes discrepancies from expert form.** The learner performs the task and compares his form with the model. A coach/mentor can be important in this step.

3. **The learner performs the task while attending to the element.** The expert normally performs without conscious attention to the element of form. In fact doing so would typically degrade performance. Here, however, the learner does attend to the element to ensure he performs it in the desired manner.

4. **Behavior is repeated until habitual.** The behavior is repeated. It is important that form be as correct as possible.

5. **Performance without attending to element.** Conscious attention is removed. The learner tries to perform the task correctly without attending to the element of form.

*Deliberate Practice of Thinking and Reasoning Tasks*

Deliberate practice is a well-known methodology for training in sports as well as many other fields, for example, playing a musical instrument. The U.S. Army makes extensive use of the methodology in training gunnery and in flight school. Soviet chess trainers have made successful use of the technique. They are one of the first to apply it to a purely thinking task involving decision-making in a performance environment.

Collective tactical exercises, such as those at a Combat Training Center (CTC), do not currently apply deliberate practice methodology. Instead they exercise the habits already existing in the soldiers. At the CTC the exercise does not stop for the O/Cs (coaches) to correct and the students do not repeat the behavior according to correct form. Also the CTC involves a full-blown performance, while in deliberate practice elements of form can be isolated with the learner paying attention to those elements. At the CTC the unit is trying to perform at its best
level. When one attends to the elements of form it often degrades performance. Therefore during a performance at the level of the CTC when one is trying to be most effective it is inappropriate to attend to individual elements. At the end of the exercise, at the after-action review the leaders may realize some of the mistakes they made but do not have the opportunity to perform the task correctly according to the specified standard. The realization of error alone will not generally improve performance because, as in the example of the commander at the breach site, lack of knowledge and understanding are not the fault. After years of schooling and study most leaders have a tremendous amount of knowledge. But they may have little practical experience applying the knowledge and what experience they gain in exercises is most often not done in a deliberate fashion. Therefore, leaders tend to not be skillful in applying the knowledge they possess.

Army tactical exercises are like scrimmage games played under realistic conditions. Anyone who has coached a sports team knows that players improve their skills most at practice during drills and exercises under the influence of coaching, not at scrimmages. Deliberate practice is specifically designed to improve performance. During work activities you must act with skills you have - "go with what you got" - and during stressful performance you must go with what is most ingrained. During deliberate practice, however, you improve and expand the skills you have.

A simple illustration: in a tournament, a professional golfer with a weak shot from a sand trap will take risks to avoid landing in a trap. In deliberate practice he or she may hit repeatedly from a trap. It is characteristic of deliberate practice that you focus on behaviors that you do not yet perform well, while in performance you avoid such weaknesses as far as possible.

Knowledge and study, deliberate practice, and collective exercises are all important in producing expertise. See figure 2.
Deliberate Practice is an Important Part of Training Strategy.

Figure 2. Deliberate Practice Training Strategy.
Think Like A Commander

Think Like a Commander is a prototype individual commander trainer designed to apply deliberate practice concepts to train the battlefield thinking habits that underpin such tasks as planning, predicting, visualizing, deciding, and directing. The prototype system involves presentation of scenario-based situations and structured questioning to elicit the individual’s mental models and thought habits. The prototype system includes an initial set of eight situations.

Development of Think Like A Commander for the Armor Captains’ Career Course

The development of Think Like A Commander for ACCC began with an analysis of brigade and battalion commander vignettes developed by ARI for the School for Command Preparation at Fort Leavenworth. The analysis focused on determining the tactical situations that were appropriate for the captain level and determining what, if any, revisions were needed to make the vignettes appropriate. The focus was not exclusively on company command, rather, the focus was on positions that a captain would be expected to perform. Small Group Instructors (SGI) at the U.S. Armor Center’s Armor Captains Career Course performed the analysis and revisions. Once the analysis was completed the vignettes were appropriately modified. The analysis and modification resulted in eight vignettes that encompass offensive, defensive, and stability and support operations.

An important component of the vignette development process was a determination of the important considerations a student should comprehend or “see” after watching the vignette. These indicators are key teaching points for each vignette and represent the important aspects of the scenario that should cue the student thinking process. For each vignette, 10 to 16 indicators were determined. Students and coaches can use the vignette-specific indicators to indicate whether a particular theme was exhibited in the student’s thinking. For example, the theme of “model a thinking enemy” applies across all vignettes, but the considerations that students should make if they are modeling a thinking enemy are different for each vignette. Thus, the indicators fulfill the role of probes as described earlier.

In conjunction with the modifications of the tactical vignettes, an analysis of the ATTM was conducted to develop a mechanism for developing an automated system to deliver the training content, collect student responses, and provide feedback on student performance. As a result, a computer-based-training program was developed to deliver the training material and collect data during the use of the training. The application was developed in Microsoft Visual Basic 6.0 and provides direct links to audio-video files that present the tactical vignette. Furthermore, the application provides for automated data collection of student responses to the vignettes, determines the amount of time student spend on tasks, provides additional tools, and includes a mechanism for student feedback.

The program was developed using sound instructional design practices and included students and instructors in the development process. All materials were developed with SGIs from the ACCC and included a user jury with students from those classes. The user jury
provided valuable feedback and suggested a number of revisions to the application, both in style of presentation and function.

The following figures are screen captures for the training application and are provided to give the instructor or mentor a better understanding of the actual flow of the training.

Figure 3 contains a screen shot of the main screen. The student is provided with several options. First, the student can watch the "Road to War," a short audio-video file that provides an overview of the current state of affairs. There are two other audio-video files available to the user. The first provides an overview of Adaptive Thinking and is used to provide the student with a better understanding of the importance of the training methodology (U.S. Army Training Initiatives Office, TRADOC DCST, 1999). The second provides a replay of an interview with BG (ret.) Wass de Czege (U.S. Army Training Initiatives Office, TRADOC DCST, 2000), and outlines the adaptive thinking methodology.

![Figure 3. Think Like A Commander - Main Screen.](image)

Finally, on the right hand side of the Main screen, the student is provided with a description of the eight vignettes. By selecting a vignette, the student is taken to the next step in the training program.
Figure 4. Think Like A Commander – Vignette Screen.

A tactical situation is described in animated and narrated format. Typically, a vignette presentation will last for two to four minutes in length. Figure 4 provides a representation of the vignette presentation.

Once the vignette presentation is completed, the student is automatically transferred to the Notes section (see Figure 5). This is where the student is asked to think about and document everything from the situation that should be considered before making a decision. Here, the student is given the opportunity to formulate a process or model to use for tactical problem solving. The process is expedited by the use of the TLAC Themes previously mentioned.
Figure 5. Think Like A Commander – Notes Screen.

The student is given several tools (located on the right hand side) to complete the process. First, the students are given links to information about each of the eight themes. They are used to reinforce the meaning and utility of the themes and help to integrate the themes into the students thinking framework or model. Second, the student is provided with a text copy of the script. The script is used to allow the student to review the content of the vignette. It allows students to get a better understanding for the need for “active listening” when confronted with a problem. Typically, students will consider several variables or issues concerning the vignette, and then using the tools provided will consider several other issues. In a real world setting, the tools may not be available; therefore, they try harder to think about important elements as they are confronted with them. Active listening, therefore, also helps to expedite the thinking process by forcing officers to consider and assimilate considerations rapidly.

The Notes page also contains links to the important maps required for the vignette, a link to the Rules of Engagement for the scenario, and a link to allow the student to replay the vignette.

The interaction the student makes with the Notes page are recorded for analysis, including the free text input, the tools the student utilizes, and the order in which the tools are used. Furthermore, the system creates a record of the themes the student requests assistance
with. The data is used to determine the amount of time it takes the student to assimilate the themes. Furthermore, the amount of time the student spends on the task is recorded, allowing researchers to calculate the rate of improvement throughout the use of the eight vignettes.

After completing the Notes section, the student is taken to the class discussion section of the program (see Figure 6). Here the student and SGI are provided with the tools needed to facilitate the discussion. The tools include the required maps, vignette script, rules of engagement, and the list of considerations the student provided for the vignette.

As previously mentioned, a key component of the ATTM and TLAC is the coaching a SME provides by observing and guiding the students with regard to the expert habits. During the class discussion students should be encouraged/required to discuss and/or defend considerations relevant to the vignette. Class members discuss the second and third-order effects related to actions students suggest. The SGI, as a mentor, facilitates the discussion and is actively monitoring performance, assessing adequacy, and controlling the structure of training.

![Figure 6. Think Like A Commander – Discussion.](image)

The final phase of the training methodology is the Self-Assessment section of the program (see Figure 7). Here, the student is shown the set of indicators developed by tactical
experts for the vignette. These considerations are unique to each vignette and represent some of the important information a soldier should attend to in making a decision. Typically, there are 10 to 16 key considerations for each vignette with 1 to 4 for each theme. The student is provided with the notes they made earlier in the program allowing for a quick comparison of their thoughts to those of the experts. They are asked, based on their earlier input, to place checkmarks before the expert considerations that they previously considered.

Figure 7. Think Like A Commander – Feedback.

Students are also asked to make the same evaluation on the class as a whole. The purpose in this step is to allow the student to get a true representation of their individual performance. For example, a student may only get fifty percent of the important considerations for a vignette. During the class discussion, however, ninety to one hundred percent of the key considerations may be discussed. Students may inappropriately believe that their performance was directly linked to the performance of the class as a whole. This individual feedback supplements and complements the feedback given by the SGI mentor during the class discussion phase of the training.

Once the students rate their performance, they are given direct feedback for each individual theme. For example, a student may be told that he or she got 1 out of 4 correct for the “Model a Thinking Enemy” theme. The student is then able to access additional information to focus his future thinking process.
Using Think Like A Commander

Planning and Preparing for the Training Event

The instructor or trainer should conduct a formal review of the Think Like A Commander themes (Appendix A), vignettes (Appendix B and TLAC application), teaching points (Appendix C), instructor’s notes (Appendix D), and slides (Appendix E) prior to class instruction. The instructor should also be familiar with the computer-based training application in order to instruct students on its use. The software application was developed with specific training design characteristics in mind in order to insure ease of use.

As described above, a number of tools and materials are provided to facilitate the use of the Think Like A Commander methodology. While the tools provide a roadmap, they do not need to be followed as strict doctrine. Instructors should use the materials to introduce topics and issues that relate to the materials they wish to discuss in class. Therefore, the Think Like a Commander vignettes can address as many or as few topics as the instructor desires.

Conducting the Training Exercise

Once the instructor is familiar with the TLAC products the training exercise can start. To begin, the instructor should introduce the TLAC training methodology to the training audience. This should include a brief overview of adaptive thinking. Two videos included in the TLAC training application assist the instructor in introducing the training methodology. The first provides an overview of Adaptive Thinking and is used to provide the student with a better understanding of the importance of the training methodology (U.S. Army Training Initiatives Office, TRADOC DCST, 1999). The second provides a replay of an interview with BG (ret.) Wass de Czege (U.S. Army Training Initiatives Office, TRADOC DCST, 2000), and outlines the adaptive thinking methodology.

After introducing adaptive thinking and the TLAC application, the instructor should allow the students to watch the Road to War video. This video will give students an overview of the overall scenario and situation from which the TLAC vignettes were developed.

Finally, the instructor can assign a vignette from those available to start the training. After watching the audio/video file, the student is asked to analyze the vignette and determine key variables and considerations that are important based on the situation. The student can use the tools provided to assist in developing their list.

Once the class completes this process, the class discussion can be initiated. During the class discussion the instructor should provide coaching to improve student understanding. The class discussion should require students to produce decisions, visualize, or make recommendations that require adaptive thinking. Instructors can cross-train students by putting them in a role other than their primary functional areas. During the discussion, instructors or mentors should provide students with an expert perspective and evaluate performance on the thinking and decision-making process.
Planning the Adaptive Thinking Training Class Discussion

Planning is a key component to conducting a successful class discussion. A good discussion plan will address the focus of the discussion, the length and type of discussion, and resources required to prepare and conduct the discussion. This plan should be developed early and in conjunction with the training plan to properly manage the time available. In developing a discussion plan, instructors should:

- Review the key considerations,
- Review the Instructor’s Notes, and
- Select potential discussion slides.

Review of Objectives and Intent. Using training aids and products provided in Appendixes B, C, D and E, the instructor/mentor should review the vignette and key considerations that were presented during the vignette. The instructor should determine the students understanding of what happen during vignette and the key decisions that were made. This discussion should add relevance to the follow-on topics of discussion.

Focusing on four to six key considerations (or teaching points) will allow a thorough discussion of the training event and discovery of the processes that were involved surrounding the vignette. In conducting the class discussion, instructors should:

- Conduct the class discussion as soon as possible,
- Focus on the 8 themes and events/evidence that they were being used in cognitive thought,
- Focus on key events that should have led to certain considerations,
- Provide an open environment for an honest discussion
- Focus on critical time leading up to a decision, and consider the second and third order effects of decisions made (what would happen as a response to that decision?), and
- Encourage students to talk through their decision making process and discover the factors that went into their thought processes.

Further, the discussion should focus on:

- The time and events leading up to and including the commander making a key decision, and
- Why a certain decision should be made.
- Understanding how to apply the 8 themes.

The instructor should always wrap up the discussion by refocusing the students on the training objectives and any adjustments that should be made, before turning class back to the students, where the students can complete the self-evaluation section of the training.

More information on techniques for the class discussion will be presented in the following section.
Student-Mentor Interactions

This section describes how the interaction between the coach and students is facilitated. The remainder of this paper focuses on the qualities of the coach-student interaction as described by Ross & Lussier (1999).

Scaffolding. The goal of adaptive thinking is for students to automatize their thinking habits about tactical problems. In TLAC, students think about the tactical problem on their own. During the class discussion, the instructor needs to make sure the student’s thinking process is correct; that it models an expert thinking process. To help them generate their analysis of what is going on in a situation and what effect will be generated by various actions, the themes can be used to help bring the situation in focus. One way of training an expert thinking process is for instructors to encourage simple “what if” questions as the group discusses the vignette. The instructor should help them “close in” on what is going on and what effect certain actions would have.

Again, using the themes to examine the situation from several perspectives can encourage deeper understanding. Some students, during the class discussion, only try to confirm their original assessment while other students will tend to look at variations in so many things at once that they do not know what is causing what or what effect some action will have. Scaffolding can address these tendencies and produce more successful hypothesis generation.

“Scaffolding has been described as a process that enables a... novice to solve a problem, carry out a task, or achieve a goal which would be beyond his unassisted efforts” (Wood, Bruner, & Ross, 1976, p. 90). “The hallmark of scaffolded instruction is its interactive nature.... Critical to the teaching-learning process is the role of dialogue; it is the means by which support is provided and adjusted.... The relationship between the learner and the teacher in this supportive dialogue is to be contrasted with that observed when students are left to discover or invent strategies independently or when students are passive observers who receive demonstrations and are ‘talked at’ regarding strategy use” (Palincsar, 1986, pp. 74-75).

Observing students as they actively struggle with problems is the first step to good scaffolding. Scaffolding starts to be applied as soon as the students receive the challenge, and they start trying to understand what the problem is and how it can be approached. After hypothesis generation, during group discussion, the instructor may need to provide scaffolding by using the themes to help the students focus on relevant information. The instructor may also need to demonstrate some basic considerations or teaching points.

Good battlefield thinking distinguishes successful and unsuccessful commanders, but students may lack the skills to know how to think about tactical problems. First, they may not recognize structure of good tactical thinking; it consists of variables and the relationship between them. For example, if we do this action using these resources, we can expect this outcome. Second, students may not be able to adapt their situational assessment as new information is received. Students, who can’t easily relate new information to their current battlefield assessment, resist changing their thinking in the face of anomalous data by ignoring it, reinterpreting it, or making only marginal changes to their assessment. As one instructor in the Field Artillery Captain’s Career Course observed during a simulation-based student exercise, the
students “picked a bad road” and continued down it regardless of what happened. The students seemed to be in a comfort zone by sticking to their plan regardless of new input. Third, students may also err the other way and abandon their ideas because they just do not know how to relate new information to a hypothesis. They may “jump to conclusions” that an assessment is wrong based on one bit of conflicting information. If they cannot adapt their thinking to new information that does not exactly fit their original concept of the situation, their performance will be less adaptive.

**Asking Questions**

Much of scaffolding depends on the instructor’s ability to ask the right kind of questions. Good questions help the instructor to gain insight into the students’ thinking process and stimulate the students to reflect on their conclusions and methods. At the most basic level, good questions are respectful and thoughtful. It’s okay to have fun during the learning process, but questions that offend students and put them on the defensive are not useful.

Good questions stimulate thoughtful observation by the students, and help students’ attend to their own ideas, not the instructor’s ideas. Good questions build good habits of thinking in such areas as drawing conclusions, observing, seeing issues from more than one perspective, and questioning assumptions. The instructor must leave responsibility to the students, and follow the “rhythm” of the thinking process. Introduction of information that students are not ready for, in either the form of a question or a mini-lecture, will have little or no impact on the students’ thinking. Good questions invite response and build trust for continued interaction. Some students may have an initial resistance to the open forum of discussion used in this type of instructional approach. Instructors may have to work to learn to ask good questions, and students may need to learn how to respond.

Good questions:

- Are clearly stated.
- Focus on the big ideas and get students “out of the weeds.”
- Make students search productively for an answer.
- Make learners consider new perspective.

Bad questions are:

- Disrespectful.
- Trivial.
- Too big in scope.
- Closed ended (yes or no answer required).
- “Trick” questions.
- Ones you are really anxious to answer yourself as an instructor.
Things to remember as you learn to scaffold the thinking skills of others during training:

- Intervention with scaffolding can alleviate student frustration and enhance the learning experience, but should not take away all responsibility from the students.
- Lack of or ineffective scaffolding leads to very high student frustration levels and an overall reduction in learning efficiency. Strike a balance between challenge and support.
- The goal is not to tell the student that they were right or wrong, but to lead the student to effective thinking techniques.
- The only way to learn to facilitate other people's development, as described here, is to try it and reflect on your success.

Conclusion

The term “adaptive thinking” was previously described as the “cognitive behavior of an officer who is confronted by unanticipated circumstances during the execution of a planned military operation” (Lussier et al., 2000). The TLAC program is one way to address the need for focused deliberate practice of battlefield thinking skills. That is, TLAC is one way to train adaptive thinking behaviors. Instructors are encouraged to use the adaptive thinking methodology during other activities to help reinforce the training by allowing students additional opportunities to practice expert tacticians’ thinking patterns.
References


Appendix A

Think Like A Commander Themes of Battlefield Thinking

**Keep a Focus on the Mission and Higher’s Intent.**
- Commanders must never lose sight of the purpose and results they are directed to achieve—even when unusual and critical events may draw them in a different direction.

**Model a Thinking Enemy**
- Commanders must not forget that the adversary is a reasoning human being, intent on defeating them—it’s tempting to simplify the battlefield by treating the enemy as static or simply reactive.

**Consider Effects of Terrain**
- Commanders must not lose sight of the operational effects of the terrain on which they must fight—every combination of terrain and weather has a significant effect on what can and should be done to accomplish the mission.

**Use All Assets Available**
- Commanders must not lose sight of the synergistic effects of fighting their command as a combined arms team—this includes not only all assets under their command, but also those which higher headquarters might bring to bear to assist them.

**Consider Timing**
- Commanders must not lose sight of the time they have available to them to get things done—a good sense of how much time it takes to accomplish various battlefield tasks and the proper use of that sense is a vital combat multiplier.

**See the Big Picture**
- Commanders must remain aware of what is happening around them and how it might effect their operations and how what they do can effect others’ operations—a narrow focus on your own fight can get you blind-sided.

**Visualize the Battlefield**
- Commanders must be able to visualize a fluid and dynamic battlefield with some accuracy and use this visualization to their advantage—a commander who develops this difficult skill can reason proactively like no other.

**Consider Contingencies and Remain Flexible**
- Commanders must never lose sight of the old maxim that “no plan survives the first shot”—flexible plans and well thought out contingencies result in rapid, effective responses under fire.
Appendix B

Overview of the Think Like A Commander Scenarios

**Vignette 1: Trouble in Mclouth**

A refuel mission runs into a refugee roadblock. Large crowds and a small amount of time constrain you. How will you continue the mission while dealing with the host nation and the media?

**Vignette 2: Save the Shrine**

Enemy agents have spread misinformation in an attempt to disrupt your timing. Angry civilian convoys are on the move. How will this influence your mission?

**Vignette 3: The Recon Fight**

The enemy’s recon has been defeated, but the Dakotans unit boundaries appear to have shifted. Your western-most scout has been lost. How will you counter the enemy’s projected movements?

**Vignette 4: A Shift in Forces**

A semi-successful air attack leaves the enemy stronger than anticipated. Lead elements of the enemy tank division may be headed in your direction. Most of your resources are committed. Can you adjust your plan to deal with the shift in forces?

**Vignette 5: The Attack Begins**

3 hours prior to attack, you’re bogged down in a minefield while taking HE fire. Can you accomplish your mission?

**Vignette 6: The Bigger Picture**

Your task force crossed the LD 10 minutes ago and all is proceeding well. Too well. A large number of enemy troops are moving forward under white flag. The main defensive belt appears to be crumbling, but the security zone continues to fight. How will you handle this?

**Vignette 7: Looking Deep**

Enemy forces appear to be regaining control and repositioning offensive forces. Are they planning to retake the initiative or are they bolstering their defense? How does this influence your plans?
Vignette 8: Before the Attack

The enemy's mechanized army is building much faster than expected. Every hour will result in increased casualties upon engagement. You need to move up your attack. How will you adjust to accommodate the change in the corps schedule?
Appendix C

Teaching Points for the Think Like A Commander Scenarios

Vignette 1: Trouble in Mclouth

Keep Focus on Mission/Higher Intent
- What was the back-up plan?
- How will the host nation respond to my actions?
- How do the ROE apply in this situation?

Model a Thinking Enemy
- What do the civilians want? Food? Transportation?
- Is there a hostile intent here?
- How can we best influence these people? Crowd leader(s)? Local official?
- How will the media be used by the enemy?

Consider Effects of Terrain
- What other routes are available?

Use all Available Assets
- Can I get civil affairs support?
- How can I best use the media?
- What can the Centrallian military and local agencies do to support us?
- Are there alternative ways to get fuel to ROSE?

Consider Timing
- How much time do I have to make a decision?

See the Bigger Picture
- Can the get by without refueling in ROSE?

Visualize the Battlefield
- What could have been done to avoid this?

Consider Contingencies and Remain Flexible
- How can this situation get worse? How can it be solved?
Vignette 2: Save the Shrine

Keep Focus on Mission/Higher Intent
- How do I apply the ROE in this situation?
- What coordination do I need to make with adjacent units?
- What compromises can be reached to alleviate civilian’s fears?

Model A Thinking Enemy
- What do they intend to accomplish with these disruptions? Disrupt my defensive preparations?
- What response is the enemy anticipating and what will escalate the situation?
- How do you distinguish between those who want to cause harm versus others?

Consider Effects of Terrain
- What information can I collect with route recon?
- Can the convoys bypass checkpoints?

Use all Available Assets

Consider Timing
- How long do I have to get my initial response teams into position?
- How long will it take to get their response team into action?
- What is the earliest I can disrupt their movement from the cities?

See the Bigger Picture
- How can I help correct the misinformation?
- What other methods will the enemy use to destabilize our operations?

Visualize the Battlefield
- What options are available to me regarding the bus convoys?

Consider Contingencies and Remain Flexible
- How will I control possible violent reactions on the part of the bus convoys?
Vignette 3: The Recon Fight

Keep Focus on Mission/Higher Intent
- Can I get a full copy of the Scout 15's OPORD?
- What is the purpose and intent for the reconstituted scout OP?

Model a Thinking Enemy
- How does 11 MIBR support the enemy attack?
- Given the situation, what are 9 MiD's options?

Consider Effects of Terrain
- How do streams and vegetation effect enemy schemes of maneuver?
- What effect did terrain have on the destruction of Scout 15?
- What is the best location to accomplish Scout 15's mission?

Use all Available Assets
- What assets, equipment and personnel are needed for the mission?
- What assets are available within the TF to assist in Scout 15's mission?
- Can I cover Scout 15's NAIs until the reconstituted OP is in position?

Consider Timing
- How long will it take to get the reconstituted force into position?
- How long will the element execute the mission? When can I expect them back?

See the Bigger Picture
- Who was Scout 15 coordinating with at the coordination point at PL IOWA?
- Who command and controls and supports the reconstituted element?

Visualize the Battlefield
- How does the loss of Scout 15 effect the mission?

Consider Contingencies and Remain Flexible
- What effect will this have on the company's original mission?
Vignette 4: A Shift in Forces

Keep Focus on Mission/Higher’s Intent
- Has the enemy main effort shifted?

Model a Thinking Enemy
- What other indicators are there that 2TD is coming east?

Consider Effects of Terrain
- Where should I engage 15 MIBR and what are the desired effects?

Use All Assets Available
- How does 11 MIBR support the enemy attack?
- What assets can I bring to bear on the 15th? CAS? FASCAM? Aviation?
- If the reserve is committed to our AO, what are my employment options?

Consider Timing
- How soon will 15 MIBR get to EA TIGER?

See the Bigger Picture
- If the main effort shifts, how can I support me?

Visualize the Battlefield
- Can 4-25 hold BP 21?
- How quickly can I finish the fight with 9 MIB?
- Can I block 15 MIBR from BP 22?
Vignette 5: The Attack Begins

Keep Focus on Mission/Higher's Intent
- Can the unit continue its current course of action?
- Can I change the course of action and still achieve the commanders intent?

Model a Thinking "Enemy"
- Is the enemy trying to prevent us from using that avenue of approach?
- Do I need to coordinate to prevent fratricide with adjacent units?
- Where is the enemy that is calling in this indirect fire?

Consider Effects of Terrain
- What terrain lends itself to an enemy OP?
- Where can I move to evacuate the effected area?
- What routes can I use to continue the mission?

Use All Assets Available
- Can I get Air support to interdict the enemy OP or identify the enemy location?
- Can I call in counter battery fire or smoke to screen my movement?

Consider Timing
- What does this do to the timing of the mission?

See The Bigger Picture
- Do I need to report up to see if the TF should alter their speed?
- Is there the possibility that 4-80 can pass through us?

Visualize The Battlefield
- Where can I focus scouts to identify enemy obstacles and OP?

Consider Contingencies and Remain Flexible
- What happens if I make a bad decision?
- Have I reached the criteria that requires me to abort the mission?
Vignette 6: The Bigger Picture

Keep Focus on Mission/Higher's Intent
- If the enemy begins withdrawing, do we pursue them?
- How do the ROE apply in this situation?
- Can I conduct both POW processing and offensive operations?

Model a Thinking "Enemy"
- If I ask to wait, will the enemy in the security zone begin surrendering?
- Where are the enemy's mobile reserves? "Will surrendering cause them movement problems?"
- Could this be an attempt by the enemy to disrupt/delay our operations?

Consider Effects of Terrain
- What is the shortest distance to the objective?

Use All Assets Available
- Where can I get trucks and buses to move EPWs?
- Are the MPs available to assist?

Consider Timing
- How long before EPWs get to PL IOWA? How long before I get to PL IOWA?
- How long do I anticipate it taking to process EPWs?

See The Bigger Picture
- What effect will this have on 2d timeline?

Visualize The Battlefield
- How can this situation be best exploited?
- What is happening in 1 and 3's AO?

Consider Contingencies and Remain Flexible
- What do we do if enemy security zone stops troops from surrendering?
- How does this affect the mission of the?
Vignette 7: Looking Deep

Keep Focus on Mission/Higher's Intent?
  • What intelligence do I need to provide the Bde?
  • What screening responsibilities to I still possess?
  • How fast do I need to execute this operation in order to support the Cdrs intent?

Model a Thinking Enemy?
  • What is the 9th's Tank Bn doing in the center?
  • Why is he moving the air defense forward?

Consider Effects of Terrain?
  • What avenues can I use to quickly move to my new AO? For the zone recon?
  • Where will the enemy position himself for a withdrawal? For an attack?

Use All Assets Available?
  • What assets can initiate the zone recon until the BRT is in position?
  • How will the companies support the zone recon (CASEVAC, Resupply, etc.)?

Consider Timing?
  • How much time do I have to develop a plan and make a decision?
  • How long will it take to move to the new location to begin operations? How will this affect the higher commanders' intent?
  • How soon can we expect the enemy to begin their operations?

See The Bigger Picture?
  • Do I need more support from Division now that I have more enemies to fight?

Visualize The Battlefield?
  • What are the enemy's options?
  • Is there increased enemy activity vic. MEADE?

Consider Contingencies and Remain Flexible?
  • What COAs do I have available if the enemy attacks vs withdrawals?
Vignette 8: Before the Attack

Keep Focus on Mission/Higher's Intent?
- If I have good success, can we still use PL DIME as the battle handoff line?
- Will the TF movement delay affect my ability to accomplish my mission?

Model a Thinking Enemy
- How will the enemy try to exploit the Brigades disrupted timing in its movements?

Consider Effects of Terrain
- How will terrain effect my movement to the objective?
- Will the terrain give the enemy an advantage during my movement/contact?

Use All Assets Available
- Can I get Division fire support to destroy the enemy between IOWA and DIME?
- Do I need additional engineers to prepare the passage lanes in time?

Consider Timing
- Can I cross the LD prior to 0530 if the rest of the TF is not prepared?
- Will crossing the LD prior to 0530 create unacceptable risks to my flanks?
- How long will it take me to secure the passage lanes? How long before the other units arrive?

See the Bigger Picture
- What are the Brigades plans for destroying the enemy north of DIME?
- Will the TF delay affect the Brigades ability to accomplish its purpose?

Visualize the Battlefield
- What are the enemy elements I encounter trying to accomplish?
- Can I destroy enemy in my AO to facilitate the forward passage of lines?

Consider Contingencies and Remain Flexible
- How will enemy resistance, or lack of it, affect my operation?
- Will I be asked to continue the fight north if there is little enemy resistance?
Appendix D

Facilitator’s Notes for the Notes for the Think Like A Commander Scenarios

VIGNETTE 1: TROUBLE IN MCLOUTH
VIGNETTE 2: SAVE THE SHRINE
VIGNETTE 3: THE RECON FIGHT
VIGNETTE 4: A SHIFT IN FORCES
VIGNETTE 5: THE ATTACK BEGINS
VIGNETTE 6: THE BIGGER PICTURE
VIGNETTE 7: LOOKING DEEP
VIGNETTE 8: BEFORE THE ATTACK
FACILITATOR'S NOTES FOR THE THINK LIKE A COMMANDER SCENARIOS

VIGNETTE 1: TROUBLE IN MCLOUTH
### Vignette 1: Trouble in McLouth

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<td><strong>Thinking Framework / Focus Themes</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>NARRATOR:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>1. Keep focus on mission and commander’s Intent:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- You are the Company Commander and your CO/TM, as part of the TF, has begun the movement out of AA Hawk north to your assigned sector area.</td>
<td>- This vignette reminds us that the operational environment, even in high intensity operations such as the one envisioned in this tactical scenario, will include aspects of operations all along the spectrum from stability operations to high combat operations.</td>
<td>A. Mission completion.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- As the lead CO/TM you are responsible for securing FAA Rose in order for the Support Platoon, following your CO/TM, to establish a ROM prior to the TF occupation of assigned sector. Your RED Platoon is providing escort security for the Support Platoons 6 tankers.</td>
<td>- FM 3-0, Operations, 14 June 2001, describes the nature of operations in a complex, full spectrum environment. Emerging doctrine recognizes that contemporary combat operations will be conducted in environments that will be characterized by civilians on the battlefield, including local civilians and possibly non-combatants from private volunteer organizations (PVOS) and even civilians from the international community, including the United Nations. The doctrine stresses our requirement to protect these civilians during operations. But doctrine also notes that it is possible that the enemy could have influenced their actions and, in this vignette, that is a strong consideration. FM 3-0 accounts for this possibility when it states: “…that adversaries will continue to seek every opportunity to gain an advantage over U.S. and multinational forces…”</td>
<td>B. Full spectrum operations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- A refugee camp just southwest of McLouth was designed to accommodate 200 refugees but has swollen to 800 refugees in the past 2 days since the camp near Aghinlan was abandoned. Personnel manning the McLough camp reported 2 hours ago that over half of the refugees were leaving the camp. The refugees were complaining that the Centrallian government were preventing the refugees from moving south.</td>
<td>- TRADEC Pamphlet 505-70, Battlefield Visualization Concept, 1 Oct 96, supports the FM 3-0 conclusion above and further indicates how missions may be affected by noncombatants on the battlefield.</td>
<td>C. Battle command.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- You have just passed the MP TCP east of McLouth when your</td>
<td>- As you consider the effects of the civilian problem to your mission, note that emerging doctrine (FM 3-0) on force tailoring (para 3-27), provides this guidance concerning METT-TC adjustments—The basic force and its general augmentation are subject to a METT-T analysis to determine whether any changes are necessary to account for the realities of the planned operation…” As you think this vignette through, you should consider whether any changes are necessary to your mission, and if so, what those are and how you recommend them.</td>
<td>D. Civilians / noncombatants on the battlefield.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1.1 What should you be considering right now?</strong></td>
<td><strong>1.2 What facts do we have to promote how we think about this problem?</strong></td>
<td>1.1.1 As a backdrop, there are many points to consider before discussing the essence of the vignette itself. Reviewing the vignette using the graphic (Civilians-on-Battlefield) that characterizes the type of actual incidents that this vignette portrays leads to a thinking pattern based that encompasses the following points:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1.1.1</strong></td>
<td><strong>1.3 What do our orders/briefings tell us to expect concerning noncombatants?</strong></td>
<td>a. The strategic / operational / tactical aspects of the range of Army full spectrum operations (Full-Spectrum- Ops) and how they affect the operations in this vignette.</td>
</tr>
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<td><strong>1.4 Does this &quot;trouble in&quot;</strong></td>
<td>b. The terminology / relationships that offense, defense, stability, and support operations have to each other in full spectrum operations which affect this vignette (Para 1-46 Full Spectrum Ops).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. The strategic / operational / tactical aspects of the range of Army full spectrum operations (Full-Spectrum- Ops) and how they affect the operations in this vignette.</td>
<td></td>
<td>c. The aspects of the “C” in “METT-TC” that requires your considerations for civilians on the battlefield as an additional fundamental for executing combat operations (METT-TC).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. The fundamentals of full spectrum operations that must be integrated to achieve mission objectives, even within the context of this vignette (Fig 1-4 Full Spectrum Ops).</td>
<td></td>
<td>d. The aspects of noncombatants on the battlefield and what doctrine says about how we must be prepared to treat them—and how you would begin to treat them on your arrival at the bogged down Traffic Control Point in this vignette (Battlefield Noncombatants).</td>
</tr>
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<td>c. As indicated by the fundamentals slide, how the employment of assets, that are linked to the battlefield operating systems (BOS) that may be available, during situations such as in this vignette might or might not affect the outcome of any decisions that you make (Battlefield Operating Systems).</td>
<td></td>
<td>e. As indicated by the fundamentals slide, how the employment of assets, that are linked to the battlefield operating systems (BOS) that may be available, during situations such as in this vignette might or might not affect the outcome of any decisions that you make (Battlefield Operating Systems).</td>
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<td></td>
<td>f. Summary: There are many “tools” or “modules” available to you as you form your critical thinking patterns. The slides above represent a basic or fundamental set of thinking “tools” for almost any tactical situation and the affects they have on combat leaders. Learn to keep these fundamentals in mind as you add additional tools to help you form your own critical thinking patterns through the remaining analysis of this and other vignettes.</td>
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<td>1.3.1 There are several factual sources of information to help us think about this problem:</td>
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<td>a. Doctrine, tactics, techniques and procedures (see doctrinal discussions at left, slides at right, and</td>
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| RED Platoon Leader reports that a large group of civilians had descended upon his convoy at the TCP.  
- You are the location shown. Anticipating a problem you decide to return to the TCP.  
- Upon arrival you are met by the Platoon Leader.  
- "Sir, I'm glad to see you. As soon as I got here the MPs stopped the convoy and all of these civilians came pouring down the hill there and before I could do anything they were all around the vehicles. You can see there is no way I can turn around on this road. Looks like 100 or more civilians. They surrounded all 6 tankers and see they are climbing up on top of the tankers and on my Bradleys. The remainder of the TF is only 10 to 15 minutes behind. Besides that sir, these journalists over there are interviewing civilians and setting up their cameras. I told them you were coming and they want to do an interview with you. Here they come now sir." NARRATOR continues: You were also informed that TF scouts report civilians blocking highway 92 four kilometers west of McLouth.  | 1:30. The Army leadership framework applies to all Army leaders; as you assume positions of increasing responsibility, you'll need to develop additional attributes and master more skills and actions. Part of this knowledge includes understanding what your bosses are doing—the factors that affect their decisions and the environment in which they work...* | 1.3.1 FM 3-0 and TRACOC Pam 525-70 remind us of our responsibilities and of who noncombatants are and the impact they may have on our operations.  
1.4.1 No, you are not relieved of your primary mission. The primary mission to defend the area remains job 1. In the complex environment of the contemporary battlefield, we must cope with civilians on the battlefield as a matter of course and as a complication factor:  
- The orders provide no discussion of this. The mission you are focused on, moving to your defensive positions, remains in effect, but the affects could be numerous: slowing of OPTEMPO—not making march times, not getting to objective positions on time, not being able to provide requisite support.  
- This situation is complex, combining both higher and lower aspects of the range of Army full spectrum operations. SASO is a relatively recent term to describe what, in practice, in Bosnia, Kosovo, Africa, the Middle East, and elsewhere, has been done for quite some time now and is addressed by doctrine.  
- Your problem, a swarming of civilians in, around and on your POL supply vehicles, complicates your ability to support the tactical defensive mission while simultaneously conduct sustaining operations. So, while "Job 1", executing your mission order continues, now you are faced with "Job 2", handling the civilian refugees, and "Job 3", handling the media (press, journalists). You have your primary orders and you must continue to move your tactical and support force into position. But, also by doctrine, it is simultaneously necessary to protect these noncombatant civilian refugees on the battlefield. At this point, you should be considering the use of all available assets, looking for external support (PSYOPS, PA, etc.) to deal with the civilians and the media. This would free you up to continue to execute tactical operations.  
- The media should have no effect on your mission. You should note that the media will be there to search out any potential news story, or even concoct one, such as "military abuse" of the refugees. You should seek Divisional PIO/PAO support to handle the media in this situation  
1.3.1 The three jobs mentioned above compound one another. A delay in the mission is going to be...* |
## Vignette 1: Trouble in McLouth

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### Verbal Vignette Information

McCloud:

Also, Centralian militia have arrived at your site and inform you that there are many additional refugees congregating in McCloud.

* This ends the situational updates.

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2. **Model a thinking enemy:**
   A. Exploitation of civilians / noncombatants on the battlefield.
   B. PIR.
   C. Incident reporting.

2.1 Is it possible that the enemy may actually have fomented this problem or will attempt to take advantage of it?

2.2 What are the means we have to determine enemy involvement and or decide what the refugees want or need?

2.3 Should we have requested a PIR re: the refugees?

2.4 How should this incident be reported to higher HQ?

3. **Consider effects of terrain:**
   A. Feasible road network bypasses.

3.1 Are there feasible bypasses that would enable us to continue to move into sector despite the incident near

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2.1.1 The enemy may well be involved in this incident in McCloud. The idea is to study the map situation, determining how the enemy could have become involved in this incident. If you study the enemy tactical plan (slides Current Ground-Situation & Noncombatants on Battlefield) against the locations of the civilians / noncombatants on the battlefield, and why these civilians are on the battlefield, it could be deduced that they have been provoked into these actions to augment the thinking enemy's plan.

2.2.1 The Centralian militia is on the ground at the site. They may be able to provide information both on the refugees and on whether the enemy is behind this incident. Our own counterintelligence may be able to help. CA and PSYOPS assessments of the area prior to our movement might provide warning of this problem.

2.3.1 The Division may have anticipated this as a problem and because refugee problems certainly affect our operations, we should have, at least considered, a PIR involving the possibility of refugee movement interfering with our operations. The commander must be aware of the attitudes and political divisions of the population and recognize that there may be a third party civilians who may gain from any demonstration of Government or US military inaction, weakness or errors.

2.4.1 You are required to report any incident of this nature. An assessment as to whether CA, PSYOPS, MAPS, or other division level assets are needed should be included and requested.
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| B. Effects of civilians blocking roads  
C. Planning considerations.  
D. Execution rerouting of assets. | McLouth?  
3.1. What are our primary considerations for identifying a bypass?  
3.2. Is there a report of a roadblock west of McLouth? How does that impact our decision?  
3.4. In the planning stage of this operation (visualizing the battlefield), should we have anticipated such potential interruptions of traffic on the MSR?  
3.5. By what route may we move the tankers that have not yet reached Lt. Newlbs position? | 3.2.1. We are moving fuel tankers, so any bypass we choose must be accessible to fuel tankers. The 5,000-gallon tankers will require routes supported by the appropriate class of bridge. If alternative routes lack bridges capable of handling heavy tankers, then the problem is more complex. Any possible time delays in delivery of this fuel must be assessed by the Commander.  
3.3.1. The roadblock may also limit available options concerning movement of other brigade or division level combat and combat support units. This could have a resulting negative impact on units' movement rates and their mission accomplishment.  
3.4.1. "Wargaming" and "what-if" tasks may help develop branches, sequels, or even unit SOPs capable of dealing quickly with situations like this.  
3.5.1. Think through the terrain situation, determining how terrain and available road networks might affect this situation. |  

4. Use all assets available:  
A. Elements of combat power available.  
B. Interactions of combat power available.  
C. Brigade / Division assets available.  
D. Role / use of host nation forces.  
E. Role of public affairs / media.  
F. Planning for PA / media.  
4.1. What elements of combat power are you constrained (must) or restrained (mustn't) use?  
4.2. How do these elements interact to help you understand how best to handle this type of situation?  
4.3. What assets, in this situation, are available to the Brigade that can help?  
4.5. What role can Centralist Militia and or local authorities play?  
4.6. Should "Battle Drills" for quick responses by Civil Affairs, Public Affairs, and PSYOPS teams be developed for these situations?  
4.1.1. Review briefly the elements of combat power a commander should consider as an available means to mission execution (Elements-of-Combat-Power). Your thought process should take you from thinking inside the box to thinking outside the box. First, you should consider that your mission and objectives are constraints inside a box that you know you have to do. Then, you should begin thinking outside of the box—where you consider other constraints and restrictions affecting your mission—those you must do and those you must not do, the resources you have vs. don't have, the mission you must accomplish vs. the detractors to the mission you must consider. The information you develop as a leader (see Doctrinal Linkages / Discussions on leadership) will paint the situation and guide your use and requests for additional resources to build into your task organization.  
4.3.1. There are considerable assets at our disposal.  
4.4.1. Think about what is known about Centralist forces and how SOPs or prearranged COAs might be used to integrate Centralist forces into this operation.  
4.5.1. As thinking points, there are certain preplanned, rehearsed, and/or task organized supporting units that can provide an effective response to this situation. These depend on their doctrinal missions, capabilities, current task organization, and Commanders priorities.
Vignette 1: Trouble in McLouth

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<td>5. Consider timing:</td>
<td>5.1 What must be done right now?</td>
<td>5.1.1 We must divert or stop the next aerial which is ten minutes from the scene of the incident. We also need to start working to restore order. We do not have to deal immediately with the media, but ultimately we will need to talk to them or they will draw their own conclusions—the results may be unfavorable.</td>
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<td>Intentionally left blank.</td>
<td></td>
<td>A. Friendly Timing.</td>
<td>5.2 What effect will any delay have on our operation?</td>
<td>5.2.1 Any delay imposed, as a consequence, of the trouble in McLouth, will directly affect our occupation of the sector and our preparation for the defense.</td>
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<td>B. Enemy Timing.</td>
<td>5.3 Where are Civil Affairs, PSYOPS and PQA support located now and when might they be available?</td>
<td>5.3.1 These assets may already be employed and not available. A query as to location should be asked of both the Bde and Div staff and or the Commanders of those units themselves. The Brigade Commander might also discuss their availability directly with Division if he senses an extended delay in obtaining support might threaten mission accomplishment.</td>
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<td>C. Operational/Tactical pauses.</td>
<td>6.1 What is the bigger picture;</td>
<td>6.1.1 The immediate effect is to delay occupation of the sector. If the problem is not resolved quickly then it may inhibit our ability to defend successfully which puts the overall mission at risk.</td>
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<td>D. Movement.</td>
<td>A. How does the trouble in McLouth impact the Brigade operation?</td>
<td>6.2.1 Lateral movement in the division sector is important, but not absolutely essential yet. The primary danger now is that the problem may worsen and interfere with sustaining the defense or maneuvering combat units.</td>
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<td>E. Sustainment / Replenishment.</td>
<td>B. Is east and west movement through McLouth essential to the success of the Brigade operation?</td>
<td>6.3.1 On the basis of current available information, there appears to be no similar activity in sector but we need to assess whether it is a problem unique to our sector. Does it presage activity of a more serious nature? Additional PIR are essential to focus thinking about the situation. Additional collection of information should be continuous.</td>
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<td>6.2 See the bigger picture;</td>
<td>C. If we are experiencing this level of difficulty in McLouth, what will the effect be on other units of the Brigade?</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
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<td>A. How does the bigger picture fit in the big picture.</td>
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<td>B. Effects of situation on Division plan.</td>
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<td>C. Success of higher's operations.</td>
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<td>As you consider the vignette, envision and describe the battlefield from the beginning to the end. Emerging doctrine suggests these are aspects of leadership common to all commanders (FM 3-0). Visualize, Describe, Direct, Chapter 5, para 5-7 and Figure 5-1): As part of this process, particular attention is drawn to the following discussion found in para. 5-9: <em>. Commanders use the factors of METT-TC to assess and visualize the situation. Staff estimates and collaborative information sharing among commanders refine and deepen their situational understanding. Then commanders visualize the operation, describe it within their intent, and direct their subordinates toward mission accomplishment. Depending on echelon, commanders examine various elements of operational design and determine factors that will shape the operations. They direct operations through plans and orders and synchronize the BOS throughout the operations. Throughout, commanders personally apply the leadership element of combat power through their presence and impact.</em></td>
<td>7.1 Visualize the battlefield:</td>
<td>7.1.1 We need to work with the Centrallian military, Centrallian authorities, and refugee leaders to assure that they understand our mission priorities and that the refugees are being accommodated where possible. For example, the problem may be that the refugees require water and food. It will be better in the long run to solve this dilemma rather than hand the enemy a propaganda tool or exacerbate the trouble in McLouth to the point of violence or serious protests.</td>
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<td>A. Accurately—realistic space-time forecast.</td>
<td>7.2 What should be considered when visualizing the battlefield?</td>
<td>7.2.1 Per the doctrinal evolution beginning in para 5-7 of FM 3-0, the acts of visualizing, describing, and directing are aspects of leadership common to all commanders (Visualize-Describe-Direct-Lead-Assess):</td>
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<tr>
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<td>B. Dynamically—entities change over time.</td>
<td>a. How does the commander monitor changing time and space factors within the Battle Area?</td>
<td>a. Partially through the lens of his subordinate's reports. The fluid nature of operations, technology, and volume of information increase the importance of commanders being able to visualize and describe</td>
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<td>C. Proactively—what can I make enemy do?</td>
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- **Verbal Vignette Information**

- **Doctrinal Linkages / Discussions (If Any)**

- **Thinking Framework / Focus Themes**

  a. Why is constant visualization and reassessment important?

  operations to subordinates and staff. Commanders’ perspective and the things they emphasize change with echoic. Operational art differs from tactics principally in the scope and scale of what commanders visualize, describe, and direct. Operational commanders identify the time, space, resources, purpose, and action of land operations and relate them to the JFC’s operational design. In contrast, tactical commanders begin with an AO designated, objectives identified, the purpose defined, forces assigned, sustainment allocated, and time available specified.

  b. It will help shape the decisions the commander must make. In this case, the outcome of the incident may affect future attitude and behavior of the population. Afterwards, the Commander will have to revise his estimate of civilian factors. While the JFC and component commanders exercise leadership primarily through subordinate commanders, small unit commanders command face-to-face. Operational success depends on the ability of operational commanders to visualize and describe complex land operations; tactical success depends on the ability of small unit commanders to motivate and direct soldiers."

- **Facilitator’s Aides**

- **Facilitator’s Probes**

  8. Consider contingencies and remain flexible:

  A. Show rich contingency planning.

  B. Brigade alternative plans.

  8.1 Given that the order explicitly warned us of this problem, what should the brigade have done to prepare?

  8.2 What do we do now?

  8.3 What could we have done to prepare for the media on the scene?

  8.4 How do we develop contingency plans?

  8.1.1 We should have planned alternate routes. We should also have sent teams composed of MP’s, CA and PSYOPs as a minimum to assess the conditions along the route and among the civilian population. This planning would have enabled us either to head off this problem or to minimize its effects. As a minimum, we should have consulted with Centralian Militia in the area prior to moving CSS assets in.

  8.1.2 Given the conditions as they are now we will have to divert or stop the fuel re-supply convoy. We still have options—we might stop the convoy and operate with the fuel on hand until the problem is solved or reroute the fuel convoy by sending reconnaissance out to locate bypasses. We must also inform the brigade and units of this problem in the event this is the start of a wider problem.

  8.1.3.1 We should plan for media coverage of all our operations. We can develop communications themes and “talking points” for distribution ahead of time. The media will be with us—the lesson learned from our recent operational history is to prepare for them.

  8.1.4 Contingency planning stems from the classic Military Decision Making Process (MDMP). When we ‘wargame’ a course of action, we should identify potential branches and sequels to our plan, either as
Vignette 1: Trouble in McLouth

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consequence of enemy or 3rd party actions, or to take advantage of opportunity. In this vignette, we see the effect of not fully analyzing the mission for implied tasks and inadequately Wargaming possibilities.
VIGNETTE 2: SAVE THE SHRINE
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<td><strong>NARRATOR:</strong></td>
<td>You are the A Company Commander. You receive the following report from the 5S over your Company Net. “Our counter-intelligence has detected at least three known Dakto agents in the McLaugh refugee camp this morning.”</td>
<td>1. Keep focus on mission and higher commander’s intent: A. Mission directives. B. Mission changes. C. Understanding / clarifying. 1.1 What effects may the task to “defuse” the situation in Nortonville have on the Brigade as and the primary mission to occupy the sector and prepare to defend? 1.2 What effects does the Cdr’s guidance have regarding our mission? 1.3 The Commander has told us “to “defuse” the situation”. What does this mean? 1.4 What do we know about the mission assigned to the Centralist Militia in Nortonville?</td>
<td>2. Model a thinking enemy: A. Enemy motivations. B. Lessons learned. C. Advantage taking. D. PIR/ common picture. 2.1 What do we know about the role, if any, of the Dakto’s in the sector? 2.2 What is the enemy up to? 2.3 What did we learn from the incident in McLaugh about mitigating this problem? 2.4 How can we ID Dakto agents and stop their misinformation campaign? 2.5 How can Dakto agents spurn the situation in McLaugh (current ground situation). Reports suggest the Dakto are behind the “Save the shrine” crisis. 2.5.1 We know Dakto agents spurned the situation in McLaugh (Current Ground Situation). Reports suggest the Dakto are behind the “Save the shrine” crisis. 2.5.2 We also know that Dakto reconnaissance and SPF will attempt to penetrate deeply in our rear both to facilitate reconnaissance and to conduct direct action missions (Current Ground Situation). Therefore, we should not find it surprising that the Dakto are at the bottom of the incidents in McLaugh and Nortonville. 2.5.3 We learned several things (Impact-of-Occurrence). We also know that we need to work with local authorities where and when possible (Payoffs: Role-Capabilities) and that the brigade commander must assess viability and support requirements to work with: a. Use Centralist forces to support. b. Use CAPS/OPS/PA as enablers. 2.5.4 The best way to identify Dakto Agents is to use CI to ID them with help of Host Nation. Additionally, our own security operations will enable us to locate reconnaissance and SPF that may have penetrated the sector. 2.5.5 Gain intelligence, conduct direct actions to slow defensive preparations, degrade public support and alter world opinion. 2.5.6 We can by working with the Centralist authorities either stop or offset the...</td>
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**TF COMMANDER**

“Hey, I assume the 2 told you about the shrine problem in Nortonville. Though it is out of our sector, the routes from the major cities to Nortonville are. Part of the initial action is going to be up to you. We’re arranging a joint military/civilian response but...”
## Vignette 2: Save the Shrine

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<td>that could take until mid morning to organize. I want you to block buses moving through your sector in order to diffuse the situation that might develop in the north until BDE can organize a response.”</td>
<td>agents take advantage of this situation?</td>
<td>effects of the enemy’s information operations.</td>
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<tr>
<td>2.1 How can we preclude Dakotan agents from taking advantage of this situation?</td>
<td>2.1 We can (PSYOPS-Rollout)</td>
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<tr>
<td>2.2 How can we develop a more complete PIR supported picture of this situation?</td>
<td>a. Mobilize CAPPSYOP/PF to counter the misinformation campaign.</td>
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<tr>
<td>2.3 Consider effects of terrain. A. Affects on mission. B. Advantages / disadvantages.</td>
<td>b. Use PSYOPS Loudspeaker teams to get the truth out.</td>
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<tr>
<td>3.1 Does terrain have any affect on exarcerbating or helping to solve this problem?</td>
<td>c. Work with local leaders and media to get the truth out.</td>
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<tr>
<td>3.2 Does the location of Nortonville present any difficulty to us in assisting to “defuse” the situation?</td>
<td>d. Develop additional PIR concerning alternate route, current conditions within the Centralian forces TACON to the division and what they have been tasked to do. Quickly forward this request to Div.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>3.3 Does the location of Nortonville provide any advantage to us?</td>
<td>e. f. g. h.</td>
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<tr>
<td>3.4 What affects does terrain have on our efforts?</td>
<td>2.11 The terrain favors our efforts to prevent the arrival of convoys of protesters if that is what we or the centralian authorities choose to do (Current Ground Situation). Convos from Kansas can only enter the sector by crossing the Missouri or Kansas Rivers. Therefore we can isolate the Sector or at least track movement across the Rivers since friendly troops are securing all of the Bridges.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Nortonville in any of the 4 locations indicated.”</td>
<td>2.11.1 Nortonville is in 1st Bde sector so we must coordinate with them to ensure we know what they know about their sector, or at least what they know about Nortonville.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>“Convos</td>
<td>2.12 If there are enemy agents in and around Nortonville they are at considerable risk. We can control access and entrance to Nortonville readily. The terrain around Nortonville does not offer much cover or concealment for the enemy. By establishing checkpoints, the Centralians can control access to the town.</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>2.14 Limited crossing sites on the Kansas and Missouri Rivers enables us to focus our efforts. Thus we will have tied up the better part of our unit unless they can be relieved.</td>
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<th>BACK TO THE S2</th>
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<tr>
<td>“If TF Hawk handles anything north of Leavenworth then there are three locations where a convoy out of Leavenworth is likely to enter our sector as shown.”</td>
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<tr>
<td>Convos coming from Kansas City most likely will cross into our sector headed to</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nortonville in any of the 4 locations indicated.”</td>
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<td>“Convos</td>
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<th>Intentionally left blank.</th>
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<th>* Intentionally left blank.</th>
<th>3.1 Does terrain have any affect on exarcerbating or helping to solve this problem?</th>
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<td>- Chaplain liaisons and maintains contact with indigenous religious leaders.</td>
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<td>Information operations and PSYOPS.</td>
<td>- Assets available:</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>A. Assets available in sector.</td>
<td>B. Internal vs external.</td>
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<tr>
<td>C. Crowd control</td>
<td>4.1 What assets are in our sector that we may use to solve this problem?</td>
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<td>4.2 What are the tactical costs of</td>
<td>4.1.1 BRT, TF Scouts, Nortonville Militia, lead TFs, AASLT troops.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>4.2.1 Any asset tasked to “defuse” the situation will be distracted from its defensive preparations and will expend resources. Commanders have to estimate the cost of such diversions to execution of the tactical plan. A plan modification or acceptance of more risks may be necessary</td>
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<td>4.3.1 MP; MI; PSYOPS, CA. Chaplain.</td>
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## Vignette 2: Save the Shrine

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<td>Coming from Lawrence or moving west of KC on I-70 or highway 24 would likely enter the sector along one of the 4 routes indicated.”</td>
<td><em>Civil-Military operations, esp. liaison with police.</em></td>
<td>Involuntary divorce any of these assets from their primary tasks?</td>
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<td><em>Intentionally left blank.</em></td>
<td><em>Intentionally left blank.</em></td>
<td><em>What have we learned in Brescia, Kosovo and Haiti about crowd control?</em></td>
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<td>5.1 How long do we have to react?</td>
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<td>5.2 How long before others can help?</td>
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<td>5.3 If we detain a convoy that are coming, then do we have to cope with them?</td>
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<td><strong>Rear area operations responsibilities; location of the DRA. The troops in the Division and Brigade Rear Areas certainly need to know the situation that is developing re: the Shrine.</strong></td>
<td><strong>See the bigger picture:</strong> A. How our fight fits in the big picture. B. Division rear operations. C. Key terrain.</td>
<td>6.1 What affect may the arrival of protesters south of the Kansas River have on the Brigade and Division rear area operations?</td>
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<td>6.2 What help may we expect from Division Rear?</td>
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<td>6.3 Why is Nortonville important to them?</td>
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<td>6.4 What are the consequences of a confrontation with the</td>
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| Intentionally left blank. | Intentionally left blank. | Intentionally left blank. | COBs?  
| 7. **Visualize the battlefield:**  
| A. Accurately—realistic space-time forecast.  
| B. Dynamically—entities change over time.  
| C. Proactively—what can I make enemy do? | 7.1 How may we regain the initiative vis-à-vis the “information campaign” the enemy is running?  
| 7.2 What will time allow?  
| 7.3 How did you visualize this battlefield? | 7.4.1 Work with media to get truth out. Mobilize PSYOPS to get our story out. Meet with local leaders and cooperate with them to defuse the problem. Work with the Centrals to bring protest leaders to the Nortonville site to see for themselves that we are not destroying the Shrine and that, in fact, Centrals forces are expressly in Nortonville to protect the Shrine.  
| 7.4.2 Projecting movement and activities overtime and understanding friction is key. Visualization of status over time is the key to understanding risk and opportunity. The commander must have a realistic appreciation of what time will allow and how it will affect his forces and further options.  
| 7.4.3 Per the doctrinal evolution in FM 3-0, Operations, Chapter 5, the acts of visualizing, describing, and directing are aspects of leadership common to all commanders. Reviewing the business on visualizing, describing and directing in FM 3-0, Chapter 5, and the graphic (Visualize—Describe—Direct—Lead—Assess), many elements come together in order to successfully envision the battlefield, from beginning to end. One of the important missions you have as a commander / leader is to ensure you understand how your part of the operation interplays with the rest of the force and their missions. One of the best ways to ensure you have a handle on the operations at hand is to get into a habit of taking time to yourself to think the operation through from beginning to end. Where you cannot visualize some particular aspect, go to your boss and seek his guidance, his vision. | 8. **Consider contingencies and remain flexible:**  
| A. Contingency planning  
| B. Other options. | 8.1 What are our options?  
| 8.1.1 There are several options for planning at this time (Options)  
| a. Isolate the area by preventing entry into the sector.  
| b. Secure/visit Nortonville and bring local leaders to the site to see for themselves that no one is defacing or endangering the Shrine. Local leaders need to lead. We do not want to assume the responsibilities of the Centrals. We want to enable them to achieve success.  
| c. Develop routes for the protest leaders to get to Nortonville that preclude delaying our operation and holding protest convoys outside the sector.  
| d. Task Force Eagle TTP included physical isolation of the problem as we are contemplating (TF-Eagle-Lands-Lnd). ‘Dominant’ meant that if troops were committed, they needed to be committed in sufficient strength to handle any contingency. ‘Mass’ meant to move resources quickly to the site of the problem in order to achieve dominance, ‘Attack at all echelons’ meant mobilizing the whole organization to address the problem with local authorities at each level up to and including the head of state.  
| e. 8.2 If we choose to isolate the area, how do we do it?  
| a. Block the routes of march. |
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<td>s.1: How can we avoid the situation before we move out of TAA Hawk?</td>
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<td>s.4: How do we avoid this kind of surprise?</td>
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FACILITATOR'S NOTES FOR THE THINK LIKE A COMMANDER SCENARIOS

VIGNETTE 3: THE RECON FIGHT
Vignette 3: The Recon Fight

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| Information       | "Red Flags"
|                  |  | Focus Themes                  |
|                  | Other Vignette Information | 1. Keep focus on mission and higher commander's intent: |
|                  |                           | 1.1 What are the fundamental purposes of security zone operations? |
|                  |                           | A. Mission completion.          |
|                  |                           | B. Security zone operations.    |
|                  |                           | C. Battle command and control.  |
|                  |                           | D. Fires control.               |
|                  |                           | 1.2 How do our security zone operations support the higher commander’s plan? |
|                  |                           | 1.3 How are security zone operations executed? |
|                  |                           | a. What are the forms of security operations? |
|                  |                           | b. How does the battle handoff occur and what is the significance of the BHL in the security zone fight? |
|                  |                           | c. Who is in charge of the security zone fight? |
|                  |                           | d. How do we control fires in the security zone? |
|                  |                           | e. Who is in charge of the C2 and striker teams who support the BRT? |
|                  |                           | 1.5.1 Review the slide on "Security Zone Operations: Fundamental Purposes" Operations in a security zone are concerned with protecting the force and/or preventing the enemy from gaining vital intelligence on force dispositions. |
|                  |                           | a. The chief supporting purpose is to "fix" the enemy force and then provide early and accurate warning of enemy presence, both within our units and to higher headquarters. The critical question for this vignette is whether or not we actually achieved the desired end-state? Briefly review the disposition of enemy and friendly forces at the conclusion of the vignette and make a determination (Enemy/Friendly-Disposition). |
|                  |                           | b. The intent of security operations are to gather information about the enemy and provide warning, reaction time, maneuver space, and protection for the main body force. |
|                  |                           | i. There are four forms of security operations (Forms-of-Security-Operations): screen, guard, cover, and area security. The definitions of these four forms: Screen: Guard: Cover: and, Area Security at Area Security. Refer as needed to the security operations doctrinal source references and discussions at the following hyperlinks: |
|                  |                           | i.1 FM 71-3: The Armored and Mechanized Infantry Brigade, 8 Jan 95. In FM 71-3, there is no discrete section on security operations at the brigade level; rather the discussion of security is woven throughout the text. Chapter 5, Section IV, discusses using the Brigade as a Division covering force in security operations. Chapter 5, Section III, discusses the Passage of Lines and where the burden is placed for supporting rearward passage of lines of the stationary or passed unit. Chapter 6 also discusses Battle |
Vignette 3: The Recon Fight

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<td>picture:</td>
<td>Handover and the Battle Handover Line (BHL) from security force to main defensive area as an essential part of defensive operations designed to facilitate the rearward passage of the security force, but more importantly to assure pressure is maintained on the enemy. Generally, the BHL is established at phase lines as control measures to delineate where battle handover is to occur.</td>
<td>security zone fight. The security zone commander must understand and know who is responsible for establishing them, their graphic portrayal, and the use of boundaries that affect and/or effect fires, including both permisive and restrictive type of fire control measures (Fire-Support-Coordination). The question aims at a review of those measures. Control of fires is exercised through the establishment of fire control measures, e.g., No Fire Areas / Restricted Fire Areas (NFA / RFA), etc. to protect forces and facilitate clearing fires. The Brigade may also specify a Coordinated Fire Line (CFL) to preclude the Division or higher echelons from engaging targets in close proximity to the Brigade’s units without coordination. The definitions of the fire support coordination measures you should think about in this or any type of tactical situation requiring supporting fires are in the following slides: (Fire-Support-Coordination-cont., Fire-Support-Coordination-cont., and, Fire-Support-Coordination-cont.). * The Brigade order does not clearly delineate C2 for the BRT and Colt teams that are spread throughout the Brigade Sector.</td>
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"One of these got pretty deep before it was discovered and we believe it crossed over from 1st BDE sector somewhere north of Nortonville."

"Based on this analysis we have tentatively identified the enemy unit boundaries and though not sighted, we think the 9th AT battalion will..."
### Vignette 3: The Recon Fight

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<td>probably work its way down the east side of Stranger Creek to provide a guard and protect the flank from possible counter attacks.”</td>
<td><strong>Docent Linkages / Discussions (If Any)</strong></td>
<td>d. Movement vicinity Div NAI suggest the main attack is in progress (NAI). e. Density of traffic and direction from NAI north of PL IOWA (NAI). 2.6.1 This is important in that if 9th MID can be made to halt, the enemy may not elect to commit 2nd TD, his second echelon, into the Brigade Sector.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Based on BDE recon locations the 28th’s zone of attack appears to be solely concentrating on the Stranger Creek crossing sights in the Mt Pleasant area, in the center sector.”</td>
<td><strong>Thinking Framework / Focus Themes</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>“The 120th MIBR is on a narrower front maybe about 5 km wide as shown on the map.”</td>
<td>2.5. What conditions might influence the enemy to keep his main effort in the West?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“It seems as though the 11th MIBR may go around 1st Brigade’s strongpoint in Nortonville and my guess is they will continue south around and on either side of highway 99, if this is true we could end up with 2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* Intentionally left blank.</td>
<td>3. Consider effects of terrain. A. Own COAs. B. Enemy COAs.</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>* Intentionally left blank.</td>
<td>3.1. What effect might terrain have on the enemy’s courses of action?</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3.2. What effect might terrain have on our operations?</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3.3. What is the central effect the terrain will have on enemy movement?</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3.1.1 The two avenues of approach (AA) (Ave-of-Approach) in our sector can accommodate up to two enemy divisions. The enemy will not reinforce a failed assault. While they may enjoy certain, they are also canalized by Perry Lake to the west and Stranger Creek to the east. In the south, as the AAs open up, they afford the enemy the opportunity to mass an assault crossing of the Kansas River primarily to the east of Lawrence.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>3.2.1 Noting our dispositions, we should enjoy increasingly longer ranges for observation and fires as the enemy moves south.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>3.3.1 Stranger Creek that generally flows northwest-southeast defines the terrain in the northern half of our sector. The result is that the enemy will tend to “flow” southeast or he will cross the natural compartments of the terrain.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
**Vignette 3: The Recon Fight**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>What do we know?</th>
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<tr>
<td>What do we think we know?</td>
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<tr>
<td>What do we want / need to know?</td>
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**Facilitator’s Aides**

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<tr>
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<th>Thinking Framework /Focus Themes</th>
<th>Facilitator’s Probes</th>
<th>Facilitator’s Notes</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Battalions in our sector.</td>
<td><em>Intentionally left blank.</em></td>
<td><em>Intentionally left blank.</em></td>
<td>4. Use all assets available:</td>
<td>4.1. What is the effect of the loss of Scout 15 on our efforts to maintain awareness of enemy movements and intentions?</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>A. Effects of loss of assets.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>B. Options for use of assets.</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>C. Battle command.</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>4.2. What options are there for employing the Brigade Reconnaissance Troop or other recon assets available to regain the benefits lost with the apparent loss of Scout 15? Can the reconstituted unit handle the problem? Why were you asked to do this new mission?</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>4.3. Losing Scout 15 (where was Scout 15) will force the brigade to consider how best to assure observation of NAI 101 (NAIs) for which Scout 15 was responsible. Scout 15, located in the west, was in the best position to track commitment of 3rd MIP units along the brigade’s western boundary. Loss of Scout 15 may result in lack of contact with enemy forces committed along the brigade boundary or enemy forces that cross the boundary south of Nortonville.</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>4.3.1. Scout 15 was responsible for NAI 101. Options for BRT employment are contained in FM 71-3. For example, the BCT commander can either redirect BRT assets or task a TF to assume responsibility for NAI 101. Since Colt 1 and GSR 2 are already oriented on NAI 101 and 102, the real issue may well be how to assign responsibility for the NAI. The Brigade collection plan also assigned Colt 1 and GSR 2 to look at these critical NAI. Still reconstituting Scout 15 is essential. We may also seek to use other division-level and possibly corps-level sensors. For example, it is likely a J-STARS track flown in support of the Corps main effort will enable J-STARS to detect movement through these NAI. There are considerable RECON resources at our disposal (RECON-Resources-Available). Click on the two hyperlinks and review the potential assets available in the Task Organizations’ presented in the Brigade OORD and Division OPLAN. Compare and contrast the RECON assets available in the Task Organizations with what you would expect to be available to call on for assistance, the typical brigade and division level RECON assets, and the RECON type organizations that could provide assets to you in resolving this situation.</td>
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<tr>
<th>Consider timing:</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A. Friendly Timing.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Enemy Timing.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. Operational /Tactical Pauses.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D. Movement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.1. What are the precise locations of the lead MIBRs as of this update?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.2. How long before: a. their lead elements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.3. Once again, quickly review the current enemy and friendly dispositions (Enemy-Friendly Dispositions) and the NAIs (NAIs). We do not know precise locations since TF 4-81 has withdrawn, but it is likely the MIBRs are in NAI 101, 102, and 103 where movement is now being reported. With the loss of Scout 15, we are not as positive about what is happening in NAI 101.</td>
</tr>
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**D-3-4**
## Vignette 3: The Recon Fight

<table>
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<td><strong>Facilitator's Notes</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Verbal Vignette Information</td>
<td>Orders Data/ &quot;Red Flags&quot;/ Other Vignette Information</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>E. Sustainment / Replenishment.</strong></td>
<td>arrive in our MBA?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>their main body armor could arrive in MBA?</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5.2 What decisions must we make next and how long will it take us to:</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>a. reposition the Security Detachment?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>b. task UAV assets?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>c. get Aviation support?</td>
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<tr>
<td>* As you consider the vignette, envision and describe the battlefield from the beginning to the end. Emerging doctrine suggests these are aspects of leadership common to all commanders (FM 3-0. Operations, Chapter 5). As part of this process, particular attention is drawn to the following discussion found in para. 5-9: &quot;...Commanders use the factors of METT-TC to assess and visualize the situation. Staff estimates and collaborative information sharing among commanders refine and deepen their situational understanding. Then commanders visualize the operation, describe it within their*</td>
<td>7. How did you visualize the battlefield?</td>
<td>7.1 How did you visualize the battlefield?</td>
<td>7.1.1 Per the doctrinal evolution in FM 3-0. Operations, Chapter 5, the acts of visualizing, describing, and directing are aspects of leadership common to all commanders. Reviewing the business on visualizing, describing and directing in FM 3-0. Operations, Chapter 5, and the graphic (Visualize-Describe-Direct-Lead-Assess), many elements come together in order to successfully envision the battlefield, from beginning to end. One of the important missions you have as a commander / leader is to ensure you understand how your part of the operation interplays with the rest of the force and their missions. One of the best ways to ensure you have a handle on the operations at hand is to get into a habit of taking time to yourself to think the operation through from beginning to end. Where you cannot visualize some particular aspect, go to your boss and seek his guidance, his vision.</td>
<td>a. As accurately as possible describe the security zone to the main battle area?</td>
<td>7.1.2.1 The loss of Scout 15 is critical. Information is needed as to the security zone to the main battle area?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Vignette 3: The Recon Fight

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</table>

**Verbal Vignette Information**

Intent, and direct their subordinates toward mission accomplishment. Depending on echelon, commanders examine various elements of operational design and determine factors that will shape the operations. They direct operations through plans and orders and synchronize the BOS throughout the operations. Throughout, commanders personally apply the leadership element of combat power through their presence and impact.

7. What options might you consider recommending to your higher HQs?
7.4 What would a FRAGO sound like to implement your suggestions to higher HQs?

** Enemy dispositions in the NAIs. Within 30 to 60 minutes, the enemy could be in our positions on all fronts, so the use of additional reconnaissance assets should increase as soon as possible.**

7.3.1 We could recommend the increased use of close air support (CAS), army aviation reconnaissance assets (helos and fixed wing), use of FASCAM or FA fires to deny or restrict the enemy’s use of terrain, etc. to shape the AO and deny 11th MIBR the opportunity to change directions of attack.

7.4.1 Review the FRAGO format extracted from FM 101-5-2 and develop your input to this question.

### Don'ts

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### Constitution

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>a. Consider contingencies and remain flexible:</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A. Forces reconstruction.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Planning flexibility.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. Show rich contingency planning—branches and sequences.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

8.1.1 Review the recon resources available (RECON: Resources: Available). Scout 15 was a BRT asset. The BRT should re-seed Scout 15’s NAI sensors. If the BRT can’t cover Scout 15’s loss, then we may task a TF to do so or shift sensor coverage.

8.2.1 Quickly review the brigade decision support matrix and make a determination on your own as to the flexibility of the overall plan.

8.3.1 As we consider enemy actions, we should review what we must do in the event that the enemy enjoys success. We need to consider how we would delay or defeat 9th MID if it were also committed in our sector. In any case, we must anticipate enemy actions that would defeat the Commander’s intent if the enemy attacked along our western boundary and how we would coordinate that fight.
FACILITATORS’ NOTES FOR THE THINK LIKE A COMMANDER SCENARIOS

VIGNETTE 4: A SHIFT IN FORCES
**Vignette 4: A Shift In Forces**

<table>
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<td>VERBAL VIGNETTE INFORMATION</td>
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<tr>
<td>NARRATOR:</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>You are the Assistant S3.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>You have just entered the BDE TOC after trying for hours to find the S3. He is nowhere to be found and is likely lost trying to find his way back to the TOC. The Battle Captain gives you the following information.</td>
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<tr>
<td>The old man is on his way back from forward with TF 4-81 and 4-25. He wants an update and recommendation from you or the 3rd act as soon as he hits the ground. Here's what has happened since you left...</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>BATTLE CAPTAIN’S SITUATION UPDATE:</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>&quot;Up until the last hour, operations have been going pretty much as planned. In the east, TF 4-82 is fully engaged with two Mech. battalions from the 28 MIB. Those Mech. battalions have tanks cross-attached.&quot;</td>
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<tr>
<td>&quot;As you know, the 1-55 AVN attack against that eastmost Mech. battalion did not go as well as anticipated due to the heavy ground cover in that part of EA THUNDERBOLT.&quot;</td>
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| 1. Keep Focus on the mission and higher commander’s intent: | 1.1 If TD commits in our sector, what effect does this have on the timeline and end-state concept? | 1.1.1 Review the current enemy and friendly dispositions (Enemy, Enemy, Dispositions). If the TD follows 9 TD into our sector, there are several effects that might have which place the Commander’s intent and concept at risk (Effects of 2TD-Commitment). |
| A. Mission | 1.2 If TD commits in our zone, what may need to be done? | 1.2.1 Commander may need to shift the main effort to our brigade (Effects of 2TD-Commitment). |
| B. Commander’s intent | 1.3 What planning has the division done that could facilitate our efforts? | 1.3.1 The division has stipulated that we are the second priority for committing the reserve. Additionally, the division could shift main effort to us including priority of fires and other resources. |
| C. Commander’s end-state | 1.4 What else is occurring that may affect our fight and possibly the division’s effort? | 1.4.1 1st Brigade reports that a tank battalion from 3MD has “slipped around to the east.” This tank battalion may develop a gap between our brigade and 1st Brigade. |
| D. Mission planning | 1.5 Why is the situation with a single tank battalion “slipping” away from 1st Brigade important? | 1.5.1 If that battalion enjoys success, the enemy is more likely to commit the 2nd Tank Battalion in our sector. 2TD could effectively defeat the CO’s intent if it is allowed to penetrate our brigade. |
| | 1.6 What is the most dangerous development reported in our update? | 1.6.1 If 15th MIB is able to exploit any success enjoyed by the lone tank battalion from 3rd MD, they will be able to over-commit 2TD. We must prevent this. |

**Additional Doctrine Notes:**
- See FM 3-90, Tactics 4 Jul 2001. See Chapter 9. The Area Defense. para 9-10, pgs 9-55 and para 9-3425, pgs 9-3-172 re reserve operations and positioning of reserve and how to determine the right size for the reserve (para 5-13). Fundamentally, the quality of the information we have on the enemy drives how large a reserve we need if little is known of the enemy, then the reserve is larger. A commander’s decision to employ his reserve is one of the most critical decisions that can be made.

*So the two enemy Mech. Bns 4-80 is fighting are at about 80*

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# Vignette 4: A Shift In Forces

<table>
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<td>Verbal Vignette Information</td>
<td>to 70% strength. 4-25 is holding its own at this time, so it is fully committed. They estimate their strength at between 75 and 80%.</td>
<td>make his main effort against us.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>In the west, TF 4-25 fought a tough defense in sector against 12th MIBR. The 120th has gone into a hurry defense at about 50% strength. This happened further south than we wanted, and the 9 MID A tank brigade is passing through them at the time under heavy fire support and air defense cover. They are headed toward EA LSCN as we had planned.</td>
<td>2.1.1 15 MIBR may not commit on the axis the 2 estimates. They may instead exploit the seam developing along our boundary with 1st Brigade (Enemy/Friendly-Dispositions) Specifically they could follow the tank battalion of 3rd MID that seems to be advancing toward the northern flank of TF 4-25.</td>
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<td></td>
<td><em>IF 4-25 is in their prepared positions on BP 4 at about 75% strength and keeping anything from going west.</em> We got a heads up from 1 BDE just 10 minutes ago. 3 MID has not fired their tank brigades. 1 BDE has not fired in control except that one of the tank battalions slipped around to the east and is in the position shown, headed for our sector. 1 BDE says they may not be able to handle them in time so we need to be prepared to take them on.</td>
<td>2.1.1 The strongpoint at Nortonville (Enemy/Friendly-Dispositions) has effectively split the effort of 3rd MID. It is possible that 2 TD is having the same problem. Congestion among enemy units may be a contributing factor to their decision to commit at least part of 2 TD in our sector. The ridgelines running north to south west of Nortonville would seem to be the best ground for 2 TD. As they come into our sector the avenue that serves the best will cause them to turn southeast. There may be opportunity to strike them in the flank, as a consequence.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>&quot;That means that 4-25 may be fighting in two directions for awhile unless we can get something else over there.&quot;</td>
<td>2.1.1 The ground (Enemy/Friendly-Dispositions) supports movement for the 15th MIBR generally to the southeast, but the 15th MIBR axis will narrow down to only 2 or 3 NM width northwest of BP 22.</td>
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<td>3.1 What effect may the terrain have on the enemy course of action for the employment of the 16th MIBR that the S2 considers most likely?</td>
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<td>3.2 If the 15th MIBR advances on the axis stipulated by the S2, what effect will the terrain have on that effort?</td>
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<td>3.3 Does the terrain afford us any opportunities?</td>
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<td>3.4 How can we use the depth of our sector to our advantage?</td>
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See FM 5-50, Tactics, 4 Jul 2001. See Chapter 5, Basics of Offensive Operations, para 8-14/15, para 8-36/1. Para 6-4-1 ailleurs: "Terrain features that favor defensive operations include—

- A series of parallel ridges across the line of possible advance.
- Upland grassy areas, swamps, lakes, and other obstacles on the front and flanks.
- High ground with good observation and long-range fields of fire.
- Concealed movement routes immediately behind defensive positions.
- Limited road network in front of the line of contact to confine the enemy to predictable avenues of approach.
- Good road network behind the line of contact that allows the commander to reposition his forces as the battle progresses.
- The opposite of the terrain conditions listed above degrades a force's ability to conduct defensive operations. For example, terrain with a limited road net that canalizes the defending force allows the enemy to predict its movement and take steps to interdict that movement."

---

**Note:**

- **15th MIBR:** 15th Mechanized Infantry Brigade
- **3rd MID:** 3rd Mechanized Infantry Division
- **1st Brigade:** 1st Mechanized Infantry Brigade
- **BP 22:** Base Point 22
Vignette 4: A Shift In Forces

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Verbal Vignette
Information

- As you know, TF 4-81 is in its prepared positions on BPs 32 and 33. 4-81 reports 65% combat strength.*

- The air assault task force on BP 34 has seen little action thus far and are at 95% combat strength. They are now oriented to the west, ready to stop any enemy movement along the corridor between LIKON and their position.*

- TF 1-58 AVN has 13 Apaches and 3 Knives warriors operational at this time. They have one attack company reuniting at the FARRP, and the other is in position just south of BP 36, ready to go on order to BP 22 to destroy the tank Bde’s second echelon.**

**C4-80 is still on BP 35, and they’re close to 100% strength, but they’re now reporting to TF 481. And the BRT Scouts are still in position north of Pts. DOLLAR.*

- Sir, a situation is developing with the 2nd TD that has us really concerned. Within the past hour we have destroyed or captured recon vehicles from the 2nd TD R&E battalion in three separate locations in the rear of 4-80 as shown. Just ten minutes ago, 4-80 scouts reported capturing a BRDM-2 from 2nd TD’s 15.*

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Order of Battle
"Red Flags":
Other Vignette Information

- See FM 5-90, Tactics. 4 Jul 2001. See Chapter 8, Basics of Defensive Operations, pg 8-36, para 8-132, referring to the perimeter defense, states simply: "Mutual Support". The commander positions his defending forces to ensure mutual employment of defensive resources, such as crew-served weapons, observation, and maneuver elements. Mutual support between defensive elements requires careful planning, positioning, and coordination because of the circular aspects of the perimeter defense. Surveillance, obstacles, prearranged indirect fires, and the provision for maneuver elements to exploit or reinforce fires are used to control gaps in the perimeter. Defensive plans provide for using all available support including field artillery systems to limit danger close, attack helicopters, and close air support.*

- While the comments are applicable to the perimeter defense, most are also applicable to the area defense.

Thinking Framework
Focus Themes

- 4. Use all assets available:
  A. Available ROS elements' systems (maneuver, FLS, AD, etc.) both within and external to our Bde.
  B. Reserves
  C. Joint forces (TACAIR).

  4.1 If the division shifts the main effort to us, what assets may be assigned to us to support?

  4.2 If we become the main effort, how might we use resources best?

  4.3 If we become the main effort, do we employ FASCAM, fires, attack aviation, TACAIR, division reserve?

  4.4 If we become the main effort, how can we help TF 4-25?

  4.5 If we become the main effort, what do we do about TF 4-80?

  4.1.1 In addition to priority of fires, CAS and counter mobility efforts the division could release TF 4-80 (the division reserve) for our use or use TF 4-80 to counterattack into our sector.

  4.2.1 If we become the main effort we have two problems. In the west (Enemy-Friendly Dispositions), we must defeat both the 9th MIBR tank brigade and one tank battalion from the 3rd MIBR. In the east, we must maintain the freedom to maneuver fires and or troops against the 15th MIBR while keeping the 9th MIBR at bay.

  4.3.1 We will no doubt need to use all the assets division might provide in order to finish the fight against the 9th MIBR while delaying the 15th MIBR and shifting the fight against the remainder of 2 TD (Enemy-Friendly Dispositions).

  4.4.1 We can help TF 4-25 (Enemy-Friendly Dispositions) immediately, by assigning them priority of fires. Equally important we can take the deep fight to 3rd MIBR’s tank battalion and use FASCAM to prevent 15 MIBR from coming straight south into TF 4-25.

  4.5.1 TF 4-25 is at risk to flank attack from the 15th MIBR or being bypassed by that (Enemy-Friendly Dispositions). We need to consider how best to disengage and withdraw TF 4-80 or if we leave them they must refuse their southwestern flank. We may facilitate that by resewing to them C1-450.

Facilitator's
Aides

- 8.1.1 If 15 MIBR is committed in our sector, how long before it reaches EA Tiger or EA Lion?

  8.2.1 If the division reserve is committed in our sector how long will it take them for reach the Brigade Sector?

  8.3.1 Timing is the key problem for us in this situation. We must finish the fight against the 9th MIBR’s tank brigade before we can deal the...

Facilitator's
Notes

- 8.4.1 We must delay the arrival of 2TD and divert 15th MIBR away from its intended axis. Dynamic obstacles and attack aviation can assist us with 15th MIBR. We should exploit division to impose delay on 2TD.

- 8.5.1 Despite our present difficulties, the depth of our sector and the continued strength of our committed forces will enable us to disrupt, delay and ultimately defeat 15th MIBR and...
### Vignette 4: A Shift In Forces

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>What do we know?</th>
<th>What do we think we know?</th>
<th>Thinking Framework / Focus Themes</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Facilitator's Aides</strong></td>
<td><strong>Facilitator's Probes</strong></td>
<td><strong>Facilitator's Notes</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MI/BRI stuck in the mud in the location shown. At this time, lead elements of the 15 MI/BRI are crossing PL IOVA in the west.*</td>
<td>- Intentionally left blank.</td>
<td>- 15th MI/BRI and we may also have to buy time to maneuver the division reserve. How can we do that?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Intel says that the lack of success by MID against S BDE and the fact that it is developing between 4-80 and 4-25 in our sector has caused 2nd TID to commit in our sector. They believe 15 MI/BRI is acting as the division forward detachment to probe the seam and might either turn south through 6A TIGER or secure crossing sites over Stranger Creek from Eason south.&quot;</td>
<td>- Intentionally left blank.</td>
<td>- 6.4 How can we assure we have time to defeat 15th MI/BRI or buy time to defeat them and for division to assess 2nd Tank Division's intentions?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;If the rest of 2nd TID would follow white 9 MID keeps us occupied. 9 MID 8TR Bde has begun moving south into 3 BDE's sector probably in an attempt to keep 3 BDE occupied as well. 2nd TID's objective would be to defeat the division reserve and capture bridges over the Kansas River at Eudora, DeSota, and/or Topeka.&quot;</td>
<td>- Intentionally left blank.</td>
<td>- 6.5 Central to the Corps' intent is to buy time to commit additional forces. How may we accomplish this?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Awaiting your orders. sir. This ends the Battle Captain's update.&quot;</td>
<td>- Intentionally left blank.</td>
<td><strong>6.1</strong> If we determine to shift forces, what are the key issues we must consider?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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**Thinking Framework / Focus Themes**

1. **Key Issues to Consider (Enemy-Friendly Dispositions):**
   - Where we want to kill the enemy.
   - Time to move units.
   - How to exploit the enemy.
   - Coordination measures required.

2. **Committing 2nd TID in our sector puts the Division scheme of maneuver at risk (Enemy-Friendly Dispositions):**
   - The division is to accommodate making the main effort in 1st Brigade.

**Facilitator's Notes**

- See FM 3-0, Operations. As you consider the vignette, envision and describe the battlefield from the beginning to the end. "Emerging doctrine suggests these are aspects of leadership common to all commanders (FM 3-0). Visualize, Describe, Direct, Chapter 5.
- 7. Visualize the battlefield:
  - Accurately—realistic space-time forecast.
  - Dynamic—entities change over.

7.1 Can TF 4-81 be used against the 15th MI/BRI, if the Division commits the division reserve to EA Line? 10
7.2 What can we do to unphase the enemy plan

7.1.1 Yes, TF 4-81 (Enemy-Friendly Dispositions) could shift to BPA south of EA Tiger with lead element arriving in 20 minutes.
7.2.1 Quickly complete the defeat of the 15th MI/BRI and prevent success by the 15th MI/BRI (Enemy-Friendly Dispositions).
7.3 Per the doctrinal evolution in FM 3-0, Operations, Chapter 5, the acts of visualizing, describing, and directing are aspects of leadership common to all commanders.
## Vignette 4: A Shift In Forces

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<td><strong>Drum Linkages/Discussions (If Any)</strong></td>
<td><strong>What do we know?</strong>/<strong>What do we think we know?</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>para 6-7 and Figure 5-1) As part of this process, particular attention is drawn to the following discussion found in para. 5-9: “...Commanders use the factors of METT-TC to assess and visualize the situation. Staff estimates and collaborative information sharing among commanders refine and deepen their situational understanding. The commanders visualize the operation, describe it within their intent, and direct their subordinates toward mission accomplishment. Depending on echelon, commanders examine various elements of operational design and determine factors that will shape the operations. They direct operations through plans and orders and synchronize the BOS throughout the operations. Throughout, commanders personally apply the leadership element of combat power through their presence and impact.”</td>
<td><strong>time.</strong></td>
<td><strong>at the juncture.</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.3 How did you visualize this battlefield?</td>
<td><strong>B. Proactively—what can I make enemy do?</strong></td>
<td>7.4 What visualization of the battlespace does our plan reflect?</td>
<td><strong>Visualize/Describe/Direct:</strong> many elements come together in order to successfully envision the battlespace, from beginning to end. One of the important missions you have as a commander/leader is to ensure you understand how your part of the operation interplays with the rest of the force and their missions. One of the best ways to ensure you have a handle on the operations at hand is to get into a habit of taking time to yourself to think the operation through from beginning to end. Where you cannot visualize some particular aspect, go to your boss and seek his guidance, his vision. 7.4.1 We have arrayed our defenses in depth and have oriented forces, obstacles and fire to reflect the view that in the north, the enemy is forced to bear southwest and will generally funnel into the center of our sector in the south.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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> *Intentionally left blank.*

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> *Intentionally left blank.*

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*See FM 3-0, Tactics, 4 July 2001. See Chapter 3, The Area Defense, pg 8-8, para 9-2425, which states:*

*9-24. Attempting to defend everything defends nothing. Therefore, the commander carefully designs his defense plan to ensure his defending force can halt the enemy attack and develop an opportunity to seize the initiative and undertake offensive operations. The cohesion of the defending force has a significant impact on the overall effectiveness of the defense. The commander must be prepared to adjust the defensive dispositions to meet changes in the enemy's dispositions to maintain that cohesion if the defense is to remain viable.*

*See FM 3-90, Tactica, 4 July 2001. 9-25. This area defense concept requires that defensive positions accomplish the mission independently or in combination by defeating the enemy by fire, by absorbing the strength of the enemy's attack within the position, or by destroying the enemy with a local counterattack. The commander combines the advantages of fighting from prepared positions, obstacles, prepared fires, and local counterattacks to isolate and overwhelm selected enemy formations. He must be prepared to*

---

8. Consider contingencies and remain flexible: Show rich contingency planning.

A. Ability to accept attached forces.

B. Employment of reserves.

C. Alternates positions.

D. Graphic control measures.

E. Timing.

F. Ability to seize initiative and undertake offensive operations.

8.1 Is the Brigade prepared to accept attachment of additional forces?

8.2 What provisos have been set up to be made to employ the Brigade Reserve?

8.3 Does our plan afford us flexibility?

---

8.1.1 The brigade [Enemy-Friendly-Dispositions] has not planned adequately to receive forces. The brigade still must determine link-up points and routes for forces that may be allocated.

8.1.1.1 The brigade must plan for [Enemy-Friendly-Dispositions]:

a. Routes.

b. Alternate positions.

c. Attack positions and graphics to support counterattacks, including objectives, boundaries, etc.

d. Planned movement times.

e. The effect that moving the Division reserve will have on our own ability to maneuver.

8.3.1 We have arranged our forces in depth and have adequate reserves to shift forces or counterattack. Our plan is flexible.
Vignette 4: A Shift In Forces

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<td>1</td>
<td>rapidly shift the nature and location of his main effort throughout his AO. The commander may have to reposition defending units within their defensive positions or reposition between terrain features as he masses overwhelming effects against the attacking enemy. The defensive plan should designate axes of advance and routes for the commitment or movement of reserves, or the forward or rearward passage of one unit through another. It should identify an area for aerial maneuver by attack helicopters, air assault units, or fixed-wing aircraft. This capacity to reposition is dependent on the defending force having superior tactical mobility. Without tactical mobility, defending forces stay in their prepared positions and accept the possibility of becoming decisively engaged.</td>
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FACILITATOR'S NOTES FOR THE THINK LIKE A COMMANDER SCENARIOS

VIGNETTE 5: THE ATTACK BEGINS
### Vignette 5: The Attack Begins

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#### NARRATOR:

You are the Company Commander. Your Company is part of the infiltration TF with the mission to secure OBJ Meade.

You are now at the location indicated moving with the center platoon.

The TF is supported by 2 OH-58D reconnoitering units ahead of you. About 2 minutes ago you heard explosions and the Platoon in the East reported scattered mines falling on just to the north of their position locking their route.

Minutes later artillery rounds begin impacting at the location you are at.

- **Time is approximately 0330.** Based on WARNORD 2 timelines, the LD is scheduled for 0330.

  - This vignette enables examination of a number of issues including infiltration, such as maintaining an infiltrating force, crossing danger areas, fire support of infiltrating units, link-up and assuring forward passage of lines at within a Brigade and by a Brigade as part of a Division supporting a forward passage of lines. The issues of coordinating with a following unit that is charged with clearing a zone and air cavalry in the reconnaissance role are also introduced.

  - Fundamentally, the vignette illustrates what happens when an infiltration is not thoroughly planned to include sustaining the infiltrating force. FM 3-90, Tactics, 4 July 2001, discusses the infiltration problem at length beginning at para 3-56. FM 3-90 stipulates as a minimum a number of control measures including defining an AO for the infiltrating unit, delineating one or more infiltration lanes, specifying assault positions, identifying rally points and a limit of advance. Our order does none of these things. Nor does our order discuss our means of evacuating casualties within the infiltrating unit.

- **Other Vignette Supporting References:**
  - FM 3-90, Tactics, 12 Jul 00
  - FM 71-100, Division Operations, 28 Aug 1998;
  - Chap 4, Offensive Operations, Sub-Sub-Section on Infiltration.

#### Thinking Framework / Focus Themes

1. **Keep focus on mission and higher commander’s intent:**
   - A. Commander’s intent.
   - B. Mission completion.
   - C. Security operations.
   - D. Infiltration.

1. **Would a Brigade size unit normally infiltrate?**
   - E. Army Aviation support.
   - F. Fire Support.

1.1 **What is an infiltration?**

1.1.1 The previous slide (Infiltration-Task: FRAGO) provides the doctrinal definition from FM 71-100, which provides insight as to the level of forces that may expect to receive an “infiltration” order. Additionally, FM 3-90 says: “An infiltration is a form of maneuver in which an attacking force conducts undetected movement through or into an area occupied by enemy forces to occupy a position of advantage in the enemy rear while exploiting only small elements to enemy defensive fires (FM 3-0, Operations). Infiltration is also an ambush technique used within friendly territory to move forces in small groups at extended or irregular intervals. (See FM 3-90, Chapter 18 for a discussion of infiltration as a movement technique.)" FM 3-0, paragraph 7-36, provides this additional insight to infiltration: “The need to avoid being detected and engaged may limit the size and strength of infiltrating forces. Infiltration rarely defeats a defense by itself. Commanders direct infiltrations to attack lightly defended positions or stronger positions from the flank and rear, to ensure key terrain to support the defensive operation, or to disrupt enemy sustaining operations. Typically, forces infiltrate in small groups and reassemble to continue their mission.”

1.2 **Would a Brigade size unit normally infiltrate?**

1.3 **Where would you conduct an infiltration?**

- a. What is the mission of the OH-58s?
- b. How may they help?

- c. Would they be able to detect and report the enemy OPs?
- d. What kinds of reconnaissance missions would they normally provide?
- e. Would their mission need to be changed in order to be of optimal help in finding the enemy OPs?

- f. What is the effect may 8-02’s dilemma have on our operation?

1.5 **What help do we have immediately available?**

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<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>The subject COP assets. They may need additional support. They have been on station for a while. We need to determine how much longer they will be. Additional resources should be requested.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1.1 What considerations must we give priority to? |

1.2 What options do we have? |

<table>
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<tr>
<td>What are the options for the subject COP assets?</td>
<td>How do we request additional resources?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2.1 Model a thinking exercise. |

A. Define the enemy. |
B. Define the problem. |
C. Define the solution. |
D. Define the tactics. |
E. Define the intelligence. |
F. Define the support. |
G. Define the objectives. |
H. Define the timeline. |
I. Define the constraints. |
J. Define the resources. |
K. Define the consequences. |
L. Define the risks. |
M. Define the benefits. |
N. Define the alternatives. |
O. Define the feasibility. |

3.1 Consider the enemy's goals. |

A. Define the enemy's goals. |
B. Define the enemy's resources. |
C. Define the enemy's capabilities. |
D. Define the enemy's intentions. |
E. Define the enemy's vulnerabilities. |
F. Define the enemy's threats. |
G. Define the enemy's weaknesses. |
H. Define the enemy's strengths. |
I. Define the enemy's opportunities. |
J. Define the enemy's limitations. |
K. Define the enemy's constraints. |
L. Define the enemy's objectives. |
M. Define the enemy's strategies. |
N. Define the enemy's tactics. |
O. Define the enemy's techniques. |

4.1 Consider the enemy's weaknesses. |

A. Identify the enemy's weaknesses. |
B. Identify the enemy's vulnerabilities. |
C. Identify the enemy's threats. |
D. Identify the enemy's limitations. |
E. Identify the enemy's constraints. |
F. Identify the enemy's objectives. |
G. Identify the enemy's strategies. |
H. Identify the enemy's tactics. |
I. Identify the enemy's techniques. |
J. Identify the enemy's weaknesses. |
K. Identify the enemy's strengths. |
L. Identify the enemy's opportunities. |
M. Identify the enemy's limitations. |
N. Identify the enemy's constraints. |
O. Identify the enemy's objectives. |

5.1 Consider the enemy's capabilities. |

A. Define the enemy's capabilities. |
B. Define the enemy's resources. |
C. Define the enemy's intentions. |
D. Define the enemy's goals. |
E. Define the enemy's objectives. |
F. Define the enemy's strategies. |
G. Define the enemy's tactics. |
H. Define the enemy's techniques. |
I. Define the enemy's weaknesses. |
J. Define the enemy's strengths. |
K. Define the enemy's opportunities. |
L. Define the enemy's limitations. |
M. Define the enemy's constraints. |
N. Define the enemy's vulnerabilities. |
O. Define the enemy's threats. |

6.1 Consider the enemy's strategies. |

A. Define the enemy's strategies. |
B. Define the enemy's tactics. |
C. Define the enemy's techniques. |
D. Define the enemy's weaknesses. |
E. Define the enemy's strengths. |
F. Define the enemy's opportunities. |
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7.1 Consider the enemy's weaknesses. |

A. Define the enemy's weaknesses. |
B. Define the enemy's vulnerabilities. |
C. Define the enemy's threats. |
D. Define the enemy's limitations. |
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8.1 Consider the enemy's capabilities. |

A. Define the enemy's capabilities. |
B. Define the enemy's resources. |
C. Define the enemy's intentions. |
D. Define the enemy's goals. |
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O. Define the enemy's threats. |
## Vignette 5: The Attack Begins

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<tr>
<td>+ Intentionally left blank.</td>
<td>+ Intentionally left blank.</td>
<td>+ Division is firing counterfire via MLRS.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>+ Order stipulates 66 FA Bde as counterfire HQ.</td>
<td></td>
<td>3. Consider effects of terrain.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3.1 What is the most likely location for the observers that are calling fires on 6-502?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3.2 What effect will terrain have on our attempts to relieve 6-502?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3.3 Does the terrain tend to favor us or the enemy in this situation?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3.4 What effect will terrain have on enemy movement toward the 6-502?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3.5 Can we a link up between mounted forces and the 6-502 under cover?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3.6 Does the terrain offer 6-502 any opportunity?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2.4 Is an enemy counterattack against the 6-502 likely?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2.5 What other conclusions might the enemy reach as a consequence of discovering the 6-502’s attempt to infiltrate the security zone?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2.6 Has the enemy shown the dexterity necessary to enable them to maneuver to take advantage of their success against the 6-502?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Zoom-in (Min) they will have to enter open ground where our artillery and possibly attack helicopters can reach them.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2.4.1 While an enemy counterattack against the 6-502 is dangerous (Friendly-Situation-Zoom-in-Mines) it is not very likely at present. They are disposed in a security zone at the point of the 6-502’s difficulty. Continuing to counterattack by fire is far more likely than a local counterattack by the BTR brigade.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2.5.1 They may read this effort as a harbinger of the division main effort and maneuver their reserves either to thicken their defense or maneuver to counterattack any penetration that we achieve.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2.6.1 The enemy has demonstrated, during their offensive operations the ability to adjust to unfolding situations. Nonetheless, looking at the situation (Friendly-Situation-Zoom-in-Mines), we have an hour or more to affect a remedy even if the enemy acts immediately.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4. Use all assets available:</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4.1 What help do we have immediately available?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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D-5-3
## Vignette 5: The Attack Begins

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<tr>
<td>A. Consider all elements/systems.</td>
<td>4.2 What else can the Brigade do immediately?</td>
<td>marked with an RFA. Determining whether the targets are in the RFA will delay counter fires. Firing on targets in the RFA may only be done with the approval of the Headquarters that established the RFA. We have a scout weapons team on station that may be able to identify the observer and suppress them. We may also be able to identify enemy artillery C2 nets and attack them electronically since they are now likely to emitting.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Assets immediately available.</td>
<td>4.3 What are our options for taking OBJ Meade?</td>
<td>4.2.1 Firing smoke and immediate suppression on suspected enemy Out Posts in the tree line north of 6-502 (Friendly-Situation-Zoom-in-Mines) may give the battalion time to evacuate its wounded and withdraw the two companies that have been detected. We also need to determine what our options are if 6-502 cannot continue the mission.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. Asset options for employment.</td>
<td>4.4 What help could the division provide?</td>
<td>4.3.1 It is not imperative that we decide immediately, but we need to consider whether 6-502 will be able to continue the mission. We need to consider what the best course of action might be in the event 6-502 is unable to continue the mission. We could assign the mission to TF 4-80. They are closest to 6-502 and they planned to link up and pass 6-502 in any case.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D. Asset availability.</td>
<td></td>
<td>4.4.1 The division could assign other supporting fires. The division might also assign attack helicopters units to assist. Finally, CAS could be made available.</td>
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* Intentionally left blank.

6-502 reports lead companies at 60% strength.

6. Consider timing:
A. Friendly Timing.
B. Enemy Timing.
C. Operational/Tactical Pauses.
D. Movement.
E. Sustainment/Replenishment.

6.1 Will we need permission to send relieving forces?

6.2 What is the closest heavy force to 6-502?
   a. What is its’ current mission?
   b. How long will it take for them to arrive at 6-502?
   c. What would be the overall effect on the operation if it is given a mission to rescue 6-502?

6.3 How long must the 6-502 wait if we execute as planned?

6.1.1 We may need permission to cross the LDLC early. The division may grant permission for all or part of the Brigade to cross or even adjust LD for the attack. They may also restrict us to the original timelines which are there because of other restrictions: CFL, FSCL, RPA, NFA, RFL etc. You should conduct a quick review of these as reflected in Fire Support doctrine in the following fire control measures slides (slides: Fire-Support-Coordination; Fire-Support-Coordination-conds; Fire-Support-Coordination-conds; and, Fire-Support-Coordination-conds).

6.2.1 TF 4-80 is about 6 KM south of the main body of 6-502 (Friendly-Situation-Zoom-in-Mines).
   a. Currently, TF 4-80 is preparing for the attack to cross the LDLC at 0630. They are still inside the LDLC.
   b. At 3 about minutes per kilometer, or 20 KPH, TF 4-80 lead could reach 6-502 in about 18-20 minutes from the time they begin to move.
   c. If TF 4-80 is used to relieve 6-502, there will be some delay in the TF achieving the mission assigned to it.

6.3.1 6-502 is hard pressed, but should be able to withdraw to cover and concealed positions. Once that is done, the battalion should be able to wait up three hours for a linkup with TF 4-80. The only caveat to this view is that it is unlikely that the 6-502 could defeat a determined counter attack by the 8th Tank Battalion in this time.
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<td>e. See the bigger picture:</td>
<td>4.1. What effect may 6-502's dilemma have on the Division Scheme of maneuver?</td>
<td>4.1.1 Potential exists if 6-502 cannot continue that the CG’s concept to create an assessable flank and to conduct a coordinate attack is at risk.</td>
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<td>• As you consider the vignette, envision and describe the battlefield from the beginning to the end. Emerging doctrine suggests these are aspects of leadership common to all commanders (FM 3-0: Visualize, Describe, Direct, Chapter 5, para 5-7 and Figure 5-1). As part of this process, particular attention is drawn to the following discussion found in para. 5-9:</td>
<td>• As you consider the vignette, envision and describe the battlefield from the beginning to the end. Emerging doctrine suggests these are aspects of leadership common to all commanders (FM 3-0: Visualize, Describe, Direct, Chapter 5, para 5-7 and Figure 5-1). As part of this process, particular attention is drawn to the following discussion found in para. 5-9:</td>
<td>4.2. Will we have to alter the Commander’s concept to save 6-502?</td>
<td>4.3. What may we be able to do to retrieve the situation without attacking early with heavy forces?</td>
<td>4.4. In what way is it accurate to say that the position in which 6-502 finds itself can be mitigated?</td>
<td>4.2. While 6-502 is in serious trouble, the situation is salvageable. For example, one of the three maneuver companies assigned to 6-502 is not under fire. 6-502 still has options. If by assigning other support resources to support them, including artillery and aviation, 6-502 may not only be able to extract itself, but also may be able to continue the mission to seize OBJ Meade. If this is possible, then neither our concept nor that of the Division is at risk.</td>
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<td>7. Visualize the battlefield:</td>
<td>7.1. What must we do to retrieve the situation?</td>
<td>7.1.1 If you formulated a concept that embodies your solution, consider how it might read in a FRAGO (inc. in fact, for practice, you might want to formulate a FRAGO (see FRAGO Format). Your order should include how you can support 6-502 in solving its immediate problem—getting out of the beaten zone and how you will support their MEDEVAC problem. Ground or Air. You also have other options including an early LD and assigning the 6-502 to another unit. Think through those options including having 6-502 continue the mission.</td>
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<td>A. Accurately—realistic time forecasts.</td>
<td>7.2. If we move up our LD time to effect a ground linkup with 6-502, where should that occur?</td>
<td>7.2.1 A feasible linkup site could be at the intersection of two secondary roads that are 2.5 kilometers west of Millwood (Friendly-Situation-ZoomOut). It can be found readily enough in the dark. The danger is that if 6-502 is under observation then that road junction is also. The linkup point should be, if possible, the closest covered and/or concealed point to 6-502.</td>
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<td>b. Dynamically—entities change over time.</td>
<td>7.3. If we are denied permission to attack early, what considerations should we make?</td>
<td>7.3.1 6-502 still has significant combat power. If the battalion is able to maintain positions south of PL Dollar (Friendly-Situation-ZoomOut), they are ideally situated to protect the eastern flank of units moving to envelope OBJ Meade from the west. They may also be able to identify the enemy positions from which they were observed.</td>
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<td>c. Proactively—what can we make enemy do?</td>
<td>7.4. In the event the enemy does counterattack, what are the most likely avenues into 6-502’s area?</td>
<td>7.4.1 The 9th MIB Tank Battalion is the unit best postured to counterattack and could approach from the northwest moving generally along the watercourse of Stranger Creek or it could strike straight south and attack the western flank of 6-502. It is not very likely that they will mount such a counterattack in support of the security zone where the 6-502 is currently embroiled.</td>
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<td>will shape the operations. They direct operations through plans and orders and synchronize the BOS throughout the operations. Throughout, commanders personally apply the leadership element of combat power through their presence and impact.*</td>
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D-5-6
FACILITATOR'S NOTES FOR THE THINK LIKE A COMMANDER SCENARIOS

VIGNETTE 6: THE BIGGER PICTURE
## Vignette 6: The Bigger Picture

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**NARRATOR:** You are the Company Commander.

It is now 0540 your team is on Objective Meade with TF 6/204. TF 4/25 and 4/60 crossed the LD 10 minutes ago and are proceeding without incident thus far. You receive a call from your TF commander:

"This is what I need you to do; there are successful deep attacks north of PL Kansas that have brought the Dakotas to the negotiating table. Word I get is that we could have a cease-fire within the next two hours depending on how the negotiations go but for now I want you to continue with your mission. You can expect chaotic conditions when you reach PL Iowa because there have been numerous sightings of apparently unarmed Dakotan small troop units.

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- Transition to post-war ops.
- References:
  - FM 27-10, War of Land Warfare, 1976, Chapter 3: Prisoners of War. We have significant responsibility for the safety and speedy removal of EPW from the environs of combat. This vignette allows us to examine the problem of managing EPW in the context of ongoing operations during which some of the enemy choose to surrender while others do not. FM 27-10 lays out our legal responsibility. It is important to recall that our responsibility to EPW does not extend to risking the lives of our soldiers unnecessarily the role of hostile intent and the right to self-defense remains the basis of our Rules of Engagement.
  - FM 3-9, Operations. This vignette also focuses on the problem of transition from combat operations to post-combat and stability operations. Chapter 6 discusses the importance of transition in Full Spectrum Operations.
  - FM 21-90 Tactics, Chapter 3, The Basics of the Offense, discusses transitions in detail.

1. Keep focus on mission and higher command’s intent:
   - A. Command intent / guidance.
   - B. Mission / tasks.
   - C. Operations priorities.
   - D. Operations risks.
   - E. Lead—Assess.

1.1 How clear is the Commander’s guidance?

1.2 What are our tasks at this point?

1.3 What are the priorities for these tasks?

1.4 What is the essence of what the CO told us?

1.5 Is the attack still on? What does the Commander intend?

1.6 What questions would you want to ask the Commander?

1.7 The Commander indicates there is some risk to us in the current situation. Does he tell us what to do about the risk?

1.8 What if anything should we tell our units?

1.1.1 With the Commander’s operations order is a bit unclear what you should do in terms of shifting from war to post-war operations—war never end neatly. After reviewing his intent, guidance, and the enemy / friendly situation maps (Enemy-Friendly-Situation and Enemy-Friendly-Situation-Close-Up), some considerations should come into mind:
   - a. If we slow down or stop, we are likely to have trouble generating momentum to attack again. During Desert Storm CENTCOM issued halt instructions the night before cease-fire and then ordered the resumption of the attack; many units experienced difficulty getting back on the move.
   - b. The Commander probably cannot clarify this situation now.

1.2.1 We still must:
   - a. continue the attack to include assisting the forward passage of the 26th AD.
   - b. We must deal with apparent Dakotan defections and a potential cease-fire.

1.3.1 Based on the Commander’s guidance and a close up look at the situation (Enemy-Friendly-Situation-Close-Up), there are probably two high-priority actions:
   - a. Priority #1—Ensuring forward passage of the 26th AD and seizing as much ground as possible to facilitate a favorable political settlement.
   - b. Priority #2—Dealing with Dakotan defections and preparing for a possible cease-fire.

1.4.1 Many Dakotans appear eager to surrender, but troops in contact do not seem inclined to surrender. In short we do not quite know what the Dakotans may do. Commander wants us to attack aggressively, but also warns us that a cease-fire might be imminent (Guidance).

1.8.1 The attack is most assuredly still on. We might consider modifying our efforts to accommodate the possibility of Dakotan collapse.

1.8.1 Perhaps we should ask for clarification of the Commander’s guidance. We need to ask what will constitute the Commander’s decision point for assigning a limit of advance. We may want to ask what is most important to him--attacks aggressively or preparing for cease-fire?

1.7.1 We may want to ask the Commander what risks he is willing for us to assume:
   - a. He does not want to culminate our attack too early and lose momentum. That type of situation may cost us the opportunity of gaining as much ground as possible or may allow the enemy commander time and space to regain control of his major units.
   - b. He is concerned that the enemy may use surrendering troops as a shield.

D-6-1
Vignette 6: The Bigger Picture

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heading south between PL Kansas and Dime. I guess they don't want to take another night of pounding like they had last night. The 3 estimates that there are between 2000 and 3000 Dakota troops heading south under white flags from PL Kansas clear across our Division's front."

"Most of them are on foot but a few are in open top trucks. So, it is hard to say what will happen when they reach the security zone troops of the 3rd and 9th MIDs. But, for right now the enemy seems to be holding firm between PL Dollar and Dime. You should be prepared for more restrictive rules of engagement north of PL Iowa to encourage those fleeing troops to actually surrender. Also, we have to exercise caution so the Dakotans don't use this as an opportunity to move loyal troops forward.

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2. Model a thinking enemy:
   A. Patterns of enemy operations.
   B. Indicators and enemy capabilities may not match.
   C. Opportunities.

2.1 Are enemy intentions clear?
2.1.1 Is there any way the enemy can obtain benefit from the apparent detection of 3-3x troops from the main defensive area?
2.1.2 What indicators might there be of further enemy collapse?
2.1.3 How might we offer frontline troops the opportunity to surrender?
2.1.4 What risks to our troops would this entail?
2.1.5 Are we required to place our troops at risk in order to afford the enemy the opportunity to surrender?
2.1.6 What would indicate the enemy regaining its composure?

2.1.1 Transition from war to peace is never clear. We do not know what the enemy may do - fight or collapse. Units still in the security zone apparently intend to fight (Enemy-Friendly-Situation).
2.1.2 Commander has alerted us to the possibility that the movement of troops south (Enemy-Friendly-Situation-Close-Up) from the main defensive area may screen the movement of enemy reserves or at least distract us from reacting to the commitment of enemy reserves (Enemy-Friendly-Situation).
2.1.3 If security zone troops do not react to contact or begin to move south this may indicate the collapse of the enemy (Enemy-Friendly-Situation).
2.1.4 PEYOPS teams employing Dakota linguists may be used to offer an opportunity to surrender.
2.1.5 The bulk of the troops we face are Mech and Armor units that may strike at up to 2 kilometers. Clearly then loudspeaker teams would have to assume some risks to offer surrender.
2.1.6 Unless ROE are modified specifically to cause us to assume risk, we are not bound by the law of land warfare to assume any risk -- the enemy, if they desire to surrender must demonstrate that intent (Enemy-Friendly-Situation).
2.1.7 There are several indicators (Enemy-Friendly-Situation):
   a. Flow south by enemy units ceases.
   b. Enemy is able to reconstitute units.
   c. Every unit in contact continues to resist.

D-6-2
## Vignette 6: The Bigger Picture

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<td>&quot;So your mission remains the same at this time. The more aggressive we are, the more higher will get out of the Daikatana at the negotiating table, however you need to be prepared to process a lot of EPW once you get up to PL Iowa. You should be prepared to have PL Iowa become your limit of advance.&quot;</td>
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<td>the enemy regains control of his</td>
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<td>5.4 What might such a course of</td>
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<td>to follow this operation. We</td>
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<td>prepare to position ourselves,</td>
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<td>6. See the bigger picture:</td>
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<td>A. Affects of command</td>
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<td>operations.</td>
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<td>B. Timing of operations</td>
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<td>affecting other operations.</td>
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<td>C. Positioning of units</td>
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<td>during battle.</td>
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<td>D. COAs.</td>
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<td>E. How our fight fits in the</td>
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<td>6.1 Given task 1 to continue</td>
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<td>continue the attack, how</td>
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<td>Bde upon reaching PL IOWA;</td>
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<td>a. Provide the best possible</td>
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<td>b. Provide the greatest</td>
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<td>c. Position the Bde to</td>
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<td>6.3 What is a likely course</td>
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<td>of his major units North of</td>
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<td>6.4 What might such a course</td>
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**D-64**
**Vignette 6: The Bigger Picture**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>What do we know?</th>
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<th>What do we want / need to know?</th>
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<td>Focus Themes</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Facilitator's Probes</strong></td>
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| Action, if required, drive as new mission for the Bde? | A FRAGO effort and planning for either of the above mentioned missions might be prudent for the Bde Commander and staff. |

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>7. Visualize the battlefield:</th>
<th>7.1 The enemy security zone appears to extend from just north of PL Dallas to just north of PL Kansas &amp; depth of about 15-20 Kms.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A. Accurately—realistic space-time forecast</td>
<td>7.2 The enemy develops deep security zones in order to screen their main defense and disrupt our attack to the NW. Depth affords them flexibility and provides them some protection from our artillery.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Dynamically—entities change over time</td>
<td>7.3 The danger that the intent to surrender among the Dakotans is not universal poses risks to non-combat units involved in the forward passage.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. Proactively—what can we make enemy do?</td>
<td>7.4 On the best defensive ground immediately north of objective Meade. Passage Points should be established along any route through objective Meade that will facilitate the forward movement of the 25th AD. The intent is to provide maximum flexibility for that unit commander as he passes through the Bde zone.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| 7.6 Where should the Bde position its attack to most fully facilitate the passage of the 25th AD into the attack? | 7.8 Each attack formation should establish an initial EPW collection points off the high-speed avenues of approach and to the rear of their advanced units. We should select EPW collection points on terrain that provides cover from direct fire. FM 27-10, The Law of Land Warfare (see FM 27-10) requires us to safeguard prisoners. Provides in-depth discussions. |

| 7.7 How do we ensure that movement of EPWs and refugees does NOT impact adversely on the forward movement of the 25th AD? | 7.9 Per the doctrinal evolution in FM 3-0, Operations, the acts of visualizing, describing, and directing are aspects of leadership common to all commanders. Reviewing the doctrine on visualizing, describing and directing in FM 3-0, Chapter 5, and the graphic (Vis-Des-Dir-Lead-Assess), many elements come together in order to successfully envision the battlefield, from beginning to end. One of the important missions you have as a commander / leader is to ensure you understand how your part of the operation interplays with the rest of the force and their missions. One of the best ways to ensure you have a handle on the operations at hand is to get into a habit of taking time to yourself to think the operation through from beginning to end. Where you cannot visualize some particular aspect, go to your boss and seek his guidance, his vison. |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>8. Consider contingencies and remain flexible.</th>
<th>8.1 Given the intent to develop an assailable flank what opportunities may develop as a consequence of the way the enemy has deployed in the security zone?</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A. Enemy security zone</td>
<td>8.1.1 If we are able to defeat the enemy security zone forces quickly, we may be able to take advantage of apparent defections to penetrate the main defense far enough east to create an assailable defense.</td>
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<tr>
<td>8.2.1 The unidentified tank battalion in the northwest quadrant of the zone is the most immediate threat to our efforts.</td>
<td>8.2.1 The unidentified tank battalion in the northwest quadrant of the zone is the most immediate threat to our efforts.</td>
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## Vignette 6: The Bigger Picture

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<th>Facilitator's Notes</th>
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<td>8.3. We have air and artillery that may be used to interdict the movement of that forces. We may also be able to encourage the Dukarton defectors to move south. This is a move, which may interfere with the movement of that tank battalion.</td>
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<td>8.4. We may need to ask Bega for reinforcing combat power from the Div Rear to reinforce MP's. They will likely come across stay behind elements interspersed with the refugees and potential EPW's (see FM 27-10). As the main effort we should be able to obtain whatever support is necessary.</td>
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Operations affects on contingency planning.
B. Use of all means available.
C. Procedures for handling of bypassed forces or POWs.
FACILITATOR'S NOTES FOR THE THINK LIKE A COMMANDER SCENARIOS

VIGNETTE 7: LOOKING DEEP
## Vignette 7: Looking Deep

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>What do we know?</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>NARRATOR:</strong> You are the brigade recon team commander, conducting flank screen on the east of the brigade sector. Task Force 9-502 began their infiltration across the LD at 2100. At about 2200, the enemy's forward reconnaissance platoons in front of 2&lt;sup&gt;nd&lt;/sup&gt; Brigade began withdrawing to their subsequent prepared positions. The forward recon platoons in front of 1&lt;sup&gt;st&lt;/sup&gt; and 3&lt;sup&gt;rd&lt;/sup&gt; Brigades remained in position. At approximately 2300, division began reporting a thickening of enemy air defense weapon forward of Phase Line Dune. These included SA-13s and 2 S-55s from the remnants of the forward brigades' air defense batteries.</td>
<td>1. Keep focus on mission and higher commander’s intent: A. Enemy C2 affects plan. B. Opportunities. C. Mission completion. D. Options—Branches and Sequels.</td>
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<td>+ Intentionally left blank.</td>
<td>+ FM 3-90.3: The Mounted Brigade Combat Team, is the main source for information on the BRT. + FM 3-0: Operations, is rich with insight into the development and execution of operations that would lead thoughtful soldiers to considering transitions, enemy actions, terrain and therefore branches and sequels as an instrucital part of how we operate. See Chapter Five, FM 3-0 particularly for the Lead-Assess model and Chapter Six, FM 3-0, which includes an important discussion on why we develop contingency plans or branches to our plan. Branches are contingencies or options built into an operational design either to exploit success or counter enemy actions.</td>
<td>1.1. Does the S2 take a firm position on the most likely enemy courses of action? 1.2. Our order is to conduct a Zone recon, would an area recon be more appropriate? 1.3. How large of an area zone can we cover? 1.4. Can we still complete our screening responsibilities? 1.5. When and how is the BRT going to hand over that mission? 1.6. What do we need to provide the S2E Commander?</td>
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<tr>
<td>+ Intentionally left blank.</td>
<td>1.1.1. No. The S2 leaves us with two possibilities, counterattack or delay. 1.2.1. FM 3-90.3 Mounted Brigade Combat Team provides definitions of zone and area reconnaissance. Both the MTCD and BRT Organization provide further understanding of the capabilities of a BRT. a. Critical tasks associated with zone and area reconnaissance are— - Determine location and strength of enemy forces. - Reconnoiter terrain for its impacts on the operation. - Locate and determine the extent of contaminated areas. - Locate by bypasses to all natural or manmade obstacles - Classify all bridges, underpasses, overpasses, and culverts. - Conduct route reconnaissance as required. 1.3.1. Each of the ground reconnaissance platoons is capable of— - Conducting a zone reconnaissance 3 to 5 km wide at a rate of 1 kph. - Conduct an area reconnaissance of a 2x2 km area in two hours. - Man six short duration (less than 12 hours) OPs. - Man two long duration (greater than 24 hours) OPs. - Communicate with its headquarters from 10 to 35 km via FM voice. - Communicate with its dismounted OPs and patrols up to 10 km via FM voice. - Operating mounted with an operating range of 300 km. - Infiltrate dismounted at a rate of 1 kph. - Defeating light skinned vehicles with .50 cal, MK19, and AT4. - Man two hastily or one deliberate checkpoints. - Call for fire via Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below (FBCB2) or FM voice. - Sustain itself with Classes III/IV for 48 to 72 hours. - Provide combat lifesaver (CLS) care and limited casualty evacuation (CASEVAC) for wounded personnel.</td>
<td>1.4.1. No. We need to find out who is going to take over that screening mission. 1.5.1. Before the BRT moves to their new location. (See Timing below) 1.6.1. FM 3-90.3, page 4-14 tells us that we need to provide him with information/intelligence about the location and intent of enemy forces.</td>
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<tr>
<td>+ Intentionally left blank.</td>
<td>2. Model a thinking enemy: A. Enemy actions to shape the battle.</td>
<td>2.1. What do the enemy actions to this point indicate? 2.2. What indications are there of a possible enemy</td>
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<tr>
<td>+ Intentionally left blank.</td>
<td>2.1.1. The enemy withdrew the security forces in our zone. It is possible he is gone so to invite us to attack. His intention may be to create an assailable flank. 2.2.1. There are several:</td>
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<tr>
<td><img src="image" alt="" /> <em>The current time is 0230. Your S2 now give you an enemy situation update.</em></td>
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<tr>
<td><img src="image" alt="" /> <strong>S2:</strong> <em>Sir, at around 0100 this morning, the CAR of the 42nd Independent Brigade and the reserve tank battalion of the 9th MID began moving forward as shown.</em></td>
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<td><img src="image" alt="" /> 3. Consider effects of terrain.</td>
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<td>A. Consider terrain from the enemy perspective.</td>
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<td>B. Examine how terrain may afford opportunity.</td>
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<td>C. Consider terrain effects on our operations and COAs.</td>
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<td>D. Use terrain to shape the battlefield.</td>
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<tr>
<td><img src="image" alt="" /> 3.1 What effect may the terrain have on the enemy counterattack?</td>
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<td>3.2 How am I going to transition from my screen position to the zone recon?</td>
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<td>3.3 Where would the main focus of the recon be?</td>
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<td>3.4 What cover and concealment does the terrain offer within the zone?</td>
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<tr>
<td><img src="image" alt="" /> 3.1.1 The terrain, particularly the streams, will tend to force the enemy to the east (Enemy-Friendly-Situation). The 9th MID tank battalion is unlikely to head south along our boundary with 1st Bde simply because crossing Stranger Creek is more difficult there.</td>
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<tr>
<td><img src="image" alt="" /> 3.2.1 You should take the quickest route.</td>
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<tr>
<td><img src="image" alt="" /> 3.3.1 The focus should be on the 9th Tank BN, NW of objective Meade.</td>
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<tr>
<td><img src="image" alt="" /> 3.4.1 The terrain offers marginal cover and concealment.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

a. Movement of air defense assets. 
b. 9th MID tank battalion moving southeast. 
c. Unknown Mech battalion moving southeast. 
d. Two AT batteries taking up positions in the vicinity of OBJ Meade. 
e. Movement of artillery. 

2.3.1 No, the major indicators do not enable us to draw a firm conclusion yet. The enemy may be thickening his security zone or actually contemplating a counterattack. Although, considering the five indicators above, it looks like a possible enemy counterattack. 

2.4.1 There is significant enemy activity in the eastern part of our sector (Enemy-Friendly-Situation). The CAR of 42nd INFR, one UH Mech battalion and two AT batteries are all moving south or southeast toward the eastern part of our sector. 

5.1.1 While enemy intentions are not yet clear, this movement suggests the enemy is trying to secure his eastern flank. It is possible the enemy is trying to create an assailable flank as we move north. 

5.1.1 At a rate of movement of 2 minutes per kilometer, the 9th MID tank battalion will reach OBJ Meade in 30 minutes (Enemy-Friendly-Situation). The 6-502 moving at the rate of 4 Kilometers per hour will arrive 30 minutes later. 

...
### Vignette 7: Looking Deep

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**The lead tank battalion has been moving down Strange Creek under terrain shielding and good coverage by air defense, smoke and radar jamming.**

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**We have only had sporadic pickup of their movement, but believe they are currently in the position shown, heading east-southeast. Simultaneous with the movement of these units, an unidentified battalion-sized unit of BMPs and tanks began moving southeast from the vicinity of Phase Line Kansas. They are accompanied on their west flank by an anti-tank company of ATGM Launcher vehicles. We believe that these are units put together from the remnants of 9 MID units that were previously destroyed.*

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**4. Use all assets available:**

A. Consider all elements' systems.

**4.1 What assets do we have that are not presently assigned to the Bde that we could use to track or interdict the movement of the lead MID tank battalion?**

**4.2 Does the BRT have sufficient assets to carry out the mission?**

**4.3 What other assets does the Bde have?**

**4.4 What support will the BRT need from the Brigade in order to accomplish this mission?**

4.1.1 Since we are the Division main effort, we can call on Division resources. Division has far better resources for tracking the tank battalion (Enemy-Friendly-Situation) than Bde does. For example: Air Cavalry and SIGINT both can assist in tracking. The Division also has a JSTARS Ground Station Module (GSM) that could enable real-time tracking.

4.2.1 No. The zone is too large for the BRT to handle.

4.3.1 Look at 4.1.1. Reference 4-13 to 4-19.

4.4.1 CASEEVAC, Re-supply, link up points with frontline units, commo (bears)

**5. Consider timing:**

A. Friendly Timing.

B. Enemy Timing.

C. Movement in

**5.1 If the enemy is planning to counterattack 6-502, how long will it take him to get to OJ Meade?**

**5.1.1 At a rate of 2 minutes per kilometer the lead tank battalion can reach OJ Meade (Enemy-Friendly-Situation) in 30 minutes. If the UI Mech battalion spotted 11 kilometers north of OJ Meade turned due south, it could reach OJ Meade in 22 minutes.**

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4.1.1 Since we are the Division main effort, we can call on Division resources. Division has far better resources for tracking the tank battalion (Enemy-Friendly-Situation) than Bde does. For example: Air Cavalry and SIGINT both can assist in tracking. The Division also has a JSTARS Ground Station Module (GSM) that could enable real-time tracking.
## Vignette 7: Looking Deep

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<tr>
<td>MID has restored sufficient command and control to take aggressive action.*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>relation to time and space.</td>
<td>5.2 How long will it take for 6-502 to get to OBJ Meade?</td>
<td>5.2.1 If we assume that 6-502 can sustain a rate of movement of 4 kilometers per hour, it will take nearly an hour to OBJ Meade (Enemy-Friendly-Situation).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>At this time, we think that action could either be a coordinated delay against our attack or a counterattack on the east flank of our attack.*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5.3 How long before we have to start the mission (i.e., the zone recon)?</td>
<td>5.2.1 Although not stated, you should assume that you should need to start the mission as soon as possible.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;That ends my briefing, sir.&quot;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5.4 How long will the mission last?</td>
<td>5.4.1 We can expect to be conducting zone recon until we have identified enemy intentions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The time is 0300 hours. The 2nd Brigade commander, through the night battle captain, directs the brigade recon team to conduct zone recon between PL DOLLOR and PH IOWA to identify enemy intentions.</td>
<td>+ Intentionally left blank.</td>
<td>+ Intentionally left blank.</td>
<td>8. See the bigger picture: A. How our fight fits in the big picture and Commander's intent.</td>
<td>8.1.1 The movement of additional combat forces south into our zone may affect the Commander's intent to create an assailable flank within our zone.</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>+ Intentionally left blank.</td>
<td>+ Intentionally left blank.</td>
<td></td>
<td>8.2 Have enemy actions significantly affected the Brigade plan?</td>
<td>8.2.1 Yes, if the 6th MIBR battalion reaches OBJ Meade (Enemy-Friendly-Situation) prior to the 6-502 then the Brigade plan is at risk.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>+ As you consider the vignette, envision and describe the battlefield from the beginning to the end. Emerging doctrine suggests these are aspects of leadership common to all commanders (FM 3-0, Visualize, Describe, Direct, Chapter 5, para 5-7 and Figure 5-1): As part of this process, particular attention is drawn to the following discussion found in para. 5-9: */...Commanders use the factors of METT-TC to assess and visualize the situation, staff estimates and collaborative information sharing.</td>
<td>7. Visualize the battlefield: A. Accurately—realistic space-time forecast.</td>
<td>7.1 What may the enemy intend or what is a consequence of what we see?</td>
<td>7.1.1 The movement to the southeast of the CAR of 42nd MIBR and the UI Mech battalion coupled with the appearance of AT units north and northeast of Meade (Enemy-Friendly-Situation) suggests that the enemy is strengthening his left or eastern flank. He will either protect that flank or create the conditions for a counterattack.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>B. Dynamically—entities change over time.</td>
<td>7.2 Is taking Objective Meade essential no matter what we choose to do?</td>
<td>7.2.1 OBJ Meade is essential to the BDE no matter what we decide. If we shift west, taking and holding Meade protects our flank (Enemy-Friendly-Situation).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>C. Proactively—what can I make enemy do?</td>
<td>7.3 How can we determine if the enemy intends to counterattack from the east?</td>
<td>7.3.1 The continued east movement of the 9th Tank Battalion and associated elements.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| | | | 7.4 How did you envision this battlefield? | 7.4.1 Per the doctrinal evolution in FM 3-0, Operations, the acts of visualizing, describing, and directing are aspects of leadership common to all commanders. Reviewing the doctrine on visualizing, describing and directing in FM 3-0, Chapter 5, and the graphic 'Vis-Des-Cr-Lead: Assess', many elements come together in order to successfully envision...
### Vignette 7: Looking Deep

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**Thinking Framework/Focus Themes**

- Among commanders refine and deepen their situational understanding. Then commanders visualize the operation, describe it within their intent, and direct their subordinates toward mission accomplishment. Depending on echelon, commanders examine various elements of operational design and determine factors that will shape the operations. They direct operations through plans and orders and synchronize the SOK throughout the operations. Throughout, commanders personally apply the leadership element of combat power through their presence and impact.

- The battlefield, from beginning to end, one of the important missions you have as a commander/leader is to ensure you understand how your part of the operation interplays with the rest of the force and their missions. One of the best ways to ensure you have a handle on the operations at hand is to get into a habit of taking time to yourself to think the operation through from beginning to end. Where you cannot visualize some particular aspect, go to your boss and seek his guidance, his vision.

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**Facilitator's Aides**

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**Thinking Framework/Focus Themes**

1. **Consider contingencies and remain flexible:**
   - Show rich contingency planning.

2. **As the BRT Commander, what subsequent missions can we expect to be given?**

   - **Should the Bde order include contingency planning for branches and sequels?**

   - **Several sections in FM 3-90, Tactics, lays out the development of offensive courses of action (e.g., Ch 3, Common Offensive Planning Considerations and Ch 5, Planning an Attack). The manual stipulates that a valid course of action is one that considers and is able to defeat any likely course of action. Our current plan does not include explicit consideration of possible enemy reactions.**

   - **We can expect to return to a screen mission after a period of refurbishment or reconstitution.**
**Vignette 8: Before the Attack**

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<tr>
<td><strong>NARRATOR:</strong></td>
<td>You are the company commander.</td>
<td>1. Keep focus on mission and higher commander’s intent.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. At 1530 on the 20th, the Division Commander received an intelligence briefing. The conclusion of this briefing was that the Dakotans second Mechanized Army was building their defenses near of PL Kansas much faster than we anticipated. His G2 cautioned that every hour of delay in our attack would multiply our casualties suffered. The commander’s directive was:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.1. “I want 1st BDE to execute their counterattack as soon as possible, get them up there.”</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.1.1. What are some of our options to support higher intent?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2. The BDE CDR then initiated a Call with commanders of TF Hawk, Condor, and Eagle. The TF Hawk Commander said his preparations were complete and only needed a 4 hour warning to move out. The TF Condor commander said he could definitely be ready early but that</td>
<td>1.2. Model a thinking enemy:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2.1. X Corps G2 reports the Dakotan 2nd Mech Army is preparing its main defenses more rapidly than we estimated. The Corps CG wants to accelerate the time in order to commit 25th AD prior to the enemy completing his preparations.</td>
<td>1.2. Adjust to enemy actions.</td>
<td>2.1. On what basis has the X Corps Commander determined to accelerate the time of commitment for 25th AD?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2.2. 9th MID forces south of PL Kansas remain a matter of concern, 9th MID and remnants of other units constitute the security zone and the 1st echelon defense for the Dakotans (Enemy Situation). X Corps requires that enemy forces be defeated in order that 25th AD does not have to fight through them to reach the enemy’s main defense.</td>
<td>1.2. Enemy security zone.</td>
<td>2.2. What issue is our sector continues to concern the X Corps and 55th Mech?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2.3. In our zone south of PL Dime there are 14 motorized platoons presently in the security zone (Security Zone Ops). There is also a company sized</td>
<td>1.2. Enemy reinforcing elements.</td>
<td>2.3. What 9th MID formation has the 55th Division stipulated that we must eliminate?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2.4. 9th MID forces south of PL Kansas remain a matter of concern, 9th MID and remnants of other units constitute the security zone and the 1st echelon defense for the Dakotans (Enemy Situation). X Corps requires that enemy forces be defeated in order that 25th AD does not have to fight through them to reach the enemy’s main defense.</td>
<td>1.2. Enemy options.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.3. What is the decision to go early been taken and how does this effect the CORPS Commander’s intent?</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.3.1. We should recommend to CG that a line further north be established as a BHL. PL Dime may be the soundest choice from our point of view.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.4. What additional efforts support will be required to facilitate moving the attack up earlier?</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.4.1. Fundamentally, enemy actions drove this decision. The enemy has been able to prepare his defense more rapidly than anticipated. The Corps CG wants to accelerate the plan to preclude our having to attack more fully developed positions.</td>
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**Notes:**

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### Vignette 8: Before the Attack

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- **Verbal Vignette Information**
  - he would have to decide when with his staff and subordinates. The TF Eagle commander said it would be risky for him to start his attack earlier than planned, he would prefer to move the battle hand off line further south rather than try to coordinate a significant change in timing at this point in time. He added that some elements of the 9th MID might remain a threat to Hawk and Condor if this was done.

- **Orders Data/ “Red Flags”/ Other Vignette Information**

- **Doctrinal Linkages / Discussions (if Any)**
  - 2.4 What 9th MID forces are south of PL Dime now?
  - 2.5 What is their function and how might the enemy’s more rapid preparations affect them?
  - 2.6 What reinforcing forces does 9th MID have that could affect our fight?
  - 2.7 What options might the enemy have that would make our problem more difficult?

- **Thinking Framework / Focus Themes**
  - combined arms reserve on objective Lee and an air defense battery.
  - 2.8.1 The remnants of the 9th MID constitute the security zone of the 2nd Mech Army. Because the enemy is completing preparation quickly the security zone forces could be withdrawn or may delay.
  - 2.8.2 There is an unidentified tank battalion 10 km north of OBU 1, a company sized combined arms reserve and an infantry company in the vicinity of Atchison.
  - 2.8.3 2nd Mech Army has committed the 3rd and 9th MID and 2nd TD in the 1st echelon of their defense. 2nd TD and 10th MID form the main defense. This leaves 22d IMSR uncommitted (RDP-Revision). 42nd IMSR could reinforce 1st echelon, counterattack to maintain the 1st echelon or remain in reserve in support of the main defense. 2nd Mech Army could also push forces south to strengthen the security zone though there are no indicators they are doing this.

- **Facilitator’s Probes**
  - 3.1 Although the BHL has been moved south of PL Iowa we have not been given a limit of advance. How far north should we go?
  - 3.2 How far north must we go to meet the CG’s intent?
  - 3.3 What control measure might we want to consider that we have cleared the enemy as far north as PL Dime?
  - 3.4 Where are some of the logical sites for establishing passage points and passage lanes?
  - 3.5 How far north must we position tube artillery to support battle hand off?
  - 3.6 How do we meet the CG’s intent if we are not able to have the BHL moved north.

- **Facilitator’s Notes**
  - 3.1.1 Obviously to seize OBU’s Lee and Hill we need to advance north of PL Iowa (Enemy-Situation). Since the BHL is a de facto limit of advance we may wish to ask the line be redrawn far enough north to assure the directive to complete destruction of the 9th MID.
  - 3.1.2 The Division CG stipulated that he would deal with enemy units north of Dime while we would be responsible for enemy units south of PL Dime (Guidance). Therefore we must consider reaching Dime and clearing the enemy in zone essential to meeting the CG’s intent.
  - 3.1.3 We may wish to assign objectives that will assure that we destroy identified units north of OBU Lee & Hill. We may also consider coordinating a limit of advance a kilometer or so beyond Dime to assure we have met the Division CG’s guidance (slide OV-0811-2311).
  - 3.1.4 We should choose sites far enough south of PL Iowa to facilitate 25th AD crossing PL Iowa in sound tactical formations. We must also be able to maneuver far enough east enable to 25th AD to have already crossed Stranger Creek before reaching our passage lanes (Transitions and slide Actions-on-transition).
  - 3.1.5 We should position the artillery as close to the BHL as tactically sound (Battle-Handover). If we assume a 15 km range for conventional ammunition we should position within 5 km of the BHL.
  - 3.1.6 We would require attack helicopter support and then would not be able to ensure that the enemy north of PL Iowa was destroyed.
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**Units to support the mission.**

Units to support the mission. During Desert Storm following the breach on 24 February 1991, 1st Infantry Division supported passage of artillery units that had been reinforcing the 110 DIVARTY and escorting them to linkup with units they would support following the passage.

**4. Use all assets available.**

- A. Consider all systems.
- B. How may Division help sustain this effort?

4.4.1 What are some assets from outside the brigade that would enable us to meet the CG’s intent on the accelerated timeline?

4.3 Given what we know about the enemy are there ways to bring all of our assets to bear quickly?

4.4 How else might we use our resources to assure meeting the accelerated time for battle handoff?

4.5.1 What other assets might we seek to support clearing the 9th MID more quickly?

4.6 Given that we are accelerating the timing of the counterattack, might we request from Division the use of scatterable mine fields in support of our shaping fight?

4.4.5 How might we use scatterable mines to support the passage of the 25th AD?

4.4.1.1 If we can get General Support Aviation we could air-assault 6-502 into OJU Meade (Ground-Situation) which will enable them to meet the accelerated timeline (Guidance).

4.2.1 We could adjust our concept of the operation to conduct a frontal attack of the security zone and therefore more quickly overwhelm the enemy.

4.3.1 We may want to have 6-502 and TF 4-61 begin preparing passage lanes during the final assault on Lee and Hill.

4.4.1 We have adequate artillery for the attack as originally planned with 1FA Bn in direct support and a second reinforcing (PA-Tactical-Instructions). Given the new timeline we may wish to ask for additional reinforcing artillery to support rapid destruction of identified enemy forces.

4.4.1.1 The Division Commander has retained release authority for long duration scatterable mine fields. We would have to make the case for an effort using this asset to support our maneuver.

4.4.1.1 Given that we are able to track the movement of the 9th MID Tank Battalion east southeast along Stranger Creek we could use scatterable mines to inhibit that unit’s movement.
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#### 6. Consider timing:

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<tr>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>What drives our ability to LD earlier?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>Does going earlier include any risks?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>What do we want the battlefield to look like in the next hour?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>If we succeed in moving the BHL further north can we achieve all we hope in the time allowed?</td>
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#### 6.1.1 We should at least consider an earlier Mech LD to accommodate the accelerated timeline. A decision to do so rests on the ability of the Mech units to go early, availability of helicopters to air lift 6-502 or we could use 6-502 against the security zone forces and pass our heavy units forward of the 6-502 (Enemy-Situation). |

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<td>6.2.1</td>
<td>There are at least two risk factors associated with an early LD. We have not rehearsed a night attack and we have too little time left to do so. Additionally, 1st BDE may have some trouble protecting our west flank if we increase the tempo and/or go early. 6-502 will also not have time to rehearse a night air assault.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.3.1</td>
<td>We want to have one TF in the correct position to have engaged the unidentified tank battalion that remains in our zone. We want to have control of the routes required to move the 25th AD forward. (No 8in sized units intact in position to interdict that movement). The EFPWs captured on route held on the flanks of those key routes away from the FLOT.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.4.1</td>
<td>Given the distance that 25th AD has to move they can be approaching PL Iowa with their lead elements within three hours. We have enough time to clear south of PL Iowa and can probably get to drome, but we will be pushing it.</td>
</tr>
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<td>6.1.1</td>
<td>If 25th Mech Army decides to commit 42nd MIBR we must know as soon as Division does. Most importantly we need to know how Division will prevent 42nd MIBR from affecting our fight. We need to know also how division intends to &quot;deal with&quot; the tank battalion north of Obj. Lee (Enemy-Situation).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.2.1</td>
<td>This operation depends on how soon we cross the LD and what assets Division assigns us in support. We have more than enough combat power to do the job. The question is how long will it take?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.3.1</td>
<td>If we can LD early with Mech forces we almost certainly can take Lee Hill by 1100, but we need to warn game the situation as it exists now. We may be able to do all that is required by 1100 whether or not we LD early.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.4.1</td>
<td>Yes, if we get sufficient supports to support the armored elements of the 9th MIBR (2nd MA) that are most likely to maneuver or counterattack near or into our zone.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.5.1</td>
<td>The bulk of 2nd MA.</td>
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#### 7. Visualize the battlefield:

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<td>7.1</td>
<td>We don't know how Division intends to do this. We need to ask the CG how he intends to do this and need to track the Division effort to prevent being surprised and maintain the &quot;picture&quot; on the 42nd MIBR.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.2.1</td>
<td>If the 42nd MIBR commits in our zone the Division can certainly interdict, but is unlikely to destroy them.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.3.1</td>
<td>The Division certainly has adequate resources to defeat the 9th MIBR units that remain in zone, but is unlikely to be able to destroy them.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.4.1</td>
<td>The TFs are more likely to enter a series of hasty defensive positions or...</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### 6.1.1 We should at least consider an earlier Mech LD to accommodate the accelerated timeline. A decision to do so rests on the ability of the Mech units to go early, availability of helicopters to air lift 6-502 or we could use 6-502 against the security zone forces and pass our heavy units forward of the 6-502 (Enemy-Situation). |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sub-questions</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6.2.1</td>
<td>There are at least two risk factors associated with an early LD. We have not rehearsed a night attack and we have too little time left to do so. Additionally, 1st BDE may have some trouble protecting our west flank if we increase the tempo and/or go early. 6-502 will also not have time to rehearse a night air assault.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.3.1</td>
<td>We want to have one TF in the correct position to have engaged the unidentified tank battalion that remains in our zone. We want to have control of the routes required to move the 25th AD forward. (No 8in sized units intact in position to interdict that movement). The EFPWs captured on route held on the flanks of those key routes away from the FLOT.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.4.1</td>
<td>Given the distance that 25th AD has to move they can be approaching PL Iowa with their lead elements within three hours. We have enough time to clear south of PL Iowa and can probably get to drome, but we will be pushing it.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### 6.1.1 If 25th Mech Army decides to commit 42nd MIBR we must know as soon as Division does. Most importantly we need to know how Division will prevent 42nd MIBR from affecting our fight. We need to know also how division intends to "deal with" the tank battalion north of Obj. Lee (Enemy-Situation). |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sub-questions</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6.2.1</td>
<td>This operation depends on how soon we cross the LD and what assets Division assigns us in support. We have more than enough combat power to do the job. The question is how long will it take?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.3.1</td>
<td>If we can LD early with Mech forces we almost certainly can take Lee Hill by 1100, but we need to warn game the situation as it exists now. We may be able to do all that is required by 1100 whether or not we LD early.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.4.1</td>
<td>Yes, if we get sufficient supports to support the armored elements of the 9th MIBR (2nd MA) that are most likely to maneuver or counterattack near or into our zone.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.5.1</td>
<td>The bulk of 2nd MA.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### 7. Visualize the battlefield:

- As you consider the vignette, envision and describe the battlefield from the beginning to the end. Emerging doctrine suggests these are aspects of leadership common to all commanders (FM 3-0). Visualize, Describe, Direct. Chapter 5, para 5-7 and Figure 5-1). As part of |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sub-questions</th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>We don't know how Division intends to do this. We need to ask the CG how he intends to do this and need to track the Division effort to prevent being surprised and maintain the &quot;picture&quot; on the 42nd MIBR.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.2.1</td>
<td>If the 42nd MIBR commits in our zone the Division can certainly interdict, but is unlikely to destroy them.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.3.1</td>
<td>The Division certainly has adequate resources to defeat the 9th MIBR units that remain in zone, but is unlikely to be able to destroy them.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.4.1</td>
<td>The TFs are more likely to enter a series of hasty defensive positions or...</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Vignette 8: Before the Attack

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>What do we know?</th>
<th>What do we think we know?</th>
<th>What do we want / need to know?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Facilitator's Aides</strong></td>
<td><strong>Facilitator's Aides</strong></td>
<td><strong>Facilitator’s Notes</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Verbal Vignette Information</strong></td>
<td><strong>Orders Data/ “Red Flags”/ Other Vignette Information</strong></td>
<td><strong>Thinking Framework / Focus Themes</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Doctrinal Linkages / Discussions (If Any)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Facilitator’s Probes</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- This process, particular attention is drawn to the following discussion found in para. 5-6. "...commanders use the factors of METT-TC to assess and visualize the situation. Staff estimates and collaborative information sharing among commanders refine and deepen their situational understanding. Then commanders visualize the operation, describe it within their intent, and direct their subordinates toward mission accomplishment. Depending on echelon, commanders examine various elements of operational design and determine factors that will shape the operations. They direct operations through plans and orders and synchronize the BOS throughout the operations. Throughout, commanders personally apply the leadership element of combat power through their presence and impact."

| G: Proactively—what can I make the enemy do? | 7.3 Will Division be able to “take care” of 9th MD units north of PL Dime? | small level unit meeting engagements than a fully prepared defensive belt. The Bde may require a larger Mech reserve to fully exploit soft spots in the enemy defense. |

#### 7.1 Per doctrinal evolution in FM 3-0, Operations, the acts of visualizing, describing, and directing are aspects of leadership common to all commanders. Reviewing the doctrine on visualizing, describing, and directing in FM 3-0, Chapter 5, and the graphic (Us-Describe-Div Lead-Assess), many elements come together in order to successfully envision the battlefield, from beginning to end. One of the important missions you have as a commander/leader is to ensure you understand how your part of the operation interplays with the rest of the force and their missions. One of the best ways to ensure you have a handle on the operations at hand is to get into a habit of taking time to yourself to think the operation through from beginning to end. Where you cannot visualize some particular aspect, go to your boss and seek his guidance, his vision.

8. Consider contingencies and remain flexible:
   - A. Always plan for contingencies.
   - B. Anticipate changes to our plans driven by enemy activities.

| 8.1 What enemy actions are likely south of PL Iowa for which we should plan contingencies? | 8.3.1 It is possible that enemy will be the Combined Arms Reserve positioned on Objective Lee to counterattack south of PL Iowa probably toward Objective Grant (slide D008-009-1112). We must plan to meet that contingency. |

8.2.1 9th MID has a tank battalion due north of OBJ Lee that can reach OBJ Hill 45 minutes after it begins movement. If they cross PL Dime they are our responsibility.

8.3.1 The Division has accepted responsibility for coping with that tank battalion and all 9th MID forces north of PL Dime. We should coordinate closely with the Division to ensure we are able to track the tank battalion and respond if it should cross PL Dime. We must also be prepared to destroy the tank battalion if it assumes defensive positions in our zone (Transitions and slide Actions-on-Transition).

8.4.1 If 42nd IMIBR is committed south of PL Dime it could pose a threat to the Corps plan. We must be prepared first to defeat them north of OBJS Lee and Hill and then destroy them in order to assure forward passage of 25th AD.

D-8-5
Appendix E

Slides For The Think Like A Commander Scenarios

VIGNETTE 1: TROUBLE IN MCOLLUTH
VIGNETTE 2: SAVE THE SHRINE
VIGNETTE 3: THE RECON FIGHT
VIGNETTE 4: A SHIFT IN FORCES
VIGNETTE 5: THE ATTACK BEGINS
VIGNETTE 6: THE BIGGER PICTURE
VIGNETTE 7: LOOKING DEEP
VIGNETTE 8: BEFORE THE ATTACK
SLIDES FOR THE THINK LIKE A COMMANDER SCENARIOS

VIGNETTE 1: TROUBLE IN MCLUSOTH
Vignette 1, Civilians on the Battlefield

Cdr Moves Forward  Civilians Block TCP  Cdr Returns to TCP

Platoon Leader Briefs Cdr at TCP  Civilians Swarm over TCP  Cdr Confronted by Press

Vignette #1 Current Ground Situation
Full Spectrum Operations

- FM 3-0, Operations (DRAG), Full Spectrum Operations, pg 1-15, para 1-46:
  - "Offensive Operations aim at destroying or defeating an enemy. Their purpose is to impose US will on the enemy for decisive victory.
  - "Defensive Operations defeat an enemy attack, buy time, economize forces, or develop conditions favorable for offensive operations. Defensive operations alone normally cannot achieve a decision. Their purpose is to create conditions for a counterforce that regains the initiative.
  - "Stability Operations promote and protect US interests by influencing the diplomatic, civil and military environments. Regional security is supported by a balanced approach that enhances regional security and economic prosperity simultaneously. Army force presence promotes a stable environment.
  - "Support Operations employ Army forces to assist civil authorities, foreign and domestic, as they prepare for or respond to crises and relieve suffering...."

Army Forces Accomplish Missions by Combining and Executing Four Types of Military Actions:

Offense  Defense  Stability  Support
in Joint, Multinational, and Interagency Operations.

Nature of mission dictates proportion & relationship of the types of military action
Fundamentals of Full Spectrum Operations

Principles of War

Operational Framework
- Defense
- Offense
- Stability
- Support
- Agility
- Depth
- Synchronization
- Versatility
- Power
- Speed
- Mobility
- Accuracy
- Force of Character
- Mass
- Maneuver
- Mobility
- Flexibility
- Duration
- Complete Control
- Focused Effort
- Common Purpose
- Protracted War

METT-TC

- Mission
- Enemy
- Terrain and Weather
- Troops and Support Available
- Time
- Civil Considerations
Battlefield Noncombatants

- **FM 3-0, Operations (DRAG):**
  - The Threat Dimension, page 1-8, para 1-27–
    - "Adversaries will continue to seek every opportunity to gain an advantage over US and Multinational forces... This environment and wide array of Threats presents significant challenges. Army Forces must simultaneously defeat an adversary while protecting noncombatants and the infrastructure on which they depend..."
  - The Land Combat Ops Dimension, pg 1-10, para 1-34–
    - "Scope... Land combat normally entails close encounters and continuous contact with noncombatants. Rules of engagement (ROE) and the disposition of noncombatants reflect this."

- **TRADOC Pamphlet 525-70, Battlefield Visualization Concept, 1 Oct 95:**
  - "Noncombatants are those individuals in the tactical area of interest who are not engaged in active hostilities. These individuals may include refugees, evacuees, prisoners of war, or members of nonmilitary organizations. Their presence, attitudes, physical activities, and requirements can have a significant effect on the outcome of the mission. Sustaining total mission awareness requires that noncombatants be considered in the commander's vision of the battlefield."

- Intelligence
- Maneuver
- Fire Support
- Air Defense
- Mobility/Countermobility/Survivability
- Combat Service Support
- Command and Control
Elements of Combat Power

Maneuver
Firepower
Leadership
Protection
Situational Understanding
Information

Staff Tailoring: Task Force Eagle in Bosnia
(Extract from FM 3-0 DRAG, Operations)

Original Staff

Personal
IG
SJA
PAO
Chaplain
CSM
Surgeon

Chief
G1 G2 G3 G4 G5

Special
ADE
ALO
ADAQ
MP
Signal
**Task Force Eagle in Bosnia**

Army forces combine, sequence, and conduct military operations within complex environments to support national objectives. Beginning in December 1995, Task Force (TF) Eagle deployed to Bosnia to support a NATO unified action under the Dayton Accords. The Army-led task force moved elements from Western Europe into the Balkans by air, rail, and road under severe winter conditions. The force encountered several challenges as it closed into the AO. The area was a former war zone, heavily laden with unexploded munitions and millions of landmines. Armed forces warring factions faced each other along battle lines, where a tenuous cease-fire remained in effect. TF Eagle's AO contained forces under the United Nations (UN) Protection Force, a situation that required extensive information exchange and coordination before mission transfer to the NATO Implementation Force, IFOR.

Adding to the complexity was TF Eagle's multinational composition of 25,000 soldiers representing 11 nations. TF Eagle closed in the theater of operations on 14 February 1996. The credible, overwhelming force coupled with extensive planning, liaison, leadership and discipline overcame language and cultural barriers to move the warring factions into designated garrisons. Within one year, IFOR implemented the military provisions of the Dayton Accords and created conditions for implementation of the accords' civil provisions.
SLIDES FOR THE THINK LIKE A COMMANDER SCENARIOS

VIGNETTE 2: SAVE THE SHRINE
Commanders Guidance

- Initial action is up to YOU
- Joint military response is being arranged  
  BUT will not be ready until mid-morning
- YOU defuse situation until Brigade can get organized
Possible Impact of the Incident

- May divert assets from job #1
- Assets conducting intelligence collection may need to be assigned to determine enemy intent in causing incident
- Forces assigned to regulate movement along various routes may be distracted by appearance of bus convoys en route to Nortonville
- Bus convoys may hinder movements of forces conducting route marches and/or security operations along various routes
- Confusion concerning responsibility for and hand over of convoys between Bde and Div assets may result

The Nature of and Dealing with Crowds

- Crowds are made up of people
  - Mounted in vehicles or on foot
  - Absorb or redirect
  - Let it wear itself down
- Mobility overmatch
  - They may be diverted while mounted in busses by the use of AFVs
  - If on foot, they may swarm near wheeled vehicles BUT will keep distant from combat vehicles, especially those moving
- MASS assets on key crowd objectives in not smaller than platoon sized units
  - Come at crowds from several angles to divert their energies
- Use of AVN assets to track, report crowd movements is critical
  - Integrate combat camera to document
  - Help tell BDE and Div story
Crowd Capabilities

- Crowd Mobility
  - Operational by bus
  - Tactical by foot
- Crowd Tactics
  - Mass near shrine
  - Block movement of Bde units
- Crowd C2
  - Key leaders
  - Phone and FM radio to instruct
  - Motorolas
  - Cell phones
- Crowd Recon
  - Small cars for route recon
  - Ops established to monitor Bde movements
- Crowd Tactics
  - Block Movement using their vehicles
  - Mass in front of vehicles

Visualize, Describe, Direct -- The Lead-Assess Model

FM 3-0, Operations, Chapter 5:

"Visualizing, describing, and directing are aspects of leadership common to all commanders. The fluid nature of operations, technology, and volume of information increase the importance of commanders being able to visualize and describe operations to subordinates and staff. Commanders' perspective and the things they emphasize change with echelon.

- "Operational commanders identify the time, space, resources, purpose and action of land operations and relate them to the JFC's operational design.
- "In contrast, tactical commanders begin with an AO designated, objectives identified, the purpose defined, forces assigned, sustainment allocated, and time available specified."

---

E-13
Options

- Isolate the area
- Interface with local leaders.
- Develop protest routes.

TF Eagle, Bosnia, 1995-1996

Developed TTP for just this kind of problem. Their principles were:

- Isolate
- Dominate
- Mass
- Attack problem at all echelons
SOF, CA, Psyops, Role Capabilities

- These assets can assist the Bde in “defusing” ops
- Providing population security
  - Supervise tactical operations conducted by HN military units to detect, neutralize and destroy threats
  - Isolate agents from civil population
  - Help protect the civil population
- As a subset of Foreign Internal Defense (FID) assets may have trained select HN forces to perform counterterrorist missions
SLIDES FOR THE THINK LIKE A COMMANDER SCENARIOS

VIGNETTE 3: THE RECON FIGHT
Forms of Security Operations

Security operations are conducted to gather information about the enemy and to provide early warning, reaction time, maneuver space, and protection for the main body. Security operations are characterized by reconnaissance to reduce terrain and enemy unknowns, gaining and maintaining contact with the enemy to ensure continuous information flow, and providing early and accurate reporting of information to the protected force. Security missions include screen, guard, cover, and area security missions.

Security Zone Operations
Fundamental Purposes

- Provide early and accurate warning.
- Provide reaction time to maneuver force.
- Orient on the force.
- Perform continuous reconnaissance.
- Maintain contact with the enemy.
**Screen**

The primary purpose of a screen is to provide early warning to the main body. Based on the higher commander's intent and the screen's capabilities, it may also destroy enemy reconnaissance and impede and harass the enemy main body with indirect and/or direct fires. Screen missions are defensive in nature and largely accomplished by establishing a series of OPs and conducting patrols to ensure adequate surveillance of the assigned sector.

(The screen provides the protected force with the least protection of any security mission.)

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**Guard**

A guard force accomplishes all the tasks of a screening force. Additionally, a guard force prevents enemy ground observation of and direct fire against the main body. A guard force reconnoiters, attacks, defends, and delays as necessary to accomplish its mission. A guard force normally operates within the range of main body indirect-fire weapons. The main body commander assigns the guard mission when he expects contact or has an exposed flank that requires greater protection than a screen provides.

(More robust combat effort than a Screen.)
**Cover**

A covering force accomplishes all the tasks of screening and guard forces. Additionally, a covering force operates apart from the main body to develop the situation early and deceives, disorganizes, and destroys enemy forces. Unlike screening or guard forces, a covering force is tactically self-contained and capable of operating independently of the main body.

(More robust than a Guard effort. Assumes major engagement required.)

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**Area Security**

A form of security that includes reconnaissance and security of designated personnel, airfields, unit convoys, facilities, main supply routes, lines of communications, equipment, and critical points. An area security force neutralizes or defeats enemy operations in a specified area. It operates in an area delineated by the headquarters assigning the area security mission. It screens, reconnoiters, attacks, defends, and delays as necessary to accomplish its mission. Area security operations focus on the enemy, the force being protected, or a combination of the two.
Battle Handoff Definition

Battle Handoff is the action of passing responsibility for fires and control of a sector normally along the FLOT. Units in the MBA assign security forces missions to defeat reconnaissance, force premature deployment of attacking units and to disrupt the efforts of those units to sustain the pace of the attack.

Fire Support Coordination Measures

Establishment

All fire support coordinating measures except boundaries are established by the supported maneuver commander on the basis of recommendations by the FSCOORD.

Graphic Portrayal

Once established, coordinating measures are displayed on maps, firing charts, and overlays and are stored in computers. Usually, coordinating measures are labeled at each end of a line or within the graphic, space permitting. Both the graphics and the lettering are in black for all measures.

Boundaries

In various operations, boundaries are used by the maneuver commander to indicate the geographical area for which a particular unit is responsible. They describe a zone of action or sector of responsibility for a maneuver unit. A boundary is the basic fire support coordinating measure. Boundaries are both permissive and restrictive in nature.

- They are restrictive in that no fire support means may deliver fires across a boundary unless the fires are coordinated with the force having responsibility within the boundary or unless a permissive fire support coordinating measure is in effect that would allow firing without further coordination. Fires delivered near boundaries also should be coordinated with the adjacent unit. The primary purpose of a restrictive measure is to safeguard friendly forces.
- They are permissive in that a maneuver commander, unless otherwise restricted, enjoys complete freedom of fire and maneuver within his own boundaries. The primary purpose of a permissive measure is to facilitate the attack of targets.
Fire Support Coordination Measures (cont’d)

Zones of Fire
Zones of fire are assigned to FA and NGF units for the control of fires laterally and in depth to support operations. Lateral limits within which a unit must be able to fire may be designated by azimuths or boundaries. Zones in depth may be designated by minimum or maximum range lines or by forward or rearward extensions of the lateral boundaries of the supported force. The zone of fire for an artillery unit is dictated by the assigned tactical mission. For example, the direct support mission specifies that the zone of fire is the zone of action of the supported maneuver force. Uniform coverage is not a requirement, since the maneuver commander may want to weight certain portions of his zone of action with a fire support means such as artillery.

Permissive Measures
• Coordinated Fire Line (CFL)
• Fire Support Coordination Line (FSCL)
• Free Fire Area (FFA)

Restrictive Measures
• Restrictive Fire Line (RFL)
• Airspace Coordination Area (ACA)
• No Fire Area (NFA)
• Restrictive Fire Area (RFA)

Fire Support Coordination Measures (cont’d)

Permissive Measures
• Coordinated Fire Line (CFL)
A co-ordinated fire line is a line beyond which conventional or improved conventional indirect-fire means (mortars, field artillery, and NGF ships) may fire at any time within the zone of the establishing headquarters without additional coordination. The purpose of the CFL is to expedite the attack of targets beyond it. Usually, the CFL is established by a brigade or a division, but it may be established by a maneuver battalion. It is located as close to the establishing unit as is possible, without interfering with maneuver forces, to open up the area beyond to fire support.

• Fire Support Coordination Line (FSCL)
An FSCL may be established by the corps within its area of operation to support its concept of the operation. It must be coordinated with the appropriate tactical air commander and other supporting elements. The purpose of this permissive fire control measure is to allow the corps and its subordinate and supporting units (such as the Air Force) to expeditiously attack targets of opportunity beyond the FSCL. The attack of targets beyond the FSCL by Army assets should be coordinated with supporting tactical air. This coordination is defined as informing and/or consulting with the supporting tactical air component. However, the inability to effect this coordination does not preclude the attack of targets beyond the FSCL.

• Free Fire Area (FFA)
A free-fire area (FFA) is a specific area into which any weapon system may fire without additional coordination with the establishing headquarters. It is used to expedite fires and to facilitate the jettison of munitions when aircraft are unable to drop them on a target area. Usually, the FFA is established by a division or higher commander.
Fire Support Coordination Measures (cont’d)

Restrictive Measures

- **Restrictive Fire Line (RFL)**
  This is a line established between converging friendly forces (one or both may be moving) that prohibits fires or the effects of fires across the line without coordination with the affected force. The purpose of the line is to prevent interference between the converging friendly forces. It is established by the commander common to the converging forces.

- **Airspace Coordination Area (ACA)**
  The ACA is primarily a coordination effort of TACAIR and indirect fires; therefore, fire support people are the focal planning point. The purpose of the ACA is to allow the simultaneous attack of targets near each other by multiple fire support means, one of which normally is air. For example, tactical aircraft, field artillery, and naval gunfire can attack the same target complex or targets close to one another while operating within the parameters of an established ACA.

- **No Fire Area (NFA)**
  An NFA is an area into which no fires or effects of fires are allowed. Two exceptions are:
  - When establishing headquarters approves fires temporarily within the NFA on a mission-by-mission basis.
  - When an enemy force within the NFA engages a friendly force. The commander may engage the enemy to defend his force.
  The purpose of the NFA is to prohibit fires or their effects in the area. Usually, it is established by a division or corps on identifiable terrain, when possible.

- **Restrictive Fire Area (RFA)**
  An RFA is an area in which specific restrictions are imposed and in which fires that exceed those restrictions will not be delivered without coordination with the establishing headquarters. The purpose of the RFA is to regulate fires into an area according to the stated restrictions. It is established by maneuver battalion or higher echelons of command. On occasion, an RFA may be established by a company operating independently.

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Enemy Avenues of Approach

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E-23
What RECON resources are available?

- At Brigade / Battalion:
  - BRT
  - COLTs
  - TF/TF Scouts
  - Division UAVs

- Other at Division / Corps:
  - Aviation / OH-58s
  - CAV SQDN
  - JSTARS
  - ELINT
  - COMMINT

Visualize, Describe, Direct -- The Lead-Assess Model

FM 3-0, Operations, Chapter 5:

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- “In contrast, tactical commanders begin with an AO designated, objectives identified, the purpose defined, forces assigned, sustainment allocated, and time available specified.”
US ARMY REPORT AND
MESSAGE FORMATS

TABLE OF CONTENTS

FRAGO Format
http://155.217.58.58/cgi-bin/atdl.dll/fm/101-5-2/section2.htm#f050

TITLE: FRAGMENTARY ORDER [FRAGO]
REPORT NUMBER: F050

GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS: Use to send timely changes of existing orders to
subordinate and
supporting commanders while providing notification to higher and adjacent commands.
Send
FLASH precedence O&I or CMD IAW unit SOPs. Reference: FM 101-5.

LINE 1 -- DATE AND TIME ______________________ (DTG)

LINE 2 -- UNIT: ________________________________ (Unit Making Report)

LINE 3 -- FRAGO ORDER NO. ___________________ (Fragmentary Order)

LINE 4 -- REFERENCES ___________________________ (Changes to OPORD
Only)

LINE 5 -- TIME ZONE ____________________________ (Time Zone Used in
FRAGO)

LINE 6 -- SITUATION ____________________________ (Mandatory Include
Changes)

LINE 7 -- MISSION ________________________________ (Mandatory)

LINE 8 -- EXECUTION -- INTENT ___________________ (Optional)
a. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS ____________________ (Changes to OPORD Only)
b. TASKS TO SUB UNITS_______________________ (Changes to OPORD Only)
c. COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS________________ (Changes to OPORD Only)
LINE 9 -- SERVICE SUPPORT ____________________ (With Changes)
LINE 10 -- COMMAND AND SIGNAL________________ (With Changes)
LINE 11 -- ACKNOWLEDGE_______________________ (Mandatory)
LINE 12 -- CDR NAME, RANK___________________ (Commander’s Name and Rank)
LINE 13 -- OFFICIAL__________________________ (Optional)
LINE 14 -- ANNEXES__________________________ (Optional)
LINE 15 -- DISTRIBUTION______________________ (Optional)
LINE 16 -- NARRATIVE________________________ (Free Text for Additional Information Required for Clarification of Report)
LINE 17 -- AUTHENTICATION____________________ (Report Authentication)
SLIDES FOR THE THINK LIKE A COMMANDER SCENARIOS

VIGNETTE 4: A SHIFT IN FORCES
**Enemy-Friendly Dispositions**

**Effects of 2 TD Commitment**

- Places Commander's intent and concept of operations at risk.
- Commander may need to shift forces.
- Our Brigade becomes 2d priority.
- Could expect main effort shift to us.
- Could expect priority of fires.
- Could expect other resources.
FM 3-0, Operations, Chapter 5:

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Visualize
Nature and Design of the Operation
- The nature of the operation
- Resources
- Purpose
- Action

Describe
Time, Space, Purpose & Action
- Decision making
- Shaping operations
- Sustaining operations

Direct
Battlefield Operating Systems
- Intelligence
- Maneuver
- Fire
- Air operations
- Cyberspace
- Electronic warfare
- MSE
- C2

Assess
Line of Operation
- Battle command elements
- Plan and orders
- Preparations
- Execution

E-30
FIELD MANUAL
No. 101-5-2

HEADQUARTERS
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Washington, DC, 29 June 1999

US ARMY REPORT AND
MESSAGE FORMATS

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LINE 8 -- EXECUTION -- INTENT___________________(Optional)
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c. COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS (Changes to OPORD Only)

LINE 9 -- SERVICE SUPPORT (With Changes)

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SLIDES FOR THE THINK LIKE A COMMANDER SCENARIOS

VIGNETTE 5: THE ATTACK BEGINS
Forms of Reconnaissance (FM 17-95)

- Route Reconnaissance
  - A route reconnaissance is a directed effort to obtain detailed information of a specified route and all terrain from which the enemy could influence movement along that route. A route is the prescribed course to be traveled from a specific point of origin to a specific destination. Route reconnaissance may orient on a road or on an axis of advance. This mission is appropriate when a commander wants to use a route. He must first ensure that it is clear of obstacles and enemy and that it will support the proposed forces before he uses it. Route reconnaissance may be performed as a mission itself or as a task during another mission. Route reconnaissance proceeds faster than zone reconnaissance because effort is concentrated along the route and terrain the enemy can use to dominate movement along the route.

Area Security

A form of security that includes reconnaissance and security of designated personnel, airfields, unit convoys, facilities, main supply routes, lines of communications, equipment, and critical points. An area security force neutralizes or defeats enemy operations in a specified area. It operates in an area delineated by the headquarters assigning the area security mission. It screens, reconnaisces, attacks, defends, and delays as necessary to accomplish its mission. Area security operations focus on the enemy, the force being protected, or a combination of the two.
Infiltration Task

- What is an infiltration?
  - "Infiltration is the covert movement of all or part of the attacking force through enemy lines to an objective in the enemy's rear. The division assigns this form of maneuver to forces to support other maneuvers. Divisions themselves seldom infiltrate. An infiltration is a slow operation and requires stealth. Infantry or cavalry company/troop or battalion/squadron units are best suited for infiltration operations. However, small armor or mechanized units may also infiltrate taking advantage of faulty enemy dispositions, gaps created in obstacles, and diversionary attacks." (FM 72-92, Infantry Operations, Chapter 1

Forms of Reconnaissance (FM 17-95)

- Zone Reconnaissance
  - A zone reconnaissance is a directed effort to obtain detailed information concerning all routes, obstacles, terrain, and enemy forces within a zone defined by boundaries. Obstacles also include chemical and radiological contamination. A zone reconnaissance is assigned when the enemy situation is vague or when information concerning cross-country trafficability is desired. The commander, through his intent, may focus the reconnaissance on the enemy, the terrain, or a combination of the two. Additionally, the commander may focus the reconnaissance effort on a specific enemy force such as the enemy's reserve tank brigade. It is appropriate when previous knowledge of the terrain is limited or when combat operations have altered the terrain. The commander assigning the mission needs this information before other forces enter the zone. Zone reconnaissance may be oriented on the main body's zone of action or an axis of advance.
Forms of Reconnaissance (FM 17-95)

• Area Reconnaissance

• An area reconnaissance is a directed effort to obtain detailed information concerning the terrain or enemy activity within a prescribed area. An area reconnaissance is a specialized form of zone reconnaissance. It is assigned to a cavalry unit by the commander under the same circumstances as a zone reconnaissance. The regimental commander may assign an area reconnaissance mission to one of the ground squadrons, the aviation squadron, or task organize an air-ground team to perform the mission. Area reconnaissance proceeds faster than zone reconnaissance since the effort is focused on a specific piece of terrain or enemy force. The squadron or troops may perform area reconnaissance. This mission lends itself to formation of air-ground teams. The squadron may be required to reconnoiter one large area or several smaller ones.

Fire Support Coordination Measures

Establishment
All fire support coordinating measures except boundaries are established by the supported maneuver commander on the basis of recommendations by the FSCOORD.

Graphic Portrayal
Once established, coordinating measures are displayed on maps, firing charts, and overlays and are stored in computers. Usually, coordinating measures are labeled at each end of a line or within the graphic, space permitting. Both the graphics and the lettering are in black for all measures.

Boundaries
In various operations, boundaries are used by the maneuver commander to indicate the geographical area for which a particular unit is responsible. They describe a zone of action or sector of responsibility for a maneuver unit. A boundary is the basic fire support coordinating measure. Boundaries are both permissive and restrictive in nature.

• They are restrictive in that no fire support means may deliver fires across a boundary unless the fires are coordinated with the force having responsibility within the boundary or unless a permissive fire support coordinating measure is in effect that would allow firing without further coordination. Fires delivered near boundaries also should be coordinated with the adjacent unit. The primary purpose of a restrictive measure is to safeguard friendly forces.
• They are permissive in that a maneuver commander, unless otherwise restricted, enjoys complete freedom of fire and maneuver within his own boundaries. The primary purpose of a permissive measure is to facilitate the attack of targets.
Fire Support Coordination Measures (cont’d)

Zones of Fire
Zones of fire are assigned to FA and NGF units for the control of fires laterally and in depth to support operations. Lateral limits within which a unit must be able to fire may be designated by azimuths or boundaries. Zones in depth may be designated by minimum or maximum range lines or by forward or rearward extensions of the lateral boundaries of the supported force. The zone of fire for an artillery unit is dictated by the assigned tactical mission. For example, the direct support mission specifies that the zone of fire is the zone of action of the supported maneuver force. Uniform coverage is not a requirement, since the maneuver commander may want to weight certain portions of his zone of action with a fire support means such as artillery.

Permissive Measures
- Coordinated Fire Line (CFL)
- Fire Support Coordination Line (FSCL)
- Free Fire Area (FFA)

Restrictive Measures
- Restrictive Fire Line (RFL)
- Airspace Coordination Area (ACA)
- No Fire Area (NFA)
- Restrictive Fire Area (RFA)

Fire Support Coordination Measures (cont’d)

Zones of Fire
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- Airspace Coordination Area (ACA)
- No Fire Area (NFA)
- Restrictive Fire Area (RFA)
Fire Support Coordination Measures (cont'd)

Permissive Measures

- **Coordinated Fire Line (CFL)**
  A coordinated fire line is a line beyond which conventional or improved conventional indirect fire means (mortars, field artillery, and NGF ships) may fire at any time within the zone of the establishing headquarters without additional coordination. The purpose of the CFL is to expedite the attack of targets beyond it.
  Usually, the CFL is established by a brigade or a division, but it may be established by a maneuver battalion. It is located as close to the establishing unit as is possible, without interfering with maneuver forces, to open up the area beyond to fire support.

- **Fire Support Coordination Line (FSCL)**
  An FSCL may be established by the corps within its area of operation to support its concept of the operation. It must be coordinated with the appropriate tactical air commander and other supporting elements. The purpose of this permissive fire control measure is to allow the corps and its subordinate and supporting units (such as the Air Force) to expeditiously attack targets of opportunity beyond the FSCL. The attack of targets beyond the FSCL by Army assets should be coordinated with supporting tactical air. This coordination is defined as informing and/or consulting with the supporting tactical air component. However, the inability to effect this coordination does not preclude the attack of targets beyond the FSCL.

- **Free Fire Area (FFA)**
  A free-fire area (FFA) is a specific area into which any weapon system may fire without additional coordination with the establishing headquarters. It is used to expedite fires and to facilitate the jettison of munitions when aircraft are unable to drop them on a target area. Usually, the FFA is established by a division or higher commander.

Fire Support Coordination Measures (cont'd)

Restrictive Measures

- **Restrictive Fire Line (RFL)**
  This is a line established between converging friendly forces (one or both may be moving) that prohibits fires or the effects of fires across the line without coordination with the affected force. The purpose of the line is to prevent interference between the converging friendly forces. It is established by the commander common to the converging forces.

- **Airspace Coordination Area (ACA)**
  The ACA is primarily a coordination effort of TACAIR and indirect fires; therefore, fire support people are the focal planning point. The purpose of the ACA is to allow the simultaneous attack of targets near each other by multiple fire support means, one of which normally is air. For example, tactical aircraft, field artillery, and naval gunfire can attack the same target complex or targets close to one another while operating within the parameters of an established ACA.

- **No Fire Area (NFA)**
  An NFA is an area into which no fires or effects of fires are allowed. Two exceptions are:
  - When establishing headquarters approves fires temporarily within the NFA on a mission-by-mission basis.
  - When an enemy force within the NFA engages a friendly force. The commander may engage the enemy to defend his force.
  The purpose of the NFA is to prohibit fires or their effects in the area. Usually, it is established by a division or corps on identifiable terrain, when possible.

- **Restrictive Fire Area (RFA)**
  An RFA is an area in which specific restrictions are imposed and in which fires that exceed those restrictions will not be delivered without coordination with the establishing headquarters. The purpose of the RFA is to regulate fires into an area according to the stated restrictions. It is established by maneuver battalion or higher echelons of command. On occasion, an RFA may be established by a company operating independently.

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Visualize, Describe, Direct --
The Lead-Assess Model

FM 3-0, Operations, Chapter 5:
"Visualizing, describing, and directing are aspects of leadership common to
all commanders. The fluid nature of
operations, technology, and volume of
information increase the importance
of commanders being able to visualize
and describe operations to
subordinates and staff. Commanders' 
perspective and the things they
emphasize change with echelon.

- "Operational commanders identify
the time, space, resources, purpose and
action of land operations and relate
them to the JFC’s operational design.

- "In contrast, tactical commanders
begin with an AO designated,
objectives identified, the purpose
defined, forces assigned, sustainment
allocated, and time available
specified."
FIELD MANUAL
No. 101-5-2

HEADQUARTERS
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Washington, DC, 29 June 1999

US ARMY REPORT AND
MESSAGE FORMATS

TABLE OF CONTENTS

FRAGO Format
http://155.217.58.58/cgi-bin/atd.dll/fm/101-5-2/section2.htm#f050

TITLE: FRAGMENTARY ORDER [FRAGO]
REPORT NUMBER: F050

GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS: Use to send timely changes of existing orders to
subordinate and
supporting commanders while providing notification to higher and adjacent commands.
Send
FLASH precedence O&I or CMD IAW unit SOPs. Reference: FM 101-5.

LINE 1 -- DATE AND TIME_________________________(DTG)
LINE 2 -- UNIT_________________________(Unit Making Report)
LINE 3 -- FRAGO ORDER NO._________________________(Fragmentary Order)
LINE 4 -- REFERENCES_________________________(Changes to OPORD
Only)
LINE 5 -- TIME ZONE_________________________(Time Zone Used in
FRAGO)
LINE 6 -- SITUATION_________________________(Mandatory Include
Changes)
LINE 7 -- MISSION_________________________(Mandatory)
LINE 8 -- EXECUTION -- INTENT_________________________(Optional)
a. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS  (Changes to OPORD Only)

b. TASKS TO SUB UNITS  (Changes to OPORD Only)

c. COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS  (Changes to OPORD Only)

LINE 9 -- SERVICE SUPPORT  (With Changes)

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SLIDES FOR THE THINK LIKE A COMMANDER SCENARIOS

VIGNETTE 6: THE BIGGER PICTURE
Commander’s Guidance

- Be prepared for possible cease fire in 2 hours
- Attack aggressively
- Be prepared for large numbers of EPW
- Exercise caution
- Be prepared to have PL IOWA as unit of advance

CFL Definition

- **Coordinated Fire Line (CFL)**
  
  A coordinated fire line is a line beyond which conventional or improved conventional indirect-fire means (mortars, field artillery, and NGF ships) may fire at any time within the zone of the establishing headquarters without additional coordination. The purpose of the CFL is to expedite the attack of targets beyond it. Usually, the CFL is established by a brigade or a division, but it may be established by a maneuver battalion. It is located as close to the establishing unit as is possible, without interfering with maneuver forces, to open up the area beyond to fire support.
RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

- Units to ensure all soldiers understand ROE
- All US soldiers to extend maximum respect to CENTRALIAN peoples, customs, cultures, historic places
- Units will identify personnel with DAKOTAN/CENTRALIAN language capabilities
- Property rights will be respected and maneuver damage will be minimized within CENTRALIA. Confiscation of property, without the approval of CENTRALIAN authorities, is forbidden
- Expect up to 3,000 refugees per day moving south once DAKOTAN forces attack south. Expect up to 10,000 refugees per day as enemy forces approach CENTRALIA. CENTRALIAN MILITIA and police forces will attempt to move refugees away from main battle areas. Units should plan for and expect traffic jams, refugees requiring medical attention and in need of food and water.

Visualize, Describe, Direct -- The Lead-Assess Model

FM 3-0, Operations, Chapter 5:

"Visualizing, describing, and directing are aspects of leadership common to all commanders. The fluid nature of operations, technology, and volume of information increase the importance of commanders being able to visualize and describe operations to subordinates and staff. Commanders’ perspective and the things they emphasize change with echelon.

- "Operational commanders identify the time, space, resources, purpose and action of land operations and relate them to the JFC’s operational design.
- "In contrast, tactical commanders begin with an AO designated, objectives identified, the purpose defined, forces assigned, sustainment allocated, and time available specified."
SLIDES FOR THE THINK LIKE A COMMANDER SCENARIOS

VIGNETTE 7: LOOKING DEEP
Area and Zone Reconnaissance

*Area*. An area reconnaissance is a directed effort to obtain detailed information concerning the terrain or threat activity within a prescribed AO. The reconnaissance of the area can be conducted maneuvering elements through the area or establishing observation posts (OP) within or external to the AO. See below for critical tasks associated with an area reconnaissance.

*Zone*. A zone reconnaissance is the directed effort to obtain detailed information concerning all threat forces, routes, obstacles, and terrain within a zone defined by boundaries. A zone reconnaissance is assigned when the situation is vague or when information about cross-country trafficability is desired. It is appropriate when previous knowledge of the terrain is limited or when combat operations have altered the terrain. The reconnaissance may be threat-oriented or terrain oriented. A zone reconnaissance is deliberate, time consuming.
- We have transitioned from Defense to offense so the original PIR established in the OPLAN have been overcome by events.

- Current enemy situation reveals several matters of concern of which the most important are the movement of the 9th MID Tank Battalion and the CAR of the 42 IMIBR.

- Logical PIR for this phase of the operation could be:
  - Will the 9th MID Tank Battalion Attack, Defend or Delay and from where?
  - Will the CAR of the 42nd IMIBR Attack, Defend or Delay and from where?

---

**MTOE**

**BRT**
- HQ PLT 2-0-11
- 1xM1025 (CO)
- 2xM998 (1SG/XO)
- 1xM1097 (TOC)
- 1x5TON (SUPPLY)

**SCT PLT**
- 1-0-17
- 6 x 1025/26

**COLT PLT**
- 1-0-20
- 7 x 1025/26

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BRIGADE RECONNAISSANCE TROOP

- FM 3-90.3, page 4-14. "The primary mission of the BRT is to obtain information for the brigade commander, answering his CCIR. The reconnaissance troop is optimized for performing area reconnaissance and is capable of performing zone reconnaissance missions. Currently, the most effective means of insertion is through ground or air infiltration. It can perform route reconnaissance when reinforced (such as engineers, CA, CI, or human intelligence [HUMINT], combat platforms, UAV, chemical reconnaissance) and under permissive METT-TC conditions. The BRT has limited capability for security operations. The BRT can screen when reinforced with indirect fire support, sensors (GSR, UAV), or other brigade assets. It can be attached to a maneuver task force to assist in performing guard missions. It performs R&S tasks for the brigade if the brigade conducts a cover mission."
Each Platoon is capable of:

- Conducting a zone reconnaissance 3 to 5 km wide at a rate of 1 kph.
- Conduct an area reconnaissance of a 2x2 km area in two hours.
- Man six short duration (less than 12 hours) OPs.
- Man two long duration (greater than 24 hours) OPs.
- Communicate with its headquarters from 10 to 35 km via FM voice.
- Communicate with its dismounted OPs and patrols up to 10 km via FM voice.
- Operating mounted with an operating range of 300 km.
- Infiltrate dismounted at a rate of 1 kph.
- Defeating light skinned vehicles with .50 cal, MK19, and AT4.
- Man two hasty or one deliberate checkpoints.
- Call for fire via Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below (FBCB2) or FM voice.
- Sustain itself with Classes III/IV for 48 to 72 hours.
- Provide combat lifesaver (CLS) care and limited casualty evacuation (CASEVAC) for wounded personnel.

Visualize, Describe, Direct — The Lead-Assess Model

FM 3-0, Operations, Chapter 5:

"Visualizing, describing, and directing are aspects of leadership common to all commanders. The fluid nature of operations, technology, and volume of information increase the importance of commanders being able to visualize and describe operations to subordinates and staff. Commanders’ perspective and the things they emphasize change with echelon.

"Operational commanders identify the time, space, resources, purpose and action of broad operations and relate them in the JFC’s operational design.

"In contrast, tactical commanders begin with an AO designated, objectives identified, the purpose defined, forces assigned, sustainment allocated, and time available specified."

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SLIDES FOR THE THINK LIKE A COMMANDER SCENARIOS

VIGNETTE 8: BEFORE THE ATTACK
Security Zone Operations
Fundamental Purposes

- Provide early and accurate warning.
- Provide reaction time to maneuver force.
- Orient on the force.
- Perform continuous reconnaissance.
- Maintain contact with the enemy.
Battle Handover Line

- Battle Handover Line is a control measure that defines or stipulates the point upon which responsibility for fires and control pass from the stationary force to the moving force.
- Stationary force will continue to provide fire support on call from the moving force.

Guidance

- "DDE will handle anything north of PL DIME".
- "I'm leaving it up to you to CLEAR the enemy south of PL DIME."
- "Just so there's no misunderstanding, this means you must eliminate the threat in your AO and clear the passage lanes by 1100 hours. Establish your coordination points for the passage by 1200 hours."
Guidance

• "DDE will handle anything north of PL DIME”.

• "I’m leaving it up to you to CLEAR the enemy south of PL DIME.”

• "Just so there’s no misunderstanding, this means you must eliminate the threat in your AO and clear the passage lanes by 1100 hours.”"Establish your coordination points for the passage by 1200 hours.”

Fire Support Tactical Missions

The artillery normally is assigned one of four tactical missions to support your operation effectively. It can instantly shift support to a different maneuver organization in a particular battle scenario by using these missions. These tactical missions are listed from the most decentralized to most centralized. They are as follows:

• Direct Support (DS) - an FA unit provides close and continuous fire support to your units. An FA Unit usually is placed in direct support of a specific maneuver brigade.

• Reinforcing - an FA unit augments the fires of another FA unit and yet is almost as responsive to your units as DS artillery. An FA unit can reinforce only one other FA unit.

• General Support Reinforcing (GSR) - a unit furnishes fires for the entire force within its range and reinforces the fires of another FA unit as a second priority.

• General support (GS) - a unit provides fires in support of the entire force within its range capability.
PIR

- We have transitioned from Defense to offense so the original PIR established in the OPLAN have been overcome by events
- Current enemy situation reveals several matters of concern of which the most important are the movement of the 9th MID Tank Battalion and the CAR of the 42 IMIBR
- Logical PIR for this phase of the operation could be:
  - Will the 9th MID Tank Battalion Attack, Defend or Delay and from where?
  - Will the CAR of the 42nd IMIBR Attack, Defend or Delay and from where?

Actions on Transition

- **Actions on Transition include the following:**
  1. Maintain surveillance of the enemy
  2. Establish and Maintain local security
  3. Redeploy fire support as required
  4. Maintain contact with adjacent units as required
  5. Transitions combat support and service support
  6. Consolidate and Reorganize
  7. Assures the transition requirements are understood in the command
Transitions During the Offense

- Commanders may transition during the offense for a number of reasons including: culmination, end of hostilities, or a change of mission.

- In any offensive transition even one produced by the end of hostilities the commander must assume a hasty defensive posture in order to provide for the security of his force and to prepare for defensive operations or transition to post hostility operations.

Visualize, Describe, Direct -- The Lead-Assess Model

FM 3-0, Operations, Chapter 5:

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- "In contrast, tactical commanders begin with an AO designated, objectives identified, the purpose defined, forces assigned, sustainment allocated, and time available specified."
Appendix F

The Think Like A Commander Software Application

This section describes the system requirements recommended to install and use the Think Like A Commander (TLAC) training program. The chart below lists hardware and operating system specifications for optimal TLAC use.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Component</th>
<th>Specification</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Processor</td>
<td>Pentium II 400 MHz</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Memory</td>
<td>128 MB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fixed Disk</td>
<td>500 MB free space</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Video Memory</td>
<td>8 MB VRAM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sound Card</td>
<td>Sound Blaster compatible w/ speakers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Screen Display</td>
<td>1024x768, 16 bit color</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CD-ROM Drive</td>
<td>8x or faster</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Additional Software

The TLAC prototype requires the following additional software:
- Microsoft Media Player 6.4 or higher
- Microsoft Office 2000 (for Instructor Materials and Spell Check)

Operating System Requirements

The TLAC prototype application was developed and tested for Microsoft Windows 98, Windows NT 4.0 with Service Pack 6 or higher and Microsoft Windows 2000. TLAC may have unexpected results if installed on other operating systems. Therefore, the TLAC application should not be installed on Microsoft Windows 3.11, Windows for Workgroups 3.11, Windows ME, Windows NT 3.51, or Windows XP operating systems. Installation instructions are provided in the Installation Procedures section of this document.

Installation Operating System And Devices

Installation Resources:
- Microsoft Windows 98, Windows NT 4.0, or Windows 2000 operation system
- Microsoft Windows Operating System Service Pack
  - Service Pack 6.0 (or higher) or Windows NT 4.0
  - Service Pack XX (or higher) for Windows 98
  - Service Pack XX (or higher) for Windows 2000
- Microsoft Office 2000 Professional Edition CD-ROM and Service Release 2a
- Microsoft Windows Media Player
  - Windows Media Player 6.4 for Windows NT 4.0
- Windows Media Player XXXXX for Windows 98 and Windows 2000
- TLAC 1.0 installation CD-ROM
- TLAC Installation Procedures

**Installation Procedures:**

These procedures assume that an accepted Microsoft Windows operation system and additional required software is already installed on the computer. If the operation system is not installed, you should consult the installation instructions for the operation system you are going to install.

Follow the steps below to install the TLAC software.

**NOTE:** Administrator permissions are required to install TLAC under Windows NT 4.0 and Windows 2000.

Insert the **Think Like A Commander: Captain’s Edition Prototype version 1.0** CD-ROM. The installation process will automatically start after the disk is inserted.

If the installation screen does not appear you can start the installation by selecting **SETUP.EXE** from the TLAC CD-ROM.

1. Select **Run** from the **Start** menu.
2. Select **Browse**.
3. Select the drive with the **TLAC1.01** CD-ROM.
4. Click OK at the Run window.

![Image of Run window]

After the installation program starts, follow the steps below to complete the installation.

1. Click Next on the TLAC Installation Welcome screen.

![Image of Welcome screen]

F-3
2. Select the destination folder from the Choose Destination Location screen. The default location is C:\Program Files\TLAC. Click the Next button.

3. When the Setup Complete screen appears, click Finish to restart your computer.

NOTE: The installation program will put a shortcut to the TLAC training program on the Start menu. To run TLAC, select Start, Programs, Think Like a Commander – Captain’s Edition, and select the Think Like A Commander program.